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Dissociation between Users' Explicit and Implicit Attitudes towards Artificial Intelligence: An Experimental Study

Valentina Fietta, Francesca Zecchinato, Brigida Di Stasi, Mirko Polato, Merylin Monaro

Abstract—The latest developments in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) have given rise to many ethical and socio-economic concerns. Nonetheless, the impact of AI technologies is evident and tangible in our everyday life. This dichotomy leads to mixed feelings towards AI: people recognize the positive impact of AI, but they also show concerns, especially about their privacy and security.

In this paper, we try to understand whether the implicit and explicit attitudes towards AI are coherent. We investigated explicit and implicit attitudes towards AI by combining a self-report measure and an implicit measure, i.e., the Implicit Association Test. We analysed the explicit and implicit responses of 829 participants. Results revealed that while most of the participants explicitly express a positive attitude towards AI, their implicit responses seem to point in the opposite direction. Results also show that, in both the explicit and implicit measures, females show a more negative attitude than males, and people who work in the field of AI are inclined to be positive towards AI.

Index Terms—implicit attitudes, attitudes towards AI, Implicit Association Test, explicit-implicit cognition

I. INTRODUCTION

Broadly speaking, Artificial Intelligence (AI) refers to machine systems that are capable of sophisticated (i.e., intelligent) information processing [1]. Nowadays, Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly part of our daily lives, affecting our society and economy in ways we are often not conscious about [2]. AI systems are widely present as piece of software in computers, mobile phones, and TV applications, to name a few. For example, AI can predict our preferences and future purchases and make suggestions based on our previous choices. AI influences our existence substantially, and further advances in the field of AI have the potential to impact nearly all aspects of society: the job market, transportation, healthcare, education, and national security [1]. Although AI frequently enters the political and technological debates, public opinion has not yet faced discussions on the benefits and risks of using AI in the long-term [1]. Indeed, the assessment of the public's attitudes towards AI has received little attention and, to date, only a few scientific studies have systematically investigated opinions about AI and accounted for those individual factors that implicitly mediate attitudes and user experience towards AI systems and devices [3],

[4]. Extensive knowledge of attitudes and opinions towards AI may increase the acceptance of technology [5], and this is especially relevant in some areas, such as medicine and public health, where AI can bring significant improvements. Currently, it is still unclear whether the worldwide population does have a full understanding of what AI technologies really are and their practical applications [1]. The public opinion concerning AI appears to be mixed: on one hand, people recognize the positive impacts that AI technologies have on their lives and are optimistic about the future use; on the other hand, significant concerns emerge, especially in relation to job loss, privacy and excess of control of AI systems over humans [6]–[9]. Moreover, AI technologies are developing rapidly and people's opinions are influenced by contextual variables [5].

This study, by combining self-report measures and the Implicit Association Test (IAT), aims to investigate people's implicit and explicit attitudes towards AI systems, as compared to human-based activities and services. In line with previous studies and with the evidence that individuals tend to show an implicit preference for what is perceived as similar, as opposed to dissimilar [10], we hypothesize that participants will show more positive attitudes and more trust towards human and human-controlled services, as compared to AI technologies, regardless of their explicitly declared (i.e., self-reported) opinions. Moreover, previous studies [11] demonstrated that demographic characteristics and familiarity with AI play an important role in the attitude towards these technologies. Thus, in this paper it will be investigated how implicit and explicit attitudes towards AI change according to demographic variables (gender, age, education level) and familiarity with the AI field.

Crucially, a systematic evaluation of the level of acceptance, opinions and preferences towards AI by different people and in different sectors, adopting both implicit and explicit measures, can provide a reliable guide to further develop and improve AI technologies and, most importantly, to ameliorate user experience in relation to AI.

II. RELATED WORKS

A. Previous studies on explicit attitudes towards AI.

To date, attitudes towards AI and the level of acceptance of intelligent technologies have been just marginally investigated by the social sciences. Moreover, data have been collected mostly through explicit techniques, like questionnaires and structured interviews.

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In 2019, Zhang and Dafoe conducted an extensive survey addressing the American public's attitudes toward AI and AI governance [1]. The questions included topics such as workplace automation, attitudes regarding international cooperation, the trust of the subjects in AI and its impact in governance. The responses of US people to the survey revealed that many of them looked positively at AI technologies. In particular, the greatest support came from wealthy, educated, male individuals, and from those who had direct experience with AI technologies. However, 82% of the surveyed thought that AI and robots should be carefully managed, due to the possible AI-enhanced cyber-attacks, surveillance, and global manipulation. Crucially, the survey highlighted that a majority of Americans believe that high-level machine intelligence would be harmful to humans [1].

The Special Eurobarometer 460, a survey among all 28 EU countries, detected the attitudes of subjects towards the impact of digitalization and automation in daily life [11]. The results indicated that 75% of the Europeans believed it has a positive impact on the economy, 67% on the quality of life and 64% on society. Again, differences emerged among different demographic groups: men, younger respondents, well-educated, daily Internet users and those with less financial stressors were more positive towards digitalization and robotization. Although having a generally positive view of AI, 72% of the participants believed that robots and AI steal people's jobs and 88% of the respondents agreed that robots and AI are technologies that require careful management. Further, it was found that a greater knowledge of AI increases the positive attitude towards it [11]. Similarly, another study revealed that people who had previous experience with robots showed more positive attitudes when interacting with them than those who had not [12]. It was also found that the cultural background had a significant effect on participants' attitudes towards robots.

In a study investigating opinions of 352 machine learning experts of different nationalities, Grace et al. [7] found that this population predicted that AI would outperform humans in many activities over the next 10 years (such as translating languages, writing high-school essays, driving trucks, working as a surgeon etc.) and that the advances in AI would lead to the automatization of all human jobs in 120 years. A brief questionnaire aimed at assessing experts' opinions related to the future progress in AI revealed that experts expect a 50% chance that higher-level intelligence will be developed by 2040-2050 and 90% chance by 2075 [13]. According to the responders, there would be a 1/3 chance that superintelligence will have a "bad" or "extremely bad" impact for humans. One of the most complex issues concerns the perception of moral responsibility. Some authors suggested that in high stake scenarios people might attribute to AI the same level of causal responsibility and blame as they attribute to humans, and they might expect that both humans and AI can justify their decisions in the same way [14]. Differently, other studies demonstrated that people may not be willing to blame machines for moral harm [15].

Finally, there is evidence suggesting that the current global health crisis may have increased people's acceptance of AI

technologies. For instance, recent empirical studies conducted in the tourism industry showed that, in the presence of the COVID-19 threat, consumers preferred robot-staffed hotels rather than human-staffed ones. Notably, these findings are in contrast with many of the studies conducted before COVID-19, which indicated a preference for human service rather than robot service in hotels and may be mainly due to the health crisis [5].

In the final analysis, the current literature suggests that people have a positive explicit attitude towards AI; however, at the same time, they show concerns about the possible consequence of applying AI for certain purposes and prospect future scenarios where AI technology replaces humans and becomes potentially dangerous for them. Differences in explicit attitudes towards AI emerged according to gender, age, education, and previous experience/work in the field of AI. Attitudes are also influenced by external and cultural factors, which can lead to a rapid change in public opinion.

B. *Implicit attitudes and IAT.*

Our cognition can operate in explicit and implicit modes, with both modes having the potential to influence our behaviour and judgments, although acting through different processes and influenced by different sources of information [16]–[20]. Explicit cognition refers to deliberate processes that require the expenditure of mental effort and are under the individual's conscious control, whereas implicit cognition encompasses more automatic processes that are likely to operate without awareness [17], [18], [21]. Attitudes are also subject to these two mechanisms. They are defined as memory associations between a target object and an evaluation of that object [22]. The stronger the association between the object and its evaluation, the greater the possibility that the evaluation is spontaneously activated in front of the object. Evaluations that come to mind very quickly are called automatic or implicit attitudes, while those needing reflections are referred to as deliberative or explicit attitudes. Consequently, people are mostly aware of their explicit evaluations, but they are not necessarily aware of their implicit evaluations. Previous studies demonstrated that implicit and explicit attitudes do not always coincide: the explicit attitude towards a target object can be negative whereas the implicit attitude is positive or vice versa [23], [24]. This phenomenon is called implicit-explicit discrepancy (IED), or implicit ambivalence towards the attitude object. In these circumstances the subject is aware of his positive but not of his negative reaction to the object (or vice versa) or is aware of having both positive and negative reactions but denies that one reaction is valid or believes it derives from an external source (e.g., from social media).

Different models have been proposed to explain IED [25], [26]. The Associative Propositional Evaluation Model (APE) assumes that there are two different systems by which attitudes are formed: i) a slow system, responsible for implicit attitudes, which are shaped through the repeated pairings between an object and the related evaluations; ii) a fast system, responsible for forming explicit attitudes, which operates by cognitive processes of higher level and is affected by explicit processing

goals [25]. Thus, explicit attitudes can change quickly in response to new information, but the old implicit attitude can also remain in memory and influence subsequent behaviours [27], [28]. According to the meta-cognitive model (MCM), this results in dissonance; indeed, old and new attitudes can interact producing evaluative responses consistent with a state of implicit ambivalence [36]. Prior research has also demonstrated that the magnitude of IED (large vs small IED) plays an important role in processing new information related to the target object: the greater the discrepancy between implicit and explicit attitude, the greater the scrutiny of information [29]. People with a low explicit and a high implicit prejudice towards a target object, or vice versa, seem to process new information carefully with the attempt to reduce the discomfort deriving from ambivalence and dissonance [29].

The differences between explicit and implicit cognitions implicate that their measurement requires different methods and tools. Indeed, while explicit cognition, presuming accurate introspection, can be assessed using direct and self-report measures (e.g., questionnaires), the investigation of implicit cognitions requires indirect measures, which allow the concealment of what is being assessed and the elicitation of an automatic (i.e., not consciously controlled) response from the examinee [17]. This characteristic makes implicit measures particularly important, providing the opportunity to overcome key limitations of self-report measures, such as social desirability biases or lack of awareness [17].

A prominent and widespread tool for the measure of implicit cognitions is represented by the Implicit Association Test (IAT), a tool developed and validated to detect the strength of the automatic association between concepts [30], [31]. The classical IAT consists in a computer-based task in which participants are asked to classify visual stimuli (e.g., words or images) using two keyboard keys, while their reaction times are recorded [30]. The instrument builds on the assumption that it is easier, hence faster, to use the same response key for items belonging to mentally associated categories than for items belonging to non-associated categories. The IAT has been mainly adopted to investigate attitudes (i.e., favourable or unfavourable dispositions) towards social groups, for example related to race and ethnicity [30]. To this regard, several experimental studies have highlighted discrepancies between explicit and implicit attitudes, suggesting that the IAT can resist self-presentational forces that mask personally or socially undesirable associations, including gender and racial stereotypes and stigma, thus allowing the emergence of those associations that the individual does not wish to openly disclose [30], [32].

The IAT has found numerous applications, such as in the fields of clinical and forensic psychology, consumer research and neuromarketing [33]–[36]. For instance, consumer research applies the study of cognition and implicit preferences through the IAT to make targeted advertising and product placement more effective [37]. To date, implicit measures such as the IAT have been adopted to assess individuals’ attitudes towards a specific category of AI, namely robots. Sanders et al. employed an IAT to study whether there is an attitude difference towards humans and robots [38]. Results showed that participants held more positive implicit associations towards

other humans than robots. A similar finding is also reported in [39] and [40]. Chien et al. also showed that a more positive explicit attitude towards robots is achieved through direct interaction and that older adults tend to have a more negative implicit attitude than younger adults [39]. In this paper, we propose to apply the IAT to investigate individuals’ implicit attitudes towards a more general concept of AI. Indeed, robots are often associated with anthropomorphic characteristics [40], that may affect the implicit human perception per se. Because AI takes different forms and nowadays the interaction of humans with AI takes place mostly through non-robot like agents (e.g., vocal assistants, chatbot), it is interesting to assume a general perspective that is free from the specific peculiarities of one or another form of artificial intelligence.

III. METHOD

Data were collected between December 29th, 2020 and January 6th, 2021. 1139 participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk [28]. They were asked to complete a survey that consisted of two sections: (i) an IAT aimed at gathering the implicit attitudes towards AI, and (ii) a self-report questionnaire to measure explicit attitudes. After cleaning up the dataset, 121 participants were excluded because they completed only the first part of the survey (IAT), while 50 participants were excluded because they did not pass one or more control-check questions intentionally placed in the questionnaire (e.g., “Please select the option B”), revealing an inaccurate response style. 139 participants were excluded because they showed a random response style to the IAT, characterized by extremely low response times. The final dataset involved 829 participants (377 females and 452 males) with an average age of 34.95 years (range 18-77 with $\sigma = 11.75^1$) and a mean of 15.67 years of education ($\sigma = 2.09$ in the range 5-21). Geographically speaking, 457 participants resided in North America, 145 in Asia, 121 in South America, 98 in Europe, 6 in Australia, and 2 in Africa. All subjects gave their informed consent before participating in the data collection and received a compensation of 10 U.S. cents to complete the tasks. Data were collected anonymously. The present research was designed in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki and approved by the ethics committee for psychological research at the University of Padova.

A. Study of implicit attitudes through IAT

We implemented the IAT task through the Qualtrics platform and according to the original procedure proposed by Greenwald [17]. The IAT included 20 stimuli: ten images and ten words. Five images were related to the category ‘humans’ and five images were related to the category ‘AI’. Images represented humans or AI playing actions, and were tied up two by two between categories (i.e., drone for pizza delivery vs. delivery boy, driverless car vs. human car driver, war drone vs. soldier, vocal assistant vs. human operator, automated production line vs. human production line). Note that we chose five scenarios where the AI is easily representable with images,

¹ σ indicates the standard deviation.

as some AI products are integrated with other tools and, thus, difficult to be depicted. The ‘humans’ images were balanced for gender (the delivery boy and the soldier were men, the human operator and the car driver were women, while in the human production line there were both men and women). As regards words, 5 words belonged to the category ‘good’, so they were positive words (i.e., Lovely, Delight, Joyful, Spectacular, Cheer) and 5 were negative words (i.e., Nasty, Bothersome, Pain, Horrible, Hurtful). The IAT consisted of 7 blocks, with 20 or 40 trials each [17]. Blocks 4 and 7 were the critical ones (those we analyzed) with 40 trials each, while the others were training blocks with 20 trials each. Training blocks are designed to allow the participants to get familiar with the tasks. The structure of the IAT is reported in Figure 1. In the first block (20 stimuli) participants were asked to classify images according to one of the two categories (‘humans’ vs. ‘AI’) placed respectively in the upper right and upper left corner of the computer screen, pressing one of the two buttons (‘E’ or ‘I’) on the keyboard corresponding to the response labels. In the second block (20 stimuli), subjects had to classify words according to one of the two categories (‘good’ vs. ‘bad’). The third block (20 stimuli) required participants to classify both images and words (‘humans’/‘good’ and ‘AI’/‘bad’). The same task was repeated in block four (40 stimuli), which was the one we analyzed. In the fifth block (20 stimuli) we asked participants to classify just words but, differently from the second block, the category labels were reversed in their positions (‘bad’ vs. ‘good’). The sixth block (20 stimuli) required, again, to classify both images and words, but the four categories were paired differently with respect to the third block (‘humans’/‘bad’ and ‘AI’/‘good’). Finally, the seventh block (40 stimuli) was the same as for block six, but it was the one we analyzed. To avoid effects due to the order of presentations of the blocks (i.e., practice effect [42]) and the positions of the labels, we created four different versions of the IAT, where the two critical blocks were inverted and the position of the labels switched. We randomly administered to each participant one of the four versions reported in Table I.

TABLE I
REPRESENTATION OF THE FOUR VERSIONS OF THE IAT.

		Left label (key E)	Right label (key I)
Version 1	Block 4	humans/good	AI/bad
	Block 7	humans/bad	AI/good
Version 2	Block 4	AI/bad	humans/good
	Block 7	AI/good	humans/bad
Version 3	Block 4	humans/bad	AI/good
	Block 7	humans/good	AI/bad
Version 4	Block 4	AI/good	humans/bad
	Block 7	AI/bad	humans/good

Throughout the entire task, we collected the response time (RT, or the time the participant takes to classify the stimulus) and the number of errors (number of stimuli incorrectly classified) [43]. A participant with an implicit positive attitude towards AI is expected to show faster RTs in the block where ‘AI’ images and ‘good’ words share the same response key. On the contrary, if the participant prefers humans to AI, having a negative implicit attitude towards AI, RTs are expected




Fig. 1. Structure of the 7 blocks of the IAT.

to be faster when ‘AI’ images and ‘bad’ words share the same response key. Average response times to block 4 and 7 of the IAT were used to calculate the d-score [44]. The d-score is obtained by subtracting the average RT for the block associating ‘AI’ and ‘bad’ words from the average RT in the block associating ‘AI’ and ‘good’ words, and then dividing this difference by the inclusive standard deviation of the two blocks. The IAT’s d-score was calculated via *iatgen* online [45]. A positive d-score (> 0.2) indicates a positive attitude towards humans and a negative towards AI. A negative d-score (< -0.2) indicates a preference (positive attitude) for AI over humans. A d-score between -0.2 and 0.2 indicates a neutral attitude both towards AI and humans, with no preferences for one of the two categories. Note that participants showing a 0.1 proportion of too short (< 300 ms) response times

were excluded by ‘iatgen’ [45], as it indicates the subject has responded randomly to the task.

B. Study of explicit attitudes through a self-report questionnaire

The second section consisted of an ad hoc questionnaire that included demographic information (e.g., age, gender, education level, occupation, nationality) and explicit questions regarding attitudes towards AI. Explicit questions required a response on a Likert scale, ranging from 1 to 5. Questions are reported in Appendix VI.

IV. DATA ANALYSIS

Data analysis was conducted with Python using Pandas and Scipy Libraries [46], [47]. The significance threshold of the p -value was set to 0.05. The Pearson’s product-moment correlation (r) [48] was adopted to investigate the association between age and education level and the measures of explicit and implicit attitudes; the point-biserial correlation (r_{pb}) [48] was adopted for dichotomous variables like gender. The one-way independent ANOVA [48] was run to investigate the differences in explicit and implicit attitudes between participants with an occupation outside the AI field, working in the AI field and unemployed subjects. When statistically significant results emerged, the partial eta-squared (η_p^2) was reported as an effect size. The one sample t-test (t) [48] was performed in relation to explicit measures, in order to determine whether the sample’s true mean (μ) statistically differed from the central value of the Likert scale (3 = neutral attitude).

V. RESULTS

A. Implicit attitudes (IAT)

According to the d-score value, we classified participants in three groups: having a positive, negative, or neutral implicit attitude towards AI. The distribution of the three groups is reported in Figure 2. The analysis highlighted that 77.10% of the participants obtained a positive d-score ($d > 0.2$), which indicates a negative implicit attitude towards AI; 6.15% obtained a negative d-score ($d < -0.2$), which means a positive attitude towards AI and 16.75% did not show any preference for humans or AI ($-0.2 < d < 0.2$).

As concerns the relation between implicit attitude (d-score) and demographic variables (gender, age, education level, occupation), it emerged that an older age was associated with a negative attitude towards AI (positive d-score). Similarly, being female was positively correlated with a negative attitude towards AI (positive d-score). An ANOVA revealed that people working in the field of AI compared to participants working out of the AI field (post hoc test: $t=3.620$, $p_{\text{tukey}} = 9.11e^{-4}$) and unemployed participants (post hoc test: $t=5.189$, $p_{\text{tukey}} = 7.98e^{-7}$) had a more positive attitude towards AI (negative d-score). Results are reported in Table II.




Fig. 2. Participants distribution according to their implicit attitude towards AI.

TABLE II
RELATION BETWEEN D-SCORE AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES. (*) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THREE GROUPS WAS TESTED: PARTICIPANTS WORKING IN THE FIELD OF AI (N=216), PARTICIPANTS WORKING OUTSIDE THE AI FIELD (N=415) AND UNEMPLOYED PARTICIPANTS (N=198).

Variable correlated with d-score	r/F	p
Age	$r = 0.131$	$1.63e^{-4}$
Education level	$r = -0.065$	0.061
Gender	$r_{pb} = 0.085$	0.015
‘Do you work in the field of Artificial Intelligence?’ (*)	$F_{(2,826)} = 13.829$	$p = 3.93e^{-4}$ $\eta_p^2 = 0.032$

B. Explicit attitudes

From the analysis of the responses to the explicit questions, it emerged that the sample mean significantly differed from the central value of the Likert scale (3 = neutral attitude). In other words, participants expressed a positive explicit opinion towards AI in all questions. Results of the one sample t-test are reported in Table III.

The most representative question of the explicit attitude was ‘Which is your opinion about Artificial Intelligence?’. According to this question we classified participants into three groups: having a positive, negative, or neutral explicit attitude towards AI. The distribution of the three groups is reported in Figure 3. Just 6.25% of the participants had a negative explicit opinion about AI (responded 1 = very negative or 2 to the Likert scale); 23.40% had a neutral explicit attitude (middle value of the Likert Scale = 3); 70.45% of the participants had a positive explicit attitude (responded 4 or 5 = very positive to the Likert scale).

We tested the correlation between the explicit attitude (measured by the question ‘Which is your opinion about Artificial Intelligence?’) and demographic variables (gender, age, education level, occupation). Results are reported in Table IV. Similarly to what emerged from the analysis of the implicit attitudes, being male was correlated with a positive attitude towards AI. People working in the field of AI showed a more positive explicit attitude compared to participants working outside the AI field (post hoc test: $t = 3.916$, $p_{\text{tukey}} = 2.87e^{-4}$) and unemployed subjects (post hoc test: $t = 2.669$, $p_{\text{tukey}} =$

TABLE III
RESULTS OF THE ONE SAMLE T-TEST FOR EXPLICIT QUESTIONS.

Explicit Question	t	p	Cohen's d
'Which is your opinion about Artificial Intelligence?'	$t_{(828)} = 28.82$	$p < 10e^{-5}$	$d = 4.298$
'How favorable are you to the current use of Artificial Intelligence?'	$t_{(828)} = 24.98$	$p < 10e^{-5}$	$d = 4.127$
'How scared are you of the current use of Artificial Intelligence?'	$t_{(828)} = -4.927$	$p = 1.01e^{-6}$	$d = 2.233$
'What do you think about the impact that Artificial Intelligence currently has on the economy?'	$t_{(828)} = 20.865$	$p < 10e^{-5}$	$d = 4.068$
'What do you think about the impact that Artificial Intelligence currently has on society?'	$t_{(828)} = 16.21$	$p < 10e^{-5}$	$d = 3.674$
'What do you think about the impact that Artificial Intelligence currently has on the quality of human life?'	$t_{(828)} = 20.598$	$p < 10e^{-5}$	$d = 3.82$




Fig. 3. Participants distribution according to their explicit attitude towards AI.

TABLE IV
RELATION BETWEEN AI EXPLICIT OPINION AND DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES. (*) THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THREE GROUPS WAS TESTED: PARTICIPANTS WORKING IN THE FIELD OF AI (N=216), PARTICIPANTS WORKING OUTSIDE THE AI FIELD (N=415) AND UNEMPLOYED PARTICIPANTS (N=198).

Variable correlated with 'Which is your opinion about Artificial Intelligence?'	r/F	p
Age	$r = 0.063$	0.070
Education level	$r = 0.084$	0.016
Gender	$r_{pb} = -0.070$	0.043
'Do you work in the field of Artificial Intelligence?' (*)	$F_{(2,826)} = 7.829$	$p = 4.28e^{-4}$ $\eta_p^2 = 0.019$

0.021). A higher education level was positively correlated to a positive attitude towards AI.

C. Dissociation between Implicit and Explicit attitudes

To investigate the presence of a dissociation between implicit and explicit attitudes, we created a new variable called 'attitude discrepancy' that reflects the discrepancy between the attitude that emerged from the IAT (having a positive, negative, or neutral implicit attitude towards AI) and the attitude that the subject showed according to the explicit question 'Which is your opinion about Artificial Intelligence?' (having a positive, negative, or neutral explicit attitude towards AI). The analysis of the 'attitude discrepancy' revealed that 87% of the participants ($n = 723$) showed a dissociation between explicit and implicit attitude, while only 106 participants maintained

a coherence between the implicit and explicit measure. Figure 4 represents the distribution of the participants according to the direction of the discrepancy of attitude: 704 participants showed a negative direction of discrepancy from explicit to implicit, while just 19 subjects presented a positive direction of discrepancy from explicit to implicit. More in detail, 439 participants with a positive explicit attitude showed a negative implicit attitude; 107 participants with a positive explicit attitude showed a neutral implicit attitude; 158 participants with a neutral explicit attitude showed a negative implicit attitude. Just 3 subjects with a negative explicit attitude showed a positive implicit attitude; 6 participants with a negative explicit attitude showed a neutral implicit attitude; 10 subjects with a neutral explicit attitude showed a positive explicit attitude.




Fig. 4. Number of participants who showed a discrepancy in their attitudes from explicit to implicit.

For each participant, the implicit-explicit discrepancy (IED) has been calculated as the value of the difference between the standardized explicit and implicit measures of the attitude towards AI [29]. A value of zero corresponds to the absence of dissociation between explicit and implicit attitudes. The higher the value of the IED, the greater the dissociation between explicit and implicit attitudes. As concerns the direction of the IED, positive values indicate a positive implicit and negative explicit attitude; negative values indicate a positive explicit and a negative implicit attitude. Figure 5 represents the distribution of the participants according to the value of the implicit-explicit discrepancy. It is worth noting that most of the participants showed a small discrepancy, especially in the direction of explicit negative and implicit positive attitude.

A more consistent discrepancy is observed for those who have a positive explicit and a negative implicit attitude.




Fig. 5. Distribution of the participants according to the value of the IED.

To explore the role of the demographic variables in the dissociation between explicit and implicit attitudes, we correlated the IED with age ($r = 0.108$, $p = 0.002$), education level ($r = -0.100$, $p = 0.004$), and gender ($r_{pb} = 0.096$, $p = 0.006$). Being older, being male and having lower educational level seems to be correlated to with a greater IED discrepancy. As concerns the occupation, the results from the one-way independent ANOVA revealed that the IED of people working in the field of AI is greater than that of people working out of the AI field and unemployed ($F_{(2,826)} = 14.234$, $p = 10e^{-5}$; post hoc test working in AI vs. unemployed: $t = 4.458$, $p_{tukey} = 2.80e^{-5}$; post hoc test working in AI vs. working out AI: $t = -4.927$, $p_{tukey} \leq 10e^{-5}$).

VI. DISCUSSION

Although artificial intelligence is increasingly present in our lives, up to now scientific research has not dealt in depth with issues concerning the attitudes and trust of users towards intelligent technologies. Researchers in the field of AI recognize the necessity of building trust between humans and AI systems, improving the user experience, enhancing interpretability and explainability of AI algorithms, and increasing the transparency of AI methods [49]. However, the knowledge about how humans think about AI is still very poor. Without understanding how the human mind perceives artificial intelligence, it is difficult to build trusted and highly accepted AI systems. The few scientific studies that have investigated the perception and attitudes of people towards AI revealed a very complex scenario, characterized by mixed feelings: people recognize the positive impact of these technologies, and at the same time they show serious concerns about privacy, security, and social-economic issues. This paper contributes to shed light on users' perception of AI, studying the unconscious cognitive mechanisms underlying the attitudes towards a general concept of AI. We have collected and compared both implicit and explicit attitudes towards AI, observing a clear dissociation between them. Indeed, 85% of the participants explicitly declaring to have a positive opinion about AI turned out to have an implicit negative, or at most

neutral, opinion about it, suggesting that the users' attitudes towards technology suffer from unconscious and innate biases. The magnitude of this effect seems to be related to factors like age, education, gender, and familiarity with the AI field. This phenomenon, known as implicit-explicit discrepancy (IED) [23], is well known in psychology, especially in social psychology, where many studies highlighted the existence of implicit biases (stereotypes, prejudices) for certain stigmatized social groups, such as African Americans, homosexual people and women [50], [51].

One possible explanation of the IED phenomenon in relation to attitudes towards AI is the sensitivity of our brain for those stimuli recognized as "different". Indeed, our brain tends to show an implicit preference for what is perceived as similar and familiar, as opposed to dissimilar or unknown [10], [52]. For example, Eyssel et al. [53] investigated how robot characteristics like the voice and the gender influenced the acceptance of the human-robot interaction, finding that the acceptance increased when the gender of the robot and the user were the same and when the robot's voice was similar to that of the human being. In other words, attitudes of the people towards AI seem to pass through unconscious mechanisms, which should be considered when an AI system is built and exploited to improve AI acceptance.

More recently, light has been shed also on the consequences of IED, particularly with respect to the degree of discrepancy shown by a subject. It has been argued that some people may perceive that they have both positive and negative associations towards an object, even if one of the two associations is not endorsed or is felt to be inappropriate or wrong [29]. Thus, the person is motivated to try to control the negative automatic reaction. People with a large IED process new information related to an evaluated object more carefully, probably in the attempt to reduce the discomfort deriving from ambivalence [24]. External pressures can also contribute to amplify the ambivalence and its associated feelings. For example, valuing egalitarianism when people have a large IED in relation to racial bias (high implicit and low explicit prejudice) can contribute to create ambivalence and discomfort. All these mechanisms should be considered when new ways to improve the AI acceptance are proposed or when new AI products are placed on the market. As a concrete example, sponsoring a new technological product as something that the person cannot do without, creating a social status, can generate a conflict in those people who have an implicit negative judgment towards the use of that technology and concerns towards its implications [54], [55]. The unconscious implicit bias towards AI can also lead to more general consequences on society. For instance, a negative implicit attitude towards AI may delay or discourage the introduction of technologies that can improve the quality of life, such as driverless cars (DLC). Even though several analyses have demonstrated that driverless cars may reduce traffic fatalities by up to 94% (human error) [56], it has been shown that the acceptance of DLC decreases as the level of automation increases [57]. Moreover, a negative attitude can induce an unrealistic level of expectation (e.g., DLC must guarantee almost no fatalities) that could indefinitely delay the exposure of DLC on public roadways [58]. It should be also

noted that the consequences of the negative attitudes towards AI may be different according to the different forms of AI.

Another interesting result of this study, which confirms results from previous literature [1], [8] concerns the influence of some demographic variables on AI implicit and explicit attitudes. In both the explicit and implicit measures, females show a more negative attitude towards AI than males. However, when males show an implicit-explicit discrepancy, this has a greater magnitude than females. A role seems to be played also by the familiarity with the AI word, as people working in the field of AI appear to be more positive towards AI, both explicitly and implicitly. Again, when they present an IED, this is greater than the discrepancy showed by people with less familiarity with AI.

As concerns the limitations of this study, one consists of having used just images representing AI products that replace people in their activities. This might have influenced the subjects' attitudes. Thus, future studies should consider this aspect and test implicit attitudes also towards AI products that enhance humans instead of replacing them. Broadly speaking, peoples' attitudes towards AI might be totally different according to the different scenarios in which AI acts and to the different form that AI assumes (e.g., robots vs no-robot like agents). Thus, future studies should be focused on how explicit and implicit attitudes change according to different application scenarios and AI features, including aesthetic form, functionalities, and degree of responsibility in the task. For instance, more IATs might be run to over different contexts.

A second important limitation concerns the fact that the stimuli we used for the 'humans' category include highly gendered roles (e.g., a man soldier). In this way, we did not fully control for the impact of gender. To avoid the impact of gender in the evaluation, future studies should include both genders for all roles.

A third limitation refers to the comparability of the implicit and explicit measures. The measures we chose are consistent with those in previous literature. However, future research should include explicit measures that more closely paralleled the implicit ones. For instance, instead of rating the generic concept of AI, subjects could be asked to rate how good it is to use AI (versus humans) to deliver packages or drive a car, etc., allowing to consider the sum of all the ratings. A standardized and well-established questionnaire about AI acceptance could be useful.

To conclude, research in AI should consider not only explicit opinions but also implicit mechanisms when new AI technologies are designed. Implicit methods could be used to improve trust in AI and its level of acceptance. AI should not be presented to people only through science fictions films that usually describe it as dangerous and out of human control; on the contrary, more space should be given to all the positive current applications of AI, like in the medical field, allowing the user to build solid positive associations with the AI.

The debate on whether it is positive or negative and ethical to improve people's acceptance of AI is open [59]. Some authors argue that helping people overcome the prejudices they have towards AI, by increasing trust in machines, will lead to positive implications for society. A greater acceptance of AI

would imply greater use of it [60] in supporting humans when making important decisions (e.g., medical, financial decisions), improving the quality of life (e.g., nutrition, physical exercise, medical screening) and work [61]–[63]. Other authors have raised their concerns, arguing that indiscriminately favoring the acceptance of AI could lead to devastating consequences for society, especially for technologies whose misuse or abuse might turn, in the long term, to be more deleterious than beneficial [64], [65]. In other words, from an evolutionary perspective an implicit negative attitude, or a bias towards AI technologies, as happens for other domains (e.g., the loss-averse phenomenon) [66] could have a protective value for humans. It follows that in the future, with the increasing spread of AI, a regulation that considers both the risks and the benefits of accepting and trusting AI will become necessary, for example by limiting the user awareness campaigns aimed at increasing their trust in intelligent machines in specific domains (e.g., preventive medicine).

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APPENDIX 1

Self-report questionnaire investigating explicit attitudes.

- 'Which is your opinion about Artificial Intelligence?' (from 1=Very negative to 5=Very positive)
- 'How favorable are you to the current use of Artificial Intelligence?' (from 1=Not at all favorable to 5=Very favorable)
- 'How scared are you of the current use of Artificial Intelligence?' (from 1=Not at all scared to 5=Very scared)
- 'What do you think about the impact that Artificial Intelligence currently has on the economy?' (from 1=Very negative to 5=Very positive)
- 'What do you think about the impact that Artificial Intelligence currently has on society?' (from 1=Very negative to 5=Very positive)
- 'What do you think about the impact that Artificial Intelligence currently has on the quality of human life?' (from 1=Very negative to 5=Very positive).