

PHD DISSERTATIONS OF NORTHWESTERN ITALIAN
PHILOSOPHY CONSORTIUM — FINO

Intentionalism's Ontological Reduction Critiqued Via Tim
Crane's View of Pain's Painfulness.

Zenen Peder Kristensen

25-JUNE-2020

Examination Committee: Prof. Giovanni Leghissa, Prof. Alessandro Salice &
Prof. Saulius Geniusas.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	p. 3
THE PROBLEM: INTENTIONALISM'S ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTION OF QUALITATIVE MENTAL STATES TO INTENTIONALITY	
CHAPTER 1	p.23
THE PAINFULNESS IN QUESTION	
CHAPTER 2	p.41
TIM CRANE'S VIEW OF INTENTIONALITY FOR HIS MENTAL STATES	
CHAPTER 3	p.49
EXPOSITION: WHAT PAINFULNESS IS DESCRIBED AS BY CRANE'S INTENTIONALISM	
CHAPTER 4	p.64
REBUTTING CRANE'S STRONG INTENTIONALISM'S DEFINITION OF PHENOMENAL CHARACTER	
CHAPTER 5	p. 86
HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENAL CHARACTER	
CHAPTER 6	p. 112
THE INVESTIGATION'S VIEW OF THE PHENOMENAL CHARACTER OF PAIN'S PAINFULNESS	
CHAPTER 7	p. 136
THE METAPHYSICAL COMPARISON	
CHAPTER 8	p.149
CONCLUSION	

INTRODUCTION

THE PROBLEM: INTENTIONALISM'S ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTION OF QUALITATIVE MENTAL STATES TO INTENTIONALITY.

INTRODUCTION

Ontological reduction has been pursued vigorously in the philosophy of mind at least since Gilbert K. Ryle in the early 20th century, remarked that a belief in an immaterial soul was equal to believing in a 'ghost in a machine'.¹ Ghosts, under the prevailing zeitgeist of philosophical naturalism were regarded with incredulity and quickly equated with erroneous, cultural

¹ This phrase is used by Ryle throughout his 1945 *Concept of Mind* (London, Routledge (2009) edition) to denote what he sees as an erroneous view of the human person, engendered by alleged Cartesian category mistakes. It is introduced here: ". . . My destructive purpose is to show that a family of radical category-mistakes is the source of the double-life theory. The representation of a person as a ghost mysteriously ensconced in a machine derives from this argument." p.8. The 'double life' in the immediate context of the quote is, according to Ryle, to hold that phrases like 'the average man' actually refer to an object in the same sense that 'Ali' refers to my particular neighbor next door.

superstitions or versions thereof. Similarly, the mind as a synonym for—or part of—the human soul was variously sought to be ontologically reduced to the brain and / or the body.

1. TYPE IDENTITY THEORY

The first major attempt at ontological reduction was the Type Identity Theory.² Here, a given mental-state, e.g. bodily pain, etc. was said to be identical to activity of a particular set of neural activity, e.g. the ‘firing’ of C-fibers, etc. This was largely defeated by Hillary Putnam while laying the foundation for his view with his multiple-realizability argument.³ In his foundation Putnam launches a counter example to the identity of human pain to something in their brain by pointing out that an octopus experiences pain—yet—its brain has a very different structure. Putnam uses the power of an a posteriori counter-example within the almost Aristotelian act of definition-making to cease the flouting of academic, philosophic conversation about Type Identity theory.

2.FUNCTIONALISM

² For early, major proponents, largely contemporaries of Ryle, see H. Feigl, H., "The 'Mental' and the 'Physical'," in Feigl, H., Scriven, M. and Maxwell, G. (eds.) *Concepts, Theories and the Mind-Body Problem*, Minneapolis, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science (1958), Vol. 2; U.T. Place, "Is Consciousness a Brain Process?," *British Journal of Psychology*, (1956) : 47, 44-50; J.J.C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes," *Philosophical Review*, 68 (1959) : 141-156. Putnam would later respond to Type Identity in the form of its latter proponent D.M Armstrong's *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*, London, Routledge (1968).

³ Hilary, Putnam, "The Nature of Mental States," In W.H. Capitan & D.D. Merrill (eds.), *Art, Mind, and Religion*. Pittsburgh University Press (1967).

The second significant foray into ontological reduction of the mind to the brain was where Modern, Analytic Philosophy of Mind sought to avoid the pressure to the ‘middle term’—the specified brain state—of Type Identity Theory, with versions of Functionalism.⁴ Functionalism relaxes this pressure, placing burden upon the ‘initial’ term of environmental input, and the ‘final term’ of behavioral output. Between this input and output, is the ‘middle term’ of a brain state which fulfills the ‘function’. This functional brain state may have mental properties supervene upon it or some species of reductive exemplification where the mental, supervening ‘top’ is nothing above or beyond its causal ‘base’. Whereas Putnam’s a posteriori counter-example ended widespread academic interest in Type Identity Theory, it would be a thought experiment that would largely spell the end for Functionalism - Ned Block’s 1978 ‘Chinese Nation’.⁵ Using bodily pain again, the ‘Chinese Nation’ thought experiment makes the initial, middle and final term of the ‘China brain’ completely out of people. Imagining that an initial group receive the message for pain, pass it on to the medial group; and the middle group in turn pass it on to the final term, or ‘output’ group, e.g. they scream or collectively wince, etc. Block asks, how

⁴ There are numerous varieties of functionalism motivated by philosophical naturalism. A useful overview of Functionalism can be found in Daniel Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson, *Philosophy of Mind and Cognition* (2007). Sydney Shoemaker, *Identity, Cause, and Mind*, Cambridge (1984), Cambridge University Press, is also a quality introduction. Jaegwon Kim, *Mind in a Physical World*, Cambridge, MA: Bradford (1998) is an exceptionally clear version of Functionalism also useful as an introduction. Both Putnam (1967) and Jeffery Fodor Fodor, J. 1974. “Special Sciences (or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis),” *Synthese* 28: 97—115 were notable proponents.

⁵ Ned Block, “Troubles with Functionalism”, *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 9: (1978) : 261 - 325; p.279 (belonging to section 1.2 of the paper). Similar objections were raised by Thomas Nagel, “What Is It like to Be a Bat?” *The Philosophical Review* 83; (1974): 435–50, John Searle, “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 3; (1980): 417–24, and Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” *The Philosophical Quarterly* 32; (1982): 127–36.

reasonable is it to think that the middle group of people are in pain in virtue of simply being the middle term? The consensus has been negative.

3. INTENTIONALISM

It is within this progression of ontological reductionism in Modern, Philosophy of Mind that a contemporary attempt of ontological reduction is particularly germane to Theoretical Philosophy - a reduction to Intentionality. What has come to be called 'Intentionalism' in Analytic Philosophy of Mind, is a rather barren view of the mind.⁶ Whereas non-reductivists are confronted with a baroque, colorful, qualitative-filled inner world of emotions and sensations to say the least, Intentionalists generally divide this inner world into a spartan two: mental-states of awareness-only and intentional objects which are identified with the body. In keeping with the Analytic example of pain, Intentionalists divide the state of affairs of bodily pain into two items: the the mental-state of awareness, and the bodily tissue damage, etc. as object.

(i). Mental-state of awareness (sometimes referred to as 'pain')

|

Intending

⁶ For Intentionalism, sample major works are Fred Dretske, *Naturalizing the Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1995); William Lycan, *Consciousness and Experience*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1996); and Michael Tye, *Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1995); *Consciousness, Color, and Content*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2000). Minor voices within Intentionalism who may display nuances, are not limited to, but are represented by: David Bain, "Intentionalism and Pain," *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 53(213), (2003): 502–523; Alex Byrne, "Intentionalism defended," *The Philosophical Review*, 110(2), (2001): 199–240; Tim Crane, *Elements of Mind*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2001); Gilbert Harman, "The intrinsic quality of experience." *Philosophical Perspectives*, 4, (1990): 31–52. W.G. Lycan, "The case for phenomenal externalism." *Philosophical Perspectives*, 15, Metaphysics, (2001): 17–35; Michael Thau, *Consciousness and Cognition*, Oxford: Oxford UP, (2002); etc.

|

∨

(ii) Object: the bodily spot that is damaged or irritated.

Intentionalists, motivated by the Transparency of Experience, are against any sense-data view which places the qualitative properties of worldly objects, into the mind as some interior, private theater. Thus for them, the taste and color of a lemon are all qualities of the mind-external object, and not of the mental-state intending them. In this respect, they are laudably proponents of that our experience is of transcendent being, and not some veil of immanent sense-data. This transcendence of the object even extends to bodily sensations for the Intentionalist. Pain, is identified with the intentional object of bodily damage or disturbance. The pain is not in the mind; rather the mind is busily intending the damaged part of the body. This is where the ontological reduction sets in. This time in three places.

Firstly, as just described, bodily pain is reduced to the damaged or irritated body. For these intentionalists, pain just is the damaged body as object. Emphasize here that pain is on the object / content end of the relation to a mental-state.

Secondly, the mental-state of so called 'pain' is generally stripped of any qualitative properties and construed as an 'awareness-only' or, intentionality-only, mental-state, intending the bodily object. Some Intentionalists do add other mysterious 'what it is like' properties, to the mental-state but none of these are meant to cross the immanent sense-data line. If genuine qualitative properties are added to the intentionality-only mental-state than these Intentionalist are classified

as Weak Intentionalists. They are a minority though, and since they are generally not reductionistic, I will not focus on them in this thesis.

Thirdly, this qualitatively bare, intentional mental-state of ‘pain’ is now reduced to some feature of the brain. Here, Fred Dretskey in his Institut Jean Nicod lectures⁷ is seminal. Intentionality, it is argued, can be naturalized just as a speedometer ‘intends’ the speed of the car, so can some structure of our brain intend our world. Rings of a tree and years also are said to stand in this intentional relation. No immaterial mind with its own primary intentionality is needed. Conversation here has centered around the naturalization of these bare intentionality, mental-states.

4. MY ARGUMENT.

It is the qualitative ‘bareness’ of the Second Reduction of Intentionalism which I will focus in upon. If I provide good reason that this reduction should be rejected, then I add to the cumulative case as to why this current installment of ontological reductionism in Analytic Philosophy of Mind, i.e. Intentionalism, should be rejected as depicting reality.

In my view, the Second Reduction of Intentionalism has a strong prima facie counter example in the central Analytic test piece in the discussion of ontological reduction in Philosophy of Mind -

⁷ Published in in the Dretskey (1995) referenced above.

that of pain. The central test piece of pain for the Analytic is a normal, experienced bodily pain like that of stubbing one's toe at night. In Chapter One, I characterize this Analytic pain and define it as descriptively-thin, admitting the very two properties I want to conduct a metaphysical comparison upon: qualitative and presentational. Firstly, it is qualitative in the sense that it has an experiential feel and texture. This I summarize as qualitative properties. Secondly, that the qualitative painfulness of this pain is presented.

The phenomenal character for painfulness of these two properties stand in stark contrast to Intentionalism's barren, intentionality-only view of all mental-states - including their Analytic, descriptively-thin pain. The phenomenal character of Intentionalism's painfulness is devoid of qualitative properties and is not presented. I present the contrast between these competing construals of the phenomenal character of painfulness and subsequently, argue against the ontological reduction of painfulness to the account of the Intentionalists. To do so, I my argument will have two major contours: a thinker I focus in upon and a tool I use upon his reduction of painfulness to intentionality.

5. THE PARTICULAR INTENTIONALIST THINKER

The Intentionalist whom I will focus in upon is Tim Crane, the former Kingsbridge Professor of Philosophy at Cambridge, and the Founding Director for the Institute of Philosophy, University of London. As a significant figure in present Analytic, Philosophy of Mind, has

advocated two central theses. Firstly, that all mental-states are intentional.⁸ This would be still compatible with a non-reductive view of the qualities of the mind, but he endorses the second thesis: that all mental-states are exclusively intentional.

The qualia theory might be considered a version of the view that all mental states are intentional, but one that stops short of intentionalism by holding that there are non-intentional properties which contribute to phenomenal character. Impure intentionalism, by contrast, insists on the determination of the phenomenal character of an experience by its *intentional nature alone*, and therefore implies the rejection of the qualia theory.⁹

Notice the refusal to admit qualia, or qualitative properties, to account for a a mental-state's phenomenal character. Rather according to Crane's, the description of the phenomenal character of a mental-state can be completely captured using only intentionality, i.e the above quoted, “. . . determination of the phenomenal character of an experience by its intentional nature alone . . .”. In this way, Crane is reflective of Intentionalism in endorsing a bare, intentionality-only view of all mental-states.

In keeping with the Analytic, central text case of descriptively-thin pain, Crane will exert considerable attention as to how he reduces this apparently obvious qualitative and presented mental-state to a mental-state with with only intentional properties. He will seek to divide and

⁸ Tim Crane, “Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental,” in *Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Anthony O’Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 229 - 252.

⁹ Tim Crane, “Intentionalism”, *Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind* eds. Beckermann & McLaughlin (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009) 474-93; p. 14 (emphasis *mine*). The same view is put forward by Crane in his “The Intentional Structure of Consciousness,” in *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*, edited by A. Jokic and Q. Smith (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press (2003): 33-56; p. 14 (emphasis *mine*): “. . . A stronger form of intentionalism says that no mental state has any non-intentional mental properties. In §4, I shall argue for strong intentionalism, and against weak intentionalism.” I will expand upon this point in Chapter Two.

conquer. His position is that phenomenal character for bodily sensations is divided into two parts. First, the mental-state, with an intentional mode. It is this mental-state with its intentional mode which produces the second part of the sensation's phenomenal character for Crane - the attributed location. Both are mentioned below as what fixes phenomenal character:

. . . phenomenal character of a state is fixed not just by the content, but by the content and the intentional mode. This is the third view I mentioned at the beginning of this section, and it is the view I want to defend. . . I call this theory the 'perceptual theory', since it treats bodily sensation as a form of perception, . . .¹⁰

Elsewhere, he gives a helpful illustration of intentional mode and content with seeing, vs. hearing an aeroplane:

. . . The phenomenal character of a visual experience of an aeroplane flying overhead is given by giving its content—the aeroplane, its shape and size and so on—and by giving the experience's intentional mode: seeing. The phenomenal difference between seeing an aeroplane overhead and hearing one is partly a matter of the content—what is experienced—but also a matter of the mode of apprehending this content, the intentional mode in Searle's sense.¹¹

Here, seeing and hearing are different ways—or 'modes'—of intending the aeroplane, ie. 'intentional modes'. It is with these two parts that Crane applies it to the phenomenological character of pain.

¹⁰ Crane (2003) p. 50.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 21.

So one is attributing to one's ankle when one says that it hurts is something which has what I called in §2 a relational structure: the content of the sensation is that one's ankle hurts, the object of the sensation is the ankle (apprehended as one's ankle) *and the mode is the hurting*.¹²

Here we have the mental-state of pain, with its content 'that it hurts.' Pain's intentional mode is its painfulness, i.e. ". . . the hurting.". Emphasizing again his division of the phenomenal character of pain, between:

A: the mental-state of pain's intentional mode of painfulness, and;

B: the attributed content 'that it hurts'

Ontological reduction is evident when the painfulness in 'A' is identified with a part of a mental-state, where that same mental-state is exclusively characterized by intentionality. I will label this genus for Crane's intentionality-only mental-states, 'C'.

C: A mental-state, characterized exclusively by intentionality.

The painfulness of pain I will label (PF)

PF: The experienced painfulness of pain.

Thus we now have an ontological reduction of:

PF → C.

¹² Ibid. p. 23.

In abstraction, this reduction does not shout of implausibility. This is where I want to focus in upon each 'PF' and 'C' and argue against this reduction. This is where I move onto the 'tool' I will use to appraise Tim Crane's Intentionalism of pain's painfulness.

6. THE TOOL

The tool I use in criticism of Crane's Intentionalist view of painfulness has two parts: Phenomenal Assay's and Leibniz Law of Identity. Firstly, In keeping with the central Analytic example of pain, will do a *phenomenological assay* of each Crane's intentionality and one part of the phenomenal character of pain, used by Crane - pain's *painfulness*. These assays will construe Crane's intentionality-only mental-states as being composed of only intentional properties. The assay for the painfulness of pain will reveal, the experiential painfulness of a normal bodily pain to be presented qualitative properties.

Secondly, I will use these descriptions in a comparison, where I will judge this attempt at identifying pain's painfulness to an intentional mode of a mental-state exclusively composed by intentional properties. This comparison will roughly, say that if two entities differ in their phenomenological descriptions, then those two entities cannot be identical with each other. In other words: differing descriptions ground non-identity. This is actually Leibniz's Law of Identity in its contrapositive form put to use with Phenomenological descriptions:

Leibniz's Law Identity, contrapositive form:

$$(\forall x)(\forall y)((Fx \ \& \ \neg Fy) \rightarrow \neg(x=y))$$

Traditionally, under Identity, the relation is reflexive, but this is where Ontological Reduction differs - in Modern, ontological reduction the relation is asymmetrical. In an ontological reduction one entity is said to actually, exhaustively consist in another. Take for example heat. Thus, (A) 'heat' really 'is' (B) 'mean molecular motion,' i.e. (A) = (B) - where the '=' is an asymmetrical 'is' of ontological reduction of the (A) to the (B). Ontological reduction can also be combined with explanatory reduction, e.g. the 'mean molecular motion' is offered to explain experienced heat. My sights in this thesis are upon ontological, not explanatory reduction.

7. APPRAISAL OF THE TWO PARTS OF THE TOOL UPON CRANE'S VIEW

With the two, non-identical descriptions of painfulness's phenomenal character: one purely intentional; the other qualitative and presented, I judge with the counter-positive of Leibniz's Law of Identity that the painfulness of a normal, bodily pain experience, e.g. a stubbed toe, etc. cannot be identical to a mental-state composed of only intentional properties. Given the descriptions, A cannot be identical to C. If they cannot be identical, then painfulness cannot be reduced to a mental-state characterized only by intentionality. With this non-identity, Crane's account of ontological reduction is judged implausible. After noting the advancement for the

Philosophy of Mind in my approach, I will outline how I will argue for this conclusion in the structure of my thesis.

8. WHERE THIS THESIS ADVANCES THE CASE AGAINST ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTIONISM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Where this thesis advances the case against ontological reduction in Modern, Analytic Philosophy of Mind in arguing against Tim Crane's view, is in that I do not use purported counter examples or thought experiments. Rather I argue with a principle underemphasized in this discussion, but a principle (endemic) to my Theoretical Philosophy sphere. Leibniz's Law of Identity in its contrapositive form put to use with Phenomenological descriptions. It is true that during its inception, the Type Identity Theory was argued against using the Law of Identity but my approach differs in two respects. Firstly, that this objection was centered upon purported properties of the soul, e.g. non-spatiality, etc. My approach is to use the the Law of Identity's contrapositive against a particular mental-state's, e.g. pain's, identity with an exclusively intentional mental-state. Secondly, I incorporate the use of phenomenal descriptions and their phenomenal character to advance the Law of Identity against the reduction of pain to intentionally. The phenomenological descriptive element and focus upon mental-states are novel in my approach. Buttressing my choice of Intentionalism and Tim Crane are four things.

Firstly, is that my approach basis non-identity upon non-identical descriptions—and—that this is notably a way that Tim Crane does not base non-identity. Rather, Crane rests non-identity primary upon the shoulders of a posteriori counter-examples. Writing of the non-identity of mental-states with physical properties, Crane will appeal to Putnam’s counter-example, and not descriptive non-identity:

. . . There are things that the identity theory can say in response to these points. But I will not pursue them here, since I believe that Putnam’s argument must be accepted. So if the identity theory is false, then mental properties are not identical with physical properties. So mental properties are distinct from physical properties. Therefore property dualism is true after all. There is no way of avoiding this conclusion: if entities are not identical, then they are distinct, however else they may be related. There are two kinds of thing, not one: this is dualism, like it or not.¹³

The ‘if’ here is the contingent discovery of a counter-example. Putnam’s ‘octopus pain’ was the a posteriori discovery of black swans for Crane. My approach will address Crane’s reductionism in the descriptive sphere, not primarily in the a posteriori. Secondly, is that this present chapter in ontological reduction in Philosophy of mind is largely focused upon reducing contents of mind to something rather ‘home turf’ to Theoretical Philosophy - Intentionality. Thirdly, is that the prominent figure in Analytic Philosophy of Mind I have chosen is remarkable in that he is seeking to reduce the prima facie phenomenal character of qualitative and presented painfulness to intentionality. Lastly, justifying my choice of Tim Crane is in that he thinks of his position on pain as a phenomenal thesis and repeatedly claims to let the phenomenology be a guide in

¹³ Crane (2001); p. 56 - 57.

philosophical view construction. For his view as a form of Phenomenology, consider this statement from his early Elements of Mind:¹⁴

We are talking here about the appearance of mind, how minds seem to those who have them. Hence, most of the rest of this book will in a sense be an exercise in *phenomenology*, . . .

Earlier countenancing eliminativists, Crane would write that the nature of the phenomena should be one's guide for how far Philosophical accounts go:¹⁵

As we shall see, the idea of intentionality is in places intractable, and in some places vague. But it is not part of this strategy to claim that all rough ideas can be sharpened to the same degree. *We must let the nature of the phenomena be our guide* to how far to go, and not impose constraining and distorting assumptions upon them.

With the intentionality of all mental-states in view, Crane thinks the phenomenal should continue to guide. Even to the extent of Intentionalism being a “phenomenological thesis”. Consider his 2009 ‘Intentionalism’ article:

But as I see it, its appeal for reductionists is not the main reason for believing in intentionalism. The line of thought developed earlier in this section is a defense of intentionalism as a phenomenological thesis: a thesis about what it is like to be a subject of experience. *As a phenomenological thesis*, intentionalism offers the prospect of a unitary account of states of mind, an account which explains the unity of our concept of mind. Our concept of mind, on this account, essentially involves the concept of a subject's point of view on the world.¹⁶

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 8, *emphasis mine*.

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 3, *emphasis mine*.

¹⁶ Crane (2009) p. 496 - 497.

Interesting, that here, with intentionality, Crane will let the nature of the phenomenal guide. As we'll see with painfulness, he is willing to depart from the phenomenal. But this is not his expressed thought. That Crane will view his endeavor as a phenomenological one or appealing to phenomenological data are as follows. Here is Crane (1998) in the context of whether pain is a mental object or not; he writes:

Mental objects are generally rejected for metaphysical reasons: their criteria of identity are obscure, and it is hard to see how they can be accommodated by a 'naturalistic' world view. However, my concern in this paper is not with metaphysics, but with phenomenology: the correct account of how things seem to us.¹⁷

In Crane (2003) he is dealing with the phenomenal data of pain's location:

The phenomenological facts are as follows. Pains and other sensations are felt to be located in parts of the body. . . . Someone who becomes convinced by the physicalist arguments for identifying sensations with brain states will come to believe that sensations are really located in the brain. But having this belief does not change the apparent location of the sensation in the body.¹⁸

Lastly, in Crane (2009), he says of Strong Intentionalist's view of pain-content as nothing more than bodily damage / disorder:

¹⁷ Crane, 1(998) p. 234 (emphasis mine)

¹⁸ Crane (2003) p. 42 - 43 (emphasis mine)

“But nonetheless it seems to me that the view cannot be correct. The main reason is that it is phenomenologically implausible, and the task we are engaged in here is a phenomenological one.¹⁹

Reading the above, Theoretical Philosophy is confronted with a leading Analytic who sees his Intentionalism regarding pain as some kind of phenomenal thesis and appeals to the phenomenal character of pain. Buttressing that Crane claims and appeals to Phenomenology, is that Crane also claims to draw from Brentano and Husserl in the realm of intentionality: Consider how he roots his argument for intentionality as the mark of the mental:

. . . ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would *ipso facto* cease to exist’. Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena.²⁰

With this appeal to Husserl and Brentano, why not match Crane with what, in Husserl’s view, his descriptively-thin, Analytic phenomenal character of pain’s painfulness would be? I answer in the affirmative and in Chapter Five, sketch a Husserlian account from the Logical Investigations. Thus, critiquing Intentionalism via Tim Crane is justified for his appeal to Phenomenology and its tradition - not failing to mention Intentionality as a central feature for his account. For these reasons, examining Tim Crane’s work on the phenomenal character of pain’s painfulness is an apt choice for judging contemporary ontological reduction in Philosophy of Mind.

¹⁹ Crane (2009) p. 488 (emphasis mine).

²⁰ Crane (1998) : p.229.

9. STRUCTURE OF THIS THESIS

The first port of call, is to make sure Tim Crane and I are on the same page when speaking about the painfulness of experiential, bodily pain. In this chapter I substantiate that we are and I formulate my 'Painfulness Question'. I use this question in identifying what in Crane's view is the phenomenal painfulness of normal, bodily pain identical in what follows.

In Chapter Two, I will present Tim Crane's view of intentionality. It is not very nuanced, and looks back to Brentano / Husserl. For the later metaphysical comparison, Crane's definition of intentionality is important as it will be compared to the definition of painfulness I develop.

In Chapter Three, I substantiate the claim that Crane's Intentionalism holds the phenomenal character of the painfulness of a common bodily pain, e.g a stubbed toe, to be composed of all and only by intentional properties. I do this, revealing his account to hold the phenomenal painfulness of bodily pain to be identical to the intentional mode of his Intentionalist mental state of pain.

In Chapter Four, I present and rebut Crane's Intentionalist definition of phenomenal character as solely 'conscious character.' I exposit his definition and rebut it with a provisional definition of phenomenal character as 'qualitative properties which appear to us'.

In Chapter Five, with this alleged identity of pain's painfulness to an Intentionalist intentional mode in mind, I ask - what is a reasonable, broadly rigorous description of phenomenal character in which to adjudicate this identity? I argue that Crane, via drawing upon Brentano / Husserl and appealing to phenomenal adequacy, is to be met with a a description of phenomenal character informed by Husserl in his Logical Investigations. This is of phenomenal character as abstracted, intuited, properties of a presented object, i.e. AIPPO. With the descriptively-thin, Analytic test-piece of pain in mind, I note that Husserl would endorse with AIPPO that pain's painfulness is presented. This is will be used in the final metaphysical comparison in Chapter Seven.

In Chapter six, expisit the Investigations view of pain and apply the AIPPO phenomenal character to it. This reveals the phenomenal character of pain in the Investigations as abstracted, intuited *qualitative* properties of a presented pain object, i.e. AIQPPPO. This this establishes the phenomenal character of painfulness as qualitative. Together with the presented nature of painfulness, its qualitative nature is crucial to the metaphysical comparison with Crane's view of the phenomenal character of painfulness. This leads us to Chapter Seven.

With each the definitions of the phenomenal character of pain's painfulness in hand, in Chapter Seven I finally conduct a metaphysical comparison for the identity claim exposited between painfulness and Crane's intentional mode exposited in Chapter Two. Using the counter-positive of Leibniz's Law of Identity, I judge that any two phenomenal character descriptions which do not share in even a single property in common cannot be identical to each other. The presented,

qualitative nature of AIQPPPO painfulness is not shared by Crane's intentional mode of 'pain'. Without this identity, the Second Reduction of Intentionalism is counted against..

Lastly, in the Conclusion, I conclude that this non-identity between Crane's account and my Investigations accounts of the painfulness of pain is a good reason to reject Intentionalism's Second Reduction. This in turn transmits a good reason to reject Intentionalism's and its current provision of ontological reduction in Modern, Analytic Philosophy of Mind.

CHAPTER ONE

THE PAINFULNESS IN QUESTION

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I focus in on the view of pain Tim Crane has in play within the context of his ontological reduction of it to a mental-state composed exclusively by intentionality. This is important for it is the phenomenal character of the painfulness of his view of pain I will be assaying and using in a metaphysical comparison in Chapter Seven. Issues surrounding Crane's Analytic view of pain in contrast to the Phenomenological tradition are addressed.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

In this chapter I display and unpack the Analytic central test case of pain Tim Crane uses. I argue in support of this definition's distinct-ness as a sensation from an emotion. I make a distinction between descriptively-thick versus descriptively-thin definitions for pain. I argue that the

Analytic central test-piece of pain is a descriptively-thin definition. I advocate where this Analytic descriptively-thin pain is appropriate and sufficient for later metaphysical comparison I conduct. This is in contrast to possible other descriptively-thick accounts of pain. Explicitly defining Crane's descriptively-thin analytic definition of pain is important for he has penchant for re-describing pain phenomena. This is amidst his insistence upon the importance of phenomenology as presented in my Introduction. Two instances of his redescription are presented and argued against after presenting his descriptively-thin Analytic test-case of pain and defending my focus upon it.

1. WHAT VERSION OF PAIN I WILL BE USING

As stated in the Introduction, the target of this thesis is ontological reduction in Analytic, Philosophy of Mind. Within Analytic Philosophy of Mind, bodily pain is simply used as a central test piece in adjudicating reduction. The Analytic text piece of pain in this context is a *descriptively-thin* object. In this sense the Analytics have in view a normal, experiential bodily sensation. It is within this tradition that Tim Crane—being an Analytic—is arguing for his view. In his *Elements of Mind*,²¹ and *The Mechanical Mind*,²² Crane is in dialogue with each of the figures for the three movements of ontological reduction mentioned in the Analytic Tradition. Since I emphasize Crane's (2003) "The Intentional Structure of Consciousness", it is useful to

²¹ Crane (2001).

²² Crane, *The Mechanical Mind: A philosophical introduction to minds, machines and mental representation*, (2nd ed.); London, New York; Routledge (2003).

show how he likewise uses this descriptively-thin, Analytic test piece of a normal, bodily pain sensation. His text is as follows:

Pains and other sensations are felt to be located in parts of the body. To attend to a sensation is to attend to the (apparent) part or region of the body where the sensation is felt to be.²³

Here, the pain, is a bodily sensation. He emphasizes that it is ‘felt’. By this I read that it is an experience. A footnote to this portion of text, Crane makes clear that he has a normal, bodily pain in view, like the stubbing of one’s toe. Consider:

I mean to describe normal experience; of course there are many interesting borderline cases (e.g. referred pain; and so-called ‘deep pain’, apparently unlocatable by the subject) and many pathological cases that are hard to describe adequately. The extent to which we find these cases unintelligible tracks the extent to which they depart from the normal case of localizable sensation.²⁴

With this note, Crane makes clear that he is keeping with the descriptively-thin Analytic test piece of a normal, bodily pain sensation, i.e. experience. This Analytic Test Piece of Pain is summarized:

The Central Analytic Descriptively-Thin Test Piece of pain:

- normal
- bodily sensation
- experiential

²³ Crane (2003), p. 42.

²⁴ Ibid. p. 42, n.19.

Sincere it is the Modern, Analytic Philosophy of Mind's tradition I am interdicting upon, It will be their descriptively-thin, central test piece of pain I will be keeping with. I will translate it it into Husserlian Logical Investigations categories later, but this is more of aforementioned translation for comparison than an elaboration. I will unpack this descriptively-thin Analytic test case of pain above and then argue for my restriction to its context.

By *normal* the Analytic Test Piece of Pain, as noted by Crane, does not address chronic, or psychological pain. Rather it uses episodic, common place pains like stubbing ones toe. This I summarize as 'normal' under the Analytic test pice of pain.

That the Analytic Test Pice of Pain has in view pain as an *bodily sensation* is important. This clearly distinguishes the pain in view as not an emotion. Though 'pain' language can be used of both emotional and bodily sensations. Take the 'pain' of grief vs the 'pain' of a stubbed toe. Like the Analytics, I will uphold this distinction between emotion and sensation. I will take a moment here to argue for this distinction between emotions and sensations with respect to 'pain.'

In my view this is the major ambiguity in pain language. As expressed above, my loci of investigation is upon the phenomenal character of the painfulness of the Analytic descriptively-thin, experiential, bodily pain sensation. This is in distinction to *emotional* pain. Sometimes we say 'emotional suffering.' But this conflation of bodily pain for emotional suffering has a long history. At least beginning with Plato and Aristotle, pain was considered solely an emotion, i.e. a

passion of the soul.²⁵ This conclusion was not reached via phenomenological grounds, but rather reasoned to via philosophical grounds. Pleasure was also taken as an emotion—and pain, being its opposite—was reasoned to be an emotion. Also, the fact that unlike our senses, which each have their own species of qualities they sense, pain has a variety of different qualities which can evoke it. Consider the pain of a flame, of a sudden, loud sound, or a sharp needle, and a flash of strong light after complete darkness - each evoke experiential, bodily pain, yet each represent very different qualitative properties a causes, e.g. tactile, auditory, and visual. I find these features about the phenomenal character of bodily pain quite interesting, but resist the possible implication via an analogous feature to emotions, that pain is not not a bodily sensation. I resist via something also very classical - the existence of putative counter examples.

Here, I think of two counterexamples. Firstly, of women who opt for a natural child birth with no epidural anesthetic. Here, their emotional state may be one of being pleased upon seeing the beginning of their child entering the world while their body, undergoing contractions is providing ample phenomenal, experiential, bodily painfulness. In this example, not only are the emotional pleasure and the phenomenal bodily pain distinct, there are two entities in existence: the emotion and the sensation. Secondly, less dramatic examples could come from physical training regimes where there is mild pain in terms of felt bodily strain, yet one is presently happy because of the health and / or skill the training is maintaining or building. In contrast, I think of times any of us

²⁵ For the history pain in this respect, see Karl M. Dallenbach, “Pain: History and Present Status,” *The American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Jul., 1939), pp. 331-347; and Keele KD, *Anatomies of pain*. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications; (1957); Interestingly, Brentano also held to apparent, bodily pain as an emotion; see Saulius Geniusas, “The Origins of the Phenomenology of Pain: Brentano, Stumpf and Husserl”, *Continental Philosophy Review* 47(1):1-17 (2014).

have gone through intense emotional suffering while in perfect health. In these examples, our emotional posture towards the felt bodily sensation is distinct from that sensation.

Lastly under the descriptively-thin, Analytic test case of pain, is *experiential*. Few have hammered home this aspect of pain within Analytic Philosophy more clearly than Ned Block. His seminal (1995) paper²⁶ took length to distinguish between experience that is conscious and phenomenal and ‘experience’ with non-phenomenal, causal chains of data from our world though to our senses, to our brain and back to bodily responses. Block gives his famous example of a conversation taking place and that one only notices that they knew the compressor in the fridge was running after the compressor turned off. Block explicates this as non-experimental brain processes that tracked the sound of the compressor. This he labels as ‘Access Consciousness’ or ‘A-Consciousness’. The other experiential or phenomenal experience he labels as ‘Phenomenal Consciousness’ or ‘P-Consciousness’. Useful in illustrating this distinction is when Block is presenting the work of another on pain:

Andrade (1993, p. 13) makes it clear that the concern is P-consciousness; for example, "Without consciousness, there is no pain. There may be tissue damage, and physiological responses to tissue damage, but there will not be the phenomenological experience of pain."²⁷

²⁶ Ned Block, ‘On a confusion about a function of consciousness’ *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 18 (1995), 227-247; reprinted in *The Nature of Consciousness* eds. Ned Block, Owen Flanagan and Güven Güzeldere (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1997).

²⁷ Ibid. p. 237. The Andrade (1993) referred to is: J. Andrade, “Consciousness: Current views.”, In: *Depth of Anesthesia*, ed. J. G. Jones. Little Brown (1993).

For anyone who has used heavy-duty pain relievers this portion of text is relatable. Again, I think of a mother in labor who has opted to use an epidural anesthetic. When fully enacted the mother can feel her body going through the physiological responses to the birthing process. When the epidural is at a high affectivity what she does not feel is experiential (phenomenal) pain.²⁸ Here, the physiological responses would be the A-Consciousness and the experiential, phenomenal painfulness, the P-Consciousness.²⁹ Making these explicit from Anandrade's text:

A-Consciousness: tissue damage, physiological responses to that tissue damage;

P-Consciousness: the experiential, phenomenal pain.

Thus, in the descriptively-thin analytic test case of pain, the normal, bodily sensation we are after is an experience in the P-Conscious sense. Let me take a moment to argue why this descriptively-thin analytic test piece is an appropriate scope of discourse for my argument against Crane - and by extension, ontological reductionism in Modern, Analytic Philosophy of Mind.

Firstly and most importantly is that all I need for my argument against the identity of pain's painfulness to intentionality is found *within* the descriptively-thin, Analytic central test-piece of

²⁸ Epidural Anesthetic can be used to give bodily perception of the labor, but mitigate the experienced pain. See, P. Aleshi & J. H. Turnbull, Ch. 21 "Spinal and Epidural Anesthesia," in P.K. Sikka et al. (eds.) *Basic Clinical Anesthesia* DOI 10.1007/978-1-4939-1737-2_21, © Springer Science(2015); pgs. 211 - 231: "Unlike the on-off clinical characteristic of spinal anesthesia, epidural anesthesia can more finely be tailored to the needs of the clinical situation, such as the creation of a segmental blockade. The choices of local anesthetic, dosage, volume of infusion, and level of injection easily alter the intensity and extent of the blockade. As such, the often-unwanted effects of neuraxial anesthesia, such as hypotension and motor blockade, may be more easily balanced with desired clinical affects." p. 223.

²⁹ Though belonging to the phenomenally, descriptively-thick tradition below, Merleau-Ponty's distinction with respect to pain between the body vs the 'pain space' fits with Block's Access and Phenomenal Consciousness. The pain space is a lived, affective space which indicates the bodily location in distress. See his *Phenomenology of Perception*. Trans. by D. A. Landes. London: Routledge (2012): p.96ff.

pain. That the descriptively-thin Analytic definition has pain as *sensuous* in being a bodily sensation and in being an experience it is *presentational*. Sensuousness I will argue in the metaphysical comparison, is translatable as qualitative. Being experiential is translated into being presented or ‘presentational’ also in Chapter Five. Each of qualitative and presentational I will use in comparing the central Analytic test piece of pain’s painfulness to Crane’s Intentionalist construal of the mental-state of pain. These two properties in hand from the Analytic, descriptively-thin pain are *sufficient* for my argument’s metaphysical comparison. Let me buttress this sufficiency of the thin-description this with an argument via analogy.

To argue that one needs a more descriptively-thick definition of phenomenal pain in order to rebut Intentionalism’s Analytic descriptively-thin construal of pain has an analogy in Geometry. In order to conduct a metaphysical comparison of the assays of a two geometric figures one does not need metaphysically thick descriptions of them. Take for example a two dimensional, right triangle and a two dimensional equal-lateral square. One can compare the number of points and sides of the two figures without knowing issues of how a point can have location without extension or the nature of the boundaries of the lines of either figure.³⁰ These descriptively-thick elements of the figures are interesting, but not necessary to metaphysical comparison of the number of points and sides. Analogously, the sensuous, experiential nature of Analytic descriptively-thin pain is sufficient for the metaphysical comparison I will conduct. Sufficient, in that the descriptively-thin Analytic definition of pain has my two properties of interest, i.e. being sensual and experiential. As I mentioned these will be paired with qualitative properties and

³⁰ Barry Smith’s work on boundaries is a good example which also touches upon the extension-less-ness of points. As an introduction consider his, “Boundaries: A Brentanian Theory” *Brentano Studien* 8 (1998 / 1999), 107-114.

being presented in my comparison to Crane's mental-states exclusively composed by intentionality.

Secondly, is that this descriptively-thin pain of the Analytics is the test piece for their tradition. To argue against Analytic attempts at reduction via more complex (albeit interesting) features of normal, episodic pain is outside this criticism's context. These more complex, features of bodily pain are shown to be *descriptively-thick* against the foil of qualitative and presented, descriptively-thin, Analytic pain. Fredrik Svenaeus also notes this kind of division of descriptions. He uses 'narrow' for the conception of pain, like the one in use by the Analytics. Svenaeus accordingly notes that in contrast, Phenomenology often explores the 'wide' facets of pain experience:

. . . Phenomenology has the potential of improving upon such narrow conceptions of pain by showing how it is a peculiar and many-faced form of embodied experience.³¹

I agree with Sevanaeus that there is much improvement. Consider a notable few revealed by the foil of the Analytic, descriptively-thin pain. Under a wide / thick description, normal, experiential, bodily pain has the ability to powerfully draw one's attention out of the world, and even away from much of one's lived-body. This is described as pain's *centripetal* function.³² Sometimes pain, with this centripetal function, even 'yanks' us out of our awareness of future and past. This attention-centering feature of pain also highlights pain's *passivity*. Against the

³¹ Fredrik Svenaeus, "Pain." in the *Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotions*, Szanto, Thomas & Landweer (eds.) (Routledge; forthcoming).

³² Drew Leder, "Toward a Phenomenology of Pain.", *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry* 19 (1984-85): 255-266.

vortex of pain's centripetal force, the subject is generally helpless to direct their attention elsewhere. This helplessness in avoiding the experience of pain renders the subject passive - the subject often cannot avoid the experience of pain.³³ Furthermore, some if not all, species of pain offer degrees of *alienation* from ones body.³⁴ Not only are we passive to it yanking us out of time, the world and much of the lived body, pain also mentally renders the offended body part as 'alien.' The body being in pain, may temporally or significantly jeopardize some of our life goals and themes within our narrative-self. Here the pain alienates us from how we want to be in the world. A normal, bodily pain has an ability to shade and color our world from the vantage point of the sufferer. This affect upon the sufferer's lived world is sometimes referred to as a mood.³⁵ Applying Heidegger's use of pain to bodily pain, pain also reveals our will to not be absolute. As much as our will may shape reality, pain reigns in its scope.³⁶ Less plausibly to in my view, Heidegger places pain alongside the logos in the structural elements of reality.³⁷

In stark relief to the Analytic descriptively-thin pain, descriptively thick pain also uplifts pain's *paradoxical* nature when it becomes chronic.³⁸ Against the foil of the qualitative and presented,

³³ Fredrik Svenaeus, "The Phenomenology of Chronic Pain: Embodiment and Alienation." *Continental Philosophy Review* 48(2), (2015): 107–122.

³⁴ Fredrik Svenaeus, *Phenomenological Bioethics: Medical Technologies, Human Suffering, and the Meaning of Being Alive*. London: Routledge (2017): 1–162.

³⁵ Jean-Pierre Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*. Trans. H. E. Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press (1956): 436 - 445.

³⁶ Parvis Emad, "Heidegger on Pain: Focusing on a Recurring Theme of His Thought," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*. Bd. 36 H. 3 (Jul. - Sep. 1982). pp. 345—360: P. 354.

³⁷ Orville Clark, "Pain and Being: An Essay in Heideggerian Ontology," *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*: (Fall 1973): 179 - 190; p. 182.

³⁸ Drew Leder, "The Experiential Paradoxes of Pain." *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, 41: (July 2016): 444–460

descriptively-thin Analytic central test-case of pain, the features listed above are descriptively-thick. These descriptively-thick accounts are beyond the focus of this thesis' focus upon the qualitative and presented.

2. THE PAINFULNESS QUESTION

With Crane as arguing with the descriptively-thin Analytic definition of pain, I will posit my 'painfulness question' here. It is formulated as follows:

The Painfulness Question:

What on Crane's Intentionalist account of the descriptively-thin Analytic pain is the phenomenal character of that pain's painfulness identical to?

As an example of the phenomenal character of the painfulness consonant with the descriptively-thin Analytic central test case of pain used by Crane, I offer the phenomenal painfulness felt in one's toe when they stub that toe in a darkened bedroom. The phenomenal character of this painfulness is normal, in the sense that it is acute and not chronic, i.e. it begins and ends in a limited span of time. It is sensual in the sense that it is not an emotion - though particular emotions may consequently erupt, e.g. anger, etc. In not being an emotion, it is 'bodily' in the sense that it is a way our body is phenomenally presented to be or a 'bodily sensation'. In also being consonant with the descriptively-thin definition, the stubbed toe is also experiential. It is for this kind of painfulness my Painfulness Question is broadly focused in upon. In asking for its

phenomenal character, I am not asking for its Access-Consciousness features - though those are likely to be present. With the aim of this thesis I am not even assaying pain's location or its directed-ness. The direct experiential 'ouch' of this late night jolt is what I am after.

What lengthens this chapter are instances of redescription of the some of the phenomenal character of experiential pain by Crane. Seeing as my chief disagreement with Crane's Intentionalism is his redescription of the phenomenal character of the painfulness of experiential pain as an intentional mode, in what follows, I will uplift this tendency towards redescription. I will go over his redescription of the phenomenal character of experiential, bodily pain's location and ability to wake one from sleep. Lastly I will clarify in argument that this normal, experiential, sensual, bodily pain is distinct from emotional 'pain'.

3. EXAMPLE OF CRANE'S RE-DESCRIPTION : PAIN AS A PRESENTED OBJECT

Given his appeals to phenomenology, Crane (2003) does demur from the phenomena with respect to the phenomenological character of a normal, experiential, bodily pain's presentation. The presented nature of pain is addressed by Crane under pain as an object. Pain as an object is redescribed by Crane and pain's ability to rouse one from sleep. Let me begin with phenomenological character of presented, bodily pain as an object.

Crane has repeatedly shied away from construing pain as an object whether it be diffused or distinct. Characterizing the presentation of pain as an object, consider his rejection of it in Crane (1998):

Although I think that we must be alive to this possibility, it seems to me that—independently of the metaphysical objections to mental objects—phenomenology does not decisively establish their apparent existence. For each of the examples discussed above admit of alternative, equally plausible descriptions which do not require us to posit mental objects.³⁹

Rather, he refuses to put it at the intentional object end of mental act -and-object. In this sense, to phrase it awkwardly, despite the phenomenology, Crane refuses to give pain a *locative* location.

Invoking grammar here, Crane is consistent in this and can re-describe pain in the *accusative*:

We can capture the spirit of this view by saying that there is a way in which English misleads when we say that Vladimir has a pain in his ankle, as if the pain were a kind of object he had in his ankle. Rather we might say that Vladimir pains his ankle, where *paining* is a relation between the ankle and Vladimir.⁴⁰

As will be shown in the following chapter, this re-description of a bodily pain in the accusative is not an expositional miss-step. Rather according to Tim Crane, it follows from the phenomenal painfulness of pain, i.e. the hurting, as being a way--or mode--of a particular mental state, i.e. the mental state of pain.⁴¹ Again this places pain with its painfulness in the mental-act side of the act

³⁹ Tim Crane, "Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental," in *Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Anthony O'Hear (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p. 229 - 252; p. 234.

⁴⁰ Crane (2003) p. 52.

⁴¹ This will be expanded upon in Ch. 2, but for example: "So one is attributing to one's ankle when one says that it hurts is something which has what I called in §2 a relational structure: the content of the sensation is that one's ankle hurts, the object of the sensation is the ankle (apprehended as one's ankle) and the mode is the hurting." Ibid. p.53.

—object relationship. This is at odds with the phenomenal character of a normal, experiential bodily pain sometimes being a object we are aware of - whether that pain object is distinct or has a diffused bodily location or not. To note, Crane may be correct that pain has an accusative role, but he refuses it the other - as an object of intention.

4. EXAMPLE OF CRANE'S REDESCRIPTION: WAKING FROM PAIN

Related to re-describing phenomenal, bodily pain's location in the accusative instead of in the locative is Crane's refusal to admit phenomenal data of pain as an object. This time as a species of mental object, i.e. a pain object. If phenomenal pain were a mental object, then it would sit comfortably with the locative. In an earlier work, Crane eschews this view and it impacts how he describes the phenomenal of having a bodily pain wake one up from sleep:

. . . independently of the metaphysical objections to mental objects—phenomenology does not decisively establish their apparent existence. For each of the examples discussed above admit of alternative, equally plausible descriptions which do not require us to posit mental objects. The phenomenon of being woken by pain, for instance, can be redescribed as follows: I might be in pain when I wake up, but it does not follow from this that the pain woke me up. It is equally consistent with the story that I was awoken by some *non-conscious event in my brain*, which then gave rise to pain when I become conscious.⁴²

⁴² Tim Crane, "Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental," *Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Anthony O'Hare; Cambridge University Press (1998) p. 229 - 252; p. 234.

Instead of the experiential bodily pain being the object who's phenomenal character one feels and awakens them, Crane redescribes this phenomena as a contemporaneous waking and instantiation of phenomenal pain. The phenomenal pain was not in existence before waking, rather a brain event triggered our rousing and our consciousness resulted in existence of the phenomenal mental-state of pain. With 't' marking a time, under Crane's description the process of waking from a bodily pain looks like this:

Crane's Waking From Pain Progression:

t1: bodily irritation

t2: bodily signals to the brain to the brain of the bodily irritation;

t3: your brain wakes you

t4: you experience the phenomenal pain

In this description of phenomenal pain waking us, I hear Ned Block's Access Consciousness and Phenomenal Consciousness. Later in his (2003) work, Crane will explicitly refer to it.⁴³ Thus, plugging A and P-Consciousness into Tim Crane redescription of waking from phenomenal painfulness would look like this:

Crane's Waking From Pain Progression with A & P Consciousness:

t1: A-Consciousness of bodily irritation (tissue damage);

⁴³ Crane (2003), p. 41, n. 14.

t2: A-Consciousness of bodily signals to the brain of the bodily irritation (physiological response);

t3: A Consciousness of your brain waking you (physiological response);

t4: P-Consciousness of your experience of a felt (phenomenal) painfulness.

Notice that the phenomenal painfulness comes after being woken by the physiological response of the brain in t3. The experience comes in t4. The cause of waking is found in t3 not in t4. One is woken in t3 by the A-Conscious process of their brain. Consider the contrast:

Woken by:

A: a non-conscious brain process, or;

P: by the pain that is consciously felt, i.e. phenomenal painfulness.

This Tim Crane, claims it is an “. . . equally plausible . . .” description that one is woken by (A) and not (P). Here I would agree that the description of being woken by non-experiential, physiological causes, i.e. (A), is equally plausible for *some* of the cases. I can think of phenomenal data which fit with this description of waking and then experiencing the reason why your body woke you. Where I disagree with Crane is in the plausibility of this description is that it covers *all* the cases of apparently waking from felt painfulness, i.e. (P). In short: (A) is an equally plausible description for *some* cases, but an un-plausible redescription for *all*.

In counter example to the the equally plausible description of (P) as a cause for all waking ‘from’ pain, I offer in general experience from sports medicine. Those suffering from some species of shoulder injury often wake during the night from the shoulder pain.⁴⁴ Here (P), the phenomenal pain with its felt painfulness, is experienced as the cause of waking. In this general shoulder injury example, the phenomenal data is of waking in response to the painful phenomenological character of the experiential pain. Non-conscious, physiological states and processes are very likely in place, but the experienced cause was an experienced phenomenal state with its phenomenological character, i.e (P). Examples could be brought in from back injuries, as the phenomena of waking during the night from the felt, phenomenal pain is also commonplace.⁴⁵ Given my counterexamples, Crane’s general description of the phenomena of waking from pain as due to A-Consciousness causes is to be rejected as equally plausible. Rather describing

⁴⁴ I know this from my own rock climbing injury. Copious attention to shoulder injuries and sleep disturbance from experienced pain is evidenced in medical journals. See as an example: “The most important complaint of patients is increasing night-time pain and disrupted sleep. Painful conditions often disrupt sleep and, in advanced stages, may even have a negative effect on daily activities. Shoulder pathologies have been shown to be related to night pain, insomnia, and lack of sleep due to pain in the affected side . . .”, from Serbest, et al., “Preoperative and post-operative sleep quality in rotator cuff tear patients,” *Knee Surgery, Sports Traumatology, Arthroscopy* (2017) 25:2109–2113 DOI 10.1007/s00167-016-4228-5; p. 2109. That Serbest (2011) has in view pain along the lines of IATA consider that the shoulder pain it mentions is the kind consciously ameliorated by various pain-killers: “In the first 2 days, additional analgesia was provided when required via dexketoprofen (50 mg at six-hour intervals). The same treatment protocol for pain control was applied to all patients. After discharge from the hospital, dexketoprofen 3 × 50 mg was administered. For patients who required further pain relief, etofenamate 2 × 500 mg was given.” p. 2111.

⁴⁵ I know this from my father’s own back injury. Medical journals are rife with reference to experiential pain and sleep disturbance for back injuries. Here are two examples: “A large prospective study found there was a highly significant relationship between pain and sleep ($P < 0.0005$), with a 55% increase in the proportion of participants reporting restless/light sleep *after* chronic low back pain *onset*.” from D. Hurley et al, “Physiotherapy for sleep disturbance in chronic low back pain: a feasibility randomized controlled trial,” *BMC Musculoskeletal Disorders* 2010, 11:70; <http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2474/11/70>; p. 2 (emphasis *mine*); “Logistic regression showed that *pain intensity* and *pain duration* were significantly associated with *sleep disturbance* . . . Each increase of pain intensity by one point on a VAS was associated with a 10% increase in the likelihood of reporting sleep disturbance.” from S. M. Alsaadi et al, “Prevalence of Sleep Disturbance in Patients with Low Back Pain,” *European Spine Journal* (2011) 20:737–743 DOI 10.1007/s00586-010-1661-x; © Springer-Verlag (2010), p. 740 (emphasis *mine*).

instances like the the sports medicine ones above as really owing to A-Consciousness would be an act of re-description.

CONCLUSION

In the process of pressing Tim Crane's version of Intentionalism on its identity of the phenomenal character of the painfulness of Analytic descriptively-thin pain with an intentional mode composed of only intentional properties, we have seen that he and I have moderate agreement. We both have in view a normal, experiential, bodily sensation like the stubbing of one's toe or a toothache and not an emotion. We both have in view a sensuous, experiential pain and not a non-phenomenal bodily / brain process. I framed my Painfulness Question upon this agreed descriptively-thin Analytic token of pain. The Painfulness Question will focus upon the phenomenal character of the painfulness of this mental-state and not its location or directed-ness, i.e. intentionality. Noting this agreement upon the token of pain investigated, Crane's penchant for re-description was also noted, evidenced in how he treats pain's primary presentation as a diffused or distinct object and the phenomena of apparently being woken by the phenomenal character of a pain's painfulness. As I will argue in the chapters that come, this penchant for re-description does not stop at object and waking, but extends to the very nature of the phenomenal character of bodily pain's painfulness itself.

CHAPTER TWO

TIM CRANE'S VIEW OF INTENTIONALITY FOR HIS VIEW OF MENTAL STATES.

INTRODUCTION

Before moving on to a metaphysical comparison of Crane's Intentionalist mental-state of pain, it is essential to piece together what will be compared. In this chapter I will look at the version of intentionality that Crane uses for his mental-states. This chapter is brief due to the lack of detail Crane's account possesses.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

I will first present Crane's view of intentionality centered in his (2003) work. After explicating it, I note a feature of his view that gives it some complexity, i.e. the optional awareness of the

intentional object. Granting that this textures his account I note that he does not seem aware of the scene around Husserl and that this impacts Crane's unitary account of intentionality. I briefly note where this is important for experiential, bodily pain.

1. BRENTANIAN LEANINGS

Tim Crane's important paper within Analytic Philosophy of Mind, "Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental"⁴⁶ explicitly attributes to Brentano,⁴⁷ Crane's view that all mental states are intentional.⁴⁸ Writing of the consensus that a number of Analyticians⁴⁹ have against the idea that all mental-states are intentional, Crane expresses his indebtedness to Brentano, Husserl and Sartre:

But this consensus raises a puzzling historical and exegetical question. If it is so obvious that Brentano's thesis is false, why did Brentano propose it? If a moment's reflection on one's states of mind refutes the thesis that all mental states are intentional, then why would anyone (including Brentano, Husserl, Sartre and their followers) think otherwise? Did Brentano have a radically

⁴⁶ Crane, (1998) p. 229 - 252.

⁴⁷ For Brentano's life and relation to Husserl see Guillaume Fréchette, "The Origins of Phenomenology in Austro-German Philosophy: Brentano and Husserl," in J. A. Shand (ed.) *A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Philosophy* (London; Wiley-Blackwell 2019) : 418 - 453.

⁴⁸ For Analytic reception of Brentano's text on intentionality see Philip J. Bartok, "Brentano's Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and Phenomenal Readings," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (October 2005): 437 - 460.

⁴⁹ Crane rightly notes Louise Antony, 'What it's Like to Smell a Gardenia' *Times Literary Supplement*, 4897 (February 7 1997), Colin McGinn, *The Character of Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), and John R. Searle, *Intentionality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Add to the list Julien Deonna, Fabrice Teroni, *The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction*, (New York: Routledge 2012) and Davide Bordolini, "Not in the Mood for Intentionalism", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, (2017) p. 60 - 81 when it comes to moods.

different inner life from the inner lives of contemporary philosophers? Or was the originator of phenomenology spectacularly inattentive to phenomenological facts, . . .⁵⁰

Crane will conclude that Brentano was neither inattentive, nor had a radically different interior life than we do. Extending from this ‘all’ position regarding mental states and intentionality, Crane will imitate intentionality from them (Husserl, Satre, etc.) construing it as the mind’s directed-ness towards and object.⁵¹ Using the example of a doctor, Crane (2003) expresses his view well:

I understand intentionality in a traditional way, as the mind’s direction or directedness upon its objects. When a state of mind is about something--say, as a belief that *my doctor smokes* is about my doctor--I shall say that the state of mind has an object. . . . The objects of intentional states are sometimes called ‘intentional objects’, and I will follow this usage.⁵²

And just a bit further down also:

If a state of mind has an object, if is *directed on* an object, then it is intentional.⁵³

Thus, we have for Crane, intentionality as this ‘directed-ness’ of mental-states towards intentional objects.

Tim Crane’s definition of Intentionality:

⁵⁰ Crane (1998) p. 230.

⁵¹ That Crane has in view for intentionality the mind’s directed-ness, see also his “A Short History of Philosophical Theories of Consciousness in the 20th Century” in Kind, A. eds, *Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries*, Book 6, Routledge, June (2018) p.78 - 104.

⁵² Crane (2003) p. 37.

⁵³ Ibid. p. 38.

- the mind's 'directed-ness' upon an object

He will subsequently define intentional objects as an open category which can admit existing and non-existing objects.⁵⁴ Important to note here, is that Crane leaves the definition of intentionality at this 'directed-ness' upon an object. He agrees that discussions begin with 'about-ness' or 'of-ness' but settles in upon the 'mind's direction' or 'directed-ness'.⁵⁵

This is important for my thesis for in the subsequent two chapters, where I expisit that Crane holds to the mental-state of pain as being exclusively composed by intentionality or intentional properties — it is this definition of intentionality which is used. This is important in the metaphysical comparison which follows for it is this directed-ness which stands in stark contrast to the presentation of the qualitative nature of the self painfulness of pain. In short here: Crane's intentionality is an 'out-rushing' of intention in contrast to the experiential 'in-rushing' of presented painfulness. Husserl would say 'intuited. Related to this are two significant related features to Crane's view of intentionality as related to pain.

2. NUANCING OF CRANE'S DEFINITION OF INTENTIONALITY

⁵⁴ Ibid. p.37-38 "Intentional object are just whatever one's intentional states are directed on. My thought about my doctor is directed on my doctor, on smoking, and on the fact that he smokes: intentional objects can be ordinary objects, properties, events, or states of affairs (so 'object' here does not mean *particular*). . . . And, notoriously, some intentional objects do not exist"

⁵⁵ For a more textured account of Intentionality descending from Brentano, see Dermont Moran, "A Case for Philosophical Pluralism: The Problem of Intentionality," in *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement*. (New York, Cambridge University Press 1996): p. 19-32.

Firstly, it is interesting that Crane will allow that one may not always be aware of the intentional object of one's mental-states. This is how he defends that moods—via directed-ness—are intentional: he separates the metaphysical reality of the directed-ness of the mental-state from an epistemic knowledge of what it is directed upon, i.e. its intentional object. Consider his reply in a Croatian Philosophy Journal where he is rebutting various criticism of his *Elements of Mind* book:

Puškariæ seems to think that the fact that someone can be depressed without knowing what they are depressed about is a reason for thinking that depression is not intentional. But this would be so only on the assumption of the general principle that subjects must always be able to know, or even to say, what the intentional object of their state of mind is. Yet only the slightest reflections on the limits of subjects' self-knowledge will show this general principle to be false, for reasons entirely independent of the truth of intentionalism. Given this, then it is open for the intentionalist to say that the answer 'nothing in particular' could simply be a statement of the subject's lack of self knowledge.⁵⁶

The Scholastics would have applauded this distinction between the metaphysical and the epistemological, i.e. the line of being vs the line of knowing. Notice in Crane's reply that it is the subject's lack of knowledge of the mood's intentional object which is at fault here—not—the mood's intentionality. The mood has is 'ray' of directed intentionality whether the subject knows it or not. Here the metaphysical and epistemological are quite clear. This complexity is lost on Crane's view of intentionality though. He notes Brentano's familiarity with the Medieval

⁵⁶ Tim Crane, "Summary of Elements of Mind and Replies to Critics," *Croatian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. IV, No. 11, (2004) : 224 - 240; p.237.

‘intentiones’⁵⁷ and references history for it Medieval and Classical ⁵⁸, but the early German scene surrounding Husserl is noticeably absent. This is reflected in Crane’s simplistic construal of the intentionality of all mental-states solely as ‘directed-ness.’⁵⁹ This is my second point.

As Salice (2015)⁶⁰ notes, not all of those involved in the Munchen and Göttingen Circles viewed intentionality as a unitary phenomena.⁶¹ Consider the example of believing your bicycle is locked at rack outside versus leaning out the window to see that it is still locked outside. The difference in phenomenal textures for how each ‘point-to’ the bicycle may be subtle, but are discernible. Each the belief and the perception are ‘of’ the locked bicycle, but are they intentional in the exact same way? Does the intuition of perception and the signification of perception both mean properties of the presented object in the same way? Here the semantic nature of intuition and signification are according to Husserl in the Investigations, different.⁶² The same goes for how linguistic signs and images are ‘of’ their objects. Here we have potentially at least four

⁵⁷ Crane (1998) p. 1

⁵⁸ Christian Knudsen, ‘Intentions and Impositions’ in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* A. Kenny et al (eds.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Victor Caston, ‘Aristotle on the Problem of Intentionality’, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. LVIII, No. 2 (June 1998).

⁵⁹ For an account that is not as simplistic displaying the historical decent and modification of intentionality from Brentano, though Husserl to the Modern Analytics including Tim Crane, see Dermot Moran, “Intentionality: Some Lessons from the History of the Problem from Brentano to the Present,” *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 21. No. 3, (2013) : 317 - 358.

⁶⁰ Alessandro Salice, “The Phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen Circles,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (Winter 2015): <http://plato.stanford.edu/board.html>; this example of diversity over intentionality in the Munich and Göttingen circles is also evident within the variety of positions over the nature and intentionality of emotions; see Ingrid Vendrell Ferran, “The Emotions in Early Phenomenology,” *STUDIA PHÆNOMENOLOGICA* XV (2015) : 329 - 354.

⁶¹ For a similar list, yet not referencing the students and thinkers contemporary of Husserl, see Martin Davies, “Consciousness and the Varieties of Aboutness.” in C. Macdonald & G. Macdonald (eds.), *Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers: 1989) : 356 - 392.

⁶² Alessandro Salice, 2012, ‘Phänomenologische Variationen. Intention and Fulfillment in Early Phenomenology,’ *Intentionality*. ed. A. Salice (München: Philosophia, 2012) : 203–242; p. 208-210.

different species of intentionality, e.g. belief, visual perception, symbolic, and image based. The list could be broadened to bodily sensations, emotions and concepts. Compounding this is that some in the Munchen and Göttingen Circles did not even think perception was intentional; rather it was mostly an in-rushing of presented, intuited properties. Contrast this with Crane's one-size-fits-all construal of intentionality had by all mental-states of 'directed-ness.'

Where this is important for this thesis is with respect to pain. Does Crane's singular 'mind's directed-ness towards and object' fit how a bodily pain experience like a stubbed toe, intends the toe that is injured? Is the intentionality of this pain identical to that of visual perception? Phenomenologically, it is not as apparent to my experience. The phenomenal character of how a symbol 'points' to its objects contrasts with the phenomenal character of intentional vision. This is significant for the examples Husserl uses where the interpreted sensation is presentative are verbal and linguistic symbols. I touch upon this in Chapter Six, on Husserl's view of pain in the *Logical Investigations*.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I presented Crane's definition of Intentionality, revealed simply as a mind's directed-ness upon an object. I mused that this admitted some complexity in a metaphysical / epistemological distinction, but lacked other nuancing. My main concern was Crane's lack of awareness of possible non-unitary accounts of intentionality, especially where it may be relevant

to a normal, bodily pain like a stubbed toe. Regardless of these features of Crane's definition of Intentionality, explicating it in this chapter provides us with the nature of his intentionality which will be crucial to the metaphysical comparison to pain's painfulness later.

CHAPTER THREE

EXPOSITION: WHAT PAINFULNESS IS DESCRIBED AS BY CRANE'S INTENTIONALISM

INTRODUCTION

I need to substantiate the claim that Crane's Intentionalism⁶³ holds the experiential painfulness of a common bodily pain, e.g a stubbed toe, to be composed of all and only by intentional properties. Namely, that our felt, qualitative painfulness is really only a way of our mind's 'directed-ness' towards a part of our body.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

⁶³ For its expositional breadth and clarity, I have chosen to focus in upon Tim Crane, "The intentional structure of consciousness." In: Jokic, A and Smith, Q, (eds.) *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford University Press: New York (2003) pp. 33-56. Other works of his will be consulted where deemed appropriate.

In this chapter I justify my claim that Tim Crane, under his Intentionalism, holds our mental states to be composed of only intentional properties. From this exposition I focus in upon the structure of Crane's view of mental-states as applied to experiential pain. With this structure in view I isolate what part of this model answers the Painfulness Question of the previous chapter. This poises us to compare the phenomenal character within the Painfulness Question against Crane's intentional mode in the chapters that follow.

1. EXPOSITION OF CRANE'S INTENTIONALISM.

For those unfamiliar with Tim Crane's Intentionalism, Crane embraces a view within the philosophy of mind which holds that *all* of the properties which compose our mental-states are only intentional properties. Thus he rightly identifies his view as a version of 'Strong Intentionalism.' Since weak Intentionalist are a minority within Intentionalism, I will drop the 'strong' in front of Intentionalism unless for an explicit comparison - such as follows. Within the vein of Intentionalists, Crane's view is contrasted with minority view, called 'Weak Intentionalism'⁶⁴. Weak Intentionalism holds that for many, and perhaps all mental states, there are in addition to their intentional properties, qualitative properties (loosely, 'qualia') which ground that mental-state's feel. Using Weak Intentionalism as a foil, it is clear from the below

⁶⁴ Sydney Shoemaker's "Qualities and Qualia: What's in the Mind?", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 50 (1990) p. 109 - 130 is the first one to come to mind. Others could include Ned Block "Inverted Earth", in Block, Flanagan, and Guzeldere (eds), *The Nature of Consciousness*, MIT Press, Massachusetts (1997) pp. 677 - 685; Brian Loar, "Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia" In Jokic, A and Smith, Q, (eds.) *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford University Press: New York (2003) pp. 77 - 98.

that Crane (2003) affirms only intentional properties as composing all of our mental-states in contrast to any additional qualitative properties:

I will then go on to argue that bodily sensations should be thought of as intentional states However, the fact that bodily sensations are intentional states does not rule out their having (narrowly) qualitative properties (qualia) in *addition* to their intentional character. One could hold that all mental states are intentional, but that some have non-intentional qualia. This is the view I call ‘weak intentionalism’. Weak intentionalism is contrasted with strong intentionalism, which says that all mental states have only intentional mental properties. Two types of strong intentionalism are distinguished in s. 5, and I argue for the type that I call the ‘perceptual theory’.⁶⁵

Thus, notice in the above the affirmation that under Weak Intentionalism one can admit qualitative properties in addition to their intentional properties. Crane is explicit that Strong Intentionalism only admits intentional properties--and--that he shall argue for a species of Strong Intentionalism.

Useful in this context of a contrast with Weak Intentionalism is his construal of a toothache. Notice how the ‘naggingness’ of a toothache--mentioned as a quale--is rejected as belonging to a toothache under Strong Intentionalism. Please bear with me in with this extended quotation:

Qualia are either mental states or properties of mental states. For example, one could call the mental state of having a toothache a *quale*, or one could call the particular naggingness of the toothache the *quale*. Intentionalism must reject qualia in the first sense--obviously, since intentionalism is the view that all mental states are intentional. But it need not reject qualia in the second sense. A version of intentionalism—weak intentionalism—maintains that all mental states

⁶⁵ Crane (2003) p. 37.

have some intentionality, but that some of these states have qualia-properties. The experience of a toothache, for instance, has intentionality (it is tooth-directed) but on top of this it may have specific qualia which account for its particular feeling. *A stronger form of intentionalism says that no mental state has any non-intentional mental properties.* In s. 4, I shall argue for strong intentionalism, an against weak intentionalism.⁶⁶

Qualia, even as a property, belonging to an intentional mental-state are rejected under Crane's Strong Intentionalism. Notice that he affirms this for Strong Intentionalism in the context of a type of pain, e.g. a toothache, where Weak Intentionalism could admit qualia which would ground that pains's particular felt quality as a property for that mental-state. Rather, mental-states, even the likes of a toothache, are only composed of intentional properties. To make this position of Crane's Intentionalism explicitly clear:

(i) All mental-states are composed exclusively by intentional properties.

(ii) Phenomenal pain is a mental-state.

(iii) Phenomenal pain is composed exclusively by intentional properties.

From this view of all and only intentional properties belonging to our mental states I believe there is a tension with the phenomenal data of the bodily pain - more restrictively - with its experienced painfulness. This brings me back to the the Painfulness Question of the previous chapter.

The 'Painfulness' Question:

⁶⁶ Ibid. p. 41 (emphasis *mine*).

What on Crane (2003)'s Strong Intentionalist account of pain is the phenomenal character of experiential, bodily pain's painfulness identical to?

To answer this question, I will need to do two things. One, understand the structure of his account of bodily pain. Then, secondly, ascertain what part/parts of his model of bodily pain are the phenomenal character of pain. From there I can ask which part of the phenomenal character of pain is its' felt painfulness. Let's see how Crane (2003) develops his account of Intentionalism' sensual, bodily pain with an eye as to where he answers the Painfulness Question.

2. THE STRUCTURE OF CRANE'S ACCOUNT OF PAIN

So, on Tim Crane's Intentionalism, what is the answer to the Painfulness Question? We already know from the above that mental-states are composed of all and only intentional properties. Knowing this, phenomenal painfulness must be identical to some set of the intentional properties that jointly compose the mental state of pain. Taking this point into consideration, there is a four part structure, including the mental-state of pain, in which he uses to describe the phenomenal character of bodily pain. The four parts in the structure of the states of affairs of 'pain' are:

- (i) the mental state of pain.
- (ii) the intentional mode of the mental state.
- (iii) the content attributed to the body by the intentional mode of the mental state the mode belongs to.

(iv) the part or region of the body as intentional object which the content is attributed to.

The progression would go like this:

(i) mental-state → (ii) intentional mode → (iii) content → (iv) intentional object

Referring to the mental-state of pain as a sensation, from the mental-state, all (i-iv) are visible in the below quote concerning pain from Crane (2003):

So one is attributing to one's ankle when one says that it hurts is something which has what I called in s.2 a 'relational structure': the content of the sensation is that one's ankle hurts, the object of the sensation is the ankle (apprehended *as* one's ankle) and the mode is the hurting.⁶⁷

Thus (i) is the mental-state of pain mentioned as a sensation in the above quote: “. . . the object of the sensation is the ankle . . .” It is this mental-state of a sensation which has the following mode, content and an ankle as its intentional object.

Accordingly (iii) is the content which is attributed by the mental-state of pain. This content is what the the mental state is attributing to an intentional object. In the case of the mental-state of pain in the quote above, the content of pain is a part of the body intended as 'hurt.' This attribution can either be true or false.⁶⁸ True as in the case of an actual damaged / irritated part of the body. False as in the attribution of 'hurt' to a missing limb as in the case of 'ghost limb'

⁶⁷ Ibid. p. 53.

⁶⁸ It Crane's view it can also be non-propositional, i.e. denying the valence of truth, in Crane's view: "A state of mind has propositional content when the content of the state is evaluable as true or false. But many intentional states have, on the face of it, non-truth-evaluable contents." Ibid. p. 40. Crane goes on to give the examples of emotions, desires and some thoughts.

situations. Note that this attributed content is distinct from the object which is the intentional object of this mental-state. Crane expresses it well:

This is why we cannot say in general that intentional states are relations to intentional objects. As noted in §3, phantom limbs show that someone can feel a pain in a part of their body even when this part does not exist. So an intentionalist cannot say that pain is a relation to a body part. Rather, pain is a relation to an intentional content, where the intentional content is the way things seem to the subject.⁶⁹

It is also important to note under Crane's view of content in the quote above, that the intentional content is, ". . . the way things seem to the subject." This seeming is part of the phenomenal character of what is presented to the perceiver - albeit by their mental-state attributing such content to their body. Content together with intentional mode will constitute for Crane the phenomenal character of pain. I will return to this after finishing with this four-fold taxonomy of what is present in the state of affairs of pain for Tim Crane's Strong Intentionalism.

Closely related to content, is the 'intentional object' (iv) of pain. Continuing with the hurt ankle example, the intentional object is the ankle as a part of the body. With respect to content, this object could not exist; rather the content is the 'ankle intended as 'hurt'' and pending further confirmation the intentional object of the ankle must be discovered.

⁶⁹ Ibid. p. 54.

Lastly, (iii) the intentional mode. For Crane (2003) there is the mode, or way the mental state is doing the intending. Crane calls this the ‘intentional mode.’ As an example of an intentional mode he provides the example of hearing vs. seeing a plane overhead:

Consider first a strong intentionalist theory of perception, and what it would say about the phenomenal character of (say) visual experience. The phenomenal character of a visual experience of an aeroplane flying overhead is given by giving its content—the aeroplane, its shape and size and so on—and by giving the experience’s intentional mode: seeing. The phenomenal difference between seeing an aeroplane overhead and hearing one is partly a matter of the content—what is experienced—but also a matter of the mode of apprehending this content, the intentional mode . . .⁷⁰

Notice in this quote that seeing is an intentional mode whereby which the plane is intended. Using seeing the plane as an example of this four-part state of affairs of sensation for Crane, view the below:

(i) Mental-state --> (ii) seeing --> (iii) shape and size, etc. of the areoplane --> (iv) the areoplane itself.

Consider the contrast with the auditory mental-state, i.e. ‘hearing’ mentioned in the quoted text:

(i) Mental-state --> (ii) hearing --> (iii) sound, location , etc. of the areoplane --> (iv) the areoplane itself.

Under Crane’s model it makes sense that phenomenal character, at least in part covaries with intentional mode. Note how different the details within (iii) of the two modes of intending the

⁷⁰ Ibid. p. 51.

areoplane are. With the analogy of sight with its' four fold structure in mind, let us now turn again to pain .

To see the four fold structure of pain I will parallel it with Crane's example of sight. Using the quote I began this section with, here is the parallel of the pain account to the visual perception account above. Revisiting the quote:

. . . the content of the sensation is that one's ankle hurts, the object of the sensation is the ankle (apprehended as one's ankle) and the mode is the hurting.⁷¹

Translating this into the parallel with perception above:

(i) Mental-state of sensation --> (ii) hurting --> (iii) 'that my ankle hurts' --> (iv.) ones' ankle

As show in the progression above, Crane (2003), has pain as a mental-state of sensation. This sensation has the intentional mode of 'hurting.' These two together attribute the content, 'that my ankle hurts,' to the existing / possibly non-existent intentional object of ones's ankle. Now that we are settled on the structure of what is in place when we experience pain for Crane, let us get clear on what part / parts of this structure are the phenomenal character of experiential, bodily pain.

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 53.

3. WHAT PART OF CRANE'S VIEW OF PAIN IS THE PHENOMENAL CHARACTER OF EXPERIENTIAL BODILY PAIN.

Keep in mind that my analysis of the structure of experience for Crane has its purpose to be in a position to answer the Painfulness Question of his view. In this sense then, we now need to know, what the whole phenomenal character of pain is on this four-fold view of the state of affairs of pain - for it is phenomenal painfulness we are pressing his account upon. Crane's answer is explicit: the phenomenal character of pain is comprised of pain's intentional mode and the intentional content:

According to a strong intentionalist theory of perception, the phenomenal character of a perception is fixed by two things: mode and content. . . . I say the same thing about bodily sensations.⁷²

Pain, being a bodily sensation, falls under the claim of this quote. Using the example of seeing an aeroplane from under the section about content (ii) above, Crane provides an illustrative example of how this works:

The phenomenal character of a visual experience of an aeroplane flying overhead is given by giving its content—the aeroplane, its shape and size and so on—and by giving the experience's intentional mode: seeing.⁷³

In this example of seeing the aeroplane the phenomenal character of the state of affairs is spread out between the content and the intentional mode of sight. The phenomenal character of the

⁷² Ibid. p. 51.

⁷³ Ibid. p. 51.

content - its presented qualities, e.g. the shape, size, etc. of the aeroplane is one part. The other is the undescribed phenomenal character of the mode - the seeing. Thus:

— content (ii): shape, size, etc.

Phenomenal character of seeing the aeroplane {

— mode(iii): sight

This lack of phenomenal description of the intentional mode does not carry over into Crane's account of pain however. How the phenomenal character of pain is jointly constituted by mode and content is clear from a portion of the quote I began this section with. Consider again the text from p. 23:

. . . the content of the sensation is that one's ankle hurts, the object of the sensation is the ankle (apprehended as one's ankle) and the mode is the hurting.⁷⁴

Thus the phenomenal character spread for phenomenal pain according to Crane's Intentionalism would look like this:

— content (ii): 'that my ankle hurts'

Phenomenal character of pain {

— mode (iii): 'hurting'

Consistent with his model, Crane holds the attributed content to the ankle and the way it is attributed as jointly comprising the phenomenal character of phenomenal pain. Below, I will look at which ones of these is best identified with painfulness.

⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 51.

4. WHERE THIS VIEW LOCATES THE PHENOMENAL PAINFULNESS OF PAIN.

So, in answering my Painfulness Question, in this spread of phenomenal character of pain from intentional mode to attributed content, where is the painfulness? Consider again the text from p. 53:

. . . the content of the sensation is that one's ankle hurts, the object of the sensation is the ankle (apprehended as one's ankle) and *the mode is the hurting*.⁷⁵

Between the attributed content, and the intentional mode, the intentional mode of 'hurting' looks most like the painfulness of pain. Supporting this position is the similar wording this same position is found in in Crane (2009):

Hence the intensity of a pain should not be thought of so much as a property of the pain, but rather as a determination of an intentional mode.⁷⁶

Thus, with respect to the phenomenal character of painfulness, the item in Crane's system it is identical to is as follows:

Phenomenal character of painfulness ---> intentional mode (iii) of 'hurting'

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 53; emphasis mine.

⁷⁶ Crane (2009) p.489.

In answer to my Painfulness Question. I will take Crane's intentional mode of 'hurting' in his four-fold structure of pain as his answer. Before I conclude with this, I will argue for this identification briefly.

That Crane identifies painfulness with the intentional mode in the mental-state of pain is easier to see using an analogy and illustration he offers in Crane (2003). First is his analogy of sight to pain:

Pressing the analogy with perception, we can say that pain is a kind of feeling, just as seeing is a kind of perceiving. There are of course many other kinds of bodily feeling: each of these ways in which one can feel one's body are the intentional modes which have parts of the body as their intentional objects.⁷⁷

Sight, being one of our senses grounds the analogy with the sensory capacity that represents bodily pain. So on Crane's Intentionalism, just as sight is a way of perceiving, so pain is the way of sensing part of one's body as hurt. Remember that this intentional mode was revealed just a bit ago as the 'hurting' in the phenomenal character of the four-fold structure of pain. In Crane's account, the 'hurting' is not the content of the mental-state of pain but rather a way that part of the body is perceived. This is clear in a colorful illustration he subsequently gives:

We can capture the spirit of this view by saying that there is a way in which English misleads when we say that Vladimir has a pain in his ankle, as if the pain were a kind of object he had in his

⁷⁷ Crane (2003) p. 52.

ankle. Rather we might say that *Vladimir pains his ankle*, where paining is a relation between the ankle and Vladimir.⁷⁸

Note here, that the ‘paining’ is a way of intending one’s ankle. This ‘paining’ is another way of saying the ‘hurting’ of the intentional mode mentioned previously. Thus in answer to my Painfulness Question, Crane (2003)’s version of Intentionalism would answer that the intentional mode of the four-part structure to pain is identical to the painfulness of pain.

CONCLUSION

First we saw that for Crane’s Intentionalism the sensory mental-state of pain has to be identical to all and only intentional properties. We then looked at what Crane’s model was for this this mental-state, and presented his fourfold structure of mental-state, intentional mode, content and intentional object. This narrowed our focus to what parts of his model are identical to the phenomenal character of pain. We saw that according to Crane, this is pain’s mode and content. From there I asked under my Painfulness Question which of his mode or content is the phenomenal character of the painfulness of pain identical to. The answer was the intentional mode characterized as a ‘hurting,’ or a ‘paining.’

This has the remarkable consequence of the phenomenal character of the pain’s experiential painfulness being identical to an intentional mode exclusively composed by intentional

⁷⁸ Ibid. p. 52; emphasis mine.

properties. Recall the position of Crane's Intentionalism from the previous chapter regarding the composition of mental-states. Extending this to the parts of mental states we have:

- (i) All parts of a mental-state are exclusively composed by intentional properties.
- (ii) Intentional modes of mental-states are a part of those mental-states.

(iii) Intentional modes of mental-states are exclusively composed by intentional properties.

Now applying this to the mental state of phenomenal pain with its intentional mode of 'hurting / paining' we end up with:

- (i) Mental-states' intentional modes are exclusively composed by intentional properties.
- (ii) The phenomenal character of the painfulness of a normal, experiential, bodily pain is an intentional mode of the mental-state of pain.

(iii) The phenomenal character of the painfulness of a normal, experiential, bodily pain is exclusively composed by intentional properties.

With an intentional mode exclusively composed by intentional properties deemed as identical to the painfulness of my Painfulness Question, I begin progressing to the metaphysical comparison of this intentional mode with painfulness. Next in this progression is to rebut Crane's objection that the meaning of 'phenomenal character' supports his Intentionalist definition of pain's painfulness.

CHAPTER FOUR

REBUTTING CRANE'S INTENTIONALISM'S DEFINITION OF PHENOMENAL CHARACTER

INTRODUCTION.

Thinking of the descriptively-thin presented, qualitative pain of Chapter One, if one were to make the phenomenal character of pain's painfulness into an Intentionalist's intentional mode, what would the first step be? The first port of call would be to define 'phenomenal character' into something more accommodating of Intentionalism. Something devoid of sensory, qualitative notions. This chapter rebuts this move by Crane.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

In this chapter I expose a definition of phenomenal character which Crane uses when referring to sensations like experienced painfulness, i.e. ‘conscious character’. This definition is consistent with his Intentionalism. If this definition stands it makes the metaphysical comparison between Crane’s intentional mode of pain and the phenomenal character of the painfulness of pain in the next chapter mute. The route to Crane’s definition is not direct though, and it takes some exposition before it is in a position to be rebutted. After the exposition, I offer my rebuttal centered upon the meaning of ‘phenomenal’ and ‘phenomenal character’.

1. THE ROUTE TO PHENOMENAL CHARACTER

This Crane does but the route is not direct. I will begin with the section of (2003) where he first significantly uses ‘phenomenal’ language. Below is the first mention of ‘phenomenal’ in the context of the apparent qualitative notion of sensations:

It is also possible to use the term ‘qualia’ for the ‘qualitative’ in the broad sense (= the conscious) mentioned in s.1; but to avoid confusion I will here use the term for qualitative properties in the narrow sense. I will use the term ‘phenomenal’ for qualitative in the broader sense (after all, the English phenomenon derives from the Greek for appearance).⁷⁹

‘Phenomenal’ in Crane’s view, is defined in light of two senses Crane makes for ‘qualitative’ in the quote above mentioned under ‘broad’ and ‘narrow.’ The ‘broad’ sense is equated with to simply be conscious of something. What the ‘narrow’ sense is, is not immediately given.

⁷⁹ Crane (2003) p.40.

Following the trail left in this first mention of a definition for ‘phenomenal’, we leave for Section One of (2003)⁸⁰ for an elaboration of each sense of ‘qualitative.’ In understanding Crane’s definition of ‘phenomenal’ this will be determinate. Below is a key section of what he is referring to from Section One of the earlier part of Crane (2003); notice the two senses to ‘qualitative’:

In effect, there are two options. *The first* is that a state of mind is ‘qualitative’ when it has qualities that are like those of sensation. In this sense, perceptions are not qualitative states. So the category of the qualitative is a subcategory of the conscious. One might be happy with this way of talking, so long as one had a satisfactory way of describing *non-qualitative* conscious states. *The second* option is to say that a state of mind is qualitative when it is conscious. In this case, perceptions are qualitative, but then so are many other propositional attitudes.⁸¹

So now we see that the ‘narrow’ sense from the previous quote is the Option One of this one. This ‘narrow / option one’, Crane will refer to as the ‘qualitative’. Informative here is that these are qualitative properties “. . . like those of a sensation . . .”. With reference to the ‘narrow sense’ of ‘qualitative’, Crane a little further on writes explicitly that it refers to something like ‘qualia’:

However, the fact that bodily sensation are intentional states does not rule out their having (narrowly) qualitative properties (qualia) in *addition* to their intentional character. . . . This is a view I call ‘weak intentionalism’. I discuss this view in s. 4. and reject it.⁸²

⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 33 - 37.

⁸¹ Ibid. p. 36 emphasis mine.

⁸² Ibid. p. 37.

The ‘broad’ sense of ‘the conscious’ from the first quote is the Option Two of the text just before my example. As shown in the beginning of this chapter, ‘phenomenal’ in it is defined under this broad ‘consciousness’ of the ‘broad / Second Option’. Connecting the example of perception mentioned above, earlier on the same page Crane developed this example. In this example he presents perception as within a class of mental-states which are broadly qualitative in us being conscious of them, yet are not sensual like a bodily sensation. This is also his way of saying that perceptions are not narrowly qualitative. His example is as follows:


I can consciously realize that now is the time to book the table for the restaurant: there is something it is like for this to suddenly come into my mind. So if the qualitative is just the conscious, then there are many propositional attitudes that are qualitative.

Hammering this gulf between ‘narrow’, qualia embodying, qualitative properties and bare consciousness-possessing, ‘broad’ qualitative properties are his contrast between perception and sensation. Before I make a diagram of Crane’s two senses of ‘qualitative’ with reference to ‘phenomenal’ consider how he enshrines this divide in the example of perception against sensation:

. . . it seems as though perceptual experiences are propositional attitudes that also have qualitative character. . . We can say that perceptions and sensations feel a certain way, to be sure; but it does not take much reflection to realize that the way a perception ‘feels’ is different from the way a bodily sensation feels; . . . So whatever qualitative features are, *we should not think of them as being the same in perception as in sensation.*⁸³

⁸³ Ibid. p. 35 (emphasis *mine*).

There is a categorical denial here. Whatever feel perception is said to have it is not within the same genus of felt texture as bodily sensations are for Crane. I represent these two options / senses of qualitative with respect to ‘phenomenal’ in the tree tree below:



With these two senses of ‘qualitative’ we are almost to the destination of how Crane defines ‘phenomenal character’ in accordance with his Strong Intentionalism. Looking at the diagram above, ‘phenomenal’ is under a ‘broad / ‘ option two’ sense of qualitative and revealed to be only a consciousness-of something. This broad sense of qualitative that ‘phenomenal’ is under for Crane is the bare-consciousness of remembering an appointment or an elusive ‘feel’ a visual perception may have.

With this emphasis upon consciousness-only for ‘phenomenal’ as broadly qualitative, Crane applies this to the phrase ‘phenomenal character’ and comes up with:

So the phenomenal character of experience is its *conscious character*, . . .⁸⁴

And there we have it, our destination - Crane (2003) defines 'Phenomenal character' as 'conscious character'. If one treats each 'phenomenal' and 'character' as their own independent blocks to be connected one would receive this combined meaning — 'phenomenal' is simply a bare consciousness-of something and 'character' is, well, . . . character. Devoid of a narrow qualitative sense, Crane has indeed defined 'phenomenal character' in-line with his Intentionalism. In summary, the route or progression towards this meaning could be construed as follows:

The Progression of 'Phenomenal Character' to 'Conscious Character' for Crane's Strong Intentionalism:

Define two senses of qualitative; one of them conscious-of only.

↓

Place 'phenomenal' under the conscious-of only sense.

↓

Use the phrase 'Phenomenal Character' with the sense 'phenomenal' is under.

↓

Thus, phenomenal character is translated as 'conscious character.'

Let me finish this journey of how Crane defines phenomenal character in line with his Intentionalism with one last note on his posture towards this definition. Writing of this broad sense of qualitative when applied to phenomenal character, he states:

⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 40 (emphasis *mine*).

And it is not contradictory to say that one can give an account of phenomenal character in terms of intentionality.⁸⁵

It makes sense that he would write that it is “. . . not contradictory . . .” to claim that ‘phenomenal character’ can mean ‘conscious character’. If one takes the obvious meaning of each ‘phenomenal’ and ‘character’ on their own there is no contradiction. I agree that when each term is taken independently, the translation is permissible. But this is where the substitution of ‘conscious character’ for the ‘phenomenal character’ of the painfulness of pain stops. Below I will deploy my objection to Crane’s definition of Phenomenal Character.

2. MY OBJECTION TO PHENOMENAL CHARACTER AS CONSCIOUS CHARACTER

My objection is that Crane uses the broad sense implied by the term ‘phenomenal’ simply as ‘appearing’ to cover all of ‘phenomenal character’. There are three good reasons why his definition of ‘phenomenal character’, i.e. ‘conscious character’ should be rejected. Firstly is that ‘phenomenal’ in its historical usage does not strictly mean only ‘appearing’ but it used to imply that *something* appears. This leads into the second objection based upon the meaning of ‘phenomenal character’. Specifically, that the phrase ‘phenomenal character’ implies an appearing of that something’s *qualitative character*. And by this I do not mean Crane’s broadly qualitative. The last third reason has to do with the Phenomenological tradition. This is that the

⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 41 (emphasis *mine*).

Preliminary Definition of Phenomenal Character implied by my first two objections, i.e. ‘something qualitative which appears’ is consistent with the Phenomenological Tradition - which Crane appeals to as shown in the Introduction. These three reasons composing my objection argue that Crane’s definition for phenomenal character should be abandoned for the Preliminary Definition. Below I will unpack my reasons.

3. PHENOMENAL IS NOT USED FOR SOLELY AN APPEARING.

Crane offers as part of the justification for defining ‘phenomenal character’ as ‘conscious character’ the meaning of ‘phenomenal.’ Recall, a line from the portion of text I began the section on Crane’s definition of phenomenal character:

I will use the term ‘phenomenal’ for qualitative in the broader sense (after all, the English phenomenon derives from the Greek for appearance).⁸⁶

Crane is correct that in english when we use ‘phenomenal’ as in ‘phenomenal character’ we are using the adjectival form of the noun ‘phenomenon.’ Noting this though, I have two objections to using the solely the ‘appearing’ meaning of ‘phenomenal’ in supporting the definition of ‘conscious character’ for the ‘phenomenal character’ of painfulness. .

⁸⁶ Ibid. p.40.

First, is that in English the adjective ‘phenomenal’ implies that *something* is appearing. This is in distinction to a full-stop meaning of only ‘consciousness-of’ of Crane’s broad sense of qualitative. That the use of ‘phenomenal’ implies the appearing of something is born out by ‘phenomenal’ being an adjective. Being an adjective, it is modifying a noun, i.e. a *something*. This is evident by the awkwardness in English of saying the ‘conscious character’ of something. In less awkward but more cogent English, rephrasing ‘conscious character’ also implies that there is a *something* which appears. Consider the phrase as a question: “What is the character that you are conscious of?” Here, the *something* in question is the character:

‘conscious-of’ → character

Secondly, is that though Crane appeals to the Greek root of the term for ‘phenomenon’ in support of ‘appearing’ for the meaning of phenomenal, both the Late Latin and Classical Greek roots support my objection via implying that something appears. I’ll look at each in turn.

4. ROOT OF PHENOMENON IMPLYING A PRESENTATION: LATE LATIN

The derivation from Greek Crane mentions in the quote above likely comes to English through the Late Latin.⁸⁷ Not only is Anglo-Saxon a cognate language with Latin, but it has significant borrowing through the Norman conquest and the influence of the Latin Vulgate. The Normans in

⁸⁷ ‘phaenōmēnon’ within Classical Latin is noticeably absent from my Casselli’s: Simpson, D. P. *Cassell’s Latin Dictionary: Latin-English, English-Latin*. London: Cassell, (1977).

particular brought with them their Latin descent French upon anglo-saxon lands. When centuries later a Chauceronian England looked to exalt their impoverished anglo-Saxon, they turned to Norman French vocabulary to barrow and anglicize for enrichment. The greek borrowing, Late Latin likely came into english through here.⁸⁸

When looking at Lewis and Short ‘phaenōmēnon’—based upon the greek ‘φαινόμενο’—does mean ‘appearance’.⁸⁹ But when you look up the references listed each are the appearances of *something*. For the singular, Theodorus Priscianus, a fourth century physician writes of the presentation of particular medical conditions as ‘phaenōmēnon’ in his *Medical Matters in Four Books*.⁹⁰ For the plural, Lactantius’s *Institutiones Divinae* is referenced and the ‘phaenōmēna’ are various things which appear in the air or sky in his course of refuting non-christian views.⁹¹ Again, an appearance of something is the use here.

5. THE GREEK ROOT TO PHENOMENAL

Likewise, ‘Phainómenon’, in classical greek φαινόμενον, is from the passive or middle participle of the verb ‘φαίνω’ - to appear. Thus a ‘phainómenon’ is that which appears, i.e. a phenomenon,

⁸⁸ Wheelock, F. M, *Wheelock’s Latin. 6th edition*. New York, N.Y: HarperResource (2000); Introduction: p.xiii - xxxii.

⁸⁹ *A Latin Dictionary. Founded on Andrews’ edition of Freund’s Latin dictionary.* eds. C. T. Lewis, and C. Short. Oxford. Clarendon Press. (1879.); entry under ‘phaenōmēnon’.

⁹⁰ Theodorus Priscianus, *Rerum Medicarum Libri Quatuor* (Strasburg, 1532); Book 2, Chapter 7ff.

⁹¹ Caelius Lactantius Firmianus, *Institutiones Divinae*, (Liverpool Univ. Press 2003) Book 2, Chapter 5, Passage 11.

an appearance.⁹² This, like the Late Latin based upon it, is the appearance of something. Three references here are instructive.

The pre-socratic Anaxagoras writes that phenomena “are a glimpse of the unseen.”⁹³ Here, the unseen is an appearing. Aristotle in his *Rhetoric* uses various conjugations and tenses of ‘phainein’ for the appearing of an argument that is invalid or unsound.⁹⁴ Relevant feature of appearances to my objection are that these appearances are still the presentation of *something*, i.e. an argument, in this context. Lastly, according to Preus, for Plato, the world we perceive is made up of ‘phainomena’ as shifting modes of being. Opinions vary, e.g. Aristotle, the Epicureans and Stoics, etc. how reliable these appearances are to truth, but relevant to my objection is the feature of appearances that they are still the presentation of *something*.

6. IN SUM FOR PHENOMENAL NOT SUPPORTING CONSCIOUS CHARACTER AS PHENOMENAL CHARACTER.

⁹² I leaning on Anthony Preus’s *Historical Dictionary of Greek Philosophy* (Scarecrow Press: 2007) xxiv + 345; p. 199 entry ‘Phainómenon’.

⁹³ Anaxagoras in DK 59 B21a, being referenced by Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Mathematicians* 7.140; quoted in Preus (2007). The ‘DK’ being quoted is: Diels, H. and W. Kranz, eds., *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. Three Vols. Reprint of Sixth Edition (Berlin 1974). In Diels’ system, (B) stands for fragment and (21) is the number of the fragment, and (a) is a sub-portion of that text.

⁹⁴ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* trans. J.H. Freese, *Aristotle*, Loeb Classical Library, Vol. 22, (Cambridge / Harvard University Press, 1926); Book II, Chapter 24 - 25; e.g. II.24.1 "But as it is possible that some syllogisms may be real, and others not real but only apparent (φαίνεσθαι), there must also be real and apparent (φαίνεσθαι) enthymemes, since the enthymeme is a kind of syllogism." - parentheses mine.

Thus far, both the English and the Late Latin support that 'phenomena' implies an appearance of something. With the Late Latin we saw that it was medical conditions for Theodorus, and things in the sky for Lactanius. We may add Greek to the list of roots for 'phenomenon' in 'phenomenal' which imply the appearance of something. Now we are in a position to ask, what is this *something* which appears? This gets us to the second part of my objection to the broadly qualitative definition of 'phenomenal character' as 'conscious character' when applied to the painfulness of pain. Namely, that that 'phenomenal character' means an appearing of a something which is *qualitative* - not bare-consciousness as in Crane's broad sense of 'qualitative'.

7. THE SOMETHING WHICH APPEARS IS QUALITATIVE

This second part of my objection to the Tim Crane's Strong Intentionalist broadly qualitative definition of 'phenomenal character' builds upon the last section's focus upon 'phenomenal'. With 'phenomenal' implying an appearance of something, in the phrase 'phenomenal character' we have supplied what that something is in this case - character. So, in the first analysis, 'phenomenal character' means 'appearing character'. Less awkwardly and more cogently we could rephrase this as, 'the character which appears to you'. Thus:

'appears to you' (phenomenal) → 'character'

Now we can suss out ‘character’. The chief difficulty is that the phrase ‘phenomenal character’ is not commonly used in vernacular english outside of Philosophy of Mind. This perhaps is what makes it a lacuna for various theoretical fill-ins. My recourse to defining it is to look to the meaning of ‘phenomenal’ (above) and now see how ‘phenomenal character’ could be used in context in english. Let me illustrate by an example.

Lets say you travel to northern Sweden and see the Northern Lights for the first time. You observe their undulating, luminescent (frequently) green colors in the night sky. After this visit, you travel back to your home and friends ask you about what the Norther Lights were like.

They likely did not ask you, “What was the *phenomenal character* of the Northern Lights you saw?” If we were to stick to versions of ‘phenomenal’ and ‘character’ they could say, perhaps in frustration, “What was the character of the phenomena?”. Or replacing ‘phenomena’ with ‘appeared’ we could get “What was the character of the Northern Lights which appeared to you?” In all of these formulations, what the friend is asking for is a description, relaying the qualities of the Northern Lights which you saw. You may reply with its color, movement, shape, size, etc., e.g., “It was long, green and ribbon-like; slowly moving against the night sky.” The color, shape, size, movement, etc. are all qualitative properties of the Aurora Borealis experienced by you. This is the ‘character’ in question. Thus:

‘character’ = qualitative properties.

And, these qualitative properties together, when experienced by you were its phenomenal character at that time. I will buttress this interpretation of ‘character’ with a portion of text from Tim Crane himself.

Interestingly, in another portion of (2003) Tim Crane would agree with me in respect to phenomenal character. While unpacking the nature of an intentional mode, he gives the example of the mode of sight vs. hearing and illustrates phenomenal character. This is the example of the aeroplane:

Consider first a strong intentionalist theory of perception, and what it would say about the phenomenal character of (say) visual experience. The phenomenal character of a visual experience of an aeroplane flying overhead is given by giving its content—the aeroplane, its *shape and size and so on* . . . Certain properties of objects (e.g. *colors*) can be apprehended only in certain modes, so cannot figure in the content of certain modes (one cannot *smell* colours). But others are not mode-specific: thus, for example, the difference between seeing shapes and *feeling* them . . .⁹⁵

In this section of text, under phenomenal character we have shape, size, colors, smells and texture. These are all qualitative properties. Crane even says this of colors, that they are “. . . Certain properties of objects . . .”.⁹⁶ So, even by Crane’s own omission, we have phenomenal character as qualities of presented objects, e.g. the aeroplane in this case. At this juncture, looking at the meaning of ‘phenomenal’ and ‘phenomenal character’ it would be fair to define ‘phenomenal character’ as:

⁹⁵ Crane (2003) p. 51, emphasis *mine*.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.* p. 51.

Preliminary definition: Phenomenal Character:

df: 'phenomenal character' = qualitative properties which appear to us.

Notice how distinct the Preliminary Definition of Phenomenal Character just given—and Crane's omission about the areoplane—are from his broadly qualitative definition of phenomenal character:

df: 'phenomenal character' = conscious character

The two definitions differ in two broad and important ways. Crane's broadly qualitative phenomenal character is of the mental-state (experience) and not of the intended object. Secondly, in being broadly qualitative (in his sense) it is devoid of qualitative properties. Instead, Crane's experience is bare awareness or consciousness-of. This is in stark contrast to the qualitative properties which are appearing or being presented in the Auroa Borealis or the areoplane.

Important to note here that this Preliminary Definition of Phenomenal Character is one I reside with before Husserl-izing it in Chapter Five. I will build upon it with Husserl's Logical Investigations in the next two chapters. This Preliminary Definition for 'phenomenal character' brings me to my third good reason for objecting to Crane's 'consciousness only' definition of phenomenal character: the Phenomenological tradition.

8. REASON THREE: THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL TRADITION

That Phenomenal Character is simply not a broadly-qualitative, ‘consciousness-of’ but rather in line with my Preliminary Definition of appearing qualitative properties, is also supported by Phenomenology’s tradition. Dan Zahavi⁹⁷ in commenting upon the Modern Analytic tradition, notes that the Phenomenological tradition eschews placing qualitative properties of ‘presented’ worldly objects—with their phenomenal character—inside the mind. Rather, Phenomenology with its emphasis upon the transcendental nature of experience and ‘being in the world’, generally consider phenomenal character down at the presented object-end of the ‘mental-state —> intentional object’ relationship. Consider Zahavi here:

The so-called qualitative character of experience, the taste of a lemon, the smell of coffee, the coldness of an ice cube are not at all qualities belonging to some spurious mental objects, but qualities of the presented objects.⁹⁸

Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre are all marshaled in support by Zahavi. Important in displaying the Phenomenological Tradition’s support for my Preliminary Definition, notice how the ‘what’ of what is presented are *qualitative* properties, e.g. the taste of a lemon, smell of coffee, the felt cold of an ice cube, etc. Also, the obvious fact, that in Zahavi’s summary, these qualities are qualities

⁹⁷ Dan Zahavi, “Intentionality and phenomenally: a phenomenological take on the hard problem”, *The Problem of Consciousness: New Essays in Phenomenological Philosophy of Mind*; E. Thompson (ed.), *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*; Supplementary Volume 29, (2003): 63-92.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 73-74

of *presented* objects. Here we have both the qualitative properties and and ‘appearing’ of my Preliminary Definition for Phenomenal Character.

Zahavi notes that for thinkers such as Husserl, here can be phenomenal character in both locations: mental-act and the object. Important to note here that the phenomenal character of each is grounded in them being *presented*, not in their *location*. Strangely enough, many Analytics will sidestep presentation as being essential to being phenomenal, and will focus upon location. For them it is being located in the ‘where’ of the mind. This location provides the *différens* as to what is called phenomenal, as in phenomenal character. David Chalmers is explicit on this locational *différens* for what is ‘phenomenal’:

Some representationalists, such as Dretske and Tye, occasionally put their view by saying that phenomenal properties are identical to certain *represented* external properties, such as physical redness. As I am putting things, that would be a category mistake: phenomenal properties are by definition properties of subjects or of mental states, and physical redness is not (or need not be).⁹⁹

In case it is unclear that it is not redness when presented which is a phenomenal for Chalmers, consider him in another work from the same year. In this example, the very red apple that is being looked at cannot be said to be phenomenal. Additionally, he is again explicit that what is phenomenal is a property of a mental state:

Mary looks at a red apple, and visually experiences its color. This experience instantiates a phenomenal property R, which we might call phenomenal redness. It is natural to say that Mary is having a red

⁹⁹ David Chalmers, “The Representational Character of Experience.” in B. Leiter (ed.) *The Future for Philosophy* (Oxford, 2004) : 153 - 181; p. 156.

experience, even though of course experiences are not red in the same sense in which apples are red. Phenomenal redness (a property of experiences, or of subjects of experience) is a different property from external redness (a property of external objects), but both are respectable properties in their own right.¹⁰⁰

Locating phenomenality in mental-states has the strange implication that extra-mental physical objects like the apple above and Crane's aeroplane and the Aurora Borealis above —*when presented*—cannot be said to have phenomenal character. One cannot speak of the phenomenal character of their presented color or sound. More recently Jeff Speaks reiterated this position on 'phenomenal' properties:

It should be uncontroversial that phenomenal properties, as introduced above, are properties of conscious subjects. (Hence phenomenal properties, as defined above, pertain to what is sometimes called 'creature consciousness' as opposed to 'state consciousness.')

The phenomenal property that I instantiate at a time is what it is like to be me at that time.¹⁰¹

Speaks will explicitly say that what goes for phenomenal properties also goes for phenomenal character.¹⁰² Earlier, Alex Byrne would make the same statement about the location 'phenomenal character':

¹⁰⁰ David Chalmers, "Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument." in Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), *There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument*. (MIT Press). (2004): 269 - 298; p. 271.

¹⁰¹ Jeff Speaks, "Is Phenomenal Character Really Out There in the World?", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*; (2015): 91 (2):465-482; p.

¹⁰² Ibid. p.467. "[R2] For every phenomenal property, there is some phenomenal character such that that phenomenal property is identical to (or supervenes on) the property of having an experience with that phenomenal character. . . . [∀F: F is a phenomenal property][∃G: G is a phenomenal character] F = the property of having some experience e such that G(e)."

It seems to me preferable to sort out these basic ontological questions first, before starting the philosophical argument. And this is best done, I think, by stipulating that the phenomenal character of an experience *e* is a property, specifically a property of *e*: that property that types *e* according to what it's like to undergo *e*. . . . For these reasons, the PANIC theory . . . [Tye's view] . . . will be set out here with phenomenal character understood as a property of a mental state, a fortiori not a proposition.¹⁰³

Note carefully here that 'e' is the experience, and for Alex Byrne 'phenomenal character' is a property of 'e'. For Byrne, to be 'phenomenal' is first to belong to a mental-state of experience. It does not hinge on qualitative properties appearing / being presented a la my Preliminary Definition of Phenomenal Character. In comportment with the Phenomenological Tradition note how Michael Tye's response to both both Byrne and Speaks is in line with my Preliminary Definition of Phenomenal Character. Consider Ty's response to Byrne first:

. . . a quick comment on phenomenal character. . . . we talk of beliefs as having content and of words as having meaning, but we don't take belief contents or word meanings to be properties of beliefs and words respectively. Why do that from the outset for phenomenal character? Buy into the Cartesian view of experiences as inner ideas or pictures viewed by an inner eye and it may be natural to take the 'feel' of an experience as a property of the idea or picture. But that isn't commonsense. It's philosophical dogma — precisely the dogma which representationalism opposes.¹⁰⁴

Illustrative is how Tye writes that the contents of beliefs are not properties of those some beliefs. This is exactly the strange consequence of not defining phenomenal character around what is presented. That Tye rials against the Cartesian 'inner theater' reflects his placing of what is

¹⁰³ Alex Byrne, "DON'T PANIC: Tye's Intentionalist Theory of Consciousness," *A Field Guide to Philosophy of Mind: Symposium on Michael Tye's Consciousness, Color and Content*; (Winter 2002) : 3-27. <<http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/tyesymp.pdf>>; p. 9 (*emphasis mine*).

¹⁰⁴ Michael Tye, "To PANIC or Not to PANIC? - Reply to Byrne," *A Field Guide to Philosophy of Mind: Symposium on Michael Tye's Consciousness, Color and Content*; (Winter 2002): 28-33. <<http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/tyesymp.pdf>>; p. 30.

phenomenal ‘down’ where presentation is and not exclusively upon mental-states. Using the example of staring at a red computer screen, Tye, in a article rebutting Speaks reinforces this presentational definition of phenomenal character with typical object properties of colors:

What my experience is like – what is often called ‘the phenomenal character of my experience’ -- is not a property of my experience. The only properties of which I am aware are external properties, including the color red. So, the phenomenal character of my experience is a cluster of external properties. In the simplest case, it is just the color red.¹⁰⁵

Displaying that this is in concert with the Phenomenological Tradition, Zahavi will remark approvingly of Tye in this respect:

Dretske's and Tye's intentionalistic interpretation of phenomenal qualities has the great advantage of staying clear of any kind of immanentism. As already mentioned, it also bears a certain resemblance to views found in phenomenology.¹⁰⁶

Zahavi will note Tye’s insistence upon putting phenomenal character ‘not in the head’, and his endorsement of the Transparency of Experience as having significant parallels in the Phenomenological Tradition. Both of these show Phenomenology’s comportment with my Preliminary Definition of Phenomenal Character.

¹⁰⁵ Michael Tye, “Yes, Phenomenal Character Really is Out There in the World.”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*; 91 (2): 483-488 (2015); p. 485.

¹⁰⁶ Zahavi (2003); p. 76.

9. IN SUM FOR PHENOMENAL CHARACTER NOT SUPPORTING CONSCIOUS CHARACTER AS PHENOMENAL CHARACTER'S MEANING.

In this part of my objection to Crane's Strong Intentionalist definition of 'conscious character' for 'phenomenal character' focusing upon the meaning of 'phenomenal character.' I argued on the basis of two things that 'phenomenal character' means 'qualitative properties which appear to us'. Firstly, that in dependence upon the meaning of 'phenomenal' I argued for, 'phenomenal character' as an 'appearing of something'. This 'something' in 'phenomenal character' is obviously 'character'. Secondly, I argued that this 'character' is qualitative properties as shown by how contextually the phrase is used in English to ask for someone's qualitative assay of something that appeared to them. I supported this account via a quote from Crane (2003) where in contrast to his broad qualitative sense he uses 'phenomenal character' to refer to narrow qualitative properties. I buttressed these two reasons with the Phenomenological Tradition's agreement with my Preliminary Definition for Phenomenal Character's emphasis upon qualitative appearing, or presentation.

CONCLUSION

I have objected that the phrase 'phenomenal character' cannot be a broadly qualitative 'consciousness-of' or sheer appearing, i.e. the 'conscious character' of Tim Crane's. I supported this on the basis of the meaning of 'phenomenal' and 'phenomenal character.' I argued that

‘phenomenal’ implies the appearing of something. I furthermore argued that ‘phenomenal character’ implies that the character appearing are qualitative properties like colors, sounds, textures, etc. distinct from qualitatively-sheer, broadly qualitative properties. I conclude that ‘phenomenal character’ as an Intentionalist’s ‘conscious character’ should be abandoned. In the next two chapters I will begin my turn to Husserl to meet Crane’s Husserl inspired view of intentionality with what (in the Investigations) the Phenomenal Character of pain’s painfulness would be. This is in preparation for the metaphysical comparison of Crane’s painfulness to my Husserlian one.

CHAPTER FIVE

HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENAL CHARACTER

INTRODUCTION

Progressing to the metaphysical comparison of the competing descriptions of the phenomenal character of pain's painfulness I desire a more rigorous description of 'phenomenal character' to be used for painfulness than developed last chapter. Namely, that if Tim Crane is willing to draw from Brentano / Husserl for intentionality, then why not meet him with what, for Husserl, the phenomenal character of pain's painfulness would be? I answer in the affirmative. With an eye to the qualitative and presented nature of painfulness, this section of my thesis divides into two parts. Part One, is this chapter on what Phenomenal Character would be for Husserl's Investigations. Part two, in the next chapter, is then sketching an account of pain and its painfulness also from the Investigations. In this sense then, I first develop an account of phenomenal character from the Investigations and then plug pain into it to get painfulnesses

phenomenal character - focusing in upon its qualitative and presented nature. Thus, I begin with Phenomenal Character from Husserl's Logical Investigations.

Recall from Chapter Three, that Crane's Intentionalism describes the phenomenal character of pain's painfulness as an intentional mode of pain exclusively constituted by intentional properties. Following this Crane claimed that intentionality could completely constitute pain's painfulness's phenomenal character. In Chapter Four, I rebutted Crane (2003)'s Intentionalist definition of 'phenomenal character' and concluded that the locution 'phenomenal character' reasonably means:

Preliminary Definition of Phenomenal Character:

def. 'phenomenal character' = the qualitative properties which appear to us.

But with the up coming metaphysical comparison to Crane's intentional mode, I want some increased rigor in defining the two key parts of this definition of phenomenal character:

Key Parts to the Preliminary Definition of Phenomenal Character:

- 'appear to'
- 'qualitative properties'

Each of these two parts when writing of the phenomenal character of the painfulness of pain could use some revision. First, is that the 'appears to' can admit more than once sense. Second,

that ‘qualitative property’ is decent, but as mentioned earlier I will refine it with Husserl. With these in mind, I will migrate the Preliminary Definition to the more rigorous Husserlian definition for the up and coming metaphysical comparison. To do this I am primarily going to turn to early Phenomenology - but specifically, in the form of Edmund Husserl and his Logical Investigations. I will share my justification for this turn to Husserl.

In my view a migration from the Preliminary Definition to a Husserlian Definition of phenomenal character is justified when addressing Crane’s description of the phenomenological character of pain’s painfulness on two accounts. Firstly, in that Tim Crane appeals to phenomenology in advancing his description. This was shown in the Introduction. In this sense, consulting one of the leading figures who largely instigated the tradition of Phenomenology, is justified. If anyone deserves to be a Archimedean starting point for what phenomenal character means when applied to experienced entities—like felt, bodily pain—it is Edmund Husserl. Secondly, because Crane is explicitly appealing to Brentano and Husserl for his version of intentionality. Consider how he roots his argument for intentionality as the mark of the mental:

. . . ‘It is of the very nature of consciousness to be intentional’ said Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘and a consciousness that ceases to be a consciousness of something would *ipso facto* cease to exist’. Sartre here endorses the central doctrine of Husserl’s phenomenology, itself inspired by a famous idea of Brentano’s: that intentionality, the mind’s ‘direction upon its objects’, is what is distinctive of mental phenomena.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ Crane (1998) : p.229.

With this appeal to Husserl and Brentano, why not match Crane with what, in Husserl's view, this descriptively-thin, Analytic phenomenal character of pain's painfulness would be? This and the next chapter are an answer in the affirmative. Granting these two reasons, utilizing Husserl in his *Logical Investigations*¹⁰⁸ I will begin the Husserlian definition of phenomenal character, later to be completed with pain's painfulness. These elements, enable Husserl's view of pain in the *Investigations* as a feeling-sensation which can function as a presented 'object' and/or and act, intelligible. Importantly, these two parts reveal the phenomenal character of painfulness to be *presented* and identified with *qualitative* properties

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

In this chapter I begin to develop an *Investigations* based definition of the phenomenal character of pain's painfulness I will be using in the metaphysical comparison. This leads into a further presentation of each element used in the definition. The entire definition for this phenomenal character of pain's painfulness would read as 'abstracted, intuited, qualitative properties of a presented pain object' — or AIQPPPO. Focusing in upon phenomenal character, I will cover 'abstracted', 'intuited', 'qualitative', 'properties', and 'presented object' — or 'AIPPO'. The 'Q' of 'Qualitative' will be left for the next chapter when I plug in the feeling-sensation of pain as the 'presented object', i.e. PO.

¹⁰⁸ Edmund Husserl (1900/1901) *Logical Investigations*, Vol. I & II, *International Library of Philosophy*, trans. J.N. Findalay (1970), eds. D. Moran (2001), Routledge (2013). Sincere this edition of the *Logical Investigations* is heavily edited by Moran, i.e. he draws from differing german editions to make this one; I will use the traditional notation, i.e. LI (investigation number, eg. VI), (Chapter, e.g. 3) and (Section number, eg. 23) along with Moran (2013) edition's page numbers, e.g. LI VI Ch. 3, sec. 23 (p. 235 - 236).


1. THE MIGRATION OF DEFINITIONS.

As is often with Husserl, what begins with such evident beginnings, leads to something intricate. This is no different with the phenomenal character. Using sample, structures taken mostly from the Fifth and Sixth Investigations, I will rigorize ‘phenomenal character’ as the *abstracted, intuited properties of a presented object*:

Phenomenal Character (AIPPO):

df: ‘phenomenal character’ = abstracted, intuited properties of a presented object

To understand what the abstracted, intuited properties of a presented object are according to Husserl in the Investigations will take some unpacking - which I will begin below. The structure it gives this chapter, is that I am seeking to migrate the Preliminary Definition of Phenomenal Character to my AIPPO definition. This migration will look like this:



The Preliminary Definition of Phenomenal Character's 'qualitative properties' will be broken down into the 'abstracted, intuited properties', i.e. AIP. The 'appears to' into a 'presented object', i.e. PO. The intuited properties, and their abstraction from a presented object come together in AIPPO. This AIPPO definition of Phenomenal Character will provide me with the 'presented' in pain's painfulness. But first, let me support this through developing the definition from the Investigations.

2. AIPPO FROM THE INVESTIGATIONS

To understand the AIPPO Definition's 'abstracted, intuited properties' and 'presented object', I think it is most useful to center it upon Husserl's example of perceiving a box. I will share his example of perceiving a box and then unpack the notions need to understand it. Here we go with the first example from LI V:

All this becomes clear if we change our field of illustration for that of vision. . . . I see a thing, e.g. this box, . . . I always see one and the same box, however it may be turned and tilted. . . . But each turn yields a new 'content of consciousness'. Very different contents are therefore experienced, though the same object is perceived. The experienced content, generally speaking is not the perceived object. . . . In the flux of experienced content, we imagine ourselves to be in touch with one and same object.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ LI V. Ch. 2, Sec. 14 (p. 104)

The box example is used by Husserl in trying to answer the question of how do we have the experience of perceiving the box, when at any one point in time, we do not see all sides of it? Here the tension is between the phenomena of being in the presence of the box, contrasted with that of what sides, surfaces of the box we are actually experiencing at a time.

Contrast of phenomenal data:

‘the full-bodily presence of the box before us’ <—vs.—> ‘the sides of the box seen by us’

Understandably, Husserl’s question with the perception of the box is how do we reconcile the phenomenal data of these two? If only parts of the box are experienced by us, how do we walk away with a presentation of the box itself? Why do we not just have an experience of a mock storefront husk of the box, hollow behind the sides which show? Instead we experience the presentation of the object itself. How he resolves this will lead me to defining AIPPO Phenomenal Character.

To do this I need to look to the next time he uses something like the box example in the next Investigation, i.e. LI VI. The challenging element in this next step is that the box-like example in LI VI is moored Husserl’d categories. I will display the text first, and then unpack it. Writing of *visual* perception taken in isolation, Husserl writes:

Perception, . . . claims to give us the object ‘itself’, . . . But generally, and in all cases of ‘external’ perception, this remains a mere pretension. The object is not actually given, it is not given wholly and entirely as that which it itself is . . . “ [via visual perception alone] “. . . It is only given ‘from the front’, only ‘perspectively foreshortened and projected’ etc. While many of its properties are

illustrated in the nuclear content of the precept, . . . many others are not present in the precept in such an illustrated form: the elements of the invisible rear side, the interior, etc., are no doubt subsidiarily intended in more or less definite fashion, symbolically suggested by what is primarily apparent, but are not themselves part of the intuitive . . . content of the precept.¹¹⁰

One can see the similarity with the box example from LI V. In this text from LI VI, the question is over whether visual perception alone can give us the presentation of the object when visual perception alone often only gives us some slice or part of the object at a time, and not the whole, e.g. “. . . it is only given ‘from the front’ . . .” etc.. Helpful in this quote is that Husserl also writes of properties. Here, what is experienced are often *some* of the *properties* of an object — not *all* of them. Thus we are back to the problem of the contrast in phenomenal data again between presented object and experienced properties of that object. How Husserl resolves this phenomenal tension between presentation of the entire box vs experience of some of its properties is intimated in the end of the text. The ‘invisible rear side’ and ‘interior’ of the box are intended, but not *intuitively*. Instead they are ‘symbolically suggested.’ This contrast between intuition and *signification*, will prove crucial for understanding the AIPPO. Crucial for it leads to *presentation* and *meaning*.

3. THE DISTINCTION: MEANING VS. PRESENTATION

¹¹⁰ LI VI Ch. 2, Sec. 14, (p. 220) insertion ‘[. . .]’ mine.

It was the early Phenomenologists from the Munich and Göttingen circles who debated the contrast between mental-acts, which *meant* their objects versus mental-acts which *presented* them to the subject.¹¹¹ Describing it broadly, meaning (*meinen*) was largely reserved for thinking about something when that object was not present and perceived. This is distinct from naming the object or imaging the object - both of which could accompany the mental-act of meaning.¹¹² In this sense think of our traveler before they went and saw the Northern Lights. Without imagining the Northern Lights, someone in *thinking* about the Lights signifies the object of the Lights—in as sense, ‘points’ to them—without having the object of the Lights brought before them. In thinking about the Northern Lights without perceiving them, our traveler is ‘meaning’ them. Walter Hopp gives a nice example of thinking about his bicycle, presumably locked in the bike rack in front of the building while up in his office. Here, his thought is ‘meaning’ the bicycle which is non-present to him from where he is seated in his office. From there he could go downstairs and see the bicycle.¹¹³

Presentation (*Vorstellung*)¹¹⁴ on the other hand is defined broadly in contrast to meaning. Where in meaning the object, the object is not present to the conscious experience of the subject - in

¹¹¹ Here, I am indebted to Salice (2015).

¹¹² Salice (2016) notes that in reference to how non presentational nor necessarily linguistic or imagistic meaning was, by one of the early Phenomenologist, Adolf Reiner called “blind” for its lack of presentation: (1911a, 106 Eng. 328) 1911a, ‘Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils,’ in *Sämtliche Werke*, pp. 95–140. Eng. trans. by B. Smith 1982. ‘On the Theory of the Negative Judgment,’ in *Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology*, B. Smith (ed.), Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 315– 346, 351–377.

¹¹³ Walter Hopp, “Introduction: Intuitions.” *Teorema: Revista Internacional De Filosofia*, vol. 34, no. 3, (2015) : 5–18 ; p. 6; Hopp’s fuller look at presentation can be seen in his addressing intuitive content and the nature of interpretation for Husserl in his “Husserl on Sensation, Perception, and Interpretation”, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Jun., 2008) : 219-245.

¹¹⁴ Ibid. p.11-12; presentation is first mentioned by Salice (2016) under Alexander Pfander as ‘Vorstellung’. Pfander’s work is referenced under (1900, 25ff.) (*Phänomenologie des Wollens. Eine psychologische Analyse*, Leipzig: Barth). Salice on Pfander: “. . . he recognizes that presentations are always intuitive (anschaulich), . . .”

vorstellung it is. Using our Northern lights example, the traveler in going from thinking about the Northern Lights to traveling and seeing them, moved beyond meaning the Lights to presenting. Continuing with professor Hopps's bicycle example above, he presents the bicycle to himself when he goes downstairs to unlock his bike and ride home. There he is visually presented with his bicycle.

4. HUSSERL ON THE DISTINCTION IN HIS INVESTIGATIONS

Husserl has a direct interaction with this distinction in LI VI. In how the 'box problem' illustrates what would be his view of phenomenal character it is centrally important. Before I display the text, it may be important to note three things.

Firstly, is to address the 'I' of 'intuitive' within Husserl. To those unfamiliar with Husserl, the talk of 'intuitive'.¹¹⁵ Here, for Husserl, 'intuitive' minimally means 'direct' as in the sense of mediated or not-mediated and is often applied to sensory experience.¹¹⁶ This is the 'I' in AIPPO. In the LI VI passage above Husserl uses it with visual sensory experience, e.g. “. . . part of the intuitive . . . content of the precept.” What was brought forward in visual perception was said to

¹¹⁵ For how differently Analytic Philosophy has come to use the term 'intuition' and its cognates from early Phenomenologists, see John J. Drummond, "Intuitions" *Teorema: Revista Internacional De Filosofia*, vol. 34, no. 3, (2015); p. 19-36; Aaron Preston gives a historical account of the shift from early Phenomenology's sense of 'intuition' to Analytic Philosophy's rational insight or confidence in a proposition without evidence in his "Intuition in Analytic Philosophy." *Teorema: Revista Internacional De Filosofia*, vol. 34, no. 3, (2015), pp. 37-56.

¹¹⁶ I write 'minimally' because as Drummond (2015) noted above would expand the direct nature of Husserl's intuitions to “. . . an episodic character; the presence of an attentive mind; perfect clarity, i.e., having the intended object directly present as it is itself; and a truth-disclosive character.” p.1.

be “intuitive.” This makes sense when considering how in-direct ‘meaning’ an object was, e.g. solely thinking about the object as opposed to perceiving it, etc. More on this under ‘signitive’, below. With ‘intuition’ as one of the key features of Husserl’s view of perception, Kevin Mulligan has even remarked that the early Husserl was a kind of sophisticated naive realist.¹¹⁷

Briefly, the second feature important to understanding this text from the Sixth Investigation is that of the ‘act-object’ structure to Husserl’s philosophy of mind. Analytic philosophy of mind has taken to speaking of ‘mental states,’. Husserl will write of our mental-states as ‘mental-acts’ and often simply as an ‘act’. What the act presents is its’ object. Here, the object is what visual perception presented to us. Being visual perception, the emphasis is upon the intuitive. As we will see later, according to the Investigations, perception of many everyday objects are actually a mixture primarily of intuition and signification.

Thirdly, is in the nature of ‘signitive’.¹¹⁸ By ‘signitive’, Husserl means things like concepts which—when appropriately correct—‘mean’ or ‘point to’ their objects. This is broadly different than the presentation of the seen Bicycle and Northern Lights mentioned above. As indicated by the name, ‘signitive’ acts or parts, i.e. moments, operate more as signs referring to something

¹¹⁷ Kevin Mulligan even characterizes this aspect of Husserl’s view of perception as a sophisticated version of Naive Realism; see. K. Mulligan, “Perception” in eds. D.W. Smith & B. Smith, *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, (Cambridge University Press; 1995); p. 168 - 138; esp. p. 169 “. . . His central thesis concerning *what we see* is that the primary object of perception are public things, the things we all think we see most of the time, which stand before us *in propria persona* (LI V sec.11, sec.14, sec.2). In this respect Husserl is decidedly a naive realist. But he also wants to claim that this direct, straightforward perception of public things is mediated by what he calls *perceptual content*: we always see what we see in a particular way (LI I sec. 23). . . .”.

¹¹⁸ Thomas Byrne, “Husserl’s Theory of Signitive and Empty Intentions in Logical Investigations and its Revisions: Meaning Intentions and Perceptions”, *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, (Routledge, Taylor & Francis 2020) is an invaluable resource for the signitive in the Investigations.

which may or may not exist at that time or absolutely. The signitive entity of the concept of a square-circle absolutely has no object it points to - there are no actual square-circle objects. Blueprints on the other hand, can exist before the building they refer and during the completed building's existence. In both of these examples they are 'signitive.' In the LI VI passage above, 'signitive' is used when it says of what is not seen of the box-like thing is intended as ". . . symbolically suggested by what is primarily apparent . . .". I take by "symbolically" Husserl implies 'signitive'. Now on to Husserl's treatment of presentation and meaning.

I introduced the early phenomenologist's distinction between presentation and meaning with independent mental-acts, i.e. mental-states of seeing or meaning a bicycle or the Northern Lights. In the Sixth Investigation below, Husserl begins with this conception. The contrast is between mental acts which have their *presented* objects and those which do not (meanings). In this portion of LI VI Husserl reflects this, but then goes on to compare the parts of a *single* mental-act which has intuitive parts and signitive (meaning) parts — which together —present an intended object. This is where the text becomes most instructive. Below is as follows:

In an intuitive presentation (*vorstellung*) an object is meant in the matter of perception or imagination: in this manner it is more or less perfectly made apparent. To each part and each property of the object, including its reference to a *here* and *now*, there must necessarily be a corresponding part or moment of the conscious act. What we do not mean, is simply not there for our presentation (*Vorstellung*). We now find in general that it is possible to draw the following phenomenological distinction between:

- (1) *The purely intuitive 'substance' (Gehalt)* of the act, i.e. all that corresponds in the act of the sum total of the of the object properties that 'become apparent'.

- (2) *The signitive 'substance'* of the act, which corresponds to the sum total of the remaining, subsidiarily given properties of the object, which do not themselves become apparent.¹¹⁹

What is in view is the perception of an object, like our box above. In this presentation the object is more or less “made apparent”. Here is our *vorstellung*. Where the *meaning* nature of the signitive comes in, is in all parts of the presented object which are not intuited. Together, the intuitive part and the signitive part of the act, are responsible for the presentation of an object as a whole - *in propria persona*. What is revealing is how explicit this part of LI VI is, in Husserl’s focus upon the *single* mental-act of presenting the object with these two parts:

— intuitive part (moment): corresponds to all the properties of the object that were experienced.

Mental-act presenting an object {

— signitive part (moment): corresponds to all the remaining properties of the object which were not apparent (hence not intuited) but meant at that time.

These two parts each take a share of the properties of the intentional object to correspond to. Together in the mental-act they are responsible for presentation the whole intended object. Notice in the list section of the quote that the relationship between the signitive part and the intuitive part of the mental act. The signitive seem to ‘fill out’ the presentation of the object by corresponding to “. . . to the sum total of the *remaining* subsidiarily given properties . . .” which were not apparent. The properties given intuitively seem to have a primacy and together with the

¹¹⁹ LI VI Ch. 3, Sec. 23 (p. 235 - 236)

signitive moments are responsible for the presentation for the entire object. This relationship is easily seen with our box and box-like examples above.

For ease of presentation I use the example of a single box, i.e. a cube, with a single property standing for each side. So, our box has a total of six properties. The box is tilted towards us so only three of its six sides can be seen by us, i.e. properties (1-3). These are experienced and intuited by us. The remaining unseen sides, i.e. properties (4-6) at this time are solely signified by us in concert with the intuitive parts of the mental act:

Intuitive: experiences the apparent properties (1-3); —————
} presenting the (6)
property box at t
signitive: ‘means’ all the remaining non-appearing properties (4-6) —————

Now, we are thrown back to the phenomenal data in LI V we began this section on Husserl with. The phenomenal data of having the box presented before us - not a husk of three visible sides only - vs what sides were intuited by us. What LI VI reveals is that the entire box is presented to us via our mental-act having two main parts. A part which intuited the presently visible sides of the box—and—a part which signifies, or means, the unseen sides of the box.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ With the intuitive / signitive structure to many perceptual mental acts that I put forward, I come to a very different conclusion than Kevin Mulligan: “. . . Husserl argues that seeing particulars *is not any sort of meaning*, neither naming (whether descriptive or not) nor predicating. . . .” in his “Perception.” In *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl.*, Eds B. Smith/D. Woodruff Smith (Cambridge, 1995):168–238; p.171 (emphasis *mine*). The quote from LI VI Ch. 3, Sec. 23 (p.236) above is explicit in this with its context of a perception of an object and that “. . . whatever in the object lacks intuitive presentation . . .” is “subsidiarily meant” by an “array of signitive components.”

Let me buttress this bipartite, signitive / intuitive structure to a perceptual act with a bit more of text following section I quoted above. Husserl in the immediate context of the quote above affirms this model without explicitly giving an example like my box one:

We all draw such a distinction, in purely phenomenological fashion, in the intuition involved in the percept or image of a thing, between whatever in the object is truly made apparent, the mere 'side' from which the object is shown to us, and whatever lacks intuitive presentation (*Darstellung*), is hidden by other phenomenal objects etc. Such talk plainly implies, what phenomenological analysis within certain limits definitely proves, that even what is not presented (*Nicht-Dargestelltes*) in an intuitive presentation (*Vorstellung*) is subsidiarily meant, and that an array of signitive components must accordingly be ascribed to the latter, from which we have to abstract, if wish to keep our *intuitive* content pure.¹²¹

Husserl is explicit here that in the presentation of an object, i.e. “. . . the percept . . . of a thing . . . the object . . .” what of the object is not intuited is “. . . subsidiarily meant . . .”. Furthermore, that this subsidiarily meaning of the un-intuited properties of the object are accomplished by “signitive components”. These are the signitive moments or parts of the typical bipartite intuitive / signitive, presentational mental-act I have unpacked above.¹²²

¹²¹ LI VI Ch. 3, Sec. 23 (p.236)

¹²² If the signitive moment in a perceptual act is somehow conceptual or a concept, then Chad Kidd in his “Re-examining Husserl’s Non-Conceptualism in the *Logical Investigations*” *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. 101: Issue 3 (De Gruyter, 2019) : 407 - 444; would agree with my bipartite mental-acts of intuitive and signitive moments, e.g. “. . . Husserl did not begin . . . with a view of perception that mangles the distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual content. Rather he begins with a view that combines conceptual and non-conceptual commitments in a distinctive and systematically consistent way.” (p. 442).

I write typical because within the context Husserl acknowledges that not all mental-acts have a mixture of intuitive and signitive components, i.e content. Some may have only signitive. This he labels a *pure meaning*.

In the former [pure meaning], the presentation (*Vorstellung*) would have only signitive content: no property of its intentional object would remain over which was brought to intuitive presentation (*Darstellung*) in its content. The special case of purely signitive presentations, well-known to us as pure meaning-intentions, therefore appears here as a limiting case of intuition.¹²³

This makes a spectrum with limit cases on each extreme. Conversely, the mental-act where all the properties of the object are intuited, is the other limiting case:

In the second case the presentation (*Vorstellung*) has no signitive content whatever. In it all its fullness: no part, no side, no property of its object fails to be intuitively presented (*dargestellt*), none is merely indirectly and subsidiarily meant.¹²⁴

Thus I remain with this spectrum:

Pure meaning | ————— mixed signitive / intuitive ————— | Pure Intuition

Husserl in LI VI does include the layer of imagination sometimes alongside these two within the mental-act of perception. Consider this section of text following from the intuitive / signitive section I have been dwelling upon:

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

. . . On account of the mixture of perpetual and imaginative components which the intuitive substance of a percept permits and usually exhibits, we can again consider adopting a division of perceptual content into *pure perceptual content*, on the one hand, and, *supplementary image-content*, on the other. . . . The narrowing of an impure percept which throws out symbolic components yields the pure intuition which is immanent in it: a further reductive step then throws out everything imagined, and yields the substance of pure perception.¹²⁵

For simplicity, I will remain with the intuitive and signitive as they will play a central role in the Investigations' view of pain. Let us now look how Husserl describes the presentation these 'mixed' intuitive / signitive acts provide. This will give us the PO, i.e. 'presented object' of my AIPPO phenomena character and assist in understanding the A, i.e. abstraction.

7. THE PRESENTATION OF 'PO' IN AIPPO

The LI VI text above, where I mined out the intuitive / signitive distinction is useful for the nature of presentation (*Vorstellung*) in one respect and unhelpful in another. Useful in the sense that presentation is defined broadly in contrast to meaning. Thus, the opposite of only thinking about (meaning) one's bicycle locked down below is, according to this contour in the Investigations, to be presented with the bicycle. This contrast is helpful, but where the text is not, is in that the text uses appearance language for presentation. It begins with appearing language " . . . made apparent . . .", but in the sentence before the numbered list it transitions to existential language. What is not intended is simply ". . . not there . . ." for our presentation. This is

¹²⁵ LI VI Ch3. Sec. 23 (p.237)

consistent what I have presented of meaning and presentation so far. In Husserl's explicit interaction with meaning and presentation, presentation implies the presence of the object to the conscious subject. This is consistent with the examples of the Northern Lights and the bicycle above.

But Husserl continues to use appearance language for what is presented in the numbered list though, e.g. the objects's properties 'become apparent'. This is not helpful in refining my initial definition for phenomenal character away from appearance language to something more rigorous. Husserl has some more helpful structure to his thought in his Fifth Investigation (LI V). Noting that for Husserl presentation implies in some sense the existence of the object before the conscious subject, let us progress from the contrast with meaning. For this I will go back to some helpful content in LI V for descriptions presentation other than 'appearance'. I present a sample survey below.

In LI V Ch. 1, Sec. 2 he redescribes the 'appearing' of presentation as a '*standing before us in person*':

The appearing of the thing (the experience) is not the thing which appears (that seems *to stand before us in propria persona*).¹²⁶

¹²⁶ In LI V Ch. 1, Sec. 2 (p.83) emphasis *mine*.

In LI V Ch. 2, Sec. 11, In the context of talking about objects which do not exist in contrast to those that do, if we remove the redundancy of mentioning presentation, he describes presentation as an object '*given to consciousness*':

It makes no essential difference to an object *presented and given to consciousness* whether it exists, or is fictitious, or is perhaps completely absurd.¹²⁷

In LI V Ch.3, Sec. 22 he describes presentation as '*to set before consciousness*'. The context here is Husserl arguing for his position that an objectifying act is a composite unity of various acts, e.g. intuitive-acts, meaning-acts, emotional-acts, etc. This is in distinction to a collection, something like a swarm of bees, or within our mind like a suspended-mobile with multiple hanging mirrors all pointing in the same direction:

We can, in other words, interpret our proposition as saying that an intentional experience only gains objective reference by incorporating an experienced act of presentation in itself, through which the object is presented to it. The object would be nothing to consciousness *if consciousness did not set it before itself as an object*, and if it did not further permit the object to become an object of feeling, of desire etc.¹²⁸

Lastly, in LI V. Ch. 3, Sec. 27 presentation is '*to place full-bodily-presence-ly something before us*'. The context here for Husserl are his views on to what is different between an imagination or

¹²⁷ LI V Ch. 2, Sec. 11 (p.99) emphasis *mine*.

¹²⁸ LI V Ch.3, Sec. 22 (p.129) emphasis *mine*.

a perfect hallucination ('mere presentations') and a genuine perception.¹²⁹ Important for me is how he describes presentation here. As follows:

In perception the object seemed to achieve *full-bodied presence, to be there in propria persona*. In the imaginative presentation it merely 'floats before us', it is 'represented' without achieving full-bodied presence.¹³⁰

Notice the emphasis in perception that the object is presented with a fullness of presence as itself. Useful is the contrast with imagination, where the presentation lacks this presence.

More examples from the LI could be presented but these I determined as the most helpful in trying to increase the level of description of phenomenal character's from the Preliminary Definition's appearance language. Let's consider them in a list:

Presentation is:

- to appear [LI VI Ch. 3, Sec. 23 (p. 235 - 236)]
- to stand before us in person (in propria persona) [LI V Ch. 1 Sec. 2 (p.83)]
- to be given to consciousness [LI V Ch.2, Sec. 11 (p.99)]
- to be set before consciousness [LI V Ch.3, Sec.22 (p.129)]
- to be placed before us full-bodily-presence-ly (*in propria persona*) [LI V. Ch. 3, Sec. 27 (p. 137)]

¹²⁹ Husserl's view in the immediate context is that they primarily differ from the genuine perception in lacking as a quality, belief: "But, later, its perceptual character, the act-quality of belief, fell away, and the mere perceptual presentation remained. The same compounding must be assumed to obtain in all presentations: everywhere the underlying perceptual presentation - whose quality forms the matter - will be completed by belief-character." (LI V. Ch. 3, Sec. 27 p. 137).

¹³⁰ LI V. Ch. 3, Sec. 27 (p. 137) emphasis *mine*.

The above in the list from LI V & VII are considerably deeper in meaning than just ‘appearing’ used in the Preliminary Definition of Phenomenal Character. ‘Appearing’ could imply an appearance and not the object itself. Presentation for Husserl is a presentation not of an appearance, but of the thing itself. He says ‘*in propria persona*’ in LI V, Ch. 1, sec. 2 (p.83) and LI V. Ch. 3, Sec. 27 (p. 137) above. In Legal Latin this means to decline a lawyer or a representative to stand for you in a court - instead you, represent yourself.¹³¹ For AIPPO, the ‘presented object’, i.e. PO, is this this full-bodied ‘*in propria persona*’ given-ness to consciousness. This impacts in what sense properties are abstracted, i.e. A, for AIPPO. Before I move onto the A, I want address the P, i.e. ‘properties’ of AIPPO phenomenal character, for it still centers us in the Investigations’ passage used above for the meaning / presentation distinction.¹³²

5. THE P (‘properties’) IN AIPPO PHENOMENAL CHARACTER

In the LI VI passage used above for the meaning / presentation distinction Husserl lists all the below as constituents which are presented:

LI VI passage on what is presented:

¹³¹ ‘In curia domino regis ipse in propriety persona jura decernit.’ Latin, meaning: ‘The king in person judges in his own court.’ from J.W. Jones, *A Translation of all the Greek, Latin, Italian, and French Quotations which occur in Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England; and also in the Notes of the Editions by Christian, Archbold and Williams*, London, (1823). p. 151; (in a note for p.41).

¹³² LI VI Ch. 3, Sec. 23 (p. 235 - 236)

- the object its self
- parts of the object
- properties of the object
- spatial / temporal location

Following from the dual composition of many perceptual mental acts, is that the intuitive part / moment of the act presents the intuited *properties* of the object when presenting the entire object. I think this is why he includes properties alongside with the object and its spatial / temporal location. Useful for this thesis is that Husserl is explicit in this text that properties are apparent in the presented object they belong to:

. . . *The purely intuitive 'substance' (Gehalt) of the act, i.e. all that corresponds in the act of the sum total of the of the object's properties that 'become apparent' . . .*¹³³

This is convenient for me, for my metaphysical assay of the phenomenal character of intentionality and pain's painfulness will focus upon the *properties* of each. In order to get the intuited, *qualitative* properties of 'Q' in AIQPPO, I will need to turn to Husserl's view of pain in the Investigations. I want to hold off on the Q turn for a bit for this present 'P's emphasis upon the bipartite nature of the presented properties, i.e intuited and signified, ground the next section for 'A', i.e. abstraction. It will be these intuited properties of a presented object, that, when abstracted, they compose the Investigations' AIPPO phenomenal character. Now, to abstraction.

6. THE A IN AIPPO PHENOMENAL CHARACTER

¹³³ Ibid. (p. 235 - 236); emphasis mine.

When it comes to my Husserlian phenomenal character, the division of the intuitive and signitive part of a presentative mental-act has an important consequence upon the Preliminary Definition of Phenomenal Character. Intuited properties conjoined with properties meant, constitute objects that are presented. Because of this, there is a catch when it comes to phenomenal character: in this model, some of an object's properties are *intuited*, and the presented object they jointly compose, is *presented*:

Some of the Properties of the object ←—intuited

The object ←— presented

Terminology is flexible even for Husserl, but for the sake of economy in presentation the Preliminary definition's 'appears to' for properties will be reserved for the presentation of object. It is the object which appears (is presented), and perceived properties intuited. In this sense the intuited properties are presented *in* the presented object. How does Husserl in the Investigations cash this out? After all, objects are the proper subject of presentation. Husserl would say we need to *abstract*. This is the 'A' in AIPPO. And he does in the context of LI VI, I have been using:

In each presentation (Vorstellung) we can therefore surely *abstract from all signitive components*, and limit ourselves to what is really represented in its representative content. By so doing we form a reduced presentation, with a reduced object in regard to which it is purely intuitive. We can accordingly say that the intuitive substance (Gehalt) of a presentation comprises all that is pure intuition into it, just as we may also speak of the object's purely intuitive content, of all that is

rendered intuitive in this presentation. The like applies to the signitive substance of the presentation: this can be said to be all that is pure signification in it.¹³⁴

Knowing what we know now about the general intuitive / signitive bipartite structure of presentational perceptions this makes sense. To *present* the intuited properties of an object before our consciousness, we need to abstract our attention away from all the properties solely signified by our mental act. Husserl calls this a “reduced presentation” of a “reduced object” that has only “pure intuition in it”. This abstraction brings the intuited properties of a presented object before our consciousness in the PO sense displayed above, but in a reduced, presentational form. There is a clear example of this in the same context as the quote above. The separation of what is intuitive in the presented object from the signitive is said to be *abstraction*:

We all draw such a distinction, in purely phenomenological fashion, in the intuition involved in the precept or image of a thing, between whatever in the object is truly made apparent, the mere ‘side’ from which the object is shown to us, and whatever lacks intuitive presentation (Darstellung), is hidden by other phenomenal objects etc. Such talk plainly implies, what phenomenological analysis within certain limits definitely proves, that even what is not present (Nicht-Dargestelltes) in an intuitive presentation (Vorstellung) is subsidiarily meant, and that an array of signitive components must accordingly be ascribed to the latter, from which we have to *abstract*, if we wish to keep our intuitive content pure . . .¹³⁵

Here in this LI XI passage, one is able to *abstract* away the properties signified in the presented object, and focus upon the properties intuited. Shifting the example to my box example again, abstraction would be to focus our attention in upon the hollow husk of the sides of the box facing

¹³⁴ LI VI, Ch. 3, Sec. 23, (p.237)

¹³⁵ LI XI Ch. 3, Sec.27 (p. 236) Emphasis mine.

us. If this were the six-property-box example again, this would mean to focus upon the box as if it did not have the sides we could not presently see, i.e. properties (4-6). Resultantly, we have a reduced presentation of only properties (1-3) as a reduced object. Following Husserl here, the A of abstraction is the reduced presentation of a reduced object comprising that presented object's intuited properties. This 'reduced presentation' of the intuited properties as a reduced object of from the presented object fits with what we are doing when asking of an object's phenomenal character - we are abstracting what is present in our experience. Let me summarize.

7. THE INVESTIGATIONS' AIPPO PHENOMENAL CHARACTER IN SUM

Putting the abstraction, intuition, properties and presented object together, an Investigations' definition of 'phenomenal character' of AIPPO would be:

Investigations AIPPO Phenomenal Character:

The abstracted, intuited properties of a presented object as a reduced object, reductively presented via the selfsame abstraction.

This feature of the Investigations's sense of 'phenomenal character' agrees with the sense the locution 'phenomenal character' has vernacular English. When someone is asking what the phenomenal character of something was, they are in this sense, asking one to focus upon the properties given by the experience. They are not asking for the un-intuited, meant properties of the presented object. Instead they are asking us to abstract - and abstract the properties which

were intuited from the presented object. Furthermore, this exploration into the Investigations meets Crane's view a phenomenal character that is *presented*. This is in sharp distinction to his pain as an intentional mode which is part of the presenting. Moving towards my metaphysical comparison I will now look for the 'Q' of *qualitative* for the phenomenal character of the property of presented pain's painfulness.

CONCLUSION.

In this chapter I briefly argued for the use of Husserl's Logical Investigations for a definition of the phenomenal character to be used in my final metaphysical comparison. I displayed that Husserlian AIPPO phenomenal character reveals the phenomenal character to be *presented*, intuited properties. In this respect Husserl in the LI reflects my position that phenomenal character is presented. This is even if the properties in question are presented as a reduced object in abstraction. Rather, the very act of abstraction dovetails with what one appears to be doing when asking for the 'phenomenal character' of something - asking about what properties are intuited in the presentation of the object. Both the Investigations and the quarry of 'phenomenal character' support my view that pain's painfulness is presented. Next, I will progress to the *qualitative* of painfulness via a look into Investigations's presentation of pain and plugging this into the AIPPO definition for painfulness's phenomenal character. This will convert the AIPPO into AIQPPPO.

CHAPTER SIX

THE INVESTIGATION'S VIEW OF THE PHENOMENAL CHARACTER OF PAIN'S PAINFULNESS

INTRODUCTION

The last chapter developed Husserl's LI account of phenomenal character, as AIPPO. This chapter will plug in the Investigation's view of pain to that account of phenomenal character. Asking what the Investigation's view of the phenomenal character of pain's painfulness will produce a definition where 'qualitative' i.e. the 'Q' is added to the properties and the pain as presented object are added to AIPPO. This will result in the Investigations's phenomenal character of painfulness as AIQPPPO. AIQPPPO will establish the Investigations' view of painfulness as presented and qualitative. This has been delayed until now for, as it will be shown, his account's intelligibility is dependent upon the distinctions developed previously, e.g. emotion / sensation, intuition / signification, etc.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

First, I will present the Logical Investigation's version of Chapter One's distinction of a sensation versus an emotion. Secondly, I will note the pain account's indication that phenomenal pain is qualitative. Thirdly, I will unpack how Husserl's account of pain works for it poses some mystery in how Husserl's pain could both be an object, and an act with an intentional object.

1. THE SENSATION / EMOTION DISTINCTION IN THE FIFTH INVESTIGATION

The first major feature of LI V's account of pain is that Husserl endorses the difference between a bodily sensation and an emotion I argued for in Chapter One. Husserl refers to bodily sensations as 'feeling-sensations' and emotions as 'feeling-acts'. Husserl mentions the titles against the backdrop of interacting with Brentano's view:

Brentano has already pointed to the ambiguity here dealt with, in discussing the intentionality of feelings. He draws a distinction, in sense if not in words, between *sensations* of pain and pleasure (feeling-sensations) and pain and pleasure in the sense of *feelings*. . . . Our distinction should constantly be kept in mind and fruitfully applied in analyzing all complexes of feeling-sensation and feeling-acts. Joy, e.g., concerning some happy event, is certainly an act.¹³⁶

¹³⁶ LI V Ch. 2, Sec. 15 (p. 110)

In the above emotions, or feeling-acts, are evidenced to be what we would call emotions with the example of joy. Feeling-sensations are referred to as pains and the equivocal ‘pleasure.’ That feeling-sensations are clearly not emotions is evident in answering what kind of property is the intuited property of painfulness in the Fifth Investigation. I look at this next.

2. PAIN IS A FEELING-SENSATION

First, is that the phenomenal, normal bodily pain which is the focus of this thesis, is a ‘feeling-sensation’¹³⁷ in the Fifth Investigation. Sensory, as opposed to emotional pain is mentioned under the distinctions ‘feeling-sensations’ vs ‘feeling-acts’ initially in the title Chapter Two, Section 15 subheading ‘(b)’:

(b) Are there non-intentional feelings? Distinction between feeling-sensations and feeling-acts.¹³⁸

Then this distinction is addressed in the following paragraph but not strictly adhering to the terminology of the subheading.

Every *sensory feeling*, e.g. the pain of burning oneself, or of being burnt, is no doubt after a fashion referred to an object: . . .¹³⁹

¹³⁷ For Husserl’s Stumpf and Brentanian background with this notion see, Saulius Geniusas, “The Origins of the Phenomenology of Pain: Brentano Stumpf and Husserl.”, *Continental Philosophy Review*, 47 (1) (2014) : 1-17

¹³⁸ LI V Ch. 2, Sec. 15 (p.109)

¹³⁹ Ibid. (p. 109).

The proximity to the subheading makes clear that the sensuous pain here, referred to as a ‘sensory feeling’ is our ‘feeling-sensation’ of pain. Here the identification of an experiential, sensuous pain like burning oneself, is made to a feeling-sensation. Note how similar this is to my central example of the normal, experimental pain of stubbing one’s toe. Writing of this same burn in the same context a paragraph earlier, Husserl will display this pain’s distinction from emotions, placing into the category of quality laden, feeling-sensations, of texture and color:

The sensible pain of a burn can certainly not be classed beside a conviction, a surmise, a volition etc. etc., but beside sensory contents like rough for smooth, red or blue etc.¹⁴⁰

Here, the feeling-sensation of sensible is classed beside felt, qualitative entities like texture and color. This is in distinction to other acts like the feeling-act of a conviction and a volition like a choice, etc. Again, within the same section, discussing Brentano’s view of pain, Husserl will endorse this distinction with its terminology between the bodily sensation of pain versus an emotion, say of anger or disgust, etc. This time clearly using feeling-sensation for pain and feeling-act for emotions:

Brentano has already pointed to the ambiguity here dealt with, in discussing the intentionality of feelings. He draws a distinction, in sense if not in words, between *sensations* of pain and pleasure (feeling-sensations) and pain and pleasure in the sense of *feelings*. . . . This notion I regards as quite correct, but only doubt whether the meaning of the word ‘feeling’ does not lean predominantly towards ‘feeling-sensation’, . . . Our distinction should constantly be kept in mind and fruitfully applied in analyzing all

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. (p. 109).

complexes of feeling-sensations and feeling-acts. Joy, e.g., concurring some happy event is certainly an act.¹⁴¹

It is comforting to know that the same ambiguity in ‘pain’ language attending Husserl’s generation as it still does in the English using world today. Both the ‘pain’ of grief and the ‘pain’ of a stubbed toe are spoken of as pain. Husserl is clear that the sensual, bodily pain we are after is a feeling-sensation, and not a feeling-act.

3. THE FEELING-SENSATION OF PAIN IS A QUALITATIVE ENTITY FOR AIQPPPO. ITS PAINFULNESS, A QUALITATIVE PROPERTY.

Using more of the same portion of the LI V, is that the painfulness of this burn example of a feeling-sensation is qualitative in this context:

The sensible pain of a burn can certainly not be classed beside a conviction, a surmise, a volition etc. etc., but beside sensory contents like rough for smooth, red or blue etc. If we recall such pains, or any sensory pleasures (the fragrance of a rose, the relish of certain foods etc. etc.) we find that our *sensory feelings* are blended with the sensations from the various sense-fields, just as these latter are blended with one another.¹⁴²

There is a cornucopia of qualitative entities in this passage, linking the feeling-sensation of the pain of a burn, to them. We have textures, colors, fragrances, tastes and pains explicitly

¹⁴¹ Ibid. (p. 110)

¹⁴² Ibid. (p. 109 Emphasis *mine*).

mentioned. Important to note here, is that pain is placed in the feeling-sensation type along with these other obviously qualitative tokens of textures, colors, fragrances, and tastes. Given this inclusion, I conclude that the intuited property that painfulness is, is a *qualitative* property of pain. This is the Q, of AIQPPPO.

4. UNPACKING THE REST OF HUSSERL'S VIEW OF PAIN IN THE INVESTIGATIONS

With the conceptual foundation of meaning / presentation parts to a mental-act and the description of abstraction and presentation, I can sketch a definition of pain Husserl gives in this very same Fifth Investigation I have been using. In my view, the key to understanding the Investigations' definition of pain lies in two crucial notions: Interpretation and the signitive / intuitive, bipartite composition of many mental-acts. Since we are already familiar with the signitive / intuitive feature, let me begin with the Interpretive.

I will frame this presentation of intuitive / signitive model for pain with an example which I think is the most helpful in understanding this. This is my six-property (sided) box example from before. Recall that in this example, three sides (properties 1 - 3) of the box are intuited, and the remaining other three sides (properties 4 - 6) signitively intended. Remember also that the entire box is presented *in propria persona* to the conscious subject. This is minimally accomplished via the mental-act which intends the box containing the intuitive and signitive moments that collectively correspond to the total properties of the box. With this box example in mind, I will

move onto a class of examples which Husserl thinks yields the best examples for how interpretation works. I will apply this to the feeling-sensation of pain and its non-intentional and intentional functions.

5. VERBAL EXPRESSIONS AND ARABESQUE

In the section before the context of pain in the Investigations, Husserl writes what he thinks yields the best example for how interpretation works for contents that are not acts but can be used to constitute acts - verbal expressions:

. . . we believe we have found an evident difference between intentional experiences, in whose case *object intentions* arise though *immanent characters* of those experiences in question and experiences in whose case this does not occur, contents that may serve as the building-stones of acts without being acts themselves. . . Verbal expressions yield the best examples of all. Let us imagine that certain *arabesques* or figures have affected us aesthetically, and that we then suddenly see that we are dealing with symbols or verbal signs.¹⁴³

In the above from LI V Ch. 2 Section 14, Husserl affirms that verbal expressions provide some of the best examples of all. I will break the ‘verbal expressions’ into two species: the spoken (verbal) *espresso* mentioned and the arabesque. This also parallels with his ‘verbal signs’ and ‘symbols’ at the end of the quoted text. I will exposit how Husserl’s example of verbal expression illustrates the nature of LI’s pain first, and then the arabesque. I will show how each

¹⁴³ LI V Ch. 2, Sec. 14 (p. 105).

line up with my signitive / intuitive interpretation via the box example and then how they illustrate pain.

6. VERBAL EXPRESSION

This is the most fertile of the examples for it has some direct parallels with the pain discussion later in LI V. The first parallel comes from the first half of the text above. This feature I call the three-fold function of the feeling-sensation. Notice first that there are experience's with objects, i.e. “. . . intentional experiences . . .” with “. . . object intentions . . .”. These are experiences who have intentional objects via being interpreted by “. . . immanent characters . . .”. This ‘character’ is reasonably ‘act character’ which at this point in Husserl’s exposition of LI V he will write ‘ensouls sense’ producing the presentation of an object.¹⁴⁴ In this scenario there are two members:

(1) Primary mental-act (‘experience’) —> (2) Primary content: intended object

Second there are experiences in which “. . . whose case this does not occur . . .” As I will show later, this is likely when experience is directed towards sensations which were not interpreted into an act, producing a presented object. Instead the experience has as content that which “. . . may serve as building-stones of acts without being acts themselves. . . .”. Here also this scenario has two members:

¹⁴⁴ LI V, Ch. 2, Sec. 14, (p. 105)

(1) Primary mental-act ('experience') → (2) Primary content: building-stones for an act, but are not themselves an act.

Thirdly is the converse of the last one. Here the content of 'building-stones' for acts, are assembled, and an act is produced. In this third scenario there are three members:

(1) Primary mental-act ('experience') → (2) primary content: secondary act (assembled 'building-stones') → (3) secondary content : intended object.

Notice in these three, the difference in the '(2) Primary content':

- (O) Intended Object
- (B) Building-stones for and act, that are not themselves and act
- (A) An act with with its own content

The last two of these primary contents are reflected in Husserl's example of the Verbal Expression. Verbal expressions are an example for Husserl for contents which are not acts themselves but can be used to constitute acts. Husserl gives the example of a man hearing an uncomprehended word:

Or let us take the case of an attentive man hearing some totally strange word as a sound-complex without even dreaming it is a word, and compare this with the case of the same man afterwards hearing the word, in the course of conversation, and now acquainted with its meaning, but not illustrating it intuitively? What in general is the surplus element distinguishing the understanding of a symbolically functioning expression from the uncomprehended verbal sound?¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ Ibid. (p. 105).

Husserl uplifts the experience of hearing a sound and not knowing it was a word. Then, at another time interpreting that sound as a word and knowing what it symbolically presents. Here, the verbal sound as content, first acts as a (B) building-stone non-act, and then later as an (A) act with its own meaning. Here at first the uncomprehended word was a mere ‘sound complex’. This is the (B) building-stone content for an act. Once the sound complex was properly interpreted, he heard the sound as a word with its signified content, i.e. meaning. Here the (B) building-stones for an act were cobbled together into an (A) act with a meaning. Verbal expressions are indeed good examples of interpretation. There are additional examples in LI I of verbal expressions having their content largely determined by how they the ‘building-stones’ are assembled, i.e. interpreted:

Examples of equivocal expressions readily show that we can effect and can recognize sudden changes of meaning without in the least needing accompanying illustrations. The descriptive difference, here evidently apparent, cannot be the sensuous sign, which remains the same: it must concern the act-character, which is specifically altered.¹⁴⁶

Here in LI I, the distinction between the sensuous sign, and its meaning—bestowed by act-character—is evident. The sensuous sign remains the same yet, via equivocation, the symbol can change its meaning. The interpretive change, attributed here to ‘act-character’, is responsible for the meaning of the sensuous sign. Using the three types of Primary content above (O, B & A), the sensuous sign of verbal symbol in equivocation is a (B) building-stone for differing acts. Equivocation is an interpretation of the symbol, and the symbol the (B) building-stone in constituting differing acts with their varying Secondary contents.

¹⁴⁶ LI I Ch. 2, Sec. 22, (p. 213).

Interestingly the ‘building-stones’ language of which verbal expressions were the best for is also used for sensations and interpretation in the adjacent context of LI I quoted above:

The perceptual presentation arises in so far as an experienced complex of sensations gets informed by certain act-character, one of conceiving or meaning. To the extent that this happens, the perceived object appears . . . Phenomenal analysis teaches us, further, that the sense-contents provide, as it were, the analogical building-stuff for the content of the object presented by their means.¹⁴⁷

The example is perception of an object and the corresponding sensations in the mind. These sensations are interpreted—given an ‘objective interpretation’—and it is in this interpretation that object is presented. Interesting here is that the sensations are said to be the “building-stuff” for the content which will present the object. Here the parallel with verbal expression is tight. The passage from LI V with ‘verbal expressions’ and ‘arabesque’¹⁴⁸ had the three forms of Primary content (O, B, & A). It used (B) ‘building-stones’ for acts that are not themselves acts. Here in the LI I passage above, sense-contents are the ‘building-stuff’ for content. This makes sense if the sense-contents were not an act—but upon interpretation—the ‘building-stones / stuff’ for acts that they are, were assembled into an (A) act with the content of an object. Now to display the parallels of the feeling-sensation of pain with that of the sensuous verbal expression unpacked above.

¹⁴⁷ LI Ch. 2 Sec. 23, (p.214).

¹⁴⁸ LI V Ch. 2, Sec. 15 (p. 109).

What connects the feeling-sensation of pain with the verbal expression firstly is that pain has the same three-fold Primary (O, A & B) content structure as that of verbal expressions. The language is even similar to verbal expression passage with its three Primary contents. Consider the below:

Sensations of pleasure and pain may continue, though the act-characters built upon them may lapse. When the facts which provoke pleasure sink into the background, are not longer apperceived as emotionally colored, and perhaps cease to be intentional objects at all, the pleasurable excitement may linger on for a while: it may itself be felt as agreeable. Instead of representing a pleasant property of the object, it is referred merely to the feeling-subject, or itself presented and pleases.¹⁴⁹

The context is pleasure but Husserl begins with pleasure's pair of pain also. I will of course focus upon the pleasure as a surrogate for pain. When the feeling-sensation has lost its object it can be an (O) object, e.g. ". . . or itself is presented and pleases" presumably of another act. When the feeling-sensation, is not interpreted as an act, or presented as an object, the feeling-sensation can remain an (B) 'building-stone' for an act, had by the feeling-subject's lived-body. That the feeling sensation can function as an (A) act when suitably interpreted is evidenced by the beginning of this quote. The feeling-sensation while interpreted had "facts" which were its "intentional object." Thus the Investigations has pain as a qualitative feeling-sensation which, like a verbal expression can function as a presented object (O). Like a verbal expression, the feeling sensation could not yet be understood, and remain an meaningless sensory patch (B)

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. (p.111).

presumably had by lived-body. Or, like an understood expression—via interpretation—operate as an act (A) signifying its intended part of the body.¹⁵⁰

That this is the case is evident by another portion of text from same section of LI V speaking of pain of a burn like tactile touch:

. . . no one would think of calling the referred sensations intentional. It is rather the case that our sensations are here functioning as presentative contents in perceptual acts, or (to use a possibly misleading phrase) that our sensations here receive an objective ‘interpretations’ or ‘taking-up’. They themselves are not acts, but acts are constituted through them, where ever, that is, intentional characters like a perceptual interpretation lay hold of them, and as it were animate them.¹⁵¹

Here, like verbal expressions, the feeling-sensations are (B) building-stones for acts, i.e. “They themselves are not acts, but acts are constituted through them . . .”. Additionally they can function as “perceptual acts” (A) when they receive an object-presenting “. . . ‘interpretations’ or ‘taking-up’, or when “. . . intentional characters like a perceptual interpretation lay hold of them . . .”. Feeling-sensations if not left as (B), were seen to be themselves presented. I list this

¹⁵⁰ Salius Genaiusas, “Pain and Intentionality” in *Perception, Affectivity, and Volition in Husserl’s Phenomenology*, eds. Robert Rubio, Shigeru Taguchi & Robert Walton (Springer 2017) : 113 - 136; has a similar three-fold function to the feeling-sensation of pain in the Investigations but in two different places. “. . . this schema invites one to recognize pain as an irreducible ambiguous phenomena. It invites one to maintain that pain can be conceived both as a non- or pre-intentional sensation and as an intentional phenomenal.”: “ (p.123) Here the feeling-sensation as (B) and (A) seem to be in view. the other place is: “. . . pain can be given three fundamentally different ways: either, first, as an intentional feeling, or, secondly, as one’s body-object, conceived as an object of one’s feelings, or, finally, as the atmosphere that embraces any intentional object that consciousness-in-pain might be sensing, perceiving, or contemplating.” (p.124). Here the feeling-sensation of pain can be (A) , (O) and presumably (B) if by the “atmosphere” Genaiusas means the feeling-sensation as a building-stone for acts which is not an act itself. Later on he is explicit about the feeling-sensation as (O) object: “. . . pain is conceived as a lived-experience, it is given adequately . . . By contrast, insofar as pain is conceived as an object of experience, its evidence is inadequate . . . “ (p. 126). Here the I understand the “lived-experience” as (B) had by the lived-body. The feeling-sensation of pain as (O) Object is explicitly stated.

¹⁵¹ Ibid. (p. 109).

under the Primary Content of (O) Object, for it is unclear how *presentation* could apply to anything other than ‘object’ broadly construed.

Seeing how the feeling-sensation of pain in the Investigations lines up with Husserl’s own endorsed example of verbal expression justifies the parallelism. Via being like a sensual, verbal expression, Investigations’ pain is displayed having its three-fold function as object, act or building-stone for acts. This leads open the question of how it is that verbal expressions and pain are able to have this three fold function. I think this is where the intuitive / signitive distinction of LI XI fits this lacuna very well.

In my reading of the Investigations, the interpretation of sensations is clear with the signitive / intuitive distinction from LI XI introduced in Chapter Five. Remember again the the bipartite composition of signitive / intuitive to many mental-acts and my six-sided (property) box example. With the six-sided box, the mental-act that intended it had an intuitive moment pertaining to the properties of the box so intuited (sides 1-3), and a signitive moment pertaining to the properties (sides 4-6) of the box meant but not seen. This dual composition in the mental-act results in the presentation of the entire box (sides 1-6).

<u>Mental-act presenting six-property box:</u>	<u>Presented box (all 6 sides / properties)</u>
- intuitive moment (corresponds to) —>	seen sides / properties 1-3 of the box
- signitive moment (corresponds to) —>	unseen sides / properties 4-6 of the box

Now let me exchange the box example for the verbal expression. The verbal expression when understood is divided between the seen (1-3) properties of the sensuous verbal sign, and its corresponding unseen—yet meant—object the expression. This object is the (4-6) unseen, yet signified properties of the box. In this sense understanding a word is to have the intuited symbol stand before us as the visible sides of a box and to have the object of the word the unseen, back sides of the box. In this sense, this is when the audio sensation is interpreted as (O) object - this time a word with its meaning. When the verbal expression is not understood as a word, the intuited properties stand as an absurd, husk of a non-object. This is the (B) building-stones for an act. Under my Sixth Investigation reading, interpretation is the recognition of the intuited moment in the experience of the verbal expression as corresponding to the intuited sensuous properties of a particular word and complimenting the intuitive moment of the act with the appropriate signitive moment to complete the meaning. In doing so the mental-act with these intuitive and signitive moments experiences the sensuous verbal complex as a word with an object - the word has meaning. A verbal expression as a non-understood, sensuous, audio complex is non-intentional, via the intuitive moment corresponding only to the sensuous properties of the audio complex. These ‘hang out’ there with no unseen side of the box so intended to provide meaning. Here, via varying the intuitive and signitive moments to the mental act intending the verbal expression, the intentionality of the audio sensation is decided.

Pain’s parallel with verbal expression enables a likewise exchange with the box example for feeling-sensation of pain. The felt pain sensation is the intuited sides of the box (sides 1-3) and the object the pain points to are the portions of the box unseen (sides 3-6). Without the signitive

moment to the mental-act intending the feeling sensation of pain, the intuited, qualitative properties of the sensation are non-presentational, i.e. non-intentional. They are either left as building-stones for an act (B) or as an object (O) that the mental-act intending the feeling-sensation has presented. For pain in the Investigations to be intentional, it must be intended by a mental-act which interprets it as a perceptual act (A). This interpretation of the primary act upon the secondary act of the feeling-sensation is accomplished by that primary act having a signitive moment which furnishes the feeling-sensation with the 'un-seen' side fo the box of its bodily object. Where this is especially clear for me is in Husserl's second example of Arabesque.

7. ARABESQUE

Living in an Arabic context, and having Arab family, I know the arabesque example for the 'verbal expressions' intimately. Before acquiring much Arabic, the letters and words used in arabesque art were unknown to me. All I were aware of were the luxurious curves and delicious complexity of the lines, dots and shapes. The sensuous qualities of the strokes were plainly before me; but their meaning was not. Upon acquiring more Arabic, the arabesque art now was revealed as written symbols of a language with meaning, artfully painted or engraved. And by *meaning*, I mean in the Investigation's sense - signification. This phenomena of the shift from mere art to language symbols with meaning, is best explained by the signitive / intuitive distinction.

In keeping with Husserl's Arabesque example, consider a single arabic word, artfully drawn in calligraphy, e.g. 'siara' for 'car'. The arabic characters in themselves could stand as a sensuous complex of curves and dots before our attention—or—the curves, dots, etc. could be considered as the word 'siara', and point to a car. Consider this change temporally. At first there is intuition of its sensuous properties, e.g. its lines, curves, etc. These will be the intuited properties of the box (sides 1-3). At this time, call it 't1', there is no sense of the arabesque as signs with consequent meaning. No sense of them as words. At this time, the mental-act intending the art contains only intuitive moments corresponding to the properties so intuited, i.e. properties of the artistic pattern, e.g. its lines, curves, dots, etc. At some time, 't2', one could become competent in Arabic and see the (sides 1-3) properties of arabesque art as words.

In seeing an arabesque as words, one's experience changes. Added to the mental-act's intuitive moment, is the signitive moment of what object(s) the Arabic word refers to. This signified object is the unseen (sides 4-6) properties complimenting the intuited properties (sides 1-3) of the Arabic letters in the arabesque art. The phenomenal character of experiencing the arabesque art as words in t2 is the result of addition of a signitive moment to the intuited moment of the perceptual, mental-act. In this sense the objects which the Arabic words refer to—or mean—are the unseen sides (sides 4-6) of the presented box. In this example, the arabesque word with the object it refers to (means), *together are the presented box*. Experiencing arabesque as words is the inclusion of a signitive moment to the mental-act which originally only included an intuitive moment. This inclusion of a signitive moment was the interpreting which switched the function of the Arabesque from meaningless art to, words artistically rendered. The first was with out

meaning and the second was. Here, Arabesque is an analogy like verbal expression for how the feeling-sensation of pain can function non-intentional and intentionally.

8. ADDITIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE INTENTIONAL AND NON-INTENTIONAL FUNCTIONS OF PAIN IN THE INVESTIGATIONS

The intentional and non-intentional nature of pain in the Investigations makes sense when one considers that for Husserl, consciousness does not reside only in the head; consciousness extends to wherever the lived-body may be. In this sense, the sensation of pain is a part—or a moment—of that extended consciousness. Think of my stubbed toe example: in Husserl's view, the phenomenal location of the pain in my stubbed toe can be located there, because the my consciousness of the lived-body which extends to my toe. Being a moment of consciousness, pain can be used to constitute an act of consciousness when combined with a signitive moment. In producing an act, the act which the sensation belongs to as a moment, can now have an object. Linking interpretation to the addition of signitive moments, sensations undergoing an interpretation which gives them an object of the body can be seen below. Continuing from the passage quoted above:

In just this manner it seems that a burning, piercing, boring pain, fused as it is from the start with certain tactual sensations, must itself count as a sensation. It functions at least as other sensations do, in providing a foothold for empirical, objective interpretations.¹⁵²

¹⁵² Ibid. (p.109 - 110).

Here as before the sensation is a potential subject of interpretation - an interpretation in to an act with object. Interestingly, this object is 'empirical.' In keeping with the lived-body and body distinction, this 'empirical' body would be damaged or irritated part of the body. The sensation as a constituent of the conscious lived body, can function as a intuitive content within a combined intuitive-signitive act to intend a part of the body simpliciter, i.e. the non-lived body - the 'empirical' body.

That the feeling-sensation of pain can have this intentional / non-intentional function is displayed by the three-fold function as Primary Content it could perform, i.e. (O, B or A). As both (O) and (B) pain was non-intentional. As an Act (A), it was.

This intentional and non-intentional function of pain is reinforced by the analogy of tactile sensation, Husserl uses for the feeling-sensation of pain, in the same context. The analogy with touch portrays pain as referring to both to our lived-body in pain, and to what is causing the feeling-sensation of pain:

Every sensory feeling, e.g. the pain of burning oneself, or of being burnt, is no doubt after a fashion referred to an object: it is referred, on the one hand, to the ego and its burnt bodily member, on the other hand, to the object which inflicts the burn. In all these respects there is conformity with other sensations: tactual sensations, e.g. are referred in just this manner to the bodily member which touches, and to the external body which is touched.¹⁵³

¹⁵³ Ibid. (p.109).

Notice how the feeling-sensation of some spatial texture refers to both the bodily member which has it (the sensation)—and—to the object with the textured surface (the texture). So, the surface is smooth, and my tactile feeling-sensation ‘of’ the smoothness is had by my finger. The surface could disappear and the feeling-sensation could linger. Here I could stop and consider the sensation itself and not the marble table surface which provoked it. Husserl writes here, that this is the same with the feeling sensation of pain. Pain can be intending an object when interpreted into an act, or remain presented when left up to itself. In this way, the intentional / non-intentional functions of the Investigations’s view of pain is supported.

With this model for pain from the Investigations it is not mysterious how pain could have these non-intentional and intentional functions in terms of a sensation of the lived-body and when that sensation ‘points to’, i.e. intends, our empirical body. Additionally, my account of Husserl’s Investigation’s pain stands at odds with those who hold his view of pain to be non-intentional. Speaking of Husserl in the Fifth Logical Investigations, consider Agustín Serrano de Harro:

Concerning pain or pleasure we certainly deal with a conscious intention is directed. This non intentional experience belongs, however, to the affective order, not to the representative one, since it carries with in an essential emotive or emotional tone. In conclusion, pain is not an intentional object grasped or apprehended, nor is s either an act of grasping and feeling; it is only sensation and affective.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ Agustín Serrano de Haro, “Is Pain An Intentional Experience?”, PHENOMENOLOGY 2010, Vol. 3. *Selected Essays from the Euro-Mediterranean Area: The Horizons of Freedom*. Edited by Ion Copoeru, Pavlos Kontos, and Agustín Serrano de Haro (Bucharest: Zeta Books / Paris: Arghos-diffusion, 2010): 386 - 395; p. 388.

There is no extended interpretation of the LI V or VI in de Harro's account, so his statement is not surprising. Nor is Husserl's example of verbal symbols mined.

8. SUPPORT FOR THE ARABESQUE MODEL FOR THE INVESTIGATIONS' VIEW OF PAIN

Here are two features which make this Arabesque word example for pain especially applicable. Just as an arabic work in Arabesque is a verbal symbol, so also symbols in general may admit a natural to conventional division. Natural signs point to their object initially, apart from some baptizing act of a person. The best example I know of comes from personal objects of a loved one, left after the loved one's death. Conventional symbols in contrast have their referent in virtue of an agential baptism of meaning. With this distinction in mind, some species of feeling-sensations of pain may be natural signs of which we automatically experience them as presenting a particular part of the body. Other bodily sensations, like a language with its symbols, may need to be learned. I must confess that this is the case according to my athletic experience. In competitive rock climbing, I had to learn what felt bodily sensations indicated the tensing of my inner and lower back in order to succeed in some boulder problems. These sensations did not initially present me with exact muscles I needed to constrict. I had to learn what parts of my body those sensations were symbols of. This is all to suggest that the interpretive model I give for the dual function of pain may be a good phenomenal fit. Others, like a language with its symbols, may need to be learned.

The Arabesque example is further supported by possible varieties of intentionality introduced in Chapter One. The phenomenal character of how a belief intends (means) and object, e.g. the parked bike outside, etc., differs to me from how a symbol is ‘of’ an object. Like the Arabesque, one may not always be aware the the qualitative sign is a word. Furthermore, the sign feels more to ‘stand for’ and object than how the belief intends and object. This is also similar to bodily pain. My pain may be located where the disturbed body part is, but the pain does not seem to have a clear ‘ray’ of intention landing upon the body part or region. Rather, we learn what the pain ‘stands for’. In this sense, pain reflects the phenomenal difference of how a belief means and object versus how a symbol means an object. The feeling-sensation of pain’S phenomenal character as intentional is more akin to the verbal expression than to belief or perception.

9. PLUGGING THE INVESTIGATIONS’S PAIN INTO THE AIPPO PHENOMENAL CHARACTER

Inserting the Investigation’s view of pain developed above into AIPPO phenomenal character I end up with a much more baroque definition of of the phenomenal character of pain’s painfulness. With the ‘Q’ of qualitative and the ‘PO’ of ‘pain object’ arrive to AIQPPPO for the phenomenal character of painfulness:

The Phenomenal Character of Pain’s Painfulness (AIOPPPPO) = the intuited qualitative properties of a presented pain object that are reductively presented before our consciousness as a reduced object via abstraction.

Importantly for my metaphysical comparison, this definition reveals painfulness to be *qualitative* properties which are intuited from a presented pain object. Being abstracted from their presented pain object, the qualitative properties of painfulness are also *presented* - albeit, reductively as a reduced object.¹⁵⁵ Even though they are presented in abstraction, the Investigations view of pain as a feeling-sensation supports my descriptively-thin description of the phenomenal character of pain's painfulness as *qualitative* and *presented*.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I showed that Husserl's view of the phenomenological character of pain's painfulness would encompass my emphasis upon a descriptively-thin pain's painfulness as presented qualitative properties. With respect to qualitative, Being a property of a feeling-sensation of pain, painfulness is reasonably reckoned as qualitative. I buttressed this with other clearly felt-qualitative sensory examples used by Husserl in the context of pain, e.g. being burnt, etc. With respect to being presented, Husserl's painfulness is presented via being an qualitative property of a presented feeling-sensation of pain. I noted that whether this sensation when presented was either an object (via the another mental act intuiting it and having signitive content

¹⁵⁵ That pain's painfulness belongs down at the presented end of the act - object relationship in contrast to Crane has also been noticed by some in Phenomenology. Critiquing Tim Crane's view of painfulness as an intentional mode, consider Corijn Van Mazijk, "Husserl, Impure Intentionalism, and Sensory Awareness", *Phenomenology and Cognitive Science*, April, Vol. 18, Issue 2; Springer (2019): p. 333-351; (p. 8): "Degrees of pain intensity then belong to the way of presentation of the hurting object (say, one's hurting arm), rather than to the mode of intending. If this is indeed a plausible alternative construal on the impure intentionalist's own terms, the decision to locate pain intensity on the side of mode seems arbitrary, if not far-fetched."

added to it) or not - Husserl affirms that it can be presented. There is one step deeper though, that in being intuited, the property/ies of painfulness are able to be attended to and abstracted from the presented sensation. Via this abstraction, the intuited painfulness is reductively presented as a reduced object. This was noted that it comports with the act of asking about an object's phenomenal character - we describe the intuited properties we abstracted from the presented object. With the Investigations' qualitative and presented painfulness, I am am ready to proceed to the metaphysical comparison with Tim Crane's view of the phenomenal character of painfulness.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE METAPHYSICAL COMPARISON.

INTRODUCTION

In everyday life we use differing descriptions to ground the non-identity of various objects. I think of looking through the kitchen utensil drawer in my apartment looking for the wand, cheese grater. More subtly, I attend to a present disturbed interior state and try to discern if it is anger or sadness. Here, there is an assay of the phenomenal character of my mental-state and a decision of what it is identical to. In this same respect I compare the descriptively-thin assays of Crane's intentionality, and the Husserlian phenomenal character of pain's painfulness. I then use this metaphysical comparison to judge AIQPPPO's identity to Intentionalism's mental-state of pain.

CHAPTER OVERVIEW

This chapter deploys the counter-positive of Leibniz Law of Identity mentioned in the Introduction, upon the two developed descriptively-thin descriptions, i.e. Crane's and AIQPPPO's, as to what the painfulness of pain is identical to. Each of the descriptions are prepped for the comparison and then compared. From there Crane's is adjusted and re-compared, and found dissimilar on two accounts. This is used to cement the non-identity of two descriptions from one another.

1. INTRODUCTION: THE TOOL FOR THE METAPHYSICAL COMPARISON

Recall from the introduction Leibniz Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals in its contrapositive form:

$$(\forall x)(\forall y)((Fx \ \& \ \neg Fy) \rightarrow \neg(x=y))$$

This would read: for any x and any y , if something true of x is false of y , then x is not identical with y . According to this Law, clear property disagreement is ground for non-identity of two entities. A classic example comes from within basic geometry.

A geometric square and a geometric pentagon can not be numerically the same entity because they differ in the number of sides and corners, i.e. lines, and points. The square is minimally composed of four lines as sides and four points as corners. In contrast, the pentagon is minimally composed of five lines and five points. Here the y of the Pentagon has at a minimum the property

F: being five-sided. The *x* of the geometric square does not possess this *F*, i.e. the square is not five-sided.

According to the counter-positive of Leibniz's Law of Identity, the qualitative dissimilarity between the geometric square and pentagon contributes to the knowledge of their distinct-ness. This is commonsensical and straightforward. Strangely enough, the counter-positive of Leibniz's Law of the Indiscernibility of Identicals has not seen much use in contemporary, Analytic Philosophy of Mind. As I noted in the introduction, Tim Crane prefers to use a posteriori counter-example to establish non-identity. This is in contrast to non-identical phenomenal character - even descriptively-thin ones.

Instead, the counter-positive of Leibniz's Law has seen currency in a short debate over identity conditions and vague objects. Leibniz's Law was used by Harold H. Noonan in buttressing Gareth Evans in countering the view of vague objects.¹⁵⁶ Interestingly, this use of the counter-positive of Leibniz's Law of Identity as a kind of scalpel to separate what is distinct had some use early in the Twentieth Century by J. M. E. McTaggart in his idealism. Here he referred to the counter-positive of Leibniz' Law as the 'Dissimilarity of the Diverse.'¹⁵⁷ What is refreshing about McTaggart here is his emphasis diversity because of dissimilarity. The challenge for me is

¹⁵⁶ Harold W. Noonan, "Vague Identity Yet Again", *Analysis*, Vol. 50, No. 3, June (1990) p. 157 - 162. One may see Noonan's article for a bibliography to the debate. Noonan is buttressing Gareth Evans, "Can there be vague objects?", *Analysis*, 38: 208 (1978). Harold and Benjamin Curtis also gloss the counter-positive of Leibniz's Law of Identity in their "Identity", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/identity/>>.

¹⁵⁷ John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart, *Nature of Existence*, Vol.1, Cambridge University Press (1921). See especially his Ch. 10 "Dissimilarity of Substances", section 99. (p. 101).

in that 'Dissimilarity of the Diverse' was used by McTaggart to differentiate substances in his system. McTaggart reflects one objection to my use of Leibniz's Law in counter-positive: its proper subject is objects, i.e. 'substances' for McTaggart. Like McTaggart's dissimilarity of the diverse, I want to establish the non-identity of descriptively diverse items: the phenomenal character of Crane's Intentionalist's painfulness and the phenomenal character of Husserl's pain's painfulness. The objection runs, that the counter-positive of Leibniz's Law—and McTaggart's Diversity of Diverse—ranges over *objets* and their properties. Not properties themselves. This is true. I have too caveats to this construal of the counter-positive though which make my approach permissible.

One, is that in using Husserl's Investigations to meet Crane's Brentianian inspired view of intentionality, Husserl's view of painfulness, i.e. AIQPPPO includes abstraction. Under abstraction, the intuited, qualitative properties of presented pain's painfulness constitute a reduced object. As a reduced object, the properties of painfulness are able to stand as a variable, e.g. an x or a y , etc. in the counter-positive Law of Identity above. As a reduced object, painfulness is then able to be ranged over with properties, i.e. an F , etc. Another way to express this is that the painful properties, when abstracted are presented as a reduced object which is a whole in abstraction. This whole is able to stand as an object in abstraction, along with its own properties as moments of that whole. Here, I will inspect the abstracted whole of the phenomenal character of painfulness for its moments of being qualitative and presented. As will be done below, the phenomenal character of painfulness as a reduced object in abstraction will be a variable, e.g. an x or y , with its F s of qualitative and presented.

My second caveat is that to not admit the phenomenal character of pain's painfulness as a reduced object to use within Leibniz's counter-positive Law of Identity is to succumb to a kind of absurdity. I point to the fact that this position leads to the position that one cannot perform a metaphysical comparison upon properties. This is absurd in principle and experientially. Take for example comparing the red color of one apple and the green color of another. The red of the first apple may be shiny and full-bodied. Whereas the green the other apple may be dull and pale. In principle, the color properties of each are comparable, but each of the property-instances had by the apples are not objects, properly speaking. Butressing this is experience. To deny that the color properties of the two apples cannot be compared belies experience. This is to succumb to absurdity. Rather, the abstraction in the Investigations's AIPPO phenomenal character makes sense of our experience. If properties of an object are abstracted as reduced objects in a reductive presentation, then our experience of comparing those properties is explained. The phenomena of comparing properties, e.g. the colors of the two apples, etc. is intelligible under Investigations's view of phenomenal character with its abstracted properties as reduced object. Since I am using the Investigations model for phenomenal character I will assume the truth of its reduced objects for use within Leibniz Law of Identity.

2. SETTING UP THE FIRST ITEM FOR COMPARISON: THE AIQPPPO PHENOMENAL CHARACTER OF PAIN'S PAINFULNESS

From the last chapter here is the phenomenal character of painfulness for the Investigation's feeling-sensation of pain:

The Phenomenal Character of Pain's Painfulness (AIOPPPPO) = the intuited qualitative properties of a presented pain object that are reductively presented before our consciousness as a reduced object via abstraction.

With my focus upon the descriptively-thin Analytic test piece of pain, it is AIOPPPPO's qualitative and presented nature I am after. It is there. Painfulness are intuited *qualitative* properties. Furthermore, as properties of a presented pain object, they themselves are reductively *presented* in abstraction from the entire pain object. This emphasis upon the qualitative and presented as properties of the reduced object of painfulness produces this object and property tree:

—> (F) are qualitative properties (as a reduced
object);

(PF) Painfulness —> (x) experienced ('intuited')
properties of a presented
pain object:

—> (G) rare reductively presented (via
abstraction).

In this description tree (PF)—the *x*—is the experienced properties of the presented pain object. (F) stands for being *qualitative* properties (of a reduced object). (G) stands for being reductively

presented (in abstraction). Formulating this it would look like x as having each of these would be:

(PF) AQPPO's description: $(\forall x)((Fx \ \& \ Gx)$

Now I will move onto Crane's account.

3. SETING UP THE SECOND ITEM FOR COMPARISON: CRANE' INTENTIONAL MODE OF PAIN AS PAIN'S PAINFULNESS

In formulating the first property (H) for Crane's intentional mode, we will need to briefly survey the conclusions of Chapter Three and Four. I argued in Chapter Three, that Crane under Intentionalism held all mental-states—including their parts, e.g. intentional modes—to be composed of only intentional properties. Hence, in Chapter Four, the phenomenal character of all mental-states—including pain—could be characterized completely in terms of intentionality. This was the thrust of his definition of phenomenal character in Chapter Four. Accordingly, (H) will be :

(H): 'exclusively characterized by the mind's directed-ness upon an object, i.e. intentionality'.

In the Chapter Two I introduced that Crane's Brentano / Husserl inspired view of intentionality was that of the 'mind's directed-ness upon an object. I relayed his example of his thought about that his doctor smokes. In this example his mind was said to be directed upon his smoker-doctor.

This characterizes intentionality for Crane. In the description tree, (I) will refer to this feature of Crane's thought:

(I): 'the mind's directed-ness upon an object, i.e. intentionality.'

With (y) as the intentional mode of pain, the description-tree for the comparison would look like this:

—> (H) is exclusively characterized by the
mind's directed-ness upon an object,
i.e. intentionality.

(C) Painfulness —> (y) Intentional mode of pain {

—> (I) is Intentional, i.e. the mind's directed-
ness upon an object.

In this description tree (C)—the y —is the intentional mode of pain. (H) stands for the intentional mode's exclusive characterization by the mind's directed-ness upon an object. (I) stands for y being intentional, i.e. exhibiting the mind's directed-ness upon an object. Formulating this it would look like y as having each of these would be:

(C) Crane's description: $(\forall y)((Hy \ \& \ Iy)$

From here I will begin the comparison.

4. USING THE TOOL: LEIBNIZ'S LAW OF IDENTITY IN CONTRAPOSITIVE

Now we are brought back to the (PF) and (C) of the introduction. The proposed ontological reduction of (PF) to (C) is to be judged. As the two descriptive trees stand there is no clear contradiction. (H) and (I) are no negation of either of (F) and (G) of the AIQPPPO phenomenal character of painfulness this at this level of description. We end up with::

(PF) AIQPPPO's description: $(\forall x)((Fx \ \& \ Gx)$

(C) Crane's description: $(\forall y)((Hy \ \& \ Iy)$

None of the properties of either y (Crane's description) or x (AIQPPPO's description) explicitly contradict each other. That is, until (H) and (I) are looked at more closely under the lens of Intentionalism and the contrast between intention and presentation. Together these, I will argue, translates the (H) of y into $(\sim F)$ and the (I) of y into $(\sim G)$.

5. TRANSLATING THE (H) OF y AS $(\sim F)$.

The translation of the exclusive intentionality, i.e (H) of y into the non-qualitative of $(\sim F)$ is founded upon the conclusions of Chapter Three and Four of this thesis. What these two chapters reveal are Crane explicitly holding that all mental-states have no qualitative properties. Recall in Chapter Three the denial of pro-qualia and Weak Intentionalism views in favor of a Strong Intentionalism. Recall also in Chapter Four, Crane's working with the senses of 'qualitative' in

order to define phenomenal character in a way consistent with his Intentionalism. This was eschewing a 'narrow' sense of qualitative where qualia and felt bodily states were listed under.

Because of these two features:

- the 'only-intentional-properties' of all mental-states under Crane's Intentionalism, and;
- the explicit re-working of the definition of Phenomenal Character to accommodate Intentionalism.

I conclude that y 's (H) translates as the negation of x 's (F), i.e. $(\sim F)$. For Crane's description, the 'no-qualitative properties belonging to mental states', i.e. (H), equates to Crane's description holding that his intentional mode of pain is has no qualitative properties. Painfulness in being qualitative properties, then translates (H) as a denial of qualitative properties. That is $(\sim F)$.

6. TRANSLATING THE (I) OF y INTO $(\sim G)$.

This translation goes through because under Crane's Intentionalism, being intentional (I), is in some respects opposite of being presented (G), for at least two reasons. Firstly, in Crane's view the mind's directed-ness is solely an intention as driven by (H). Under his Intentionalism—captured by (H)—there are no qualitative properties had by the intentional mode in which for it to be intuited and consequently presented. In this sense, (I) in being not-presented is $(\sim G)$.

Secondly, is that intentionality and presentation are opposites of each other with respect to intentional and presentational directions. The intentionality of Crane's 'mind's directed-ness' is

directed *towards an object*. Painfulness, as a property of a presented pain object is presented, albeit derivatively, *towards consciousness*. To say that the intention is a presentation is to confuse the intention with what is presented. To help see this, I find it helpful to construe intentionality and presentation in directions of ‘rushing’. Intentionality as the mind’s directed-ness towards and object is an ‘*out-rushing*’ of intention accomplishing the presentation of an object. Conversely, presentation is the ‘*in-rushing*’ of the presented object so intended as to be placed before consciousness the object *in propria persona*. The ‘out-rushing’ (I) of Crane’s intentional mode y is not the direction of the presented object. Via (I) ‘intentional’, implying that its not an in-rushing of presentation (I) is translatable as $(\sim G)$. For these two reasons:

- lack of qualitative properties in which to be intuited, and;
- the out-rushing of intention being ‘not the in-rushing’ of presentation.

I conclude that (I) translates as the negation of (G) of x . Thus we have (I) as $(\sim G)$.

Now we have the translated situation for each x and y ; for each of the intentional mode and the presented qualitative properties.

(PF) AQPPO’s description: $(\forall x)((Fx \ \& \ Gx)$

(C) Crane’s description: $(\forall y)((\sim Fy \ \& \ \sim Gy)$

Now we are in a position to compare the two descriptions again.

7. COMPARISON OF THE TRANSLATED CRANE DESCRIPTION WITH THE AIQPPO DESCRIPTION OF PAIN'S PAINFULNESS

Simply by looking at the properties had by the respective descriptions (x and y) one can see that they are not identical to each other. More importantly that the Crane description is not identical to the the AIQPPPO description. I will display the non-identity of with respect to each property.

The non-identity of Crane's description to the AIQPPPO description on the basis of their being qualitative properties or not:

$$(\forall x)(\forall y)((Fx \ \& \ \neg Fy) \rightarrow \neg(x=y))$$

Here Crane's description of the painfulness of pain is non-qualitative. AIQPPPO's is.

Below is the non-identity of Crane's description with the AIQPPPO description on the basis of their being presented or not:

$$(\forall x)(\forall y)((Gx \ \& \ \neg Gy) \rightarrow \neg(x=y))$$

Here Crane's intentional mode, in being an intention and devoid of any qualitative properties is not presented. AIQPPPO's experienced qualitative properties of painfulness are.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have shown that the phenomenal character of Crane's description of the painfulness of pain is not identical to my Investigations definition of phenomenal character even when applied to phenomenal painfulness. Using the counter-positive of Leibniz Law of Identity, the dissimilarity of the Crane's description from my AIQPPPO description of painfulness even thinly-described is clear. One is qualitative and presented; the other non-qualitative and non-presented. This non-identity of Crane's description to my AIQPPPO description in the next chapter will be utilized to argue that the ontological reductionism of Intentionalism should be rejected.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION: DESCRIPTIVE NON-IDENTITY WITH THE PAINFULNESS OF PAIN AS A GOOD REASON AGAINST ONTOLOGICAL REDUCTION IN MODERN, ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY OF MIND.

CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have provided a strong prima facie counter-example to Intentionalism's Second Reduction of presented, qualitative mental-states to a mental-state exclusively characterized by intentionality. I chose the painfulness of pain to see if it could be identified with an Intentional mental-state of only intentionality. To motivate this I choose a particular Intentionalist figure who appealed to the Phenomenological tradition in his construal of intentionality and its method. This was Tom Crane and his intentional mode of pain. His intentional mode of pain caught my

attention for he affirmed two things about it: one, that it was the painfulness of pain, and two; that it was exhaustively constituted by intentional properties. Here, the Second Reduction of Intentionalism was evident - an intentional mode composed only of intentional properties was said to be that which pain's qualitative and presented painfulness was identical to. This was the ontological reduction mentioned in the Introduction of (PF) to (C).

In Chapter Two I confirmed that this was Tim Crane's view. In chapter Three I rebutted his defense of its phenomenal character as solely characterized by intentionality. This brought me to meeting his Brentano / Husserl inspired view of intentionality with what in Husserl's Investigations the nature of the phenomenal character of pain's painfulness would be. Accommodating Crane's descriptively-thin Analytic test piece of pain, the Investigations revealed the phenomenal character of painfulness to be at a minimum qualitative and presented. With these two properties in hand, I conducted a metaphysical comparison using Leibniz Law of Identity in counter-positive to see if the two phenomenal characters for painfulness could be identical: Crane's — pure intentionality; and my Investigations' one — qualitative and presented. Judging that they were not identical via Leibniz's Law of Identity, Crane's reduction of (PF) to (C) was rejected.

Now, this brings us back to broader Intentionalism and ontological reductionism in modern, Analytic Philosophy of Mind. I conclude that this lack of identity for Crane's attempted reduction of qualitative, presented painfulness to a mental-state solely composed by intentionality is a good reason against the Second Reduction of Intentionalism. Crane's failed

reduction is a token of the same Type of the Second Reduction of broader Intentionalism. Furthermore, what is a good reason against the Second Reduction of Intentionalism, operates as a good reason against Intentionalism itself. What is a good reason against Intentionalism strengthens the cumulative case against ontological reductionism in Modern, Analytic Philosophy of Mind. The progression would go like this:

What is a good reason against ontological reductionism in Crane

|

∨

Is a good reason against the ontological reductionism of the Second Reduction in Intentionalism;

|

∨

What is a good reason against the ontological reductionism of the Second Reduction in Intentionalism;

|

∨

Is a good reason against the ontological reductionism of Intentionalism.

|

∨

What is a good reason against the ontological reductionism of Intentionalism;

|

∨

Is a good reason against the ontological reductionism in Modern, Analytic Philosophy of Mind.

In this sense, my thesis adds to the cumulative case as to why this current installment of ontological reductionism in Modern Philosophy of Mind, i.e. Intentionalism, should be rejected as depicting reality. I accomplished this though not offering a thought experiment or an a posteriori counter example. Rather, my account focused upon competing descriptions of

phenomenal character and their non-identity. From the divergent descriptions of these phenomenal characters I used Leibniz's Law of Identity in counter-positive to establish their non-identity. This has the advantage of being an 'at hand' method of experience and reason in which to adjudicate the reality of alleged reductions. One does not need to come up with a clever thought experiment. Nor is one vulnerable to the claim of the reduction until an ostensive counter-example is found. Rather, in the spirit of Phenomenology, the structure of what we are conscious of can be used together with Leibniz's Law of Identity in counter-positive, to resist ontological reduction of the mind to the body in Modern, Philosophy of Mind.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Antony, L. (1997). 'What it's Like to Smell a Gardenia' *Times Literary Supplement*, 4897
(February 7).

Andrade, J. (1993) "Consciousness: Current views," In: *Depth of Anesthesia*, ed. J. G. Jones.
Little Brown.

Armstrong, D. M. (1968). *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (Routledge, London).

Aleshi P. & J. H. Turnbull, J. H. (2015). "Spinal and Epidural Anesthesia," in P.K. Sikka, P. K. et
al., (eds.) *Basic Clinical Anesthesia*.

Alsaadi, S. M. et al., (2010). "Prevalence of Sleep Disturbance in Patients with Low Back Pain,"
European Spine Journal (2011) 20 :737–743.

Aristotle (1926). *Rhetoric* trans. J.H. Freese, *Aristotle*, Loeb Classical Library, Vol. 22,
(Cambridge / Harvard University Press)

Bartok, P. J. (2005). "Brentano's Intentionality Thesis: Beyond the Analytic and Phenomenal Readings," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (October): 437 - 460.

Block, N. (1995). 'On a confusion about a function of consciousness' *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 18, 227-247; reprinted in *The Nature of Consciousness* eds. Ned Block, Owen Flanagan and Güven Güzeldere; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press (1997).

_____. (1997). "Inverted Earth", in Block, Flanagan, and Guzelere (eds), *The Nature of Consciousness*, MIT Press, Massachusetts : 677 - 685.

Bordolini, D. (2017). "Not in the Mood for Intentionalism", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* : 60 - 81.

Bryne, A. (2002). "DON'T PANIC: Tye's Intentionalist Theory of Consciousness," *A Field Guide to Philosophy of Mind: Symposium on Michael Tye's Consciousness, Color and Content*; (Winter) : 3-27. <<http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/tyesymp.pdf>>

Bryne, T. (2020). "Husserl's Theory of Signitive and Empty Intentions in Logical Investigations and its Revisions: Meaning Intentions and Perceptions", *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, (Routledge, Taylor & Francis).

Caston, V. (1998). 'Aristotle on the Problem of Intentionality', *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. LVIII, No. 2 (June).

Chalmers, D. (2004) "Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument." in Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), *There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument*. (MIT Press) : 269 - 298.

_____. (2004a) "The Representational Character of Experience." in B. Leiter (ed.) *The Future for Philosophy* (Oxford) : 153 - 181.

Clark, Orville (1973). "Pain and Being: An Essay in Heideggerian Ontology," *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*: (Fall): 179 - 190.

Crane, T. (1998). "Intentionality as the Mark of the Mental," *Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind*, ed. Anthony O'Hare; Cambridge University Press : 229 - 252.

_____. (2001). *Elements of Mind*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. (2003). “The Intentional Structure of Consciousness”, In A. Jokic & Q. Smith (Eds.), *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. (2003a). *The Mechanical Mind: A philosophical introduction to minds, machines and mental representation*, (2nd ed.); London, New York; Routledge.

———. (2004). “Summary of Elements of Mind and Replies to Critics,” *Croatian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. IV, No. 11 : 224 - 240.

———. (2009). “Intentionalism.”, In A. Beckermann & B. McLaughlin (Eds.), *Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. (2018). “A Short History of Philosophical Theories of Consciousness in the 20th Century” in Kind, A. eds, *Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries*, Book 6, Routledge, June : 78 - 104.

Curtis, B. & Noonan, H. (2018). "Identity", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, eds.

Edward N. Zalta; Summer Edition. URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/identity/>>.

Cutter, B. & Tye, M. (2011). "Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain",
Philosophical Issues Vol. 21 : 90-109.

Davies, M. (1989). "Consciousness and the Varieties of Aboutness." in C. Macdonald & G.
Macdonald (eds.), *Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation*,
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers) : 356 - 392.

Dallenbach, K. M. (1939). "Pain: History and Present Status," *The American Journal of
Psychology*, July; Vol. 52, No. 3 : 331-347.

Deonna, J. & Teroni, F. (2012). *The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction*, (New York:
Routledge).

Diels, H. and W. Kranz, eds., (1974). *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*. Three Vols. Reprint of
Sixth Edition.

Dretske, F. (1995). "Phenomenal Externalism, or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where Are
Qualia?," *Philosophical Issues*, 7 : 143-58.

———. (1996). *Naturalizing the Mind*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press .

———. (2003). "Experience as Representation," *Philosophical Issues*, 13: 67-82.

Drummond, J. (2015). "Intuitions" *Teorema: Revista Internacional De Filosofia*, vol. 34, no. 3 : 9-36.

Emad, Parvis (1982). "Heidegger on Pain: Focusing on a Recurring Theme of His Thought," *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*. Bd. 36 H. 3 (Jul. - Sep.) : 345—360.

Evans, G. (1978). "Can there be vague objects?", *Analysis*, 38: 208.

Ferran, I. V. (2015). "The Emotions in Early Phenomenology," *STUDIA PHENOMENOLOGICA XV* : 329 - 354.

Fréchette, G. (2019). "The Origins of Phenomenology in Austro-German Philosophy: Brentano and Husserl," in J. A. Shand (ed.) *A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Philosophy* (London; Wiley-Blackwell) : 418 - 453.

Firmianus, Lactantius (Caelius). (2003). *Institutiones Divinae*, Liverpool Univ. Press.

Geniusas, S. (2013). "On Naturalism in Pain Research: A Phenomenological Critique" *Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy*, Vol. 1, No. 1 : 1 - 10.

———. (2014). “The Origins of the Phenomenology of Pain: Brentano, Stumpf and Husserl”,
Continental Philosophy Review 47(1):1-17.

———. (2015). “The Subject of Pain: Husserl’s Discovery of the Lived Body”, *Research in Phenomenology* 44: 384 - 404.

———. (2017). “Pain and Intentionality”, *Perception, Affectivity, and Volition in Husserl’s Phenomenology*, eds. Rubio, R., Taguchi, S., & Walton, R. (Springer 2017) : 113 - 136.

Hopp, W. (2008). “Husserl on Sensation, Perception, and Interpretation”, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June) : 219-245.

———. (2015). “Introduction: Intuitions.” *Teorema: Revista Internacional De Filosofia*, vol. 34, no. 3, (2015) : 5–18

Hurley, D. et al, (2010). “Physiotherapy for sleep disturbance in chronic low back pain: a feasibility randomized controlled trail,” *BMC Musculoskeletal Disorders* : 11:70.

Husserl, E. (1900/1901) *Logical Investigations*, Vol. I & II, *International Library of Philosophy*, trans. J.N. Findalay (1970), eds. D. Moran (2001), Routledge (2013).

Jokic, A. & Smith, Q. (eds.) (2003) *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford University Press: New York : 33-56.

Jones, J. W. (1823). *A Translation of all the Greek, Latin, Italian, and French Quotations which occur in Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England; and also in the Notes of the Editions by Christian, Archbold and Williams*, London.

Keele K.D. (1957). *Anatomies of pain*. Oxford: Blackwell Scientific Publications.

Kidd, C. (2019). "Re-examining Husserl's Non-Conceptualism in the *Logical Investigations*" *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, Vol. 101: Issue 3 (De Gruyter) : 407 - 444

Knudsen, C. (1982). 'Intentions and Impositions' in *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy* A. Kenny et al (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Leder, D. (1984-85). "Toward a Phenomenology of Pain.", *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry* 19: 255–266.

———. (2015). "The Phenomenology of Chronic Pain: Embodiment and Alienation." *Continental Philosophy Review* 48(2): 107–122.

———. (2016). “The Experiential Paradoxes of Pain.” *Journal of Medicine and Philosophy*, 41: (July): 444–460.

———. (2017). *Phenomenological Bioethics: Medical Technologies, Human Suffering, and the Meaning of Being Alive*. London: Routledge.

Lewis, C. T. & Short, C. (1879). *A Latin Dictionary. Founded on Andrews' edition of Freund's Latin dictionary*. Oxford. Clarendon Press.

Loar, B. (2003). ‘Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia’, In Jovic, A and Smith, Q, (eds.) *Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives*. Oxford University Press: New York : 77 - 98.

Lycan, W. (1996), “The Case for Phenomenal Externalism”, *Philosophical Perspectives*, 15: 17-35.

———. (2001). *Consciousness and Experience*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

McTaggart , J. M. E. (1921) *Nature of Existence*, Vol.1, Cambridge University Press.

Merleau-Ponté, M. (2012). *Phenomenology of Perception*. Trans. by D. A. Landes. London: Routledge.

Moran, D. (1996). "A Case for Philosophical Pluralism: The Problem of Intentionality," in *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement*. New York, Cambridge University Press : p. 19-32.

_____. (2013). "Intentionality: Some Lessons from the History of the Problem from Brentano to the Present," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol. 21. No. 3 : 317 - 358.

Mulligan, K. (1995). 'Perception', in eds. D.W. Smith & B. Smith, *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, Cambridge University Press : 168 - 138.

Noonan, H. (1990). "Vague Identity Yet Again", *Analysis*, Vol. 50, No. 3, June.

Pfänder, A. (1900) *Phänomenologie des Wollens. Eine psychologische Analyse*, Leipzig: Barth.

Preus, A. (2007). *Historical Dictionary of Greek Philosophy*, Scarecrow Press.

Preston, A. (2015). "Intuition in Analytic Philosophy." *Teorema: Revista Internacional De Filosofia*, vol. 34, no. 3 : 37–56.

Priscianus, Theodorus (1532). *Rerum Medicarum Libri Quatuor*, Strasburg.

Reiner, A. (1911). 'Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils', in *Sämtliche Werke*, pp. 95–140. Eng. trans. by B. Smith, B. (1982) "On the Theory of the Negative Judgment", in *Parts and*

Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, B. Smith (ed.), Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 315– 346, 351–377.

Salice, A. (2012). 'Phänomenologische Variationen. Intention and Fulfillment in Early Phenomenology,' in: A. Salice (ed.): *Intentionality*. München: Philosophia : 203–242.

_____. (2016). "The Phenomenology of the Munich and Göttingen Circles", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = [<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/phenomenology-mg/>](https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/phenomenology-mg/).

Sartre, Jean-Pierre, (1956). *Being and Nothingness*. Trans. H. E. Barnes. New York: Washington Square Press : 436 - 445.

Searle. J. (1983). *Intentionality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Serbest, S. et al., (2017). "Preoperative and post-operative sleep quality in rotator cuff tear patients," *Knee Surgery, Sports Traumatology, Arthroscopy*; Vol. 25, Iss. 7; July: 25 : 2109–2113

Simpson, D. P. (1977). *Cassell's Latin Dictionary: Latin-English, English-Latin*. London: Cassell.

Smith, B. (198 / 1999). "Boundaries: A Brentanian Theory" *Brentano Studien* 8 : 107-114.

Speaks, J. (2015) "Is Phenomenal Character Really Out There in the World?", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* : 91 (2):465-482.

Sydney, S. (1990). "Qualities and Qualia: What's in the Mind?", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 50 :109 - 130.

Tye, M. (1995), *Consciousness, Color, and Content*, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

_____. (2000). *Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

_____. (2002). "To PANIC or Not to PANIC? - Reply to Byrne," *A Field Guide to Philosophy of Mind: Symposium on Michael Tye's Consciousness, Color and Content*; (Winter): 28-33. <<http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/tyesymp.pdf>>

_____. (2005). "Another Look at Representationalism about Pain," in *Pain: New Essays on Its Nature and the Methodology of Its Study*, ed. Murat Aydede Cambridge.

_____. (2015). "Yes, Phenomenal Character Really is Out There in the World.," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*; 91 (2): 483-488.

Van Mazijk, C. (2019). "Husserl, Impure Intentionalism, and Sensory Awareness",

Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, April, Vol. 18, Issue 2; (Springer) : 333-351.

Walter, H. (2015). "Introduction: Intuitions." *Teorema: Revista Internacional De Filosofia*, vol.

34, no. 3 : 5–18.

———. (2008). "Husserl on Sensation, Perception, and Interpretation", *Canadian Journal of*

Philosophy, Vol. 38, No. 2 (June): 219-245.

Wheelock, F. M. (200) *Wheelock's Latin. 6th edition*. New York, N.Y: Harper Resource.

Zahavi, D. (2003) "Intentionality and phenomenally: a phenomenological take on the hard

problem", *The Problem of Consciousness: New Essays in Phenomenological Philosophy*

of Mind; E. Thompson (ed.), *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*; Supplementary Volume 29

: 63-92.

———. (2004). "Intentionality and Experience", *Synthesis Philosophica* 40, February: 299

-318.