



**UNIVERSITÀ
DI TORINO**

**L'ÉCOLE
DES HAUTES
ÉTUDES EN** 
**SCIENCES
SOCIALES**

UNIVERSITÀ DEGLI STUDI DI TORINO
DIPARTIMENTO DI CULTURE, POLITICA E SOCIETÀ
ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES
MONDES AMÉRICAINS

Dottorato di Ricerca in
GLOBAL HISTORY OF EMPIRES - XXXV CICLO
in co-tutela con
MONDES AMÉRICAINS, EHESS

**GOVERNING THE NORTHERN FRONTIERS IN THE NEW KINGDOM OF
GRANADA, 1680-1739: POLITICAL PRACTICES AND COMPETING INTERESTS ON
CONTESTED GROUND.**

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Anni accademici: 2019-2023.

Settore scientifico-disciplinare: M-STO/02 STORIA MODERNA

*¿Qué mayor felicidad en la tierra,
Beatísimo padre, que vivir donde a
cada paso pueda uno ver y disfrutar
tantas y tan grandes cosas? (...)
Afirmase, además, que el aire es
saludable y saludables asimismo son
las aguas de los ríos, como que corren
sin cesar sobre oro, porque no hay
ninguno, ni tampoco montaña ni
llanura que no lo guarde en sus
entrañas.*

Pedro Mártir de Anglería,
Décadas del Nuevo Mundo,
1504, DEC. III,1. VIII.

Remerciements

Throughout the research that led to this dissertation, I have benefited from the help of many people. Most of all, I would like to thank Jean-Frédéric Schaub for his unwavering support and enlightening guidance through many years of tutorship.

I am very grateful to the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris for the years of academic education and the opportunities it has offered me. Therein, I would like to thank Mondes Américains research lab, and especially Clément Thibaud, Gorette Frouin, Stéphanie Medina, and Jeanne Moisand, whose help with funding, academic mobility, and everyday support have been fundamental.

Furthermore, I thank the program Global History of Empires for the funding and trust it provided me with, particularly through Federica Morelli, who welcomed me at the University of Turin at the start of a year that would prove very difficult, as well as Barbara Curli, the program's current director. Likewise, I thank Anna Bottesi, whose friendship made the quarantine a little lighter and less confusing, and Maria Olga García, and Renato Vico for their company in difficult times.

Many individuals assisted me with archival research, but above all, I would like to express my gratitude to Luis Miguel Córdoba Ochoa for guiding me as I ventured into the Archivo de Indias for the first time. His kindness and advice encouraged me more than I will ever be able to tell him. This dissertation is dedicated to his memory.

In Medellín, the Archivo Histórico de Antioquia is run by hearteningly kind and resilient archivists, whose assistance during several short stays was essential. In particular, I am thankful to Gema Botero for her kind help, and to Manuel Salvador Cartagena Herrera for sharing documents with me and for digitalizing some more when I had already returned to Europe. In Bogotá, the Archivo General de la Nación was made easier to navigate thanks to the help of John Alejandro Rueda and Edilberto Umaña, whom I also thank.

Many seminars and workshops contributed to the conception of this dissertation throughout the years. In particular, the Taller Umbra, led by Marta Herrera Ángel, gave me the chance of presenting my research at a time when the pandemic impeded all but virtual encounters. At the EHESS, I must acknowledge the seminar Historia de las Españas, organized by Bernard Vincent and Jean-Frédéric Schaub, for many years of

training and fellowship. Caroline Cunill's seminar on Translators and interpreters was also an important space for many ideas to flourish. Furthermore, the yearly Seminario de historia of the Festival de Música Barroca y Renacentista de Vélez Blanco, provided me with a crucial environment to discuss this dissertation, as well as to make new bonds beyond the academic field. I would like to thank Bernard Vincent, Francisco Andújar Castillo, and Jean-Frédéric Schaub for their invitations to the festival, as well as my fellow festivalgoers, Javier Gómez Mesas and Mariana Meneses Muñoz for their insight and friendship. Recently, José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez and Mauricio Arango gave me a chance to present my research at their seminar Fronteras, which proved an important step in the consolidation of several ideas.

The process of writing this dissertation was facilitated by the chance I had to spend some time at the Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, at the Universidad Autónoma de México. The stay in Mexico enabled me to start writing in conditions difficult to improve. I am extremely grateful to Gibrán Bautista y Lugo and Marta Atzin Bahena Pérez for sharing their wisdom, kindness, and spirit, and for welcoming me to unknown yet familiar lands. Carolina Abadía Quintero I thank for her keen ear, for her generosity, and her welcoming wit, all of which helped me think better and move beyond the first chapters. I must also say a word of gratitude to Huemac Escalona Lüttig and Marta Martín Gabaldón for welcoming us in Oaxaca with kindness and care, as well as the program FAILURE: Genealogies of Unsuccess.

Throughout the semesters, I had the privilege to have many discussions with professors whose insight was helpful, for which I am grateful. In particular, I give special thanks to Baptiste Bonnefoy, Margarita Garrido, Carl Langabaek, and Darío Barrera. Moreover, many parts of this dissertation were read and corrected by friends and family. In particular, I would like to thank Lisa MacKinnon, Gabriel Groz, Agneska Bloch and Salomé Ketabi for their meticulous and essential proofreading. I also sincerely thank Inès Anrich for her constant advice and encouraging comments at the latest hour.

During the years spent working on this project, I relied on the support of colleagues who became friends. I would like to thank my fellow Ph.D. students from Mondes Américains research lab, Simon Lefebvre, Ana María Jiménez and Jerónimo Bermúdez, for their knowledge and friendship. Most of all, I sincerely thank Seyni

Gueye and Elisa Cerón for their academic advice, travel company, and humor in times both light and grim. To my colleague, Antoine Rousseau, for his company in organizing our Atelier des doctorants, and for his friendship over the years, I sincerely thank. Finally, I wish to express my most heartfelt gratitude to my fellow partner in burden, Michele Magri, whose frank solidarity, and constant companionship made this arduous process smoother amid our shared endeavors. Finally, for the sake of concision, I wish to thank several dear friends: Andrés Felipe Durán, Carlota Sandoval Lizarralde, Alejandro Caicedo, Laura Cárdenas, and Victoria Bergbauer; and family: Ana Aranzazu Vergnon, Dominique Vergnon, Mauricio Villa, Fiona Rambo, and Darlys Blandón.

Lastly, I would like to thank my mother for listening to my tirades on historical sources and figures, all the while reassuring me in my plight with an endless patience. My father, I wish to thank for our conversations too, as the curiosity to explore the questions raised in this dissertation arose from a dialogue which we have knit over many years. Finally, I am grateful to Sol for her love and patience, without which this ship would never have reached its port.

Résumé

L'objectif de cette thèse est d'examiner la manière dont les frontières situées dans l'arrière-pays caribéen, s'étendant du Darién à la péninsule de la Guajira, ont été gouvernées au cours d'une période marquée par diverses perturbations : la transition dynastique de 1700, de nombreuses guerres (dont la guerre de Succession d'Espagne, 1702-1714), l'apogée de la contrebande et une grande instabilité politique dans les sièges de gouvernement du Royaume : l'Audiencia de Santafé et la brève vice-royauté de la Nouvelle Grenade (1717-1723). Les frontières, éloignées des villes, sont des espaces poreux et hybrides. Cependant, leur place dans les préoccupations politiques n'est pas marginale mais centrale.

En effet, les frontières sont des espaces essentiels à la circulation des personnes, des biens et des idées. De plus, de nombreuses frontières de la Nouvelle Grenade étaient chargées d'or, tant sur terre que dans les rivières. Il était donc essentiel de les contrôler, d'ordonner les populations qui s'y trouvaient et de les intégrer au royaume et, à plus grande échelle, à la Monarchie. Pour étudier la manière dont ces territoires ont été gouvernés, cette thèse vise à examiner les défis territoriaux posés par ce vaste espace : distance, sécurité, contrebande et corruption ; peuplement et exploitation des terres. À cet effet, certaines questions sont posées : Comment les territoires échappant au contrôle de la Couronne ont-ils été conquis et intégrés ? Que suggèrent les conflits juridictionnels qui se sont déroulés au niveau local sur la dynamique politique au niveau du royaume ? Quels étaient les enjeux majeurs liés à la protection et à l'exploitation de l'arrière-pays ? Comment les populations autochtones ont-elles été intégrées à la Monarchie ? Comment évoluent les différents types d'interactions entre acteurs inter-impériaux et autochtones ? Quels sont les mécanismes de " bon gouvernement " ?

Dans cette étude, une attention particulière est accordée à la compréhension de la tension qui prévaut entre les groupes d'intérêts des officiers et des vecinos, les groupes indigènes et la Couronne. En théorie, les officiers défendaient un projet impérial en protégeant les intérêts de la Couronne et de ses sujets. Mais dans la pratique, la justice royale n'était pas appliquée, ce qui nuisait aux Indiens, dont la position cruciale à la frontière poussait les autorités à entrer en concurrence pour négocier avec eux. Ainsi, les négociations se déroulent entre les indigènes "dociles" et les autorités, qui cherchent à régler la frontière et à freiner l'avancée des Indiens "hostiles". Marrons,

étrangers, intrus et contrebandiers complètent le tableau d'une région socialement mixte. Les frontières septentrionales du Royaume ont donc été influencées à la fois par des forces atlantiques et globales plus vastes, ainsi que par des dynamiques politiques et territoriales locales.

Mots clés : Autorités - Frontières - Conquête – Contrebande - Nouvelle Grenade - Histoire politique

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to examine the way in which the frontiers located on the Caribbean hinterland, stretching from the Darién to the Guajira peninsula, were governed during a period marked by various disturbances: the dynastic transition of 1700; numerous wars (including the War of Spanish Succession, 1702-1714); the heyday of smuggling, and considerable political instability in the Kingdom's seats of government: the Audiencia de Santafé and the brief viceroyalty of New Granada (1717-1723).

Frontiers, located far from cities, were porous and hybrid areas. However, their place within the political preoccupations was not marginal but central. In fact, frontiers were essential areas through which people, goods, and ideas circulated. Additionally, many frontiers of the New Kingdom of Granada were laden with gold, both on land and in rivers. Thus, controlling them, ordering the populations within, and integrating them into the Kingdom and, on a larger scale, to the Monarchy, was an essential task. To study how these territories were governed, this dissertation aims to examine the territorial challenges this vast area posed: distance, security, contraband, and corruption; land settlement and exploitation. To this effect, some questions asked are: How were territories beyond the control of the Crown conquered and integrated? What do the jurisdictional conflicts that played out at local level suggest about the political dynamics at Kingdom level? What were the major stakes involved in protecting and exploiting the hinterland? How were native populations integrated into the Monarchy? How did the various types of interaction between inter-imperial and native actors evolve? What were the mechanisms for ensuring "good government"?

In this study, particular attention is directed at understanding the prevailing tension between interest groups of officers and vecinos, native groups, and the Crown.

In theory, officials defended an imperial project by protecting the interests of the Crown and its subjects. But in practice, the application of royal justice was not carried out, hampering Indians, whose crucial standing on the frontier made authorities compete to negotiate with them. Thus, negotiations were carried out between "docile" natives and authorities, who sought to settle the frontier and curb the advance of "hostile" Indians. Maroons, foreigners, interlopers, and smugglers complete the picture of a socially mixed region. The northern frontiers of the Kingdom, thus, were impacted both by larger Atlantic and global forces, as well as by local political and territorial dynamics.

Keywords: Authorities - Frontiers - Conquest - Smuggling - New Granada - Political history

Resumen

El objetivo de esta tesis es examinar la forma en que se gobernaron las fronteras situadas en el interior del Caribe, que se extienden desde el Darién hasta la península de la Guajira, durante un periodo marcado por diversas perturbaciones: la transición dinástica de 1700; numerosas guerras (incluida la Guerra de Sucesión española, 1702-1714); el apogeo del contrabando, y una considerable inestabilidad política en las sedes de gobierno del Reino: la Audiencia de Santafé y el breve virreinato de Nueva Granada (1717-1723).

Las fronteras, situadas lejos de las ciudades, eran zonas porosas e híbridas. Sin embargo, su lugar dentro de las preocupaciones políticas no era marginal sino central. De hecho, las fronteras eran zonas esenciales por las que circulaban personas, mercancías e ideas. Además, muchas fronteras del Nuevo Reino de Granada estaban cargadas de oro, tanto en tierra como en los ríos. Por ello, controlarlas, ordenar a las poblaciones de su interior e integrarlas en el Reino y, a mayor escala, en la Monarquía, era una tarea esencial. Para estudiar cómo se gobernaban estos territorios, esta tesis pretende examinar los retos territoriales que planteaba esta vasta zona: distancia, seguridad, contrabando y corrupción; poblamiento y explotación de las tierras. Para ello, algunas de las preguntas que se plantean son ¿Cómo se conquistaron e integraron los territorios fuera del control de la Corona? ¿Qué sugieren los conflictos jurisdiccionales que se desarrollaron a nivel local sobre la dinámica política a nivel del Reino? ¿Cuáles eran los principales intereses en juego en la protección y explotación del interior? ¿Cómo se integraron las poblaciones autóctonas en la Monarquía? ¿Cómo

evolucieron los distintos tipos de interacción entre los actores interimperiales y los nativos? ¿Cuáles eran los mecanismos para garantizar el "buen gobierno"?

En este estudio, se presta especial atención a la comprensión de la tensión imperante entre los grupos de intereses de oficiales y vecinos, los grupos nativos y la Corona. En teoría, los oficiales defendían el proyecto imperial protegiendo los intereses de la Corona y de sus súbditos. Pero en la práctica, la aplicación de la justicia real no se llevaba a cabo, lo que perjudicaba a los indios, cuya posición crucial en la frontera hacía que las autoridades compitieran para negociar con ellos. Así, las negociaciones se llevaban a cabo entre los nativos "dóciles" y las autoridades, que buscaban colonizar la frontera y frenar el avance de los indios "hostiles". Cimarrones, extranjeros, intrusos y contrabandistas completan el cuadro de una región socialmente mixta. Así pues, las fronteras septentrionales del Reino se vieron afectadas tanto por fuerzas atlánticas y globales más amplias, como por la dinámica política y territorial local.

Palabras clave: Fronteras - Conquista - Contrabando - Nueva Granada - Historia política

Riassunto

L'obiettivo di questa tesi è esaminare il modo in cui le frontiere situate nell'entroterra caraibico dell'area della Nuova Granada, che si estendono dal Darién alla penisola di Guajira, sono state governate durante un periodo caratterizzato da vari disordini: la transizione dinastica del 1700; numerose guerre (tra cui la Guerra di Successione Spagnola, 1702-1714); il periodo di culmine del contrabbando e una notevole instabilità politica nelle sedi di governo del Regno: l'Audiencia de Santafé e il breve vicereame di Nuova Granada (1717-1723).

Le frontiere, situate lontano dalle città, erano aree porose e ibride. Tuttavia, occupavano un ruolo tutt'altro che marginale tra le preoccupazioni politiche del tempo. Le frontiere erano, infatti, aree essenziali attraverso le quali circolavano persone, beni e idee. Inoltre, molte frontiere del Regno di Nuova Granada erano ricche di oro, sia nelle miniere che nei corsi d'acqua. Pertanto, controllarle, ordinare le popolazioni al loro interno e integrarle nel Regno e, su scala più ampia, nella Monarchia, era essenziale. Per studiare come venivano governati questi territori, questa tesi si propone di prendere in considerazione le sfide territoriali che questa vasta area poneva: distanza,

sicurezza, contrabbando e corruzione, nonché insediamento e sfruttamento del territorio. A tal fine, alcune domande qui poste sono le seguenti: come furono conquistati e integrati i territori al di fuori del controllo della Corona? Che cosa suggeriscono i conflitti giurisdizionali che ebbero luogo a livello locale sulle dinamiche politiche a livello di Regno? Quali erano le principali poste in gioco rispetto alla protezione e allo sfruttamento dell'entroterra? Come vennero integrate le popolazioni autoctone nella Monarchia? Come si sono evoluti i vari tipi di interazione tra attori inter-imperiali e nativi? Quali erano i meccanismi per garantire il "buon governo"?

In questo studio, un'attenzione particolare è rivolta alla comprensione della forte tensione esistente tra i gruppi di interesse degli ufficiali e dei *vecinos*, i gruppi indigeni e la Corona. In teoria, i funzionari difendevano il progetto imperiale proteggendo gli interessi della Corona e dei suoi sudditi. Tuttavia, in pratica, l'applicazione della giustizia reale non veniva attuata, ostacolando gli indigeni, la cui posizione cruciale sulla frontiera spingeva le autorità alla competizione per negoziare con loro. Così, le trattative finivano per svolgersi tra nativi 'docili' e autorità, che cercavano di organizzare la frontiera e di frenare l'avanzata degli indiani 'ostili'. *Maroons*, stranieri, intrusi e contrabbandieri completavano il quadro di una regione socialmente eterogenea. In tal senso, è dunque possibile osservare come le frontiere settentrionali del Regno fossero influenzate tanto da forze atlantiche e globali più ampie, quanto da dinamiche politiche e territoriali propriamente locali.

Parole chiave: Frontiere - Conquista - Contrabbando - Nuova Granada - Storia politica - Storia politica

Summary

GOVERNING THE NORTHERN FRONTIERS IN THE NEW KINGDOM OF GRANADA, 1680-1739: POLITICAL PRACTICES AND COMPETING INTERESTS ON CONTESTED GROUND. ...ERREUR! SIGNET NON DEFINI.

REMERCIEMENTS.....	3 -
<i>Résumé</i>	6 -
<i>Abstract</i>	7 -
<i>Resumen</i>	8 -
<i>Riassunto</i>	9 -
SUMMARY	11 -
GENERAL INTRODUCTION	14 -
I- Presentation	14 -
Object.....	14 -
Chronology and geography	19 -
Problematization.....	32 -
II- Historiography	36 -
An observation on partitions in history	36 -
What has been written and what has not	38 -
III- Sources and methodology	46 -
Archival sources.....	47 -
IV- Structure	47 -
Remarks on vocabulary	50 -
PART I: CHALLENGES IN THE <i>LONGUE DURÉE</i>	53 -
CHAPTER 1: POLITICAL TURMOIL IN THE EARLY 18 TH CENTURY	54 -
INTRODUCTION	54 -
I- A DIFFICULT TURN OF THE CENTURY	55 -
II- THE VICEROYALTY OF THE NEW GRANADA: LAYERS OF MOTIVES AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL FAILURES?.....	64 -
1) <i>Broad issues</i>	65 -
2) <i>The petitions asking for the Viceroyalty</i>	71 -
III- HESITATIONS AND RENEWALS.....	77 -
CONCLUSIONS	81 -
CHAPTER 2: OF ILL-PRACTICES AND OPPORTUNITIES: CONTRABAND AND FRAUD, AND CORRUPTION.	83 -
I- CONTRABAND: AN AMBIVALENT QUESTION.....	86 -
1) <i>Definitions and outline</i>	86 -
a) What is contraband?	86 -
b) How did contraband operate in the New Granada?	91 -
c) Actors, practices, and scales.....	92 -
2) <i>The question of gold, fraud, and the Cajas Reales</i>	98 -
II- A SOLUTION TO DEFEND THE COAST: A VENTURE IN PRIVATEERING	106 -
1) <i>Contraband on a Caribbean scale</i>	106 -
2) <i>Of pirates and privateers and the Spanish Monarchy</i>	111 -
3) <i>The creation of a privateering company: a private initiative</i>	119 -
a) Background and preceding discussions	119 -
b) The company.....	126 -
c) Aftermath	134 -
CONCLUSION.....	138 -
CHAPTER 3: TIME, SPACE AND CHANGE: AN OVERVIEW	140 -
INTRODUCTION	140 -
I- VARIABILITY THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD AND AREA OF INTEREST.....	141 -

1) <i>Governing immensity: decision-making and hesitations</i>	- 141 -
2) <i>Pacification or conquest?</i>	- 148 -
a) Foreword	- 148 -
b) The renewal of efforts to conquer, pacify, and reduce	- 150 -
c) Some examples.....	- 156 -
II- CONTINUITY IN THE EXTREMES: THE STRUGGLE FOR SOVEREIGNTY IN GUAJIRA AND DARIÉN	- 162 -
1) <i>The extremes</i>	- 163 -
2) <i>Conquest in the Guajira</i>	- 168 -
3) <i>The quest for Darién</i>	- 174 -
a) Native inhabitants and Spanish advances	- 174 -
b) Foreign fascination.....	- 178 -
c) Materialized fascination	- 180 -
CONCLUSIONS	- 186 -
PART II: POLITICAL PRACTICES IN CHANGING SPACES	- 188 -
CHAPTER 4: THE POLITICAL GAME IN AN EXPANDING FRONTIER: USING AND MISUSING AUTHORITY 1697-1718	- 188 -
INTRODUCTION	- 188 -
I-ANTIOQUIA AND THE CITARÁ IN THE EARLY 18TH CENTURY	- 191 -
1) <i>Geographical and historical frame, an overview of the area</i>	- 191 -
2) <i>The spatial configuration and conditions in early 18th century Antioquia contextual and chronological frame</i>	- 199 -
3) <i>An overview of Antioquia's relationship to the Citará 1684-1712</i>	- 206 -
II- CARVAJAL: A DISTURBER OF THE PEACE? ON LOCAL AND REGIONAL DYNAMICS -	216 -
1) <i>On governors: two profiles</i>	- 216 -
2) <i>The juicio de residencia: a control mechanism revealing of the symptoms of a kingdom in growing creolization</i>	- 224 -
III- THE EXPANSION IN MURRÍ: BETWEEN PERSONAL INTERESTS AND GENERAL WELFARE	- 231 -
1) <i>The initiative</i>	- 231 -
2) <i>The expeditions</i>	- 234 -
3) <i>An attempt at discerning motives on different sides</i>	- 240 -
IV- GREATER FORCES AT PLAY	- 245 -
1) <i>The backfiring of the Juicio de residencia</i>	- 245 -
2) <i>A note on initiatives and government</i>	- 249 -
CONCLUSION	- 259 -
CHAPTER 5: COMPETING FOR JURISDICTION AND GOLD: THE DYNAMICS OF SETTLING AND INTEGRATING THE FRONTIER, 1700-1730	- 263 -
INTRODUCTION	- 263 -
I- THE BROADER DIALOGUE ON GOVERNING THE CHOCÓ	- 264 -
II- RECLAIMING MURRÍ FOR THE NATIVES FROM CITARÁ	- 272 -
1) <i>The native petition</i>	- 272 -
2) <i>The quarrel with the Citará's newly appointed Superintendent</i>	- 279 -
III- SETTLING THE FRONTIER	- 286 -
1) <i>Frontier agents set to the task</i>	- 286 -
2) <i>A poor recipe for integrating the Crown: Church, censuses, tribute</i>	- 290 -
3) <i>A convoluted, mobile, complex space</i>	- 302 -
IV-HYPOTHESIS: MURRI'S ROLE IN THE SEPARATION	- 310 -
1) <i>Murri, Juemia, Chaquenodá and the broader context</i>	- 310 -
2) <i>Aftermath</i>	- 312 -
3) <i>The fragility of the bargain</i>	- 315 -
CONCLUSIONS	- 317 -
<i>Afterword</i>	- 320 -
CHAPTER 6: INTEGRATION OR RESISTANCE ON CHANGING FRONTIERS -	322

INTRODUCTION	322 -
I- INDIAN CONDITIONS IN THE FACE OF INCREASING PRESSURE TO INTEGRATE: LABOR AND PROTECTION	328 -
1) <i>Governing over spatial and political units: encomiendas and resguardos</i>	329 -
2) <i>Mistreatments and protectors</i>	334 -
II-THE PINTADOS IN THE PROVINCE OF SANTA MARTA: INTEGRATION AND SERVICE -	338
1) <i>An ethnohistorical sketch of the Pintados</i>	338 -
2) <i>The role of the Pintados at the end of the 17th century</i>	346 -
3) <i>The petitions</i>	352 -
III-RESISTANCE IN THE FACE OF NON COMPLIANCE.....	358 -
<i>Conclusions</i>	365 -
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.....	370 -
MAPS AND TABLES	381 -
SOURCES.....	382 -
PRINTED SOURCES	382 -
ARCHIVAL SOURCES	384 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY	385 -
ANEXES	406 -
<i>AHA, 25, 776, Padrón Juemia and Chaquenodá, f.608.</i>	406 -
<i>General map</i>	408 -

General Introduction

I- Presentation

Object

The objective of this thesis is to study the government of the frontiers located in the north of The New Kingdom of Granada between 1680 and 1739. By government, we understand the exercise of authority over a territory and its population, in an Ancien Régime framework that assumes unequal interdependent relationships between those who exercise authority and those over whom it is exercised. Although the government of souls supported the government of subjects, this work deals primarily with civil authorities: *oidores*, governors, captains. Ecclesiastical authorities appear, in particular, when they work hand in hand with, or are in confrontation with, civil authorities. By authorities, we mean civil authorities, i.e., the Real magistrates and officers of different qualities and natures, both *criollos* and *peninsulares*, present in The New Kingdom of Granada. By frontiers, we mean several things. In part, we refer to those bordering areas between provinces, that is, jurisdictional frontiers. On the other hand, the idea of frontiers has been conceptualized in the historical discipline under a multiplicity of meanings and meanings that provide the term with great versatility.

In particular, the frontiers of composite political configurations have been studied as porous and fluid spaces, dividing as well as connecting. In this sense, frontiers are also social facts, collectively perceived lines that exert a categorization of the parts they divide; the frontier separates social spaces as much as it unites them. This is why we have decided to adopt the term frontiers to refer to those areas over which the authorities did not exercise the authority at their disposal. That is, they could not guarantee the stability of the pillars that supported the Monarchy's authority in an Ancien Régime society. In the frontiers, the authorities lacked the ability to guarantee:

1- the control of the exercise of violence¹ between corporations, neighbors, native communities; 2- the administration of social groups (through the production of information to identify and govern); 3- the application of Real justice, guarantee of social peace; 4- the ability to convince adherence to the Catholic faith and the Monarchy project; 5- the system of unequal interdependence (marked by a growing racialization) that determined the relationships that sustained social relations.

Why are the northern frontiers of the New Kingdom important? They were located in the flat lands between the cities (on the Caribbean coast) and those of the interior (on the Andean slopes). Control of these frontier spaces was difficult not only because of the topography and climate, but also because they were areas where rebel Indians and foreigners from various nations, often allied with each other, circulated. In addition, these spaces represented a reserve of natural resources whose riches had already been praised by the chroniclers of the 16th century. Rich in gold, salt, animals, and plants in unimaginable varieties, the frontiers were as threatening as they were enrapturing. For these reasons, as Germán Colmenares has explained, they constituted a priority space in the concerns of the rulers².

Why is it interesting to question the exercise of authority in this period? By virtue of a series of changes that took place at the beginning of the passage from one century to the next. In 1700, the death of Charles II and the accession to the throne of Philip of Bourbon, grandson of Louis XIV, would result in the longest reign of the Monarchy. As part of a large-scale monarchical body, the New Granada was affected by this change by virtue of the conflicts that occurred during the War of Succession. But, at the same time, it was less affected than other regions, such as Aragon or Catalonia, whose jurisdictional organization changed drastically after 1714. If this dynastic change impacted the kingdom, it was mainly by virtue of what the War of

¹ In the modern period, explosions of violence were the empirical spark that animated the development of political philosophy. The religious civil wars in England (1649) and the wars of religion in France (1658-1653) would mark Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau in their respective attempts to explain the delegation of a part of individual sovereignty (Jean Bodin) in favor of a superior apparatus, capable of silencing dissent for the common good. The seventeenth century was generally marked by instances of a breakdown of social peace: 1640: separation of Portugal; 1647: insurrection in Naples; 1648-1662: revolts in the Russian Empire; 1638: revolts in Scotland; 1641-1656: revolts in Ireland. On this, see Werner Thomas, *Rebellion and resistance in the seventeenth-century Hispanic world : proceedings of the International Colloquium Leuven, 20-23 November 1991* (Leuven University Press, 1992), <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/libro?codigo=5960> Introduction.

² Germán Colmenares, *Relaciones e informes de los gobernantes de la Nueva Granada* (Fondo de Promoción de la Cultura del Banco Popular, 1989) Introduction.

Succession accentuated and brought to light: the weak capacity of the highest levels of government to assert their authority over the organs of government; the exploitation by all the contraband trade; the desired and defended autonomy of the Caribbean littoral provinces from the central authority embodied by the Audiencia of Santafé; the omnipresent corruption among officers who held offices and magistratures.

The arrival of Philip V to the palace of Buen Retiro would take place despite the war, and soon (1702-1703) the reforms of Philip V's new retainers would be implemented. The interpretation of the change produced by the arrival of a new dynasty at the head of the Monarchy has produced varied historiographical lines because, in fact, asking questions about the influence of the dynastic change opens many paths. From the perspective of political philosophy, one possible path would consist in asking how jurists and treatise writers theorized political authority during the reign of Philip V. This is not my purpose. Another would be to study the transition from the institutional change initiated by the reforms of 1702-1739, which has already been done. The path I have chosen questions the empirical exercise of government throughout an aggregation of territories and populations³. What obstacles and challenges were faced by those who governed The New Kingdom of Granada between 1680 and 1740? How did the exercise of government articulate with the social fabric of an American body undergoing Creolization? Is it possible to discern an evolution in the authorities' ability to superimpose an imperial order on the interests of dominant social groups? We hope that assuming an evolution and focusing on differences is less of a bias than a try to make a science of differences, in the words of Marc Bloch.⁴

These questions will be applied to the northern frontiers of The New Kingdom of Granada. There, the 1680s saw the beginning of exploration and conquest campaigns on the frontiers of the kingdom and other areas of the Monarchy. Part of the interest was economic: new gold deposits were essential to relaunch what had been a fruitful exploitation in the 16th century. Throughout the first decades of the 18th century, the mechanisms of a progressive integration of the northern frontiers of the kingdom would

³ For a methodological explanation of how questioning empirical governance allows one to write a political history of ancien regime societies, see Jean-Frédéric Schaub, "How to Write the History of Europe?" *European Review* 26, no. 3 (July 2018): 514-44, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1062798718000212>.

⁴ Marc Bloch, "Que Demander à l'histoire ?" 1937.

continue and multiply.⁵ In 1740, new exploration and conquest orders were issued to reiterate the need to subdue the resistant indigenous populations. During the period spanning 1680-1739, integration occurred at several levels: the provinces, the kingdom, and the Monarchy. The means used to gain control of these areas ranged from negotiation to conquest, and in all cases resulted in the founding of urban centers. None of this was new; negotiating or taking up arms and then founding cities had been the *modus operandi* of territorial integration since the 16th century⁶. The objectives were equally varied: in some places, it was mainly to ensure the extraction of gold; in others, to facilitate traffic. As the driving force behind this integration, governors, officers, and neighbors deliberated on the best way to govern the kingdom, without ever abandoning the pursuit of their own personal interests. In addition to these discussions, initiatives of conquest and pacification, on the one hand, and defense and management of the territory, on the other, were designed and put into practice. It is these initiatives, discussions, and practices, applied to a set of spaces and individuals, that this dissertation will attempt to examine.

To understand the significance of examining the government of the frontiers through the examination of actions, discussions, and practices, we must refer to a further set of questions regarding the subject of study and chronology. Why is it relevant to raise the question of the government of this kingdom during this period? How does this period differ from the period before or after, if at all? To begin with, asking questions about how the Indies were governed, that is, how they exercised the magistratures and offices, is a simple question that relates to a complex reality. Indeed, assembling and preserving a structure of justice and government in charge of channeling command over lands of varied geographies and stratified populations, and in the process of racialization, is not at all easy.⁷ The question, in fact, has been raised many times in historiography, for asking how authority was consolidated and preserved

⁵ On the integration of the frontiers of empire, see, for example, Valentina Favaro, Manfredi Merluzzi, and Gaetano Sabatini, *Frontiers: processes and practices of integration and conflicts between Europe and America (16th-20th centuries)*, 2017, <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/libro?codigo=685143>.

⁶ Germán Colmenares, *Historia Económica y Social de Colombia*, 5. ed, vol. 1, Biblioteca Germán Colmenares (Santafé de Bogotá: TM, 1997), 5; José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, “La Hispanofilia ¿se Refleja o Se Construye En Las Indias?”, in *El Espejo de Las Indias Occidentales*, ed. Gibrán Bautista y Lugo and Oscar Mazin (El Colegio de México, UNAM, 2023), chap. 1.

⁷ Jean-Frédéric Schaub, “Conclusion: Diversity and Empire - Old Question, New Answers,” in *Diversity and Empires* (Routledge, 2023).

is the most essential question of political history. From cultural geography⁸, through historiography focused on the domination of a colonial state⁹, to the political history of imperial configurations¹⁰, to more local historiographies¹¹, historians have sought to understand how an imperial bureaucracy was installed in America and maintained for three centuries. The works on the conquistadors¹² already provided the keys to understanding the tension inherent to the stages that reactivated the situations of conquest and frontiers, between the search for personal profit and the establishment of an exogenous governmental apparatus, with its own laws and institutions.

Next, after a chronological restitution that allows us to frame this work, we will see what questions have emerged from research and how these have channeled the

⁸ Carl Ortwin Sauer, *Descubrimiento y dominación española del Caribe* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1984); Carl Ortwin Sauer, *The Early Spanish Main* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

⁹ José María Ots y Capdequí, "El Estado Español En Las Indias," (*No Title*), 1941; John Leddy Phelan, "Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 5, no. 1 (1960): 47-65, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2390824>; John Leddy Phelan, *The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century; Bureaucratic Politics in the Spanish Empire* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), <http://archive.org/details/kingdomofquito000phel>; Horst Pietschmann, *El Estado y Su Evolución al Principio de La Colonización Española de América* (Fondo de cultura económica México, 1989); Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, "La Administración Colonial," *Nueva Historia de Colombia*, 1979, 85; John Lynch, "The Colonial State in Spanish America," in *Latin America between Colony and Nation: Selected Essays*, ed. John Lynch, Studies of the Americas (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2001), 45-57, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230511729_3.

¹⁰ J. H. Elliott, "Spain and America in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *The Cambridge History of Latin America: Volume 1: Colonial Latin America*, ed. Leslie Bethell, vol. 1, The Cambridge History of Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 287-340, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521232234.011>; John H Elliott, "The Spanish Monarchy and the Kingdom of Portugal, 1580-1640," *Conquest and Coalescence: The Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe*, 1991, 48-67; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Holding the World in Balance: The Connected Histories of the Iberian Overseas Empires, 1500-1640," *The American Historical Review* 112, no. 5 (December 1, 2007): 1359-85, <https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr.112.5.1359>; Michel Bertrand, "Configurations sociales et jeux politiques aux confins de l'empire espagnol," *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 62e année, no. 4 (2007): 855-84; Emmanuel Blanchard and Joël Glasman, "Introduction Générale : Le Maintien de l'ordre Dans l'Empire Français : Une Historiographie Émergente," in *Maintenir l'ordre Colonial. Afrique, Madagascar, XIXe-XXe Siècles*, ed. Bat J.P, Courtin N, and (dir.) (Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2012), 11-41, <https://hal.science/hal-00758771>; Jorge Canizares-Esguerra, *Entangled Empires: The Anglo-Iberian Atlantic, 1500-1830* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2018).

¹¹ Galo Ramón Valarezo, "La Visión Andina Sobre El Estado Colonial," 1986; Marta Herrera Ángel and Diana Bonnett Vélez, "Ordenamiento Espacial y Territorial Colonial En La Región Central Neogranadina, Siglo XVIII. Las Visitas de La Tierra Como Fuente Para La Historia Agraria Del Siglo XVIII," *América Latina En La Historia Económica*, 2001, 11-32; Diana Bonnett Vélez, "Entre el interés personal y el establecimiento colonial. Factors of Confrontation and Conflict in The New Kingdom of Granada between 1538 and 1570," *Historia Crítica*, no. 39E (November 2009): 52-67, <https://doi.org/10.7440/historicrit39E.2009.03>.

¹² Mario Góngora, *Estudios sobre la historia colonial de hispanoamérica* (Editorial Universitaria, 1998), chap. 1; James Lockhart, *The Men of Cajamarca: A Social and Biographical Study of the First Conquerors of Perú* (University of Texas Press, 2013).

works on The New Kingdom of Granada, before and during the period we are interested in.

Chronology and geography

This work refers to The New Kingdom of Granada, the northernmost of the South American continent. The New Kingdom of Granada was in a situation of relative independence regarding the monumental viceroalties of New Spain and Perú. In the absence of a Viceroy, the highest authority in the New Kingdom was the president of the Audiencia and Captain General. Their prerogatives were therefore both civil and military; they were to administer justice, guarantee the quiet, peace and tranquility of the natives, and ensure the government and defense of their provinces¹³.

The geographical demarcation of the kingdom does not correspond to a single name. Multiple toponymic denominations were given to the kingdom throughout the modern period: The New Kingdom of Granada, New Granada, Tierra Firme. In the 16th century, the Kingdom of Tierra Firme contained the provinces of Veragua, Castilla del Oro, the latter containing the governorate of Darién. Although in the 17th century these provinces would have been under the jurisdiction of the provinces of Panamá and Veraguas, the president of the Real Audiencia of Panamá was both governor and captain general of Tierra Firme¹⁴. Moreover, it was not uncommon for the New Kingdom was also associated with Tierra Firme. The president of the Real Audiencia of Santafé was Captain General of The New Kingdom of Granada. However, even in the eighteenth century, the northern provinces of the New Kingdom were sometimes described as belonging to Tierra Firme, sometimes classified as a kingdom, sometimes as a province. For example, in 1692, Francisco Fernández de Heredia, the future governor of the province of Antioquia, was ordered to “embark on the first fleet or galleons that leave for the province of Tierra Firme”¹⁵.

The New Kingdom of Granada initially described one of the four provinces created during the conquest - the New Kingdom of Granada, Santa Marta, Cartagena

¹³ Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias, 1680, Book III, Title III, Laws I-III.


¹⁴ For example, a royal cédula sent to the governor and captain general of the Audiencia of Panamá Panamá: “Cédula a Enrique Enríquez de Sotomayor, gobernador y capitán general de Tierra Firme y presidente de la Audiencia de Panamá, ordenando que juntamente con la Audiencia y el obispo, provea lo que convenga para que cesen los daños que padecen los indios de Chepo por parte de los salvajes bugue-bugues [cunas]”, AGI, Panamá, 229, L.3, F.115v-116r, Real.

¹⁵ AHA, Volume: 537, document 8496, f.24, v-36r.

and Popayán - belonging to the Kingdom of Perú¹⁶ . The New Kingdom of Granada was founded by Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada, in whose eyes the Andean highlands, at 2600 m. above sea level, resembled his native Granada. Since 1547, it was home to the Real Audiencia of Santafé. In the middle of the 16th century, the name “New Kingdom of Granada” came to define the jurisdictional space that emanated from the Audiencia of Santafé, located in the city of Santafé. This toponymic ambiguity has been highlighted by many works, some of which have seen in the multiplicity of designations a symptom of the difficulty of governing that which was difficult to name¹⁷ .

¹⁶ Caroline Anne Hansen (Williams), “Conquest and Colonization in the Colombian Chocó, 1510-1740” (Department of History, University of Warwick, 1991), 39.

¹⁷ Marta Herrera, *Ordenar Para Controlar. Ordenamiento Espacial y Control Político En Las Llanuras Del Caribe y En Los Andes Centrales Neogranadinos. Siglo XVIII* (Universidad de los Andes, 2014), 155-56, <https://doi.org/10.7440/2014.26>.



Source: Marta Herrera, *Ordenar Para Controlar. Ordenamiento Espacial y Control Político En Las Llanuras Del Caribe y En Los Andes Centrales Neogranadinos. Siglo XVIII* (Universidad de los Andes, 2014), p. 35.

The northernmost provinces of the kingdom were, from west to east: Citará (belonging to that of the Chocó), Antioquia, Cartagena, Santa Marta and Río del Hacha (separated from Santa Marta in 1717). The province of Darién belonged to the jurisdiction of the Audiencia of Panamá, but, de facto, many orders directed towards Darién were sent to the governors of Cartagena and Antioquia, due to their geographic proximity. This area of the New Kingdom was thus under the influence of three

Audiencias: a direct influence of the Audiencia of Santafé, whose president had jurisdiction over them; in the west, a relative influence of the Audiencia of Quito, which had jurisdiction over the province of Popayán, to which the Chocó belonged; and, to a certain extent, some influence of the Audiencia Panamá, the closest to the Caribbean provinces of the New Kingdom. The province of Citará, which belonged to the Chocó, was subject to a regime of jurisdictional overlapping until 1736¹⁸. This complex jurisdictional panorama was further complicated by the overlapping of ecclesiastical jurisdictions. For example, the diocese of the bishop of Popayán included the province of Antioquia; the provinces of Cartagena and Santa Marta, on the other hand, each had its own bishop in the 17th century.

These two provinces enjoyed relative autonomy from the jurisdiction of the Audiencia of Santafé. In particular, the governors of the province of Cartagena, where the most important economic transactions of the region took place, were often involved in jurisdictional tensions with the Audiencia of Santafé by virtue of their awareness of their regional importance¹⁹. The governor of Cartagena was so important that, in the 1730s, both he and the president of the Audiencia of Panamá had the power to pardon by the *via reservada*, a power generally enjoyed by the Viceroy²⁰.

¹⁸ The Citará, belonging to the geographic space of the Chocó, was under the shared jurisdiction of Antioquia (belonging to the jurisdiction of the Audiencia of Santafé) and Popayán (belonging to the jurisdiction of the Real Audiencia of Quito). Geographically, however, the closest Audiencia to the Citará was that of Panamá. When there were territorial threats that entered the Gulf of Darién towards the Citará, the Audiencia of Panamá was notified.

¹⁹ On this, see the PhD thesis of Synnøve Ones, “The Politics of Government in the Audiencia of New Granada, 1681-1719” (PhD dissertation, University of Warwick, 2000), <http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b1372173~S9>.

²⁰ Jairo Antonio Melo Flórez, “La Cara Oculta de La Justicia. El Perdón En La Justicia y El Gobierno de La Monarquía Hispánica En El Virreinato Del Nuevo Reino de Granada, 1739-1808”, el 1 de enero de 2020.



Map 1: *The northern frontiers of The New Kingdom of Granada, populations, and topography.*

Source: personal production with QGIS based on sources cited in the chapter.

What is the specificity of the chronology selected in this research? To answer this question, we must look back in chronology to understand what precedes.

The first thing that should be mentioned is that the territorial conquest of the Indies had a global resonance, and this was achieved, from the beginning, through what has been called the “environmental conquest”. The expeditions of the conquistadors gave rise to the foundation of Spanish towns and cities, which would spin the political fabric of the empire. But the exchanges with the American space gave rise to an integration of the different parts of the world before a substantial urban fabric was established. Indeed, the arrival of Columbus in the Indies, and the subsequent conquest, not only caused encounters between individuals, but also led to a bacterial, cultural, and

environmental shock. The circulation of animals, plants and ideas revolutionized the modern world.

In 1520, four years before Pizarro's first expedition, the chronicler Fernández de Oviedo reported that the banana or plantain (imported from the Canary Islands) had adapted and that crops of the fruit were thriving in the Antilles²¹. Around the same time, Girolamo Fracastoro invented the word *syphilis* to describe the new disease in circulation. At the same time that the mines of Potosí were discovered, around 1545, the chronicler Cieza de León noted that large quantities of wheat were being produced in Perú.²² From the first explorations of the South American continent, the advance was made with horses, pigs, chickens, goats and cows²³ that broke into the American biological order, changing the customs of its inhabitants and its landscapes in a lasting way²⁴. The progress of these expeditions went hand in hand with the collection of information on medicinal or ritual plants, such as coca and tobacco. Some of them, such as guaiac wood, or *gaillac*, an analgesic, came into circulation at the beginning of the 16th century²⁵ and would later be marketed throughout the world.

While these animal and vegetable exchanges took place, the conquest founded cities where the spheres of political power could settle: Mexico was founded on Tenochtitlán, Ciudad de los Reyes (Lima) was founded on the Pacific coast and Santafé was founded on Bacatá. Once the first stage of consolidation of the Indian centers of government was over, and the cities that housed them were founded, a first moment of territorial expansion that began in the 1580s gave rise to a series of incorporations. Thus, from the end of the 15th century, either by inheritance or by conquest²⁶, different

²¹ Alfred W Crosby, *The Columbian exchange: biological and cultural consequences of 1492* (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2003), cap. 3.

²² *Ibidem*, cap 3.

²³ Elinor GK Melville, *A plague of sheep: environmental consequences of the conquest of Mexico* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), cap. 1; François-René Picon, “Le cheval dans le Nouveau Monde.”, *Études rurales* 151, núm. 1 (1999): 51–75, <https://doi.org/10.3406/rural.1999.4116>.

²⁴ Carl Henrik Langebaek y Carl Henrik Langebaek Rueda, *Antes de Colombia: los primeros 14.000 años* (Debate, 2021).

²⁵ Boumediene, Op. Cit, chapter 1.

²⁶ Around 1598, in the *Speech and Warnings to Philip III, at the beginning of his government*, Antonio Perez, or more probably Baltasar Alamos y Barrientos, defined the Spanish Monarchy as being composed of “The kingdoms of Your Majesty [which] are divided into inherited and conquered, and one and the other into together and united or apart and divided. Inherited I call those that without contradiction have come from many years to this part from one successor to another, and that have been accustomed for some centuries to this manner of kingdom and succession, which with all those of Castile, subject to the Real Council that they call of justice; those of the crown of Aragon, as well of the mainland as of the

parts were integrated into the Monarchy in a short time: the Canary Islands, Granada, the Caribbean, Navarre, New Castile, New Spain, Valencia, Perú, and towards the end of the 16th century the Philippines and Florida²⁷. How did the transition from conquest to integration take place? While conquest meant a political incorporation of a space whose limits and geography were known more approximately than with certainty, the incorporation of its populations into the Monarchy and the effective control over the territory were processes of much longer duration. And this brings us back to the problem of government. Regardless of the moment we are referring to, it was constant practice. In other words, the exercise of government is constant from the moment the conquest project is launched (although not all conquests were the result of government projects) until it has been incorporated. But this raises a difficulty: how to govern frontiers that are in the process of incorporation.

This question is valid throughout most of the Monarchy's experience in the American territories of the Crown. The incorporation of New Spain, New Granada and the Caribbean, Perú and then Chile were non-linear processes, full of setbacks and frustrations for the different parties involved and this, in particular, in the abundant frontiers of each of the spaces. The course that the expansion of Spanish authority over the American space would take would depend, in part, on the vicissitudes of the conquest and the responses to it, as well as on the availability of basic resources for subsistence. In this sense, the end of the 16th century had brought with it numerous revolts – not only in the Iberian Peninsula, such as those of Avila and Aragon – of enslaved Indians and Africans, a relative uproar due to what has been considered as the “expansionist” pretensions of Philip II. In Chile, for example, revolts around the Biobío river, the natural boundary between the kingdom of Chile and the Mapuches, imposed the course of the river as a frontier, leading to a northward expansion of the river.²⁸ At the same time, new mechanisms of supervision and classification were being deployed

islands that it possesses in the Mediterranean Sea, that all will follow the same fortune. The states of Flanders and the Netherlands are also inherited states (...).”

²⁷ María del Pilar López Martínez and José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, “Los horizontes de una geografía imperial. Pensar las formas de expansión y vertebración política del mundo hispánico entre los siglos XV y XVII,” *Magallánica: revista de historia moderna* 9, no. 17 (2022): 176-206.

²⁸ Cristian González Labra, “Trayectoria Histórica de La Frontera Hispano-Mapuche (Chile): La Larga Duración Para La Conformación Territorial, 1605-1716. Perspectivas Desde La Geopolítica Hispano-Parlamentaria,” *Revista de Historia (Concepción)* 26, no. 2 (December 2019): 129-47, <https://doi.org/10.4067/S0717-88322019000200129>.

in America, beginning with the *visitas de la tierra* and various general *visitas* that sought to produce information in a rationalized manner about the territories in the Indies, their populations and resources.

In The New Kingdom of Granada, the establishment of the seat of the Audiencia of Santafé (1549) in the Andean highlands, on the foundations of the pre-Hispanic territorial order²⁹, had created a nucleus of power far from the first cities founded on the Caribbean coast, the first region of the continent explored by the Iberians: Santa Marta (1533) and Cartagena (1535). This situation would leave indelible marks on the provincial relations of what would become The New Kingdom of Granada, crossed for three centuries by the political bicephaly of having a capital of commerce and affluence in the Caribbean, and an administrative capital in the cold lands of the central mountain range of the northern Andes.³⁰ Another important population and political axis would find a seat in the city of Popayán, founded in 1537 in the south of present-day Colombia. In the 16th century, the gradual conquests from the cities and towns founded in the previous century would expand, encountering more or less resistance depending on the state of the native populations, some more battered than others by the bacterial shock and the violence of the conquest. This phenomenon has been described as the “insularity” of Spanish authority over its American territories³¹. What is certain is that, at the end of the 16th century, native populations were abundant and circulating free of any control.

Subjected from the first decades of the century to a European classificatory gaze that could not make use of categories apart from those provided by European knowledge, the Indians were considered as backward peoples in the process that human groups had taken after the great flood. Thus, instead of defining with new terms, these

²⁹ Marta Herrera Ángel, “Transición entre el ordenamiento territorial prehispánico y el colonial en la Nueva Granada,” *Historia Crítica*, no. 32 (July 2006): 118-52, <https://doi.org/10.7440/historicrit32.2006.05>.

³⁰ Juan Jiménez Castillo, “THE PERCEPTION OF A THIRD AMERICAN VIRREINAGE IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (1650-1717),” . . . , n.d., 37.

³¹ Tamar Herzog uses the expression “islands of occupation” to define the presence of Europeans on the frontiers between the Spanish and Portuguese empires, see Tamar Herzog, *Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas* (Harvard University Press, 2015), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1287grm> Introduction.

populations were classified according to older notions.³² The notions inherited from the Reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula made the Spaniards see *behetrías* wherever they found Indians considered as barbarians, less “civilized” than those who inhabited the ancient Inca space. As Juan David Montoya Guzmán has studied, the chronicler Cieza de León even produced a theorization on the differences between native populations based on a geographical determinism *avant la lettre*. The non-sedentary populations of the flat and warm lands were considered barbaric and lazy, by virtue of their easy access to food.³³ Throughout the 16th century, relations between Spaniards and Indians became more complex. Attempts to conquer and subdue certain areas of the New Kingdom saw wars of conquest and failures that would last until the middle of the 17th century. This was the case of several attempts to make *entries into* the Chocó (1539-1645), the Darién (1564-1640), and the Cauca Valley (1580-1640).³⁴

The long seventeenth century, which was marked by famines and wars in Europe, was a period of particular cooling of the planet.³⁵ The events that took place during this time rearranged the geopolitical map. The growing importance of the British and Dutch trading companies in the world economy, as well as the ambitions of the monarchs behind them, were incessant throughout the century. Thus, the American territories of the Spanish Monarchy, incorporated a century and a half earlier, were subjected to the territorial expansion ambitions of competing empires. In 1648, a new geopolitical order was reached with the Treaty of Westphalia and Spain lost the fight for its claims to the Netherlands. In 1650, the English took Jamaica and a decade later tensions were heightened in Florida. The former empire of Charles V and Philip II was losing pieces. The Monarchy was getting smaller. Economically, the crisis unleashed

³² On this, see Anthony Pagden, *Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c. 1800* (Yale Univ. Press, 1995), 35; and David A. Lupher, *Romans in a New World: Classical Models in Sixteenth-Century Spanish America* (University of Michigan Press, 2003), chap. 1; Samir Boumediene has called this a transposition of the “ancien sur le nouveau” Samir Boumediene, “La Colonisation Du Savoir,” *Une Histoire Des Plantes Médicinales Du Nouveau Monde*, 2016, chap. 1.

³³ Juan David Montoya Guzmán, “‘The remotest lands of the world’: history of the Pacific frontier, 1573-1687” (2014), 45-46, <https://rio.upo.es/xmlui/handle/10433/954>.

³⁴ Marta Herrera Ángel, “CULTURA Y GUERRA: LOS SINDAGUA DE LA LA LAGUNA DE PIUSBÍ (EL TRUENO) A COMBESOS DEL SIGLO XVII,” *Historia Crítica*, no. 39 (2009): 68-79.

³⁵ Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Les Paysans de Languedoc* (De Gruyter, 1966); Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Daniel Rousseau, and Anouchka Vazak, *Les Fluctuations Du Climat De l'an Mil à Aujourd'hui* (Fayard, 2011); Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013).

in the 1580s had culminated in 1630, although it would extend throughout the century, during which the crown would declare bankruptcy five times.³⁶ Many factors led to this crisis, but we can highlight a chronic deficit of the Monarchy's finances due to the succession of wars in Europe. The creation of the vellon coin, a cheaper amalgam limited to the peninsula, did not solve the crisis. In 1619, the Council of Castile requested a consultation (Consulta) and in the same year, it was decided to renew the alternative of conversion or expulsion offered to the Moors who remained in Spain, who were accused of being an unwelcome fifth column, aligned with the Turk enemy.

The 1620s brought with it the period of Count-Duke Olivares, with a project to strengthen the political, jurisdictional, financial and military ties that united the territories of the Monarchy. Despite having succeeded in imposing and then normalizing the exceptional Millions tax³⁷, the failure of Olivares' project to unify the Monarchy under Castile would fail. However, some of his ideas -which were not so much his own³⁸ —, would be taken up again in the Nueva Planta decrees at the beginning of Philip V's reign. In any case, from Olivares' period we can highlight the debate on dysfunctionalities, which many also commented on. The non-Castilian peninsular kingdoms of the Monarchy, protected by ancient fueros, contributed less than Castile to the treasury and the army.³⁹ For their part, the American kingdoms served since the 1560s as an economic reserve, providing a flow of gold and silver. When these precious metals reached the Peninsula, they caused a devaluation of the currency itself, leading to an increase in prices and a monetary crisis. At the same time,

³⁶ The Crown declared bankruptcy in 1607, 1627, 1647, 1653 and 1680. See Adolfo Meisel-Roca, *Cartagena de Indias en el siglo XVII*, ed. Haroldo Calvo-Stevenson, (Banco de la República de Colombia, 2007), 345, <https://doi.org/10.32468/Ebook.664-197-5>.

³⁷ Gibran Bautista y Lugo, “Integrar Un Reino: La Ciudad de México En La Monarchy de España, 1621-1628,” 2021.

³⁸ Neither the fact of convening the Juntas, nor the use of the millionaire's tax, was the exclusive work of Don Gaspar de Guzmán. On this see John Huxtable Elliott and José F De la Peña, *Memoriales y Cartas Del Conde Duque de Olivares*, vol. 2 (Ediciones Alfaguara, 1978); J. H. (John Huxtable) Elliott, *The Count-Duke of Olivares : The Statesman in an Age of Decline* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1986), <http://archive.org/details/countdukeofoliva0000elli>; Jean-Frédéric Schaub, *Le Portugal au temps du comte-duc d'Olivares (1621-1640) : Le conflit de juridictions comme exercice de la politique*, Bibliothèque de la Casa de Velázquez (Madrid : Casa de Velázquez, 2017).

³⁹ As John H. Elliott explains, “For Olivares (...) the legal and institutional diversity of the kingdoms of the Spanish Monarchy represented an intolerable impediment to his plans to maximize resources and achieve the military cooperation among those that was essential for survival.” John Elliott, *Spain, Europe and the Overseas World: (1500-1800)* (Taurus, 2010), 46.

the idea that Spain was not only bleeding, but depopulating⁴⁰, added interrogations to the question of how to govern such a space from a head (Castile) perceived as impoverished but depositary of most of the positions and offices.⁴¹ The elaboration of political theories to support the question of how to govern a political entity of such a widespread nature abounded. How to govern a political body of disparate territories with Castile at the head? What place did the American kingdoms occupy in such a configuration?

One of the topoi of the seventeenth century is that of the alleged decadence. The voices of arbitistas such as Sancho de Moncada and Fernández de Navarrete, who in the 1620s and 1630s denounced the lack of currency and claimed that Spain was bleeding to death (“España se desangra”), saw Spain's international situation as part of the problem. The culprits? Metals and foreigners. First German, and later Genoese bankers had taken the precious metals going from America to Spain. The money changers or currency brokers, often natives of other kingdoms, were blamed for taking the strongest coins, such as the silver reales (as opposed to the vellón).⁴² For Sancho de Moncada, the influx of American metals was responsible for the fact that “before the discovery of the Indies it used to be bought for a quarter, what is now bought for six reales (...) and with the abundance of silver and gold its value has dropped”.⁴³ The Real Hacienda was in debt, both in the long term because of loans, such as the *juros*, and in the short term, due to the absorption of capital implied by the seats and foreign

⁴⁰ Pedro Fernández de Navarrete saw several causes for the depopulation of Spain, among which were the expulsion of Jews and Moors in 1492 and 1609 respectively (Discourse VII); the tolerance of vagrancy (in opposition, according to Navarrete, to the “Indians of Perú, whom we judged to be barbarians, were very vigilant in not allowing loafers, making even the old, the lame, the lame and the blind work in some ministries where their illness did not hinder them. This is what Father Acosta, Valera and Garci Laso write. And the fact that there are many idlers in Spain, and consequently many poor people, arises from different causes”. (Discourse IX); and by the inability of the brothers to be heirs of estates and lands, and to keep them thus in the families (Discourse XII). See, Pedro Fernandez Navarrete, *Conservacion de Monarchies y discursos políticos sobre la gran consulta que el Consejo hizo al Señor Rey Don Felipe Tercero ...* (in the office of Don Benito Cano, 1792).

⁴¹ On this, see John H. Elliott, *The Rebellion of the Catalans (2. ^a Edition): A Study of the Decline of Spain (1598-1640)* (Siglo XXI de España Editores, 2013), chap. VII, Olivares and the Future of Spain. This was a view shared by many in Castile. In his *Discurso*, quoted above, Alamos de Barrientos, explained that “In other Monarchies all the members contribute for the preservation and greatness of the head and naturals of it, as is just...; and in ours it is the head that works and gives so that the other members are fed and last.” Quoted in Elliott, *The Rebellion of the Catalans*, p. 165.

⁴² Law IV of the New Compilation 1644: “Otrosoi, we are informed that some foreigners and non-natural persons of our kingdoms try to be money changers and have money exchanges in our court and outside it, and of the coins that they collect in them, they choose the good ones in which there is more profit”.

⁴³ Sancho de Moncada, *Political Restoration of Spain*, 1619, Third Discourse, Chapter II “*The poverty of Spain has resulted from the discovery of the West Indies*”.

lenders.⁴⁴ In 1679, an economic restructuring began with the creation of a special Currency Board.⁴⁵

While towns and cities were founded during the 17th century, the effects of the economic crisis did not go unnoticed. From 1630 onwards, and more and more after 1650, the crown resolved to sell the trades in the image of the venality that had been practiced in France since the 13th century, which would lead to a patrimonialization of the trades from the 15th century onwards. This meant an additional source for an exhausted Real Hacienda – one of several, since in this period the systematic and generalized imposition of the *media annata*⁴⁶ - became systematic. At this critical point, as has been studied by Burkholder and Chandler, trades began to be sold to criollos, the children of Spaniards born in America. This would lead, within half a century, to a certain Creolization of offices —which led Burkholder and Chandler to speak of a certain disconnection or impotence of the kingdoms of the Indies with the Peninsula— towards the end of the century.⁴⁷

The end of the century, labeled as “decadent” by authors who have emphasized the “consciousness of decadence” of a Monarchy struggling more to survive than to prosper.⁴⁸ This idea, however, has recently been reevaluated and the reign of Charles II has been credited with the dawn of many of the reforms that would be consolidated under Philip V.⁴⁹ However, in economic terms, a greater economic difficulty can be observed not only in the peninsula but also in the American territories. The reasons that led to this crisis are various, some common, others local. In The New Kingdom of Granada, the economic crisis had manifested after the exhaustion of the gold reserves

⁴⁴ López Serrano, “El cambio del siglo XVI al siglo XVII. 1598 - 1609: corrupción, refeudalización y crisis del imperio español”, s/f.

⁴⁵ Cecilia Font de Villanueva, “The monetary stabilization of 1680-1686 : thought and economic policy,” 2008, <https://repositorio.bde.es/handle/123456789/7390>.

⁴⁶ Created by decree on May 22, 1631, the *media annata* was the sum paid to the Real Hacienda for obtaining a position or office; it corresponded to half of the salary for the first year of exercise. <https://dpej.rae.es/lema/media-anata>. Carlos Álvarez Nogal, “La Demanda de Juros En Castilla Durante La Edad Moderna: Los Juros de Alcabalas de Murcia,” *Studia Historica: Historia Moderna* 32 (2010): 47-82.

⁴⁷ Mark A. Burkholder et al., *From Powerlessness to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the Audiencias in America, 1687-1808*, 1. ed. in Spanish, Section of Works of History (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1984).

⁴⁸ Christopher Storrs, “The Survival of the Spanish Monarchy under Charles II (1665-1700),” *Manuscripts*, no. 21 (2003): 039-061.

⁴⁹ Alain Bègue, *Charles II, 1665-1700: the defense of the Hispanic monarchy at the decline of a dynasty*, CNED-Belin éducation ([Paris] Paris: CNED Belin éducation, 2017).

exploited during the 16th century, around 1640. The depression caused by the decrease in gold production⁵⁰ in the New Granada gave rise to a recession in the revenues of Cartagena. Impoverished, the city was increasingly helpless: the *situado*, which since 1672 was sent from Santafé and Quito, often arrived with delays. This made it difficult to finance the guards, and in general, the expenses for the defense.⁵¹ At the same time, the wait between each arrival of the fleets and galleons was extended, going from every three to four years to every five or six years towards the end of the 17th century, a trend that would culminate during the War of Succession.

In the 1680s, when Solórzano de Pereyra compiled the Indian legislation, a debate that had been brewing for several decades over who should rule in the Indies of this Monarchy made up of such disparate peoples and parties was coming to an end. The criollos, increasingly rooted and important, had managed to consolidate a territorial and flexible power through marriage alliances, land grants and capitulations in their favor. Now, in addition, they were able to buy offices. Solórzano wrote that “for the vassals of one of these kingdoms to be used for the government of another, it is necessary that there be no suitable and sufficient persons in it”.⁵² This idea was quite new, and Solórzano was making proof of his Indianism, perhaps to his regret. At the beginning of that same century, a debate had raged over whether criollos should govern the territories of the Indies. The positive answer argued that the criollos knew the kingdoms better and were better suited to good government. The negative response deplored the access of the criollos to the government, alleging that they would look after their own interests more than those of the crown; reversing this trend by appointing

⁵⁰ According to one estimate, in the period between 1640 and 1715 gold production was reduced by 90%. Meisel Roca, *Cartagen s XVII* p 349. However, it must be taken into account that we only have figures for legalized production, that is, that which was worked and mined and passed through the Real's treasury. Informal and unregulated gold production was considerable, particularly in certain areas such as the Darién. On this, see for example Ferran Vives Via, “La extracción de oro en el Darién del siglo XVII. Origin and consolidation of a frontier mining system (1637-1641 and 1679-1698),” *Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura* 49, no. 2 (July 1, 2022): 29-63, <https://doi.org/10.15446/achsc.v49n2.93879>.

⁵¹ José Manuel Serrano-Álvarez, “Gasto Militar y Situados En Cartagena de Indias, 1645-1699,” *Chapter 6. Gasto Militar y Situados En Cartagena de Indias, 1645-1699. Pp. 251-348*, 2007.

⁵² Manuel Rivero Rodríguez, “The Reconstruction of the Spanish Monarchy: The New Relationship with the Kingdoms (1648-1680),” n.d.

officers (often military) from the peninsula would be a task that would last until the 1750s.⁵³

The chronological framework chosen for this study covers the years 1680-1739. The starting date corresponds to the last two decades of the reign of Charles II, a high point in the New Kingdom of Granada due to the accumulation of foreign invasions and assaults on the Caribbean ports. The final date of the chronology is 1739, a date that stands out for the beginning of the War of Jenkins' Ear and with the arrival of the first viceroy, Sebastián de Eslava, when the second Viceroyalty of the New Granada was erected. The arrival of Eslava marked a change, not only because of his will to rule with severity, but also because, starting with his government, the impulse to control and integrate the kingdom's unsubdued frontiers would take on much greater dimensions.

Problematization

The end of the 17th century has been defined as a period of generalized crisis. Paul Hazard's classic work, *La crise de la conscience européenne 1680-1713*⁵⁴, takes precisely the turn of the century as a laboratory sample (an “échantillon”) to study the passage between the Baroque and the Enlightenment. These two categories refer to something more like an esprit du temps, something like a Zeitgeist manifested in literature and political culture. For Hazard, the sixteenth century had been that of hierarchy, discipline and order, guaranteed by authority and belief in the divine, which sustained an unequal society. In the eighteenth century, on the contrary, a rejection of dogmas, constrictions, and authority emerged, leading to the search for an unequal society. Hazard's scheme seems outdated today, but why is it interesting to bring it up? According to this classification, the French experience appears to be diametrically opposed to that proposed for the Spanish Monarchy by historiography, which projects a passage from pactism to absolutism with the dynastic change at the end of the century, from a pactist and polisynodal government to a more direct or “executive” exercise of authority. The passage from the Councils to the Secretariats of State, War and Navy, and the use of the *vía reservada* would have marked this transition. The passage from

⁵³ Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso, “Of Experience, Zeal, and Selflessness': Military Officers as Viceroys in Early Eighteenth-Century Spanish America,” *The Americas* 68, no. 3 (2012): 317-45.

⁵⁴ Paul Hazard, *La crise de La conscience européenne (1680-1715)* (Fayard, 2014).

the Councils to the Secretariats and the increasing use⁵⁵ of the *vía reservada* to expedite the exercise of authority have been much discussed. However, as we have seen, applying this question to the government of territories more distant from the Monarchy requires an answer beyond institutional reforms. Nevertheless, Hazard's postulate is interesting due to the inverted mirror it offers from political theory, not least because it echoes the influence that each side of the Pyrenees contributed in forging a common political culture between the two centuries.

For the rest, it is worth asking how the composite⁵⁶ and counterbalanced⁵⁷ body of a Monarchy could see its branches shaken with the arrival of the Bourbons and an absolutist conception of monarchical power. Was absolutism imported from France to Spain at the beginning of the 18th century? Formally, the sphere of influence of Louis XVI over his grandson, Philip V, as evidenced by their exchanges of letters, prevailed until 1709. Just as the execution of Charles I of England endowed the English throne with a sacrosanct dimension after 1649, absolutism was on the rise in 17th century Europe. It has been debated whether the reign of Philip V was the beginning of absolutism in the Monarchy. Other discussions have focused on whether the “imported” French absolutism was French, or whether its roots go back to Spain itself.⁵⁸ But framing the question of how (differently, similarly, innovatively) authority was exercised – during the early Bourbon period – rather than asking whether it was initially absolutist, raises several interesting issues. Indeed, it is not the same to ask: “was the reign of Philip V absolutist, as opposed to that of Charles II?” (which inevitably leads to a Boolean answer) as to ask: “how was the use of authority placed at the service of government in both reigns?” Indeed, today the debate is less focused on absolutism, and more on understanding the Monarchy as a polycentric, flexible whole, where the flexibility of the government guaranteed the permanence of the whole, and this was

⁵⁵ There are traces of the use of the reserved way prior to the arrival of the Bourbons. For example, its use in the early seventeenth century during the Anglo-Spanish tensions of 1602 is documented, see for example John Silke, “Spanish Intervention in Ireland 1601-2: Spanish Bibliography,” *Studia Hibernica*, no. 3 (1963): 179-90.

⁵⁶ J. H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” *Past & Present*, no. 137 (1992): 48-71.

⁵⁷ Lynch, “The Colonial State in Spanish America”.

⁵⁸ Jean-Frédéric Schaub, *La France Espagnole. Les Racines Hispaniques de l'absolutisme Français* (Média Diffusion, 2014).

manifested precisely in leaving judges and ministers a margin to apply the rules to the context in a casuistic manner.⁵⁹

Two ideas should be mentioned before proceeding further. On the one hand, the question of the Spanish crown's ability to impose its authority has been discussed since the modern period. The formula “obedézcase pero no se cumpla”, was invoked to justify the idea that the king was always right but that, being so far away, he could not be asked to have an accurate understanding of the reality of the Indies and, therefore, could be excused for having ordered an inadequate decision or decree.⁶⁰ Obedience was, therefore, negotiated according to the context.⁶¹ In this formula, it was therefore the minister who was to blame (for bad advice) and the responsibility to change such orders, even if it meant not complying with them (“viva el Rey, abajo el mal gobierni”). Thus, the orders received were applied when they served the interests of the local authorities and elites but were not carried out if they were contrary to them.

On the other hand, historiography has also attempted to answer the question of the transmission of authority during the period through the jurisdictional framework that supported it. In this case, the Council of the Indies has served as a field of study to determine how its capacity to make and impose decisions evolved during the period.⁶² Other works have attempted to evaluate the dissemination or concentration of authority. John Lynch, for example, has postulated that the transmission of authority through the numerous branches of government meant that many offices and positions were

⁵⁹ Yann Lignereux and Clément Thibaud, “Gouverner l'empire - Expériences françaises et ibériques aux Amériques (XVIe-XIXe siècle),” *New World New Worlds. Nouveaux mondes nouveaux - Novo Mundo Mundos Novos - New world New worlds*, June 14, 2018, <https://doi.org/10.4000/nuevomundo.72065>.

⁶⁰ Benjamín González Alonso, “La fórmula 'Obedézcase pero no se cumpla' en el Derecho castellano de la Baja Edad Media,” *Anuario de historia del derecho español*, no. 50 (1980): 469-88.

⁶¹ Jean Paul Zúñiga, *Negociar la obediencia: autoridad y consentimiento en el mundo ibérico en la Edad Moderna* (Editorial Comares, 2013), <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/libro?codigo=555503>.

⁶² Francisco Eissa Barroso, “El Abate, el Consejo y el virreinato: La política cortesana y la primera creación del virreinato de Nueva Granada (1717-1723),” in *España y América en el Bicentenario de las Independencias: I Foro Editorial de Estudios Hispánicos y Americanistas* (Universitat Jaume I, Servei de Comunicació i Publicacions, 2012), 293-314, [https://research.Revista de Indias 77, no. 271 \(December 30, 2017\): 791-821, https://doi.org/10.3989/revindias.2017.023](https://research.Revista de Indias 77, no. 271 (December 30, 2017): 791-821, https://doi.org/10.3989/revindias.2017.023); Bernard Lavallé, “Guillaume GAUDIN, Penser et gouverner le Nouveau-Monde au XVIIe siècle, l'empire de papier de Juan Díez de la Calle, commis du Conseil des Indes,” *Caravelle. Cahiers du monde hispanique et luso-brésilien*, no. 101 (December 1, 2013): 260-61, <https://doi.org/10.4000/caravelle.691>; Guillaume Gaudin, “La démesure des listes du Conseil des Indes au XVIIe siècle : le Nouveau Monde vu depuis les bureaux madrilènes,” *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez* 44, no. 2 (2016): 83, <https://doi.org/10.4000/mcv.5766>; Guillaume Gaudin and Thomas Glesener, “The Letters of the First Audiencia of Manila (1584-1590). Communication, “friction” and power challenges at the confines of the Spanish Empire,” in *Political and Administrative Agents in Spain and America. Siglos XVII-XIX.*, Albatros, 2017, 135-49.

overlapping. This, Lynch says, was intentional, as it prevented the monopolization of power; letting them fight each other for authority would have been a way of ensuring that the head of the body politic was not competed with, as its parts competed. This resonates with what Pablo Fernández Albaladejo has proposed about the transition between a judicial system (based on a long process of horizontal consultation) to an administrative monarchy.⁶³

In essence, even if we strip away the grand concepts of political history such as “pactism,” “absolutism,” and “executive power” to focus on the practices of government and the exercise of authority, the tendency toward conceptualization is a reflex of those who practice social science. On the other hand, the question of the imposition of authority opens more doors than it provides answers. What is meant by the ability of a monarch to impose his authority: to be obeyed by his ministers, the ministers by the officers and the officers by their subordinates? Is it then an evaluation of the (trickle-down) transmission of authority? If not, is it the sovereigns' capacity to enforce the laws and decrees that prevail within his political base? Is it to impose reforms that will bring about change in the desired direction? The question of the exercise of authority and government can be posed in many ways.

How does dynastic change manifest itself in government? What is life on the frontiers like? What is the relevance of frontiers to political history? What can the study of frontiers teach us about the fabric of the Monarchy? The period 1680-1740 has been studied as a period of gradual recovery of control over the trades. How does this manifest itself in frontier spaces? Contraband and misrule have been blamed for the “lack of authority” over this area of the Monarchy. What government initiatives emerged to remedy this? I seek to answer all these questions in this thesis, and all of them are related to the difficulties of the chosen period and to the main question about the exercise of authority in the Indies, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a period still little studied, although the winds of historiography are changing.

⁶³ Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, *Fragments of Monarchy: works of political history* (Alianza Editorial, 1992).

II- Historiography

An observation on partitions in history

The historical discipline with a view to American history has made use of articulating divisions of what are imagined as commissioned periods. The demarcation of the periods that would make up the history of the Spanish Indies (Habsburgs and Bourbons), whose turning point coincides with the turn of the century (1700), is inherited as much as that between modern history and contemporary history (which varies from country to country). These broad periodizations of the temporal dimension, which is continuous⁶⁴, lead to the formation of temporal units, differentiated by widely accepted moments of rupture (1492, for example). This broad periodization has been described by Antoine Prost as producing cold periods (“des périodes refroidies”). In opposition to these, would stand “live cuts”, operated by the historian to highlight the specificity of a chosen chronology.⁶⁵

To a certain extent, the history of Hispanic America follows a division into cold periods. The discovery accompanied by the conquest would be a first period, marked by plunder, greed, disease and competition; then would come a colonial period of order, work, and evangelization; finally, independence would be reached as the result of a republican and conscientious emergence, making certain former vassals into the future citizens of the continent. This chronological division had its detractors. Already in the 1950s, Father Severino de Santa Teresa wrote criticizing the classic division, alleging that to label as “conquest” what had been a pacification, tarnished the pious passion that had pacified the Indians after the order of Philip II.⁶⁶ Santa Teresa added that labeling as “colony” what had been an imperial experience made up of multiform territories -today we would say composite or polycentric- did not do justice to the imperial experience lived by the aggregated territories of the Spanish Monarchy.

⁶⁴ Time is one of the four dimensions, along with the three spatial dimensions that we perceive with our senses. The articulation between the four dimensions has been advanced by physics under the term space-time, a four-dimensional continuum. This has been addressed by Einstein in his theory of general relativity, which implies a curvature of space-time; by the idea of special relativity (which posits the particularity of two views applied to the same object depending on the point of reference from which it is observed); and by quantum mechanics, which highlights the probabilistic quality of occurrences in the universe.

⁶⁵ Antoine Prost, *Douze Leçons Sur l'histoire* (Média Diffusion, 2014), 127 “La construction historique du temps.”

⁶⁶ *Ordinances of discovery, new population and pacification of the Indies* given by Philip II, July 13, 1573, in the forest of Segovia.

Another type of partition has been offered from political history. Numerous Spanish historians were attached to the partition between Austrias mayores and Austrias menores for a long time. In this scheme, the appellation “Austrias menores” perpetuated the received ideas about the inexorable inadequacy of Charles II. On the other hand, the Bourbon period, taken in a robust block spanning 1700-1810, has been presented as an entirely different moment. The system would have transitioned from a monarchical governance framework backed by a vast, overlapping, and cumbersome array of jurisdictions to an executive governance framework. This would have occurred with the passage from a pactist *modus operandi* based on the fueros and exemptions to an “absolutist” mode imported from France. Not only has the concept of absolutism as an articulating concept of Bourbon government been somewhat rethought, but there is currently so much scholarship about negotiations and mediation that it seems unsatisfactory to define the “pactist” moment as emblematic and exclusive to the Habsburgs.

Perhaps, historiography has found ways to overcome all the previous chronological and semantic divisions that once operated as scissures in our conception of history. Today, concepts such as resistance, obedience, integration, failure, circulation, negotiation, and exploitation not only serve to organize scholarly encounters whose participants are interested in disparate epochs, but they offer, *de facto*, a bridge between those epochs. Does this mean that it is useless to refer to old chronological partitions? It would be tantamount to asserting that the conceptual work of political history prior to the 1990s is obsolete, something with which I could not agree. On the contrary, the idea of a pactist Monarchy in opposition to an absolutist Monarchy invites us to reflect on these terms and the governmental practices they entail. Such was my reflection at the beginning of this thesis, when I asked myself if the dynastic change in 1700, mirroring the turn of the century, would have had an impact on the exercise of government in the New Kingdom of Granada. To canvas this, I had to outline what had and had not been written about this kingdom during this period.

What has been written and what has not

First of all, it must be said that the primary interest in studying this period is that there was a historiographical vacuum to be filled. The modern history of the New Granada has developed under the influence of historiographical divisions that, to use Michel Bertrand's words, make the first half of the eighteenth century the mediocre consequence of the difficult previous century, or an opaque prelude to the second half of the century, marked by the well-known reforms from 1760 onwards.⁶⁷ In this manner, the chronologies chosen to address topics geographically located in the New Kingdom⁶⁸ or in one of its subregions or provinces, often start from 1750⁶⁹, or from 1700, including, for example, the entire eighteenth century (and even up to 1810), but often omit the period 1700-1740.

Some notable exceptions to this trend are works published since the 1960s, and they are essentially of three types and I will begin: 1- the relatively recent Colombian historiography (post 1990), based on a regional approach; 2- the Anglophone historiography, largely American, since the 1960s and, since the 1980s, with the notorious influence of the Warwick school; 3- the Colombian and Spanish historiographies that have approached the New Kingdom of Granada through major

⁶⁷ Michel Bertrand, "The Difficult Emergence Of The 'First' Eighteenth Century In Americanist Historiography," *The First Eighteenth Century In Spanish America*, Edited By Bernard Lavallé, 2012, 9-26.

⁶⁸ For other spaces, such as Quito, this partition has been overcome more than twenty years ago in the work of Tamar Herzog, which offers the unique chronology 1650-1750. See, Tamar Herzog, "La Administración Como Un Fenómeno Social: La Justicia Penal de La Ciudad de Quito (1650-1750) (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1995), Pp. 352.," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 29, no. 2 (May 1997): 495-548, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X9726476X>; Tamar Herzog, "Rites of control, practices of negotiation : pesquisas, visitas y residencias en las relaciones entre Quito y Madrid (1650-1750)," in *Tres grandes cuestiones de la historia de Iberoamérica : ensayos y monografías : Derecho y justicia en la historia de Iberoamérica : Afroamérica, la tercera raíz : Impact in America of the expulsion of the Jesuits [CD-Rom with 51 monographs]*, 2005, ISBN 84-932739-5-3 (Three great questions in the history of Ibero-America : essays and monographs : Law and justice in the history of Ibero-America : Afro-America, the third root : Impact in America of the expulsion of the Jesuits.

⁶⁹ María Dolores González Luna, "La política de población y pacificación indígena en las poblaciones de Santa Marta y Cartagena (Nuevo Reino de Granada), 1750-1800," *Boletín americanista*, January 11, 1978, 87-118; María Dolores González Luna, "LOS RESGUARDOS DE SANTA MARTA Y CARTAGENA EN LA SEGUNDA MITAD DEL SIGLO XVIII," n.d., 29; Margarita Garrido, "La política local en la Nueva Granada 1750-1810," *Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura*, no. 15 (January 1, 1987): 37-56; Santiago Castro-Gómez, *La hybris del punto cero: ciencia, raza e ilustración en la Nueva Granada (1750-1816)*, 1. ed (Bogotá: Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2005); Steinar Sæther, *Identidades e Independencia En Santa Marta y Riohacha, 1750-1850* (Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, 2012); Beatriz Amalia Patiño Millán, *Criminalidad, ley penal y estructura social en la provincia de Antioquia 1750-1820*, Segunda edición, Colección Memoria viva del bicentenario, Antioquia (Bogotá, D.C: Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 2013).

themes of economic and social history since the 1970s. In the following, I will outline the works that cover this chronology, but first I must preemptively underline that many works are limited to a provincial scale, traced on the current regional interests, or in the best of the cases, regional. This is explained, in part, by the weight of regional historiographies in Colombian production, due both to the diversity of present-day Colombia and to the particularities that make national history a heterogeneous whole.

Among the Colombian works that cover the transition between the two centuries -and it should be noted that the works of Antioqueño historians on Antioquia are predominant- is the book by Pablo Rodríguez on the Cabildo of Medellín⁷⁰ and the work of Luis Miguel Córdoba Ochoa on Medellín.⁷¹ For the Caribbean area, fewer works have been interested in this chronology, since the works that cover the entire eighteenth century⁷² (but that do not stop substantially in the first decades) prevail. On the contrary, many works, whether regional or national in scope, begin their chronology in 1750, thus reiterating the post-1750 partition that presupposes the rupture supposedly operated by the Bourbon reforms of the second half of the century.⁷³ The Colombian Pacific, on the other hand, has attracted the attention of many Colombian and foreign scholars (how can we fail to mention the fundamental work of William Sharp, who wrote a long history of the Chocó in the 1940s?). Many works on this area adopt a broad

⁷⁰ Pablo Rodríguez, *Cabildo y vida urbana en el Medellín colonial, 1675-1730*, 1. ed, Colección Clío de historia colombiana 3 (Medellín, Colombia: Editorial Universidad de Antioquia, 1992).

⁷¹ Luis Miguel Córdoba Córdoba Ochoa, "Una Villa Carente de Paz, Quietud y Tranquilidad. Medellín Entre 1675 y 1720", *Revista Historia y Sociedad*. Vol. 3, el 1 de enero de 1996.

⁷² Luna, "LOS RESGUARDOS DE SANTA MARTA Y CARTAGENA EN LA SEGUNDA MITAD DEL SIGLO XVIII"; María Teresa Arcila and Lucella Gómez, *Libres, cimarrones y arrochelados en la frontera entre Antioquia y Cartagena: Siglo XVIII* (Siglo del Hombre Editores, 2009); José Trinidad Polo Acuña, "Poblamiento y conflicto social en la frontera guajira (1700-1800)," *El Taller de la Historia* 1, no. 1 (2009): 27-74, <https://doi.org/10.32997/2382-4794-vol.1-.num.1-2009-638>.

⁷³ José Polo Acuña, "Contraband and indigenous pacification on the Colombian-Venezuelan frontier of La Guajira (1750-1820)," *Latin America in Economic History* 12, no. 2 (January 1, 2005): 87, <https://doi.org/10.18232/alhe.v12i2.Criminality, Criminal Law and Social Structure in the Province of Antioquia 1750-1820>; Orián Jiménez, *El Chocó, sus gentes y paisajes, Vida cotidiana en una frontera colonial, 1750-1810* (Medellín: Universidad de Antioquia, 2004); Sæether, *Identidades e Independencia En Santa Marta y Riohacha, 1750-1850*; Garrido, "La política local en la Nueva Granada 1750-1810."

temporal perspective⁷⁴ ; others concentrate on the eighteenth century⁷⁵ , but often deal less with the first half of the century than the second half.

On the other hand, the other category of works that have contributed to our knowledge of this period comes from the English-speaking academia. The Warwick school has been prolific and has led to a multiplication of theses on the New Kingdom of Granada in the 18th century. This has essentially been done under the tutelage of Anthony McFarlane, followed by Lance Grahn, Synnøve Ones, Caroline Williams and, more recently, Francisco Eissa Barroso and Ainara Vázquez Varela. McFarlane's works constitute an invaluable source for Colombian historians of the eighteenth century because of the compendium of information they contain. The work of Lance Grahn (retired from research, but not from academia) focused on contraband, economics, corruption, and the world of the Atlantic Ocean. His works are a fundamental basis for understanding the commercial and political dynamics that prevailed in the New Kingdom in the 18th century. Synnøve Ones (now Rosales) published a thesis in 1980 that anticipated the work of Francisco Eissa-Barroso, both of which focused on the local and transatlantic political spheres that governed the kingdom during the first decades of the 18th century. Ones' thesis concentrates on the power relations between the Audiencia of Santafé and the governors of the Caribbean provinces (Cartagena and Santa Marta), with a particular focus on the jurisdictional conflicts that prevailed in the relations between the two spheres.⁷⁶ Thanks to her work, the complex relationship between the “central” power of the Audiencia in the Andes and the spheres of the Caribbean provincial governments is better understood.

⁷⁴ Sven-Erik Isacson, “Atrateña Biography. The Formation of an Indigenous Place-name Under Spanish Impact (Chocó, Colombia),” *INDIANA* 3 (January 1, 1975): 93-110, <https://doi.org/10.18441/ind.v3i0.93-110>; William Frederick Sharp, *Slavery on the Spanish Frontier: The Colombian Chocó, 1680-1810*, 1st ed (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976); Patricia Vargas Sarmiento, *Los Embera y Los Cuna: Impacto y Reacción Ante La Ocupación Española Siglos XVI y XVII*, Serie Amerindia, no. 6 (Bogotá, Colombia: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología : CEREC, 1993); Juan David Montoya Guzmán, “Guerra, frontera e identidad en las provincias del Chocó, siglos XVI y XVII,” no. 15 (2008): 25; Juan David Montoya Guzmán, “Mestizaje y Frontiers In The Pacific Lands Of The New Kingdom of Granada, Siglos XVI y XVII,” *Historia Crítica* 59, no. 59 (2016): 41.

⁷⁵ Erik Werner Cantor, *Ni Aniquilados, Ni Vencidos: Los Emberá y La Gente Negra Del Atrato Bajo El Domino Español, Siglo XVIII*, 1. ed, Colección Cuadernos de Historia Colonial, title 8 (Bogotá, Colombia: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, 2000); Orián Jiménez, *El Chocó, un paraíso del demonio: Nóvita, Citará y el Baudó, siglo XVIII* (Universidad de Antioquia, 2004); Mónica Patricia Hernández Ospina, “Formas de territorialidad española en la Gobernación del Chocó durante el siglo XVIII,” *Historia Crítica*, no. 32 (December 2006): 12-37.

⁷⁶ Ones, “The politics of government in the Audiencia of New Granada, 1681-1719”.

Eissa-Barroso's work also focuses on the spheres of Neogranadian civil power, but from the perspective of the viceroy. In particular, Eissa-Barroso has studied the reasons that led to the establishment of a Neogranadian viceroyalty first, and then a second.⁷⁷ His perspective, which could be described as Atlantic, emphasizes the underlying courtly dynamics that determined the fate of the first viceroyalty –its failure, in particular.⁷⁸ Barroso has concentrated on the viceroys and presidents of the Audiencia, as well as the officers in Madrid, to trace the threads of transatlantic correspondence. The exercise is rich and intriguing; however, it neglects the intrinsic factors that led to the establishment of the viceroyalty in the New Kingdom of Granada, by delegating sole responsibility for the tribulations of the viceroyalty to courtly dynamics from Madrid. Although these works help to understand the complex framework in which the New Kingdom was inserted within the Monarchy, and reveal the progressive recovery of Peninsular control over the kingdom, they do not reveal the local voices that called for the establishment of the Viceroyalty.

Working hand in hand with Eissa-Barroso, Ainara Vázquez Varela has contributed, on the one hand, to the direction of a collective book on politics and society during the reign of Philip V.⁷⁹ On the other hand, Vázquez Varela has produced a rich prosopography of the officers of the Real Audiencia of Santafé in the eighteenth century

⁷⁷ Barroso, “El Abate, el Consejo y el virreinato”; Francisco Eissa Barroso, “La Nueva Granada en el sistema de Utrecht: Condiciones locales, contexto internacional, y reforma institucional”, in *Resonancias imperiales: América y el Tratado de Utrecht de 1713*, ed, First Spanish edition, Historia económica (América y el Tratado de Utrecht de 1713 (Colloquium), Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Dr. José María Luis Mora, Consejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnología : Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2015); Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso, *The Spanish Monarchy and the Creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1717-1739): The Politics of Early Bourbon Reform in Spain and Spanish America* (BRILL, 2017), <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004308794>.

⁷⁸ The American dimensions of these reforms were concentrated in The New Kingdom of Granada where a viceroyalty was established with the aim of improving government, ending contraband and strengthening territorial protection and tax collection capacities. This reform, however, was not only short-lived, but the extent to which the viceroy had a positive impact on the aforementioned problems is more than questionable. In this sense, the works of Francisco Eissa-Barroso have carved an important path to understand the international, not to say Atlantic, situation in which the kingdom found itself at the beginning of the 18th century. Thanks to Eissa-Barroso, we understand more clearly how the decision to found a viceroyalty in the New Kingdom and the destiny of that viceroyalty depended on Atlantic and court dynamics that had little to do with the will of the neighbors;

⁷⁹ Francisco A. Eissa-Barroso and Ainara Vázquez Varela, eds, *Early Bourbon Spanish America: Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700-1759)*, Early American History Series: The American Colonies, 1500-1830 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2013). The texts that make up this collective book address varied issues, including: the social mobility of Philip V's courtiers between Perú, Spain, and France; the networks of Viceroy Jorge de Villalonga (first viceroyalty of The New Kingdom of Granada); merchant interests; the appointment of career military men with Mediterranean experience in the Indies; and the reforms of Cardinal Alberoni in the first half of the eighteenth century.

that helps to understand the social framework in which the political dynamics of the Santafé elites were inscribed.⁸⁰ Caroline Williams († 2019) had a prolific career at the University of Bristol after studying at the University of Warwick in the late 1980s. Williams devoted much of his career to the study of the indigenous peoples of the present-day Colombian Pacific in their struggle between resistance and adaptation⁸¹, in addition to other work in Atlantic and insular history.⁸² Her works combine deep knowledge of the sources with a great capacity to convey the voices that emerge from them, always highlighting the tension between native and Spanish or criollos interests. Her contribution to a long history of the native populations of the Chocó is fundamental to understanding the relations they maintained with the authorities throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and has been fundamental for the elaboration of this dissertation. With this piece of work, I, I hope to contribute to the production of a history of these communities where Williams' work suggests more questions than it answers. For indeed, by taking the point of view of the natives to give them a voice in a detailed and eloquent manner, Williams had, however, little scope to make explicit the sociopolitical fabric behind the criollos and Spaniards who interacted with the natives.

There is also a category that is more difficult to define, to which researchers from different milieus have contributed, whose scope encompasses the entire New Kingdom or various parts of it. In this category, the work of Marta Herrera Angel, whose *Ordenar para controlar* offers a dynamic, rich and stimulating comparison between the Caribbean plains and the central Andes during the eighteenth century, stands out. It is essential for the elaboration of this thesis due to its archival richness and erudition. It offers a complex vision of the deep territorial, political and sociocultural differences of the societies faced by the Bourbon authorities in their

⁸⁰ Ainara Vázquez Varela, *De La Primera Sangre de Este Reino* (Bogotá: Universidad del Rosario, 2011).

⁸¹ Hansen (Williams), "Conquest and Colonization in the Colombian Chocó, 1510-1740"; Caroline A. Williams, "Resistance and Rebellion on the Spanish Frontier: Native Responses to Colonization in the Colombian Chocó, 1670-1690," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79, no. 3 (August 1, 1999): 397-424, <https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-79.3.397>.

⁸² Caroline A. Williams, "Opening New Frontiers in Colonial Spanish American History: New Perspectives on Indigenous-Spanish Interactions on the Margins of Empire," *History Compass* 6, no. 4 (2008): 1121-39, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2008.00540.x>; Caroline A. Williams, "Living Between Empires: Diplomacy and Politics in the Late Eighteenth-Century Mosquitia," *The Americas* 70, no. 2 (2013): 237-68.

attempt to order the land and its people. It also allows us to understand how two of the most important political spaces of the Kingdom were shaped in the modern period: the Caribbean and the Andean highlands around Santafé. Popayán, which could be considered the third key space, has also been carefully studied by Herrera Ángel.⁸³

This research has been conceived, in part, to complete the comparison proposed by Herrera Ángel, extending the field of study from the Caribbean plains to the Pacific lands. The rationale for tackling all the northern frontiers in their entirety, as previously mentioned, stems from the realization that the issues afflicting this region were remarkably similar, spanning from the Darién to the Guajira. By studying the solutions advanced and the practices developed throughout the region, it is possible to probe political practices in a continuous, but geographically diverse zone. In other words, the frontiers of the north constitute a continuous but varied space, and it is the diversity of its resources that determined, to a large extent, the political interests that were exercised over it.

More generally, the works produced by historians within the framework of the New History of Colombia, inspired by the economic and social history of the *Annales*, and led by Jaime Jaramillo Uribe⁸⁴, Álvaro Tirado Mejía and Germán Colmenares, are essential bases for any work on modern Colombian history. In this capacity, they have been pivotal in establishing a comprehensive understanding of the significant economic and social trends at the national and regional levels since the 16th century. For example, the works of Germán Colmenares on Cali allow us to understand the economic dynamics that governed the logics of expansion that, from the south of the Kingdom, sought to set foot in the lands of the Pacific. For their part, the economic series of Germán Colmenares, Álvaro Tirado Mejía and José Antonio Ocampo provide a framework for understanding the relationship between the gold cycles and the Neogranadian economy. Linked to the New History, we also find historian Mara Dolores (Lola) González Luna, whose works examine the form taken by indigenous settlements for the

⁸³ Marta Herrera Ángel, *Popayán: la unidad de lo diverso: territorio, población y poblamiento en la provincia de Popayán, siglo XVIII*, 1. ed (Bogotá D.C: Universidad de Los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales-CESO, Departamento de Historia, 2009).

⁸⁴ Jaime Jaramillo Uribe, director of the *Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura* since 1963.

work of the land (*encomiendas, resguardos, adjudicaciones*).⁸⁵ Due to the economic and social perspective of much of the work produced by the New History, the focus of the research of many of its members was centered on major problems of what was read as the colonial domination exercised by a “Colonial State”. Thus, works were produced on slavery, the colonial economy, mestizaje, the encomienda, and the mita. However, it cannot be said that these works are particularly attentive to the period that interests us. Moreover, the historians of the New History took advantage of the unfolding of a new way of doing history to navigate between epochs; they wrote as much about the “colonial” as about the republican.

During this period, many Spanish researchers have contributed to the history of the New Kingdom. Starting with the work of María Teresa Garrido Conde on the Neogranadian viceroyalty.⁸⁶ Before Francisco Eissa Barroso's work, this was the most detailed study on the failure of the first viceroyalty of the New Kingdom. On the other hand, in the 1970s and 1980s, the journal *Temas americanistas* of the University of Seville published numerous articles by Sevillian researchers with immediate access to the Archivo General de Indias.⁸⁷ The product of this proximity between the university and the archives was a production of archival compilation. Many of the papers published in the 1980s in *Temas americanistas* are more closely resemble archival transcriptions than scholarly articles. The value of these is that, by almost exactly paraphrasing the sources without providing any commentary, they constitute an important tool for research.

Finally, some archaeological and anthropological works complete the picture of works that look at the chronology of the New Kingdom of Granada. Reichel Dolmatoff, the most important anthropologist of the Colombian 20th century, produced a series of anthropological and ethnological works on pre-Columbian societies without which we would not understand where the societies that confronted the Spanish in the Caribbean

⁸⁵ Luna, “La política de población y pacificación indígena en las poblaciones de Santa Marta y Cartagena (Nuevo Reino de Granada), 1750-1800”; María Dolores González Luna, “Características de las Gobernaciones de Santa Marta y Cartagena en relación al tema de los Resguardos indígenas,” *Boletín americanista*, January 11, 1979, 65-80.

⁸⁶ María Teresa Garrido Conde, *La creación del virreinato de Nueva Granada 1717-1723* (Escuela De Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1965).

⁸⁷ Amada Moreno Lorente, “La Fundación de La Compañía de Armadores En Corso de Cartagena de Indias (1737),” *Temas americanistas*, 2, 85-90, 1983; Carmen Gómez Pérez, “La población de Cartagena de Indias a principios del siglo XVIII,” 1983, <https://idus.us.es/handle/11441/14537>.

provinces for three centuries came from.⁸⁸ His works on the Chimilas and Koguis are a good example of this.⁸⁹ Kathleen Romoli's work in anthropology on the populations of the Colombian Pacific is essential for a history of the Cunas and Emberas.⁹⁰ In the same line, we can place the works of Sven Eric Isacson, who studied the populations of the Atrato (area of the Atrato River in the Chocó, west of present-day Colombia).⁹¹ Following in these footsteps is also the anthropologist Juan Camilo Niño, responsible for a monumental cosmological study of the Ette (Chimilas).⁹²

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Although works on the New Kingdom abound and come from different centers of production with different historiographical influences, the majority trend of historiography lacks some bridges. On the one hand, there are no interregional bridges. Caribbean history in Colombia even has its own journal, the journal *Historia Caribe* (with a strong focus on the 19th century). It constitutes a wide study block, and rightly so. In the years before 1760, southeastern Antioquia became the focus of population efforts and a political center around Rionegro and Medellín. However, prior to that, the history of the province had been marked by its association with the northern regions of the Kingdom, specifically the Citará, Darién, and Cartagena. Nevertheless, few works have successfully established a connection between Antioquia and the Caribbean.⁹³ On the other hand, although it is evident that the trend is changing, there are few works that offer a chronological bridge between the end of the seventeenth century and the beginning of the eighteenth century. Two recent collective publications directed by

⁸⁸ Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff, "Notas etnográficas sobre los indios del Chocó," *Revista Colombiana de Antropología* 9 (January 1, 1960): 75-158, <https://doi.org/10.22380/2539472X.1588>.

⁸⁹ Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff, "Chimila Ethnography," *Thesaurus: Bulletin of the Instituto Caro y Cuervo* 3, no. 1-3 (1947): 354; Gerardo Reichel-Dolmatoff and Sydney Muirden, "The Kogi: A Tribe of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, Colombia. Vol. 2," 1951.

⁹⁰ Kathleen Romoli, "El Alto Chocó En El Siglo XVI," *Revista Colombiana de Antropología* 19 (1975): 9-38; Kathleen Romoli, "El Alto Chocó En El Siglo XVII. Part II: Las Gentes," *Revista Colombiana de Antropología* 20 (January 1, 1976): 24-73, <https://doi.org/10.22380/2539472X.1730>; Kathleen Romoli, "Apuntes Sobre Los Pueblos Autóctonos Del Litoral Colombiano Del Pacífico En La Época de La Conquista Española," *Revista Colombiana de Antropología* 12 (1963): 261-90.

⁹¹ Isacson, "Atrateña Biography. The Formation of an Indigenous Place-name under Spanish Impact (Chocó, Colombia)"; Sven-Erik Isacson, "Transformations of Eternity: On Man and Cosmos in Emberá Thought," 1993; Jacob Abraham Loewen et al., "Conservation of Medicinal Plants in an Emberá Community of Panamá: Property Rights and Knowledge Transmission," 2004.

⁹² Juan Camilo Niño Vargas, "Cycles of Destruction and Regeneration: Historical Experience Among The Ette Del Norte de Colombia," *Historia Crítica*, no. 35 (2008): 106-29; Juan Camilo Niño Vargas, "El Tejido Del Cosmos. Time, Space, and the Art of La Hamaca Among The Ette (Chimilas)," *Journal de La Société Des Américanistes* 100, no. 100-1 (2014): 101-30.

⁹³ Arcila and GómezLibres, *cimarrones y arrojados en la frontera entre Antioquia y Cartagena.*

Bernard Lavallé⁹⁴, attempt to alleviate this absence from the point of view of the kingdom of Perú, as well as some theses in preparation on The New Kingdom of Granada.⁹⁵

III- Sources and methodology

The sources used for this study come mainly from the Archivo General de Indias (Seville), the Archivo General de la Nación (Bogotá) and the Archivo Histórico de Antioquia (Medellín). Printed sources are another important source for this study. When I began this doctoral work in the fall of 2019, I intended to consult the Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid), the Archivo de Medellín, the Archivo Central del Cauca (Popayán)⁹⁶, and had planned to spend a full semester in Seville to consult the Archivo General de Indias. The arrival of confinement at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic raised the prospects for accessing archives and libraries. The digital was essential; the digitized a fortune. Archival digitization projects, such as the *Neogranadina* project, as well as countless research support groups in social networks, were fundamental for researchers at the beginning of the thesis to be able to conceive a project without archives and libraries. This implies that this dissertation also reflects the particular moment in which it was formulated, and its flaws reflect this. The dissertation contains two absences, which stem from the impossibility caused by the pandemic. On the one hand, the role played by the Cabildos of the American cities studied remains to be studied; on the other hand, this work should be complemented with a study of the role played by the *pardo* and mulatto militias⁹⁷ during the period,

⁹⁴ Bernard Lavallé, *El primer siglo XVIII en Hispanoamérica* (Framespa, 2012); Bernard Lavallé y Claudia Rosas Lauro, *El virreinato del Perú en la encrucijada de dos épocas: (1680-1750)* (Instituto Riva-Agüero, 2022).

⁹⁵ In particular, the thesis in preparation by Julián Andrei Pedraza, elaborated at the Colegio de Michoacán, Mexico, analyzes, from a political and cultural perspective, the powers held by viceroys and presidents-governors of The New Kingdom of Granada. It combines a direct government and a Superior government, spheres of authority with different territorial and institutional scopes. Their context, legal characteristics and operational functioning in the period between 1670 and 1749 are examined.

⁹⁶ I am grateful to Carolina Abadía Quintero for sharing with me her transcriptions of the Cabildo collection of this Archive for the preparation of Chapter 5.

⁹⁷ On this, see Baptiste Bonnefoy, “Enchevêtrement des appartenances et constructions impériales : miliciens de couleur dans les villes espagnoles, françaises et britanniques de la Caraïbe (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles)” (n.d.); Sebastián Amaya Palacios, “Milicias Independentistas Antioqueñas. Hispanic Inheritance and Republican Transformation: Regulations, Financing and Charter,” *Revista Universitaria de Historia Militar (RUHM)* 10, no. 20 (2021).

which would have helped to complete the picture of how the mixed communities of the Caribbean militarized.

Archival sources

See table in Sources.

The significant use of the Royal Cédulas in this thesis stems from two things. On the one hand, the Royal Cédulas can be defended as valuable documents for political history, as they enable us to discern the daily decision-making process in response to petitions emanating from America. Royal Cédulas did not produce a fixed normativity. Rather, they provide an account of the political intentionality that emanated from Madrid on a daily basis, applied to America. On the other hand, due to the nature of these documents—whose origin was often a request or petition by an American vecino or officer—they often contain several elements that account for the context in which the petition was produced: the moment, the actors, and the interests behind it. Thus, many Real Cédulas offer a glimpse of the political life in the provinces to which they were destined, as well as an outline of what was being decided in the Peninsula.

IV- Structure

To study how the frontiers of the northern The New Kingdom of Granada were governed between 1680 and 1739, elements of response are proposed in six chapters arranged in the form of a funnel. This means that an approach that moves from the global to the local is intended. In other words, the magnifying glass used to approach the question thickens along the way. This will make it possible to explore the issue through smaller and smaller approaches. This allows, along the lines of Jacques Revel, to vary the scales to examine the problem at various levels.

The thesis is divided into two parts. The first part of the thesis focuses on the stakes of government in the long term, or the “longue durée”. The reference to Fernand Braudel's *Méditerranée* is a choice that stems from the desire to make this part a first approach to the major problems faced by the authorities of the New Kingdom, beyond the chronological terms of the thesis. In this sense, these problems are inscribed in a *temps long*, a scale of analysis that allows the study of the relationship of populations

with their environment. Thus, the three chapters of this part address the great challenges of government: insecurity in the Caribbean at the end of the reign of Charles II, the reformism of Philip V's first reign (1700-1724); contraband, corruption and “excessive” practices by officers and magistrates; the defense of the territory.

The first chapter analyzes the New Granada from the point of view of its place within the Monarchy. This chapter sets out to understand what was at stake in this kingdom through what the peninsular authorities denounced as problems and challenges. Chapter 1 proposes an approach to the challenges declared by the officers on both sides of the Atlantic and the reforms undertaken to face them. The chapter thus allows us to determine what appeared to be the greatest challenges of government in that kingdom, and to evaluate the causes, sincerity, and instrumentality of those who enunciated the problems. On the other hand, it allows approaching the reform that led to the first viceroyalty, from the point of view of the neighbors of Cartagena, through the petitions that were raised from there for the establishment of the viceroyalty. This adds complexity to the reading proposed by a history of more Atlantic tendencies, according to which the viceroyalty project would have responded exclusively to an impulse from Madrid.

The second chapter, following on from the first, proposes an analysis of the role of bad government practices, which we could place under the threshold of “bad government” (“mal gobierno”). One of the primary factors around which these malpractices were articulated was gold. The exploitation of gold was the kingdom's major source of income, and the methods of transporting gold dust explain, in part, the proliferation of malpractices. In this sense, the chapter addresses three topics: first, a discussion of the smuggling of gold dust and other goods is proposed; then, a case study of corruption in the Cajas Reales, based on the conversion of gold, is presented; finally, a discussion of the solutions advanced to contain contraband is offered and one of them in particular is studied: maritime privateering. This chapter focuses on the Caribbean provinces, although it is also important to highlight the articulation of the contraband from the Caribbean coast with the Andean interior, through which the goods arrived from Perú on their way to Spain.

The third chapter offers an evaluation of the variations, continuities, and permanencies in the *longue durée*. In this sense, the objective is to question the object

of study of the first part of the thesis (political practices applied to the territory) through the stated variables (variability: continuity, permanence, singularity) by crossing two perspectives: spatial and temporal. Thus, the chapter allows us to address the variations in the strategies advanced by officers and governors to administer the territory and its populations. Furthermore, the chapter attempts to explain the similarities and particularities of each of the political spaces, traced on different biospheres and climates. Thus, the relationship between the challenges posed by these topographical particularities and the development of pacification efforts is made explicit.

The second part deals with three case studies at different scales and also consists of three chapters organized chronologically. The objective of this part is to show how government, exercised at different levels, was framed in a political game of networks, friendships and different forms of dependence. This section allows us to examine the interplay between the authorities and the indigenous populations, who were confronted by threats, displacements, and negotiations along shifting frontiers.

The first chapter of this part concerns the political game at the provincial level, examined through a case study of the conquest and exploration of the northwestern province of Antioquia by its governor, José López de Carvajal (1709-1714). This chapter examines the political dynamics that the governor, a peninsular outsider, faced upon his arrival in The New Kingdom of Granada. In particular, the chapter proposes a study of networks accompanied by a reflection on the political conflict emanating from the residence trials (“juicios de residencia”). The chapter introduces the question of the conquest of the internal frontiers of the northern provinces of the kingdom and the negotiation processes that took place for this purpose.

The fifth chapter is a continuation of the fourth chapter and examines the interprovincial competition to populate the gold frontiers subsequent to the foundations carried out by Governor Carvajal. Indeed, after the initial foundations and the interpersonal conflict to which they gave rise, the dimension of the efforts to populate acquired an interprovincial scope. To understand this dimension, the chapter offers a review of the competition to establish population centers in the Citará between the provinces of Popayán and Antioquia. Moreover, the case study allows us to approach the exercise of government through one of the frontiersmen appointed for such activities: captains Aguerra, under the authority of the governor. Through an

examination of the foundations led by captain Aguerre Antonio de Varela and his secular counterpart, a *cura doctrinero* named Ignacio de Ibarra, this chapter allows us to study the processes of negotiation and integration of native communities in the broader framework of a Pacific region, relegated to the position of mining frontier of the Kingdom and coveted by neighboring provinces.

The sixth and final chapter offers a discussion on the government of native populations in the process of integration, through a case study centered on the Pintado Indians of the province of Santa Marta. For this purpose, it does not consider the perspective of the governor or captain, but rather the perspective of the Indians themselves. With the support of several Indian protectors, the Pintados advocated for the improvement of their conditions after having voluntarily submitted to the Crown at the dawn of the period under study. At the end of the chronology of interest to us, the Pintado Indians would have gone from resilience manifested in the petitions they sent to the Crown, to a rebellion expressed in the forging of alliances with the “rebellious” Indians of the province. The case of the Pintados allows us to examine the integration of the indigenous populations in the light of the reconfiguration process that was taking place in the frontiers of the northwest (the provinces of Santa Marta and Cartagena). These provinces underwent a process of settlement along the frontiers between them, demarcated by the Magdalena River, in the first half of the 18th century. The morphology of the settlements underwent an evolution marked by the foundation of Indian towns, the emergence of mixed “arrocheladas” populations and the multiplication of maroon settlements, as a byproduct of the increasing importation of slaves. Thus, the chapter explores the indigenous resistance to the growing pressure to join the Monarchy or submit to violent conquest.

Remarks on vocabulary

In this dissertation, I focus on New Granada, a political entity that has been subjected to the historian's gaze under a double gaze. The experience of the New Granada, during the period defined as “colonial” by certain historiographies, has been characterized by a progressive grasp of uncontrolled frontiers. This manner of taking hold of frontiers (of “colonizing” them) was achieved through the imposition of an exogenous order, based on an imperial project, sustained in the Catholic faith of universalist projection, for the benefit of an elite and to the detriment of the local

populations. In this sense, social relations in the American territories were of a “colonial” nature. However, the New Granada was also a political entity defined by provinciality, given its status as a kingdom within a much broader configuration: the Spanish Monarchy. The whole purpose of the study of the political history of New Granada rests on this double attribution, colonial and provincial, since the intersection of both dimensions allows us to comprehend the construction of the Monarchy in peripheral areas that were, at the same time, central in the political exchequer. Indeed, the northern frontiers of New Granada are anything but marginal: they were the coastal hinterland and lowlands through which goods and people circulated between the Caribbean and the Andes. As such, they experienced centrality in the political realm and peripherality in their jurisdictional framework.

In this study, however, the adjective colonial and the verb to colonize are absent. The reason for this, more than to assert a historiographical position in the Emic/Etic debate, lies in the fact that the thesis proposes an examination of a lexicon linked to the imposition of authority in the monarchical context: conquest/conquer, reduction/reduce, pacification/pacify, population/populate, vecino/avecindar, plantas/plantar. These terms denote the reality that the colony/colonization binomial, which is absent from the sources during the period studied, encompasses without defining. The objective of such practices in the eighteenth century was referred to as “territorial ordering”, based on the expression of James S. and Nancy Duncan, in line with the notion of classification understood by Michel Foucault as an order that equips social bodies with the tools to adhere to it. Although this expression is not used in the thesis, the background of the expression has been articulatory of many of the reflections contained in it. Finally, other expressions that are exogenous to the sources are used in this dissertation — at least because of the translation operated between the Spanish of the sources and the English of the writing — such as the verb “to settle” which refers to the idea of settlements, which can range from villages to cities, founded at a certain time. In the same way, the verb “to extract” is used to refer to the mining activities carried out in the west of the kingdom.

Having considered these ideas, I would like to end this section with a note on changes in vocabulary and historiographical trends. The debate over whether the Indies were colonies or kingdoms of a Monarchy is useful to consider the limits that the

vocabulary operates in the exercise of writing history. Today, we tend to talk more about a composite and polycentric Monarchy than a colonial State. In part, this is because historiography is diversifying. The comparative history of empires seeks to study the imperial configurations of the modern period outside the framework of the nation-state.

But even today, certain university spheres in Latin America, inspired by Marxist structuralism, tend to use words such as “domination”, “control” and “invasion” to refer to conquest. I have chosen to use “conquest” by virtue of the semantic load that the word and verb “to conquer” provide: an ideological weight that was developed since medieval times and that carries a particular political project, something that the idea of “invasion” does not hint at. In essence, I have attempted, to the greatest extent possible, to use the vocabulary used by the actors. Throughout the process, I have attempted to make explicit the definitions and semantic charges of expressions and words with dictionaries of the period, notably the *Tesoro de Covarrubias* (1616) and the *de Dicionario de Autoridades*.

Part I: Challenges in the *longue durée*

The first part of the thesis focuses on the stakes of long-term government, or the “longue durée”. The reference to Fernand Braudel's *Méditerranée* is a choice that stems from the desire to make offer an initial approach to the major problems faced by the authorities in the New Kingdom, beyond the chronological boundaries of the thesis. It seeks to understand how populations related to the terrain in which their societies were grounded: What major challenges of government were faced? What is the specificity of the chosen period in the New Granada and within the Monarchy? How were solutions to these challenges proposed and what social dynamics determined their success or failure? How was the territory understood and managed? These problems will be understood within a *temps long* frame, a scale of analysis that allows the study of the relationship of population groups with their environment. Thus, the three chapters of this part address the great challenges of government: insecurity in the Caribbean at the end of the reign of Charles II, the reformism of Philip V's first reign (1700-1724); contraband, corruption and “excessive” practices by officers and magistrates; the defense of the territory.

Chapter 1: Political turmoil in the early 18th Century

Introduction

We start from afar, from the other side of the Atlantic, looking towards that tumultuous kingdom of which disturbing news had been arriving since the end of the previous century. In 1697, the French had sacked Cartagena and the governor of the eponymous province had refused to cooperate with justice, earning himself a jurisdictional quarrel with the Royal Audiencia in Santa Fe. Cartagena and its province, once again, contested the supreme authority in the kingdom. The Royal Audiencia, in turn, had become entangled in its own troubles. In 1715, the president of the Audiencia would be deposed by his *oidores*. However, discontent regarding the state of misgovernment (*desgobierno*) and difficulties seethed not only in the political spheres. Regional and provincial reports, written by civil and ecclesiastical authorities, complained in telling words of the ill effects that the War of Succession had wrought: rampant smuggling, convoy robberies, and poverty. All seemed to be going amiss in the New Granada.

The arrival of a new favorite at the court of Philip V, Cardinal Alberoni, once the French prince was free of his French strings, brought with him a series of reforms whose greatest manifestation in America was the creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada. Conceived as the remedy to various ills, the viceroyalty promised to better ensure the streamlining of orders and appointments and to improve communications with Madrid. Although the failure of the first Viceroyalty (1724) depended on various factors, including the personality of the new Viceroy and the entanglements of court politics in Madrid, the establishment of the Viceroyalty was more than that. Symptomatic of a reformist vein emanating from different parts and strata of the Monarchy, the Viceroyalty was also a political ideal, defended by the inhabitants who clamored for its erection. A matter of political ascent in the polycentric, but still relatively hierarchical

structure of the Monarchy, the perception of a “third viceroyalty”¹ carried with it the promise of better communication with the spheres of power.

Beginning this dissertation by addressing the subject of the viceroyalty will therefore offer a large-scale approach to the New Granada. Approaching this reformist episode will help us introduce the major themes that propelled the reforms, themes that the political communication highlighted in 1697, in 1717, or even in 1739. This chapter will show that, despite the difficulties to stabilize the government and the good state of the Kingdom, the impulse to improve government in the New Granada, whether rhetorical or genuine, was uninterrupted until the establishment of the second Viceroyalty in 1739. To address this matter, we will consider first the difficult turn of the century leading up to the accession of Philipp V, followed by the creation of the first Viceroyalty, and lastly, what had or had not changed by the end of the period in 1739 when the second Viceroyalty arose.

I- A difficult turn of the century

The particularly unstable political climate of early 1700s New Granada has been the focus of several historical works as, more broadly, the turn of the century and the reign of Philip V have come under greater interest in recent years. The University of Warwick has been one of the centers where a renewal of the historiography about the New Granada proved to be vibrant and novel, as discussed in the general introduction. Recently, the works of Synnove Omnes, Ainara Vázquez Varela, Adrian Pearce and Francisco Eissa Barroso’s have produced works on this particular period, adding much to our understanding of that world and that moment. The creation of the Viceroyalty has been studied from perspectives that have complexified the understanding of its vicissitudes, such as Ainara Vázquez Varela’s sociopolitical perspective, the focus on political spheres underpinning Synnove Omnes’ 2000 thesis, or the Atlantic macro perspective recently defended by Francisco Eissa Barroso. All these perspectives emphasize the intricate social web that stretched across the Atlantic, whose intrigues and struggles initiated and ended the first viceroyalty. Moreover, these perspectives have retraced the factors which drove the Crown to establish the Viceroyalty. These

¹ Castillo, J. J. (2016). [SPA] LA PERCEPCIÓN DE UN TERCER VIRREINATO AMERICANO EN EL SIGLO XVII (1650-1717)//LA PERCEPCIÓN DE UN TERCER VIRREINATO AMERICANO EN EL SIGLO XVII (1650-1717). Librosdelacorte. es, (12), 25-62.

were, namely, political instability, contraband, and fiscal corruption, all hailed as the main disturbers of the Kingdom's welfare. Nevertheless, these authors have only partly considered these reasons without grounding them within the territorial history of the Kingdom before 1717. By territorial history, I am referring to the *temps long*, that of the geographical and material setting, the field where the relationship between individuals and the environment is expressed. For indeed, there were long brewing broader issues that contributed to the notion that a viceroy could offer a solution to the Kingdom's problems.

Emphasis on the weight of Madrid courtly politics notwithstanding, explanations of why the project to create a Viceroyalty in the New Granada always begin with an assessment of the broader causes that worried the Crown in respect to the New Kingdom. As Eissa-Barroso has put it: "political instability was one of three themes that permeated the history of the region in the late-seventeenth and early eighteenth century, alongside contraband trade and defensive concerns."² Indeed, the New Granada had undergone a period marked by political instability at the judicial and administrative head, the Audiencia, since the mid-17th century.

This period has been characterized in historiography as a one of greater disconnect of the governing parties in the Indies, with those in Madrid. This, as well as the economic downturn of the 1630s, pushed the Crown to begin to sell certain offices in the 1630s, a trend that would peak in the 1680s.³ But besides offices being sold to *criollos*, there were reports of faulty or missing appointments. In 1649, for example, only two *oidores* currently served at the Audiencia in Santafé and there were irregularities in the collection of *medias annatas*, taxes paid by officials upon assuming their charges⁴. In 1655, it was reported that in Santafé there was "no one to buy the twelve vacant offices of Regidor" due to the extreme poverty of its inhabitants, in general, and the expensiveness of purchasing offices.⁵ This was, in fact, used as a pretext by Santafé's Cabildo to address the King and ask for a *merced* of "propios"

² Eissa-Barroso, *The Spanish Monarchy and the Creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1717-1739)*, 53.

³ M. A. Burkholder y D. S. Chandler, "Creole Appointments and the Sale of Audiencia Positions in the Spanish Empire under the Early Bourbons, 1701–1750*", *Journal of Latin American Studies* 4, núm. 2 (noviembre de 1972): 187–206, <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022216X00002042>.

⁴ AGN, Reales cédulas, t. III, f.31-32.

⁵ AGN, Reales cédulas, t. III, f. 93-95.

(benefits in which to invest outside the Royal Hacienda's domain) like other cities in the New Kingdom –the petition was granted.⁶ Many of the Royal Cédulas expedited during this period relate to fiscal matters of the Monarchy's bureaucracy. The *cobro* of the *media annta*, for instance, was tightly surveilled, as was the taxation of all *oficios vendibles*, an increasingly important resource for the crown.

But not all the negative reports concerned fiscal matters, as many too stressed the troubling abuses endured by Indians at the hand of corregidores. This had led the crown to expedite a Royal Cédula ordering a *protector general de Indios* be named in the New Granada.⁷ Like protectors of other minorities in the Spanish Monarchy, such as *protectores de moriscos* and *protectores de judíos*, who were attached to (and paid by) *aljamas*, *protectores de Indios* aided communities to defend their rights before justice. *Protectores* circulated between villages, usually within one or two provinces, but seldom ventured into the frontier. Even if frontiers where non-subjugated communities roamed free often under the cover of difficult landscape, frontiers were under multiple layers of jurisdiction (Council of the Indies, Audiencia, Governors/Bishops, parish/cura doctrinero/mission) and the legal framework offered by the Monarchy was ever-present. Legal documents could be brandished in any remote corner of the Monarchy for an individual to behest his right, under the shape of a Royal Cédula, *Merced*, *Instrumento*, or *Capitulación*. But in factual terms, the circulation of *Protectores* in frontiers was inferior to that of protectors where encomiendas and

⁶ “por parte del cabildo de Justicia y regimiento de la ciudad de Santafée del nuevo Reyno de granada se me ha representado se halla con mucho desacaecimiento y que no havia quen comprse diez y doce oficios de regidores de ella que estaban vacos y que los que actualmente lo heran deseaban dejar los suyos con que resulta falta deGobierno y conocido perjuicio en mi Real hazienda y otros ymcombenientes y que todo naciía de que la dha ciudad en otras inferiores siendo aquella cabeça del dho nuevo reyno con que se hallaba con gran desconsuelo y con las cargas y obligaciones de los oficios que heran muchas por aver muy pocos regidores y para remedio de todo me suplicaron les hiciere merced de que se les diese cedula concediendo a la dha ciudad, seis mil pesos para propios que se impusieren y asignarsen en cosas que no fuesen de mi RI Hazienda ni en perjuicio del bien común cometiéndole al Presste y Audiencia de aquella ciudad que buscasen los medios mas suabes que se pudiesen hallar y propusiese el dho Cavildo pues de otra manera no hera posible conservarse con la estimación necesaria siendo así que no tenís más propios que una de hesa que se arendava en poconas de mil pesos que oy estaban embargados por diferentes devitos y que no hera cosa justa que teniendo las ciudades deauqella provincia muy gruesas cantidades de propios estuviese la de Santafé sin ellos, y que a los capitulares de el dho cavildo se les concediesen diferentes preeminencias para que con esto tuviesen más estimación los dos oficiales y para tomar decisión en esta materia (...) ordené a la dha mi Audiencia por cedula de 26 de diciembre de 1647 tomase lo que había sobre todo lo que pedía la dha ciudad”.

⁷ AGN, Reales cédulas, t. III, f.161.

pueblos de indios were instituted.⁸ For indeed, in the early modern Americas, the task of caring for native populations by reducing them to Christianity on imperial frontiers had been conferred to Christian missions, or regular clergy. Possibly because of the meager oversight of missions on the frontier, and arguably worsened by the absence of *protectores de Indios*, many reports came of abuses by Franciscan friars in the western parts of the Kingdom.

Other reports focused on the alarming state of the kingdom's defenses, which found themselves at their nadir as French ships sacked Cartagena de Indias in 1697. According to Eissa Barroso, the French occupation of Cartagena de Indias in 1697 and the chronic political infighting in Panama and Quito during the War of the Spanish Succession were determining factors in the perception of the need for reform in New Granada. And indeed, the invasion of Cartagena had brought to the surface several dysfunctions related to the ability of the Peninsular government to impose its authority in the context of invasion, which would have been impossible without the Governor's collaboration.

In July 1696, Jean Bernard Louis Desjeans, Baron de Pointis, the esteemed French Minister of the Navy, and King Louis XIV, made a momentous decision. They resolved to organize an expedition with the explicit aim of capturing the fortified city of Cartagena. This audacious venture occurred against the backdrop of strained Franco-Spanish relations during the late 17th century, characterized by frequent incursions into the territory of the Hispanic monarchy by Louis XIV. The Cartagena expedition holds significance when viewed within the broader context of the conclusion of the League of Augsburg war. This war, ultimately resolved by the Treaty of Ryswick in September 1698, witnessed Louis XIV, in alliance with the Scottish Jacobites, clashing against the League of Augsburg comprised of the Spanish Monarchy, England, the United Provinces, the Holy Roman Empire, Portugal, Scotland, and Sweden. The expedition to Cartagena in 1697 emerged as one of the final military Louis XIV's attacks against the territories of the Hispanic monarchy. Targeting Cartagena holds particular significance owing to its strategic importance. By the end of the 17th century, Cartagena had emerged as the preeminent port in the northern region of the South American

⁸ See the number of *Fronteras de la historia* devoted to *protectores de indios*: Vol. 28 N°. 1 (2023): "Los protectores de indios: oficio, mecanismos legales y poder social".

continent. It served as a vital gateway to the Caribbean area and played a pivotal role as a transit point for the silver from the southern Potosí mines. Moreover, a substantial proportion of goods destined for the ports of the Netherlands and Andalusia also passed through Cartagena.

Jean Baptiste Ducasse, Governor of Saint-Domingue, was commissioned by de Pointis to assemble an auxiliary squadron comprising as many freebooters as possible. Ducasse had succeeded in establishing his authority over freebooters in the French part of the island, after being appointed Governor of Saint-Domingue. Setting sail from Brest on January 6, 1697, they joined Ducasse and his buccaneers at Petit-Goâve (Pitiguao) and made up a total of 29 or 30 ships and between 5,000 and 6,500 men, of which 3,000 were buccaneers⁹. The Governor of Cartagena, Diego de los Ríos y Quesada, who had only been in post for two months, was notified of the presence of a French squadron nearby bearing no flags.¹⁰ He requested reinforcements from the President of the Audiencia de Santafé as, he argued, he disposed of a mere 150 men, including 37 artillerymen, to defend the city.

Measures were decided upon, and a junta of the *cabildos militares*, convened by the Governor of Havana, instructed De los Ríos to provide reserves for the defense and eventual sustenance of the city. At the time, the Governor had nearly half a million pesos in the city's coffers. The subsequent sequence of events unfolded with remarkable swiftness. The French rapidly gained control over the city's castles and walls. On April 13th, 29 sets of sails were sighted and soon thereafter canon fire from the assailing ships hurtled against the walls of the city. The Jesuits, who had convents churches and missions in the province reported, in their 12th Carta Anua (1694-1698) titled "*Lo que obraron y padecieron los nuéstrros en la pérdida de Cartagena*", the arrival of De Pointis and 25 ships:

"On the thirteenth day of April of the same year, this city was beset by a French

⁹ Numbers are debated: Enrique de la Matta Rodríguez hints at 5,000 men, a figure taken from the chronicle of contemporary military officer José Vallejo de la Canal; see José Vallejo de la Canal, *Diario historico del sitio, indefension, perdida y sacco de Cartagena de las Indias, ganada y destruida por el frances el año de 1697...* ([S.l.: s.n., 1698). Nicolás del Castillo refers to 6,500 men, see Subgerencia Cultural del Banco de la República, "La piratería a fines del siglo XVII: Asedio de Cartagena por el Barón de Pointis | La Red Cultural del Banco de la República", consultado el 22 de agosto de 2023, <https://www.banrepultural.org/biblioteca-virtual/credencial-historia/numero-89/la-pirateria-fines-del-siglo-xvii>.

¹⁰ Enrique de la Matta Rodríguez, *El asalto de Pointis a Cartagena de Indias* (Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1979), 38.

squadron consisting of twenty-five ships: most of them were small pirate vessels summoned for this faction by the Governor of Pertiduan, one of the main captains of this navy.”¹¹

The Jesuits described the French route from Bocachica castle into the town. They passed to Getsemaní, a district south of the narrow land corridor in which the city of Cartagena lies, and which functioned as the city’s garrison, where they took shelter. Their advance was swift. Between April 16th and April 20th, De los Ríos’ troops lost the castles surrounding the town, all of which had been built in the 17th century and were in good condition: Bocachica, Santa Cruz and San Felipe. The first was deserted due to lack of organization and fear of French bombardment, the second (which protected the entrance to the port) was abandoned by decision of the military, and the third was defended by Captain Juan Manuel Robles and 150 volunteers, after the Governor refused to defend it.¹²

The following day, with their defenses undermined, and their fate sealed, the *vecinos* of Cartagena surrendered to the French forces. As part of the terms of capitulation, a sum of 12,000,000 pesos from the city’s *Cajas Reales* along with another 1,000 pesos for the cost of their freedom, was agreed upon as indemnity, to be paid by Cartagena to the French¹³. Another condition set by de Pointis was that the French would respect the property of the *vecinos* who wished to remain in Cartagena (unless it was made of gold, silver, or stone) if they swore loyalty to Louis XIV. The capitulation also stipulated French respect for churches and monasteries¹⁴. According to contemporary witness Vallejo de la Canal, a thousand people left the city with the Governor on May 6th or 7th, who made his exit. But things started to sour when upon leaving, the promise to leave church buildings unharmed was broken and churches were ransacked to the Jesuit’s dismay:

““After these people left the plaza, the French began to collect the silver and gold of the *vecinos* and *forasteros*, showing immediately how poorly they would keep their

¹¹ “El día trece de abril de mismo año se halló esta ciudad acometida de una escuadra francesa que constaba de veinte y cinco navíos: los más eran vasos pequeños de piratas convocados para esta facción por el Gobernador de Pertiduan, uno de los principales cabos desta armada.”

¹² Rodríguez, *El asalto de Pointis a Cartagena de Indias*, 79-94.

¹³ Rodríguez, 51.

¹⁴ José del Rey Fajardo y Alberto Gutiérrez, *Cartas anuas de la Provincia del Nuevo Reino de Granada: años 1684 a 1698* (Archivo Histórico Javeriano Juan Manuel Pacheco, S.J., 2014).“(…) que no tocarían los franceses a los templos ni casas de religión y que a las personas religiosas y demás eclesiásticos no se les haría agravio alguno en sí ni en sus haciendas o alhajas.” *Carta Anua* no 12, *Ibid.* §8.

word, since without any respect for the capitulation, they entered the houses of religion and stripped them of everything that was worth anything in them. And they did the same with the churches where they did not even leave the bells.”¹⁵

This was all the more dramatic as the Jesuits had hidden away some of the wealth owned by the city’s notables in their convents and churches, in exchange for a sum of money.

As fate would have it, the French were forced to leave in a hurry due to an intense period of rain, plunging the city into an epidemic of dysentery that claimed around 800 lives in just a few days. The freebooters then returned to Cartagena to demand a larger share of the booty from De Pointis. According to the latter’s account, the freebooters misunderstood the terms of the attack, claiming to receive 10% of the total obtained, rather than 10% of the first million and 3% of the rest, as De Pointis claimed. According to the Jesuits, the “pirates”, numbering five hundred, locked up all those who had remained in the city in the Cathedral for three days and three nights, and pillaged and tortured the city’s inhabitants in order to get their hands on all the valuables:

“The pirates, forming a new squadron [sic] all on their own, returned to the city and, gathering all the people who had remained in the city, they locked them in the Cathedral Church. Men and women, secular and religious, were locked up here for three days and nights with all the discomforts that can be imagined, and the heartless and cruel people did not allow them to leave that place during all that time.”¹⁶

In the aftermath of the events surrounding the defeat of Cartagena, inquiries were initiated in Santafé to investigate the actions and decisions taken by Governor De los Ríos. In particular, his handling of the crisis and subsequent surrender came under scrutiny, as did his failure to respond to requests for reinforcements. The President of the Audiencia, Gil de Cabrera, appointed Carlos Alcedo y Sotomayor, *oidor* of the Audiencia, judge of the investigation (“*juez pesquisidor con máximas atribuciones en*

¹⁵ “Salida esta gente de la plaza se dieron los franceses a recoger la plata y el oro de los vecinos y forasteros mostrando desde luego lo mal que guardarían su palabra pues sin respeto de lo capitulado entraron en las casas de religión y las despojaron de cuanto en ellas había algo que valiese. Y lo mismo hicieron con las iglesias donde no dejaron ni aun las campanas” Ibid.

¹⁶ *Cartas anuas de la Provincia del Nuevo Reino de Granada: años 1684 a 1698*, Colección Archivo Histórico Javeriano (Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana : Archivo Histórico Javeriano, 2014), Letter 12, f. 78v. “Los piratas formando nuevo esquadron [sic] dellos solos volvieron a la ciudad y recogiendo toda la gente que en ella había quedado la encerraron en la iglesia Catedral. Hombres y mujeres, seglares y religiosos estuvieron aquí encerrados tres días con sus noches con las incomodidades que se pueden discurrir, ni permitiéndoles aquella gente desalmada y cruel salir de aquel lugar en todo ese tiempo.”

el asunto de la entrega de Cartagena”). The inquiry culminated in a report¹⁷ whose outcome had received much historiographic attention, and of which several elements help make sense of an event otherwise difficult to grasp. It found that the governor had been in cahoots with the French and willingly left the city undefended, even though the city had funds for extra guards and arms. He then systematically gave the order to abandon the defense as the French advanced and had willfully ignored the reinforcement troops sent to Mompox (178 km south of Cartagena on the Magdalena River). Once capitulations were starting to be negotiated, De los Ríos had made no effort to negotiate and thereafter left Cartagena, escorted by the French, with a sum of 2.000.000 pesos for himself of which a part had come from the Royal Hacienda’s coffers and another from the vecinos themselves.

De los Ríos had returned to Cartagena at the end of August. He refused to allow the Audiencia to interfere and prevented Alcedo (the *oidor* in charge of the investigation) from entering the city on the pretext that the Audiencia had no jurisdiction to judge him. After several days during which the governor refused to hand over the acts Alcedo needed, he let him enter the city. But the two argued and *oidor* Alcedo brandished his sword in the name of the king before the governor, which is why he was sent to the “sala de matos”¹⁸. This led the president of the Audiencia, Gil de Cabrera y Dávalos, to adopt a *Real Acuerdo*, on November 30, 1697, to go to Cartagena with an *oidor*, a fiscal, 50 or 60 men and full powers, effectively transporting the Audiencia and its jurisdiction to Mompox (300km from Cartagena). But De los Ríos used various means to prevent the Audiencia’s entrance, and there was even a mutiny against President Cabrera y Dávalos, organized by a De los Ríos ally, when they learned that the Governor had been deposed¹⁹.

The sources mention the terror sown by the Governor, virtually locked in the city, who insisted that he intended to “defend his jurisdiction” which surprised the members of the Audience, who were quick to assert that their jurisdiction was

¹⁷ AGI, Santa Fe, 459, *Representación fiscal y diaria relación sobre la entrega y capitulaciones de la plaza de Cartagena de Indias hecha por don Diego de los Ríos , gobernador de ella en 4 de mayo del año pasado de 1697 a las armas de Francia*, May 17, 1700.

¹⁸ AGI Santa Fe 459 *Representación fiscal* Fol 100 in De la Matta Rodríguez, *op. cit.* p.145. The “sala de matos” was a special prison cell to which Cartagena’s notables were sent.

¹⁹ Rodríguez, *El asalto de Pointis a Cartagena de Indias*,

superior³⁶. He justified this by stating that, as a captain in the army, he had exclusive jurisdiction over military affairs “exclamando contra [Alcedo] y contra todos los togados con pretexto de que querían usurpar la jurisdicción de los militares”²⁰. However, in the Hispanic monarchy, the President of the Audiencia also held the title of Captain General, giving him superior military jurisdiction. The Council of the Indies condemned De los Ríos’ resistance, stating that the Audiencia was the “viva imagen del Rey por su representación a quien esta conferida toda la facultad real sin la menor duda²¹” and that, consequently, disobeying the Audiencia’s orders constituted disobedience to the King. They added that the President of the Audiencia had “la misma autoridad y poder que tienen y les concede su Magestad a los Virreyes de Lima y México”²².

In November 1700, a new *oidor* was appointed to the case, Bernardino Angel de Isunza, from the Audiencia de Santafé, but he had difficulty completing the investigation due to the Governor’s hostility. De los Ríos fled to Jamaica and, finally, the case was dropped in 1704 by the Audiencia and the Council of the Indies and closed in 1706 by a Royal Cédula of October 29, in view of the war that stifled attention for the events of 1697.

To gauge the extent of the economic damage inflicted upon the city during the French attack, it is illuminating to examine the figures. A staggering sum of 46,000,000 pesos serves as a testament to the vast wealth that flowed through the port. Of this amount, the French seized 20,000,000 pesos, while 300,000,000 pesos were lost due to damage sustained by artillery, weapons, and various goods, including slaves. Additionally, 23,000,000 pesos represented the cost of damage inflicted upon castles and walls²³. But the capture of Cartagena carries significance for two key reasons. On the one hand, it only stressed the already coping defenses of a city which saw the beginning of the War of Succession with worry, as its defenses were in need of repair. *Vecinos* took a hard blow as well: merchants and traders had seen their business sacked, religious communities had had to surrender the welfare of their estates and the castles had been trampled by the troops. The physical, moral and pecuniary hardship caused

²⁰ *Respuesta fiscal*, May 21, 1700, AGI Santa Fe 357, in Ones Synnøve, *op. cit.* p.177.

²¹ *Ibid*, p. 181.

²² *Respuesta fiscal*, May 21, 1700, AGI Santa Fe 357, in Ones Synnøve, *op. cit.* p.181.

²³ Rodríguez, *El asalto de Pointis a Cartagena de Indias*, 3.

by the sacking was substantial. But another faulty relationship had surfaced in the events: the place that Cartagena occupied within the Kingdom and its relationship to the Audiencia of Santafé. Cartagena, the pearl of the Crown, had of old somewhat resisted the authority of the Audiencia as its economic standing was superior to that of the distant, Andean, capital. The events of 1697-1700 had shed light not only on the difficulties the Audiencia had in asserting its jurisdiction over the city, but also on the capacity of the Audiencia itself to superimpose the King's justice, as was its task. This is best exemplified in the Audiencia's claim that it held "la misma autoridad y poder que tienen y les concede su Magestad a los Virreyes de Lima y México"²⁴. The fact that the Council of the Indies was compelled to explicitly state such a fact is indicative of a need to reaffirm it. This possibly hints at the idea (unsupported in the legislation) that Audiencias were lesser organs of administrative power than Viceroyalties, or at least that a Viceroy held better quality and authority than a President of the Audiencia.

The Audiencia of Santafé, New Kingdom of Granada, and city of Cartagena all suffered from the French invasion of 1697. It was in this climate that the War of Succession dealt another hard blow to Cartagena and its provinces, making the idea of establishing a Viceroyalty seem all the more needed, as the following part will discuss.

II- The Viceroyalty of the New Granada: layers of motives and circumstantial failures?

As the War of Succession unraveled in the Caribbean, much of Spain's transatlantic trade with its Indian realms came to a halt. Sources stress the economic difficulties that came with the war, aided only by the increasing contraband that foreigners could now engage in with greater ease²⁵. After the war ended, a shift in the court in Madrid would bring about the entry of new political forces and a wave of reforms, one of which was precisely to establish a Viceroyalty in the Kingdom. There are two layers of motives that led to the creation of the Viceroyalty: macro-motives (as in, concerns for better administration, an increased ability to impose decisions and authority, and a better oversight over local government) as well as local motives, in

²⁴ *Respuesta fiscal*, May 21, 1700, AGI Santa Fe 357, in Ones Synnøve, *op. cit.* p.177.

²⁵ Lance Grahn, "POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND REFORM IN CARTAGENA PROVINCE, 1700-1740", *s/f*, 25; Rodolfo Segovia, "El contrabando en el Nuevo Reino de Granada (1700-1739)", ed. Banco de la República, *Boletín cultural y bibliográfico* 39, núm. 61 (2002): 22.

particular, a set of petitions emanating from Cartagena in 1709. This part will discuss these layers of motives which engage with a plethora of actors, interests, and circumstances.

1) Broad issues

Historians of the New Granada have stressed the importance of the overthrow of the president of the Audiencia of Santa Fe, Francisco de Meneses, in 1715, an event which had catalyzing effect in reformism relating to the Kingdom. A few facts to understand the political context: on February 4, 1712, Francisco Meneses Bravo de Saravia, a Chilean-born criollo of distinguished lineage, succeeded Diego Córdoba Lasso de Vega as President of the Audiencia de Santafé and was favorably received by the *oidores* who belonged to the kingdom's criollo elite²⁶. Soon, however, *oidor* Domingo de la Rocha and Archbishop Francisco Cosío y Otero, along with a group of *vecinos* from the city, denounced his "military" conduct, about which numerous letters were sent to the king, through the Council of the Indies, in 1713. Even though the King had granted Meneses permission to wear military dress, the *oidores* were outraged that he had begun presiding over the Audience sessions in full dress, when everyone was wearing mourning dress due to the death of the Dauphin of France. Charges regarding his conduct began to emerge accusing him of corruption, namely of selling offices to the highest bidder and of favoring the sale of offices to descendants of conquistadors in order to establish his influence over the Santafé elite. He was also accused of interfering in matters outside his jurisdiction, particularly in the commercial affairs of the town's *cabildo*, and of participating in smuggling activities in Cartagena²⁷.

On the 23rd of September tensions imploded as *oidores* Yepes and Aramburu, and the *fiscal* Zapata, were prevented from holding the Audiencia at its palace in Santafé and were forced to take council at the convent of San Agustín (in front of the Audiencia's building on the Plaza Mayor). Once president Meneses bade them in, the *oidores* locked the door of the room (appropriately named the "Sala de Acuerdo") and arrested Meneses. Meneses was imprisoned, and the *oidores* spent five years of work

²⁶ AGI, Santa Fé 266, Minutas de Cédulas y Provisiones de Nuevo Reino de Granada, letter of 14 de octubre de 1706 requesting the Presidency; letter of 24 octubre 1710 confirming the appointment of Meneses.

²⁷ Ones, "The politics of government in the Audiencia of New Granada, 1681-1719", 270.

and 13,00 pages of administrative documentation justifying their actions²⁸. While the motives for the overthrow –the argument that Meneses delved in his excesses and had a rebellious character– the support he received from Santafé’s wealthiest *vecinos* was uncanny, as Santafé’s eleven most prominent *vecino* families sent a letter to the King defending Meneses²⁹.

Why was Meneses ousted after only a little over two years in power? On this event, Synnove Ones and Eissa Barroso have written lengthy pages. Ones argues the affair must be understood as the product of a military (Meneses) vs. *letrados* (the other *oidores*) friction³⁰. Barroso adds to the answer a clue: Meneses had had become indebted to his patrons in the French Compagnie de Guinée, on whose vessel he was transported from Madrid to Cartagena. He incurred into a fifty-thousand-peso debt which he nearly paid entirely, for which he meddled in contraband and gold dealings. Additionally, he had paid numerous debts with political favors to the Santafé elite, which might explain the latter’s support of the ousted president. Barroso estimates that Meneses’ French influence was not a problem while the French had the Asiento in Cartagena, but after the treaty of Utrecht and the passing of the Asiento to the British South Sea Company, Meneses’ ties must have become less attractive. A recently introduced piece of the puzzle into the complex social and economic networks of the New Granada, Meneses was discarded. This was not isolated from the former scope of French influence over the political spheres of the Spanish Monarchy, whereby, especially before 1710, Versailles had a role in promoting allies in local and regional government (for example Bartolomé de Ponte was named governor of Santa Marta after becoming indebted to the French, and thanks to the influence of the Count of Pontchartrain, Louis XIV’s Minister of the Marine³¹ (Eissa p. 74-75). French clout over Madrid, however, did not outlive the War of Succession, or at least not in the manner

²⁸ Omnes, op. Cit p. 271-278.

²⁹ McFarlane Anthony, *Colombia before Independence: Economy, Society, and Politics under Bourbon Rule*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 285.

³⁰ As both Ones, Eissa Barroso and Vazquez Varela have shown, the early 18th century witnessed the arrival of military men (who had exercised military authority on account of a *cursus honorum* they had fulfilled, and gone to wars, not just men who had been named Captain or Sargent upon arriving in the Indies) and the gradual rooting of criollos in the administration of the Indies. Citar.

³¹ Eissa-Barroso, *The Spanish Monarchy and the Creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1717-1739)*, 74–75.

it had influenced government, communications, and trade in the period 1700-1709³². Another major propelling factor for the creation of the Viceroyalty was the arrival in Madrid of a new favorite. This aspect of the reform is certainly wider and more Atlantic, and it is a good example of how personal influence held by *validos* (or *privados* in the medieval Castille) could introduce reforms from the head of the Monarchy.

The decision to create a Viceroyalty in northern South America, known as the Viceroyalty of New Granada, in 1717 was a significant development in the governance of Spanish America. While the Royal Cédulas from May 27, 1717, claimed that the idea had been discussed “in various occasions,” there is a lack of corroborative evidence for this claim. The only other document suggesting an earlier consideration of the creation of the Viceroyalty was a note in the memoirs of the Duke of Saint-Simon, a member of Philip V’s French entourage. According to Saint-Simon, the Prince of Santo Buono, the new Viceroy of Peru –who spent some time in Cartagena before reaching Lima (see chapter 6)– recommended in 1716 the establishment of a third viceroyalty in Santa Fe, segregating the provinces of New Granada, Cartagena, Panama, and Quito from Peru. The king purportedly approved this project in the same year. The absence of extensive documentation on the decision to create the Viceroyalty has puzzled historians. Unlike other significant transformations in Spanish governance, there is no record of a *consulta* (formal consultation) produced by the Council of the Indies, which was customary for such decisions. Nor were high-ranking governmental officials or authorities consulted about the matter before the decree of April 29, 1717³³.

This lack of document is attributed to the context in which the decision was made at the Spanish court. A series of drastic changes had affected the central institutions of American government in the months preceding the April 29 decree due to the rise of Abbot Giulio Alberoni to power. An interesting character who has produced much literature and commentary, from his unappealing appearance³⁴ and tastes to his worldly reforms³⁵, Alberoni, a clergyman from Piacenza, arrived in Spain

³² Adrian Pearce, *The Origins of Bourbon Reform in Spanish South America, 1700-1763* (Springer, 2014), 23.

³³ Eissa-Barroso, *The Spanish Monarchy and the Creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1717-1739)*, chapter 4.

³⁴ Bègue, *Carlos II, 1665-1700*.

³⁵ Allan J Kuethe, “Cardinal Alberoni and Reform in the American Empire”, en *Early Bourbon Spanish America Politics and Society in a Forgotten Era (1700 - 1759)*, ed. Francisco Eissa Barroso y Ainara Vázquez Varela (Brill, 2013), 16.

in 1711 and gained influence through his association with Queen Maria Luisa and by later arranging Philip V's second marriage to Elizabeth Farnese. As Alberoni gained the king's confidence, he marginalized the Councils and strengthened communications through the *via reservada*, an executive³⁶ mechanism that allowed the king and his Secretaries of State to handle key matters of government without the intervention of the Councils. Indeed, the creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada was part of a broader set of reforms introduced in 1717 by Alberoni to increase royal authority over Spain's governance of and trade with the Indies. These reforms sought to weaken and bypass institutions like the Council of the Indies and the merchants' guild of Seville, upending long-held channels of commercial and decision-making communication.

One important step in this direction was the bypassing of the Council of the Indies, facilitated by Alberoni's reforms in the years 1717-1719, in a context where there was a division between supporters of these measures, and those of the Habsburg polysynodal model³⁷. In particular, the Councils saw their power reduced by a series of royal decrees between 1717 and 1720. In 1717, the Council of the Indies was deprived of the power granted to it by Philip II in 1564, which stipulated that all general orders sent to the Indies had to be "señaladas y [...] firmadas de los de nuestro Consejo Real de las Indias", thus depriving it of the privilege of being indispensable in communication between the authorities in the Indies and those on the Peninsula. Removing the Council from the decision-making scene enabled Alberoni to push through various reforms aimed at strengthening his authority over Atlantic trade and territories, in what Christopher Storrs has called a more "Atlantic" phase of Hispanic politics, marked by the loss of the Monarchy's European territories (the Spanish Low Countries and Italian territories) at the end of the War of Succession³⁸. These reforms included: the creation of a royal tobacco monopoly in Cuba, the creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada, the reform and relocation of the Seville consulate and the

³⁶ Executive is here used in the sense that it facilitated passing-on of orders directly to the Viceroy, theoretically bettering their execution.

³⁷ The polysynodal model was predominant during the Habsburg period. It relied upon a number of Council for deliberation on various matters. On this model, and a discussion around its role and way of functioning, see Elliott, "Spain and America in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries", 290; Phelan, "Authority and Flexibility in the Spanish Imperial Bureaucracy". On the friction around the model at the time, see Barroso, "El Abate, el Consejo y el virreinato".

³⁸ Storrs Christopher, "Felipe V: caesura or continuity" in Eissa-Barroso Francisco and Vázquez Varela, Ainara (eds.), *Early Bourbon Spanish America. Politics and society in a forgotten Era (1700-1759)*, Leiden, Brill Academic Publishers, 2013, p. 11.

Casa de la Contratación to Cádiz, and the creation of the Real Factoría de Indias³⁹. To summarize then, the creation of the Viceroyalty must be understood within Alberoni's large and ambitious reformist agenda, but it also stemmed from pressing concerns regarding the welfare of the Kingdom, especially after the attack on Cartagena, the War of Succession and the 1715 debacle.

And yet, it must be noted that, according to scholarship, the *raison d'être* of the 1717 reform around the Viceroyalty is too be found in the abovementioned general intention to expedite and restructure (or "reconfigure" as some authors put it) the shape of the monarchy and the way in which its parts communicated. The idea that a Viceroy would better conditions and government was not new. Some historians have seen in the post-Olivares decades an undying reformist impulse which led to the creation of projects and proposals to this effect⁴⁰. In this sense, a proposal to create a Viceroyalty in 1650 New Granada, with its seat in Cartagena, has been studied as one such effort to redirect the course of political communication through a shorter channel. On this note, different interpretations lead to a number of suggestive ideas. For instance, Manuel Rivero has set forth the idea that the "excessive decentralization" produced by the viceregal system after Olivares, in a Monarchy whose parts were imperfectly linked, was at the heart the revolts in places where a Viceroy had been sent; the discontent centered around the king's absence which the viceroy's presence only half-remedied. This, Rivero stresses, led to a reevaluation of the powers that the Viceroy had, no longer as a figure who would govern in the King's stead (like a steward would), but as one of the King's subordinates and, in any case, a royal officer⁴¹. This idea has been debated, as some contemporary scholarship retains to the idea that the viceroy was seen as the King's Vicar⁴².

Beyond the frame of the viceregal institution's evolution, this raises the question of how the Viceroy was perceived as well as the question of how Viceroy acted once in power. For indeed, much current attention is being dedicated to study Viceroy in

³⁹ See Allan J. Kuethe, "Cardinal Alberoni and reform in the American Empire", in Eissa-Barroso Francisco and Vázquez Varela,

⁴⁰ Rivero Rodríguez, Manuel. "La reconstrucción de la Monarquía Hispánica: La nueva relación con los reinos (1648-1680)." *Revista Escuela de Historia* 12.1 (2013): 00-00.

⁴¹ Rivero Rodríguez, Manuel. "La cour du roi et les cours des vice-rois: la crise du gouvernement de la monarchie espagnole au XVII e siècle." *Histoire, économie & société* 38.3 (2019): 33-49.

⁴² Garrido Conde, *La creación del virreinato de Nueva Granada 1717-1723*; Castillo, "LA PERCEPCIÓN DE UN TERCER VIRREINATO AMERICANO EN EL SIGLO XVII (1650-1717)."

the Indies, in particular by examining their *juicios de residencia*. A productive institution for such a topic is the University of Almería where several dissertations on the matter have been published or are ongoing⁴³. Broadly speaking, it has been proven by historiography that Viceroyalty acted much like Governors, or even worse, in regard to using their position to secure benefits of social and pecuniary kind. In other words, especially in the Viceroyalty of Peru, Viceroyalty acted in corrupted ways⁴⁴. What is more, the notion that this happened was not only well-known, but such practices were often defended by officials themselves who alleged that their late-coming salaries were insufficient to cover their expenses, making it a logical consequence that their illicit dealings were justified⁴⁵. Similarly, in the commercial sphere, the systematization of penalties for corruption had also developed, particularly in the second half of the 17th century; *indultos*, for example, had become more like taxes than actual penalties in the face of commercial fraud⁴⁶.

Thus, the idea that the arrival of a Viceroy would change the status quo and redress all ills and malpractice, by establishing a power whose nature emulated that of the kings, is somewhat difficult to grapple with. Indeed, we must consider that, during the period 1717-1739, thrice did the highest authority in the Kingdom oscillate back and forth from the President of the Audiencia to the Viceroy, as the first Viceroyalty was created, and later the second one. How did the offices of President and Viceroy differ? If Viceroyalty were the representatives of the King in his kingdoms, how did this make them more capable of effecting change? And if so, how did early modern officials perceive the President of the Audiencia's ability to exert authority? Indeed, it is not the objective of this thesis to answer these questions -answers have already been given, and

⁴³ Namely, diferente tesis in preparation at the Universidad de Almería under the direction of Franújar Castillo..

⁴⁴ On the use of this term, see different works compiled in Francisco Andújar Castillo and Pilar Ponce Leiva, *Debates sobre la corrupción en el mundo ibérico, siglos XVI-XVIII* (Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes, 2018), <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/libro?codigo=720010>.

⁴⁵ Francisco Andújar Castillo, "Interpretar la corrupción: el marqués de Villarrocha, Capitán General de Panamá (1698-1717)", *Revista Complutense de Historia de América* 43 (2017): 101–26, <https://doi.org/10.5209/RCHA.56728>; Luis Miguel Córdoba Ochoa, "Los altos precios de la vida en los puertos del Caribe, los cortos salarios de los oficiales y la justificación velada de los fraudes a la Corona en las primeras décadas del siglo", en *Debates sobre la corrupción en el mundo ibérico, siglos XVI-XVIII*, ed. Francisco Andújar Castillo y Pilar Ponce Leiva, Biblioteca Virtual Miguel de Cervantes, 2018.

⁴⁶ See on this matter Alfonso Jesús Heredia López, "La Casa de Contratación y el fraude en el comercio indiano a mediados del siglo XVII", *Ohm : Obradoiro de Historia Moderna*, núm. 31 (el 11 de abril de 2022), <https://doi.org/10.15304/ohm.31.7387>.

a dissertation on the matter of the president of the Audiencia during this period is currently being written⁴⁷.

However, it must be said that the idea that the Viceroy could impose his authority amid the thicket of clientele and dependencies that hampered the enforcement of Crown policies in the Indies has both institutional and a social aspect. Institutional, because of the Viceroy's greater primacy in the Monarchy's chain of communication; social, because the Viceroy would arrive from abroad as an arbiter, to safeguard the interests of the crown in that part of the monarchy, rather than the interests of the local elites. Obviously, this is far from what happened, as Viceroys integrated, created, and transferred networks of dependency and economic interest wherever they were sent.

In essence, thus, discerning the extent to which early modern officials were convinced of the benefices brought by the arrival of a Viceroy is a hard task. For indeed, the corruption of Viceroys in New Spain and Lima was well known. Likewise, it is difficult to evaluate how much of the authority and dignity theoretically vested in the Viceroy was actually perceived thus by contemporaries in the administration and population. How much did Bourbon ceremonies and power semiotics transpire through the Viceroy? These questions beg longer answers than those in this chapter and some can be sought for in existing bibliography⁴⁸. But maybe a more pertinent question, in light of a history that is social and political, would be: how was the Viceroy/Viceroyalty question perceived amongst the population?

2) The petitions asking for the Viceroyalty

While historians of the first viceroyalty of the new Granada have stressed the unknown character of the origins of such a decision, nothing has been written about the pleas that anteceded its creation, please that emanated from the cities themselves. In 1709, near the end of the War of Succession, several petitions demanding a Viceroyalty be created in the New Granada were sent to the Audiencia of Santafé by officials in

⁴⁷ Julian Andrei Velasco Pedraza, Tesis de doctorado, Centro de Estudios Históricos, El Colegio de Michoacán, Director: Dr. Víctor Gayol.

⁴⁸ Garrido Conde, *La creación del virreinato de Nueva Granada 1717-1723*; Inmaculada Rodríguez Moya y Víctor Mínguez Cornelles, "Cultura simbólica y fiestas borbónicas en Nueva Granada. De las exequias de Luis I (1724) a la proclamación de Fernando VII (1808)", *Revista CS*, núm. 9 (2012): 115–43; María Soledad Barbón, *Colonial Loyalties: Celebrating the Spanish Monarchy in Eighteenth-Century Lima* (University of Notre Dame Press, 2019), <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv19m63gt>.

Cartagena, which were later dispatched to the Council of the Indies. “Extreme poverty and unrest” were the words used to qualify how *vecinos moradores* (i.e., who resided in Cartagena) fared in conditions of relative precarity, as the arrival of Galeones had been significantly reduced during the War (McFarlane) and contraband, heightened by the War, did away with a part of the merchandise destined for the port of Cartagena”. One letter by *the Cabildo eclesiastico y secular de religiones* of Cartagena stated that:

“They consider the **delays and misery** in which they find themselves due to the great delays that the galleons have had in the past years, and the loss of wealth that they have experienced; and they ask HM to consider the request of the entire city to establish the Viceroyalty as it is the only way **to redeem it from so much damage as it is suffering**. The extreme misfortune and misery that its residents find themselves in **due to the lack of annual commerce because of the delayed shipments that the galleons** of HM have had in the past years in the course of their race to Mompox due to the disturbance that occurred in the year 97 [i.e. 1697, the invasion of Cartagena] and the continuous and **repeated blows of loss of wealth due to robberies** that the ships that traffic **in this port by the enemies in the isles of Curaçao** and Jamaica whose daring and audacity, there being no squadron in this port to restrain them, have entered into greater endeavors as evidenced by their interference with the commerce of HM.⁴⁹“

So too wrote the *Prelado* de Cartagena the same year, explaining how the combination of robberies to the city, along with the effects of the current war, had made its *vecinos* poor to the extent to which alms (*limosnas*) were almost non-existent:

“For the daily sustenance of this holy community, motivated all this delay of the lack of frequency of trade that annually took place in this city of the galleons and fleets of HM whose failures and the continuous robberies of English enemies and the invasion occurred in the past years of 1697 as well as other unfavorable consequences that they have added, have brought this city and its neighbors to the miserable state in which it is, both in the ruins of the houses and walls, as well as in the lack of funds,

⁴⁹ “Ponderan los atrasos y miseria con q se alla por las grandes imbernadas q han tenido los galeones en los años pasados, y pérdida de caudales que se han experimentado; y piden a SM tenga a bien lo pedido por toda aquella ciudad sobre establecer el Virreynato por ser el único medio de redimirla de tantos menoscabos como los que está padeciendo. La suma desdicha y miseria que se hallan sus vecinos moradores por la falta de comercio anual por las cargas y imbernadas que los galeones de VM an tenido los años pasados en el curso de su Carrera a Mompox por la inbación acaecida en los de noventa y siete y los continuos y repetidos golpes de perdidas de caudales por robos que an executado las embarcaciones que trafican en este puerto los enemigos en las isalas de Curasado y Jamayca cuyo arrojo y osadía, no habiendo escuadra en este puerto que se lo refrene, han pasado a entrar en mayores empeños como se evidenzió en el que entraron en la perturbasion de los comercios de VM” AGI, SANTA FE, 449, Cartas y expedientes de los ofciales reales de Cartagena, El Cabildo eclesiástico y secular de religiones de ella, Cartagena, a 23 de septiembre de 1709

this holy community being the most damaged in this city, the first because of the short income it has; the second for **the scarce or none alms that fall due to the extreme poverty of the vecinos** (...) due to the lack of commerce of the ships that come to this port, those that do not come because of the harm they receive from **the enemies that confront these coasts assisting in the islands of Curacao and Jamaica**, not having generally been able to obtain any alms.... in that it is served to order in this city the viceroyalty be established and that in this way we may see it restored to the old credits and wealth that it enjoyed, this being the principal means of being able to maintain itself free of the **contagion and malignity of the enemies** who we do not doubt, seeing the lost one, **intend to enter the empire with their efforts to bring it to greater ruin**.... we do not doubt thus he will command it giving the provisions to at least establish the mentioned viceroyalty”⁵⁰


For the *prelado*, evidently, the affair was not only restoring the credits and wealth of Cartagena’s regular clergy, which, like most religious sectors had suffered from the blow of 1697, but a question of protecting the entry-way into the “empire”, in its South American territories, against foreigners. Indeed, this his excerpt embodies the tension that permeated the history of the Spanish Monarchy since the 16th century, between necessity and refusal of foreigners⁵¹. On the one hand, Asientos given to foreigners since the 16th century had only multiplied ever since, complexifying the role they played in commerce and trade. On the other hand, foreigners were responsible for channeling smuggled goods in and out of the continent, something which local communities relied upon. For the Crown, foreigners had been also counselors and bankers who had funded

⁵⁰ “para el sustento diario desta santa comunidad, motivado todo este atraso de la falta de frecuencia el comercio que anualmente havia en essta ciudad delos galeones y flotas de VM cuyas faltas que los continuos robos de enemigos ingleses y la invasión acaecida en los años pasados de 1697 como otras consecuencias nada favorables que estos se han agregado han traido a esta ciudad y sus vecinos al miserable estado en que se halla, tanto en la ruinas de las casasy murallas, como falta de caudales siendo esta santa comunidad la más perjudiciada en esta ciudad, lo primero por las cortas rentas que tiene; lo segundo por las pocas o ningunas limosnas que caen por la suma pobreza de los vecinos (...) por la falta de comercio delas embarcaciones que a este puerto venían , las que no vienen por los perjuicios que reciben de los enemigos que enfrentan estas costas asistentes en las islas de Curasao y Jamaica nohabiendo podido generalmente conseguir ninguna limosna... en que se sirva mandar en esta ciudad se establezca el virreinato y que de esta suerte logremos verla restituida a los antiguos créditos y combeniencias que gosava siendo este el principal medio de poderse mantener libre del contagio y malignidad de los enemigos quienes no dudamos viendo la escaecida pretendan entrat en el imperio con su abastecimiento de ponerla en mayor ruina... no dudamos assi lo mande dando las providencias siendo servido que al menos entable el dicho virreinato” AGI, SANTA FE, 449, Cartas y expedientes de los ofciales reales de Cartagena, El Prelado de Cartagena, 1709.

⁵¹ For more on this debated matter, see María Begoña Villar García y Pilar Pezzi Cristóbal, *Los extranjeros en la España moderna: actas del I Coloquio Internacional. Celebrado en Málaga del 28 al 30 de noviembre de 2002* (Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación, 2003), <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/libro?codigo=3567>.

expeditions and wars; but foreigners on the frontiers of the Monarchy, particularly in America, meant trouble for the Royal Hacienda, zealous of its *quintos*.

But the letters demanding the Viceroyalty be established hinted not only at the attack of 1697, and the current war which, in turn, had amplified the role of foreign tradesmen and smugglers. In a letter, the Cabildo of Cartagena explained how contraband from the Caribbean, which entered the continent through the Rio de la Hacha and Magdalen River, in the provinces of Santa Marta and Cartagena respectively, hindered Cartagena and its vecinos as merchants coming from the south and Andean regions to trade, seldom reached Cartagena, preferring to trade in Mompox, which lay one step before Cartagena in the south>north commercial route. Wealthy vecinos, deciding to profit from the blooming trade in Mompox and Tamalameque (map n° 2), relied on Cartagena no longer, leaving the city outside transactions that hinged on merchandise from different parts of the continent.



Map 2: Commercial routes from Santafé to Mompox, circa 1710.

Personal production with QGIS based on sources cited in the chapter.

Spanish merchants no longer sold *ropas*, but these were smuggled into the continent through rivers, ruining, according to the cabildo, trade and *rentas* for all.

“Every day with more seriousness we experience the total ruin and extreme backwardness in which this city finds itself, motivated only by the **lack of merchants that came to it from the provinces of Santa Fe, Popayán and Antioquia and other parts**, both for the amount of silver, gold and emeralds as well as for the fruits [sic] to execute with them their purchasing of fabrics (*ropas*) from Spanish merchants in that city (...) All this has ceased and is to the detriment of this entire city by reason of **the intermission made by the town of Mompox and the city of Tamalameque**, which one and the other are distant on the Rio de la Magdalena, where by making a stopover, most of the merchant subjects,

encouraged by some powerful neighbors of both town and city, **achieve and have achieved the freedom of use of their wealth from the *ropas* that are introduced through the mouth of the Rio de la Magdalena, in of the Hacha** and the other parts of this coast, as much of this province as that of Santa Marta, whose pernicious consequences have put this city in the miserable state in which today it is, as in total ruin of the commerce of the city of Seville, which was the one that, with its concurrence in this city, filled the gap of the commodities of its *vecinos moradores* (dweller neighbors), the treasury of Vm, and of the revenues of this city.”⁵²

While the nature of these claims (whether they are true or somewhat exaggerated) will be unpicked in chapter 2, solely dedicated to discussing the contraband, it must be said that many voices rose in consonance to describe the dire situation. But, above all, petitions of this sort, which merged 1- a true basis for complaints (commerce had suffered from the war making *vecinos* poorer), with 2- a general plea that besought something from the King (*providencias, mercedes*, an institutional reform, in essence, the *économie de la grâce*, as António Manuel Hespanha has put it). As a means of repairing the situation, the Cabildo proposed that the richest *vecinos* from Mompox to return to Cartagena for the defense of the port and return of its former commerce, suggesting only those who owned *ganado bacuno* (bovine cattle) stay behind in the swamp-ridden and fertile grasslands of the bank of the Magdalena. They stressed the return of the wealthiest *vecinos* was of paramount importance in accord with the status of the city, as **capital** of the Kingdom (not politically but economically) and most important port, ought to recuperate for the sake of the Monarchy’s finances and defense:

“for which reason we must beg HM to order that the residents of the said town of Mompox and city of Tamalameque who find themselves with increased wealth, should come to reside here with their families, so that in this way, as the capital of this kingdom, there will be a greater population of residents, so that in the event of enemies, there will be a

⁵² “Cada día con más veras experimentamos la total ruina y summo atraso enque esta ciudad se halla, motivado solo dela falta de comerciantes que a ella concurrían delas provincias de santafe, popayan y Antioquia y otras partes, tanto por los caudales de plata, oro y esmeraldas como de los frutos para ejecutar con ellos sus empleos de las ropas de los comerciantes españoles en esa ciudad (...) todo esto ha cesado y están en perjuicio de toda esta ciudad por razón del intermedio que hace la villa de Mompox y ciudad de Tamarameque, que una y otra distan en el Rio de la Magdalena en la que haciendo escala, la mayor parte de los sujetos mercaderes fomentados de algunos *vecinos* poderosos de una y otra villa y ciudad, logran y han logrado la linertad de empleos de sus caudales de las ropas que se introducen por la voca del Rio de la Magdalena, en de el Hacha y las demás partes desta costa, tanto de esta provincia como la de Santa Marta, cuyas perniciosas consecuencias han puesto esta ciudad en el miserable estado en que hoy se halla, como en total ruina del comercio de la ciudad de Sevilla, que era el que con su concurrencia en esta ciudad llenaba el hueco de las conveniencias de sus *vecinos moradores*, el del erario de Vm, y de las rentas de esta ciudad.”

greater number of them for the regular defense of the dominions of HM (...) remaining only the number of those neighbors that own *haziendas* with *Ganaos Bacunos* (cattle)”⁵³.

In conclusion, the establishment of the Viceroyalty of New Granada in 1717 was driven by the Alberoni and the Crown’s concerns for defense, finances, and the well-being of its subjects in the region. If, how, and when the petitions produced in 1709 in Cartagena influenced the view that the Viceroyalty was needed, is yet to be studied. The question is a tricky one indeed: the letters asking for the Viceroyalty to be established were produced at a time when French influence was still ongoing at the court, and they must have arrived in Spain the year 1710, a bitter year in than ongoing war. What is more, after Alberoni had landed in the seat of power, the Council of the Indies (to whom this sort of information would’ve been addressed) was completely sidelined from the creation of the Viceroyalty. An example of this is the fact that it was not notified to the Council of the Indies until a year after the dispatch of the Royal Cédula of May 27, 1717, which decreed it. While the question of motives, and the proportion of some versus other, calls for further research, what is certain is that once the idea had formalized, it became entrenched; even after the project was cancelled in 1724, a hunger for the Viceroyalty persisted. Discussing this will be the purpose of the next few pages.

III- Hesitations and renewals

It was decided the Viceroyalty would be installed and for, its preparation, a Royal Cédula was dispatched on May 27, 1717, prescribed that a “minister of integrity, standing, authority and representation”⁵⁴. Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero, the man chosen for task new the Kingdom well, as he had been named Protector General de Indios in 1684, leading him to travel to many parts of the New Granada; he thereafter became a member of the Council of the Indies. Pedrosa, was given the power of President of the Audiencia and Capitan General until the first Viceroy, Jorge de

⁵³ nos precisa suplicar a VM se sirva mandar que los vecinos de dicha villa de Mompox y ciudad de Tamalameque se hallen con caudales crecidos, bajen ellos y sus familias a residir en esta ciudad para que de esta suerte como capital que es de este reino se halle con más población de vecinos moradores, para que en los casos que se pudieren ofrecer de enemigos se halle con más crecido grueso de ellos para la defensa regular de los dominios de VM (...) quedando solo el número de aquellos vecinos que tuvieren hazienda de Ganaos Bacunos.”

⁵⁴ Eissa Barroso, *The Spanish Monarchy*, p. 141.

Villalonga. Traditionally, the failure of the Viceroyalty, has been interpreted as an out-of-proportions feud between two men. In this analysis, Pedrosa is often characterized as a sage and judicious figure whose actions in the Kingdom were sensible and needed; Villalonga on the other hand, has been viewed as an ill-tempered, contraband-fostering individual. Indeed, Villalonga's request for a ceremony and procession of great magnitude has often been read by historians as a hubris-like attitude which would have explained the poor state of his relationship to Pedrosa, who in consequence saw many of his decisions and appointments revoked by Villalonga⁵⁵. Recently, Consuelo Maqueda Abreu and Francisco Eissa Barroso have nuanced these ideas, and the latter has offered a new interpretation of the two men's inability to see eye to eye as a minor determining factor in the Viceroyalty's suppression. The reasons for the latter have been studied and published in the works cited in this chapter, but if one were to summarize the more recent studies, it can be attributed to Villalonga's refusal to abide with part of the instructions for the 1720 *Proyecto de flotas y galeones*⁵⁶, as well as other reasons of which the Council of the Indies was weary, like the costly aspect of upkeeping a Viceroy, and the little need to enhance the prerogatives of the person (President of the Audiencia or Viceroy) at the head of the Kingdom and, ultimately, the Council's resentment against a project of this magnitude, of which it was never a part⁵⁷.

In more factual terms, Villalonga's ceremonious character seems to have been the least of his problems, as his task of curbing contraband and improving tax collection in the New Granada found a murky downturn as he became implicated in illegal trade and left the post with an investigation into his wrongdoings and contraband. From a broad angle of observation, the end of the Viceroyalty signified a return to the status quo although, arguably, the status quo had not altered by Villalonga, who ably introduced himself in the webs of friendship and clientele that allowed him to strive economically. However, the return to a status quo, as the highest authority reverted to the President of

⁵⁵ Eissa-Barroso, Francisco A. "Two Architects and Faulty Foundations?: Explaining the Suppression of the First Viceroyalty of New Granada." In *The Spanish Monarchy and the Creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1717-1739): The Politics of Early Bourbon Reform in Spain and Spanish America*, 6:141–71. Brill, 2017. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctvbqs8bk.11>.

⁵⁶ Spain, *Proyecto para galeones y flotas del Peru y Nueva España y para navios de registro, y avisos que navegaren a ambos reynos*. [5 April, 1720.], 1720. Arguably, the most ambitious reform project of the first half of the century. On this see Pearce, *The Origins of Bourbon Reform in Spanish South America, 1700-1763*.

⁵⁷ Idem.

the Audiencia, left various reforms in place, most notably in the Chocó, a region made province and set under the authority of superintendents, inspired on the French model of intendants. Superintendents in the region, though, would fall prey to the same sort of mechanisms that turned the provincial sale of offices into a web of dependency that trickled down from governors, who charged with selling the posts (for more on this see chapter 6). The superintendent, far from solving issues of tax-collection and bad government, seemed to only perpetrate what was already wrong with these issues.

The end of the Viceroyalty and the arrival of the new President of the Audiencia, Mariscal del campo Antonio Manso Maldonado, brought about a series of reports inquiring as to the state of the kingdom. In these reports, the same ailments that the New Granada had borne in the later decades of the 17th century still beset the Kingdom after the first Viceroyalty. In the 1720s, *oidor* Francisco de Alcantud undertook a *visita* in several western provinces of the Kingdom. In it, he spoke disparagingly of the same sorts of problems: political infighting between spheres of interest, issues with tax collection, informality in mining ventures, abuses to Indians by civil and ecclesiastical frontier agents like corregidores and missionaries. Of the Superintendent reform Alcantud said he had hoped the arrival of Manso for substantial reform but “the one provided by the said erector was only to appoint a general superintendent without any income for his maintenance with the power to remove all the lieutenants appointed by the Governor of Popayán.”⁵⁸ In 1729, the President Antonio Manso wrote a report on his time in office, of a kind that would become customary for viceroys to produce: *Relaciones de Mando*. In it, he described the way in which he had found the Kingdom upon taking up his post in 1724.

“I found it, sir, in the ultimate desolation: the main neighbors and nobles withdrawn from the place, the stores almost idle, the offices of the republic vacant, all dejected and in a pitiful poverty.”⁵⁹

Manso’s words echo those of the wealthy *vecinos* of Cartagena from 1709; they carry the same plea for a solution to be found to extreme poverty, something which

⁵⁸ “La q se dio por el expresado erector fue solo nombrar un superintendente general sin renta ninguna para su manutención con facultad de quitar todos los tenientes puestos por el Gobernador de Popayán”

⁵⁹ *Informe rendido por el Mariscal de Campo D. Antonio Manso, como Presidente de la Audiencia del Nuevo Reino de Granada, sobre su estado y necesidades en el año de 1729*, in Germán Colmenares, *Relaciones e Informes de los gobernantes de la Nueva Granada*, Bogotá, Banco Popular, 1989, Tomo 1, p. 27: “Halléle, señor, en la última desolación: los vecinos principales y nobles retirados del lugar, los comercios casi ociosos, vacos los oficios de república, todos abatidos y en una lamentable pobreza”

many peninsular officials saw as a paradoxical situation considering the richness in resources and variety that the New Kingdom offered:

“Considering this in long days, my words have labored to explain how so much wealth and abundance sympathize in a land where almost all the inhabitants and neighbors are beggars.”⁶⁰

Several themes dominate Manso’s report (which, for the sake of being concise, I have only transcribed two passages), and they can be coupled in three spheres which exemplify the struggles with hardship in ensuring good government (*buen gobierno*): 1- the question of Indian welfare within the advancement of the monarchy’s grasp on the frontiers; 2- the question of contraband, fraud, illicit trade which strained the Royal Hacienda’s finances; and 3- the issue of corruption or maladministration, which according to Pedrosa had much to do with the social networks of favor and dependency in the Kingdom.

Regarding the first issue, it was not uncommon for authorities to blame one another for abusing their authority in ways that lead the Indians to seek freedom by fleeing, the ultimate effect of poor treatments (on this, see chapter 6). In 1736, for example, during a pastoral visit by the bishop of Popayán, a significant issue with the treatment of Indians in the west of the Kingdom came to light, namely in Citará, Chocó, and Antioquia. The bishop reported that the primary source of trouble lay with the non-ecclesiastical authorities. In these areas, where Indigenous people were engaged in mining activities and employed as carriers, a disturbing pattern of deaths and marauding had emerged⁶¹. Amidst these challenges, a pervasive atmosphere of finger-pointing and blame-shifting among various authorities further complicated the situation⁶². The other two spheres are interesting because they reveal the extent to which the claims of an unruly and impoverished Kingdom must be taken with a pinch of salt. Indeed, it is not so much that there was no commerce, only that it was an illicit commerce (*trato ilícito*). In fact, many works on the economic effects of the War of Succession have shown,

⁶⁰ Idem p. 29: “Considerando esto en largos días, ha trabajado mi discurso en componer cómo se compadece tanta riqueza y abundancia en una la tierra donde casi todos sus habitantes y vecinos son mendigos”

⁶¹ This situation in the Chocó, as the bishop commented, contrasted sharply with the more positive example of Sabanalarga, where an old encomienda system had been successfully implemented. Notably, the bishop attributed the success of Sabanalarga to its unique conditions, characterized by a colder climate and the absence of mining activities.

⁶² AGN, RC t. 10, f.314-318

interprovincial commerce increased during this time⁶³. Similarly, it was not so much that the people in office did not administer or care for betterment (*mejoras*), but rather that they sought to ameliorate that which suited them and used their posts for personal promotion. Discussing these three spheres will be the purpose of the following chapters.

In the years 1730, a renewed interest for installing a Viceroyalty sprung once more. As the second arose in 1738, voices accounting for the state of the New Granada decried the same sort of issues. After all, only seventeen years had passed. Upon Viceroy Eslava's arrival in 1738, his reports sounded the alarm of the woes of contraband as well as the general unrest on the frontiers of the kingdom, for which conquest and pacification were the only solution. The establishment of the Viceroyalty resulted in a notable surge in directives aimed at "conquest and pacification" which, incidentally, casts doubt on the idea that the concept of *conquest* had shed its positive semantic connotation since Philipp II had established *pacification* as the preferred notion.

Conclusions

The New Granada's turn of the century was permeated by instability and insecurity of many kinds. It became apparent that defense, finances, and government were in need of reform, as administrators in Madrid could conclude from the accounts of events spanning 1697-1715. The Viceroyalty installed to this effect was, as far as historiography can tell, of little use. Moreover, the debate on whether the Viceroyalty failed due to courtly politics in Madrid, or to personal feuds between the heads of government has produced complementary explanations. To these explanations the voice of *vecinos* in the Province of Cartagena must be added, for not only do they tell us things about the state of the province during the war of Succession, they also hint at the perception they had of the Viceroyalty and the Viceroy's capacity to transcend the spheres of local government and impose decisions more swiftly. Whether instrumental

⁶³ Rodríguez, *Cabildo y vida urbana en el Medellín colonial, 1675-1730*; Carlos María Birocco, "Cambio de dinastía y comercio interregional. La élite porteña durante la Guerra de la Sucesión de España", en *América bajo los Austrias: economía, cultura y sociedad*, ed. Héctor Omar Noejovich, 1. ed (International Congress of Americanists, Lima, Perú: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Fondo Editorial, 2001).

and opportunistic or sincere, the belief that a Viceroyalty would quell long-brewing issues gives us a sense of the climate amongst inhabitants at the time, their initiatives in search for better conditions, and the political communication between the Crown and its subjects during a time of plights.

After the experiment of the first Viceroyalty subsided, new reports and enthusiasm for reform emerged, bringing with them new orders to conquer and pacify. The issue of security and finances seemed more pressing. In these reports, contraband and bad government were hailed as the main drivers of the Kingdom's instability. And it is worth discussing these questions so very familiar in archival documentation and historiography. For indeed, contraband was ultimately what permitted vecinos to buy European goods during the war and, at the same time, sell produce from the Americas in absence of the *flotas y galeones*. Similarly, bad government and corruption were lambasted by all officials and yet practiced with little heed of the consequences, which had become a part of the bureaucratic routine.

Addressing the establishment of the viceroyalty at the start of this dissertation has allowed us to raise several issues which concerned different spheres of government (peninsular, local, regional) regarding the New Granada. The utility of this is double: on the one hand it allows to consider the problems hailed as the most pressing in the Kingdom, driving decision-making and reform. On the other hand, it has allowed us to harken back to local voices of *vecinos* and inhabitants whose accounts shed light on a reality that is not identical to the one the Council of Indies might have seen. This diachronic manner of tackling challenges to government binds together the strings of the social and political spheres, offering a more nuanced discussion on the motives that drove initiatives, pleas, and resistances. To continue in this light, the questions of corruption, bad government, and conquest or pacification will be tackled in the following chapters of this part.

Chapter 2: Of ill-practices and opportunities: contrabandand, fraud, and corruption.

In the previous chapter we saw how, in 1709, the *vecinos* of Cartagena sent letters to the King supporting the establishment of a viceroyalty in the New Kingdom because smuggling was driving them into poverty. Their convoys were being attacked and looted, and foreign smugglers roamed freely along the frontiers, where hostile indigenous populations circulated. This, they said, was due to the insecurity that the war had caused in Cartagena. The War of Succession did indeed put a stop to the arrival of Galeones between 1702 and 1714. It also led to an increase in smuggling by land, through rivers and estuaries, as the military effort was concentrated mainly on the ports. In the years 1735-1739, tensions in the Caribbean escalated and attacks by privateers increased as strained relations between the coastguard and foreign smugglers worsened and the authorities wavered between strategies to curb smuggling on the Caribbean frontier. The overall balance of power in the Caribbean had also shifted as a result of British expansion in Florida and Central America. In this context, the *vecinos* formed a privateering company (*Compañía de armadores de corso*) to defend the coast from smugglers.

Contraband was indeed used as a powerful rhetoric tool by all kinds of officials in Spanish America. It was seen as the channel through which Royal coffers were depleted, inhabitants suffered, and foreigners enriched themselves off Spanish trade. The genealogy of this type of thought, whereby foreign actors drained the riches of Spain has its roots as early as the 16th century, when foreign bankers like the Fuggers and Welsers financed expeditions to the Indies in exchange for privileges.¹ In the 17th century, foreign bankers—often Conversos of Jewish ancestry, Portuguese, or

¹ In 1527, the Fugger and Welser established a trading post known as a 'Factory' in Hispaniola, specifically in Santo Domingo. The Welser's jurisdiction extended from coast to coast, spanning from the North Sea to the South Sea, encompassing the Caribbean to the Pacific. See John Hemming, *The Search for El Dorado* (New York: Dutton, 1979), 17–18, <http://archive.org/details/searchforeldorad00hemm>.

Genovese—were seen as rapacious agents exploiting an impoverished Spain.² Their prerogatives included the deployment of German miners and African black slaves to engage in gold mining activities and were thus seen as leeches on the finances of the Kings and Queens of Spain. In the 18th century, foreign interlopers like merchants, traders, and bankers, were a constitutive part of transatlantic exchanges, and their activities were a fundamental component of the Monarchy’s economic circuits. Spain managed the production of certain commodities that were sold in the Indies through the system of *Flotas y Galeones*, namely: wheat, flour, olive oil, wine, and wool. But it could not provide a large part of the products that allowed for maintaining Spaniards’ status and position in the Indies, like manufactured goods (lamps, clocks, and mirrors from the Dutch provinces), silk from India, and fine clothing from France, or porcelain from China. Other goods, Spain imported from established companies; the most notable example being that of slave trade companies.

This configuration made the Spanish monarchy dependent on foreign trade. At the same time, Spain’s commercially exclusive relationship with its overseas territories, impeded the licit arrival of much of the needed foreign merchandise. Goods from England, for example, needed to be imported through Spain before being re-exported from Cádiz to Caribbean ports – a process of months, with substantial lag time, that was seldom sufficient in regard to the amounts needed. Consequently, contraband, smuggling, illicit trade –terms which are used interchangeably in this chapter– became the means of solving the issue.

That contraband was a necessity rather than a hindrance is a point consistently made in the historiography of the Spanish Americas has. The outcry over the damage caused by smuggling, as it appears in historical sources, must be taken with a pinch of salt. How, then, should one approach early eighteenth-century historical sources from New Granada in an attempt to find in them an accurate account of how the authorities

² In 1628, Francisco de Quevedo offered the following reflection on the role of Genovese bankers in “bleeding-out” the Monarchy’s wealth from the Indies: “Señor, Genova a vuestra majestad, a sus reinos y ministros es de más útil que las Indias. Es Genova el cajón secreto en donde salvamos el caudal de los franceses y ingleses, que lo que llevan es desaparecido, y con su comercio nos dejan pobres y sucios y necios. Y de las Indias sólo se salvan aquellas barras que cobra Genova, porque aunque el oro y plata que ellas os dan, se le llevan ellos, es con bien regateada ganancia de tutor que esconde las joyas que ve a peligro de ser hurtadas. El oro y la plata llevan a Genova, es verdad; mas de allí lo pasan a emplear en posesiones, juros, rentas y estados y títulos en vuestros reinos de España, Ñapóles, Milán y Sicilia.” Francisco de Quevedo, *Lince de Italia ú zahori español*, 1628.

dealt with contraband? The exercise that this question poses is a difficult one because, by definition, contraband was only recorded when it was successfully intercepted. Moreover, it would require a background study of the webs of relationships and dependencies that made such practices possible, at least amongst officials; sources for merchants and traders are rarer. To this end Lance Grahn's work has filled an important historiographical gap as far as Neogranadian contraband is concerned. But it is not smuggling itself as an activity that this chapter will attempt to study. Rather, the questions posed in this chapter concern the territorial and political aspect of contraband in early eighteenth-century New Granada. Indeed, as suggested in Chapter 1, contraband was a practice whose ubiquity in the northern frontiers -both coastal and interior- was condemned by contemporary commentators and blamed for the kingdom's ills. In this sense, contraband, fraud, and corrupt practices shaped political practices and behaviors of social groups and individuals, whether Spanish, Criollo, or Indian.

In this chapter, I will argue that contraband, like war and conquest, constituted a rhetorical argument that authorities and vecinos alike used to capitalize on the attention of authorities in Spain in order to obtain *Mercedes*, *providencias*, and licenses. Very few officials were interested in stopping contraband. Other officials' willingness to stop smuggling depended on their current situation and that of their allies. This is particularly evident in the case of smuggled gold dust, the kingdom's most important commodity. Fraud in the mining and minting of gold was prosecuted according to the connections of the fraudsters with officials at various levels of the administration. The years after 1680 saw an increase in the number of Audiencia offices held by Criollos, as has been shown.³ But the "creolization" of the bureaucracy behind the Royal Hacienda at the local level - the *Cajas Reales*, *Reales Fundiciones* and *Casa de la Moneda* - made instances of corruption commonplace and difficult to curtail. In essence, contraband, fraud, and corruption were common practices rooted in social dynamics of interdependence. These practices were territorialized in the sense that they were based on territory: both a result of the territory's production or morphology (e.g., a gold-producing province like Antioquia; a province of important commercial transit like Cartagena) and a result of the social dynamics produced by actors and their

³ Burkholder y Chandler, "Creole Appointments and the Sale of Audiencia Positions in the Spanish Empire under the Early Bourbons, 1701-1750*"; Burkholder et al., *De la impotencia a la autoridad*.

interests. Open or contested spaces, such as maritime and terrestrial borders, thus constituted an open scene where these actors came into play. In these scenarios, politics, reform, and legislation were palliative afterthoughts. As a result, the success of reiterated royal orders and *cédulas*, local reforms to improve defense, and the relevance of reports offering solutions to smuggling were all hampered by the prevailing interests of officers and magistrates with strong social and economic ties to the territory under their jurisdiction.

To discuss these ideas, this chapter will take a two-pronged approach. First, we will ask what contraband can be understood to be, how it functioned in the arena of interest, and what the particularities of New Granada as a gold-bearing region were. The second part will focus on the case of a privateering company that was purportedly founded to curb contraband, but whose fate reveals much about the dysfunctionality of Spain's commercial exclusivity with the Indies, the monarchy's relationship with foreigners, and the political dynamics between the monarchy's bureaucracy and the *vecinos*.

I- Contraband: an ambivalent question

1) Definitions and outline

a) What is contraband?

Historical works discussing contraband usually start by giving a contemporary definition of the term, and it is not a superfluous exercise to reproduce. According to the María Moliner dictionary: “Para los juristas de los siglos XVI al XVIII, significó ir contra un bando, es decir no acatar los reglamentos referentes a la forma en que debía ejercerse el comercio legal, los gravámenes a pagar y el tipo de productos que podían ser transportados y vendidos.” (Moliner 1994, p.11).⁴ This is not far from the definition of contraband which was taking shape in the 18th century. Indeed, the *Diccionario de Autoridades* (1726) gives the following: “BANDO. s. m. Edicto, ley ò mandáto solemnemente publicado de orden superior: y la solemnidad y acto de publicarle se llama tambien assi.”. Contra-bando, thus, means contravening a *bando*, a published prescription, norm or law, and is given the following definition: “CONTRABANDO.

⁴ The definitions provided by historical and contemporary dictionaries are willingly kept in Spanish.

s. m. Contravención de alguna cosa que está prohibida por bando, publicado a voz de pregonero, en los lugares o sitios destinados para hacer público lo que el Príncipe quiere que se observe, o que no se execute. Es formado de la preposición Contra y del nombre Bando. Latín. Factum contra interdictum Principis. SALC. Trat. del Contrab. cap. 1. Contrabando es una dicción moderna, compuesta de la preposición Contra y de la voz Bando, no conocida de los Jurisconsultos.” As the makers of the *Diccionario* remind the reader: the word was unknown by *jurisconsultos* because it only gradually became of common usage.

A key moment in understanding this notion transpired on August 15, 1713, through the issuance of a Royal Edict which clarified that any proscribed goods or commodities deemed impermissible for trade would be labeled as “contrabando.” This designation extended to both items unacknowledged in official declarations and those fraudulently declared as lost, subsequently finding acceptance in commercial exchanges. The elucidation of Félix Joseph Abreu Bertodano in 1746 further expounded on this, stipulating that any merchandise, produce, effects, or commodities forbidden within the realm of trade, or those for which requisite payments were not made, would be classified as contraband.⁵ In broader terms, contraband encapsulated any merchant transaction of purchase or sale that lacked authorization, along with any commercial endeavors where due transactional levies had not been duly remitted.⁶ In essence, thus, the concept of contraband in the early modern period can be succinctly defined as any form of unauthorized commercial activity, encompassing a range of transactions conducted outside the regulatory purview of the Spanish Crown.

⁵ Bertodano was ambassador to King Charles III at George II’s court in London. His father was governor of Caracas and his maternal grandfather had been governor of Cartagena de Indias. His career began as he was named *Consejero togado en Indias* by Philipp V and in 1741 he was already an officer in the Secretariat of the Count of Montijo, ambassador to the Diet of Frankfurt. Likewise, at a very early age, when he was barely twenty-five years old, he published in Cadiz his *Tratado juridico-político sobre presas de mar* (1746), which years later would be translated into French. See biography in <https://dbe.rah.es/biografias/43291/felix-jose-abreu-y-bertodano>. In this treaty, Bertodano expanded on known legislation to produce a framework for the unraveling of legitimate violence (or “just occupation”) in cases of war. For example, he produced a definition of “presas de mar”: “es una justa ocupación de las Naves, y Mercaderías que en ellas se conducen, pertenecientes á los Vassallos de el Soberano á quien se ha declarado la Guerra, hecha por los Subditos de el [del] Soberano su Enemigo, con legitima Patente de Corso.” For more on privateering ordenances, see Daniel Calixto Garrido, “Las ordenanzas de corso y el marco de actuación corsario” (<http://purl.org/dc/dcmitype/Text>, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 2016), <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/tesis?codigo=112412>.

⁶ Rodríguez Treviño Julio César, “La organización jurídica, económica y social del corso español en la isla de Santo Domingo: su uso en el siglo XVIII para perseguir el comercio ilícito”, *Ulúa* 22, 2013, p. 11-44, ISSN: 1665-8973.

This phenomenon was intimately linked to the regulation of overseas commerce, particularly in the context of the Carrera de Indias. The Crown exercised meticulous control over 15 designated American ports, regulating not only vessels and cargoes but also their intended destinations. Commercial transactions were channeled through the Casa de la Contratación in Cadiz, and commercial consulates (*Consulados*⁷) who amassed licensed merchants in America. Legitimate transactions were expected to be routed through the certain ports and facilitated by authorized merchants, distinctly differentiated from contrabandists. Such policies inadvertently impeded trade development and undermined the interests of insular merchants, compelling them to resort to illicit exchanges. In Santo Domingo, for example, the shortage of viable shipping opportunities for cocoa, leather, tobacco, and ginger, engendered a decline in local product prices, sowing discontent among both port communities and inland producers. This discontent fostered an environment conducive to contraband activities, where foreign goods of reduced cost were introduced to the island in exchange for local merchandise, thereby perpetuating a cycle of circumvented trade regulations.⁸

Even though the words “legal” or “illegal” were not used to describe contraband in the early 18th century, these words have been used by modern-day historians to describe the phenomenon. For instance, in an article comparing contraband in New Granada and New France, Muriel Laurent makes the case that contraband falls into the category of that which is illegal, as “De manera general, la ilegalidad se define como la contravención a las normas que establecen lo que es legal y aceptado en una sociedad dada.” Laurent’s position is that, because it went against established norms, contraband was a set of illegal practices that embodied the tension between established norms produced by “those who held power” and the social, political, and economic dynamics of the “human group upon which they [the norms] were imposed.” This interpretation of contraband as a mechanism that contravened the interests of an extractive metropolitan “Colonial state” harkens back to an idea of a dominant mercantilist Spain,

⁷ On *consulados*, see, for example, Guillermina del Valle Pavón, “Disputa entre los consulados de Cádiz y México por los mercados de Nueva España. Fines del siglo XVII y primeras décadas del siglo XVIII,” *Trocadero: Revista de historia moderna y contemporánea*, no. 21 (2009): 265–81; Manuel Lucena Salmoral, “Los Precedentes del Consulado de Cartagena. El Consulado de Santa Fe (1695-1713) y el Tribunal del Comercio Cartagenero,” n.d., 20; Robert S. Smith, “The Consulado in Santa Fe de Bogotá1,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 45, no. 3 (August 1, 1965): 442–51, <https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-45.3.442>.

⁸ Idem.

exerting a vertical authority over its so-called colonies. In such a setting, the “Colonial state” would have imposed restrictions through legislation, making contraband illegal. In the following paragraphs, I will try to propose a different lexicon through which this topic can be discussed.

The past three decades have witnessed the marriage of political history and legal history, particularly in the historiography of the Iberian Peninsula in the early modern period. Many works from this union have helped reconsider the idea that a “Colonial State” superimposed its norms and authority over its colonies.⁹ For one, the idea of a “State” implies a monopoly on the production of law, which was not the case of the Spanish Monarchy or of European Monarchies during the *Ancien Régime*.¹⁰ Because the idea of the State is so intimately linked to the idea of legality and illegality, it follows that once the “State” is removed from the picture, so does the idea of illegality. Indeed, illegal, or legal, were terms used (at the time of production of the *Diccionario de Autoridades*) to describe the following: “ILEGAL. adj. de una term. Lo que es contra ley, derecho, o razón. Es voz de poco uso fuera de lo forense. Latín. Illegalis, que es de donde se tomó.” This means that the notion of legality applied to the realm of *fueros* (*fueros, forense*) i.e., exemptions, rights, and privileges acquired by political communities and corporations since the Middle Ages. To put it bluntly, something illegal, thus, was something that went against a *fuego* (“FUERO. s. m. Ley o estatuto particular de algún Réino o Provincia”).

Applying the term illegal to the practice of contraband, thus, not only echoes a legal framework typically provided by States (*états-nation*), but it also does away with the term used by the actors of the time: illicit. Indeed, the most used expression to qualify contraband in Early Modern Spanish America was “illicit trade/commerce” (*trato ilícito* or *ilícito comercio*). Illicit, the *Diccionario* tells us, consists of “ILICITO, TA. adj. Lo que no es permitido, o que no es lícito executar o decir. Viene del Latino Illicitus, a, um.” The adjective *-licitus* (something permitted) shares the root of the verb

⁹ On the notion of the “Modern State” see Jean-Frédéric Schaub, “La notion d’État Moderne est-elle utile?: Remarques sur les blocages de la démarche comparatiste en histoire”, *Cahiers du monde russe* 46, núm. 1–2 (el 1 de enero de 2005): 51–64, <https://doi.org/10.4000/monderusse.8775>.

¹⁰ For a synthesis of debates around the “State” in early modern Iberian monarchies, see Jean Frédéric Schaub, “La penisola Iberica nei secoli XVI e XVII: la questione dello stato”, *Studi storici: rivista trimestrale dell’Istituto Gramsci* 36, núm. 1 (1995): 9–49; Antonio Manuel Hespanha, “Una nueva historia política e institucional”, *Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales* 41, núm. 166 (el 12 de mayo de 1996), <https://doi.org/10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.1996.166.49493>.

licet (present infinitive *licēre*, perfect active *licuit* or passive *licitum est*, future participle *licitūrus*), which means to allow. It is the same root that gave us the English license (Spanish: *licencia*) or, in modern-day Spanish, *licitación* (a permit). And indeed, *licit* truly reflects the nature of contraband, as illicit commerce was in fact simply that: commerce without a license. For indeed, illicit commerce, or contraband, was carried out by all sorts of actors (from foreign trading companies to Spanish officials on either side of the Atlantic, Spanish-born, and American born merchants). Many of these actors had a license to commercially sell and buy many types of goods. What is more, in the case of foreign companies, they held *Asientos*. Their participation in contraband, thus, must be understood as a practice for which they did not have a specific license, which incidentally is precisely how actors of the time describe instances of contraband.

Why, then, is this reality different from the one suggested by the term “illegal”? Many of the individuals responsible for carrying out such acts were a part of the bureaucracy which upheld the monarchy. If we agree that the plurality of legal registers in the Monarchy translates into a “decentralization of the forms of exercise of authority in corporate society,”¹¹ it follows that the actions committed by its officers could not possibly be described as illegal, as there was no monopoly over the normative production, because –as the *fueros* demonstrate– the idea of a “State” becomes difficult to espouse.¹² This is not merely a nominal issue. The vocabulary with which we think about early modern phenomena conditions the way we conceive of the past. These illicit actions were in fact punished with fines and *indultos* that became so normalized that they developed into a regulatory tax that acquitted and thereby normalized contraband, fraud, and corruption *a posteriori*.¹³ This raises the question of how significant the participation of officials in contraband was. For indeed, if the most affected party was the King (because the King’s finances suffered most from the parallel trade), was it perceived as an offense to the Royal Hacienda or to the general welfare (*bien común*)? Before answering these questions, we will first explore how these practices functioned.

¹¹ Schaub, “La penisola Iberica nei secoli XVI e XVII”.

¹² *Ibidem*.

¹³ Alfonso Jesús Heredia López, *El control de la corrupción en la monarquía hispánica: la Casa de la Contratación (1642-1660)*, Colección historia, núm. 377 (Sevilla: Editorial Universidad de Sevilla, 2021), cap. 4.

b) How did contraband operate in the New Granada?

It can be argued that, broadly, contraband in the New Granada functioned in three ways:

1. *From the exterior into the interior.* For example: on a larger scale, from the port of Cartagena to Santafé, or, on a smaller scale, from the Guajira peninsula into the province of Santa Marta.
2. *From the interior to the exterior.* For example: from the interior gold and silver-producing regions of Antioquia and Mariquita to Mompox through rivers and *caminos*, and thence to Cartagena.
3. *From one region to another,* never leaving the New Granada, or leaving the New Granada but staying in the same region. This could be the case of unminted gold going from Citara to Popayán (same jurisdiction, different region), or of wool produced in Quito and smuggled to Popayán (same region, different jurisdiction).

The merchandise being contrabanded into South America through its Caribbean coast with the purpose of being sold in the new Granada were of different types. From Europe, commodities like cloths and tissues (*ropas*), books, lamps, mirrors, and products like wheat flour, wine, olive oil, and powder were sent; through ports like Amsterdam there arrived from Asia porcelain, silk, and spices. One particularly valuable commodity that had to be transported to America for silver mining was *azogues* (mercury) which helped separate silver from other materials.

It follows that contraband routes were abundant and varied; a thesis chapter will not suffice to explore the geography of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, considering the discussion of interest here, these trade routes are fundamental for understanding the articulation of contraband between urban centers and peripheral spaces—which were not peripheral geographically but politically, as contraband routes often crossed the regions connecting coastal cities to Andean cities through the frontiers located in-between provinces. For example, several important routes followed the courses of the Rivers Magdalena, Hacha and Cesar in the Provinces of Cartagena and Santa Marta. In these provinces, the Chimila Indians and Guajiro (nowadays Wayuu) Indians aided

foreign smugglers. The Guajira peninsula, which fell under the jurisdiction of Santa Marta's *ranchería de perlas* but was effectively under Guajiran control, is a stretch of barren lands etched by tributaries of the Rio de la Hacha; it served as a natural frontier for foreign illegal traders. Dutch traders often docked their boats by river deltas where they engaged in fruitful relationships with the Indians in the region (see chapter 3). The introduction of *ropas ilícitas* through this route was a headache for authorities, whose solution was to send troops on foot, resulting in encounters with varying degrees of violence. In the limits between Cartagena and Santa Marta, it was the Magdalena River and its *Cuenca*—a marshland-like basin brimming with *ciénagas* (swamps, marshes) or lakes, as well as rivers and creeks— that served as natural cover for smuggling.

c) Actors, practices, and scales

As we have pointed out, contraband cannot be described as an illegal activity that contravened the norms of a ruling elite. Rather, it was a common practice in which all strata of society participated by trading without a license, which is to say, illicitly. In more practical terms, even though inhabitants could participate in contraband, the most profitable and successful smuggling was done by those who already had disposal of an infrastructure through which to carry out the smuggling of non-registered goods. In this sense, it seems logical that many of the persons implicated in contraband were miners, merchants, and landowners. The success of their endeavors, as Zacharias Moutoukias has explained, can be found in the fact that these miners, landowners, and merchants, who constituted an economic elite, were at the same time officials who held public magistratures (Cabildo, Santa Hermandad). As Moutoukias points out: “Consequently, we should ask ourselves up to what point the representatives of the crown, charged with carrying out its legal dispositions, constituted an element separate from the dominant nucleus of smugglers, whose activities they were supposed to repress.”¹⁴.

Smuggling, as we have established, constituted a top-to-bottom practice in early modern Spanish American societies. The implication in these activities of foreign, local, peninsular, indigenous, and African actors is attested in historical works and

¹⁴ Zacarias Moutoukias, “Power, Corruption, and Commerce: The Making of the Local Administrative Structure in Seventeenth-Century Buenos Aires”, *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 68, núm. 4 (1988): 771–801, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2515681>.

sources. While the purpose of this chapter is not to enumerate instances of contraband for the sake of detailing participation in it, the goal in discussing contraband is to participate in a discussion of its role in New Granada. Thus, in order to assess the paradoxical role that it played, as both a friend and foe, it is necessary to give some examples of the structure of the phenomenon. To do this, a few examples will be given of individuals implicated in illicit trade, followed by an assessment of its territorial articulation, and a word on gold and silver.

Viceroyalty were often implicated in contraband. Not only did they possess a valuable opportunity to enter smuggled goods with little surveillance during their voyage to America (viceroys must always depart from Spain), but they also had premium access to the groups of merchants who sought favor from them. Here the case of Jorge de Villalonga, the first Viceroy of the New Kingdom, is representative. Villalonga became so implicated in contraband, during a time of receding French influence and growing British presence in the Caribbean, that charges of illicit commerce were brought up against him and enacted (with fines) during his *Juicio de Residencia*. The Viceroys of Peru famously participated in contraband through the port of Callao, like the Marquis of Castelflos, or the Count of la Monclova, who had been Viceroy of Peru (1689-1705) and New Spain (1686-1688). And indeed, the knowledge that most Viceroys indulged in such practices made appointing high-ranking officials a worrisome task for the Crown. Furthermore, competition between officials in port cities like Cartagena, and officials in the Royal Audiencia in Santafé, often centered around the control of channels for illicit trading with foreign interlopers. Such was the case in 1710 when the president of the Audiencia, Lasso de la Vega, who clashed with the governor of Cartagena José de Zúñiga y la Cerda after the latter favored Spanish merchants with license to sell exclusively in Honduras to sell their products in Cartagena, which undermined the Compagnie de Guinée's trade therein – the president was involved in contraband ventures with the French Asiento.¹⁵

Indeed, the Asiento was a determining factor in New Granada's experience of contraband, because it fostered such rivalries between different interest groups among economic and political elites (which were, effectively, overlapping groups of

¹⁵ Eissa-Barroso, *The Spanish Monarchy and the Creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1717-1739)*, 73.

individuals), who attempted to protect the interests of the foreigners who held the Asiento at different times. For example, Juan Díaz Pimienta, the Governor Cartagena (1699-1705), had a conflictual relationship with the French Compagnie de Guinée as he attempted to protect the interests of the Portuguese company, the erstwhile holder of the slave trade monopoly in the Kingdom.¹⁶ Furthermore, it could be argued that, because the Asiento represented such an important market through which large quantities of goods transited with license, it also served as a channel through which to introduce minor quantities of unlicensed goods, either hidden among licit merchandise or at plain sight, but allowed entry after paying a bribe to port officials.

Foreign companies that held the Asiento regularly introduced unlicensed merchandise with ease, by using their licensed ships to introduce more *bozales*.¹⁷ In fact, the Asiento was mostly profitable because of smuggled goods and not on account of licensed merchandise, as only between 1713 and 1733, for instance, only eight ships from Britain arrived in the Americas. For example, in 1714, royal officials in Cartagena informed the Royal Audiencia of the “fraudulent introduction of blacks by the Compagnie de Guinée,” after the treaty of Utrecht had already been signed.¹⁸ In 1724, as the production of gold increased in New Granada, miners and merchants found a way to channel their production through other means than the fleet of galleons, which were insufficient. Only four galleons visited Cartagena after 1712; and 36 registry ships, or *naves de registro*, sailed to Cartagena between 1713 and 1763.¹⁹ In the face of heightened contraband of gold and silver, the Council of the Indies and the Crown warned of the “total extinction of commerce” and ordered merchants not to expedite their metals (gold and silver) through foreign-company-owned ships, but rather to use the next “salida de Galeones” in 1724. Not doing so, they noted, robbed the Royal hacienda from its “due rights” (*debidos derechos*), namely the *quinto*, after which they cited the regulations of trade within the Asiento de negros, stating that no foreign-

¹⁶ Eissa-Barroso, 22.

¹⁷ The term “bozales” referred to incoming African slaves who did not speak Spanish. “Bozal” means muzzle, so that “bozales” conveys the idea that their mouths were covered or impeded from speaking [Spanish].

¹⁸ AGI, Santa Fe, 449, Cartas y expedientes de los oficiales reales de Cartagena, Cartas que envían gobernadores y oficiales reales a Santafé, vistos en el Consejo.

¹⁹ M. S. Anderson, *Europe in the Eighteenth Century: 1713 - 1783*, 2. ed., 4. impr, A General History of Europe 8 (London: Longman, 1981), 293.

company ship had the right to transport metals or any other “caudales ni efectos que no sean product de la venta de los Negros” into Europe.²⁰

Other foreign actors were British, Dutch, and French smugglers who ventured into minor or *hidden* ports, as Ernesto Bassi has posited, like Riohacha, Santa Marta, the Atrato.²¹ They offered merchandise year-round –while the Galeones struggled to make it to the Indies once a year– and sold at lower prices. This was particularly profitable in the face of the inflation stemming from the scarcity of Galeones, which made the prices of licensed merchandise soar. Fine linens, wheat flour, wine, olive oil, lamps and other commodities were essential for Spanish inhabitants to upkeeping certain standards of life, especially for wealthier *vecinos* and Spanish officials residing in Cartagena. These articles were among those most smuggled, and the prices of fine clothing articles, for instance, were between 20 and 30 percent less than those of licitly imported *ropas*.²²


At a provincial level, the implication of governors was indeed very strong. In 1740, the Council of the Indies sent a Royal Cédula in dismay, reacting to reports of a cover-up of contraband in the provinces of Santa Marta and Cartagena in 1735. The men implicated were Pablo de Santiago, Manuel Polo, don Pedro Gómez, don Ignacio Francisco de Acosta, and Capitan Agustín, who were accused of trafficking *ropas* through the *Ciénaga* of Santa Marta, and thus from the Caribbean into the New Kingdom. The merchandise was shipped in canoes and sloops belonging to Don Francisco de Acosta, which sailed into the Magdalena River. The Acosta *plateños* (from Plato, Santa Marta province) were descendants of the Canarian group that had settled in the region since the 17th century. This group had founded settlements including Remolinos, Mompox, Tenerife, Plato, and El Banco. Especially in Plato, many were the descendants of Francisco de Acosta, who, in, the mid-17th century, had participated in the second founding of this settlement by the order of Viceroy Eslava, and played a role in subjugating the indigenous Chimila people, who had shown fierce resistance to catechism. Navigating up the river (southward) the boats reached the towns of Tenerife, Nuestra Señora del Rosario and Tamalameque (map n°3). The council noted the

²⁰ AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. 8, f. 238-239, Cédula expedited on February 28th 1724.

²¹ Ernesto Bassi, *An Aqueous Territory: Sailor Geographies and New Granada's Transimperial Greater Caribbean World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2017).

²² Grah, “POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND REFORM IN CARTAGENA PROVINCE, 1700-1740”.

incongruity of the case, as charges against the accused had been abandoned by royal officials of both provinces. Furthermore, when interrogations (*confesiones*) were conducted in the towns of Tenerife, Nuestra Señora del Rosario and Tamalameque, the vecinos “testifies he commerced licitly and with legitimate license.” Insinuating that the unresolved issue was a joint cover-up between governors, the Council bade the incoming governors of both provinces to take the *juicios de residencia* of their predecessors so that the issue might be cleared up.²³




Map 3: *Illicit commerce in the Province of Santa Marta, 1730s, locations.*

Personal production based on sources cited in the chapter.

Interprovincial contraband, which was often land-based, was equally difficult to intercept, especially when it involved the participation of governors. Often, governors were or had been involved in various *negocios* (deals, purchases, sales) in the provinces to which they were sent. In these cases, the involvement in smuggling

²³ AGN, Reales Cédulas t. 10, f. 22-25, Cédula expedited on the 17th of September 1740.

centered on what the province produced. For example, around a third of the province of Santa Marta was covered by *ciénagas* (swamp-like lands, rich in salt and a unique biodiversity). When governor Juan Eusebio Davalos finished his term and his *Juicio de Residencia* was carried out, it was revealed that the governor used to smuggle salt from the *ciénagas* of his province up to Mompox, one of the most important trading posts of Cartagena province, in the near vicinity. The process must have been relatively easy, not only due to the geographical proximity of the place of production and the place it was smuggled into (see map n°4), but also because this area constituted a more untamed (or at least less controlled) part of Santa Marta province (see chapter 6 for more on this).



Map 4: *Ciénagas in the Province of Santa Marta.*

Personal production with QGIS based on sources cited in the chapter.

The other reason was all the more pernicious: salt, like all underground resources, was a royalty to the Crown.²⁴ Indeed, while subjects of the King were encouraged to exploit minerals like gold and silver for which a license was required and an infrastructure (*reales de minas, reales cajas, contaduría, casas de la moneda*) was put in place.²⁵ The exploitation of salt, on the contrary, was the Crown's prerogative to exclusively extract with a few exceptions. Indeed, there had been salt marsh encomiendas in the province of Santa Marta which, in 1680, were defended as lawfully belonging to an *encomendera* upon proving the Crown had done nothing to entertain the *salinas* and exploit salt (see chapter 6). Indeed, the Juicio de Residencia taken to governor Dávalos reminded that no subject had a license to take salt, so the governor did it “under the pretext that it was on behalf of His Majesty.”²⁶ For these dealings in salt, the governor was afforded a fine of 500 pesos, which represented about half his yearly salary.

American products like pearls, salt, tobacco, aguardiente, and cacao were smuggled between provinces, often with the aid of officers themselves. But the most sensitive smuggled good was gold, whose circuit of production and transit spanned hundreds of kilometers and involved completing several levels of processing.

2) The question of gold, fraud, and the Cajas Reales

The abundance of gold in New Granada, which was exploited in many ways and in various forms and which, in the absence of currency (*moneda corriente*), acted as a sort of *moneda de cambio*, was undoubtedly the argument most used by Spanish officials to engage in fraudulent practices that undermined the finances of the Royal Hacienda. Indeed, the use of gold in the shape of pebbles for daily transactions was commonplace well-known and unalterable. In gold-producing regions where the metal was found in riverbeds and riverbanks, like the Chocó, the informality of settlements was the product of a rising presence of Spanish and criollo *entradas* (expeditions)

²⁴ Remedios Ferrero Micó, “La hacienda y los metales preciosos en el Nuevo Reino de Granada”, en *El sueño de El Dorado: estudios sobre la plata iberoamericana (siglos XVI-XIX)*, 2012, ISBN 978-84-9773-636-7, págs. 15-24 (El sueño de El Dorado: estudios sobre la plata iberoamericana (siglos XVI-XIX), Servicio de Publicaciones, 2012), 15–24, <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5250842>.

²⁵For an outline of mining legislation in the 16th century, see Miguel Ángel Martínez, “Legislación minera colonial en tiempos de Felipe II”, 1998.

²⁶ AGI, Escribanía, 1193, 2022.

resulting in improvised mining camps. During the first Viceroyalty of the New Granada, as explored in Chapter 1, superintendents were appointed in different parts of the Viceroyalty in a move to improve the execution of orders in different jurisdictions. This was the case in the Chocó, a province once under Popayán's jurisdiction but under the influence of neighboring Antioquia province. In 1724, the Council of Indies requested an "opinion on the convenience of separating the Province of Chocó from that of Popayán." Queries concerning the subject were addressed to fray Manuel Caicedo, a Franciscan Friar whose pivotal involvement in endeavors to establish missions within the region from as early as 1680, had earned him many friends and collaborators, both among miners and officials.²⁷ He reported that "in that country there is no trade in gold or silver coinage, nor in silver because there is only gold dust, and each one uses it to buy the supplies and other things he needs, giving a little portion of gold dust for what he buys, more or less according to the amount and estimation."²⁸ Caicedo further explained how this affected the price of smuggled gold:

"[With] powdered gold and without forming bars it is not necessary to pay the *quintos* and other taxes which are due, they are six and a half percent, for all the vassals because that powdered gold taken from Panama is taken to the deposits and other coasts of Cartagena and Portobelo where foreign ships continually trade and even some are determinedly waiting for the powdered gold from the mines of Chocó, with which they receive it all because those who bring it always flee from declaring it lest they should pay the rights; except for some very costly quantities that are melted down and made into currency in the Royal Mint of Santafé, to whose damage is added that the intrinsic value of each castellano of gold, being as it is of 22 of law, is regulated by 21 *reales* of silver, and those who take it out of those provinces only pay it at 16 well cleaned and blown, and for the same price the foreign merchants perceive it."²⁹

²⁷ For more on Caicedo, the following works are paramount: William Frederick Sharp, *Slavery on the Spanish Frontier: The Colombian Chocó, 1680-1810*, 1st ed (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976); Caroline Williams, *Between Resistance and Adaptation: Indigenous Peoples and the Colonisation of the Chocó, 1510-1753* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2005).

²⁸ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, N. 45 Franciscan Fray Manuel de Caycedo, letter 24/07/1724, "Dictamen pedido por el consejero de Indias Tomás de Sola sobre combeniencia de separar la provincia del chocó de la de Popayán."

²⁹ Idem. "porque con oro en polvo y sin formar varras no llega el caso de pagar los quintos y demás otros que deven, que son seis y medio por ciento, a todos los vasallos porque aquel oro en polvo sacado a panamá lo conducen a bastimientos y demás costas de Cartaxena y Portovello donde continuamente ay embarcaciones de estrangeros comerciando y aun algunos esperando determinadamente el oro en polvo de las minas del chocó con que todo lo perciven pues siempre los que lo traen huyen de manifestarlo por

Part of the difficulty of seizing the gold was the ease with which it was hidden away in barrels and trunks. This deprived the Royal Hacienda of the quinto (the tax on most produce and especially on metals, which oscillated between 1/5th and 1/20th of the production). One of the most common routes for the contraband of gold was from the mines located in the province of Antioquia, where *official* gold production recuperated after a downturn in 1680 as new sources were discovered.³⁰ This gold was then sent to Mompox by land, whence it was shipped to Cartagena on the Magdalena River; it was ultimately bound for Europe. In 1710, the governor of Antioquia, José López de Carvajal, notified that “[he had] received denunciations and reports that Antonio González de Lopera and Ygnacio de Herrera were leaving this city for the town of Mompox taking out gold powder *sin quintar*, and also molten gold, and with some signs of marks without the real stamp or payment of royal *quintos* of HM,” saying later that the *descamino* (seizure) had not been possible after a pursuit of the individuals had been attempted. The two men had fled Antioquia on mules through the wilderness and catching them had been impossible.³¹

Similar situations were reported in other provinces where gold was abundant in different forms, where Cajas Reales were established near mining centers to make taxation more immediate. Otherwise, gold had to be sent to the Royal Casa de la Moneda in Santafé, founded in 1620. Because metals had to pass through Cajas Reales—the royal deposits which made up the Crown’s financial infrastructure in the Indies—upon which salaries and *situados* were assigned, these functioned both as the Crown’s bank, but also as the main financial source for the Monarchy’s bureaucracy in the Indies. Governor and Viceroy salaries, for example, were always situated (assigned) in American Cajas Reales. Officials in the Cajas Reales of mining provinces were particularly prone to monetary fraud. The term *fraud* encompasses a reality alike to contraband, in that the term described fraudulent activity in the realm of taxation, but also contraband, as Lance Grahn has observed: “the term fraud referred to the

no pagar los derechos; excepto algunas cantidades muy costosas que se funden y hacen moneda en la real casa de stafé a cuyos perjuicios se añade el que e valor intrínseco de cada castellano de oro, siendo como es de 22 de ley , se regula por 21 reales de plata, y los que lo sacan de aquellas provincias solo lo pagan a 16 bien limpio y soplado, y por el mismo precio lo perciven los mercaderes extranjeros”.

³⁰ See estimations by Ann Twinam Ann Twinam, *Miners, merchants, and farmers in colonial Colombia*, Latin American monographs, no. 57 (Austin, Tex: University of Texas Press, 1982), tbl. 1.

³¹ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, f. 20.

movement between Spanish and Spanish American ports of products which, though part of legal trade, exceeded the amount allowed to be carried by a particular ship according to its license.”³² Fraud was thus both the activity of obtaining funds in a deceitful way, as well as smuggling merchandise of a licensed kind in a way that exceeded such license.

For example, a prolonged case of fraud in the Cajas Reales of Popayán and Antioquia provinces, took place between 1687 and 1704. The fraud committed consisted in the following operation: arguing that there was no *moneda* (currency) with which to pay their salaries,³³ six officers in both provinces, decided to convert their salaries to gold *doblones*. In fact, salaries were assigned in maravedis and ducats but paid in pesos.³⁴ Converting salaries into pesos was thus common practice. What wasn't as common, though, was using the conversion rate reserved for the Crown and Royal Hacienda transactions—which was more profitable—to convert their own salaries into gold *doblones* (which was forbidden), thus obtaining a higher value for their salaries. In fact, there were two conversion rates for gold *en pasta*. The first was “con el que se recibe,” that is, the one reserved for the king by virtue of the *quinto* (the tax on one fifth of the production of gold); and the second was reserved for the local coffers (salaries, expenses, trade) which was subject to a lower conversion tax.³⁵ Indeed, the conversion rate used by the Crown provided that one *peso de oro* of 22 and ½ carats was equivalent to 24 and ¾ maravedis per carat. The following operation gives the value of a *peso de oro* of 22 carats and ½ in maravedis: $22.5 \times 24.75 = 556.875$. Therefore, 1 *peso de oro* converted at the rate reserved for the king was worth 556 maravedis. In his report, the *oidor* recalls that the rates of *reducción* (conversion of gold) were stipulated in Book VIII of the *Recopilación de Leyes de Indias* (in “De la Administración de la Royal Hazienda”), stating that:

³² See Lance Grahn, *The Political Economy of Smuggling: Regional Informal Economies in Early Bourbon New Granada*, Dellplain Latin American Studies, Boulder, CO, and Oxford, Westview Press, 1997, p. 13, cited in Williams, *Between Resistance and Adaptation*, 181 footnote n. 10.

³³ AGI Santa Fe 293 “Voto en el Tribunal de Quenta de la Ciudad de Santa Fe en Justicia sobre la forma de las Libranças que executan los oficiales de Popayán, Antioquia y otros, del oro en pasta de las Caxas de su cargo pertenecientes a su Magestad”, by *oidor* Francisco Joseph Merlo de la Fuente Voto en el Tribunal de Quenta de la Ciudad de Santa Fe, 1705, § 32.

³⁴ Bernal Antonio M. (ed.), *Dinero, moneda y crédito en la Monarquía Hispánica*, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 1999, p. 248.

³⁵ AGI Santa Fe, 293, Voto en el Tribunal de Quenta de la Ciudad de Santa §17.

“It is disposed that in order to charge the Royal officials in their books of the gold that there is, and that they collect from *quintos*; and that belongs to His Majesty, they should calculate the account to the tune of 556 mrs. Each peso, or castellano of gold of 22 carats at the rate of 24 mrs. $\frac{3}{4}$ of another each carat; to make the payments, they should not make this account, **but that of the true and common value**; the consequence is legitimate and consequently, in whatsoever other form the royal officials have executed has been against the mint and clear disposition of his Majesty.”³⁶

The conversion rate *del común valor* used for transactions like paying salaries amounted to 1 peso = 589 maravedis. In 1663, the Royal Hacienda had decided to devalue the maravedis (at that time 1 peso = 544 maravedis) to obtain additional resources for the Royal Hacienda. To do this, 45 maravedis were added to each *peso de buen oro* (22 and 1/2 carats), so that the *peso de buen oro* was set at 589 maravedis. This inflation of the common currency favored the Royal Hacienda because it allowed for savings in administration –as the salaries of officers were fixed in maravedis and ducats but paid in pesos. For example, the annual salary for the period of a fiscal or oidor was 800,000 maravedis.³⁷ If 1 peso = 544 maravedis, the annual salary of an oidor paid in pesos was 1470.58 pesos. If 1 peso = 556 maravedis, the salary of an oidor paid in pesos would be of 1438.84 pesos.

Oidor of the Royal Audiencia José Merlo de la Fuente oversaw the prosecution of the case. Between 1705 and 1708, information was gathered and charges against the accused officials were brought, namely against José Gómez de Salazar, *contador* of the Antioquia’s Cajas Reales between 1687 and 1704. He was son of prominent Juan Gómez de Salazar, who had been governor of Antioquia between 1658 and 1664, and had been appointed *contador* by Diego de Córdoba, president of the Audiencia de Santafé and former governor of Antioquia. In 1704, a year before the unearthing of the affair, he gave up his office to Pedro Pérez de Guzmán. In 1705 the Audiencia ordered that his property and funds be seized and Gómez de Salazar remain confined to his house under penalty of two thousand pesos until the amount stolen was restituted to the

³⁶ “Está dispuesto que para hazerse el cargo los oficiales Reales en sus libros del oro que hubiese, y que cobraren de quintos; y que a su Magestad perteneciere, formen la cuenta por 556 mrs. Cada peso, ô castellano de oro de 22 quilates a razón de 24 mrs. $\frac{3}{4}$ de otro cada quilate; para hacer las pagas, no deven hacer esta cuenta, sino la del verdadero y común valor; la consecuencia es legitima y por el consiguiente, en quantas es otra forma hubieren executado los oficiales reales han sido contra la menta y clara disposición de su Magestad.”

³⁷ Ones, “The politics of government in the Audiencia of New Granada, 1681-1719”, 49.

Cajas Reales. The accountant fled only to later return to the province.³⁸ In 1724, two decades after the events, Lorenzo Fernández de Seijas, *contador* of the *tribunal de cuentas* reopened the case and condemned José Gómez de Salazar's debt and "robbery." His claims materialized in a Royal Cédula expedited to New Granada ordering the matter be resolved³⁹.

Among other things, this case illustrates the ease with which opportunities for personal enrichment originated in mining fronts like the provinces of Antioquia and Popayán. The coopting of funds from the Reales Cajas was a result of the wealthier and politically influential families' control over financial resources. Similarly, Francisco Eissa Barroso reports that "in 1718, the coffers at the royal treasury of Santa Fe held a grand total of nineteen *reales* in cash and a long list of loans and debts owed by treasury officials, private businessmen and merchants; local elites had come to exercise such control over royal finances in the region that treasury funds were frequently used as a source of credit for financing private enterprises."⁴⁰ But this case also speaks of the lack of liability which instances of enrichment entailed, or, in other terms, of the inefficiency of "control mechanisms" in the face of corruption.⁴¹ Comparable to contraband, personal enrichment was expected from officers whose late-coming salaries and considerable expenses were deemed disproportional and asynchronous.⁴²

Likewise, in 1729, Enrique José de Montefrío, former *Contador* of Mariquita, complained to the Royal Audiencia that his Majesty's *quintos* were not being paid to the Royal Hacienda.⁴³ According to Montefrío, the gold bound for Cartagena through Mariquita, Honda, and Mompo (see map) was not being molten into bars (*lingotes*) smuggled in its primary form of *oro en polvo*. This was due, he continued, to the fact

³⁸ The years 1698-1708 were particularly unstable in the province of Antioquia, during the tenure of Governor Francisco Fernández de Heredia. For more on this, see chapter 4.

³⁹ AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. 8, f. 234.

⁴⁰ Eissa-Barroso, *The Spanish Monarchy and the Creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1717-1739)*, 58.

⁴¹ On control mechanisms in the Spanish monarchy, see Francisco Andújar Castillo, Antonio Feros, y Pilar Ponce Leiva, "Corrupción y mecanismos de control en la Monarquía Hispánica: una revisión crítica", *Revista electrónica de Historia Moderna* 8, núm. 35 (el 31 de diciembre de 2017): 284-311; Heredia López, *El control de la corrupción en la monarquía hispánica*.

⁴² Ochoa, "Los altos precios de la vida en los puertos del Caribe, los cortos salarios de los oficiales y la justificación velada de los fraudes a la Corona en las primeras décadas del siglo".

⁴³ AGN, Reales Cédulas, t.7, f. 288-290.

that *alcaldes ordinarios*⁴⁴ were elected for a year, and thus “confuse the accounts and dissimulate income” and were “colligated ones with the others and [remade] the elections with colligated vecinos (...) because of their” *compadrazgo*.⁴⁵ In order to remedy the situation, the petitioner suggested the office of Corregidor be suppressed in Mariquita, and that royal officials be installed permanently. This proposal speaks to Montefrío’s opinion on the corregidores in contraband, namely that the corregidor (the highest office in government in Mariquita⁴⁶) shared too many interests with the *alcaldes ordinarios*, subjugating government and the administration of justice to the interests of a socio-economic elite. His suggestion to install royal officers in Mariquita (as opposed to members of the *cabildo* and *regimiento*, or, in other words, local vecinos) echoes the idea that royal officials from abroad were more likely to protect the interests of the Monarchy.

Of Montefrío we know that he was an officer whose career spanned at least twenty years. He was born in the New Granada to parents from Montefrío, Andalusia, and is attested to as occupying the post of *alcalde* in Mariquita in 1714. During his time there, he closely watched over the silver mines of the province and actively participated in keeping a zealous eye over the transportation of *azogues* during a clash over jurisdiction between the President of the Audiencia and the Bishop of Mariquita.⁴⁷ He then went on to become accountant in the 1730s at the Cajas Reales of Mompox. It seems safe to assume that he was well accounted in the world of mining in New Granada and, given his mobility across the territory, he presumably knew the Kingdom well. In 1729 his petition was accepted by the Crown, who called for investigating the state of mining in Mariquita. This was, ostensibly, the origin an investigation carried out by Antonio Manso, president of the Audiencia from 1724 to 1731 into the Mines of Mariquita. Manso’s investigation not only revealed instances of fraud on behalf of

⁴⁴ Official within the Administration of Justice who exercised jurisdiction in a town and was the predetermined judge of all civil and criminal cases.

⁴⁵ Literally denoting the relationship of a godfather to his godson, the notion of “compadrazgo” commonly referred to a close friendship. The *Diccionario de Autoridades* (1726-1739) offers the following acceptance: “COMPADRE. Llama tambien assí en Andalucía y otras partes la gente vulgar a sus amigos: y suele ser modo de saludarse, quando se encuentran en los caminos y las posadas unos con otros.”

⁴⁶ Not to be confused with *corregidores de indios*.

⁴⁷ Luis Navarro García, “Azogue y mitayos en las minas de Nueva Granada, 1714”, *Temas Americanistas*, núm. 5 (1985), <https://doi.org/10.12795/Temas-Americanistas.1985.i05.02>.

officials, but also mistreatment of the native workforce in the mines, causing Indian populations to massively flee, as will be discussed in chapter 6.

In essence, the exploitation of metals was one of the most important sources of contraband, both at the source of exploitation and during its routing. This poses the problem of evaluating the magnitude in which gold was illicitly exploited and commercialized. Even though we have official data for gold production, which can only represent a fraction of the gold extracted, it is safe to say that much of the gold in circulation was not minted into coin, remained untaxed, and was commercialized through channels outside the Royal Hacienda's sight. This was made possible by the participation of all sorts of actors in the chain of production and commercialization of metals, from the complicity of officials to the participation of natives in aiding foreign smugglers.

We have established several points thus far: What contraband was, how it operated, and who was involved. Also, we have discussed the particularities of the New Granada in relation to gold production and how it was articulated with contraband and fraud. We have also established the extent to which contraband was omnipresent and participated in by a variety of actors. For some, contraband was necessary to upkeep their living standards and honor; for others it was an opportunity to advance their personal situation. For the Royal Audiencia, it was a leak in its coffers and needed to be handled. These elements help us to partially answer the question whether smuggling was a friend or foe. The answer is, evidently, both; it depends on who you ask. This answer alone is underwhelming, but posing this question has allowed us to assert different points that complicate the somewhat blunt perception of reality which royal officials offered.

First, as the historiography on smuggling has shown, the participation of the officers of the monarchy in smuggling was endemic, ranged across ranks, and the basis for excusing the excesses of officials –as they used their magistratures for personal benefit– had been laid since the 17th century. It was also widespread among the population of the northern frontiers (as well as in Lima, the Río de la Plata, Santo Domingo, Chiapas), particularly those in areas of mercantile transit or mining production. Incentives to curb contraband were thus low, and initiatives to do so were more rhetorical than factual.

In the next part, though, we will focus on a case in the provinces of Cartagena and Santa Marta, where the vecinos of province whose merchants benefitted from contraband, while at the same time also suffering more intensely at the hands of it. A solution to remedy the damage caused, both to vecinos and to the Royal Hacienda, emerged in this context. More precisely, in 1737, a privateering company was created in Cartagena, with the purpose of intercepting and capturing the ships of foreign smugglers. The foundation and failure of this company have been partially studied. Lance Grahn dedicated an article to it in 1997. But it yet remains to explain the relationship between the motives underlying the creation of the company in the context of the late 1730s and the increasing role of privateering in the Neogranadian Caribbean.

II- A solution to defend the coast: a venture in privateering

1) Contraband on a Caribbean scale

In order to introduce the case, it might be useful for the reader to be able to imagine how privateering functioned. What did the activity of a privateer entail? How did the interceptions of smuggled goods play out? To address this question, we will briefly consider the case of a privateer in 1730s Cuba. His itinerary is illustrative of a season at sea at a time of heightened tensions with the United Kingdom.

In the 1730s, the island of Cuba, like many parts of the Spanish Caribbean, had seen the formation of *compañías de armadores de Corso*, privateering companies that acted like a sea force, chasing, detaining, and inspecting ships of all nationalities. The main goal of these inspections was to find merchandise being carried without a license. In 1737, the captain of one such company, Antonio de Mendieta, sent a report to the Governor of Cuba with his itinerary, as was his duty, for privateering captains were under the authority of Governors. Privateering Captains often enjoyed close relationships with governors who were expected to grant letters of marque.⁴⁸ His report has been preserved in the Archivo General de Indias, and it offers an itinerary of his

⁴⁸ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, The report's first lines established the normative frame for this relationship in its first lines: "Report made by Don Manuel Martinez Carvajal (fiscal of the Council of the Indies) on what has resulted from the records sent by the government of Havana, regarding what has been done with the seizures made by Captain Don Antonio de Mendieta in those seas and coasts; It is based on what is prescribed in the royal decrees of May 30, 1721, in which what must be observed in Havana concerning the distribution of seizures is ordered; and in that of June 6, 1728, whereby power is given to the Governors of the Indies to openly grant licenses for privateering under the necessary bonds."

endeavors at sea.⁴⁹ The report focuses on the time from March 6th to August 6th, a five-month period which extends from March, a time of relative calm in the waters, to August, when the hurricane season began. The narration of his company's comings and goings between the many different ports of the Caribbean, as well as his successes and failures, is offered summarily in the following points. Some excerpts are transcribed, and others paraphrased to facilitate comprehension. Locations and types of ships are in bold, and merchandise is underlined:

1) On April 2nd:

*"I caught an **English pink** that had left **St. Kitts for London**, loaded with sugar, fourteen tons of Campeche wood,⁵⁰ known to be **from the river of the Hacha** (in New Granada's Guajira Peninsula), where they go to make this trade, both English and Dutch (...) I determined to dispatch it to this port that April to avoid carrying this burden"⁵¹.*

2) Later in April

*"(...) whither I followed my route for the **island of Tobacco**, which not having been able to reach because of the currents, I crossed to the coast of the mainland. I landed on the 26th windward of **Cumaná** on whose coast I made my awaited: Until the 5th of May, when I sailed along the whole coast to **Margarita**, from where I crossed to **Caracas**, and not having found any vessel nor any news of having found any traffickers, I made my way in search of the island of **Puerto Rico**, on whose coast I landed on the southern side, where **I caught a sloop from Curaçao** that was coming to make its dealings to the said coast with some goods, and having learned that said sloop was of better sail than the one I had taken out of the port of Havana, I took her so that together with the other I could have a cruise in **the Mona and the Sabona**, which is the place where the Dutch who leave Curaçao and go to the north traffic.".* This passage leaves

⁴⁹ AGI, Santo Domingo, 2167, "Informe hecho por Don Manuel Martínez Carvajal, fiscal del Consejo de indias) sobre lo que resulta de los autos remitidos por el gov de la Habana".

⁵⁰ "Palo de Campeche," also known as "Logwood" in English, refers to a type of tree native to Central America, particularly the Yucatan Peninsula, Belize, and parts of Mexico. The scientific name for this tree is "Haematoxylum campechianum." It is renowned for its dense, heavy wood that yields a valuable red dye known as "campeche wood" or "logwood dye." This dye was in great demand in Europe during the 16th to 18th centuries and was used for dyeing fabrics, especially in the production of high-quality, vibrant red textiles.

⁵¹ 2^o de abril un pingue inglés que había salidos de la isla San Cristóbal (Saint Kitts) para Londres: cargado de azúcar, catorce toneladas de palo de Gravalete/Campeche, y conociendo ser dicho palo del rio de lacha, donde van a hacer este comercio, así ingeleses como olandeses."

the justification for capturing the ship with the better sails unclear. The only thing the captain states is it carried some goods, but no details are given.

2) On May 9th, he came across a **Dutch frigate** that had come **from Amsterdam to the island of Eustatius y Saba**, two Dutch islands that form the arc of volcanic Minor Antilles in the Caribbean. The frigate's mission was to transport two governors: one Eustatius y Saba and the other for Saint Martin. Because the frigate was "*incontinent,*" the captain bade them go on board his ship "*giving them my table, bed, and giving them the advice that by their rank (though not by their person) they deserved, (...) I determined to bring her to this port of **Havana.***"⁵² It turns out the two governor's ship was carrying licensed products which were returned to their owners upon inspection, while some other hidden –presumably unlicensed– merchandise, was sent to be inspected. The captain explained how he had done right by the governors "*having returned to them all the clothes (ropas) and other articles of merchandise that they were carrying without missing anything of what they had in their chests, although it seems that they complained to the president of Santo Domingo, informing him that I had given them bad treatment. I attribute this to the fact that they wanted **what they had under the hatches** to be delivered to them, which I had not done because I could not do such a thing: rather, I passed on board the said frigate with the notary and other officers and had the hatches nailed, caulked, and sealed, and charged the officer, in whose charge the mentioned frigate was placed.*"⁵³

3) On May 14th:

*"The following day I set sail for the inlet of **Manzanillo**, where, while I was between **Cape Tiburon and Punta de Maysi (Cuba)**, I caught an **English brigantine that had left Jamaica and was on its way to London.** Having found a bar of gold (gold*

⁵² "hallo en ella dado fondo una fragata olandesa que venía de Abstardam (Amsterdam) para la isla de Eustaquio y Saba, la que traía dos gobernadores, el uno para las dos expresadas isla, y el otro para la de San Martín, y habiendo yo recalado el día 13 encontré dicha balandra con la citada fragata incontinente, hice pasar a mi bordo los expresados gobernadores, dándoles mi mesa, cama, y haciéndoles el consejo que por su grado (aunque no por su persona) merecían, y reconociendo que dicha fragata pudiera haber ido a la isla de Curazado a repararse de víveres y agua, y no haver fondeado en dicha isla de la Mona, conociendo ser sospechosas estas satisfacciones, determiné el traerla a este puerto de la Habana"

⁵³ "habiéndoles restituido toda la ropa y demás trastes que conducían sin haberles faltado cosa alguna de lo que ellos tenían en sus cofres, aunque parece dieron por quejoso al presidente de Santo Domingo, informándole de que les había dado mal trato. Esto lo atribuyo a que querían q se les hubiera entregado lo que traían bajo de escotillo, lo que no había ejecutado por no poder hacer tal cosa: antes pasé con el escribano y demás oficiales al bordo de dicha fragata e hice clavar las escotillas, galafatearlas y y sellarlas, y hacer cargo al oficial, a cuyo cargo se puso la dicha fragata."

*bar) and some double silver (doubloons?), a stick of granadillo⁵⁴ and some cacao, I determined to capture her as prey.*⁵⁵ This is interesting for it hints at the possibility that the captain might not have captured the ship as prey if he had deemed the quantities of unlicensed goods too meagre, which gives us an idea of the on-the-spot decision making. In other words, Captains must decide whether the procedure initiated after capturing ships as “presas” (prey) was worth the wait, bureaucracy, and effort, in terms of time and money. For the privateers’ share –after the seized goods were taxed (a portion, like the *quinto*), went to the Royal Hacienda⁵⁶– was proportional to the confiscated quantities, as we will see.

3) In June:

“having news in the Bay of Ocoa (today’s Dominican Republic) was a Dutch ship of thirty cannons dealing [presumably, without a license] (tratando): I did not lose time in their request and having landed in that port, they gave me the news of two days that had been made to sail, and that said he passed to the inlet of Manzanillo, I prepared myself as soon as I could with water and supplies because I lacked them.”. This ship he failed to outsail, which had negative consequences for the Spanish, as the Dutch proceeded to rob and sink a Spanish sloop: *“I also found the news of a Spanish sloop (balandra) that had left Maracaibo loaded with cocoa for Caracas and by contingency of the times had landed in the Bay of Ocoa (in Hispaniola) where this sloop had found the Dutch dealing and not wanting to sell their cargo of cocoa, they did the infamy of killing them: they sank the sloop taking advantage of their cargo”⁵⁷.*

⁵⁴ Granadillo, or *Caesalpinia granadillo*, first classified by botanist and engineer Henri Pittier in 1923, is a tree native to modern-day Venezuela. Its wood is very resistant and was therefore sought for building machines, like early modern trapiches (mills) for pressing sugar cane to extract sugar juice, then cooked into brown sugar. On the use of manzanillo wood for trapiches in Venezuela, see Luis E Molina, “Las cosas del trapiche: máquinas, utensilios, aparatos y herramientas de haciendas azucareras de la provincia de Caracas (siglo XVIII)” 41 (2018).

⁵⁵ “Al día siguiente di a la vela haciendo mi derrota para la ensenada del manzanillo, en la que estando entre cabo de Taburón y punta de Maysi (Cuba), apresé un bergantín inglés que había salido de Jamaica y hacía su viaje para Londres. Habiéndole encontrado un tejo de oro (barra de oro) y alguna plata doble (doblones), palo de granadillo y algún cacao, determiné el darle por presa”

⁵⁶ Óscar Cruz Barney, *El corso marítimo*, <https://biblio.juridicas.unam.mx/bjv/id/3373> (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, 2016), cap. 3, <http://ru.juridicas.unam.mx:80/xmlui/handle/123456789/12275>.

⁵⁷ (...) teniendo noticia en la Baía de Ocoa (Rep Dominicana) se hallaba un navío olandés de treinta Cañanos tratando: no perdí hora de tiempo en su solicitud y habiendo recalado en dicho puerto, me dieron la noticia de haber dos días que se había hecho a la vela, y que decía pasaba a la ensenada del Manzanillo, me habilité lo más breve que pude con agua y víveres por carecer de ellos. También encontré la noticia de haber una balandra española que había salido de Maracaibo cargada de Cacao para Caracas y por

3) Then, on August 6th:

*“The governor sent me away again with the order to remain on these coasts until September 2, when I captured **a frigate (fragata)** and **a pink (pingue)** loaded with sugar and Campeche ink stick, which I sent to the port, and I stayed following the order, at which time I captured two other English vessels, which I searched, and not having found prohibited goods, I let them go on their way.”⁵⁸*

In the span of a little under five months, the captain managed to apprehend six ships successfully, but, crucially, failed before the mightier Dutch ship. These excerpts highlight several things: the difficulty in apprehending well-organized ships in a strong formation, like the case of Dutch ships; the abundance of myriad products from different parts of the Americas, and the underwhelming nature of some of the quantities at stake.

This example of a season at sea, spent scouting the coasts of the insular west Caribbean, is as realistic a picture as is needed to understand the underwhelming fate and failure of Cartagena’s privateering company. Indeed, while Dutch, French and, especially, English privateering had long been a central practice in the exercise of maritime dominion, Spanish-American privateering was only starting to bloom. This part will develop the argument that, overall, initial Spanish-American privateering yielded underwhelming results because of its inefficiency in light of the considerable superiority of its many targets: smuggler, pirate, and privateers. Furthermore, Neogranadian privateering, as will be discussed, was seldom successful at effecting anything other than a palliative remedy to a rotted issue. A great deal of this was due to the topographic scene in which privateering unfolded.

In the following pages, a brief explanation of the Spanish Monarchy’s hesitant experience with privateering will be introduced, followed by an exposition of the case,

contingencia de los tiempos había recalado en dicha Bahía de Ocoa (en La Española) en donde había encontrado esta balandra a la holandesa haciendo trato y no habiendo querido venderle su carga de Cacao, hicieron la infamia de matarles: echaron a pique (hundieron) dicha balandra aprovechando su carga.”

⁵⁸ El 6 de agosto me volvió a mandar fuera el gobernador con la orden de mantenerme en estas costas hasta el 2 de septiembre en cuya salida apresé una fragate y un pingue cargados de azúcar y de palo de tinta Campeche que remití al puerto, y me quedé siguiendo la orden, en cuyo tiempo apresé otras dos embarcaciones inglesas, las que registré, y no habiendo encontrado géneros de los prohibidos, las dejé ir en su derrota.

after which some relaxations will be offered as to the articulation between contraband and privateering.

2) Of pirates and privateers and the Spanish Monarchy

Reforms to the armada, such as the reinforcement of the Armada de Barlovento or the later military reform of the 1740s, as well as localized initiatives to improve Cartagena's defenses in the 1720s (see chapter 3) were both attempted. Interestingly, another type of defense existed since the beginning of global navigation: privateers, or, in Spanish, *corsarios*. Historiography on pirates, privateers, buccaneers, corsairs and "villans of all nations," to echo Markus Redikker's use of the expression, has expanded in the past decades, and we are learning more and more about the individuals that terrorized early-modern sea-farers and coast-dwellers. Fascination with privateers, their experiences, and their place within the Empires which they served probably has something to do with their ambivalent status: their actions were legitimized by the powers they served, and in such a sense they could exert legitimate violence like that of oceanic Armadas, but in terms of their social composition crews of *armadores de Corso* amassed people of all sorts, from military officers to former pirates and merchants.

It was a rather striking experience to delve into the question of privateering and to discover the notable increase of privateering companies active in the Caribbean in the second half of the 18th century. A simple search for the keywords "patente de Corso" (letter of marque) on the Spanish Archival Portal (P.A.R.E.S.) indicates an exponential increase of such documents from 1680 to 1740, and increasingly from 1740 to 1810. This is not an *effet d'archive*. Rather, it mirrors quite precisely the provision of such documents which, in turn, translates the evolution of privateering within the Spanish Monarchy. Why were corsairs so scarce before 1680? Why was the defense of the Empire, contrary to what English monarchs had sponsored, left to the Armada alone? What happened during the early 18th century that led to an increase in *patentes de Corso* being delivered? These questions beg a thorough answer which this dissertation could not grant. Furthermore, there is a compendium of works on the legislative corpus through which privateering was fomented starting in the late 17th century. Also, some studies have shown the genealogy of certain types of localized privateering, particularly

in New Spain or in Peru's south sea. There are few specific works for the case of the New Granada in the late 17th and early 18th centuries, and we thus know little about the origin, presence, and fate of *compañías de armadores* attested in archival documentation.

While the purpose of this dissertation is more concerned with the northern frontiers located inland from the coast, in other words the coastal hinterland, it seems appropriate to discuss the subject of privateering insofar as it is inseparable from the larger question of coastal defense. Indeed, the matter of defense in the New Granada was closely connected to the issue of contraband. Merchandise was transported from the southern parts of the hinterland, through rivers and marshes, only to be smuggled through major river deltas where both sea and river-faring ships (like small sloops) could navigate from one liquid frontier to the other. Thus, the ocean should not be viewed as a border that closed off the continent, or from which the continent would have been closed off, but as a frontier traversed by river deltas with possibilities of exchange between solid and fluid ground. Thus, the issue of privateering is intimately linked to the points of entry to the continent and its hinterland. Its main objective was to capture merchants engaged in illegal trade, fugitives from justice, and foreign actors who often engaged in all kinds of trade with native groups.

The first consideration in understanding the increased prevalence of privateering companies in the Caribbean as a component of the Monarchy's defense strategy, and therefore a unique evolutionary element during the relevant time period, must be an exploration of who, why, and how individuals crossed the oceans, and how privateers functioned among the variety of actors. First, it must be noted that the pursuit of sea-dominance served as a point of contention between European empires starting from the late fifteenth century, as Iberian monarchs endeavored to divide the oceans and assert their sovereignty over them through the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494). In the late sixteenth century, various notions regarding the ownership of the ocean were in conflict.

On one hand, there was the idea that the oceans were a common good that could not be appropriated, which guaranteed the right of free circulation, in the sense developed by Francisco de Vitoria. Conversely, the concept that the oceans were under the sovereignty of the policies that defended them was proclaimed by jurists such as

Solórzano Pereyra and Camilo Borell, in the concept of *mare clausum*. Subsequently, Hugo Grotius developed his Mare Liberum theory (*Mare Liberum sive de Jure Quod Batavis Competit ad Indicana Comercia Disertatio*),⁵⁹ which was invoked by the Dutch in their occupation of the Indian Ocean. The 17th century saw the British, French, and Dutch engaging in a race to control trading routes and coasts, sparking a debate over the extent of ocean possession. Trading posts were rapidly established: Java (1620), Virginia (1620), Barbados (1625), Guadeloupe (1639). Initially, the competition between European powers allowed pirates, buccaneers, and filibusters to work in the service of these powers. This opened the door for individuals and groups to participate in oceanic power struggles. At the end of the 17th century, Spanish and English legislation had been established to define their rights more clearly on the ocean. Privateers, unlike pirates, freebooters, and buccaneers, complied with these laws, at least in theory. European pirates and corsairs have been viewed as, if not the cradle (Lucena), at least a common ancestor of early modern corsairs and military seamen; their activity reflected the custom whereby subjects of any belligerent polity could legitimately act against those of rival polities in the Middle Ages.⁶⁰

In the early modern period, both England and the Holy Roman Empire, under Frederick III, established that letters of marque authorizing privateering were granted as protection against *laesa maiestas crimes*, which threatened the public order of the sovereign. As a result, these letters were applicable to foreigners in the respective kingdoms. This was expounded by Jean Bodin in *The Six Books of the Republic* when he outlined the legitimacy of exercising the right of marque against foreigners:

“But there is one difference which is and hath alwaies bene common to al people, that is to wit, **the right of marque against strangers**, which hath no place against the subiects: for which cause the emperour Frederick the second, sent backe vnto the states of the empire, those which demaunded the right of reprisall against the subiects of the [C]empire. And in briefe the straunger might be driuen out of the countrey, not onely in time of warre (for then we dismisse the ambassadours themselues) but also in time of peace; **least the naturall subiects manners should by the euill companie**

⁵⁹ Manuel Lucena Salmoral, *Piratas, corsarios, bucaneros y filibusteros* (Síntesis, 2005), 18–19, <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/libro?codigo=259726>.

⁶⁰ For a chronology of Iberian privateering and how armadas were born from it, see Manuel Lucena Salmoral, *Piratas, corsarios, bucaneros y filibusteros* (Síntesis, 2005), <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/libro?codigo=259726> p. 21. And Lucena citing Konezke p. 22.

of straungers be corrupted: for which onely cause Lycurgus seemeth to haue forbidden the Lacedemonians [Sidenote 216 - *] his subiects without leaue to depart out of his kingdome, or to haue the vse of gold or siluer; as the East Indians of China forbid their subiects vpon paine of death from receiuing of straungers: so to meet with the enterprises that the straunger might make against another mans estate.⁶¹

Bodin discussed the nature of the right of marque and reprisal, how it originated in the sovereignty of the Republic, at the heart of the monarch's majesty. Because the latter emanated from God, the Monarch was its *depository*, and therefore *distributed* it to governors and magistrates as well as to Parliament.⁶² Bodin deplored that this had led to an abuse of the right to reprisal:

“howbeit that the princes by little and little **gaue this power vnto magistrats and gouernours**; and in the end reserued this right **vnto their owne soueraigntie**, for the better assurances of their peaces and truces, which were oftentimes broken by the rashnesse of some particular men, **abusing this right of Marque or Reprisal**. In this realme **the parliament graunted letters of Marque**, as we find by the decree of the xij of Februarie 1392, vntill that Charles the eight by an especiall edict, reserued that power vnto himselfe, in the yeare 1485.”⁶³ (...) “As for **the title of Maiestie it selfe**, it sufficiently appeareth, that **it onely belongeth to him that is a soueraigne prince**: so that for him that hath no soueraigntie to vsurpe the same, were a verie absurd thing: but to arrogat vnto himselfe the addition of most excellent and sacred maiestie, is much more absurd **the one being a point of lightnes, and the other of impietie**: for what more can we giue vnto the most mightie and immortal God, **if we take from him that which is proper vnto himselfe?**”⁶⁴

Spanish privateering started to be regulated in the 14th century by Pedro of Aragon, and a century later the means by which privateering brought money to the Crown were codified: a *fianza* (bail) could be paid to avoid being boarded by a ship of

⁶¹ Jean Bodin, *The Six Bookes of a Common-weale. Written by I. Bodin a famous Lawyer, and a man of great Experience in matters of State. Out of the French and Latine copies, done into English, by Richard Knolles* (London: G. Bishop, 1606). <http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A16275.0001.001>. p. 67.

⁶² Bodin explains the trickling-down of depositing sovereignty: “C'est pourquoi la loy dit, que le gouverneur de pays, ou lieutenant du prince, apres son temps expiré, rend la puissance **comme depositaire, & garde de la puissance d'autrui**” See more in “Le fondement principal de toute République” Jean (1530-1596) Auteur du texte Bodin, *Les six livres de la Republique de Jean Bodin angevin...*, 1629, p. 124, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6546272j>.

⁶³ Idem p. 180.

⁶⁴ Idem. p. 182.

corsairs. In the time preceding the Catholic Monarchs, especially in the north of Spain (in Gipuzcoa, for instance⁶⁵) and in the southern Mediterranean on African coasts, privateering was encouraged. The discovery of the Indies changed Isabel and Fernando's attitude towards privateering, and it was thenceforward prohibited and equated to piracy, considered a vicious activity. This lasted only until Charles V reestablished privateering and even encouraged it by offering *armadores* the *quinto* or 20% of the proceedings. The proportion of foreign privateers, pirates, and hostile seamen (and even seawomen, like Anne Bonny and Mary Read⁶⁶) of all sorts was much greater than that of Spanish privateers, which brew a hostility against the troops of mostly Protestant foreign corsairs who pillaged ports and coastal towns.⁶⁷

In 1621, Felipe IV expedited a Royal Ordonnance, "to navigate *in corso*, both against Turks, Moors, and Moriscos, as well as against the Rebels of the islands of Holland and Zeeland," followed by two more in 1623 and 1624.⁶⁸ These were dispatched with the aim to differentiate all corsairs from pirates by describing how must go about becoming a *corsario*. They also detailed the proceedings of privateering: how to proceed towards suspicious vessels, the way to handle prisoners, and how confiscated merchandise was to be divided.⁶⁹ In 1652 the Crown separated Indian and metropolitan privateering by granting letters of marque only to Mediterranean privateering, forbidding privateers from approaching the coasts of Brazil or Spanish America. Later, the English conquest of Jamaica, in 1655, substituted Tortuga as a new base for smugglers and privateers. Consequently, the years 1670 saw an increase in attacks by foreign pirates and privateers in the Caribbean (Henry Morgan's attack on Portobello in 1671 comes to mind). In reaction to this, the Spanish Crown expedited in 1674 the first *Ordenanza de Corso* (royal ordinances through which the Crown dictated its

⁶⁵ Ramón Aizpurua Aguirre, "El corso de la Compañía Guipuzcoana: los casos de la lancha San Fernando y de la balandra Nuestra Señora de Aránzazu", *Itsas memoria: revista de estudios marítimos del País Vasco*, núm. 5 (2006): 379–92.

⁶⁶ Marcus Rediker, "When Women Pirates Sailed the Seas", *The Wilson Quarterly* 17, núm. 4 (el 22 de septiembre de 1993): 102–11.

⁶⁷ Lucena Salmoral, *Piratas, corsarios, bucaneros y filibusteros*, 24.

⁶⁸ Óscar Cruz Barney, "Comentarios a la ordenanza de corso para Indias de veintidós de febrero de 1674", *Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de México*, núm. 199–200 (1995): 179–201.

⁶⁹ Julio César Rodríguez Treviño, "La organización jurídica, económica y social del corso español en la isla de Santo Domingo: su uso en el siglo XVIII para perseguir el comercio ilícito", s/f, 34.

policy concerning Privateering)⁷⁰ exclusively directed to the Indies, and the first to refer to American *corso* since Felipe IV's *Ordenanza* of 1621.

At the end of the 17th century, a considerable number of orders were produced, directing foreign captains who engaged in privateering to be tried and hanged in America, rather than sending them Spain, which was a laborious and costly matter. This made it very dangerous for English pirates, for instance, to roam American waters under Spanish control, as they risked being hanged in situ. As Manuel Lucena explains, the moment Britain became a colonial power in the 18th century, protecting pirates and privateers was no longer a priority, in the face of the British Royal Navy. Thus, privateering in the 18th century, for the Spanish, would become less a matter of countering pirate attacks, but rather one of curbing contraband.

The transition from coastal defense against pirates to coastal defense against smuggling was not instantaneous. It spanned approximately forty years, marked by wars that reset the balance of power in the Caribbean. Commercial privileges were granted to the ally-of-the-moment, and tolerance for the ally nation's commercial activities changed accordingly. For example, French trade prompted criticism prior to Philipp V's accession to the throne, and during his years under the close tutelage of his grandfather, Louis XIV, French ships carried correspondence to and from the Indies, as well as goods. At the same time, the British, with Scots and English newly united under the Act of 1707, enjoyed a monopoly on the slave trade through their access to the *Asiento*, granted by the Treaty of Utrecht, and were thus able to bring enslaved men, women, and children to New Granada through the port of Cartagena. Wars in the Caribbean, or the prelude to wars, as skirmishes and violent encounters increased, led to a concentration of often weary and seldom sufficient coastal guard troops in the effort to calm the turmoil. Contraband, therefore, was not just a symptom of the increased domination of seas and continents by European powers, but also a result of the competition between these powers; in short, it was a byproduct of war.

As contraband increased in the years of the War of Succession, privateering increased as a response in the Caribbean, and the legal basis for it were ready to be exploited. While English and French privateering had been mostly aggressive, Spanish

⁷⁰ Cruz Barney, Óscar. (2020): «El corso marítimo: un instrumento de represalias y combate al comercio ilícito en. Indias», *Cliocanarias* n.º. 2, pp. 157-189

privateering aspired to be defensive, as its main goal in was to take that which was the Crown's property, and thus take part in a "just war" against those who harassed the "Real Haber."⁷¹ In 1714, at the end of the War of Succession the Crown expedited an Ordenanza de Corso stating that letters of marque could be handed out by Viceroy and Presidents of the Audiencia and Captains General.⁷² This was the first *Ordenanza de Corso* of its kind in two ways: it was in terms of the delegation of authority to American authorities it enforced. As a result, the deliverance of letters of marque increased dramatically, especially in Santo Domingo and Cuba.

In the 1720s and 1730s, Spanish Monarchy saw a flourishing of privateering activities in the South Sea which aimed at keeping foreign smugglers away. For, indeed, whatever the serious need for contrabanded goods and the structural role that smuggling played in the Americas, official orders from Madrid -and local initiative- were to put a stop to it. One such company was the *Compañía de armadores de los navíos de corso de la Mar del Sur* in Peru, which left us a copy of its governing chart as it litigated with the public prosecutor, regarding "compliance with the conditions and qualities of the armament and distribution of the value" of the Dutch vessel, 'San Luis', captured in the coasts of Pisco, one of its captures. The Company and armament consisted of a ship of war named Nuestra Señora del Carmen; it must pursue and seize any foreign ships that may have been introduced into this South Sea and contain and restrain the pernicious results of the prohibited trade of the French, on March 4, 1725, and more generally, to promote trade and prevent the "introduction of foreigners and their troops."⁷³

In general, bibliography is still meagre in respect to producing a comprehensive study of privateering companies in the early 18th century Caribbean. Indeed, there are studies on such companies and activities, but only in a succinct manner.⁷⁴ What is

⁷¹ Rodríguez Treviño Julio César, "La organización jurídica, económica y social del corso español en la isla de Santo Domingo: su uso en el siglo XVIII para perseguir el comercio ilícito",

⁷² José Luis de Azcárraga y de Bustamante, *El corso marítimo, concepto, justificación e historia* (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto "Francisco de Vitoria," 1950), 28.

⁷³ ESCRIBANIA, 521B Pleitos Audiencia de Lima, 1729 La Compañía de armadores de los navíos de corso de la Mar del Sur con el fiscal, sobre cumplimiento de las condiciones y calidades del armamento y reparto del valor del navío holandés, 'San Luis', apresado en las costas de Pisco. Fenecido en 1732. 4 piezas

⁷⁴ Some examples: Victoria Stapells Johnson y Antonio Rivero Taravillo, *Los corsarios de Santo Domingo, 1718-1779: un estudio socio-económico* (Lleida: Universitat de Lleida, 1992); Casey S. Schmitt, "Virtue in Corruption: Privateers, Smugglers, and the Shape of Empire in the Eighteenth-

certain, however, is that privateering in the Neogranadian Caribbean saw a peak after the War of Jenkins' Ear, while privateering companies in Santo Domingo and Peru had been used in prior decades. One such company is registered as the *Compañía de armadores* led by Julian Almirante in the 1720's in Cartagena and Santa Marta; it played an important part in apprehending the fugitive Fray Juan Dionisio del Camino, a Franciscan friar who had seemingly fled the New Granada with a large quantity of emeralds, amethysts, and non-minted gold.⁷⁵ Del Camino was pursued by local justices in Rio de la Hacha but managed to escape and was subsequently apprehended embarking a Dutch privateering ship destined for Curaçao, at the Port of Rio de la Hacha. It can be inferred that the company had a wide terrain to watch over and to be mobile around, as the mentioned port lay approximately 340km up the coast, north of Cartagena Bay.⁷⁶ For reference, such a coastal length is comparable to the spat of coast separating Calais from the peninsular port of Cherbourg in Normandy.

To summarize, we have explored in this introductory part how the Spanish Monarchy's hesitant relationship to privateering explains the late-coming legislation which ultimately endorsed this type of defense mechanism. The line separating privateering from other activities was often blurry. In England, the line separating

Century Caribbean", *Early American Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal* 13, núm. 1 (2015): 80–110, <https://doi.org/10.1353/eam.2015.0002>; Rafal Reichert, "Corsarios españoles en el Golfo de Honduras, 1713-1763", *Estudios de Cultura Maya* 51 (el 23 de noviembre de 2017): 151, <https://doi.org/10.19130/iifl.ecm.2018.51.884>.

⁷⁵"He had with him up to five thousand pesos, a little less, and some gold alaxes and emeralds and amatas (amethysts) that he worked for their transportation to the royal court of VM and attending to the surroundings and damages that he did to his province, he went to my government, his prelate and provincial minister giving an account of everything so that I would give him prompt help to present them with the religious that he sent with this commission, and I gave them the comptetentes although they did not have effect until arriving at the port of the Rio de la Hacha where the religious caught him that followed without being able to take the money to him for having hidden it, and there he caught him and there was way of executing new escape, embarcandose in an olandesa sloop for curazao and being made to the sail arrived a corsair that left of this port of Cartagena and battling it surrendered it and apressó. / "llevaba consigo hasta cantidad de cinco mil pesos pocos menos, y algunas alaxas de oro y esmeraldas y amatas (amatistas) que labró para su transporte a la real corte de VM y atendiendo aledaños y perjuicios que hacía a su provincia ocurrió a mi gobierno, su prelado y ministro provinzial dando cuenta de todo para que le diese prontos auxilios a que los presen con religiosos que embió con esta comisión, y les di los comptetentes aunque no tuviesen efecto hasta llegar al puerto del Rio de la Hacha en donde lo cogió el religioso que seguía sin poderle quitar el dinero por haberlo ocultado, y allí lo prendió y hubo forma de de executar nueva fuga, embarcandose en una balandra olandesa para curazao y haziénsose a la vela llegó una corsaria que salióde este puerto de Cartagena y batallando la rindió y apressó"

⁷⁶ ESCRIBANÍA, 583A, Pleitos gobernación de Cartagena, Carta del 15 marzo 1721: Carta del virrey Eslava al rey.

privateers and the men of arms was initially blurry, and then became defined upon the creation of the Royal Navy, although the two collaborated closely after that. In Spain, the separation between the two was established with the first legislation codifying it. But as the activity of the *guardacostas* and privateers had the same goal, although they did not yield the same benefits, the two were bound to work in the same direction.

In the following pages, a case study will help us understand the use of privateering as a potential solution for defense, in the face of the *guardacostas*' inability to secure the Caribbean coast of the New Kingdom of Granada.

3) The creation of a privateering company: a private initiative

a) Background and preceding discussions

The decade of the 1720s saw reports on the heightened contraband or “illicit trade” alarm officials in Madrid. The problem was not an easy one to solve. To intercept smuggling on its way rather than in the sea, the strategies implemented by Cartagena’s governors during this time were far from original. In essence, port cities might be defended through naval defense (*guardacostas*) or through defense on land (soldiers on foot). In 1724, two Spanish navy ships were designated as *guardacostas* and stationed in Cartagena. These vessels served their purpose until 1732, at which point they were withdrawn from their coastguard duties, likely due to their perceived inefficacy in reference to their high costs. In that same year, a new approach to counter smuggling was implemented via strategically located coast guards. This tactic was used between 1732 and 1737, however it does not appear to have been more successful than the previous method.⁷⁷

Additionally, the 1730s had brought numerous improvements to Cartagena’s fortification system, which Juan de Herrera y Sotomayor had led (see chapter 3 for more on his defense works in Cartagena), most notably by directing the reconstruction of San Luis de Bocachica castle. But while the defense of Cartagena had been prioritized after the attack of Baron de Pointis in 1697 (see chapter 1), the Caribbean coast was often described by officials as “wide and open” (“abierta y dilatada”). Contraband relied on

⁷⁷ Adolfo Meisel-Roca, “¿Situado o contrabando? : la base económica de Cartagena de Indias a fines del Siglo de las Luces” (Bogotá, Colombia: Banco de la República, diciembre de 2003), <https://doi.org/10.32468/chee.11>.

many routes and affluents of main rivers, through which the transit of goods was achieved. Bartolomé Tienda de Cuervo, former accountant of the treasury of Cartagena, implemented such a strategy during his tenure as Intendente General of Cartagena (1734). It should be mentioned that, like most governors and officials in the New Granada, during the period ranging from 1700 to 1740, Tienda de Cuervo had himself participated and overseen the smuggling of contraband flour into Cartagena,⁷⁸ something the president of the Audiencia Antonio de la Pedrosa y Guerrero had discovered with shock in 1717.⁷⁹

While Cartagena had developed castles and fortifications of great scale, the rest of the New Granada's Caribbean coast lacked structures for defense. Santa Marta had its own fort, and so did too Rio de la Hacha: the Castillo San Jorge. The problem, even when such structures were present, was that governors, in a cross between carelessness and corruption, had failed to ensure that these fortifications be upkept. For example, the Castillo de San Jorge had not been repaired in all of Pedro de Olivera Ordóñez's tenure, as his Juicio de Residencia revealed in 1700.⁸⁰ Aside from forts, the coast was guarded from different posts, set upon different parts of the land (inlets, small peninsulas, hutches, and makeshift fortifications). The precariousness of such a defense structure would strike any modern-day observer: guard posts on the Caribbean consisted often of huts which soldiers guarded from, living in villages on the vicinity.

In 1736, during the governorship of Antonio Salas (1730-1736) for example, a Royal Cedula expedited on August 8th ordered the creation of new guard posts to defend the coast. The following table displays a transcription of the configuration of such posts, their robustness of arms and men and locations.

Table 1: Guard posts on the Caribbean coast 1736.

⁷⁸ Grahn, "POLITICAL CORRUPTION AND REFORM IN CARTAGENA PROVINCE, 1700-1740".

⁷⁹ Segovia, "El contrabando en el Nuevo Reino de Granada (1700-1739)".

⁸⁰ AGI, ESCRIBANIA,1193, Juicio de residencia a Pedro de Olivera.

N°	Ubicación	Soldados y caballos	Indios
1	Río de la Hacha	30 hombres + caballos -8 en el Cabo/Monte de Soldados -6 en cuesta del Rosario -8 en la Cruz (playa) -8 en la ciudad	
2	Boca y entrada del Río Grande de la Magdalena	-cabo residiendo en Barranquilla con 2 hombres en la Ciénaga + otros 2 y 2 caballos -5 hombres + subalterno -2 caballos -1 barqueta en Sabanilla/playa francesa -4 + cabo en isla Cabica	5 (Isla Cabica)
3	Punta de Canoa (siempre hay 2 soldados de Cartaxena)	- 1 oficial -5 hombres -2 caballos -1 barqueta	2 indios del pueblo Samba
4	Isla de Barú y la Ciénaga	-1 cavo -piragua y barqueta -10 hombres de armas y remo (existentes + los que quiera de la isla e isla de San Bernardo)	
5	Tolú	Cabo en Tolú (€ Capitanía de guerra) 18 hombres de Cartagena en total -8 en Rincón Grande (piragua y caballos) y Aguadilla -Cispatá (boca Río Sinú)	

		-piragua, caballos, barqueta -2 hombres en Tolú	
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Another reason for the lack of effectiveness of such guards, was that goods could be hidden anywhere by smugglers, who in turn could escape into the vast wilderness, eluding capture and the seizure of their goods altogether. One such thing had happened to Miguel de la Encalada y Orozco, regidor in Santa Marta, who declared that: “A month after taking possession of this government and general captaincy, he provided him as judge of the province’s seizures, releasing him the corresponding dispatch, and with him he went immediately to run this windward coast to the Hacha River and nearby coves, and from there he went around the coast of Bayahonda to the cities of the valley and Pueblo Nuevo with the savannas of the Paso del Adelantado, without leaving road nor corner unregistered, and on account of some suspicions, he registered the mounts of the herd of thumb, **where he found 20 and so many of illicit goods, flour and brandy, which he seized without catching the owners because, as he found, they had left those effects hidden and fled (with the news that the declarant was in those places)**, and having remained in these offices for two months without finding anything else, he brought what was seized to this city as will be recorded and its benefit in the Royal Contaduría.”⁸¹

The issue, as Encalada pointed out, was that the broadness of the coasts rendered ineffective attempts to seize goods and smugglers: “And since then, he has seen that the Governor has continually sent officers and parties with this responsibility to the great river of the Magdalena and the Cesar with the places of Chiriguaná and Paso del Adelantado, moving the officers one to another, so that the work is bearable, **because**

⁸¹ AGI, Santa Fe, 384, Declaración de Don Miguel de Encalada y Orozco, regidor anual, February 15th 1734: “al mes de haber tomado posesión de este gobierno y capitania general le proveyó por juez de comisos de la provincia librándole el correspondiente despacho y con él pasó inmediatamente a correr esta costa de barlovento hasta el Río de el Hacha y caletas de su cercanía, y de allí atajó discurriendo toda aquella Bayahonda hasta las ciudades del valle y pueblo nuevo con las savanas de el paso del adelantado, sin dejar camino ni rincón que no registrase, y por algunas sospechas que tuvo registró los montes de el ható de pulgar, en donde encontró 20 y tantos de géneros ilícitos, harina y aguardiente, los que comisó y no cogió dueños porque, según reconoció, habían dejado escondidos aquellos efectos y puestos en fuga con la noticia de que andaba por aquellos parajes el declarante, y habiéndose mantenido en estas contadurías tiempo de dos meses sin encontrarse otra cosa alguna, trajo lo comisado a esta ciudad como constará y su beneficio en la real contaduría a que se remite.”

since the land is so open and open that from any place in it one can go on horseback to the new kingdom and provinces of Peru, it is not possible to keep it all even though the desire is great and the providences are greater.” It is hardly surprising that Enclada would have reached such a conclusion after having surveilled the section of coast within his jurisdiction for two years. Indeed, if one merely considers the itinerary declared by the Judge of Comisos (seizures), the immensity of the area to be traversed is shocking, considering the extreme dryness of the Guajiran Peninsula, the elevated temperatures which can reach 40 degrees Celsius during the day, and the precariousness of roads in the area. The desert peninsula must have appeared as a dilated open plain extending on all sides from the coast southward; hence the Judge’s appreciation of how it seemed possible to reach all places and even Peru from where he stood (stressed sentence in previous quotation). On a side note, this perception of the Guajira peninsula, a frontier by all accounts at least until the 19th century, the periphery of a peripheral area in the Kingdom, seemed for a split second, in the eyes of a Contraband Judge, as a center whence to reach other parts of the monarchy.

Below is a map showing the area that Olivera traversed while carrying out his duties, between Pueblo Nuevo (now called Valencia de Jesus⁸²), Valledupar and El Paso del Adelantado. As the official rightly points out, this area is essentially a valley that follows the course of the Cesar River, which flows between mountainous formations on either side, on the west the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta, and the Serranía del Perijá on the east, the natural border separating modern-day Colombia and Venezuela.

⁸² Herrera, *Ordenar para controlar. Ordenamiento espacial y control político en las Llanuras del Caribe y en los Andes centrales neogranadinos. Siglo XVIII*, 270.



The immensity of the land was linked to the second problem, that of security. Indeed, the Indios Guajiros, as was often reported to the Crown, not only shielded but aided foreign, mainly Dutch, traders in their activities. The Guajiros, a patrilineal warfare-practicing clan-centered ethnic group native to the Guajiran peninsula, were fierce enemies; confrontation with them often ended in bleak results. One such occasion was the killing of teniente Juan Gonzalez de Noriega, “who was treacherously killed by some smugglers, vagrants and little-known people, because he wanted to thwart the smuggling of some merchandise that they were storing in the Menchiquejo channel.”⁸³ The death of Noriega was mentioned in many letters around the year 1737; it was somewhat instrumentalized to showcase the barbarism of traffickers in the Magdalena and Cesar rivers.

In 1736, upon assuming the position of governor and captain general of the province of Cartagena, Don Pedro José Hidalgo immediately initiated an exploration of the province’s condition and that of the entire New Kingdom of Granada, combining personal experience with received reports. He was against conflating the land defenses as Antonio Salas had done, a strategy of which Governor Hidalgo doubted the “favorable effects.”⁸⁴ The inadequacy of available vessels in Cartagena to curb illicit foreign activities was abundantly clear, underscoring the necessity for new ships from Spain. Hidalgo repeatedly conveyed this concern to His Majesty through various

⁸³ Declaración del Alférez Don José Nicolás de la Rossa, Procurador general de la ciudad.

⁸⁴ AGI, SANTA FE 384, Respuesta y orden aue con fecha del 24 de mayo dio el gobernador de Cartagena al oficial comandante del Rio de la Hacha.

communications, expressing the difficulties in defense of the coast of the New Granada from the Guajira (northeastern extreme) to the Darien (northwestern extreme):

“the coast of that kingdom, when considered from the northern border of the Province of Maracaibo, to the extreme point of Cartagena on the southern side, stretches for three hundred leagues, leaving aside the great distance by which it then stretches in the same direction towards Portobelo; It also needed a Guardia, since everywhere there are coves, ports, and supply ports where the ships can safely find a bottom, running along the coast in a few places, and these are subject to the jurisdictions of different governments, the rest of the land being unpopulated; or the country of Guajiro Indians. Although it is true that to reach the sea it is necessary in many parts to have great roughness of the roads, and there would be others; it is certain that it is surpassed by the greed that knows how to tame the barbarity of the rebellious Indians and to use them for trafficking, as is now experienced on the coasts of Darién, Bayaonda, La Cruz and other ports on the river of the Hacha and Maracaibo, where foreign ships are continually attending to trade”⁸⁵

The governor was careful to explain his view as to why the coasts were so depleted of defenses. He mainly attributed it to the known enmity between the previous governor, Antonio de Salas, and the Bishop in Santa Marta, which had led both men to govern against the greater good of the two contiguous provinces. Hidalgo explained they had been incapable of reaching a joint solution, despite the Royal Cedula ordering that “Antonio de Salas, then governor of Cartagena, and those who succeeded him in that government, should prevent illicit trade in that governorate and this one of Maracaybo, placing guards in the three governorships of Cartagena and Maracaybo,” for which interprovincial cooperation was necessary. Hidalgo explained both men had acted “the first to accredit himself as Grand Minister, even at the cost of some untruthful and other unfounded impositions; and the second to take revenge on me because I carried out the royal orders of HM to pass to those kingdoms and before that because I defended the Royal Patronage and Royal Jurisdiction.”⁸⁶

Other accusations of poor government on behalf of Salas were that he had lingered in Cartagena along with his ally, the bishop of the same province, exceeding

⁸⁵ AGI, Santa Fe, 384, Relato de carta del gobernador de Cartagena Don Pedro Hidalgo.

⁸⁶ AGI, Santa Fe, 384, Declaración de Don Miguel de Encalada y Orozco

the termination of their charges; he was also accused of having attempted to charge royal officials a fee to compensate for the lack of *caudales* (affluency) in the Royal Cajas. He and the ministers of the province were accused of carelessness, having provided disposition for the extinction of the illicit trade only on February 3rd of 1736. This, of course, was probably due to the involvement of the ministers and government in contraband, as was usually the case in the province. Subsequent Royal Cédulas were expedited ordering a solution be found to Cartagena's defense, dated from August 18th, November 13th, and December 2nd, 1736.⁸⁷

b) The company

Hidalgo summoned teniente general Blas de Lezo, ordering him to call a *junta* to find a new solution to Cartagena's defense and extinguish "*dicha tienda de cuervos y ratas*." The use of the expression "tienda de cuervos" might have been a pun, designed to refer negatively to smugglers by using the last name of Bartolomé **Tienda de Cuervo**, the former governor whose policy of assigning soldiers on foot along the coast was rejected by Hidalgo.⁸⁸ This was the start of a phase of deliberation during which several military officers of Santa Marta and Cartagena were summoned to give an account of their experience and advice as to the pertinence of the project. Illustrious figures of the provinces, such as alferez José Nicolas de la Rosa, and teniente Manuel Carrera y Urbina gave testimony and advice.

The first proposition was the creation of a small fleet to defend Cartagena, consisting of one or two vessels of war to repel foreigners, for which, as per the accounts of royal officials, there were no means in the Cajas Reales. The possibility of arming a *galeota* and six lanchas was subsequently explored, and the small fleet managed to find "near that port three Dutch sloops" but to little effect. Thus, the necessity of taking the solution to private capital emerged, and the vecinos were summoned to partake in the venture. It was thus that With the Royal Decrees of August 18, November 13, and December 2, 1736, in his possession, Hidalgo contemplated the creation of a maritime force to repel foreign vessels. Consulting with Blas de Lezo, commander of the coast guard ships, Hidalgo met with distinguished residents of Cartagena individually. He

⁸⁷ AGI, Santa Fe, 384, Auto de 5 abril de 1737 de Don Pedro Josef Hidalgo.

⁸⁸ Ibidem.

presented to them the potential benefits inherent in establishing a privateer company, highlighting its value to both His Majesty's service and Spanish commerce.

In turn, the city's wealthy vecinos expressed their desire to eradicate smuggling. Two years later, the fiscal of the Council of the Indies announced that Blas de Lezo had convinced them of supporting the project, suggesting Lezo's resolve outweighed the vecinos' enthusiasm. A meeting at Hidalgo's residence on April 3, 1737, gathered the vecinos alongside Lezo. Together, they proposed the foundation of the Company, backed by a fund of 24,000 pesos divided into 48 shares of 500 pesos each, a considerable amount, which corresponded to between half and a third of a governor⁸⁹ or oidor's salary (1470 pesos)—quite a hefty sum. The terms outlined a commitment to arm two sloops for war and a vessel that would bring merchandise from Cadiz.

How did they justify this petition? The explanation offered by officials in the province of Cartagena suggested that the endemic scarcity of coin with which to pay for goods made it impossible to hold local *ferias* (markets). This, according to Governor Hidalgo in Cartagena, was the root of foreign success in smuggling, as inhabitants had no licit way of acquiring goods with gold dust only: “el perjuicio que resulta de la libertad con que comercian los extranjeros en aquellas dilatadas costas con tanto interés que se conceptúa que por este medio **extraen, cada año, más de dos millones de pesos de intereses que produce aquel reino**, sin computar la extracción que se hace por Portobelo y Costa de Tierra Firme; que motivó a destacar dos navíos de la Armada, que los guardasen, con que se logró desterrar de estas a los extranjeros.”⁹⁰ In such a panorama, it is evident that goods would be acquired through a different channel. The claim that products were either unavailable or too expensive was not unlike the long-held claim that officials' salaries were systematically inferior to the cost of living.

⁸⁹ In the period spanning 1680-1730, governor's salaries oscillated between 1500 and 1800 pesos per year. In the Philippines, it amounted to 1650 pesos in 1721; in Popayán the governor's annual salary in 1694 was of 1.124.924 maravedis, or 1790 gold pesos, (4 tomines, 1 granos y 5 maravedis). See respectively Alexandre Coello de la Rosa, “Corrupción, codicia y mal gobierno en las islas marianas (1700-1730)”, *Illes i imperis; 2014: Núm.: 16. Corrupción, codicia y bien público en el mundo hispánico (siglos XVIII-XX)*; p. 39-70, 2014, <http://repositori.upf.edu/handle/10230/24179>; Francisco Javier Casado Arboniés, Manuel Casado Arboniés, y Emiliano Gil Blanco, “Las cartas-cuenta de la Caja Real de Popayán (1656-1700)”, *Estudios de Historia Social y Económica de América*, núm. 3 (1988): 53–92. For the Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e historia (ICAN)'s currency conversion tool: <https://serieeconomicasicanh.neocities.org/ConversionMoneda>.

⁹⁰ AGI, SANTA FE 384, relato de carta del gobernador de Cartagena Don Pedro Hidalgo.

Indeed, both ideas justified finding alternative ways to come by merchandise or funds for personal enjoyment. They explained the need for the vessel as follows:

“in order that they be granted license and registration for one ship each year, leaving the port of Cadiz for the port of Cartagena; **loaded only with Wine, Flour, Oil, Iron, Steel, gunpowder; bullets and ammunition, jarzia, linens, tar, pitch, firearms and blades;** With the power to return loaded with fruits of America, in order to be able to maintain and increase their armaments with these goods and supplies, which, being all ready for it, and not having them in those dominions where to buy them [sic], this providence was necessary to continue and increase the armed force of need; **as well as to sell, to their mercy and benefit, to any part what they had left over of the aforementioned goods.**”⁹¹

Before having obtained the approval to register their ships, the company had to purchase its crafts. Agents were dispatched to Cuba in search of a suitable vessel, but upon finding none, they proceeded to Jamaica. There, they acquired a fourteen-gun sloop and an eighteen-cannon bark. This inadvertently validated concerns held by the metropolitan authorities, alarmed with the reliance on British trade. Even so, the company’s directors proceeded to hire crews of one hundred sailors for each ship and procured sufficient supplies for a two-month voyage. These endeavors fully depleted the company’s original operational fund of 24,000 pesos. Despite the initial expenditures, the results were promising, kindling shareholders’ expectations of eventual returns on their investment. During the company’s inaugural coastal expedition between July and September, their privateers successfully seized a Dutch smuggling vessel valued at around 4,500 pesos near the Sinu River’s mouth.⁹² Subsequent exploits in October and November yielded the capture of two additional Dutch prizes, both sloops with individual values exceeding 20,000 pesos each.⁹³

⁹¹ a fin, de que se les concediese licencia y registro para un navío cada año, que saliere del puerto de Cádiz para el de Cartagena; cargado solamente de **Vino, Arina, Azeyte, Hierro, Azero, polvora; valas y municiones, jarzia, lona, alquitrán, brea, armas de fuego y blancas;** con la facultad de volver cargados de frutos de la América para, con estos géneros y pertrechos, poder mantener y aumentar sus armamentos que, **siendo todo preziso para ello, y no haverlos en aquellos dominios dónde comprarlos** [sic], se había prezisa esta providencia, para continuar y engrosar la fuerza armada de nezesidad; **como también lizenzia para vender, a su merced y veneficio, para qualquiera parte lo que de los expresados géneros les sobrara**

⁹² AGI, Santa Fe, 384, Carta de 7 de Julio de 1738.

⁹³ Lance Grahn, “GUARDING THE NEW-GRANADAN COASTS, DILEMMAS OF THE SPANISH-COAST-GUARD IN THE EARLY BOURBON-PERIOD”, *American Neptune* 56, núm. 1 (1996): 19–28.

But not everything had gone smoothly and officials in Madrid began to doubt the suitability of the company. In March 1737, Francisco de Varas y Valdez, Intendant of the Navy for the Indies in Cadiz, who had initially supported the venture, claiming it would be a failure if will not to supply the company with provisions, wrote to Cartagena with concern. After having captured a Dutch ship, the company had seemingly failed to send seven men who manned the ship to Cadiz, which was the stipulated procedure that the crew of privateered vessels needed to undergo. Varas, referring to previous communications, pointed out that the available evidence did not confirm their arrival, as they couldn't have been on the latest dispatch from the mainland, which reached the Bay of Cádiz in March 1737. He further noted that, according to a letter from the governor of Cartagena dated October 17 of the same year, only two ships had arrived from that province: "El Fuerte" and another vessel. These ships brought a total of twelve individuals, including three foreigners mentioned in the departure registry, who were received in Portobelo. Varas reported that other individuals of Dutch nationality with a similar destination were handed over by the Lieutenant General, while the Chief Magistrate of the Inquisition residing in Portobelo embarked four individuals, subsequently sent to the Inquisition tribunal of Lima and Cartagena, and then to the tribunal in Seville. Varas conveyed this information to the council, indicating that the seven prisoners referred to in the governor of Cartagena's letter had not been accounted for in the reported arrivals.⁹⁴

Nevertheless, a year later, the company had garnered support among some officials in Madrid. The 13th of February 1738 a Junta general del comercio was

⁹⁴ "solo ha llegado de aquella provincia el Navío nombrado el fuerte y el de Don Norberto de Michelerra (¿?), por henero deste año en los que vinieron doce, los 3 extrangeros que dice la partida de registro, ser recibidos en Portobelo donde se remitieron en Portobelo por el presidente de Panamá, a entera disposición de la tribunal de la casa sin más expresión: 5 olandeses que con el mismo destino entregó el teniente general y los 4 restantes que embarcó el alguacil mayor de la inquisición que reside en portobelo, y remitía el tribunal de la inquisición de Lima y Cartagena à entregar, à la disposición de la de Sevilla; lo que participa el sr Varas para que se haga presente al consejo y no haver llegado los 7 reos sobre que escribe el gobernador de Cartagena. " "only two ships arrived from that province: the ship named "El Fuerte" and the one from Don Norberto de Michelerra (¿?). In these, twelve people arrived, including the three foreigners mentioned in the registry departure, who were received in Portobelo where they were sent by the President of Panama, to be at the full disposition of the court without further details. Additionally, five Dutch individuals with the same destination were handed over by the Lieutenant General, and the remaining four were embarked by the Chief Magistrate of the Inquisition residing in Portobelo, who were sent by the Inquisition tribunal of Lima and Cartagena to be delivered to the disposition of the tribunal in Seville. Mr. Varas reports this to make it known to the council that the seven prisoners mentioned in the letter from the governor of Cartagena have not arrived." AGI, SANTA FE, 384, Constancia del 21 de octubre de 1738 sobre reos de la Comp de Corso

celebrated and Governor Hidalgo's plea was heard. The Marqués de Torrenueva, Secretario del Despacho Universal de Indias y Marina,⁹⁵ presented Hidalgo's plea and testimonies, through which he intended to demonstrate the appropriateness of the Company's endeavors. Torrenueva agreed upon the need for such a venture, agreeing that no other strategy offered an effective halt to contraband, as Valdés reported in a letter to Cartagena:

"Inclining with their indignation the Real Animo of HM to approve the company formed by some neighbors of the referred city of Cartagena, forcing themselves to practice privateering in those coasts to hinder the expressed continued frauds that are experienced in them, constituting the capital of **240 pesos in 48 shares of 500 pesos each one**, for the purpose of giving beginning (...) and the just zeal and punctual comprehension with which the said governor of Cartagena informs SM, disapproving the previous attempt to guard those coasts with people on land, whose people on land, land whose main charge had the care of **Don Bartolomé Tienda de Cuerbo**, and has always doubted the trade of the possibility of favorable effect by the long distance of over 300 leagues."⁹⁶

Even so, Valdés made it clear he deemed some of the licenses solicited by the company of Armadores to be excessive. He hinted that they sought to profit from commercial licenses rather than merely providing necessary supplies. In particular, he referred to the license to import flour the company had petitioned, saying it was unreasonable as there weren't sufficient vecinos from Cartagena to consume the flour which arrived therein, not to mention the one introduced through the Asiento de Negros:

"because there are few people of distinction who consume it [flour] and it is regularly brought down to Sta. Fe more than the amount that corresponds to such short expenditure, even without taking into consideration that which is frequently carried by the ships of the Asiento de Negros, from which results the judgment and distrust of the trade that in the attempt to ask (those who are interested in the company of shipowners) the annual registration with this and other fruits of Spain, they are interested in the usefulness of other goods that they hope to introduce recommended

⁹⁵ This office Secretaría de Estado para Marina e Indias, resuscitated in 1721 after Alberoni's demise, and constituted an oversight and reform-oriented entity which formulated the José Patiño's agenda while in power as Secretary of State (1726-1736). On this see Allan J. Kuethe y Kenneth J. Andrien, *El mundo atlántico español durante el siglo XVIII: Guerra y reformas borbónicas, 1713-1796*, 1a ed. (Editorial Universidad del Rosario, 2018), cap. 3, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvc5pfbv>.

⁹⁶ AGI, Santa Fe, 384, Sr Don Francisco de Varas y Valdes, Cádiz 26 febrero de 1738, "Inclinando con su con su indignación el Real Animo de Sm a que se sirva aprobar la compañía que tornaron algunos vecinos de la referida ciudad de Cartagena, obligándose a practicar el corso en aquellas costas para estorbar los expresados continuados fraudes que se experimentan en ellas, constituyendo el capital de 240 pesos en 48 acciones de a 500 pesos cada una, para el fin de dar principio (y le ha sido muy apreciable el justiciado celo y puntual comprensión con que dicho gobernador de Cartagena informa a SM desaprovando el anterior intento de que aquellas costas se guarden con gente en tierra cuyo encargo tuvo principal al cuidado de don Bartolomé Tienda de Cuerbo, y siempre ha dudado el comercio de la posibilidad de efecto favorable por la dilatada distancia de más de 300 leguas."

by the permission of flour and other fruits.”⁹⁷

From December 1737 to August 1738, the company managed to secure an extra 10,000 pesos to finance two more ventures. However, these campaigns yielded meager results, with the privateers managing to apprehend only an insignificant English turtler. Notably, a fleet of Dutch ships, including a man-of-war, dealt a decisive defeat to the company’s pair of vessels in April 1738, leading to their hasty retreat to Cartagena’s harbor. Four months later, misfortune struck anew as the company’s sloop foundered, leaving the privateers with only the solitary barkentine. Disheartened by the dearth of achievements and reluctant to absorb any further setbacks, particularly in light of the absence of assistance from the mainland, the directors of the Company convened on August 23, 1738, and resolved to suspend operations upon the anticipated arrival of the recently dispatched Spanish warships from Havana to Cartagena.⁹⁸

Why was the company’s lifespan so short? The company’s end was, in the main, because it burnt its joint-stock capital too quickly. Within less than two years it had blown through all its capital and the additional 10,000 pesos it had lent:

“having consumed the fund of said company in the four campaigns that its armament had executed, the profits it had acquired, and more than ten thousand pesos that they had supplied, and more than ten thousand pesos that they had supplied, they begged me to hold a general meeting to determine and having been executed in my presence on the 23rd of August of last year 1738 in which the directors presented the expenses that had been executed, stating the extent that they made, they determined that they could not continue and that having satisfied the directors of their scope (to which they were ready) the company, with the exception of (list of directors), should be considered extinguished and that they would continue the privateering until the vessels of VM that came from Havana to these coasts”⁹⁹

⁹⁷ AGI, Santa Fe, 384, Sr Don Francisco de Varas y Valdes, Cádiz 26 febrero de 1738, “por que son pocas las personas de distinción que la consumen y regularmente baja a Sta. Fe más de la que corresponde al corto gasto, aún sin hacer consideración de la que llevan con frecuencia las embarcaciones del Asiento de Negros, de que resulta el Juicio y la desconfianza del comercio de que en el intento de pedir (los que se interesan en la compañía de Armadores) el rexistro anual con este y otros frutos de España, lleven el fin de interesarse en la utilidad de otros géneros que esperen introducir recomendados del permiso de harina y otros frutos”.

⁹⁸ Grahn, “GUARDING THE NEW-GRANADAN COASTS, DILEMMAS OF THE SPANISH-COAST-GUARD IN THE EARLY BOURBON-PERIOD”.

⁹⁹AGI, Santa Fe, 384 , Carta a 4 de junio de 1739, Carta del gobernador de Cartagena “habiéndose consumido en las cuatro campañas que había ejecutado su armamento el fondo de dicha compañía, las utilidades que había adquirido, y más de diez mil pesos que ellos tenían suplido, me suplicaban se hiciese junta general para que determinasen y habiéndose ejecutado en mi presencia el día 23 de agosto del año pasado de 1738 en que hicieron presente los directores de los gastos que se habían ejecutado, constando el alcance que hacían, determinaron no poder continuar y que satisfechos los directores de su alcance (a que estaban prontos) se diese por extinguida la compañía, à excepción de (lista de directores) y que continuarían el corso hasta que los navíos de VM que viniesen de la Havana a estas costas”

Additionally, authorities on either side of the Atlantic were aware of discrepancies in Cartagena as to the effectiveness of maritime defense versus land defense. Manuel Carrera y Urbina, one of the officials who had been asked to give an opinion on the convenience of founding the company in 1737, had underlined the successes of operations on land “no satisfecho el señor gobernador en el celo que tiene y ha tenido de quitar este pernicioso abuso, ha continuado las guardias del rio grande.” He added “dice que lleva entre 8 y nueve meses “en este paraje sin que por aquellos parajes ni ríos hubiese entrado, bajado ni subido cosa que fuese de trato ilícito porque este fue el fin principal de su incumbencia,” although he afterwards stated that “ha hecho por mar y por tierra algunos descaminos como constará en la Royal Contaduría.”¹⁰⁰

The underwhelming nature of declarations such as Urbina’s must have fomented doubts in Madrid as to the vecinos’ real intentions – whether they merely wanted commercial licenses or wished to defend the coast. It can be presumed that this contributed to the Council’s decision to suppress the company in late 1738. The Council declared that:

“Not only should the company of shipowners formed in Cartagena, of which the governor Pedro Hidalgo gives an account, not only not be approved, but it should be ordered to be disbanded and extinguished immediately, as its establishment contains very serious and intolerable damage, as is recognized by the examination of some of its conditions, as he is surprised to have passed through it.”¹⁰¹

The Council expressed concerns about the conditions and implications of the company’s formation. Most notably, councilors were concerned with some conditions (numbers 2; 5; and 12) in the company’s foundation charter, such as its ability to appoint and remove ship captains, the issuance of patents, and the handling of captured

¹⁰⁰ AGI, Santa Fe, 384 , Declaración del teniente Manuel Carrera y Urbina, “Y es clara consecuencia de que no se desembarcó otra cosa ni se logró trato alguno puesto que no denunció de otros géneros quien hizo denuncia de el aguardiente y que aun con todas estas infatigables diligencias, no satisfecho el señor gobernador en el celo que tiene y ha tenido de quitar este pernicioso abuso, ha continuado las guardias del rio grande pues para retirarse el que declara en su segunda salida fue destacado a este mismo sin el alférez don Diego Román y para que este se retirase fue destacado también con gente el teniente Don Juan de Noriega a quien mataron en el Rio Grande antes de llegar a la boca del de César unos metedores”

¹⁰¹ AGI, Santa Fe, 384 , Dictamen del Consejo, “no solo no se debe aprobar la compañía de armadores formada en Cartagena, de que da cuenta el gov pedro Hidalgo, si no es que se debe mandar deshacer y extinguir inmediatamente pues contiene su establecimiento gravísimos e intolerables perjuicios, como se reconoce con el examen de algunas de sus condiciones, extrañándole aver pasado por ella.”

goods. Also, it raised concerns about the company's potential interference with the governor's authority, as "el no intervenir el gobernador en las instrucciones ofende desde luego de la autoridad que seguía, se está allí ejerciendo en nombre de VM." Furthermore, councilors were concerned about the Company's potential impact on the finances of the Royal Hacienda, who would be deprived, they explained, of collecting the usual benefits from *presas* and *comisos* (seized smuggled goods). In essence, the claim was that the company's ability to resell – which only gave the usual quinto to the Royal hacienda – was less profitable than Navy's confiscation of illicit products.

"being more harmful than all the 1st condition in three parts that it contains, which boils down to the fact that the seizures made by the company would be taken to any port and would be sold freely by the directors, to the effect that the ministers of VM would have no vote or action other than to collect the royal duties to be paid on the seized clothing, that these duties would be the same as if they were effects of Spanish commerce, carried in galleons, and that as such they would be given royal dispatch to be taken to the kingdom of Santa Fe and any other province where it is requested."¹⁰²

Ultimately, the council's fear was that the company's directors and crew sought to profit from reselling seized merchandise, and especially to foreigners:

"The same thing would happen with the traffic of the company whose directors, always in sight, would take good care to send to sell the captured goods to the places where there was more scarcity, and with eagerness to the arrival of galleons since in one and the other consisted their greater earnings. That although this is evidence even if it is considered right that the company proceeds with the greatest fidelity, the council, which must attend to everything to prevent damages, has in mind that it has been put before the court, a case in which, having entered a port a foreign ship, adding that it would be captured, there was someone who gave an account to the governor, and with some indications (that did not make proof), that it had been bought with its cargo from the foreigners who were driving it, which (although it is not to be expressed) if it happened, would be the last blow for the ruin of those kingdoms and of the commerce of Spain,

¹⁰² Idem, "Con que recurren a VM otras potencias, siendo más perjudicial que todo la condición 1era en tres partes que contiene, que se reducen a que las presas que hiciera la compañía se llevaran a qualquier puerto y se vendieran libremente por los directores, en que no tendrían los ministros de VM más voto y acción que cobrar los reales derechos que deben pagar las ropas apresadas, que estos derechos serían los mismos que si fueran efectos del comercio de España, conducidos en Galeones y que como a tales se dará real despacho de sacar para el reino de Santafé y otra cualquiera provincia por donde se pida"

since the foreigners were able to do with security the damages that they now do with risk.”¹⁰³

c) Aftermath

This bleak picture of inefficiency, along with an underwhelming economic reward for the Royal Hacienda, as well as for the privateers, made the venture a less than profitable affair. How should one understand the failure of such an endeavor, when its counterpart, British privateering, for example, proved so successful? The answer involves a complex set of elements which would necessitate a much more systematic comparison. Even so, it is striking that the company was cut short despite having funds, apparent enthusiasm, and sufficiently arduous motives. On the one hand, the seizures it achieved were insufficient – which shouldn’t surprise us, as we’ve seen what 6 months at sea looks like for a privateering ship in a busy transit zone like Cuba (see introduction to this part). Maybe the venture was miscalculated. So seemed to think the company. This phenomenon, consisting of a private initiative – headed by private vecinos who disposed of magistratures, wealth, land, or all the these – and the support of the governor, was the elementary recipe for initiatives of all sorts, but especially those related to defense, conquest, and exploration.

In this respect it does not differ much from the initiatives which we will discuss in subsequent chapters. In these cases, local authorities like the lieutenant and governor shared common interests with vecinos whose capital and position allowed them to solicit *Mercedes* (royal grants) and *providencias* as a counterpart to their promises that they would use these to serve the crown. Authorities in Spain and New Granada viewed these initiatives with suspicion,¹⁰⁴ and requested *consultas* and reports to elucidate what

¹⁰³ Idem, “sucediera esto mismo con el tráfico de la compañía cuyos directores, siempre a la vista, cuidarían bien de enviar a vender los géneros apresados a los parajes donde hubiese más escasez, y con anhelación a el arribo de galeones pues en uno y otro consistían sus mayores ganancias. Que aunque esta es evidencia aun dando por acertado que la compañía proceda con la mayor fidelidad, el consejo, que todo lo debe atender para precaver los daños, tiene presente que se la ha puesto delante en sala de justicia, caso en que, habiendo entrado en un puerto una embarcación estrangera, agregando que sería apresada, hubo quien diese cuenta a el gobernador, y con algunos indicios (que no llegaron a hacer prueba), de que había sido comprada con su carga a los estrangeros que la conducían lo que (aunque no es de expresar) si sucediera era dar el ultimo golpe para la ruina de aquellos reynos y del comercio de España pues lograron los estrangeros hacer con seguridad los daños que hacen ahora con riesgo.”

¹⁰⁴ In other cases, suspicion and oversight stemmed from Royal Audiencias at the level of the Kingdom. Needless to say, though, that the interests protected by the Royal Audiencia were not the same as the ones protected by Secretariats and Councils in the Peninsula, as Audiencia *oidores* had local interests and ties.

the intentions behind such ventures were. In this case, the Council of the Indies would have been the highest authority in the face of this Company. By the 1720s, the Secretaría de Estado para Marina e Indias had oversight over such questions, and it is significant that the Council of the Indies produced a deliberation deciding to end the Company a year after the Secretaría had started a process to investigate the project.¹⁰⁵

This initiative, like other unsuccessful initiatives that failed to retain the support of peninsular or regional authorities, is more than a symptom of discordance between the interests of vecinos (territorial defense and commerce), and those of the Crown's finances (the Royal Hacienda). This tension between what was financially desirable for the Crown, and what was in the interests of communities or corporations in the Monarchy, is the backbone of relationships between the different centers of the monarchy and Madrid.¹⁰⁶ The negotiation of a permission to establish a private venture for the public benefit – *bien común*, considering contraband went against common welfare, as defined by González de Salcedo, Pedro in his *Tratado juridico politico del contra-bando*¹⁰⁷ – depended on more factors. The most notable factor was, indeed, of financial kind. The Crown's ability to amass revenue from different sources in the Indies weighed in every authorization of the King pondered. Ensuring income, be it from the land, its minerals, and fruits, as well –or especially–from those who had “usurped” the resources of a “bleeding” Spain, outweighed the legitimately recognized motives of Cartagena's vecinos.

This did not mean that awareness of the need for better defense in the Caribbean had dwindled. However, war had been brewing in the Caribbean. Tensions related to British expansion in North America (namely, the question of the border between British Georgia and Spanish Florida) and the Caribbean fueled the war. In July 1739, Admiral

¹⁰⁵ AGI, Santa Fe, 384, Sr Don Francisco de Varas y Valdes.

¹⁰⁶ On integration of ciudades and villas in the Monarchy, see, for example Manuel Herrero Sánchez, “El modelo republicano en una monarquía de ciudades”, en *Soulèvements, révoltes, révolutions: Dans l'empire des Habsbourg d'Espagne, xvie-xviii siècle*, ed. Alain Hugon y Alexandra Merle, Collection de la Casa de Velázquez (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2017), 245–66, <http://books.openedition.org/cvz/1906>; Bautista y Lugo, “Integrar un reino: la ciudad de México en la monarquía de España, 1621-1628”; Ibáñez, “La Hispanofilia ¿se refleja o se construye en las Indias?”, 33–34.

¹⁰⁷ Pedro González de Salcedo, *Tratado juridico politico del contra-bando* (a costa de Joseph Pinto ..., 1729). “Y como por él se permita todo géenro de hostilidad contra los Enemigos, y se prohíba su comercio, y tráfico por él, y por el derecho, y conveniencia pública; todo lo que en contravención suya se obrare, se deberá dezeit y llamar Contrabando, que es lo mismo que contra la orden, y voluntad suprema del Principe.”

Vernon's troops sailed to Cartagena with the intention of attacking the city, whose defenses were held by no other than the later proclaimed hero, Blas de Lezo. It was then that Sebastián de Eslava took up his post as the first Viceroy of the second viceroyalty of the New Granada.

By all accounts, Viceroy Sebastián de Eslava was a notable exception to the streak of leisurely Viceroys that governed the Indies in the early 18th century. According to the historiography, he was a stern figure with a severe character, whose focus on attacking contraband bordered on obsessive. Indeed, Eslava made it a priority of his tenure (1740-1749) to address this question. This must have dissuaded both his entourage and the elites in Santafé to attempt to involve him in any such business. The fact that half of the individuals in Eslava's company left him before his tenure ended has been interpreted as indicative of this firm conduct.¹⁰⁸ Upon accessing his tenure, Eslava wrote several reports on the state of the Kingdom, with reference to omnipresent smuggling, focusing particularly on interior/exterior contraband in Cartagena and Santa Marta, through which nonregistered merchandise entered and was extracted on small ships capable of sailing in both rivers and the sea. It must be mentioned that not only was Eslava seemingly predisposed towards a strict manner of using his magistrature and authority, but the creation of the second Viceroyalty of the New Granada in 1739 was underpinned by a will to redress the bedeviled mores of contraband and the aid it received from native populations on the coast. These intentions were plainly expressed in a Royal Cédula sent to Eslava:

“One of the most important ends that I have had in consideration to move my Real encouragement to erect the Viceroyalty of the new kingdom of Granada in which I have chosen you, [to remedy] the uprooting of the provinces that I have added to it, the unrestrained vice of illicit commerce with foreigners that has not been possible to achieve, until now in the midst of the continuous care in dictating convenient providencias, that if one or the other had been enough, they would not have been enough nor would it have been impeded by many of those who had to execute it, in the vice that it was tried to impede.”¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁸ Eissa-Barroso, *The Spanish Monarchy and the Creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1717-1739)*.

¹⁰⁹ AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. IX, f. 727-729: “Uno de los más importantes fines que he tenido en consideración para mover mi real animo a erigir el Virreinato del nuevo reyno de Granada en que os he

The King's realistic yet tired observation that the repetition of *providenzias* and orders for the desired effect (to curb contraband) was evidently useless, as the individuals involved in executing orders were the most interested in upkeeping the practices of smuggling. These orders, repeated and re-expedited, had advanced the matter in certain respects (see chapter 4), but still lacked the desired effects, partly because of the implication of officers in contraband, but also on account of the extension of the land itself, and the pointlessness of having either guardacostas or on-foot soldiers guard such wide spaces. This was reflected in the abovementioned royal Cédula, entrusting Eslava with the mission of stopping illicit commerce:

“From what is on record in my Council of the Indies in successive notifications and dependencies, it is understood that the **ships of war and guarda costas I have already maintained on several occasions to guard those [coasts] are no remedy** that can suffice alone, since the illicit dealings with **small vessels in coves and shallow shoals where the ships cannot enter are those doing the illicit trade in view of them [warships and guardacostas] without them being able to prevent it.**”¹¹⁰

The years after the War of Jenkins' Ear would bring many changes to the commercial infrastructure of the Monarchy's American territories. *Flotas* and *galeones* were abandoned in favor of individual registered ships (*naves de registro*), a much more difficult target to attack than a fleet of galleons. Single-register ships brought over merchandise in accord to the needs of the moment, but these ships and the companies entrusted to sail them (like the company of Caracas) were seen with suspicion by institutions which had long upheld the system of *flotas* and *galeones*, namely the different *consulados* and the Casa de la Contratación¹¹¹. José del Campillo, succeeded José Patiño as minister of Finance, Navy, War and Indies in 1741; he would be at the

elegido, s el desarraigar de las provincias que a el he agregado, el imbertrado vicio del Comercio Ilizito, con los estrangeros queno se hà podido lograr, hasta ahora en medio del continuo cuidado en dictar convenientes providenzias, que si vien una u otra hubiera vastado las muchas que se han ordenado, hubieran sido sufizientes ni no lo hubiese impedido hallarse muchos de los que lo havían de ejecutar, en el vicio que se intentava impedir.

¹¹⁰ “de lo que consta en mi Consejo de las Indias en subcesivas noticias y dependencias se llega a comprehender que los Navíos de Guerra, Guarda Costa que ya **en varias ocasiones he mantenido para guardar aquellas no es remedio que vasta solo, pues haciéndose el ilícito trato con embarcaciones pequeñas en caletas, y surgideros** de poco fondo donde no pueden entrar los navíos están aquellas haziendo el ilizito comercio a vista de estos sin que se lo puedan impedir

¹¹¹ Kuethe y Andrien, *El mundo atlántico español durante el siglo XVIII*, 157.

head of reforms in the subsequent decades, including a reshaping of the monopoly on trade by Cadiz, fostering a diversification of traded products. His most important written work, *Nuevo sistema de gobierno económico para la América* (1789), provided a new economic model for trade relations between Spain and the American territories.

The War of Jenkins' Ear had also changed the shape of maritime defense, as a system of permanent battalions had been set in many parts of the Caribbean during the war, with success in Cartagena. This system of battalions would be amplified in the years following the Treaty of Madrid by the new minister in charge, La Ensenada. In the 1740s and 50s, the Crown would promulgate new regulations for Cuba, Veracruz and Yucatan, which provided norms and prescriptions for the formation of companies, including companies of Spaniards and of *pardos*. Similarly, privateering companies and their activities in the Caribbean would only increase until the early 19th century, as contraband, and especially intra-American contraband, soared during the decades following the War of Jenkins' Ear.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided us with different examples of how contraband, corruption, and fraud were practices at the heart of everyday experience in an area of the monarchy like northern New Granada. This area constituted a frontier which was not peripheral but was instead at the core of exchanges between the new Granada, the American continent, the Caribbean, and the rest of the globe. Contraband of merchandise was both a hindrance to some –the Royal Hacienda, mostly– and an invaluable precious source of goods for others, and especially for American merchants and traders who participated in a continental system of trade with commodities like aguardiente, Palo de Campeche, cacao, and gold. Participation in contraband was ubiquitous, from the upper echelons of society to the lowest strata. Control mechanisms were enforced without resulting in an alteration of these practices, as repercussions became taxes instead of remissions (like *indultos* or fines). Normative limits were prescribed but not complied with and seldom enforced. Those who did comply risked obtaining less profit from their activity. Thus, tolerance for fraud and corruption, similarly to contraband, in areas where monetary stability was scarce, was

commonplace for the same reasons. These kinds of malpractice could not possibly be contained by the same social structures which enabled them.

Furthermore, the inability of local and peninsular government to implement a concise and lasting strategy to defend coasts has been seen as a dysfunctionality of government in the Indies. And indeed, debates around territorial management lingered for years (see the next chapter for a *longue-durée* assessment of this). But the powerlessness to curtail contraband stemmed mainly from the fact that it was essential for Spanish American inhabitants, which only added to the already turbulent relationship between Spain and foreign commercial interlopers.

Proposed solutions like the mentioned privateering company usually involved private capital and were backed by political figures in cities. These experiences of negotiation constituted fundamental instances of political communication whereby subjects (republics, corporations, cities) and the Monarch attempted to meet halfway between each party's interests and prerogatives. As Manuel Herrero Sánchez has argued: "each nucleus engages with both the sovereign and other entities, while maintaining a hierarchical order."¹¹² In the case of Cartagena's Vecinos, contraband, a mutual nuisance, was used as a rhetoric asset to obtain a portion of the King's grace in hopes to acquire commercial licenses and, tangentially, defend the coasts of the Kingdom. In the following chapters we will see how similar ventures like exploration and conquest were proposed and advanced through the same mechanism which attempted to unite the interests of many parties on ground at once fertile, hostile, and contested.

¹¹² Manuel Herrero Sánchez, "El declive de la Monarquía Hispánica en el contexto internacional durante la segunda mitad del siglo XVII", en *La decadencia de la monarquía hispánica en el siglo XVII: viejas imágenes y nuevas aportaciones*, 2016, ISBN 978-84-16647-00-2, págs. 39-58, 2016, 39-58, <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5716568>.

Chapter 3: Time, space and change: an overview

Introduction

The late 17th century was one of evolving borders, disputes, and spatial and political reconfiguration. Events like the British invasion of Jamaica in 1655 altered the balance of power in the Spanish Caribbean, giving the English an important stronghold. But many disputes had taken place over time, within borders far less easily defined, during processes involving negotiations between authorities and *vecinos* alike, as historians have shown in the case of Amazonia, for example¹; others had imploded more abruptly, as the insularity of authority which Europeans both enjoyed and suffered made them vulnerable to attacks on many frontiers of their imperial expanses². Indeed, between 1680 and 1730, American territories under European dominion experienced several such cases: on the northeast coast, King Philip's War in 1675, the Yamasee Revolt of 1715 in South Carolina, the Puebla Revolt of 1685 in New Mexico, the Natchez Revolt in French Louisiana from 1729 until 1731. European authority over contested land³ faced challenges throughout the Early Modern period and in the 17th century as a whole, but the late 17th century proved an especially fertile ground for this type of struggle on the frontier, where the confluence of many actors and interest groups shaped the spatial, social, and political face of the Americas.

The goal of this chapter is to present an overview of one such process on the frontiers of the New Granada's northernmost provinces, as authorities in Spain, in the New Granada, and at a local level, as well as inhabitants such as *vecinos*, people of

¹ Sebastián Gómez González, *Frontera selvática: españoles, portugueses y su disputa por el noroccidente amazónico, siglo XVIII*; Sebastián Gómez González, Colección espiral (Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, 2014); Tamar Herzog, *Frontiers of possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas* (Harvard University Press, 2015); Pablo Ibáñez-Bonillo, "The Portuguese conquest of the Amazon Estuary : identity, war, frontier (1612-1654)" (Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2016), <https://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/handle/10023/9790>.

² See, for instance, Soizic Croguennec, "BORDERLANDS AND ACCOMMODATION: SPANISH SOLDIERS AND AMERINDIAN NATIONS IN LOUISIANA AND FLORIDA (1763-1803)," *Almanack*, núm. 27 (2021): ed00321, <https://doi.org/10.1590/2236-463327ed00321>.

³ The expresión contested ground is a reference to Donna J. Guy y Thomas E. Sheridan, eds., *Contested ground: comparative frontiers on the northern and southern edges of the Spanish Empire*, The Southwest Center series (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1998) In this compendium of chapters, a comparative approach to north and south American frontiers in the Spanish Empire allows for an understanding of frontiers as ground in between forces, claims, and jurisdictions. .

color, and natives, participated in the struggle. Given the breadth of both the period proposed (1685-1740) and the terrain, the questions of space and time will be examined through different lenses, in an attempt to produce a broadly accessible analysis, while also considering particularities. The idea of examining the New Granada in the *longue durée* in the first part of this dissertation is, of course, a reference to Braudel's *Mediterranée*, in which the area of study consists of a multisided entity of which all aspects (geographical, social, political) are essential to its understanding. In this sense, the proposed structure for the chapter poses the question of time (rupture/variability/continuity) and tackles it by adopting a geographical focus across provinces, with an emphasis on decision-making by authorities (peninsular/local/ecclesiastical) interacting with a plethora of social groups defending their own interests (*vecinos*/natives/maroons).

The first part of the chapter focuses on the north-central provinces of Citará Antioquia, Cartagena, and Santa Marta, where varying characteristics led to different—yet interconnected—scenarios across the period. The second part will focus on the Guajira and Darién, where change can be discerned too, but the chronology set forth does not allow for an understanding of it; rather, these two provinces held a special place within the Kingdom, Monarchy, and globe, and they remained “frontiers” well into contemporary times⁴. The discussion around space and time does not seek to assert, contradict, or nuance *what changed and what didn't* for the sake of summarizing general trends. Rather, it seeks to give examples of variability across scenarios (points in space/time) to illustrate the particularities and differences among them, as well as the range of actors involved in the success or failure of attempts at remaking the frontier.

I- Variability throughout the period and area of interest

1) Governing immensity: decision-making and hesitations


As we saw in Chapter 1, the transition from Charles II's reforms, led by his in-fighting *validos* and the reformism inspired by Orry during the War of Succession to,

⁴ The Darién is still a natural frontier between North and South America. The gulph of Urabá, formerly known as the gulph of Darién, has been a coveted area among narco-criminal groups. It constitutes a passageway to North America and is traversed by an estimated third of a million people per year. The guajira is still home to contraband entering Colombia. In the 2000 smuggling of petroleum from Venezuela was commonplace in the region.

later, Cardinal Alberoni's attempt at securing a set of reforms, before being sidelined, does not constitute a homogenous strand of reformism spanning forty years. Rather, it is symptomatic of renewed attempts to deal with the already waning economic crisis and with the awareness of a certain powerlessness in several parts of the Monarchy, as local elites had amassed more offices and power during the previous decades. Arguably, the War of Succession brought to light several challenges in the Indies. These included problems with the supervision of Indian administrators, an increasing number of offices purchased by criollos, difficulties in communication both in terms of orders from the Iberian Peninsula to the Americas and in terms of economic exchanges (a failing *sistema de flotas y galeones*), and an increasingly adverse international balance of power resulting from a combination of circumstances that favored foreign ambitions in the Spanish Caribbean. These issues had crystallized since the mid-17th century and were felt all over the monarchy. Not entirely dissociated from these matters was the question of control over frontiers. It interlaced with the geopolitical question in the New Granada, as Indian trade, resulting from native-foreign relations in geographically peripheral regions, was a byproduct of the "lack of authority." It was denounced by spectators at the time as an aggravating cause of the problems affecting the New Kingdom of Granada: vulnerability in defense, bad government, illicit trade, poverty and free-roaming Indian populations.

Some issues related to defense were rather obvious. For instance, Cartagena, the New Granada's main port, was a priority for the Crown as it represented the costliest vulnerability in case its defenses were breached. This was precisely what had happened in when Francis Drake had attacked Cartagena in 1597. His troops sacked the city and destroyed its defenses; famine and trouble settled in. A hundred years later, Louis XIV dealt an important blow to the Spanish Monarchy as he ordered Bernard Louis Desjeans, Baron de Pointis, the esteemed French Minister of the Navy to organize an expedition with the explicit aim of capturing the fortified city of Cartagena. As mentioned in chapter 1, the attack of July 1697, was possible because the Governor of Cartagena, Diego de los Ríos, had made a secret deal with the French, according to which he would sell the city's arms, underpay, and dismiss the *guardias* (guards), ensuring the success of the assault. In return, he would be safely escorted out of Cartagena and obtain a part of the booty. After this dire incident, de los Ríos was

inculcated by the Council of the Indies. Even though the attack had been negotiated between a corrupt governor and the French, for the Crown, the lesson to be learned after the attack was that securing Cartagena was an evidently pressing matter.



Sketch from: Singladuras por la historia naval, fortificaciones de Cartagena de Indias, online: <https://bit.ly/3DigCvQ>

Securing the bay of Cartagena would be the task of engineer Juan de Herrera y Sotomayor for the following thirty years. The bay had two “bocas” or mouths: Bocachica and Bocagrande. Since the foundation of the city, the Bocagrande channel was the most used by vessels as its greater width allowed for easier maneuvering of deep-draft ships, a task that was complicated in the Bocachica channel. But Bocagrande had been closed off after two ships sank there in the 17th century, causing an accumulation of sand that impeded transit. Thus, the challenge for Sotomayor was securing Bocachica, on which the Castle of San Luis de Bocachica stood. Inspired by the innovations in the field of fortifications, developed by Luis XIV’s engineer, Sébastien Le Prestre, marquis de Vauban, between 1714 and 1725, Sotomayor directed the reconstruction of the San Luis de Bocachica Castle as well as the construction of the San José Battery, on the nearby islet of Draga. Two reinforcing batteries, Punta

Abanicos and Varadero, were added on the Barú Island. This defensive distribution was a response to the Pointis attack, which clearly showed the existing defenses to be sufficient. Thus, both sides of the bay could now defend the mouth spewing cannon fire from either side.

But some issues related to defense were much more difficult to solve. In general, the question of defense was a matter of debate. Sotomayor, for instance, saw his projects stall because the *cabildo* debated at length on whether to close the access to Bocachica. A review of correspondence and documents attesting to decision-making reveals the troublesome affair of administrating the New Granada and its “liquid frontiers” in particular. Most of the affluents of the main rivers in the north (Magdalena, Cauca, Atrato) were little-known and officials who ventured into the thick hinterland, under conditions that made exploration difficult, permanently discovered new uncharted waterways. Conversely, the circulation of native groups who had not submitted to the Crown, and their considerably greater skill at navigating, trekking, and general resistance in the various biospheres that made up the northern frontiers (e.g., marshes, dry-tropical forest, dry-humid forest, savannah, high altitude mountain) made them formidable guides or adversaries for the Europeans. Not only was exploration difficult, but defense against hostile native groups and foreign incursions which sought to deal in “illicit commerce” or even to colonize parts of the terrain was nearly impossible.

In this configuration, instances of hesitation, convoluted deliberation, and contrived solutions regarding how to secure the territory were abundant, and traces of this can be found in archival sources. This was mainly because the terrain was so unknown. Because explorations hinged on 1- how secure the area was for *entradas* (exploration groups), and 2- enthusiasm and capital for *descubrimientos*, led by groups of *vecinos* and, often, the governor and his captains, some rivers remained mostly unexplored and would not be charted until the early 19th century, among others, by Alexander Von Humboldt’s expedition. For example, explorations of the Atrato river, whose delta is located on the Gulph of Darién, were not attempted until the late 16th century when the Governor of Cartagena’s expedition followed the course of the Atrato in search for a tributary of the Atrato river which was rumored to empty into the Pacific,


before they were ambushed by Indians and turned back⁵. Then, during the 17th century, Franciscan expeditions went along the Atrato seeking to convert Embera and Cuna populations living on its banks. As discussed in Part II of this dissertation, the Franciscan missionary experience in the Chocó was mostly difficult, resulting in tense encounters, rebellions, and allegations of mistreatment on the part of the friars. Another type of exploration was that of smugglers, or individuals who engaged in illegal commerce, at times fleeing from authorities through the thick jungle.

Because so much of the immense terrain was uncharted, decisions to grant free navigation and circulation varied greatly during this time. This was especially the case in the province of Chocó and in Río de la Hacha (Santa Marta province). In Chocó, for instance, the Atrato was closed for navigation in 1697 at a time of heightened foreign menace but especially due to foreign smugglers who were helped in their activities by Indians⁶. Because the prohibition was so difficult to enforce, subsequent orders were expedited in following decades⁷. In 1733, after the Governor of Chocó Francisco de Ibero and his officials had been inculpated with charges of illicit trade, the Council of the Indies learned that contraband was transported through a *camino* (road) that lead from the Ciénaga Tadia to the Marrí river mouth, through which illegal trade was practiced from the north of the province of Citará (northern Chocó), to the Atrato River:

⁵ This expedition allowed them to verify that one of the Atrato's tributaries, Oromira (see chapter 4) contained gold deposits, see Williams, *Between Resistance and Adaptation*, 30.

⁶ Enrique Ortega Ricaurte, *Historia documental del Chocó*, edición original: the University of Virginia (Ed. Kelly, 1954).

⁷ AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. 9, f. 229, Reiteration of prohibition to navigate the Atrato of 1733.



Larger scale:



Similarly, in 1738, the Council of the Indies requested a confidential map from an engineer named Briones depicting the vicinity of Rio de la Hacha, as well as the coasts and villages adjacent to the mountains where illicit commerce was said to be ongoing and in need of suppression. This demand followed a debate among officials over the convenience of closing two canals by the name of Caño Culebras and Caño Cenizas, through which “much of what entered the large and open coast of Santa Marta and Rio de la Hacha” passed; recently, two Dutch sloops had made their way into the area in this manner. Effectively, however, the abundance of *caños* (channel, stream) and the smuggler’s collaboration with natives made closing a few of them an insufficient solution⁸. In the 1730s, debate in the province of Santa Marta over whether to close off the access to the Rio de la Hacha, as illicit trade by Dutch merchants was so well installed, they now “sold publicly” and in such a reduced amount of time they quickly “celebrated their sales” and returned to Curaçao. More information and the opinions of local officials was required by the Council as to whether closing the entire river was feasible and sensible⁹.

To summarize, then, the question of how to secure an unknown or misunderstood topography was very common in correspondence between Seville, Madrid and Santafé. This question was linked to the broader issue of securing the coast and hinterland against contraband, as much of the debate around affluents, *ciénagas* and deltas was linked to the debate around preventing foreign frigates (*fragatas*), sloops (*pingues, balandras*) and other small ships from entering into the continent to sell and buy provisions, only to return to the sea once their expedition came to fruition inland. Thus, two main issues had to be tackled. On the one hand, there was the issue of improving coastal defense through military reform and other means, like privateering, as discussed in the previous chapter. The other issue was that of inland defense through foundations, mainly of *reducciones, pueblos* and *villas*, to contain the circulation of free actors such as maroons and “hostile” natives.

In both cases, the period saw variations in the strategies implemented to enforce authorities’ grasp over frontiers both maritime and terrestrial. How these variations presented themselves across the period, in other words, whether it is possible to note

⁸ AGI, Santa Fe, 384, Carta del Consejo, 18 de marzo 1738.

⁹ AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. 9, f. 287-289.

evolutions, continuity or variability, is the task of any historical approach. How change comes about, what feeds ruptures, why different decisions are made; these are all proper questions to ask oneself when historicizing a subject. -These questions will be answered thoroughly in the chapters that follow. But for the sake of understanding the period broadly, and especially the chronological starting point of this dissertation, two points will be tackled here: how the strategies and approaches to conquering or “pacifying” the inland and hinterland varied according to the terrain and the interests officials had therein; how the extremes of the northern borders, the Darién and Guajira, where change occurred in the *longue durée* outside the bounds of the chronology of interest and a number particularities of both areas explain a number continuities therein.

2) *Pacification or conquest?*

a) Foreword

In the 1950s, Father Severino de Santa Teresa took the following position in his *Historia documentada de la iglesia en Urabá y el Darién: desde el descubrimiento hasta nuestros días*:

“In accordance with true historical criticism, we will introduce the following modification in the division: The period of the discovery and conquest, from the year 1492 to 1550, that is, until the establishment of the Royal Audience in the New Kingdom of Granada, we will call Discovery and Pacification. The colonial period, from 1550 to 1810, we will call, more appropriately, Spanish America. To the independence of America up to our days, we will give the name of Independent Spanish America. Here is the reason for the modification adopted: The title that we give to the first part, was already provided for in the Laws of the Indies, by decreeing that, “for just causes and considerations it is convenient, that in all the capitulations that are made for new discoveries, this word conquest is excused, because having to be done with all peace and charity, it is our will, that even this name interpreting against our intention, does not cause, or give color to the capitulated, so that force or aggravation can be done to the Indians.”¹⁰

In the 1950s, when his monumental *Historia* was published, historiography was moving away from the partition of history that had been forged during the nineteenth

¹⁰ Severino De Santa Teresa, *Historia documentada de la Iglesia en Urabá y el Darién desde el descubrimiento hasta nuestros días*, Biblioteca de la Presidencia de Colombia (Bogotá: Kelly, 1956), 81.

century when the use of the word “colonia” had become generalized. Santa Teresa’s proposal has a defect with respect to nineteenth-century partitions: it conflates all “colonial” history without differentiation, from 1550 to 1810—not only because Santa Teresa omits mention of what becomes of the period 1492-1550, which has traditionally been called “*Conquista*,” but also because the proposed chronological range is presented as a single “colonial” block. Santa Teresa’s justification for such a method recalls a law of the *Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias*, from the time of Philip II, commanding that the term *conquista* be dropped in favor of the term *pacificación*¹¹. In fact, *conquista* did not disappear, but its meaning became more nuanced. At the beginning of the eighteenth century, traces of this can be found in records, which offer mentions of “conquests attempted by X” or keep records of “the conquest of the X Indians.” This use of the term carries the notion of defined subjugation attempts, aimed at or by a specific set of actors, as opposed to the general stream of military action undertaken by conquistadors in the early 1550s.

Santa Teresa’s commentary shows a discomfort with the word *conquista*, wishing, it seems, to limit its use to the first fifty years of American-Spanish contact. But this approach masks the reality of a much slower conquest: the one that took place on the margins of Spanish America. Not margins as we understand periphery or fringes, as in the territories where 1- jurisdictions were superposed or ill-defined and a dispute for the control of resources and circulation prevailed¹², 2- spats of land lay in-between populated areas (coastal and central-Andean cities) in this case Andean settlement nuclei with the lower lands¹³, 3- zones that were hardly known and, therefore, remained unexplored until the 18th century, giving rise to *entradas* in many areas of the continent. These three points cover, in general terms, some aspects of what contemporary historiography has defined as “frontier.” To put it differently, the chronological classification advanced by Santa Teresa clouds the processes of conquest on the margins of the empire, the empire being understood as the physical terrain and people over which the authority (*imperium* and *potestas*) of the monarch - and, consequently,

¹¹ See *RLDI* 6. tit. I, lib. IV and *Ordinances of Philip II on populations* published in 1573, Ordinance n° 29.

¹² Such as the limits of Cartagena/Santa Marta, or Citará/Antioquia/Cartagena.

¹³ Marta Herrera Ángel, *Ordenar para controlar: ordenamiento espacial y control político en las llanuras del Caribe y en los Andes Centrales Neogranadinos. Siglo XVIII*, Tercera edición, La carreta histórica (Medellín: La Carreta Editores: Uniandes : Cesó, 2007).

of his magistrates and officials - extended. This section seeks to unpack the vocabulary with which this conquest was referred to and what lay behind it, as well as to explain how the 1680s ushered in new strategies of conquest and pacification.

b) The renewal of efforts to conquer, pacify, and reduce

The morphology of urban settlements in the New Granada, as explained in the introduction, was first and foremost coastal and then Andean. This posed the problem of administrating the space in between the coast and mountain ranges, so that once the coast had been settled into cities and port cities, the hinterland could be controlled. The only major port which was a step in the Carrera de Indias of Flotas y Galeones was Cartagena, while the ports of Santa Marta and Riohacha were “hidden ports,” as Ernesto Bassi has discussed, alluding to the fact that they were “ports frequently mentioned in Spanish reports as sites used by Spanish, British, Dutch, French, and Danish subjects to engage in illicit commercial exchanges”¹⁴. The hinterland, extending from the desert plains of the Guajira, laden with salt mines and ponds, passing the savannah lowlands of the Magdalena basin, brimming with pastures and trees that extend in width not unlike those in the central African savannah (Cartagena Province), all the way to the dense tropical humid forests of the Citará and Darién provinces, is of a considerable size. In width, it spans roughly 850 kilometers. For some reference, it is the same distance than that which separates Cordoba, in Andalucía, from Bordeaux, Milan from Berlin, and Aswan, in the Lower Nile region, from the city port of Alexandria. It is thus very difficult to establish a general sense of the “state of things” during the late 1680s or early 1690s throughout this region, encompassing such different topographies and peoples. Furthermore, the extremes of the Guajira and Darién were subject to several common characteristics which will be addressed in part 3.

For now, let us focus on the state of the central northern provinces of the New Granada 1680’s onward, from east to west: Santa Marta and Rio de la Hacha, Cartagena, and Antioquia. It must be noted that all of these provinces will be discussed in detail, and the introductions to parts II and III of this dissertation aim precisely to consider the particular conditions of, respectively, northwestern and northeastern provinces. Indeed, the 1680s saw several royal cédulas arrive in the New Granada with

¹⁴ Bassi, *An Aqueous Territory*, 25.

the purpose of commanding the advancement of the conquest against Indians qualified as “rebeldes, “hostiles,” “bravos” in New Granada, Chile, and Peru¹⁵. These gave way to a renewal of strategies that sought to “pacify” these regions. These strategies were not unlike those which had been attempted since the 16th century, and their study in historiography falls under the lens of *poblamiento*, which literally translates to ‘populating’. It is an interesting turn in historiography that the term chosen to describe the process of conquering through settlements would be comprised in a term so broad, so ambiguous. Populating the Indies, even in the early 18th century, was by no means a peaceful endeavor. Indeed, populating and pacifying were two verbs commonly employed to describe the attempt to submit native populations to the will of authorities. In 1741, Viceroy Sebastián de Eslava would say explain his manner of trying to negotiate with a cacique to “pacify and populate the Indians subordinate to his command.” Here, populating references compelling (and/or coercing) the Indians to settle in villages; another verb used to express this need was *avecindarse* (to become a *vecino* of a town). Even so, while negotiations, especially in certain zones, through intermediaries or go-betweens, as well as persuasion, and slow getting-to-know-each-other articulated the process of *Conquista y pacificación*, armed struggles abounded.

In this dissertation, it is unavoidable to refer to *poblamiento* insofar as it is both a notion increasingly used in the 18th century, as well as a historiographical approach. But also, because populating the Indies, or better even *settling them* through villages and towns involved a complex process. Although the goal was indeed *populating*, it was also to populate the Indies according to a multidimensional civilizational conception which comprised: a spatial dimension (*ciudades, pueblos, villas*, all of them centered around a church and central *plaza*); a political dimension, in which the Republic took shape (i.e. the public thing, that which belonged to the subjects of the king and ordered their assembly) expressed in the *república de indios /república de españoles*, the *cabildo* and *regimiento*; and a religious dimension whereby the universality of Christianity should bring all beings into the lord’s house¹⁶. In this sense, parishes functioned as primary territorial units upon which spatial assignment (assignation territorial) functioned.

¹⁵ AGN Reales Cédulas t.III.

¹⁶ Cf. la maison Dieu: Church>from Old English *circe* / from Old Norse *kirkja*> kuriakón (dóma) = the lord’s house.

This civilizational, and by the same token, evangelizing endeavor, took the shape of a civil and military “pacification,” whereby *reducciones* were made in the form of towns (*pueblos*), often founded under the authority of a designated Indian captain or *cacique*, who was himself under the authority of a Spanish captain or *corregidor*. When ecclesiastical authorities took up the task, *reducciones* took the shape of missions (*misiones*) to which *pueblos* were annexed. The idea of *reducciones*, whether of civil or ecclesiastic initiative, translate the intentions behind orders of *conquista* and/or *pacificación*, the choice of words varying in accordance with the time, as Felipe II chose the latter over the former. In his *Tesoro de la lengua castellana*, 1611, Sebastián de Covarrubias gives the following definition: “Reducir, Latin, reducir, reducirle, es convencerle Reduzido, convencido, y buelto a mejor orden..” In the same sense, to *convince* amounts to: “Convencer a uno, reducirle a que mude de parecer. Latin. Convinco. Is. Vinco, redarguo, evinco. Convencido, y buelto a mejor orden..” Thus, two senses that are not unrelated structure the latin root “reduce”:

- 1) That of convincing someone
- 2) That of making them, either by convincing or by other means, to adhere to a better order.

Convincing thus acquires the sense of betterment, improvement, and compliance with an established convention of what “a better order” implied. Spanish was not alone in having fostered a different meaning for the notion of reducing. In *Henry the V*, Act 5 scene 2, the duke of Burgundy makes a plea to restore the state of things prior to the eruption of war between factions, and explains the state of the kingdom in these words:

And all our vineyards, fallows, meads, and hedges,
 Defective in their natures, grow to wildness.
 Even so our houses and ourselves and children
 Have lost, or do not learn for want of time,
 The sciences that should become our country,
 60 But grow like savages, as soldiers will
 That nothing do but meditate on blood,
 To swearing and stern looks, diffused attire,
 And everything that seems unnatural.
 Which to *reduce* into our former favor
 65 You are assembled, and my speech entreats
 That I may know the let why gentle peace
 Should not expel these inconveniences

And bless us with her former qualities¹⁷.

Reducing, in the sense of returning to a better state, or convincing to return to a better state – “better,” here, being the vehicle for the abovementioned civilizational endeavor – was the ultimate goal of *conquista* and *pacificación* expeditions, whether they were called one or the other. Ultimately, the ideal of reducing the Indians to Christendom was the ideological cornerstone of officials and ecclesiastic authorities alike. And, as we will see, the hope that conversion through good example and emulation of converted Caciques would, little by little, convince (reduce) native populations by capillarity, can be found in archival documentation, even in the areas most challenging to authorities. One example is that of (el cacique rebelde en sqntq mqrtq 1750 estudiado). Of course, this ideal of conversion by capillarity was theoretical; in practice, the vicissitudes of war and its participants made the process a harsh experience for natives.

The royal cédulas sent to the New Granada and other parts of the Americas had heterogenous effects depending on many factors, like the particular interests of local officials who also happened to have the most interest in enriching themselves and extend their sphere of influence. For comparison: starting in the west, the Chocó was undergoing, at the time, an important native rebellion in which Indians of different ethnic groups collided and then co-acted to expel, kill, and deter (mostly) Franciscan Friars whose incursions into the chocean wilderness had intensified since the 1660s (see intro to part II). The interest posed by the Chocó mainly hinged on its gold deposits, which authorities from Antioquia and Popayán raced to attain. In Cartagena and Santa Marta Provinces, the situation was variable, but the most pressing issue was security. Along the border between both provinces, marked by the Magdalena River, and all the way to the Río de la Hacha (in the east), i.e., largely, the mid-terrain between both provinces, the area was dominated by the Chimilas, a “barbarian,” “rebel” Indian group. In Cartagena, several attempts to contain the circulation of Chimilas were made, and violent encounters and skirmishes often ended poorly. While a coherent strategy to deal with the Chimilas would not be implemented until the 1730s, attempts to persuade other non-submitted natives who were perceived as “friendly” or “docile,” through negotiation and “gentle means,” were underway throughout the period. Additionally, in

¹⁷ William Shakespeare 1564-1616, *Henry V*, 1599.

the limits between the provinces of Antioquia/Cartagena/Santa Marta, *palenques* and maroon communities formed, often on higher ground like *serranías*, mountains and hills, or what was known as *monte*.¹⁸

In Rio de la Hacha province an area mentioned as the *Ranchería de perlas*, pearl extraction, had been one of the main activities of Santa Marta province, and *Indios buzeros* (free-divers, or apnea-divers) constituted an important *main d'oeuvre* in the extraction of pearls, oftentimes a deadly endeavor. But until an important percentage of the province's population was made of native Wayuu populations. There were also maroon communities dating from the late 16th century.¹⁹ The untamed parts of this province, to the north, constituted a frontier on which these populations circulated and, in the case of the Wayuu, participated in illicit trade with foreign merchants and undertook acts of inter-ethnic warfare. Attempts at pacifying the frontier necessarily had to emanate from the provinces of Santa Marta and Cartagena, as the peninsula did not have an urban center whence troops of soldiers or companies of regular clergy could be sent. Thus, several attempts to pacify and populate areas where 1-free people of color, mestizos and “people of all colors” lived freely in informal towns and 2- “hostile” Indians circulated, were executed with more haste in the late 17th century, and this from west to east, although the fate of these efforts varied enormously.

In Antioquia, native populations were neither a substantial obstacle nor an essential asset –this has been one of the focal points of the argument that advances the development of Antioquia province as a particular experiment in the New Granada, as its development in the 18th and 19th centuries was based on family steads and individual farms of mostly white colonizers.²⁰ But the demographic profile of the province, and in particular of its towns – like Medellín after 1700 – was much more complex, as migration from elsewhere in the province and kingdom had brought many blacks, *mulatos* and free people of color – African slaves had been imported as early as 1550

¹⁸ On the idea of wilderness and mountain summarized in the word “monte,” see Juan David Montoya Guzmán, “‘Las más remotas tierras del mundo’: historia de la frontera del Pacífico, 1573-1687” (2014), <https://rio.upo.es/xmlui/handle/10433/954>; Herrera, *Ordenar para controlar. Ordenamiento espacial y control político en las Llanuras del Caribe y en los Andes centrales neogranadinos. Siglo XVIII*.

¹⁹ José Trinidad Polo Acuña, a, y Diana Carmona Nobles, “El mestizaje en una frontera del Caribe: el caso del pueblo de Boronata en la Guajira, 1696-1776.” *Investigación y Desarrollo* 21, núm. 1 (el 1 de enero de 2013): 130–56.

²⁰ On this, see Twinam, *Miners, merchants, and farmers in colonial Colombia* Introduction.

to work in the mines of Buriticá²¹— as well as mestizos.²² On the border between Antioquia and Cartagena, many mixed communities lived on the frontier.²³ But the free indigenous population was meagre, and mostly concentrated in *encomiendas* located in the north of the province. Antioquia's particularity, compared to Cartagena and Santa Marta Provinces, was that its *encomiendas* concentrated most native populations after the initial epidemiological shock and violence of the 1500s had decimated indigenous populations in the area. Thus, *encomiendas* encompassed the small numbers of remaining natives to the region, as well as Anacona (outsider) Indians, who had migrated from lands further south in the Viceroyalty of Peru. The Indian presence was thus roughly contained, and when the governors of Antioquia did heed the call for pacification on the frontier, it was because it either represented a chance to curb violence on contested terrain (on the borders between provinces) or because it represented an opportunity for discovering gold sources; see chapters 4 and 5 for a discussion of how both motivations coincided in between 1709 and 1726²⁴.

Like the rest of the New Granada, the province of Antioquia lived through a redistribution and consolidation of *encomiendas* after all *encomiendas* were technically dismantled and transferred²⁵. *Encomiendas*, the main unit of production and labor which operated since the conquest in the 16th century, had shaped the exercise of peninsular authority upon native tribes and their workforce. In this configuration each *encomendero* received a parcel of land and Indians attached to it as a *repartimiento*: an **entrusted** piece of the demographic and material burden, entrenched in the logic of *Conquista y pacificación*²⁶. In the 1680s, as many *encomiendas* were integrated into the crown, the morphology of settlements changed, as well as ownership or possession of the land²⁷. It must be remarked that while *encomiendas* in the northern provinces dwindled, in the central Andes (around Santafé de Bogotá— *encomiendas* were still an

²¹ Twinam, 17.

²² Rodríguez, *Cabildo y vida urbana en el Medellín colonial, 1675-1730*.

²³ Arcila y Gómez, *Libres, cimarrones y arrojados en la frontera entre Antioquia y Cartagena*.

²⁴ AHA; censo poblacional Antioquia 1692.

²⁵ See chapter 6.

²⁶ For a detailed definition of *encomiendas* see introduction.

²⁷ For a study on the distinction between possession, occupation, usufruct and property of land in the New Granada, see several works by Jesús Bohórquez.

essential unit of production and population well into the 18th century²⁸. Conversely, demographic sources for the provinces of Cartagena and Santa Marta convey a much higher estimation of free peoples, both indigenous and of African origin, and a complex socio-cultural configuration, with an abundance of maroon communities in Cartagena, and a large number of untamed groups in Santa Marta province, Rio de la Hacha province, and the terrain extending from both towards the Perijá Mountains (which constitute the modern-day Colombo-Venezuelan border).

The list of populations living on the frontiers of these provinces, i.e. in the area not controlled by Spanish authorities is long, but let us mention some of them, to which will thenceforward be alluded. The lands surrounding the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta were inhabited by the native Arhuaco and Kogi (contemporary ethnic denominations); the lowlands around the Magdalena and extending south into the Serranía de Perijá (south-east of Santa Marta) were dominated by natives of the Chimila family (Chibcha-speaking, see chapter 6), Chimila being a broad term used to refer to an ethnic diversity composed of Tomocos, Orejones, Tupes and Motilones. Some “hostile” groups also circulated freely in their areas, like the Pintados, of Malibu filiation. Further west, in the valleys of the rivers Sinú and Atrato lived some of the first native continental groups to have endured the conquest (contrary to the native peoples of the insular Caribbean): the Cuna and Embera (sometimes referred to as Chocoes by officials). The Cuna were some of the most resilient ethnic groups of the Neogranadian Pacific, and instances of trouble with “the Cuna” referred to in the singular, are profuse in correspondence between frontier officers (corregidores, captains) and governors (see Chapter 5).

c) Some examples

The subjugation of the different native populations who circulated freely on the frontiers of this large area was neither a homogeneous nor definitive process during the period we are considering; rather, it was marked by individual actors and collective enterprises that advanced “pacification” in the different provinces, which was ultimately dependent on several factors. For instance, motives for seeking to achieve such a subjugation varied greatly. Starting in the west, the Citará, Chocó and Darién

²⁸ On this, see Marta Herrera Ángel, “Transición entre el ordenamiento territorial prehispánico y el colonial en la Nueva Granada,” *Historia Crítica*, núm. 32 (julio de 2006): 118–52, <https://doi.org/10.7440/historit32.2006.05>; Herrera, *Ordenar para controlar. Ordenamiento espacial y control político en las Llanuras del Caribe y en los Andes centrales neogranadinos. Siglo XVIII*.

had always been linked to the quest for gold since Spanish conquistadors had come across the legend of Dabeiba (see Introduction to part II) long before they settled any land in South America. Thus, the race to pacify and evangelize native populations aligned with the will to find resources, map, chart, and report findings back to local and peninsular authorities. The two things were interconnected. One more discursive and justifying, the other more silent and decisive. Attempts to discover and conquer the Pacific regions had been tried since the early 1600s and it had been the Crown's privilege to appoint "adelantados" to undertake expeditions. During this time, many expeditions were led by individuals from the Province of Popayán. But the personal character of their efforts, and the conflicts derived from this characteristic – not unlike those in Peru half a century before, had convinced the Crown to delegate responsibility to provincial governors in the vicinity of Chocó along the Caribbean and Darién regions: Antioquia, Cartagena and Panama.²⁹ In the 18th century, a jurisdictional dispute over Antioquia and Popayán would ensue (see Chapter 5).

In this sense, after a series of unsuccessful and deadly pacification attempts undertaken by Franciscan friars in the 17th century, momentum was renewed in the 1670s *bachiller* Antonio de Guzmán who received an "Instrucción del descubrimiento y pacificación de la Provincia del Chocó, sus caminos, rios, puertos, quebradas, amagamientos de oro, sitios de sus poblaciones y viviendas u en donde se hizo la erección de los pueblos que se habían de fundar." Guzmán carried out a successful series of *entradas* and *fundaciones* in the course of his *descubrimientos*. His *entradas* crystallized a competition between the governorships of Antioquia and Popayán for discoveries in the Chocó (see chapter 5), as well as between members of the clergy, some of whom (Franciscan friars, mainly) competed with secular clergymen. The pressure exerted by the missions in the 1670s built up until the rebellion of 1686, which resulted in a generalized yet seemingly spontaneous rebellion against Spanish presence in Chocó³⁰. It produced a time of post-conflict stasis until the 1710s when new *entradas* were launched from the province of Antioquia. As opposed to the spiritual conquest

²⁹ Germán Colmenares y Germán Colmenares, *Cali, terratenientes, mineros, y comerciantes, siglo XVIII*, 4. ed, Biblioteca Germán Colmenares 3 (Santafé de Bogotá: TM Editores, 1997), 80.

³⁰ On the rebellion, see Caroline A. Williams, "Resistance and Rebellion on the Spanish Frontier: Native Responses to Colonization in the Colombian Chocó, 1670-1690," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 79, núm. 3 (el 1 de agosto de 1999): 397–424, <https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-79.3.397>.

hitherto attempted, this time authorities in Antioquia focused on negotiations through intermediaries, ultimately benefiting both sides and privileging the reestablishment of relations between Spaniards and Indians after the anomy produced by the revolt (see Chapter 5). Efforts thus varied diachronically; at times evangelization was more directly attempted, while at others civil authorities engaged in negotiations.

In the province of Cartagena and Santa Marta, attempts to negotiate with indigenous groups also saw the light of day at the end of the 17th century. Some of the most pressing motivation for conquering untamed frontiers in those provinces resulted from struggle against the Chimila Indians, Guajiro/Wayuu Indians, and maroons, against whom the authorities sought to forge alliances with other groups in the province. In certain regions, as in the northeast of the province of Santa Marta, on the border with that of Maracaibo, unsuccessful attempts to install villages around San Nicolás de los Menores and in the province of Maracaibo in 1694 led to the abandonment of the villages founded after the murder of a *cura doctrinero*. Provincial authorities reported that the difficulties encountered stemmed from the laboriousness of evangelizing the Indians of this region, the little “love” the missionaries had for them, and the excessive pressure exerted by *encomenderos*. In many cases, hostilities against the missionaries, which often ended in massacres (as in Chocó in 1685), led to the total withdrawal of the authorities. In this case, the governor of Cartagena, Martín de Ceballos, was ordered not to entrust (*encomendar*) the Indians until the situation calmed down, and this only in the case of a new attempt, as the fiscal of the Council recalled in the dispositions given for the area:

“in case of a new attempt at founding and considering it convenient to treat the mentioned Indians with gentleness and leniency, deferring their entrustment until they are well rooted in the faith, I have also resolved that on this point what is provided for in the laws and royal decrees be observed, and especially those that are referred to in which it was declared that the [first] twenty years that the converted Indians are to remain without being entrusted or taxed, are to be counted from the day of Baptism”³¹.

³¹ SANTA_FE, 525, Real cédula de 18 de enero de 1718, por mandado del rey a don francisco de Arana y consejeros de Indias (copia): “en caso de volverse a fundar y considerando ser conveniente se trate con suavidad y sin rigor a dichos indios, difiriendo el encomendarlos hasta que estén bien radicados en la fê, he resuelto así mismo que sobre este punto se observe lo que disponen las leyes y reales cédulas, y

In the province of Cartagena, in addition to the question of the Chimilas, who circulated freely on both banks of the Magdalena River -- and, consequently, in both provinces, there was also the question of the *cimarronaje* (marooning), whose long history in that province was punctuated by key events at the end of the 17th century. In 1696, for example, the new interim governor of the province, who had arrived to replace the outgoing Martín de Ceballos, Sancho Ximenes Castellano, chaplain of the castle of Bocachica (Cartagena Bay), was alerted of disturbances in the *palenques* of the *sierras* southwest of Cartagena. His predecessor had made violent entradas to varying degrees of success into the *palenques* of the Matudere and María mountains, which had existed since the beginning of the 17th century.

It turns out, amid his offensive, that Ceballos had reached an agreement with the *palenqueros* of the María mountains southwest of Cartagena de Indias, who had declared in 1688 that they would submit to authorities and forego their respective strongholds. Authorities, wanting to use “soft means,” accepted and, to formalize their entry into the body of subjects of the king, a royal cédula was issued on August 23rd, 1691, to the *negros criollos de la montaña*, guaranteeing their freedom. The death of Governor Ceballos produced a *renversement de situation* because the arrival of Sancho X gave an opportunity to certain dissident factions of the *cabildo* of Cartagena who, ever since the time of Ceballos, had disapproved of the fact that the maroons were not assailed as vigorously as they had intended. Opposition from the cabildo led Sancho Ximeno to revoke the freedom negotiated by Ceballos, leading to a new persecution of the maroons. Ximeno alleged that “it was necessary to revoke what was resolved by his predecessor, as far as the aforementioned criollos were concerned, and that they be declared as slaves, since they all had known owners and were of the same species and quality as the other blacks and castes, and that in this way it was necessary to carry out the unveiling of them (...)” and concluded that “it was necessary to revoke what was resolved by his predecessor, as far as the aforementioned criollos were concerned, and that they be declared as slaves, since they were all known owners and of the same species and quality as the other blacks and castes and that in this way the removal of

especialmente las que quedan referidas en que se declaró que los [primeros] veinte años que los indios convertidos han de estar sin ser repartidos ni tributar, se quenten desde el día del Bautismo.”.

them be carried out (...),” leading Ximeno to “declare [that] they should not enjoy the liberty granted to them by said cedula”³².

Thus, vecinos of the province took up arms, gathered capes and, under the leadership of the governor interim and deputy Don Juan de Mier, went down to the village of Tenerife in Santa Marta and captured 92 black Creoles, killing 43 others, including Domingo Criollo, the captain and leader of the Palenques. The prisoners were sentenced to 200 lashes each and to be returned to their owners in exchange for payment for the “cogida.” Faced with these actions, the Council of the Indies answered by requesting autos explaining the events so that “they would recognize the excess with which [Ximeno] worked in the reduction of the Indians, without taking care of what was commanded and prescribed in the laws of the kingdoms of the Indies and especially by the said cedula of August 13, 1691.”³³

Maria Cristina Navarrete has alluded to this case and explained the non-compliance demonstrated by the governor as one of many instances of disobedience and lack of enforcement of royal policies, adding that, as in Brazil, inhabitants of towns surrounding and local authorities the quilombolas often disagreed on how to tackle them.³⁴ But this case also illustrates the superposition of diverging interests permeating the way in which conquering or pacifying new territory unraveled. The Council of the Indies often played the role of defending the rights of native and maroon communities and ordered royal dispositions to this effect. The *cabildo*, on the other hand, an important institution where the notable vecinos of cities were assembled and acted of their own accord, oftentimes in conjunction with governors. Thus, royal jurisprudence endorsing the liberty of the palenqueros was, in fact, overrun by the personal and economic interests of wealthy vecinos, who had more to gain from seizing maroons or capturing their former slaves anew.

³² AGN, Reales Cédulas, tomo 3, f. 217-218: “conbenía revocase lo resuelto por dicho su antecesor, por lo que tocaba a dichos criollos, y que se declarasen por esclavos, pues lo eran todos con duenos conocidos y por de una especie y calidad que los demas negros y castas y que assi combenia se executase la develacion de ellos (...)” y leading Ximeno to “declarô no devían gosar de la livertad que por dicha cedula les concedi” (...) “se reconozca el exceso con que obrô en la reduccion de ellos, sin arreglarsse a lo mandado y prevenido en las leyes de los reinos de las indias y especialmente por la dha cedula de 13 de agosto de 1691.”

³³ Ibidem.

³⁴ María Cristina Navarrete Peláez, “De las ‘malas entradas’ y las estrategias del ‘buen pasaje’: el contrabando de esclavos en el Caribe neogranadino, 1550-1690,” *Historia Crítica*, núm. 34 (julio de 2007): 159–83, <https://doi.org/10.7440/historcrit34.2007.07>.

Indeed, diverging interests often led to jurisdictional frictions amongst justices in far-flung regions of the northern frontiers, as the following chapters will discuss. Tensions between ecclesiastical and civil or military authorities often marred the process of pacifying unsubmitted communities. In some cases, though, collaboration between these was successful, and the combination eased the tensions that regular missions often installed. Three figures which often worked in consonance were Indian *protectores*, *curas doctrineros*, and *capitanes aguerra*. *Protectores de Indios* were officials appointed on near and distant terrain across the Monarchy, whose task it was to direct, aid and respect subjected natives, ensure their rights as subjects of the king were honored. In the 1670s, several royal cédulas were expedited to the New Granada clarifying the role of protectors, asking a general protector to be appointed in the New Kingdom.³⁵ Unlike regular clergy, secular clergy oftentimes were perceived as less menacing than the groups of friars who “scared the Indians” and were so mobile that missions were of a considerable instability. *Curas doctrineros* tended to remain in situ for years at a time, building personal relationships with the communities they served. Captains aguerra were scarce in the Spanish Monarchy and mainly existed on frontiers like Galicia, northern New Spain, Río de la Plata. Starting in the late 17th century, captains *aguerra* were dispatched to frontiers of different kingdoms of the Indies: northern New Spain and Yucatan, Chile, the Caribbean provinces of the New Granada (Chocó, Antioquia, Cartagena, and Santa Marta) and, later, Rio de la Plata. In the New Granada, as Marta Herrera has examined in her diachronically comparative work of the Caribbean Plains and the central Andes, in the latter, clergy and justices (magistrates) were far more implanted, and the superposition between pre-Hispanic *poblamiento* and Spanish-founded settlements ensured a better control of native populations.³⁶ Conversely, the difficulties facing authorities in the Caribbean Plains made territorial administration much more difficult, and control over non-submitted populations was patchy at best, and feeble in most cases.

Thus, it was precisely in these types of spaces, where “hostile” natives circulated freely, that captains aguerra played an important role. Because they amassed both civil and military authority, their capacities in decision-making were greater than

³⁵ AGN, Reales Cédulas, tomo 3.

³⁶ Herrera Ángel, *Ordenar para controlar*, 353.

those corregidores, who were usually assigned to Indian populations in far-flung areas and oversaw the daily activities of native communities under the auspices of local authorities and were often in charge of enforcing labor and surveilling the collection of Indian tribute (tax) – tasks otherwise left to encomenderos in the Central Andes where encomiendas run strong. But corregidores had a bad reputation, and outcry over their misdeeds and abuses (both towards Indians and towards the Royal Hacienda) were denounced in many parts of the northern provinces. Captains aguerra, on the other hand, were not confined to overseeing Indian affairs, but could also levy troops, appoint captains, organize constructions, and oversee fiscal matters. They were under the direct authority of governors to whom they answered exclusively; oftentimes of criollos origin, they were *vecinos* of the main cities of these provinces, and thus disposed of a social network that helped them finance and support their activities, and of a finer knowledge of their province, its geography, and peoples than, for instance, a governor newly arrived from Spain.

All these strategies to encourage pacifying the unconquered frontiers constituted the experience of government and life on the margins of authority: that of the Audiencia in Santafé, that of the Crown with its Council of the Indies in Madrid, that of provincial Governors in main cities. It consisted of a struggle between actors of many types, whose interests overlapped, coincided and at times collided. The variation in these strategies had much less to do with how much the royal orders to conquer and pacify were obeyed or not, and more to do with the interests of individuals and groups who saw an opportunity for personal promotion in advancing the frontier, be it pecuniary, for social recognition, following a true-hearted Christian mission or for glory and honor.

II- Continuity in the extremes: the struggle for sovereignty in Guajira and Darién

1) *The extremes*

This final part intends to address, in broad terms, the continuity and permanence of problems in the Guajira and Darién, the two extremes of the northern frontiers. Continuity and permanence, in the sense that the evolution of the advancement of “pacification” in these areas lies outside the bounds of the chronology examined in this dissertation. Change in negotiation and warfare varied between 1680 and 1740, but the general state of affairs towards the 1740s was relatively unchanged.

While it is unavoidable to mention these regions, the Darién and Guajira are not a central part of this dissertation for two main reasons. The first is historiographical: the relatively isolated nature of both regions allowed for phenomena to develop in a somewhat localized manner, giving rise to singular experiences like Indian-foreign collaboration for contraband, indigenous resistance until the 19th century, and a considerable foreign presence. This, along with the way in which regional historiographies in Colombia and Panamá have evolved, results in a rather defined historiographical field for each of these areas. Of course, regional historiographies of the other provinces (departments of present-day Colombia) of interest have also developed with relative autonomy. In the case of the Guajira, however, ethnohistorical research offers answers to the problematics tackled in this dissertation during the projected chronology. For example, José Polo Acuña’s work has been fundamental in the field of Guajiran history, and he has overcome the typical post-1750 temporalization that erases the first half of the 18th century to give us a more complete view of 18th century developments.³⁷ Contributions to historiography on the Darién have come from outside Latin-America as the convoluted history of Scottish and English attempts to

³⁷ See, for instance, José Trinidad Polo Acuña, “Poblamiento y conflicto social en la frontera guajira (1700-1800),” *El Taller de la Historia* 1, núm. 1 (2009): 27–74, <https://doi.org/10.32997/2382-4794-vol.1-num.1-2009-638>; José Polo Acuña, “Contrabando y pacificación indígena en la frontera colombo-venezolana de la Guajira (1750-1820),” *América Latina en la Historia Económica* 12, núm. 2 (el 1 de enero de 2005): 87, <https://doi.org/10.18232/alhe.v12i2.365>; José Polo Acuña, “Los wayúu y los cocina: dos caras diferentes de una misma moneda en la resistencia indígena en la guajira, siglo xviii,” 1999, <https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/30524>. Margarita Restrepo Olano, “Un Ejemplo de Relaciones Simbióticas En La Guajira Del Siglo XVIII. Historia de Una Sublevación Bajo El Liderazgo Del Cacique Cecilio,” *Revista Complutense de Historia de América* 39, núm. 0 (2014); Acuña, a, y Nobles, “El mestizaje en una frontera del Caribe.”

settle it made it a topic of great interest since the 19th century, producing a diverse palate of historiographical foci.³⁸

The second reason for omitting the Darién and Guajira as full-blown research objects in this dissertation is that both regions' variability (evolution, continuity, ruptures therein, etc.) must be understood in broader chronological terms, or in a wider *durée*. Generalization always carries the peril of omitting particularities while also shedding light on appreciable trends. But in general terms, it can be said that there were very few changes to the situation of the two geographical extremes of the area selected for the purpose of this dissertation: the Darién gulph and the Guajiran peninsula. These two areas were, in fact, usually mentioned by actors of the time and by posterior historiography as a duo, for the pair remained far from Spanish control (or, in the words of the time “not pacified”) well into the colonial period's dusk³⁹. This was due to many reasons.

First, the geography of both regions made them difficult to access. As a result, Spanish towns were almost inexistent, and in any case unstable and at risk. The Darién and Guajira, interestingly, are almost extreme opposites of an equally narrow strip of land. The Darién is the southern part of the central American isthmus, a hilly land covered in a thick carpet of green, a tropical humid forest traversed by creeks and

³⁸ De Santa Teresa, *Historia documentada de la Iglesia en Urabá y el Darién desde el descubrimiento hasta nuestros días*; Carl Henrik Langebaek y Jacobo Walburger, eds., *El diablo vestido de negro y los cunas del Darién en el siglo XVIII: Jacobo Walburger y su Breve noticia de la provincia del Darién, de la ley y costumbres de los yndios, de la poca esperanza de plantar nuestra fè, y del número de sus naturales, 1748*, 1. ed, Biblioteca banco popular (Bogotá D.C., Colombia: Universidad de Los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Departamento de Ciencia Política, Centro de Estudios Socioculturales e Internacionales, 2006); Sebastián Gómez Gómez, “Las Tensiones de Una Frontera Ístmica: Alianzas, Rebeliones y Comercio Ilícito En El Darién. Siglo XVIII,” *Historia y Sociedad*, consultado el 23 de septiembre de 2022, https://www.academia.edu/2007812/Las_tensiones_de_una_frontera_%C3%ADstmica_alianzas_rebeliones_y_comercio_il%C3%ADcito_en_el_Dari%C3%A9n_Siglo_XVIII; Louise Bénat-Tachot, “Santa María la Antigua del Darién: chronique d'une infortune locale,” *e-Spania. Revue interdisciplinaire d'études hispaniques médiévales et modernes*, núm. 22 (el 31 de octubre de 2015), <https://doi.org/10.4000/e-spania.25105>; Daniela Vásquez Pino, “La hidrarquía en las costas del Darién: extranjeros, colonos y cunas entre 1739-1800,” en *Conflictos indígenas ante la justicia colonial: los hilos entrelazados de una compleja trama social y legal, siglos XVI-XVII*, ed. Héctor Cuevas Arenas (Editorial Universidad Santiago de Cali, 2020), 99–125, <https://doi.org/10.7476/9786287501676.0005>; Ferran Vives Via, “La extracción de oro en el Darién del siglo XVII. Origen y consolidación de un sistema minero de frontera (1637-1641 y 1679-1698),” *Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura* 49, núm. 2 (el 1 de julio de 2022): 29–63, <https://doi.org/10.15446/achsc.v49n2.93879>.

³⁹ John R. Fisher, Allan J. Kuethe, y Anthony McFarlane, *Reform and insurrection in Bourbon New Granada and Peru*, ed. John R. Fisher, Allan J. Kuethe, y Anthony McFarlane (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 6, <http://webcat.warwick.ac.uk/record=b1171481~S15>.

streams, an unforgiving jungle to venture in. The Guajiran peninsula sticks out of the continent like a pear-shaped landmass on the Western side of lake Maracaibo. It is home to the Wayuu indigenous groups, referred to as Guajiros until the 20th century. The language spoken by these peoples, Wayunakii, is a Caribbean language, of the Wayunakii language family belonging to the Arawak family.⁴⁰ The social organization of these populations remains, until this day, matrilineal, clan-based and territorialized as interclan warfare revolved around defined territories.⁴¹ Social structures and languages in the Darién were of another kind: Embera/Wounan and Cuna/Tule languages belong to the Chibcha language group,⁴² and studies have shown their organization was rather egalitarian, usually grouping two or three couples to a family group, and communities generally followed the oldest male.⁴³

The history of both provinces in the 17th century is one of ecclesiastical conquest, rather than conquest by political authorities. In the Guajira, the most important *chef-lieu* was Riohacha, as mentioned above, which held importance on account of its pearl production, but was under the status of *Ranchería*, annexed to the jurisdiction of Santa Marta (“La provincial de Santa Marta y su *Ranchería* de perlas”). Effectively, orders targeted at the Guajira were also sent to Maracaibo and Cartagena, the provinces on either side of Santa Marta. Most of the population consisted of Guajiro Indians along with stations where soldiers guarded the coast, some pueblos (founded by regular clergymen) and hamlets. The difficulties in securing the province were enormous, officials often complained of a lack of soldiers, of means to pay soldiers, and of a general state of precariousness in provisions and manpower. This was the case well into the 1730s, as getting soldiers to the Guajiran coast was an incredibly difficult task. In an auto dated April 5, 1737, Don Pedro Josef Hidalgo, “Brigadier of the royal exercises and governor of and captain general of this square, and general commander

⁴⁰ Mansen, Richard y David Captain (2000) “El idioma Wajúu (o guajiro)”; María Stella González de Pérez y M^a L. Rodríguez de Montes (eds.) *Lenguas indígenas de Colombia: una visión descriptiva*: 795-810. Bogotá: Instituto Caro y Cuervo.

⁴¹ Adolfo Meisel Roca, ed., *Historia económica y social del Caribe colombiano*, Textos universitarios (Santafé de Bogotá: Ed. Uninorte, Centro de estudios regionales ECOE ed, 1994), 50–51.

⁴² For a classification of Colombia’s language groups divided into lineages of greater and smaller scope, see: Jon Landaburu, “Las lenguas indígenas de Colombia: presentación y estado del arte.,” *Amerindia* 29 (2004); Jon Landaburu, “Las lenguas indígenas de Colombia y del Amazonas colombiano: situaciones, perspectivas.,” *Revista Colombia amazónica* 9 (2016): 9–22.

⁴³ Peter Herlihy, “Settlement and Subsistence Change Among the Chocó Indians of the Darién Province, Eastern Panama: An Overview,” el 1 de enero de 1985.

province in it, that of Sana Martha and Maracaibo, to take care of the illicit introductions” explained:

“The guards placed in different parts and places of the land, which have been practiced until now and are maintained at present, have not had any favorable effect, as is practically experienced, nor is it expected that they can produce it in the future, because being so vast and open these coasts, even if the number of guards were so large that a large army could be formed from it the coasts still could not be entirely guarded because of their length and many supplying ports for which greed discovers and opens every day new paths and roads, making it evident that the deployments which are made of the short garrison of this very important place to guard the very few ports of the many that exist in this area could not be covered by them.”⁴⁴

Similarly, though following a different historical trajectory, no cities had been established permanently after Santa Maria la Antigua del Darién and San Sebastián de Buenavista were abandoned. Indeed, in the 16th century the Darién was an important point of mineral extraction and, consequently, of political interest for conquistadores and the Crown. Between 1513 and 1538, the Spanish had based camp in the abovementioned settlements, founding the towns of Santa María and San Sebastián whence they could send expeditions into the Darién, Urabá, Sinú and Atrato regions. But after the mining enterprises had fallen into decay, indigenous labor had dwindled and the 17th century had settled, the Darién was left with a meagre presence of Spanish authorities in place and from then onward, mining in the Darién became more atomized, comprised of individual *cuadrillas* whose workforce depended on imported and smuggled slaves.⁴⁵

In jurisdictional terms, the Darién’s administration oscillated between two Audiencias, Panama and Santafé, but effectively, orders related to defense were sent

⁴⁴ SANTA_FE, 384 , Auto de 5 abril de 1737 de Don Pedro Josef Hidalgo, “caballero de la orden de Santiago, Brigadier de los reales ejercicios y gobernador de y capitán general de esta plaza, y provincia comandante general en ella, la de Sana Martha y Maracaibo , para cuidar las ilícitas introducciones: “Las guardias puestas en diferentes partes y parajes de la tierra, que basta ahora se han practicado y al presente se mantienen, no han surtido ningún efecto favorable , como prácticamente se experimenta, ni se espera que puedan producirle en adelante, pues siendo tan dilatadas y abiertas estas costas aun quando el numero guardias fuese tan grande que de el pudiese formarse un ejercito numeroso... aun no podrían quedar enteramente guardadas las costas por su longitud y muchos puertos surtideros para los que la codicia descubre y abre cada día nuevas sendas y caminos, siendo evidente que los destacamentos que para estas guardias están hechos de la corta guarnición de esta importantísima plaza sobre cubrirse con ellos poquísimos puertos de los muchos que ay.”

⁴⁵ Vives Via, “La extracción de oro en el Darién del siglo XVII. Origen y consolidación de un sistema minero de frontera (1637-1641 y 1679-1698).”

through the provinces of Cartagena, Antioquia, and “Tierra Firme,” a dubious territorial demarcation which was used until the late 17th century, which referred to the two *gobernaciones* of Tierra Firme established by Santiago de Balboa, Diego de Nicuesa and Alonso de Ojeda, conquistadors of the 1510s: Castilla del Oro, Darién and Veragua. The fact that no settlements other than ecclesiastical missions, and especially no cities aside from Santa Maria del Darién and San Sebastian de Buenavista, briefly, had endured, must have enhanced the idea of the Darién, a land most referred to in relation to its supposed riches as early as 1514, as an “el Dorado.” Indeed, it had remained in the collective imaginary as a frontier of sorts: between audiencias, provinces, and ocean – an in between⁴⁶. Similarly, the Guajira remained distant and inhospitably arid, its treacherous rivers seemingly disposed to aid foreign smugglers rather than allow Spanish incursions without distress. Thus, both provinces had meager Spanish populations and, consequently, both the Darién and Guajira were governed from afar: orders pertaining to the Darién were received in and thence expedited from Panama, Antioquia, and Cartagena; those directed at the Guajira from Cartagena and Santa Marta, but also from the province of Maracaibo.

Therefore, it was only in the late 19th century that missions in the Guajira managed a relatively successful implantation of religious communities and schools for indigenous children.⁴⁷ This is not to say that contraband and self-government did not persist, as Guajiran clan politics and contraband economy remain somewhat autonomous in respect to the Colombian State.⁴⁸ What is more, the Darién remains to this day an evidently magnificent natural obstacle between the north and south American continents, seldom traversed but by the most need-driven migrants from south to north. In order to briefly illustrate the relative continuity of the Guajira and Darién through during the first half of the 18th century, we will now briefly consider some of the attempts to pacify these regions, the reasons for their failure, and the way in which different interests group interacted in both places. While these examples seek

⁴⁶ When Balboa, in 1514, reported his rich discoveries in Darién, no time was lost in sending out Pedro Arias Dávila as governor, who landed at Santa Marta.

⁴⁷ Juan Felipe Córdoba Restrepo, “En tierras paganas Misiones católicas en Urabá y en La Guajira, Colombia, 1892-1952,” 2012, <https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/9935>.

⁴⁸ José Trinidad Polo Acuña, “Los indígenas de la Guajira y su articulación política al Estado colombiano (1830-1880),” *Historia Crítica*, núm. 44 (2011): 80–103; Ludys Velásquez Mora, “Del contrabando a la política en la Baja Guajira y Norte Del Cesar,” 2022.

to illustrate the particularities of each of these regions insofar as they remained in a relative state of autonomy due to the meagre presence of Spanish authorities, it does not follow that the other provinces of the northern borders did not have similar experiences. On the contrary, many of the experiences of the Darién and Guajira were also implemented in other provinces and, of course, in other regions of the Monarchy: negotiations between native chiefs (both auto-designated or designated) Spanish officials; classification attempts by Spanish officials in an attempt to grapple with the ethnic complexity of the region; Spanish-native cooperation for the survival of soldiers and miners given the areas' natural conditions.

2) Conquest in the Guajira

One of the most salient attempts at conquering the Guajira took place after Royal Cédulas were expedited in the 1690s, accusing authorities of doing little to curb contraband, carried out by foreign (mostly Dutch) smugglers and facilitated by Guajiran Indians. In 1694, attempts at establishing missions in the Guajira led to the creation of two settlements: San Nicolas de los Menores and La Cruz. A previous settlement consisting of a mission house had been established in the aldea (hamlet) of San Nicolas de los Menores at the end of the 16th century, as well as a few towns settled by missionaries between 1595 and 1596: Camarones, Molino, Cañaverales and Villa Nueva.⁴⁹ In the northeast of the province of Santa Marta, on the border with that of Maracaibo, where Guajiros circulated freely, some attempts had been undertaken by the Governor to establish villages around San Nicolas de los Menores and La Cruz in the province of Maracaibo in 1694 (nombres). However, an armed movement of the Cocina Indians⁵⁰ in 1701 forced missionaries to withdraw to their headquarters in Maracaibo, a move approved by a Royal Cédula in 1702, in which the King ordered the two friars Menores and La Cruz to move to Maracaibo. Thus, the Guajira Indians would remain without any missionaries in their territory until 1715. After the war of

⁴⁹ Acuña, “Poblamiento y conflicto social en la frontera guajira (1700-1800)” citing Capuchin Father José Agustín Mackenzie. .

⁵⁰ The Cocinas were the “other side of the coin” to the Wayuu: they belonged to the same ethno-linguistic branch but split into two factions as the introduction of cattle in the late 16th century produced an integration of cattle-breeding by the Wayuu, and a refusal of breeding from the Cocinas who, additionally, remained hermetic to mestizaje with foreigners. On this see, Acuña, “Los wayúu y los cocina.”

Succession, the bishop of Santa Marta, Antonio Monroy y Meneses, appointed two missionaries from Maracaibo, Mérida and La Grita as interims for the towns of La Cruz and Menores, because the Indians from these towns “had rebelled and burned the church, images and ornaments and [done] other atrocities”⁵¹.

Between 1717 and 1718, an exchange of correspondence between the King and Fray Antonio Monroy Meneses Bishop of Santa Marta (who served a long period, from 1715 until 1738), and other officials shows certain discrepancies as to where the capuchin friars were most needed, whether in Maracaibo or Santa Marta. In a letter to the King, the bishop pleaded the Capuchin friars be relocated to the Rio de la Hacha in Santa Marta province as that the Indians were in full rebellion “flechado” (arrowing) and taking cattle ranches and “they reached the Rio de la Hacha with the purpose of conquest”⁵² from Maracaibo to Tamalameque, a 300 km land extension which, if true and not an exaggeration on behalf of the bishop, reaches across the width of the region.



⁵¹ Ibidem.

⁵² “se hicieron al Rio de la Hacha con título de conquista,” Carta al rey de Fray Antonio obispo de santa Marta, 1717

In 1718, the governor of Cartagena reported that the town of San Nicolás de los Menores had been entrusted to Father Don Pedro de Peralta, named Indian Prefect, but that the venture had failed, in part, due to the Indians' lack of trust in the missionaries, their fear of being *encomendados*:

“but because he arrived and no priest wanted to take care of them, they fled to the mountains and the town was ruined, expressing at the same time the serious inconveniences that follow from entrusting (*encomendar*) the Indians, because of the oppression with which they hold them they become horrified of the faith, and return to the mountains, or flee elsewhere, and then come to rob those people who are gathered in the faith.”⁵³

Often, authorities reported that the difficulties encountered stemmed from the laboriousness of evangelizing the Indians of this region, the little “love” the missionaries had for them, and the excessive pressure exerted by encomenderos. In many cases, hostilities against the missionaries, which often ended in massacres (as in Chocó in 1685), led to the total withdrawal of the authorities. In this case, bishop of Santa Marta was ordered not to entrust (*encomendar*) or order the Indians in any way until the situation calmed down, and this only in case of a future attempt at evangelization. The *fiscal* of the Council recalled the dispositions given for the area, which foresaw that they were not to be evangelized “in case of a new attempt at founding and considering it convenient to treat the mentioned Indians with gentleness and leniency, deferring their entrustment until they are well rooted in the faith, I have also resolved that on this point what is provided for in the laws and royal decrees be observed, and especially those that are referred to in which it was declared that the [first] twenty years that the converted Indians are to remain without being entrusted (*encomendados*) or taxed (paying *tributo*), are to be counted from the day of Baptism.”⁵⁴ Behind this order by the Council of the Indies seems to be the presumption

⁵³ “pero que por haver llegado este y no querer encargarse de cuidar de ellos ningún sacerdote se huyeron a los montes y se arruinó el referido pueblo, expresando al mismo tiempo los graves inconvenientes que se siguen de encomendarse a los indios, pues por la opresión con que los tienen toman horror a la fe, y se vuelven a los montes, o se huyen a otra parte, y vienen después a robar aquellos pueblos a los que están congregados en la fe” SANTA_FE, 525, Real cédula de 18 de enero de 1718, por mandado del rey a don Francisco de Arana y consejeros de Indias (copia).

⁵⁴ “en caso de volverse a fundar y considerando ser conveniente se trate con suavidad y sin rigor a dichos indios, difiriendo el encomendarlos hasta que estén bien radicados en la fe, he resuelto así mismo que

that more time in the school of faith in the love of God would better prepare them for the *encomienda*.

Finally, after having been endorsed by the Crown, the Capuchin friars from Maracaibo settled in the towns founded by the Bishop and Governor. But the volatility of relations continued throughout the decade. In 1724, that same year, the governor complained that the towns founded by the Governor, now overseen by the Capuchin friars from Maracaibo Province –there were 200 in friars in Menores in 1724– was poorly administered, and that the Indians “(...) were of great rudeness, walked naked and fed on snakes, lizards, and other animals, as well as wild herbs and roots. Their only occupation had been that of robbing travelers, and now they were reluctant to inhabit the houses that the bishop had built for them.”⁵⁵. Monroy y Meneses the bishop of Santa Marta was forced to flee a town he had founded a mere eight years before, San Pedro Nolasco, without being able to save the life of a missionary present therein⁵⁶.

In the 1730s, the situation had not changed, and the “poblamiento” front – the process of attempting to influence the social and spatial shape of the Guajira – had not come to fruition.⁵⁷ It must be noted that part of the dysfunctionalities in the manner of attempting evangelization and control stemmed from jurisdictional frictions between regular clergy, provincial governors, and bishops, which are too complex to address here. For example, after pleading for Capuchin friars to be moved from Maracaibo to Río de la Hacha, and the expedition of the Royal Cédula cited above, the bishop programmed a visit to La Cruz and San Sebastián de los Menores. But the friars refused to attend the visit, which led to a jurisdictional dispute, which the Viceroy Sebastián de Eslava finally concluded by ruling in favor of the Capuchins.⁵⁸ In general terms, though, the resistance and bravery of the Guajiros played a decisive role in the lack of “progress” made by missions in the Peninsula. In official correspondence, Guajiros

sobre este punto se observe lo que disponen las leyes y reales cédulas, y especialmente las que quedan referidas en que se declaró que los [primeros] veinte años que los indios convertidos han de estar sin ser repartidos ni tributar, se quenten desde el día del Bautismo,” SANTA_FE, 525, Real cédula de 18 de enero de 1718, op. Cit.

⁵⁵ Sæther, *Identidades e independencia en Santa Marta y Riohacha, 1750-1850*.

⁵⁶ Acuña, “Poblamiento y conflicto social en la frontera guajira (1700-1800).”

⁵⁷ This, of course, in terms of the political shape that towns took in the Guajira, not of the way landscapes were influenced, for example, by the arrival of cattle, a conquest of another kind.

⁵⁸ For example, after pleading for Capuchin friars to be moved from Maracaibo to Río de el hacha, and that the Royal Cédula cited above, the bishop programmed a visit to La Cruz and San Sebastián de los menores which the friars refused to attend, leading to a jurisdictional dispute over who could order whom, which the Viceroy Sebastián de Eslava finally ended, ruling in favor of the Capuchins. Acuña op. cit.

were perceived as extremely brave and bellicose by military and ecclesiastic authorities alike, and a great proportion of the men were warriors⁵⁹. Things started to change in 1738 as authorities debated how to better curb the Guajiros, whose main hindrance to the crown was the contraband they entertained with foreigners, from which they got supplies of firearms, and the violence they could exert towards vecinos and authorities alike. Viceroy Eslava explained that:

“The Guajiro Indians are a not very numerous nation, but very brave. They inhabit a beautiful portion of flat and very fruitful land, and they have a part of the coast with different inlets and coves, and a very good bay, which they call Honda/Konda, which although it is not for large ships, it is for good sloops, which, anchoring (?) in her, they are with total security if of the Sea, as of q it tries to insult them: and in the coast that these dominate is the rich fishery of pearls, which they use to exchange for glass beads and other jewels to the foreigners. These same Indians have been reducing the province of the Rio de la Hacha to the greatest misery, since, having taken away the water from the neighbors, their cattle and the lands they cultivated passing the river, towards the Guajiros, they are already reduced to little flat land, They are so daring that having gone out in time of Antonio de Salas soldiers to the guards of Pinto and ojo de Cano to prevent them from entering in contraband, they charged the guard and sent it fleeing, killing the cavo who commanded it: they use firearms supplied by the strangers with whom they have their dealings”⁶⁰.

In the final report produced after the *visita* to his tenure as Viceroy 1741, his *Relación de mando*, Sebastián de Eslava prepared an account of his actions in government in a section titled *Gobierno*. This section, it must be noted, is comprised exclusively of news and accounts related to the advancement of frontier pacification

⁵⁹ Restrepo Olano, “Un Ejemplo de Relaciones Simbióticas En La Guajira Del Siglo XVIII. Historia de Una Sublevación Bajo El Liderazgo Del Cacique Cecilio.”

⁶⁰ “The Guajiros Indians are a not very numerous nation, but very brave. They inhabit a beautiful portion of flat and very fruitful land, and they have a part of the coast with different inlets and coves, and a very good bay, which they call Honda/Konda, which although it is not for large ships, it is for good sloops, which, anchoring (?) in her, they are with total security if of the Sea, as of q it tries to insult them: and in the coast that these dominate is the rich fishery of pearls, which they use to exchange for glass beads and other jewels to the foreigners.

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and new discoveries, which illustrates the extent to which these two were a priority in the exercise of authority in the New Kingdom. But new discoveries, it was reported, were impossible in the provinces of Rio de la Hacha and Maracaibo (the two were officially separated in 1743⁶¹), contrary to some recent successful attempts in Chocó, which had led to a change of approach by authorities:

“And not being able to practice similar attempts with the nation of Goajiro Indians of the Province of the Hacha River, H.E. [Eslava] maintained religious friendship with the principal Cacique D. Cecilio Sierra with impulsive inductions to the security of that nation and warned the Lieutenant Governor of the Province to take advantage of the occasions which could be offered through this Confederate Cacique to pacify and populate the Indians subordinate to his command”⁶².

These lines evoke a strategy undertaken by authorities since 1740 and especially after 1746 by a group of merchants who sought to protect their commercial interests by allying themselves with Cacique Cecilio López Sierra, to pacify the Guajira and reign over its inhabitants.⁶³ Cacique was General of the Guajira from 1735 until 1784, Cecilio López Sierra was the bastard son of Captain Peninsular, judge of *comisos*⁶⁴, alguacil mayor of the Holy Office and teniente general Jacinto Lopez Sierra, and of the Indian guajira and *cacica* of San Nicolás de los Menores, Magdalena Martínez de Gayaso. The negotiations took a poor turn and the Guajiros would thereafter take part in an uprising against the *teniente de gobernador*, José Javier Pestaña, in 1753. Not only that, but in

⁶¹ Restrepo Olano, “Un Ejemplo de Relaciones Simbióticas En La Guajira Del Siglo XVIII. Historia de Una Sublevación Bajo El Liderazgo Del Cacique Cecilio.”

⁶² y no pudiéndose practicar semejantes intentos con la nación de indios goajiros de la Provincia del rio del Hacha, mantuvo S.E [Eslava] religiosa amistad al Cacique principal D. Cecilio Sierra con impulsivas inducciones a la seguridad de aquella nación y advertidos encargos al Teniente Gobernador de diha Provincia para que se aprovechase de las ocasiones que por medio de este Confederado Cacique se pudiesen ofrecer de pacificar y poblar a los indios subordinados a su mando.” Colmenares, *Relaciones e informes de los gobernantes de la Nueva Granada*, 65–66.

⁶³ As Margarita Restrepo Olano explains: The merchants chose the cacique Don Cecilio Lopez Sierra to present to the king their idea of evangelizing the Guajiros, supposing that in this way they would have more money, since it was not difficult to imagine that their interest was not only, nor principally, evangelizing. The cacique met in the capital with the viceroy and the proposal was that they would conquer the Guajiros without the Crown having to pay any expenses. In exchange, they asked for permission to settle black slaves in Santa Marta or in Río Hacha, and to establish along the coast the trade of flour that they would bring from the foreign colonies, one of the great businesses of the region. If this project were approved, the merchants would not only increase their wealth, but also the indigenous labor force would increase and the Hispanic market would expand, resulting in a greater commercialization of the products and the consequent benefit for the royal hacienda.

⁶⁴ Judges of *comisos* (literally, judges of that which was seized), dealt with penalties to the crime of smuggling.

1760 the following Viceroy ended his tenure with a *Relación* in which he expressed with handsome words the “the engagement celebrated by D. Bernardo Ruiz de Noruego, to conquer the Guajiros and other nations that range from the lake of Maracaibo to the river of the Hacha, which although it was ordered many years ago by His Majesty, had not taken effect for lack of a person to be in charge of it,” although he then concluded that it was doubtless a “very useful undertaking **if it is achieved** [emphasis added]; and it would seem that all the aids conducive to this end should be given to it.”⁶⁵

The conquest of the Guajira which progressively morphed into an increased practice of negotiation rather than confrontation might well have been a learned experience which officials had been increasingly attempting in other regions of the New Granada, as this dissertation will discuss. Nevertheless, these practices would not be dissociated from warfare and rebellions –such as the one which followed the events of 1753 or in 1769. Rebellions (*levantamientos*) would multiply in the half-century that preceded the independences of the 19th century, during which the Guajiros would go on to play an important part.

3) The quest for Darién

a) Native inhabitants and Spanish advances

The situation in Darién presents certain similarities to the one described above insofar as negotiations were crucial to maintain Spanish settlements, but the rather more atomized and ethnically diverse native population to the Darién was organized differently to the Guajiros, and experiences of warfare and negotiation therein were thus more localized. Both the Guajira and Darién were areas of foreign-native exchange, frontiers where trade, alliances, linguistic and knowledge exchange took place. But from this perspective, the Darién is importantly distinct in several respects. Before examining what made the Darién the object of inter-imperial encounters and interests, it must be said that the territory was inhabited for millennia before being

⁶⁵ “(...) merece el principal lugar contrata celebrada por D. Bernardo Ruiz de Noruego, de conquistar a los goajiros y demás naciones que median desde el lago de Maracaibo hasta el rio de la Hacha, que aunque muchos años ha estaba mandada hacer por S.M., no había tenido efecto por falta de sujeto que se encargase de ella. Es empresa muy útil si se logra; y a sí parece se le deben dar todos los auxilios conducentes a este fin” Colmenares, *Relaciones e informes de los gobernantes de la Nueva Granada*, 119.

explored by some of the earliest conquistador expeditions. The Embera/Tule peoples of the Darién had adapted to life in the thick jungles of the isthmus since 11.000 BCE. In the years following initial Spanish incursions, Cuna people became “agents of social change” as Ignacio Gallup-Díaz has shown and, to the best of their ability, adapted and changed in the face of Spanish pressure⁶⁶. The native peoples of the early and mid-eighteenth century, thus, and this is true for most native groups of the Caribbean coast and hinterland, were not the same societies as the late 15th century populations that encountered the first conquistadors.⁶⁷

Indeed, the Darién, for all its isolation and topographical obstacles, was the subject of mining, explorations, and incursions since the 16th century. Gold exploitation decimated Indian numbers, and quite early, African slaves were imported and forced to work in gold extraction, which led to many of them to search for freedom by forming maroon communities, which were shut down or delocalized by expeditions from Panama until 1609, after which the maroon question would progressively disappear from the documentation available for that century.⁶⁸ Entering the 17th century, the Darién appeared as a practically empty space, with a very reduced colonial presence, counting few haciendas, shipyards, and sawmills, all of which were sustained by slave labor⁶⁹.

In 1617 a failed attempt by a group of Spaniards from Cartagena to extract gold occurred, followed by another of the kind in 1620⁷⁰. During the early decades of the 17th century, the Cuna peoples of the Atrato (a south-north flowing river which served as the most important fluvial way of communication between the Pacific jungles of Chocó and the gulph of Darién) migrated north and settled in the Darién. There, they encountered Burumias and Emberas, who were at war with the Carautas/Catíos, a

⁶⁶ Ignacio Gallup-Díaz, *The Door of the Seas and the Key to the Universe: Indian Politics and Imperial Rivalry in Darién, 1640-1750, revised edition* (Columbia University Press, 2005).

⁶⁷ Carl Henrik Langebaek y Jacobo Walburger, eds., *El diablo vestido de negro y los cunas del Darién en el siglo XVIII: Jacobo Walburger y su Breve noticia de la provincia del Darién, de la ley y costumbres de los yndios, de la poca esperanza de plantar nuestra fé, y del número de sus naturales, 1748*, 1. ed, Biblioteca banco popular (Bogotá D.C., Colombia: Universidad de Los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Departamento de Ciencia Política, Centro de Estudios Socioculturales e Internacionales, 2006).

⁶⁸ On this, see Enriqueta Vila Vilar, “Cimarronaje en Panamá y Cartagena. El costo de una guerrilla en el siglo XVII,” *Caravelle. Cahiers du monde hispanique et luso-brésilien* 49, núm. 1 (1987): 77–92, <https://doi.org/10.3406/carav.1987.2341>.

⁶⁹ Vives Via, “La extracción de oro en el Darién del siglo XVII. Origen y consolidación de un sistema minero de frontera (1637-1641 y 1679-1698).”

⁷⁰ Vives Via.

complex socio-political panorama⁷¹. Starting in the 1630s, but especially after 1679, the Darién would become of great interest for gold extraction, an activity headed by the Julián Carrisoli, a Spaniard raised among the natives and, later, his son Luis. *Cuadrillas* of slaves thus entered the Darién in the later decades of the 17th century, and an extractivist economy was organized with the endorsement of the Audiencia of Panama. Mining activity was not without opposition as, indeed, native resistance repeated during the period, with a native rebellion breaking out in 1679.⁷² In 1684 a rumored pirate invasion from the South Sea and Cuna uprising led to the retirement of Spanish *cuadrillas* from the Darién and, as they left, the Spaniards found indeed, an Anglo-native troop that had made its way to the Caribbean coast and was ready to invade a Spanish town.⁷³

The Crown considered that the constant pirate attacks and the insubordination of the indigenous people required that the region be conquered by force, but given the impossibility of militarily subduing the Darién due to the difficulty of the terrain and the lack of resources, the peninsula opted to dismantle the mines, considered the main incentive of pirates. The prohibition of extraction and the absence of colonization led to the development of a peripheral and irregular mining economy over two decades. Extraction continued informally, as mayors were hand-picked among the miners, and no record was kept of the mines or their production. The royal *quinto* was paid anecdotally, more as a way for the presidents of the Panama Audiencia to protect themselves from criticism than as a systematic collection that benefited the Royal Treasury.⁷⁴

During the time the Carrisolis dominated the Darién and mining practices were being established, the policy of reducing Indians to towns was implemented, and in doing so Spanish authorities claimed they had “reduced Darién Indians” many of Cuna (or Tule) Indians. But the years 1680s and 1690s also brought the arrival into Darién of many English, Scottish and French sailors, venturers, merchants, and other travelers

⁷¹ Patricia Vargas, “Los emperas y los cunas en frontera con el imperio español. Una propuesta para el trabajo complementario de la historia oral y de la historia documental,” *Boletín Museo del Oro*, núm. 29 (1990): 75–101.

⁷² Vives Via, “La extracción de oro en el Darién del siglo XVII. Origen y consolidación de un sistema minero de frontera (1637-1641 y 1679-1698).”v

⁷³ Vives Via.

⁷⁴ Vives Via.

who were interested in the Darién. Not until the 1720s and 1730s would Spanish authorities take an interest in administrating Darién and asserting their order, especially after a rebellion that burst in 1727. Thereafter, when Alcedo, the president of the Audiencia of Panamá attempted to negotiate with *caciques* appointed by his justices in Darién, the endeavor floundered catastrophically, as officials failed to realize the “tribalization” of Darién Indians, – “tribalization” as in the attempt to classify Cunas as Dariénes under structures of authority recognized by Spanish officials– and thus failed to effectively submit native groups to their control⁷⁵. In other words, the *caciques* appointed by officials had no concrete power over their social groups, as these had kept their own structure of authority hidden from Spanish knowledge and understanding. As Gallup-Díaz has shown, this “dual nature” of Tule political power eluded observers such as the President, just as it had eluded the other European intruders, the buccaneers, and the Scots. Caroline Williams has noted that the same dissonance influenced the decisions of Spanish officials in Chocó, as they were convinced that appointing *caciques* enabled them to influence native authorities, while the *caciques* were, in turn, perceived as opportunistic⁷⁶. The same rings true in Antioquia in Citará, as chapters 3 and 4 will show, where Spanish-appointed *caciques* were typically only recognized as leaders when already acknowledged as such by their communities.

While appointing *caciques* and handing out Spanish titles did not help to evangelize the Cunas, Spanish-appointed chiefs surfed the changing waters of alliances to use their Spanish titles for personal promotion and convenience. s Gallup-Díaz has put it, “[they] brandish[ed] their staves of office, medals, awards, and royal commissions like talismans.”⁷⁷ But the reality was that behind the mask of Indian authorities that supposedly ruled in conjunction with the Spanish over the “Dariénes as one whole tribe,” social and political structures were much more atomized than those which the first conquistadors had encountered and, in this sense, many groups and individuals were positively predisposed to alliances of convenience (through which to improve their conditions), and this is precisely what occurred well into the 18th century.

⁷⁵ Ignacio Gallup-Díaz, “The Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién, 1735-50,” *Ethnohistory* 49, núm. 2 (el 1 de enero de 2002): 281–317, <https://doi.org/10.1215/00141801-49-2-281>.

⁷⁶ Williams, “Resistance and Rebellion on the Spanish Frontier.”

⁷⁷ Gallup-Díaz, “The Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién, 1735-50.”

b) Foreign fascination

The Darién has been the subject of an extensive literature for a nearly a century, partly due to the fascination of Scottish historians after 1697.⁷⁸ Some of the most recent works on the Darién at the intersection of historical anthropology and imperial history have delved into multiple aspects of region's historical experience. Imperial history has underlined the connected character of the region, insofar as it represented an area of foreign covetousness, where different jurisdictions and empires met. Because of its resources and early explorations, it was the subject of incursions and attempts at invasion or settlement, depending on one's perspective. Another approach is more anthropological: at a crossroads between an ethnological approach to native inhabitants and an emphasis on their perspective and agency, it seeks to invert the focal point of historical inquiry to underpin the natives' agency in the fate of the Darién.⁷⁹ Both approaches shed light on native actors' practices and motivations in their dealings with Europeans. Because, indeed, if the Guajira was a land of exchange and smuggling through its deserts and rivers, the Darién was too, through its thick vegetation.

The gulph of Darién, explored by Exquemelin in the 16th century and thenceforward a focal point of European interest in the Americas, held great strategic potential. Not only did it serve as a connection between oceans and the two continents, but it also had incommensurable natural riches. Lionel Wafer, who explored the Darién in 1681, recounted with a perspective that combined his experience as a voyager in the company of other Europeans, partaking in action, and that of a doctor, a medic, who was taken in and healed by the Cuna Indians as he was wounded in the knee.⁸⁰ The result is a rich anthropological narration of the Indians' way of life, mores, social organization, culture, along with his personal insight on the matter. In today's reading, following recent reflections produced by the history of sciences, "within the period between Exquemelin and Wafer, the pirate narrative increasingly turned to Early Modern natural science and thus came to serve a major function in epistemological

⁷⁸ G.P. Insh, *The Darién Scheme* (Historical Association, London 1947) J.S. Barbour, *A History of William Paterson and the Darién Company* (Edinburgh 1907); and F.R. Hart, *The Disaster of Darién. The Story of the Scots Settlement and the Causes of its Failure 1699–1701* (London 1930).

⁷⁹ Herlihy, "Settlement and Subsistence Change Among the Chocó Indians of the Darién Province, Eastern Panama." Vásquez Pino, "La hidarquía en las costas del Darién."

⁸⁰ Sophie Jorrand, "'A New Voyage' de Lionel Wafer : de la colonisation à une hétérologie méso-américaine ?," *Alizés : Revue angliciste de La Réunion*, núm. 31–32 (2009): 38.

empire building, contributing to what has been called the “second conquest” of the Americas.”⁸¹ A New Voyage Round the World (1697) by William Dampier, published just two years prior, and equally impactful in the minds of the time, took the globe a step nearer everyday Europeans whose psyches were starting to open to the possibility and of travel and its increasing ordinary character.⁸²

Indeed, travel literature and *récits de voyage* were an important piece of European monarchies’ imperial projects. For the English Crown, travel literature had a part to play in consolidating its outlook upon the world. While the imperial nature of the English Crown had been posited by Henry VIII in 1533⁸³, the enactment of such a nature would begin at the end of the 16th century as the Crown had authorized, by letters, patent or royal charter, the establishment of colonies and plantations in the New World. As early as 1578, Queen Elizabeth granted Humphrey Gilbert the right not only to “discover, find, explore and visit,” but also to occupy and settle in “all distant, pagan and barbarous lands, regions and territories, not actually possessed by any Christian prince or people.” Gilbert took possession of Newfoundland in 1583, while Walter Raleigh established his first colony on Roanoke Island two years later. Around the same time, in 1582, Richard Hakluyt published his *Divers voyages touching the discovery of America*, and two years later his *Particuler Discourse Concerninge the Greate Necessitie and Manifold Commodities That Are Like to Growe to This Realme of Englande by the Westerne Discoveries Lately Attempted, Written in the Yere 1584*.

These compilations of voyages, known simply as Hakluyt’s *Voyages*, sought to establish the legitimacy of English claims in the new world. Hakluyt appropriated the tales of voyages of other men, some of which he had planned to accompany like Sir Humphrey Gilbert, others he had never met, like Martin Frobisher, explorer of the Canadian northeast. Hakluyt’s compilation became an Early Modern bestseller. Part of the goal in recounting the travels, among others, of Sir John Hawkins, which included

⁸¹ Alexandra Ganser, “Pirate Science, Coastal Knowledge: Choreographies of the American Isthmus in the Late Seventeenth Century,” en *Agents of Transculturation: Border-Crossers, Mediators, Go-Betweens*, vol. 6 (Waxmann Verlag Münster, 2013), 115., citing Bauer, Ralph. *The Cultural Geography of Colonial American Literatures: Empire, Travel, Modernity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Bauer 3

⁸² Vives Via, “La extracción de oro en el Darién del siglo XVII. Origen y consolidación de un sistema minero de frontera (1637-1641 y 1679-1698).”

⁸³ GUILLUY Thibault. — « Les conceptions de l’empire dans l’histoire britannique (XVIe-XVIIIe siècle) : entre unité et union ,” *Jus politicum*, juin 2015, n°14. + podcast spotify de la bbc on the tudors

details of his profit after having shipped 500 enslaved Africans from the Guinea coast and sold them in the West Indies, was to entice others into venturing across the sea into the West. References to the opportunities for trade in the new global market, and the finding of new trade routes were abundant, as were the descriptions of how and where to find spices, how to engage with merchants, and how to arrive at certain destinations. Hakluyt even included foreign tales, like that of a Venetian merchant on the Moluccas, and of nutmeg from the island of Banda. While some passages are of a fantastical kind (dog-headed people and large-footed Ethiopians make an appearance) Hakluyt's *Voyages* must be understood within the context of Elizabethan politics, whose imperial ambitions were quickly developing. In fact, Hakluyt contributed to the advancement of such ambitions by presenting his *Discourse Concerning Western Planting to queen Elisabeth in 1584*, "concerning the great necessity and manifold commodities that are like to grow to these Realm of England by the Western discoveries lately attempted" before the Queen and her council, with which he argued in favor of England's participation in the race for the Indies.

c) Materialized fascination

Lionel Wafer's account of Darién in 1681, thus, was preceded by a century during which Europeans' openness to travel and discovery had been fed by travel literature and tales of natural resources of immense scope and diversity. In 1697, A Scottish venture into colonizing the Darién took shape. The expedition was organized with the backing of a joint-stock company, with the Scots holding 50% of the shares, and the rest divided among English and Dutch investors. Despite the anxieties of the East India Company and Parliament, the venture, promoted by William Patterson, would fail after two attempts to settle in the town of New Edinburgh, among the thick, dense forest.⁸⁴ With a 90% mortality rate, the failure would mesmerize Europeans, whose unsuccess depended rather on natural obstacles and Scottish unpreparedness, than on of Spanish intervention.

Indeed, the threat the Dairén posed to Spain was great, both in terms of its reputation and because any foreign presence in Portobello (north-west of New

⁸⁴ Sophie Jorrand, "From 'the Doors of the Seas' to a Watery Debacle: The Sea, Scottish Colonization, and the Darién Scheme, 1696–1700," *Études Écossaises*, núm. 19 (el 1 de abril de 2017), <https://doi.org/10.4000/etudeseccossaises.1184>.

Edinburgh), an important hub for trade between Spain and the Americas, was a menace to the *Sistema de flotas y galeones*. Indeed, Portobello served as the destination for the annual *galeones* convoy from Seville, where Spanish and European goods were exchanged for silver and other colonial products. Apprehension as to the Scottish expedition was generalized. The Viceroy of New Spain, Don José Sarmiento de Valladares, for example, feared that the Scots might seize both Panama and Cartagena and potentially gain access to the Pacific Ocean by crossing the isthmus of Panama. Additionally, the threat of a Protestant invasion was worrying for the Spanish Crown, already having had the experience of protestant dissent in its former Dutch Provinces⁸⁵.

Spanish officials scrambled to assemble troops from Cartagena and Portobello, but when they arrived, there were no Scots to combat, as hardship, malaria, and hunger had taken their toll on the settlers. The economic disaster of the failed colonization attempt would shake the finances of the Kingdom, and in so doing, sealed Scotland's submission to England.⁸⁶ The Union of the Crowns in 1707 produced Scotland's final reattachment to the southern neighbor – the dynastic union of England and Scotland achieved by the accession to the English throne of James VI of Scotland having already passed – something no future Jacobite rebellion, like that of 1742, would curb in the following decades.

While the southern part of the Panamanian isthmus constituted a territory administrated by both Audiencias and several neighboring provinces, the land known as Darién lacked a defined sovereignty. Alliances were multiple, changing, and localized. Such had been the case, for example, of the French buccaneer Le Picard in 1687, who was unable to cross the Isthmus of Panama because some Cuna villages had signed a treaty of friendship with the Spanish⁸⁷. Reports of foreign explorers scouting the gulph of Darién in small sized ships commonly caught the attention of Spanish officials.

⁸⁵ Christopher Storrs, “Disaster at Darién (1698–1700)? The Persistence of Spanish Imperial Power on the Eve of the Demise of the Spanish Habsburgs,” *European History Quarterly* 29, núm. 1 (enero de 1999): 5–38, <https://doi.org/10.1177/026569149902900101>.

⁸⁶ Mark Horton y Caroline Williams, “‘To Transmit to Posterity the Virtue, Lustre and Glory of their Ancestors’: Scottish Pioneers in Darién, Panama,” en *Bridging the Early Modern Atlantic World* (Ashgate, 2009), 131–50.

⁸⁷ Daniela Vazquez pino, *Hidrarquia*, citing a Lane, *Piracy*, 1998.

In 1702, as the war of succession broke out, reports from the teniente general of the province of Chocó, Manuel Herrera located south of Darién, – a province co-administered by Popayán and Antioquia, as we will see in chapters 3 and 4 – that pirates and “Indios Dariénes” were navigating upriver on the Atrato. Indeed, the Rio Atrato was an asset and vulnerability at the same time, something Spanish officials knew. They had placed several *Vigías* along the river and prohibited its navigation since 1697, but these measures had not had much effect, as smugglers of many nationalities and Indians still used it as a main waterway⁸⁸. Spanish authorities had learned of this not because they were posted in the Darién, but because:

“Having for some time now been involved in the reduction of different Indian partitions living as maroons and fugitives in the mountains and swamps of these provinces, and having succeeded in bringing many of them and populating the towns of these provinces.”⁸⁹

Several encounters and skirmishes occurred after the pirates confiscated some Spanish cargo, and three Indians allied with Spanish troops were murdered, their heads impaled on steaks.⁹⁰ The report was followed by a translation of a letter with by the governor of Jamaica Peter Beckford, who had been given instructions by “Great Britain and its minister Milord the great Admiral of England” against Spain and France. In particular:

“I, on behalf of the great admiral of England and on behalf of his sacred majesty, neighbor of the great Britain, give license to Ephriam Pilrrieston [sic] [possibly Ephraim Pilgrimston?], captain of the ship called the Dragon, to enter America and seize ships, make invasion in any port in all America, and run the whole coast by sea and land, and I command him to notify me within six months of all the ships he has captured, what has happened by sea and land, if he has had any lack of supplies, gunpowder and bullets, so that we can help his soldiers, people of sea and land to carry out all hostilities against these two crowns and their vassals that her sacred royal majesty the queen of Great Britain commands, so that all the princes

⁸⁸ For the Royal Cédula whereby navigation was prohibited, see Enrique Ortega Ricaurte, *Historia documental del Chocó*, edición original: the University of Virginia (Ed. Kelly, 1954); on the *Vigías*, see Vásquez Pino, “La hidrarquía en las costas del Darién.” See too, AGN, Caciques e indios, D. 14, 8.f. 222.

⁸⁹ AGN, Caciques e indios, D. 14, 8. Carta 1. “Habiendo de algún tiempo a esta parte entendido en la reducción de diferentes parcialidades de Indios que andaban cimarrones y fugitivos por las montañas y ciénagas de estas provincias, y conseguido traer muchos y poblarlos en los pueblos de ella.”

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

(...) I command the officers of this ship to obey him in all that is offered of sea and war and to send me notice so that we may assist and favor them given this under my command and seal, on the twentieth day of July of the first year of his reign of 1702 = General Sipson, Pedro Beckford (gov. of Jamaica).”⁹¹

The news of an invasion of 105 Englishmen ready to enter the Chocó made it all the way to Antioquia province, and further south to Popayán and Quito, and justices in Antioquia asked for instructions to better prepare the defense.⁹² In this sense, during times of war, the Darién presented itself as a territorial weakness, a blind spot which Spanish authorities did not control, and whose population readily allied when the proposed partnerships were convenient to them.

A similar situation played out before the War of Jenkins when, in 1743, five foreigners were intercepted in the coast of Garrotes (Colon). One of them, Agustín Molinas, an Englishman, defined himself as “católico, apostólico y romano, casado en el nuevo reino de Granada, marinero desertor de la balandra corsaria inglesa nombrada la Nueva Godfrey (...) y su capitán Nicolas Wheti [sic].”⁹³ The ship, a sloop, was actually called the Young Godfrey and its Captain was Nicolas White.⁹⁴ It was one of the privateering vessels that had sailed from Newport (present-day Rhode Island) to help in the assault that Admiral Gordon was preparing on Cartagena. The Atlantic colony of Newport was a loyal subject of the king of England and ventured willingly into privateering after having suffered often from Spanish and French attacks.⁹⁵

The account given by “Agustín” to Spanish officials borders on the fantastical but may hold some truth. He claimed to be of 44 years of age and to have fled Portobello with eight Englishmen whom he had convinced to go “serve the catholic King.” He had then supposedly spent four years off the coast of Caracas with news of war, during which he feared being extorted because of his nationality. Wishing to “live amongst Catholics,” though, he would leave for Jamaica where he had embarked as a corsair. In this manner, he arrived in Caledonia (the former Scottish settlement in Darién) where

⁹¹ AGN, Caciques e indios, 14, D. 8.

⁹² Idem, F. 233.

⁹³ AGN, Reales Cédulas, T. 10, De las diligencias hechas últimamente para confederarse con los indios del Darién los ingleses,

⁹⁴ https://threedecks.org/index.php?display_type=show_ship&id=29056 see bottom page for sources and other references.

⁹⁵ William Paine Sheffield, *Privateersmen of Newport*, John P. Sandborn Printer, 1883, 6–11, <http://archive.org/details/PrivateersmenofNewport>.

he stayed for two days on a privateer ship. One day during this time, around 11 am, three Indians had come on board to exchange ripe plantains for aguardiente and tobacco. Around 4pm four more Indians arrived of which “one seemed to be a mestizo” and claimed to be the son of a Cacique, as he “spoke enough Spanish.” He had come on board to inquire about his brother, who had been captured and taken hostage to Jamaica by a captain of the name Dentt [sic] who, he said, “*había de venir a hacer colonia en aquel paraje con sus ingleses.*” One Digby Dent had indeed been appointed captain of the Kinsale frigate on June 9th, 1738. In 1739 he had taken command of Hampton Court under commodore brown in the West Indies and led a successful attack on Portobello as a part of Admiral Vernon’s scheme against Cartagena. After several registered attempts in Cuba which followed the same logic, no traces of Dent are available until 1747, when he was registered as commodore of a Squadron on the Jamaican station⁹⁶.

The declarant stated that, while in Jamaica, he had heard a rumor of Dent and his intentions to “make a colony” in Darién from various “English gentlemen,” and that the Indians upon learning this, had asked Agustín to accompany them to discuss the matter with their Indian Captain Francisco. After talks with the Indian Captain, the declarant would have “conspired with his countrymen (*paysanos*)” to kill their Captain and take the sloop to Portobello to dislodge the enemy of the Spanish King. They would give up (no reasons were given as to why), according to his account, and decided instead to arrive in Portobello by a small boat (*lancha*) to have an audience with the governor and warn him of “the Privateer’s plans to assail the port and confiscate a cacao cargo and two *balandras* from Chagre.”

Reactions from Spanish officials to this news were full of doubt. On the one hand, the Viceroy said to President Alcedo, the news did not fit with the ones Spanish intelligence had sent from Jamaica. On the other, though, the intention of English privateers to “confederate with the Indians of Darién to enter the Kingdom and establish themselves in Calidonia” seemed truthful as a letter from the governor of Portobello spoke of five English deserters who had abandoned an English sloop. He added the news must be true, as it recalled the communication “*de los unos con los otros [Indians and English],*” and the “persuasive permission of the Indians to [allow them] to found

⁹⁶ John Charnock, *Biographia Navalis: Or, Impartial Memoirs of the Lives and Characters of Officers of the Navy of Great Britain, from the Year 1660 to the Present Time; Drawn from the Most Authentic Sources, and Disposed in a Chronological Arrangement*, vol. 3 (R. Faulder, 1795), 374-379.

themselves in their territory.” This, the governor granted to the Viceroy, was a “new reason that proves the superior disposition by H. E. not to neglect that province”⁹⁷.

Even though the English invasion did not materialize, and what is more, Admiral Gordon’s attempts to seize Cartagena were rejected and crushed, the tale given by “Agustín Molinas” is indicative of the way the Darién was still perceived by foreign and competing powers. This does not mean that foreign powers naïvely considered Darién a virgin land for colonization. Indeed, the history of Darién had been traversed by many events: mining activities were installed, failed, and then reinstalled, making vecinos of neighboring provinces wealthy and Spanish attempts to exploit Darién and use its peoples as laborers had somewhat worked. Attempts to reduce them to pueblos, either by friars or by officials had mostly failed, and rebellions had punctuated time in the area since the 17th century. The Scottish “disaster of Darién” had been an international topic of interest and a resounding failure for Scottish ambitions in the West Indies. Even so, this version of events during a moment of heightened international tensions in the Caribbean, fifty years after the Scottish venture, replays the European *topos* of an uncertain Indian ally, but also a player open to any game, and a somewhat unreliable friend. This *topos* might well be, if considered from another angle, the greatest asset of native groups in areas that could be defined as “contested ground,” where alliances were forged and reforged not in abstraction of, but many times in syntony with, much larger geopolitical junctures.

Was the Darién an exception to the northern borders of the New Granada? As this section has shown, the Darién shared many experiences (mining, missions, resistance, appointment of Indian chiefs by Spanish authorities) with its neighbors. But there is also a certain continuity through the period 1685-1740 which the other provinces lack on such a scale. There is indeed a certain continuity in the Darién, partly provided by its topography, but also the social configurations of its peoples: a continuing failure at evangelization, at dominating nature, a continuous lack of efforts to administer. This continuity makes the Darién if not exceptional, at least particular. For the Darién differs in a way which a look at its international significance can highlight. It is also a case of continuity from a Caribbean and Atlantic perspective, as foreign covetousness for Darién never ceased and British (and later French) ambitions

⁹⁷ AGN, Caciques e indios, D. 14, 8., f. 973.

to install themselves on the southern isthmus replayed across the decades. It is worth mentioning, not to teleologize but rather to echo, that Ferdinand de Lesseps and, later, the United States' canal building venture, hinged on the same presupposition or idea of the Darién as an open land, with people willing to negotiate with the highest bidder.

Conclusions

The reign of Charles II and the reprisal of efforts to conquer and/or pacify, in other words, to reduce populations to a state in which they were manageable, had various motives and effects. From an infrastructural perspective, securing the terrain was a difficult task. Hesitation and debate, stemming from a lack of accurate knowledge of the terrain, often incited officials to make repetitive or contradictory decisions. The issues that worried the Crown were related to defense and the Royal Hacienda; protecting finances and ports, curbing contraband, and ensuring the circulation of export goods was the main priority for the Council of Indies. Local government had other interests. Whether it was to discover gold sources, to curb the advance of “rebel” Indians, or to stop them from smuggling and trading with foreigners, governors, the cabildo and frontier officers often collaborated in discovery and pacification ventures. In the process, they sometimes clashed in jurisdictional disputes with friars whose missions were protected by the crown, and bishops took sides according to their particular interests. Native and maroon communities seized the chance to negotiate better conditions and even freedom, but many resisted negotiations; warfare and uprisings were common in the most extreme regions of the territory, Guajira and Darién. A general tendency towards an increase in attempts at negotiating rather than attacking is visible during the period and, in these negotiations, frontier officials (Indian protectors, *curas doctrineros* and captains *aguerra*) were essential. In some cases, though, a deeply rooted misunderstanding of indigenous societies and a lack of fluency in their languages led officials to misjudge the scope of their capacity to influence the structure of authority which structured native communities. On the extremes, inter-imperial interactions were abundant, and natives forged close relationships and even inter-mixed with foreigners, giving way to a particular experience of the frontier, sometimes outside the reach of Spanish authorities. The Crown's ability to ensure its

sovereignty in these parts was called into question as competing European powers coveted strategic locations. In part II, the north-central provinces will be discussed in more detail, as well as cases of fruitful negotiation and the local/regional/global dynamics allowing for their success or failure.

PART II: Political practices in changing spaces

Chapter 4: The political game in an expanding frontier: using and misusing authority 1697-1718

“Y solo los malos e injustos usurpadores de SM, de terrenos, con el soborno, quedan impunitos, y con mayor libertad para mayores delitos, con la confianza de el apoyo que merecen, de los efectos que causa el sabor del dinero. Y querer numerar todos los monstruos que se ven en esta Audiencia es querer reducir las aguas del mar, a un pequeño baso.”

José López de Carvajal to the King

AGI, Santa Fe, 362, N°28^a.

Introduction

This chapter¹ focuses on the processes of conquest through negotiation that were undertaken in the first quarter of the eighteenth century in the northwestern region of the New Kingdom of Granada and the political game upon which such processes depended² This will be done through an exploration of a little-known episode in the

¹ Recommendation to the reader: Chapters 4 and 5 are intimately linked. Chapter 5 discusses the aftermath of events unveiled in this chapter. In this sense, the elements within this chapter are important to understand the problems and questions explored in Chapter 5. Reading this chapter before Chapter 5 is thus highly recommended.

² The works of late historian Caroline A. Williams have been essential during the production of this chapter. Her works take on the perspective of the native peoples of the Chocó in their struggle between resistance and adaptation to colonial rule in the 17th and 18th centuries. The last chapter of her previously mentioned book (*Between Resistance and Adaptation*, 2004) describes the attempts made by the governor of the province between 1705 and 1712, José López de Carvajal, to negotiate with native authorities in search of respite from conflict, after the bloody events of the Indian revolts that occurred in Chocó in 1685. Having access to a variety of archives allowed Williams to produce a complex perspective of what

history of the New Kingdom of Granada, when José López de Carvajal, governor of the northwestern province of Antioquia, sought to conquer and settle the lands west of the capital of the province (Santafé de Antioquia) by negotiating with native populations living in the area, between 1709 and 1714.

After a long military career and a subsequent decade serving the Crown in the Carrera de Indias, Carvajal ended his *cursus honorum* as governor of the province of Antioquia. He irrupted into the status quo of a province whose governor of nine years had fostered close ties with the most important families. Thus, he bred a deep enmity with the outgoing governor, Francisco Fernandez de Heredia. Their feud would have lasting repercussions on Carvajal's government. As governor, Carvajal concentrated a substantial part of his efforts on the frontiers of the province and on its Indian population. He ordered the *empadronamiento* of Indian populations within *encomiendas*, negotiated the reduction³ of Indians on the frontier with Citará through *pueblos de indios*, and pushed for the discovery of new gold sources. But his political misgivings about some sectors of the New Granada's political and economic elite, led to the curtailing of his negotiated conquest. In the face of this, Carvajal's government oscillated between three behaviors that were not incompatible in the 1710s: a quixotic drive to conquer new territories; a preoccupied disposition towards the "restauration of the Monarchy" and the *quietud*⁴ of its inhabitants; and an attention to righteous administration and order.⁵ These three manners of directing political intent are emblematic of the shifting ideals that permeated changing political cultures during the reign of Philip V.

she described as a final movement in a great cacophony of events that marked the relationships between Indians and Spanish authorities in the Chocó. But shifting the perspective to the larger initiative emanating from Antioquia and the political dynamics behind the officers' motives, as well as to the authorities' intentions in conquering and governing—allows for a discussion of the different ways that Spanish projections of conquest and exploitation played out in the frontier. For this purpose, crossing archival material from the AGI (Seville) and AHA (Medellin, Antioquia) has been crucial.

³ On this term, see Chapter 3.

⁴ On the idea of *quietud* ("quiet") as a driving political intention during the late Habsburg period, see Luis Miguel Córdoba Ochoa, "DE LA QUIETUD A LA FELICIDAD. LA VILLA DE MEDELLIN Y LOS PROCURADORES DEL CABILDO ENTRE 1675 Y 1785" (Medellin, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1996).

⁵ On the nascent attention to spatial order see Marta Herrera, *Ordenar Para Controlar. Ordenamiento Espacial y Control Político En Las Llanuras Del Caribe y En Los Andes Centrales Neogranadinos. Siglo XVIII* (Universidad de los Andes, 2014), <https://doi.org/10.7440/2014.26>; and Edgardo Morales Pérez, *La Obra de Dios y El Trabajo Del Hombre. Percepción y Transformación de La Naturaleza En El Virreinato Del Nuevo Reino de Granada*, Universidad Nacional de Colombia (Medellin, Colombia, 2011).

A few preliminary remarks are in order before stating the main arguments. The use of the term “conquest” is a voluntary choice emanating from the belief that we ought not to project our modern views of complex processes onto the past. On the one hand, the word *conquista* was used by actors of the time referring to the action of undertaking military “*entradas*” (expeditions) with the purpose of subjecting local populations, collecting information on the terrain and its resources and inhabitants, and submitting them to Spanish authority by different sets of means, ranging from military to spiritual, with the goal of integrating them into the Spanish Crown⁶ These initiatives should be understood within the general attempts to conquer the boundaries of the kingdom, starting in the 1680s, but also within the specific need for finding new gold deposits in the area. These attempts also responded to territorial threats in a kingdom within the Spanish Monarchy, that was subjected to a specific vulnerability because of its northernmost position in the South American continent. A final note: the fact that local authorities sought to conquer the northern border of the province does not mean it had remained untouched since the early fifteenth century. On the contrary, it was a space with a high circulation of actors whose social configurations had been tested and dislocated by intra-ethnic disputes and earlier attempts of conquest. Finally, as we will see, conquest and negotiation were not incompatible in the representations of early 18th century actors.

⁶ The word *conquest* is polysemic, as it may refer to a *longue durée* process (“conquista” is often cited as a general goal, e.g., to advance the conquest of these realms (“para avanzar la conquista de estos reinos”) but it may also refer to a defined occurrence, i.e., an expedition, or the intentions to deploy Spanish military presence to a defined area. One has but to look at general histories of Latin America, usually divided in sections to the effect of “Conquest”, followed by “Colonization”, followed by “the emergence of the state”. This is the way history school programs in Latin America are structured to this day in textbooks and syllabi. But this positivistic and constrained view of the complex processes that shaped the history of the Spanish monarchy’s ultramarine territories does not do it justice. Since the 1980s and the influence of Marxist historiography, Colombian scholars in history have tended to limit the use of the word “conquista” to early stages of what was traditionally known as the stage preceding colonization, or banned the word altogether, preferring the use of terms which, in their eyes, offer a local or native perspective of the effects which conquest entailed for the natives, giving way to statements describing the “Spanish invasion”. While such a term serves the purpose of illustrating how the native peoples probably perceived the Spanish arrival and ensuing effects (like the demographic cataclysm it provoked), it does not carry enough complexity, as it fails to convey the many aspects of “conquista”. Furthermore, it hinders our ability to distinguish the “*invasión*”, invasion of foreigners, as perceived by the local authorities and populations—a menace most prevalent in the late 17th century—and the concrete actions undertaken by local and central authorities to submit the boundaries of provinces and kingdoms within the Monarchy. See introduction for a more developed explanation of the use of this term.

In this chapter I will argue that the case of José López de Carvajal allows us to understand the complexity of the exercise of government in the Indies at the beginning of the eighteenth century. We will examine how the use of authority to carry out initiatives was conditioned by an inexorable political game. To move the gears of this game, several types of tools were necessary: a) institutional tools (a knowledge of the Monarchy's bureaucracy), b) juridical keys (provided by the plural normative backbone of the Monarchy), and c) social savvy (a certain dexterity navigating the societal factions, to garner more sympathy than enmity). We will see how these elements were articulated by adopting a provincial approach, as we focus on the province of Antioquia. Moreover, this case will allow us to see how different political ideals converged in the persona of the governor, something symptomatic of the changing political ideals of the period.

More broadly, this case study allows us to discuss political practices set in motion at the frontier, both as a response to real or feigned threats to authority over a territory, and as a means of exploiting the territory for resources. It also allows for a study of the political dynamics entrenched in the relationships between center-periphery and region-capital dichotomies. In order to tackle these questions, the chapter will be divided into four focus points: a contextual point in which elements for an understanding of the scenario in Antioquia and Citará will be offered; a second point in which the conflict between parties amid the attempted expansion will be examined; a third point in which the actions carried out, their scope, and significance, will be discussed; and a fourth point, which will aim to discuss the aftermath of the conflict and its effects on good government (*buen gobierno*).

I-Antioquia and the Citará in the early 18th century

1) Geographical and historical frame, an overview of the area

The events presented in this chapter took place in different frontier areas between several provinces in the Northern New Granada. This area was made up of islands of authority where Spanish authorities scarcely exercised their authority⁷ This

⁷ For a similar context in the Gulf of Mexico (Florida and Louisiana), see Croguennec, "BORDERLANDS AND ACCOMMODATION".

insular character of authority in frontiers was ineffective, as studies on other internal (interprovincial) frontiers of the Spanish empire have shown⁸ Internal frontiers⁹ within the kingdom were usually areas whose difficult access resulted in officers from different provinces having to strive to bring themselves there. This characteristic enabled the communication and circulation of other actors, mainly different native groups, resulting in the porosity of borders and jurisdictions, as frontiers were porous, serving as what Marie Louise Pratt has called “contact zones”, i.e., “social spaces where cultures meet, clash, and grapple with each other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power”¹⁰. On one level, individuals came into play in the frontier. On another level, the frontier was at the center of jurisdictional interprovincial competition. The boundaries of jurisdictions were all but set in 1700. The three jurisdictional entities that are of interest here are Chocó, Antioquia and Popayán. Popayán and Antioquia had been settled through cities and villas since the 16th century¹¹, with Spanish *vecinos* and Cabildos. This led to the development of merchant and mining groups that had interests in the Chocó, a region stretching south from the

⁸ The process of founding villages, sometimes with forts, created conquered patches of territory where officers were able to impose a certain sovereignty, controlling the territory, its resources, often by negotiating with native groups. Ibáñez-Bonillo, “The Portuguese conquest of the Amazon Estuary”; Gómez González, *Frontera selvática*; Arcila y Gómez, *Libres, cimarrones y arrochelados en la frontera entre Antioquia y Cartagena*; Williams, “Resistance and Rebellion on the Spanish Frontier”.

⁹ In the strictest sense, “internal” refers to non-maritime borders. But in the idea that an internal frontier goes beyond the geographical border, it signifies a more complex concept. The idea of the *frontier* has been extensively written about since Frederic Jackson Turner theorized the concept through the idea of an ever-expanding territory at the borders of civilization. The idea has been made polysemic; at times describing a gateway for interaction and cultural exchange, and at others reduced to an interpersonal, metaphysical boundary. The idea, for the purpose of this dissertation, is to approach frontiers as areas of land where the ability to exert authority and control is in the hands of different (or opposing) parties. Within this frontier there are borders of jurisdictional, provincial and interimperial character, as well as natural barriers. The utility of the concept lies in translating the complex reality of imperial powers, whose territorial extension was greater than the effective expansion of its authority. For a comparative study of frontiers, see for example Guy y Sheridan, *Contested ground*. For studies on frontiers in the New Granada see: Maria Regina Celestino de Almeida y Sara Ortelli, “Atravesando fronteras. Circulación de población en los márgenes iberoamericanos. Siglos XVI-XIX”, *Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos. Nouveaux mondes mondes nouveaux - Novo Mundo Mundos Novos - New world New worlds*, el 31 de enero de 2011, <https://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/60702>; Montoya Guzmán, “Las más remotas tierras del mundo”; Arcila y Gómez, *Libres, cimarrones y arrochelados en la frontera entre Antioquia y Cartagena*. For a study on in Spanish Florida, see Croguennec, “BORDERLANDS AND ACCOMMODATION”.

¹⁰ Marie Louise Pratt, “Arts of the Contact Zone”, *Profession*, 1991, 33–40.

¹¹ The conquest in the 16th century led to the creation of four large provinces in what was then known as Tierra Firme, in the northern parts of the Kingdom of Perú: Santa Marta to the northeast, Cartagena in the north and northwest, the New Kingdom of Granada in Santafé, and Popayán in the south. See map in annexes.

Darién, along the Pacific coast. Because of its natural resources, the Chocó was coveted by the contiguous provinces of Antioquia and Popayán.

Jurisdictionally, though, things were more intricate. The Chocó had been an independent *gobernación* (Governorship) in the 17th century. Subsequently, it was attached to the jurisdiction of the Province of Popayán, which sat much closer to Quito than to Cartagena and in relative autarchy, depending jurisdictionally on the two *audiencias* of the northern Viceroyalty of Perú: the Audiencia of Santafé and the Audiencia de Quito¹². In the 17th century, the Chocó was divided into two provinces: Noanama in the south, closer to Popayán and under its rule; and Citará in the north, accessible to officers in Antioquia. The province of Antioquia, which had consolidated its independence from the Province of Popayán between 1568 and 1584, had always regarded the Chocó with gluttonous eyes and pushed for an expansion of its jurisdiction into the Citará in 1685, which was denied it after the governor of Antioquia failed to effectively curb the Indian revolts of that year. The struggle between the two provinces culminated in 1726 when the Crown ruled the Chocó must be made a fully-fledged governorship, independent both from justices in Popayán and Antioquia. The northern part of the Chocó (Citará) was geographically distant both from Popayán during its rule over the Chocó, but also from its chosen capital (as it was made a governorship), Quibdó. Additionally, because of the Gulf of Darién's proximity to Cartagena, along the coast, information regarding the Chocó, officers, and orders concerning the Chocó were often dispatched to and from Cartagena and Antioquia, especially before 1726.

Geographically speaking, the Chocó constitutes a coherent ecosystem beside the Pacific coast, which is why its definition as an independent governorship produced a coincidence between an ecosystem and its political demarcation. The region's size is considerable, as it spans over 45,0000 km² of tropical rainforest (for comparison: it is slightly larger than the size of Denmark), extending from the mountains of the western cordillera into the Pacific Ocean. The climate is extremely humid, with over 90% humidity throughout the day, and consistent rain throughout the year, except for a decrease in the months of June and July.¹³ The dense forest was perceived as impenetrable and perilous—an extension of the Darién. The region is traversed by many

¹² See Herrera Ángel, *Popayán*, 80.

¹³ Robert Cushman Murphy, "The Littoral of Pacific Colombia and Ecuador", *Geographical Review* 29, núm. 1 (1939): 1–33, <https://doi.org/10.2307/210063>.

rivers whose cradle lies deep in the forest. Most are affluents of the San Juan, which streams into the Pacific Ocean, or of the Atrato, San Jorge or Cauca rivers, that provide access to the Caribbean as they flow into its waters.

Many nations of natives that lived in the province were hostile to conquistadors and colonizers, and attacks by poisonous darts were common across time.¹⁴ Who these natives were is a task that ethnographers and linguists have tried to answer, as the sources present a fabricated classification of the peoples living in the Chocó. It is for this reason that historians who work on the Chocó often employ the terminology found in the sources, so as not to contradict them by trying to assert its native inhabitants' ethnicity at a certain point in history.¹⁵ The native peoples living in the province of Citará comprised, but were not limited to, the Cunas, Citaraes (Emberas), and Oromiras.¹⁶ Linguistically speaking, the myriad of peoples in the Chocó-Urabá-Darién region spoke languages belonging to the Chocó language group, divided into different categories. The further filiation of these groups is disputed amongst linguists, some arguing the Chocoan languages belong to the Caribbean family group (of which little remains in terms of glossaries or any written trace); others argue they belong to the Chibchan family group.¹⁷ The events studied in this chapter involved several indigenous groups that inhabited the area and whose submission had been attempted by Spanish authorities since the 17th century.

The Spanish encountered the peoples of the Darién and Urabá in the earliest stages of the 16th century. Several expeditions in Tierra Firme¹⁸ between 1511 and 1538

¹⁴ James Jerome Parsons, *Urabá, salida de Antioquia al mar: geografía e historia de su colonización*, 2a ed (Bogotá: Banco de la República : Ancora Editores, 1996).

¹⁵ For example, Caroline Williams refers to the "Citaraes" of the Citará.

¹⁶ According to Caroline Williams: "The other three groups are somewhat easier to identify, as one of these (the Noanama) came under crown control in the 1630s, and the other two (the Citará and the Tatamá) fell under Spanish control during the late 1670s.11 The identity of the Tatamaes, however, is less clear than that of the other two groups. In the 1660s and 1670s, the Spaniards used the names Tatamá, Chocó, and, more rarely, Poya, without distinction in referring to the indigenous inhabitants of the area surrounding the upper San Juan and headwaters of the Atrato. Kathleen Romoli has shown that in the 1570s the Tatamaes and Chocoas were two distinct groups, but since there is insufficient evidence to indicate whether both survived as separate and independent peoples a century later, they will, for the sake of clarity, be referred to throughout this study as the Tatamá.", Williams, "Resistance and Rebellion on the Spanish Frontier"; Romoli, "El alto Chocó en el siglo XVII. Parte II".

¹⁷ For a summary of the discussion: Julian H. Steward, ed., *Handbook of South American Indians*, Bulletin 143, vol. 6 (United States Government Printing Office, Washington: Smithsonian Institution, Bureau of American Ethnology, 1950).

¹⁸ Tierra Firme, another way of referring to the northernmost area of the South American continent, was a large province, divided in two *gobernaciones*: Veragua and Castilla del Oro. The latter included the

had provided opportunities for conquistadors to map the Chocó, learn of its riches, and dream of finding the Dabeiba.¹⁹ By 1570 several expeditions had reported gold in the basins of the rivers San Juan and Atrato, making it an attractive prospect for settlers in Popayán and Antioquia. Expeditions from Antioquia were thus organized northward using the course of the Atrato River. From further south, in places like Cartago, Cali, and Anserma, *vecinos* organized expeditions through mountain passes, crossing over the cordillera occidental, or by the San Juan River from Buenaventura.²⁰ Despite the efforts to explore, colonizing and settling were neither a preoccupation nor a priority.

The first attempt at conquest was a spiritual one, and it dates to 1624 as Governor Valenzuela Fajardo sent a group of Jesuits who managed to establish several *reducciones* and pacify the Noanama Indians (south Chocó). This was also the case in the following years of 1659, 1660 and 1661.²¹ The Franciscans also became interested in the Chocó and sent a mission from Cartagena in 1648, led by Fray Matías Abad, who sought to pacify the Citará Indians (north Chocó) but found a quick death²². By 1666, the Chocó resurged in the interests of the Crown as awareness regarding the depletion of mines in neighboring Antioquia settled after 1650.²³ This led the Crown to expedite a Royal Cédula ordering the governors of Cartagena, Popayán, and Antioquia to pacify the natives in the Chocó and access its gold deposits.²⁴ Another Franciscan mission, this time aided by the governor of Antioquia, attempted to reduce the natives to settlements, which resulted in a rebellion, a massacre of the friars, and flight of those who survived. Some attempts at contact and compiling information were successful, such as those by Governor Bueso de Valdés who sent an expedition from Antioquia in 1677. Other successive episodes of the sort include Sebastián de Arce's attempt to

Darién and was later considered to be a part of the New Granada. Even though this area was jurisdictionally dependent on the Audiencia de Panamá from an administrative and judicial point of view, toponyms for areas long called in a certain way prevailed, and the toponym Tierra Firme, which carried no jurisdictional meaning, still signified the northern isthmian, Caribbean, and Pacific coasts of northern South America well into the 18th century.

¹⁹ On Dabeiba and its interpretation, see Sharp, op. cit. and Montoya Guzmán, “Las más remotas tierras del mundo”.

²⁰ On this, see the seminal work by Sharp, *Slavery on the Spanish frontier*, 26.

²¹ Ibid.

²² On the relationship between Franciscans and natives, and the shortcomings of evangelization in the Chocó, see Williams, “Resistance and Rebellion on the Spanish Frontier,” Chapter 4.

²³ James Jerome Parsons, *La colonización antioqueña en el occidente de Colombia* (Banco de la República, 1997), 91–92.

²⁴ Werner Cantor, *Ni aniquilados, ni vencidos*, 12.

establish a fiefdom in the Chocó, using the natives as slaves for labor, and resulted in a case of ill-fated hubris.²⁵ But things became unstable towards 1680, leading justices in Santafé to claim evangelization efforts had been fruitless and summoning a new collective effort by Antioquia and Popayán to “pacify” the Chocó.²⁶ But this only worsened tensions and, in 1684, an alliance of different Indian groups in the Citará revolted against abuses committed by Franciscan missionaries.²⁷

Presumably, years later, the memory of the rebellion of the late 1680s hung, bloody and terrible in the minds of all, and instability amongst native groups and Spanish authorities reigned. Letters exchanged between justices in Antioquia, Popayán, and Madrid reflect the volatile character of relations in 1685. A Royal Cédula expedited that year accounts for an incident in which a reversal of matters stirred officials:

“Don Gerónimo de Berrío, my governor of the city and province of Popayán, refers in letters of the twenty-second of May of sixteen hundred and eighty-four and twelve of January of this year that the provinces of the Citará in the Chocó were at peace, although with little submission to the Spaniards, it so happened that after the Chorucos of gentle nation had killed an Indian, the cacique of the Citará and his people went out to punish them with a license given to him by Domingo de Veytia, the Spanish lieutenant that Juan Bueso de Valdés had stationed there, and with (...) the people that he had with him executed many deaths, and having gone the said cacique with twelve or thirteen *prezas de rescate*, which the mentioned lieutenant tried to take them away, he summoned the whole province and killed the said Domingo de Veytia and the Spaniards and slaves that he had there.”²⁸

²⁵ Sharp, *Slavery on the Spanish frontier*, 28.

²⁶ On a detailed account of the fraught relationship between indigenous groups, Franciscans and civil justices, see Montoya Guzmán, “Las más remotas tierras del mundo”, 434-437.

²⁷ The case has been thoroughly studied in several publications. See, for instance, Williams, *Between Resistance and Adaptation*; Montoya Guzmán, “Las más remotas tierras del mundo”; Juan David Montoya Guzmán, “¿Conquistar indios o evangelizar almas? políticas de sometimiento en las provincias de las tierras bajas del Pacífico (1560-1680)”, *Historia Crítica*, núm. 45 (septiembre de 2011): 10–30, <https://doi.org/10.7440/historicrit45.2011.02>.

²⁸AGN, Reales Cédulas, T. 4, f. 142, “Don Gerónimo de Berrío mi governador de la ciudad y Provinzia de Popayán rrefiere en cartas de veinte y dos de Maio de Mil seiscientos y ochenta y quatro y doce de henero deste año que hallandose las provinziás del citará en el chocó en paz aunque con poca sugezion a los españoles, sucedió que haviendo muerto a un indio los chorucos de nazon gentil, salio el cacique del citará con su jente al castigo de ellos con lizenzia que para ello le dio Domingo de Veytia theniente español que tenía allí puesto Juan Bueso de Valdés y con (...) gente que llevaba executó en ellos muchas muertes iendo el dho cacique doce o treze piezas de rrescate que habiendoselas querido quitar el dho theniente convocó toda la Provinzia y mató al dho Domingo de Veytia y a los español y esclavos que allí havia”

This excerpt is interesting for several reasons. On the one hand it shows the variety of authorities who came into play in Citará, both from Popayán (the governor writing) and Antioquia (the governor executing orders) at the provincial level, a *teniente* (lieutenant, appointed by the governor of Antioquia),²⁹ and three Indian groups, as perceived by justices: the Cacique and his people (presumably belonging to the Citaráes), *prezas* or *indios de rescate*³⁰, and the Chorucos, described as gentle Indians.³¹ It also points to the distant character of the administration through which the Citará was governed, and the difficulty in executing expedited orders.³² On the other hand, it signals the culmination of processes that took place in the late 1670s as the Governor of Antioquia strove to strengthen control over Citará to protect Antioqueño mining ventures, in which he himself took part along with Domingo de Veytía, with whom he held a slave gang and mining venture from 1684.³³ The complexity of the revolt of 1684 has been studied in several forecited works and can be summarized in the following way. From the 1660s mounting pressure by ecclesiastical and military authorities

²⁹ *Teniente* and *corregidor* were cumulative charges, often named in frontier areas to supervise and preside over Indian *reducciones*.

³⁰ In the early years of the conquest in the 16th century, the “rescue” of Indians meant the acquisition of Indians by barter and purchase. This, like “esclavos de guerra” (slavery by war), i.e., the subjection to slavery of the population that had refused the requirement of Spanish rule, were the two forms of provisioning slave labor. These were limited by legislation produced by the Crown in the late 16th century. See Isabel Fernández Tejedo, “De la esclavitud al servicio personal (el régimen de trabajo en Yucatán durante el siglo xvi)”, en *Des Indes occidentales à l’Amérique Latine. Volume 2*, ed. Thomas Calvo y Alain Musset, Historia (Mexico: Centro de estudios mexicanos y centroamericanos, 2013), 409–22, <http://books.openedition.org/cemca/2103>. According to Silvio Zavala, the *indios de rescate* “[were] Indians who, in accordance with the customs of pre-Hispanic society, performed servile tasks and [that], through purchases, tribute or other deals, passed from the hands of the indigenous masters to those of the Europeans”, in Silvio Zavala, “Los Esclavos Indios.”, en *Contribución a la historia de las instituciones coloniales en Guatemala*, vol. 36 (Colegio de Mexico, 1945), 11–52, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv8bt2r7.4>.

³¹ “Gentle” or “docile” Indians, were native groups perceived by authorities as either non-threatening or non-aggressive, and thus more apt for services, labor, and more open to evangelization. As Caroline Williams points out, this category was longtime applied to the Indians of Citará and other native peoples of the Chocó, a categorization that the rebellions in the Citará province proved wrong during the last fifteen years of the 17th century, and the broader strategies of resistance through desertion and flight implemented by said native groups. See Williams, “Resistance and Rebellion on the Spanish Frontier”. Interestingly, in *Historia de Cali*, Gustavo Arboleda also qualifies the Chorucos as enemies of the Chocó, describing how in 1679 a group of their nation had killed a Cacique in the Chocó, leading justices in Buga and Caloto, in the south of Popayán Province, to come in aid of the Chocó Indians. Scarcely named and not amongst the native groups often referred to, the Chorucos might have been present along the whole Pacific region.

³² In this matter, the order given by the governor was to treat the Indians in the gentlest way so as to ensure the most effective way of ruling over them. The failure of such orders is evident, as they either came too late, or were insufficient to tame the already burgeoning animosity that native populations had come to foster.

³³ See Williams, *Between Resistance and Adaptation*, 125 footnote 149.

seeking further evangelization and territorial control led to an increase in violent incidents involving the latter and native groups in the Chocó. The rebellions that started in 1684 were the result of an alliance between several native groups who sought to dislodge the Spanish. Orders by the Crown were received after action had already been taken, most notably through the slaughter of indigenous and black enslaved people who had joined forces. In the end, Governor Bueso de Valdés' forces slaughtered the enslaved blacks and made slaves of the rebellious Indians. The aftermath of the rebellion, after 1686, showcased another dynamic whereby native populations displayed their refusal of Spanish authority not by overtly rebelling, but rather through desertion and flight, and most of the settlements on the Atrato were abandoned. This produced a situation in which many Indians returned to their previous habitats. Others regrouped in settlements defined as *cimarronas* by officials as a way of resisting evangelization and Spanish domination.³⁴ During the last fifteen years of the century Justices from Antioquia retreated from the Citará, except for a few entradas into the Chocó, and the northwestern part of the kingdom was progressively explored by a new set of actors whose presence had been felt since 1679, namely freebooters, merchants, and privateers of different nationalities.³⁵

The Atrato and San Juan rivers, and its many affluents, presented a network of entries into the continent through which to smuggle goods from the Caribbean and Pacific oceans, respectively. The years preceding the war of Succession and those encompassing it are estimated to be amongst the highest in contraband, although the very nature of the phenomenon makes it difficult to quantify. For instance, in 1695 Marco Renjifo, identified as a Cacique Indian from the town of San Juan, in the southern Chocó, testified after oidor (judge) Merlo de la Fuente demanded information on the state of things in the Chocó at the Royal Audiencia de Santafé when reports

³⁴ Cimarronas, or marron settlements, were places outside of Spanish authorities sphere of control. The term, usually used to refer to towns founded by enslaved people of African origin who managed to flee, was also used to refer to indigenous communities who, in the eyes of the Spanish, were *acimarronados*, or informally regrouped. The term carried a strong connotation of something similar to acculturation, as officials often insisted on how these “cimarrones” were by definition mixed regardless of their ethnic origins. For a discussion of this phenomenon as a manifestation of native resistance, see Williams, 192-193. Chapter 7. On marooning and flight as a means of emancipation, see Aline Helg, *¡Nunca más esclavos! Una historia comparada de los esclavos que se liberaron en las Américas* (Banco de la República, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2018), cap. 2.

³⁵ Attempts at exploring, mapping, trading and even colonizing parts of this territory, along with blatant attacks to cities and ports took place in: Portobelo (1671), eastern Darién (1697), Cartagena (1698), Sinú (1701), Atrato delta in Citará (1702).

came of a how ship carrying basic goods such as aguardientes (distilled sugar cane liquor), wine, salt and meat had entered the province. Renjifo stated “[that] in that province the Spanish merchants and other people introduce[d] wines, liquors, aguardiente, crossbows and *anacos* (pieces of cloth) and other things to be sold from the province of Quito, Guayaquil and other parts through Cali and the river of Atrato, where all those who enter from all parts will go out and then [...] They are to be carried on shoulders to carry them from their town of San Juan de Noanama, to Novita, which is the town of the whites and blacks who live there with everything, and the gold mines are so rich in gold. And they do not pay them for their work more than two pesos, and they should be paid four (...).”³⁶

The situation was similar in the Caribbean, but the main difference was that fewer cities were in proximity to the Citará province (Antioquia and Cartagena, at best). Reacting to such practices was thus a difficult task. Aided by the Cuna of Darién, foreign merchants and *contrabandistas* began exploring the various river deltas and canals that headed inland, and foreign covetousness increased as sovereignty over the Darién and the north of Chocó were challenged, especially in times of war (see Chapter 1). It was in a context of retreat and war that local justices in Antioquia decided to renew contacts with the populations of Citará.

2) The spatial configuration and conditions in early 18th century Antioquia contextual and chronological frame

Before getting into the events that led up to the attempted conquest of lands to the northeast of Antioquia, having set the frame for the situation in Chocó, we must refer to the conditions in Antioquia that led to such a venture, because it was not an isolated occurrence; rather, it stemmed from a pattern of internal colonization rooted deep in the history of the region.

³⁶ AGN, CONTRABANDOS, 15, f.448-449, “dijo que lo que save y puede desir es que en aquella provinsia los mercaderes españoles y otras personas introdusen vinos aguardientes vaietas y anacos y otras cosas para bender de la provinsia de quito guayaquil y otras partes por Cali y el rio de Atrato, a donde ban a salir todos los que entran por todas partes y despues se [...]ason cargar a hombros para condusirlas, desde su pueblo de San juan de Noanama, asta Novita, que es el pueblo de los blancos y negros que allo ahy de todo, y ser tan las minas de oro. Y no les pagan por su trabajo mas de dos pesos, deviéndoles pagar quatro (...)”,

For a start, the province of Antioquia had been founded as a result of expeditions that had departed from Cartagena and Santa Marta in the 1540s, as news of the discoveries in Peru made colonizers dream of heading south, dreaming of places where gold was abundant and almost holy. It was thus with the “Dorado” and Dabeiba in mind that the Spanish came upon the territory of Urabá. Its numerous rivers and streams had resonated in the ambitions of the conquistadors and explorers. The rumor of a place called Dabaybe (Dabaibe, also spelled Davaive or Daveiva) had reached the ears of Vasco Núñez de Balboa's expedition in 1512 through the Indians of the Darién, who ensured the myth was spread amongst the Spanish.³⁷ In the Urabá, Sebastián de Buenavista was founded, and reports were sent of rich and advanced settlements of about 100.000 Indians, who had mines in a land by the name of Buriticá, lands that extended across “eight moons of travel (by foot)”³⁸. The exploitation of Buriticá in the 16th century had been so profitable since the 1540s that, between 1551-1560 and 1601-1610, it yielded between 10 and 20 tons of gold, or a rate of 1 to 2 tons of gold per year.³⁹ Further south, encounters with other native groups, such as the Indians of Nutibara, resulted in violence as the Spanish demanded gold.⁴⁰ Conflicts also erupted between conquistadors during the initial phase of the conquest, as expeditions met, and their leaders clashed in a dispute over jurisdiction.⁴¹ It was in his course south, following the Cauca River from Santa Marta, that Jorge Robledo founded Antioquia, in 1541, as recorded by chronicist Pedro Cieza de León:

“This city of Antioca is founded and settled in a valley of these I mention, which is between the famous and renowned and very rich rivers of the Darien and Santa Marta, because these valleys are in the midst wide mountain ranges. The seat of the city is very good and of great valleys, along a small river. The city is closer to the north than any of those of the

³⁷ Juan David Montoya Guzmán, "'The remotest lands of the world': history of the Pacific frontier, 1573-1687," 2014, 178, <https://rio.upo.es/xmlui/handle/10433/954>.

³⁸ The expression used by Juan de Badillo is “ocho lunas de andadura”, see Juan David Montoya Guzmán y José Manue González Jaramillo, *Indios, poblamiento y trabajo en la provincia de Antioquia: siglos XVI y XVII*, Libros de la facultad. Historia (Medellín, Colombia: Facultad de Ciencias Humanas y Económicas, Universidad Nacional de Colombia-Sede Medellín, 2010), 16.

³⁹ Pierre Chaunu, *Conquête et exploitation des nouveaux mondes*, Nouvelle Clío PUF (Humensis, 2014), 307.

⁴⁰ For instance, Vadillo's expedition killed the Cacique of Nutibara after having kidnapped his family, and asked for twelve baskets of gold in exchange for their release.

⁴¹ On this topic, and the various clashes amongst conquistadors during the 16th century, see Juan de Castellanos, *Elegías De Varones Ilustres De Indias*, 1857, <http://archive.org/details/elegias-de-varones-ilustres-de-indias-1>. See too: Montoya Guzmán y González Jaramillo, *Indios, poblamiento y trabajo en la provincia de Antioquia*, 15–18; Lockhart, *The Men of Cajamarca*.

kingdom of Peru. Other rivers run next to them, many and very good, which spring from the mountain ranges that are on the sides, and many springs of very clear and tasty water; the rivers, all of which bear gold in great quantity and very fine, and their banks are populated with many groves of fruit in many ways. Everywhere surrounded by large provinces of Indians.⁴²

The reasons for having settled near the Cauca River are those that relate to the basic requirements of civilization: water and a way in and out. There is no doubt that, additionally to these, the valley of the upper Cauca presented the attractive quality of being the northernmost point of the province within the Kingdom of Perú. This provided a potential connection to the Caribbean ports of Cartagena and Santa Marta, which would have completed the circuit from Peru to Cartagena through a straighter and certainly less treacherous route than the intricate odyssey that passing through Santafé entailed. Although it was eventually transferred along with its *vecinos* to Santafé (producing the toponym Santafé de Antioquia), to another settlement founded by another conquistador: Marshal Jorge Robledo. This new location stood a few kilometers south of the former, but it retained many of its characteristics: proximity to the river, to the western mountain range and the lands of Urabá, and a tropical savannah climate and biosphere.⁴³ In this sense, the territory also presented a certain number of difficulties for the establishment of the elemental production cell that underpinned the development of regional economies and social configurations: the *encomienda*. Contrary to the *llanuras del Caribe*⁴⁴ (Caribbean plains), or the provinces surrounding Santafé de Bogotá and the southern provinces of the New Granada, the *encomienda* was difficult to establish in Antioquia, mainly because Indian populations were too small, even after the relative betterment of their conditions in the 17th century (after the

⁴²Pedro de Cieza de León, *La crónica del Perú* (Madrid, Calpe, 1922), 43, <http://archive.org/details/lacrnicaelper00ciez>.

⁴³ On this convoluted episode and the vicissitudes in the founding of Santafé, see Montoya Guzmán y González Jaramillo, *Indios, poblamiento y trabajo en la provincia de Antioquia*, 17-20. On the different ecosystems in Antioquia, see Felipe Fonseca Fino et al., *Ecosistemas continentales, costeros y marinos de Colombia*, Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi (IGAC), Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales (IDEAM), Instituto Alexander von Humboldt, Invemar, Instituto Amazonico de Investigaciones Científicas Sinchi, and Instituto de investigaciones ambientales del Pacífico IIAP. (Imprenta Nacional de Colombia, 2007). On Antioquia's different climates, see <https://es.climate-data.org/america-del-sur/colombia/antioquia-72/>.

⁴⁴ On this expression, used to refer to the geographical complex encompassing the plains which make up most of the Caribbean hinterland, see Herrera, *Ordenar para controlar. Ordenamiento espacial y control político en las Llanuras del Caribe y en los Andes centrales neogranadinos. Siglo XVIII*.

visita of *oidor* Francisco Herrera Campuzano).⁴⁵ Thus, the province relied much on its own main d'oeuvre, some Indian *mita* (labor), and greatly on the importation of enslaved African workers from the slave market in Cartagena⁴⁶; *encomiendas* only developed where indigenous populations had subsisted. Thus, the spatial configuration of Antioquia differed greatly, in terms both of topography, demographic distribution, and the possibilities it had for sustaining life as the Spanish sought it.

The province's development from its capital was slow during the 17th century and the lack of resources and "advancement" of the province's cities was abundantly mentioned in correspondence.⁴⁷ Santafé de Antioquia, the *chef-lieu* of the province was described thus in 1709 by the governor of the province: "he only wishe[d] to partly recover part of what this province is lacking, since this city is made up of only thirteen houses of earthen walls and roof tiles and the rest is merely short of mud and straw."⁴⁸ Additionally, Santafé de Antioquia had unexploited potential stemming from its position: it was relatively near the coast, more specifically, the Gulph of Urabá. Located 138 kilometers inland, the city—whose colonial center still stands today—extends on the slope of the Cauca River, at a temperature of around 25 degrees during the day, and about 20 at night as per recent measurements.⁴⁹ As there was no *camino*, or road, the voyage from Cartagena to Santafé was made exclusively from the east of the continent. Navigating the Cauca River—called Bredunco at the time— would have been an option, but while native populations seem to have mastered it for centuries using light combinations of wood and palm to make rafts, there is no record of the Spanish attempting it.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Luis Miguel Córdoba Ochoa, "La memoria del agravio en los indígenas según la visita de Herrera Campuzano a la gobernación de Antioquia (1614-1616)", *Revista Historia y Justicia*, núm. 3 (el 30 de octubre de 2014), <https://doi.org/10.4000/rhj.5677>.

⁴⁶ Manuel Casado Arboniés, "Mineros de Santa Fe de Antioquia en la segunda mitad del siglo XVII", *Estudios de Historia Social y Económica de América*, núm. 3 (1988): 93–110.

⁴⁷ Córdoba Ochoa, "Una Villa Carente de Paz, Quietud y Tranquilidad. Medellín Entre 1675 y 1720".

⁴⁸ AGI, Santa Fé, 362, n 12, letter from Carvajal to the king, 24th January 1709: "Solo quiere recuperar en parte lo destresada que está esta provincia pues siendo esta ciudad cabeza della se compone tan solo de trece casas de tapia de tierra y tehas y el resto q es corto de embarrados y paja".

⁴⁹ <https://es.climate-data.org/america-del-sur/colombia/antioquia/santa-fe-de-antioquia-50304/>

⁵⁰ Miguel de Santisteban, "Viaje muy puntual y curioso de don Miguel de Santisteban desde Lima a Caracas por tierra el año 1740", en *Documentos para la historia económica de la época colonial: viajes e informes.*, Biblioteca Nacional de Historia (Caracas, Venezuela, s/f), consultado el 24 de abril de 2023. Cited too in Lina Rocío Medina Muñoz, "MAESTROS DE LA NAVEGACIÓN: LAS TÉCNICAS DE MOVILIDAD FLUVIAL EN LA COLOMBIA PREHISPÁNICA", *Diálogo andino*, núm. 63 (diciembre de 2020): 51–65, <https://doi.org/10.4067/S0719-26812020000300051>. Santisteban 1970, p. 51-52, cited by Lina Rocío Medina.

During the first quarter of the century in the province of Antioquia, the jurisdictional extension of the province stretched from the Atrato River in the eastern mountain range of the northern Andes to the Cauca River, bordering the province of Cartagena, and from the Gulf of Urabá to the province of Mariquita. The urban spatial configuration of the province was organized around two nuclei, to use Juan David Montoya Guzmán's expression. There was an initial urban nucleus, mostly centered around mining, which responded to the initial direction of the conquest. It was formed by the cities of Cáceres, Santafé de Antioquia, Zaragoza, Remedios and Guamocó. A second nucleus existed around the Aburrá valley and the Villa de Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria de Medellín and Rionegro, whose foundation, respectively in 1675 and 1705, responded to a first attempt to populate and "pacify" that valley. Four of the seven Indian towns of the province belonged to the first nucleus: Sabanalarga, Buriticá, Cañasgordas and Sopetrán.⁵¹

At that time, the province constituted a frontier zone, due to its remoteness and the heterogeneity of the occupation by Spanish urban centers. In this sense, this period should be distinguished from the second half of the 18th century, marked by the expansion towards the north with the discovery of mines in the Osos Valley, and towards the southeast with the settling of the lands that currently make up the departments of Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío. This process of late exploration towards the south was due to many factors, among them: the low population density in the province, the difficult terrain, and the remoteness of Santafé de Antioquia from the rest of the provincial capitals, located in the central Andes.⁵² The urban history of the province of Antioquia is, until the 1750s, a history of failures and relocations of those first urban sites that were founded in northern territories, difficult to access and threatened by native populations.⁵³ This history is that of one of the last concrete

⁵¹ Most of the initial towns, cities, and villages of the province were located in the valleys and slopes of the central mountain range around the jurisdictions of Santafé de Antioquia, Arma to the south, Rionegro to the east, Cáceres, and Zaragoza to the north and northwest. The subsequent development of the southeast of the province, starting in Rionegro, corresponds to the transfer of the titles of Santiago de Arma (1756) to a region considered more stable and better connected to the area surrounding the Aburrá Valley: that of San Nicolás.

⁵² The positions of Santafé de Antioquia, Arma, and the first towns of the province, respond to the course taken by the first expeditions of conquest in the area by Juan de la Cosa, in 1510, through the Urabá, towards the south of the continent, and which gave rise to the first foundations.

⁵³ See: Yirla Marisol Acosta Franco, "Ciudades y Villas. Construcción y Representaciones de La Comunidad En El Nuevo Reino de Granada, Siglos XVI y XVII," *Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de La Cultura* 47, no. 1 (January 1, 2020), <https://doi.org/10.15446/achsc.v47n1.83144>.

attempts, in the modern period, to conquer and open the way to Urabá and Darién, in a porous space between the province of Chocó and the province of Antioquia.⁵⁴

Like the rest of New Granada, the situation of the province of Antioquia during the end of the XVII century and the beginning of the XVIII century was one of various difficulties: depopulated cities, the considerable poverty of its neighbors, and the scarcity of products and currency, as well as the poor state of its roads.⁵⁵ Part of the economic difficulties in the New Granada came from the exhaustion of mines, established after the initial phase of pillaging and looting, in the central cordillera of the Andes, as facilitated by the discoveries of gold mines in Cáceres (1576) and Zaragoza (1581), and silver mines in Mariquita.⁵⁶ These economic difficulties, which began in the 1630s with what has been described as the exhaustion of the *first gold cycle*,⁵⁷ suffered, in New Granada and particularly in Antioquia, an accentuation in the 1680s with the exhaustion of the vein gold mines in Remedios and Zaragoza, to the northeast of Santafé de Antioquia.⁵⁸ This led the authorities and residents of Santafé de Antioquia to take a particular interest in the northern lands that ran in the valleys leading to the Chocó.

One can appreciate the extent to which the border with Chocó occupied a space in the minds of those governing Antioquia in the emphasis made by Governor Francisco Fernández de Heredia, predecessor of José López de Carvajal, in the definition of the limits of the province given by the governor in a document providing the title of Corregidor of the Indians of the province of Antioquia: “governorship and province of

⁵⁴ The question of the jurisdictional boundary between Antioquia and Chocó has been the subject of numerous studies, which have shown that the area between the two provinces was always an object of appetite for the justices in Antioquia, who did not hesitate to demonstrate that they were the *de facto* rulers of the northernmost territories, being distant from Popayán (whose jurisdiction included the province of Chocó) and the urban centers of the Pacific. This tension was perpetuated for decades, until the justices in Antioquia were victorious in a dispute with Popayán and succeeded in separating Popayán from Chocó in 1726. On this tension with Popayán, see Herrera Ángel, *Popayán*.

⁵⁵ Sebastián Gómez G, “Proyectos Fallidos, Proyectos Conclusos. La Provincia de Antioquia y Sus Caminos En Dirección a Los Países Del Chocó. Siglo XVIII”, (*Libro*) *Caminos, Rutas y Técnicas. Huellas Espaciales y Estructuras Sociales En Antioquia. Dirección de Investigaciones Medellín (DIME)*, 2005. Pp. 195 – 207. ISBN: 9588256127, s/f, consultado el 23 de septiembre de 2022.

⁵⁶ Hansen (Williams), “Conquest and Colonization in the Colombian Chocó, 1510-1740”, 38–41.

⁵⁷ On the cycles of gold and the most thorough works on economic history, see, Colmenares, *Historia económica y social de Colombia*; Jorge Orlando Melo y Germán Colmenares, eds., *Germán Colmenares, ensayos sobre su obra*, 1. ed, Biblioteca Germán Colmenares 11 (Santafé de Bogotá: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1999).

⁵⁸ Jorge Orlando Melo, *Historia Mínima de Colombia*, First edition, Colección Historias Mínimas (Madrid : México, D.F: Turner Publicaciones ; El Colegio de México, 2017).

Antioquia, land between the two rivers Bredunco and Nive, Puerto de Urabá, up to the northern sea and its demarcation by the king our Lord”. Thus, the governor continued: “Because this city [Santafé de Antioquia], is a frontier of Chocó enemies and other nations of rebellious Indians who are about to reduce to our holy Catholic faith and the governors, my predecessors have appointed officers of war in it, such as field master, sergeant major, captains and all others necessary for a good military disposition.”⁵⁹ The governor's words translate the reality of a provincial capital on the frontier, whose expansion, whether ambioned or effective, was always latent, even—or even more so—after the brutal repression of the 1685 revolts.⁶⁰

Expanding into the Chocó was not only in the hands of those in government. As we have seen, it had been attempted by Franciscan missions since the 16th century. Also, wealthy *vecinos* from Popayán and Antioquia had done so by mounting mining ventures with *cuadrillas de esclavos* in the Citará and Darién since the 16th century.⁶¹ Here, the interests of the political class and the economic class were in syntony. As local magistratures were in the hands of certain wealthy families, their interests intertwined with mining operations and territorial expansion⁶²: the capital to carry out private enterprises lay in their hands. But there was another type of expansion: the kind that was achieved through negotiation.

This type of expansion was achieved by negotiating with non-subjected native populations who sought better living conditions by integrating the Monarchy and giving up their ways of life for the promise of protection. Negotiations resulted in plans to establish villages (*pueblos*) with a church or chapel. Indians thereafter became tributaries, who paid tribute to the crown in accord with the region's natural resources. This resulted in two assets for the authorities: gold mining and control over native populations, insofar as they were subjected to tribute and represented a labor force in the mining operations too.⁶³ In the north of Chocó (Citará) native populations had been

⁵⁹ Don Antonio Legarda: Title of *corregidor* of the Indians of the province of Antioquia, granted to him by Governor Don Francisco Fernandez de Heredia, AHA, 04/30/1698 - 05/06/1698.

⁶⁰ Williams.

⁶¹ On the Darién see Vives Via, “La extracción de oro en el Darién del siglo XVII. Origen y consolidación de un sistema minero de frontera (1637-1641 y 1679-1698)”.

⁶² By “territorial expansion” I mean the expansion of *vecinos*' zone of influence, or, in other words, zones where they could exert authority (*mando*), circulate, and exploit natural resources.

⁶³ This is a time prior to the massive importation of enslaved Africans from Cartagena, partly from the asiento de Negros granted to the English in 1714, and partly through smuggling.

particularly distraught in the last fifteen years of the 17th century. This convulsion presented an opportunity for negotiations between native groups and authorities in the closest province, Antioquia. And indeed, Antioquia's relationship to the Citará was a complex experience, which we will outline in the following pages.

3) An overview of Antioquia's relationship to the Citará 1684-1712

For two centuries, the magistrates of these two provinces of Antioquia and Popayán had struggled to establish themselves as the interlocutors of the natives of the region later known as Citará (north of the Chocó). The 1684 rebellion marked a change in Antioquia's relationship to the Citará. This sidelined Popayán, even though it kept its influence in Noanama (south Chocó). This shift manifested through a notable increase in appointments of many captains and *tenientes* from Antioquia under the pretext of protecting the border with the Citará. Additionally, the military convulsion of the years 1697-1710 encompassing the Scottish invasion of Darién, the ransacking of Cartagena, and the War of Succession, would provide additional reasons for such appointments. A review of the chronology spanning the 1684 uprising in Chocó until the War of Succession will allow us to understand the gradual increase of exchanges and appointments between Antioquia and the Citará

To understand how Antioquia's role on the frontier with the Citará evolved, it is important to allude to two recurring themes that permeated this struggle. Firstly, the ongoing contest between the provinces of Antioquia and Popayán, and secondly, the indigenous factor, encompassing negotiations and resistance. Caroline Williams' work highlights several key elements that are both striking and illuminating regarding the interactions between the indigenous communities of the Citará region, situated in Northern Chocó and bordering Antioquia from the west, and the Spanish colonizers. Specifically, the indigenous inhabitants of the Citará region exhibited varying attitudes towards the Spanish presence. When it became apparent that coexistence with the Spanish was inevitable and the economic benefits of trade with them became increasingly significant among native communities, the indigenous populations of Citará predominantly sought to engage in negotiations. Notably, these negotiations often involved seeking assistance from authorities in Antioquia, frequently appealing to the Governors of Antioquia during the 1680s.

This preference stemmed from their perception that these authorities were more equitable and amicable in negotiation processes. This had to do, in part, with the abuses committed by friars from Popayán in the decade preceding the rebellion, which had angered not only the indigenous but also Spanish populations that had settled in Chocó. Equally important in this preference were the cries over abuses committed by Indian *Corregidores* appointed by Popayán. In 1680 both Indians and Spanish wrote to Governor of Antioquia Radillo de Arce threatening—after many unanswered pleas—that they might leave the province if a *teniente* and two Franciscan friars were not removed and replaced. Both Indians and settlers from Antioquia had come to fear these three men, after violent incidents of beatings and torture had broken out by their hand. Antioquia feared the abuses and tempers of some Franciscan friars and a *teniente* appointed by Popayán.⁶⁴ The governor's response was that he had not received any indication on behalf of the Royal Audiencia as to removing the three individuals and resorted to writing instructions to the former. As a result of this, a conspiracy involving Indians and Spanish was wrought with the purpose of removing the friars and *teniente*. Upon learning of this, the conspirators sought after by the friars and justices from Popayán were arrested and charged with treason. One conspirator was sentenced to death and to be quartered. Some of the conspirators managed to escape into the refuge of their Indian allies.⁶⁵

This incident did not, however, ignite the rebellion. Governor Radillo de Arce managed to intervene and remove Lope de Cárdenas and the *tenientes*, managing to attract those who had fled to “come out from the hills.”⁶⁶ The rebellion broke out spontaneously in the town of Negua, whence it spread to different corners of the Citará, leading to the slaughter of slaves, Spanish and Indians on either side, with alliances comprising all three groups. The rebellion ended as the troops commanded by Antioquia's Governor Bueso de Valdés' forces slaughtered the enslaved blacks and made slaves of the rebellious Indians. In the aftermath of the rebellion, native populations displayed their refusal of Spanish authority—not overtly rebelling, but rather through desertion and flight—and most of the settlements on the Atrato were abandoned. This produced a situation in which many Indians either returned to their

⁶⁴ Williams, *Between Resistance and Adaptation*, 133.

⁶⁵ Williams, 135.

⁶⁶ Williams, 138.

previous areas or, according to the justices in the province, regrouped in settlements—defined by officials as *cimarronas*—as a way of resisting evangelization and Spanish domination.⁶⁷

The panorama was, indeed, very complex. Caroline Williams’s interpretation is that what transpires from such a complexity are several things: the interdependence of Indians and Spanish on the frontier, as many Spanish who revolted against what they perceived to be abuses by Popayán and fled, depended on their Indian allies for providing and upkeeping the fortifications laid. More generally, it seems that the 1680s incursions into the Chocó fed the tensions amongst some indigenous groups as growing numbers of Spanish settlers from Antioquia and Popayán entered their territory and the provinces, shifting the balance between Indians and the former.⁶⁸ Namely, Indians decried the abuses carried out by *curas doctrineros* from Popayán since the 1680s, and those committed by Franciscans as well.⁶⁹ After 1680, Indians indicated they wished *tenientes* from Antioquia to represent them, rather than those from Popayán. Indians were aware of the competition between provinces. Thus, such a request pitted officials in both provinces against each other, who now competed for access to native *pueblos* and the surrounding lands.⁷⁰ The rebellion of 1684-1686 marked an end to Spanish incursions from Popayán and Antioquia into the Chocó, at least for a decade.

In the late 1680s, the aftermath of the rebellion had brought about famine and a standstill of agricultural activity. According to Antonio de Veroiz y Alfaro, only 34 slaves belonging to three small *cuadrillas* (mining gangs) remained in the Citará in 1688.⁷¹ Thus, mining activities were concentrated in the southern part of the province (Noanama), more accessible to Popayán from the south. Members of wealthy families of farmers, miners, and merchants from Cali had *cuadrillas* and mining interests in

⁶⁷ Cimarronas, or maroon settlements, were places outside of the Spanish authorities’ sphere of control. The term, usually used to refer to towns founded by enslaved people of African origin who managed to flee, was also used to refer to indigenous communities who, in the eyes of the Spanish, were *acimarronados*, or informally regrouped. The term carried a strong connotation of something similar to acculturation, as officials often insisted on how these “cimarrones” were by definition mixed regardless of their ethnic origins. For a discussion of this phenomenon as a manifestation of native resistance, see Williams, 192-193. Chapter 7. On marooning and flight as a means of emancipation, see Aline Helg, *¡Nunca más esclavos! Una historia comparada de los esclavos que se liberaron en las Américas*, cap. 2.

⁶⁸ Williams, *Between Resistance and Adaptation*, 138.

⁶⁹ Williams, 131.

⁷⁰ Williams, 134.

⁷¹ Williams, 152.

Noanama and Raposo since the previous century.⁷² However, the north of the province, the Citarà, remained in a state of dispersion. This, until in 1695 an attempt to assemble the dispersed population—dislodged after the rebellion and its repression—was headed by sargento mayor Antonio Alfaro. Alfaro had been appointed by the governor of Popayán in 1688 and remained in the Citarà at least until 1695, “sustaining himself only with the fruit of his *cuadrilla*.” He claimed to be “the first *teniente* and *reedificador* that there has been in this province, after the punishment and reduction [of 1686].” And indeed, Alfaro had been in talks with the *cacique* and governor of Bebará (“located on the road from Antioquia,” near Murri, see map) to form a new town in the area. Apparently, *tenientes de gobernador* appointed by Popayán to the different parts of the Chocó, opposed the creation of new towns in the north of the province, arguing this would lead to the discovery of new roads and riches. One of them, Manuel Herrera, even entered the new town of Bebará and arrested Alfaro, who wrote a report decrying these actions. He begged the king to “inhibit [me] from the jurisdiction of the governor of Popayán and his *tenientes*, so that I may more freely execute your royal orders.” The incident recalled by Alfaro is consistent with the behavior of *tenientes* and *corregidores* from Popayán who viewed activities in the Citará with suspicion. Wary of officers negotiating with Indians, they exhibited a hostile attitude towards initiatives to populate and discover mining resources without their playing a part in it. This would reaffirm the indigenous predilection for dealing with officers from Antioquia after the 1690s.⁷³

In 1697 Francisco Fernández de Heredia became governor after the man appointed to the office, as Antonio Alfaro (most likely the same Antonio Alfaro mentioned above) never took up the post,⁷⁴ and the following appointee, Juan de Leygrave fell ill. Using his network of friends in Santafé, Heredia convinced the Royal Audiencia of appointing him to the governorship; the details of how he managed this remain murky.⁷⁵ Heredia became governor in 1698 and remained governor of Antioquia until 1708 with no *juicio de residencia* having been carried out in 1703 when his first

⁷² Colmenares y Colmenares, *Cali, terratenientes, mineros, y comerciantes, siglo XVIII*.

⁷³ “Informe del sargento mayor D. Antonio de Veroiz y Alfaro sobre la fundación y reedificación del pueblo de Bebará, habitado por cincuenta y dos indios tributarios con sus familias. Sus gestiones al respecto. Noviembre 30 de 1695.” Ortega Ricaurte, *Historia documental del Chocó*, 149–53.

⁷⁴ Angel Sanz Tapia, *¿Corrupción o necesidad?: la venta de cargos de gobierno americanos bajo Carlos II (1674-1700)* (Editorial CSIC - CSIC Press, 2009).

⁷⁵ See Chapter 4, part 2.

five-year term ended. During his first term (1698-1703) Heredia appointed at least one Sargent and eight Captains to different posts in the province. These appointments followed a payment of the rights due to acquire sold offices. This was a lucrative market of increasing scope since the 1680s.⁷⁶ All nine appointments were justified by invoking Santafé de Antioquia and Medellín’s position as “a frontier of *indios chocoes*, rebels and not reduced to the guild of our holy catholic faith” and given the “likely attempts by foreigners to invade the province” and their “alliance with the Cuna Indians.” Here is a list of the appointments made by Heredia with the locations where these officials were posted.

Table 2: Appointments made by Francisco Fernández de Heredia

Official's Name	Title/Appointment	Location	Dates between which appointment was made
Rafael de Oquendo	Protector of indios of the province of Antioquia	Sopetrán encomiendas	May 14, 1698 - June 10, 1698
Don Antonio Legarda	Corregidor of the indios of the province of Antioquia	Antioquia Province	April 9, 1698 - May 4, 1698
Don Francisco de Villa y Posada	Captain of Spanish infantry	Antioquia, Cartagena, Santa Marta	June 28, 1698
Don Martín Frutos y Saavedra	Captain of Aguerra of the Boca del Darién	Zaragoza	May 19, 1699 - June 9, 1708
Don Felipe de la Arada y Ceballos	Captain of Spanish infantry of the	Santafé de Antioquia,	November 30, 1700 - January 18, 1701

⁷⁶ On the purchase and sale of military offices, see Antonio Jiménez Estrella, “‘Mérito, calidad y experiencia: criterios volubles en la provisión de cargos militares bajo los Austrias’, en Juan Francisco Pardo Molero y Manuel Lomas Cortés (Coords.), *Oficiales reales. Los ministros de la Monarquía Católica (siglos XVI-XVII)*, Universitat de València, Valencia, 2012, págs. 241-264.”, 2012, 241-64; See also Francisco Andújar Castillo, “Redes de amistad, paisanaje y venalidad de limeños en torno a los hábitos de las Órdenes Militares a finales del siglo XVII”, *Revista de Indias* 78, núm. 272 (el 7 de mayo de 2018): 79, <https://doi.org/10.3989/revindias.2018.003>; Julian Andrei Velasco Pedraza, “Cuando la cabeza duele, el cuerpo duele: usos y abusos en la provisión de oficios del superior gobierno del Nuevo Reino de Granada (finales del s. XVII)”, *Historia Y Memoria*, núm. 19 (el 18 de julio de 2019): 163-91, <https://doi.org/10.19053/20275137.n19.2019.8503>.

	forasteros of the city of Antioquia		
Antonio de Piedrahita y Saavedra	Captain of Aguerra of the Valle de Río Negro	Antioquia, Guarne, la Ceja, Marinilla,	May 14, 1698 - March 6, 1699
Lázaro José Correal y Soto	Captain of Spanish infantry of the Villa de Medellín	Medellín	June 18, 1700 - June 27, 1700
Lorenzo Vásquez Romero	Captain of Spanish infantry of the forasteros of the Villa of Medellín	Medellín	December 29, 1702 - July 25, 1703
Don Carlos de Molina y Toledo	Sargento Mayor of the Villa de Medellín	Medellín	May 14, 1700 - July 2, 1700
Joan Esteban de la Cruz Castellanos	Captain of Spanish infantry of the pardos cuarentones	Santafé de Antioquia	April 20, 1699 - May 30, 1699
Don José Cataño Ponce de León ⁷⁷	Captain of Spanish infantry of the Villa de Medellín	Antioquia, Tierra dentro, Urabá, Medellín, Chocó	December 15, 1698 - December 18, 1698
Don Francisco de Villa y Posada	Encomendero of the pueblo of San Pedro de Sabanalarga	Sabanalarga, Urabá, Sopetrán, San Jerónimo,	November 27, 1703 - November 15, 1703

Except for the Indian Protector, Rafael de Oquendo, the Indian Corregidor, and the *encomendero* in Sabanalarga, all of these were military appointments made under the pretense that the frontiers of the province in the north needed protection. Heredia

⁷⁷ “Hijo de En 20 de noviembre de 1673 años, el maestro Francisco Javier de la Serna, cura y vicario de la Ciudad de Antioquia, bautizó, puso óleo y crisma a José Manuel, hijo legítimo de Francisco Cataño Ponce de León y de doña María de Castrillón Bernaldo de Quirós. Fueron padrinos el señor gobernador Francisco de Montoya y doña Ana de Castrillón Bernaldo de Quirós, su mujer. Lorenzo de Castrillón Bernaldo de Quirós, (febrero 1) Medellín” - *Bautismos La Candelaria libro 01 mixto*, online resource.

presumably capitalized on the request by natives that *tenientes* from Antioquia be appointed to the Citará. He also justified these appointments in the frontier on the Gulf of Darién (now called the Gulf of Urabá) by claiming to wish to defend the province from likely attacks such as the attack on Cartagena in 1697. Similar attacks, he claimed in 1698, were very likely:

“As far as it is convenient that in this city that is the main head of this government, (...) on account of it **being [a] frontier of Chocoos Indians, [who are]rebels and not reduced to the guild of our catholic holy faith,** for the assaults that can give it and with this reason, my predecessors have appointed *maestres de campo, sargentos mayores, capitanes de infantería - 212 -spañola* and *capitanes de a caballo* and in the present with more persistence, it is due to attend to this point **for what could happen in the presidios of Cartagena and Santa Marta, antemurales of these interior provinces** that arrive on some of these places, the arms of the Christian king, as they did last year of 1697, surrendering the garrison of Cartagena, attacking and surrendering it by force of arms to the great detriment of the commerce of Spain and those of these provinces, (...) with the occasion of the interests that they acquired in said city and presidio of Cartagena, **it will be very possible that they will return a second time to it, or to the one of Santa Marta, or to the river of Atrato that is located in greater proximity to this city** and in this river or in some of the referred places the **French arms can populate and their corporals want to penetrate these provinces** and it is necessary, to stay watchful and careful to meet them in campaign in any of the ports, in the great river of the Magdalena or river of Atrato, to reject their attempts and to punish their audacity.”⁷⁸

In 1699, the fear of invasion was provided as the reason for appointing the *capitán de infantería de los pardos cuarterones*, Joan Esteban de la Cruz⁷⁹ to the south of the Atrato river. Governor Heredia claimed, “I have received the news that six arks loaded with Englishmen and Scots and families have arrived on the coasts of the Darien and Isla de Pinos to settle on said island with arms and ammunition, which they have brought for their defense and are settling, with which news he orders the companies to

⁷⁸ AHA, t. 537, doc. 8497, f. 44v-45v.

⁷⁹ Joan Esteban de la Cruz Castellanos, cuarentón y que he reconocido de su proceder, el que es acto y a propósito para nombrarle por capitán de dichos pardos cuarentones, por ser hijo de Esteban de la Cruz Castellanos, quien ha servido en el presidio de Cartagena, en la compañía de don Andrés de Rebolledo, dando buena cuenta de su persona y que dicho Joan Esteban de la Cruz Castellanos, seguirá el ejemplar de su padre en servicio de su majestad [f 51 v.] c

enlist in the town of Medellín and the valley of Rio Negro” and that “there are enough people to form two companies, one of “cuarterones pardos” and the other of “pardos.”⁸⁰

Likewise, in 1698, he appointed Don José Cataño Ponce de León *capitán de infantería española* in Medellín. He justified it expressing, “because this province is at risk from the invasions of various warring Indians, with whom it borders, and because I have had news from people who have come to me from the province of Chocó, that the Cuna Indians, who were at peace, had risen up, with the death of three religious and some Spaniards, and that they were making agreements with the Chocó Indians for a general uprising, killing all the Spanish people and other people they had in their service in the said province.” Ponce de León, like all appointed captains of infantry, was a descendant of the “first conquistadors of these lands.” His grandfather, Mateo de Castrillón, and his maternal grandmother, Maria Vazquez de Guadamiros, who married in Santafé around 1638, were the patriarchs of one of the most powerful families in the province. They owned mines, *encomiendas*, lands and held magistratures and military posts. In fact, all of the individuals named to the post of Capitan came from notorious families in Santafé de Antioquia, as lists of contributors to the purchase of arms in 1703 show.⁸¹

In 1702, when news of English troops a hundred strong lurked in the Gulf of Darién and were ready to enter the Chocó, news arrived in Antioquia and Popayán,⁸² and *teniente* Manuel Herrera, stationed in the Chocó, gathered troops for defense. Heredia, once again, took to selling offices on the frontier arguing defense against foreigners. He claimed to have news of “six urcas loaded with foreign nations, and of families and armed crews with the intention of populating that place, and that they can penetrate the interior of these provinces of the interior of these provinces of the Chocó because it is immediately adjacent to this city, which is the frontier of the rebellious

⁸⁰ The Company of *Pardos y Cuarterones* assembled individuals of different caste together in military service. In Antioquia, they were said to be “more appropriate for the mountains.” They did not however receive a salary for their service. *Milicias de pardos* and *milicias de color* would become institutionalized in subsequent years. Rodríguez, *Cabildo y vida urbana en el Medellín colonial, 1675-1730*, 68–69. On this see too Bonnefoy, “Enchevêtrement des appartenances et constructions impériales : miliciens de couleur dans les villes espagnoles, françaises et britanniques de la Caraïbe (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles)”.

⁸¹ On these, see Rodríguez, *Cabildo y vida urbana en el Medellín colonial, 1675-1730*, 68.

⁸² See Chapter 3, part II, section 3). José María Restrepo states that Manuel Herrera’s news of 155 men (a slightly higher figure) arrived in Santafé de Antioquia on Christmas Eve 1702. José María Restrepo Sáenz y José Restrepo Posada, *Gobernadores de Antioquia* (Bogotá: Editorial Lumen Christi, 1970), 114.

Indians, attracted by their greed and minerals.”⁸³ This, he argued, along with the fact that the number of *vecinos* in the town of Zaragoza (former mining district) had dwindled, made it necessary to appoint a Captain *aguerra* in Zaragoza, so that he may for this reason it is necessary to name one of them as *Capitan a guerra* (captain of war) and of Spanish infantry and “juez de apelaciones” (judge of appeals) “so that with it he can assist in making lists in the said city of all the residents and inhabitants such as browns and blacks, and that they be prepared for the occasion that may be offered in the service of his majesty.”⁸⁴

But the statement lacked in congruence, as Zaragoza was not only far from the mouth of Darién (the Gulf of Urabá), it was not even located on the way to Darién from Santafé de Antioquia but on the northeastern slopes/foothills of an altogether different mountain range: the central cordillera. In order to get troops from Zaragoza to the Darién, the entire western Andes Mountain range would have had to be crossed. The excuse, thus, was purely rhetorical. But Heredia himself recognized the “great distance” between Santafé and Zaragoza (149km). However, he justified it claiming he appointed Martin de Frutos y Saavedra, *natural* of Béjar (Spain), so that he would prevent fraud, look after the Royal Hacienda, and, especially, name other officers. Not only did he appoint captains with this excuse, but he also requested 200 gold of 20 karats pesos to levy troops for the defense of the province, something *vecinos* saw with suspicion. No invasion came but the governor insisted he be delivered the gold.⁸⁵ Some authors consider that the threat was purely rhetorical, and that Heredia used it for personal advancement exclusively.⁸⁶

In essence, the frontier shared by Antioquia and Citará had periodically given way to fraught encounters and the way to safeguard it increasingly tended towards negotiation. However, it was also a powerful rhetorical argument whose advance served

⁸³ AHA. Caja B – 115. Documento 0454. Folios 1r – 10 v. seis urcas cargadas de naciones extranjeras, y de familias y de tripulación de armas con designios de poblarse en aquel sitio y que pueden penetrar lo interior de estas provincias del Chocó por estar inmediato a esta ciudad frontera de los indios rebeldes de ella atraídos de su codicia y de los minerales.

⁸⁴ por este motivo ser necesario nombrar uno de ellos por capitán a guerra y de infantería española y juez de apelaciones para que con ella pueda asistir a hacer listas en dicha ciudad de todos los vecinos estantes y habitantes como pardos y negros, y que estén prevenidos para la ocasión que se ofreciere en servicio de su majestad,

⁸⁵ Francisco Duque Betancur, *Historia del departamento de Antioquia: épocas del descubrimiento y conquista, colonia, independencia y república* (Impr. Departamental, 1967), 333.

⁸⁶ Rodríguez, *Cabildo y vida urbana en el Medellín colonial, 1675-1730*, 67.

as the backbone for appointments and requesting funds. Militarization, thus, was more symbolic than performative. Military careers were sparse in Antioquia, while military appointments abounded and served as social currency. As Pablo Rodríguez has shown, within the body of *vecinos*, those who held military offices could invoke their *fuero estamental* and even be granted land *Mercedes* or be freed from paying the *media annata*.⁸⁷ But perhaps we should consider that the rhetorical argument could have also functioned in a figurative way. Historians who have focused on the construction of the frontier as an imaginary division have stressed that the concept of a frontier between Spaniards and barbarism in fact “led them to recognize geographical and socio-cultural frontiers in the discovered American territories.”⁸⁸ In other words, the frontier was also imaginary: a conceptual (historical, ethnic, and geographical) construction that could be invoked to designate the separation of two worlds: the pacified (later called “civilized”) parts of the kingdom and the barbarous world of non-pacified Indians. In this sense, the frontier lost part of its tangibility; it became a vague idea of the Other’s territory.

In contrast to Heredia, José Lopez de Carvajal, his successor, named fewer captains on the frontier, or at least there are dramatically fewer traces of appointments carried out by Carvajal. Likewise, there seem to have been no concrete instances of negotiation between Indians and Heredia in the Citará. It seems that, at least during the time of Heredia’s governorship throughout the War of Succession, news of skirmishes and periodical tensions in the Citará arrived in Antioquia during the 1710s, as José López de Carvajal would later report. That the companies and captains appointed by Heredia participated in these events is unclear and would require further research. What is certain is that the alliance of Cuna Indians and foreigners before and during the War of Succession favored incursions and contraband, and reports of these activities were invoked as pretexts for military appointments. Upon Carvajal’s arrival, however, despite reports of localized Indian attacks, negotiations for the sake of exploring and exploiting the lands to the west of Santafé de Antioquia were undertaken.

⁸⁷ Rodríguez, 69.

⁸⁸ Christophe Giudicelli y Chantal Caillavet, eds., “El proceso colonial de invención de las fronteras: tiempo, espacio, culturas”, en *Fronteras movedizas: clasificaciones coloniales y dinámicas socioculturales en las fronteras americanas* (México, D.F.: Zamora, Mich: Centro de Estudios Mexicanos y Centroamericanos ; El Colegio de Michoacán, 2010).

In conclusion, relationship between the Citará and authorities in Antioquia had evolved after the rebellion of 1684. Following the rebellion, natives expressed their predilection for negotiating with officials from that province, and those from Popayán were feared and suspected. During the first decade of the 18th century, the contiguous regions of Darién and Citará remained a pretext for appointing military officials in Santafé de Antioquia and Medellín, under the pretense that the province's status as a frontier was under threat by rebel Indians and foreigners alike.

In the following part, we will tackle Carvajal's arrival to the province of Antioquia. To better grasp the parties at play, we will outline a profile for both Carvajal and his predecessor, Heredia. Then, we delve into the details of the *juicios de residencia*, which sealed the bitter feud between converging political factions.

II- Carvajal: a disturber of the peace? On local and regional dynamics.

This part will be devoted to a recounting and interpretation of the feud that occurred upon the arrival of José López de Carvajal to the Province of Antioquia through a microhistory of the conflict. This will serve the purpose of illustrating underlying causes and dynamics, of which the feud is but a symptom. Indeed, by studying the inner workings of political devices like the *Juicio de residencia*, aimed at overseeing the actions of officials, one takes a closer look at a procedure which sits at a cross section between the social dynamics it underpinned, the broader political workings of the kingdom, and the parties at play. Thus, the section will be divided into two points. In the first point a comparative profile of both governors will offer a perspective on the manner of accession to power, trajectories and actions of the two individuals. This will be followed by a discussion on the *Juicio de residencia* itself, its use by different parties, political significance, and limitations.

1) On governors: two profiles

Captain of Sea and War, José López de Carvajal y Cortés, born in Spain (most likely in Málaga or Cádiz), had arrived in the Indies after "23 years, 2 months, 24 days

in: army of Catalonia, navy of the ocean sea, guard of the race of the Indies, with plates of soldier, *cavo principal* of different companies, ensign of sea and war, and reformed, captain of sea and war, governor of the *patache* of Cuba and Captain of Sea and War of the ship Nuestra Sra del Populo. His career in the service of the Crown was extensive: he had served the Crown for 19 years in different offices, first as a simple soldier and corporal of a company from 1667, in one of the tercios of the army of Catalonia (that of Federico Garcia), for nine years, until December 8, 1676.⁸⁹ In 1677 he returned to Málaga for a short period, and from there he was given an ordinary position in the company of Captain Marcos de Urdiales (Sea and War) of the Galleon of Santo Domingo, in the service of the Field Master Don Francisco de Espinosa. In this company he occupied various positions, ascending in the military hierarchy until 1687, year in which he returned to Málaga. It can be assumed that it was on that occasion that he met the woman who would become his wife, Juana de Torres de Ponce de León, daughter of a mercantile family from Malaga who had made a fortune in the purchase and sale of wines and grapes from Aljarafe.⁹⁰

It is not clear in what year Carvajal and Torres de Ponce de León married, or how their alliance came to an end, although it is known that they had two daughters, who were married in Spain, as well as two sons, one named José, and another, Pablo, who left with him for the New Kingdom. However, it is possible that the union between them did last not long, for in 1691 a lady of Irish origin, but possibly raised in Spain, Elena Josefa Linza, accused him from Santo Domingo of having failed to keep a promise of marriage, leaving her disillusioned and leading her to donate her dowry.⁹¹

⁸⁹ AGI, INDIFERENTE, 135, N°13 Relación de servicios del capitán de Mar y Guerra, D. Joseph López de Carbajal

⁹⁰ Francisco Javier Gutiérrez Núñez, "Cristóbal García de Segovia y El Patronato de La Sacristía Mayor Del Convento de San Francisco Casa Grande de Sevilla (1688-1692), in Congreso Internacional. Franciscanism: Identity and Power. Baeza-Priego de Córdoba (2015), AHEF, Córdoba 2016, Pp. 395-420.", January 1, 2016.

⁹¹ Linza belonged to a little-studied group of Irish catholic matrons in Spain during the late 17th century. They sponsored different causes, like hospitals, girls schools, and convents. This was, in fact, what Josefa Linza did after being jilted by Carvajal: she donated her dowry to the leper Hospital of San Lázaro in Seville. On this see, Andrea Knox, "The Convent as Cultural Conduit: Irish Matronage in Early Modern Spain", *Quidditas* 30, núm. 1 (el 1 de enero de 2009), <https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/rmmra/vol30/iss1/9>; Andrea Knox, "Out with the Bad Air, In with the Good: Irish Dominican and Poor Clare Sisters in Spain and the redesign of Convent interiors", in *Ireland and the Iberian Atlantic*, ed. Igor Perez Tostado (Valencia, Spain: Albatros Ediciones, 2020), 341–57, https://www.albatrosediciones.com/obra_titulos.php?recordID=36&nom=ireland-and-the-iberian-atlantic.

The context in which they met is unclear, but the dates in the documentation produced by Linza coincide with the information provided in the service sheets: it is plausible to think that the paths of Carvajal and Linza crossed during the nine years of service in the Armada del Océano. During these years he participated in transoceanic voyages and war conflicts that took him through the different bodies of the monarchy, from the Battles in Messina (1674-1678), and the last milestone in the secession of the Dutch provinces in 1681.⁹² On that occasion, Don Diego Carrillo Esquivel, Captain of Sea and War of the Navy of the Ocean, reported having seen Carvajal “always advancing in the service of His Majesty with great courage and satisfaction; and that in the voyage that the Armada made to Flanders with the Prince of Parma in the year one thousand six hundred and eighty, having overcome such a great storm, Carvajal had demonstrated prowess and bravery, risking his life by climbing the mast of the ship during a storm to “cut the bows of the camp” saving the crew from disaster.⁹³ One must try to imagine what such a military career entailed. Beyond adventure and broadening his knowledge of the world, Carvajal spent almost twenty years immersed in a world whose possibilities were vast in terms of the sociability it offered, economic fortune, and the ability to climb the military hierarchy.⁹⁴

It was thus that, in 1693, Carvajal offered, to carry 15 tons of *azogues*⁹⁵ (quicksilver) cargo destined for New Spain, in a ship of which he became captain: Nuestra Señora del Pópulo and Jesús el Nazareno. He served the Crown as cargador for nearly nine years by transporting *azogues* to Cuba.⁹⁶ It was precisely as a means of

⁹² See AGI, Indiferente general, 135, N°13, Relación de servicios del capitán de Mar, y Guerra, D. Joseph Lopez de Carbajal and AGI; Santa Fe, 362, N. 24, 13 de enero de 1714, el Conde de Frigiliana al rey: Memorial de JLC

⁹³ AGI, Indiferente general, 135, N°13, *ibid.*

⁹⁴ The following quotation, which only lists the obligations with which the captain of a vessel, in whose charge the royal merchandise was found, had to comply: “it appears by certification given in this court on the third of January of sixteen hundred and ninety-three, by General Don Pedro Carrillo de Albornoz, Admiral who was of that Navy in the aforementioned voyage that the said Joseph Lopez de Carbajal entered Cartagena with the Patache in his charge on the tenth of October of the said year of sixteen hundred and ninety, where he fulfilled his registry, delivering the people of the Sea, and War on behalf of his Majesty, as the cost of the lists of Veeduría, and Contaduría de Galeones.”(AGI, INDIFFERENTE, 135, N.13) This offers us a glimpse of what was surely one of many trips that allowed Carvajal to get to know the ports of the Caribbean, entertain relations with the officials of the different branches of the Government, and insert himself into the mercantile networks woven by the actors of a space, in essence, in movement.

⁹⁵ Also called quicksilver, or mercury, *azogues* were a fundamental material to import to the Indies, as they were indispensable for the extraction of silver. So precious were *azogues* in the Monarchy, that the drowning of the Flota de *azogues* (Quicksilver fleet) in 1724 was received as a major blow to the Crown.

⁹⁶ Tapia, *¿Corrupción o necesidad?*, 79.

compensation for these services that he was granted the position of governor of La Grita with Merida and Maracaibo, in 1702. It is interesting to note that Carvajal obtained his governorship for services and not for having bought it, contrary to most of the Indian governors in times of war.⁹⁷ But Carvajal did not end up taking up the post in Maracaibo, the reasons for which are unknown.⁹⁸ However, it is interesting to reflect on what experience he might have had as he became appointed governor of a province in the Indies. For this, we must dwell on the context: it was during the War of Succession that Carvajal was presented with the opportunity to exercise a government in the Indies. From Josefa Linza's accusations we know that he must have spent intermittent time in Santo Domingo, some more in Havana (with his *patache*), and a great deal between Cádiz and Seville, not counting the travel time during the expeditions in the context of war. Thus, we can infer that, before the beginning of the 18th century, Carvajal had never exercised civil or governmental authority; his military jurisdiction was channeled by the normative parameters of the Navy and, at another level, by the system of rules of life at sea.

The move from Cádiz and the port cities of the Caribbean must have been a contrast to the life that Carvajal had led up to then, oscillating between Andalusia and the ocean.⁹⁹ It was not though, with Josefa Linza or Juana Torres Ponce de León that Carvajal left for the New Granada, but with a Dutch woman by the name of Francisca Kaiser, who he presumably never married.¹⁰⁰ Kaiser arrived in the New Kingdom nine days later,¹⁰¹ which gave Carvajal a reason to undertake an additional voyage in the area he was discovering.¹⁰² One can only imagine what it must have been like for this Andalusian, about sixty years old, to have arrived in Cartagena and set out for the gnarled mountains of the central cordillera. Carvajal was accustomed to the humidity of the Caribbean and the heat of Andalusia, to the sea, to salt, and to the inclemency of the ocean. His daunting ascent through the valleys of the Andes introduced him to

⁹⁷ Tapia, *¿Corrupción o necesidad?* op. Cit.

⁹⁸ Restrepo Sáenz y Restrepo Posada, *Gobernadores de Antioquia*.

⁹⁹ AGI, Contratación, 1247, N^o4.

¹⁰⁰ Restrepo Sáenz y Restrepo Posada, *Gobernadores de Antioquia*, 122.

¹⁰¹ Betancur, *Historia del departamento de Antioquia*, 336.

¹⁰² It seems curious to note that Carvajal, at some point, upended his relationship to the wealthy and notable Juana Torres ponce de León with whom he had four children (one of which, José López de Carvajal was named factor and proceeded to pursuing a career in New Spain, see AGI, Contratación, 5469, N.3, R. 119), and went on to live informally with a woman of Dutch origin, presumably sacrificing the social standing which his first marriage provided.

variations unlike any found in Europe.¹⁰³ As he passed through different thermal floors every five hundred meters, he must have seen the vegetation change with the passing of hours, an immense contrast with every step. The jungle must have been thick and lurking, the steep slopes threatening to swallow the passage of travelers; the rustling fauna, the imminent danger of attack, all must have invited the senses to fear for life.¹⁰⁴ Because there wasn't a *Camino real* from Cartagena to Antioquia, he was forced to pass through Mompox in the Magdalena Bank, then to the valley of Guamocó and through the port of Espíritu Santo, and further into the west where he stopped lengthily at the towns of Cáceres and Zaragoza—the northwestern cities that had provided much of the gold during the first gold cycle—which, in his own words, had not been visited by a Governor in 56 years.¹⁰⁵

He found them in an alarming state, owing to the decline of the exploitation of gold mines in the region since the 1630s, resulting in depopulation and a lack of basic tending services (cleaning, roads, spiritual, police, etc.).¹⁰⁶ Carvajal was struck by the precarity of roads and towns, some of which counted so few *vecinos* and houses it must have seemed as though he was entering a wild country. His words echo this impression: “The city of Cáceres has 20 huts of cane and the same for the church, and it has been necessary to rebuild it, so has the city of Zaragoza in relation to that of Cáceres, both of which are occupied by blacks and mulattos without any *vecinos* in either city, of which twenty are white men, none are women, and not, Sir, because the lands are lacking in gold (...) Causing all this great poverty, the city of Guamocó is completely depopulated and the lord has consumed these cities for many years, sir, which gave you a lot of income, as there were large groups of people in these foundries.”¹⁰⁷ Having lived in Santo Domingo, visited la Habana, and grown up in the ports of Andalusia, the palpable shock his words exude is understandable, for what was Carvajal in capacity of

¹⁰³ On this see Olivier Dollfus, “The tropical Andes: a changing mosaic”, en *Anthropological History of Andean Politics*, ed. Jacques Revel, John V. Murra, y Nathan Wachtel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 11–22, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511753091.004>.

¹⁰⁴ All this is transparent in a letter written by Carvajal to the king in which Carvajal describes "inaccessible uninhabited mountains[s] he bequeathed to Antioquia in 1707 and the feud with his predecessor broke out quite early. José López de Carvajal's arrival in in Santafé de Antioquia caused a certain upheaval amongst vecinos in the cabildo, upending the status quo which had installed since his predecessor had begun his ten-year term at the very unstable end of the previous century.”

¹⁰⁵ AGI, Santa Fe 362, f. 25: letter from José López de Carvajal to the King, 12th of March 1714.

¹⁰⁶ AGSI, Santa Fé, 362, n. 24.

¹⁰⁷ AGI, Santa Fé, 362, n 12, letter from Carvajal to the king, 24th January 1709.

anticipating of the rich realms of Perú, but to find a land filled with Spanish cities and rich mines?

While Carvajal had embarked on a journey of dimensions unbeknownst to him and his family, Francisco Fernández de Heredia had governed in Santafé de Antioquia for nine years. Born in 1643 in Santafé to Aragonese parents,¹⁰⁸ Heredia was a second generation criollo whose parents had immigrated to the New Kingdom in the early 17th century. His family owned several haciendas around Santafé. He referred to himself as “vecino” and “natural” of the New Kingdom of Granada.¹⁰⁹ Of his career before being governor in his fifties, most of what is known is he was *notario* for the Santo Oficio—which would garner him a quarrel with the Bishop of Popayán, who excommunicated Heredia in 1706—and *capitán de caballos* of a company. He also played a role in the short-lived Consulate of New Granada. Consulates were organisms instituted with considerable success in Lima, Mexico, and Rio de la Plata in the second half of the 18th century. Their main goal was to regulate commercial relations between the metropole and the indies, offering a tideway for transactions and better regulation of incomes and outcomes of merchandise, as well as more rigorous taxation. Interestingly, an attempt at installing a consulate in Cartagena took place in the latter years of the 17th century, when, in 1681, an effort was made to regulate commerce, certainly in the face of growing contraband and the freedom with which commercial transactions were carried out in the Caribbean.

In this context, it was the merchants of New Granada who gave powers to Don Tomás de Solórzano and Don Francisco Fernández de Heredia to negotiate in Spain the seat of the Consulate in Santafé, according to historian Manuel Lucena Salmoral, who describes the former as “Santafereños,” confirming Heredia’s birthplace. But Lucena is wrong in stating that, “The second [Heredia] had served as governor of Antioquia and was listed as a neighbor of Santafé.” But the power of attorney was signed by the *neogranadinos* in favor of Heredia and Solórzano in 1691, during the period of governor of Pedro Eusebio correa; Heredia would not be governor of Antioquia until

¹⁰⁸ Angel Sanz Tapia, *ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ “having exercised his government of the province of Antioquia for nine years with zeal, for the conservation of his neighbors of the royal estate "of the New Kingdom of Granada, from where I am a natural and *vecino*” AGI, Santa Fé, 262, N.20, Fco Fdez de Heredia to the King 1712, on “vejaciones y estorsiones en su persona”.

ten years later. The difference that arises with the correction that I propose, is to say that Heredia was before an intermediary between the merchant elites of Santafé, performing in the protection of the interests of his social circle, before being governor of Antioquia.

Heredia's profile was indeed quite different than that of Carvajal's. Not only was Heredia undoubtedly more familiar with the New Kingdom than Carvajal was, but he had experience dealing with authorities in Santafé, merchants in and from Cartagena, and was overall familiar with the structure of authority and its actors in the New Kingdom, as well as the issues at stake. Additionally, Heredia, who had undergone an education at a school in Santafé, was well acquainted in the kingdom, his male friends, *connaissances*, and family members also exercising magistratures.¹¹⁰ How did he obtain his post? Antonio de Alfaro had obtained the post as compensation for having lifted 200 men for the defense of Cartagena (1697) but he did not access the post.¹¹¹ Juan de Leygrave was appointed governor in 1697. Leygrave, claiming to be suffering from pain due to a disabling *apostema* (abscess), remained in Cartagena de Indias nearly a year after his appointment, at a time when Heredia was also in Cartagena. The latter obtained endorsement for his appointment as interim governor by the Royal Audiencia, aided by his son-in-law who was the accountant of the Crusade Court in Santafe. Finally, a report by the fiscal Antonio de la Pedrosa confirmed what Heredia reported from Cartagena, advocating his definitive appointment as governor: that Leygrave "walks and strolls publicly all day long through the city of Cartagena, manifesting in his breath that he is well and healthy, which the governor of that place corroborates in the report he has made to this Audiencia with the addition that he departs at night, attends the conversation houses that exist in that city and who attends at that time".¹¹² Thus, Heredia was finally appointed and held the office for nine years without a trial of residence after five years in government (as stipulated in the *Recopilación de Leyes de Indias*), even after being charged with misgovernment (*mal gobierno*) in 1697, something that can be read as symptomatic of the moment.¹¹³

¹¹⁰ His son-in-law, for instance, Don Cristóbal de Pedroso, accountant of the crusade tribunal.

¹¹¹ Tapia, *¿Corrupción o necesidad?*, 410.

¹¹² Archivo Histórico de Antioquia, Tomo: 537. Documento: 8496. Folios: 33v.

¹¹³ Rodríguez, *Cabildo y vida urbana en el Medellín colonial, 1675-1730*, 88. The time, that is, was complex for more than one reason. A certain syncopation always ruled the manner in which appointments

How Heredia came to merit the tenure of Governor is unknown, although the fact that this was for his “services to the crown” is visible in a document held at the Archivo Histórico de Antioquia. Interestingly, a recent survey of the granting of offices in the New Granada during the turn of the 18th century shows the murky task researchers face in trying to find information for this period.¹¹⁴ Of a list of 6 governors spanning the end of one century and the beginning of the other, precise details on whether they bought or acquired their offices by merit is scant.¹¹⁵ As to why Heredia was given his charge by the King, it is unknown. On the one hand, Heredia stands out as one of the 17 criollo governors recorded by José María Restrepo for the entire colonial period, of which there are 65. In this case, Heredia not only recognized himself as a *vecino*,¹¹⁶ but also declared himself a native of the New Kingdom of Granada. And this is an important key to understand an incident that took place in the transition between his government and that of Carvajal, as the tension between both governors can be interpreted as belonging to a wider friction, growing ever larger during the 18th century, between *criollos* and Peninsulars. This conflict is particularly visible in a judicial process where different interests and actors converge on stage: the *juicio de residencia*.

in the Indies were decided in Spain and subsequently implemented, seldom resulting in accurate communication about who occupied a post, who had been appointed, and overall deaths and changes in administration for various reasons, like illness. What is more, the destabilization produced by the assault on Cartagena in 1697, as well as its resounding echoes, shocked the *esprits* of late 17th century observers, within and without the administration. As we saw in part I, the logics of privateering and pillaging during the war of succession hindered the New Granada in more than a material sense, as authority held by officials seems to have been put to hampering uses. In this context, it must be understood that the sense of an “unruly” place, hindered by “desgobierno”, perils both spiritual and temporal, must have allowed for a certain *laissez-faire* by those in power. Additionally, systematic examination of different types of Archives displays similar patterns in the years 1696-1706: the Crown’s focus in supervising and ordering was concentrated on the affairs of the war, and less so in everyday questions. Conversations with colleagues working on the ecclesiastical sphere during the War of Succession have confirmed the idea that some officials, of different nature, must have profited from the context of war to stay in post without being called to a *residencia* or supervised.

¹¹⁴ Julián Andrei Velasco Pedraza, “Una radiografía del poder: la provisión de oficios de gobierno en el Nuevo Reino de Granada, 1670-1749.”, Promoción a la investigación en Historia colonial (Bogotá: Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e Historia., 2018), <https://www.icanh.gov.co/investigacion/icanh-centro-investigacion/proyectos-investigacion/historia/resultados-2017/radiografia-del-poder>.

¹¹⁵ Velasco Pedraza.

¹¹⁶ *Naturaleza* and *vecindad* are different things. As Tamar Herzog has pointed out, *vecindad*, or having the status of *vecino*, in the Hispanic Monarchy, spans from recognition amongst the communities of *vecinos*. Being recognized as a neighbor by one's peers (fulfilling obligations, rights, contributing to the community and meeting the required criteria) functions as a recognition whose effects are more tangible than mere provenance. *Naturaleza* referred to the place of birth, which meant that, in principle, it was fixed. Nevertheless, *cartas de naturaleza* could be obtained on account of having lived in a place for long periods all the while contributing economically to the place. In factual terms, few *cartas de naturaleza* were expedited.

2) The *juicio de residencia*: a control mechanism revealing of the symptoms of a kingdom in growing creolization.

The documentation produced by *juicios de residencia*, whereby the use of authority in the hands of officials was put to a test, are a rich source of information. As Tamar Herzog has pointed out, *residencias, visitas y pesquisas*, can be considered instances that allow to reflect on the nature of American and Peninsular administration during the Early Modern Period.¹¹⁷ Indeed, *juicios de residencia* have been studied from many perspectives, all of which give keys of interpretation leading to different outcomes. One of the earliest focused on the normative aspect of the procedure and its display; another was centered on the institutional significance of these procedures from a punitive point of view, as in how they functioned effectively or failed at evaluating government. *Juicios de residencia* and *visitas* as control mechanisms that allowed for a margin of negotiation and mediation are one of the latest methodological perspectives to be adopted, within the framework of the history of corruption in the Monarchy.¹¹⁸ Other recent perspectives have focused on the performative aspect of justice which took place therein¹¹⁹; more recently the idea that these procedures were a chance for cooperation amongst *vecinos* and even a patching up of the tissue binding the social body, “A symbolic instrument of political disposition.”¹²⁰

In this case, Carvajal was tasked with carrying out the *juicio de residencia* to his predecessor. It is an important thing to note, as a successor in charge of evaluating

¹¹⁷ Tamar Herzog, “Ritos de control, prácticas de negociación: Pesquisas, visitas y residencias y las relaciones entre Quito y Madrid (1650-1750)”, s/f, 4.

¹¹⁸ Alfonso Jesús Heredia López, *El control de la corrupción en la monarquía hispánica: la Casa de la Contratación (1642-1660)*, Colección historia, núm. 377 (Sevilla: Editorial Universidad de Sevilla, 2021). In this same sense, Tamar Herzog explains that the “residencia” was an “ordinary” control mechanism (as opposed to the Visita or Pesquisa) as it was applied every time a president, oidor, or viceroy finished his term in office, and because it had fixed rules on how to proceed. In this sense it was a universal means of control from which no officer was exempted. Herzog, 6.

¹¹⁹ Silvina Smietniansky, “El juicio de residencia como ritual político en la colonia (Gobernación de Tucumán, siglo XVIII): A political ritual. Tucumán 18th Century”, *Memoria americana*, núm. 15 (diciembre de 2007): 71–101.

¹²⁰ Tamar Herzog, “La comunidad y su administración”, *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez. Nouvelle série*, núm. 34–2 (el 15 de noviembre de 2004): 161–83, <https://doi.org/10.4000/mcv.1320>.: “La necesidad de hallar un camino dorado entre fiscalización por una parte, y consenso por otra, influía en la selección de los jueces de las residencias. En la mayoría de los casos, los seleccionados eran individuos que ya formaban parte de la sociedad local, o que se iban a integrar en ella de inmediato. Sucesores en el oficio (especialmente común en el caso de las residencias de corregidores) o compañeros de tribunal (en el caso de los ministros), estos jueces de residencia eran por definición personas que no podían ser indiferentes a los resultados de su investigación”.

his predecessor's actions presumably he had more personal motives to either gain the said predecessor's favor, and frankly little to engage in overt conflict, especially when the individual destined for the charge was a foreigner or *forastero*. The implications of this—whether or not the residencia judge was the predecessor—have been highlighted by historiography, with a particular emphasis on the importance of juggling inspection and consensus.¹²¹ This is an important idea, because *juicios de residencia* conveyed a polysemic effect amongst the *vecinos* within the communities they were carried out in: inspections had an important formal character insofar as a review of the facts was made with testimonies and inquiries. But such government practices such as the visit had a performative, or symbolic, character. Not only did they represent occasions of evaluation whose organization operated in a social space in view of the neighboring communities, in transit through the towns and cities,¹²² and with physical headquarters in the squares of the urban centers, but they also constituted moments where the jurisdiction emanating from the translation of the monarch's authority, and therefore royal authority itself, were staged.¹²³

Presumably, enmity between the two arose as Heredia refused to recognize the validity of Carvajal's appointment as governor, bidding the cabildo to impede Carvajal from taking office until he proved his credentials, which had been granted to him during a time when the court of Madrid had been under "enemy influence."¹²⁴ According to Carvajal, upon learning of his successor's arrival, possibly fearing a close inspection of his deeds (and considering he also had a pending lawsuit before the ecclesiastical justice),¹²⁵ Heredia wrote to his son-in-law, Don Cristóbal de Pedroso, accountant of the crusade tribunal ("contador del tribunal de cruzada"). In full awareness of his wrongdoings, Heredia begged Don Cristóbal to plead his case to the *oidores*, "request[ing] letters of favor and endorsement"¹²⁶ of the Audiencia, who heeded the call and sent letters to the *oidores* Audiencia de Santafé, as a preemptive measure by

¹²¹ Herzog. Op. cit.

¹²² Not unlike the perimeter of justice that was produced as *oidores* went out on *visitas* in the kingdoms, the *Juicio* created a perimeter within which *vecinos* could express their discontent and praise towards the officials being evaluated.

¹²³ Silvina Smietniansky, "El juicio de residencia como ritual político en la colonia (Gobernación de Tucumán, siglo XVIII): A political ritual. Tucumán 18th Century," *Memoria americana*, no. 15 (December 2007): 71-101.

¹²⁴ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, N°20, Francisco Fernández de Heredia, to the King, 1712.

¹²⁵ Restrepo Sáenz y Restrepo Posada, *Gobernadores de Antioquia*.

¹²⁶ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, N28a: Documentos proveídos por José López de Carvajal.

which he might shield himself from tight scrutiny.¹²⁷ This attempt failed, as Carvajal proceeded to examine Heredia, who would later describe Carvajal's *juicio de residencia* as a "secret enquiry" ("pesquisa secreta"), complaining to the king that: "the aforementioned my successor has not been pressed to obey or comply with the royal provisions which in my favor and defense have been released by this royal audience (which is the castle that defends afflicted vassals of the pride of the governors subordinated to it), with the justification that is customary". While both men agree on the facts, Carvajal regarded this as an additional element indicating Heredia's guilt.

The *juicio de residencia* was carried out and, as was stipulated, Carvajal prevented Heredia from leaving the city while charges were brought. After receiving the judgment of residence from José López de Carvajal, word spread that Heredia was going to escape. Carvajal, along with a squadron of five men, cornered Heredia in his house and nailed his door shut, tying it with a chain. He was imprisoned twice in his house and wrote lengthy letters to the king, mustering his best prose to present himself as a faithful servant wrongly convicted. In a letter dated 1712, Heredia lamented only having been able to leave his house as he suffered from "a sore thigh and some swelling in the leg."¹²⁸ Heredia would also accuse Carvajal of being a sly impostor who used two different names: his official name and another (José Cortés) for secret business. This claim was seconded by at least one minister of the Royal Audiencia, and an inquiry was opened to no avail by the newly appointed fiscal, Manuel Zapata.¹²⁹ This claim was not original. In fact, Josefa Linza had accused Carvajal of having double names as well. How the two coincided on this point is unclear but one possibility is that Heredia Carvajal's arrival was preceded by the news of his arrival.

Carvajal produced 49 charges against Heredia and an additional charge for violent banishments ("destierros violentos"), varying in scope and gravity. After examination, these charges were partly ratified by the Council of the Indies, and Heredia was fined and "condemned in suspension of any administration of justice for six years and, upon their term, prevented of exercise without license from his majesty

¹²⁷ Diego de Córdoba Lasso De Vega president of the Audiencia at the time, Luis Antonio de Losada oidor, and Pedro de Sarmiento Huesterlin, fiscal.

¹²⁸ Restrepo Sáenz, *Gobernadores de Antioquia*, 120, and AGN, Residencias, Antioquia:SC.54,13, 1708.

¹²⁹ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, N° 28A, "y que el informante no era sino Don Joseph Cortés, sobre cuya quimera se empeñó mucho el nuevo fiscal Don Manuel Zapata, y pidió Provisiones para que remitiera sus papeles de servicios haciendo las ceremonias e infomaciones fantásticas, solo afin de atajarle y mortificarle."

or the council, and [we] revoke all that is contrary to our sentence.”¹³⁰ Charges in *sentencias* emanating from *juicios de residencia* vary in forcefulness, as trivial charges for petty offenses were often imputed and revoked. But in Heredia’s case, most were confirmed. Of particularly dire consequence was Heredia’s decision to sell the arms which the province had in store, located in Santafé de Antioquia, and keeping the proceeds for himself, during such a turbulent time in the New Granada, similarly to what Diego de los Ríos, governor of Cartagena Province, had done before the invasion of Cartagena in 1697.

But the *Juicio de residencia* carried out to and by governors concerned many aspects of the governor's tenure; yet these were not limited to the “public” aspects of a term in power, as the sphere of justice created around the *juicio* allowed any individual to file a complaint against the individual being examined.¹³¹ Indeed, because the line separating the public and private spheres was less defined than after the emergence of the State and Nation-States, deeds and actions carried out in “private life” were just as susceptible to come under scrutiny as were official decisions.¹³² In this sense, the line between what was morally acceptable or reprehensible, and what was lawful, could be joined in scrutiny examination of tenures, making overtly wrongful actions (punishable in accordance with laws both canon and civil) condemnable. In this sense morally wrong actions were not condemnable by civil justice—rather by ecclesiastical justice—but might be perceived as confirmation of “public” misdeeds. Thus, a morally questionable private character could aggravate the judgment handed down upon actions carried out “for the public good” or the “good of the republic.”¹³³ However, the procedure could be instrumentalized by the person in charge of its realization—or the

¹³⁰ AGI, Escribanía, 1193, Sentencia del consejo de India, residencia tomada por José López de Carvajal a Francisco Fernández de Heredia en 1704.

¹³¹ Herzog, “La comunidad y su administración”.

¹³² As Jon Leddy Phelan has put it, on the one hand, there was the modern ideal of a salaried and disinterested magistracy with clearly defined duties; on the other, there was the patrimonial tradition, according to which the holder of the office exploited every economic and social opportunity to his advantage. Phelan, *The Kingdom of Quito in the Seventeenth Century; Bureaucratic Politics in the Spanish Empire*, 145.

¹³³ On the permanent tension between the public and private person of judges and magistrates see Carlos Garriga, “‘Crimen corruptionis’. Justicia y corrupción en la cultura del ‘ius commune’. (Corona de Castilla, siglos XVI-XVII)”, *Revista Complutense de Historia de América* 43 (el 1 de enero de 1970): 21–48, <https://doi.org/10.5209/RCHA.56725>. The moral rectitude expected of magistrates must guarantee their ruling as passionless and impartial arbiters of God, they must be free from fear, greed, hate and love.

person being examined—for matters of their own convenience. Thus, arguments accusing of misdeeds, of “public” nature, or “contrary to the common welfare,” must be warily read, as the act of accusing one another was sometimes linked to personal motives rather than legal criteria.

In this sense, a very revealing example of the dimensions acquired by the residency trial is in the ramifications it had, beyond the material sphere. Heredia’s goods were seized and confiscated, namely some jewelry and clothes, of value in the context of scarcity which prevailed. The proceeds from the sale of these effects were used to pay for the expenses of the residency trial. But Heredia had put himself in an awkward position: a dozen bondsmen were still waiting to be repaid by him, and they sought justice in the correspondence. Carvajal, of course, sought by all his means to remedy this solicitude of those who persecuted his predecessor. So, he went on to review of all Heredia's assets; among them was Maria Rosa, a *mulata* slave. In 1706, at the start of the case, she had three daughters (one three years old, two twins) and a son in the womb.¹³⁴ The case opens with a letter from Heredia explaining that the deed of sale for María Rosa and her children, granted to Nicolás Antonio del Pino y Guzmán (“commissary and qualifier of the holy office of the inquisition, vicar priest and ecclesiastical judge of [this] said city”) was not valid because the transaction had taken place “in confidence,” and alleging the existence of a secret “instrument” which invalidated it. Thus, he declared the liberty of Maria Rosa by means of an “instrument of freedom,”¹³⁵ for herself and her children, in perpetuity. The prosecutor assigned to the case and Carvajal both intervened. Carvajal replied with an uncharacteristically dry and parsimonious tone, arguing that the deed of sale was prior to the instrument of freedom and therefore could not be valid.

The case took several years, and many letters were exchanged. These exchanges revealed the nature of Heredia and María Rosa’s relationship. Both the information provided by Heredia and his way of referring to his former slave evolved: he initially referred to her as “Maria Rosa,” and subsequently as “Maria de la Rosa,” within a few

¹³⁴ AHA, T. 87, 2394, f. 127.

¹³⁵ Whereby he “declared as free but not subject to slavery or subjection the said María de la Rosa and the said Bernardo her son and the said Juana Feliciano; and the others who seem, as such free persons, and not subject to slavery or subjection of any kind, may seem to be prosecuted and use their freedom.” AHA, T. 87, 2391.

months. It was revealed that the child she carried in her womb was the Governor's son. It was also revealed, after two years of paperwork, that María de la Rosa had followed Francisco Fernández de Heredia from Cartagena, where she was originally from (Heredia stated she was a "criolla" from Cartagena), and that she had done so under certain conditions, agreed upon as the pair concluded a deal in Cartagena, in the year 1697. According to Heredia, the French threat to Cartagena that year would have made him fear for his life, and for that reason he would have decided to grant freedom to María de la Rosa. This tacit agreement implied that María de la Rosa would continue fulfilling all her duties as a slave, but that, implicitly, both would have always known of her freedom, which she would be able to acquire in case any mishap was to happen to Heredia. María de la Rosa expressed herself eloquently in the letters she wrote in her defense:

"María de la Rosa, free morena ("morena libre"), before your grace I appear and say that the lord governor don Francisco de Heredia my master, from the city of Cartagena offered me my freedom and having come to govern this province he brought me to this city, and as recognized to this benefit, I have served him, as if I were; and in the time that I was governing, for my greater security and safeguard I asked him to grant me a deed of freedom, for which effect the alguacil mayor Francisco José de Foronda validated me, so that I told him, and wrote said freedom (...) He then made for me the paper that I have presented before your grace, of my freedom, which I have been enjoying, and my master has treated me as such, and for all this, and I ask and beg your grace to order the mentioned *alguacil mayor*, who is now a notary, to declare what I have alleged, and if his person validates me for the instrument of my liberty, your grace serving me to protect me in it, protesting as I protest to contend, any trial and obstacle that may be placed against me, and that I be given a view of everything to plead my right =Xa= María de la Rosa."¹³⁶

¹³⁶ "María de la Rosa morena libre, ante vuestra merced parezco y digo que el señor gobernador don Francisco de Heredia mi amo, desde la ciudad de Cartagena me ofreció libertad y habiendo venido a gobernar esta provincia me trajo a esta ciudad, y como reconocida a este beneficio, le he servido, como si lo fuera; y en el tiempo que estaba gobernando, para mi mayor seguridad y resguardo le pedí, me otorgas escritura de libertad para cuyo efecto me valida el alguacil mayor francisco José de foronda, para que se lo dijera, y escribiera dicha libertad, (...) me hizo después el papel que tengo presentado ante vuestra merced, de mi libertad, que estado gozando coma y dicho mi amo como a tal me ha tratado, y por todo coma y pido y suplico a vuestra merced mandé el dicho alguacil mayor que hoy es escribano, declare lo que llevó alegado, y si me valide su persona para el instrumento de mi libertad, sirviéndome

If the testimonies are true, this case, whose resolution was in favor of María Rosa, who enjoyed her freedom during the four years in which the case was not closed, allows us to comment on several things. The first thing that can be said is that it constitutes a good example of the relations between Spanish masters and their slaves in areas where the scrutiny of the Republic, even in remote areas, was pervasive. Furthermore, María Rosa's defense of the freedom she had been promised by beseeching the cooperation of several officers in Santafé de Antioquia, proves not only a knowledge of her rights, but of the provincial bureaucracy as well. Indeed, the years spent in Heredia's service in Cartagena and Antioquia had given María Rosa the opportunity to accumulate a great deal of knowledge about the world of officials and government. She was careful not to blame Heredia in any of her letters, and kept an assured, yet diplomatic tone, affirming her status of freedom as a "mujer" or "morena (and not "negra") libre." In the end, it seems Heredia had in fact promised to sell her and her children (including his own child) and had deceived her with promises lacking material proof. Despite Carvajal's reluctance to accept her initial claims, the four-year-long process resulted in María de la Rosa obtaining her emancipation papers, and Heredia's character being perceived as even more dishonest.

The *juicio de residencia* taken by Carvajal has led us to discuss several things about government in early 18th century New Granada. First, that the years spanning the War of Succession constitute a period of greater disconnect between Madrid and the American territories. This was partly produced by an increasing creolization of offices since the 1680s. The effects of this were a considerable lack of oversight of those in power, manifested in the fact that Heredia stayed in power for nine years without having been submitted to a *juicio de residencia* after the first five. Furthermore, as Carvajal, a peninsular with no ties to the province, attempted to carry out his duties as judge to Heredia, the latter activated his web of clientele and friendship, which extended into Antioquia and Santafé.

vuestra merced de ampararme en ella coma protestando como protesto contender, cualquiera juicio y óbice que se me pusiera, y que se me dé vista de todo para alegar de mi derecho =Xa= María de la Rosa" AHA, T. 87, 2394, f.130.

The ramification of this trial went further than the enmity that brewed between the two men. Heredia would hold a grudge for years to come, hampering Carvajal's most sizeable initiatives. Namely, the negotiations he undertook between 1707 and 1710, which successfully engendered the establishment of a settlement 400 to 500 strong around the river Murri. Exploring this will be the object of the following section.

III- The expansion in Murri: between personal interests and general welfare

1) The initiative

In his voyage from Cartagena to Antioquia, described in point II (1), it was noted that Carvajal took his time to visit the northeastern parts of the Province of Antioquia which had before been amongst the most productive in the industry of gold: Guamocó, Caceres and Zaragoza. In fact, Carvajal decided to visit the province, returning to towns of Caceres and Zaragoza which “ha[d] not been visited by any governor in 56 years.”¹³⁷ In Zaragoza, he stayed for over a month, from April 4th to the 23rd of May 1711.¹³⁸ These voyages, both the one from Cartagena to Antioquia, and his general *visita*, were an opportunity for him to find out about the history of the province, the kingdom, and the general state of things. He was particularly motivated by accounts of gold deposits in different parts. For one, there was the impending idea that the Dabeiba was yet unfound and must be within reach from Antioquia. But his musings on gold went further than that. In one of his first letters to the king, from 1708, Carvajal expressed his conviction that there must still be “indios gentiles” (gentle Indians, or non-evangelized or submitted populations) in the northwestern parts of the province, dwelling precisely where the gold was to be found. He explained that:

“Last year I informed His Majesty of the news with which I found myself with testimony of the instrument in my possession of such a large treasure that is contained in the province of Davaide, which I think is adjacent to this one, begging him to grant me permission for its discovery. I now have other truthful [news] of more immediate wealth that is contained in the terms and demarcation of this government in places that are inhabitable and deserted, and to this news is added that of the existence in these places of some nations of Gentile Indians and with greater certainty of the

¹³⁷ AGI, Santa Fe, N° 28^a and f.25, Méritos de José López de Carvajal.

¹³⁸ Betancur, *Historia del departamento de Antioquia*, 337.

Carautas, who, more or less fifty years ago, rose up and killed a Captain Arce who was in those parts ranching with a quadrille of blacks, profiting from a copious amount of gold, and they took the black women who were there and some of the blacks, having killed others.”¹³⁹

The Carautas had indeed been at the center of an incident in 1623 and subsequently punished for their role therein.¹⁴⁰ Interestingly, his use of such an episode to convince the Crown of the benefits of advancing into the northern regions is representative of the transmission (possibly oral) of violent accounts that marked the history of the province, but also to the wild realities of mining in the northern borders. Furthermore, it testifies to the early circulation of slaves imported in Cartagena, through the Portuguese slave trade (*asiento*), all the way to the province of Antioquia.¹⁴¹ Referencing mining operations in the north of the province gave Carvajal an opportunity to showcase the lack thereof in current times, as mining in Antioquia had seen only a small recuperation starting in the 1680s. Relaunching mining activities in Antioquia, under the pretext of its benefits, both local and peninsular, was thus a sensible argument to set forth. But Carvajal’s desire to carry out expeditions and “entradas” in search for Dabeiba, revealed the extent to which the idea that gold-laden

¹³⁹ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, f. 2. “aora me allo con otras verídicas [noticias] de riqueza más inmediatas que se incluye en los términos y demarcación de este gobierno en parajes inhabitables y deciertos, acua noticia se agrega la de aver en dhos sitios algunas naciones de indios gentiles y con mayor serteza de los Carautas, que estos abrá cincuenta años más o menos que se levantaron y mataron a un Capitán Arce que estava por aquellas partes ranchiado con con cuadrialla de negros desfrutando copiosa cantidad de oro, y se llevaron las negras que avía y algunos de los negros aviendo muerto a otros.”

¹⁴⁰ Montoya Guzmán, “Las más remotas tierras del mundo”, 106-107. Relations between the different native groups of the region and the Spaniards were turbulent throughout the 17th century. In a letter to the king in 1708, José López de Carvajal said that he estimated “aver en dhos sitios algunas naciones de indios gentiles y con mayor serteza de los Carautas”, probably referring to the whipping of the Carautas Indians by the Spaniards in 1623. As Juan David Montoya explains “Ocio y Salazar, [who] accompanied his brother Juan Caicedo y Salazar in 1623 to the “punishment” of the Carautas, stated that an entry to reduce the Citarabirae was urgent, because the province was “poor and ruined” due to the constant killings of Spaniards and Indians that kept in “captivity” the Antioqueño neighbors and made impossible the “pacification” of the other provinces “because this was the key to pass to them.” Some of those attending the meeting, proposed to enslave the citarabirae perpetually, but the majority voted for slavery to be “thus” for only ten years.”. On myriad native groups from the Citará, Atrato and south Darién who sought refuge from inter-ethnic wars in Antioquia during the 16th century, like the Titiribies and Citarabíes, and their relationships to authorities, see Montoya Guzmán, 293–94; 304–12.

¹⁴¹ During the period comprising 1622-1631, it is estimated that 12.518 were imported through Cartagena, by way of 88 ships. This represented an overall decrease compared with the beginning of the century, where, in six years, from 1595 to 1601, 196 ships arrived in Cartagena, importing 23.317 slaves. Nevertheless, the mass arrival of enslaved Africans in Antioquia and Chocó is usually dated to the years following the granting of the Asiento to the South Sea Company in 1713. During this time (1714-1736) 65 ships arrived with 10.601 individuals on board to be sold at the marketplace in Cartagena. Ildefonso Gutiérrez Azopardo, “El comercio y mercado de negros esclavos en Cartagena de Indias (1533-1850)”, s/f, 24.

lands, uncharted and unspoiled, might yet lay within the grasp of Spanish authorities, prevailed. The legendary Dabeiba was, ultimately, the reason Carvajal set out to explore a dense mountain range of humid tropical jungle, crossed by rivers and streams, within the mountain range.¹⁴²

The development of the project was as follows: to explore the lands to the northwest of the jurisdiction, rich in gold due to their alluvial beds, would be a priority for the Royal Hacienda, just as the evangelization and reduction of the rebellious Indians would be for the royal service. Both territorial and population control were inseparable from the ambitions to conquer and exploit such domains. In this sense, describing his project as a “conquista” was not incompatible with negotiation. Indeed, conquering the souls of Indians through evangelization and establishing Spanish control over the territory was the ultimate goal. For this goal to be attained, “soft means” were implemented. *Conquista* therefore was not so much about the process, as the word indicated in the 16th century, but rather about the final objective. This semantic shift in the word *conquista* was not exclusive to this case, nor was it generalized. In other parts of the New Granada, *conquista* was also used to convey the idea of a final objective that centered on bringing Indians to a better state through “reducciones” (see chapter 3). But, of course, “medios suaves” or soft means were not exclusively implemented. The fight against the Chimilas and Guajiros in Santa Marta is one example of negotiation crossed with violence.

Even in Antioquia debate around how to deal with Indians had seen different proposals throughout the years. The confrontations and massacres between the inhabitants of the *villas* and towns of the north of the province and Indians of the Chocó¹⁴³—called “Chocoos” by the authorities but belonging to a panoply of ethno-

¹⁴² It is worth quoting C. E. Piazzini who has devoted extensive studies to the region: "Geomorphologically, it is a mosaic of fluvial-marine plains, alluvial plains, narrow and steep valleys and mountainous escarpments ranging from sea level to 4000 m a.s.l. in Colombia and over 5000 m a.s.l. in Ecuador". Carlo Emilio Piazzini Suarez, *Between Colombia and Panama: Archaeologies of the Northern Chocó* (University of Antioquia, 2020), 10.

¹⁴³ Relations between the different native groups of the region and the Spaniards were turbulent throughout the century. In a letter to the king in 1708, José López de Carvajal tells the king that he estimates "aver en dhos sitios algunas naciones de indios gentiles y con mayor serteza de los Carautas", probably referring to the whipping that the Spaniards imparted to the Carautas Indians in 1623. As Juan David Montoya explains: "Ocio y Salazar, [who] accompanied his brother Juan Caicedo y Salazar in 1623 to the "punishment" of the Carautas, stated that an entry to reduce the Citarabirae was urgent, because they had "pobreçida y arruinada" the province due to the constant massacres of Spaniards and

linguistic groups¹⁴⁴—of the last century, and especially of the revolt of 1684-84, had marked the *esprits of the moment*. In this sense, the search for gold was presented as a solution to the need for pacification, a benefit for the royal finances, and a necessary income for the impoverished people of the province.¹⁴⁵ The governor emphasized the “miserable state of poverty in which that city was found” and the need to receive orders on how to act in case the “infidel Indians should oppose with their weapons to penetrate it.”¹⁴⁶ In his memorial, written after his term as governor, Carvajal would express that the area was home to many infidel Indians, some of whom kept sanctuaries where their practices were maintained: [the area is occupied by] “nations of infidel Indians, such as the Catíos, Berlangas, Urabaes, Guasuseses, Quenequenes, Carautas and Oromiras, the latter being the most powerful in their sanctuaries than the others, of which VM has been informed on other occasions and of the imponderable of the treasures that they enjoy and have in their adoratories (temples).”¹⁴⁷

2) The expeditions

By 1709, not even two years after taking office, Carvajal had undertaken two expeditions into Murri, discovering and charting valleys, claiming “inside these mountains where it is known from the ancient Indians that they are very rich and

Indians that kept in “cautiberio” the neighboring Antioqueños and that made the “pacification” of the other provinces impossible “por ser esta la llave para pasar a ellas.” 279 Some of those attending the meeting, proposed to enslave the Citarabiraes perpetually, but the majority voted for slavery to be “so” only for ten years.” Montoya Guzman, “The Most Remote Lands of the World,” 107.

¹⁴⁴ On this see “2.1 Creando naciones” Montoya Guzmán, “Las más remotas tierras del mundo”, op. cit. The practice whereby Spanish authorities designated differing ethnic groups under one name was very common. For a historiographical recount of several ways in which the Spanish built an identity for native groups so as to impose onto them a category, see Guillaume Boccara, “Mundos nuevos en las fronteras del Nuevo Mundo”, *Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos. Nouveaux mondes mondes nouveaux - Novo Mundo Mundos Novos - New world New worlds*, el 8 de febrero de 2005, <https://doi.org/10.4000/nuevomundo.426>. For an example of how such impositions of categories mirrored the dichotomy of hostile/docile Indians in the Chocó, see Montoya Guzmán, “Las más remotas tierras del mundo”.

¹⁴⁵ As Lopez de Carvajal writes in one of the first letters he sent to the Council of the Indies, in 1708: “I intend to make this entrance at my own expense and that of the other villagers who would voluntarily concur in this enterprise for the wealth that is contained is the main thing tending to the service and utility that its conservation will bring to you and likewise the desire that I have for the relief of the extreme poverty and misfortune in which the province finds itself, it may happen that in the movement of the land the Indians referred to oppose the defense pretending to prevent such a useful discovery.” AGI, Santa Fe, 362, folios 1-2.


¹⁴⁶ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, f. 2.

¹⁴⁷ AGI, Santa Fé, 362, N° 24: “Naciones de indios infieles, como son la de los Catíos, Berlangas, Urabaes, Guasuseses, Quenequenes, Carautas y Oromiras, siendo estos últimos los más poderosos en sus santuarios que otros algunos que tiene infomado a VM en otras ocasiones y de lo imponderable de los thesosros que estos disfrutan, y tienen en sus adoratorios”

abundant lands of gold and within them is that very sanctuary named the Oro Mina by Chocoes, and in Panama the Dios Caron, and by the ancient conquerors the Dabaide.”¹⁴⁸ On an expedition in 1711 Carvajal reached the Atrato River after having traversed over a hundred leagues of previously unexplored land. He did this with the assistance of two Ladino Indians, Esteban Tabares and Pedro Enauda: According to the protector of the Indians of the province of Antioquia, Rafael de Oquendo, these Chocoes were "acquainted with all the land and were great experts and mountaineers."¹⁴⁹ Further expeditions were carried out in 1711. He took a course north from Santafé, to Cañasgordas (see map), whence he followed a road straight west following the course of river Murri, a tributary of the Atrato river. This part of the road required climbing the western slope of the cordillera that separated Santafé from the Pacific lowlands of the Chocó. The expedition must have passed relatively close, although further north, to the paramo Frontino, whose peak reaches 4080 meters o.s.l. From tropical savannah to high altitude paramo, to the humid tropical forest of Chocó, Carvajal and his companions, priest Solano de Salazar, and Don Joseph Mastorel and Baltasil, passed through at least three types of thermal floors. On the other side of the cordillera, upon arriving to the Atrato, they followed the course of the river Bojayá, another affluent of the Atrato (see map n°5). The Bojayá flows north-east through the Chocó and empties in the Atrato on the near exact opposite side to Rio Murri.

¹⁴⁸ “adentro dhas montañas en donde se tiene noticia por la de los yndios antiguos el que son tierras riquísimas y abundantes de oro y dentro de ellas está aquel santuario muy nombrado que llaman el oro mina los chocoes y por la parte de panama el dios caron, y los conquistadores antiguos el Dabaide” AGI, Santa Fe, 363, letter n. 12 dated January 24th 1709 from Carvajal to the King.

¹⁴⁹ For this reference, see Montoya Guzmán, “Las más remotas tierras del mundo”, 351.



Map 5: *The road to Murri and rivers in the area.*

Personal production based on sources cited in the chapter.

On the way up the cordillera from Santafé, Carvajal passed through “a valley called Abraquí with many large and small ravines which were examined in order and it was found to contain an abundance of gold, having brought to the royal *fundición* a short portion to perform a test, it was found to have 21 carats and its samples promise to be widespread in that place because it is a breeding ground [of gold].”¹⁵⁰ This, he had found with the help of “practical persons who had explored (“catearon”) at [my] his orders.”¹⁵¹ In Abraquí, nowadays spelled “Abriaquí,” as well as a “sanctuary” by the name of Oro Mira (Oromina), “which the ancient conquistadors named el Dabaide,” he met scattered indigenous populations he qualified as “fugitive Indians,” referring to

¹⁵⁰ Ibid. “un balle que se nombra abraqui con muchas quebradas grandes y pequeñas las quales se catearon de mi horden y se à hallado tener todas el oro en abundancia aviendo traído a la real fundición una porción corta para hacer el ensaye se ha hallado tener 21 quilates y sus muestras prometen ser general en aquel paraje por ser criadero”.

¹⁵¹ AGI Santa Fe 362, letter from Carvajal to the King on January 24th, 1709.

the natives who had fled the violence of the 1684-1686 uprising and who—if one is to take the word of Spanish officers—now lived in disregard of ethnic belonging and wished to settle in Christian *pueblos*.¹⁵²

The process of discovering and conquering lands, and subsequently establishing settlements had been stipulated since the reign of Philipp II (*Ordenanzas de descubrimiento, nueva población y pacificación de las Indias dadas por Felipe II* on July 13th, 1573).¹⁵³ But the strategy, which consisted in reducing native populations to villages overseen by *corregidores*, *capitanes aguerra*, and governor Indian chiefs appointed by Spanish governors, was implemented in frontier areas across the Americas where Europeans made use of their jurisdiction to distribute fragments of authority to individuals with whom they could negotiate—and this was a process which developed over time. In counterpart, these individuals were thence forward recognized by Spanish authorities as “indios principales.”¹⁵⁴ This placed them at the head of the hierarchy within República de Indios. How was this of use to them? Indios principales, such as caciques or governors, were then able to use this jurisdiction within their República to seek protection or betterment for their own sake, that of their families, or even their communities.¹⁵⁵ However, as pointed out in chapter 3, this did not mean that they were

¹⁵² Indigenous populations were often classified in binary terms, for either officials were not able to distinguish between them unless the natives were explicit and truthful about their “identity,” but often the binarity of “hostile” versus “docile,” which evolved to be “civilized” versus “uncivilized” in the 19th century, served as a homogenization of differences on either side of the divide, erasing belongings, motives, nuance and personal or collective interests, which could either strengthen Indian alliances or break community ties. See Chapter 5 for an example of how this strengthened alliances amongst the Pintados and Chimilas in the province of Santa Marta. For the dichotomy between civilized and uncivilized, see Herrera, *Ordenar para controlar. Ordenamiento espacial y control político en las Llanuras del Caribe y en los Andes centrales neogranadinos. Siglo XVIII*; Montoya Guzmán, “Las más remotas tierras del mundo”.

¹⁵³ 13 de julio de 1573. Ordenanzas de descubrimiento, nueva población y pacificación de las Indias dadas por Felipe II, el 13 de julio de 1573, en el bosque de Segovia.

¹⁵⁴ Also, *capitanes*, *gobernadores de indios*, *indios mandones* or caciques (a title imported from other regions of south American native groups), On how the appointment of Caciques and Indios principals played out in other parts, many works can be cited. For example, in Chiapa, examples of Caciques being appointed as a result of their actions as negotiations and mediators, see for example Martha Atzin Bahena Pérez, “Una sociedad de frontera: configuración de la vecindad de Ciudad Real, Chiapa (1524-1630)” (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2021), 80–83. On a recount of the historiographical and anthropological debate around *cacicazgos* in an imperial context, see Ibáñez-Bonillo, “The Portuguese conquest of the Amazon Estuary”, cap. 5.2 “El debate sobre los cacicazgos amazónicos”.

¹⁵⁵ This method for officializing the position of those with whom the negotiations were undertaken did not mean that the men who acquired these titles were recognized as such by their communities; many times, they were perceived as Spanish allies and rejected, as the source from which their authority emanated was considered illegitimate itself. On this see Williams, *Between Resistance and Adaptation*, 194.

now recognized as authorities by their own people, as often the coincidence between Spanish appointments and community-recognized leaders was out of syntony.

In this case, initial negotiations were led by Joseph Sagito, the most senior member of Bebará village, one of the few Indians referred to as *lenguaraces*, or able to speak Spanish and communicate with authorities.¹⁵⁶ Referred to as “cacique” in the documents, Sagito negotiated with Carvajal, and later became his ally in convincing, in the years 1710-1712, members of neighboring *cimarronas* to join the settlement of Murri where, he said, they would suffer no abuses from *corregidores* and would be welcome in better conditions.¹⁵⁷ This led to the initial congregation of 150 natives in the settlement of Murri. By 1711, the number in Murri was 500. The process, which unfolded throughout the years 1709-1712, consisted in organizing expeditions, or *entradas*, along with a *cura doctrinero* (a secular priest) alongside whom the native groups were thence organized in Indian villages, or *pueblos*, around a church whose construction was one of the main activities in the village. By all accounts, these 500 marrons, or fugitives, corresponded to the same individuals and families who had fled the violence that overtook the Citará during the rebellion in the late 1680s.¹⁵⁸ Displaced and scattered, they lived on the fringes of Citará around Murri, about a week’s march to Santafé de Antioquia.

The natives in charge of negotiating, mainly Sagito and his family, expressed the will to ensure better conditions for his people and regain control over their ways of living.¹⁵⁹ This, along with, presumably, the attractiveness of the promise of protection by Carvajal, and the promise of sharing the proceeds from gold, must have acted as substantial incentives for what cannot be regarded as a simple submission to peninsular authorities, but rather a bargain on the native’s behalf. In fact, one of the main motives expressed by Spanish officers, whereby the natives sought evangelization to live in the Christian manner (“vivir Xptianamente”) might have been a merely instrumental argument on behalf of the natives, who often claimed to wish to adhere to Christendom

¹⁵⁶ Williams, 216.

¹⁵⁷ Williams, 198.

¹⁵⁸ Historian Caroline A. Williams, in her thorough examination of how Carvajal and the natives came into contact, the motives for negotiation on both sides, and the significance of these events within the larger frame of the native populations of Chocó’s struggle, has made the case that these corresponded to the same natives who had fled to Bebará after the violence of the 1684 repression.

¹⁵⁹ Williams, *Between Resistance and Adaptation*, 200.

as the foremost reason when seeking negotiation on contested ground.¹⁶⁰ Some officials seem to have been aware of the instrumentality of this argument, as the sincerity of these claims was questioned. In fact, the rates of evangelization and success of indoctrination in the Chocó region were catastrophic, as was the case in other frontier areas where this was posited as a fundamental reason for adherence to the Monarchy for His Majesty's protection. Not only was the animosity against Franciscan clerics constant, but natives in the region do not seem to have abandoned their former cults in the process.¹⁶¹ Whether Carvajal and other officers involved in the negotiations were aware of this is uncertain.

Whatever the suspicions on either side of the negotiating table, the settlement at Murri acted, in Caroline Williams's words, as a magnet for other natives who had been displaced or sought better conditions in the Citará. Thus, Murri's population steadily increased while surrounding settlements and more distant towns decreased in size.¹⁶² The protection offered by justices in Antioquia seemed to have a performative effect, at least, in playing to the weaknesses perceived and criticized insofar as Popayán's government in Chocó was concerned. Indeed, Carvajal and officers from Antioquia took advantage of the well-known abuses inflicted by *corregidores*, *sargentos*, and other locally dispatched military officers, to position themselves as a gentler authority. In fact, word of abuses and excesses on behalf of civil and religious authorities still spread steadily after the rebellion in 1686, and traces of such events can be found in correspondence from the turn of the century. Therefore, the argument of protection was essential to display for officers in Antioquia. The promise whereby, under the crown's protection, Indian rights would be protected and guaranteed, was undoubtedly the foremost—and only—advantage for the peoples of Citará, as was the

¹⁶⁰ Similarly, C. Williams speculates as to whether the natives might not have manipulated Carvajal with the argument of gold, similarly to how they claimed to seek evangelization, to take advantage of his attention and intent.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid*, Chapter 7.

¹⁶² To quote Caroline Williams: "By December 1710, only 10 or 12 of the 36 or 38 families normally resident in Bebará remained in the village. Similar movements were reported in Quibdó and Lloró. Indians, Spanish settlers claimed, were migrating en masse towards the Murri River. Over the course of the following year, further movements took place, as Indians still remaining in the villages left to join *cimarronas* situated either in the vicinity of the Murri and Sucio rivers, or 'in many other parts . . . that fall within the jurisdiction of this province [Antioquia]'. At the same time as Indians deserted their settlements in December 1710, prominent members of the village communities travelled to Antioquia in person, accompanied by their interpreters, to request the governor's assistance in making their resettlement legal and permanent.", *op. cit.* p 95.

case in the broader colonial setting. By integrating natives into the República de Indios, natives were de facto given a chance to use the legal dispositions they were entitled to as subjects of the Crown.¹⁶³

While we cannot draw conclusions on the scope of the effects that the negotiations in Murri had, in terms of successfully ameliorating the global conditions of the individuals involved, sources show that within their broader choice to adhere to a colonial system, the adherence to the frame offered by the Monarchy—under the shape of *pueblos de indios* and *reducciones*—had a tangible impact in the trajectories of some individuals who led the negotiations. Indian chief negotiators received official titles whereby they could exercise jurisdiction within their *pueblos*. Namely, the Indian chiefs would receive titles such as “cacique” or “mandón”, legitimizing their position as speakers on behalf of their communities, entrenching the practice in the region.¹⁶⁴ This also meant that they now carried a title that was understood within the hierarchical structure of the *República de Indios* and was recognized by law, handing them the possibility, at least in theory, to assert their rights as subjects of the Crown.

3) An attempt at discerning motives on different sides

While the effects of the negotiations undertaken between Carvajal and his allies and the native chiefs would have lasting effects in the perception of how negotiations *could* be carried out with certain Spanish authorities (namely, with Carvajal and his descendants, see Chapter 5), historiography has not done Carvajal justice in attempting to discern the motives behind such an enterprise.

Carvajal’s own motives have various layers, ranging from his duties to the Crown, to personal interest.¹⁶⁵ On the one hand, he exposed the classic view that conquering the lands northwest of Santafé, because of their richness, would bring wealth to his Majesty’s Royal Cajas. Furthermore, settling natives into *pueblos* was, if

¹⁶³ There is some debate around whether arguing that the indigenous use of legal concepts and tools in the Spanish Monarchy amounts to the defense of a colonialist frame, one from which no indigenous *agency* can emanate. But maybe the problem is the frame of the debate itself. That the use of legal resources in order to better their conditions and ascend in society, ensuring a better welfare for themselves, their families and communities, albeit within a colonial frame, is an undeniable reality. Examples from the Chocó are particularly telling in this regard. This is not to say that the system they then found themselves in worked to their favor, as demonstrated by the many examples of failure in seeking betterments on account of non-compliance with royal orders by officials.

¹⁶⁴ On this topic, see Werner Cantor, *Ni aniquilados, ni vencidos*, 70–71 and 141–42.

¹⁶⁵ A review of the dichotomy between his personal motives and those oriented towards the common good, or the “public cause” will be discussed in Chapter 5.

not a solution, a buffer strategy, as news that an uprising in the Chocó was in process reached Antioquia. Carvajal warned in 1709 “and because I have news that there are a number of Indians who have risen from the Chocó, and other barbarians among them there, and immediately I have not penetrated further into the mountains where it is known by the ancient Indians that there are very rich and abundant lands of gold.”¹⁶⁶ Additionally, it was the Crown and its delegates’ duty to ensure evangelization from which the Indians would benefit by accessing the language of Christ and the sacraments. Finally, Carvajal’s motives might well have been at a crossroads between the search for gold, which would enrich the Hacienda as well as his own pockets. But Carvajal was also imbued with a certain quest of knowledge and a will to understand.

In practical terms, the explorations undertaken implied a great level of personal investment, as Carvajal explained as he narrated how he had entered “by the headwaters of the river called Bojayá, all on foot, naked, and with little food, because the ruggedness of the terrain did not allow greater conduction, but on the shoulders of those who had been introduced; and with no other retinue than that of a priest named Dr. Don Francisco Solano de Salazar, Don Joseph Mastorel and Baltasil, and four black slaves fervent only of the desire to reduce Infidels to the guild of Our Holy Church, add domains to his majesty, and discover treasures which would be used to the utmost necessity of his Royal Arcas and the Common; with no cost to the Royal Hacienda or to the vecinos but to my own wealth (...) depriving my sons of the enjoyment of it.”¹⁶⁷ The passage illustrates the complex way the layers of motives are listed one after the other, the public, the private, and the royal. This goes to show that it is possible the reasons for these deeds coexisted.

What was the reaction to Carvajal’s deeds in Spain? The experience of Carvajal at Murri left officials bemused as to the scope of Carvajal’s claims, as well as the conflictual character of the process. Writing to the Council of the Indies as soon as he

¹⁶⁶ Here, the argument between finding gold and the need to secure the lands progressively discovered is exposed clearly, almost as an outcry for securing the area so that it might be put to economic use. AGI, Santa Fe, 362, letter n12, from Carvajal to the King, January 24th, 1709.

¹⁶⁷ “por la cabecera del rio llamado bojayá, todo a pie, desnudo, y con corto alimento, por no permitir la fragosidad del terreno, mayor conducción de el , sino ombros de los introducidos ; y sin otra comitiva que la de un sacerdote llamado Dr Dn Fco Solano de Salazar, Dn Joseph Mastorel y Baltasil, y 4 negros esclavos fervorizado solo del deseo de reducir Infieles al gremio de NRa SRa IGlesia + añadir dominios a Sm + descubrir thesoros con q se utilizare la suma necesidad de suss Reales Arcas y el Comun; Ø costo RH /vecinos sino a su caudal = "privando a sus hijos del goze de él", in AGI, Santa Fe 362, documents provided by Carvajal to the King, though the Price of Santobuono, document n.28^a.

struck gold, Carvajal announced his findings. The matter struck the *fiscal* of the Council as incongruous or delirious. The *fiscal* replied by pointing out “how fallacious such proposals have been in all times in Spain as well as in the Indies” and demanded more information on the matter, especially “that which the Audiencia might gather of the will and mood of the Vecinos to have accompanied him [Carvajal] personally.”¹⁶⁸ On the one hand, the *fiscal*’s words reveal the interest and need to pursue the conquest of lands which, as the Council of the Indies was aware, remained outside of the Crown’s authority, as well as the need for insight as to how to handle such an area, and the need for information to reach Madrid.

Demanding the *vecinos* be questioned was also a way to put the community of *vecinos* to a litmus test, a sort of evaluation of motives and government. And, in fact, the vicar and clergy, the neighbors, poor and plebeians of the city of Santafé de Antioquia expressed themselves in 1709, in a series of letters supporting José López de Carvajal, describing the improvements that had resulted from his government, which by then had been in place for a year and a half: “For in the midst of the extreme poverty and annihilation in which this city found itself, the fervor of his zeal was so great that he achieved a rejoicing that was not expected given the precariousness and impossibility of the republic.”¹⁶⁹ Carvajal managed to obtain letters from: the town council, justice and referendum of the town; the vicar ecclesiastical judge, and of tithes (*diezmos*), and the clergy and the *vecinos* of Medellín; as well as letters from the *vecinos* and plebeians (plebe), the poor and plebeians, the vicar and clergy, the town council, justice and reference of Santafé de Antioquia. In these letters, Carvajal’s zeal, devotion and fervor to good government were lauded with detail and attention to his will to “conserve” the province and attention to the poor.

The zeal, devotion and rigor lauded by the *vecinos* of different social strata relate to Carvajal’s overall gestion. How does the experience in Murri factor into the *vecino*’s general appreciation? This is not directly expressed in the letter, which stresses the Governor’s general qualities. Were the *vecinos* of Santafé de Antioquia and Medellín profiting from the exploitation of gold in Murri? This is a difficult question

¹⁶⁸ AGI Santa Fe 362, f. 1-2.

¹⁶⁹ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, f. 9-14, "pues en medio de la suma pobresa y aniquilación en la que alla esta ciudad fue tanto el fervor de su zelo que consiguió el regocijo que no se esperaba según la flaqueza y ymposibilidad de la república".

to answer. Caroline Williams has argued that Murrí was somewhat of a failure, claiming gold was found in large amounts, and that ultimately Murrí was both unsuccessful and unprofitable. Her assessment is that Sagito and the natives from Bebará convinced and lured Carvajal in order to coopt his attention and assistance, but that the venture in itself was not profitable.

Another element through which one might attempt to evaluate the truth behind Carvajal's motives in Murrí is to estimate the existence of gold in the riverbeds. Wary of the mistrust with which great declarations of gold were perceived by officials both in Spain and in Santafé, Carvajal took it upon himself to demonstrate its presence by sending small quantities of gold to Madrid after having submitted them to examination for a declaration of their purity in carats. Caroline Williams has indicated the presence of gold was probably more meager than that which he announced, as the profitability of the Real de Minas de San Matheo was not as high as declared. But several things must be considered, including continuation of foundations around Murrí in subsequent decades, which Chapter 5 will discuss. Nor does Williams' argument consider the fact that, first, the profitability of exploiting gold in the area cannot be evaluated through the information which historians have access to, on account, precisely, of the informal nature of mining enterprises in the Chocó.¹⁷⁰ Indeed, we do not have accurate data for gold production in the Chocó. As we saw in the first part, the exploitation of gold in the Darién and Chocó regions, since the 16th century was largely outside of Crown control or even knowledge. Because gold rarely passed through the *real fundición*, the only gold declared would have had to pass through the Reales Cajas and *real fundición*. And this rings even more true in the case of the 18th century, when *cuadrillas de negros* increased in size and scope, many of them known by officials, though not controlled by them. Gold extracted from rivers, as we saw in Chapter 2, was a common currency in the New Kingdom. It remained in a closed circuit, used by all kinds of inhabitants for economic transactions. On a final note, and as an afterthought, why would Murrí have been a less profitable area for the exploitation of gold than other parts of the Chocó, seeing as that very same activity is still carried out there today?

¹⁷⁰ Williams often cites Ann Twinam's economic studies on the New Granada, which include charts where gold production is shown. The problem is that this only considers the gold that resulted from mining through the Reales de Minas, of which the main products passed through the Reales Cajas and was taxed. But it does not account for informal mining by *vecinos* and their *cuadrillas*.

Lastly, it seems relevant to note that Carvajal was imbued with a certain thirst for knowledge and a will to discover. Very early in his governorship, he ventured into Urabá and explored several river mouths along the Bojayá and Sinú rivers, near the Gulf of Darién. He also mapped the discovery of a river previously unknown to the Spanish, a “celebrated river” “known from ancient traditions” which he named Río Verde.¹⁷¹ This river would be at the heart of successive foundations around Murri. In the region, his meager party of five men found quantities of gold described as “very rich” and “abundant.” We must not, however, wrongfully attribute a scientific trait to Carvajal, whose recounting of expeditions was far from the type of documents produced in 17th century *visitas de la tierra*. Expeditions to classify nature in the New Granada would be organized in the second half of the 18th century with a taxonomist and increasingly rational approach.¹⁷²

In this part we have seen how Carvajal conceived and justified his project to venture into the west of Antioquia’s jurisdiction, in the porous frontier separating Antioquia and the Citará. His main motivations were securing those lands for the exploitation of gold. This must be understood in the context of Carvajal’s arrival and visit to the province. On the one hand, the idea of this frontier as a land where hostile populations circulated was present in the minds of Antioquia’s inhabitants, and news of disturbances arrived during those decades. On the other hand, having visited the province, including the cities of Zaragoza, Guamocó, and Cáceres, Carvajal had been struck by the state of poverty from the decaying mining ventures. The people he must have met in these cities were old enough to have learned from their parents and grandparents of the abundant gold that was once extracted until the 1650s. Thus, his insistence upon finding new gold reservoirs speaks directly to the idea that the only future of the province, if it were to recuperate economically, lay necessarily in a renewal of its mining ventures. This observation is important to understand the development of regional economic dynamics: contrary to other parts of the New Granada, especially in the central Andes and even in the Caribbean plains of Cartagena, the economic

¹⁷¹ AGI, Santa Fe, N°24, January 13, 1714, the Count of Frigiliana to the king: Memorial by José López de Carvajal.

¹⁷² This was achieved with the Chorographic Commissions of the 1850s.

development of Antioquia and Chocó lay almost exclusively in mines, and at this time agriculture was almost exclusively for self-sustenance.

In the final section of this chapter, we will discover how Carvajal's actions were hampered by several individuals with close ties or belonging to the Royal Audiencia in Santafé, as a result of his enmity with his predecessor, Fernandez de Heredia.

IV- Greater forces at play

1) The backfiring of the Juicio de residencia

As soon as 1712, Carvajal wrote back to the Council of Indies, explaining that the Royal Audiencia had not given him license (permission) to continue the “discoveries,” and that this was detrimental to the welfare of the province, which lay in a state of “destruction.” Carvajal did not specify what license he needed from the Royal Audiencia. Was it not licenses but pecuniary aid he requested? In later years he would insist that his endeavors had been carried out with no other funding than that of his pocket.¹⁷³ What is certain is that Carvajal's troubles with the Royal Audiencia were all but over.

At the term of Carvajal's tenure in 1714, Francisco de Alcantud was appointed *juez de residencia* to Carvajal's tenure by the Royal Audiencia. Previously, Alcantud had been *Corregidor (de naturales)* in Sogamoso (central Andes, near Santafé de Bogotá) and was acquainted with the ministers serving in the Audiencia in Santafé. As *corregidor* in Sogamoso (central Andes), amongst other things, he had been charged with collecting Indian tributes and directing their activities and tribute.¹⁷⁴ Alcantud was appointed *juez de residencia* by the Royal Audiencia after the judge initially charged with the *visita*, Clemente de Araujo, named by the king, was removed by the Audiencia as he was found to be Carvajal's son-in-law which incapacitated him from carrying out the task.¹⁷⁵ Upon arriving in Medellín, Alcantud complained that the sitting governor (Pedro Eusebio Correa) had not heeded the prerogatives with which Alcantud presented

¹⁷³ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, N°28A, Documents provided by José López de Carvajal.

¹⁷⁴ Not to be confused with Corregidores in the Iberian Peninsula, whose role was similar to that of governors in America. On the role of *corregidor de naturales* in the salt mines of Zipaquirá (central Andes), see Marta Herrera Ángel, “El corregidor de naturales y el control económico de las comunidades: cambios y permanencias en la provincia de Santafé siglo XVIII”, *Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura*, núm. 20 (el 1 de enero de 1992): 7–25.

¹⁷⁵ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, n. 28A. Letter from Alcantud to the Prince of Santobuono, 6th of September, 1714.

himself as *juez de residencia*¹⁷⁶ and later learned that Carvajal had left (or “fled,” in Alcantud’s words) the province.¹⁷⁷ Alcantud proceeded to investigate the presumed “flight” that Carvajal had made, questioning officials and *vecinos*, who responded to interrogations posed in stark terms, vaguely informing Alcantud about the road taken by Carvajal from the port of Espiritu Santo to Cartagena. As a result of Carvajal’s absence, Alcantud proceeded to publish a public edict against Carvajal, summoning him to present himself in Santafé and, in the meanwhile, went over the accounts and papers relating to his tenure.¹⁷⁸

After the *juicio de residencia*, Alcantud found Carvajal guilty of not having handed over the input corresponding to the tributes paid by Anacona¹⁷⁹ Indians in the province. He was accused of fleeing with the money and charged with returning it to the Royal Hacienda. When counts were made and questions were asked in months following his so-called flight, Carvajal was found to have no debts in the province; none of his goods could thus be seized. In such cases legislation was quite specific, as it was stipulated since the reign of Philip II that in the case that governors failed to hand over the sum of Indian tributes, it was the guarantors whom they had initially designated upon their accession to the post who were charged with redeeming the sum of the tributes.¹⁸⁰ Thus, several persons were summoned in Carvajal’s process while counts were made of the tributes missing. The funds were eventually handed over by Carvajal who had an obligation to remain in the New Granada until the *juicio* was concluded. In

¹⁷⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷⁷ It is noteworthy that two years had then passed since the end of Carvajal’s tenure.

¹⁷⁸ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, 24a (papel sellado de 1714), f. 7.

¹⁷⁹ Foreign Indians, from other parts of the Monarchy, like the Kingdom of Peru.

¹⁸⁰ AHA, t. 537, doc. 8496, f. 24v-36r: “Don Francisco Fernández de Heredia: título de gobernador de la provincia de Antioquia que le otorga el rey don Carlos”. Quote: “que primero y antes que seáis recibido al uso y ejercicio del aiais4 de dar y deis fianzas legas, llanas y abonadas, en la cantidad que se os señalare por el cabildo de la ciudad de Antioquia, de que bien y fielmente usareis el dicho cargo cumpliendo con vuestras obligaciones, leyes reales y capítulos de gobernadores y corregidores y que cobrareis los tributos que los indios de vuestro gobierno debieren pagar y no haciéndolo pagareis de vuestra hacienda los rezagos que en vuestro tiempo se causaren, como tenéis obligación, haciendo para ello padrones de los indios tributarios al tiempo que entrareis a seguir el dicho cargo, como está dispuesto por las leyes que hizo el virrey don Francisco de Toledo, confirmadas por el señor rey don Felipe Segundo (que santa gloria halla) so pena que no cobrando los dichos tributos, pagarán los dichos fiadores, lo que de ellos dejares de cobrar, sin que sobre ello, se os admita ninguna diligencia, ni descargas que presentes y más lo juzgado y sentenciado, en vuestra residencia como fiadores de juzgado y sentenciado y porque ha sido informado que sin embargo, de estar prohibido, por diversas cédulas y ordenanzas reales que ninguno de los gobernadores y corregidores de las indias puedan sacar de las cajas de [f 26 v.] comunidades de los indios la plata que está en ellas, contraviniendo a ello muchos de los gobernadores y corregidores le han sacado para emplearla en sus tratos, granjerías y usos propios de que se ha seguido mucho perjuicio a los dichos indio”.

fact, he had remained in Cartagena. But soon the case came to the attention of the Council of the Indies, who expressed the opinion that Alcantud's authority as Visitor should be revoked. The Council believed Alcantud's supervision of the process had become biased and that he had taken a personal dislike for Carvajal. At the end of the process, the fiscal judged that Alcantud's actions had been unlawful and excessive. This prompted the Crown to expedite a Royal Cédula depriving Alcantud of his prerogatives.¹⁸¹ Finally, a second judge was appointed, Francisco de Mariaca, and it was his *juicio de residencia*, comprising information gathered for over five years, that was accepted by the Council.

The available documents do not explain more than the decision of the Council of the Indies, but a study of the Neogranadean networks allows us to propose that Alcantud and Heredia knew each other because they were both Creoles of the Santafé elite. In fact, Carvajal himself accused Heredia of having poisoned the Royal Audiencia of Santafé and its entourage against him. Another consequence of Heredia's grudge against Carvajal seems to have been, precisely, the obstruction of his actions by the Royal Audiencia (or at least the total lack of support), during his entire mandate. Carvajal produced a considerable amount of information through letters and petitions that were sent to the king from 1709 to 1718, and in them he thoroughly complained about the difficulties he had had in trying to obtain jurisdiction for his explorations, conquests and settlements, arguing that the Royal Audiencia and its ministers had become so partial to Carvajal's success, that they had "ordered the destruction of Murri," sending men from Chocó to "disturb the aggregation" and sack the *cura doctrinero's* house.

On the other hand, Carvajal had earned the enmity of an *oidor* of the Audiencia of Santafé, Vicente de Aramburu, a *limeño* with close ties to the elite in Santafé. In fact, at the very end of the *juicio de residencia*, when it was the Consejo de Indias' turn to judge in last instance the deeds and accusations from all sides, the fiscal reported that Aramburu had curbed Carvajal's actions in the northern parts of the province citing Aramburu's "embarrassment (...) so that such a high purpose could not be achieved, because the Audiencia had ordered him to seize his [Carvajal's] salaries to satisfy the salaries of the ministers of the residence that José López de Carvajal took of Francisco

¹⁸¹AGN, Residencias Antioquia, SC 54, 12, 330v, RC.

Fernández de Heredia (...) thus making it impossible to continue the company.”¹⁸² The fiscal was careful to explain that which Carvajal had only briefly stated without explaining, i.e., the way the Ministers in the Audiencia had interfered with his actions in Murri:

“Vicente de Aramburu issued dispatch calling to the Indians of Bebará offering them the reparation of the vexations that the *thenientes* and *corregidores* inflicted on them, with which news the Indians of the aggregation and its population of Murri were disturbed and tried to leave for the mountains. Carvajal with this motive, and having attended to the remedy of said vexations, presented it to Oidor Aramburu so that he might overrule it because of the serious inconveniences that would result from its execution, such as the **mentioned disturbance of the Indians and their return to the Gentility with which they would lose their souls and the tributes that they voluntarily offered.**¹⁸³”

This passage illustrates the extent to which trust between officials and natives depended on personal *in situ* relationships, as it was not uncommon for communities who had recently settled, to become suspicious and “agitated” when ministers from the Royal Audiencia attempted to communicate with them. Aramburu’s interference in this case seems to have upended a long process of trust-building between officers in Antioquia and natives congregated in Murri, something the fiscal must have understood on account of having examined more than one case of the sort, giving legitimacy to Carvajal’s proceedings, and asking he “was paid for his services and to continue to support the reduction” and that “Carvajal should be approved in not having complied with Aramburu's order that disturbed the Indians”¹⁸⁴. This was not the only mishap that ended the experience of negotiations in Murri, for as we will see, the myriad of interests at play in the area, and the overlapping jurisdictions the region was under, played a

¹⁸² “embarazos de Aramburu (...) para que se mallograra tan alto fin, porque la Audiencia le avía mandado embargar sus sueldos para satisfacer los salarios de mos ministros de la residencia q José López de Carvajal le tomó a Francisco Fernández de Heredia (...) imposibilitando por este medio continuar la empresa”

¹⁸³ Vicente de Aramburu expidió despacho llamando a los indios de bebará ofreciéndoles el desagravio de las vejaciones que les hacían los thenientes y corregidores con cuya noticia se turbaron los indios de la agregación y su población de Murri intentandose ir a las montañas Carvajal con este motivo y el haver ocurrido al remedio de dichas vejaciones lo representó al oidor Aramburu para que sobreseyese por los graves inconvenientes que resultarían de su ejecución , como el que ha referido de tubarse los indios y volverse a la gentilidad con que se perderían sus almas y los tributos que voluntariamente ofrecían.

¹⁸⁴ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, summary by the fiscal, document n. 28.

crucial role in Murri's fate and, more generally, in the fate of the expansion of Antioquia into the lands of Chocó.

2) A note on initiatives and government

In Chapter 2, the creation of a privateering company as per the governor of Cartagena's initiative was discussed. The fate of that company was determined, above all, by its low profitability. It was also hampered by the breaks that the council of the indies put on it, arguing it was unfavorable to his Majesty's finances. Furthermore, its founding chart gave it too much autonomy and *potestas* over its direction. The company should have been in the interest of the *vecinos* (some of them were also merchants). Crucially, though, it should have been in the interest of the Crown, who had itself requested opinions to be produced on how to stop contraband. It thus strikes as contradictory that the initiative would have been halted by the Council of the Indies and the *Secretaría universal*¹⁸⁵. Similarly, we have seen how Carvajal was convinced of the benefits his expeditions and foundations to the general welfare of the province. Support for the governor and his endeavors was expressed by different groups of *vecinos*. And indeed, because the province's income came from gold, seeking gold was the logical solution to the slowly waning economic crisis. It follows that support for the governor, whose priority it was to organize Indian populations and foster gold mining would have been strong.

How are these two things related? Both cases translate the failure of a venture whose pertinence for the greater good (*bien común*) was expressed by the proponent Governor and the *vecinos*. In other words, the governor was backed by *vecinos*, some of whom held public magistratures, others who figured amongst the poorest of the city and villa. This initiative can thus be classified as one for general welfare, or "buen gobierno". As mentioned in previous parts of this dissertation, the separation public from private uses of authority was seldom achieved. In this sense, governing for the greater good was not incompatible with the search for personal profit¹⁸⁶. But that does

¹⁸⁵ See Chapter 2.

¹⁸⁶ As discussed in Chapter 2, a certain leverage for the use of authority with personal -pecuniary- motives, was common. It was expected that magistrates withheld sums of money for themselves while in office, something they justified by invoking high prices and a lack of funds. And yet, there were instances where the use of *excessive* authority or force, were decried as an abuse of power. An example

not mean that all officials stood on the same bench in regard to their misuse of authority. As discussed in Chapter 2, a certain leverage for the use of authority with personal -pecuniary- motives, was common. It was expected that magistrates withheld sums of money for themselves while in office, something they justified by invoking high prices and a lack of funds. And yet, there were instances where the use of excessive authority or force, were decried as an abuse of power. An example of this is the qualification of Alcantud's embitterment towards Carvajal made by the Council of the Indies, who expressed Alcantud had used excessive means, something he would be accused of several times thenceforth. How to evaluate the practices of government within a political game played by individuals? These individuals not only bore a family history but also entertained complex social —at times transatlantic— relationships.

Because this chapter follows the interrogations that bind this dissertation together, it is essential that we return to the question of how authority was used during this period. As we have seen, it is not viable to take *juicios de residencia* as exact measures of the character of an official's tenure, as these could be instrumentalized politically, and even fit into larger political dynamics, which individual actors were swallowed into. Thus, determining the intention to govern well, or exercise *buen gobierno*, must involve a series of exercises that might provide a qualitative analysis of government. It is indispensable to tackle documentation in varying forms, ranging from letters, to *sentencias*, to royal *cédulas*. This should be done bearing in mind that textual analysis, of course, carries the danger of interpreting assertions in a literal manner, thus complicating the task of properly evaluating the character of political figures.

Though the exercise of examining the synthesis of charges confirmed or refuted by the Council of the Indies, as seen in point 2 (b), grants an overview of the charges and the outcome of *residencias*, it comes across as a rather subjective procedure. On many occasions, so as not to charge officials with a great quantity of petty or smaller charges, charging the heftiest fine only comes across as an instrumental decision. This was doubtless a strategy to avoid charging excessively but remain fair in their deliberations as the individual received a fine in any case. The problem with this is that smaller charges, which were dismissed in the ultimate instance, were not penalized, and

of this is the qualification of Alcantud's embitterment towards Carvajal made by the Council of the Indies, who expressed Alcantud had used excessive means, something he would be accused of several times thenceforth.

the motive behind those indulgences lies in mystery, hindering a clear view of the Council of the Indies' priorities. Like in the case of contraband, recent historiography on corruption has emphasized the organic role of misdeeds in the overall structure of government, articulated between the Crown and its apparatus, local authorities, local elites, and political bodies (*repúblicas*).¹⁸⁷ In this sense, misdeeds were a part of the way in which the system functioned, as they represented a weak link in a chain of actions through which authorities negotiated within the republic, and officials, paid once per year, were always in need of coin for their expenses, and thus were expected to keep a part of the sums they handled. How then can one try to discern intentions in government through these lengthy procedures, which were often politically or at least personally motivated? The question is, of course, without an answer. But that is not to say that the documents we have aren't without clues as to the political culture of the parts at play.

As we have seen, both the *trajectories* and personalities of the governors that are of interest here differ. It could be said about Francisco Fernández de Heredia that he acted in a manner that might indicate guilt. He sought support from his allies to curb his successor's arrival in power and activated his network of friends to subsequently hinder Carvajal. On the other side of the spectrum, Carvajal's manner of handling things can be perceived as intransigent, overtly severe and inculcating. He was arguably excessive in his use of force in imprisoning Heredia for months at his home in Santafé de Antioquia. These two distinct ways of being in power cannot be explained in a deterministic way by referring solely to their backgrounds. In other words, it was not because one was *criollo* and the other Spanish that one was clientelist and the other righteous and severe. For example, Carvajal prevented the closure of a gold mine in Medellín even though neighbors had demonstrated that the mine was contaminating the city's water and making its inhabitants sick.¹⁸⁸ These adjectives do not suffice to qualify them, as both exhibited wrongful and legitimate behaviors at different times. But, in general, it might be said that their sense of what was right for the common welfare—what good government ought to ensure—might have been different, as they ultimately acted with different standards while in power.

¹⁸⁷ Sánchez, "El modelo republicano en una monarquía de ciudades".

¹⁸⁸ Rodríguez, *Cabildo y vida urbana en el Medellín colonial, 1675-1730*.

Producing a historical account of complex individuals, with multiple and changing motivations, is an almost antithetical exercise to the tendency of human beings to want to find patterns and generalities. In this sense, one would perhaps like to attribute contrary characteristics to Heredia and Carvajal, opposing them as the rivals they were. But in fact, at least towards the end of his life, Carvajal had integrated into the elites of the New Kingdom quite well. We know that he had become the procurer of slave traders in Santafé de Bogota, and that he frequently protected the interests of the miners in Santafé de Antioquia. And, finally, that he married an Antioqueña, Doña Ana María Saldarriaga, with whom he later stayed in Cartagena and had a daughter, María Ignacia López de Carvajal, who would marry Joaquín Rocha y Lavarcés Bogotá (1687 -1763),¹⁸⁹ future *visitador*, governor of Antioquia and advisor to Viceroy Solís, and son of Domingo de la Rocha y Ferrer, *oidor* of the Royal Audiencia of Santafé.

In short, therefore, Carvajal also looked after his own interests, protected the mining class, and ended up integrating himself into the Creole elite. And in fact, not complying with the broader interests of the Cabildo could be fatal for a Governor, as Carvajal presumably understood upon his arrival. For indeed, his stern behavior and severity with his predecessor garnered him dislike from a group of *vecinos*. In 1708, upon Carvajal's arrival, there was even a noteworthy incident when several *vecinos* refused to pay the costs of the *residencia* carried out by Carvajal. A sign in rough handwriting was nailed to the door of the Royal Contaduría with the following statement: "May the Garcías and the Canos¹⁹⁰ live with their allies and may the governor die with his allies, may a criollo Lord and not a Frenchman come to govern, may no one pay the residency and with that he will not go, it will cost him his money, and if he goes around we will kill him." Not only do these words translate the animosity bred against Carvajal, but it might also indicate something about how Carvajal was perceived. In fact, Carvajal is here described as a Frenchmen, as opposed to a "Criollo Lord." Is this in any way reflective of a factious opinion borne out of the context of the War of Succession? Was Carvajal perceived as a Francophile peninsular in opposition to their (Antioqueño elites') welfare? Were these *vecinos* of Santafé de Antioquia expressing a distaste for "Frenchmen" by metonymizing Carvajal as a Frenchman,

¹⁸⁹ <https://dbe.rah.es/biografias/51826/joaquin-de-la-rocha-lavarces>

¹⁹⁰ Two important families in Santafé.

while in fact alluding to the new dynasty in power? Unfortunately, there little information on the case.¹⁹¹

Furthermore, an exploration of the character would be incomplete if we do not consider Carvajal's practices on the frontiers of the province. While Carvajal's main motives for exploration revolved around gold, his manner of unfolding his negotiations and explorations is of relevance. A sense of fairness prevailed in his take on conquest, as the importance of ensuring *pueblos de indios* be capable of governing themselves and live at peace, with spiritual education and subsistence, were pursued by Carvajal. While such an idea might sound naïve or paternalistic, to a Catholic man born in the 1650s, the misery both spiritual and material of native peoples might very well have seemed a tragedy to alleviate, not merely an obstacle to mining the terrain. On the contrary, it was the spiritual conquest that might help these native peoples find good in their desolation. In the following quote, these thoughts are articulated by Carvajal, at the end of his quest to continue his deeds in the Chocó because, first and foremost, the destruction of Murrí's consequences hindered its inhabitants:

“And they even say that the ministers of Chocó have been favored by the Royal Provision of the Real Audiencia de Santafé for these excesses, since the petitioner's actions were approved by a royal cédula that he cites in the attached memorial. And it cannot but pain his heart and **even cry with tears of blood, to see these Indians scorned by these means**, being persecuted and caused **disturbances to the tranquility they enjoyed**, causing them despair and horror to the name of Christian [sic], **and more so being so novices, in the milk that they have begun to take away from the Christian Doctrine**, and its healthy policy. And the supplicant not being able to give them the **help and defense that when he aggregated them he offered them on behalf of HM**; because he is upset to experience that his own vassals request the desolation of their domains and union of them, whereby he is certain that in the end, with the spite of the persecution, **they will be reduced again to the law of the *Genitlísimo***, thereby causing the loss also of the business of the neglected minerals and the impossibility of **the new route attempted through the west**; because these Indians are friends (...) of the new discovery that has been planned.”¹⁹²

¹⁹¹ See annexes for a photo of the sign, as transcribed by officers in Antioquia.

¹⁹² AGI, Santa Fe, 362, N28a: Documentos proveídos por José López de Carvajal: “Y aún dicen se allan favorecidos los ministros del chocó de Real provisión de la Real Audiencia de Stafé para estos excesos, estando lo q obró el Suppte aprobado por real cédula que cita en el memorial adjunto. Y no puede menos que dolerle el corazón y **aún llorar con lágrimas de sangre**, ver escarnecer por estos medios a estos Indios, perseguirlos y causarles alborotos al sosiego que gozaban ocasionándoles a desesperación y

In this excerpt, Carvajal thrice uses figures of speech which hinge on bodily fluids: tears, blood, and milk. The tears are of blood as a result of the pain caused by the conflict in the Citará, the flight of its peoples and their marooning in the province, and subsequent dislocation by force. Thus, they are deprived of that which they are barely novices in, the Christian Doctrine's milk, and its "healthy politic." In the Ancien Régime, the idea of milk was more than metaphor for transmission, it was considered a vehicle for virtue and language.¹⁹³ But the concern was not only spiritual. The main political contract between the Crown and the Indian Republics, which ensured the protection of the Indians, their education and protection in exchange for their submission, was not assured, as Carvajal lamented. According to the Captain of Sea and War, what was at stake in Murri—that is to say, the reason why the Popayán justices present in the Chocó had destroyed the reduction—was obtaining indigenous labor for gold mining:

"[the inhabitants of the Chocó] deprived of captivating those *miserable*¹⁹⁴ Indians, making them work pitifully, and over their natural strength, burdening them excessively with such unmeasured loads of weight, that like the beasts they got sores so big on their backs, they issued a Royal Provision to demolish the population and that their confidants, or feudatories had more slaves, **that they martyred, with the customary tyrannies in the province of the Chocó**; giving reason to the despair of those humble Indians, and to their retreat of quality to the center of the mountains, that they regretfully return to their most gentle state, and their souls to His Divine Majesty."¹⁹⁵

horror al nombre de Christiano [sic], y más estando tan novisios, **en la leche que han empezado a quitar de la Doctrina Christiana, y su saludable política**. Y no poderles dar el suppte el **auxilio y defensa** que quando los agregó les ofreció de parte de Sm; porque se alla con la contristación [sic] de experimentar que sus mismo basallos solicitan la desolación de sus dominios y unión de ellos, por donde tiene por cierto que al cavo, con el despecho de la persecución, se volverán a reducir a la ley del genitlísimo, perdiéndose también el trajín de los minerales descubiertos y imposibilitándose en el todo la nueva derrota intentada por la parte de el oeste arrivadha; por ser estos indios amigos (...) del nuevo descubrimiento prevenido".

¹⁹³ Jean-Frédéric Schaub y Silvia Sebastiani, *Race et histoire dans les sociétés occidentales (XVe-XVIIIe siècle)*, Collection "Bibliothèque Albin Michel histoire" (Paris: Albin Michel, 2021).

¹⁹⁴ "Miserable" must be understood here in the sense of "miserabilis". See Caroline Cunill, "L'Indien, personne misérable. Considérations historiographiques sur le statut des peuples indigènes dans l'empire hispanique", *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 64–2, núm. 2 (2017): 21, <https://doi.org/10.3917/rhmc.642.0021>.

¹⁹⁵ Santa Fe, 362, N28a: Documentos proveídos por José López de Carvajal. "[los havitadores del Chocó] privados de cautivar mas aquellos Indios misserables, haziendolos trabajar lastimosamente, y sobre sus fuerzas naturales, cargandolos con exceso con cargas de pesso tan desmedido, que como a las bestias se les hacian llagas tan crecidas en la espalda, libraron Real Provisión para demoler dha población y que sus confidentes, o feudatarios tubiesen más esclavos, que martyrisan, con las tiranías acostumbres en dha

Besides worrying about their enslavement by other actors on the frontier, Carvajal seems to have been genuinely concerned as to the fate of the province's native inhabitants. Upon his arrival and visits to the province, he ordered the *empadronamiento* (register, census) of all Indians living in the *encomiendas* of Sabanalarga, Buriticá, Cañasgordas, and Sopetrán on the 30th of April of the year he arrived. Carvajal even relocated to the towns of Sopetrán, Sabanalarga, and Buriticá while this order was implemented, to personally supervise the task.¹⁹⁶

And indeed, one of Carvajal's traits while in power seems to have been an attention to the population order. He often commented, with deploring words, on the intermixing of inhabitants in urban places within Antioquia. Places like Guamocó, which had been partially abandoned by authorities, had mixed populations living liberally. Several works have shown that this was the case in Medellín as well, where the valley of Aburrá upon which it was located was an attractive hub for people of all colors who had migrated there since the 17th century and settled in the environments of the villa without possessing a piece of land.¹⁹⁷ Of Guamocó, Carvajal would later add: "There remains only a *Rochela*¹⁹⁸ of evils where the fugitive slaves and the free ones who cannot suffer them in another province take refuge, enjoying, safe and sound, those minerals so rich, without paying their mag their royal *quintos* (royalties). And this inevitably, because it is an exquisite and singular retreat, as they live all together there, unrestrained in their customs and vices, and like barbarians, without any justice to fix them."¹⁹⁹ The considerable population of all colors led Carvajal to reiterate that "because many weapons have been recognized in mulattoes, sambagigos and blacks, as well as slaves, who by no pretense charge in public or secret, covert or uncovered, offensive or defensive, with a penalty of two hundred public lashes and six years in the

provincia del chocó; dando motivo a la desesperación de aquellos humildes indios, y que se retiren de calidad al sentro de las montañas, que vuelvan a su gentilísimo lastimosamente, y su Mag Divina estas almas."

¹⁹⁶ Betancur, *Historia del departamento de Antioquia*, 336–37.

¹⁹⁷ The overpopulation of the Valley of Aburrá would feed the expansion of urban settlements in the lands south-west of Medellín during the second half of the 18th century. See Rodríguez, *Cabildo y vida urbana en el Medellín colonial, 1675-1730*, 82.

¹⁹⁸ *Rochela* was a term used to refer to informal settlements where people of all colors lived without distinction and often "sin dios ni ley" (without God or Law).

¹⁹⁹ Santa Fe, 362, N28a: Documentos proveídos por José López de Carvajal.

galleys.” He did, however, allow *mulatos*, *cuartertones*, and descendants of Spaniards to bear swords.²⁰⁰

But what does this case show about *good government* at a larger scale? It can be argued it illustrates the overall dynamics that prevailed in the Audiencia de Santafé during the War of Succession, by showcasing the Audiencia’s role as it acted in the interest of its own social fabric. Carvajal, in one of his last attempts at pursuing his activities, took reams of paper to describe the way in which the *oidores* from the Audiencia de Santafé were clientelists, providing *providencias* (*licences*) and jurisdiction only to their “allegados” (close allies). This, of course, does not differ much from what was happening around the same time in the Audiencias of Lima, Mexico, and Quito, where *oidores*—despite there being strict rules in place preventing *oidores* from taking up roots—remained longer than it was stipulated and found ways to bring over their clientele to the Indies.²⁰¹ They often found ways to continue dealing with their clientele in the peninsula from the Indies, and quickly integrated friendship and dependence networks in situ.²⁰² Nonetheless, it is interesting to note how determined the *oidores* were, at least according to Carvajal’s grievances to curb his prerogatives, and favor only their clients and relatives.

At the end of his exchange of letters with the king, Carvajal engaged in an exercise of political commentary by illustrating his ideas on why the dependance on the Royal Audiencia in the New Kingdom, as opposed to governors depending on their contact with the king (Royal Patronato). This hints at, if not a modern conception of an executive chain of command like that which Viceroyalties had, at least at a critic’s perception of the role the Real Audiencias played in hindering the application of royal

²⁰⁰ “Por cuanto se ha reconocido muchas armas en los mulatos, sambagigos y negros, así como esclavos, que por ningún pretexto carguen en público ni en secreto, encubiertas ni descubiertas, ofensivas ni defensivas, con pena de doscientos azotes públicos y seis años en las galeras.” See Rodríguez, *Cabildo y vida urbana en el Medellín colonial, 1675-1730*, 83.

²⁰¹ Patricia Gutiérrez Rivas, “Poder y corrupción en la audiencia de lima en el siglo XVIII. Aproximación al estudio de un grupo dirigente colonial”, *Revista de Comunicación de la SEECI* 0, núm. 12 (el 15 de noviembre de 2005): 55, <https://doi.org/10.15198/seeci.2005.12.55-83>.

²⁰² Francisco Andújar Castillo, “La red clientelar del príncipe de Santo Buono, virrey del Perú, más allá de su séquito. Estudio a partir de una sátira contra la corrupción”, *Investigaciones Históricas. Época Moderna y Contemporánea*, núm. 41 (2021): 7–44, <https://doi.org/10.24197/ihemc.41.2021.7-44>; Mark A. Burkholder, “From Creole to Peninsular: The Transformation of the Audiencia of Lima”, *Hispanic American Historical Review* 52, núm. 3 (el 1 de agosto de 1972): 395–415, <https://doi.org/10.1215/00182168-52.3.395>; Burkholder y Chandler, “Creole Appointments and the Sale of Audiencia Positions in the Spanish Empire under the Early Bourbons, 1701–1750*”; Herzog, “Tamar Herzog, La Administración Como Un Fenómeno Social”.

prerogatives (“el motivo que se le tiene para proponer la independencia de las Reales Audiencias.”)²⁰³ The ambivalence of Audiencias, courts of justice, and government, which were always in danger of creolization, was well known; hence the installation of a viceroyalty seemed, at least initially, an adequate solution.²⁰⁴ Indeed, Carvajal’s requests had been heralded by the Crown as positive, and providences were given for him to carry on thus. His statements present the Real Patronato as being curbed by the Royal Audiencia, who incidentally was presented like a *camarilla*. This echoed the thoughts that Antonio Manso Maldonado would express in 1729 at the end of his mandate as president of the Audiencia: In 1729, Antonio Manso, president of the Audiencia, wrote his end-of-term report, and severely criticized the inefficiency of the administration, both regional and local, and the grip of the interests of a powerful socio-economic group on the entire government. In its report, the Audiencia is the main obstacle to good government; it presents the same problems as those that had overwhelmed it in 1715 and at the end of the 17th century. In particular, he denounced the control of the *oidores* over the office of the President, arguing that the latter must often submit to the will of the “togados,” and that the latter govern by virtue of their personal interest:

“It is necessary for a President who is not a learned man to subordinate himself to the robes; and if in the robes there were that maturity and good desire for the pure administration of justice, no dismay would remain for the President; but many times he knows and knows that the path is astray, and he has to tolerate unreason because his hands are tied.”²⁰⁵

All Audiencias entailed a web of social relations. Does that mean one cannot draw specific conclusions upon examination of this case? While the Audiencia de Santafé was not an isolated case of a clientelist court, as studies on the Audiencias of Lima and Panamá have shown,²⁰⁶ it was entering a uniquely chaotic period as the revolt of 1715 unfolded, which had as its cause trying to end the “parentelas” and “camarillas” though the creation of a Viceroyalty (see Chapter 1). Complex networks of social lines

²⁰³ AGI op. Cit.

²⁰⁴ Eissa-Barroso, *The Spanish Monarchy and the Creation of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (1717-1739)*.

²⁰⁵ Colmenares, *Relaciones e informes de los gobernantes de la Nueva Granada*, 34. “(...) es preciso a un Presidente que no es letrado subordinarse a las togas; y si en éstas hubiese aquella madurez y buen deseo de la pura administración de justicia, ningún desconsuelo quedara al Presidente; pero muchas veces éste conoce y le consta que la senda es extraviada, y ha de tolerar la sinrazón, porque tiene atadas las manos”.

²⁰⁶ Burkholder, “From Creole to Peninsular”.

made it particularly dysfunctional; as *oidores* remained in post longer than expected, some were related. This is reflected in Carvajal's anger towards the curbing of his projects by a group of which he was an outsider. These words he wrote to the king as early as 1709, at the same time as he attempted to gather letters in his favor to show proof of support amongst the urban communities he governed:

“The fact that we have reached this state, as can be recognized by the accounts of the said cities, has been caused by the repeated dispatches, costs and salaries, condemnations that the Real Audiencia of Santa Fe has given them, and continues to give them, [they] who dispatch royal Provisions to anyone who asks for them and how they ask for them without paying attention to the serious harm that follows to the vassals of HM and this is, Sire, with such disorder that in the two years since I took possession, they have dispatched to this city and town more than thirty, and **among them and serving the neighbors of my government without any justification other than asking for them, and they give them to all their relatives within the fourth degree**, and the land being so short of **Vecinos I have come to be governor of their blacks and mulattoes, and notwithstanding this shortness, they believe it is something**, and in substance, Sire, **it is naught more than what I represent to you** and I find myself every day threatened with judges who have to be dispatched at my expense preventing me considerations.”²⁰⁷

The role of governors, in Carvajal's reading, was curbed by the dynamics of an Audiencia that rang too loudly in the cacophony of voices that attempted to direct authority in the New Kingdom. His insistence that Audiencias be removed from all their power was to carry weight in the following decades as governors acquired, increasingly, the role of *jueces ordinarios* in the *primera instancia*, as new ideas around better government propelled the role of governors to facilitate the administration of justice.²⁰⁸ Rather more shocking is Carvajal's conception of the social and collective praise of “what is nothing,” saying in other words that the Antioqueños were blinded by their

²⁰⁷ “el aver llegado a este estado como se puede reconocer por las cuentas de dichas ciudades lo a ocasionado los repetidos despachos, costos y salarios, condenaciones que les ha echado y echa la RA de Stafé quienes despachan reales provisiones a qualquiera que las pide y como las pide sin atender al grave perjuicio que se le sigue a los vasallos de vm y esto es, señor, con tal desorden que en dos años que a que tomé possession no cavales han despachado a esta ciudad y la villa más de treinta y entre ellas y/sirviendo a los vecinos de mi gobierno sin más justificación que pedirlas y las dan para todos sus parientes dentro del quarto grado, con que siendo la tierra tan corta de vecinos bengo a ser governdor de los negros y mulatos dellos, y no obstante esta cortedad están creyendo es algo y en sustancia señor no es más de lo que represento a vm y me hallo cada día amenasado con jueces que se han de despachar a mi costa previniéndome consideraciones” Op. Cit, Carvajal to the king, January 24th 1709.

²⁰⁸ Patiño Millán, *Criminalidad, ley penal y estructura social en la provincia de Antioquia 1750-1820*, 56.

pride of such a poor province, something echoed by *visitador* Mon y Velarde 50 years later.

Conclusion

Carvajal remained in the New Kingdom of Granada for six years after his tenure ended, even after the Council of the Indies ratified his innocence in the ill-fated Heredia trial. He remained for a time in Cartagena and remarried. Living off his savings (and business?), he managed to intercept the future viceroy of Peru, the Prince of Santo Buono, who was making the customary visit to the kingdom upon his arrival there. It is because of the interaction of the two men that so much information about Carvajal exists to this day. And Santo Buono, despite his troubled administration, had a quite sensible reading of the quixotic character who insisted on being heard, and wrote incessantly to the king, with the aim of being given providences to continue defending the aggregation in Murri. Carvajal, having developed a fine understanding of the needs of the province, asked the king—via Santo Buono—for the means to build a road linking the province of Antioquia with Cartagena in order to face the supply problems of Antioquia. Achieving “the turn from the west” would have connected the Andean cities in the south of the kingdom and, more broadly, those coming from Quito and Peru, by a straighter route, with the ports of the Caribbean. This *avant l'heure* proposal, since this would only be attempted concretely—and with partial results—at the end of the 19th century, speaks to us of a concern for the improvement or promotion of the infrastructure of the New Kingdom, which was beginning to take shape. Carvajal died two years later in the New Kingdom, without having returned to govern the northern borders of Antioquia. But that was not the end of the matter, for the aggregation of Murri, and other sites in the area, would be settled by officials of the province of Antioquia in the years 1724-1726, solidifying Antioquia's jurisdiction over the frontier, and solidifying the practices of negotiation with the Indians of the Citará.

Perhaps it can be said that Carvajal belonged to a generation of peninsular military men who were, at a given moment, agents of the Crown in the Indies, and who had a reformist sensibility, a certain conception of what the empire should be, reflected not so much in the type of actions they carried out, but in the way they did it. In this sense, Carvajal could be thought of as part of a group of military men appointed under

the first reign of Philip V, in what was an attempt to retake command over the exercise of authority in the Indies, over the body bodies of Creole officers. In one of his last letters, Carvajal expressed his intention, echoing the expressions used by the *arbitristas* in the 17th century,²⁰⁹ saying that the only thing he wanted was the "restoration of the republic." In fact, this might indicate to us that Carvajal, like many agents who had served the Crown and the Monarchy, deeply believed that the monarchy was forged *in finibus*, that is to say, on the confines of the territory. This is particularly interesting at a time when clientele-knitting and the creolization of urban elites (*repúblicas*) had reached a new peak. That he did not use the expression "restoration of the republic," but of the monarchy²¹⁰, could indicate to us Carvajal's perception of duty in government as one not limited to the urban republics of the kingdoms in the Indies, but designed for a grander (monarchical) scale.

Indeed, this idea is not far from the drive to govern upon principle, for the *betterment*²¹¹ of the province, at a time when the ideal of governing towards something better, as opposed to governing to keep the peace, was slowly settling.²¹² In an era of growing clientelization and creolization of urban elites and republics, it was precisely this purpose that succeeded in disturbing the status quo of the particularly effervescent creole networks (*camarillas*) during the first decades of the eighteenth century, without this meaning an abandonment of their ambitions for command and power.

Several elements emerge from an approach to Carvajal through his behavior in command or, to put it another way, a series of political emotions can be distinguished in the Captain of the Sea and of War during his government: an iron conception of the duty to guarantee royal justice; a distrust of (and initial antipathy to) the installed Creole networks; a sense of duty towards the Crown—demonstrated already in his time at sea, towards his crew; and an inclination towards the good government of the natives, in

²⁰⁹ On the expression "restauración de la república," see, for example, de Moncada, *Restauración política de España*.

²¹⁰ Pagden, *Lords of all the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France c. 1500-c. 1800*, 15–16.

²¹¹ Betterment is translated here from "mejora" "Mejora, adelantamiento y aumento de alguna cosa.", *Diccionario de Autoridades*, 1726, or the idea of improving the state of something, in this case territory or urban place.

²¹² Córdoba Ochoa, "DE LA QUIETUD A LA FELICIDAD. LA VILLA DE MEDELLIN Y LOS PROCURADORES DEL CABILDO ENTRE 1675 Y 1785".

need of protection (*miserabilis*).²¹³ Like Antonio Manso Maldonado, mentioned above, Carvajal was part of a generation of military men appointed to government positions during the reigns of Philip V, through whom the Crown sought to break into the local Creole order. The military men appointed as presidents, viceroys, and governors were armed with a military career in the Mediterranean, Africa, and the North Sea, during which they had constituted themselves as servants of the Crown, defenders of its interests, and agents of a larger-scale monarchical project.²¹⁴ These agents, at least initially, approached the challenges of government with less reliance on local clientele networks than their Creole counterparts. Versed in command and in the world, many saw to the protection of the Royal Interests and even had reformist ideas. In some cases, they had an affinity for the exercise of a just, hence good, government that would guarantee the advancement of all its parts.

Thus, to harken back to this chapter's initial argument, Carvajal's case allows for an exploration of shifting political paradigms in the Spanish Monarchy, as ideas of conquest and negotiation merged in practice, and peace and *quietud* were sought simultaneously to a betterment of conditions and order. This confluence of discourse on the purpose of political decision-making has been masterfully explored by Luis Miguel Córdoba from the perspective of the Cabildos. Similarly, Edgardo Pérez Morales has stressed that we cannot point to a single Enlightenment movement in New Granada, ideas around ordering and classifying natural and human spaces for the purpose of better dominating nature. Traces of these incipient ideas can be found in initiatives such as Carvajal's project of opening a road from Antioquia to Cartagena. These ideas would develop in Antioquia in subsequent years on different levels (cities, province), leading to conflict amongst *vecinos* and mediation.²¹⁵

More broadly, in this chapter we have explored the vicissitudes of governing a province with special focus on its frontiers. The relationship between the province of

²¹³ On the perception of Indians as *miserabilis*, minors, in need of protection, see Cunill, "L'Indien, personne misérable. Considérations historiographiques sur le statut des peuples indigènes dans l'empire hispanique".

²¹⁴ On this see Eissa-Barroso, "'Of Experience, Zeal, and Selflessness': Military Officers as Viceroys in Early Eighteenth Century Spanish America".

²¹⁵ Córdoba Ochoa, "DE LA QUIETUD A LA FELICIDAD. LA VILLA DE MEDELLIN Y LOS PROCURADORES DEL CABILDO ENTRE 1675 Y 1785", 144;149.

Antioquia and its neighbor, the province of Citará, has been explained, and we've started to understand how the gold-rich frontier of Citará acted as a *plaque tournante* of relations between confining provinces. Carvajal's conquest "beyond a hundred leagues of land never discovered by anyone else" allowed for an expansion of Antioquia's jurisdiction into the natural ecosystem of the Chocó: a section of the borders of Antioquia thenceforth extended to the River Atrato, thus comprising a piece of the Citará, a sub-region nowadays known as the *Urabá Antioqueño*.²¹⁶ The upkeeping of settlements around Murri would be crucial for Antioquia's jurisdiction to hold over this area. In the following chapter we will explore how these efforts were perpetuated into the 1730s, extending the conflict over the area to an interprovincial struggle, defined by lasting debates on how to administer the frontier of the Pacific New Granada.

²¹⁶ This region is made of two separate territorial entities. One is what geographer James Parsons named Antioquia's corridor to the sea and comprises a long extension of Antioquia all the way to the Gulf of Darién, nowadays called the Gulf of Urabá. Another lies to the east of the province, stretching from Santafé to the Atrato River and allowing the province of Antioquia an access to that crucial north-south axis. It is Antioquia's jurisdiction over this area that Carvajal's entradas allowed to consolidate. See following chapter for more.

Chapter 5: Competing for jurisdiction and gold: the dynamics of settling and integrating the frontier, 1700-1730

*Todos estos adelantamientos é
tenido porque, señor, para la g[u]erra más bale
maña que fuerza.*

Captain Aguerra Antonio Varela
to Governor Facundo Guerra Calderón
AHA, 25, 776.

Introduction¹

In the previous chapter, we focused mainly on how the political game on the frontier conditioned the success or failure of negotiations on the frontier, in a context of tension between different interest groups. This chapter tells the sequel to Murri as an Antioqueño² enclave on the province's western frontier with the Citará. In this sense, the chapter offers a microhistory of the dynamics of frontier settlement. This microhistory is a part of a broader context in the New Kingdom of Granada: the creation of the First viceroyalty, which brought about new circumscription statuses, like Superintendencies. Indeed, the Chocó was the object of a discussion on how to better guarantee government (in relation to native populations and populations of color) and administration (in relation to tax collection and jurisdiction). To understand how the microhistory of Murri fits into the larger context of the Chocó will involve a change in scales. A cross-examination of both threads will allow us to make three arguments.

First, that the separation of Chocó from Popayán was the result of deliberations; the interprovincial competition to rule in the Citará played into this debate as it became apparent that an independent government was necessary. Second, that resettling Murri

¹ For a chronology and introduction to the Chocó, Citará and Antioquia, see part 1) in Chapter 2.

² Antioqueño is the demonym used to refer to the inhabitants of Antioquia in Spanish; its use in English is adopted by Ann Twinam and Caroline Williams.

asserted Antioquia's jurisdiction all the way to the river Atrato, an essential resource. Third, that this was achieved under a dissonance whereby the integration of pueblos into the Monarchy and Christendom was invoked as a purpose, but in practice the integration of natives was marred by the dynamics of exploitation on the frontier and its topographical characteristics. Both thwarted the guarantees that natives sought as they negotiated their submission to Spanish authorities.

The chapter will begin with a discussion on the dialogue about how to govern the Chocó, which was quadrantally exchanged between the Council of the Indies, the Audiencia of Santafé, and authorities in the provinces of Popayán and Antioquia. A second point will examine the revival of requests to settle the area of Murri after José Lopez de Carvajal's death. A third point will explain the dynamics of settling and integrating parts of the frontier through *pueblos de indios*. And a fourth part will discuss the way in which the three previous points interlace.

I- The broader dialogue on governing the Chocó.

The Chocó was the subject of reformist intentions during the first Viceroyalty of the New Granada (1717-1723). Namely, authorities were worried about bad administration, delays and irregularities in taxation and abuses to Indians. In 1713, Vicente de Aramburu, *oidor* of the Royal Audiencia, carried out a *visita* in the province to investigate claims of illegal commerce down the Atrato river. He subsequently dispatched a report that illustrated what the Monarchy's policy of selling offices entailed at a local level. Aramburu explained that the hierarchical structure that constituted the pyramid of officers whereby the province was governed (governor > *tenientes* > *corregidores*) was also one of codependency and favors amongst officials. Indeed, because the governor of Popayán sold *tenientazgos* to future *tenientes de gobernador*³, who then sold the posts of *corregidores*⁴ to their *allegados* (friends, close relationships). *Tenientes* and *corregidores* thus multiplied, in the Chocó and these were named by Popayán. In the previous chapter, a similar situation in the province of Antioquia was discussed. The Governor of Antioquia, Francisco Fernandez de Heredia, did as much by appointing officers to his relations among the members of the Cabildo

³ AGI, Santa Fe 362, N°39, Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona to the Crown. November 15th, 1720.

⁴ Bound to oversee Indian settlements.

itself. Since no military *cursus honorum* was required for the appointment of *capitanes*, they functioned as honorary titles from which appointees could benefit without having to advance through a military career; this was the case throughout the Monarchy⁵.

The influence exerted by the *tenientes* of each of the provinces of the Chocó derived from their relationship with the governor of Popayán and extended beyond their own office to that of the *corregidores* of the Indian settlements, whom they appointed. According to a 1713 report, sent to the Crown by Vicente de Aramburu, oidor of the Audiencia of Santa Fe, the *tenientes* bought their posts from the governor of Popayán for a sum which varied between five and six thousand pesos, and the *tenientes*, in turn, sold the post of *corregidor* in the Indian settlements⁶. In exposing the corruption of the royal administration in the Chocó, Aramburu observed that the effect of such actions was the proliferation of *tenientes* and *corregidores* in that region. The province of Noanama, was composed of only five settlements (Tadó, Las Juntas, El Barranco, San Joseph de Noanama, and San Agustín) and was governed by one *teniente* and five *corregidores*⁷. The province of Citará, composed of only three settlements in 1713 (Quibdó, Lloró, and Bebará), was governed by one *teniente* and three *corregidores*⁸. Thus, the sale of offices created a situation of excessive *tenientes* and *corregidores* for such few settlements. Furthermore, because they were not paid, they were forced to “to take from the Royal Hacienda”⁹.

In 1719, Antonio de la Pedrosa, commissioned to visit the New Kingdom in preparation for the first Viceroyalty, visited the Chocó. He reported on the “lamentable state of the Chocó”, the royalty frauds “defraudes a los quintos”) and the necessity for the Chocó to cease depending on the governor of Popayán. However, Pedrosa’s only reform was to establish a superintendent, as mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. But the superintendent had not changed anything to the actual administration of the province, except for, allegedly, an increase in registers as to how many *cuadrillas* there

⁵Jiménez Estrella, ““Mérito, calidad y experiencia”.

⁶ AGI, Santa Fe, 362“davan por los expresados empleos a los govres de popayán quatro mil o seis ml pesos, y que por la thenencia de la provincia de Nobita se acabavan de dar por ella ocho mil pesos”

⁷ Hansen (Williams), “Conquest and Colonization in the Colombian Chocó, 1510-1740”, 275.

⁸ Williams, *Between Resistance and Adaptation*, 159.

⁹ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, N°38A Report by Antonio dela pedrosa y Guerrero.

were in the Chocó¹⁰. Deprived of a salary, the superintendent relied on selling offices to sustain his living. Allegations of corruption and inefficiency in government, along with Pedrosa's visit, possibly led the Council of the Indies to order the commissioning of a *consulta* on whether to separate the Chocó from the jurisdiction of Popayán. The *consulta* gave way to several officers visiting the area and reporting back their findings.

Thus, discussions on how to better govern the Chocó multiplied in the 1720s. *Visitador* Francisco de Alcantud¹¹ y Gaona inspected the Chocó and wrote particularly poignant letters¹². Alcantud reported many difficulties in ensuring good government, stating he had initially set off for the Chocó to “brin[g] [out] peoples of war” to arrest and imprison Don Luis de Acuña y Berrio for having killed one Don Gaspar García Pizarro¹³. His mission led him to evoke the “delicate state in which those provinces remained in terms of obedience”¹⁴. Alcantud explained that offices formerly sold by the governor to the *tenientes* —for a price ranging four to eight thousand pesos— were now sold by the Superintendent, named by Pedrosa.

“a general superintendent without any income for his maintenance with the power to

¹⁰ German Colmenares makes the following assessment about the lack of official figures in the period: “The most powerful among them succeeded each other as lieutenants of the governor of Popayán in the province of Nóvita, and for this reason the product of the mines was permanently hidden from the surveys of the Spanish administration. In 1726, the procurator of Cali, Escobar Alvarado, affirmed that in 1680 there was still no news of many of the mines that were being exploited and “the fertility and abundance was not known until the last of the said eighteen-eight was appointed superintendent in the said provinces”. Colmenares y Colmenares, *Cali, terratenientes, mineros, y comerciantes, siglo XVIII*, 83.

¹¹ Alcantud had stayed in the area after his *Juicio de residencia* of Carvajal's governorship in order to capture Luis de Acuña for the murder of one Gaspar García Pizarro, that Alcantud headed to Citará Province. He attempted to arrest Acuña who had fled Quibdó, the head of the province, and had managed to take refuge in a convent. Having failed to arrest Acuña once he had arrived in Quibdó, Alcantud received a commission by the Royal Audiencia of Santafé to explain what he had undertaken and report back from the Chocó. See AGI, Santa Fe 362, N°39, Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona to the Crown. November 15th, 1720. He had been *teniente* for a year in 1720.

¹² Alcantud was an ill-tempered conflict-driven individual whose actions, wherever he took up post, garnered him enemies. His criticism of others and praise for himself was noteworthy and he was perceived as a cunning, ambition driven individual who had fled Spain young to profit from business in the western parts of the New Granada. On this see Luis García Benítez, *Reseña histórica de los obispos que han regentado la diócesis de Santa Marta* (Academia Colombiana de Historia, 1953), 181.

¹³ He pursued his quest with twelve soldiers, “because although he had found others with the terrors [sic.] and voices that ran everywhere of the opposition and resistance that the mentioned *teniente* Luis de Acuña had tried with more than seven and fifty men armed with their rifles they deserted me, finding on the way on each journey these same voices and news that many subjects were giving me”. Spanish: “pues aunque había recultado otros con los aterrores [sic.] y voces que en todas partes corría de la oposición y resistencia que el enuncaiado theniente Luis de Acuña tenía intentada con más de siete y cincuenta hombres armados con sus fusiles me desertaron allando en el camino en cada jornada estas mismas voces y noticias que muchos sujetos me daban”.

¹⁴ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, op. cit. “llevando consigo la gente de guerra que combiniese para sufragarme los auxilios que necesitase en la execusión de las prisiones de reos por lo delicado que se allaban aquellas provincias del Chocó en la obediencia”.

remove all the lieutenants placed by the Governor of Popayán (...) and to place others to his satisfaction [and who] would oversee collecting the royal revenues in the 4 provinces, as everything was executed there, and I saw it operate for more than six months (...). It is more pernicious than any benefit (these *providencias*) [because] if there are four provinces and each minister spent all his time collecting for the Royal Treasury, only one will not have the capacity in the four provinces so dilated and distant because even though he may have his lieutenants, it is not their responsibility to give an account of the royal treasury, and they will only enter into such jobs for their own benefit that they will request to have”¹⁵.

Because the *tenientes* did not receive a salary, they must live off their own activities, and because everything was so expensive — “since an *arroba*¹⁶ of fresh beef is worth four *patacones*, and if it is salted, twelve *patacones*”, he explained¹⁷— the penniless *tenientes* must resort to taking money out of the Royal Hacienda. Since the superintendent did not himself receive a salary, corruption was to be expected.

Socially, two main ideas transpire from Alcantud’s report: on the one hand, *cuadrillas de negros* had increased in numbers, and they constituted most of the population, living in mining villages alongside their *dueños de cuadrillas*, or *mineros* (miners) for whom they built houses and storehouses. These miners, merchants and *regateantes* (bargainers) lived liberally and “those who govern do nothing to contain libertinage and actions”¹⁸. Alcantud was reportedly scandalized because of the second social trait of the mining frontier: *cuadrillas de negros*, led by miners and merchants, sometimes even lived alongside Indians, within their *pueblos de Indios*. This, according to Alcantud, was harming these nations, who were “the most domestic, Christian and gentle” in the new Kingdom of Granada, which he justified by recounting the increase in “*pueblos de indios* of the Citará Indians, of which there were three, with about 200 tributary Indians and their growing families¹⁹” which, in his view, indicated the natives’

¹⁵ Ibidem, “un superintendente general sin renta ninguna para su manutención con facultad de quitar todos los *tenientes* puestos por el Gobernador de Popayán (...) y que pusiere otros a satisfacción [y que] fuese a su cargo recaudar vra real hazienda en las 4 provincias como todo se exectutó allí, y lo vide operar más de seis meses de tiempo”(…). Es más pernicioso q cualquier beneficio (estas *providencias*) [porque] si son 4 provincias y cada ministro gastaba todo su tiempo recaudando para la Real Hacienda, uno solo no tendrá capacidad en las 4 provincias tan dilatadas y distantes "pues aunque poga sus *tenientes*, no es de la incumbencia de ellos el dar cuenta de vra real hacienda, y solo entrarán en los tales empleos por al utilidad propia q solicitarán tener”.

¹⁶ Between 10 and 15 kilograms.

¹⁷ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, n. 39, “davan por los expresados empleos a los govres de Popayán quatro mil o seis ml pesos, y que por la thenencia de la provincia de Nobita se acabavan de dar por ella ocho mil pesos, que siendo el país tan costoso (pues una *arroba* de carne de baca fresca vale quatro *patacones*, y si es salada doce , (...).”.

¹⁸ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, N°39, Ibidem.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

predisposition regroup in villages when treated properly. Alcantud, as it was frequent, praised himself for having founded a new village himself in the Citará, which he named Chiquinquirá de Beté from a miscellaneous group of inhabitants:

“I left as many as 50 Indians paying tribute with a lot of *chusma*, and most of them were infidels and Maroons, and there were many more who had withdrawn to the deserts fleeing from the humiliations they suffer; I did this without going to look for them in the mountains, nor sending people for them, nor spending any money from Your Majesty, only with good treatment that I tried to have those Indians who were in the villages, so that no one would harm them or bother them, and that they would be paid for their work punctually in my presence, only with the good treatment that I procured for those Indians who were in the villages, that no one would harm or bother them, and that their work would be paid punctually in my presence, and that the product would be given to them so that they could use it freely as their own, things that they had never experienced; I was not unnoticed by the malice of the other observers, slandering me that I loved the Indians very much, As if God, my Lord, did not command me to do so and His Majesty did not entrust it to me so earnestly, and fearful that the town I founded would not be destroyed after I left the government, I sent the documents and **asked my general superintendent and erector of the viceroyalty to confirm it to me by virtue of your royal powers**, as indeed he confirmed it with all the same capitulations that I made in my royal name”²⁰.

Alcantud also condemned the state of *caminos* (roads) and the difficulties which this caused *indios cargueros* (carriers) from the province of Tatama (south of Chocó). He explained that because the roads weren't tended to, the *cargueros* transported goods north to the Citará “for twelve days with four arrobas each on their backs” which is why “none of them reach an old age because most of them die young split from this excessive and tireless work”²¹. Additionally, he reported that “all the gold that these provinces produced and that have produced millions, all the more was going to end up on the ships that came from Panama to the river San Juan, and stop at the port or cove of deposits (*bastimentos*) that are on the coast of Portobello or [end up in] trade with ships of France, Holland and England, to increase their strength and give

²⁰ “[Beté] en que dejé ya hasta 50 indios pagando tributos con mucha chusma, y gentío todo lo más de infieles y cimattones que abía muchos más qe se habían retirado a los desiertos huyendo de las vejaciones q padecen , y esto lo ejecuté señor si averlos ido a buscar a los maontes, ni embiado gente por ellos, ni aver gastado dinero alguno de Vra Rh, solo con el buen tratamiento que procuré tubiesen aquellos indios que estaaban en los pueblos, que nadye me les hicierse daño ni moelestia, y que se les pagara el trabajo puntualmente en mi presencia, y se les entregase el producto a ellos mismos para que usasen de él libremente como suyo, cosas que nunca avían experimentado; por lo qual no dejé de ser notado de la malicia de los demás avistadores, calumniándome de que quería mucho a los indios, como si dios nro señor no me lo mandaray vra mag nno me lo encargara tan encarecidamente y temeroso que el tal pueblo que fundé no me lo moliessen luego de q yo dejase el gobierno remití los autos y pedí a vro superinendente grál y erector del virreintao q me lo confirmara en virtud de vros reales poderes como con efecto lo confirmó con todas las mesmas capitulaciones q en vro real nombre les hice”

²¹ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, N°39 Ibidem.

us the wars that we have experienced in the past²²”. Some historians have attempted to produce quantitative descriptions of gold productions in the New Granada²³. The problem, however, as Caroline Williams²⁴ and German Colmenares²⁵ have remarked, is the lack of official figures between 1690 and 1724. Indeed, smuggled gold left the province in quantities difficult to estimate because most of it never passed through the real hacienda, as there were no Cajas Reales in the region.

In 1724, Franciscan missionary fray Manuel Caicedo’s produced a report after Councilor of the Indies Tomas de Sola requested another *dictamen* (opinion) on the convenience of separating the Chocó from Popayán. In his report, Caicedo echoed Alcantud’s own opinions. Namely, that the four provinces of Chocó were never visited by the governor of Popayán because of the distance separating Popayán from Chocó. Caicedo also stressed the rise in prices which made most commodities in Chocó too expensive: “Everything is very expensive: each bushel of corn is worth 6 pesos of gold, four bunches of bananas [are worth] one peso of gold, an arroba of beef six pesos, of pork 12, each head fourteen; salt is sold at three pesos of gold per arroba, when there is abundant supply of it (and when there is little, the weight grows without moderation); the same goes for tobacco, linen, sugar and other things to eat and wear because there is nothing. [each] quintal of iron at fifty pesos of gold (131 pesos of silver), and the quintal of steel at 80 pesos of gold (210 pesos of silver)²⁶”.

He said the most important thing was to “open a road to bring the necessary things to the Chocó through the rivers Atrato and San Juan. This idea was not original, for in fact it had proposed first by Governor José Lopez de Carvajal. The governor had erstwhile remarked on the absurdity of importing merchandise from such distances to Chocó, seeing as the gulf of Darién (nowadays Urabá) was so close to the capital of

²² Ibidem, “Todos los oros que producian estas provincias y que han producido millones todo lo más iba a parar por los barcos que venían de panamá al rio de san juan, yba a parar al puerto o ensenada de bastimientos q está en la costa de potobelo o comerciar con navíos de francia, olanda e inglaterra para q tuviesen ma´s fuerzas para darnos las guerras q emos experimentado en los tiempos”.

²³ See Twinam, *Miners, merchants, and farmers in colonial Colombia*.

²⁴ Williams, *Between Resistance and Adaptation*, 153.

²⁵ Colmenares y Colmenares, *Cali, terratenientes, mineros, y comerciantes, siglo XVIII*, 83.

²⁶ “todo es muy caro: cada fanegada de maiz vale 6 pesos de oro, cuatro racimos de platano un peso de oro, arroba de carne de vaca seis pesos, de cerdo 12, cada cabeza catorce; la sal se vende a tres pesos de oro la arroba, cuando hay abundante provenciencia de ella (y cuando hay poca crece sin moderación el peso); idem el tabaco, lienzo, azúcar y otras cosas para comer y vestir poraue no hay nada. Quintal de yerro a cincuenta pesos de oro (131 de plata regulad de castellano a 21 reales, y el quintal de acero a 80 pesos de oro (210 de plata)” AGI, Santa Fe, 362, N°45.

Antioquia, from where merchandise could be sent to Chocó. But this was impossible due to the prohibition to navigate and practice commerce in the Atrato (1697), as Caicedo reminded²⁷. Thus, merchandise had to be taken by land, making the prices much more expensive due to the transportation: For example, a quintal de silver from Cartagena was priced at 20 silver pesos, a quintal of steel was priced at 30 silver pesos. Buga, Cartago, Toro and Anserma, to the south of Chocó provided the provinces of Chocó with meat, tobacco, crossbows, linens, and salt. All of this, according to Caicedo, was bought “por quenta del rey” to sustain the cuadrillas de negros working in the lines across the Chocó. To palliate the loss of funds, Caicedo recommended to sell the surplus from incoming merchandise to the very miners at “moderate and equitable” prices. Caicedo believed that the separation would favor this type of decision-making.

After these visits took place in the 1720s, and Antonio de la Pedrosa had created the superintendency in the Chocó in 1719, the new governor of the province of Popayán, the Marquis of San Juan de la Riviera, complained that Pedrosa had separated “the towns of Chocó” from “the jurisdiction of Popayán”. These were no longer under the jurisdiction of the governor of Popayán but of the superintendent of Chocó, Luis de Espinosa. This, the governor saw as a violation of his prerogatives. Pedrosa defended his actions, but the Crown ruled against the separation, sending two Royal Cédulas (April 18th and June 18th 1721) ordering that things in the Chocó were to “run as they had done before the arrival of the Superintendent so that the Marquis of San Juan de la Riviera and his immediate successor might experiment no fault or reduction of their jurisdiction and authority in regard to those of their predecessors”²⁸. However, in 1723, Viceroy Jorge de Villalonga managed to obtain a report from the Tribunal de Cuentas proving the “considerable excess with which the province of Chocó had contributed to [the] Royal Hacienda since its separation from the government of Popayán and that no Governor was hindered as a result of this separation”. Villalonga had thus “suspended the compliance with the orders in those Royal Cédulas”, offering us a good example of “se obedece pero no se cumple” as justified by the argument that expedited orders did not correspond to the interests of the King (in this case the King’s finances).

²⁷ The question of closing the Atrato to navigation in 1697 is also discussed in chapter 3, where various debates and hesitations about closing navigable waterways are explained.

²⁸ AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. 7, f. 94.

Ultimately, the fiscal of the Council of the Indies ruled that Villalonga should not have gone through with the non-compliance, as he had full “conocimiento de causa” of his action’s effects²⁹. Effects on what? Nothing more is cited in the Royal Cédula. But we can presume that the Council sought to protect the jurisdiction of the governor of Popayán. Or was it that the reports produced by Villalonga seemed suspicious to the Council? Posterior reports from Popayán would confirm that higher accounts had been taken in Chocó since the arrival of the superintendent. Possibly, it was a matter of not understanding what was best. How aware were the councilors of the size of such a space like the Chocó? They had surely received reports and might even have kept copies of the *Visitas de la tierra* carried out in the area during the previous century. But miscomprehension of the terrain was often an obstacle to fully grasping the object of political interest, especially in such distant frontiers.

And indeed, this decision by the Council of Indies was short lived, as a Royal Cedula would be expedited in 1726 separating the Chocó from Popayán. This did not signify the end of the superintendency, which was perpetuated even after Villalonga’s demise as viceroy in 1723, as we will see in the following pages. In fact, the superintendent of Chocó would become implicated in a quarrel over the settlements around Murri, prolonging the competition with Antioquia over the Citará.

In this part we have seen how the proliferation of reports ensuing the circulation of high-ranking officials, like oidor Vicente de Aramburu, prompted the Council of the Indies to request information on the state of the Chocó in the 1720s. Discussions on several fronts —contraband, Indian welfare, official corruption, scarcity, and inflation— led officials visiting the province to recommend that it be separated from Popayán, a step beyond the appointment of a superintendent. In the following pages of this chapter, we will examine how the *reducciones* in Murri established by José López de Carvajal fit into this situation. We will also discuss how the revival of interest in Murri and new petitions for the establishment of *pueblos de indios* during the first viceroyalty of New Granada led to a new phase of competition and strife among officials, including the newly appointed superintendent.

²⁹ Ibidem.

II- Reclaiming Murri for the natives from Citará

1) The native petition

What happened to Murri after Carvajal's death? The answer is as uncertain as it is complex. Carvajal's successor, José de Yarza, seems to have paid no attention to the expansion of the route to the northwest; no surviving documents refer to such an effort. The revival of the efforts to colonize Murri began, in fact, around 1722, according to the first documents that refer to Murri after this period are from 1722, during the governorship of Facundo Guerra Calderón, who inquired about the state of the settlements founded by Carvajal. The last news from Murri, dating from 1718, were of destruction, as pointed out in chapter 5. In 1720, however, the governor wished to gain insight into the happenings in Murri. He sent orders for information to be gathered on how the natives lived and whether they were present in large numbers, if they intended to remain in Murri. It came to the governor's attention that a Spaniard named Hilario de Betancourt was living with the Indians around Rio Verde (the river discovered by Governor Carvajal), taking on the role of *lenguaraz*, or interpreter, for them, effectively speaking on their behalf and mediating with officers from Antioquia. He did not hold an official position as *protector*, interpreter, or *defensor*. Although little information is given about his activities in Rio Verde, it is likely that he had an interest in mining the area. In practice, however, the natives apparently perceived him as an intermediary who spoke on their behalf.

On the 4th of October 1722, a group of five Indians “that dwell in the solitude of the mountains”³⁰ from the area of Murri appeared before the governor of Antioquia, Facundo Guerra Calderón. They had made the four-day journey with Hilario de Betancourt as an interpreter, given that most of them “most of them barely know how to pronounce the Castilian language”³¹. They spoke for themselves and “sixty other compatriots (*compatrios*)” and stated their will to “leave the solitude of the *montes*³² and live “in a Christian and catholic manner given the tranquility of the place and the fertility of its soil”³³ In exchange for being allowed to “found themselves” in Rio Verde,

³⁰ AHA, 25, 776, f.593v, “que tienen su asistencia en la soledad de los montes”.

³¹ AHA, 25, 776, f. 594 “los más de ellos que apenas saben pronunciar el idioma castellano”.

³² This phrase was repeated several times, see AHA, 25, 776, f. 602; 609; 615.

³³ *Ibidem*, “vivir christiana y católicamente, respecto a lo apacible del paraje y fertilidad de su terreno, fertilidad”.

the group of natives promised they would “contribute[ing] to this royal treasury the tributes that they are obliged to pay to His Majesty, for which purpose they ask his mercy to protect them with royal aid and protection and to place in that place a clergyman or priest to administer the holy sacraments and baptism to the most of them who have not received them, and that for their maintenance, while his majesty gives them the necessary providence (trusting in the royal protection), they have made in the aforementioned place their *rozerías* (gardens) and (*labranzas*) farms.”³⁴ They also pointed out they wished to settle under the leadership of Juan Dogaví who they referred to as “Captain, the one who best spoke the Spanish language”. The governor granted them their wish and on the very same day expedited an *auto* to Betancourt, so that he would sponsor and protect (“patrocine y amparara”) in Rio Verde.

Within a year, in April 1723, a group of them returned to Antioquia and informed the governor of that Hilario de Betancourt had brought them “little or no promotion (“poco o ningún fomento”)³⁵. They demanded anew (“piden nuevamente”) –it is not mentioned *when* they had first asked this– to be granted a different auxiliary (“auxiliador”). In fact, expressing themselves before the governor, they asked that it be “Pablo de Carvajal, *vecino* of this said town, (...) as they expressed their affection for him for [being] the son of the governor Don Joseph López de Carvajal”³⁶. Indeed, we know that Carvajal had wanted Murrí to be left in charge of “one of his sons” and wished to keep the links between his family and the settlements near Rio Verde³⁷. But did Pablo de Carvajal have any links to Murrí other than his father’s name? What were his merits?

The governor stated he wrote about the matter to the new Viceroy, Jorge de Villalonga, and asked for “providencias”, without receiving an answer regarding the matter. While it is not specified why the governor sought the Viceroy’s approval on the matter, the governor did not seem to have expressly needed Villalonga’s approval, for despite receiving no answer, Governor Guerra Calderón went ahead with appointing

³⁴ Ibidem, “contribuyendo a esta real caja los tributos que son obligados a pagar a su majestad para cuyo efecto piden a su merced los ampare con el auxilio y protección real y les ponga en aquel sitio un sacerdote o cura que les administrare los santos sacramentos y el del bautismo a los más de ellos que se hayan sin haberlo recibido y que para su manutención ínterin su majestad de la providencia necesaria (fiados en el amparo real) han hecho en dicho lugar sus rozerías y (labranzas)”

³⁵ AHA, 25, 776, f. 596.

³⁶ “como expresaban del cariño que le tenían por hijo del gobernador Don Joseph López de Carvajal”.

³⁷ AGI, Santa Fe, 362, N°28.

Pablo de Carvajal, providing him with a commission. Indeed, this meant he was appointed to a specific task, without being granted any specific military or civil office. Why wasn't he initially named Captain *aguerra* or Corregidor? Possibly because he was very young. While we don't have of a birth date for Pablo de Carvajal, it is certain that he arrived in Antioquia as a child as he was one of José Lopez de Carvajal's children from his first marriage with Juana Torres Ponce de Leon.³⁸ If we presume he was 20 when he had his first child, Maria Josefa, with his wife, Jeronima de Antia, in 1723 (the couple had seven children between 1723 and 1737³⁹), that would make him around 95 years old when he presented a project (inspired in his father's road project) to build a road from Antioquia to the Chocó in 1798, an advanced age as J. S. Gomez has noted⁴⁰.

But age must have been only one reason. Many appointments of young men as captains can be traced. For instance, José Cataño Castrillón, cited in the table above, was only 25 when he was appointed captain of Spanish infantry⁴¹. Lack of experience might have played as well. But furthermore, the governor might have made such an appointment to avoid naming a military officer in the Citará, possibly to avoid stirring up backlash from Popayán or the Royal Audiencia in Santafé. Governor Calderón had only been appointed in 1721 by Viceroy Villalonga, after the man appointed in 1713 for the task (Andrés Alvarez de Faldo) failed to arrive in New Granada⁴². Was Guerra Calderón somehow indebted to Villalonga? This might explain why he proceeded so carefully. Whatever the case, Calderón thereafter obtained Villalonga's approval and informed the Royal Audiencia of the appointment (f.598r). Thus, on April 2nd, 1723, he gave **“I give faculty to the aforementioned Don Pablo de Carvajal, so that in the interim, I order him to sponsor, protect, protect, guard and defend (...) the natives from any person who wants to enter the expressed place to cause them any inconvenience, vexations, or offenses, maintaining and conserving them, in all peace**

³⁸ See Núñez, “Cristóbal García de Segovia y El Patronato de La Sacristía Mayor Del Convento de San Francisco Casa Grande de Sevilla (1688-1692), En Congreso Internacional. El Franciscanismo: Identidad y Poder. Baeza-Priego de Córdoba (2015), AHEF, Córdoba 2016, Pp. 395-420.”

³⁹ Antioquia, *Libro IVto de bautismos*, 1718 a 1739, “Don Juan José Santana. Por encargo del ilustrísimo señor Obispo”, online resource.

⁴⁰ See G, “Proyectos Fallidos, Proyectos Concluidos. La Provincia de Antioquia y Sus Caminos En Dirección a Los Países Del Chocó. Siglo XVIII”.

⁴¹ See registry on Familysearch: individual number 97RQ-TD6.

⁴² Restrepo Sáenz y Restrepo Posada, *Gobernadores de Antioquia*, 133.

and quiet, making them continue **and continue the culture and form of the felling that they have begun**, and other work that they undertake, without allowing the aforementioned to cause any harm to the passers-by.”⁴³.

Three days later, Guerra Calderón produced a document containing a series of instructions he sent to Pablo de Carvajal, which stated the “instruction and orders that Pablo de Carvajal must follow in the intendency that has been placed in his care”⁴⁴ (f. 600r) warned [him] of the way he ought to govern for the consecution of this attempt” (f. 596)⁴⁵. One might be tempted to understand the term “intendency” (*intendencia*) as a task, duty, and as opposed to a reference to Bourbonic intendencies, Bourbonic offices institutionalized in New Spain and Cuba, La Plata and, later, in Peru Chile and Guatemala⁴⁶. While an attempt at creating one in Cuenca, Quito, the project was unsuccessful in the New Granada⁴⁷. However, Pablo de Carvajal, years after these events, would declare having served as “capitán superintendente y justicia mayor de todo el dicho valle de Murri”⁴⁸. No documents testifying Carvajal was indeed superintendent have resurfaced during this research. However, it is highly possible he was appointed intendente in the valley of Murri, following the tendency to name intendentes as the first Viceroyalty of the New Granada was created.

The instruction sent by the governor contained the following indications:

Instruction and order that Don Pablo de Carvajal must observe in the intendency that has been put to his care as a helper of the natural Indians of the cimarronas of the

⁴³ AHA, 25, 776, f.598r, “**doy facultad al sobredicho Don Pablo de Carvajal, para que interín otra cossa le hordeno, patrozine, ampare, guarde y defienda (...) a dhos naturales de qualesquiera personas que quisieren entrarse en el expresado sitio a hazerles algunas molestias, vejaciones, o o agravios, manteniéndoles y conservándolos, en toda la paz y quietud, haciéndoles proseguir y q prosigan la cultura y forma de las rozerías q tubiesen comenzadas, y demás trabajo que emprehendiesen, sin permitir que los referidos agan daño alguno a los viandantes**”.

⁴⁵ (“la manera en que debía gobernar para la consecaucución de este intento” (f.596.)

⁴⁶ Luis Navarro García, *Intendencias en Indias* (Seville: Publicaciones de la Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos de Sevilla, 1959).

⁴⁷ Attempts at establishing intendencies in the New Granada waned after the death of José de Gálvez, their main proponent. On this see Anthony McFarlane, *Colombia antes de la independencia: economía, sociedad, y política bajo el dominio borbón*, 1a ed. en español (Bogotá, Colombia: Banco de la República: El Ancora Editores, 1997), 328. While intendencias were not implemented in the New Kingdom, recent research has shown how several components of the intendency system designed for New Spain were used to manage the royal, ecclesiastical, and municipal treasuries of the New Kingdom of Granada. On this see José Joaquín Pinto Bernal y José Joaquín Pinto Bernal, “El sistema de intendencias y el gobierno de los erarios en el Nuevo Reino de Granada. Una aproximación institucional”, *Fronteras de la Historia* 27, núm. 1 (junio de 2022): 230–51, <https://doi.org/10.22380/20274688.1946>.

⁴⁸ A.H.A. Gobernación. Minas. T. 354, documento 6655, f. 73r.

Chocó that have come out of the roughness of the mountains, and come to this government asking for the protection of them as they wish to be founded and make their village, and dwellings in the land that is between the Rio Verde and the river Murrí [≈70 km away], in whose care the referred don Pablo in virtue of the *despacho* which he has received to this effect, interim another providence is given, will execute the following:

1-The first thing that he will execute, after arriving at the place of Murrí is that if Ylario de Betancour, a person for this same effect, brings to that place, he will also be dispatched (damaged paper).

2-After this dispatch has been arranged, having arrived at this place, he will try to gather the Indians that are in it and if it can be, to get out of the brush of the mountains, the Indians that have promised to leave and together they will all make a register of it with enough distinction, as well of the men as of the women, girls and boys, with reason of the families of which they are composed.

3-Executed this in conformity of the said *despacho*, he will celebrate (incomprehensible) the said Indians so that they begin to form their ranches, and housings, as also their *rozerías*⁴⁹, and that they take ahead those might have already started, treating them with all the mildness, and sagacity, without giving them any reason to disperse or return to their retreats, instructing them in the mysteries of our holy faith, giving them to understand what they earn in their catholic reduction with the other necessary things in this regard.

4- Once the aforementioned register or list has been drawn up, send a copy of it to this government so that it may record the natives who have been there, informing them of everything that may be found.

5- He will try attempt the Indians, keeping the limits of their work, do not bother or harm any passenger or passerby, and the same luck on the contrary to cause displeasure.

6-Particularly, special care will be taken to have a fine knowledge of the Indians of their Magesties (?) as well as to impose themselves in their language, so that no Indians from the towns of the provinces of the Chocó will interfere or interpose themselves in this place with the aforementioned, any Indians from the towns of the provinces of the Chocó, in which he will take great precaution making them go, or sending to their towns, those who bring them there.

7- The letter that is given to him for the general intendant of the provinces, he will send it as soon as he has the opportunity of a safe person with whom he can obtain an answer to it.

8- And in resolution of the maintenance and care of the Indians, he will act in the way that best serves both majesties, divine and human, and as he trusts in their zeal and activity, he will give an account in this government of everything that is necessary and happens. Antioquia, April 5, 1723.⁵⁰

⁴⁹According to the Real Academia Española, the term “rocería”, spelled with a “c” in modern-day spanish, belongs to colombian spanish and related to the verb “rozar”, litterally meaning “to graze”, as in “to lightly touch”, holds until today the meaning of mowing the grass or vegetation on a terrain. It is interesting to note that this word already held the meaning of “preparing land for agriculture” in the New Granada in the eatly 18th century.

⁵⁰ “Instrucción y órden que ha de observar don Pablo de Carvajal en la intendencia q se ha puesto a su cuidado de auxiliador de **los indios naturales de las cimarronas del chocó**, q han salido de la aspereza de los montes, y venido a este gobierno pidiendo el amparo de ellos por querer fundarse y hacer su pueblo, y viviendas en el terreno que está entre el río Verde y el río Murrí, en cuyo cuidado el referido

Several things are striking in the list of instructions. Firstly, the degree of care expressly stated by the governor in describing how Carvajal was to handle relationships with the natives, is illustrative of the fragility which justices from Antioquia and Popayán had come to understand the natives in the Chocó, considered as particularly domestic, soft, and prone to abide, on the one hand. But these natives were also to be treated with “blandura, sagacidad and mancidad” (zeal, astuteness, and gentleness). This rather resembled the way might treat a group of infants “without giving them cause to disperse or return to their retreats”.⁵¹ Such a conception of native fragility echoes the perception of Indians as miserabilis⁵², perpetual minors to be instructed in the ways of the faith so that they might find peace and quiet⁵³. The idea that these indigenous populations were particularly gentle did not however devote them of character. Indeed, the treacherous or dishonest character of Indians was usually rephrased at need, especially when attempting to explain failings after instances of negotiation. In this passage, the strategy set forth by the governor is coherent with the way justices in

don Pablo en virtud del despacho q para ello se le ha lbrado interñin otra providencia se da, executará lo siguiente: 1—lo primero que ejecutará, luego que llegue al sitio de murrí es q si aportare por aquel paraje Ylario de Betancour, persona âpn para este mismo efecto, se le libró también despacho; para q no se encuentren estos recogerá se le entregó (papel dañado) lo qual podrá efectuar en qualquier parte q le (...). 2—Arreglándose este dicho despacho, haviendo llegado â dho sitio, procurará juntar los indios q hubiere en él y si pudiere ser, q salgan de la maleza de los montes los más q dhos indios han prometido saldrán y juntos todos hacer padrón de ello con bastante distinzión, assí de los hombres como de las mugeres, muchachas y muchoachos, con razón de las familias de q se componen. 3—Exectuado esto en conformidad del dho despacho calebrará (incomprensible) â los dichos indios para **que comiencen a formar sus ranchos, y viviendas, como también sus rozerías, y q lleven adelante las q tubieren principiadas, tratándolos con toda la blandura, mancidad, y zagacidad, sin dar motibo a q se dispersen**, o buelvan a sus retiros, instruyéndolos en los misterios de nra santa fé, **dándoles a entender lo q ganan en su catholica reducci3n con lo demás nezesario** sobre este particular . 4—efectuado el referido padrón o lista, remitir copia de él a este gobierno para q en él conste de los naturales q hubieren sido, avisando de todo lo que escaeciones. 5— Procurará q dhos Indios conveniéndose los limites de sus lavores, no molesten **no hagan daño a ningún pasajero o viandante, y la misma suerte por el contrario para q se ocasionen disgustos**. 6—Particularmente se tendrá expecial cuidado de tener fino conocimiento de los indios de su mag (;) dcomo de imponerse en su lengua, para q dediante esto no se intometan ni interpongan en dho sitio con los referidos, ningunos indios de los pueblos de las provinziias del chocó, en lo qual ha de poner gran prevenzi3n haciendo yr, o remitiendo a sus pueblos, a los q por allí aportaren. 7— la carta q se le entrega para el intendente general de dhas provinziias, la remitirá luego q aya ocasi3n de persona segura con q se pueda lograr respuesta de ella . 8— y **en resoluci3n de la manutenci3n y cuidado de dhos indios obrará de la suerte q más bien servidas sean ambas magestades, divina y humana— y como se fia de su celo y actividad— dando quenta en este gobierno de todo quanto fuere preciso y acaeziere. Antioquia a 5 de abril de 1723.**”

⁵¹ “sin dar motibo a que se dispersen o buelban a sus retiros”

⁵² Cunill, “L’Indien, personne misérable. Considérations historiographiques sur le statut des peuples indigènes dans l’empire hispanique”.

⁵³ C3roba Ochoa, “Una Villa Carente de Paz, Quietud y Tranquilidad. Medellín Entre 1675 y 1720”; C3rdoba Ochoa, “La memoria del agravio en los indígenas según la visita de Herrera Campuzano a la gobernaci3n de Antioquia (1614-1616)”.

Antioquia had carefully found a way to entice, satisfy and keep Indian populations interested in negotiating with them.

The other striking element lies in point 6, whereby the governor besought Carvajal to “impose himself in their languages” to better control that the individuals. Essentially, what transpires out of this order is twofold. On the one hand, the governor seems to have been very cautious not to seem as though justices in Antioquia were enticing Indians from the Chocó (under jurisdiction from Popayán) to leave the province for Antioquia, thus conveying only Indians from the frontier in Antioquia to come populate the settlements. On the other hand, the preoccupation over miscommunication is manifest. This was not an isolated issue but a much more structural problem in the Chocó, as the lack of proficiency, interest, or even basic knowledge of Franciscan missionaries in the Chocó was a factor for dysfunctional relationships between Franciscans and natives, barely understanding one another. This resulted in many hindrances for indigenous populations, who had to rely on *ladinos*, or *lenguaraces* from within the community or on external interpreters who had a sense of their language, like Hilario de Betancourt.

For comparison, this greatly differed from other frontier areas like the province of Chiapas (between modern-day Mexico and Guatemala), where Dominican friars had not only learned indigenous languages, but taught to read and write to Indian *escribanos*, who then went on to produce vocabularies (lexicons) of native languages since the mid-16th century⁵⁴. In the Chocó, meteorological and topographical conditions were harsh and ill-fit for the preservation of paper. But that in itself does not explain the fact that Franciscans did not record or learn native languages. Indeed, they lacked initiative to learn indigenous languages and, seemingly, to educate Indians in reading and writing. The Crown had become aware of this. Indeed, only two years later, after the matter had once more come to royal attention, the Crown had expedited a Royal Cédula ordering Franciscans in the Chocó, who were accused of profiting from the labor of the natives in their charge, were highly compelled to learn the languages of their *agregaciones*, for, as the Cédula stated, “*como no son lenguaraces, no les tienen*

⁵⁴ Bahena Pérez, “Una sociedad de frontera: configuración de la vecindad de Ciudad Real, Chiapa (1524-1630)”, 78–79.

cariño a los indios”⁵⁵. This suggested that linguistic comprehension begot love and the will to care.

To understand this, it might be interesting to frame it within the field of what has been described as *language* or *linguistic ideologies*, as defined by socio-anthropological research. Its proponents have attempted to define the relationship between held beliefs and linguistic practices. In this sense, Kathryn Woolard, for example, has defined language ideology as “representations, whether explicit or implicit, that construe the intersection of language and human beings in a social world”. Judith Irvine proposes the following definition: “[it is] the cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests”⁵⁶. If we apply this thought to the recommendation that learning languages enabled friars to love Indians, it follows that there was a perceived link between linguistic abilities or knowledge and the ability to understand the representations that underpinned linguistic practices. In other words, indigenous languages was not only a tool for successful communication, but an entryway into the native’s social and political representations and cosmogony. Understanding was, thus, the path for Pablo de Carvajal, as well as Franciscan friars, to treat Indians with the love they deserved as children of God.

2) The quarrel with the Citará’s newly appointed Superintendent

Upon his arrival in Murrí, Pablo de Carvajal did as he was bid by the governor in delivering a letter from the latter to the Superintendent in the Citará (point 7- in the Instructions). The Superintendent, installed after 1717 when the first Viceroyalty was erected in new Granada, oversaw the tenientes to whom he sold the posts. It had been, as we have seen, the solution proposed after the consulta and Antonio Manso’s first visit to the kingdom, after which he proposed a series of measures to better the problems of the kingdom, including naming superintendents⁵⁷. Vicente Gaspar Rugero had thus been named superintendent in 1719 by Antonio de la Pedrosa. In factual terms, because he still relied on Popayán for his jurisdiction, and chose tenientes from that province, the ties between him and those who had always had a hand in Chocó from the south

⁵⁵ AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. 7, f. 40.

⁵⁶ For a bibliographical outline of the concept, see Pierre Swiggers, “Ideología lingüística: dimensiones metodológicas e históricas Linguistic ideology : Methodological and historical dimensions”, 2019.

⁵⁷ For Manso’s Visit, see Chapter 1.

were ever so strong. As observed by Francisco de Alcantud during his visit to Chocó, the power structure in Citará had not substantially changed as the superintendency was installed. Alcantud objected that the superintendent had simply removed the tenientes appointed by the governor of Popayán to “name others to his satisfaction”. The superintendent delegated in them the task to collect taxes in the four provinces that composed the newly created superintendency of Chocó: Nóvita, Citará, Tatama and Raposo. This was a source of hindrances to the Royal Hacienda according to Alcantud “for although [he] may place his lieutenants, it is not for them to provide an account of your Royal Hacienda, and they will only enter into such employments for the personal utility that they will request to obtain.”⁵⁸.

This is why, in 1723, instead of writing to the governor of Popayán, Governor Facundo Guerra Calderón sent a letter to the superintendent del Citará with Pablo de Carvajal (dated April 5th, 1723), in which he preemptively explained what Pablo de Carvajal was attempting in Murri and justifying Antioquia’s rightful, jurisdictional capacity to do so as well as Antioqueño officials’ duty towards the crown and monarchy. The governor introduced the matter by stating it was the second time these natives sought to:

“to found themselves in this district **in a place most suitable because it is situated between Rioverde and Murri**, where they want to form their pueblo, and **to live Christian and catholically**; with many other expressions worthy of all appreciation. And having recognized their well-directed request (which deserves to be appreciated) and bearing in mind **the repeated orders of your Majesty on the encouragement and protection of the natives**; and your Royal Laws which deal with the **reduction** of these: I have had the good will to admit your request, which they have undertaken for the second time.”⁵⁹

The governor then proceeded to explain Pablo de Carvajal’s mission in Murri and the reasons for which it was desirable, and the governor preemptively argued that most of the natives in question, who were seeking to settle in Rio Verde, were of the same people as the ones who had dealt with José López de Carvajal ten years earlier.

⁵⁸ AGI, Santa Fe 362, N°39, Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona to the Crown. November 15th, 1720: “(...) pues aunque ponga sus tenientes, no es de la incumbencia de ellos el dar cuenta de vra real hacienda, y solo entrarán en los tales empleos por la utilidad propia que solicitarán tener”.

⁵⁹ AHA, 25, 776, f. 602 “fundarse en este distrito en un lugar muy a proposito por ser esta en medio de Rioverde y Murri, en donde qu’ieren formar su pueblo, y vivir xptiana y catholicamente; con otras muchas expresiones dignas de todo aprecio. Y habiendo reconocido su bien dirigida pretencion (que merece ser apreciable) y teniendo presente los repetidos encargos de su Mag sobre el fomento y amparo de los naturales; y sus reales leyes que tratan de la reducción de estos: He tenido por bien admitir su instancia, q an emprendido aun de segunda vez”

Possibly, this stressed the choice of Pablo de Carvajal, whom the Indians had requested as supervisor, all the more adequate. Additionally, the Superintendent clarified that only Indians already living in the jurisdiction of Antioquia, dispersed in Cimarronas, were concerned by the plan:

“Pablo de Carvajal (vecino of this city, person of utmost satisfaction) must go to the place of Murri with the Indians who are here for this purpose, at the place where they want to settle, he must **keep them in peace and quiet**. Guiding and governing their actions in the best service of both majesties, **making them form their houses and dwellings, as well as their rozerias and labranzas**; for the best achievement of which, I have forewarned the aforementioned, not to admit any Indian from the towns of the jurisdiction of Your Grace, but only those who have long been kept in the zimarronas, as well as all those born and raised in them: **most of whom, I am informed, are those that Don Joseph Lopez de Carvajal, governor of this province, founded in the place of Murri.**”⁶⁰

Immediately after making this claim, the rhetoric used took a different tone, as the governor reminded the superintendent of the collision between the Royal Audiencia (oidor Aramburu in particular, and the tenientes in the Citará) who were accused of having destroyed Murri in the later years of Carvajal’s life (after his departure to Cartagena) and was careful to point out the “unusual and irregular way of proceeding” by the Royal Audiencia in the matter. He also defended that it was the Crown’s ultimate wish for Indigenous populations to become evangelized and settled, wherever the more suitable location for them might be—which, he deduced, the Indians were free to choose). This made the destruction of Murri by justices in the Citará even more contrary to the common good of the Monarchy’s, which is why the King had, time and over, approved the project:

“[the mentioned place of Murri], whose town was demolished by order of the justices of that province, without any regard to the fact that **HM (may God save him) had approved the aforementioned foundation**, and that in order for it to be **increased and continued**, he had issued three Royal Cédulas that are still in this government, with which they were notably damaged in that jurisdiction upon receiving an order from the Real Audiencia where an account was given of everything that had been done, and if this was not carried out, I think it must have been because the orders that were sent would not have arrived; In this unprecedented and irregular way of proceeding, the whole order of the reciprocal correspondence that should exist

⁶⁰ AHA, 25, 776, f. 602, “Pablo de Carvajal (Vezino de esta ciudad, persona de toda satisfacción) para q pase a dho sitio de Murri con los indios q para este efecto se hallan aquí, y en la parte donde ellos quieren fundarse, los mantenga con toda paz, y quietud. Guiando y gobernando sus acciones al mejor servicio de ambas magestades, haciéndoles formar assi sus casas y viviendas, como sus rozerias y labranzas; para cuyo mejor logro, tengo prevenido al referido, no admita indio ninguno de los pueblos de la jurisdicción de Vmd, sino solamente aquellos que ha mucho tiempo se mantienen en las zimarronas, como todos los nazidos y criados en ellas: **que los mas estoy ynformado son los q Don Joseph Lopez de Carvajal, gobernador q fue de esta provincia, fundó en dho sitio de Murri.**”

between the Royal Ministers was inverted: **For even if the Indians who were founded in Murri were from Chocó (which they were not), those justices should have taken care of them so much that they should have allowed those who were not willingly populated in one place to be populated in another; because as his Royal intention is only to educate them, and to impose upon them the Holy Faith, and that they contribute to his royal tributes, and that they may do this in one place as well as in another, it seems that he allows them to choose whichever is more agreeable to them: With the news that you will have of what happened in that time (which is very short that has passed) you must recognize the unwise manner in which those in that province engaged in the demolition of the town.**⁶¹

The preemptive argument slid halfway through the paragraph is worthy of attention. Guerra Calderon's remark that "even if the Indians that became settled had been from the Chocó (which they were not)", is related to one of the contentious arguments brandished by authorities whenever it suited them. Namely, that the Indians must not be moved from their territory or "natural habitat". The Recopilacion de leyes de Indias, though, was not very specific. There were laws about the immutability or mutability of Indians: (Book VI, Title I) that the Indians from the province of Santa Cruz (Charcas) not be taken out of their Province (Law xiiii, of 1614); a law granted by the Emperor in 1536 that Indians living outside *reducciones* could move from one place to another (Law xii); another granted by Philip II for Indians in the Philippines, stating that they should not be taken from one island to the other (Law xv); two laws (xiii and xvi) granted by the Emperor in 1528 and 1541 and reiterated by Philip II in 1556 and 1568 respectively, that the Indians of American realms not be taken to Spain or out of their "natures" (*naturalezas*), granted by the Emperor in 1556 and that Indians from "cold land" (*tierra fría*) not be taken out to "warm land" (*tierra caliente*) or vice versa. Book III focuses on reductions and *pueblos de indios*. In this book, a law provided that "That the Reductions cannot be moved out thereof without the order of the King,

⁶¹ AHA, 25, 776, f. 602 [dho sitio de murri], cuyo pueblo se demolió por orden de las justicias de esa provincia, sin reparo alguno a q **SM (Dios le guarde) tenía aprovada dha fundación, y q para q se aumentase y prosiguiese**, havia expedido tres reales zédulas que paran en este gobierno, con q se pudieron en esa jurisdicción rezivir crecido quebranto à haverse dado providencia por la Real Audiencia donde se dio quenta de todo lo subcedido, **q si assí no se executó, discurro sería porque no llegarían los autos que se remitieron; en cuyo ynaudito e yrregular modo de proceder se ynvertió todo el orden de la resíproca correspondencia q entre los Mnros Reales debe haver: Pues aun quando los Indios que se fundaron en Murri fueran del Chocó (q no lo fueron) debieron aquellas justicias atender a q los encarga tanto SM que permite se pueblem en otro lugar, los q en uno no estubieren gustosamente poblados; porque como su real ánimo, solo se endereza a que se eduquen, e ympongan en la sta fe, y contribuyan a sus reales tributos, y esto lo puedan executar tanto en un lugar como en otro, parece que les franquea a su arbitrio el que más agradable les fuere: con q por noticia que tendrá vmd de lo acaecido en aquel tiempo (que es muy corto el q ha pasado) reconocerá lo nada adbertidos q en esa provincia andubieron en la demolición de dho pueblo**

Viceroy or Audiencia.”. While the specific instruction for the Provincia de Charcas spoke of the prohibition of moving Indians out of their province, the same cannot be said for other laws whose scope was less clear. What did their “naturaleza” mean?

The superintendent’s reply from the 8th of August 1723 was dry and brazen. Rugero began by stating that the “fundazion de este pueblo de Murry que intenta mediante las instancias, que me asegura le han hecho los indios a este fin cuya resolución es notablemente perjudicial, a esta provincia por los motivos que en caso necesario pondré en la consideración de SA y del exmo señor virrey, los quales por aora omito, referir a vmd por no molestarlo.”. Hinting at the reasons for the inconvenience without overtly stating them was a way for Rugero to reaffirm his jurisdiction over the Citará in regard to Antioquia, now that a channel of political communication existed between the high instances of government in Santafé and the superintendent of the Citará. Rugero nonetheless gave two arguments for the inconvenience: a legal argument (they ought not to be moved), an argument around Popayán’s greater need for indigenous labor (they are needed here for traffic), and a third argument around indigenous velleity and treacherousness (what the Indians seek is actually to live freely as maroons):

“I can only say that it will be a very **nefarious matter to carry out this foundation with the natural Indians of this province** as you are aware, and it will be carried out as it was done on the last occasion when an attempt was made to carry out the same and it was suspended, in consideration of the fact that by their nature, they cannot be removed by Royal ordinances as well as by the law compiled from their origin; and less of **this province that is antemural of that of Antioquia** and other cities of the savannah being as they are here more necessary for the transport of this important commerce, but altogether, **because their intention and end is to hide in a disguised cimarrona**, in said place because in it they are distant of this province and of that, with which reason they will not only be [?]cimarrones, but it will also serve as a reclamation for those who are in these towns.”⁶²

Usually, indigenous leaders appealed against being displaced by verbalizing the limits within which their territory stood, which otherwise were ill-defined. Whether native communities declared the limits of their territory or not, this was little to never

⁶² AHA, 25, 776, f. 604, Solo sí digo que será materia muy reparable se aga dha fundación con los indios naturales de esta provincia como a vmd le consta, y se verificará así como se hizo la ocasión pasada en que se intentó executar lo mismo y se suspendió, en consideración de que por su naturaleza, no pueden ser removidos así por Reales ordenanzas como por ley recopilada de su origen; y menos de **esta provincia que es antemural de la de Antioquia** y demás ciudades de la savana siendo como son aquí más necesarios para el tráfico, de este preciso comerzio y juntamente que su pretensión y y fin es, esta en zimarrona disimulada, en dho sitio pues en el se hallan distantes de esta prov (¿?) y de esa, con cuio motibo no solo seran e(¿?) los zimarrones , sino recalmo para los q se hallan en estos pueblos.

respected by local justices who went on with their plans for restructuring the social and labor landscape where need be (see following chapter for such a case). The argument whereby the Indians leaving the Citará for Antioquia was detrimental to the former's mining economy was also rather fallacious, as these natives were not originally used for labor by justices in the Citará but lived in *cimarronas*. Which is why the third argument, whereby Rugero inferred the Indian's aspiration to settle concealed their wish to live freely as if they were *cimarrones* –but under Crown protection- directly contradicts the previous argument. For, if these Indians merely wished to officialize their settlement but live like *cimarrones* (freely) as they were living before pleading Antioquia's protection, how could it be argued that they would thence be missed in mining operations in the Citará?

Evidently, the struggle was more about jurisdiction than about indigenous welfare, mining, or the law. Rugero ended the letter with a remark on the lack of profit which the settlement in Murri brought to the crown compared to the Citará, as well as a warning that the “Fundación” in Murri would bring nothing but intra-ethnic conflict:

“[I am informed] also of the lack of fruit that the population offers in view of what these provinces produce to the Royal treasury, **since they exceed 236 pounds of gold**, which I have sent, which neither Murri nor Antioquia, I believe, will be able to give to His Majesty. And if the town is founded it will only serve to get the Indians ready to **continue the war with the Cuna**, deserting for this reason both provinces to the detriment of both majesties”⁶³

The idea that Indians, albeit their willful adhesion to Spanish rule, such as in this case, never ceased to carry their own interests and wars (with the Cunas, in this case), was very common. In this case, Rugero's last attempt to prove a point echoes the preoccupation (or misunderstanding) which Spanish authorities felt toward the complexity of an ethnic panorama in the Chocó which they failed to grasp. Partly because they did not speak the languages, as referred to above, and partly because of the difficulty of settling towns -thereby seldom coexisting- the understanding of indigenous ways, cultures and mores in the Chocó was inferior to that which emerged

⁶³ AHA, 25, 776, f. 604, Vicente Gaspar Rugero to Facundo Guerra Calderón, Bebará, y Agosto 8 de 1723. “como también de él ningún fruto que ofrece dha población a vista de lo que producen a la real hacienda estas provincias pues pasan **de 236 libras de oro** las que tendo remitidas lo que Murry ni Antioquia discurro podrán dar a su Magestad. **Y de fundarse el pueblo solo servirá de allarse promptos los indios para seguir la guerra con el cuna, desertando por esto ambas provincias** en deservicio de ambas majestades”

in the central Andes⁶⁴. While officers in developed better strategies to negotiate with natives, the fear of rebellion, intra-ethnic collusion, and intra ethnic warfare were ever-present in the minds of Spanish and criollo officers living in the boundaries of such territories and must have caused them a deeply unsettling feeling of misapprehension of their surroundings. So, although the pertinence of Rugero's warnings is difficult to evaluate in this specific case it does translate an omnipresent reality in American frontiers where authorities attempted to negotiate with natives to gain control over contested lands.

Despite these warnings, the governor in Antioquia decided to go ahead with his plans for resettling the area around Murri and appointed a replacement for Pablo de Carvajal. This appointment would lead to the foundation of three settlements around Murri, in the lowlands of the paramo⁶⁵ Frontino. These settlements would further demarcate Antioquia's jurisdiction over the area stretching west to the Atrato. The frictions between Antioquia and Popayán over who was to govern over the Chocó did not cease, for mining from those two provinces into the Chocó would continue to increase, leading to new attempts to reform. These advances into the Chocó would also complexify the social relations between peoples of color, Indians, criollos and Spaniards in the area. And as relations between social groups grew, the colonization of contested territories was rhythmmed by the proliferation of *discourses* about the region's native populations who chose to negotiate and settle in Spanish-led settlements. The experience of these men, women and children resonates with a type of conquest and subsequent colonization where extraction, and not civilization was the main activity. The Chocó would rapidly acquire many of the traits which characterize such a frontier, one where mixed societies worked together, yet separately, for the exploitation of finite resources. In the following part, the details of the foundations undertaken and the integration of natives that followed will be discussed.

⁶⁴ In the central Andes, where encomiendas were close by to Spanish towns and missions, contact produced better knowledge of one another. Conversely, in the jungles of the Pacific, the precariousness of urban settlements made inter-subjective knowledge more speculative.

⁶⁵ High altitude plateaus (between 2.900 and 5.000 m.o.s.l) in the Andes near the equatorial line. They are located between the tree line and the permanent snow line. Vegetation in the paramo is mainly constituted of shrubs, bushes and plants with an inferior need of oxygen.

III- Settling the frontier

1) Frontier agents set to the task

Shortly after Pablo de Carvajal was appointed, he resigned from the task, claiming it to be too difficult. But that did not deter the governor of Antioquia from settling the frontier around Murri. It was Antonio de Varela Jaramillo who took up the task in 1724, a *vecino* of Santafé de Antioquia, and quite possibly a criollo, judging from his spelling and Americanisms⁶⁶. In order for us to understand the social dynamics of appointments on the frontier, a note on Santafé must be laid before proceeding. Contrary to Medellín whose racial and social profile was mixed from its foundation in the late 17th century, becoming a “poblado” which acted like a magnet for all kinds of people, Santafé de Antioquia, as the capital, was smaller and many of its principal houses were occupied by criollo officers whose extended families also lived in the province; these families also owned lands and encomiendas. A good measure of how enrooted these families were, some since the early conquest, are genealogical studies, extraordinarily abundant for the region. But another clue lies in the Registry books for baptisms (*libros de registro*), where the same last names are repeated time and over (it must be said that slaves took on their master’s last name, and emancipated people of color often kept their given last names).

Antonio de Varela was a *vecino* of Santafé. He might have had an illegitimate son, as he became godfather to a boy named Antonio, and stated as “hijo de la Iglesia”, baptized in April 1711⁶⁷. As Captain Aguerra of the Real de Minas of Murri⁶⁸, Varela’s prerogatives were different from the commission which Pablo de Carvajal had received. This likely indicated the governor’s will to formalize the initial attempt to organize the *cimarrones*, as Captains Aguerra had military jurisdiction to muster troops and civil jurisdiction to deliver justice -Varela was named captain Aguerra and highest justice.

⁶⁶ Because Varela often wrote from where he was located, or so it seems, his letters to the governor are in his own handwriting; it corresponds to his signature. His spelling is inconsistent and changing, even for standards of the time before spelling was standardized, and if not dyslexic, he does seem to write in a fashion whereby his spelling emulates spoken word, and not the contrary. His sentences

⁶⁷ Antioquia - Bautismos y Confirmaciones, libro 3.

⁶⁸ AHA, 27, 776, f. 615. The fact that Varela was named Captain to the Real de Minas can indicate two things: either that José López de Carvajal’s Real de Minas de San Mateo was still in operation, or, more likely, that the title expressed the main intention for the new settlements would center around mining gold.

Captains Aguerra⁶⁹ were most common in frontier areas of the Spanish Monarchy. Capitanes Aguerra were originally civil authorities granted military competences to deal with questions related to war⁷⁰. This gave them capacities to rule as judges within the ordinary justice (they had civil and criminal fuero), but military *fuero*⁷¹ until the latter was removed from them in 1786⁷². They oversaw the administration of justice, but they also had military prerogatives. Usually, they worked hand in hand with other Capitanes, Alcaldes and Military companies which they could form themselves⁷³. The main benefit in appointing a captain Aguerra was, therefore, to bring a “judge” to this unstable frontier where peoples of various statuses were in movement, as Varela himself explained:

“Your Grace, in taking care of matters of such importance to the service of both Majesties, and [to remedy the fact] that the lack of a judge would not result in some inconveniences, was kind enough to appoint me captain of war and chief justice of the said Real de Minas de Murri, for which he dispatched me a title in form, providing especially for the promotion of the Indians, the care and protection of those who were scattered in that district”⁷⁴

In these instructions, “amparo” and “foment” are heralded as the main concern as to Indian welfare, with their introduction to Christian doctrine being the foremost priority. Captains Aguerra started to be appointed in the Indies in the late 17th century in frontiers where pacification and reduction through different means were needed in

⁶⁹ *Diccionario de Autoridades*: CAPITÁN A GUERRA. Título que se da a los Corregidores de las Ciudades, para poder entender en los casos que tocaren a la guerra dentro de su territorio y jurisdicción, en falta de Cabo militar. Latín. Urbis cum potestate imperioque militari Praefectus. RECOPI. DE IND. lib. 5. tit. 2. l. 1. El de Castellano, Alcalde mayor y Capitán a guerra del Castillo de Acapulco con mil ducados de sueldo y salario.

⁷⁰ Colón de Larreategui gives us the following account of the reiteration of the prerogatives of Captains Aguerra under Carlos II: “In the Royal Decree of 1696 issued by Don Carlos II, for the reestablishment of the militias in the kingdom, the power was confirmed to the aguerra captains that in the old days they had, so that in all acts of the militia, in which civil and criminal jurisdiction was granted to those employed in it, they could judge all causes in the first instance with an appeal to the supreme council of war.” See Félix Colón de Larreategui, *Juzgados militares de España y sus Indias* (Madrid: Imprenta de Repullés, 1817, 1817), 197, <https://liburutegibiltegi.bizkaia.eus/handle/20.500.11938/82285>.

⁷¹ Francisco Andújar Castillo, “El fuero militar en el siglo XVIII. Un estatuto de privilegio”, 1996, <https://digibug.ugr.es/handle/10481/50491>.

⁷² Colón de Larreategui, *Juzgados militares de España y sus Indias*, 198.

⁷³ For an example of this in central Mexico (San Luis de Potosí) see, José Alfredo Rangel Silva, “CAPITANES A GUERRA, LINAJES DE FRONTERA. ESTRATEGIAS DE DOMINACIÓN ENTRE LAS ELITES FAMILIARES EN EL ORIENTE DE SAN LUIS, 1617 – 1823” (Colegio de México, 2006).

⁷⁴ AHA, 25, 776, f. 615, “vuestra merced atendiendo a negocio de tanta importancia al servicio de ambas majestades, y que por falta de juez no resultasen algunos inconvenientes tuvo por bien el nombrarme portal capitán a guerra y justicia mayor de dicho sitio de real de minas de Murri, para lo cual fue servido de despacharme título en forma, previniendo especialmente por el, el fomento de los indios, la guarda y amparo de los que por aquel distrito estuviesen dispersos”.

several frontiers of America and Captains Aguerra were increasingly appointed to them. The trend of appointing Captains Aguerra to frontiers where other civil and military figures were absent only increased in the 18th century. Jorge Conde Calderón has tracked down a series of such appointments in Santa Marta, Cartagena, Darien, Chocó, Antioquia Guajira and Popayán⁷⁵. In the third quarter of the 18th century, Captains Aguerra multiplied in the New Granada and New Spain, where a *reglamento* was expedited through the *via reservada* for the Militias of Yucatán and Campeche in northern New Spain, and Yucatán. As such, captains Aguerra oversaw various aspects which advancing the frontier implied: from negotiating with the native, to funding villages, ordering soldiers, and warranting order, ranging from the creation of churches in settlements to providing “padrones” censuses. Varela answered directly to the governor, who, at this time, answered directly to the Viceroy, as the Viceroyalty of the New Granada lived out its first installment (1717-1723). Below is the first trace of Varela’s commending as Captain Aguerra:

“The aforementioned Don Pablo de Carvajal having left the said place of Murri and returned to this city, giving the reason that it was no longer convenient for him to enter it, I decided to remove him, as in effect I removed the aforementioned commission and instruction; taking, as I deemed it a fundamental cause for the accomplishment of the expressed reduction and population of the said natural Indians to dispatch, as I did to Antonio Varela, a neighbor of this city, the title of captain of war and major justice of that mining royal, with a specific clause about the protection and promotion of them; giving him the orders and dispositions that seemed to me the most essential for this purpose. And because in virtue of them the aforementioned captain Antonio Varela is currently engaged in the aforementioned reduction and formation of towns of the said Indians, as is evident from his letters, and especially by one dated October 26th of last year, by which he participates in the foundation of two towns, San Nicolás de Juemia and San José de Chaquenodá, which he has completely carried out.⁷⁶”

⁷⁵ Jorge Conde Calderón, “La administración de justicia en las sociedades rurales del Nuevo Reino de Granada, 1739-1803”, *Historia Crítica*, núm. 49 (el 1 de enero de 2013): 35–54, <https://doi.org/10.7440/historicrit49.2013.03>. Captains aguerra became more frequent in the last quarter of the 18th century. On captains aguerra during that period see Santa Marta, “HUGUES SÁNCHEZ MEJÍA”, s/f, 53.

⁷⁶ AHA, 25, 776, f. “habiendo el mencionado don Pablo de Carvajal desamparado el dicho sitio de Murri y vuéltose a esta ciudad dando por razón, no serle conveniente el entrar más a él, tuve por bien retirarle, como con efecto le retiré la expresada comisión e instrucción; tomando, como tomé por causa fundamental para la consecución del expresada reducción y población de los dichos indios naturales el despacharle como le despaché a Antonio Varela vecino de esta ciudad título de capitán a guerra y justicia mayor de aquel real de minas, con cláusula expresa acerca del amparo y fomento de ellos; dándole a este intento los órdenes y disposiciones que me parecieron más esenciales. y por qué en virtud de ellas se halla actualmente el referido capitán Antonio Varela entendiendo, en las sobredichas reducción y formación de pueblos de dichos indios como consta de sus cartas, y

Varela was thus appointed around 1725 with specific orders to assemble the natives, clear the designated are (“limpiar”, or to carry out “limpias”, i.e., to clean the land) and create a register or “padrón” of the populations. Varela, though, was not alone in the task. Writing in 1725, Varela reported to have founded one town, Juemia, with sixty-seven Indians, Indian females (*indias*) and *chinitas*:

“sir, in order to achieve what I intend, which is for God's glory and His Majesty's service, to populate these Indians and to avoid the damage previously done, I have thirty-nine Indians with children, female Indians at the site of Juemia, and I am already building the town and I have given them the layout of the clearing.”⁷⁷

These natives, Varela reported, were now receiving the “pasto espiritual” and praying daily. Meanwhile, Varela began activities in the Pueblo de Chaquenodá, which was founded in the area near Juemia, in Rio Verde, 2 to 3 days from Murri, where he had managed to build six houses and a chapel. While during their initial appeal to the governor, in 1723, Juan Dogaví had been requested by the Indians as Capitan, four notable figures had emerged amongst the Indians in Murri: Pachito ladino, Juanchito Anunpi, Juan de Guaitta and Choquerre. These Indians carried out different tasks and soon became Varela’s helpers and main interlocutor, circulating in-between villages, scouting the area for *cimarronas* in which they attempted to persuade *cimarrones* to join the Spanish settlements, but also fetching merchandise and tools. Within a few weeks, these men would receive an appointment on account of their assistance to Varela.

Another person who aided Varela in founding the towns and carrying out the censuses for the elaboration of the requested padrones, was *cura presbítero doctrinero*, Ignacio de Ibarra. *Curas doctrineros* were, as we have discussed, often sent to frontier areas where the regular clergy either had no presence or had failed at evangelizing native populations. Interestingly, Ibarra came from a renowned family in Antioquia. His father was Sargent Major Gerónimo de Ibarra, who owned mines and slaves, and must have been wealthy, for we know he lent the money upon which Ibarra survived

especialmente por una de fecha de 26 de octubre del año próximo pasado, por la cual me participa tener en el todo efectuada la fundación de 2 pueblos que son san Nicolás de Juemia, y San José de Chaquenodá”.

⁷⁷ AHA, 25, 776, f. 606, letter from Captain Varela to Governor Guerra Calderón, dated July 20th 1725, “señor que consiguiendo lo que pretendo que es ber onrra de Dios y el servicio de su magestad , poblar estos indios y que no ayga el perjuicio que antes â bida tengo yo el sitio de Juemia treinta y nueve indios con chinos indias estoi ya asiendo el pueblo y les quedé señalada la dispocisión del linpio”.

for the four years that Ibarra remained in service⁷⁸. We also know that, between 1730 and 1740, Ibarra himself bought several slaves, to which he gave his last name and some of which integrated society in Santafé de Antioquia by marrying white women and proving merits to the crown⁷⁹. Ibarra's status in Murri was first described as “cura yntterino deste real de minas”, which begs the question of whether the real de minas in Murri was the same as the real de minas de San Mateo opened by José López de Carvajal in 1712. Other questions emerge: as *cura doctrinero*, was Ibarra in charge of evangelization at the real de minas? In that sense, does it follow that Indians were working in considerable numbers at the mines? If not, does it imply that Ibarra was stationed at the real de Minas to oversee activities carried out both by enslaved Africans and Indians? This latter possibility seems plausible as Ibarra was later accused of acting upon his personal interests.

With Varela and Ibarra living in around Murri for lengthy periods at a time, the foundation of towns would begin. The process of populating the frontier through foundations entailed different degrees of integration, as was mentioned in Chapter 3: political integration, whereby representatives were chosen and lists of inhabitants were drawn; spatial integration, through the modification of the habitat to guarantee there be huts, houses and a church; and religious integration through education in matters of the spirit. The following pages will unwrap these phases of integration.

2) A poor recipe for integrating the Crown: Church, censuses, tribute

The progression of steps needed to settle a village in the Chocó follow the Instructions, applied in the Indies when *reducciones* and *fundaciones* were laid. After the *indios principales* were given titles and prerogatives over the others, the actual settling of the land could be undertaken. The main step was building the church (*iglesia*) or chapel (*capilla*), without which the settlement could not prosper, for the need to give the Indians the “Pasto Espiritual” (spiritual nourishment) was the foremost priority in the foundations. Thus, Varela judiciously reported on the construction of the *capillas* as Carvajal had once reported. Most buildings in this area (chapels and huts) were made from wood, straw and *bahareque*⁸⁰. The building of a chapel, preceding that

⁷⁸ AGN, Caciques e Indios, 6, 27, f. 318-322.

⁷⁹ De La Pedraja René, “La Mujer Criolla y Mestiza en la Sociedad Colonial, 1700—1830*”, *Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad*, núm. 13 (enero de 1984): 199–229, <https://doi.org/10.13043/dys.13.9>.

⁸⁰ Native construction system based on interwoven sticks or canes coated with mud.

of houses because it was primordial, and it had to be undertaken during Varela's visits. But Varela could not live in the valley of Murri but travelled there periodically there as laws preventing Spaniards from living in reductions were in place⁸¹, but also because life was more comfortable in Santafé de Antioquia. This produced a situation in which, as Varela explained, the chapels were being built while nothing else was ready for the native families to live in their settlements.

"I now go on to give account to Your Excellency of my inutility in this Valley, the *población* of the Indians I have already in Chaquenodá already founded town with **six houses and a chapel which the Indian Pachito made**, I am now trying to cut wood to build the church, which I did not do before because I had that chapel while the church is built, so I would have a place to gather the Indians and that they not scatter, so that they would be able to maintain themselves. And so far, they are residing and to some of them **I have had to grant licenses so that they may go back to the settlements in which they were while the *rozas* are made, because the town lacks *mantenimientos* for the people which you will see accounted for"**.⁸²

Indeed, the order whereby a chapel or church ought to be the first thing erected in a *reducción* was stipulated in the *Recopilación*⁸³. While this did not necessarily cause many problems in regions where provisioning new towns was possible, either through transporting merchandise from other places, or through basic farming, the agricultural front in the Chocó was more like the one in the Amazon than in the rest of the New Granada. Of course, the main reason for this was the terrain: thick, rainy jungle carpeted the mountainous valley slopes, covering them with a vegetation so abundant that horticulture was accomplished with the jungle rather than against it, by way of chakras or gardens which functioned within the rainforest ecosystem. Because the Spanish organized *pueblos de indios* in a format that varied little, no matter to the setting. The steps were: 1. church building, 2. Paying tribute, 3. clearing an area for *sementeras* (sowed land; gardens and vegetable patches). Because modifying the order of priorities in these steps was not possible, the format imposed by the *Ordenanzas* and other legal dispositions engendered a palpable inadequacy. In the excerpt above, Captain Varela admitted that process of assembling and keeping the natives in their *pueblo* was hindered by the lack of food in these pueblos. This need for provisions was the root cause for having to grant the Indians mobility. Indeed, Varela was forced to grant leave

⁸¹ Book VI Title III: That no Spaniards, Blacks, Mestizos, and Mulattos live in Indian Villages (Law xxi); That no Spaniard shall live in Indian Towns longer than the day he arrives, and another (Law xxiii).

⁸² F. 609

⁸³ Book VI Title III: That in each reduction there be a church with a door and key (Law iiiii). That there be Doctrine in the towns of the Indians at the expense of the tributes (Law v).

to most of the families so that they could return to their previous settlements and gardens and bring back food. In Varela’s eyes, this presented a risk, as they might be enticed back to the wilderness by inhabitants of many *cimarronas*, which still lay out in the frontier. While the dysfunctionality of the process, whereby the “pasto spiritual” was primordial over the actual “pasto” is evident to a contemporary reader, Varela classified this as “one of the many contrapesos which I have encountered in building this town”⁸⁴.

The second step in the integration of the reduced natives was the elaboration of a register or *padrón* of the natives living there. This provided officials a better grasp of who lived where, how many able-bodied men there were for work and how many tributary families could be taxed. For indeed, the last stage of integration, through which natives proved their allegiance to the Crown, was by becoming tributaries. This procedure, more than a pecuniary transaction, sealed the relationship between compliant natives who chose to adhere to the Crown. Varela and Ibarra made the registers while the chapel and town were being built.

<i>Padrón y matrícula correspondiente to the Indians living in Juemia, transcribed from the documents made by Captain Antonio Varela and Cura Doctrinero Ignacio de Ibarra.</i>							
Item	Men	Age	Women	Age	Children	Age	Total
1	Don Juan (Dogaví), Governador	30	1		1 male		3
2	Choquerre, Capitán	40	1		2 male 3 female		7
3	Guaita, Alcalde		1		1 male 3 female		6
	Toro Filcal		1		3male 1 female		6
6	Êcho		1		1 male		5

⁸⁴ AHA, 25, 776, f. 609, Varela to the governor on July 20th 1725: “uno de los muchos contrapesos que me he encontrado al construir esta ciudad”.

					2 female		
9	Asovia		1		1 male 1 female		4
4	Guachigui		1		1 female		3
6	Guancho Días		Siterajura Cana		3 male 1 female		6
17	María “unmarried Indian”						1
18	El Sarcotepa						1
							TOTAL = 42

*Padrón y matrícula corresponding to the Indians living in **Chaquenodá**, transcribed from the documents made by Captain Antonio Varela and Cura Doctrinero Ignacio de Ibarra.*

Item	Man	ge	Wife	ge	Children	ge	otal
	Francisco Tovar, alias Pachito Ladino Governador	0	Margarita		Bernauc		
	Juanc hito Arunpia (Capitán)	5	Abuparí	0	Pansapí Mechura Chiscehriga Juana	5 3	
	Soganpo (Alcalde)	0	Baquerosa		Chiviga Meguai Francisca Salazar		

	Atanasio filcal	0					
	Anpao		Su mujer				
	Hurupare						
	Thoribio				Perucho		
	Bogaví						
	Abatteú		Su mujer		Luiso/Buiso Doittotto		
0	Bueragama “no se pone la edad por ser tan bosales que no se les puede ajustar”		Manun guí		Gingortto Domaratto Deguaí Chona		
1	Don Diego		Chaquede		Tuii Reyna Churra Pavanama		
2	Cavida		Chununa		Paparra Gitagai		
3			Ciai		Paneso		
4			Doganchi		Silvestre Guanchigaragama Geraunera Ettapi Doquirupa Parittagu		
5			La Rosa		Aberende (¿) María		

6			Getrudis Baruma				
7			Anchiruma		Chunana		
8	Nequegemer						
9			Domaroquira				
0	Bittorio						
1			Topauma		Francisco		
						TOTAL = 61	
						TOTAL between the two villages = 102.	

The padrones revealed there to be 111 individuals counted amongst both villages of Juemia and Chaquenodá: 80 adults, 21 children, 10 young Indian females. One hundred and two individuals were recorded, and another nine people are included in the censuses if one counts not the transcription of Varela's letter to the governor, but the items on the sheet of paper where Varela and Ibarra wrote down the names of the populations living in both villages (see annexes). The paper still carries the traces of the way it was folded into quarters, probably to facilitate taking note of the names while standing; it speaks of the material precarity in the exercise of the task. The writing on the paper where the lists were made show two handwritings, one responsible for writing down the population of Chaquenodá and another for Juemia. The first hand was that of *cura doctrinero* Ignacio de Ibarra, displaying an ecclesiastical calligraphy, tidy and elongated; the other, that of Captain Varela: square, erratic in its spelling, resulting in *staccato* lines of text where words split in syllables. Presumably, thus, it was Ignacio de Ibarra who oversaw the census in Chaquenodá and Varela who oversaw the one in Juemia. Ibarra's rigor might explain why the census from Chaquenodá is richer in

details than that of Varela, who, for instance, recorded individuals but failed to add several people to his final report, including:

a) in the section “muchachos varones” (young men): three (3) [children] of the cunacuna (“tres de la cunacuna”).

b) in the section “chinitas pequeñas” (little Indian girls): one [daughter] of the cunacuna.

This point is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, as the *cunacuna* (of the Cuna nation) female is singled out, we could presume that most of the people in the census were of Embera/Chocó nation, the sworn enemies of the Cunas, as explained in chapter 3⁸⁵. How had this Cuna woman come to live amongst others? Two generations had passed since 1686, and one since governor Carvajal’s settlements had been founded in 1710. Had she grown up Cuna amongst the Embera who settled under Carvajal’s protection fifteen years earlier? Varela, at one point, commented that there were no Indians “of the ones that Carvajal reduced”. This contradicted the governor’s letter to the superintendent. But were these Indians in any way related to the former? Was acceptance of Cuna minorities frequent in communities of marron Indians? Was this an exception? These questions would necessitate many more censuses, a scarce material for this age and place. Another thing to point out is the terminology employed herein: *chinitas* refers to young Indian woman, under the age of sixteen according to one author. Historians who have studied this term point to the Quechuan origin of the term, which flourished in the Andes⁸⁶. But seems to have been used in other realms, like that of Chile, where *chinitas* was used to refer to Huilliche female members⁸⁷.

One last remark on the registers is of relevance. Amongst the men, distinctions of rank are made for three appointees in each *pueblo*, corresponding to the rank of Governor, Captain, and Alcalde. In Juemia, Juan Dogaví was appointed Governor, in accordance with the natives’ petition; Choquerre was appointed Captain and Juan de

⁸⁵ The war between the Cuna and Emberas was hailed by officers as one of the structural problems of the Chocó, whose population was more interested in intra ethnic conflict than in living “christianly”. This was mentioned in Superintendent Rugero’s letter, for example.

⁸⁶ Elvira Ramos, Miguel A. Rodríguez, y Teresa Bianculli, “Chinas y chontales. Regionalismos léxicos en documentos venezolanos del siglo XVII”, *Fermentum. Revista Venezolana de Sociología y Antropología* 19, núm. 54 (2009): 102–16.

⁸⁷ Florencia Roulet, *Los indios de la frontera sur en la mirada de los últimos viajeros coloniales: identidades, relaciones interétnicas y proyectos políticos hacia el espacio pampeano-cordillerano y sus pobladores autóctonos en las postrimerías del orden colonial* (Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, 2013), 273, <http://repositorio.filo.uba.ar/handle/filodigital/6021>.

Guaitta was appointed *Alcalde* (judge). In Chaquenodá, Francisco Tovar alias Pachito Ladino was appointed Governor; Juanchito Arunpia was appointed Captain and Soganpo was appointed *Alcalde*. These offices constituted the basic positions of authority that Indians could access if they were to conform an Indian Republic. Theoretically, the República de Indios mirrored the República de Españoles by establishing means of representation of native communities through elected or appointed individuals. This alternative between elected or appointed individuals is crucial for indeed, self-proclaimed captains and governors could acquire appointments without having previously been recognized as worthy of them by their communities. The same was true of areas as in which the title of Cacique was granted by Spaniards. “Cacique” was the title given prehispanic authorities in the Caribbean; the Spanish encountered the word very early. Thenceforward “Cacique” became a widespread title whereby Spanish authorities sought to appoint those who worked closest to them without considering the latter’s position within their social structures. This was mentioned in relation to natives in the Darién who underwent such a process alongside Spanish officers. These who failed to understand the social hierarchies within the Cunas and appointed Caciques who did not have effective social clout.

The República de Indios was conceived as a means of ensuring indigenous representation before the local authorities. It was also conceived to keep both republics parallel but separate, as both constituted sociopolitical structures within the monarchy. Effective spatial separation hinged on many factors. In large cities like Lima, it was deliberately planned and achieved. In smaller urban formations like pueblos on the frontier, it was much more difficult. In the previous chapter, we saw, for example, how claims that the Villa of Medellín harbored a confluence of Spaniards and peoples of color and of all kinds, living liberally. *Repúblicas* were meant to function at the smallest level possible —the smallest unity being that of the parish, for which naught but a church or small chapel was needed. Wherever there was a parish alongside civil authorities and a couple of vecinos assembled in a Cabildo⁸⁸, these could be said to constitute a Republic. But can the same be said of native societies on the frontiers? For

⁸⁸ Cabildos were the main American institution guaranteeing representation of behalf of the vecinos. As governmental bodies of collegial nature, Cabildos were the scene of various forms of political communication. Usually the highest-ranking vecinos, as well as some other social groups (like poor Spanish) from a town or villa, assembled to channel their demands.

if the central Andes or the Yucatan had seen the rise of important republicans de indies, with a cabildo, a protector, interpreters, and other civil officials, those in the Citará were much more precarious.

In March 2023 I had the privilege to discuss the topic with Professor Darío Barrera; afterwards my perception of the question changed. Professor Barrera made the argument that without an indigenous Cabildo, the idea of a republic is ineffectual. Other than the lack of a cabildo, the lack of coincidence between appointed Indian authorities and self-recognized authorities makes the representation offered by these Republics incomplete. Can we therefore conclude that the pueblos founded by Antonio de Varela were constituted in a Republic? The answer seems to be negative. Although in some cases the caciques recognized by their communities acted as intermediaries, like cacique Sagito (chapter 4), especially when they were *lenguaraces* (chapter 1), having the possibility of mediation does not translate into a republic. In other words, it is not because the individuals who communities sought to be represented by accessed offices recognized by the crown, that we can assert the existence of a República de Indios. This idea puts into question the relevance of such a concept in the context of frontier societies where processes whereby integration and representation within the monarchy were, in fact, incomplete.

Once the registers were made, integration into the Crown's domain pended, ultimately, on the display of the Indians' will to contribute to royal finances. As such, they were taxed with tribute, which took different forms in accord to what was produced in the region. In the Citará, they were also expected to hand over proof of the existence of gold, the resource which most interested the Crown. This mechanism of integration was based on a pact, according to a *pactist* ("pactista") interpretation of power relations, whereby Indians recognized their status as free vassals of the Crown. Jurist Solorzano de Pereyra explained the tribute was paid "to help defending and protecting them in peace and war from the expenses that would have to be incurred in their Christian education and government"⁸⁹. More broadly, the process of integration whereby native

⁸⁹ Solórzano de Pereyra, *Política Indiana*, Vol. 1, title 2, book 2, chaoter XIX, cited in Felipe Castro Gutiérrez, "Los indios y el Imperio : Pactos, conflictos y rupturas en las transiciones del siglo xviii", en *Los virreinos de Nueva España y del Perú (1680-1740) : Un balance historiográfico*, ed. Bernard Lavallé, Collection de la Casa de Velázquez (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2019), 7–22, <http://books.openedition.org/cvz/7089>.

communities displayed their good will in negotiations or adherence to the Spanish colonial setting was usually expressed by donating gifts like live animals, fruit, meat or fish, cloths, baskets, and meat⁹⁰. Victuals, of great importance in an inhospitable context, were greatly appreciated as donated gifts. But in the New Granada, gold was often expected to be handed over by natives, as it had been since the early stages of conquest in the 16th century. In the past, in the conquest of Antioquia, the failure to the expectation of receiving gold from native groups had even led to episodes of violence (see previous chapter 4 part I- on Jorge Robledo's expedition).

In this case, the next step next in line after having finished making the matricula, was for the Indian Captains and Governors to head for Santafé de Antioquia and “recognize the Caxa”, in the sense of contributing to the Royal Hacienda to declare their status as subjects. Informing the governor of his misgivings and challenges in founding the settlements, Varela warned the governor not to heed the Indians' complains of chimeras, as he “pay[ed] them what they ordered [to do]”. In thus warning the Governor, the Captain doubtless sought to preemptively excuse himself from claims that he forced the natives to do unpaid labor. Although nothing is noted in the available documentation as to salaries, it was often the case that natives received compensation for their services, whether they be mining, guarding the area (militarily, see chapter 6), or farming. He finished his letter by asking the governor to formally write to Don Juan Dogaví, Pachito Ladino and Juanchito and behest them to contribute at the Caja Real. But also to entertain them and gift them in return when they came to Antioquia. In advising the governor to treat the native leaders with “agasajo” (hospitality) but at the same time heeding mistrust towards the Indians' eventual statements regarding their experience, Varela's cautionary words translate the character of these frontier relationships. Based on initial trust, they thenceforth depended on “maña”, which translates to guile, wits, or astuteness. This likely indicates that, in the case of this frontier, trust was hard to come by, even between officers in Antioquia and natives where relationships had been keener than those between the former and Popayán. In this sense, entertaining the principal Indians (“indios principals”) was a way for justices foment a positive outlook on the natives' perception of what they were gaining by submitting to Spanish rule.

⁹⁰ See chapter 6 for an exchange of gifts between a Cacique and local authorities.

It was thus in January 1726 that a group of 18 of the Indios principals from the towns founded under Captain Varela's inference in the Valle de Murri, Chaquenodá and Juemia, journeyed to Santa Fe de Antioquia to contribute to the Real Caja. The procedure entailed a set of steps which aimed to familiarize the natives with the place in which they ought to tribute from then on, as well as with the bureaucracy installed to that effect. The Governor explained that much in a certification following Varela's notification of arrival and compliance:

“As presented with the registrations of the Indians of the two towns: San Nicolás de **Juemia and San Joseph de Chaquenodá**, which are referred to, and in attention to what is expressed about the Indians having gone out to this city by virtue of my disposition so that according to their population they may recognize this royal treasury and be in intelligence of the part where they must contribute their tributes and other payments, when the time comes: Capp Antonio Varela shall go with them to the royal accountant's office where, with my assistance, the delivery of the gold that the Indians voluntarily come to pay will be made, and they shall be given the receipts which are requested by the royal officials, and I shall be given full certification of the delivery to be placed in the records; and testimony shall be taken of the *matriculas*, and taken to the royal accountant's office so that the number of the Indians of the two towns may be recorded therein.”⁹¹

Don Miguel Francisco de Mena Felices, accountant and fiscal of the royal treasury of his majesty of this city of Antioquia and its province by the king, certified that “having come the captain of Spanish infantry don Facundo Guerra Calderón governor and captain general of this said city and its province in company of Antonio Varela captain to war of the valley of Murri and the Indians of the towns of Chaquenodá and Juemia of the said valley, exhibited in recognition of vassalage in this royal treasury dust and having melted had of law 22 carats, and paid to his majesty his royal rights of the veinteavo⁹² (...) there remained 33. 07 pesos tomines of the mentioned law, which were charged in the common and general royal book of all current goods of this present

⁹¹ AHA, 25, 776, f.615, “en señal de vasallaje, y rendimiento de los pesos de oro q constarán de los autos obrados por Vmd en razón de esta fundición, y sin embargo, de averseles prevenido por mi a los referidos el q hasta que Vmd lo hordenase, o diese disposición, sobre el señalamiento y tasa de tributos, no estaban obligados a contribuir con algunos, han Ynstalado voluntariamente en q quieren nuevamente contribuir a su Magestad con los requintos que les ha dictado el afecto con q se han fundado: en ejecución de esto, â salido conmigo a esta ciudad el Indio cappn de dho pueblo de Chaquenodá con los tributos de los Indios de su cargo, para su entero en la Real Contaduría”

⁹² In the New Granada, during the 17th century, the *quinto* (1/5th) of gold production oscillated in fact between a fifth and a twentieth of the production, in accord to the prevailing *merced* or, in other words, the King's good grace. The latter varied: at times the *quinto* was enforced in its strict sense, other times vecinos and miners achieved a lowering of the quinto by arguing that tools to exploit gold were too expensive, leading them to incur in excessive spending. On this, see Manuel Casado Arboniés, “La producción de oro en Santa Fe de Antioquia a través de las Cuentas del Quinto Real: (1654-1699)”, *Estudios de Historia Social y Económica de América*, núm. 2 (1986): 131–78.

year”⁹³. The following year, in February of 1727, Governor Facundo Guerra Calderón certified that the natives had once more gone out to the provincial capital and had presented the Caja Real with their contribution to the “tercios de Navidad”⁹⁴ —a tax levied around Christmas or San Juan, through which they reiterated their vassalage and subjection to the crown. Varela reiterated the Indian’s explicit and personal will to serve the king as vassals in another letter of the same year, stating that:

“in sign of vassalage, and yield of the pesos of gold that will consist of the proceedings worked by Your Majesty on account of this foundry, and in spite of having warned the aforementioned that until Your Majesty ordered it, or issued a disposition on the designation and rate of tributes, they were not obliged to contribute, they have voluntarily stated that they wish to contribute once again to Your Majesty with the requisites that the affection with which they have been founded has dictated to them: in execution of this, The Indian captain of the town of Chaquenodá has gone out with me to this city with the tributes of the Indians under his charge, for their deposit in the Real Contaduría”⁹⁵

In essence, paying tribute sealed the Indian’s adherence to the Monarchy as subjects of the King, along with their education in spiritual matters and registration in the matricula, as we have seen. But another factor was indispensable for negotiations and subsequent administration: assigning Indian captains and governors. As mentioned in chapter 3, these could be chosen among Indian leaders, but those who ended up being recognized by authorities were not necessarily recognized as such by their peers. In the following part, we will look at how Varela appointed, related to and dealt with these Indian captains. This will give us a chance to discuss the complexity of the territory. It was not in fact limited to the two towns of Juemia and Chaquenodá. The comings and goings of these Indian captains reveal the complex space underlying the Antioqueño sphere of influence in Chocó.

⁹³ AHA, 25, 776, f.618.

⁹⁴ Heraclio Bonilla, “El funcionamiento del tributo en Nueva Granada a finales del siglo XVII: Guatavita en 1690”, *Procesos. Revista ecuatoriana de historia* 1, núm. 26 (el 4 de febrero de 2015): 29, <https://doi.org/10.29078/rp.v1i26.179>.

⁹⁵ AHA, 25, 776, f.624. “en señal de vasallaje, y rendimiento de los pesos de oro q constarán de los autos obrados por Vmd en razón de esta fundición, y sin embargo, de averseles prevenido por mi a los referidos el q hasta que Vmd lo hordenase, o diese disposición, sobre el señalamiento y tasa de tributos, no estaban obligados a contribuir con algunos, han Ynstalado voluntariamente en q quieren nuevamente contribuir a su Magestad con los requintos que les ha dictado el afecto con q se han fundado: en ejecución de esto, â salido conmigo a esta ciudad el Indio cappn de dho pueblo de chaquenodá con los tributos de los Indios de su cargo, para su entero en la Real Contaduría”

3) A convoluted, mobile, complex space

During the four years of his time in Murri, Varela encountered several difficulties for establishing government on the frontier. Many of these difficulties had to do with the precarity of means through which to establish livable conditions in such a far-flung area. In this sense, circulation between villages was essential, both for fetching merchandise and tools, but also to scout the area for *cimarronas* which they attempted to persuade to join the Spanish settlements. Even when unsuccessful, this frontier-strung proselytism allowed captains to assert their presence in a contested terrain, but also to assemble information on their surroundings. Indeed, the very subsistence and stability of the settlements depended on these two things. Provisions had to be carried in from Quibdó, sometimes from Antioquia or even Cartagena and Popayán (fray Caicedo).

Another difficulty was linked to the competition between provinces. Thus, another problem was that of having a seemingly polycephalic enemy, as the Justices from Citará attempting to undermine Antioquia's jurisdiction by luring settled or reduced Indians away, other "persons" who circulated in the area seem to have attempted to counsel the native group about which Spanish officers to appeal to, as Varela complained in a letter to the Governor:

"as far as the departure of Pachito Ladino, Guanchito and the others is concerned, they hardly (?) heard from the Indians, except from some people who pretend, he came with all liberty and to keep himself, so they went [to] advise them, putting them to terrors as I have it proved (proven) and you told me that you will already know, they advised him to go to seek the sergeant Joseph Pablos del Pino or Graviel de Ipes, and Don Pablo de Caravajal, not because of the harm he did to the Indians nor to any of the assistants of this country where I meditate, sir, that in order to succeed in these attempts, and there is no one to reprimand it, sir, that by achieving what I intend, which is the glory of God and the service of His Majesty, to populate these Indians and that he they not suffer the harm that occurred before"⁹⁶

Moreover, the instability of the frontier was palpable. Varela described the simultaneous character of the activities carried out: settling the pueblos, fetching

⁹⁶ AHA, 25, 776, f. 606, "en lo que toca a la salida de Pachito Ladino, Guanchito y los demás no apenas (¿?) olido de los indios sino es de al gunas personas que pretenden, el bino con toda liverttad y por manttenerse, así pasaron aconsejarlos, poniendoles a terrores como lo tengo pobrado (probado) y a Vmd me dittò le consttara ya también, le aconsejaron fueran a perder al sargentto Josephe Pablos del Pino o Graviel de Ipes, y a Don pablo de Caravajal, no por daño que le êcho a indios ni a menos a ningun asistente de este pais a donde meditto señor que al fin de gosar sus intentos, y no ayga quien lo repienda/respienda de caía señor que consiguiendo lo que pretendo que es ber onrra de Dios y el servicio de su magestad , poblar estos indios y que no ayga el perjuicio que antes ávia."

provisions, carrying out the padrones, and getting a sense of the surroundings to secure the settlements. This was done by sending out scouts who returned with information regarding the *cimarronas* and indigenous groups who lived outside the confines of the villages. Incidentally, it was common practice for indigenous mediators to attempt to convince the latter to leave the liberty they lived, which also implied a series of dangers, and settle into pueblos. In fact, settling the area hinged on parleys with natives who showed a disposition to negotiate and exchange their free-roaming lives –in a territory which had already suffered changes and reconfigurations. This implied forging partnerships which depended on different degrees of trust and mistrust.

The practice of naming an *Indio principal* had been in place since the early conquest, and was it was crucial. In some cases, because they gained the trust of chosen native representatives who they then negotiated with, as we saw in the previous Chapter (3) in the case of Cacique José Sagito, or in Chapter 6 regarding Cacique Amuscoteguí. In this case, Francisco de Tovar Pachito Ladino was named Governor of the town of Chaquenodá by Antonio Varela. He had served as interlocutor and assistant, working closely with Varela during the foundations. Who explained in a letter to the governor that he had agreed to appoint Pachito ladino: “no por voluntad sino por averlo pedido Pachhito, lo hiciera casique, no porque fue obstinamiento de ellos [los indios] sino del mismo pachito a lo cual le respondí que le daría el nombramiento de Gn [gobernador] en el Inter salía así Vmd”.⁹⁷

Varela justified he had named him governor “*antes para conseguir mejor la fundación de dichos pueblos lo procuré tratar con la mejor mañosidad, de suerte que cómo está de manifiesto, lo hice gobernador del de Chaquenodá*”. After having been named governor, Francisco (Pachito), aged forty, went on to live in the pueblo of Chaquenodá along with his partner Margarita of the same age, and their son Bernauz. In 1726 Captain Varela wrote a letter to the governor in which he detailed, not without embarrassment, how Francisco Tovar had used his position to deceive Varela by claiming to go out on expeditions to “do his majesty’s bidding” while being in league with the “indios montataces” (ranger Indians, or wild Indians). The captain admitted to having misjudged Francisco as he had needed him for support in settling the pueblos, because he thought Francisco to be “one of the better Indians”, but also having later

⁹⁷ AHA, 25, 776, f. 609.

been aware of his “fallacies”. He explained that because he did not want to scare off the natives, he had done nothing regarding his suspicions of Tovar, admitting the fragility of trust between the captain and the native groups. Pachito Ladino ended up fleeing the settlement after finding an excuse to leave the town, departing with all he possessed, including several hens. What is more, Tovar “persuaded the Indians to leave and absent themselves with the reasons provided by his evil intent, all of which were alien to the quiet that the Indians were enjoying”⁹⁸.

The reasons Varela gave for Francisco Tovar’s betrayal to the project of bringing peace and quiet, as he put it, were twofold: the Indian’s natural inclination to deceit, and the company of his wife, a *yerbera*. They are both interesting to examine as they echo representations through which native populations were negatively qualified by officers in an effort to justify their subduing. First, there was the reference to the inevitable return to in-civility, given the Indians’ inherently treacherous nature. As Varela explained, he had employed Tovar in the reduction of the Indians “llevando a lo que parece de su natural inclinación ha efectuado diversas acciones en dicho pueblo que todas cómo han pasado por mi vista me han dado a entender ser más que veleidoso genio”. Referencing the natural inclination and velleity of the Indians was seemingly contradictory to the discourse which most Spanish officers held concerning the Indians of Chocó, often qualified as being “of the most docile nation”. This goes to show the swift adaptation of *topoi* used by frontier authorities to paint a picture of native

⁹⁸ AHA, 25, 776, f. 619, full citation: “digo: que Francisco de Tovar, conocido comúnmente por pachito ladino; como a vuestra majestad consta es un indio ladino de los pueblos de la provincia de Popayán y este algunos días que se mantiene introducido, contra parcialidad de los indios que he poblado, ya en las cimarronas con ellos, ya en el mismo sitio de Murri con algunos que por allí había dispersos, y ya saliendo a esta ciudad a presencia de vuestra majestad fingiendo recados de los indios montaraces para efecto de su población que vuestra majestad ha tenido por ciertos llevado del aseo que la asistido a su reducción; y habiendo emprendido yo esto, y tratado de fundar dichos pueblos, no quise inquietar al dicho indio francisco aunque me hallaba enterado de sus falacias, porque temí me perturba se los que estaban ya fuera de los montes, antes para conseguir mejor la fundación de dichos pueblos lo procure tratar con la mejor mañosidad De fuerte que cómo está de manifiesto, lo hice gobernador del de Chaquenodá, que es El donde se pobló la parcialidad a que se hallaba agregado juzgando que de esta suerte fuese uno de los mejores indios; pero no ha sucedido así porque llevando a lo que parece de su natural inclinación ha efectuado diversas acciones en dicho pueblo que todas cómo han pasado por mi vista me han dado a entender ser más que veleidoso genio comprobando está con haberse querido ausentar del pueblo para lo que sacó de él las gallinas y demás que allí tenía, y no sólo esto, sino que también persuadió a los indios saliesen y se ausentasen con razones que proporcionó su mal intento, ajenas todas de las quietud que gozaban dichos indios, pasando a más su osadía”

populations in accordance with their necessities⁹⁹. In justifying the settlements, Indians were described as willing tributaries and docile souls awaiting to be taught the Lord's word; in rebuking adverse behavior, references to their malicious character were brandished as damaging but inevitable hazards. The other reason given was the influence Margarita:

“(…) since he has in his company an Indian named Margarita married in the town of Quibdó, which is the principal of those of the Chocó; with whom he lives scandalously in those places, having her as a concubine, which proves the general affirmation about the said Indians that I have not wanted to correct because of what I have said (...), fulfilling my obligation to inform Your Majesty as I am doing, so that you may be so kind as to provide the providence that you deem most convenient to this end and also to that of the concern that all those Indians suffer with the presence there of the Indian who is considered a Yervattera, having learned that some of the losses that they have suffered from the death of their children and others that usually occur come from her guidance, and for this reason they have even been many times about taking her life, which if I had not hindered them, I do not doubt that they would have done it, for I soothed them with the promise that Your Grace will try to remedy the excesses of the said Indian Margarita.”¹⁰⁰

Antonio Varela's claim that lives had been lost amongst the Indians since the arrival of Margarita and her practices as *yervatera*, translate the conception of the *yerbatera*, *bruja* or *hechizera* as a individual-type, characterized by a deemed or effective knowledge of plants, practicing devilish sorcery, and, on occasions, perpetuating the heresies of the native's polytheistic practices. In many of the inquisitorial processes hosted by the Tribunal of the Inquisition in 1614, the question of whether and how the women accused of brewing potions was often raised. The fear of a demon-mongering, herb-prescribing native sorceress was prevalent in early-modern American societies, with an Indian component that the Witch Hunt in Europe lacked: it was sustained by the endurance of native populations' beliefs and practices well into the 18th century. This was particularly true in negotiated spaces and frontiers,

⁹⁹ Montoya Guzmán, “Las más remotas tierras del mundo”, On discourses about natives of the Chocó, see.

¹⁰⁰ AHA, 25, 776, f. 619, “(…) pues tiene su compañía una India nombrada margarita casada en el pueblo de Quibdó, que es principal de los del chocó; con quienes corriente en aquellos parajes vive escandalosamente teniéndola por concubina que comprueba la general afirmatoria sobre los dichos indios que no he querido corregir por lo que llevo dicho (...) cumpliendo con mi obligación en noticia de Vmgd como lo executo, para que se sirva de dar la providencia que tubiere por más combeniente a este fin y ttambién al de zese la ynquietud que todos aquellos Indios padezen con la estada allí de la India a quien tiene por Yervattera aviendo consevido el que algunos quebrantos que an padezido de muerttes de hijos, y otros que sueles acaezer les vienen por dirección de la dha, y por esto aún an estado muchas veces por quitarla la vida, que a no averselo yo estorbado no dudo lo ubieren executado sosegandolos con que de parte de VMD se les probea en remedio a sus enunciada india margarita algún exceso”

where contact with missionaries had been rocky and ill-turned, as they had in the Citará. Thus, the matter of indigenous practices prevailing amongst reduced natives was a fear anchored in reality. But it was also enrooted Amerindians into what early modern Europe perceived as a succession of idolatrous societies which had eventually converted to Christianity, as Christians in-the-making¹⁰¹.

Many Indians were treated as witches and sorcerers, in accordance a Catholic understanding because of some of their practices, whose meaning was unknown. In the eyes of the Spaniards, the Indians appeared as subjects rooted in their past, who could not assimilate the customs and beliefs of the Hispanics. For this reason, one of the most recurrent and easy accusations against them was that of witchcraft, since the worst prejudices were intertwined with the most deeply rooted fears, without the accused being able to prove their innocence in a reliable way¹⁰². Indians accused and found guilty of superstition were not mortified with torture or capital punishment, pointing out that a superstitious crime had an implicit and explicit pact with the devil. However, under the divine and human protection embodied in the king, when they were brought to trial, judges were driven to consider that, perhaps involuntarily, they could have been deceived by the devil. The concept of “invincible ignorance” that protected the Indians went hand in hand with their religious behavior, since it was considered that the natives were so fragile that under bad influences, they could break the imposed moral order and because of this ignorance they clung to their superstitious and magical beliefs¹⁰³.

Authorities in Santafé decided to isolate Margarita to prevent her spreading of the “Ydolatría”¹⁰⁴ and sent to the near town of Bebará. Pachito ladino was first sent to the Royal Jail in Santafé de Antioquia¹⁰⁵ and was subsequently dispatched to Sopetrán, to live in one of the encomiendas with remained in the north of the Province of Antioquia¹⁰⁶. The incident with Pachito Ladino reveals several things in terms of the discourse produced about the natives, but also about the frontier itself. On the one hand,

¹⁰¹ Serge Gruzinski y Carmen Bernard, *De la idolatría: Una arqueología de las ciencias religiosas*, Sección e obras de historia (México D.F: Fondo de Cultura Económica - FCE, 1992), 58.

¹⁰² Gobierno de Chile, Ministerio de Planificación y CONADI, Re-Conocer, “Informe de la Comisión Verdad Histórica y Nuevo Trato con los Pueblos Indígenas”, 2009, 79.

¹⁰³ Quetzalcoatl Tonatiuh Uribe Sánchez, “La justicia y la hechicería en el oriente de Michoacán: el juicio de Juan Rosales en 1732”, *Revista Historia y Justicia*, núm. 11 (el 20 de octubre de 2018), <https://doi.org/10.4000/rhj.3388>.

¹⁰⁴ AHA, 25, 776, f. 621-622.

¹⁰⁵ AHA, 25, 776, f. 623.

¹⁰⁶ AHA, 25, 776, f. 620.

the contradictions at the heart of a double-sided discourse whereby natives from the Chocó were both presented as “docile”, “the most docile nation”, the softest Indians and most apt towards civilization which “desirous of living in the evangelical law” (f.623). On the other, when something went wrong, officials depicted them as canny and insufferably submitted to their “natural inclination [to betray or to escape]”. This contradiction knit the threads of discourses around natives during the century and into the 19th century.

A notable element of Varela’s discourse on Indians in Murri, when explaining Pachito’s actions, was the use of the verb *plantar*, and the description of Indians as new plants. Indeed, Varela explained “the aforementioned Indian Francisco Tovar caused with his harmful operations the notable damage of persuading the Indians settled in Chaquenodá to leave the town and return to the Cimarronas, and to reiterate in their *Ydolativo* [sic], which is possible **because they are such recent plants** [sic].”¹⁰⁷; But the verb *to plant* was also used to refer to the fact of *emplacing* or engendering the founding of towns themselves: “plantando en él pueblo de San Nicolas] los Indios de una parcialidad”; “en el sitio donde el Sr Governador Don José Lopez de Carvajal plantô el que fundô en su gobierno”, “fundé otro Pueblo de la otra parcialidad plantando allí también casas y disponiendo la formación de iglesia”¹⁰⁸. Valera was not alone in using the verb; Joseph Francisco Pimienta (*witness*), Francisco Joseph de Foronda (*escribano*) also did. This use of the verb to plant is striking. It may be an Americanism, a local usage of the verb. But it also might be linked to the development of ideas about the control of nature of the kind that would bloom with the Enlightenment¹⁰⁹. Was this manner of referring to the reduction of Indians based on an assimilation of Indians to nature as two related entities bound to be controlled? Further lexicological research must be carried out to confirm this hypothesis.

More generally, the documentation produced about Pachito Ladino’s betrayal also revealed how convoluted and mobile a frontier this was. First, because the priority for those in charge of government was ensuring 1) evangelization and 2) tribute,

¹⁰⁷ AHA, 25, 776, f. 619-620, “dho Indio Francisco Thovar Caus[ó] con sus perjudiciales operaciones el notable daño de persuadir a los Indios Poblados en Chaquenodá, el que dejando el Pueblo se buelban a las Zimarronas, y reiteren en su Ydolativo, que es dable por ser planttas tan reziennte”

¹⁰⁸ AHA, 25, 776, f. 615.

¹⁰⁹ Morales Pérez, *La Obra de Dios y El Trabajo Del Hombre. Percepción y Transformación de La Naturaleza En El Virreinato Del Nuevo Reino de Granada*.

integration into the Monarchy was marked by building a church before anything else in the settlement, natives often returned to their previous lands. Additionally, we have seen how these captains were mobile agents themselves. They went to Santafé de Antioquia to pay tribute; scouted the frontier attempting to convince others in the *cimarronas* to leave their habitat and integrate Spanish rule by arguing “the soft conditions” and “good treatments” they had received (f. 623). They also left on errands. For example, Varela stated he had sent Don Juan and Choquerre “to the Chocó in search for salt and tobacco”¹¹⁰. Pachito ladino had brought back Margarita, as a concubine from the town of Quibdó, where he had gone on a mission to bring back provisions (see distance in map). In his letter to Governor Guerra Calderón, in 1723, the Superintendent Gaspar Ruggero claimed that Pachito was a fugitive from Ibagué, whence he had fled along with Agustín Bepa (another of the native interlocutors) because he owed 200 *patacones* in debt¹¹¹.

Because of the scarcity of produce, and the precarity of mining ventures and villages, the circulation of peoples in the frontier was quite high in despite its peripheral position in regard to Santafé de Bogotá. This was out of necessity, as the general precarity settlements and infrastructure made the region dependent on provisions from Cartagena, Antioquia and Popayán. The Chocó was never conceived as a land for settling, as William Sharp remarked fifty years ago¹¹², but a land for settling natives and extracting gold. The case of Juemia and Chaquenodá in the Valley of Murrí were no isolated case. In fact, a Royal Cédula from 1720, regarding the Chocó and Franciscan missionaries therein, explicitly prohibited missionaries from “mutating” from one *doctrina* to another without previous authorization from the Bishop in Popayán, arguing the volatility of missions –and ensuing failure– spun greatly from the constant moving of Franciscan missionaries, the precarious villages and mission they built being displaced alongside them, and the general instability this entailed for the natives¹¹³.

¹¹⁰ AHA, 25, 776, f. 610.

¹¹¹ “siendo los pretendientes Agustin Bepa fiscal de doctrina de este pueblo de bebara, y francisco ladino abecindado muchos años en la ciudad de Ibaguñe de donde salíño fugitivo por Duzs (ducientos) patacones que devía, uno y otro ladino, com los demás que por serlo andan con semejante [sic] novedades, las que no siendo admitidas por Vm volverán a su Zentro” f. 604.

¹¹² Sharp, *Slavery on the Spanish frontier* Introduction.

¹¹³ AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. 7, f. 40.

Despite this instability, reports that the towns of Juemia and Chaquenodá in the valley of Murri prospered and its inhabitants were readily paying tribute to the crown, and content with the treatment they had received. Ignacio de Ibarra and Varela produced a document whereby they detailed how Juemia and Chaquenodá had been founded. At the end of the last page, Ibarra's handwriting was hastily replaced by Varelas's, who had just enough space left in the page to insert final comment. In fact, a messenger had just arrived with the news that additional Indians had come out of the wilderness in Citará withing to settle around Murri and that, as always, he had to reassure them that he did in fact have authority to "populate them" and that they would be subjected to no harm. This excerpt also informs us of the name of the real de minas in Murri which had presumably been reactivated, no longer under the name San Mateo but San Jose.

"Having already written this to you, Don Juan and Choquerre came to you, I had sent them to the Chocó for salt and tobacco, and they gave me information that the Indians that I was going to see had come out of their own will to settle there, I have reason that all that province is very happy that these towns are founded here and my brother also told me that if you do not resolve any determinations I will (¿) for the rebelliousness that they had to populate to tell them that I had the power of Santa Fe to populate them so if you offer to say the same although the locals have told them that it is a lie that deceived them. they have come very willingly from the Citará to dig their town. You are certain that I have well explored by the hand of my brother, and I do not see anything against this that is done before many from that province come to plant here because that is lost and there are no mines and I ask God to keep you from these mines of San Josep October 26, 1725. ¹¹⁴

This was so, that in January of 1727, the teniente of Citará, Cristóbal de Córdoba, sought instructions from the governor of Antioquia, Facundo Guerra Calderón, though Antonio de Varela because five or six Indians had abandoned the newly founded town of Bojayá, in the province of Citará, to go live in the valley of Murri. The Indians argued that "diciendo q no les es conveniente el vivir en aquel pueblo y q[ue] expontáneamente quieren tener su habitación en uno de los dos, de dho

¹¹⁴ AHA, 25, 76, f. 610v: "Teniendo ya en escrita esta a Vmd allegó Don Juan y choquerre, los avia enviado al choco en solitud de sal y tavaco y me dan rason que los indios que yo yva a ber eran salidos de su boluntad a poblar se alla, tengo rason que toda aquella provinsia se alla muy gustosa que se funden aquí estos pueblos y mi hermano me lo aavisa tambien a si vmd no se resele culaquiera determinasi3n yo me (¿) por la reveldia que tenian a poblarse desirles que tenia facultad de santa fe de poblar los asi Vmd si se ofrese digalo mismo aunque los de a aqui les an dicho que es mentira que los enga3o ellos an venido mui gustosos del sitara a cavar su pueblo Vmd está sierto q yo e tantiado bien la provinsia por mano de mi hermano y oservo cosa en contra desto que sea echo antes sanen muchos de aquella provincia a plantar aqui porque aquello esta perdido y no a y minas y no ofreciéndosele otra cosa pido a dios guarde a Vmd destas du minas des Jose octubre 26 de 1725"

valle”¹¹⁵. The fact that rather than seeking the authority of Vicente Gaspar Rugero, the newly appointed Superintendent, the *teniente* turned to the governor of Antioquia can be interpreted as an indication of how authorities in Antioquia had higher capabilities and to attract indigenous families seeking stability. In the face of the latter, appointed authorities in the Chocó could do little to stop the spread of rumors regarding better conditions in Antioquia. That natives were disposed to move in between provinces does not indicate a carelessness as to jurisdictional boundaries within a unique biosphere (the pacific jungle). Rather, it speaks volumes about their understanding of the political spheres which competed for jurisdiction at the frontier between these western provinces. They gauged the conditions of negotiation and living offered amongst the provinces and used their presence to navigate the inner workings of the frontier.

IV-Hypothesis: Murri’s role in the separation

1) Murri, Juemia, Chaquenodá and the broader context

How did the experience in Murri fit into the greater picture of the Citará in the early 18th century? How was the Citará articulated within the Chocó? Did the foundations in Murri play a part in the reconfiguration of jurisdictions that ensued the Chocó’s separation from Popayán?

A real *cédula* from 1726 indicates proves the Crown’s decision so separate the Chocó from the military and civil jurisdiction held by Popayán. Ecclesiastically, both regular and secular clergy from Popayán remained in the Chocó, as ecclesiastical and civil jurisdictions were two juxtaposed spheres. Since the mid-20th century, starting with William Sharp’s works on the Chocó, the question of this separation had been explained as one of many changes implemented by the local administration in its search to better administer the region, especially regarding tax collection. We have seen that efforts to reframe the structure of authority in the Chocó started in the early 1720s. The conflict over resources both natural and demographic had come to the attention of the Council of the Indies as it demanded *consultas* to decide what would serve the interests of the Chocó.

¹¹⁵ AHA, 25, 776, f.624. The town of Bojayá had been founded in 1726 by Captain Cristóbal de Córdoba, *teniente* of Citará.

Did the foundations around Murri and Rio Verde play a role in the Council of Indies' decision to separate the Chocó? Authors who have mentioned the separation usually harken back to the Royal Cédula expedited to this effect. The reasons given are those echoed in the reports written by the Individuals who contributed to produce an answer: Fray Manuel Caicedo, Francisco de Alcantud y Gaona and Vicente de Aramburu. Antioqueño foundations in Murri are not mentioned in the cédula. Rather, the consulta shed light on what wasn't working in the province, namely reporting the failing of officials both Ecclesiastical and Civil. But the consulta also shed light on the aftermath of the 1684 rebellion, as news of the profitable extractions the increasing number of cuadrillas were producing. Namely, Fray Manuel Caicedo reported on how the cuadrillas worked¹¹⁶, the working conditions for enslaved Africans, their stipends, the uses to which they were put alongside Indians, and the widespread fraud and contraband of gold. But the Council must also have been aware of the jurisdictional tensions between Popayán and Antioquia during the revival of settlements in Murri. Indeed, the presence of Antioqueño justices on the frontier and news of their successful *pueblos* must have kindled the Council of the Indies' wish for a more thorough report.

Was the success of Juemia and Chaquenodá definitive in this decision? It seems unlikely that its importance would have been that resounding. Furthermore, we must not overestimate the success of these settlements insofar as publicizing their attractiveness to other Indians was precisely what Varela needed to do. As most officials in the frontier, Varela seems to have been driven by both duty and personal glory, as many of his last recorded letters beg the governor to beg the governor to make the news of his successes known in Santafé de Antioquia, where Varela was a known social figure. In 1725 he asked the governor:

“Your grace will do me the affection, both for the Indians and for the others who assist in these parts, so that they will come out of their error and that many people of that city [sic] will know that I have populated the Indians, to my knowledge and not to theirs, and that I did not do it for my convenience but to serve their Mag.¹¹⁷”

¹¹⁶ See AGI, Santa Fe, 362, N°45. See also Williams, *Between Resistance and Adaptation*, 153.

¹¹⁷ AHA, 25, 776, f. 606: “Vmd me ara el cariño por quienes disponen pues asi para los indios como para los demas que asistiesen en estas partes para que salgan de su error y que muuchas personas de esa ciudad [sic] sepan que he poblado los indios, a mi consta y no a la ellos, y que no lo ê cho por mi combeniencia sinopor serbir a su Mag.”

However, the notion that the province of Antioquia had successfully asserted its jurisdiction around an area conquered by its former governor, Jose Lopez de Carvajal, could have played a role in deciding to separate the Chocó from Popayán. How so? The Citará, as has been discussed, had been under the influence of Antioquia since the 17th century, and despite efforts by justices in Popayán, Murri and its surroundings remained under Antioqueño administration. This trend would only crystallize in the 18th century, as families from Cali, Pasto, Popayán and even Quito became implicated in mining ventures in Noanama (south Chocó). The notion that the Chocó was being shared by the mercantile and mining elites of two contiguous provinces plausibly ignited the notion that the Chocó must become an independent entity. But did the separation of Chocó change anything to this assessment?

2) Aftermath

In 1729, as the Chocó became an independent *Gobernación* of Chocó¹¹⁸ its first Governor, Francisco de Ibero, was appointed and would soon thereafter be accused of illicit commerce by *oidor* Martínez Malo of the Royal Audiencia¹¹⁹. Nothing on that front seemed to have changed. And why would it? The thirst for gold was soaring. *Cuadrillas* of slaves were increasing, especially around Novita and Baudó. The demographic profile of the Chocó followed this trend. As more slaves were introduced in Tadó, Baudó and Novita (south Chocó), through the port of Buenaventura and by roads from Cali and Anserma, the south of the Chocó became mostly populated by blacks, *mulatos* and *zambos*¹²⁰. The north (the Citará) remained mostly populated by natives and its exploitation for gold remained of smaller scope. Antioqueño mining *cuadrillas* ventured into the Atrato through the roads opened by Carvajal and mined within their borders, as Antioquia's jurisdiction extended to the Atrato thanks to Carvajal's and Varela's explorations and foundations.

The years 1730 saw rise of importations of slaves to the south Chocó (Novita). This trend had undergone an initial phase in the 1710s during which the which nucleus of *cuadrillas* formed. A subsequent phase of slave importations *en masse* consolidated

¹¹⁸ Archivo Nacional, *Historia Documental del Chocó* (Bogotá: Ed. Kelly, 1954).

¹¹⁹ AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. 9, f. 234.

¹²⁰ Jiménez, *El Chocó, un paraíso del demonio*.

in the 1740s¹²¹. This changed the social front of south Chocó. Germán Colmenares offers that in 1727 there were over 3.500 slaves in the Chocó, a number which would rise to 7.000 in the subsequent 50 years¹²². Working conditions were tough. With little food and respite, slaves were under the authority of their Cabos (corporals), who were under the authority of their masters and *tenientes*. In 1728 an uprising broke out as 40 black slaves killed 14 Spaniards and the miner to whom they belonged. Julián de Trespalacios Mier, the *teniente* general, chief magistrate, and superintendent of the Noanamá and Chocó provinces for the Spanish crown addressed suspicions of a potential conspiracy among *cuadrillas* of enslaved Africans around San Francisco de Tado. He was particularly concerned about the violent nature of the uprising. This, he explained, was due to the fact that the majority of those involved belonged to the Mina Cast from Guinea. He gave a recount of the rumors circulating amongst Mina slaves of different *cuadrillas*¹²³. According to Trespalacios, it had even come to the attention of His Majesty that:

“[they must] tak[e] special care to advance it [the criminal cause] also in order to see if it resulted in collusion with the other gangs, because through the atrocious rushes of the uprisings, he must be suspicious and there are many reasons that persuade him, even if the barbarity of the Guinean nation, which is largely uneducated in the Catholic religion, were not so prone to such an act. must be suspicious and there are many reasons that persuade him, even if the barbarity of the Guinean nation, which is largely uneducated in the Catholic religion.¹²⁴”

¹²¹ Germán Colmenares, *Historia económica y social de Colombia, 1.537-1.719: Popayán, una sociedad esclavista, 1680-1800* (Universidad del Valle, División de Humanidades, 1973), 84.

¹²² This rapid rise led to a depletion of gold in certain areas, leading to a necessary readjustment between the number of *cuadrillas* in relation to the yield of deposits. See José Antonio Ocampo Gaviria y Germán Colmenares, “La formación de la economía colonial (1500-1740)”, en *Historia económica de Colombia* (Bogotá: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2015).

¹²³ ACC, Fondo Cabildo, t. 10, f. 6, 29-37, “Petición al Cabildo”. “(...), y por lo que también expresa Nicolas Nanga esclavo de dicho Perea que estuvo trabajando con dicho negro Barule y le oyó hablar de comprar escopeta para matar el minero que reflexionado todo con la coincidencia que requiere el presente estado y siendo el dicho Nicolás Nanga uno de los agresores del pasado tumulto y de los que concurrió aquitar la vida a su amo Francisco Perez produce todo sospecha bastante a haber tratado dicho negro Barule el acto referido, y hallándose presente don Cristobal Baca asintió a la gravedad de este negocio y ofreció ocuparse en conducir dicho negro Barule a este sitio.”. Trad: “(...) and as to what Nicolas Nanga slave of said Perea expressed, that he had been working with said black Barule and heard him speak of buying shotgun to kill the miner that reflected everything with the coincidence that requires the present state and being said Nicolas Nanga one of the aggressors of the past tumult and of those who concurred to take the life of his master Francisco Perez produces all suspicion enough to have dealt with said black Barule the referred act, and finding himself present Don Cristobal Baca nodded to the seriousness of this business and offered to take care of driving said Negro Barule to this place.

¹²⁴ Archivo Central del Cauca - A.C.C.- (Popayán), Cabildo, t. 10,

Trespalacios mentioned there was information suggesting that some individuals from the Novita region may have been in contact with the rebels in San Francisco de Tadó and were planning a similar uprising. In 1729 alarms rang as rumors circulated¹²⁵:

“(...) and more with the news that spread that there were two Blacks confederated with more than three thousand of the other Cuadrillas of those Provinces, **to lord over them** [señorearse de ellas], for which he had gone to the aforementioned town of Tadó to contain this temerity, where he found that his lieutenant had punished four Blacks, Corporals [Cabos] of the faction, with which this unrest had ceased, and that having justified the cause of this incident, he found it to be the oppression in which the Masters keep the slaves, with so much work, punishment, and short nourishment.¹²⁶”

To deal with the affair, the governor sent troops and their commander deceived four leaders with the false promise of negotiating with them; the leaders were and then executed them. Many of these slaves were *bozales*¹²⁷ (Africans that spoke no Spanish) but sources have shown that they spoke some English after having spent some time in Jamaica, as the South Sea Company (who held the Asiento since 1714) often smuggled slaves through that port. In this sense, the way the rebellion unfolded and the opposition to “whites” that underpinned it, stressed the Jamaican and Caribbean roots of the rebellion¹²⁸. Uprisings such as this contributed to the phenomenon of marooning amongst African slaves who had fled their masters and formed communities since the early 17th century¹²⁹, both in the Caribbean and Pacific lowlands; this will be further discussed in chapter 6.

In general, after the separation from Popayán, much stayed the same in Chocó. In 1736, a Royal Cédula expedited to the Chocó allowed the governor’s salaries to be paid in gold. This rang of inconsistency, as it had been disavowed in the past as a detrimental practice to the Royal Hacienda. Similarly, clientelism amongst officials was

¹²⁵ On the role of rumors of uprisings and their circulatin amongst slave owners, see Aline Helg, *¡Nunca más esclavos! Una historia comparada de los esclavos que se liberaron en las Américas*.

¹²⁶ AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. 9, f. 221, “(...) y mas con la noticia que se esparció de que se hallaban dhos Negros confederados con mas de tres mil de las demás Cuadrillas de aquellas Provincias, para señorearse de ellas, por lo qual avía pasado el citado Pueblo de Tadó para contener esta osadía, donde halló que su teniente avía castigado quatro Negros, Cabos de la facción, con lo qual avía cesado esta inquietud, y que aviendo el justificado la causa de este hecho, halló ser la opresión en que los Amos tienen los esclavos, con tan crecido trabajo, castigo, y corto alimento. ”

¹²⁷ In Francisco de Saavedra’s cuadrilla, 57% of adults were bozales.

¹²⁸ Bernardo Leal, “‘MATAR A LOS BLANCOS BUENO ES, LUEGO CHOCO ACABARA’ CIMARRONAJE DE ESCLAVOS JAMAQUINOS EN EL CHOCO (1728)” 2, núm. 2 (1998): On this matter, see.

¹²⁹ Aline Helg, *¡Nunca más esclavos! Una historia comparada de los esclavos que se liberaron en las Américas*.

continuous: in 1739 a royal Cédula was expedited—as the new viceroyalty was founded—with instructions that the Viceroy should thenceforth name tenientes in the provinces to avoid the dependency ensuing their appointment by governors. It was an attempt to give such authority to the viceroy to circumvent local networks of dependency in the appointment of officers¹³⁰.

But these orders and royal cédulas were of little effect on the frontiers of Chocó, as demonstrated by the periodical reiteration of the same instructions. Historians who have taken an interest in the Chocó stress how the proliferation of mining cuadrillas in the remaining half of the 18th century saw the Chocó, especially in the south, turn into a ground of exploitation. Both Germán Colmenares and Caroline Williams conclude that the pacification of the Chocó's native populations (in 1684 through violence; 1710-1726 through negotiation) gave way to a new boom in the exploitation of gold. The new boom benefited the businessmen from Popayán, Cali and Antioquia who had helped pacify the Chocó. They benefitted economically as many were miners, but also socially, as many of the first miners to settle in the new frontier had military titles (captains, sergeants major, field masters) earned in battles against the Indians.¹³¹ Thus, little did it matter that the Chocó had been made jurisdictionally independent, for all officers in the Chocó had ties with Popayán and Antioquia, and most were there to oversee the exploitation of gold.

3) The fragility of the bargain

The advance at which mining had sprung seemed unstoppable. Yet amid the celebration of riches, some contemporary observers saw the misery of it all. In 1736, the Bishop of Popayán, Diego Fermín, whose jurisdiction extended all the way to Antioquia, carried out a pastoral visit into the Chocó. He described his voyage full of “vipers, tigers and bars”, through hardship and toil across the varying nature of the Neogranadian west. In his travel account, the bishop was particularly prolific in describing the state of the mines of Citará and northern Antioquia. According to the Bishop, everything was in ruins, poverty was everywhere. He was particularly impressed by the decay of the mines in Buriticá. He explained that “the owners of

¹³⁰ AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. 9, f. 725.

¹³¹ Colmenares, *Historia económica y social de Colombia*, 1:83. Colmenares explains that in Popayán

cuadrillas having passed away, the business had waned, causing the mentioned city and province extreme misery”¹³².

Of the natives, the bishop said he “found them as Gentile as they were before the Conquest: they do not confess or receive communion and are extremely Ignorant of the Christian Doctrine”. He explained the had “found the cause of this to be the Governors of Chocó, who in each village appoint a corregidor that governs them, and he continuously keeps them busy, in *rozar montes* for maize, both for himself and for the Governor, (...) in transporting loads on canoes through all the rivers of the Chocó which are many”. This, he argued, impeded the Indians from learning the Christian doctrine and attending mass, and from tending to their own gardens with which they must feed their families. He reminded that the Indian’s ability to tend to their *rozerías* was “a law of these Kingdoms”, and that it was the only manner of guaranteeing the Indians would not return to the Mountains, to their Gentility, oppressed by a continuous labor which they cannot endure”¹³³.

The bishop’s discourse suggests many things. First, that the claims that Indians were abused by their corregidores remained unaltered. Second, that the conditions in the Chocó did not allow the reduced natives to provide for their families because they were put to excessive work. Claims of work-related abuse were common across the New Kingdom of Granada¹³⁴. A similar dynamic was uncritically described by Captain Aguerre Antonio Varela when he explained how the Indians hadn’t had time to build *rozerías* in the new *pueblos* as they were busy building the church. Consequently, they were forced to return to their former *sementeras* and were at risk to desert their *pueblos* in the process. This too transpires from the bishop’s words: a sense of impending fragility in the bargain made by the Indians to settle. Indeed, the instability of the negotiation whereby natives adhered to the Monarchy and the Christian doctrine is apparent. On the one hand because native populations had suffered a demographic toll

¹³² AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. 10, f. 289.

¹³³ AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. 10, f. 287-291.

¹³⁴ In particular, abuse at the hands of corregidores was widespread, as we have seen this in the case of Mariquita, in chapter 2. In Tunja, the vecinos even asked the office of corregidor be suspended. See Herrera, *Ordenar para controlar. Ordenamiento espacial y control político en las Llanuras del Caribe y en los Andes centrales neogranadinos. Siglo XVIII*, 172.

throughout the centuries, through illness, war, exploitation, and enslavement¹³⁵, and had been further dislocated after of the revolts of 1686, on the other.

Like the natives of Darién, their communities and ways of life had been disrupted, their social structures upended¹³⁶. The decision to integrate the Crown was therefore only attractive as long as it presented itself as more advantageous in the face of resisting through flight and marooning (*acimaronarse*). In the case of Chocó, as we have seen in Juemia and Chaquenodá, integration was partial: it did not guarantee the elements needed for representation (*Cabildo*) or protection (*Protector de naturales*) within a República de Indios. And even the theoretical benefits of integration (protection and representation) were imperfect, because they clashed with larger political dynamics. Indeed, integration came with the burden of tribute and labor. Laws and orders regarding tribute labor were clear and often reminded and re-expedited by civil and ecclesiastical authorities alike. In practice, they were not complied with, leading to abuses that only an Indian protector could appeal against, as we will see in the following chapter.

Conclusions

This chapter has followed three intertwining *files rouges*: 1) the separation of Chocó from Popayán in the face of interprovincial competition for jurisdiction; 2) the settling of the frontier by founding *pueblos de indios*; and 3) the integration of these pueblos into the Monarchy. These three themes interlace in the case study of Murrí. Indeed, the resettlement in Murrí produced a jurisdictional conflict that plausibly contributed to the list of reasons leading to the realization that a jurisdictional redrawing was needed for better administration. Furthermore, settling villages on the frontier of Murri was a way for Antioquia as a province to affirm its jurisdiction in the stretch of land that extended to the Atrato river, and for Antioqueño mining ventures to access these lands. Finally, although the integration of the natives into the monarchy and Christendom was espoused through discourses pleading for Indians' "salud y politica doctrina" and "paz y quietud", their integration was both partial and imperfect. It was

¹³⁵ Miners in the provinces of Antioquia had profited from the conflict that marred the Chocó in the 1640s by illicitly capturing of Indians registered as captured piezas, who were sent to work at mining ventures. On this, see Montoya Guzmán, "Las más remotas tierras del mundo", cap. 8.

¹³⁶ Gallup-Diaz, "The Spanish Attempt to Tribalize the Darién, 1735-50"; Sæther, *Identidades e independencia en Santa Marta y Riohacha, 1750-1850*.

thwarted by political practices that benefitted the exploitation of gold and those that had interests in it. This not only contravened the rights Indians gained upon their submission to the Crown, but it also dampened the prospects offered by the Spanish Monarchy.

However, there is something to say about the broader role of natives in the political game on the frontier. The natives' petition to the governor of Antioquia, through which they sought to settle with Pablo de Carvajal as "auxiliador y defensor", had reignited tensions and competition between Antioquia and Popayán. This competition, which Indians knowingly navigated¹³⁷, was put under exam by the Council of the Indies in the 1720s, which resulted in jurisdictional reform. Indians were thereby political actors on a large scale.

And indeed, such a situation was the object of denunciations by certain agents who decried the state of the Chocó, but they were not at the heart of concerns in the minds of Spanish administrators. The Council of the Indies requested *consultas* on whether to make the Chocó an independent jurisdiction with the mind to improve the natives' situation, but fiscal matters weighed more. Indeed, the context in which the *consultas* emerged in the 1720's was at cross between different interrogations on governing the Chocó: 1) the structural issues posed by the region's topography (i.e. how to dominate a region so vast, humid and difficult), 2) the sociopolitical profile in constant change (i.e. how to pacify Indians to allow mining *cuadrillas* in) and the administrative problems it posed for authorities (i.e. how to make sure mining doesn't lead to too excessive fraud). During the years surrounding the *consulta* it became apparent that nor the royal *cédulas* for better administration destined to Franciscans friars, nor the reform to separate the Chocó, repaired problems that were more structural. Quite in the contrary, the Chocó became an opportunity for self-enrichment¹³⁸ amongst criollo families from neighboring Antioquia and Cali (the latter having also accumulated mines with haciendas). The foremost worry was ensuring that the increasing mining ventures pay *quintos* and remain productive.

Historian Germán Colmenares whose economic studies on the New Granada innovated the field of social history in Colombia remarked on the seemingly paradoxical intentions of the Spanish, regarding the newly discovered territory. He

¹³⁷ See Chapter 4 part 1) c).

¹³⁸ Sharp, *Slavery on the Spanish frontier*; Colmenares y Colmenares, *Cali, terratenientes, mineros, y comerciantes, siglo XVIII*; Williams, *Between Resistance and Adaptation*, 160.

refers to Colón's second voyage to the Indies in which he made sure to bring cattle and seeds with him to establish agriculture and foster an economy centered around surplus based on indigenous labor and tribute¹³⁹. This, though, was a difficult reality to achieve amid the "thrill of plunder". This inconsistency, between the realities of conquest and the motives that drove it was a constant oscillation in the way the recently occupied lands were handled. On the one hand, land grants and incentives to settle in the coastal hinterland were handed out (encomiendas, repartimientos), and on the other, graves, villages and resources were plundered with total disregard for a strategic incorporation of the plunder into either knowledge (registers, accounts) or thoughtful exploitation. Indeed, many aspects of conquest which are emotional. The gold fever, the sexual debacle, and the thrill of dominance were all elements present in the early 16th century conquest, something Fray Alonso de Montesinos reprehended conquistadors on as early as 1511. But much had passed since 1511, and two-hundred years later, an arguably similar dissonance between motives, means and outcomes can be found in the way officers proceeded in the further fronts of the frontier. And, as William Sharp noted, this possibly had to do with the way the Chocó was perceived: as an impenetrable mass of thick jungle, both inhospitable and daunting.

Let's take the example of the area encompassing the south Darién, Citará and Antioquia's Murri region (afterwards called the Urabá). Settlements in that northern region, and in the south of Darien, had failed since the settlements of Santa María la Antigua del Darién and 16th century cities had been abandoned. In later times, only *pueblos de indios* were founded, with communities charged with "sementeras and rozerías"¹⁴⁰, and some maize for authorities. But Spanish authorities in the northern Antioquia did not seek to establish agriculture. Why? In part, it is self-evident, both from a description of the terrain, and from reading the reports written by officials, that the tropical humid landscape proved too much of an arduous task. They did not seek to live there themselves by settling into cities or towns into the North. It was not the case of a frontier pushed back like the one described by Frederick Jackson Turner; no

¹³⁹ Colmenares, *Historia económica y social de Colombia*, 1:199.

¹⁴⁰ According to the Real academia de la lengua, the term "rocería", spelled with a "c" in modern-day Spanish, belongs to Colombian Spanish and related to the verb "rozar", literally meaning "to graze", as in "to lightly touch", holds until today the meaning of mowing the grass or vegetation on a terrain. It is interesting to note that this word already held the meaning of "preparing land for agriculture" in the New Granada in the early 18th century.

projects to *civilize* would see the light of dawn. The jungle was too thick, the Indians too hostile, the land too muddy. In fact, only a few small cities like Vigía del Fuerte, founded in the former town of Murri, would be founded in that region of Antioquia in the 19th century. The frontier of the Citará remained, through time, a frontier for exploitation.

As for the road that Antioquia was to take as a province, by the 1750's it had become clear that the path that urbanization was to take in Antioquia tended rather towards the south-east (Rionegro, Marinilla, Abejorral, La Ceja), and to some extent towards the temperate lands of the northeast where gold was also found (Los Osos Valley, Yarumal). The brief incursion into the Northern Pacific biosphere was indeed a short-lived experiment which did not by any means define life in Antioquia and played no little in what geographer James J. Parsons has called "the Antioqueño model of colonization"¹⁴¹.

Afterword

The Chocó still stands as a particularly impenetrable yet coveted frontier in modern-day Colombia. During the late 20th century, the northwest of the country was the home of guerrillas and paramilitary groups. On May 2, 2002, FARC guerrilla and AUC paramilitaries fought in the town of Bojayá, the town founded in 1726, by the *teniente* of Citará, Cristóbal de Córdoba. Amid confrontations, the population took refuge in the church of Bellavista. The FARC guerrillas bombed the church. Approximately 80 people died (among them were 48 minors). The massacre caused the displacement of 5,771 people to Quibdó¹⁴². Nowadays, aside from paramilitary groups and dissident guerrillas, drug cartels control the access to its river mouths. Among their interests in the region is the illegal exploitation of gold, an ongoing fever. In 2019 the Chinese mining company Zijin bought the exploitation rights to the *cerro* Buriticá, in northwest Antioquia; in May 2023 the Cartel del Golfo bombed the Zijin gold mine to favor its own illegal mining tunnels¹⁴³.

¹⁴¹ Parsons, *La colonización antioqueña en el occidente de Colombia*.

¹⁴² Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica, *Bojayá: la guerra sin límites*, 2010, <https://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra/bojaya-la-guerra-sin-limites-881784/>.

¹⁴³ <https://www.elespectador.com/judicial/atentado-en-buritica-minera-habia-pedido-proteccion-segun-la-procuradora-noticias-hoy/>

Two contradictory assessments still play out in the region: the seemingly unavoidable character of small-scale gold mining, now referred to as “minería ancestral” by NGOs, scholars, and left-leaning political parties alike; and the inexorable realization that the rivers of Chocó are poisoned. Thus, “ancestral mining” is protected on account of its grim historicity and large-scale informal operations are seldom dismantled, while awareness as to the environmental and health consequences of the latter are increasing. For decades, gold exploitation involved using mercury to separate the gold among the pebbles and soil for decades. This is why the Colombian Constitutional Court issued a *sentencia* in 2016, declaring the river Atrato as legal entity (*sujeto de derecho*). But effective protection is nearly impossible. The rivers of Chocó now contain some of the highest rates of mercury than those anywhere in south America. Mercury is found in peoples’ hair, water, blood, and urine¹⁴⁴, making populations ill as children are born with neurodevelopmental problems¹⁴⁵. Most inhabitants in Chocó are now aware that it is more advisable to buy fish caught in the sea than to fish in its rivers; the “pescado envenenado” has become a known saying in the Pacific regions of Colombia.

¹⁴⁴ Álvaro Arango Ruíz y Azucena Cabrera Jaramillo, eds., *Minería mercurio y salud. Aportes de la comunidad académica*, Editorial Lasallista (Caldas, Antioquia, Colombia, 2022), cap. 3.

¹⁴⁵ Juan Sebastián Lara Rodríguez, André Tosi Furtado, y Aleix Altimiras Martin, “Minería del platino y el oro en Chocó: pobreza, riqueza natural e informalidad”, *Revista de Economía Institucional* 22, núm. 42 (el 20 de noviembre de 2019): 241–68, <https://doi.org/10.18601/01245996.v22n42.10>.

Chapter 6: Integration or resistance on changing frontiers

*(...) y después de tomarle juramento
sobre que será rey de buen gobierno,
según lo fueron sus antecesores,
y amparará sus tierras y vasallos
de cualesquier agravios y molestias,
ellos, por consiguiente, hacen jura
de le ser obedientes y leales,
y en reconocimiento desde luego
le sirve cada cual con una joya.*

Juan de Castellanos (1522-1607),
Historia del Nuevo Reino de Granada,
canto primero.

Introduction

In the two previous chapters we have assessed that many areas in the New Kingdom of Granada remained free from the authority of royal officials in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. We also explored the political practices through which different actors attempted to get a grasp on the frontiers of the Citará. As it has been shown, the main driver for expansion in the northwestern provinces of the Kingdom was the search for gold deposits. Mining gold was in the interest of vecinos and authorities alike, as many of the vecinos in mining cities also held public magistrature, producing a confluence of interests on the frontier. In this configuration, especially in the case of a strong bond between governors and the Cabildo, militarization on the frontier –for the sake of protection– was invoked as an endeavor of utmost importance, thereby justifying the appointment of military figures whose social dignity was thus enforced. Such practices perpetrated the dilution of the Crown's interests by putting the interests of criollo families at the center. The search for personal interest had always

been at the heart of incentives to advance conquest over the land, but this came with different degrees, as explored in chapter 4.

In the northeastern parts, namely the provinces of Santa Marta and Cartagena, however, the main driver was territorial control, rather than the exploitation of a single natural asset like gold. Transporting goods, ensuring transhumance, and allowing for the circulation of officials were the main priorities. The obstacles, though, were similar: non-subjected indigenous communities resisted the mounting pressure to integrate or flee, often pushed inward towards the *montes* (wilderness) and further away from their previous territory¹. Measures against contraband aided by rebel Indians were conceived with this in mind. Also, the introduction of cattle that span from a demand for meat in the city of Cartagena, led to the introduction of “ganaos bacunos” in the province of Santa Marta and Riohacha. This, along with the progressive privatization of lands through the process of “recomposing lands”, gave way to an increased presence of humans and animals on the frontier².

Furthermore, compared to the northwestern provinces where agriculture and cattle raising was done in a small scale (in Antioquia, for instance) and was altogether impossible in the more humid zones (like the Citará jungle), the plains of the Caribbean had undergone land usage processes that were very different. Cattle and horses had been introduced in the 16th century, making cattle raisers and horse breeders out of the Guajiro Indians. In terms of production units, large haciendas of “ganados bacunos” grazed in Cartagena, around Mompox and Tamalameque, and we know that some of the land used to raise cattle was common land belonging to the communities of vecinos. Furthermore, the production unit used to articulate land usage and Indian labor, *encomiendas*, still stood in the early 18th century. Like in the case subsisting *encomiendas* in northwest Antioquia (Sopetrán, Cañasgordas, Buriticá), there were *encomiendas* in the Central Andes and in Santa Marta.

In terms of the morphology of the settlements, the proportion of towns was greater with respect to villas and cities. In general, in the Indies, there were far fewer cities and towns than Indian villages. In 1786, 94% of the settlements were classified

¹ Sæether, *Identidades e independencia en Santa Marta y Riohacha, 1750-1850*.

² Hugues Rafael Sánchez Mejía, “Composición, mercedes de tierras realengas y expansión ganadera en una zona de frontera de la gobernación de Santa Marta: Valledupar (1700-1810)”, *Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura* 39, núm. 1 (enero de 2012): 81–117.

as villages, and hence the importance of studying them. in the territorial articulation. We have figures for the end of the 18th century. In the provinces of Cartagena, the proportion of villas and towns was 21%; in Santa Marta it was 37%. In the province of Santafé (Central Andes), only 18% of urban settlements were *villas* or *ciudades*³. In the Central Andes, the correspondence between the Indian towns in the province of Santafé with the pre-Hispanic settlement bases⁴, made it possible to take advantage of the bases of the political-territorial articulation to superimpose jurisdictions.

In sociopolitical terms, the provinces of Santa Marta and Cartagena had the highest presence of maroon communities made up of former slaves who had fled their masters and settled in areas of higher altitude or of difficult access. On the frontiers of the provinces, like the case of the frontiers between Antioquia and Cartagena, mixed communities made up of mulattoes, zambos and individuals identified as “of all colors” lived “without god or law”⁵. The morphology of Spanish settlements in the northeastern provinces composed of Cities, villas, and of settlements in which Spanish and Indians lived side by side, like *pueblos de indios* and missions. Finally, free indigenous communities that had never submitted to peninsular authorities lived on wide spats of land in the Guajiran peninsula (see chapter 3) and in the plains between Cartagena and Santa Marta province.

This created a scenario in which free populations circulated amongst areas where “docile Indians”. Like in the case of the Citará, this circulation posed a problem for authority on different levels: trade and commerce between natives was negative; collaboration between natives and foreigners was unfavorable; the potential rapprochement between “docile Indians and barbarous Indians” was a potential hindrance to the stability of the province. It must be reminded here that, in areas where free natives who had endured on account, partly, of their resilience and aggressivity

³ Herrera, *Ordenar para controlar. Ordenamiento espacial y control político en las Llanuras del Caribe y en los Andes centrales neogranadinos. Siglo XVIII*, 13–14.

⁴On this, see Herrera Ángel, “Transición entre el ordenamiento territorial prehispánico y el colonial en la Nueva Granada”.

⁵ On mestizaje in different parts of the New Kingdom, see for instance Acuña, a, y Nobles, “El mestizaje en una frontera del Caribe”; Katherine Bonil Gómez, *Gobierno y calidad en el orden colonial: las categorías del mestizaje en la provincia de Mariquita en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII*, Primera edición, Colección Prometeo. Maestría (Bogotá, D.C., Colombia: Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales-CESO, Departamento de Historia, 2011); Herrera, *Ordenar para controlar. Ordenamiento espacial y control político en las Llanuras del Caribe y en los Andes centrales neogranadinos. Siglo XVIII*, 151–54.

towards Spanish authorities, keeping the “calm” and “health” Christendom’s newly integrated native communities, was a priority.

These factors posed the question of how to deal with such populations and the danger they represented to the stability of an increasingly mixed and mestizo demographic front. Partly, the solution was what has been described as “Ordenamiento territorial”, which implied ordering the space in several ways: 1) organizing and asserting jurisdictions, following the jurisdictional logic whereby magistrates and officers exerted their authority; 2) arranging spaces of production and exploitation through *encomiendas*, *haciendas*, *repartimientos* and *resguardos*; 3) ordering the population profile of the province through a series of urban formations through which the separation of Spanish and Indian republics would theoretically be achieved, but was in practice difficult to enforce.

This implied bringing hostile Indians to the righteous way of life. Who were they? How did they differ? Should they be coerced or convinced to integrate the *Pax Hispana*? Answers to these questions will be briefly offered before we move on to our case study. The variety of populations and of ways to engage with them differed depending on the hostility, terrain and interests behind integrating them into the monarchy. As we have seen, in the Chocó and Antioquia, negotiation and “soft means” were attempted with populations considered as “docile”, the Chocoes (*Emberas*). The counterpart to the Chocoes (*Emberas*) were the *Cunas* (or *Cuna Cunas*), often mentioned in the sources in relation to their fearlessness, the friendships they knit with foreigners, and the utter refusal they displayed towards submitting to the Spanish. Because officers often had trouble distinguishing between ethnic lines (not only in the Chocó where not even Franciscan friars had learned the language but in many parts of the Kingdom) Indians were often depicted in binary terms “docile” versus “barbarous”, thereby conflating all “docile” Indians on the one and all existing Indians on the other. This invisible intra ethnic distinctions and makes the task of identifying ethnolinguistic communities hard.

In the provinces of Cartagena and Santa Marta, two main ethnic groups troubled authorities on account of their collaboration in contraband, often with foreigners, and their attacks on convoys and shipment on the Magdalena River, which served as a porous border between both provinces: the *Guajiros* and *Chimilas*. One observer in the

1730s and 1740s, teniente José Nicolás de la Rosa, engaged in an explanation of the different native populations of the province of Santa Marta. He offered that:

“the already conquered that live in the towns that were nominated in their parishes, subject to doctrine, vassalage and *demoras*⁶, (...) and then (...) the non-pacified, for which, it must be noted, there are a variety of appellatives, which are Chimilas, Alcoholados, Aurohuacos, Guajiros, Cocinas, Tupes, Acanayutos, Pampanillas, Orejones, Motilones and Pintados.⁷”

These populations, he explained, could not be classified as “demorados”, or tributaries, in a context where paying tribute, as we saw in the past chapter, was the marker of subjection to doctrine and to the King⁸. In the provinces of Santa Marta and Cartagena, like in the Chocó, soft and harsh means were attempted. Whether one or the other were attempted depended much on the perception that authorities had of different native groups. For example, the Chimila Indians had resisted the advance of Spanish authorities since the 16th century and thus, pacification or conquest through force were attempted. As we saw in chapter 3, soft means were attempted with the Guajiros until the 1740s. The Guajiros, equally problematic, accepted capuchin missions, but had changing relationships to civil authorities. The same can be argued of the Citará, where authorities from Antioquia put efforts into negotiating with Indians they classified as docile Chocoos, as opposed to the barbarous Cunas, or Cuna Cunas, of which horrors were told and warfare was praised.

In this chapter, the social face of the provinces of Cartagena and Santa Marta will be examined, as it was in those provinces that a demographic shift took place across time, namely through the importation of thousands of enslaved Africans, but also because of increasing intraprovincial commerce and mobility. More precisely, we will look at the changing morphology of settlements on the frontiers between the provinces of Santa Marta and Cartagena, through the case of an Indian group in the province who willfully submitted through negotiation only to rebel and resist eighty years later, the Pintado Indians. The case of the Pintados is not only interesting as their integration is

⁶ *Demora*, as de la Rosa explains is “[a word that] demonstrates the tribute that was imposed when they were conquered, in recognition of the vassalage and was granted for the benefit of the conquerors and their descendants, to whom they entrusted themselves, so that with it they would maintain the evangelical law, with *doctrineros*, churches, ornaments, corporal medicines and other things that would lead to their education and the same royal laws (Book. 6, title, 5. *Nueva Recopilación de las Leyes de Indias*)”. José Nicolás De la Rosa, *Floresta de la Santa Iglesia Catedral de la ciudad y provincia de Santa Marta*, Biblioteca Banco Popular: 74 (Bogotá: Banco Popular, 1975), 279.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ De la Rosa, *Floresta de la Santa Iglesia Catedral de la ciudad y provincia de Santa Marta*, 280.

reflective of the changing demographic face of the Caribbean region in the first half of the 18th century. It will also allow us to discover a case where the prevalence and preponderance of personal interests of those in government outweighed the dispositions emitted by royal justice, leading the Pintados to overtly rebel sixty years after their submission.

Indeed, the Pintados were an indigenous group living in the Kingdom of the New Granada, who played an important role in guarding the hinterland the Caribbean coast thereof, as well as its, which stretched south of Santa Marta and south-east of Cartagena, in the jurisdiction of Tenerife, located in the administrative province of Santa Marta. They submitted to peninsular authorities in the latter 17th century, and their “nación” (nation)⁹ became a known ally of the Crown in the protection of the territory against foreign attacks, maroons, and rebellious indigenous groups of the region. This seems to have been the case during the last three decades of the 17th century, and well into the 1730s, until the 1740s, when the Provinces of Cartagena and Santa Marta underwent a territorial reorganization that relocated indigenous populations¹⁰. By then, some Pintados had deserted their settlements. In 1744, viceroy Sebastián de Eslava ordered the transfer of Pintados to the opposite bank of the Magdalena River, arguing they were allies of rebel Indians¹¹.

This chapter will follow to threads: 1) the question of abuses and mistreatments to Indians, and their manners of defending themselves; 2) that of the increasing pressure to integrate the Monarchy as subjects or flee and resist. These two threads will allow us

⁹ The term “nation” is here employed, as it is in the documentation of the time, because of its utility in conveying ethnic affiliation. Because the native populations were established in villages, cities, *pueblos de indios* and *encomiendas*, they were sometimes identified by the authorities according to their nation. Of course, officials were not an unbiased source: it was not uncommon for officials to allude to various non-subjugated indigenous groups as “Chimilas” or “Caribes”, two nations of Indians that remained hostile to Peninsular authority, to the point where their names became synonyms of “hostile.” See Herrera Ángel, Marta, “ ‘Chimilas’ y ‘españoles’: el manejo político de los estereotipos raciales en la sociedad neogranadina del siglo XVIII”, *Memoria y Sociedad*, vol. 7, n. 13, 2002, p. 5-24.

¹⁰ For a concise article on the conquest of Chimila territories and their reduction, see González Luna, Lola, “La política de población y pacificación indígena en las poblaciones de Santa Marta y Cartagena (Nuevo Reino de Granada), 1750-1800”, *Boletín americanista*, n. 28, 1978, p. 87-118. On the conquest and “pacification” of the Guajira, see Acuña, José Polo. “Contrabando Y Pacificación Indígena En La Frontera Colombo-venezolana De La Guajira (1750-1820).”, *América Latina en la Historia Económica*, 12, n. 2, 2005.

¹¹ See Lola G Luna, “LA NACIÓN CHIMILA: UN CASO DE RESISTENCIA INDÍGENA EN LA GOBERNACIÓN DE SANTA MARTA¹¹”, *Conquista y resistencia en la historia de América* 3 (1992): 123..

to answer a number of questions. These questions intend on offering answers in a comparative manner, harkening back to previous chapters.

- 1) We have seen that the 18th century in the northwestern provinces of the New Kingdom brought about a revival of gold exploitation for which the subjection of native communities was necessary; we also asserted that while their integration was precarious in terms of protection and representation, they were used as workforce in the mines of gold. What can be said about the pressure to integrate the Monarchy in the Northeast? What pressured native communities? How had their relationship to the advancing presence of Spanish authorities and vecinos differed?
- 2) We have seen that settling the frontier could be managed through negotiations, and that soft means were attempted with Indians that showed a disposition, something Spanish observers interpreted as docility. In the Citará, however, Indians remained mostly outside of the networks where Indian protectors circulated and disposed of no cabildo to represent them. What can be said regions where protectors de Indios did circulate, like the Caribbean Plains?
- 3) What does the rebellion of Pintados by the mid-1750s tell us about governance and the enforcement of royal dispositions on the frontier? What can it tell us about the state of frontier integration into the monarchy? What does it suggest about the way in which Bourbonic administrators would go on to handle the issue of “rebel” native populations in the second half of the 18th century?

Three parts will help us tackle these questions: a point on native conditions in the Caribbean, a second point on the Pintados and their role in Santa Marta, and a third point on their rebellion in reaction to the failing of petitions produced in their defense.

I- Indian conditions in the face of increasing pressure to integrate:

labor and protection

Up until this point, this dissertation had argued that an exponential governmental focus was applied onto the frontiers of the provinces in the northern parts of the Kingdom. This was both a result of expedited Royal Cédulas ordering conquest and pacification (with soft or violent means according to the situation), but also as a manifestation of individual or collective will to expand authority and jurisdictions over the boundaries between provinces, coastal hinterland, mountainous or jungle-laden areas. These areas usually had an inferior population density but were either rich in gold, the most valuable commodity in the Kingdom, or stood as natural frontiers in areas of mercantile transit. In these areas lived many free communities whose social lives, customs and political organization lay outside the frame offered by the Monarchy. These types of free communities were of different kinds.

1) Governing over spatial and political units: *encomiendas* and *resguardos*

The provinces of Cartagena and Santa Marta underwent a political redrawing very early in the 16th century on account of the earliness with which the Spanish founded cities and villas on the Caribbean coast. Initially, they had received capitulations that made them *Gobernaciones*. In this early stage of the Spanish advance, *gobernaciones* were all located in the frontiers, and as such, they had governmental and judicial attributions. In this sense, the governors of Santa Marta and Cartagena also held the title of Captain General, which gave them military prerogatives. We have seen a similar situation in the 1720s Chocó, as the region was made an independent *gobernación* from Popayán. The difference between *gobernaciones* or *gobiernos* and provinces is one of form. In essence, they do not refer to the same thing; the appellation "province" was itself flexible, for although the 1680 *Recopilación* provided that the major provinces were those with a Royal Audiencia, in the New Kingdom of Granada "provincial" was used to name the jurisdictions under the authority of a governor. Some of these provinces were formerly called governorships, as was the case of Santa Marta, Cartagena, Antioquia, and Chocó, as if the transition from one appellation to another denoted a formal promotion.

But the matter is more complicated if one considers that the ecclesiastical provinces were also superimposed on this denomination. In this sense, for example, the province under the authority of the bishop of Popayán included the civil province of

Antioquia. The civil province of Popayán contained, in turn, different jurisdictions of towns and cities, as well as the tenientazgos of the "province" of Chocó, later converted into a superintendency, and finally into a *gobernación*. In New Spain and Guatemala, the appellation province was often used to refer to the ecclesiastical provinces of this or that bishop. At the beginning of the 18th century, the “*gobernación de Nueva Vizcaya*” used to be considered divided into several provinces, which in themselves did not follow a single definition: Sonora, Ostimuri, Sinaloa and Rosario/Chametla are often mentioned and are present in the royal *cédula* that erected "Sinaloa y Sonora" as an independent governorship of Nueva Vizcaya. In New Granada the scenario is more complex: on the one hand, the provinces correspond to governorships such as Cartagena, Santa Marta or Antioquia, but also (generally) some Spanish *corregimientos* such as Tunja or Mariquita, while others (the government of Neiva) were part of the "province of the New Kingdom". The latter refers to the kingdoms of the monarchy considered as provinces. In the Orinoco, to the east of the New Kingdom, the "Province of the Llanos" had two governors but contained townships that were under the jurisdiction of Tunja or Mariquita. In Chile, there was also a confusion between provinces, *corregimientos* and *partidos*¹².

In Cartagena and Santa Marta, the transition from governorship to province occurred as a result of what the Royal Audiencia perceived as too much independence; in the 16th century, alliances between governors and *encomenderos* were frequent, resulting in a systematic rejection of the *visitadores* to the governorships, sent from Santafé. During this century, indigenous resistance to Spanish advances continued. But the 17th century gave rise to what has been called a "permissive attitude towards the plundering of the *encomenderos* by the second [encomenderos]"¹³. The demographic problem already appeared as a defect of such *laissez faire* policies. Moreover, this coincided with the time of greater appointments of *criollo* officials in the Indies, who had close ties with the *encomenderos*. At this dawn of Spanish territoriality superimposed on the territory, certain features of what would become a zone difficult to govern from the capital of the Kingdom were already appearing. In 1598, an attempt

¹² <https://www.hgis-indias.net/dokuwiki/doku.php?id=conceptos:nivel-provincia>

¹³ Hugues R Sánchez Mejía, “Adjudicación y conflictos por tierras comunales en los pueblos de indios de Ciénaga y Gaira en la *gobernación de Santa Marta, 1700-1810*”, *Investigación y Desarrollo* 20, núm. 2 (2012): 254–79.

had been made to regulate the use and deployment of *boga* (the activity of navigating in canoes following indigenous practices) but these were not complied with and the encomenderos delegated the task of *boga* to slaves of African descent. In 1610, the visit of Juan de Villabona y Zubiaurre led to the assignment of *resguardos* to the Alcoholados and Pintados Indians. Zubiaurre's visit highlighted the destitution experienced by the Indians, devastated by hard working conditions, dispossessed of their lands due to lack of titles, and under pressure from Spanish neighbors who extended their lands asking for grants, cow lands and encomiendas. This situation would bring the encomenderos and the visitor into conflict on numerous occasions during the 16th and 17th centuries, when the encomiendas still abounded as productive units.

From the previous pages, it emerges that, from the early days of the Spanish presence in the Indies, various forms of habitat and labor were seen to emerge in the political and territorial units. Three concepts must be introduced in order to proceed: encomiendas, *mita* and *resguardos*. The first thing to note, is that the morphology of settlements in the provinces of Cartagena and Santa Marta made for a situation in which indigenous communities lived under different ways, other than pueblos de Indios. On the one hand, as in the central Andes, although on a much smaller scale, encomiendas persisted into the 18th century. On the other, there were *resguardos*, which had been created in the 16th century to allow Indians the usufruct of land.

Resguardos were spats of land assigned to *pueblos de indios* in the 1590s until the 1650s. They were assigned to the Cacique and reverted to the Crown after a defined period. Resguardos therefore did not entail land possession but land usufruct. They were created to relieve abuses by conquistadors, granting Indians certain rights to land. For indeed, *resguardos* were encompassed under a legislation that granted resguardos a legal status. It was the task of *Visitadores* appointed by the Royal Audiencia to enforce this legislation by assigning resguardos. The idea was to grant land security to Indian communities (allowing them to grow crops and administer their land) while also monitoring their life and work. In the late 18th century, the lands under the qualification of resguardos would be reclaimed by Indian pueblos who sought to demonstrate their use of the land granted them rights over it. The resistance to visits generals in the

province of Santa Marta makes the task of identifying the placements and origins of the few registered *resguardos*¹⁴.

The *encomienda*, a productive unit created in the 16th century, functioned on the basis of two authorities, a civil one (a “known person” who had royal delegation, the *encomendero*) and an ecclesiastical one, the *capellán*. The *encomendero* had judicial powers and a guardianship that was generously defined: he must ensure that justice existed and was maintained among the neighbors, that the Indians complied with their duties and with the royal service). The *capellán* was in charge of the education of the Indians, both spiritual and political: he taught the mysteries of the faith and to pay the tithe, and to the king his tributes¹⁵. This same distribution of the tasks of teaching the Indians was later noted in the Indian villages founded between the *aguerra* captains and the *cura doctrinero*. The collaboration between these two officials combined both civil and ecclesiastical jurisdictions where the jurisdictions overlapped imperfectly. We have seen this, for example, in the previous chapter where each depended on a higher authority (respectively, the captain depended on the governor of Antioquia and the priest depended on the bishop of the ecclesiastical province of Popayán). At the beginning, the *encomienda* involved education and labor supervision. Later, the *encomiendas* became productive units, dedicated more to work than to catechesis. In the 18th century, the *encomiendas* belonged both to the Crown and to individuals, who could hold them for three lifetimes.

Although the *encomienda* could not be transmitted intra-familially for more than three generations, it survived until well into the 18th century, particularly in the Kingdom of Peru and the New Kingdom of Granada. In New Spain, especially in the north, the lands were used for cattle raising, giving rise to forms of occupation and use of the land on large estates, between *encomienda* and *hacienda*¹⁶. In the New Kingdom, the *encomiendas vacas* were systematically integrated into the crown from the second half of the 17th century onwards; the Andean region saw the persistence of the highest proportion of *encomiendas* compared to the rest of the kingdom. Even so, the integration of the *encomiendas* to the Crown, in order to create conglomerates of usable lands that could be sold and granted, gave rise to other forms of dependence than those

¹⁴ Ibid, Luna.

¹⁵ Chaunu, *Conquête et exploitation des nouveaux mondes*, 224.

¹⁶ Citing Silvio Zavala on this, see Chaunu, *Conquête et exploitation des nouveaux mondes*.

of the *encomienda*. This was the case of the *Yanaconas*, or foreign Indians, mentioned in chapter 4, or of the *inquilinos* (tenants) in Chile.

In the New Kingdom of Granada, the *encomiendas* of the Neogranadian Caribbean were less successful, profitable, and stable than those of the central Andes, around Santafé de Bogotá. This was due to several factors. In part, because the Muisca population of the Andes suffered a lesser demographic toll than the populations of the Caribbean; the descendants of the Muisca had better conditions to survive in a sedentary manner and practicing agriculture¹⁷. On the other hand, there was more space to flee from the Spanish advance in the province of Santa Marta, so a greater proportion of the population was free.

In terms of demographic variation, it is difficult to estimate the toll that labor took on indigenous populations. L. G. Luna has compared available compendiums of data from various sources, and has found that, in the provinces Cartagena, like the case in Antioquia¹⁸ Indian populations suffered an important toll between the last quarter of the 16th century (1675) and the first sixth of the 17th century (1615), to only recover by the end of the 17th century (around 1690). Oidor of the Royal Audiencia, Francisco de Aramburu, remarked that:

“Muchos pueblos, en veinte años, habían quedado reducidos a siete, cinco hasta dos individuos. Los que estaban en peor situación eran los vecinos de Santa Marta, que ocupaban en todos los menesteres de la ciudad y de la infantería, acarrando agua, leña y pesca, haciendo oficios de vigías y centinelas, y extrayendo sal, sin dejarles tiempo para entregarse a sus sementeras y cultivos.”¹⁹

And in fact, Aramburu was not alone in this. Reports that Indian populations were dwindling at high speed due to abuses by officers, *encomenderos* and friars alike, multiplied after the 1680s. In 1686 the Crown expedited a royal *cédula* to quell abuses to Indians; *cédulas* of this kind would be expedited and reexpedited throughout the first decade of the 18th century²⁰. This was mainly due to work conditions and mistreatments by *corregidores* and *encomenderos*.

¹⁷ Carl Henrik Langebaek, *Indios y españoles en la antigua provincia de Santa Marta, Colombia: Documentos de los siglos XVI y XVII* (Universidad de los Andes, 2007).

¹⁸ Córdoba Ochoa, “La memoria del agravio en los indígenas según la visita de Herrera Campuzano a la gobernación de Antioquia (1614-1616)”.

¹⁹Sánchez Mejía, “Adjudicación y conflictos por tierras comunales en los pueblos de indios de Ciénaga y Gaira en la gobernación de Santa Marta, 1700-1810”. Cited in Restrepo, 1975, p. 308.

²⁰ Sánchez Mejía.

2) Mistreatments and protectors

In both the *encomienda* and the *resguardo*, the Indians were expected to work to pay taxes. In addition, many of them were subjected to the *mita*. The *mita* was a system of work owed to a superior authority as part of an unequal relationship of dependence. It derived from the Incaic labor system that Inca rulers used to carry out public works and implied a rotation of summoned *mita 'yoq* (origin of the Spanish term *mitayo* in accord to their geographic position and their previous contributions. During the first stages of the Spanish conquest of Peru, *mitayos* were summoned in traditional ways to work in constructions. They were not paid anything as per Incaic custom, and only after a rebellion of encomenderos in the 1550s did the Crown stipulate that native labor should be waged²¹. With the development of the *encomienda*, the often functioned as a system of forced labor, as shown by the mortality rates in the mines of Potosí. Europeans were no strangers to forced labor, as forms of feudal tribute by way of labor had been introduced in Medieval Europe. For example, in the Kingdom of France, in the *corvées* were due to feudal landlords as payment for their tenancy. The system, whereby tenants signed a contract with the *seigneur* (contracts of *fermage* or *métayage*) guaranteed them the usufruct of their plots in exchange for material tribute and labor. *Corvées* were complementary to physical tribute paid in nature²².

The *mita* was not the only type of Indian labor in the Spanish Monarchy, though. Of course, it is worth remembering that in some areas of the Spanish Indies, the Indians provided a free and paid labor force, this was the case of some Chichimecas in Parral, New Spain, who were paid in blankets. In Mexico, the *Obrajes* system, which was also based on indigenous labor, essentially female, was not substantially different from the forced labor in the mines²³. In the new Kingdom of Granada, the *mita* functioned on a much smaller scale as a result of the early demographic decline²⁴: in Mariquita, the silver mines were worked by Indians as we saw in chapter 2, in Zipaquirá (Central

²¹ John Howland Rowe, "The Incas Under Spanish Colonial Institutions", *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 37, núm. 2 (1957): 155–99, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2510330>.

²² *Corvées* were reduced in the XIIIth century as an agricultural shift took place in the Kingdom of France, improving productions means and rentability. See Georges Duby, "Discussion : La révolution agricole médiévale", *Études rurales* 145, núm. 1 (1997): 51–57; On work and unequal dependancy in the Middle Ages, see, for example Alessandro Stella, "Travail et dépendances au Moyen Âge : une problématique", *Collection de l'Institut des Sciences et Techniques de l'Antiquité* 698, núm. 1 (1999): 227–44.

²³ Chaunu, *Conquête et exploitation des nouveaux mondes*, 306–7.

²⁴ Bonilla, "El funcionamiento del tributo en Nueva Granada a finales del siglo XVII".

Andes) there was a salt *mita*, there was one too in the salt marshes of Santa Marta, pearl diving *mita* in Riohacha. Whatever the system of forced labor, it was always accompanied by a tribute, which was the symbolic basis of subjection, as in any political space articulated on a fiscal structure.

All of which brings us to the problem of taxation. At the end of the 16th century in New Spain about 9 and a half *reales* (or 4 *tomines*, 6 grains of gold and 3 maravedis) plus half a bushel of corn were paid per tributary (i.e. per tributary man, head of family); in New Granada 9 *tomines* (five pesos) plus eleven *tomines* corresponding to other arrears (the requinto, the Corregidor's salary, the tribute to the cacique and the aids to the *doctrinero*) were paid. In this sense, the Indians of New Granada were imposed disproportionate tributes with respect to those of New Spain²⁵. The disproportion of tributes would be, in the 17th and 18th centuries, one of the most frequent causes that would lead Indian communities to advocate for a reduction of tributes; other frequent causes were the accusations of mistreatment perpetrated by the authority in question (*encomendero*, *corregidor*, captain).

Advocacy for such causes was the responsibility of the protector of Indians; paid by the community of natives and mobile throughout the territory. In the New Kingdom of Granada, partly due to the depletion of the native populations, partly due to specific complaints, the office of *Protector* was regulated at the end of the 17th century. In 1673 a Royal Cédula was issued on the need to appoint a general protector for the kingdom, in view of the decimation of the populations. In 1684, a young Antonio de la Pedrosa was named protector of Indians, the same one who thirty years later would oversee preparing the kingdom for the arrival of the first viceroy. Those who generally sounded the alarm about the state of the indigenous populations were the *visitadores*; but as we have pointed out, these were frequently confronted with the interests of groups of neighbors and encomenderos who frowned upon this interference from higher, more distant, and in any case uncomfortable scrutiny. The experience spoke for itself, since Herrera Capuzano's visita in 1611 had led the Crown to improve certain aspects of the Indians' living and working conditions.

²⁵ Julián Bautista Ruiz Rivera, *Encomienda y mita en Nueva Granada en el siglo XVII* (Editorial CSIC - CSIC Press, 1975), 241.


In the province of Santa Marta, *visitas* were scarce, as L. G. Luna has pointed out. But they were not nonexistent. In 1691, Juan Cuadrado de Lara was named general visitor by the royal audience. His *visita* extended throughout the province of Santa Marta, with particular attention to Ciudad de los Reyes de Valledupar, the gateway to the Guajira peninsula from the interior to the coast. Cuadrado de Lara had been sent to investigate the pacification enterprise of Governor Jeronimo Royo, who had sent Alonso del Castillo to subdue the Tomocos Indians, accused of causing damage to other towns. Cuadrado traveled to the province of Santa Marta and produced a report recounting the mistreatment of the Indians by their encomenderos. Furthermore, his inspection also highlighted the fact that the Arawak Indians who lived (and still live) in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta had their "churches", that is, temples, where they practiced their customs²⁶.

The Arawaks were on the list of hostile native populations enumerated by *teniente* José Nicolás de la Rosa ("there are a variety of appellatives, which are Chimilas, Alcoholados, Aurohuacos, Guajiros, Cocinas, Tupes, Acanayutos, Pampanillas, Orejones, Motilones and Pintados", cited above). They lived in the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta but kept friendly relations with other populations that were not subjugated, such as the Motilones, Coguis and Chimilas. The Coguis inhabited the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta; the Chimilas inhabited the center of the province, had villages on both sides of the Magdalena River, and circulated in the territory around the Ariguani and Cesar rivers with the help of the Indians of the town of San Sebastián de Rábago, south of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta²⁷. The Motilones lived in the eponymous mountain range, today the Colombian-Venezuelan border and some areas of the provinces of Mérida and Maracaibo²⁸. The map below offers a cartographic representation of the different free native groups in the province of Santa Marta in 1700.

²⁶ See Langebaek, *Indios y españoles en la antigua provincia de Santa Marta, Colombia*.

²⁷ Luna, "La política de población y pacificación indígena en las poblaciones de Santa Marta y Cartagena (Nuevo Reino de Granada), 1750-1800".

²⁸ Herrera Ángel, *Ordenar para controlar*, 262.



Source: map n°21 Marta Herrera Ángel, *Ordenar para controlar*, Universidad de los Andes, 2014. Province of Santa Marta, 1700. Settlements controlled by the colonial state and “Chimila” territories.

If we return to the words of Lieutenant José Nicolás de la Rosa, the Pintados Indians also appear in the list of rebel Indians, according to the lieutenant's classification. It seems striking that the Pintados are both included in a list of non-

subjugated populations, and that at the same time the story of their conversion is present in the same text. And this ambiguity of the painted Indians is precisely what makes them interesting. Lieutenant de la Rosa had had good relations with them and managed to interview them in some of their villages; however, de la Rosa classified them together with the Chimilas in the text that would be edited and published later. What happened to the Pintados between the first decades of the 18th century and the middle of the century? In the following part we will see who the Pintados were, the role they played in the province, and how they tried to assert provisions in their favor to improve their conditions.

II-The pintados in the province of Santa Marta: integration and service

1) An ethnohistorical sketch of the Pintados

Circulating in different parts of the provinces of Santa Marta and Cartagena²⁹, the Pintados were one amongst the many groups of Indians who lived in close contact with the Spanish and *criollo* populations of the Caribbean coast and hinterland. Although they were perceived as belonging to a unified ethnic group by the Spanish, the Pintados were not in fact a homogenous people as their adherence to colonial society and evangelization doesn't seem to have been uniform. The Pintados were an ethnic group of indigenous peoples that inhabited the territory encompassing the *ciénegas* of Zura, Zapatosa, San Pablo, and the eastern banks of the Magdalena River around Tenerife.

The name “pintado”, given to them by the Spanish, refers to the way in which these natives scored their skin and filled in the resulting wounds with pigments of different colors, creating multi-colored tattoos that decorated their bodies, along with feathers, turbans, and arrows³⁰. Often, the Pintados were mentioned in relation to the Chimilas, a larger ethnic group living in the center of the Province of Santa Marta, who frustrated provincial authorities for decades³¹. Because of their fierce resistance to the

²⁹ AGN, Caciques e indios, 36, f. 816.

³⁰ Rosa, José Nicolás de la, *Floresta*, p. 289. De la Rosa specifies that the ones who “remain subjected have moderated these customs”, and the few who remained free were fugitives, spotted accompanying the “Caribes” (a general term used to refer to non-subjugated Indians). See Herrera Ángel, Marta, *Ordenar para controlar*, p.290.

³¹ The Chimilas have been thoroughly studied by historians and anthropologists as self-recognized *ette* (Chimilas) still inhabit parts of the same region. For anthropological studies on the Chimilas see: Niño

authority of the Crown and its officials, the Chimilas represented an ongoing territorial challenge for several reasons. Namely, their territory spanned the area that stretches from the south of the Sierra Nevada to the Mompo branch of the Magdalena River (the “Magdalena bank”), and from the Cesar River in the east, to the Magdalena River in the west (see map)³². The territory inhabited by the Pintados was located within the margins of the area in which the Chimilas circulated, which made the relationship between the two nations complex.

Most of time, the Pintados were classified as “docile”³³ Indians because, according to the information given to lieutenant José Nicolás de la Rosa, they had voluntarily embraced the Catholic faith by the end of the 17th century³⁴, as opposed to the “infidel” Chimilas³⁵. De la Rosa, who wrote around in 1720, transcribed a speech made by the most senior of the Pintado elders, in which he recalled how a small group of them had come to leave their lands “up in the mountain”. It is not de la Rosa who witnesses the telling of the story, but Martín Amuscoteguí, *cacique* of the Pintados in the years 1690-1719³⁶ —himself born “in the mountain”—. It is he who narrated it to the lieutenant, who transcribed the narration “since the journey of these Pintados Indians to seek the Catholic faith is a particular case, and since I have individual news of it, I cannot omit it”. Cacique Martín de Amuscoteguí³⁷ summoned the Pintado elders to a *Cabildo abierto*³⁸, where the men collectively agreed that the eldest of all should recount the way in which they had left the *montes* to become Christians:

“That he and all those of that nation had their village in the heart of that vast

Vargas, “Cielos de destrucción y regeneración: experiencia histórica entre los ette del norte de Colombia”; Niño Vargas, “El tejido del cosmos. Tiempo, espacio y arte de la hamaca entre los ette (chimila)”; Juan Camilo Niño Vargas, “Cosmos Ette. Ethnographie d’un univers du nord de la Colombie”, 2018.

³² See González Luna, Lola, “La Nación Chimila: Un caso de resistencia indígena en la nación de Santa Marta”, in García Jordán ed., *Pilar Conquista y resistencia en la historia de América*, Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona, 1991, p. 123-137.

³³ Other terms used were: “reduced”, “domestic”, “subjected”, in Herrera Ángel, Marta, *Ibid.*, p. 296.

³⁴ Rosa, José Nicolás de la, *Floresta*, p. 202, 203.

³⁵ On the distinction between “docile” and “infidel” or “barbarous” Indians, see: Herrera Ángel, Marta, *Ibid.*, p. 296.

³⁶ We know Martín Amuscoteguí was the Cacique of the Pintados of the village of San Pablo de los Pintados, formerly known as San Pablo de Zárate, in the jurisdiction of Tenerife in the 1690’s and at least until 1719. See Herrera Ángel, Marta, *Ibid.*, p.295.

³⁷ The name was written at times with the “de”.

³⁸ The Cabildo was conformed of a number of *vecinos* (in Spanish towns) or Indian males (in Indian *pueblos*). *Cabildos abiertos* were extraordinary meetings that were open to a greater number of the inhabitants of a circumscription in the Spanish Monarchy when a particularly poignant decision or consultation had to be made.

mountain, where he was born, and **that one morning the old cacique took eight other Indians, all armed with their tungals, arrows, hoops and turbans, and walking on foot, had come to Tenerife to ask their father to baptize them,** and especially Fr. Francisco de Zura, teacher of doctrine, who was then from the town of Gongori". The ministers of the town asked the priest who was there, and offering him the case, and noted that the Indians had said that he should go alone, unaccompanied by no other person, because the town was in an uproar from the sudden arrival of nine *Carib Indians*; **but Fr. Francisco, burning with Catholic zeal, and trusting in the providence of the Lord, who had moved them, running over risks and inconveniences, resolved to go with them,** and prepared himself with a short viaticum, and on the same day he set out on foot with his wild guides. He finally arrived at the *ranchería* of the Pintados and assured by his good reception that **they wished to enter the fragrant countryside and most fertile sacred forest of our Catholic Church,** he began to educate them, persuading them together to go out and settle closer to the Spaniards. The Indians did not want to leave the mountain, judging that if they came closer, the whites (as they say) would want to dominate them. A few days passed in this persuasion, and Father Francisco, under the pretext of bringing new supplies, returned to the village, and having provided himself with ornaments and other necessary things, **returned to the *ranchería*, and got the Indians to leave to found their town on the island called Las Inmundicias,** in the middle of a swamp that is in that mountain, and there they made their huts, and the apostolic Father began to found his Church, and even before finishing it, he died³⁹."

Much is left to one's imagination, because little indicates where these mountains might be, if the term even refers to such a landform⁴⁰; if it does, it indicates little as there are several possible mountain ranges in the area⁴¹. If the cacique is correct, and the old man who declared the tale was in fact around a hundred years old, the events must have taken place in the first half of the 17th century.

³⁹ "Que él y todos los de aquella nación tenían su pueblo en el corazón de aquella montaña dilatadísima, donde había nacido, y que una mañana tomó el cacique viejo otros ocho indios, armados todos de sus tungales, flechas, aros y turbantes, y caminando a pie, habían venido a Tenerife a pedir padre que los bautizase, y señaladamente al P. Francisco de Zura, maestro de doctrina, que entonces era del pueblo de Gongori». Solicitaron los ministros de la villa al Padre que se hallaba en ella, y proponiéndole el caso, y que los indios ponían la condición, de que había de ir solo, sin compañía de otra persona alguna, que ellos le desanimaban para la empresa, porque aún de la repentina llegada de aquellos nueve flecheros caribes, se hallaba alborotada la villa; pero el P. Francisco, encendido en celo católico, y confiando en la providencia del Señor, que los había movido, atropellando riesgos e inconvenientes, resolvió ir con ellos, y se preparó de un corto viático, y en el mismo día tomó a pie el camino con sus montaraces guías. Llegó finalmente a la *ranchería* de los Pintados, y asegurado con su buena acogida de que deseaban entrar en el oloroso campo y fecundísima sagrada floresta de nuestra católica Iglesia, empezó a educarlos, persuadiéndolos juntamente a que saliesen a poblarse más cerca de los españoles. Los indios no querían dejar la montaña, juzgando que de acercarse más, querían los blancos (como ellos dicen) dominarlos. En esta persuasiva pasaron pocos días, y el P. Francisco, con pretexto de llevar nuevos bastimentos se volvió a la villa, y previniéndose de ornamentos y demás cosas necesarias, volvió a la *ranchería*, y consiguió que saliesen los indios a fundar su pueblo en la isla llamada de Las Inmundicias, en medio de una ciénaga que se halla en aquella montaña, y allí hicieron sus ranchos, y el apostólico Padre empezó a fundar su Iglesia, y aún sin acabarla, murió."

⁴⁰ In the Caribbean plains, he terms "monte" or "montaña", other than alluding to a mountainous formation, referred to vegetation or wilderness. See Herrera Ángel, Marta, *Ibid.* p.68.

⁴¹ In particular, the Sierras de María, located southwest of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, home to a number of maroon communities in the early 18th century

The explanation for the Pintados' sudden will to integrate the catholic faith and Spanish Monarchy is murky. For indeed, the Pintados, at the time of *teniente de la Rosa's* activity, were living in a series of Spanish settlements. They represented a story of successful conversion, hence de la Rosa's insistence on alluding to it in his memoirs as *teniente*. Even so, the account offered by the oldest man in the village according to whom faith had driven them, is compelling but insufficient. He explained that "We, the Pintados did not cost the Spaniards gunpowder or bullets, because we went out of our own free will to seek God. Then they sent us another Father and we got closer, until we populated these two towns that we have here, in which our saints were distributed, to make two churches for them". Teniente de la Rosa added that the pintados had "secret communication with those of the town of Zura", which was administered by Father Francisco Góngori, and that they had heard of the good treatment that the *feligreses* of Zura enjoyed and had understood the certainty of the evangelical doctrine.

Narratives about communications between native groups were brandished by authorities in its two ways. In some cases, the proselytism carried out by Indians who had "embraced the catholic faith" was commonly praised and encouraged by officials; conversely, these officials recounted in alarm incidents where barbarous Indians "corrupted" docile natives, enticing them to err from the true Catholic faith. We saw this in chapter 5 with the natives in Citará. But natives themselves used stories of willful conversion to support their position, as we will see. Thus, it is possibly to infer the account of the Pintados' conversion might have underlying factors which cannot transpire from the *teniente de la Rosa's* transcription.

As to their ethno-linguistic filiation amongst other indigenous groups of the area, Colombian anthropologist Gerardo Reichel Dolmatoff associated the Pintados with the Chimilas, believing they belonged to the same ethno-linguistic group⁴². However, more recent works, and the study of primary sources may indicate otherwise. Indeed, the pintados appear to be heavily linked to the Malibu, with whom they were frequently congregated in villages, and alongside whom they appear in 19th century

⁴² There has been great debate on the linguistic filiation of the Chimilas themselves. In 1946 Gerardo Reichel Dolmatoff exposed the theory that they spoke an Arawak language; in a 1952 publication, Paul Rivet proposed the language they spoke might have belonged to the Malibu linguistic family of the area around Mompo; in 1993 Adolfo Constenla suggested they belong to the Arahaco branch of the Chibchan languages. On this see María Emilia Montes Rodríguez y Constanza Moya Pardo, *Mysca: memoria y presencia* (Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 2016).

sources⁴³. Further research needs to be carried out in order to clarify this point as recent studies classify Chimila as belonging to the Chibchan linguistic family, whose speakers mostly lived in the Andes and Pacific Coast (the Emberas from the Chocó, broadly called “Chocoos”, also belonged to this family)⁴⁴. In contrast, the Malibu languages, spoken around the Magdalena River, were deemed to have no filiation to any known linguistic group by French linguist Paul Rivet⁴⁵. But more recently, Nicolás del Castillo Mathieu suggested they might belong to the Caribbean language group Cariban language branch⁴⁶.

The activities we know they carried out around Tenerife are that of the *boga* (navigation), in which they served as oarsmen, as well as the cultivation of lands for their sustenance, where they cultivated manioc⁴⁷. We also know, from letters written by officials, that they had herds of cattle to which they lived in proximity⁴⁸. Nicolás de la Rosa also mentions they extracted a type of balm from trees that abounded in the region they inhabited, producing a type of balm called *bálsamo de Tolú*, a substance which had medicinal uses and was known in Spain at the time⁴⁹.

Finally, a remark on their unicity as a people or is in order. We have seen that there are traces that attest to the existence of a native group referred to by Spanish observers as Pintados on account of their tattooing practices; they probably belonged

⁴³ In his vast study of Franciscan missions, brother Francisco Gregorio Arcila lists the settlements belonging to the Franciscan mission of Tenerife: “San Buenaventura de Tenerife, San Pablo de Nervití, Doctrina de Pallares, San Antonio de Guaimaral, San Nicolás de Barí de Punta de Palma, San Pablo de Zárate, Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria de la Plata.” He then qualifies the Indians inhabiting these villages or *pueblos* (“indios tenerifeños”) as “Malibúes y Pintados”. Gregorio Arcila Robledo, *Las misiones franciscanas en Colombia: estudio documental* (Impr. Nacional, 1950), 493.

⁴⁴ Terrell Malone and Adolfo Constela Umaña exposed these theories in the late 20th century, and the question has been studied more recently by Juan Camilo Niño Vargas. See Juan Camilo Niño Vargas, *Diccionario de la lengua ete*, Instituto Colombiano de Antropología e. Historia (Icanh) / Universidad de los Andes, vol. 544 (Bogotá, 2018).

⁴⁵ For a compendium of classifications of native American languages, see <https://glottolog.org/>. For works on the Malibu languages specifically, see <https://glottolog.org/resource/languoid/id/mali1242>.

⁴⁶ This hypothesis is all the more compelling, considering the Yupe or Motilon Indians, living near the Pintados, and other groups living near the Sierra de Perijá, spoke a language belonging to the Cariban language family. For more on the classification of Yupe/Motilon as a Cariban language, see Čestmír Loukotka, *Classification of South American Indian Languages* (Latin American Center, UCLA, 1968).

⁴⁷ Rosa, José Nicolás de la, *Floresta*, p.203.

⁴⁸ AGN, Miscelánea, Empleados Públicos, Volume 21, folder 2, f. 440.

⁴⁹ See entry “Bálsamos naturales” in Ballano, Antonio, comp., *Diccionario de medicina y cirugía, volume I*, Madrid: Imprenta Real, 1805. The town of Santiago de Tolú is located on the coast, south-west of Cartagena.

to the Carib family. During the 17th century, some were reduced into encomiendas⁵⁰, some descended from the mountain ranges of Santa Marta province and settled around Tenerife. These assessments do not constitute proof that the Pintados were a unified indigenous *nación*, but rather, they reflect the classification offered by authorities whose taxonomical capacities were often limited by binary dynamics (friendly/unfriendly; barbarous/docile). Thus, the previous remarks raise more questions. Were these different groups of “Pintados” the same people? Did they speak the same language? Did they relate to Chimilas and other natives in the same manner?

Let’s look at the area in which they lived. Located south of Tamalameque, Tenerife was jurisdictionally dependent on Santa Marta but sometimes included within Cartagena’s jurisdiction)⁵¹. Indeed, the porosity of the Magdalena River as an interprovincial border was, crucially, one of the reasons for the considerable circulation of natives outside of Spanish control in between Cartagena and Santa Marta provinces. The jurisdictional ambiguity between both provinces was a cause for frictions, between governors who called each other out when incidents with cimarrones living on the frontier came to the attention of officials, and also between vecinos who profited from commerce in Mompox, Cartagena but lived in *haciendas* located in Santa Marta⁵². The river acted as a fluid frontier which was essential for the transportation of goods from the interior. Therefore, the Pintados lived on the most important north-south axis in the Kingdom. After 1694, the town of San Pablo de los Pintados was divided in two, in two villages by the name of Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria de la Plata and San Pablo de los Pintados⁵³. We also know that in 1719 a group of Pintados Indians were gathered in

⁵⁰ Luna, “Características de las Gobernaciones de Santa Marta y Cartagena en relación al tema de los Resguardos indígenas”.

⁵¹ Tamalameque had been an important hub for commerce since the 16th century on account of its geographical position. However, in 1708 the city was nearly entirely engulfed in a fire from which the city never recovered; in the 1720s Mompox, in the province of Cartagena, became the most important trading post in the coastal hinterland. See Herrera Ángel, *Ordenar para controlar*, 77.

⁵² On this question, see Herrera Ángel, 122–23.

⁵³ Rosa, José Nicolás de la, *Floresta*, p.201. The full name of the second Pintado village is Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria, located on the “isla (island) de la Plata”. All of the information I have found on this village is contained in the petitions made by the *defensores*. Presumably, this village was located on one of the river-islands on the Magdalena river, close to Tenerife. The area encompasses a different village called “Plato”; it seems likely that the name “Plato” was a morphological variation of the noun “Plata” (silver) in *isla de la Plata*. Luna, “Características de las Gobernaciones de Santa Marta y Cartagena en relación al tema de los Resguardos indígenas”.

the Indian village of San Pablo de los Pintados, in the jurisdiction of Tenerife⁵⁴. Around 1740, the village was called San Pablo de Zárate, though it was indicated that it belonged to the Pintados Indians, as did Plato. Near Tenerife, the town of San Pablo probably stood near the Ciénaga de San Juan, in front of which there is the large island on that area of the Magdalena River, near Plato, Zárate and Tenerife. If the hypothesis around correct, it would mean the Pintados lived about 200km away from Santa Marta, which is coherent with the claim —explained further below— according to which they lived a week’s travel away from Santa Marta. A satellite cutting of the area is offered below for reference; it shows the river Magdalena and numerous *ciénegas* (marshes), with the villages’ estimated location.

⁵⁴ Herrera, *Ordenar para controlar. Ordenamiento espacial y control político en las Llanuras del Caribe y en los Andes centrales neogranadinos. Siglo XVIII*, 340.



Map 6: Location map, Isla de la Plata and San Juan de los Pintados.
 Personal production based on sources cited in the chapter.

2) The role of the Pintados at the end of the 17th century

In July 1689, enemy ships were spotted at the mouth of the Río Grande de la Magdalena, on the Caribbean coast of the New Kingdom of Granada. According to officials in Santa Marta, the enemy intended to navigate upriver in war sloops with the intention of sacking the towns of Mompox and Tenerife. The captain *aguerra*⁵⁵ of Barranca, Antonio Mejía y Alarcón, urged the justices in Tenerife (located on the riverbanks of the Magdalena River) to send reinforcements, who in turn summoned the Pintados for assistance. They required 36 young men along with guns, accompanied by their *cavo*. The Pintados complied and arrived quickly, aiding Captain Mejía's men in repelling the foreign ships⁵⁶. The events of July 1689 weren't an isolated incident. From 1689 French filibusters were used by the Louis XIV during the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-1797)⁵⁷, as a means of aggression against his enemies⁵⁸. The presence of foreigners on the Caribbean coast of the Spanish Monarchy would only increase thenceforth, culminating in the years following the War of Succession (1702-1714). The protection of Spanish coasts became ever more troublesome and urgent. Foreign attacks and incursions were frequent in the areas around the mouths of rivers, whereby access to the interior was facilitated, and which local authorities struggled to guard, as the coastline of the New Granada stretched for 800 kilometers, from the Gulph of Darién to the Guajira Peninsula⁵⁹.

⁵⁵ Captains *aguerra* were officers with military and judicial jurisdiction who emerged in border zones within the Spanish Empire. Their functions vary, as some also amassed the title of "corregidores" which gave them the status of magistrates, with legal and political powers delegated to them by the King. According to Jorge Conde Calderón, this was a source of jurisdictional conflicts between captains *aguerra* and other officials —governors, mayors, *alcaldes mayores*, *regidores*, *alcaldes pedáneos*— and municipal institutions (*cabildos* and consulates of towns and cities). See Jorge Conde Calderón, "Capitanes a Guerra: Gobierno económico y político en el Virreinato del Nuevo Reino de Granada", *Historia Caribe* 11, núm. 29 (diciembre de 2016): 155–82, <https://doi.org/10.15648/hc.29.2016.7>.

⁵⁶ AGN, Caciques e Indios, 33, f 996, 997.

⁵⁷ This particular conflict saw France stand against an alliance of European powers, mainly the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, and the United Provinces.

⁵⁸ Moreno Álvarez, Leonardo Guillermo, "La piratería americana y su incidencia en el Nuevo Reino de Granada, siglos XVI-XVIII: un Ensayo bibliográfico", *Fronteras de la Historia*, n. 12, 2007, p. 373-404.

⁵⁹ The mouths of the Magdalena, Sinú and Río de la Hacha rivers were particularly vulnerable to foreign attacks, as the different streams allowed for a myriad of ways inland. For a description of the difficulties in guarding the Caribbean coast of the New Granada, see AGI, Santa Fé, 384, Declaración del Alférez Don José Nicolás de la Rossa, Procurador general de la ciudad.

In the 1697 the city of Cartagena suffered a major blow as it was sieged by the Baron de Pointis on behalf of Louis XIV. The French attack, aside from illustrating the height of a two-decade long struggle between the two European powers, also pointed to Spain's weaknesses, both territorial and administrative⁶⁰. The attack revealed how frail the sturdiest of the mainland Spanish Caribbean ports was⁶¹. We have seen in chapters 1, 2, and 3 that there were many doubts amongst officials as to how to how to guard a coast with a meagre number of soldiers and few fortifications, and that several things were attempted in the first half of the century to this effect. A similar situation prevailed in Santa Marta. The city was populated, at the end of the 17th century, by little more than 20 *vecinos*⁶². It had endured 19 pirate attacks in the 39 years spanning 1655-1692⁶³, leading authorities to build small forts along the coastline, without much success at defending them. But many entry points, along the deltas of the Sinú, Magdalena and Río de la Hacha rivers allowed canoes and sloops to enter the New Granada, which made guarding the hinterland an essential preoccupation, as we have seen⁶⁴. It was in this context that the Pintados' military support was fundamental: they were military reserve summoned to guard the coast, one of little cost compared to paying soldier's wages.

Most of the information available on the activities and duties carried out by the Pintados during the early decades of the 18th century emanates from petitions they sent to the Crown between 1679 and 1719⁶⁵ by the caciques and several *protectors de*

⁶⁰ In particular given that the siege was able to go through because of the cooperation with the French of Cartagena's governor at the time, Diego de los Ríos, who had made arrangements to get paid part of the bounty after the sacking of the town. For a thorough study of the attack, see Rodríguez, *El asalto de Pointis a Cartagena de Indias*.

⁶¹ The construction of Cartagena's fortifications had resulted from the previous siege of Cartagena, and yet, a fort with no soldiers is as good as its structure can yield. This was precisely the case: the wages of a part of the city's soldiers had been diverted by the governor for his personal gain, thus leaving the ramparts of the city poorly guarded. See De la Matta Rodríguez, *Ibid.*, p.142-54.

⁶² Carmen Mena-García, "Santa Marta durante la Guerra de Sucesión española", *Anuario de estudios americanos*, núm. 36 (1979): 569-702.

⁶³ Mena-García.

⁶⁴ This point must be nuanced, as recent works on contraband in the province of Santa Marta have shown how "illicit commerce" was not only a beneficial but necessary activity on all levels of trade: for interimperial exchanges, between the Peninsula and the Americas, and on an interprovincial scale. See Granh Lance, *The political economy of smuggling : regional informal economies in early Bourbon New Granada*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1997.

⁶⁵ In carrying out this research, three sets of petitions have emerged, the oldest of which includes an *auto* (certification) from 1679 by the Bishop of Santa Marta, attesting the Pintados' service to the Crown. Thus, it is possible to infer that the petitions, which eventually led to royal dispositions in the years 1713-1714, had been in progress for much longer.

*Indios*⁶⁶, including certifications by local and regional officials, pleading for a lessening in their duties and mistreatments. In this sense, these documents contain letters of which the aim was to appeal to the Crown's responsibility to deliver justice⁶⁷ and protect indigenous populations from the abuses of local authorities. The *protectores*, who were mobile across the Monarchy's territory, were the main channel through which native groups could both seek justice and acquire knowledge on their rights, thereby creating a juridical culture amongst indigenous populations was the way to ensure the King's royal jurisdiction over them was effective⁶⁸. But the proceedings could sometimes take years and involve different officials who transcribed witnesses' testimony, assembled the documents, and sent them overseas.

One of the main figures that contributed to the petitions made by the Pintados was their cacique, Martín Amuscoteguí, responsible for numerous letters to the king between 1693 and 1719. One of his last letters gives us a sense of the hardships his community was facing in 1719. He wrote his people were in “danger of ruin known to all”⁶⁹, referring to the considerable decrease of their population as a result of their service to local officials. Specifically, the Pintados, both from San Pablo and Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria, were assigned guard duty in Santa Marta under the pretext of a scarcity of infantry soldiers, as a part of the *mita* (compulsory organized indigenous labor). Thus, groups of several dozens of male Pintados navigated northward up the Magdalena River for over seven days until they reached the port city of Santa Marta.

⁶⁶ *Protectores* (or *defensores*) de indios were individuals whose role it was to abide for justice on behalf of natives in case of injustice, mistreatments, abuse; they were present in trials before the Royal Audiencia's tribunal. In more remote zones, they were charged with amassing a series of documents which were then sent to the Audiencia in Santa Fé, and in some cases to Spain. The figure of the Indian Protector is closely linked to the idea of the “miserable indian”, developed in the early 16th century in order to promote the expansion of the Defensor's activities —as opposed to the duty of Bishops to protect them, of which the competences and scope were poorly defined. The category “defensor” was turned into an official position in the 1550's with Bartolomé de las Casas' endorsement. See Ceballos Bedoya, Nicolás, *Los usos indígenas del derecho en el Nuevo Reino de Granada durante las reformas borbónicas (1750-1810)*, master's thesis, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, (Medellín), 2020, p.51-53.

⁶⁷ As Carlos Garriga explains, it was the sovereign's topmost function to deliver justice to maintain the established political order. As such, the sovereign's main exercise was the resolution of conflicts amongst various spheres whose interests often differed and protecting the different rights and duties thereof. See Carlos Garriga, “Orden jurídico y poder político en el Antiguo Régimen”, *Istor: revista de historia internacional*, año IV, número 16, primavera de 2004, pp 1-21, 2004.

⁶⁸ On the of Indian Protectors and the access to justice by indigenous populations, see Caroline Cunill, “La circulación del derecho indiano entre los mayas: escritura, oralidad y orden simbólico en Yucatán, siglo XVI”, *Jahrbuch für Geschichte Lateinamerikas* 52, núm. 1 (2015): 15–36.

⁶⁹ Letter from Cacique Amuscoteguí (San Pablo de los Pintados) to the King, 1719, AGN, Caciques e Indios, 36, f. 816-819.

This posed several problems: it was not uncommon for them to be attacked by the rebel Chimilas on their way; once there, the insalubrious living conditions they were subjected to made vulnerable to fevers and measles, which decimated their population⁷⁰. Having completed their guard duties during the night, they were then required to work at the city's *fábricas*⁷¹ during the day. Amuscoteguí described the strenuous rhythm of labor and inhumane living conditions thus: “[the *fábricas*] with whose continuous and excessive work, the bad temper (climate) of the posts in which they were placed, and the infinity of predators, vermin, and other noxious vermin, they all became ill and died”⁷².

This was nothing new. In 1690, Captain Ignacio de Espinoza certified that sixteen Pintado Indians had been sleeping inside San Vicente castle in Santa Marta for over two months, receiving one *real* for their services each day, and suffering from the conditions in the castle⁷³. On some occasions, none of the summoned Pintados made it back to San Pablo, and often those who did brought illnesses with them and died in their villages. According to the Cacique (or his son, presumably, as Martín Amuscoteguí appears to be the cacique of San Pablo over 35 years later), writing in 1693, over 100 tributary Pintado Indians, died in 22 years of service as a result of the duties imposed on them. To give a sense of proportion, according to historian Lola Luna, there were 40 tributary Pintados in the *encomiendas* of Santa Marta and Tenerife in 1660. If the cacique's numbers are accurate, the death rate would have been of a little under 5 tributary Indians each year. The social impact of such high death rates was immense: the death of the male Pintados was often followed by that of their women and children, who died out of sheer need⁷⁴.

Aside from the *mita* by which they fulfilled guard duty, the Pintados played another military role, aiding local justices in their chase against of maroon populations in the province of Cartagena. This, they had done within larger militia groups of

⁷⁰ In 1693 a measles epidemic hit the New Granada, as attested in the letters by the cacique himself. See Emilio Quevedo, “El modelo higienista en el" nuevo reyno de granada" Durante los siglos XVI y XVII”, *Revista de la Facultad de Medicina* 53, núm. 1 (2005): 46–52.

⁷¹ According to Father Antonio Julián, the *fábricas* of the province were possibly centered around to wood extraction and boat construction. See Antonio Julián, *La perla de la America: provincia de Santa Marta, reconocida, observada y expuesta en discursos historicos* (A. de Sancha, 1787), 239–40.

⁷² AGN, *Ibid.*

⁷³ One Real, at the time, would've been equivalent to 34 maravedis. AGN, *Caciques e Indios*, 33, f. 999.

⁷⁴ AGN, *Caciques e Indios*, 36, *Ibid.*

hundreds of men; these were enlisted by the governors of Cartagena and Santa Marta to carry out *entradas* into neighboring *palenques* during the dry season (December through March)⁷⁵. Officers in the Province of Cartagena, whose enslaved population was around 1.952 people 1687⁷⁶, had to deal with the flight of enslaved peoples who managed to free themselves by considerable numbers⁷⁷; this trend would only increase in the years following the War of Succession and the massive importation of slaves through Cartagena.

In 1693 the president and *oidores* of the Royal Audiencia of Santafé dispatched a Royal Provision demanding the Pintados not be summoned to protect the coast, safe in case of a foreign attack, and ordering the justices in Cartagena to pay the Pintados for their services in the “pacification of the Palenque” from the same funds which had been used to pay the soldiers who assisted the operation⁷⁸. Indeed, in 1693 the Pintados had taken part in an expedition against a *palenque* located in the Sierras de María, in the province of Cartagena. The Pintados were excellent trackers across the difficult terrain of the Caribbean plains, hills, and forests, leading the way in scouting expeditions as they were able to distinguish whether footprints belonged “[to] a Spaniard, a Black, or an Indian”, as well as how much time had elapsed since the individual had imprinted them on the soil⁷⁹. Their knowledge of the “mountains” (they were qualified as *baqueanos*) made them crucial to local authorities who often had a mild understanding of their surroundings. The Royal Provision dispatched by the Royal Audiencia, ordering they be paid for their assistance, implies that no retribution had been given to them, which was not an exceptional occurrence.

Similarly, there are records of numerous occasions in which the Pintados participated in the pursuit and reduction of the rebel Chimilas in the neighboring province of Santa Marta. As Diego de Baños y Sotomayor, elected Bishop of Santa

⁷⁵ Herrera Ángel, *Ordenar para controlar*, 81–85.

⁷⁶ Of a total population of about 4.000 people, comprising: white vecinos (the only category accounted for in official census besides slaves), women children, enslaved people, churchmen, and the military. For these estimations, see Gómez Pérez, “La población de Cartagena de Indias a principios del siglo XVIII”.

⁷⁷ Marooning, or the action of escaping subjugation, was a generalized trend during the colonial period in the Americas. For instance, thousands of enslaved people fled Cartagena at the beginning of the 17th century, seeking freedom in the neighbouring Montes de María (a mountainous range in the province of Cartagena). See Helg, Aline, *¡Nunca más esclavos! Una historia comparada de los esclavos que se liberaron en las Américas*, Bogotá: Banco de la República / Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2018, p. 61-87.

⁷⁸ AGN, Caciques e indios, 33, f. 1006.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 993.

Marta in 1677, certified in 1679 before the King and his Council of the Indies, cacique Bernardino Amuscoteguí along with the Indians of San Pablo de los Pintados, had accompanied their convoy in the “operations undertaken for the reduction of the Chimila Indians”⁸⁰. A similar expedition was undertaken by a group of 30 Pintados in 1692, against a group of Chimilas who killed three people in the ramparts of Zura⁸¹. The same year, after repeated Chimila attacks along the *caminos reales*⁸² that crossed the Santa Marta Province, Cacique Martín Amuscoteguí and *capitán de naturales*⁸³ Luis de Lucas led an expedition of 40 Pintados armed with bows, arrows, shotguns and gunpowder, in search for Chimila villages in the wilderness. Upon scouting the terrain, they encountered a group of 30 Chimilas. According to Aflérez Salvador García, the Pintados were the first to kill three Chimilas by gun, displaying their loyalty to the crown in their fierceness, an ordeal for which García deemed they deserved a reward. A second and more violent encounter left trails of blood so profuse, the *alférez* (second lieutenant) concluded the Chimilas must have retracted because of “the many injured there were”. The account was confirmed by Captain Francisco de Larena y Cabrera, *alcalde ordinario* (magistrate) of Tenerife, who agreed the Pintados had displayed formidable allegiance to the Crown⁸⁴.

The accounts of the many officials of the provinces of Cartagena and Santa Marta show praise for the Pintados’ fierce assistance in guarding the provinces from foreigners, maroons and rebel indigenous groups. Within the case files, the certifications (*autos*), and official letters supporting the Pintados’ claims of loyalty allow us to take a glimpse at the relationship several Pintado Caciques had with the justices of Tenerife. Because the village of San Pablo de los Pintados was located in front of Tenerife, it acted as an *antemural* to the former *villa* and the surrounding villages, located on the eastern banks of the Magdalena River. Geographic proximity possibly favored close communications between the governor of Santa Marta and

⁸⁰ Ibid., f. 998

⁸¹ Ibid., f. 996

⁸² Highways built during the colonial period by Spanish authorities across the Empire.

⁸³ Position given to a military Indian chief, especially in border zones where indigenous populations were organized for warfare. See Magdalena Schibli, “Hacia una historia comparada de los pueblos de indios de San Joseph y San Marcos en la jurisdicción de Córdoba, siglo XVIII: autoridades, población, tierras y tributo”, *Memoria americana* 27, núm. 1 (2019): 107–25.

⁸⁴ Ibid f.996; f.1103-1004.

cacique Bernardino Amuscoteguí in the 1680s⁸⁵. The letters contained in the appeals seem to have been included with the objective of showing the “friendship” both men entertained. In one letter, the governor asked how the cacique’s health was, having learnt that the latter had injured his ankle and was unable to accompany the governor’s men on a mission. In another, we learn the cacique gifted the governor with a parrot “that speaks quite a lot”, for which the governor thanked him, signing “Amigo del cacique (friend of the cacique), don Pedro Gerónimo Rozo”. Of course, these exchanges were not the object of the letters themselves but peritext to the main requests the governor asked of the cacique. For instance, assistance was requested from the Pintados in “cleaning”, supplying materials for construction, and different errands commanded by justices in Tenerife⁸⁶.

3) The petitions

In general, the petitions ranging from 1693 to 1719, in which both caciques — Bernardino Amuscoteguí and Martín Amuscoteguí— intervened, along with an unnamed *fiscal protector de indios*, the justices of Santa Marta, the Governor of Santa Marta, as well as the justices of Tenerife. All petitions follow the same pattern. First, the hardships the Pintado communities were described, followed by an apologetic segment in which their loyalty to the crown and service to its local officials was offered, finally arriving to the petition not to force them to carry out guard duties in Santa Marta, exonerating them from their tribute⁸⁷. A subsequent set of petitions, written between 1713 and 1716, of which the author was the *protector de indios* Antonio Lallana Geusa. Parts of the petition were transcribed in a Royal Cédula expedited in 1714 in favor of the Pintados. The first issue raised related to the Pintados’ work conditions in two encomiendas of the province of Santa Marta. These encomiendas were located in the salt marshes of Chengue and Dulcino (north of the province) so, in order to work there, the Pintados had to travel eight days north from their towns around Tenerife. They had

⁸⁵ The governor’s sister Andrea knew cacique Martín Amuscoteguí and had “great volition” towards the Pintados. *Ibid.*, f.1102.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 1000-1003.

⁸⁷ Asking for an exemption from paying the tribute was not atypical. It was solicited in cases where harvests had been insufficient as a result of climactic hazards that damaged crops, or situations in which the tributary indigenous population had been decimated by an epidemic, or, in the case of the Pintados of San Pablo, by the latter as well as excessive work. See, for instance in Herrera Ángel, Marta, *Op. Cit.*, p. 74, a case where the tributary Indians of Zipaquirá asked for a exoneration from their tribute due to heavy rainfall that had damaged their crops.

been possessed by Doña María Antonia de Solís, as *encomendera*, around 1699, until she had lost them to the Crown in 1703 as a part of the plan to reintegrate encomiendas to the Crown. Some studies have shown that the reintegrating of encomiendas *vacas* (vacant) to the Crown was done to protect natives from the abuses *encomenderos* inflicted them, aside from making them profitable⁸⁸. Encomiendas that were stripped away from their *encomenderos* were thence administered by individuals appointed by the Governor. In the case of the encomiendas of San Juan de Ciénaga, Chengue, Dulcino, they had been administered by *alférez* Francisco de Mier.

In 1713 María Antonia de Solís solicited her case be reviewed. She managed to demonstrate the encomiendas had not been exploited, arguing the Crown had not provided canoes equipment present to exploit the saltmarshes y proving that all canoes and equipment belonged to her. In proving the boats and equipment were hers, she successfully demonstrated the Crown had done nothing to produce salt, which was one of the province's most important resources. Thus, she managed to reclaim her two salt marshes and the indigenous population attached to the encomienda, some of which were *Pintados*, by demonstrating the Crown had been negligent. Her plea was included in the protector de Indios' petition that the *Pintados* stop being forced to hard labor as further proof that the abuse they were subjected to by administrators necessitated a change of authority. The protector suggested that other Indians living near the Salinas be used as workforce:

“y asimismo dichos indios es necesario conservarlos en su pueblo por estar fronteras a los de la nación Chimillas, infieles, y para que estos se conserven como vuestra real persona lo manda por sus legales disposiciones pide el protector se sirva vuestra alteza de relevarlos de dicha mita por la distancia que hay de su pueblo a dicha ciudad y a ver otros inmediatos allá como son los Tuamatoco, Masingobonda, Gayra, el Dulcino, Taganga y Fantica qué el más distante a la plaza es de tres lenguas los cuales pueden con más comodidad acudir a la dicha mita por lo que toca a las ocasiones que se ofrecen de guerra en dicha ciudad siempre han estado y están prontos a acudir a dicha ciudad a su defensa como lo puede informar vuestro oído licenciado don Vicente de Aramburu caballero de la orden de Santiago como gobernador que ha sido de aquella provincia”⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Sánchez Mejía, “Adjudicación y conflictos por tierras comunales en los pueblos de indios de Ciénaga y Gaira en la gobernación de Santa Marta, 1700-1810”. For example, a Royal Cédula reminded the latest orders to incorporate vacant encomiendas into the Royal Erario: “Avisan del rezibo de una RZ en que se manda incorporar al Real Patrimonio de VM todas las Encomiendas que vacasen en aquel reino”, AGI, Santa Fé, 317, Cartags y expedientes de los oficiales de Santafé.

⁸⁹ AGN, Reales Cédulas, volume 6, f. 36.

Finally, the *encomiendas* were reverted to María Antonia de Solís who was given license to obtain the same number of Indians in compensation for their integration into the Crown. As for the *Pintados*, they were now directly under the responsibility of the Crown. The Royal Cédula expedited by Felipe V in light of the appeal states that: “although the previous (Royal Cédula) was **obeyed** by the Marquis of Quintana de las Torres [governor of Santa Marta Province], it has not had an effect as they are still violently ordered to keep guards and sentinels (...) from which they are dying”⁹⁰, referring to the *Pintados* of Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria. The Royal Cédula was followed by an acknowledgement of receipt by José Mozo de la Torre, governor of the province of Santa Marta, who proclaimed obedience and respect of the Royal Cédula. But an identical petition by Antonio Lallana Geusa had been sent to the king in 1714. In both petitions the issued by Lallana, the main question was that of the mandatory *centinelas* (sentinels; guard duty) carried out in Santa Marta by the *Pintados*.

Yet another issue was brought up in the pleas: that of the Indian tribute. Namely, not only were the *Pintados* complying with the guard *mita* asked of them, but they were also demanded to pay a higher tribute to the crown than the limit fixed in 1702: they were to pay 6 Reales per tributary household (paid in silver or any other material), while the established tribute had been lowered to 4 Reales⁹¹. According to the documents contained in the case, the *Pintados* were unable to pay any tribute because they spent six months of the year in Santa Marta, observing the duties required of them in the context of the *mita*, and getting no compensation for their work⁹², the consequences of which were explicitly stated. Lallana Geusa explains: “The aforesaid village is dying out as a result of making them [the *Pintados*] carry out the in the mentioned city [of Santa Marta], where they stay for over six months without getting any remuneration

⁹⁰ AGN, Reales Cédulas, volume 6, f. 44. The highlight is our own.

⁹¹ Teniente Nicolás de la Rosa commented on the reduction of tribute expressing it had been a necessary pious grant by His Majesty, with the purpose of creating incentives to “frequently attend the doctrine”: In the beginning, twelve pesos of tribute were paid to each of them per year; But since the piety and Christian zeal of our princes has remained so much in favor of these new vassals, in order to relieve them as much as possible of any obligation that might prevent them from frequent attendance at the doctrine, this tribute was finally reduced to the equitable amount of four pesos a year for each Indian, This is what is now paid by those of our province, so that they may not fail to recognize the vassalage so due to the Majesty, nor forget the mysteries of our holy faith, in which they have been instructed, in their eagerness to acquire it.” De la Rosa, *Floresta de la Santa Iglesia Catedral de la ciudad y provincia de Santa Marta*, 280.

⁹² AGN, *Ibid.*, f. 36.

not even a daily fee [for their sustenance]⁹³. It is interesting that the *defensor* would affirm no wages or any sort of retribution were being handed out to the Pintados, as local justices, certifying before the King in the 1690s appeals, had declared the Pintados were paid “1 real per day for their sustenance”. It raises the question of the veracity of the information contained in the appeals, despite the legal character of the certifications produced by the officials concerned in the process.

The 1714 and 1716 Royal Cédulas both specified that the non-compliance thereof would result in a fine of 1.000 patacones. To get a sense of the order of magnitude of the penalty, 1.000 patacones equaled 8.000 Reales at the time, which amounted to 432 pesos, 7 *tomines*, 5 granos and 6 *maravedis*⁹⁴. This is to say, the penalty for not abiding by the law would result in a fine 8.000 times greater than the daily wages supposedly paid to the Pintados for their service. A governor in the Indies earned about 1790 pesos per year in the 1690s⁹⁵, making the penalty around a quarter of a governor’s salary. Nevertheless, the fine may not have had any substantial effect, for a third set of petitions was presented before the king in 1719. The tone of this petition is more tiresome than that of the former, the letters shorter, and the outcome just as feeble.

In this petition, Cacique Martín Amuscoteguí sent a letter directly to the king on behalf of the Pintados living in the jurisdiction of Tenerife. His foremost argument is one repeated by Amuscoteguí in numerous occasions, namely the question of the voluntary character of their departure from the ‘wilderness’ and subsequent evangelization, along with the dutiful obedience that characterized their integration into the province⁹⁶. He recalled how, earlier that year, the Pintados had heeded the call of Santa Marta governor, Juan Beltrán de Caicedo⁹⁷, and his subdelegate, the of captain *aguerra* of Tenerife as enemy ships were spotted on the coastline; thirty Pintados reached Santa Marta. Amuscoteguí denounced that, even though the attack had passed,

⁹⁴ Calculated using the ICANH’s online “Herramientas para investigadores” (currency converter). In: <https://serieeconomicasicanh.neocities.org/ConversionMoneda.html>.

⁹⁵ See chapter 2, part I-2).

⁹⁶ He explained: “The natives of the said village having left the mountain voluntarily, without compulsion or force, to seek to receive and embrace our Holy Catholic faith, and to give obedience to your royal person; in it they have maintained, maintain, and will always maintain themselves as good, faithful and loyal vassals.”, AGN Caciques e indios, 36, f. 816-819.

⁹⁷ Juan Beltrán de Caicedo succeeded Mozo de la Torre after conducting a *visita* (inspection report) of his predecessor in 1716.

the thirty men had been ordered to remain in the city “carrying earth and stones for trenches and ramparts, and at night standing guard at the same posts and places where they used to do so **in the past**”⁹⁸. Indeed, there seems to have been a brief interlude of time, during the governorship of José Mozo de la Torre, during which the royal dispositions prohibiting officials from summoning the Pintados for guard duties were respected. The cacique notes:

“[the report] they [the Pintados] presented to the *maestre del campo* Don José Mozo de la Torre, governor at that time of the said city, who obeyed it, and during the whole time of his government the mentioned Indians enjoyed the tranquility of being at home and in their village, caring for their wives and children, harvesting their crops for their maintenance and paying their tribute, without the fear of the continual anxiety of the guards”⁹⁹.

From this information, it seems safe to infer that Governor José Mozo de la Torre obeyed the 1714 Royal Cédulas, giving the Indians some respite. However, Amuscoteguí stressed the question of obedience further in his letter, stating the Pintados had thenceforth suffered great demise “without the aforementioned dispatch of this Royal Audiencia having been of any value to them, because the said Governor [Juan Beltrán de Caicedo, de la Torre’s successor] ordered the said Captain Aguerra that, notwithstanding the said royal provision, he should dispatch the said Indians”¹⁰⁰. In other words, the Governor ordered the summoning of the Pintados, binding them to a three-month guard *mita* that had been revoked and prohibited under penalty of a hefty fine, an issue which had been raised at least three times in the past forty years (1679-1719) and for Royal Cédulas and Royal Provisions had been produced.

The pleas set forth by the Pintados illustrate how the enforcement of royal orders and norms was systematically breached by local officials in need for guards on the Caribbean coast. For indeed, not only the Pintados served as guards. The Indian Captain of Masinga, for example, sent a petition in 1719 sent a petition though the protector de naturales of the Kingdom, asking he and his sons be dispensed of paying tribute of account of their service:

“[service] to his majesty with their weapons horses and Indians of the town in all the functions that they have offered themselves as well of rebateo of enemies, to run the Marine inlet of those coasts by where they could throw people in earth and in different entrances that have been made of the infidel Indians of United Nations as

⁹⁸ AGN, Ibid., the highlight is our own.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., f. 816-823

in the salidas of the governors they have executed the pursuit of the paid infantry that desampararon the square, all at his own expense, proceeding with great diligence, love and loyalty to his Majesty in the aforementioned and in the observance of repeated orders of his Real service that the superiors have conferred upon him.”¹⁰¹

In every one of the pleas, previous Royal Cédulas prohibiting officials from forcing the Pintados to leave their territory for defense purposes, except in case of a foreign attack, were cited. The same can be said of the tribute regulation we have examined above. For example, the Royal Cédula of 1714 states that [guarding the city of Santa Marta] “has never been and is not of their [the Pintados] obligation but was introduced by Don Juan Eusebio Dávalos when he governed said province”. This is to say that the Pintados’ guard *mita* in Santa Marta was not prescribed or customary but had been fixed by the former governor of the province, between 1695 and 1700.

The same practices took place on the administration of *encomiendas*. In his 1719 letter, Cacique Amuscoteguí denounced that: “The oppression that these Indians experienced from their *encomenderos*, forcing them to use censures and other means to make them observe the laws that deal with this, having also recognized that the administrators put in place by the governors are more properly leaseholders who have a simulated lease on the villages, which are without *encomenderos* and attached to the Crown. For as the Indians have an obligation to pay *demoras* (tribute received by *encomenderos*) in the royal coffers in money, they keep them all year round as if they were bought slaves, so that they may work for them, enjoying the full benefit of the goods and labors in which they are exercised.”¹⁰². As Amuscoteguí pointed out, the administrators put in place could profit from Indian work without having to worry about productivity or accountability on behalf of *encomenderos*.

The Pintados living in San Pablo and Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria, two *pueblos de indios* under civil authorities, did not see their conditions improve from the petitions made by Lallana Geusa in the 1710s and 1720s. What is more, there seems to have been a recrudescence in their relationship to local authorities, possibly in light of

¹⁰¹ AGN, Reales Cédulas, t. VII “[servicio] a su majestad con sus armas caballos y indios del pueblo en todas las funciones que ellos se han ofrecido así de rebateo de enemigos, correr la Marina ensenada de aquellas costas por donde podían echar gente en tierra y en diferentes entradas que se han hecho de los indios infieles de Naciones Unidas como en las salidas de los gobernadores han ejecutado el seguimiento de la infantería pagada que desampararon la plaza, todo a su costa procediendo con gran diligencia amor y lealtad a su majestad en lo referido y en la observancia de repetidas órdenes de su real servicio que los superiores le han conferido.

¹⁰² AGN, Caciques e indios, 36, f. 816

the Crown's lack of effectiveness. Even though three petitions were presented to the Crown within forty years, supported by numerous letters from local justices, it was presumably far from the interest of most governors of Cartagena and Santa Marta provinces to abide by the Reales Cédulas written for that matter. The mounting frustration they must have felt, as well as political reform, would bring about much change for the Pintados the two following decades.

III-Resistance in the face of non compliance

The decade of 1730 was a turning point in the history of the New Granada, whose administrative seat evolved from Audiencia to the higher-ranked viceroyalty in 1739, after the failure of the short-lived first viceroyalty (1717-1723)¹⁰³. The instauration of the Viceroyalty provided for a more direct way of communication between the king and his viceroys through channels of communication like the *via reservada*. The hope for administrators was that installing a Viceroy would contribute to the swift execution of orders, quell local interests and remedy structural problems. And in fact, the arrival of Viceroy Eslava brought about an intensification of efforts to subdue native populations in territories that stood outside of the Crown's grasp at the beginning of the 18th century¹⁰⁴. The provinces of Cartagena and Santa Marta in particular, and the larger Caribbean region in general, were subjected to change. From the Guajira Peninsula which saw an exacerbation of the war against the Guajiro (Wayuu) Indians, to the reduction and conquest of Chimila territories in the center of the Province of Santa Marta, the Caribbean region of the Viceroyalty went through a process of internal conquest and territorial reorganization¹⁰⁵. But Eslava's efforts which effectively harnesses expeditions of conquest, were preceded by a different kind of policy in the early 1730s.

¹⁰³ See Chapter 1.

¹⁰⁴ See "Informe rendido por el Mariscal de Campo D. Antonio Manso, como Presidente de la Audiencia del Nuevo Reino de Granada, sobre su estado y necesidades en el año de 1729." In Colmenares, Germán, comp., *Relaciones e informes de los gobernantes de la Nueva Granada*, Bogotá: Banco Popular, 1989, p. 25-30.

¹⁰⁵ Herrera Ángel, Marta, *Ordenar para controlar*, p. 51-52.

In the 1730s, José Fernando de Mier y Guerra was *corregidor de naturales* in Santa Marta Province¹⁰⁶. With the intention of progressively restricting Chimila territory Mier y Guerra proceeded to apply a “política de poblamiento”, based on settling the frontier with reduced Indians. Between 1730 and 1740 he founded towns on the eastern bank of the Magdalena River, effectively cutting the Chimila’s access to the river, successfully isolating them in terms of natural resources, and obstructing their commerce and circulation¹⁰⁷. Moreover, Mier y Guerra also conducted expeditions against maroon *palenques*, and in general behaved towards enslaved peoples with such brutality his behavior was denounced by his contemporaries¹⁰⁸. Aside from conquering the lands of rebellious indigenous peoples, the territorial reorganization of the region displaced subjected populations living in *encomiendas*, *pueblos de indios* and *villas*, which were then regrouped in *resguardos de indios*. As the lands were the Crown’s property, they could be reappraised by the latter at any moment, a condition which originated both expropriations and especially land adjudications (*adjudicaciones de tierra*) in the latter part of the 18th century¹⁰⁹.

In the face of the territorial pressure exercised by authorities through foundations on the frontier along the Magdalena River, the years 1730 saw an increase in attacks by the Chimilas. More and more, they allied with other native groups as well as foreigners, in the context of the tensions preceding the War of Jenkins. In 1739, as the British sieged Santa Marta through the coast, the Chimilas blocked the town from the hinterland¹¹⁰. Attacks to towns were also carried out by the Chimilas alone, like one on the town of Malambo in Cartagena Province, in 1753.

¹⁰⁶ Vested in jurisdictional, military and administrative power, the office of *corregidor* had been established in the late 16th century in the New Granada in an attempt to replace the somewhat autonomous and problematic figure of the *encomendero*. It had been generalized in the Andean region of the Kingdom, but was only later reproduced in the Caribbean Plains. See Herrera Ángel, Marta, *Ibid.*, p. 172, 173, 181, 182.

¹⁰⁷ Luna, “LA NACIÓN CHIMILA: UN CASO DE RESISTENCIA INDÍGENA EN LA GOBERNACIÓN DE SANTA MARTA!”.

More generally, between 1744 and 1770, José Fernando de Mier y Guerra founded 22 sites and villages in around the riverbanks of the Magdalena river, near Mompox, Tamalameque and Tenerife, in Santa Marta province. See Herrera Ángel, Marta, *ibid.*, p. 146.

¹⁰⁸ AGN, Miscelánea, Empleados públicos, volume 21, folder 2, f. 491.

¹⁰⁹ See Sánchez Mejía, “Adjudicación y conflictos por tierras comunales en los pueblos de indios de Ciénaga y Gaira en la gobernación de Santa Marta, 1700-1810”.

¹¹⁰ Luna, “LOS RESGUARDOS DE SANTA MARTA Y CARTAGENA EN LA SEGUNDA MITAD DEL SIGLO XVIII”.

How did these changes affect the Pintados? One of the obstacles in tackling this question is the lack of documentation available for the first half of the 18th century in the Province of Santa Marta because of the many fires it endured¹¹¹. As such, we know close to nothing of what happened in the 1720's and 1730's regarding the Pintados of San Pablo. But there are clues that indicate that some Pintados had had a friendly relationship to the Chimilas. In 1709, Captain Andrés Díaz, newly arrived in Santa Cruz de Mompox stated: “for the reduction and punishment of the Indians of Chimila Nation, who have been infesting the roads, ranches and Villages of this bishopric, (...) for the common good of the people and safe passage navigation of the Magdalena river (...) and meddling with them, in their shadow [are] the Pintados”, hinting at alliances between the two nations¹¹². As Marta Herrera Angel has pointed out, the same year, the Bishop of Santa Marta wrote that the Pintados' agitation was due to the abuses they were suffering “making it a great novelty that the pintados are killers”¹¹³. Indeed, the unfolding of the 18th century would suppose a change in the way the pintados were portrayed as their attacks alongside the Chimilas seem to have become more frequent.

There is little information on the consequences of the last plea made by the Pintados in July 1719, other than the Royal Cédula it occasioned. However, we do know that a group of Pintados took it upon themselves to go to Santa Fe de Bogotá, seeking to be heard by the “lords of the chancellery and Royal Audiencia”, and “remedy for their vexations”¹¹⁴. They had solicited letters from their *cura doctrinero*¹¹⁵, and taken the long road to Santa Fe to appeal to the *oidores* (judges of the Royal Audiencia) in person¹¹⁶. Scandalized by the sufferings of the Pintados, Antonio Monroy Meneses,

¹¹¹ As pointed out p.54 in González Luna, Lola, “Los resguardos coloniales de Santa Marta y Cartagena en la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII”, in the author's unpublished doctoral thesis, *La supervivencia de los resguardos indígenas en las provincias de Santa Marta y Cartagena (1750-1800)*, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, 1976, p. 53-81.

¹¹² AGN, *Historia Eclesiástica*, 15, f., 272.

¹¹³ Herrera Ángel, Marta, *Ibid.* p. 341.

¹¹⁴ Namely, that “the 30 Indians who went down to Santa Marta have them working on carrying sand and stones for trenches from before sunrise until after the sundown, and from there they go out to guard and stand sentinel at the posts where they keep watch every night”. According to the Cacique, his community was in distress, having “the few indians that remain in the said town, having heard that the governor has requested many others to fill in the [guard] shifts”. According to Amuscoteguí, the majority of their population had fallen ill with a fever epidemic, making them unable to comply with even half of the number requested by the governor, they are requested. AGN, *Caciques e Indios*, f. 823, 824.

¹¹⁵ Priest charged with the indoctrination of native populations.

¹¹⁶ The outcome of their voyage to the capital of the viceroyalty, as well as the dialogue they might have stricken up with the *oidores* remains to be discovered, as I have not yet found traces of their endeavour

Bishop of Santa Marta, wrote to the King in August 1719, conveying the news of the Pintados' quest to reach Santafé and describing the abuses suffered by the natives:

“Your current governor has (...) bothered them day and night (...) giving them no other assistance for their sustenance than one and a half Real each, (...) and because an Indian took too long taking fish to the mentioned governor, he ordered him to be tied to a tree and punished him by hanging him upside down on a pillory. None of this can my love and docility, nor documents and examples remedy. But it does not cause me admiration when I see your highness' mandates are not obeyed”.


The bishop's description of the abuses endured by the Pintados around Tenerife gives a sense of how aware ecclesiastical authorities were, both of the excesses committed by their civil counterparts, and of their disobedience of the King's Royal Cédulas proscribing the guard *mita* on the Pintados. But ecclesiastical jurisdiction did not give them the power to intervene directly. The bishop's letter is the last document in the appeals case of 1719; the King received it in 1720. It is difficult to evaluate whether the Pintados' petition and excursion to Santafé had any effect besides having made the Royal Audiencia aware of the gravity of their situation. However, news of the Pintados' ordeal seem to have remained in the memory of locals for at least three decades as, in 1751, the Indian *alcalde* of Zambrano, Ximeno Ximénez, (south east of Tenerife) denounced the Indians of this town had been instigated into rebellion. In his report before captain *aguerra* and *corregidor* Manuel Fernández de Sossa, the *alcalde* narrated how Don Ramón Sierra, *vecino* of Mompox, had addressed the Indians of Zambrano: “in public [he said] they were lazy, and that if they were like the Pintados who had gone to Santa Fe, they would get the lands they wanted, and other news directed at inciting the mentioned Indians to the disturbance of conformity, peace, and quiet in which they live”¹¹⁷ For his remarks, Ramón Sierra was interrogated by local justices in a context of increased tensions, underpinned by the reductions and relocations of indigenous populations.

The decades of 1720 and 1730 remain somewhat of a mystery. In her study of 18th century New Granadian *encomiendas*, María Teresa Molino García accounts for 46 Pintados in the San Pablo de los Pintados in 1728, of which 10 were absent. Not

in the AGN (Bogotá). But the knowledge that such an event took place underpins the severity both of their determination, as well as that of their conditions. It also raises questions: were they all able to speak Spanish like their Cacique Marín Amuscotegui or did they use a translator? Did they merely pass on the compilation of letters they had obtained from the different officials and their cura doctrinero?

¹¹⁷ AGN, Caciques e indios, 11, f. 562-569.

only is this a meagre datum regarding the expected population growth from the end of the 17th century to the 1730s, but the absence of 10 tributary Indians illustrates a mechanism of resistance thenceforth systematized: desertion.



Map 7: *Pintado settlements along the Magdalena River.*

Personal production with QGIS based on sources cited in the chapter.

In the face of the population policy seeking to better order the population front on the frontier, in 1744 Viceroy Sebastián de Eslava ordered the transfer and regrouping of San Pablo de los Pintados and Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria with two other populations, Plato and Zárate (see map) seeking to reduce 13 existing populations to 4¹¹⁸. But things did not go smoothly. Firstly, the Pintados' image in the eyes of officials had changed. Viceroy Sebastián de Eslava, writing a *Relación de mando* (mandate

¹¹⁸ Herrera Ángel, Marta, *Ibid.*, p. 280.

report) in the late 1740s, claimed the Pintados secretly crept into the mountains where they “adored an idol set on a house or temple (...)” where they remained until “having finished their superstitious exercises and beverages they took for their inebriation”. Francisco Ignacio Acosta, *alcalde* of Tenerife was charged with assessing the matter, discovered the head of a deer placed on a barbecue or table of cane stalks, and on its circumference, many arrows and filth”¹¹⁹. Officials then proceeded to burning down the houses where these rituals were conducted. This incident seems to have contributed to the suspicion towards the Pintados, which had started brewing in the 1710s, and their subsequent treatment as “non-subjected” and “barbarous”.

As discussed by Marta Herrera Angel, the dichotomy between the categories “docile” and “rebel” Indians reflected the diversity amongst indigenous populations very poorly, as it did not include *mulatos*, *mestizos*, *zambos* or *cholos*¹²⁰, and, in general, it erased ethnic indigenous specificities. The dichotomy served the purpose of justifying the attacks against “Chimilas” or “indios bravos/bárbaros”, even when the appellation “Chimila” did not coincide with the ethnic filiation of a determinate group¹²¹. By a metonymic association, the term “Chimila” became the equivalent of “rebellious”, and it is in this category that the Pintados were thereafter classified. This shift is salient in the correspondence produced in the events of the summer 1744, when the Pintados, having been recently transferred from their towns around Tenerife to Pueblo del Rey (also called “Coscorrucio”), deserted the town when ordered to relocate to a different settlement of the name of “el Morro”¹²² in the north of Cartagena Province, on the opposite side of the Magdalena river —remaining, however, under the jurisdiction of justices in Tenerife, in Santa Marta province¹²³.

Corregidor Francisco Ignacio de Acosta informed the newly established Viceroy that the Indians of Pueblo del Rey had deserted the town on the 22nd of April 1744, leaving no women, men or children behind: “the fugitive Indians of Pueblo del

¹¹⁹ Colmenares, Germán, comp., *Relaciones e informes de los gobernantes de la Nueva Granada, Bogotá: Banco Popular*, 1989, p.48-49.

¹²⁰ Social categories based on the racial criteria, which operated distinctions at the core of colonial societies in Spanish America.

¹²¹ Herrera Ángel, Marta, *Ibid.*, p. 333, 334.

¹²² The aggregation of el Morro was a result of the planned reduction of the Pintados from San Pablo, Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria, Zarate and Plato. See Lola Luna, “Resguardos”, p. 59, 60.

¹²³ The jurisdictional ambiguity between the provinces of Santa Marta and Cartagena, explains why the reduction to the aggregation of el Morro kept its population under the authority of justices in Santa Marta province. See Herrera Ángel, Marta, *Ibid.*, p. 148.

Rey were leaving the mountains, two of them having died without confession, for refusing to incorporate the town of el Morro”¹²⁴. A few days later, four of them agreed to speak with their Pedro Nolasco¹²⁵ their *cura doctrinero* who supported the idea of a peaceful transfer, attempted to explain the reasons for the vexation of the “miserables”¹²⁶ of Plato to the Viceroy, and called for cautiousness in handling their refusal to relocate¹²⁷. He promised the Pintados they would be pardoned for their actions if they returned to Pueblo del Rey and left for El Morro on an established date, taking with them the bells and saints of their town. According to the report made by Acosta, the Pintados would have admitted they had been swayed by “the influx of some persons”, concluding “one can advert in some of them declared disobedience; in others it is simulated”¹²⁸.

A similar resistance thwarted the transfer of the Pintados of Plato and Zárate, which led authorities to discuss on how to use “soft means” to coerce them. *Corregidor* Acosta decided to use the Indians of Plato as “exemplars” for those of Zárate, supposing the latter would be inspired by the former in peacefully leaving their towns for the aggregation of el Morro. The plan consisted in arriving to Plato along with “10 or 12 orderly men in case I [Acosta] need assistance”. He explained the inhabitants of Plato were not “bothered by guards”, which made it “credible that they will be inclined [to leave] if their spirits are not deceived, in which case leniency will be as good as violence”¹²⁹. But the transfer to el Morro was just as convoluted. In October 1744, Jacinto Santillán and Bartolomé Moscote of Pueblo del Rey were imprisoned by Acosta, who ordered Captain Aguerra Fermín Amado to have them taken to Cartagena as prisoners, so that they might work in the city’s Royal *Fábricas* and “purge the grave

¹²⁴ AGN, Miscelánea, Empleados Públicos, Volume 21, folder 2, f. 440-441.

¹²⁵ A man of letters who had graduated from the Xaverian University, earning the title of Doctor in May 1737, in José del Rey Fajardo y Juan Manuel Pacheco, eds., *Libro de Grados de La Universidad y Academia*, Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana (Bogotá, 2013), 41 and 100.

¹²⁶ On the idea of the “indio *miserabile*”, see Cunill, “L’Indien, personne misérable. Considérations historiographiques sur le statut des peuples indigènes dans l’empire hispanique”.

¹²⁷ He explained the Indians were “resabiados”, a term which has no direct translation, meaning someone who reacts in a distrustful manner as a result of hardship. Namely, he argued, because their churches and houses had been in ruins for over eight months.

¹²⁸ AGN, Miscelánea, Empleados Públicos, Volume 21, folder 2, f. 440-442. It is unclear who the external instigators mentioned by the people who spoke with Nolasco were, or if it had even been the case that the instigation had come from outside the community.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, Acosta noted that *Corregidor* José Fernando Mier y Guerra “had not opposed the opinion” [to have a peaceful transfer].

prejudices their pertinacious influence has caused”. Similarly, he ordered the capture of four men, Antonio Guerrero, Manuel Santillán, Esteban Martínez y Miguel de Ospino, of the town of Malambito, whose resettlement to the northern town of el Yucal was stalling¹³⁰. He assured the captain these men were at the “head of the resistance”, making their capture essential in the successful “transferal, without giving rise to the mercy you have hitherto practiced, for otherwise nothing will be achieved”.

“Soft means” don’t seem to have been enough to curb the seemingly generalized resistance of the Pintados of Plato and Zárate, formerly living in San Pablo and Nuestra Señora de la Candelaria. Their transferal to the Yucal and Morro regroupings reduced their populations to living outside of their territory, in new settlements of different a topography, closer to the coast and, consequently, to the authorities’ vigilant eye. By 1749 the new towns of Zambrano and Tetón were formed, made up of Pintados Indians from the other bank of the Magdalena, accused of being accomplices with the warlike Chimilas and inclined to idolatry. According to Eusebio Sánchez Pareja's visit in 1752, there were 90 tributaries and 432 natives living in Tetón; in 1772 the number had dwindled to 225 people, according to Manuel Serrano García, “a drastic decrease that can only be explained by the desertion”¹³¹. Writing in 1751, brother Antonio de Toca, a member of the Franciscan convent of San Buenaventura of Tenerife declared the Pintados were “prone and habituated to malicious or ignorant sedition...”, attesting how the idea of them as seditious had permeated even the minds of the regular clergy, who had previously been rather supportive of their cause¹³².

Conclusions

In this chapter we have seen that the northeastern provinces of Santa Mara and Cartagena underwent a territorial reconfiguration in the first half of the 18th century. Encomiendas were partly integrated to the Crown, some more successfully than others; Indian towns were relocated to stop the circulation of free native groups; a population

¹³⁰ The Indian townships of Malambito, Hincapié, Caracoli and Cotoré were transferred to el Yucal in the same year. Ibid., f. 431-432.

¹³¹ Manuel Serrano García, “El obispado de Cartagena de Indias en el siglo XVIII (Iglesia y poder en la Cartagena colonial)”, 2015, 328.

¹³² Sánchez Mejía, Hugues R., *Tenencia de la tierra, mano de obra, mercados y productividad en la frontera: españoles, indígenas y comunidades campesinas en la gobernación de Santa Marta. 1700-1810*, doctoral thesis, Seville: Universidad Pablo de Olavide, 2010, p. 302.

policy that would extend into the 1740s and 1750s was put in place after the arrival of Sebastián Eslava. The latter was done in as an attempt to reorder the social front of the Caribbean plains, whose composition was diversifying. The increase in marooning and the formation of informal settlements or *rochelas*, congregating peoples of all colors made for a changing morphology of the provinces' demographic profiles. In rare cases did the natives poses the land they lived on. *Resguardos de indios* are a notable exception, as some of *resguardos* were adjudicated as land grants in the late 18th century. In the 1740 Viceroy Sebastián de Eslava, granted communal lands solicited by cacique Antonio Ruiz on behalf of his people. But Eslava's orders were never complied with by authorities in Santa Marta or by the landowners whose estates were concerned¹³³. Only after appealing anew to the Royal Audiencia between 1743 and 1745 were the parcels demarcated. Moreover, the arrival of viceroy Eslava led to the expedition of *Capitulaciones* for new *descubrimientos*, in the Darién, Santa Marta, the Guajira and lake Maracaibo. In throughout the 1760s and 1770s, full-on offensives were organized against the Cunas, Chimilas, Guajiros, and other "rebellious Indians"¹³⁴.

The civil, military, and ecclesiastical authorities of the Provinces of Santa Marta and Cartagena dealt with Indian resistance in different ways. Religious authorities lent towards considering the Pintados as "miserables", a way of staging their non-compliance and return to the wilderness as a result of their lack of evangelization, and proof of the need for their relocation to more supervised villages. For civil and military authorities, charged with the reorganization of the province and the conquest of Chimila territory, the Pintados were treated like other "rebellious" groups, suffering the fate of many indigenous populations who had resisted to colonial restructuring in different ways. The Pintados' place in the province, virtually and symbolically, oscillated between compliance and resistance, both seen as "miserables" in need of evangelization and as having visibly returned to their "former ways". The different ways in which the Pintados were qualified indicate the ambiguity of their perception on behalf of, and relationship to, local and metropolitan authorities. Marta Herrera Ángel posits that the

¹³³ Sánchez Mejía, "Adjudicación y conflictos por tierras comunales en los pueblos de indios de Ciénaga y Gaira en la gobernación de Santa Marta, 1700-1810".

¹³⁴ Herrera, *Ordenar para controlar. Ordenamiento espacial y control político en las Llanuras del Caribe y en los Andes centrales neogranadinos. Siglo XVIII*, 154.

long-lived use of their Nation's designation "Pintado(s)", given to them by the Spanish in the 17th and 18th centuries (as opposed to having designated them as "docile Indians") resulted from an intention to specifically point them out amongst other natives, possibly because of their ambiguous role in the provinces of Santa Marta and Cartagena.

But more crucially, the Pintados' place within the social, spatial, and military configuration of Caribbean plains of the New Granada was ambivalent given the submission they had acceded to, and the ensuing rights they had obtained as subjects of the Crown, resulting from a wager they had made in the mid-17th century, which possibly no longer seemed worthwhile in the mid-1740s. Not only had they obtained rights. One could argue that they had integrated the Monarchy and formed a *República de indios* in a more complete way than the natives of Citará, for example. They had formed a *cabildo*, had amassed notions of justice, rights and duties, and had secured a juridical culture that allowed their Caciques to use Indian Law to fight back abuses. However, their use of these legal tools was hampered by the greater interests that local officials had in using a cheap main d'oeuvre to guard the "Pearl of America" (Santa Marta). Following the failure of the petitions for justice made to the Crown in over four decades, their resistance was manifested through increasingly allying themselves with the Chimilas and by deserting the towns they were relocated to on the opposite side of the Magdalena River. Desertion as a manifestation of agency on behalf of subjugated populations in a colonial context is comparable to that of enslaved peoples who fled the established order, seeking to live freely in maroon communities¹³⁵. Their case illustrates the failings of a monarchical system whose evangelizing mission was supported by the idea that natives who subjugated to the colonial order were minors in need of protection (*miserabilis*). But the mechanisms of protection against the relatively autonomous authority of local officials fell short.

The question of obedience to royal orders had been brewing since the early years of the conquest, when Philipp II issued the Leyes Nuevas in 1542, seeking to curb the abuses of encomenderos and conquistadors. The precept officials abode by was to the effect of "obedézcase pero no se cumpla", inferring the orders from the king were obeyed but not complied with, under the pretext that the King couldn't possibly have

¹³⁵ For a the idea of marooning as a manifestation of agency and means of liberation, see Helg, Aline, Op. Cit, Introduction p. 9-28.

enough elements to properly judge such a distant situation. In many cases, this formula was used to adapt peninsular legislation to a colonial context¹³⁶. The effects of this breach between the norms issued on account of the Crown's responsibility to protect native populations, and the day-to-day decision-making an ocean away, were a common trend in the American territories of the Spanish Monarchy, resulting in a substantial tolerance of abuse on behalf of officials in the Americas. But maybe we can seek beyond the normative breach that such an argument allowed. For in fact, there was also an underlying dynamic that played into breaching decisions from higher instances of government (the Royal Audiencia or the Council of the Indies): the prevalence of personal or collective interests in the hands of *vecinos* and magistrates. As we have seen in other chapters, the interests of *vecinos* and local authorities often conjugated, and resistance towards the imposition of *visitas* and *residencias* was at times expressed and interference from *oidores* was judged negatively.

Indeed, in the provinces of Santa Marta, as it was the case in Citará and Antioquia, officials approached Indians as a workforce above all. The integration into the Monarchy by subjecting to the Crown was achieved through negotiation and sealed by the tribute they went on to pay. In return, Indians were allowed protection and representation: a Cabildo and a Protector. But in fact, the interests behind protecting the maritime frontier or exploiting the gold frontier were shared amongst *vecinos*, whose civil and military prerogatives allowed them to use their authority for private interests. In such a configuration, advocacy for better government of native populations had little chance.

The subsequent decades would lead changes on the frontier between Cartagena and Santa Marta. On the one hand, because commercial interests linking haciendas in the plains of the hinterland with Caribbean ports put pressure into building new commercial routes¹³⁷. On the other hand, because of the multiplication of *sitios*, *pueblos* and *rochelas* populated by poor *vecinos*, *arrochelados* and *mestizos*. In some cases, these populations would find ways to become *vecinos*, earning additional rights as

¹³⁶ Víctor Tau Anzoátegui, "La ley" se obedece pero no se cumple": en torno a la suplicación de las leyes en el Derecho Indiano" (V Congreso del Instituto Internacional de Historia del Derecho Indiano: realizado en el Ecuador (Quito-Guayaquil), del 24 al 30 de julio de 1978, Corporación de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1980), 55–112.

¹³⁷ Orlando Fals Borda, *Historia doble de la Costa* (Universidad Nacional de Colombia . Banco de la República. El Ancora, 2002), <https://repositorio.unal.edu.co/handle/unal/2991>.

subjects¹³⁸ of the king and forging new regional and local identities throughout the remaining decades of the Monarchy in the Indies. The gradual access of rights by vecinos and of lands granted by the Monarchy, produce a situation in 1810 where different behaviors were 1) the defense of the Monarchy by Indian communities who had been adjudicated land grants, and 2) the quest for political participation in the monarchy's bureaucracy by those who became vecinos¹³⁹. Slowly but surely, the second half of the 18th century would see the gradual blurring of the lines separating the *república de Españoles* from that of Indians, not only in the Magdalena region but in Antioquia and Santander. These new mixed communities became more important demographically than cities where Spanish officials found themselves in the minority. These changes would lead Bourbonic authorities, who espoused new ideas around “policía”, order and civility to deal with “miserables” (now signifying poor inhabitants rather than Indians), order their customs, lives, and work¹⁴⁰.

¹³⁸ Tamar Herzog, *Vecinos y extranjeros: hacerse español en la Edad Moderna* (Alianza, 2006), <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/libro?codigo=263471>; Hugues R. Sánchez Mejía, “De arrojados a vecinos: reformismo borbónico e integración política en las gobernaciones de Santa Marta y Cartagena, Nuevo Reino de Granada, 1740-1810”, *Revista de Indias* 75, núm. 264 (el 30 de agosto de 2015): 457–88, <https://doi.org/10.3989/revindias.2015.015>.

¹³⁹ Garrido, “La política local en la Nueva Granada 1750-1810”.

¹⁴⁰ Edgardo Pérez Morales, “La sombra de la muchedumbre: Vida urbana y reformismo borbónico en la ciudad de Antioquia.”, *Historia y sociedad*, núm. 10 (el 1 de enero de 2004): 183–99.

General conclusions

This dissertation has striven to study the government of the frontiers located in the north of The New Kingdom of Granada during a period of dynastic change, 1680-1739. To question how authority was used by those in government, different questions have been raised.

The main question asked was what obstacles and challenges those who governed the New Kingdom of Granada faced between 1680 and 1740, what decisions were taken considering those challenges, and how different actors interacted with each other. Answers to these interrogations are offered in the first chapter, where a larger perspective offers a dive into transatlantic correspondence to try to grasp what transpired as the main issues in the New Granada. From afar, the coastal cities in the Kingdom were said to be suffering at the turn of the century. The international context in the Caribbean left Cartagena weak and depleted after various attacks, and the War of Succession only further stressed the difficulties. The central body of government, the Royal Audiencia, had been enmeshed in political turmoil. In such a setting, the initiative to establish a viceroyalty with the aim of enhancing the execution of authority arose, and it reverberated across both sides of the Atlantic. The viceroyalty was not only desired in Madrid, but also the voices of Cartagena's most affected neighbors petitioned for a viceroy amid the difficulties the war was causing. The perception that a Viceroyalty could forward the kingdom into a better state was, at least, shared by some vecinos and officials, in particular, by those impacted by the lack of commerce from *flotas* and *galeones* due to the war of Succession, and those impacted by foreign contraband roaming free. Some others, however, profited from the blooming trade and contraband. These matters produced a considerable amount of political communication between different strata of the Monarchy: the Council of the Indies, *oidores*, governors, officers, and vecinos. In communicating on these topics, historians are challenged in discerning instrumentality versus sincerity in petitions, as exaggerating claims and instrumentalizing notions of insecurity, poverty, and distress were frequently used to obtain benefits in the exchange system between subjects and the King's grace.

And indeed, the Monarchy's the "lack of authority" over this area was often blamed on a series of problems: contraband, corruption, and overall bad government

(*mal gobierno*). How might one evaluate the sincerity of these claims? What was actually proposed to remedy the stated issues? How did the projected solutions articulate with the interests of officials and vecinos? The second chapter takes a closer look at these questions through the lens of case studies that relate to instances of contraband and fraud, and attempts to examine how these issues were dealt with. On the one hand, fraud, like other malpractices that constituted early modern corruption, was an overarching practice in the Monarchy's territories. In the New Kingdom of Granada, officers, merchants, and vecinos were particularly prone to engaging in transactions with gold dust, due to the availability of this non minted currency, and the endemic lack of Spanish coin. Typically, gold was extracted by miner-owned cuadrillas using slave force and, in some cases, indigenous labor, but the production seldom passed through the Royal Cajas in the more distant regions. Even when it did, officials found ways to make a profit, one example being the conversion of salaries from *reales* into gold by using the conversion rate reserved through the king. Over the years, the ruse amounted to thousands of pesos being drained from the royal hacienda.

Similarly, contraband was frequently carried out within the licit commercial system: *licencias* or permits were held for certain merchandise, but others were smuggled in with the rest. officials responsible for oversight were urged to refrain from reacting to smuggling after being bribed, thereby limiting their ability to effectively seize illicit trade. Moreover, why would they in the first place? Indeed, in times of scarcity, like the War of Succession, the only providers of European goods were foreign smugglers, aligned with Indian groups on the Caribbean coast. They consistently provided the New Kingdom with provisions and goods, particularly during periods of prolonged absence of ships from Spain. In the 1730s, the Kingdom had recuperated after the war and trade bloomed again. However, foreign aggression and contraband ran wild, and in that context, a group of officers and wealthy vecinos in Cartagena proposed what they depicted as a solution to contraband: a company of privateers. The company was created with private capital, a charter, the endorsement of the governor and failed dramatically only two years later. A combination of high fees due to the taxes requested by the Royal Hacienda from their prey (*presas*) and severe regulations imposed by the Council of the Indies quelled the project. The Council not only deemed it contrary to the Crown's interests, but also noted that it had yielded insignificant profits

to its investors. The arguments for protecting the coasts from foreign smugglers seemed more instrumental than concrete. Indeed, it was customary for political communication to solicit permissions and authorizations by citing the advancement of the Monarchy's interests. This granted neighbors and communities the authority to establish privately funded enterprises for their personal gain and, in certain instances, for the benefit of the Monarchy.

Another aspect of the discussions that were held during the period was the topic of insecurity and poverty. Insecurity was mainly caused by the roaming presence of non-subjugated Indians who attacked convoys and allied with foreigners and merchants, effectively hindering the circulation of both goods and people. These communities posed many challenges to authorities, not least because they frequently sought to form alliances with groups that had a less marked affiliation. Thus, they presented a spatial, social, and economic challenge. How did this situation evolve throughout the period? This question is the object of chapter 3. The means through which native communities were dealt with throughout the period varied in accord to many factors: their disposition towards authorities, the terrain where they lived and circulated, the need for main d'oeuvre and the disposition of authorities towards them (i.e., the extent to which authorities were willing to negotiate instead of attack). Several indigenous groups classified as hostile were the subject of different attempts to suppress their circulation and action in the provinces of Cartagena, Santa Marta and Rio de la Hacha. The Guajiros (wayuu), free from the constraints of subjected populations, circulated, traded, and bred cattle which were then sold to foreign interlopers in and around the Guajira peninsula. The Chilimas attacked Spanish convoys carrying merchandise from the interior to the coast and ambushed officials. Authorities were left to attempt to use force or, conversely, to negotiate with less overtly aggressive natives. Some were “friendlier” or “docile” as per the classifications offered at the time. These were opposed to “barbarous”, “rebel” or “bravos”.

Numerous regions of the northern frontiers were the domain of such communities, and the porous nature of these frontiers enabled them to circulate and forge alliances or engage in war against persistent adversaries. Such was the case of the Cunas, in the northwestern. They lived within the jurisdictions of Darién, Citará and northern Antioquia, and were enmeshed in a centuries old war with the Emberas, called

Chocoos by the Spanish. As such, they posed a hindrance to the prospect of exploring, conquering, and settling new territories, whether through negotiation or violence. Other native groups had engaged in open hostilities, like the Carautas and Chorucos. In the 1680s, rebellion in the face of many years of Franciscan entradas (attempts to subdue) had broken out in the northern province of Citará and a violent repression had left many homeless, living in cimarronas: families were dislocated communities displaced, and authority structures upended. In the Darién, which links the isthmus of Panama to the continent, indigenous communities developed intricate and fruitful relationships with foreign interlopers of all kinds, partly given the sporadic and inconsistent Spanish presence. The alliances formed between foreign and indigenous groups fueled foreign plans to establish colonies in the Darién, both in 1697 and 1740. Therefore, in the northern frontier of the kingdom, the regions that exhibited the greatest stability in terms of indigenous life that were free from Spanish control were the extremes, specifically the Guajira peninsula and the Darién isthmus.

What accounts for such a difference? The Darién and Guajira were furthest from the cities and roads, connecting the interior to the coast harbored in the provinces of Santa Marta, Cartagena, and Antioquia. The pressure to submit and integrate the Monarchy was thus less constant on the extremes. To organize expeditions or entradas to those places, soldiers, funds, provisions, and weapons were needed, as well as enthusiasm and royal permission. Although there was a certain reprisal of such efforts in the 1680s, the conjunction of these three elements was not constant. While in the central provinces, negotiations led to the foundation of villages and towns of mixed populations, Spanish cities were not founded in the extremes. In the 17th century, cattle rather than men had conquered the Guajira. The Guajiros of the peninsula raised cattle for centuries, adapting to a new way of life—so too did the animals adapt to the landscape. But the desert-like, heat-ridden plains were said to be hostile places for Spaniards, who seldom lived there. The Darién, conversely, presented a different challenge: one of humid forests, treacherous creeks and slopes, and brimming wildlife. Cattle could not be introduced, and meat was therefore imported at high costs from the haciendas of Cartagena. Thus, Spanish cities had not prospered since the 17th century. The inability of Europeans to adapt to these places must be considered when trying to explain the uneven spread of Spanish presence across the northern frontiers.

Historiography has advanced the postulate of Ecological Imperialism to describe the ways in which European powers related to the environments they apprehended. Mostly, they fared well in temperate regions with climates similar to those in Europe. The coastal hinterland, made of deserts, plains and jungle, was therefore less suited for European life. This does not mean it remained untouched or unmodified, for the input of European plants, animals, and illnesses had modified its natural and human front since the 15th century, but it does account for the success the extremes of the territory achieved in resisting Spanish advance.

How did ventures to advance and conquer non-subjected spaces play out in provinces where Spanish cities were present? What drove expeditions to conquer? What interests bound together or tore apart such initiatives? These questions are the fabric of chapter 4, where an answer to them is offered through a case study spanning the years 1707-1718. Namely, the case of one governor's attempts to conquer through negotiations and ensure the advance of Spanish mining cuadrillas reveals the extent to which political alliances and enmities determined the success of initiatives on the frontier. While personal profit inevitably guided most attempts to establish Spanish posts over frontiers, some initiatives were also driven by an imperial conception of native integration into the monarchy, based on the notion of reduction of native societies to a better state. In this case, a group of natives from the Citará (northwest of Santafé de Antioquia) sought the protection of justices in Antioquia. Under the authority of Governor José López de Carvajal, negotiations were carried out, and the Indians settled around the rivers Murrí and Rio Verde, in a village 400 strong. The Indians involved in negotiating and settling Murrí had been displaced by the Citará rebellions of 1680 and sought a betterment of their conditions. The fate of the settlement in Murrí would partly hinge on the vicissitudes of political competition and interpersonal conflict. Ultimately, the governor's endeavors were cut short by a conjunction of Criollo magistrates from the Royal Audiencia and Popayán, whose interests in preserving Indians on their side of the frontier -not least to use them as workforce for gold exploitation- prevailed over their welfare.

What did indigenous welfare pend on? How was their integration into the Monarchy achieved, if it was at all? To what degrees were Indians on the frontiers integrated as subjects? Chapter 5 attempts to answer these questions by following the

thread drawn in the previous chapter and examining the foundations of settlements in closer detail. The area in which the natives sought to establish their villages anew was the same as Governor Carvajal had settled, and it now stood within Antioquia's jurisdiction, as proven by subsequent descriptions of the province's boundaries. But when negotiations were resumed in 1723, the justices in the province of Popayán, neighboring to the south, manifested their discontent towards Antioqueño settlements in Murri. They claimed the foundations were illicit and argued that native displacement from the province of Citará (which was a part of that of Chocó) was contrary to the Laws of the Indies.

In reality, competition to exploit new gold sources drove the will to establish mining villages with natives as workforce. In this sense, natives were able to navigate the waters of interprovincial competition to negotiate with the authorities who presented them with a more promising scenario. Antioquia had set itself apart from Popayán on this front since the late 17th century. The struggle between both provinces, and claims of corruption by officials and mistreatment of Indians, would lead to a jurisdictional redrawing. The Chocó thus became a separate governorship in 1726. In the midst of the struggle, the new foundations followed a common scheme for integration. The measures required to guarantee the incorporation of indigenous peoples as Indian subjects, i.e., Indians within an Indian Republic, were based on a series of priority measures, including evangelization, which was ensured through the establishment of churches, political representation through the appointment of Indian authorities, and taxation, which was accomplished through the payment of tribute to the Crown.

Two practices, however, hampered the process: the order in which the steps for integration were set in motion, and the lack of knowledge officers had of native political structures when appointing Indian officers. On the one hand, the first practice created a dysfunctional situation whereby natives did not have access to their gardens or in the new villages, leading Spanish officers to grant them permission to circulate, which made the population process difficult and unstable. On the other hand, because individuals appointed as Caciques or Governors did not necessarily align with internally recognized Indian authorities, the guarantee of command over natives was not guaranteed, nor were negotiations or parleys guaranteed. In such a scenario, ensuring government for a *bien común*, or common good, that included Indians,

depended on the articulation between several factors: sensitivity towards an imperial ideal of protection of the *miserabilis*, native willingness to become subjects, and the existence of favorable right conditions for Indian societies to prosper. In the central Andes, large *encomiendas* had given way to *pueblos de Indios*, who in only some cases possessed land (in *resguardos* for example). In the northwestern frontiers, not only did subjugated Indians not rarely have access to land possession, but they were closely controlled by frontier agents whose own interests often surpassed their attempts to abide by the instructions given to them by distant governors. In this way, the guarantees of those who did submit were menaced by laziness, greed or neglect.

But the Monarchy had dispositions set in place to that effect. The fabric of empire, or, in other words, the underlying structure the Monarchy provided its territories, permeated the frontiers. The existence of a common legal culture comprising a multitude of normative layers, the circulation of agents charged with indigenous protection who carried with them written legal material such as the *Recopilación*, and the ambulatory nature of justice embodied in magistrates who conducted *visitas* and *residencias*, ensured that a culture of empire through law, bureaucracy, and justice extended through the Monarchy. However, as explored in the final chapter, while the presence of these structures guaranteed that a *república de indios* was properly formed, giving Indians the needed tools to participate in their government to promote their advancement and welfare, private interests often shielded action through those. The case of the Pintados illustrates the failure of channels of appeal to effect change to their conditions -through *protectores de indios*- in the face of private interests. Non-compliance with orders from the Crown to protect Indian subjects (who worked *mitas* and paid tribute) was commonplace. The justification for it was well known: officers shielded their non-compliance under the pretense that the King could not possibly understand their need, thereby justifying obedience without compliance.

This practice was accentuated by a drive to increase territorial control in the 1730s. Strategies aimed at populating and controlling indigenous circulation by settling villages on their frontiers increasingly pressured both subjected and free-roaming Indians. In this scenario, indigenous resistance found a favorable terrain. Many communities had subjected in the last quarter of the 17th century under circumstances of fear and need. But in the 18th century, even though provinces had continued to grow

an urban tissue, exerting pressure onto native lands, natives found ways to resist and rebel, whether overtly or by forging alliances with non-subjugated groups. The case of the Pintados illustrates the failure of the bargain they had initially made, where submission appeared to be beneficial. Their rebellion and return to former customs in the 1740s, signals that nothing was fixed on the frontiers over half a century later. On the contrary, the pressure exerted by political practices that combined the exercise of jurisdiction with personal interests, increased after the 1740s. The 1750s would give way to new Capitulations for conquest, especially against the Chimilas, Guajiros and Darienes.

This series of questions and answers has helped advance answers that hint at general trends when asking how the dynastic change manifested in government. We would be hard-pressed to offer a single answer. The choice of frontiers, or contested ground, as the main sample for this study enables us to suggest answers to this question by evaluating how the Monarchy functioned in extremis, on its margins. The margins, as we have seen, were central to political preoccupations: controlling them favored commerce, government, and circulation. In seeking to improve control over the frontiers, natives were often at the center of initiatives emanating from governors and vecinos. The approach to natives underwent some general evolutions, even though there are geographic particularities and continuities on the extremes. While in the 1680s and 1710s centuries the idea that natives' peace and quiet guaranteed ought to be guaranteed prevailed, in the 1720s and 1740s, the "advancement" and "promotion" of natives was hailed as the foremost objective. While this was not generalized, not did it apply to "rebellious" Indians, this shift in expressions signals a shift in the intentions towards subjugated Indians.

Other than improving authorities' grasp on Indians, how might we evaluate differences in the manner of governing? Parts of this dissertation have allowed us to explore a world of increasing Creolization from the 1680s, which authorities in Spain attempted to reverse by increasingly appointing career military officers. Nonetheless, in the majority of instances, irrespective of their *cursus honorum* or *naturaleza*, the benefits to be reaped in the Indies were too compelling for officials to act according to Royal Dispositions and the Royal Will. In the 17th century, government meant ensuring

that fair decisions and conditions were applied; this was described as the execution of justice. On the frontier, the execution of justice was done by Captains aguerra, whose numbers would ramp up in the second half of the 18th century. They played an increasingly important role in tax collection and government in former frontiers, whose status had become more hybrid due to new populations being founded. During this period, ideas of betterment, order, and advancement had begun to permeate the fabric of empire, even reaching frontier agents. Increasingly, happiness and ordered well-being were sought.

Was there an evolution in the capacity of the authorities to superimpose an imperial order on the interests of dominant social groups? This dissertation does not provide a unique answer. For indeed, local particularities, individual personalities and circumstances varied. Different events were examined to offer parts of an answer. As Paul Veyne has remarked, however, “an event only makes sense within a series, the number of series is indefinite, series are not hierarchically ordered, and [...] they don't converge towards a geometrical representation of all perspectives.” Even so, it is possible to say that many practices that found a beginning or an increase in the 1680s were increasingly attempted thereafter. This applies to negotiations with natives in some regions, land settlement, infrastructure, and defense. The defense infrastructure of the Caribbean coast would be remodeled following the 1720s reforms. Privateering companies, albeit the failure of the 1738 attempt, would proliferate in the 1760s and 1770s. Oversight over the royal hacienda would improve, albeit the absence of a system of Royal Hacienda intendentes, unlike Quito and Peru. Contraband, however, would remain a central issue.

Negotiation, which had been practiced during Habsburg times, prevailed into the 18th century between authorities and vecinos, authorities and Indians, and Indians and neighbors. The relaunch of the violent conquest in 1740 signaled a break from attempts to negotiate. Bourbon authorities had experimented with “soft means” for decades after the last break of violence in the 1680s, with positive results. But the new need for communication and transport between provinces and Kingdoms in the Monarchy had rendered the prevailing resistance of hostile native groups a bother.

The conquest launched in the 1740s would extend well into the 1770s, alongside efforts to order and redress integrated populations into civic ways of life and integrate

the hinterlands of provinces. More roads were built to connect *ciudades* and *pueblos*, and jurisdictions were redrawn. For example, in 1741, a jurisdictional redrawing of ecclesiastical and political character redrew the map of the frontier between Antioquia and Cartagena. The northwestern towns of Ayapel, Cáceres y Guamocó were added to the bishopric of Cartagena and their *cajas reales*, as well as that of Zaragoza, would thenceforward depend on the Caja Real of Mompo. The idea behind this was to conjugate geographical proximity with jurisdictional dependence. Decisions such as these sought to bring the Royal Hacienda and the Church closer to populations in geographically peripheral towns to improve the collection of taxes by the *cajas reales* and in religious instruction.

Behind this logic, there was the will to order societies and land use. On the one hand, this would lead authorities to clash with rebellious Indians and maroons in attempts to dislodge them from their villages and *palenques* during the second half of the 18th century. Attempts at negotiating with the Guajiros ended badly after an experience with Cacique Cecilio López Sierra. There, religious missions increased in number and in size in the following decades, founding pueblos and missions. Attempts to build roads and towns to urbanize were accompanied by a logic qualified as “Enlightened”. Enlightened administrators, such as Francisco Silvestre, Mon y Velarde in the province of Antioquia, or bishopric *visitas* with a more enlightened approach, such as those conducted by Diego de Peredo in the province of Cartagena, created population reports and censuses as well as *informes* accounting for geography, infrastructure, and populations. Throughout the second half of the century, mestizos, peoples of all colors and Indians increasingly accessed land use and political representation through Cabildos. By the same token, vecinos of mixed towns increasingly expressed a sense of belonging to their communities of vecinos or *patrias*. These traits would be the ingredients for the scenario in the 1800s, as access to vecindad and common lands gave communities a better stand on the imperial exchequer.

There can be no politics without a republic, and there can be no political life of republican dimensions without vecindad. The Cabildo, crucially, was the instance where the voices of vecinos were assembled. This dissertation has offered answers in accord to the choices made for the purpose of the research it entailed. However,

considering the Cabildos of American cities and towns might provide new angles of analysis through which to deepen the study of political life in the New Kingdom of Grenada during the early 18h century. The provinces of Antioquia and Cartagena developed dissimilar elites throughout the remaining decades of the century and political life led to different outcomes in 1810. A comparative study of the Cabildos in these two provinces might help understand the road to political representation taken by these societies. Other corporations might also help complete the sociopolitical panorama that has been offered in this study. The Santa Hermandad, whose policing role was particularly important on the frontiers, for example, ought to be studied to understand the presence of authorities in the interprovincial middle ground. These are just two elements through which government in the New Kingdom of Granada during this period might be approached.

Maps and tables

Map 1: *The northern frontiers of The New Kingdom of Granada, populations, and topography*, p. 23.

Map 2: *Commercial routes from Santafé to Mompox, circa 1710*, p. 75.

Map 3: *Illicit commerce in the Province of Santa Marta, 1730s, locations*, p. 96.

Map 4: *Ciénagas in the Province of Santa Marta*, p. 97.

Map 5: *The road to Murri and rivers in the area*, p. 236.

Map 6: *Location map, Isla de la Plata and San Juan de los Pintados*, p. 345.

Map 7: *Pintado settlements along the Magdalena River*, p. 362.

Table 1: *Guard posts on the Caribbean coast 1736*, 121.

Table 2: *Appointments made by Francisco Fernández de Heredia*, p. 210 and 211.

Table 3: *Padrones Murri* p. 292-295.

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Sección	Signatura	Sección	Tomo	Sección	Tomo
Santa Fe	6	Reales Cédulas	3	Indios	25
	266		4		87
	293		5		537
	317		6		
	357		7		
	374		8		
	362		9		
	384		10		
	459				
	525				
Escribanía	583A	Caciques e indios	14	Residencias	87
	1193		33		
			36		
Santo Domingo	2167	Contrabandos	15	Documentos	537
Indiferente general	135	Residencias	54	Libros capitulares	637
				Caja B	115
Contratación	1247				

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General map

