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THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE MEETS SCANDINAVIANISM: IMPERIAL
VISIONS, COMMUNICATION CHANNELS, AND PRACTICES OF RULE
(1843-1864)

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РОССИЯ ВСТРЕЧАЕТ СКАНДИНАВИЗМ: ИМПЕРСКИЕ
ПРЕДСТАВЛЕНИЯ, КАНАЛЫ КОММУНИКАЦИИ И ПРАКТИКИ
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Introduction

This study focuses on the history of the Russian empire's long acquaintance with a project that proposed alternative organization of political and cultural geography of the Northern Europe. Scandinavianism, nurtured by organicist rhetoric of Romanticism together with historical and philological investigations that dealt with kinship status of the Scandinavian languages at the beginning of the 19th century, proposed a supranational vision that primarily implied different forms of consolidation – from the intensification of the cultural ties to bold political designs of Scandinavian union-federation – primarily between Denmark, Sweden, and Norway.¹ Scandinavianism as a project that challenged contemporary, legally recognized state borders was hardly unique for mid-19th century Europe. It emerged during tectonic shifts that took place across the European intellectual landscape around the 1840s, when similar tendencies surfaced in German Confederation and Italian states.² The political and cultural context of the Northern Europe, however, provided Scandinavianism with its distinct features.

In the case of (pan-)Scandinavianism, prefix 'pan' appears only in translation. In the Nordic mass-media, it has always been referred to as *Skandinavism(en)*³ since the first mention in a Danish newspaper in 1843 while it sometimes obtained the prefix in the foreign press with often pejorative connotations.⁴ Although Scandinavianism could back up expansionist ambitions, rhetorically it was often presented as based on agreement, trust, freedom of

¹ During the period that this research concerns with, Sweden and Norway were united by a personal union and are usually referred to as Sweden-Norway. See: Raymond E. Lindgren, *Norway-Sweden: Union, Disunion, and Scandinavian Integration* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015); Bo Stråth, *Union och demokrati: de förenade rikena Sverige-Norge 1814-1905* (Nora: Bokförlaget Nya Doxa, 2005).

² Although some scholars trace the continuity of early Romantic impulses in 1800s as shaping firm grounds for 1840s movements, I am more inclined to see the breach between the two cases, than the genealogy. However, the organicist vocabulary of brotherly peoples coined at the beginning of the century was revoked, though with altered connotations.

³ 'En' is a definite suffix.

⁴ Ruth Hemstad, "Scandinavianism: Mapping the Rise of a New Concept," *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 13, no. 1 (June 1, 2018): 1–21, <https://doi.org/10.3167/choc.2018.130102>; Alexander Maxwell, "Pan-Nationalism as a Category in Theory and Practice," *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 28, no. 1 (2022): 1–19, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2021.2004767>.

decision-making and even altruism.⁵ By the mid-19th century, the project, although it was contested by local nationalist and conservative programmes, gained momentum on the pages of the press, in the offices of foreign ministries, at professional and scientific conferences, and among the representatives of the royal courts in Denmark and Sweden-Norway. Scandinavianism was capable of mobilizing thousands of its adherents in the streets of the Nordic capitals and, just as importantly, dozens in the highest cabinets. Ultimately, however, Scandinavianism failed in its aspirations of the political unity of the Scandinavian nations, and the defeat of Denmark in the Second War for Schleswig in 1864 is usually presented as its dramatic but logical result in the historiography, although these views are being challenged by modern research.⁶

The Russian empire – by virtue of being a neighbor to Sweden-Norway – worried about social and political capital of Scandinavianism, exacerbated by usually hostile rhetoric of its advocates. Moreover, since the Grand Duchy of Finland – a polity that in many regards retained Swedish culture, legal foundations, and institutions – remained under the scepter of the Russian Emperor since 1808-9, Scandinavianist echoes that resonated there produced internal concerns for the resilience of the imperial abode. Indeed, in Finland certain student groups and political associations regarded Scandinavian orientation as a compelling alternative to the power gravity of Saint-Petersburg. The reception of Scandinavianism in the Finlandish educated society, however, produced tensions given the synchronic rise of the Finnish-centered cultural project of Fennomania that in some of its editions repudiated Scandinavian-leaning tendencies. The dynamics of the relations between Scandinavianism and Fennomania, however, were much more complex, as I attempt to demonstrate in this dissertation.

⁵ On expansionist ambitions see, for example: Einar Hedin, *Sverige-Norge och Preussen: 1860 - 1863; projekt till Danmarks delning* (Stockholm: Vitterhets historie och antikvitets akademien, 1952).

⁶ Morten Nordhagen Ottosen and Rasmus Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang* (København: Gads forlag, 2021); Ruth Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter: skandinavisk samarbeid, skandinavisme og unionsøpplosningen* (Oslo: Akademisk Publiserings, 2008); Tim van Gerven, *Scandinavism: Overlapping and Competing Identities in the Nordic World, 1770-1919* (Leiden: Brill, 2022).

The imperial concerns about the dynamics of the project in Scandinavia and in Finland, however, were not static. First, Scandinavianism itself was a vibrant and flexible programme that survived through several decades by transforming its principles and rhetoric that resonated with contemporary anxieties and hopes on regional and local levels. Second, the imperial cabinets and publics perceived Scandinavianism differently. Their perceptions were conditioned by particularity of communication channels, foreign politics combinations, internal tensions, imperial languages of rationalization, visions of ethnic or class-based groupness and management style of these groups.⁷ Scandinavianism was a kaleidoscope of meanings, threats, and anxieties determined, besides the mobility and flexibility of the project itself, by how variegated imperial agents – in Scandinavian capitals, ministerial cabinets, Saint-Petersburg palaces, streets of Åbo (Turku) and Helsingfors (Helsinki) – understood the empire, its present politics, demands, and expectations. The relevance of my work lies in revisiting many of the well-established historiographical notions of how imperial agents at various levels perceived the threat of pan-Scandinavism.

Whereas there were synchronic contestations and debates about the nature of Scandinavianism in the press and among the government officials, I am mostly interested in how this perception changed on the diachronic timescale from the 1840s to the 1860s. The turbulent period from Nicholas I's conservative rule to Alexander II's unprecedented reforms witnessed European wars and revolutions, triumphs and defeats of the imperial power, repressions and emancipations of various scale, but most essentially, profound transformations of the social and political architecture of the regime that echoed in all composite parts of the empire. These changes resulted from comprehension of pan-imperial issues and were stipulated by imperial reactions on local manifestations, demands, and projects from the composite parts,

⁷ Ilya Gerasimov et al., "New Imperial History and the challenges of empire," in *Empire Speaks Out: Languages of Rationalization and Self-Description in the Russian Empire*, ed. Ilya Gerasimov, Jan Kusber and Alexander Semyonov (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 1–32, <https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004175716.i-280.4>.

including Finland. **The relevance of my research** is determined by addressing and reassessing essential topics of modern historiography related to Russian empire and Grand Duchy of Finland, imperial rule and its repertoire of power utilized within and beyond its borders, political languages, official institutional hierarchies, informal patron-client relations, practices of loyalty and opposition, and channels of information processing – all of which directly influenced imperial perceptions of and reactions on the issues related to pan-Scandinavian project.

Novelty of the research

This dissertation attempts to bring together three distinct historiographical fields that are not usually treated together, namely the history of the Russian diplomacy, the history of diversity management within the imperial abode, and the history of Finland as a special composite part of the empire. I am trying to complete this endeavor through the analysis of imperial reactions to the phenomenon of Scandinavianism. Although each of these fields have enjoyed considerable attention of scholars, I argue that only a synthetic analytical work that combines these subjects and disciplinary subfields allows for complex questions to be posed and answered. The sophisticated picture of imperial and Finnish responses to Scandinavianism, of their designs and implementations has never been provided before.

This study clarifies the workings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian empire in presenting the threat of Scandinavianism to the emperor and acting upon it through various measures. The thesis first places the activity of the ministry in the context of the post-Napoleonic system of international relations, which established a repertoire of actions available for the Great Powers in relation to potential threats, as well as formulated a universal language for describing these threats. My research sheds light on the diplomats' attempts to *translate* regional Scandinavianist aspirations – usually regarded as perennial and geopolitical in the

relevant historiography⁸ – into this pan-European language of collective security to develop a follow-up response.

Besides, the dissertation argues that Finland was a particular object of diplomatic concerns with regards to Scandinavianism both as an externally ‘contested’ territory and as an area threatened by potential domestic agitation. The Finnish administration and especially governors-general played a particular role in diplomatic communication related to the issue.⁹ Finally, the dissertation addresses post-Crimean diplomatic perceptions of Scandinavianism, pointing to the limitations of the aristocratic-diplomatic surveillance over the project and omnipresent narrative of Scandinavianist downfall in their dispatches. The thesis reassesses the expectations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the idea of Scandinavian union during the crucial years of 1863-4, revealing adaptive rather than exclusively repressive response that was conditioned by the imperial exposure to new principles that manifested themselves in the diplomatic world.

Second, this dissertation traces previously unexplored genealogy of internal administrative reactions to the danger of Scandinavianism in the Grand Duchy of Finland that usually finds itself in the peripheral position in standard narratives about this pan-national project. The research attempts to demonstrate earlier understudied relations between the languages of rationalization of multilayered imperial diversity and instrumentalized practices elaborated to counter Scandinavianism. Ascribed revolutionary potential of Scandinavianism in the 1840s rather approximated it with other cosmopolitical threats coming from abroad, and Fennomania often stood close to the idea of the Scandinavian consolidation than seen as opposed to it in the administrative optics. Moreover, public reactions to Scandinavianism in

⁸ Emanuel Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864: A Chapter of Russian Policy towards the Scandinavian Countries* (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1990), 549–53.

⁹ For a similar argument on the role of the Finnish administration, see also: Lidija Lempijajnen, “Vneshnie kontakty Velikogo Knjazhestva Finljandskogo: 1809-1914 gg.” (PhD diss., Herzen State Pedagogical University, 2007); Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg, “Finland och den svensk-ryska allianspolitiken intill 1830/31 års polska revolution,” *Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier*, no. 21-22 (1946): 153–346.

Finland reinforced this vision, and some intellectuals could regard the two projects as complimentary.

Modern political-ethnographic mapping that was formulated as a result of the Crimean War and Polish Uprising as well as the development of academic inquiry into national characters and mores redefined Scandinavianism and resulted in its growing association with ostensible conspiracies of Swedish-speaking population in Finland. However, the definition was contested and in the situation of persisting censorship regulations, the struggle for this definition rather deployed in the administrative cabinets that articulated Scandinavian dangers – or their absence – to pursue their own goals. Scandinavianism appeared to be an inquisitorial label that the administration and especially governor-general used in their communication with Saint-Petersburg, attuned to the changing political language of the reforming and modernizing empire.

Third, this study introduces new agents into the history of the imperial perception of Scandinavism. In addition to public intellectuals in Finland and Russian proper, whose opinions were not previously brought to light in the analysis of this problem, the dissertation addresses previously obscured institutions of surveillance and control – primarily that of the Third Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery¹⁰ – that profoundly affected the treatment of Scandinavism in Saint-Petersburg. The Third Section headquarters in Finland constituted alternative center of knowledge-production, monitoring, and feedback provision that partook in the formulation of Scandinavianist danger, its ethnographic profile as well as in the cabinet wars as a quasi-independent ‘third party’.

¹⁰ But see relevant studies on the Third Section in Finland without, however, particular focus on Scandinavianism: Osmo Jussila, “Keisarikunnan moraalilääkärit: poliittinen santarmivalvonta Suomessa 1800-luvulla,” in *Ajankohta: poliittisen historian vuosikirja 1994* ed. Mikko Majander (Helsinki, 1993), 8–36; Marina Zagora, “Gendarme control in the Grand Duchy of Finland in the 19th century,” *Vestnik YarGU*, no. 3 (2020): 40–43; Marina Zagora, “Portraying the Local Life? Gendarme Control in the Grand Duchy of Finland and the Gendarme Reports from the ‘Periphery,’ 1866–1881,” *Journal of Finnish Studies* 25, no. 2 (December 1, 2022): 226–52, <https://doi.org/10.5406/28315081.25.2.04>.

Finally, the source base for this study includes materials from eleven archival repositories located in the Russian Federation, Finland, Denmark, and Sweden. Drawing on previously unexplored sources, this work sheds light on structural elements and details of the functioning of imperial institutions, transnational communication networks, and personal relations of various agents to the dynamics of the pan-Scandinavian movement.

Purpose of the study and research question

The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the dynamics of multidimensional governmental, public, and private reactions to the phenomenon of Scandinavianism, its real and imagined effects in the Russian empire and Finland in 1843-1864. **My research question** is: ‘How and under what circumstances were imperial perceptions of Scandinavianism changing during the period?’

Research objectives

- Identify structural conditions, backgrounds, and factors of governmental acquittance with Scandinavianism in Finland and Russia
- Determine genealogy, context, and details of the diplomatic response to Scandinavianism in Copenhagen and Stockholm as well as in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Saint-Petersburg
- Trace the reactions of the imperial multilingual public spheres to the dynamics of pan-Scandinavian project
- Analyze the range of institutional views on the challenges posed by pan-Scandinavian idea, as well as repertoire of measures designed and implemented to impede the intensification of this idea in the international and domestic political fields

The object of my study is the set of source materials related to the imperial diplomatic and government institutions, agents, and public spheres that in one way or another reflected and reacted on different aspects of Scandinavianism, whether real or imagined. **The subject of this dissertation** is the range of views, opinions, perceptions that crystallized in imperial cabinets and public spheres as a result of their acquaintance with pan-Scandinavian project, the context in which they were formulated, and measures that were created through the operationalization of these diverse insights.

Research methodology

This study mostly fathoms into the debates and decisions that took place in cabinets and palaces. Often, these ‘debates’ surface as my speculative constructions since the interlocutors might have never faced each other but ‘communicated’ by the means of their reports, dispatches, and letters sent to Saint-Petersburg. The dissertation does consider broader agency and other environments, of course, but it mostly concerns itself with these settings. On the one hand, this dissertation thus analyses institutions in a manner rather traditional for Russian imperial and Finnish national historiography.¹¹ Moreover, since these negotiations often concerned policies that were meant to be applied to particular groups defined on the basis of their confession, class, or ethnic status, the dissertation draws on studies of the imperial policies with regards to particular communities and territories.¹²

On the other hand, and I would argue most essentially, the dissertation addresses conceptual languages of these debates and decisions, their rhetoric, metaphors, allusions,

¹¹ See classic studies, for example: Anatolij Remnev, *Samoderzhavnoe pravitel'stvo: Komitet ministrov v sisteme vysshego upravlenija Rossijskoj imperii, vtoraja polovina XIX--nachalo XX veka* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2010); Kristiina Kalleinen, “The Nature of Russian Imperialism in Finland During the First Half of the Nineteenth Century,” in *Ethnic and National Issues in Russian and East European History*, ed. John Morrison (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), 86-102.

¹² In this regard, see, for example: Paul W. Werth, *The Tsar's Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Aleksei I. Miller, *The Romanov Empire and Nationalism: Essays in the Methodology of Historical Research* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2008).

references, comparisons, and other tropes that affected their appeal and their result. In this sense, the empire crystallized itself not in concrete buildings of Saint-Petersburg and Helsingfors or bureaucratic institutions but precisely in the tensions, misunderstandings, and errors that the interlocutors made in trying to grasp the complexity of what empire was and what it was meant to become. The empire, or rather *imperial situation*, manifests itself as the context of their negotiations and actions.¹³

This methodological intervention guides my analysis of multifaceted, often asymmetric communications that spanned around the issue – or even diverse issues – that related to Scandinavianism. In addressing these misunderstandings and attempts to overcome them, I introduce the term *translation*, meaning the attempts of imperial agents to introduce associations, equations, and common denominators – often altering the nature of the subject – between local or even foreign practices, legal procedures, and political categories with those imperial ‘standards’ understandable for the interlocutor. Theoretically, translation underscored synchronization but in reality it often resulted in uncalculated consequences.¹⁴

Examining the period from 1843 to 1864, I can hardly ignore the rise of nationalism as one of the main challenges for imperial establishments across the globe.¹⁵ Challenges did not mean the inevitable imperial demise but rather required the adaptability of imperial regimes to new languages and practices of solidarity, and many European empires appeared surprisingly successful in this, being able to capitalize on respective nationalisms in the role of their guardians.¹⁶ The research on nationalisms encompasses thousands of volumes of theoretical

¹³ Gerasimov et al., “New Imperial History and the challenges of empire”; Alexander Semyonov, “Empire as a Context Setting Category,” *Ab Imperio*, no. 1 (2008): 193–204, <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2008.0140>.

¹⁴ I am particularly inspired by: Vicente L. Rafael, *Motherless Tongues: The Insurgency of Language amid Wars of Translation* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2016).

¹⁵ It might be, however, that the role of nationalism as a challenge for empires was overdriven or misunderstood. See: Pieter M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2016).

¹⁶ Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller, eds., *Nationalizing Empires* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2015); Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011); Krishan Kumar, “The Idea of Empire,” in *Visions of Empire: How Five Empires Shaped the World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 1–36, <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctvc773dq.5>.

literature enriched by detailed case-studies. Some of those have found their place in the core alphabet of the humanities, like Benedict Anderson's reflections on *imagined communities* or Ernest Gellner's principle of equation between national and political body.¹⁷ Methodologically, I am mostly indebted to Rogers Brubaker's elaborations on identity as a process rather than a crystallized entity. Brubaker highlights that groups – be they ethnicities or nations – are never givens but rather fields of struggle between different powers that competitively seek to categorize and classify the population while individuals or collectives, in their turn, might self-identify against the grain of such imposed procedures. Brubaker suggests moving from seeing groups to analyzing practices of groupness, and I completely share this principle.¹⁸

In studying diplomatic sources, I draw on the heterogenous theoretical intuitions of the new diplomatic history. Without much doubt, best examples of the classic diplomatic history around the issue of Scandinavianism transgressed the boundaries of the traditional disciplinary field and addressed questions beyond standard limits of the inquiry.¹⁹ New diplomatic history also calls for expanding boundaries of traditional diplomatic scholarship by focusing on issues of diplomatic culture and ritual, conceptual language of letters and dispatches, varieties of socialization and leisure, asymmetric negotiation and mediation.²⁰ In building my research on subject works and these methodological interventions, I explore

¹⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York: Verso, 1991); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008).

¹⁸ Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, "Beyond 'Identity'," *Theory and Society* 29, no. 1 (February 1, 2000): 1–47, <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007068714468>; Rogers Brubaker, "Ethnicity without Groups," *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv Für Soziologie* 43, no. 2 (2002): 163–89.

¹⁹ Here are some of them: Henrik Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme og politiske realiteter: Den politiske skandinavisme i Danmark 1830-1850* (Århus: Arusia, 1981); Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*; Erik Møller, *Skandinavisk stræben og svensk politik omkring 1860* (København: G. E. C. Gad, 1948).

²⁰ Jennifer Mori, "The State of the Art. The Way of the Future," *Diplomatica* 1, no. 1 (April 10, 2019): 5–12, <https://doi.org/10.1163/25891774-00101002>; Michael J. Hogan, "The 'Next Big Thing': The Future of Diplomatic History in a Global Age," *Diplomatic History* 28, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 1–21, <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2004.00396.x>; T. G. Otte, "The Inner Circle: What Is Diplomatic History? (And Why We Should Study It): An Inaugural Lecture," *History* 105, no. 364 (2020): 5–27, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-229X.12925>.

diplomatic environments and outlooks as significant variables in their perception of Scandinavianist dangers.

Finally, oftentimes I refer to the term *Scandinavian-wide framework* implying particular geography of imagination that made historical agents and groups think and act having considered similar practices of thinking and acting across the Scandinavian region with Finland often remaining in the liminal position.²¹ Intellectually, this framework made the publics and bureaucrats compare, contrast, or parallel their concerns with those within the area. Moreover, it also made implicit and explicit references to experiences of others within the borders of the region legitimate and justified by allusions to similarity of culture, origin, language, civilization, and other categories that rhetorically made them closer. On the one hand, this framework predated Scandinavianism and indeed laid foundations for its rise. On the other hand, Scandinavianism also dialectically solidified its mental reproduction.²²

State of the art

Scandinavianism as a political project

As early as 1900, Danish historian Julius Clausen made an observation that remains highly relevant even for contemporary research, namely that Scandinavianism is a term hard to define precisely.²³ Indeed, up to this day Scandinavianism is competitively fashioned as a movement, vision, political trajectory, and diplomatic problem in the historiography. My dissertation focuses mostly on political and diplomatic workings around Scandinavianism, and I propose to start this section with analysis of political repercussions of the project.

²¹ In this, I am intellectually indebted to: Harald Gustafsson, “A State That Failed?,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 31, no. 3–4 (September 1, 2006): 205–20, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03468750600930720>; Torkel Jansson, “Between Two Worlds: Nordic Political Cultures in a Comparative Perspective,” in *Scripts of Kingship: Essays on Bernadotte and Dynastic Formation in an Age of Revolution*, ed. Mikael Alm and Britt-Ingrid Johansson (Uppsala: Swedish Science Press, 2008), 185–220.

²² Ruth Hemstad, “Scandinavian Sympathies and Nordic Unity: The Rhetoric of Scandinavianness in the Nineteenth Century” in *Contesting Nordicness: From Scandinavianism to the Nordic Brand* ed. Jani Marjanen, Johan Strang, and Mary Hilson (Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2022), 35–57.

²³ Julius Clausen, *Skandinavismen: historisk fremstillet* (København: Det Nordiske Forlag, 1900).

Clausen pioneered historical reflection on the development of Scandinavianism. He limits himself mostly to Danish sources and shows how Scandinavism emerged from political aspirations of the Danish national-liberals. Clausen discovers the roots of the project in cultural ties and romantic explorations of the late 18th century. Whereas cultural and intellectual connections are appreciated by the author, political reverberations are dismissed – in a rather teleological fashion – as nothing but a fantasy of the youngsters who misinterpreted European and regional context.²⁴ This reflection on the gene of failure in the DNA of political Scandinavianism affected a great deal of the later research.

This work was later followed by deeper investigations of the national and local lives of Scandinavianism. John Sannes explored the Norwegian reception of the project and particular groups who sought to legitimize it in the public sphere.²⁵ Examining the press and private correspondence, Sannes argues that Scandinavian idea was not particularly popular in Norwegian intellectual circles since its main objectives that included the introduction of constitution or more inclusive representation, continued existence of Denmark and Swedish revanchist plans, usually did not relate to the local interests. Although this approach is gradually being reassessed and nuanced,²⁶ my research contributes little to the Norwegian edition of the project.

The Danish historian Henrik Becker-Christensen is skeptical of the movement's political ambitions as well.²⁷ According to his argument, Denmark was in dire need of military and diplomatic support against Prussia and the German states. This necessity coupled with liberal rhetoric of the opposition turned Scandinavianism into a viable survival strategy.

²⁴ Julius Clausen, *Skandinavismen*.

²⁵ John Sannes, *Patrioter, intelligens og skandinaver: Norske reaksjoner på skandinavismen før 1848* (Oslo: Universitetsforlag, 1959).

²⁶ Øystein Sørensen, *Norsk idéhistorie: Kampen om Norges sjel*, vol. 3 (Oslo: Aschehoug, 2001); Niri Ragnvald Johnsen, “‘Vi hafva ifrån morgon till qväll varit ute och agiterat’: Skandinavismen og pressen 1848-1864” (MA diss., University of Oslo, 2018).

²⁷ Henrik Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme og politiske realiteter: Den politiske skandinavisme i Danmark 1830-1850* (Århus: Arusia, 1981).

Becker-Christensen makes extensive use of police reports and government communications to ascertain the Danish authorities' assessment of the dangers posed by the movement prior to the regime change of 1848. The historian, moreover, sheds light on the Russian diplomats' anxieties about the progress of the movement and argues that their pressure put a stop on many Scandinavianist impulses and organizing visions. Becker-Christensen's analysis of imperial perception of the project reveals many distinct intuitions of the diplomatic agents, although his exclusive focus on Denmark does not allow him to make broader conclusions.

Other essential works put more weight on the aspects of political imagination and struggle in Denmark that affected visions of pan-Scandinavian futures there. Rasmus Glenthøj, Uffe Østergaard, Hans Vammen, Michael Bregnsbo and Kurt Villard Jensen – each in their own way – attempt to contextualize national-liberal aspirations and Scandinavianist imaginaries against the backdrop of a complex imperial situation in the Oldenburg empire.²⁸ Their works examine various aspects of nationalist and infrastructural challenges to imperial domains as well as strategies of suppression and accommodation exhibited by the Danish rule with regards to these obstacles. They address the rise of new political agents, languages, and visions of the future that competed for claiming their dominance in the political field. Their texts draw on modern theoretical and methodological foundations, but they also elaborate upon a solid tradition of the Danish political history of the 19th century, whose foundations were shaped by the works of Alexander Thorsøe, Niels Neergaard, Erik Møller and others.²⁹

²⁸ Rasmus Glenthøj, *1864 – Sønner af de Slagne* (København: Gads forlag, 2014); Uffe Østergaard, “National-Building and Nationalism in the Oldenburg Empire,” in *Nationalizing Empires* ed. by Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2015), 461–509; Hans Vammen, *Den tomme stat: Angst og ansvar i dansk politik 1848-1864* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2011); Michael Bregnsbo and Kurt Villads Jensen, *The Rise and Fall of the Danish Empire* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022).

²⁹ Alexander Thorsøe, *Kong Frederik den Syvendes regering, et bidrag til den danske stats historie fra 1848-1863* (København: Gyldendalske boghandels forlag, 1884); Niels Neergaard, *Under Junigrundloven*, vol. 1 (København: P.G. Philipsen, 1892). Unfortunately, I did not have a chance to read Møller's *Helstatens Fald* but I engage closely with his work on diplomatic history around Scandinavianism: Erik Møller, *Helstatens fald* (København: G. E. C. Gad, 1958); Møller, *Skandinavisk stræben og svensk politik omkring 1860*.

Another group of historians focus on the aspects of Danish nation-building in the nineteenth century, issues of mental mapping, imagination of the Self and Other and fostering of the national symbolics. Ole Fældbek and Inge Adriansen draw attention to the formulation of new national symbols and imaginaries that often were opposed or mutually exclusive with the semantic repertoire of Oldenburg empire.³⁰ Aladin Larguèche elaborates on the issues of the semantic border-mapping that assisted in formulating oppositions between Danish and German as well as between Scandinavian and Russian.³¹ Steen Bo Frandsen, however, demonstrates the broad range of self-identifications adhered to by the subjects of the Danish king, arguing that ‘German’ and ‘Danish’ positions were hegemonically projected by the nationalist rhetoric while the palette of statuses remained much more heterogenous even during the crisis years of wars and revolutions.³²

Although since the 2000s, there appeared a relative decline of interest for the political history of pan-Scandinavian project, giving way to research on its cultural visions, communication networks, and non-governmental agencies, Morten Nordhagen Ottosen and Rasmus Glenthøj have forcefully manifested the revival of investigations into the political dynamics of Scandinavianism in their huge volume *Union eller undergang*. Arguing against teleological narratives about the downfall of the Scandinavian union idea, the two historians reassess its chances, revealing the complex dynamics of negotiations, quarrels, and decision-making on both sides of the Øresund to argue that Scandinavian union served as a final goal of many other subordinate political programmes in Denmark and Sweden-Norway. In the scope of more than a thousand pages the authors provide new genealogies and situate driving forces

³⁰ Ole Fældbæk, *Dansk identitetshistorie: Et yndigt land 1789-1848* (København: Reitzel, 1991); Inge Adriansen, *Nationale Symboler* (København: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2003).

³¹ Aladin Larguèche, “Resistance as the Creation of a ‘Natural Frontier’: The Language of 19th-Century Scandinavism (1839-1867),” in *Contesting Frontiers, Resisting Identities*, ed. Lud’á Klusáková and Martin Moll (Plus-Pisa University Press, 2010), 181–94.

³² Steen Bo Frandsen, *Opdagelsen af Jylland: den regionale dimension i Danmarkshistorien 1814-64* (Århus: Aarhus universitetsforlag, 1996); Steen Bo Frandsen, “The Breakup of a Composite State and the Construction of a Nationalist Conflict: Denmark and the Duchies in the 19th Century,” *JEMIE - Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* 8, no. 1 (2009): 1-20.

behind the idea of the Nordic unity both drawing on virtually all existing research and addressing previously underexplored archival materials. Without doubt, a new standard work that presents a fresh narrative of pan-Scandinavian project, the book is encyclopedic – not to say megalomaniac – in its ambitions. One of the main networks of communication that endowed Scandinavianism with real political capital, according to their argument, was diplomacy.³³

Diplomacy and Scandinavianism

The historiographic tradition of diplomatic history has expanded the range of instrumentalized approaches that have been used to analyze pan-Scandinavian project. As early as 1912, Hjalmar Haralds published a history of Swedish diplomatic and military support for Denmark in 1848 then elaborated and continued by Erik Löfgren and Bo Lundqvist.³⁴ Since Sweden and the Russian empire declared their collective demarche, Russian position was also briefly addressed in the texts. Although Haralds pointed to the fact that the Swedish assistance was not determined exclusively by the public impulse of Scandinavism, the political capital of the movement in 1848 was hard to ignore at the diplomatic level. Haralds, Löfgren and Lundqvist drawing on a large body of archival sources that pertained to the diplomatic discussions, have only briefly touched on another important aspect of Oscar I's politics, namely his engagement with leading Swedish journals to shape the public opinion that would favor and reinforce his Denmark-focused activities. This aspect would play a crucial role during another crisis, the Crimean War.

³³ Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*.

³⁴ Hjalmar Haralds, *Sveriges utrikespolitik 1848, ett bidrag till belysning af danska frågans första skede. Akademisk afhandling av Hjalmar Haralds* (Uppsala: Akademiska bokhandeln, 1912); Erik Löfgren, *Sverige-Norge och danska frågan 1848-49: från stilleståndet i Malmö till den svensk-danska konventionen augusti 1849* (Uppsala: Wretmans boktryckeri, 1921); Bo Vernersson Lundqvist, *Sverige och den slesvig-holsteinska frågan 1849-50* (Uppsala: Appelberg, 1934).

Although before the 1850s, Oscar I emphasized his loyalty to the Russian emperor and his commitment to the so-called policy of 1812, meaning a close alliance between Russia and Sweden-Norway, the window of opportunity that the Crimean War opened clearly changed his approach to building relations with his eastern neighbor. Sven Eriksson's research focuses on the change in Swedish foreign policy during 1853-6, when Oscar I was shifting from Swedish-Danish neutrality towards a military alliance with the maritime powers. This policy shift was accompanied by a propaganda campaign launched under the king's aegis in the domestic journals and even European public sphere. Oscar I, having signed the November Treaty of 1855, was ready to join the coalition of European powers, but peace negotiations that soon started confused his plans.³⁵ Mart Kuldkepp, capitalizing on the research of the Swedish position during the Crimean War, has recently revisited persistent narratives of Swedish neutrality, arguing that Sweden was in fact one step from entering the hostilities under the banners of Finnish-centered revanchism and Scandinavian union.³⁶

Åke Holmberg extends Ericsson's focus to examine the extent to which Scandinavian ideas were popular among the Swedish elite and the significance of the pan-Scandinavian agenda in Swedish foreign policy. Drawing on a wide range of diplomatic and bureaucratic sources as well as on the materials of the press, he argues that Scandinavianism became one of the main ideas around which political debates unfolded in the cabinets and courts of the Scandinavian monarchs.³⁷ Erik Møller, another researcher of Scandinavianism in the high cabinets has also stressed that the promotion of Scandinavian union was only possible in the context of a doppelganger diplomacy: monarchical figures and especially King Charles XV

³⁵ Sven Eriksson, *Svensk diplomati och tidningspress under Krimkriget* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1939).

³⁶ Mart Kuldkepp, "National Revanchism at a Critical Juncture: Sweden's Near-Involvement in the Crimean War as a Study in Swedish Nationalism," *Scandinavica* 58, no. 2 (December 31, 2019): 115–33, <https://doi.org/10.54432/scand/RXJE7055>.

³⁷ Åke Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige vid 1800-talets mitt (1843-1863)* (Göteborg: University of Göteborg, 1946).

elaborated their programmes through personal environments and emissaries often provoking established ministries and legal hierarchies of power.³⁸

Emmanuel Halicz's works build on preceding research and introduce new source materials from European and Russian archives. He pioneered the introduction of a new variable into the Scandinavianist equation, namely the diplomacy of the Russian empire and its influence on foreign policies of the Nordic kingdoms. Previous works, including that of Møller and Becker-Christensen have engaged with Russian materials but Halicz's exhaustive research in the Russian archives, his impeccable knowledge of diplomatic personnel and its workings set this work on another level in its Russia-focused aspects. The historian addresses particularly the period 1853-1864 in two books. First of them explores the dynamics of the Scandinavian and, in particular, Danish neutrality arguing that non-intervention was not a simple status but rather a dynamic system of checks and balances, compromise-seeking, maneuvering, and negotiation with multiple agents involved.³⁹ Another book investigates Russian position vis-à-vis Denmark in 1856-1864 with particular emphasis on the tensions that erupted between Denmark and the German states over the issues of Schleswig. Halicz argues that Scandinavian fears continuously affected the trajectory of the imperial politics and reinforced its position as a guardian of the Danish integrity, although its intervention remained limited due to the necessity of implementing domestic reforms.⁴⁰ Drawing on Halicz's analysis, my dissertation expands the aspects of the Russian imperial engagements with Scandinavianism, contributing to and in some respects revising Halicz's analysis.

While this body of work illuminated the dynamics of international politics, the picture of diplomacy they painted often seems disconnected from other transnational information networks and intellectual debates. These studies portray foreign policy as a calculated world of

³⁸ Møller, *Skandinavisk stræben og svensk politik omkring 1860*.

³⁹ Emanuel Halicz, *Danish Neutrality During the Crimean War (1853-1856): Denmark Between the Hammer and the Anvil* (Odense: Odense University Press, 1977).

⁴⁰ Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*.

ministerial discussion, independent of domestic political and cultural reflections while real agency is relegated solely to the cabinets and high emissaries. Going against the grain of this perspective, Ruth Hemstad addresses grassroots diplomacy and professional corporations that began to shape in Scandinavia after the idea of political integration was abandoned in the late 1860s. Shifting the focus from the political field to entrepreneurial cooperation enables her to formulate a new periodization of Scandinavianism, stretching it into the early 20th century. She convincingly demonstrates how the idea of Scandinavian rapprochement adapted to the new conditions of the globalizing world, association, and cooperation pushed forward by non-governmental organizations.⁴¹

Other investigations conceptualize students as essential low-level diplomatic agents behind the dynamics of Scandinavianism. Scandinavian student festivals, a tradition invented in the 1840s, surfaces as the main arena where new programmes and designs of the Scandinavian future crystallized, spread, and were negotiated while emotive bonds tied these students in networks of trust, friendship, and altruism. Moreover, as Henrik Ullstad demonstrates, students conventions gravitated city-dwellers and commoners into their performative spectacles, contributing to the enwidening of the boundaries of participation in Scandinavianist affairs.⁴² Fredrik Nilsson argues that Scandinavian students capitalized on the features of modernity in their appearances and in their imagination, where their vehicles – steamships cruising through the Baltic shores – became significant entities of the semantic system. While the scenes of students conventions became more and more politicized, internal tensions and disagreements were alleviated by emotional aspects of the conventions.⁴³

⁴¹ Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter*.

⁴² Henrik Ullstad, “Med mjöd och manligt glam på fädrens sätt’: studentkandinavismen som ideologi och performativ praktik,” in *Skandinavism: en rörelse och en idé under 1800-talet*, ed. Magdalena Hillström and Hanne Sanders (Göteborg: Makadam förlag, 2014), 82–113.

⁴³ Fredrik Nilsson, *I rörelse: politisk handling under 1800-talets första hälft* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2000).

Niri Ragnvald Johnsen, in his turn, argues that student festivals contributed to the shaping of transnational networks that were crucial in distributing Scandinavianist agitation in local contexts.⁴⁴ The general turn towards networks of participation and action is evident in the contemporary studies of pan-Scandinavian movement. This cluster of works lays bare the agency of transnational horizontal cooperation as opposed to hierarchical relations. The map of the Nordic universities as well as the circuit of academic and professional societies produced alternative matrix of integration. The geography of the universities, spanning from Copenhagen to Christiania, Lund, Uppsala and to a degree even Helsingfors shaped the knots of this web. These networks of cooperation could either behave independently of power hierarchies or occasionally surface as tools that could reinforce governmental projects, as happened during the students convention in 1856 extensively and coordinately covered across the regions producing transnational media event.⁴⁵

Language, culture, and communication

Indeed, cross-border communication, translation, organization of media programmes that contributed to the creation of Scandinavian-wide historical and literary narratives previously eluded the focus of historical investigations and relatively recently manifested themselves in the study of Scandinavian identities-in-the-making. Kari Haarder Ekman frames pan-Scandinavianism as a politically modest but culturally appealing identity programme. Ekman investigates literary connections and cultural projects within the Scandinavian context, conceptualizing the multitude of these relations as a ‘republic of letters’. As it is rather the state of connectedness that manifests Scandinavianism in her reading, political perturbations of 1864

⁴⁴ Johnsen, “‘Vi hafva ifrån morgon till qväll varit ute och agiterat’: Skandinavismen og pressen 1848-1864.’

⁴⁵ Jonas Harvard and Magdalena Hillström, “Media Scandinavianism: Media Events and the Historical Legacy of Pan-Scandinavianism,” in *Communicating the North: Media Structures and Images in the Making of the Nordic Region* ed. Jonas Harvard and Peter Stadius (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013), 75-98.

do not represent the stalemate but rather a point of its reconfiguration. Ekman regards pan-Scandinavianism as an umbrella-project that implied competing visions of integration.⁴⁶

Ruth Hemstad addressed the issue of self-naming and terms that the advocates and critics of Scandinavianism used, concluding that concepts like *Scandinavia* and *Norden* changed their contents throughout the 19th century, and pan-Scandinavian project greatly contributed to the reformulation and wide-spread use of the terms.⁴⁷ This reformulation and attempts to accentuate a macronational identity, however, were often opposed by local identity-building processes that rejected region-wide allure of the project.⁴⁸ However, Scandinavianism often demonstrated potential for adaptability to local conditions, and trans-border communication networks that fostered its development mostly by the means of public press serve as a testament to that, as Jonas Harvard, Peter Stadius, and Magdalena Hillström demonstrate.⁴⁹

Oftentimes, the echo of Scandinavianist events reached as far as to Finland where students festivals, diplomatic twists, and political tensions in the North were enthusiastically followed by liberal public and apprehensively looked at by the administration. Pieter Dhondt in his study explores Nordic university anniversaries of the 19th century, and the Alexander Imperial University in Helsingfors also falls in his scope.⁵⁰ In the chapter dedicated to the University of Helsingfors bicentenary in 1840, Dhondt investigates orchestrated imperial attempts to formulate Finnish national tradition that would, however, manifest itself as loyal to

⁴⁶ Kari Haarder Ekman, "*Mitt hems gränser vidgades*": en studie i den kulturella skandinavismen under 1800-talet (Göteborg: Makadam förlag, 2010).

⁴⁷ Ruth Hemstad, "Scandinavian Sympathies and Nordic Unity: The Rhetoric of Scandinavianness in the Nineteenth Century," in *Contesting Nordicness* ed. Jani Marjanen, Johan Strang and Mary Hilson (Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2022), 35–57.

⁴⁸ Øystein Sørensen, ed., *Jakten på det norske: perspektiver på utviklingen av en norsk nasjonal identitet på 1800-tallet* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2007).

⁴⁹ Jonas Harvard and Peter Stadius, "A Communicative Perspective on the Formation of the North: Contexts, Channels and Concepts," in *Communicating the North*, eds. Jonas Harvard and Peter Stadius (Burlington: Ashgate, 2013), 1–24; Jonas Harvard and Magdalena Hillström, "Media Scandinavianism: Media Events and the Historical Legacy of Pan-Scandinavianism".

⁵⁰ Pieter Dhondt, *National, Nordic or European?: Nineteenth-Century University Jubilees and Nordic Cooperation, National, Nordic or European?* (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 13-38.

Saint-Petersburg. This move arguably produces concerns and irritation among liberal and Swedish-leaning groups in Finland and in Sweden. Dhondt's analysis, however, does not go far enough in analyzing the threats and anxieties that the Russian rule in Finland faced during the 1830s and 1840s, and my dissertation seeks to address this context in more detail.

Russian empire and management of diversity

The Russian empire governed diverse populations across its domains. The imperial rule demonstrated different faces in its borderlands and composite parts, that ranged from colonial exploitation to granting autonomous legal regimes. Such distribution of rule depended on many factors that included classificatory regimes, national and racial taxonomies, imperial position in the European system of international affairs, historical precedents, and monarchical will among other variables of the equation. Finland was granted with legal autonomy that became an exception, especially after the suppressions of the Polish Uprisings in 1830-1 and 1863 which justified administrative intervention of the Russian rule into earlier autonomous system while the special position of the Baltic provinces was gradually corroding during the 19th century.⁵¹

It is unnecessary to provide a historiographical overview of the imperial designs and transformations across all the domains. However, it is important to understand that Finland was often viewed by Saint-Petersburg and local administration as a part of the larger realm, and patterns of thinking, anxieties, epistemological regimes elaborated with regards to one territory and population often expanded to other areas of the imperial rule either to find contrasts or to discover parallels there. Recognizing this habit of the imperial rule, I draw on wide array of studies devoted to Russian rule in different territorial contexts. Andreas Kappeler's pioneering

⁵¹ Alexander Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia: A Study in Imperial Expansion, 1814–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020); Darius Staliūnas, *Making Russians: Meaning and Practice of Russification in Lithuania and Belarus After 1863* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007); Edward C. Thaden, ed., *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855-1914* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981).

study of Russia as a ‘multinational realm’ gave impetus to broader and deeper reflections on the consequences of this multinationalism for the government apparatus.⁵² With regards to the administrative borderland practices, I particularly draw on the analysis and conclusions made by Edward Thaden, Theodore Weeks, Alexei Miller, Mikhail Dolbilov, Anatolij Remnev, Jane Burbank, and many others.⁵³

Another conceptualization of the empire is proposed by a group of scholars behind the journal *Ab Imperio*. Their contributions, drawing on new analytical vocabulary of imperial situation, languages of rationalization and self-description, focus on the visions that those in power forge to manage the diversity. Distancing empire from the rigidness of a state that is usually supplied with territory and homogenous nation, their works provide optics able to address hybrid strategies of coexistence and management within the imperial abode. Flexible with regards to narration modes and theoretical frameworks, their umbrella-conceptualization seeks to avoid grand narratives and center-periphery dichotomies, providing a space for new interpretations. Focusing on the tensions between competing projects of self-organization and imperial aspirations to management of diversity, Marina Mogilner, Ilya Gerasimov, Sergej Glebov, and Alexander Semyonov highlight ambiguities of the imperial means as well as unpredictability of its ends.⁵⁴

⁵² Andreas Kappeler, *Rusland als Vielvölkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall* (Münich: C.H. Beck, 1992).

⁵³ Edward C. Thaden, *Russia's Western Borderlands, 1710-1870* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier 1863 - 1914* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University, 2008); Miller, *The Romanov Empire and Nationalism*; Mihail Dolbilov, *Russkij kraj, chuzhaja vera: Jetnokonfessional'naja politika imperii v Litve i Belorussii pri Aleksandre II* (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2014); Mihail Dolbilov and Aleksej Miller, eds., *Zapadnye okrainy Rossijskoj Imperii* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2006); Lev Mihajlovich Dameshek and Anatolij Viktorovich Remnev, eds., *Sibir' v sostave Rossijskoj imperii* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2007); Burbank and Cooper, *Empires in World History*; Karsten Brüggemann, “Representing Empire, Performing Nation?: Russian Officials in the Baltic Provinces (Late Nineteenth / Early Twentieth Centuries),” *Ab Imperio* 2014, no. 3 (2014): 231–66, <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2014.0079>.

⁵⁴ Gerasimov, Kusber, and Semyonov, eds., *Empire Speaks Out*; Semyonov, “Empire as a Context Setting Category”; Il'ja Gerasimov, Marina Mogil'ner, and Sergej Glebov, *Novaja imperskaja istorija Severnoj Evrazii.: Chast' 2: Balansirovanie imperskoj situacii: XVIII – XX vv.* (Kazan': Ab Imperio, 2017).

Finland in the structure of imperial governance

As Vadim Roginskiy, Päiviö Tommila, Carl von Bonsdorff demonstrate in their works, Finland was not only a contested territory during the Napoleonic Wars but also a field of the political experiment upon its annexation to the Russian empire in 1808-9.⁵⁵ Its organization, legal status, configuration of government, and even its borders were being discussed and to a certain degree invented in the dialogue between the nobility of the duchy – mostly Swedish-speaking – and imperial administration during the 1810s. Politically and culturally, Finnish identity also fluctuated between the two poles: Stockholm, with which Finland for a long period of time preserved institutional and commercial bond,⁵⁶ and Saint-Petersburg, a new center of power and an alluring place for migration and career pursuits as studied by Max Engman.⁵⁷

The history of Finland in the imperial context was extensively addressed in by Matti Klinge, Osmo Jussila, Robert Schweitzer, Juhani Paasivirta, and Lev Suni who formulated the picture of asymmetrical but ultimately peaceful negotiations – cultural, legal, and political – that characterized most of the Finnish-Russian political relations up to the 1880s when the imperial reactionary programmes interfered in the borderland policies.⁵⁸ Other works focus on the issues of administrative institutions in Finland, their range of responsibilities, power-relations between them, and their role in securing or thwarting the privileged position of

⁵⁵ Carl Gabriel von Bonsdorff, *Opinioner och stämningar i Finland, 1808-1814* (Helsingfors: Söderström, 1918); Päiviö Tommila, *La Finlande dans la politique européenne en 1809-1815* (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1962); Päiviö Tommila, *Suomen autonomian synty, 1808-1819* (Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 1984); Vadim Vadimovich Roginskiy, *Bor'ba za Skandinaviju: mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya na Severe Evropy v jepohu Napoleonovskih vojn 1805-1815* (Moscow: Ves' Mir, 2012).

⁵⁶ Arvi Lajdinen, *Razvitie kapitalizma v promyshlennosti Finljandii: pervaja polovina XIX v* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1979); Torkel Jansson, *Rikssprängningen som kom av sig: finsk-svenska gemenskaper efter 1809* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2009); Jansson, "Between Two Worlds."

⁵⁷ Max Engman, *Ett långt farväl: Finland mellan Sverige och Ryssland efter 1809* (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2009).

⁵⁸ Osmo Jussila, *Suomen perustuslait venäläisten ja suomalaisten tulkintojen mukaan 1808-1863* (Helsinki: Frenckellin Kirjapaino Oy., 1969); Robert Schweitzer, *Autonomie und Autokratie: die Stellung des Grossfürstentums Finnland im russischen Reich in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts (1863 - 1899)* (Giessen: W. Schmitz, 1978); Matti Klinge, *Imperskaja Finljandija* (Saint-Petersburg: Kolo, 2005); Lev Suni, *Ocherk obshhestvenno-politicheskogo razvitiya Finljandii, 50-70-e gg. XIX v* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1979); Lev Suni, *Velikoe knjazhestvo Finljandskoe: (pervaja polovina XIX v.); stanovlenie avtonomii* (Petrozavodsk: Izdat. PetrGU, 2013); Juhani Paasivirta, *Finland and Europe: The Period of Autonomy and the International Crises, 1808-1914* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962).

Finland.⁵⁹ Finally, a series of volumes address biographical trajectories of highest Finnish bureaucrats and intellectuals often touching on the issues of their self-identification, career paths, and aspirations provided by Finnish-imperial context.⁶⁰

Many of these works, besides addressing new archival collections, drew on earlier historiography of Finland's relations with the Russian empire that grew out of the strife about the position of the duchy in the legal and political imperial system at the end of the 19th century.⁶¹ While this part of historiography was usually highly politicized since intentions behind their publications were explicitly and implicitly articulated in the critical debate, many of these works still retain their relevance given the scope of the source materials and, in general, diligence of the authors in addressing historical issues. I would argue that the contributions by Mikhail Borodkin, Kesar' Ordin, Magnus Schybergson, and Boris Nolde among others are still useful when critically approached.⁶² Besides addressing the administrative system and tensions

⁵⁹ Kristiina Kalleinen, *Suomen kenraalikuvernementti: kenraalikuvernöörin asema ja merkitys Suomen asioiden esittelyssä, 1823-1861* (Helsinki: Painatuskeskus, 1994); Raimo Savolainen, *Suosikkisenaattorit: Venäjän keisarin suosio suomalaisten senaattoreiden menestyksen perustana 1809-1892* (Helsinki: Painatuskeskus, 1994); Raimo Savolainen, "Släktsenaten 1809-1870 - Senatorssläkterna i kollegialitetens bojar," *Historisk Tidskrift för Finland* 77, no. 2 (June 1, 1992), 173-210; Keijo Korhonen, *Suomen Asiain Komitea: Suomen korkeimman hallinnon järjestelyt ja toteuttaminen vuosina 1811-1826* (Turku: University of Turku, 1963); Robert Schweitzer, *The Rise and Fall of the Russo-Finnish Consensus: The History of the "Second" Committee on Finnish Affairs in St. Petersburg (1857-1891)* (Helsinki: Edita, 1996); Kalleinen, "The Nature of Russian Imperialism in Finland During the First Half of the Nineteenth Century."

⁶⁰ Carl von Bonsdorff, *Gustav Mauritz Armfelt, levnadskildring*, 3 vols. (Helsingfors: Mercators tryckeri, 1932); Hans Hirn, *Alexander Armfelt: början av en statsmannabana, 1832-1841* (Helsingfors: Mercators tryckeri, 1948); Lars Gabriel von Bonsdorff, *Lars Gabriel von Haartman intill 1827* (Helsingfors: Mercators tryckeri, 1946); Erkki K. Osmonsalo, *Fabian Langenskiöld: valtiollinen elämäntyö*, vol. 1 (Helsinki: Suomen historiallinen seura, 1939); Rolf Lagerborg, *Sanningen om Casimir von Kothén (1807-80) enligt aktstycken och brev* (Helsingfors: Söderström, 1953); Thiodolf Rein, *Johan Vilhelm Snellman*, 2 vols. (Helsinki: Otava, 1895); Gunnar Castrén, *Herman Kellgren: ett bidrag till 1840- och 1850-talens kulturhistoria* (Helsingfors: Mercators tryckeri, 1945); Kristiina Kalleinen, *Isänmaani onni on kuulla venäjälle: vapaaherra Lars Gabriel von Haartmanin elämä* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2001); Johanna Wassholm, *Svenskt, finskt och ryskt. Nationens, språkets och historiens dimensioner hos E. G. Ehrström 1808-1835* (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2014); Raimo Savolainen, *Med bildningens kraft: J.V. Snellmans liv* (Helsinki: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2019); Jens Grandell, *Från ett årtionde i Finland: August Schauman, republikanism och liberalism 1855-1865* (Helsinki: Finska Vetenskaps-Societeten, 2020).

⁶¹ Aleksandra Petuhova, "Russkoe nacional'noe dvizhenie i finljandskij vopros vo vtoroj polovine XIX - nachale XX veka" (PhD diss., Moscow State University, 2022); Elisabeth Stubb, *Rätt som argument: Leo Mechelin och finska frågan 1886-1912* (Helsinki: Finska Vetenskaps-Societeten, 2012).

⁶² Mikhail Borodkin, *Istoriija Finljandii: Vremja imperatora Nikolaja I* (Petrograd: Gosudarstvennaja tipografija, 1915); Kesar' Ordin, *Pokorenje Finljandii: Opyt Opisanija Po Neizdannym Istochnikam.*, vol. 2 (Saint-Petersburg: Tip. I.N. Skorohodova, 1889); Magnus Gottfrid Schybergson, *Finlands historia*, 2 vols. (G.W. Edlund, 1903); Boris Nol'de, *Očerki Russkogo Gosudarstvennogo Prava* (Saint-Petersburg: Tip. "Pravda," 1911).

within it, they shed light on the dynamic of public opinions towards Russia and Scandinavia in Finland.

Contemporary studies highlight both institutionalized censorship regime and practices of self-censorship that limited the space for public manifestations in the duchy, but they also necessitated the search for alternative ways that editors, journalists, and arising politicians used to discuss domestic problems.⁶³ Jani Marjanen and Jussi Kurunmäki argue that Finlandish mass media utilized politics of comparison in presenting news from abroad as guiding lights or examples to be avoided.⁶⁴ By the 1840s, identity-politics broadly taken consumed the attention of the editors and educated publics. While earlier studies drew on the notions of simplified opposition between so-called Fennomania that put forward Finnish-centered cultural endeavors and Svekomania guarding the privileged position of Swedish language, the multifaceted debates on identity were more complex than that.

Kurunmäki addresses the fact that besides language, the debates focused on the very principles of nationality-definition as well as on cultural repercussions that were attached to various visions of political system.⁶⁵ Liberalism, for example, was often attacked as a foreign, Swedish-leaning viewpoint, incompatible with Finnish national project. Jens Grandell demonstrates that Fennomania and Svekomania might have been less antagonistic than traditionally believed, especially during earlier stages of the formulation of respective programmes while also arguing that Finlandish liberalism did not always imply Scandinavianist foundations.⁶⁶

⁶³ Jani Marjanen, “Gränserna för det offentliga samtalet i Finland 1809–1863,” in *Frie Ord i Norden?*, ed. Ruth Hemstad and Dag Michaelsen (Oslo: Pax forlag, 2019), 111–40; Lars-Folke Landgren, “Censuren i Finland 1809 - 1919,” in *Filologi og Sensur*, ed. Hilde Bøe, Christian Janss, and Stine Brenna Taugbøl (Oslo: Novus, 2015), 53–68.

⁶⁴ Jussi Kurunmäki and Jani Marjanen, “Catching up through Comparison: The Making of Finland as a Political Unit, 1809–1863,” *Time & Society* 30, no. 4, (2021): 559-80.

⁶⁵ Jussi Kurunmäki, “On the Difficulty of Being a National Liberal in Nineteenth-Century Finland,” *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 8, no. 2 (December 1, 2013): 83–95, <https://doi.org/10.3167/choc.2013.080205>; Jussi Kurunmäki, “Kan en nation byggas på politisk vilja? Debatten mellan J. V. Snellman och August Schauman 1859–1860,” *Historisk Tidskrift för Finland*, no. 1 (2007): 63-89. <https://journal.fi/htf/article/view/53785>.

⁶⁶ Jens Grandell, *Från ett årtionde i Finland: August Schauman, republikanism och liberalism 1855–1865*.

Gradually, as Axel Lille, Max Engman, Ilkka Liikanen and Jussi Kurunmäki demonstrate, cultural positions were reformulated into the language of party or platform politics, especially after 1863 when Finlandish Diet was reintroduced and Finnish language gradually obtained its administrative status.⁶⁷ Finally, it is essential that Finlandish administration attentively followed these debates, distributing social and political capital to the loyalist and – in their views – more politically reliable groups.⁶⁸ The principles of the administrative assessment of reliability, however, were not stable or consistent, leading to internal tensions and often haphazard reactions, characteristic for other ‘borderland’ territories as well.

Before the reintroduction of the Diet and censorship relaxation of the Alexander II’s epoch, main arenas for debate were lecture halls, student reading clubs and various grassroots organizations. Matti Klinge’s fundamental work analyzes ideas that circulated among the students at the University of Helsingfors and practices of their political manifestation. He focuses on cultural and political tendencies that captured students’ attention, including Scandinavianism and Fennomania during the years 1840s-1860s. Most importantly, however, the university provided them with education and space for their practices of self-organization, shared action, and network building that would become crucial for later political struggles and formulation of the principles of Finlandish autonomy.⁶⁹

As other researchers demonstrate, visions of the united Scandinavia appeared appealing for certain groups in the duchy either due to the reasons of its liberal rhetoric or given the hopes

⁶⁷ Axel Lille, *Den svenska nationalitetens i Finland samlingsrörelse* (Helsingfors: Holger Schildts Tryckeri, 1921); Engman, *Språkfrågan*; Ilkka Liikanen, *Fennomania ja kansa: joukkojärjestäytymisen läpimurto ja Suomalaisen puolueen synty* (Helsinki: Suomen historiallinen seura, 1995); Jussi Kurunmäki and Ilkka Liikanen, “The Formation of the Finnish Polity within the Russian Empire: Language, Representation, and the Construction of Popular Political Platforms, 1863-1906,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 35, no. 1/4 (2017): 399–416.

⁶⁸ Juhani Paasivirta, *Finland and Europe: The Period of Autonomy and the International Crises, 1808-1914*.

⁶⁹ Matti Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 2 vols. (Helsinki: Studentkåren vid Helsingfors Universitet, 1969); Henrik Stenius, *Frivilligt, jämlikt, samfällt: föreningsväsendets utveckling i Finland fram till 1900-talets början med speciell hänsyn till massorganisationsprincipens genombrott* (Helsinki: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 1987).

of geopolitical redistribution that could bring Finland into the union as well.⁷⁰ I would argue, however, that local receptions of Scandinavianism exhibited a more complex dynamics and besides self-identification involved the processes of categorization and classification performed by the government. The most prominent Scandinavian intellectual of Finnish descent, however, resided in Stockholm, far from imperial government's direct reach. Emil von Qvanten authored the doctrine that united the struggle for Finnishness with pan-Scandinavian agenda. His work was assaulted by Johan Vilhelm Snellman, one of the leading ideologists of Fennomania, and scholars argue that their debate was crucial for accentuation of respective Scandinavian-leaning and Fennoman positions.⁷¹ The fact that this debate was transnational and regional, pertaining to the logic of communication characteristic for the Nordic media systems, however, escaped the attention of earlier researchers.

Sweden-oriented programmes of certain groups and newspapers – primarily that of liberal *Helsingfors Dagblad* – deeply concerned the government officials as Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg and Lars-Folke Landgren demonstrate.⁷² Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg's works, although they came out almost a hundred years ago, still retain their relevance due to her extensive archival research and especially synthetic design that addressed respective positions of Saint-Petersburg, Finnish administration and public, and even that of Russian diplomats in Stockholm when she had a chance to investigate them. Finland's liminal position not only in terms of identity-building as set in-between Swedishness, Finnishness and imperial loyalty,

⁷⁰ Runar Johansson, "Skandinavismen i Finland," *Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier*, no. 6 (1930): 256–68; Hugo E. Pipping, "Finlands Ställning till Skandinavismen," *Förhandlingar och uppsatser*, no. 34 (1921): 131–95; Mikko Juva, "Skandinavismens påverkan på de politiska strömningarna i Finland," *Historisk Tidskrift (Stockholm)*, no. 77 (1957): 330–37.

⁷¹ Arvid Mörne, "Kring Emil von Qvantens Fennomani och Skandinavism," *Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier*, no. 8 (1932): 1–85; Arvid Mörne, *Axel Olof Freudenthal och den finlandssvenska nationalitetstanken* (Helsinki: Svenska folkpartiets centralstyrelse, 1927); Mikael Björk-Winberg, "Opposition from Abroad: Emil von Qvanten and Finnish Scandinavism in the Mid-Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Finnish Studies* 24, no. 1–2 (July 1, 2021): 16–41, <https://doi.org/10.5406/28315081.24.1.2.03>.

⁷² Lars-Folke Landgren, *För frihet och framåtskridande: Helsingfors dagblads etableringsskede, 1861-1864* (Helsinki: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 1995); Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg, *Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus und Liberalismus im politischen Leben Finnlands 1856-1863* (Helsinki: Finnischen Literaturgesellschaft, 1934).

but also concerning institutional dynamics that placed it in a paradiplomatic networks of communication and made its administration into agents of foreign politics was also addressed by Robert Schweitzer and Lidija Lempijajnen.⁷³

Krusius-Ahrenberg's explanations and terminology require clarifications in the light of new studies while her rigid pairing of Scandinavianism and liberalism remains utterly questionable. Her work, however, appears in the bridging position between Finlandish imperial history as the history of an entangled institutional system and Finlandish history as a story of self-organizations, public manifestations, political imaginations, and cooperations conditioned by the imperial, often repressive context. In a way, my dissertation also seeks to find a bridging position between the two in studying cabinet manifestations and ministerial visions – products of the bureaucratic system – through the optics of the second approach, attentive to political rhetoric, performative practices, and to empire as a context-setting category.

Sources

Since the research examines, first, the dynamics of information processing and decision-making in the power grid between Saint-Petersburg, Russian diplomats in Copenhagen and Stockholm, and Finlandish administration, one set of sources addresses the workings of the bureaucratic institutions and patron-client networks that conditioned hierarchy of rule. Archival materials include personal and official documentation of governors-general Alexander Sergeevich Menshikov⁷⁴ and Fedor Fedorovich Berg⁷⁵, minister state-secretary Alexander Armfelt⁷⁶, vice-chair of the economic department of the Senate and architect of

⁷³ Robert Schweitzer, “Konsensus v period mezhdru “narushenijami konstitucii,” in *Russkij sbornik*, vol. 17 (Moscow: Modest Kolerov), 144-197; Lidija Lempijajnen, “*Vneshnie kontakty Velikogo Knjazhestva Finljandskogo*”.

⁷⁴ Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj arhiv Voenno-Morskogo Flota (RGAVMF), Saint-Petersburg. F. 19. Menshikov Alexander Sergeevich, Admiral (1787-1869).

⁷⁵ Gosudarstvennyj arhiv Rossijskoj Federacii (GARF), Moscow. F. 547. Berg Fedor Fedorovich. Op. 1. Inventory of the affairs of F.F. Berg' fond for 1700-1918.

⁷⁶ Kansallisarkisto (KA), Helsinki. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto.

Finlandish economic policy Lars Gabriel von Haartman,⁷⁷ exchanged between themselves and with other representatives of Finlandish administration, including Casimir von Kothen, Ivan Nordenstam, Robert Henrik Rehbinder, Konstantin Fisher, Platon Rokassovsky and others. Bureaucratic documentation of governor-general is stored in the respective chancellery,⁷⁸ just as documentation of ministry state-secretary.⁷⁹ I also use the documents of censorship committee, primarily for the 1840s.⁸⁰ Besides, a part of these materials was copied by the State Archive of the Russian Federation in the form of microfilms: governors-general's documentation,⁸¹ documentation of minister state-secretary and Committee for Finnish Affairs.⁸² The analysis of workings of the Ministry of War and Third Section also played important roles in my research. I am particularly interested in the reports of military attaché in Stockholm⁸³ and in the reports of the Third Section headquarters in Finland.⁸⁴

Published sources that shed light on the principles of the imperial rule include collections of legal amendments,⁸⁵ treatises and manifests,⁸⁶ protocols of the Diet proceedings.⁸⁷ Besides, some contemporary and later reflections of influential members of the Finlandish administration were published, including Alexander Armfelt's memoirs,⁸⁸ Emil

⁷⁷ KA. L.G. von Haartmanin arkisto.

⁷⁸ KA. Kenraalikuvernööriarkisto (KKK).

⁷⁹ KA. Valtiosihteerinvirasto (VSV).

⁸⁰ KA. Painoasiain ylläpidon sensuurikomitean arkisto.

⁸¹ GARF. F. R8091. Collection of microphotocopies of documents from foreign archives. Op. 1. Finland, entry ZA-1. 1627–1917.

⁸² GARF. F. R8091. Collection of microphotocopies of documents from foreign archives. Op. 1a. Finland, entry ZA-1a. 1811–1917.

⁸³ Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj voenno-istoričeskij arhiv (RGVIA), Moscow. F. 442. Collection of the military-scientific archive "Sweden and Norway".

⁸⁴ GARF. F. 109. Third Section of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery.

⁸⁵ *Samling af placater, förordningar, manifest och påbud*, vol. 1-17 (Helsingfors: A.W. Gröndahl, 1808-1859).

⁸⁶ Petr Shilovskij, *Akty, Omosjashhiesja k Politicheskomu Polozheniju Finljandii* (SPb: Tip. M.M. Stasulevicha, 1903); *Storfurstendömet Finlands grundlagar jemte bihang* (Helsingfors: G.W. Edlund, 1877); Fedor Fedorovič Martens, *Sobranie traktatov i konvencij, zaključennyh Rossieju s inostrannymi derzhavami*, vol. 1-15 (Saint-Petersburg: Tipografija A. Benke, 1874-1909).

⁸⁷ Borgareståndets protokoll vid Landtdagen i Helsingfors, vol. 1 (Helsingfors: J.C. Frenkell & Son, 1864).

⁸⁸ Carl von Bonsdorff, "Ministerstatssekreteraren Greve Alexander Armfelts Memoarer," *Historisk Tidskrift För Finland*, no. 1 (1929): 77–107.

Stjernvall-Walleen's exposition of the years 1857-61,⁸⁹ and his letters to Aurora Karamzine.⁹⁰ Russian-Finlandish relations of the period in question were addressed by many high-ranking officials, who socialized themselves with the court and elites, in their diaries and memoirs that were later published, including Peter Valuev, Alexander Polovtsov, Konstantin Fisher, Alexander Golovnin, Dmitrij Miljutin, Dmitrij Obolenskij.⁹¹

Diplomatic aspects of this research are primarily addressed through examining dispatches that were delivered to Saint-Petersburg from Stockholm and Copenhagen. Those were collected from Archive of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Empire⁹² and the Royal Archive of Denmark.⁹³ I also make use of internal proceedings of the ministry in the form of yearly reports.⁹⁴ However, I also argue that some aspects of the diplomatic workings are attainable through personal correspondence of the diplomatic representatives. I address Russian diplomat in Stockholm Jakov Dashkov's archive⁹⁵ and archives of Russian representatives in Copenhagen Paul and Nicholas Nicolay⁹⁶ together with other agents who could play diplomatic

⁸⁹ *Ur Friherre E. Stjernvall-Walléens Efterlämnade Papper* (Stockholm: O. L. Svanbäcks boktryckeri, 1902).

⁹⁰ Adolf Törngren, "Ur Friherre Emil Stjernvall-Walleens Brev till Aurore Karamzine," *Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier*, no. 15 (1939): 135–270.

⁹¹ Petr Aleksandrovich Valuev, *Dnevnik P. A. Valueva ministra vnutrennih del. T. 1. 1861-1864 gg.* (Moscow: Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1961); Alexander Aleksandrovich Polovcov, *Dnevnik. 1859-1882*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Svjaz' Jepoh, 2022); Konstantin Fisher, *Zapiski senatora* (Kyiv: Strelbytskyy Multimedia Publishing, 2018); Aleksandr Vasil'evich Golovnin, *Zapiski dlja nemnogih* (Saint-Petersburg: Nestor-Istorija, 2004); Dmitrij Alekseevich Miljutin, *Vospominanija general-fel'dmarshala grafa Dmitrija Alekseevicha Miljutina: 1863-1864* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003); Dmitrij Alekseevich Miljutin, *Vospominanija general-fel'dmarshala grafa Dmitrija Alekseevicha Miljutina: 1856-1860* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2004); Dmitrij Aleksandrovich Obolenskij, *Zapiski knjazja Dmitrija Aleksandrovicha Obolenskogo, 1855-1879* (Saint-Petersburg: Nestor-Istorija, 2005).

⁹² Arhiv vneshnej politiki Rossijskoj imperii (AVPRI), Moscow. F. 133. Chancellery of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁹³ Rigsarkivet (RA), Copenhagen. Departementet for de Udenlandske Anliggender.

⁹⁴ AVPRI. F. 137. Reports of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Op. 475. 1830-1916.

⁹⁵ GARF. F. 912. Dashkov Jakov Andreyevich, consul general to Walachia and Moldavia, ambassador to Sweden and Norway, director of the Asian department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Op. 1. Cases of permanent storage. 1771-1872, 1887-1889, 1897, 1900-1901, 1907.

⁹⁶ Otdel rukopisej Rossijskoj nacional'noj biblioteki (OR RNB), Saint-Petersburg. F. 519. Nicolay A.L., P.A., N.P., A.P.; Kansalliskirjasto, Helsinki. Monrepos Collection. Ms. Mf. 833-9.

roles, like Grand Duke Constantin Nikolaevich,⁹⁷ Nicholas Alexandrovich,⁹⁸ and, again, Alexander Menshikov and Fedor Berg.

Finally, I also utilize Alexander Gorchakov's extensive documentation and correspondence with Russian diplomats abroad.⁹⁹ Printed materials related to Russian diplomacy include Nesselrode's collection of letters and Peter von Meyendorff's correspondence.¹⁰⁰ Besides, I make use of foreign published diplomatic collections, primarily that of Prussia, France, and Sweden.¹⁰¹ Although the fonds of Russian State Historical Archive and Institute of the Russian Literature of the Russian Academy of Sciences contained only fragmentary information concerning Finland or the foreign policy of the Russian Empire with regards to Scandinavianism, several materials on the preparation of cultural events, scientific communications, and pieces of official and personal documentation proved useful for my research.¹⁰²

Addressing personal anxieties and hopes as well as group discussions on the phenomenon of Scandinavianism in Finland, I use both published and archival materials. Archival materials include personal correspondence and documents of those individuals who either self-fashioned themselves as Scandinavianist, took part in the activities under the banner

⁹⁷ GARF. F. 722. Konstantin Nikolaevich, Grand Duke, son of Emperor Nicholas I, Admiral general. Op. 1. Inventory of documents of Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich for 1810-1917.

⁹⁸ GARF. F. 665. Nicholas Aleksandrovich, Tsesarevich, son of Emperor Alexander II. Op. 1. Inventory of documents of Tsarevich Nikolai Alexandrovich for 1852-1865.

⁹⁹ GARF. F. 828. Gorchakov Alexander Mikhailovich, Prince, diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs, State chancellor. Op. 1. Inventory of the affairs of the fond of A.M. Gorchakov for 1770-1919.

¹⁰⁰ Anatole Nesselrode, ed., *Lettres et Papiers Du Chancelier Comte de Nesselrode, 1760-1850, Extraits de Ses Archives, Publiés et Annotés, Avec Une Introduction*, vol. 9-10 (Paris: A. Lahure, n.d.); Otto Hoetzsch, ed., *Peter von Meyendorff - Ein Russischer Diplomat an den Höfen von Berlin und Wien*, vol. 2-3 (Leipzig und Berlin: De Gruyter, 1923).

¹⁰¹ *Die Auswärtige Politik Preussens 1858-1871: Diplomatische Aktenstücke Abt. 2: Vom Amtsantritt Bismarcks Bis Prager Frieden*, vol. 4 (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1938); *Les Origines Diplomatiques de La Guerre de 1870-1871: Recueil de Documents*, vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1910); Henning Hamilton, *Ur Henning Hamiltons brevsamling: ett urval* (Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 1914); *Diplomatiska Handlingar rörande den danska Frågan, Februari 1863* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1863).

¹⁰² Rossijskij gosudarstvennyj istoričeskij arhiv (RGIA), Saint-Petersburg. F. 733. Department of Public Education; F. 1101. Documents of personal origin that do not constitute separate funds; F. 1018. Paskevich-Erivansky Ivan Fedorovich; F. 1250. Papers of chairmen and members of the State Council; Institute of Russian Literature of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IRLI RAN), Saint-Petersburg. F. 143. Kiselev Pavel Dmitrievich. Op. 1. Materials for the biography and activities of P.D. Kiselev, materials of A.A. Zakrevsky and various persons (1809 - 1871).

of the Nordic consolidation, or were suspected in Scandinavian-leaning conspiracies. Those include August Schauman's and B.O. Schauman's collections,¹⁰³ Carl Aspelund's archive,¹⁰⁴ Edvard Bergh's collection,¹⁰⁵ Emil von Qvanten's collection.¹⁰⁶ I use published memoirs, diaries, and correspondence collections of Finlandish intellectuals to shed light on their mapping of social and political situation in the duchy and empire.¹⁰⁷ Addressing the relations between imperial emigres and Scandinavianist advocates, I rely on Alexander Herzen's and Mikhail Bakunin's published collections of letters, on materials preserved in the Swedish Royal Library and Bakunin's digitalized collection of complete works issued on CD-ROM.¹⁰⁸

While the analysis of political processes in Denmark and Sweden-Norway is primarily based on secondary literature, I use respective digitalized newspaper collections as well as diaries and memoirs of main Scandinavianist ideologists and their opponents to analyze the dynamics of Scandinavianism in respective contexts.¹⁰⁹ Besides, I make use of declarations pronounced by Scandinavianist advocates that usually happened in the context of Scandinavian students conventions and were documented in respective accounts of the festivals.¹¹⁰

¹⁰³ Kansalliskirjasto. Coll. 201. August Schauman; Coll. 198. Bengt Otto Schauman.

¹⁰⁴ Svenska Litteratursällskapet i Finland Arkiv (SLSA), Helsinki. Coll. 146. Carl Edvard Aspelund's memoirs (1810-1900); Coll. 664. Carl Edvard Aspelund's travel diary.

¹⁰⁵ SLSA. Coll. 357. Edvard Bergh's letters (1852-1899).

¹⁰⁶ SLSA. Coll. 933. Emil von Qvanten's manuscript (1867-1891).

¹⁰⁷ August Schauman, *Från sex årtionden i Finland: levnadsminnen upptecknade av Aug. Schauman*, 2 vols. (Helsingfors: H. Schildt, 1922); Sven Gabriel Elmgren, *S.G. Elmgrenin muistiinpanot* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seuran, 1939); Zacharias Topelius, *Finlands krönika 1860-1878* (Helsinki: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2004); C. G. Estlander, "Ungdomsminnen. XIII," *Finsk Tidskrift* 74, no. 4 (1913): 252-265.

¹⁰⁸ Mikhail Bakunin, *Pis'ma M.A. Bakunina k A.I. Herzenu i N.I. Ogarevu* (Geneve: Ukrainskaja tipografija, 1896); Mikhail Bakunin, *Sobranie sochinenij i pisem, 1828-1876* (Moscow: Izd-vo Vsesojuznogo obshhestva politkatorzhan i ssyl'no-poselencev, 1935); Alexander Herzen, *Mikhail Bakunin i pol'skoe delo* (Geneve: M. Elpidine, 1904); Kungliga Biblioteket (KB), Stockholm. KB1/Ep. Q 1. Emil von Qvanten; KB1/L 10 August Sohlman's archive; KB1/Ep. H. 7:1 Sven Hedin's archive; Mikhail Bakunin, *Oeuvres completes* (Amsterdam: International Institute of Social History, 2000), CD-ROM. I am thankful to Wolfgang Eckhardt and Bakunin Arbeitsgemeinschaft in der Bibliothek der Freien for providing materials from this CR-ROM.

¹⁰⁹ Orla Lehmann, *Efterladte skrifter*, 4 vols. (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1873); Henrik Nicolai Clausen, *Optegnelser om mit levned og min tids historie* (København: G. E. C. Gad, 1877); A. F. Krieger, *Andreas Frederik Kriegers Dagbøger 1848-1880*, vol. 2-3 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1921); Louis Gerhard De Geer, *Minnen*, 2 vols. (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt, 1892); Carl Fredrik Akrell, *Minnen från Carl XIV:s, Oscar I:s och Carl XV:s dagar*, 2 vols. (Stockholm: M.W. Wallberg & Comp. Boktryckeri, 1884).

¹¹⁰ *Berättelse om Uppsala-studenternas skandinaviska fest: den 6 April 1848* (Uppsala: Wahlström & C., 1848); *Berättelse om studenttågen till Lund och Köpenhamn, sommaren 1845* (Uppsala: Wahlström & C., 1846);

Chronological framework

As stated in the title, the research addresses the period from 1843 to 1864. First date has been chosen since Scandinavianism as a term for the first time appeared in the Danish newspaper in 1843. Besides, first coherent programmes of the political consolidation under the aegis of Scandinavianism were formulated and declared during this year. One could argue, however, that the genealogy of Scandinavianism spans to earlier period that encompasses the Napoleonic Wars, rise of Romanticism, and union-projects of the beginning of the 19th century. I posit, however, that the driving forces and ideas behind Scandinavianism, apart from obvious continuity, demonstrated ruptures with earlier Romanticist formulations in being generally more exclusive towards German-speaking population of the Oldenburg composite monarchy, more federative-centered, and, essentially, much more diverse in the visions of consolidation.

Although the research formally starts with 1843, I also attempt to elucidate processes that spanned from 1830s and involved the intensification of political struggle in Sweden for the reform of representation, liberal agitation there and their echoes in Finland that resulted in administrative concerns. Those years prepared governmental patterns of perceiving Swedish and Scandinavian politics that were afterwards projected onto Scandinavianism as well. Moreover, besides sharpening imaginations and visions, the decade witnessed the elaboration of specific policies aimed at increased administrative control over the Swedish-Finlandish border and circulations of material objects, people, and ideas across it.

The period from the 1840s to the 1860s was, undoubtedly, the most flourishing with regards to the range of imagined opportunities and expected futures under the flags of Scandinavianism. The proponents of Scandinavian consolidation produced various scenarios of the foreseen community or commonality. Ranging from the establishment of cultural

Beretning om studentertoget til Upsala i juni maaned 1843 (København: Berlingske Bogtrykkeri, 1844); Anton Rosell, *Studentbesöket i Finland, 1857* (Stockholm: C.A. Leffler, 1858).

connections to the Scandinavian federation or dynastic union, these projects often followed separate lines of argumentation, rooted in diverse discourses and practices. On the one hand, Scandinavian-wide context facilitated the quest for similarities, parallels, and closeness of the Nordic nations in past and present that were often framed in terms of their kinship relations. On the other hand, comparative framework also emerged, in which differences of political systems or, in some radical editions, even of national cultures were regarded as nuisances on the way of their rapprochement. The contingency between formulated projects of the Scandinavian future produced certain tension, but their proponents often sought for a path of reconciliation and compatibility, opting rather for hybrid alliances than for the purity of dogmatics.

Finally, the year 1864 when Denmark was defeated during the Second War for Schleswig is regarded as a traditional watershed that put a stop to many ambitions projects of the Scandinavian consolidation, especially in the political field. This view has recently been more and more contested by addressing previously unexplored archival materials¹¹¹ and by demonstrating the persistence of Scandinavianist imaginations and Scandinavian-wide framework of thinking and acting in other spheres.¹¹² This dissertation, although formally its research scope is limited by 1864, also seeks to challenge the date from another angle. While political impulses of Scandinavianism slowly withered after 1864, the fears of the geopolitical ambitions and revolutionary inclinations of ostensible Scandinavianist ideologists persisted long until the end of the 19th century in Russian imperial cabinets and public discussions. This perseverance of Scandinavianism-related concerns is addressed in conclusion of the dissertation.

¹¹¹ Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*.

¹¹² Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter*; van Gerven, *Scandinavism*.

Research design

The work consists of six chapters supplemented by introduction and conclusion.

Chapter 1. Scandinavianism and the Russian empire: visions of the North

Chapter one addresses Scandinavianism as heterogenous project that embraced popular movements, pan-national visions, dynastic and diplomatic programmes. It examines political and social background of the Nordic kingdoms in the 1830s-1840s when Scandinavianism was conceived as an umbrella project that united variegated interpretations of the Nordic consolidation under its label. The text situates Scandinavianism in the web of contemporary European pan-national and regional visions. The chapter analyses trajectories of identity projections utilized by the advocates of the Scandinavian project, and it pays particular attention to the imaginaries of the Russian empire that circulated in the Scandinavianist press and public conventions tied to the project.

Chapter 2. The Grand Duchy of Finland: coordinates of concern between Sweden and Russia

The second chapter focuses on the case of the Grand Duchy of Finland and its incorporation into the Russian empire. It sets to explain the status of the duchy, its legal framework and administrative functioning. The chapter analyses the negotiation of Finnish political and cultural identity, pursued both by ex-subjects of the Swedish king who changed their loyalties to the Russian throne and by the imperial agents who came to administer Finland. It stresses collaborative efforts between governor-general Alexander Menshikov and local administration that sought to preserve the autonomy of the duchy in the turbulent decades of 1830s-1840s. The text elucidates political visions shared by the representatives of the administration that were grounded in pan-imperial vision of the estate conservatism. The second part of the chapter addressed the problems of Finnish relations with its ex-metropole

that became especially precarious for the administration in the 1830s-40s due to the changing political dynamics in Sweden. The Finnish administration wanted to establish institutional distance with Sweden by implementing tighter control for the circulation of press, goods, suspicious personalities, and ideas. On the other hand, Finnish educated society, encouraged by European nationalist-Romanticist trends, invented popular projects that centered on the idea of the Finnish national identity as based on the Finnish language. The first encounter of Finnish society and administration with Scandinavianism happens in this context of imperial concerns and novel intellectual pursuits. I argue that in the 1840s, Fennomania and Scandinavianism were perceived by the educated society and the administration as potentially intermingled and co-directional. While the students regarded Scandinavianism as pattern to be followed by then nascent Finnish-centered ambitions, the administration, following class-based and vocation-driven categorization, saw similar cosmopolitical dangers that emanated from two projects.

Chapter 3. Chapter 3. Russian diplomatic corps and the dangers of pan-Scandinavian idea

This chapter focuses on the diplomatic world and imperial diplomatic corps abroad at the beginning of the 1840s. It argues that the context of post-Napoleonic establishment was essential for the language and practice of the diplomatic communication. The Nordic kingdoms surfaced in this scheme as nodal points in the broader picture of European political equilibrium, and (pan-)nationalist popular imaginaries surfaces as contestants against this conservative establishment. I argue that the notions of revolution, movement, and agitation, central for the discourse of Vienna establishment, were instrumentalized by the Russian diplomats for the analysis of the events that deployed under Scandinavianist banner in the 1840s in Denmark and Sweden. The diplomats reinterpreted bourgeois, Romanticism-inspired, nationalist rhetoric, and practice of Scandinavian student meetings into a revolutionary provocation that sought to

shatter established social and political order in the kingdoms while also espousing anti-imperial stance. Their dispatches rather painted a picture of dangerous agitation propelled more by class struggle and anti-government action than a geopolitically-framed hazard.

Chapter 4. The Echo of Revolutions: 1848 in Scandinavia, the Russian empire, and Finland

This chapter examines imperial politics in Finland and in Scandinavia during the European revolutionary events of 1848. It demonstrates that the Swedish influence remained an essential problem for the Finlandish administration that it sought to curb through various measures. The chapter also argues that Fennomania was again perceived by the government as dangerous tendency related to the Swedish politics via the interpretation of biographical trajectories and intellectual avenues of its main advocate, Johan Vilhelm Snellman. The chapter addresses the necessitated occupation of trusted imperial agents with variegated missions that went beyond their usual scope of responsibilities. Prince Alexander Menshikov who stood close to the emperor, embarked on one of such missions that related to the imperial diplomatic assistance to Denmark in the light of its conflict with rebellious communities in the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, joined by Prussia and German states. In the context of this critical juncture, Scandinavianism surfaced in diplomatic correspondence as a project that enjoyed broad popularity and even some degree of support in the respective courts and cabinets. Menshikov, imperial diplomats, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to prevent the reification of the political union, firmly holding to the framework of Vienna establishment. Its close collaboration with Sweden, however, exposed it to necessary accommodation to Scandinavianist public authority that the empire sought to apprehensively reconcile with its foreign policy goals.

Chapter 5. The Crimean War and its aftermaths

This chapter analyses the challenges that the imperial government and Finnish administration faced during and after the Crimean War. In many ways, the imperial system of rule dramatically changed in the wake of the war, and Emperor Alexander II pursued new course that was meant to reform the outdated legal, social, and political architecture of the empire. In this chapter I am trying to demonstrate the intermingled nature of the ‘central’ and ‘peripheral’ reform politics, uncovering variegated ways in which imperial agents operationalized new rhetorical devices, repertoires of action, and institutional frameworks to reify their visions of the imperial and Finnish future. The situation of the prolonged warfare, prospects of the Swedish intervention, and expectations of the internal unrest in Finland came to influence the policy of new governor-general of Finland, Fedor (Friedrich Wilhelm) Berg. New governor-general, alarmed by the prospects of the Scandinavian union, Swedish revanchism, and internal agitation, instrumentalized ethnic classifications and favored Finnish-centered cultural endeavors to set them against Swedish-leaning sympathies. Scandinavianism became a fluid label that he, other administrators, and monitoring institutions negotiated and debated in their communications with Saint-Petersburg to request resources, draw attention, and discredit political opponents.

Swedish-leaning liberal intellectuals provided fertile grounds for governor-general to reinterpret their endeavors in a dangerous light and present them as workings of secret societies and clandestine correspondents preparing upheaval. Since Berg came to shatter previously established patterns of administration, other influential agents sought to discredit his picture of the situation in the duchy, stressing fabricated nature of the dangers that he presented or accentuating his responsibility for their manifestations. In these cabinet struggles, functionaries alluded to the notions of morality, credibility, progress, markers of ethnicity, civilization, groupness, legality, and emancipation that became essential for the public and court politics of

the reforming empire. Particular position of Finland set in the crossroads of foreign policy and control of the border and internal imperial management of the province, again accentuated significance of diversified communication channels and perceptions.

Chapter 6. Towards the flame: The Polish Uprising and the Second War for Schleswig

This chapter examines position of Finland in the context of the imperial crisis of 1863 that resulted the Polish Uprising and imperial foreign policy with regards to the Schleswig-Holstein question that erupted again in 1864. It analyses the formation of new conservative nationalist public press in Russia that forged its position in the light of the Polish struggles for independence and their suppression. The Grand Duchy of Finland, another province with legal privileges and representative political institutions, came under scrutinizing criticism by the flagship of conservative press, highly influential *Moskovskie vedomosti* newspaper. New cohort of nationalist modernizers also regarded Finland and especially ethnic Swedes as precarious element with ostensible endemic Scandinavian political sympathies. On the other hand, imperial revolutionary emigres tried to reconcile Finlandish and Polish independence, imperial break-up, and Scandinavianism in their active campaigns in Stockholm, led by Mikhail Bakunin.

In 1863-4 when Danish crisis came at the forefront again, Finlandish liberal intellectuals demonstrated their support for the Danish and broader, Scandinavian cause, again eliciting the attention of Saint-Petersburg and conservative press. Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pursuing the strategy of non-involvement, however, feared the prospects of the Scandinavian union that became closer than ever to practical reification. The ambiguity of the foreign policy trajectories spurred variegated reactions in the public press that ranged from comparing Schleswig-Holstein problem to that of rebellious Poland to envisioning the sovereignty of the novel state that would comprise the duchies. Scandinavianism, as a

pronounced trend of the Nordic public press and diplomatic negotiations, also drew the attention of the press that actively discussed its prospects and chances, pointing out threats that the reification of Scandinavian union would present for the Russian empire. Although Gorchakov and Russian diplomats abroad sought to curb the intensification of the Scandinavian ideas, the necessity to abstain from intervening in the tensions also made them expect the realization of the Scandinavian union and even reconcile Russian foreign policy with potential emergence of a new neighboring state in the North.

Notes on translation

One of my linguistic interventions concerns the term *Finlandish* which, although it might sound weird, clarifies the analytical language. The word Finlandish as *finländska* in Swedish or *финляндский* in Russian connotes the state of subjecthood relations between the population of the Grand Duchy and the Russian throne. It does not have national connotations and cultural affiliations that the word *Finnish* often unnecessarily articulates. Moreover, historical agents under my study clearly observed the difference between the two terms pointing to the semantic tensions between them. I thus use Finlandish when I address the whole population of Finland and Finnish when I want to articulate specific cultural agenda that was being formulated during this period.

I provide names of places as they were titled during this time, and hence I write Helsingfors not Helsinki, Christiania and not Oslo, Åbo and not Turku, and so on. Finally, there is a certain contestation about proper translation of the term *Skandinavismen* from Scandinavian languages into English. I use Scandinavianism as the one arguably more established in the scholarly literature. Finally, I universally address lists of archival materials as *l.* in the reference section.

Information about the organization in which the research was carried out
and about the academic supervisor

The dissertation was completed at the Department of History of the St. Petersburg School of Arts and Humanities at the St. Petersburg Branch of the Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education National Research University Higher School of Economics in cooperation with University of Turin (Italy). Academic Supervisor – Doctor of Science in history, Professor of the Department of History of the St. Petersburg School of Arts and Humanities at the St. Petersburg Branch of the Federal State Autonomous Educational Institution of Higher Education National Research University Higher School of Economics, Adrian Selin.

Degree of reliability and approbation of results

The reliability of the study is determined by a wide range of historical sources, selected in accordance with the goals and objectives of the research. The results of the work were presented and discussed in two workshops, two international conferences and two schools:

1. Autumn school “Human, too inhuman: observed, observer, field, city”, Tyumen State University, Russia, November 24–27, 2022. Report: “City as an unsafe space of provocations” (together with Tatiana Borisova).
2. Workshop “Pan-nationalisms, a Reappraisal”, University of Oslo, Norway, December 14, 2021. Report: “The Russian empire and pan-Scandinavianism: grasping a moving target”.
3. Workshop “Pan-movements, macro-regions and nation-building: Reflections on Nordic experiences in an international context, 1840–1940”, University of Helsinki, Finland, September 27–28, 2021. Presentation: “Emil von Qvanten, Mikhail Bakunin and Pan-National Activist Networks.

4. International Conference “Loyalty, Subjecthood, Citizenship: Between Empire and Nation”, National Research University “Higher School of Economics” – St. Petersburg, Russia, February 4–5, 2021. Report: “Macronationalism as Gift Exchange: The Case of Pan-Scandinavism”.

5. International conference “Usable Pasts 2019”, “Higher School of Economics” – St. Petersburg, Russia, April 15, 2019. Report: “From “system” to “brotherhood”: discussing the unity of Scandinavian kingdoms”.

6. Summer School “Russian Empire / Soviet Union through the prism of world and new imperial history”, Tyumen State University, Russia, June 30–July 5, 2019. Report: “The Russian Empire Meets Pan-Scandinavism in the 1840s.”

List of author’s main publications in the journals, included in the list of high-level journals, recommended by HSE, as well as indexed by Scopus and Web of Science:

1. Björk-Winberg, Mikael, Egorov, Evgenii. “Emil von Qvanten, Mikhail Bakunin and pan-national activist networks.” In *Nordic Experiences in Pan-nationalisms: A Reappraisal and Comparison, 1840–1940*, edited by Ruth Hemstad and Peter Stadius, 117-36. London: Routledge, 2023.

2. Egorov, Evgenii. “The Russian empire and Scandinavianism: Grasping a moving target, 1840–1864.” In *Nordic Experiences in Pan-nationalisms: A Reappraisal and Comparison, 1840–1940*, edited by Ruth Hemstad and Peter Stadius, 76-95. London: Routledge, 2023.

3. Egorov, Evgenii. “Danish visions of the Scandinavian union (1809–1810): a genealogy of the rhetoric and pragmatics of justification.” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 46, no. 5 (2021): 619-41.

4. Egorov, Evgenii. “Perevod so shvedskogo na ‘finljandskij’: politicheskaja identichnost’ Velikogo knjazhestva Finljandskogo (1831–1854) [Translation from Swedish to “Finland”: The Political Identity of the Grand Duchy of Finland (1831–1854)].” *Ab Imperio*, no. 4 (2021): 203-37.

Conclusions put to defense

1. The encounter of Finlandish administration with Scandinavianism was conditioned by the broadening boundaries of political participation in Sweden and its concerns initially relegated to the domain of political action and revolutionary agitation rather than to geopolitical imagination.

2. The flexibility of interpretation that Scandinavianism enjoyed allowed Finlandish students to formulate their interest to the project through the vocabulary of inspiration and witnessing that they sought to utilize for their domestic Fennomian project.

3. Finlandish administration also regarded Fennomania and Scandinavianism as related and cross-fertilizing endeavors in need of surveillance at this period.

3. Russian diplomatic corps in Denmark and Stockholm presented Scandinavianism as a cell of cosmopolitan revolutionary conspiracy, pertaining to anti-monarchical and class-centered principles of struggle in the 1840s.

4. During the revolutions of 1848, the Russian administration consciously but apprehensively approached the forces of Scandinavianism during Swedish-Russian assistance to Denmark, although this rapprochement dialectically presupposed conservative gravitation of the Russian empire seen by some of its agents as able to divert Scandinavian governments from taking path to Scandinavian union.

5. The experience of the Crimean War and the looming threat of Swedish intervention in 1855-6, allowed new governor-general Berg to tie his mapping of unloyalty to the notions

of Scandinavianism and Swedish-speaking groupness. In his reading, Fennomania surfaced as counterweight to Scandinavianism as a popular project.

6. Scandinavianism appeared to be a contested term, mostly debated in Finnish cabinets and monitoring institutions. The performative invocation of Scandinavianism-related threats was used in communication with Saint-Petersburg as grounds for variegated requests and demands.

7. Gradually, the mapping of loyalty in Finland was translated into the language of ethnographic observation with Finns and Swedes appearing on the different sides of the loyalty spectrum as conditioned by their natural proclivities.

8. In 1864, the Russian empire regarded the idea of Scandinavian union as a serious threat with real potential for reification. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs wished to avoid this result of the warfare, instructing its agents correspondingly.

9. The principles of non-intervention outweighed ascribed dangers of the unification, and the imperial administration rationalized the danger of Scandinavian union as unable to affect the interest of the empire thus manifesting its readiness to new combinations of the political geography in the Northern Europe.

Chapter 1. Scandinavianism and the Russian empire: visions of the North

1.1. Anxieties in Denmark

Many things went under self-imposed or externally-projected banner of Scandinavianism in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and even Finland in the 1840s-1860s. Scandinavianism, a flexible umbrella-term, also spilled into various social and political forms, from cultural ideas of the Nordic closeness inspired by the National Romanticism to a socio-political movement with masses of people, primarily students, marching under its banners, then, finally, to a governmental project shared and cherished by influential political agents across the sea.¹¹³ Pan-Scandinavianism, although it drew on the visions of a historically-shaped national community, often allowed for less rigid boundaries of ethnicity, opening the doors for Jews and Finns – who felt loyal to the project – to join the ranks.¹¹⁴ Civic participatory practices were as important as ascribed national and language-related markers. As much as Scandinavianism capitalized on the visions of the Nordic family of nations, as much it fostered the ideals of the republican mobilization in the times of crisis.¹¹⁵ Initially, Scandinavianism pertained to the political tensions that arose in Denmark in the 1840s.

The autobiography of Orla Lehmann, one of the Danish leaders of the Scandinavian union-building project, is indicative of both the flexibility of the project and of its genealogical particularities. His father was a German-speaking scholar born in Holstein who emigrated to Copenhagen in mature adulthood, married a Danish wife but still socialized mostly among the German families. The Oldenburg empire subjecthood regime allowed for his official access to

¹¹³ Magdalena Hillström and Hanne Sanders, eds., *Skandinavism: en rörelse och en idé under 1800-talet* (Göteborg: Makadam Förlag, 2014); Ruth Hemstad, Jes Fabricius Møller, and Dag Thorkildsen, eds., *Skandinavismen: Vision og virkning* (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2018).

¹¹⁴ On inclusivity see, for example, Goldschmidt's reflections in: Meir Goldschmidt, *Livs erindringer og resultater* (København: Gyldendal, 1877), 330–58. On Finnish participation see Chapter 2.

¹¹⁵ Niri Ragnvald Johnsen, “‘Vi hafva ifrån morgon till qväll varit ute och agiterat’: Skandinavismen og Pressen 1848-1864” (MA diss., University of Oslo, 2018); Henrik Ullstad, “‘Med mjöd och manligt glam på fädrens sätt’: studentskandinavismen som ideologi och performativ praktik,” in *Skandinavism: en rörelse och en idé under 1800-talet* (Göteborg: Makadam Förlag, 2014), 82–113. Also see Brubaker on the fallacy of dividing nationalisms into ‘civic’ and ‘ethnic’: Rogers Brubaker, “Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism,” in *National Self-Determination and Secession*, ed. Margaret Moore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 233-65.

bureaucratic positions both in German-speaking Holstein and in multilingual Danish capital.¹¹⁶ Lehmann, born in 1810, poignantly recollected in his memoirs how he was praised for reciting German poems in the family circle and did not make a secret of his early German-speaking socialization. His latter switch to the ‘Danish side’ reads almost as a redemption for the misdemeanors of the childhood. But Lehmann, as a later witness and a driver of the changes that took place in the Danish kingdom, was honest enough to highlight that the tensions between different groups based on their national identities sparked only later, not without his active contribution.¹¹⁷

Indeed, they could have hardly been sparked in the absence of participatory political institutions and under heavy censorship regime of late Frederick VI’s autocratic rule. Although Frederick himself was not alien to centralizing and, in a way, Danifying initiatives in his domains as well as to Romanticist languages of the national unity in Scandinavia,¹¹⁸ the decision-making relegated to the king and his environment rather than to the autonomous public. In the absence of any representative institutions, younger generation sought for other arenas of the political debate. Such an arena was provided by the Copenhagen University. Indeed, those who would transform the Danish politics of the 1840s-60s represented a generation of those who passed through the classes of the university in the 1820s-30s or taught within its walls.

Carl Ploug, Frederik Barfod, Andreas Krieger, Dietlev Gothard Monrad, Peter Herman Bang, Henrik Nicolai Clausen, Andreas Ørsted, Orla Lehmann, and many others passed through this school and got to know each other at the educational facility. Student Society and other low-level associations turned into debate arenas and later into lobbying groups within the

¹¹⁶ Here I am talking about *Indfødsret* introduced in 1776. See more in: Mikkel Munthe Jensen, “De lærdes identitet og fællesskab i den danske helstat. Fædrelandspatriotiske og transnationale selvforståelser i anden halvdel af det 18. århundrede,” *Historisk Tidsskrift* 133, no. 1 (2013): 80-120.

¹¹⁷ Orla Lehmann, *Orla Lehmanns efterladte skrifter*, vol. 1 (København: Gyldendal, 1872), 1–22.

¹¹⁸ Knud Fabricius, “Det slesvig-holstenske Kancelli og Reskriptet af 15. December 1810,” *Sønderjydske Årbøger* 44, no. 1 (1932): 27–47, <https://doi.org/10.7146/soenderjydskeaarboeger.v44i1.80878>.

political field.¹¹⁹ Student socialization established knowledge networks and friendship ties, providing building blocks for the future organized agitation and political promotion. Often out of reach from the censorship institutions, students partook in public discussions, sharpening their arguments and elaborating political programmes that would become handy with the establishment of the Advisory Provincial Estates in 1834, under the demands of the German Confederation, spurred, in its turn, by the July Revolution. Mainly, their political programmes articulated the demands for political participation, constitution, abolition of censorship, and, perhaps slightly later, the recognition of the Danish nation as a foundation for modern statehood.¹²⁰

For many liberal and nationalist commentators – the two ideologies often went hand by hand at the mid-19th century – the Danish monarchy figured as an outdated relic of the past for many reasons. The bombardment of Copenhagen in 1807, the loss of Norway in 1814 – by many regarded as natural part of the state, – and the economic crisis that swept the kingdom during and after the Napoleonic Wars made many witnesses put blame on the shoulders of Frederik VI and his obsolete ruling apparatus. The image of the last ‘absolutist rule’ in Europe was reinforced by the corrupted officer environment around the king who were seen as true rules of the land pushing forward their conservative agenda and guarding the existing system. Strict censorship, persecution of political visionaries, and exile for unwanted intellectuals added up dark colors to this unflattering picture.¹²¹

Another growing problem was a somewhat sudden ‘discovery’ of different groups, loyalties, legislative and administrative systems that all lived under the abode of the Danish

¹¹⁹ Lehmann, *Orla Lehmanns efterladte skrifter*, 1:22–79; Johannes Lehmann, *Den unge Orla Lehmann* (København: Dansk Kautionsforsikrings-aktieselskab, 1957); Hother Ploug, *Carl Ploug, hans Liv og Gerning: første Del: 1813-48* (Christiania: Gyldendal, 1905), 66–86; H. C. A. Lund, *Studenterforeningens historie, 1820-70: dansk studenterliv i det 19. aarhundrede* (København: Gyldendal, 1896), 1–46.

¹²⁰ Niels Neergaard, *Under Junigrundloven*, vol. 1 (København: P.G. Philipsen, 1892), 1–89.

¹²¹ Roar Skovmand, *Danmarks historie: Folkestyrets fødsel 1830-1870* (København: Politikens forlag, 1962), 79–80; Rasmus Glenthøj, *1864 – Sønner Af de Slagne* (København: Gads forlag, 2014), 24–40; Marcus Rubin, *Frederik VI's Tid: Fra Kielerfreden til Kongens Død. Økonomiske og historiske Studier* (København: P.G. Philipsen, 1895), 608–20.

monarchy. The Oldenburg possessions, apart from Denmark proper, also included the Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg together with Iceland, Greenland, and several small colonies in the Caribbean, on the African coast and in India after the Kiel Treaty of 1814 that separated Norway from Denmark. Besides, the Vienna Treaty stipulated that Holstein was also included into the German Confederation, and the Danish king represented its interests in the Diet.¹²² Although initially constitutional endeavors could be pursued by Danish and German-speaking intellectuals jointly, nationalist visions introduced new tensions related to the definition of groupness to be united under constitutionalist principles.

After the July Revolution, when initially under the request of the German Confederation the advisory bodies were to be established in Holstein and Lauenburg, King Frederick VI was pressed to avoid the imbalance of political institutionalization and stipulated the establishment of Provincial Estates in Denmark as well. Although legally the responsibility of the political bodies was restricted to advisory functions, they quickly overcame these boundaries to become first real arenas for the political debates where many anxieties were powerfully voiced for the first time, nationalist concerns including. The crux of the matter was the Duchy of Schleswig. Its population was linguistically mixed with Danish inhabitants residing mostly in the North and German in the South. In this, the authority of legal codes and historical precedents was faced with the demands of a nationally-representative system.¹²³

Drawing on the influence of the representative bodies – established separately for Schleswig, Holstein, Jutland, and Zealand with other islands – one side demanded the autonomy or even independence of the historically crafted and legally inseparable polity of

¹²² Michael Bregnsbo and Kurt Villads Jensen, *The Rise and Fall of the Danish Empire* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), 171-76.

¹²³ Steen Bo Frandsen, "The Breakup of a Composite State and the Construction of a Nationalist Conflict: Denmark and the Duchies in the 19th Century," *JEMIE - Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe* Vol. 8, no. 1 (2009): 1-20; Glenthøj, *1864 – Sønner Af de Slagne*, 118-47; Bregnsbo and Jensen, *The Rise and Fall of the Danish Empire*, 176-78; Claus Bjørn, *Fra reaktion til grundlov: 1800-1850* (København: Gyldendal, 1993), 90-97.

Schleswig-Holstein that gravitated towards German Confederation and consolidating Germany. Danish liberals and nationalists in Copenhagen and in Jutland, on the contrary, desired that the principles they fought for would expand to include Schleswig or at least Danish-speaking population there. The national-territorial perceptions varied, but Orla Lehmann formulated the most forceful political and zonal vision of the Danish national state that would stretch to the river Eider (*‘Danmark til Ejderen!’*) thus incorporating the whole Schleswig even with the German-speaking population. He based his theory on legal rather than exclusively ethnic principles, but all these visions were united by fostering of modern nationalist and citizenship principles that rhetorically opposed blurred loyalties and subjecthood statuses associated with loose possessions of the Danish king. The state properly speaking, according to them, did not exist, but they wanted to build it.¹²⁴

These two relative positions – Schleswig-Holsteinism and Eider-Danism – were, on the one hand, opposed to each other but, on the other, they often drew on similar nationalist, emancipatory, and frequently liberal rhetoric, although German-speaking insurgents were often blamed in cooperation with local powerful aristocracy. Another position featured as conciliatory and unifying – not necessarily conservative but predominantly so – and implied the preservation of the Danish conglomerate abode (*helstat*) against the grain of the nationalist prejudices and modern liberal politics.¹²⁵ There was a myriad of other positions that allied, opposed, or went against the grain of these political visions, reflecting the wide range of pending issues related to social question, peasant property, labor conditions, economic policy, and military defense of the kingdom. The latter issue surfaced more acute towards the mid-

¹²⁴ Claus Friisberg, *Orla Lehmann: Danmarks første moderne politiker: Orla Lehmann, de nationalliberale og Danmark 1810-49 : en politisk biografi* (Varde: Vestjysk Kulturforlag, 2000), 143-159; Glenthøj, *1864 – Sønnen Af de Slagne*, 95–115.

¹²⁵ See, for example: Bertel Nygaard, “Anti-Politics: Modern Politics and Its Critics in Denmark, 1830–1848,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 36, no. 4 (2011): 419–42, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03468755.2011.596652>.

1840s when tensions with German Confederation over Schleswig spiraled, and war was on the horizon.¹²⁶

While Frederick VI (regent 1784-1808; king 1808-1839) and Christian VIII (1839-1848) held to conservative principles of *helstat* during their respective reigns, Frederick VII (1848-1863) was more susceptible both to liberal and constitutional principles and to nationalist visions, although his eccentric personality hardly contributed to any consistency and coherency of his political thought. The nationalist agitation utilized provincial estates for their agitation on par with highly successful newspaper campaigns. Their primary medium became newspaper *Fædrelandet* edited by Orla Lehmann and Carl Ploug throughout the 1840s. Although the censorship regulations were in place until 1848, legal practice was changing in the 1840s, allowing for criticism of governmental actions and policy. Apart from propagating the principles of national consolidation, modernization of the political system and the introduction of constitution with broad (but restricted) suffrage,¹²⁷ another topic, related to cultural tendencies and political anxieties of the small state, became more and more pronounced. Various modalities of the rapprochement and consolidation of the Scandinavian kingdoms circulated on the pages of national-liberal and other newspapers, opening new prospects for defense, reproduction, and overall survivability of the Danish nation. Usually, the palimpsest of meanings was referred to as Scandinavianism (*Skandinavismen*).¹²⁸

Although some Scandinavianist ideologist stressed its exclusive nature – as impossible to encompass excessive German population, for example – its sources of inspiration were more cosmopolitical than meets the eye. Similar supranational, regional, pan-confessional projects bloomed across Europe and later planted its seeds in Africa and Asia as scholars convincingly

¹²⁶ Hans Vammen, *Den tomme stat: Angst og ansvar i dansk politik 1848-1864* (Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, 2011), 30-292.

¹²⁷ Palle Svensson, "Var vore forfatningsfædre demokrater?," *Temp - tidsskrift for historie* 3, no. 5 (September 13, 2012): 5-27.

¹²⁸ Ruth Hemstad, "Scandinavianism: Mapping the Rise of a New Concept," *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 13, no. 1 (2018): 1-21, <https://doi.org/10.3167/choc.2018.130102>.

demonstrate.¹²⁹ Pan-Scandinavianism resembled many of those European movements that similarly fostered liberal and constitutional principles in the 1830s-40s and, again like many of those, it was able to adapt to geopolitical tensions,¹³⁰ include various social and political elements in its ranks, while some of its advocates had impressive high-cabinet careers where they formulated more coherent programmes of Scandinavian unification. Even though I appreciate the heuristic potential of comparative, transnational, or entangled analysis of macro-national visions, I would argue that, like any of these other pan-projects, Scandinavianism was primarily conditioned by the circumstances of local political contestation in the European North and – often but not always – in its vicinity.¹³¹

1.2. Scandinavian-wide framework of action

Scandinavianism was a brew of cultural intentions and political visions. Although generally scholars observe the conception of the project in the mid-1840s, it drew on cultural languages that were formulated earlier. National Romanticism manifested its presence in the cultural life of Denmark and, in fact of Norway and Sweden as well, at the beginning of the century during the Napoleonic Wars. The group of outstanding poets, scholars, and intellectuals contributed to its rise and solidified position in the cultural and literary debates of the time. Romanticism came to contest Enlightenment classicism and gradually changed the sources of

¹²⁹ Louis Leo Snyder, *Macro-Nationalisms: A History of the Pan-Movements* (London: Greenwood Press, 1984); Cemil Aydin, *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought* (NY: Columbia University Press, 2007); Amotz Giladi, “Origins and Characteristics of Macro-Nationalism: A Reflection on Pan-Latinism’s Emergence at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century,” *History* 105, no. 365 (2020): 252–67, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-229X.12972>.

¹³⁰ Alexander Maxwell, “Pan-Nationalism as a Category in Theory and Practice,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 28, no. 1 (2022): 1–19, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2021.2004767>.

¹³¹ Danielle Charette and Max Skjönsberg, “State of the Field: The History of Political Thought,” *History* 105, no. 366 (2020): 470–83, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-229X.13013>.

inspiration from the Greek pantheon to Old Norse gods, myths, medieval artefacts, and popular histories.¹³²

Since the prehistoric reference base encompassed not only Danish but broader Scandinavian palette of heroes and scenarios while the temporal arc of the Romanticism implied the revitalization of the idealistic past, Scandinavian peoples appeared predestined to live together in peace – with different cultural and political conclusions drawn from this vision. Scandinavian peoples, united by the bonds of language proximity, religious homogeneity, and common origin were increasingly fashioned as a family of nations, and these cultural frames certainly possessed political implications that ranged from peaceful coexistence in separate states to amalgamation within the borders of one imagined polity.¹³³

The Napoleonic Wars contributed to tensions between Scandinavian kingdoms with Denmark-Norway and Sweden gradually finding themselves on the different sides of the barricades. The framework of the Scandinavian unity, established forcefully or with the help of a dynastic accident, however, was on the table of many agents from poets and editors to kings and respective governments.¹³⁴ While the fatal separation of Norway from Denmark in 1814 first as an independent state and then as member of the Swedish-Norwegian union under the Swedish dynasty did land a hard blow against pan-national visions, the metaphors of family, brotherhood, and blood ties persisted through the crisis and were reapplied to justify the union between Sweden and Norway as well as the mixture of respective nations as its ideal result. Moreover, Swedish propaganda usually referred to Scandinavia as to the union between the

¹³² Tim van Gerven, “The Copenhagen Question of 1800: Tracing the Intellectual Roots of Cultural Scandinavism,” in *Skandinavismen: Vision og virkning*, ed. Ruth Hemstad, Jes F. Møller, and Dag Thorkildsen (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2018), 45–72.

¹³³ Tim van Gerven, *Scandinavism: Overlapping and Competing Identities in the Nordic World, 1770-1919* (Leiden: Brill, 2022); Evgenii Egorov, “Danish Visions of the Scandinavian Union (1809–1810): A Genealogy of the Rhetoric and Pragmatics of Justification,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 46, no. 5 (2021): 619–41, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03468755.2021.1909126>.

¹³⁴ Aage Friis, “Frederik den Sjette og det andet svenske tronfølgervalg 1810,” *Historisk Tidsskrift* 7, no. 1 (1897): 241–327; Rasmus Glenthøj and Morten Nordhagen Ottosen, *Experiences of War and Nationality in Denmark and Norway, 1807-1815* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 59–96.

two kingdoms, excluding Denmark from the story.¹³⁵ Wider-encompassing visions were put aside for a moment, but not forgotten.

Similar tendencies were detectable in the Swedish and Norwegian cultural life with Romanticist agenda reviving national myths and legends, although in these cases broader pan-Scandinavian appeal might have been less pronounced. In fact, nationalist projects often contested supranational visions of the Scandinavian identity, drawing especially on historical narratives of dependency, asymmetry, and repression.¹³⁶ Scholars situate the revitalization of the Nordic (as referring to *Norden*) framework in the 1820s-30s when several tendencies contributed to the *encore*. While literary tendencies were extremely important for the Scandinavian case,¹³⁷ the formation of scholarly societies – which often included amateurs-poets in their ranks – provided new patterns of organization and knowledge-exchange within arising transnational epistemic communities.¹³⁸ The Royal Society of Northern Antiquaries was arguably the main research institution that united prominent historians, linguists, and archeologists who collected, studied, and promoted the relics of the Nordic past, sometimes with intentions of cultural or even political consolidation of the Scandinavian kingdoms. Other societies worked alongside this one while scholars from different disciplinary fields saw greater profits in exchanging their knowledge with their colleagues across the Øresund.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ Ruth Hemstad, *Propagandakrig: kampen om Norge i Norden og Europa 1812–1814* (Oslo: Novus, 2014); Ruth Hemstad, “The United Kingdoms of Norway and Sweden and the United Kingdom of the Netherlands 1814–1830: Comparative Perspectives on Politics of Amalgamation and Nation Building,” *Scandinavica*, no. 58 (2019): 76–98.

¹³⁶ Øystein Sørensen, *Jakten på det norske: perspektiver på utviklingen av en norsk nasjonal identitet på 1800-tallet* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 2007), 38-41; Niri Ragnvald Johnsen, “Inkonsekvent og Omskiftelig?,” *Historisk Tidsskrift* 100, no. 2 (2021): 116–30, <https://doi.org/10.18261/issn.1504-2944-2021-02-03>.

¹³⁷ Kari Haarder Ekman, “*Mitt hems gränser vidgades*”: en studie i den kulturella skandinavismen under 1800-talet (Göteborg: Makadam förlag, 2010), 35-57.

¹³⁸ Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, and Jakob Vogel, “Introduction,” in *Shaping the Transnational Sphere*, ed. Davide Rodogno, Bernhard Struck, and Jakob Vogel (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 1–20, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt9qdg45.7>.

¹³⁹ Kim Simonsen, “The Cultivation of Scandinavism. The Royal Society of Northern Antiquaries’ International Network, Seen Through the Letters of Carl Christian Rafn,” in *Skandinavismen. Vision og virkning* (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2018), 73–98; Kim Simonsen, “The Royal Society of Northern Antiquaries and V. U. Hammershaimb’s Collections of Faroese Folk Legends,” in *Grimm Ripples: The Legacy of the Grimms’ Deutsche Sagen in Northern Europe* (Leiden: Brill, 2022), 338–58, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004511644_014.

Scholars of the broad spectrum of disciplines under the label of naturalists were primarily guided by universal concerns and calculations: the more professionals partook in the production of knowledge, the more – quantitatively and qualitatively – they could produce.¹⁴⁰ Cultural proximity and at least partial mutual understanding afforded by the closeness of the Scandinavian languages contributed to easiness of this communication. Indeed, there were anxieties behind such avenues of thinking that related to the lack of population in Scandinavian kingdoms and, as a result, to the lack of cultural and technical specialists. Earlier proposals for knowledge-exchange and intensification of contacts were thus backed up by politico-economical visions of a Malthusian trap that limited the progress of politically separated Scandinavian kingdoms.¹⁴¹

As early as 1834, Orla Lehmann formulated the idea of uniting the cultural life of Denmark and Norway to avoid the pitfalls of cultural degradation. Although he understood that ‘the emergence of geniuses escapes statistical calculations’, a larger political entity was more populated by talented people than the smaller one. He argued that Norway and Denmark, regardless of the political boundaries, maintained cultural contacts, and it would be ungrateful for mutual enrichment to ignore the works of authors living across the sea. The idea of a common cultural space was based on the kinship of nations, which also should have resulted in a more intensive cooperation, since these nations were co-owners (*medejere*) of cultural treasures-gifts. Here Lehmann was, perhaps, more concerned with a figure of a Romanticist genius rather than a disciplinary professional, but the necessity of scaling up the exchange was contemplated in other situations as well, and Germany – as a culturally unified area despite political fragmentation – often surfaced as an example to follow.¹⁴²

¹⁴⁰ Henrik Nicolai Clausen, *Optegnelser om mit levned og min tids historie* (København: G. E. C. Gad, 1877), 271–77.

¹⁴¹ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 50-55.

¹⁴² Orla Lehmann, ”Systematisk Fremstilling af Kongeriget Norges constitutionelle eller grundlov bestemte Ret ved F. Stang, Lector i Lovkyndigheden,” *Maanedskrift for Litteratur* 12, (1834): 289-394.

While these diverse calculation of knowledge-production and cultural exchange provided incentives for the return to Scandinavian-wide framework of thinking, other developments also facilitated these dynamics. Railroads became the means of dramatic compression of time and distance, facilitating the processes of nation-building across continental Europe by binding distant territories into a network of speed transportation of people, goods, and ideas. In case of Scandinavia, we might think of steamships that played similar role but on pan-regional scale, connecting populations across borders since the late 1820s. Making mutual voyages easier and quicker, the infrastructure of steamship connection and the vehicles themselves, ennobled with the notions of modernity and freedom of travel, became important symbolic objects in later Scandinavian students' voyages and imaginations.¹⁴³

Before the students used to occupy cabins and decks of steamships crossing the Øresund, another important figure travelled by these means to melt the ice of mutual prejudices existing between Sweden and Denmark in 1829. Adam Gottlob Oehlenschläger, an (un)rivalled¹⁴⁴ patriarch of the Danish Romanticist poetry whom Lehmann certainly implied in his population-genius dependency calculations, travelled to Sweden and Norway to enjoy an exceptional reception there as a discoverer of the Nordic common ancient past.¹⁴⁵ The Swedish great poet and bishop Esias Tegnér famously crowned Oehlenschläger with a wreath in the Lund Cathedral, framing this gesture as a sign of reconciliation between the two kingdoms: 'The years of disagreements are left behind!' Tegnér clearly recognized potential political

¹⁴³ Fredrik Nilsson, *I rörelse: politisk handling under 1800-talets första hälft* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2000), 83–98; Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 300–302.

¹⁴⁴ His bitter fight with Jens Baggesen is well-known: Mads Sohl Jessen, "Det naive og sentimentale geni: om Schillers og Goethes Betydning for Oehlenschlägers og Baggesens satiriske konflikt 1802-1807," *Danske Studier* (2014): 144–67.

¹⁴⁵ Adam Oehlenschläger, *Erindringer* (København, 1872), 430-53.

repercussions behind his bold and controversial signal.¹⁴⁶ In Norway, Oehlenschläger was received with similar honors.¹⁴⁷

It was not accidental that the mythologized encounter between the two outstanding figures of the contemporary literary world – they also became well known beyond the borders of the region – shaped one of the foundational reference points for later reflections on the rise of mutual sympathies across the region. The event became especially emblematic for the new invented tradition of the Scandinavian student festivals that shaped itself during the late 1830s-1840s to establish new networks across the canals and to provide an early arena for elaborating the principles of the Scandinavian consolidation, action, and propaganda in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland. The tradition was made possible both by bold activities of the students and student societies and by previously established scholarly networks between the universities of Copenhagen, Christiania, Lund, Uppsala, and Helsingfors.

1.3. Varieties of unity at the carnivals of sympathy: Scandinavian student festivals in the 1840s

A rare student at the Nordic universities of the 1840s missed the opportunity to be involved into organization, planning, and execution of the Scandinavian festivals, or Nordic student meetings.¹⁴⁸ First groups travelled across the Sound in the winter of 1838 when the frozen canal allowed the students from Copenhagen to walk to see their colleagues in Lund. The traditions became institutionalized with mutual visits of 1842 and became especially influential in the summer of 1843 when Danish students travelled to Sweden and when political consequences of the Scandinavian-wide framework of action were forcefully envisioned and

¹⁴⁶ Tegner – von Schwerin, 25 July 1829 in *Esaias Tegner's brev*, vol. 5 (Stockholm: Allhems Förlag, 1956), 219-220.

¹⁴⁷ Oehlenschläger, *Erindringer*, 451-53.

¹⁴⁸ See, for example a later reflection on the tradition and participation of students: Arthur Abrahams, *Minder fra min studentertid* (Kjøbenhavn: Det Schubotheske forlag, 1896), 38-40.

pronounced. Swedish and Norwegian students visited Copenhagen in 1845, then two conventions happened in Christian in 1851 and 1852. In four years, the students gathered in Uppsala and in 1862 again visited Copenhagen.¹⁴⁹

Usually, a volume or two were prepared after these conventions to provide the impressions for those who could not afford to get on a voyage and for the broader public. Oral testimonies of the students must have been equally important as a medium of information-exchange, given the rising number of participants that counted hundreds of voyagers. Besides, it was very hard for the inhabitants of the receiving city to ignore the arrival of students with their usual marching along the central streets, loud exclamations and songs, distinct clothing (caps and ribbons), and overall fervent activities.¹⁵⁰ If these city-dwellers would have listened to their talks, overheard pronounced toasts or, finally, read a page or two in a fresh newspaper, they could learn of the ideas these students fostered and adhered to.

By 1843, Orla Lehmann and Carl Ploug had formulated a consistent programme of action for Denmark on the pages of *Fædrelandet*. Holstein and Lauenburg should have been separated from Denmark. The kingdom had to become a constitutional nation-state with tiny, potentially assimilating German minority in Southern Schleswig. The survival of such a small nation-state in the vicinity of Prussia and consolidating Germany was seen, however, as a hardly surmountable challenge. To tackle the problem, Lehmann, Ploug, and their associates elaborated the idea of the Scandinavian consolidation in the form of a federation uniting Denmark and Sweden-Norway that would allow the preservation of diverse administrative systems and respective national cultures. The eventual establishment of this federative system might have been reached by concrete preemptive measures that would entail the formation of

¹⁴⁹ Nilsson, *I rörelse: politisk handling under 1800-talets första hälft*, 109–38; Henrik Ullstad, “Med mjöd och manligt glam på fädrens sätt’: studentskandinavismen som ideologi och performativ praktik”; Johnsen, “‘Vi hafva ifrån morgon till qväll varit ute och agiterat’: Skandinavismen og Pressen 1848-1864”.

¹⁵⁰ Nilsson, *I rörelse*, 99-130.

a military alliance or trade agreement between the kingdoms, although economic reasons played a negligible role in their calculations.¹⁵¹

Contested in their visions by conservative newspapers and established governments both in Denmark and Sweden-Norway – at least until 1844 when Oscar I inherited the throne from conservative Charles XIV John – they did not even have the monopoly for defining Scandinavian futures within liberal and students environments. Although Lehmann and Ploug enjoyed considerable popularity in Copenhagen oppositional circles, their formulations of distinctly political unity repelled many in this part of the political spectrum as well. The variety of proposed trajectories of the Scandinavian consolidation surfaced in the press, but it must have been especially glaring during the student conventions when famous intellectuals, liberal advocates, and established scholars proposed their own readings of Scandinavian horizons of expectation. This range of visions was not only determined by the difference of local political contestations in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and even Sweden but by the multitude of doctrinal standings, cultural expectations, and tensions in these respective contexts as well.¹⁵²

Voiced opinions ranged from mere tendencies of cultural rapprochement that implied mutual reading of Scandinavian authors, intensified translation of materials or better learning of respective languages to elaborated visions of national consolidation, political union in the form of federation, and later dynastic matrimonial politics that could result in the unification of the royal houses.¹⁵³ Undeniably, the majority of these opinions surfaced as recommended outlines without detailed explications of challenges and eventual results. These diverse

¹⁵¹ John Danstrup, “Den politiske Skandinavisme i Perioden 1830-1850,” *Scandia: Tidskrift för historisk forskning* 16, no. 2 (1944): 207-286; Henrik Becker-Christensen, “Frederik Barfod og den skandinaviske bevægelse i tiden før 1845.,” *Scandia: Tidskrift för historisk forskning* 44, no. 2 (1978), 289-314, <https://journals.lub.lu.se/scandia/article/view/1236>; Henrik Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme og politiske realiteter: Den politiske skandinavisme i Danmark 1830-1850* (Århus: Arusia, 1981), 68–117.

¹⁵² Øystein Sørensen, *Nasjonal identitet - et kunstprodukt?* (Oslo: Norges forskningsråd, 1994), 191–209.

¹⁵³ See, for example: Åke Holmberg, “On the Practicability of Scandinavianism: Mid-nineteenth-century Debate and Aspirations,” *Scandinavian Journal of History* 9, no. 2–3 (January 1, 1984): 171–82, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03468758408579040>; Morten Nordhagen Ottosen, “Den dynastiske Skandinavismens grobunn og grenser, ca. 1845-1870,” in *Skandinavismen: Vision og virkning*, ed. Ruth Hemstad, Jes Fabricius Møller, and Dag Thorkildsen (Odense: Syddansk Universitetsforlag, 2017), 255–83.

reflections were united by the same vocabulary of literary tropes of the Nordic unity, freedom, and brotherhood of Scandinavian peoples that were supplied with maritime metaphors, organicist references, and historical narratives. Moreover, Scandinavian-wide framework supplied the participants with patterns of comparison, and Norwegian constitution of 1814 or Swedish political liberalism appeared as exemplary achievement to fight for in autocratic Denmark.¹⁵⁴ Some of these opinions thus might have complimented each other, but tensions between them often spilled into implicit and explicit oppositions.

One of the cultural, political, and religious leaders of mid-19th century Denmark, Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig, who at the beginning of the century participated in the propaganda campaign aimed at the amalgamation and political unification of the Scandinavian kingdoms, became a staunch opponent of these tendencies by the 1840s while advocating their cultural rapprochement. For him, potential political and national unification entailed undesired pretensions under cosmopolitical-imperial abode.¹⁵⁵ Carl Ploug, on the other hand, for the first time presented his political programme for the Swedish students in Calmar where he argued for the federative union established against the threats that Germany and Russia presented for the Nordic freedom. He was then annoyed when recognizing that the majority of the Swedish intellectuals rooted for the cultural connection without any political programmes in mind. Indeed, the opponents of the political consolidations were numerous and influential.¹⁵⁶

It would be ungrateful, however, to read the volumes of students' impressions from their voyages only in search of dogmatic tensions and programmatic visions. These pages are filled with panegyrics, poems, song lyrics, ecstatic prophesies, and tears of joy.¹⁵⁷ These

¹⁵⁴ Glenthøj, *1864 – Sønnen Af de Slagne*, 86–92; Bjørn, *Fra reaktion til grundlov*, 237–41. In a way similar to what Jussi Kurunmäki and Jani Marjanen wrote about Finland: Kurunmäki and Marjanen, “Catching up through Comparison: The Making of Finland as a Political Unit, 1809–1863.”

¹⁵⁵ Jes Fabricius Møller, “Grundtvig, Danmark og Norden” in *Skandinavismen: Vision og virkning*, 99-120; Egorov, “Danish Visions of the Scandinavian Union (1809–1810).”

¹⁵⁶ Danstrup, “Den politiske Skandinavisme i Perioden 1830-1850,” 220–32; Nilsson, *I rörelse*, 109; Christian Molbech, *Lund, Upsala og Stockholm i sommaren 1842: nogle blade af en dagbog med et tillæg om den skandinaviske eenhed* (København: Gyldendal, 1844), 283–320.

¹⁵⁷ Nilsson, *I rörelse*, 117–30.

experiences of travelling abroad and socializing with their peers must have been emotional encounters – well beyond the traditions of Romanticist textual sensitivity – for many participants.¹⁵⁸ First visitations, excitement of city-dwellers, marches along the street with women sending flowers from their windows and balconies, encounters with famous personalities, solemn dining with toasts and bottles of punch at the tables, cohabitation with their peers: everything contributed to the excitement of voyages and, essentially, to the opportunity of Scandinavianism emotionally tie together diverging opinions and trajectories.¹⁵⁹

Different political groupings, student societies, public intellectuals, and later politicians thus might have implied various things under the label of the Nordic unity or foresee diverging results of pan-Scandinavian project that for a long time resisted doctrinal monopolization and allowed flexible interpretations to encompass broader range of contributors in Denmark and in Sweden-Norway. Their cause thus appeared internally heterogeneous but still shared and common, resembling other contemporary ideological programmes. The emotional capital of Scandinavianism established a solid foundation for sensibilities of the shared duty, altruistic assistance, and volunteer activity. Those who exhibited loyalty to the project thus partook in the organizational, propaganda, and fundraising activities for the sake of the project – whatever it meant for them – through establishing networks of action. Scandinavianist ideologists readily capitalized on this emotional foundation to request adherence in the form of mobilization that spanned from agitation to military volunteering. Indeed, a word ‘Scandinavian’ often implied adherence to the political movement rather than an ethnic categorization.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ On emotions and nationalism see also: Ville Kivimäki, Sami Suodenjoki, and Tanja Vahtikari, “Lived Nation: Histories of Experience and Emotion in Understanding Nationalism,” in *Lived Nation as the History of Experiences and Emotions in Finland, 1800-2000*, ed. Ville Kivimäki, Sami Suodenjoki, and Tanja Vahtikari, (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021), 1–28, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69882-9_1.

¹⁵⁹ See, for example: *Beretning om studentertoget til Upsala i juni maaned 1843* (København, 1844); *Berättelse om studenttågen till Lund och Köpenhamn, sommaren 1845* (Uppsala, 1846).

¹⁶⁰ Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme og politiske realiteter*, 70-9.

Contemporary debates about conscription in Denmark and popular weapon training in Sweden and Norway helped formulate the principles of quasi-republican duty of defending the newly conceived shared fatherland of Scandinavia, most explicitly exhibited by Orla Lehmann's speech for the Nordic students in 1845.¹⁶¹ In it, Lehmann requested sacrifices for the sake of the project and the students' reaction signaled their readiness to bet on its realization.¹⁶² While the rhetoric often drew on altruistic patterns, many Danish national-liberals and Scandinavianists understood that they had to present the political union as advantageous for other constituent parts of the future federation as well. In Denmark, Scandinavianism capitalized on anti-German sentiments. In Sweden, mirroring the borderland-danger imagination,¹⁶³ threats and potential profits lied to the east, in Finland that was annexed to the Russian empire in 1808-9. Carl Ploug was the first to highlight the connection between future Scandinavian power and Swedish revanchist sentiments with regards to the Grand Duchy of Finland.

1.4. The Russian empire in Scandinavianist imagination

Although I will elaborate in more detail on the images of Russia and Finland in the Nordic public opinion in the next chapter, it is necessary to articulate several points here. Undoubtedly, many Scandinavianist intellectuals and politicians in Denmark and in Sweden-Norway associated the Russian empire with the images of barbarity, backwardness, expansionism, repressiveness, and potential aggression. While the annexation of Finland certainly contributed to the bitterness of the Swedish public, the consistent image of Russia must have been formulated later, during and immediately after the Russian suppression of the

¹⁶¹ Neergaard as a left-wing historian and politician pays considerable attention to the primacy of the conscription problem in Denmark, unlike other even more contemporary historical accounts: Neergaard, *Under Junigrundloven*, 1: 5-6, 30-35, 101-104, 126.

¹⁶² Orla Lehmann, *Orla Lehmann's efterladte skrifter*, vol. 3 (Kjøbenhavn, 1873), 155-63.

¹⁶³ Aladin Languèche, "Resistance as the Creation of a 'Natural Frontier': The Language of 19th-Century Scandinavism (1839-1867)."

Polish Uprising of 1830-1. It was at this point when the opposition between the semantics of freedom as represented by the Polish struggle for independence and ultimate repression on the side of the Russian forces spilled into Russian-related anxieties in the Nordic public sphere. Polish events were projected onto Scandinavian terrain, and the fears of partitions of the Nordic kingdoms, primarily of Sweden-Norway, appeared on the list of anxieties.¹⁶⁴

As early as 1837, during the decade when only sporadic Scandinavian-wide cultural and political utterances surfaced in the press, the consolidation of the North was regarded as a shield against the expansionist pretensions of the Russian empire, and later this rhetoric only consolidated further.¹⁶⁵ Danish government ruled by conservative Frederik VI and especially Swedish-Norwegian system under Charles XIV John, however, looked at the Russian empire as at the guardian of the established status quo in the North. The Swedish opposition utilized the proximity between Charles XIV John and Nicholas I by attacking the Russian imperial politics thus implicitly criticizing the alliance that the Swedish king stipulated together with its external and domestic consequences. Besides, Finland was fashioned as an example of illegitimate conquest performed by the Russian empire, and the duchy often figured as a natural part of Sweden that still retained character, language, and culture of its ex-metropole.¹⁶⁶

Not everybody was so sure or, conversely, belligerently ignorant about the cultural life of the Grand Duchy of Finland and the same Grundtvig who repudiated tendencies for the political unification, mocked those ideologists who sought to expand the domain of the Swedish or Scandinavian culture to Finland – whose Finnish-centered endeavors were usually

¹⁶⁴ Jørgen Erik Nielsen, *Fra Neva til Øresund: den danske modtagelse af russisk litteratur 1800-1856* (København: Museum Tusulanum Press, 1998), 41–45; Niri Ragnvald Johnsen, “Pan-Nationalisms across Borders: Scandinavianism in the Community of Nations, 1830–1870,” in *Nordic Experiences in Pan-Nationalisms* (London: Routledge, 2023), 106–9.

¹⁶⁵ Helge Almquist, ”Karl XIV Johan och den begynnande skandinavismen. Cirkuläret af år 1837,” *Historisk Tidskrift* (Stockholm) 34, (1914): 198–209. See, for example: *Fædrelandet*, 27.08.1841.

¹⁶⁶ See, for example, Carl Ploug’s speech in Lund in 1843: *Freja*, 27.07.1843. Henrik Edgren, “Traumakonstruktionen: Svensk historieskrivning om rikssprängningen 1809,” *Scandia* 76, no. 1 (2010): 9-39; Lauri Aadolf Puntila, *Suomen ruotsalaisuuden liikkeen synty, aatehistoriallinen tutkimus* (Helsinki: Otava, 1944), 38.

favorably covered in Danish print¹⁶⁷ – arguably implying Carl Ploug’s preaching from 1843.¹⁶⁸ Moreover, the visions of Scandinavian union often drew on the images of natural or divine trinity thus excluding Finland from this picture as an equal member. Indeed, Finnish political, cultural, and civilizational equality with other members of the imagined union was a contested topic.

Nevertheless, the empire remained dangerous precisely because it could embrace different nationalities in its abode, and Sweden, Norway, or some parts of these realms might have been pictured as new territories and populations to fall in its hands following the destiny of Poland after the partitions which became an emblematic experience of the imperial neighborhood. On the other hand, the rise of nationalist imagination questioned the credibility of empires – in a sense, the Oldenburg empire fell under this pressure¹⁶⁹ – on the grounds of their ethnic or confessional heterogeneity that made them into time-bombs that were about to explode and spill hostage nations outward.

This explicit antagonism, however, might have obscured more nuanced encounters fostered by curiosity about the mysterious otherness of the Russian empire. The first volume of Frederik Barfod’s *Brage og Idun* – a pioneering but ultimately unsuccessful issue that propagated the cultural consolidation of the North¹⁷⁰ – included long reflections on Alexander Pushkin’s poetry treated by then student Paul Møller in 1838. The commentaries started with an Orientalist remark about the backwardness and unoriginality of the Russians to then argue, however, that the Russian culture remarkably quickly caught up with the European progress.¹⁷¹ Pushkin’s talent manifested itself against all odds, political included:

¹⁶⁷ See, for example: Lenström, “Om Finnarnes Poesi,” *Brage og Idun* 4, no. 1 (1841): 1-152.

¹⁶⁸ Carl Bagge, *Berättelse om Studenttågen 1845* (Upsala, 1856), 121-2.

¹⁶⁹ Uffe Østergaard, “National-Building and Nationalism in the Oldenburg Empire,” in *Nationalizing Empires* ed. Stefan Berger and Alexei Miller (Budapest: CEU Press, 2015), 461–509.

¹⁷⁰ Becker-Christensen, “Frederik Barfod og den skandinaviske bevægelse i tiden før 1845.”

¹⁷¹ Paul Møller, “Digterskildringer,” *Brage og Idun* 1, no. 1 (1838): 238-60.

Naturally, under a constitution like the Russian one, this [his political poetry] had to lead him into many dangerous conflicts, and, if the government did not to a great extent tolerate his youth, talent, and family, he would perhaps still be alive, but in Siberia.¹⁷²

Although a huge bulk of the article was a translation of an Austrian traveler Friedrich Tietz's impressions from Pushkin's poetry and personality, his positive commentaries about Pushkin's loyalist and anti-Polish verses – Tietz argued that the Russian poet might have been a republican during the French revolution – made Møller explicitly declare that his interest was exclusively of aesthetic nature without any political repercussions.¹⁷³

Another Norden-focused issue *Nordisk Ugeskrift* provided an overview of the Russian contemporary literature in the same year, and Møller elaborated on this text in his review of Pushkin's poetry.¹⁷⁴ While these texts were devoid of political commentary, Møller insisted that the interest in poetry as a universal value laid the foundation for genuine liberal and cosmopolitan tendencies. Orientalist overtones, characteristic for his introduction, were, however, amplified in the next volume of *Brage og Idun*, where pastor Fredrik Hammerich addressed the earliest history of Slavic peoples. The author found the allegory for the controversies of the Slavic people's character that ranged from excessive love for their offspring to bloodthirst in the nature of a woman's mind:

In a woman's soul, the actual world of opposites, where paradise often borders on hell, they [meaning mutually exclusive characteristics – EE] can live together, and, if I am

¹⁷² Ibid, 240.

¹⁷³ Ibid, 258.

¹⁷⁴ Nielsen, *Fra Neva til Øresund*, 54–55. On the journal see: Ruth Hemstad, "I 'Tidens Fylde'. Panskandinaviske publisister og transnasjonale tidsskrifter," in *Litterære verdensborgere: transnasjonale perspektiver på norsk bokhistorie 1519–1850*, ed. Aasta M.B. Bjørkøy, Aina Nøding, and Anne Birgitte Rønning (Oslo: Nasjonalbiblioteket, 2019), 384–87.

not mistaken, a consideration of the Slavic people as a group of women will solve both these and many other riddles in their history.¹⁷⁵

The occasion of the Call of the Varangians that was usually treated as a symbolic birth of the Russian statehood allowed the author to contrast the backwardness of the Slavic culture with Nordic and, in general, European civilization. The distance between the two continued throughout their histories. Hammerich, contrary to more liberal narratives of the 1830s, pictured the Poles as beset by the same inaptitude of their Slavic character and oligarchic pretensions, while the Uprising of 1830-1 was paralleled to the sisters' strife between Poland and Russia, again traversing into feminizing Orientalist logic.¹⁷⁶

The text presented the history of Russia as the dynamics of relations between the all-powerful oppressor and the serving oppressed with artificial interventions unable to change the nature of this hierarchized opposition. Behind the eminence front of its contemporary history starting from Peter the Great, Hammerich again saw the feminine inconstancy of mind and the emptiness of genuine ideas. He, however, could not deny its threatening military power and argued that since the Polish Uprising fear reigned among the European publics with regards to Russia. Nevertheless, Hammerich posited that Russia had to concentrate on its civilizing mission in 'its own Asia' on par with other European powers bringing progress to this part of the world. He hoped that the 'powerful eagle' would focus on these affairs instead of turning to Europe.¹⁷⁷

These reflections were followed by other translations in further numbers of the journal and by broader reflections on the Russian history and culture in associated issues, testifying to the intensified interest in the Russian empire within Scandinavianist networks and discourses.

¹⁷⁵ Fredrik Hammerich, "Historiske Skizzer," *Brage og Idun* 2, no. 1 (1839): 96-7.

¹⁷⁶ Fredrik Hammerich, "Historiske Skizzer," *Brage og Idun* 2, no. 1 (1839): 110-11. Besides, this sounded surprisingly close to Pushkin's own interpretation of the uprising and its suppression.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 116-17.

The general educated public in the Nordic kingdoms, beyond the smaller circle of Scandinavianist enthusiasts, was arguably even more engaged in the processes of reception and reinterpretation of the Russian cultural renaissance of the 1830s-40s.¹⁷⁸ Those texts printed in *Brage og Idun*, however, serve as relatable testimonies of the complexity of these engagements which often tended to leave the realm of simplistic oppositions and dwell on more complex notions that entailed the analysis of the web of contemporary dependencies, nested sovereignties, cultural asymmetries in the globalizing world where the contours of Asia – with the Russian empire playing the role of a bridging agent – becoming more and more palpable on the map of civilizations and on mind maps of bourgeois Europeans.

1.5. Scandinavia in the Russian scenarios of power

On 27 June 1838, a delegation arrived in Copenhagen from the Swedish coast and was delightfully received in the Danish capital with crowds in unprecedented numbers – according to the later report – weaving at the harbor and cannon shots informing of their arrival. Next day the group, led by their Danish adversaries, paid visitation to the Royal Theater where they watched the ‘national’ ballet *Waldemar*.¹⁷⁹ Their plans for following days also encompassed the Royal Society of Northern Antiquaries and the shrine of the Danish kings together with the Viking’s grave in Roskilde among the list of other entertaining and enlightening facilities. The sickness that struck the leader of the delegation, however, diverted them from fulfilling many of their plans. This exposition might have sounded as covering the visit of Swedish students or intellectuals at around the same time when Nordic sentiments were on the rise, but in fact it

¹⁷⁸ Nielsen, *Fra Neva til Øresund*.

¹⁷⁹ On the ballet see more in: Patricia N. McAndrew, “August Bournonville: Scattered Reminiscences in Honor of the Hundredth Anniversary of His Birth (1905) Collected and Edited by Charlotte Bournonville: Part One,” *Dance Chronicle* 28, no. 1 (2005): 29–66.

addresses Grand Duke Heir of the Russian Empire Alexander Nikolaevitch's visit to Copenhagen.¹⁸⁰

The encounter serves the goal of slightly relativizing the nationalist-driven interests of the burgeoning educated societies in the Nordics. In fact, many of them, especially those supervised by the royal family, often fashioned themselves as producing universal knowledge that could appeal to external agents as well. The seclusion was contrary to their interests, and the list of members also testifies to this fact. Antiquaries' collections, folklore-gathering, revival of local and national traditions in arts did not only produce the foundation for contemporary nationalist myth-making, but they also enjoyed considerable popularity among wider audiences that might have not shared later goals of nation-state consolidation.¹⁸¹ Perhaps, their exclusively nationalist appeal might suffer from teleological reading of their activities. Moreover, the Russian empire whose history was and still is usually narrated from the Early Rus engagements with the Nordic Viking/Varangian policies of the 9th-11th centuries, might have not been so alien to these tendencies in the Scandinavian kingdoms.

As early as 1833 the Society of Northern Antiquaries addressed Russian diplomat in Copenhagen and prominent antiquarian enthusiast Paul von Nicolay with the news of the Nordic manuscripts publications that addressed some events from the Russian earliest history.¹⁸² Later in 1835, the Society opened subscription for the series of *Antiquitates Rossicae* series devoted to the publishing of the Islandic and ancient Scandinavian manuscripts related to the Russian history. Since the Society looked for material profits or at least financial

¹⁸⁰ Undated plan of the visit. Kansalliskirjasto. Ms.Mf. 833, C.i; Later reports with remarks on the Cesarevich's health: 17 / 29 June 1838; 20 June / 2 July 1838; 27 June / 9 July 1838; 29 June / 11 July 1838, Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Simonsen, "The Royal Society of Northern Antiquaries and V. U. Hammershaimb's Collections of Faroese Folk Legends."

¹⁸² Directory of the Society – Nicolay, 24 September 1833. Kansalliskirjasto. Ms.Mf. 833, C.o. See as well: Natalia Dmitrieva, "Islandskij uchjonyj Finn Magnusen (1781–1847) — korrespondent rossijskogo diplomata P.A. Nikolai (1777–1866), na materialah arhiva usad'by Monrepo," *Saint Petersburg and the countries of Northern Europe* 17, no. 2 (2016): 128-32.

coverage of this work, the call read as panegyric appealing to the educated minority of the Russian empire and to Emperor Nicholas I himself.¹⁸³

The text started with drawing parallels between the grandeur of the Roman and the Russian empires,¹⁸⁴ but the authors were quick to note that the latter even overcame its contestant in several ways. They were approximated, however, by the relative obscurity of their earliest history which the endeavors of publishing ancient manuscript aimed to elucidate. The authors then confirmed the opinion of many 18th century intellectuals that the ‘genuine founders of the Russian empire were Scandinavians’ and since the latter word in 1835 still enjoyed limited popularity, the text pointed out that those were the Gothic peoples of the North, meaning the Danes, Swedes, and Norwegians united by language, religion, and morals. The ancient sources of Islandic and Scandinavian origins – containing the information on Scandinavian-Russian engagements – could thus shed light on the shadows of the ancient past.¹⁸⁵ Interestingly, it was in the intersection of the Nordic-Russian past where Scandinavian entanglement of histories inseparable from each other also found its prominent place.

The enterprise, however, was somewhat sloppy either slackened by the absence of the Russian interest at this point or by more important projects executed the Society. In 1838, however, the Society again appealed to the Russian side to request material resources for the proper implementation of the project. The request was discussed in the highest echelons of the Ministry of National Education of the Russian empire, and professor of the Russian history of the Moscow University Mikhail Pogodin was meant to inspect the importance of the request and the relevance of the texts planned for publication to the Russian ancient history.¹⁸⁶ Pogodin,

¹⁸³ Antiquitates Rossicæ, 25 June / 7 July 1835. Kansalliskirjasto, Ms.Mf. 833. C.o.

¹⁸⁴ Indeed, imaginary parallels were very prominent in Russian domestic use and rationalization as well: Richard S. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy from Peter the Great to the Abdication of Nicholas II - New Abridged One-Volume Edition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 21–39; Lorenz Erren, “Russia a Republic? Some Remarks on the National Consciousness of the Decembrists,” in *The Enigmatic Tsar and His Empire. Russia under Alexander I (1801-1825)*, ed. Alexander Kaplunovsky, Jan Kusber, and Benjamin Conrad (Bern: Peter Lang, 2019), 263–83.

¹⁸⁵ Antiquitates Rossicæ, 25 June / 7 July 1835. Kansalliskirjasto, Ms.Mf. 833. C.o.

¹⁸⁶ RGIA. F. 733, op. 3, d. 87, l. 3-3ob.

however, denied the proposal since he was meant to travel to Italy that year, and only in 1842 did he embark on a voyage to Denmark. His impressions about the workings of the Danish colleagues were highly flattering but the project of manuscript publication did not seem to have ever materialized.¹⁸⁷

Pogodin's trip sponsored by the Ministry and high-level discussions about the manuscripts testified to the eager interest of the Russian scholars in earliest history of the Russian nation which also spilled into early nationalist, Slavophile, and pan-Slavic tendencies resembling the dynamics in the European cultural life.¹⁸⁸ Besides, these affairs might have testified to the earliest Russian history as an ideological tool in the monarchical scenarios of power under Nicholas I, formulated and guarded by Pogodin among others. The Russian national-conservative aspirations of the contemporary ideological doctrine sided with the paramountcy of the external origins of the imperial rule. The Call to Varangians, according to the loyalist ideological narrative, was akin to a contract between the Russian nation that unquestioningly agreed to and even requested the imposition of the external power of the Scandinavian tribe that consequently transformed into the absolutist rule of the Romanov dynasty. The patience and humility of the Slavic tribes together with the 'invited' rule was contrasted to the formations of European states where the authority was forcefully imposed and hence questioned by the revolutionary whirlwinds around the mid-1840s:

Our sovereign was an invited peaceful guest, a welcome protector, and the Western sovereign was a hated stranger, the main enemy, from whom the people sought protection in vain.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ RGIA. F. 733, op. 32, d. 57; N.P. Barsukov, *Zhizn' i trudy M. P. Pogodina*. vol. 7 (S-Peterburg: Tipografija M. M. Stasjulevicha, 1893), 34–40.

¹⁸⁸ Nathaniel Knight, "Science, Empire, and Nationality: Ethnography in the Russian Geographical Society, 1845-1855," in *Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire*, ed. Jane Burbank and David L. Ransel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 108–47; Katia Dianina, "Museum and Society in Imperial Russia: An Introduction," *Slavic Review* 67, no. 4 (2008): 907–11.

¹⁸⁹ Richard S. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy, Vol. 1: From Peter the Great to the Death of Nicholas I* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 299; Ol'ga Majorova,

Such ideological decorations of power characterized not only Nicholas I's Russian empire but also Charles XIV John's Sweden where the arrival of mysterious Odin was rhymed with the election of a foreigner Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte to the throne.¹⁹⁰ Their conservative alliance was partially reinforced by the ideological facades around the institutions and sources of authority that they embodied. While pan-Scandinavian advocates often pushed forward liberal and constitutionalist agenda, disturbing established institutions of rule, they – again – had no monopoly either on the Nordicist rhetoric or on the imaginaries of the Scandinavian past. Conservative agents also appealed to new sources of the cultural capital to guard their legitimacy and relevance. Rather coincidentally, the theory of the Varangians' takeover was often referred to as Normanism or, in some cases, as *Scandinavism* (скандинавизм) in Russia, even before the term was coined in Scandinavia itself.¹⁹¹ The narrative of the foreign rule that either referenced ancient Varangian domination or more recent lineage of Russian monarchs that had Holstein-Gottorp roots since the ascension of Peter III (Charles Peter Ulrich of Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorp) could also, quite on the contrary, contribute to oppositional programmes of delegitimization of the Romanovs.¹⁹²

Those were the starting points – of mostly ideological nature – that condition further encounters between the Russian empire and Scandinavianism. I will address many of them again in more detail in the following chapters of the thesis. In this part I wanted to highlight the ambiguity of Scandinavianism with its doctrinal heterogeneity but emotive coherency that drew on Romanticist languages as well as complex palette of meanings that were attached to Russia in

“Bessmertnyj Rjurik: Prazdnovanie Tysjacheletija Rossii v 1862 Godu.” *Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie*, no. 3 (2000).

¹⁹⁰ Solfrid Söderlind, “Introduction: Bernadotte Reconsidered,” in *Scripts of Kingship*, ed. Mikael Alm and Britt-Inger Johansson (Uppsala: Uppsala universitet, 2008), 7–22; Mikael Alm, “Dynasty in the Making. A New King and His ‘Old’ Men in Royal Ceremonies 1810-1844,” in *Ibid*, 23–48.

¹⁹¹ See, for example, footnote in: Feodor Lukich Moroshkin, *O znachenii imeni Russov i Slavjan* (Saint-Petersburg: V Universitetskoi Tipografii, 1840), 302.

¹⁹² Erren, “Russia a Republic? Some Remarks on the National Consciousness of the Decembrists.” See also Chapter 6.

Scandinavianist discourses. There is little doubt that belligerent rhetoric dominated towards the second part of the 1840s, but historical narratives allowed for more nuanced readings of these relations. This historical entanglement was as essential for the Russian empire as well since its absolutist system rested on those scenarios of power that pointed to extra-Russian, indeed Scandinavia origins of its rule agreed on by the imagined nation. Mythologies of power, however, could not obscure tensions that were rising between Sweden and the Russian empire around the Grand Duchy of Finland, and Scandinavianism played an important role in those.

Chapter 2. The Grand Duchy of Finland: coordinates of concern between Sweden and Russia

2.1. Annexation in context

The Grand Duchy of Finland as a new administrative territory was annexed to the Russian imperial domains as a consequence of the Russian-Swedish war of 1808-9. The details of the warfare have been studied for generations, and I see no need in reiterating those.¹⁹³ The war surfaced as an outcome of the European tensions spurred by the Napoleonic Wars. The Russian empire established alliance with Napoleon I after the series of military defeats in Europe. The Tilsit Treaty of 1807 manifested Russian participation in the Continental System aimed at blockading European trade with Great Britain. Sweden, although it formally joined the System, in fact remained one of the main smuggling zones for the British goods. Initially, the Russian expedition into Finland launched in February 1808 was intended to make Sweden join the Continental System in practice. The early successes of the Russian army and the necessity of Sweden to open a new front against Denmark-Norway in parallel to Russian-Swedish hostilities contributed to the reorientation of the programme and to the desire to annex Finland in full.¹⁹⁴

Swedish counterattack in summer 1808 did not alter the situation on the battlefield and in Alexander I's plans. The principles according to which Finland had to enter the Russian abode were, however, hotly debated among the military elites and members of the court environment. This 'struggle for the hearts' of the inhabitants of Finland, as one of the designers of its future political system, Göran Magnus Sprengporten wrote,¹⁹⁵ involved improvisation, planning,

¹⁹³ Kesar Ordin, *Pokorenie Finljandii: Opyt Opisanija Po Neizdannym Istochnikam.*, vol. 2 (Sankt-Peterburg: Tip. I.N. Skorohodova, 1889); Mikhail Borodkin, *Istorija Finljandii. Vremja imperatora Aleksandra I* (Saint-Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaja tipografija, 1909), 31-168.

¹⁹⁴ Martin Hårdstedt, *Om krigets förutsättningar: den militära underhållsproblematiken och det civila samhället i norra Sverige och Finland under Finska kriget 1808-09* (Umeå: Institutionen för historiska studier, 2002), 79–81; Vadim Roginskij, *Bor'ba za Skandinaviju: mezhdunarodnye otnoshenija na Severe Evropy v jepohu Napoleonovskih vojn 1805-1815* (Moscow: Ves' Mir, 2012), 128-48.

¹⁹⁵ Ordin, *Pokorenie Finljandii: Opyt Opisanija Po Neizdannym Istochnikam.*, vol. 2: Prilozhenija 17-20.

debates, and negotiations around the issues of legal framework and political practice with questions around the necessity of Landtag (Diet) convention surfacing as most contested.¹⁹⁶ Alexander I, navigating the concerns of political loyalty of the inhabitants, popular legitimacy of his power, stability of the local administration, European tensions, and driven by the ideals of the enlightened rule, finally promulgated the wide autonomy of the Grand Duchy – pushed forward by new Finnish elites – at the convened Landtag in Borgå in March 1809.¹⁹⁷

The Nordic context of the affair surfaced not only in the Swedish legal, cultural, and administrative heritage in Finland but also in the imperial rhetoric around the Fredrikshamn Treaty of 5 / 17 September 1809. The images of ‘blazing Copenhagen’ – attacked by the British fleet in 1807 – appeared as justification of the Russian aggression that sought to prevent the establishment of British-Swedish alliance. On the other shore, pitiful results of the warfare allowed for the Swedish elites to execute *coup d’etat*, dethroning Gustav IV and his offspring while introducing a new constitution that considerably limited the power of the crown. As a result of the war, the Finnish people (*Финский народ*) appeared under the Russian scepter resting in ‘calmness and safety’, while the Russian empire obtained its ‘natural border’ reinforced by the lines of fortifications.¹⁹⁸ The same natural border concerns assisted then Prince Heir Charles in justifying his endeavors with regards to Norway that eventually resulted in the Swedish-Norwegian union in 1814.¹⁹⁹ Indeed, the annexation of Finland should be

¹⁹⁶ Päiviö Tommila, *Suomen autonomian synty, 1808-1819* (Helsinki: Valtioneuvoston kanslia, 1984); On the naming of the estate convention see: Onni Pekonen, “The (Re)Naming of the Finnish Representative Assembly 1809–1919: State-Building, Representation and Sovereignty,” *Redescriptions: Political Thought, Conceptual History and Feminist Theory* 24, no. 2 (December 16, 2021): 129–49, <https://doi.org/10.33134/rds.348>.

¹⁹⁷ Ordín, *Pokorenie Finljandii: Opyt Opisanija Po Neizdannym Istochnikam.*, vol. 2: Prilozhenija 12-13; *Storfurstendömet Finlands grundlagar jemte bihang* (Helsingfors: G.W. Edlund, 1877), 72; On international tensions see especially: Lev Val'terovich Suni, *Velikoe knjazhestvo Finljandskoe: (pervaja polovina XIX v.); stanovlenie avtonomii* (Petrozavodsk: Izdat. PetrGU, 2013), 16. On the need and success of pacification in Finland: Sofia Kotilainen, “Lokalsamhället och minnena av finska kriget. Det senare politiska utnyttjandet av erfarenheterna från krisåren,” *Historisk Tidskrift för Finland* 95, no. 3 (2010): 471-509, <https://journal.fi/hf/article/view/52164>.

¹⁹⁸ Petr Shilovskij, *Akty, Otnosjashiesja k Politicheskomu Polozheniju Finljandii* (Saint-Petersburg: Tipografija M. M. Stasjulevicha, 1903), 127–29.

¹⁹⁹ Roald Berg, ‘Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 1814: A Geopolitical and Contemporary Perspective’, *Scandinavian Journal of History* 39, no. 3 (27 May 2014): 265–86, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03468755.2013.876929>.

treated in the regional – Nordic – context of the Napoleonic Wars, and new geographical boundaries often came with new rationalizations and languages shared across the regional frame.²⁰⁰ The encounter with new political, legal, and literary cultures demanded mutual adaptation and conceptual translation.

2.2. The Grand Duchy with(in) the Russian empire

In terms of the system of law, Finland functioned autonomously from the imperial core. Its legal framework, fundamental laws (*grundlagar*) in the translated manifest, was formally incorporated from the 18th century Sweden but in fact it was considerably reworked to make sense for the new political and civil organization, and in reality, it often had little to do with preceding Swedish legal practice beyond the rhetoric.²⁰¹ Swedish language and Swedish-centered culture up until the mid-19th century, however, remained at the foundation of the Finnish political identity.²⁰² While some intellectuals later read the preservation of the Swedish laws as an act of granting of a modern constitution and even statehood, this argumentation was reconsidered by historians of the 20th century.

As Osmo Jussila argued, the protection of the ‘constitution’ – the word indeed was used – meant none other than the preservation of the estate privileges. This act, however, in no way translated into the representation of Finland as a separate constitutional political body. Rather the empire followed already paved road and incorporated territories and population in the

²⁰⁰ Glenthøj and Nordhagen Ottosen, *Experiences of War and Nationality in Denmark and Norway*, 174–276, <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137313898>; Max Engman and Åke Sandström, eds., *Det nya Norden efter Napoleon: 25:e Nordiske historikermötet, Stockholm den 4-8 augusti 2004* (Stockholm: Stockholms universitet, 2004).

In some of these changes, same persons played prominent roles. See the biography of Gustav Armfelt who advised Gustav IV on Norwegian policy and then was responsible for the implementation of Finnish political system: Elof Kristofer Tegner, *Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt: studier ur Armfelts efterlemnade papper*, 3 vols. (Stockholm, 1883); Carl von Bonsdorff, *Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt, levnadskildring*, 3 vols. (Helsingfors: Mercators tryckeri aktiebolag, 1932).

²⁰¹ Boris Nol'de, *Ocherki Russkogo Gosudarstvennogo Prava* (Saint-Petersburg: Tip. ‘Pravda’, 1911), 468–90.

²⁰² Johanna Wassholm, *Svenskt, finskt och ryskt. Nationens, språkets och historiens dimensioner hos E. G. Ehrström 1808–1835* (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2014), 119–98; Max Engman, *Språkfrågan: Finlandssvenskhetens uppkomst 1812-1922* (Helsinki: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2016), 14–59.

similar way it did in the 18th century in the Baltics, seeking to retain different regional legal frameworks, as Frank Nesemann posited.²⁰³ He, however, also articulated that while the imperial government insisted on the conservative reading of the constitution as a sum of estate privileges in Finnish case, the administration and political agents recognized growing tensions between new and old interpretations of the term and some of them were ready to capitalize on those in solidifying political autonomy of the duchy.²⁰⁴ In this light the appeals to Alexander I as to the ‘first citizen of the liberal but subordinate people’ made by new Finnish elites²⁰⁵ and Speransky’s acknowledgement of Finland as a ‘state and not gubernia’²⁰⁶ must have sounded ambiguous during the times of Napoleonic Wars and reconfiguration of the conceptual political apparatus.

While Catherine II pursued centralizing initiatives towards the end of the 18th century,²⁰⁷ Alexander I never attempted to thwart the privileges granted to Finland. Keeping the laws intact – whatever it implied in different contexts – meant preserving the loyalty of local population without deep and resource-demanding interference into the local affairs.²⁰⁸ Finland came as no exception, and its autonomous status was rather sustained by a sort of ‘gentlemen agreement’ between the imperial government and the local elites.²⁰⁹ Once given,

²⁰³ Osmo Jussila, *Suomen perustuslait venäläisten ja suomalaisten tulkintojen mukaan 1808-1863* (Helsinki: Frenckellin Kirjapaino Oy., 1969); Nol'de, *Očerki Russkogo Gosudarstvennogo Prava*, 277–467.

On the intricacies of these incorporations, see: John P. LeDonne, *Forging a Unitary State: Russia's Management of the Eurasian Space, 1650–1850* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2020), 17–181.

²⁰⁴ Frank Nesemann, “Ot zavoevanija k avtonomii: političeskie i gosudarstvenno-pravovye pričiny osobogo položženija Finljandii v Rossijskoj Imperii,” in *Russkij sbornik* 17 (Moscow: Modest Kolerov, 2015), 113–43; Sergei Polskoy, “The Concepts of Constitution and Fundamental Laws in Russian Political Discourse at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century,” in *The Enigmatic Tsar and His Empire: Russia under Alexander I, 1801-1825*, (Peter Lang 2019), 135–66, <https://doi.org/10.3726/b15714>.

²⁰⁵ Gustav Armfelt, “Tres humble apperçu sur la Finlande, Juin 1810,” in *Sbornik istoričeskikh materialov, izvlečennyh iz Arhiva Sobstvennoj ego imperatorskogo veličestva kanceljarii* ed. Nikolaj Dubrovnin (Saint-Petersburg: V gos. tipografii, 1890), 290. On Alexander I’s borrowings from the contemporary European political language see also: Ekaterina Boltunova, “‘Ja proiznes pered vami slovo istiny’: reči Aleksandra I v Velikom knjazhestve Finljandskom i Carstve Pol'skom,” *Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie* 171, no. 5 (2021): 61–74.

²⁰⁶ Modest Korf, *Zhizn' grafa Speranskogo*, vol. 1 (Sankt-Peterburg: Izdanie IPB, 1861), 264.

²⁰⁷ Aleksandr Kamenskij, *Ot Petra I do Pavla I: reformy v Rossii XVIII veka* (Moscow: Nauka, 2001), 435–72.

²⁰⁸ Alexander I stressed the fact that he wished to grant the ‘political being’ to the Finnish people by preserving ‘not only civil but political laws’ intact: “Project of instruction to governor-general, 14 September 1810,” in *Sbornik istoričeskikh materialov, izvlečennyh iz Arhiva Sobstvennoj ego imperatorskogo veličestva kanceljarii* ed. Nikolaj Dubrovnin (Saint-Petersburg: V gos. tipografii, 1890), 299.

²⁰⁹ Jussila, *Suomen perustuslait venäläisten ja suomalaisten tulkintojen mukaan 1808-1863*.

however, the laws were extremely hard to revert or take back. Finnish educated society protected every dot and comma of the performatively preserved framework, and the agency of Finnish intellectuals and elites is had to exaggerate when discussion the early implementation of the administrative system born out of negotiations.²¹⁰

Politically, however, it is impossible to isolate Finland from other composite parts of the Russian empire in the analysis. Similar to some of them, Finland acquired institutions of (minister) state-secretary, governor-general, and the Senate, and they were grounded in the imperial legal and political practice.²¹¹ The political reality of the Finnish autonomy thus surfaced in interactions through patron-client relations, personal ties, networks, bureaucratic institutions, scenarios of power and restricted public spheres.²¹² Many of these power-networks, but in no way exclusively so, centered on the figure of governor-general of Finland. It became especially obvious after the Committee for Finnish Affairs was suspended in 1826 to give way for the institution of State Secretariate while governor-general secured personal presentation of Finnish affairs to the emperor. Keijo Korhonen argues that while the concept of politically autonomous Finland was formulated through the workings of the committee, after 1826 it was temporarily suppressed, and imperial power espoused more paternalistic rule.²¹³

²¹⁰ Nol'de, *Ocherki Russkogo Gosudarstvennogo Prava*, 489; Max Engman, "Finland and the Napoleonic Empire," in *Napoleon's Empire*, ed. Ute Planert (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), 227–38, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137455475_16.

²¹¹ Magnus Gottfrid Schybergson, *Finlands historia*, vol. 2 (Helsingfors: G.W. Edlund, 1903), 333–59; Alsu Biktasheva, 'Ot Unifikacii k Specifikam: Regional'noe Upravlenie v Rossijskoj Imperii (Vtoraja Chetvert' XIX Veka),' *Novoe Proshloe / The New Past*, no. 1 (2017): 147–63; Marc Raeff, *Michael Speransky: Statesman of Imperial Russia, 1772-1839* (The Hague: Springer Netherlands, 1957), 70–75; Osmo Jussila, Seppo Hentilä, and Jukka Nevakivi, *From Grand Duchy to a Modern State: A Political History of Finland Since 1809* (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 1999), 34–37.

²¹² Jussi Kurunmäki and Jani Marjanen, "Catching up through Comparison: The Making of Finland as a Political Unit, 1809–1863"; Kristiina Kalleinen, *Suomen kenraalikuvernementti: kenraalikuvernöörin asema ja merkitys Suomen asioiden esittelyssä, 1823-1861* (Helsinki: Painatuskeskus, 1994); Kristiina Kalleinen, 'The Nature of Russian Imperialism in Finland During the First Half of the Nineteenth Century', 2000, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230596931_7; Jussi Kurunmäki, 'Political Representation, Imperial Dependency and Political Transfer: Finland and Sweden 1809–1819', *Journal of Modern European History* 15, no. 2 (2017): 243–60, <https://doi.org/10.17104/1611-8944-2017-2-243>; Juhani Paasivirta, *Finland and Europe: The Period of Autonomy and the International Crises, 1808-1914* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962); Keijo Korhonen, *Suomen Asiain Komitea: Suomen korkeimman hallinnon järjestelyt ja toteuttaminen vuosina 1811-1826* (Turku: University of Turku, 1963).

²¹³ Keijo Korhonen, *Suomen Asiain Komitea*. On other channels that will be discussed later in the text, see for example: Schweitzer, *The Rise and Fall of the Russo-Finnish Consensus*.

While I partially agree with this statement, we should not ignore the gravitation of particular personalities and agents which often overshadowed formal asymmetries of administrative institutions.

Moreover, Robert Schweitzer perceptively argues that the suspension of the committee solidified power of the Senate since governor-general occupied the position of its chairman.²¹⁴ Even though the Senate legally performed as the highest body of power, the reality of Finnish administration was more complicated, again highlighting the primacy of power practice over the legal framework. A closer look at the inner workings of the body reveals the sophistication of power balance that was deployed. First, as Raimo Savolainen argued, the Senate, whose members were appointed by the emperor, was more of a prestige, in a sense, performative body, emanating the appearance of autonomy and endowing its members with political and financial capital, but in reality its political agency was limited to petty affairs.²¹⁵ Second, its formal procedure still set governor-general as its head and implied that the decisions taken awaited the final promulgation by the emperor who received its conclusions through the office of the State-Secretary of Finnish Affairs (since 1834, Minister State-Secretary). Governor-general remained a central institution in the architecture of rule throughout the period in question.²¹⁶

While the responsibilities and duties of governors-general in the Russian empire, and in Finland, in particular, were listed in the corresponding instruction, in reality the scope of assignments depended on the political capital of a person that occupied the post and on the

²¹⁴ Schweitzer, *The Rise and Fall of the Russo-Finnish Consensus*, 5–19.

²¹⁵ Raimo Savolainen, “Släktsenaten 1809-1870 - Senatorssläkterna i kollegialitetens bojar,” *Historisk Tidskrift för Finland* 77, no. 2 (June 1, 1992): 173-210, <https://journal.fi/htf/article/view/66076>.

²¹⁶ Even graphic representation of the Finnish administration often placed governor-general on the highest position in different spheres of government: *Materialy dlja statistiki Finljandii, izdannye Departamentom General'nogo shtaba Voennogo ministerstva* (Sankt-Peterburg: tip. Dep. Gen. shtaba, 1859), 232. See also: Alex Snellman and Kristiina Kalleinen, “Introduction: Finland in Imperial Context,” *Journal of Finnish Studies* 25, no. 2 (December 1, 2022): 143–53, <https://doi.org/10.5406/28315081.25.2.01>.

external and domestic context of operation.²¹⁷ Procedural legality often stumbled over monarchical wish to rule through personal environment.²¹⁸ Alexander Sergeevich Menshikov, a grandson of Peter the Great's famous associate, took the position of governor-general after Arsenii Andreevich Zakrevsky in 1831.²¹⁹ His huge correspondence with virtually all officials in the duchy points to his central role if not in the design of manifold decisions than certainly in their revision and adoption.²²⁰ One of the main lines of communication connected governor-general Menshikov with post-director of the duchy Alexander Wulffert. The specificity of this communication was defined by the paralegal and officially secret endeavor that Wulffert was busy with, namely, the perustration of letters.²²¹ Legally autonomous postal service of the duchy updated governor-general not only on the content of dangerous newspapers that attempted to cross the Swedish-Finnish border but also on the content of letters that correspondents from the ex-metropole sent to Finland.²²²

Finland was still deeply tied to Sweden in many regards. Societies across the border were engaged in common economic enterprise, relatives went on visiting each other, rumors and news spread on the same pace, especially in the coastal towns. Finland preserved special tariff with Sweden, and Swedish currency circulated in the duchy until late 1840s.²²³ The inertia of past connections clearly surfaced both in these practices of exchange as well as with regards to preserved institutional framework.²²⁴ The attempt to control this border exchange – in terms

²¹⁷ “Hans Kejslerliga Nådiga Instruktion för General-Gouverneuren i Finland, 12 February 1812,” in *Storfurstendömet Finlands grundlagar jemte bihang* (Helsingfors: G.W. Edlund, 1877), 212-227.

²¹⁸ Richard S. Wortman, *The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), 37.

²¹⁹ On Zakrevsky as governor-general see more in: Alexis A. Lillja, *Arsenij Andrejevitj Zakrevskij, Finlands generalguvernör* (Helsingfors: Mercators Tryckeri, 1948).

²²⁰ Kalleinen, *Suomen kenraalikuvernementti*, 110–17.

²²¹ Vladlen Izmozik, «*Chernye kabinety*»: istorija rossijskoj perljustracii. XVIII — nachalo XX veka: monografija (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2015), 84.

²²² O perlustrovke pisem. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 4, d. 406, l. 16. Even higher personnel were unaware about this practice, see: Menshikov – Wulffert, n.d. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 54, l. 14.

²²³ Wilhelm Lavonius, *Om tull-lagstifningen i Finland* (Helsingfors: Frenkell, 1873), 13-95; Leo Suni, *Finljandsko-russkie torgovye otnoshenija vo vtoroj polovine XIX veka : (1858-1885)* (Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool, 1963).

²²⁴ Max Engman, *Ett långt farväl: Finland mellan Sverige och Ryssland efter 1809* (Helsinki: Atlantis, 2009), 157–75; Torkel Jansson, *Riksprängningen som kom av sig: finsk-svenska gemenskaper efter 1809* (Helsinki:

of commodities, but also with regards to suspicious personalities and information – repeatedly appeared futile due to the limited resources of the administration, the sheer length of the border, and the nature of its landscape that was extremely difficult to overlook.²²⁵ The skerries of Finnish coast provided a disguise for contrabandists, while the land border in the North was hardly controlled and permeable from both sides until late into the 19th century.²²⁶

Although Sweden-related concerns were ventilated earlier – more as a military-fashioned problem of coastal defense but also as a potential zone of unrest in the wake of the war – the strategy of regulation over variegated intellectual import was prompted and sharpened by the concrete process, namely by the widening of the boundaries of political participation in Sweden in the 1830s.²²⁷ The struggle for democratization and liberalization of the political system across the sea was perceived as a politically threatening, revolutionary tendency by the administration of the Grand Duchy of Finland. Moreover, as researchers perceptively argue, the Swedish public sphere consistently framed the annexation of Finland from Sweden as a national trauma that implied the intention to bring the duchy back in the 1830s.²²⁸

Politically disenfranchised members of the Finlandish public sphere often preferred Sweden as a destination for the emigration, fueling to the imperial anxiety over the hostile

Atlantis, 2009); Mikael Alm, 'Kring märkesåret 1809: statskuppen, konstitutionen och rikssprängningen', *Historisk Tidskrift* 130, no. 1 (2010): 53–64.

²²⁵ Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg, 'Finland och den svensk-ryska allianspolitiken intill 1830/31 års polska revolution', *Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier*, no. 21-22, (1946): 153–346; Alfred Rieber, "Persistent Factors in Russian Foreign Policy: An Interpretive Essay," in *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy* ed. Hugh Ragsdale (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993), 315-359; Ocherk ustrojstva pravlenija Velikogo knjazhestva Finljandskogo, 1872. GARF. F. 547, op. 1, d. 311, l. 14-15.

²²⁶ Lars Elenius, *Både finsk och svensk: modernisering, nationalism och språkförändring i Tornedalen 1850-1939* (Umeå: Kulturgräns norr, 2001); Perry Nilsson, 'Mellan stat och imperium: En studie av gränsöverskridande förbindelser mellan Västerbotten och Österbotten under perioden 1835-1870' (MA diss., Umeå Universitet, 2017); Konstantin Zaikov and Tatiana Troshina, 'Lokal'noe soobshhestvo mezhdru imperiej i nacional'nym gosudarstvom: rossijsko-norvezhskoe pogranič'e v kontekste dvuhstoronnih otnoshenij na krajnem severe 1855–1905 Gg.', *Ab Imperio*, no. 4 (2017): 139–75, <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2017.0079>.

²²⁷ Karin Sennefelt, "The Shifting Boundaries of Political Participation: Introduction," in *Scandinavia in the Age of Revolution: Nordic Political Cultures, 1740-1820*, ed. Michael Bregnsbo, Karin Sennefelt, and Patrik Winton (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 269–78; Bo Stråth, *Sveriges historia 1830-1920* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 2012), 45–57.

²²⁸ Henrik Edgren, "Traumakonstruktionen: Svensk historieskrivning om rikssprängningen 1809," *Scandia* 76, no. 1 (2010): 9-39.

propaganda.²²⁹ To hamper the spread of perilous ideas into Finland, that was linguistically same in its upper educated strata and politically similar in terms of institutions, the administration strained its knowledge-producing and repressive mechanisms – censorship including – simultaneously giving concessions to Finland’s economy and Finnish elites to foster the loyalty.²³⁰ The administration sought to create a distance from the Swedish influence on institutional, political, and social level.

The eventual acquaintance with pan-Scandinavian idea in the Finnish cabinets and public spheres was conditioned and contextualized by the process of the institutional distancing from Sweden, precipitated mainly by political anxieties.²³¹ Economic institutions, commodity exchange, and cross-border communications appeared entangled with the omnipotent vision of political disturbance growing in Sweden. Scandinavianism featured as a continuation of revolutionary wave that was consuming the minds of the Nordic middle class in the eyes of the imperial and Finnish government.²³² The strategy of this institutional break-up was outlined and enthusiastically pushed forward mostly by the Swedish-speaking elites, many of them ex-subjects of the Swedish king, who pursued their careers in the new institutional, social, and political context of the Russian empire.

2.3. Biographical trajectories of the Finnish administration

Except for governor-general and, debatably, state-secretary, administrative personnel in Finland, according to the inherited-slash-modified Swedish legal framework, enlisted only ‘Finnish-born persons’ (*finlyandskie urozhenci*). However, one should not be puzzled by

²²⁹ Liisa Castrén, *Adolf Ivar Arwidsson isänmaallisena herättäjänä* (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1951).

²³⁰ Engman, *Ett långt farväl*, 138-75.

²³¹ Engman, *Språkfrågan*, 60–62.

²³² Evgenij Egorov, ‘Perevod So Shvedskogo Na “Finljandskij”’: Politicheskaja Identichnost’ Velikogo Knjazhestva Finljandskogo (1831–1854)’, *Ab Imperio*, no. 4 (2021): 203–37, <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2021.0097>.

this biologically-framed notion. Many contemporaries, including Menshikov, complained that it was misleading because one could be granted Finnish subjecthood and acquire the status of ‘Finnish-born’.²³³ Thus, the Finnish administration consisted both of those born in the duchy, of those whose relatives were involved in its establishment, and of those who acquired the status of Finnish subjects through the legal procedure. Hardly consistent in its cadres, those who had biographical ties with Finland dominated.²³⁴ This situation was conditioned first by the attempt to preserve favorable relations with the elites of the duchy, who were predominantly Swedish-speaking: the strategy that was widely used in the acquired territories of the empire. Second, the local elites possessed the expertise – both real and imagined – on the legal and social framework of Finland.²³⁵

To say, however, that there was a clear boundary between ‘locals’ and ‘intruders’ during the governor-generalship of Menshikov is misleading, as is to pinpoint the ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ decisions made by either side.²³⁶ The very functioning of the system relied on information exchange between various agents within it, especially given Menshikov so rarely visited the duchy due to his duties in the capital, bad health, but also due to his trust to the intermediary group of Finnish Swedish-speaking elites.²³⁷ Although higher-level decisions often caused

²³³ Bludov – Menshikov, 12 March 1843. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. Finlyandskiy otd., d. 6, l. 34. (This file was accessed in the National Archive of Finland on microfilm, and its description in RGAVMF might currently be different).

²³⁴ See on nobility, for example: Alex Snellman, “The Nobility of Finland 1809-1919: From Imperial Loyalty to Nationalist Conflict,” *Peterburgskij Istoricheskiy Zhurnal*, no. 4 (2014): 112-129.

²³⁵ Andreas Kappeler, *Russland als Vielvölkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall* (Munich: Beck, 1992), 86-123; Dominic Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals* (London: Yale University Press, 2002), 275. See also on the notion of imperial intermediaries: Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 13–14.

Alexander I’s correspondence with Russian administrators on Finland is telling with regards to the ignorance of the legal and practical traditions in the newly established duchy. See: Ordin, *Pokorenie Finljandii: Opyt Opisaniya Po Neizdannym Istochnikam*. vol. 2, Prilozhenija.

²³⁶ For such attempts see, for example: Rolf Lagerborg, *Sanningen om Casimir von Kothen (1807-80) enligt aktstycken och brev* (Helsinki: Söderström, 1953); Yrjö Nurmio, *Vuoden 1850 kielisäännöksen yleispoliittista taustaa* (Helsinki, 1942).

²³⁷ On Menshikov’s illness, see Menshikov’s diary where he meticulously observed his health: A.S. Menshikov’s diary. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 360-496; See also: Menshikov – Kothen, 18/30 December 1845. RGAVMF, F. 19, op. 3, d. 146, l. 56; GARF. F. R8091, op. 1, d. 2112, l. 388.

In the late 1840s, responding to the proposal of M.S. Vorontsov to replace him in the Caucasus, Menshikov, with his characteristic irony, noticed that his vitality was supported exclusively by medicines, and that he wanted to

unrest on lower level of the bureaucratic system, these decisions were ultimately based on the information received through this very hierarchy. The system was dynamic, and it by no means precluded administrative conflicts, but it was also holistic.

Biographical trajectories of the higher administrative cadres highlight the intermingled – through personal relations, patron-client networks, and shared expectation – state of this apparatus.²³⁸ As noted above, it was often ex-subjects of the Swedish throne and their children who became most eager to create an institutional distance between Sweden and Finland. How did it happen that their loyalty took such a turn that they became pronouncedly anti-Swedish? It is especially striking since many of the Swedish-speaking elites of the duchy at the beginning of the 19th century opted for literary strategies that at least rhetorically set them in opposition to ‘barbarous’ Russians.²³⁹ Even if this framing created a binary opposition, it, however, hardly translated itself into a social fact. Together with other oppositions within the complex imperial situation – including that of class, estate, status, confession – it established a matrix that prompted not only oppositions but also potential solidarities. Johanna Wassholm, Kristiina Kalleinen, Kati Katajisto, and Marina Vitukhnovskaja have brilliantly demonstrated how Finlandish elites recoded their identities from Swedish into Finlandish – with the latter underscoring the loyalty to the Russian throne – under the new circumstances of the imperial rule.²⁴⁰

In the multitude of administrative interactions, this opposition towards Russianness rarely played a leading role and gradually shifted into the background for a prolonged period.

spend the last years of his life in peace: A.S. Menshikov’s diary, 21 June 1849. RGAVMF, F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 480-480ob.

²³⁸ Risto Alapuro, “Finnish Elites and Russia in the Nineteenth Century,” *Peterburgskij Istoricheskij Zhurnal* 12, no. 4 (2016): 104–28.

²³⁹ Kati Katajisto, ‘Isänmaamme keisari: Eliitin kansallisen identiteetin murros ja suomalaisen isänmaan rakentuminen autonomian ajan alussa’, (PhD diss., University of Helsinki), 40–85.

²⁴⁰ Wassholm, *Svenskt, finskt och ryskt*, 37–118; 164–90; Katajisto, ‘Isänmaamme keisari’, 149–256; Kristiina Kalleinen, “Vzgljad vysshego chinovnichestva Finljandii na Rossiju, na russkih i na polozhenie Finljandii po otnosheniju k Rossii v nachale XIX v,” *Sankt-Peterburg i Strany Severnoj Evropy*, no. 5 (2004): 272–82; Marina Vitukhnovskaja, “Sluzhenie Imperii i Nacional'naja Lojal'nost': Imperskaja i Finljandskaja Biografii Jenkelej (1850–1917),” *Ab Imperio*, no. 4 (2009): 177–210, <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2009.0029>.

Moreover, discursive, and then practical opposition against Sweden – as a concrete and radicalizing political body across the sea rather than as a kind of civilization that bestowed Finland with its legal and administrative tradition – gradually appeared as significantly more important.²⁴¹ This position, developed by the leading local administrators mostly of Swedish-speaking origin, took its root around the 1830s through their repulsion of the ‘revolutionary’ and ‘ill-fitted’ processes that took place in Sweden.²⁴² These personnel’s ascendance in the empire was contingent upon their skills and expertise in Finlandish affairs, while the context of imperial-Finlandish connection opened a broad corridor for their career possibilities on the conditions of their loyalty to the Russian emperor.²⁴³

It was the so-called second generation of the Finlandish administration that shaped its political system in the 1830s-1860s. As scholars have noted, the blurred state of relations between Saint-Petersburg and Finland as well as the prolonged absence of the representative body put a lot of weight of everyday politics and larger strategies of development onto bureaucracy’s shoulders.²⁴⁴ As a consequence to that, positions, doctrinal standings, and outlooks of the leading administrators to a high degree determined the trajectory of the political life of Finland. Many of them, first pursuing diplomatic careers in the empire, indeed came to administer quasi-diplomatic relations between Saint-Petersburg and the duchy that historian Robert Schweitzer even parallels to the foreign rather than internal policy of the empire.²⁴⁵

²⁴¹ That is why there appeared a concept of two Swedens: Kurunmäki, ‘Political Representation, Imperial Dependency and Political Transfer’; Egorov, ‘Perevod So Shvedskogo Na “Finljandskij”’; Katajisto, ‘Isänmaamme keisari’, 187–202.

²⁴² It is a good question applied to all sorts of aristocratic families, as to what language they were predominantly speaking. Although all certainly were able to speak and write in Swedish, French was sometimes wider used in correspondence and even in social interaction: Hans Hirn, *Alexander Armfelt: ungdom och läroår intill 1832* (Helsinki: Mercators tryckeri, 1938), 18-47. One could argue that the repulsion dated back to the revolution of 1809 and consequent choice of Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte as heir presumptive in 1810, see Katajisto’s contribution.

²⁴³ Kalleinen, ‘The Nature of Russian Imperialism in Finland During the First Half of the Nineteenth Century’.

²⁴⁴ Risto Alapuro, *State and Revolution in Finland* (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 25, <https://brill.com/view/title/33518>.

²⁴⁵ Robert Schweitzer, “Konsensus v period mezhdru “narushenijami konstitucii,”” in *Russkij sbornik*, vol. 17 (Moscow: Modest Kolerov), 144-197. I disagree but indeed some parallels could be drawn with, for example, Russian rule in the Danuban Principalities. See: Victor Taki, *Russia on the Danube: Empire, Elites, and Reform in Moldavia and Wallachia, 1812–1834* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2021).

Whereas I tend to disagree to this comparison, there was indeed a lot in common, especially when the head of the duchy – be that formally the Grand Duke or practically governor-general – were absent from Finland and communicated through scripted orders resembling diplomatic instructions for their intermediaries.

One of the most long-standing and influential among these administrators was Alexander Armfelt. He was born to a family of then famous Swedish politician, Gustav Mauritz Armfelt. Armfelt-elder stood behind numerous political projects in Sweden and beyond its borders, ranging from the political architecture of Gustav III's absolutism and cultural 'renaissance'²⁴⁶ to the attempts of Swedish-Norwegian unification in 1808-1809.²⁴⁷ Besides, he became one of the main architects of the Grand Duchy of Finland as a political project, delimitating its administrative, legal, and even geographical boundaries.²⁴⁸ Personally insulted in Sweden in 1810-11 after the ascendance of Jean-Baptiste Bernadotte to the position of crown-prince and disenfranchised in the political situation there, he opted to leave the kingdom for Finland. His vision of the political identity of the Grand Duchy set it between the Russian empire and Sweden, leaning towards the primary, unable to return to the latter, and preserving its own identity in-between. However, the Swedish heritage that amounted to the legal, administrative, and cultural traditions had to persist as the founding pillars of the new political entity.²⁴⁹

The flexibility of his position pointed to the burgeoning imagination of new political combinations that the Napoleonic Wars brought to the fore as well as to a larger picture of aristocratic cosmopolitanism and elasticity of political identities that were only indirectly

²⁴⁶ Elof Kristofer Tegner. *Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt: studier ur Armfelts efterlemnade papper*, vol. 2 (Stockholm: Beijers förlag, 1883), 108–28

²⁴⁷ Glenthøj and Nordhagen Ottosen, *Experiences of War and Nationality in Denmark and Norway*, 64–67.

²⁴⁸ Tommila, *Suomen autonomian synty, 1808-1819*, 118–23. Geographical, meaning the unification of 'Old' (Vyborg gubernia) and 'New' Finland: Shilovskij, *Akty, Otnosjashhiesja k Politicheskomu Polozheniju Finljandii*, 129.

²⁴⁹ Bonsdorff, *Gustaf Mauritz Armfelt, levnadskildring*, 3:1–34.

anchored in the ‘national’ or cultural tradition.²⁵⁰ G.M. Armfelt’s activities in the empire paid him back as he became a close advisor to Alexander I and could influence imperial policy-making even beyond the borders of his direct responsibility. Mikhail Speransky’s exile prepared by a group of elites around Alexander I became, perhaps, one of the most important instances of such interventions.²⁵¹ Already this interaction points to the hardships that scholars face in trying to separate Finlandish and imperial bureaucracy in the context of the imperial situation. Origins meant a lot in the Russian courtly system but not in a geographical or ethnic sense: estate and status points played a more important role.²⁵²

His son Alexander Armfelt never became as influential as his father. While under Nicholas I his prerogatives and political power as a minister state-secretary were limited, the ascendance of Alexander II changed the situation in his favor.²⁵³ He was born in Riga in 1794 and during his youth lived in Stockholm, Åbo, Saint-Petersburg, Upsala, Edinburgh, and London. While his father always insisted that Alexander’s destiny lied in the Russian empire, his formative years provided him with cosmopolitan experience and opened multiple career trajectories. At one point, his father was even alerted by Alexander’s tangible sympathies towards Sweden. Although he started his service in the Russian military in 1814-1818, taking part in the last phases of the Napoleonic Wars, his career path was far from consistent, and on several occasions, he thought of changing his whereabouts to Sweden and loyalty to the Swedish court, especially under pressure of his first wife.²⁵⁴ His career went on with his activities as adjoint of the head of the Finlandish Military District. In 1824-1827, he worked as adjoint of governor-general Zakrevsky, later describing this period as the most interesting and

²⁵⁰ Again, as Wassholm demonstrates on the example of E.G. Ehrström: Wassholm, *Svenskt, finskt och ryskt*, 119-97.

²⁵¹ Raeff, *Michael Speransky*, 178-79.

²⁵² D. C. B. Lieven, *The Aristocracy in Europe, 1815-1914* (London: Macmillan, 1992), 203-42.

²⁵³ Carl von Bonsdorff, “Ministerstatssekreteraren greve Alexander Armfelts memoarer,” *Historisk tidskrift för Finland*, no. 1 (1929): 77-107.

²⁵⁴ Hirn, *Alexander Armfelt*, 65-76.

challenging in his career as he had to seek compromise within the administrative interactions concerning Finland.²⁵⁵ The launch of his long career as a minister state-secretary for Finnish affairs partially coincided with the ascendancy of his old acquaintance and patron Alexander Menshikov to the post of governor-general of Finland.

Armfelt's colleague and friend, Lars Gabriel von Haartman also had a particularly cosmopolitan biography. Having studied in Upsala and Åbo, Haartman later started his career in the imperial cabinets, namely in the offices of the Collegium of the Foreign Affairs, in 1808. In his case, imperial career was also one option among others, and his wish to emigrate was curbed by his influential father, Gabriel Erik von Haartman, one of the founding members of the Finlandish political system and of the Committee for Finnish Affairs in particular. Lars Gabriel worked several years in St. Petersburg at the committee, and then held the position of landshövding (renamed governor in 1834)²⁵⁶ in Åbo-Björneborgs län and the chairman of the economic department of the Senate where he possessed unrivaled influence. His long presidency over the economic development of Finland marked a steady progress – even if later thwarted by war and natural disasters – that his vision and skills contributed to.²⁵⁷

Haartman's imperial visions were most consistently presented by his later writings in the mid-late 1850s, although they surfaced in his policy-making already in the 1830s.²⁵⁸ His autobiography is of particular interest due to his attempts to position himself in the world of the duchy and in a larger world of the imperial bureaucracy. Written consciously in Swedish, 'not one of the world languages', it addressed his friends and colleagues to 'justify' (*rättfärdiga*) his actions in the fate of the motherland, 'united with the most powerful of the

²⁵⁵ Bonsdorff, "Ministerstatssekreteraren greve Alexander Armfelts memoarer," *Historisk tidskrift för Finland*, no. 1 (1929): 82.

²⁵⁶ Engman, *Ett långt farväl*, 115.

²⁵⁷ Lavonius, *Om tull-lagstiftningen i Finland*, 42–96; Antti Kuusterä and Juha Tarkka, *Bank of Finland 200 Years: Imperial Cashier to Central Bank* (Helsinki: Otava, 2011), 140–43; Kristiina Kalleinen, *Isänmaani onni on kuulus venäjälle: vapaaherra Lars Gabriel von Haartmanin elämä* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2001), 121–24.

²⁵⁸ Kalleinen, *Isänmaani onni on kuulus venäjälle*, 140–45.

Nordic states' (*med Nordens mäktigaste stat*), meaning the Russian empire. Tracing his origins from Sweden, Netherlands, and Germany, he concluded that he was born as a *metis* – a man of many origins and cultures adaptable to the landscape around him – while his ancestors arrived in Finland at the beginning of the 18th century. His childhood was partially shaped around connections with Russia, as his father purportedly counted himself in the 'Russian party' during the war of 1788-89 and later was welcomed in Petersburg high society.²⁵⁹

His father wanted him to follow his steps and become a doctor. When Lars Gabriel found himself in Upsala he, however, consciously opted for politics as a career path, that he for a long time 'kept hidden'. While he enjoyed his study in Upsala given his socialization among the aristocratic families, his further education at Åbo since 1807 did not pass happily, as he experienced considerable alienation from his peers. When describing the ensuing war of 1808-9, Haartman posited that the majority hoped for the reestablishment of the unity with Sweden when the Russian forces penetrated the country. These hopes, however, quickly withered, and Haartman went to Saint-Petersburg guided by his father who became a member of the famous deputation to Alexander I. His prolonged stay at the Russian capital did not bring him much pleasure as he had limited resources, few friends, and was not particularly welcomed by the Russian administration.²⁶⁰

Only later in 1811, when Gustav Armfelt came to the capital, Haartman managed to establish better relations with him and with Mikhail Speransky whom Haartman later considered his teacher and guiding figure. His career path then turned more ambitious, and he was working at the committee and then at several other boards until 1822 when his wife died, and he had to take a break from work. In 1825, he was enrolled back into the service, but due to health problems Haartman had to ask for a trip abroad in 1827 that lasted two years.²⁶¹ His

²⁵⁹ Lars Gabriel von Bonsdorff, *Lars Gabriel von Haartman intill 1827* (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 1946), 5-26, 35-37; Haartman's autobiography. KA. L. G. von Haartmanin arkisto. C 2, t. 15.

²⁶⁰ Haartman's autobiography. KA. L. G. von Haartmanin arkisto. C 2, t. 15.

²⁶¹ Bonsdorff, *Lars Gabriel von Haartman intill 1827*, 300–431.

diary that he kept during the trip revealed his attention towards aesthetics and arts in Scandinavia and Europe but also to educational, agricultural, mechanic, and economic institutions.²⁶² Upon his return in 1830, he was ready to use this knowledge for the benefit of the province, also under Menshikov's patronage.

2.4. Alexander Menshikov as an imperial agent

Prince Alexander Sergeevich Menshikov was born in 1787 in Saint-Petersburg but then lived for prolonged periods of time in the German states, only periodically visiting the empire. Brought up in the cosmopolitan world of diplomatic environments, he was educated at home and visited lectures at German universities until he came back to Russia in 1805 to stay at its service for good. Menshikov was appointed to the Collegium of Foreign Affairs, and then performed as a diplomat in Berlin, London, and Vienna. In 1809 he, however, preferred to enter the military service, took part in the Russo-Turkish War (1806-1812) and in the Napoleonic Wars, awarded for exceptional bravery at the battlefield. After the wars, Menshikov made a skyrocketing career and became close to Alexander I while also chairing the chancellery of the Headquarters.²⁶³

At the beginning of the 1820s, however, Menshikov clearly fell out of favor at the court. As Konstantin Fisher, Menshikov's future assistant, noted, the prince must have been prosecuted for his project of peasant emancipation in Russia then considered an untimely expression of *carbonariness* by the emperor, who indeed became increasingly alerted by the presence of potential secret societies since the beginning of the 1820s. As Menshikov wrote in his diary – a brilliant source of the 19th century personal and political life of the highest

²⁶² “Dagbok under et Utrikes Resa åren 1827, 1828, 1829 af L.G. von Haartman.” KA. VA.

²⁶³ Best overview of Menshikov's early life and career in: Ksenija Donik, ‘Knjaz’ A. S. Menshikov i Morskoe Vedomstvo: Reformy Flotskoj Administracii v Nachale Carstvovanija Nikolaja I’ (PhD diss., Sankt-Peterburgskij Institut istorii RAN, 2023), 27–53; See also: Ksenija Donik, ‘Dnevnik Svetlejshego Knjazja A. S. Menshikova Kak Istoricheskij Istochnik’, *Uchenye Zapiski Petrozavodskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta* 174, no. 5 (2018): 23–27.

aristocracy – the prosecution was rather based on other accusations. As Menshikov recognized, Alexander I accused him in the comments on the Greek Uprising he made in Vienna, in the defamations of the emperor’s family, and participation in recently prohibited secret societies.²⁶⁴ Adding up to that, Menshikov’s involvement in the Free Economic Society, indeed accused in ‘Carbonariness’ because of its proceedings, became suspicious. These accusations were repudiated by Menshikov, except for his attendance at the freemasonic society, but he insisted he was there only once when introduced.²⁶⁵

Menshikov then suspected that he came under surveillance. Wondering about the reasons for that, Menshikov already in the 1820s espoused pro-aristocratic stance that he later became notorious for: ‘When will [the government] stop suspecting men who have no profit in being Carbonari or rioters and whose guarantee [of loyalty] is provided by the amount of property he has?’²⁶⁶ He resided from the office but soon was rehabilitated, since Nicholas I brought him back into the court and service, and Menshikov managed to become one of the closest persons for the new monarch.²⁶⁷ He took part in the war against the Ottoman empire in 1828-29 and was wounded during the siege of Varna. Upon his return to Saint-Petersburg, Menshikov was appointed a head of the Marine Headquarters that he commanded until the mid-1850s.

During his long career he was involved in the workings of the State Council, the Committee of Ministers, numerous temporal boards, diplomatic missions, discussions about the political and economic trajectories of the empire, affecting the resolution of multiple

²⁶⁴ On secret societies and their prohibition: Vladimir Lapin, *Semenovskaja istorija: 16-18 oktjabrja 1820 goda* (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1991), 181–238; Donik, ‘Knjaz’ A. S. Menshikov i Morskoe Vedomstvo: Reformy Flotskoj Administracii v Nachale Carstvovanija Nikolaja I’, 35–49; And especially: Tat’jana Andreeva, “Aleksandr i i Vnutrennjaja Bezopasnost’ Rossijskoj Imperii: Pravitel’stvo, Tajnye Obshestva i Dvorjanstvo,” *Peterburgskij Istoricheskij Zhurnal* 17, no. 1 (2018): 65–88.

²⁶⁵ A.S. Menshikov’s diary. RGAVMF, F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 52.

²⁶⁶ A.S. Menshikov’s diary. Ibid, l. 65ob.

²⁶⁷ See, for example, Nicholas I’s testament: A.N. Camutali, ed., *Nikolaj I. Lichnost’ i jepoha. Novye materialy* (Saint-Petersburg: Nestor, 2007), 461–67.

paramount questions.²⁶⁸ As one of the most observant members of the higher society noted, Menshikov, despite him being ‘an improvisational sailor’, meaning he possessed no experience in the naval organization, had the ability to be a ‘universal man’.²⁶⁹ In 1831, Menshikov apprehensively took the post of governor-general of Finland that he was heading simultaneously with other state affairs, including the commanding of the Admiralty.²⁷⁰ These affairs of the empire, combined with his constant health problems did not allow him to leave the capital for Finland except on several occasions during his governorship, but this was no problem for the empire that used to delegate part of its power to local intermediary groups.

Menshikov was well known for his extravagant behavior and relatively independent stance on all matters of the empire that he was ready to defend.²⁷¹ Prince was hard-working both in civil affairs and in military enterprises though he considered himself an unlucky commander.²⁷² When the peasant question took the central place in the administrative discussions under Nicholas I, Menshikov became known as a stubborn defender of the aristocracy’s land property and privileges. He was one of the richest men in the empire with huge manors cultivated by thousands of serfs.²⁷³ This conservative stance also translated in his political position as a guardian of pan-imperial noble privileges, including those preserved in the Grand Duchy of Finland and secured by the emperor’s promise.²⁷⁴ Emerging modernizing tendencies among the bureaucratic cadres with new visions of standardized and culturally

²⁶⁸ See, for example: Sergej Mironenko, *Stranicy tajnoj istorii samoderzhavija: političeskaja istorija Rossii pervoj poloviny XIX stoletija* (Mysl', 1990), 100–195; Donik, ‘Knjaz' A. S. Menshikov i Morskoe Vedomstvo: Reformy Flotskoj Administracii v Nachale Carstvovanija Nikolaja I’, 5–6.

²⁶⁹ Petr Andreevich Vjazemskij, *Zapisnye knizhki* (Moscow: Russkaja kniga, 1992), 248.

²⁷⁰ Kristiina Kalleinen, the best specialist on governors-general of Finland highly estimates the results of Menshikov’s activity: Kalleinen, *Suomen kenraalikuvernementti*, 110–17.

²⁷¹ His diary is full on pungent commentaries, and from other sources it is clear that he often did not hesitate to make them public: Modest Korf, “Knjaz' Aleksandr Sergeevich Menshikov. Anekdoty – Shtuki i ostroty,” *Russkaja starina* 12, no. 3 (1875): 638-653; Konstantin Fisher, “Zapiski senatora Fishera,” *Istoricheskij vestnik* 111, (1908): 58-78.

²⁷² Menshikov meticulously noted his working affairs in his diary, including ‘dinners’ with Finnish administrators.

²⁷³ Lieven, *The Aristocracy in Europe, 1815-1914*, 45.

²⁷⁴ Interestingly, he had quite opposite views about Polish privileges while the figure of Alexander I once surfaced in his diary as a ‘hater (*nenavistnik*) of Russians’, who unlawfully ‘separated’ Poland from the empire: A.S. Menshikov’s diary. RGAVMF, F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 385ob.

assimilated administration across the imperial domains, emancipated-landed peasantry, and hence shrinking privileges of the nobility featured as a destructive trend for him, especially when Nicholas I ostensibly sided with those.²⁷⁵

In his diary, this position surfaced especially clear in 1848-9, when Yuri Samarin's handwritten 'Letters from Riga' were distributed among the highest bureaucracy and their author was shortly imprisoned because of the scandal the text produced. Its stylistic novelty as a political pamphlet surprised the readers while their tone and content espoused harsh critique against the government. According to the letters, the great empire could not and willed not protect the Russian dwellers and peasants from the misdemeanor of the German nobility in the Baltic provinces, at that time a composite part of the imperial realm. Moreover, a part of the imperial administrative apparatus did not discover any contradictions in this situation, defending the privileges of the local upper estate and relying on this class as a foundation of the imperial resilience. The 'progressists', among whom Samarin was one of the most outspoken members, considered this situation a medieval artifact, incompatible with the modern understanding of the state and its all-encompassing role as a mechanism of guardianship and control.²⁷⁶

Even though Menshikov was among those who gained access to these letters, his reaction was ambiguous: Samarin's friend wrote that Menshikov highly appreciated their style but called its content 'a chain of the most daring sophisms'.²⁷⁷ When Menshikov himself met governor-general of the Baltic Provinces and well-known Germanophile Alexander Suvorov,

²⁷⁵ These tendencies surfaced during Alexander I's reign: Patrick O'Meara, *The Russian Nobility in the Age of Alexander I* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 123–28.

²⁷⁶ Jurij Fedorovich Samarin, *Sochinenija Ju.F. Samarina: Pis'ma iz Rigi i istorija Rigi*, vol. 7 (Moscow: Izdaniye D. Samarina, 1889); Karsten Brüggemann, 'Imperiale Und Lokale Loyalitäten Im Konflikt: Der Einzug Russlands in Die Ostseeprovinzen in Den 1840er Jahren', *Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas* 62, no. 3 (2014): 321–44; Karsten Brüggemann, 'Representing Empire, Performing Nation?: Russian Officials in the Baltic Provinces (Late Nineteenth / Early Twentieth Centuries)', *Ab Imperio*, no. 3 (2014): 231–66, <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2014.0079>.

²⁷⁷ Khanykov – Samarin, 16 September 1848 in *Sochinenija Ju.F. Samarina*, vol. 7 (Moscow, 1889), LVII. I assume that the abbreviation 'A.S.' implies A.S. Menshikov.

whom Samarin pictured as the main guardian of the interests of the Baltic nobility, he wrote in his diary that he found ‘less German spirit in him than he expected.’²⁷⁸ Later Menshikov also reflected on the arrest of Samarin, noting ironically that ‘the prosecution of Samarin in the fortress for the Germans made Russian hearts tremble, and the people’s pride irritated.’ Nevertheless, Menshikov considered the publicist ‘an *ideal* [my italics – EE] Slavophile and, moreover, a communist’. He therefore did not arouse his pity, in contrast to the public, which revered Samarin as a martyr ‘for the feelings of Russian anti-Germanism.’²⁷⁹

Samarin's ‘communism’, meaning primarily the emancipation of peasants with land, and his attacks on estate privileges were part of the aspirations of the ‘national opposition’ to the conservatism of the old elites.²⁸⁰ The desire for a radical change in the ‘borderland politics’ was determined by an all-encompassing vision of a new, rational state system, which was opposed to the combination of ‘narodnost’ and ‘autocracy’ as protective and obsolete order. The hybrid regimes of empire management in the center and in the peripheries, as well as the layering of estate privileges of the often ethnically non-Russian nobility hindered the progress of standardizing state control, according to their views. The new generation of ‘enlightened bureaucrats’, inspired, among other things, by the ideas of the French socialists, regarded the state as a machine of education and universal control, armed with accurate statistical data and acting without the assistance of intermediary groups.²⁸¹

²⁷⁸ A.S. Menshikov’s diary. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 462.

²⁷⁹ A.S. Menshikov’s diary. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 468ob.

²⁸⁰ The label of ‘communist’ also marked the leader of the Fennoman movement for his pro-peasant stance: Kalleinen, ‘The Nature of Russian Imperialism in Finland During the First Half of the Nineteenth Century’, 97. See also chapter 4 of the dissertation.

²⁸¹ Mark Bassin, *Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 1840–1865* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 37–66, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511493638>; W. Bruce Lincoln, *In the Vanguard of Reform: Russia’s Enlightened Bureaucrats, 1825-1861* (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1986), 44–76; Larisa Georgievna Zaharova, *Samoderzhavie i otmena krepostnogo prava v Rossii, 1856-1861* (Moscow: Izd-vo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1984), 3–43.

Menshikov was an opponent of state rationalization programs in these domains,²⁸² which often pushed forward the erasure of estate boundaries and destruction of noble privileges. Conservative elites, including Menshikov, often blamed the reformers in pushing communist or socialist ideals under the guise of modernization or Russification.²⁸³ While Nicholas I could curb these tendencies, and prosecution of Samarin surfaced as a proof of that, Menshikov thought that in some respects the emperor approached this group's goals. Indeed, as contemporary research demonstrates, Nicholas appreciated modernizing and even Russian nationalist avenues of thinking, but only when these programmes deployed under the aegis of the imperial cabinets.²⁸⁴ Thus, when Nicholas I fostered compulsory introduction of non-Orthodox nobility of the Western Provinces into the military service,²⁸⁵ Menshikov and several other aristocrats considered it the first step in the realization of his pan-imperial anti-noble programme. Menshikov wrote that in these decisions the emperor's hatred towards the nobility exposed itself and 'despotism approached communism'. The aristocratic cosmopolitanism of the imperial elites met in the era of Nicholas I with new readings of social and political reality that sought to justify the intervention of the empire-state into the estate-related affairs.²⁸⁶

This position – that we can more often discern from Menshikov's critical commentaries and orders rather than from intellectually consistent programmes – coupled with Menshikov's usual absence from the duchy, made him protect the autonomous standing of Finland and its

²⁸² Interestingly, Ksenia Donik argues that he was a modernizing figure in his administration of the fleet: K.V. Donik, 'Knjaz' A. S. Menshikov i Morskoe Vedomstvo: Reformy Flotskoj Administracii v Nachale Carstvovaniija Nikolaja I'.

²⁸³ A.S. Menshikov's diary. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 443ob: "Kiselev in *his communism* [my italics – EE] ardently defended the request of the peasants [...]"; Konstantin Fisher, *Zapiski senatora*, 433-435: "The Milyutin party, having decided to promote *socialist principles* through the Western provinces under the guise of Russification of the region ...".

²⁸⁴ Andrej Teslya, 'Russkij Panslavizm: Ot Kul'turnogo k Politicheskomu i Obratno: Recenzija Na Knigu Borisa Prokudina'. *Filosofija. Zhurnal Vysshej Shkoly Jekonomiki* 2, no. 2 (2018): 177–85.

²⁸⁵ On that see: Leonid Gorizontov, *Paradoksy imperskoj politiki: poljaki v Rossii i russkie v Pol'she* (Moscow: Indrik, 1999), 44.

²⁸⁶ A.S. Menshikov's diary. RGAVMF. F.19. op. 7, d. 135, l. 26, 28. Showing estate solidarity, he saw in this decree the first step towards the revival of compulsory noble service with the "gradual introduction of recruitment in the upper estate".

legal framework based on the estate privileges. Menshikov to a degree shared Catherine II's vision of the empire as upheld by the bonds of the conservative estate solidarity – even though Finnish elites did not possess exclusive land-property rights²⁸⁷ – and this solidarity surpassed any national distinctions. His assistant Alexander Golovnin, who worked in Finland during the 1840s, also confirmed in his memoirs that Menshikov bet on the Swedish noble conservatism.²⁸⁸ The aristocratic agreement that backed up Finnish autonomy, as both Menshikov and Armfelt well understood, should have been protected against attempts of its rationalization and formalization from both sides.²⁸⁹ In one of his letters to the director of the censorship department of the principality, O.W. Klinkowström, Menshikov wrote, discussing contemporary press:

A lawyer, if he was not at the same time a politician, hardly understood *raisons d'état* and, consequently, the maxim of Cardinal de Retz, according to which the rights of peoples and the rights of kings agree among themselves only in silence.²⁹⁰

The uncertainty of the imperial-Finnish relations and the blurredness of the principles laid down in the constitution of the principality were both its Achilles' heel and, paradoxically, a guarantee of autonomy. Armfelt complained in his memoirs that the inhabitants of the duchy often did not understand the significance of this complex political dynamic.²⁹¹

²⁸⁷ Risto Alapuro, "Finnish Elites and Russia in the Nineteenth Century," *Peterburgskij Istoricheskij Zhurnal* 12, no. 4 (2016): 104–28.

²⁸⁸ I would argue that since Golovnin authored his memoirs in 1866, he provided a picture of almost ethnic opposition between Swedes and Finns in the duchy that was more characteristic for the epoch of the Great Reforms than for Menshikov's time in the office: Aleksandr Vasil'evich Golovnin, *Zapiski dlja nemnogih* (Saint-Petersburg: Nestor-Istorija, 2004), 69.

²⁸⁹ Egorov, 'Perevod So Shvedskogo Na "Finljandskij"'.

²⁹⁰ Menshikov – Klinkowström, 11/23 January 1846. RGAVMF, F. 19, op. 3, d. 135a, l. 94. The *lawyer* in the letter implied Johan Vilhelm Snellman, one of the main enthusiasts of Fennomania and therefore a particular threat to the peace of Finland in the eyes of the administration.

²⁹¹ Bonsdorff, "Ministerstatssekreteraren Greve Alexander Armfelts Memoarer"; See also: Jac Ahrenberg. *Människor som jag känt*, vol. 1 (Helsingfors: Söderström, 1904), 151–152.

Menshikov's political position and outlook – although it arguably took time for it to crystallize – found their practical realization in his command over the Grand Duchy of Finland. Menshikov repeatedly defended Finnish autonomy against the centralizing initiatives of the imperial ministries and chancelleries.²⁹² This opposition went well in line with other examples of political contestation between 'central' ministerial authorities and 'territorial' administration embodied in the position of governor-general.²⁹³ For example, after the Riga uprising of 1841 (also known as the Jaunbebri Potato Rebellion), the Second Department of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancellery received a proposal to standardize the legislation of the empire and appoint only Russians as officials. Menshikov criticized this document, noting that it 'caused a lot of alarm in Finland'.²⁹⁴ Indeed, Haartman considered this piece a part of the programme of aggressive pan-Slavism guided by the principles of 'socialist uniformity' – echoing standard conservative framing. Both of them were willing to curb such aspirations.²⁹⁵ Later Haartman accused many representatives of the central government, including established modernizer minister Lev Perovsky, in their attacks on Finland in his autobiography.²⁹⁶ Again, conservative solidarities overcame ethnic boundaries.

Largely due to Menshikov's intervention, plans to create a digest of laws for the Grand Duchy of Finland similar to the Digest of the Russian Empire were curtailed. Governor-general appealed to quasi-religious status of the legal system in Finland and argued that any intervention into these texts, even of editorial rather than substantial quality, might have provoked the local population.²⁹⁷ This move might be interpreted as a conscious attempt to

²⁹² Kalleinen, 'The Nature of Russian Imperialism in Finland During the First Half of the Nineteenth Century', 94-96; Kalleinen, *Suomen kenraalikuvernementti*, 110-17.

²⁹³ LeDonne, 'Frontier Governors General 1772-1825. I. The Western Frontier'; Biktasheva, 'Ot Unifikacii k Specifikam'.

²⁹⁴ RGAVMF, F. 19, op. 4, d. 405, l. 1.

²⁹⁵ Haartman – Mensikov, 7 / 19 April 1847. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. Finlyandskiy otd, Mf. 120, l. 35, 36-60. See also: Peter Scheibert, 'Finnland Zur Zeit Kaiser Nikolaus' I', *Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas* 5, no. 1/2 (1940): 142-88.

²⁹⁶ Haartman's autobiography. KA. L. G. von Haartmanin arkisto. C 2, t. 15.

²⁹⁷ Overview of the government's general orders for the Grand Duchy of Finland in 1844. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 4, d. 406, l. 141-169. This part of the document is eloquently titled "*Future* [my italics – EE] Views and

defend not only Finnish privileges but also the degree of power that Menshikov exercised in Finland, and its wording closely resembled polite refusal of another influential agent, the emperor's viceroy in the Caucasus, M.S. Vorontsov about the prospects of law codification there.²⁹⁸

In another instance in 1846, Menshikov had to warn senator and censor Otto Klinkowström about the inevitability of Saint-Petersburg's interference in the affairs of the Grand Duchy if the local authorities could not properly monitor the press. In this situation, Menshikov rather associated himself with the Finnish side: 'This is the result that I would like to avoid at all costs.'²⁹⁹ His opposition against interventions coming from ministerial authorities and various departments made him collaborate closely with Finnish bureaucrats. The defense of governor-general's position and Finnish autonomy often meant, however, enhanced local suppression of public manifestations and restricted arena for political participation.

2.5. Nicholas I's interpretation of Finnish politics

Armfelt, Haartman, Menshikov, and other representatives of upper classes, although their material backgrounds differed, had a lot in common in their trajectories of education and upbringing, and there was little incentive to oppose 'Russian' to 'Finnish' cadres during the period under Menshikov's command. This fact prompted them to collaborate for the sake of well-balanced relations between the empire and the duchy. There was much to preserve in these relations: the Grand Duchy of Finland figured as a very special part of the realm. This position

Assumptions"; Menshikov – Bludov. 21 December 1840. KA. KKK, Dd: 2, N. 330; Jussila, *Suomen perustuslait venäläisten ja suomalaisten tulkintojen mukaan 1808-1863*, 154–211; Robert Schweitzer, *Autonomie und Autokratie: die Stellung des Grossfürstentums Finnland im russischen Reich in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts (1863 - 1899)* (Giessen: W. Schmitz, 1978), 18–30.

²⁹⁸ Petr Majkov, *Vtoroe otdelenie Ego Imperatorskogo Velichestva kanceljarii* (Sankt-Peterburg: Tip. I.N. Skorohodova, 1906), 321-330.

²⁹⁹ Menshikov – Klinkowström, 11 / 23 January 1846. RGAVMF, F. 19, op. 3, d. 135a, l. 94.

surfaced, besides legal and practical relations, in the domain of the scenarios of power. The death of Alexander I, for example, prompted the bureaucrats to formulate the spectacle around the dead emperor, thus demonstrating his achievements in religious and profane terms. The position of the Grand Duchy in the ceremonies that surrounded his death surfaced in special inscriptions, invitations, positions its representatives were ought to take during numerous ceremonial occasions.³⁰⁰ Finland and Poland were considered special composite parts of the empire, both in the cabinets and at the court.

Even though Nicholas I's period of rule is usually and justifiably associated with the regime of autocratic repression and political surveillance through the emperor's personal chancellery, legality and law played essential role for the monarch, albeit specifically formulated. As Count Dmitrij Bludov, responsible for Nicholas' legal training, confessed in the 1860, he explained the difference between autocracy and despotism to Nicholas by stressing that 'the autocrat can change the laws at will, but before changing or repealing them, he himself must obey them'.³⁰¹ Nicholas seemed to have followed this advice and viewed his task as a ruler to govern according to the law and to clear up the messy legal affairs of the empire. The law came to embody the tsar's will, eliminating any room for arbitrariness. Consequently, the natural law in the empire completely succumbed to the positive law as an expression of the hierarchy of the relations between the monarch and his subjects.³⁰²

The means to establish a new legal regime and, as a result, a regularity of administrative relations varied from drafting of the Digest of Laws of the Russian empire in 1832 and its penal code in 1845 to solidifying the central ministerial powers at the expense of territorial power of

³⁰⁰ Ekaterina Boltunova, *Poslednij pol'skij korol': Koronacija Nikolaja I v Varshave v 1829 g. i pamjat' o rusko-pol'skih vojnah XVII — nachala XIX v* (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2022), 21–23.

³⁰¹ Petr Valuev, *Dnevnik P. A. Valueva ministra vnutrennih del. T. 1. 1861-1864 gg* (Moskva: Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1961), 97.

³⁰² Wortman, *The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness*, 45.

the governors throughout the 1830s and 1840s.³⁰³ The position of governor-general was abolished in the Russian proper in 1837, except for Saint-Petersburg and Moscow, while governors became accountable for the implementation of the ministerial orders.³⁰⁴ These new perceptions of legality played out ambiguously both in the Russian proper and in the provinces. On the one hand, the emperor explicitly recognized the special legal position of Finland in the Russian empire, on some occasions even referring to it as ‘constitution’.³⁰⁵ The ‘shield’ of the Swedish legal heritage was often appealed to in curbing centralizing impulses of the imperial modernization, referring either to their untimeliness, or to perennial qualities of the locals, unprepared for a radical change. On the other hand, Nicholas I, clearing up the practices of the Russian proper, struggled to establish uniformity across all imperial domains and in this regard Finland came as no exception.

Even though in the Russian proper particular territorial institutions of power were gradually demolished, other composite parts preserved peculiar traditions of rule that guaranteed their autonomous position. This ambiguity often created tension between ministries and governors-general, or, as John LeDonne frames this conflict, between functional and territorial institutions of rule.³⁰⁶ Often, representatives of progressive bureaucracy were irritated by the relics of borderland privileges and arbitrariness of governors-general that blocked the way for standardizing procedures. But another side found their ways to secure their position.³⁰⁷ Even though Nicholas I cherished the idea of the regular, uniform state in legal affairs, favoritism persisted as a means of alternative power source. Menshikov by the virtue

³⁰³ Tatiana Borisova, “The Digest of Laws of the Russian Empire: The Phenomenon of Autocratic Legality,” *Law and History Review* 30, no. 3 (2012): 901–25; *Institut general-gubernatorstva i namestnichestva v Rossijskoj Imperii, vol. 2* (Izd-vo Sankt-Peterburgskogo universiteta, 2001); Biktasheva, ‘Ot Unifikacii k Specifikam’.

³⁰⁴ Wortman, *The Development of a Russian Legal Consciousness*, 43–46.

³⁰⁵ Menshikov’s diary. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 469.

³⁰⁶ John P. Ledonne, “Russian Governors General, 1775-1825: Territorial or Functional Administration?,” *Cahiers Du Monde Russe* 42, no. 1 (2001): 5–30.

³⁰⁷ For geographically close case, see for example: Viktorija Efimova, *General-gubernatory Evropejskogo Severa: mesto i rol' v sisteme organov gosudarstvennoj vlasti i upravlenija Rossijskoj imperii (1820-1830 gg.)* (Saint-Petersburg: Dmitrii Bulanin, 2019).

of standing close to Nicholas was able to deflect many intrusions designed by the ministers and it seems that he regarded Finland as his own *votchina*.

Monarchical promises were easy to revert, however, as the examples of other autonomous parts of the empire – Poland and Bessarabia³⁰⁸ – demonstrated. These promises were contingent on practical outcomes or, to be more precise, their framings before the throne. One of the foundations of the balanced relations and hence maintaining autonomy of Finland was its ‘quietness’, meaning the absence of any dissent in the public sphere or among the administrative persons.³⁰⁹ Thus, defending its legal and political boundaries from the instrumentalized visions of the nationalizing or, during that period, rather ‘rationalizing’ empire, they simultaneously had to display their loyalty by distancing from the ex-metropole, meaning Sweden. Around the 1830s, when Swedish political life entered a period of turbulence and dynamic development, the elites of the duchy – supported in their endeavor by governor-general – made most drastic steps towards an attempt of the institutional break-up. Among the revolutionary dangers that surfaced in the Swedish public debate, one could list radical parliamentary reform, political emancipation of poorer classes, and in the 1840s – Scandinavianism.

2.6. Swedish politics and the public debate in the 1830-40s

The period of the 1830s-40s is traditionally pictured as the rise of the liberal opposition against the conservative regime of Charles XIV John in Sweden.³¹⁰ Recent scholarship has nuanced this view both by decentralizing the optics from the capital city, and by looking closer

³⁰⁸ Viktor Taki, “Istoricheskaja Pamjat’ i Konstruirovanie Regiona Posle Prisoedinenija k Imperii: Osobaja Forma Pravlenija v Bessarabii v 1812–1828 Gg.,” *Ab Imperio*, no. 3 (2004): 145–74, <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2004.0170>.

³⁰⁹ Paasivirta, *Finland and Europe*, 36–52. On *quietness and security* as principles of imperial resilience see for example: Igor’ Gurlev, “Dejatel’nost’ Policii Rossijskoj Imperii v Pervoj Chetverti XIX V. (1802-1826 Gg.),” *Vlast’*, no. 6 (2017): 130–36.

³¹⁰ Stråth, *Sveriges historia 1830-1920*, 14–30, 129–45.

at the ambiguous rhetoric of the liberal movement that proffered variegated ways towards progress through compulsory ‘civilizing mission’ of the masses and exclusive masculine imaginaries.³¹¹ Nevertheless, it is impossible to deny the transformation of the Swedish politics of the period. Limited but nevertheless comparatively broad freedom of press changed the political life of Sweden at the beginning of the 19th century. Towards the 1830s the variety of journals represented different poles of the ideological world, and liberal newspapers stood among the most popular. The inclusion of broader masses in the debate or rather in the association play with different utterances presented in the newspapers was fueled with social and economic crisis arising towards the 1830s.³¹²

First, the audience of the journals recognized the existence of the ‘social question’ that dwelled on the experiences of the growing layers of the urban poor, their economic, labor, and sanitary conditions. Second, the rigid estate structure of the Swedish legal system could not pace along with the changing social architecture. The rise of the middle-class challenged the estate system of the representation since the estate of burghers (*Borgarståndet*) was no more an adequate category of classification. Its boundaries did not correspond to new social solidarities and group interests. The ascendance of the middle class became especially painful for the legal structure, as its public representatives situated the middle class in stark opposition towards the classic high society consisting mostly of clergy and aristocracy. Simultaneously, the middle-class morale set them under the responsibility to guide and educate the urban poor whose behavior emanated dangerous features.³¹³

³¹¹ Jussi Kurunmäki, *Representation, Nation and Time: The Political Rhetoric of the 1866 Parliamentary Reform in Sweden* (Jyväskylä: University of Jyväskylä, 2000), 16; John Björkman, “‘Må de herrskande klasserna darra’: Radikal retorik och reaktion i Stockholms press, 1848-1851’ (PhD diss., University of Stockholm, 2020), 55–76; Anne Berg, *Kampen om befolkningen: den svenska nationsformeringens utveckling och sociopolitiska förutsättningar, ca 1780-1860* (Uppsala: Uppsala Universitet, 2011), 165–264.

³¹² Jan Christensen, *Bönder och herrar: bondeståndet i 1840-talets liberala representationsdebatt: exemplet Gustaf Hierta och J.P. Theorell* (Stockholm: J. Christensen, 1997); Martin Åberg, *Swedish and German Liberalism: From Factions to Parties 1860–1920* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011), 31–39.

³¹³ On representation: Berit Borell, *De svenska liberalerna och representationsfrågan på 1840-talet* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1948), 9–83; Sten Carlsson and Jerker Rosen, *Den svenska historien 8, Karl Johanstiden*

Middle-class demands that surfaced in the newspapers were reinforced by the mushrooming associations and societies that sought to push forward their reformist agenda. By building up variegated arenas of debate, the middle class created what was called *the third power* that came to challenge the institutions of the monarchy and the Riksdag. The public debate in Stockholm was well updated on the European tendencies and events, importing discourses and rhetorical devices, adapting them for the situation on the ground. The July Revolution of 1830, though it was not replicated in Sweden, had a profound influence on the public debate in the state, sharpening the critique espoused against the institutions of rule. The leading liberal newspaper, *Aftonbladet*, sometimes referred to as the first modern newspaper in Sweden, started to be published in the wake of the revolution in Europe. Its intense social and political critique as well as mobilizing rhetoric became emblematic for the overall period of the liberal movement in Sweden.³¹⁴

Criticizing political conservatism of Charles XIV John simultaneously meant the disapproval of the foreign policy that the king was pursuing. The so-called *politics of 1812* represented the protective alliance established between Sweden and Russia in 1812 that declared the abandonment of all revanchists Swedish claims for Finland and instead tied its aspirations to Norway as a constitutive part of the emerging Swedish-Norwegian union.³¹⁵ Although the alliance was established in 1812 against Napoleon, it persevered as the trajectory of the Swedish policy well into the 1840s. The tight bonds with Russia, cherished by Charles XIV, annoyed the liberal publicity in the capital that deemed the internal conservatism partly imported through the Russian influence. Hence the critique against conservatism came to target

och den borgerliga liberalismerna 1809-1865 (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1968); Kurunmäki, *Representation, Nation and Time*, 155–63.

³¹⁴ Stråth, *Sveriges historia 1830-1920*, 14-30.

³¹⁵ Torvald Höjer, *Den Svenska utrikespolitikens historia: 1792-1844*. vol. 3:2 (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1954), 230-40; See also an anthology: Tapani Suominen, ed., *Sverige i fred: statsmannakonst eller opportunism? : en antologi om 1812 års politik* (Helsinki: Atlantis, 2002).

the Russian empire as well, especially since the revanchism concerning Finland became a popular topic among the belligerent liberal intellectuals.³¹⁶

The Polish Uprising of 1830-1 became one of the pivotal moments in the formation of the European image of the Russian empire.³¹⁷ The violence espoused by the Russian forces was amplified in the public sphere across Europe. Moreover, some scholars argue that the Polish Uprising and the July Revolution also featured as a case that the public used to intervene into the foreign policy discussion of the European states for the first time.³¹⁸ Indeed, the call for intervention into the Polish-imperial struggle spread across the continent and became a centerpiece in the public debate. The moment coincided with growing reflection of the traumatic experiences of the loss of Finland in Sweden. Although the European intervention did not happen, the case of the public involvement into the machinery of foreign policy persisted afterwards, and in Sweden oppositional journals formulated their own avenues of desirable international relations. Those avenues expectedly entailed the opposition against the Russian empire, where Nicholas I also came to be more and more pessimistic about Russian connections with ‘rotting’ Europe.³¹⁹

2.7. Looking over the border

The Finlandish administration as well as bureaucracy in Saint-Petersburg was promptly notified about these trends through various channels. They feared that these ideas could easily

³¹⁶ Henrik Edgren, “Traumakonstruktionen: Svensk historieskrivning om rikssprängningen 1809,” *Scandia* 76, no. 1 (2010): 9-39; Mart Kuldkepp, ‘National Revanchism at a Critical Juncture: Sweden’s Near-Involvement in the Crimean War as a Study in Swedish Nationalism’, *Scandinavica* 58, no. 2 (31 December 2019): 115–33, <https://doi.org/10.54432/scand/RXJE7055>.

³¹⁷ Krusius-Ahrenberg, “Finland och den svensk-ryska allianspolitiken intill 1830/31 års polska revolution”, 312-26; Niri Ragnvald Johnsen, “Pan-Nationalisms across Borders: Scandinavianism in the Community of Nations, 1830–1870,” in *Nordic Experiences in Pan-Nationalisms* (London: Routledge, 2023), 99-113.

³¹⁸ Renaud Meltz, ‘Vers une diplomatie des peuples ? L’opinion publique et les crises Franco-Anglaises des années 1840’, *Histoire, Économie et Société* 33e année, no. 2 (2014): 58–78.

³¹⁹ W. Bruce Lincoln, *Nicholas I, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 109–11.

cross the sea unchallenged and ostensibly bloom in Finlandish terrain.³²⁰ In the reality of the 19th century, the maritime communication appeared faster and more reliable than the land-based means of transportation until the establishment of the railroad system.³²¹ Menshikov, for example, was constantly updated by the local administrators of the duchy on the ‘state of mind’ in Sweden, perhaps reflecting overall growing anxiety of the empire about the development of new ideas in the European political and social debate.³²² Before Alexander Wulffert took the position of post-director, it was occupied by Gustav Ladau in 1811-33.

As Konstantin Fisher noted in his memoirs, the correspondence between Ladau and previous governor-general Arsenii Zakrevsky comprised several huge pockets of perlustrated letters. The condemnation of this activity pointed to the overall aristocratic reluctance about surveillance practices, although the government perceived it as indispensable. While this claim was debated in the literature,³²³ the character of correspondence between Menshikov and Ladau differed little from the future exchange between governor-general and Wulffert. It mostly comprised post-director’s updates on ‘radical’ Swedish publications that were banned in the duchy or spread illegally throughout it. Perlustration, if we can judge by what was preserved in Menshikov’s archive, was at best a side activity of the postal system.

At the beginning of the 1830s, Ladau on numerous occasions updated Menshikov on dangerous publications issued in Sweden that explicitly aimed to assault the imperial regime. One of the first and exemplary among those was the translation of Harro Harring’s memoirs in 1833. Harring was a famous revolutionary who took part in the shattering events across Europe, from France to Poland. His memoirs, as Ladau noted, ‘being sold openly in Sweden, contain

³²⁰ Krusius-Ahrenberg, “Finland och den svensk-ryska allianspolitiken intill 1830/31 års polska revolution”, 288-89.

³²¹ Jürgen Osterhammel, *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton University Press, 2015), 96–100.

³²² Maksim Shevchenko, *Konec odnogo velichija: vlast', obrazovanie i pechatnoe slovo v imperatorskoj Rossii na poroge osvoboditel'nyh reform* (Moskva: Tri Kvadrata, 2003), 60–62.

³²³ Mikhail Borodkin, *Istorija Finljandii: Vremja imperatora Nikolaja I* (Petrograd, 1915), 171.

[...] all the horrors against Russia'.³²⁴ Attaching the memoirs to the letter, he also noted that although he desired that these memoirs would not have been imported in Finland secretly (and openly for the Library of the Alexander Imperial University)³²⁵, this wish certainly could not be fulfilled. Ladau's note underlined wider problems of the neighborhood: control over the import of prohibited or potentially dangerous materials could not be realized in practice. The problem of porous borders pertained to commodities and persons that crossed it almost unchallenged through the gulf or through the land border in the North.³²⁶

Publications on the Russian empire or Finland under the imperial regime often fell in the focus of attention of the local administration, and besides Ladau the information was supplied by other bureaucrats in the duchy, irrespective of their official position there. In the same 1833, Ladau notified Menshikov on the advertisement in the *Stockhoms Dagblad* that announced the sale of some short sketches (*skizzer*) about 'the emperors Ivan III, Peter III, and Paul I' that in his opinion contained horrible assertions against Russia. Ladau also mentioned that it was inappropriate that the Swedish government permitted to publish works with such accusations: the freedom of speech had to be limited when it addressed monarchical figures of an allied foreign state.³²⁷ The Swedish authorities in the eyes of Finlandish bureaucrats ignored the flow of offending publications that surfaced in the kingdom and closed eyes on public enunciations that quickly spread through personal contacts across the sea.

Indeed, the topic of the Swedish government too weak or unwilling to intervene in the public debate repeated continuously both in the administrative correspondence in Finland and in the communications made by the representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus,

³²⁴ Ladau – Menshikov. 15 / 27 January 1833. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 120, l. 3. Ladau must have meant Harring's *Memoiren über Polen unter russischer Herrschaft. Nach zweijährigem Aufenthalt in Warschau*, 1831.

³²⁵ *Ustav Imperatorskago Aleksandrovsikago Universiteta v Finljandii* (Helsingfors: Tip. Dep. Nar. Prosveshenija, 1829), 6-8.

³²⁶ See, for example: Haartman – Menshikov, 11 January 1832. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 56, l. 8; Reh binder – Menshikov, 5 December 1838. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 196, l. 142ob. See also: Jyrki Hakapaa, "Internationalizing Book Distribution in the Early Nineteenth Century: The Origins of Finnish Bookstores," *Book History* 5, no. 1 (2002): 39–66.

³²⁷ Ladau – Menshikov. 16 / 28 February 1833. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 120, l. 4ob-5.

Alexander Armfelt who travelled to Sweden in 1834 to renew the tariff agreement between Finland and Sweden expressed his concerns about the nature of the Swedish politics.³²⁸ Armfelt found the king in a bad mood since the Diet displayed its ingratitude towards him. Although he noted that the present Riksdag was no more ‘yelling’ than the previous, ‘the system of opposition’ penetrated its affairs deeper and was better organized. The lack of power that the government espoused was even more disturbing to see while the oppositional tendency ‘subjugated all the minds and classes in the country’. The journalists were corrupting the minds and sowing confusion to the point that one could hardly say what he wanted, as Armfelt declared.³²⁹

Consolidation of the opposition that Armfelt mentioned must have referred both to the aggravated rhetoric of *Aftonbladet* and other liberal journals as well as to the proliferation of progressive societies that widened the boundaries of political participation and repertoire of action. The very possibility of the critical press and the oppositional societies possessing such influence seemed alien to the administrator used to the sharp censorship politics and strictly guarded arenas of political participation.³³⁰ In 1829, censorship policy in the duchy was largely synchronized with Nicholas I’s imperial censorship decree of 1828, and every publication should have been censored before being published, installing preventive censorship regime. Church council was responsible for the inspection of religious literature while the university supervised academic print. Post-directorate overviewed periodical publications as a direct responsibility without ignoring other issues coming from abroad as much as it could.³³¹ Alexander Wulffert, who occupied the position of post-director after Ladau constantly updated Menshikov on the flow of hazardous publications.

³²⁸ Hirn, *Alexander Armfelt, början av en statsmannobana, 1832-1841*, 122–54.

³²⁹ Armfelt – Menshikov. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 12, l. 21-22.

³³⁰ Henrik Stenius, *Frivilligt, jämlikt, samfällt*, 129–43; Landgren, “Censuren i Finland 1809 – 1919,” 53–68.

³³¹ *Samling af placater, förordningar, manifest och påbud*, vol. 5 (Helsingfors: Gröndahl, 1831), 508-33.

2.8. Monitoring Finland: The Third Section and Governor-General

Despite the alarming situation in Sweden with regards to perceived radical politization of the society, Finland was mostly regarded as a quiet and loyal province. Often, awareness was consciously curbed and dealt with locally to avoid worrying the emperor. However, the Finlandish administration was not the only institution of knowledge-production about the duchy. Although governmental decisions were sometimes based on locally acquired or outlandish historical, statistical, and ethnographic works, domestic knowledge on the degree of loyalty and regularity of rule was mainly collected in the offices of the Third Section of His Majesty Chancellery. Established as an institution aimed to surveil the public opinion in the wake of the Decembrist revolt of 1825, the Third Section came to play the role of the political police, and its reports and actions often centered around anti-governmental, ‘revolutionary’ tendencies, persons, and organizations while also covering administrative tensions of the empire.³³²

The headquarters of the Third Section in Finland were established in 1826 and stationed in Helsingfors. Although the territory of Finlandish provinces assumed a distinct border and color on the administrative maps of the Russian empire, the Third Section proposed its own mapping technique, and Finland appeared to be in the 1st zone (okrug) of the gendarme corps together with Saint-Petersburg. Until the 1850s, its workings in the duchy, however, were by no means well organized and consistent, and later its activities were thwarted by the lack of access into the higher layers of the local society. Even the yearly reports of the Third Section reveal the lack of cohesion in the production of reliable information. The formular of yearly reports was changing year by year, sometimes dropping the political situation in the duchy

³³² Bibikov Grigorij Nikolaevich, ‘Nadzor III Otdelenija Za Chastnoj Zhizn’ju Gubernskih Chinovnikov (1820-1830-e Gg.)’, *Filosofija. Zhurnal Vysšej Shkoly Jekonomiki* 3, no. 2 (2019): 79–108; Oleg Abakumov, ‘Bezopasnost’ prestola i spokojstvie gosudarstva”. *Politicheskaja policija samodержavnoj Rossii (1826–1866)* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2021); Sidney Monas, *The Third Section: Police and Society in Russia under Nicholas I* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), <https://doi.org/10.4159/harvard.9780674865624>.

altogether, sometimes setting it into comparison with other borderland territories, especially with Poland.³³³ Finland was, on the one hand, a usual suspect after the Polish Uprising in the 1830-1 as its internal organization and status resembled the one in the kingdom. On the other hand, however, the politics of comparison usually employed by its administration and its protectors, governor-general including, set it into a far better light and presented as an exemplary borderland as *contrasted* to Poland.³³⁴

While the headquarters were established in 1826, their activities, judging by what was preserved at the archive, surfaced sporadically, often prompted by other events and processes that affected the stability of the imperial architecture. The sources of information could vary and from the same 1826 the archive saved a traveler's letter to Benkendorff where he described his impressions from the trip around the province. A.D. Hummel, a Swedish-born entomologist working for the Imperial Academy of Sciences,³³⁵ crossed four of its gubernias and presented his views for the highest cabinet. While Vyborg *län* was exposed to a high degree of the Russian influence, the deeper he travelled into the country, the more he noticed Swedish roots. Whereas Russianness in his report was often associated with order and effectiveness, Swedish institutions were blamed for their ill-managed workings. Moreover, Russian language also evaporated further into the land, 'and it is a bad attest for the Czar's servants'. According to Hummel, 'in Vyborg the inhabitants are Russians, in Åbo – Swedes, in Helsingfors – Finns', not by the virtue of language-use but rather by the proximity to the institutions of government. Focusing on the mood in the 'new capital', he noted that post-director Ladau was hated for his

³³³ Maria Sidorova and Ekaterina Shherbakova, eds., *Rossija pod nadzorom: otchety III otdelenija : 1827-1869* (Moscow: Rossijskij fond kul'tury, 2006), 17–97.

³³⁴ Ann Laura Stoler, 'Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History and (Post) Colonial Studies', *The Journal of American History* 88, no. 3 (2001): 829–65, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2700385>; Maria Leskinen, *Poljaki i finny v rossijskoj nauke vtoroj poloviny XIX v: 'drugoj' skvoz' prizmu identichnosti* (Moscow: Indrik, 2010), 302-8.

³³⁵ *Nordisk familjebok. UGGLEUPPLAGAN. 11. Harrisburg – Hypereides* (Stockholm: Boks forlag, 1909), 1292.

perlustration activities while governor-general Zakrevsky's interventions in the civil government were also exposed to wide criticism.³³⁶

Monitoring the opinions, the author noted that capital inhabitants were worrying about Nicholas I's yet unknown policy and mourned over the death of beloved Alexander I who granted their privileges. The only remedy Hummel saw for smoothening the public expectations was either the emperor's visit to the duchy or the convention of the Diet. While his report painted a picture of a rather vulnerable territory, the image provided intentions for politically emancipatory measures, such as the convocation of the Diet. Interestingly, the convention of the estates played the same role as the emperor's visit, pointing to the symbolic proximity of the two scenarios that both pertained to representation, albeit in different understanding of the term.³³⁷ Moreover, in Finland there was an established tradition of king's inspectoral voyages across the land traced to the epoch of Swedish domination, *Erikskata*, that supplied the imperial practice with local imaginaries.³³⁸

Hummel asserted that city of Åbo was still tightly connected to Sweden and the news from across the sea were followed more attentively compared to indifference towards Saint-Petersburg. Finally, and rather unexpectedly, Hummel appreciated 'the Swedes'' loyalty in Åbo higher than that of 'the Finns'' in Helsingfors since the latter were corrupted by the mirage of their authority. Overall, however, the morale surfaced as reliable, especially in rural areas 'far from the cities' – urban areas were often regarded as dangerous hives of politicizing and conspiracy – while material conditions were also improving across the land.³³⁹

³³⁶ A.D. Hummel's report. GARF. F. 109 s/a, op. 3a, d. 1343, l. 7-16ob.

³³⁷ Alsu Biktasheva, 'L'état c'est Nous? Mestnoe Grazhdanstvo, Imperskoe Poddanstvo i Revizija Gosudarstvennyh Uchrezhdenij v Kazanskoj Gubernii (1819–1820 Gg.),' *Ab Imperio* 2006, no. 4 (2006): 137–86, <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2006.0086>; See on imperial inspections also: Lincoln, *Nicholas I, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russias*, 161–73.

³³⁸ See, for example: B. O. Schauman, *Kejsar Alexander I:s resa i Finland, 1819: samlade bidrag* (Helsingfors: G.W. Edlund, 1892), 59. Governor-general's inspectoral voyages were also credited as *Erikskata*, revealing, perhaps, the status of governor-general as mini-emperor.

³³⁹ A.D. Hummel's report. GARF. F. 109 s/a, op. 3a, d. 1343, l. 7-16ob.

The letter was forwarded to then governor-general Arseniy Zakrevsky, and his reply shed some light on different understandings of the principles of the imperial resilience at the first half of the 19th century. Dismissing the letter as amateurish impressions, he argued that such texts could not serve as guiding documents for imperial policies: ‘Everything he wrote was either accumulated by eavesdropping or personal conversation which does not correspond to the common opinion.’ Vyborg gubernia, contrary to the good impression of Hummel, was one of the most problematic areas, since its inhabitants were having hard time adapting to the Swedish laws: ‘The full incorporation would be felt only by the grandsons of contemporary inhabitants’.³⁴⁰

Further Hummel’s criticism with regards to the functioning of roads and post services highlighted the author’s ignorance on the traditions and laws that differed completely from the Russian imperial framework in governor-general’s reading. Hummel’s surprise over the Swedish institutions that he met on his voyage seemed strange to Zakrevsky who noted that Finland was being ruled according to Swedish establishments, and this practice was solidified by Alexander I. The accusation that the inhabitants did not know Russian conveyed Hummel’s ‘outright recklessness’. Zakrevsky angrily wondered: ‘Is it necessary to speak Russian to serve the emperor loyally?’³⁴¹ In this sense, Zakrevsky approximated Menshikov’s later visions of the imperial loyalty and rule, even though he often articulated his burdensome position as governor-general of Finland without proper language knowledge in private correspondence where he allowed himself to ventilate on Finlandish hatred towards Russians as well.³⁴²

Talking about Åbo province, Zakrevsky agreed with Hummel, noting that higher level of education – the presence of university must have ensured this – bolstered the maintenance of order there, since Åbo also used to be the capital of Finland: ‘hence [the inhabitants]’

³⁴⁰ Zakrevsky’s reply 28 December 1826. GARF. F. 109 s/a, op. 3a, d. 1343, l. 17-23.

³⁴¹ Ibid.

³⁴² Zakrevsky – Kiselev, 5 January 1824 in *Sbornik Russkogo istoricheskogo obshhestva*, vol. 72 (Saint-Petersburg: Tip. Skorohodova, 1891), 283-4.

appreciated the well-being and easier subdued to it'. The mapping of loyalty proposed by Hummel also fell under governor-general's scrutiny. He pointed out that it was in fact the Swedes who sought to protect the privileges (*volnosta*) in Finland and who constituted the whole corps of the nobility and bureaucratic cadres while the Finns usually did not traverse social boundaries of the peasant estate and hence its low-level pretensions.

This misunderstanding revealed the epistemological discrepancy the two analytics espoused and the very instability of its mechanisms. While Hummel – in quite unorthodox fashion – tied the denomination of Swedes and Finns to the sources of power, Zakrevsky put more weight on culture and language. Finally, protecting Ladau – and himself – from accusations, Zakrevsky stated that Swedish periodicals were eagerly read by the local Swedish-speaking population, hence their surveillance work was necessary while the secret of perustration, however mildly it was being executed, could not remain in shadow for long.³⁴³ In 1826, Zakrevsky, on the one hand, secured the position of governor-general as unquestionably dominant, but his bitter fights with local administration resulted in cabinet tensions, and the Third Section report might be read as a reaction to that.

This dialogue in the archival folder elucidates the complexity of the imperial situation in Finland and perception of it in Saint-Petersburg. The crux of the matter resided not in the situation on the ground but rather in the very principles of the analysis. It started with the question over the point of observation: whether a disinterested traveler or an experienced but also enmeshed in the power play governor-general produced more reliable information. Then followed diverging interpretations of loyalty that could be grounded in language proficiency or in the appreciation of one's own status. This also presupposed the foundations of imperial classification of groupness grounded either in ethnographic features or based on the proximity to Saint-Petersburg or to local centers of power. The understanding of imperial architecture in

³⁴³ Ibid.

Finland rested on epistemological foundations of different, often incompatible knowledge-producing techniques within variegated institutions that, in their turn, possessed dynamic capitals of trust before the emperor. Hence temporarily dominating epistemologies to a high degree determined trajectories of imperial policy in Finland.

The Polish Uprising of 1830-1 became next pivotal point that intensified the activities of the headquarters of the Third Section throughout the empire, Finland including.³⁴⁴ That time the headquarters in Finland were headed by colonel Johann Wulfert, an elder brother of the future post-director Alexander. Disturbed by the aftershocks of the Polish uprising, the head of the Third Section Alexander Benkendorff ordered Wulfert to sonder the public opinion in the whole province at the end of 1830. The message was delivered through then head of the 1st district (okrug) of the gendarmerie, Petr Balabin. Benkendorff's order ran as follows:

I humbly ask your highness to order colonel of gendarmerie Wulfert to sonder all Finnish provinces, especially *in the areas that are bordering with Sweden* [my italics - E.E.] to surveil the general mood.³⁴⁵

The goal was to see whether the 'spirit of lies and rioting' penetrated the society around the duchy. Although Benkendorff was 'confident in the loyalty of good Finns towards the all-Russian throne', the measure was necessary to prevent possible unrest.³⁴⁶ Characteristically, the areas neighboring Sweden were considered most dangerous due to their state of connectivity to larger European public arenas where the impulses of the July Revolution and solidarity with Poland were gaining currency.

³⁴⁴ Governor-general Zakrevsky was also attentive to the situation in Finland, especially considering possible Polish conspiracies in Sweden: Krusius-Ahrenberg, 'Finland och den svensk-ryska allianspolitiken intill 1830/31 års polska revolution', 285-331; Lillja, *Arsenij Andrejevitj Zakrevskij, Finlands generalguvernör*, 323-60.

³⁴⁵ Benkendorff's instruction from 18 December 1830. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 5, d. 407, l. 4.

³⁴⁶ Ibid.

Wulffert, first reporting in a month, on 13 February 1831 asserted that the general sentiment towards the empire was loyal among all classes. When digging deeper into the pending issues, Wulffert elaborated on views towards the Belgian revolution and the Polish uprising. Belgian revolution, he noted, was faced with a certain level of indifference while most of his interlocutors hoped that the ‘great powers would crush the revolution’. Polish uprising that elicited more attention was also regarded through the loyal lens: the population of Finland was ostensibly surprised by the ingratitude of the Polish nation towards the present moderate monarchical rule.³⁴⁷ This attitude was reinforced by the fact that Finlandish personnel took part in the suppression of the rebellion.³⁴⁸ Further Wulffert’s itineraries across Finland yielded similar results, as he did not notice any examples of unloyalty across the country, although mentioning coastal provinces and their perilous relations with Sweden.³⁴⁹

Interestingly, Wulffert’s missions were coordinated both by the Third Section and by governor-general Zakrevsky. This fact even prompted conflicts between the two institutions regarding who oversaw the officer.³⁵⁰ Ambiguous relations between the Third Section headquarters in Finland and governor-general who was formally in charge of the executive power would continue well into the 1860s. Conflicts, however, often gave way to solidarity and collaboration, and the head of the Third Section often sent officers’ reports to governor-general, although Zakrevsky suspected Benkendorff in trying to undermine him.³⁵¹ Another discussion revolved around the usefulness of the native officers who were able to penetrate the

³⁴⁷ Wulffert’s first report: GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 5, d. 407, l. 5-6.

³⁴⁸ Ibid, 5-6. August Schauman, *Från sex årtionden i Finland: levnadsminnen upptecknade av Aug. Schauman* (Helsinki: H. Schildt, 1922), 1: 19-21; On the range of possible opinions see a brilliant study: Jussi Jalonen, *On Behalf of the Emperor, On Behalf of the Fatherland: Finnish Officers and Soldiers of the Russian Imperial Life-Guard on the Battlefields of Poland, 1831* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 251-296.

³⁴⁹ Ibid, l. 11.

³⁵⁰ GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 5, d. 407, l. 22. Quite typical for these institutions in other contexts as well: Abakumov, “Bezopasnost’ prestola i spokojstvie gosudarstva”. *Politicheskaja policija samodержavnoj Rossii (1826–1866)*, 20–21.

³⁵¹ Zakrevsky – Kiselev, 30 July 1828 in *Sbornik Russkogo istoricheskogo obshhestva*, vol. 72 (Saint-Petersburg: Tip. Skorohodova, 1891), 307-308.

‘Finlandish estates’. Wulffert’s access to the higher society was appreciated by both, again highlighting the indispensability of intermediaries in securing the imperial borderlands.³⁵²

The suspicion that came through the Ministry of Finance about arriving English ships with guns and ammunition that were destined for rebellious Finlanders in 1831 did not find any proof either.³⁵³ While Sweden surfaced as a possible center for such operations given the opposition there openly supported the Polish Uprising, only slightly curtailed in this effort by Charles XIV John, Wulffert did not discover any suspicious goods on arriving ships. Moreover, he asserted that the population of the duchy would not riot even with English guns, for their loyalty was unquestionable.³⁵⁴ Even when the borderland policy of the empire came under stress, Finland, in the eyes of those who surveilled the mood of its population, remained quiet. This quietness – at least among the peasant population – was sometimes ascribed to the popular melancholic character.³⁵⁵ Swedish-speaking Finlandish elites, although they preserved tight relations with ex-motherland, were pulled into the imperial abode through material benefits and ‘liberal and national government’, wrote the head of the Third Section Benkendorff reminiscing an official visit with the emperor in 1830.³⁵⁶

When Arsenii Zakrevsky himself took on a voyage around Finland – a standard yearly duty of the governor-general that, however, became difficult since Zakrevsky’s rise to the position of the Minister of Internal Affairs in Russia – he was as calm as Wulffert about the loyalty of the duchy in 1831. He, however, was able to localize two centers of possible unrest. The first was the Imperial Alexander University in Finland whose professors and students produced the ‘worrying spirit’ in their talks and potentially established the lines of secret correspondence with Sweden. Another ‘center’ was rather of social than institutional origin.

³⁵² Balabin’s elaboration. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 5, d. 407, l. 7-8.

³⁵³ Jalonen, *On Behalf of the Emperor, On Behalf of the Fatherland*, 251–60.

³⁵⁴ Wulffert’s report form 9 / 21 September 1831. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 5. d. 407, l. 26-7.

³⁵⁵ Maria Leskinen, *Poljaki i finny v rossijskoj nauke vtoroj poloviny XIX v: “drugoj” skvoz’ prizmu identichnosti* (Indrik, 2010), 250–54.

³⁵⁶ Alexander Benkendorff, *Vospominanija, 1802-1837* (Moscow: Rossijskij Fond Kul’tury, 2012), 457.

While the upper and lower estates of the Finlandish society were devoted to the Russian monarch, since they appreciated the profits that they previously were unable to gain under the Swedish rule, the middle class was a zone of contention, susceptible to the rioting spirit spilled over the whole Europe.³⁵⁷

Zakrevsky himself, however, fell under the criticism of the local population because of his ostensible abuse of the laws, as agent Ehrenstolpe reported in November, seconding Hummel.³⁵⁸ Since Ehrenstolpe was ordered with a task to investigate whether Finlandish population ‘enjoys the rights given to them in full’, this note must have been read as a serious accusation, although reported in a usual neutral tone. His elaborations, however, sounded even more perilous, as he wrote that the common fear of the population was to become a mere Russian province exacerbated by the images of the ‘occult’ surveillance – implying governor-general’s ostensibly existing agent network – that introduced an element of embarrassment and mistrust in social relations.³⁵⁹ In his later appeal to Benkendorff, he asked to stop sending convicts to the battalion deployed in Finland, as they negatively affected the morals of the local population in the Åland islands, a territory with deep ties to the Swedish inhabitants: the rumors thus could easily spread to Swedish newspapers.³⁶⁰

It is characteristic that the concerns of the administration pertained rather to class-based and social markers than to ethnic qualities of the population. It is hard to determine what groups Zakrevsky put under the label of the ‘middle class’ in his report but it also might be unnecessary. His vocabulary must have been borrowed from the Swedish political language where the middle-class (*medelklassen*) surfaced as a driver of the political change, while Ehrenstolpe’s concerns that addressed marginalized groups qualifying them as potential anti-governmental agents, also drew on European and Swedish examples of tensions around the

³⁵⁷ GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 5, d. 407, l. 24.

³⁵⁸ Ehrenstolpe’s report. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 6, d. 717, l. 5-7.

³⁵⁹ Ibid.

³⁶⁰ Ibid, l. 12-3.

social question and morality of the poor.³⁶¹ The Finnish administration sought to prevent perilous politics and discourses of the neighboring state from spreading into the Grand Duchy. In implementing the task, some agents either consciously or not, imported new labels and patterns of thought to map the political landscape of Finland while some of them also underlined the necessity to guarantee the special status of the territory and its population by contrasting it to a mere ‘Russian province’. While class concerns were pending, one institution, still closely tied to Sweden, also produced variegated anxieties.

2.9. The Imperial Alexander University: cosmopolitan visions, disciplinary practices

According to Matti Klinge, the Alexander Imperial University in Helsingfors provided foundations for the emergence of the civil society and political consciousness in Finland. Patterns of student and lecturers self-organization, their educational level, early politization through wide-ranging networks that spanned across the sea contributed to the central position of the university in the origins of the Finnish politics. These tendencies in the students could not avoid the attention of the administration. Indeed, the students at the University of Helsingfors – direct successor to the Åbo University that burned down in 1827 – quickly became into the spotlight of the inquiry by the executive institutions. The university enjoyed a wide range of privileges, and it functioned semi-autonomously from the imperial administrative system, although its established proximity to the institutions of power in Helsingfors did lay a seal of inspection.³⁶²

Both in the Russian proper and in the borderlands, the universities emanated cosmopolitan aura being connected through research networks and communities with other intellectual hubs across Europe. Student himself became a mythologized subject, entrenched

³⁶¹ Björkman, “‘Må de herrskande klasserna darra’”, 55-76; Berg, *Kampen om befolkningen*, 155-92; Kurunmäki, *Representation, Nation and Time*, 22.

³⁶² Matti Klinge, *Studenter och idéer: 1828-1852*, vol. 1 (Helsinki: Studentkåren vid Helsingfors Universitet, 1969), 5–23.

with romanticist symbolism of liberty and progress as well as notions of community and brotherhood.³⁶³ Practices of students' self-organization that ranged from their participation in the 'nations' and 'sections' of the university – later prohibited by the imperial administration under Nicholas I – academic and leisure discussions to political manifestations, petitions, and planned actions later became the foundation of large-scale political organization and mobilization in the duchy.³⁶⁴ After the Wartburg Festival in Germany in 1817 where the students demonstrated their potential to mobilize and protest, the studentship across Europe came to be tightly associated with cosmopolitical revolutionary impulse.³⁶⁵

The transportation of the university from Åbo, a city engrained in deep ties with the Swedish past, to a new mini-capital of Helsingfors in 1827 also followed the trajectory of distancing from Sweden. However, even such measure hardly helped to break up all the existing connections that persevered in the traditions and patterns of communication. Zacharias Topelius, a famous Finnish author, later recollected that the university life was penetrated by cosmopolitical and Swedish-leaning tendencies, even though their invocation did not always relate to any political prospects and expectations: for example, Finlandish students often sung Upsala students' songs, slightly remodeling it to fit the censorship.³⁶⁶ Other memoirs seconded his articulation.³⁶⁷ Moreover, contemporary correspondence with the Swedish colleagues went

³⁶³ On pan-imperial framework see also: Samuel D. Kassow, *Students, Professors, and the State in Tsarist Russia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 49–88; Elena Anatol'evna Vishlenkova and Irina Maksimovna Savel'eva, *Soslovie russkikh professorov: sozdateli statusov i smyslov* (Moscow: Izdatatel'skiĭ dom Vyssheĭ shkoly ėkonomiki, 2013). On the image of student see: Eira Juntti, 'The Student as a Representation of Masculinity in Nineteenth-Century Finnish Literature', *Scandinavian Studies* 89, no. 3 (2017): 301–25, <https://doi.org/10.5406/scanstud.89.3.0301>.

³⁶⁴ Stenius, *Frivilligt, jämligt, samfällt*; Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 1:121-161.

³⁶⁵ Elise Kimerling Wirtschafter, *From Victory to Peace: Russian Diplomacy After Napoleon* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021), 77–78.

³⁶⁶ Zacharias Topelius, "Anteckningar från det Helsingfors, som gått. VI. Från Universitetet 1828–1840" [Finland 19/7 1885], in *Publicistik*, ed. Pia Asp, Mats Dahlberg, Jens Grandell, Maren Jonasson, Eliel Kilpelä & Frida Wickholm (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2021), URL: <https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:sls-9512-1623252740>.

³⁶⁷ Schauman, *Från sex årtionden i Finland*, 1: 21–35.

on, and its impact clearly went beyond the topics of culture, arts, and sciences, as perustrated examples demonstrate.³⁶⁸

The university was simultaneously a modern disciplinary institution that sought to standardize both the appearance and outlook of students it produced for further loyal service.³⁶⁹ The administration homogenized statues and regulations to fit similar patterns across the empire and later introduced uniforms – diverging from Swedish traditions of clothing and thus provoking the youth – for better surveillance over student bodies. The university privileges were counterbalanced by firm surveillance not only on the part of governor-general and the Third Section but also by vice-chancellor who usually happened to be an ex-military from the imperial army.³⁷⁰ One student, long after his university days, brightly recollected the presence of vice-chancellor major general Alexander Thesleff at the university who often visited classes, suspected everything Swedish, and threatened liberal-minded scholas with a Siberian exile.³⁷¹

Zakrevsky's mention of the university as a threat was not accidental in the wake of the Polish Uprising, since he was aware that some students saluted the rebellious Poles. While this case was hardly representative for the general spirit of the students, as Klinge argues, it certainly alerted the administration. Both state-secretary Rehbinder and Zakrevsky came into the duchy to sonder the ground, and governor-general underlined the triangle of communication between Poland, Sweden, and Finland as potentially dangerous.³⁷² Indeed Armfelt later suspected that even the Swedish court favored the Poles – perhaps under the public pressure – and Russian representative in Stockholm Potocki enjoyed some extra privileges because of his

³⁶⁸ See for example a perustrated letter sent by Wulfert to Menshikov: An den Studenten Herren C J J in Hfors, Upsala den 24 Mai 1843, RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 71, l. 44.

³⁶⁹ Topelius later also highlighted this ambiguity in his memoires about university life: Zacharias Topelius, "Anteckningar från det Helsingfors, som gått. VII. Från studentlifvet" [Finland 31/7 1885], in *Publicistik*, URL: <https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:sls-9513-1623252750>.

³⁷⁰ Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 1:18–39.

³⁷¹ Biografiska anteckningar af C.E. Aspelund. SLSA 146, l. 128-30. He simultaneously and to the satisfaction of some students often assisted a lecturer of history about the Napoleonic Wars with his personal reminiscences. On Thesleff's anti-Swedish stance see also: Grot – Pletnew, 20 August 1840 in *Perepiska Ja. K. Grota s P.A. Pletnevym*, vol. 1 (S-Peterburg: Tipografija Ministerstva putej soobshhenija, 1896), 23.

³⁷² Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 1:24–29.

Polish origins.³⁷³ Imperial entanglements and politics of comparison, on the one hand, set Poland and Finland in the dangerous proximity. On the other hand, geographic proximity to Sweden with cross-marine connections preserved, surfaced as a distinct perilous feature of the Finlandish establishment, resembling the border danger in the Lithuanian provinces.³⁷⁴

Towards the mid-1830s, there appeared blurred zones of political unrest in Finland that, however, layered differently in institutional, geographic, and social dimensions. The Alexander Imperial University became the most vibrant arena of suspicion, and the administration sought to monitor it with inspections, reports, and even through the infiltration of spies among the students.³⁷⁵ Geographically, the western coastal region elicited the attention of the government as a place where institutional and personal relations with the ex-center of power persevered while the connection to Saint-Petersburg had not yet made its roots, giving way to moral and political drift and potential unrest. On the other hand, ostensibly higher level of education in Åbo circumvented such aspirations and put more weight on the consciousness of its inhabitants. Finally, while the upper classes were satisfied with their formal political agency and the lower classes pacified with lower taxation, the Swedish-inspired discovery of the middle class that was not as tightly brought into the patterns of cultural and economic capital exchange and remained virtually uncontrollable by the means of the estate-based logics of the empire, put new challenges on the way.

Many imperial agents, in their turn, were ready to embark on different paths to solidify the loyalty of the population. Some of them, even among the imperial bureaucratic elite, opted for the reintroduction of the political representation in the form of the Diet – that, according to certain visions might also be useful in destroying internal party-politics dominated by

³⁷³ Armfelt – Menshikov, 9 September 1836. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 12, l. 43-45.

³⁷⁴ Anna Komzolova, “‘Ohranenie’ Rossijskoj imperii na zapadnom rubezhe: “litovskie gubernii” i rossijsko-prusskaja granica v 1830-e - nachale 1840-h gg.,” *Vestnik Universiteta Dmitrija Pozharskogo* 10, no. 2 (2018): 64-124, <https://www.elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=37308981>.

³⁷⁵ Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 1:34–39.

bureaucratic cadres who secured their positions in the absence of it³⁷⁶ – others, especially among the progressist elites, put more weight on standardizing measures and forceful attempts to pull Finnish populations closer to the ‘Russian center’.

The precarity of the situation was amplified towards the end of the 1830s and beginning of the 1840s, since the ‘radicalization’ of the Swedish politics and the state of connectivity between Finland and Sweden continued unabated. Finnish administration looked closely for every potential outburst across the sea that aimed at Finland and Russia. It was post-director Wulfert, for example, who spotted a Swedish notice of a call by a marginal Danish newspaper, *Nordisk Ugeskrift*, to revive “the ancient unity of the Scandinavian nations” in 1837. This information was forwarded to the minister of foreign affairs, Karl von Nesselrode, with an introductory note by Menshikov: “The emperor has paid attention to the contents of the Swedish journal [...]. It is a call printed in another journal which came out in Copenhagen with the goal to prepare the minds to the revival of the union of Calmar.”³⁷⁷ Since this article framed the union as set against Russia, “a carnivorous eagle,” Nesselrode took the problem seriously and communicated with Russian representatives abroad, resulting in the Charles XIV John notorious proclamation that reinforced Swedish conservative trajectory of foreign policy.³⁷⁸

The attentiveness of Finnish institutions to Swedish and broader Scandinavian debates made it into an extra-channel of communication and knowledge-production on the North, especially in the times of tensions and crisis. Finland itself appeared in the juncture of internal and foreign imperial politics, being dependent and sensitive to the domestic pace of reforms and Swedish-Scandinavian scandals. The outcomes of the administrative anxiety thus

³⁷⁶ See, for example: Vzgl'yad na Finlandiju v 1832 godu. RGAVMF, F. 19, op. Finlyandskiy otd, d. 22. l. 34-36; Bureaucracy versus representation paradigm was developed in: Risto Alapuro, *State and Revolution in Finland* (Leiden: Brill, 2018); Esa Kontinen, “Perinteisesti Moderniin: Professioiden Yhteiskunnallinen Synty Suomessa” (PhD diss., University of Jyväskylä, 1991), 102–46, <https://jyx.jyu.fi/handle/123456789/72718>.

³⁷⁷ Wulfert’s report and consecutive documentation. GARF. F. R8091, op. 1, d. 2105, l. 1–10.

³⁷⁸ Hemstad, “I ’Tidens Fylde”, 385-87; Evgenii Egorov, “The Russian Empire and Scandinavianism: Grasping a Moving Target, 1840–1864,” in *Nordic Experiences in Pan-Nationalisms* (London: Routledge, 2023), 77–78.

ranged from emancipatory political proposals to perilous expectations of thwarting of the autonomy and hence hyperbolized sensitivity to external dangers that could easily become domestic. The empire, relying heavily on the local elites, was simultaneously a weak state in the eyes of those who sought to modernize and reprogram it and a strong realm for those whose careers and political aspiration depended on the relative autonomy that the empire was able to accommodate within its borders.

2.10. Terror of the masses: Crusenstolpe riots and their echoes in Finland

In 1838, the weakness of the Swedish government to tame the crowd and the liberal impulse surfaced most explicitly for Finlandish politicians. The riots that shattered the Swedish capital with different intensity through the three summer months were caused by the prosecution of Magnus Jacob Crusenstolpe. Magnus Crusenstolpe was a Swedish publicist, who assaulted the decisions made by Charles XIV John regarding the highest army cadres in his periodicals *Ställningar och förhållanden*. The court sentenced him to three years in prison for the breach of the press laws and defamations against the monarch. The verdict sounded overdriven and exaggerated for the broader public, especially given the context of a relative freedom of press in Sweden.³⁷⁹

As contemporary Swedish politician wrote, the crowd, consisting of artisans and workers commonly referred as ‘plebs’, aimed to storm the City Hall and to release the prisoner-became-martyr. The king was worried about the precedent that threatened the public order in the capital and wanted to approach the scene, but his advisors changed his opinion: his presence would be in vain because he could not speak Swedish.³⁸⁰ While the crowd seemed to have calmed during the day, the night appeared strained with many shot dead in the streets. The

³⁷⁹ Georg Ulfsparré, *Från Karl XIV Johans dagar: Historiska anteckningar* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt, 1907), 211-225; Ture Nerman, *Crusenstolpes kravaller. Historiskt reportage från Stockholm sommaren 1838* (Stockholm: Saxon and Lindström, 1938); Stråth, *Sveriges historia 1830-1920*, 48-51.

³⁸⁰ Ulfsparré, *Från Karl XIV Johans dagar*, 211-225.

agitation continued throughout the whole summer with varying intensity, and the oppositional journals reinforced the crowd's claims situating the Crusenstolpe affair into the matrix of pending questions regarding liberalism, freedom of press, representation, and the overall trajectory of the internal policy.³⁸¹

Russian audience had a chance to get acquainted with these events through the travel notes written by Faddei Bulgarin, earlier a fighter for the Polish independence during the Napoleonic Wars and a liberal publicist, then a popular Russian conservative author and a collaborator of the Third Section who happened to travel around Sweden at the time.³⁸² His attitude in many ways revealed a typical conservative-aristocratic stance towards the events in Stockholm and overall political life in Sweden. Although he was generally satisfied with the order and quietness in the Swedish capital, Bulgarin witnessed the protests and described them characteristically. On the evening of his arrival, he, tired after a long day of walking, came home to rest. His sleep, however, was disturbed:

Upon the day of my arrival in Stockholm, the plebs (*chern'*) in the capital embarked on rioting. A lot was written about this event, many lies printed in the newspapers and talks, and the very event was exaggerated. To begin with, there was nothing *political* [my italics – EE] about it.³⁸³

This is an interesting remark that points to a completely different understanding of the boundaries and qualification of the political. As Bulgarin defined the reasons, Crusenstolpe assaulted the decision made by Charles XIV and then the jury sentenced him to several years in prison. The crowd, consisting of sailors, artisans, and workers, came up to the city prison

³⁸¹ Berglund, 'Massans röst', 323–39.

³⁸² Abram Rejtlat, *Vidok Figljarin: pis'ma i agenturnye zapiski F.V. Bulgarina v III otdelenie* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 1998), 5–40.

³⁸³ Faddei Bulgarin, *Letnjaja progulka po Finljandii i Shvecii: v 1838 godu*, vol. 2 (Saint-Petersburg: Tipografija Ekspedicii Zagotovlenija Gosudarstvennych bumag, 1839), 11–13.

and demanded his release. The situation ignited when one of the ‘drunkards’ attempted to throw a stone into an officer. The soldiers started firing into the crowd, and the conflict erupted into several night battles around the city.

For a visitor coming from the context of the Russian empire, crowds obviously could not do any politics. Disparaging qualifiers such as plebs and drunkards amplified this intuition, for the genuine politics was delegated to the court, aristocrats, and the Riksdag while these masses only disturbed Bulgarin’s sleep:

All fair people in Sweden that have property or earn their living by fair labor, all scientists and writers expressed their anger towards these events, and even asked the government to take the strictest possible measures [...] All in all, an outstanding spirit, love, and trust towards the government reigns in Sweden. But plebs is everywhere an animal.³⁸⁴

The vulgar class-based analysis surfaced clearly in Bulgarin’s narrative. In several days, this animal-crowd again disturbed his sleep: ‘Horses, patrol’s steps, plebs’ outraging cries and fight on my street did not let me fall asleep. There is nothing to do, one must endure. The animal was curbed!’ The pique of Bulgarin’s critique then turned against lawyers who ostensibly sparked revolutionary tendencies. Bulgarin mourned that newspaper business became driven by legal professionals who sought to destroy the regime architecture, and writers were only responsible for literature sections.³⁸⁵ One of the most exemplary of such trends was the newspaper *Aftonbladet*, which was according to Bulgarin read by all classes of society: ‘Everybody has a piece of *Aftonbladet* at his hands, even those who did not agree with its opinion’.³⁸⁶ Almost omnipresent at every public convention, the journal absolutely dominated

³⁸⁴ Bulgarin, *Letnjaja progulka*, 15.

³⁸⁵ *Ibid*, 13.

³⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 124.

the public debate, according to the author. Although the newspaper was oppositional and centered on lower classes, Bulgarin appreciated the talent of its editor L.J. Hjerta.³⁸⁷

The intervention of a new agency into the world of politics concerned the authorities and imperial travelers in the Nordic kingdom, especially when contrasted with another political demonstration that happened during the same summer in Stockholm – namely, the unexpected visit of Nicholas I. In May/June 1838 Grand Duke Alexander was meant to visit the Swedish court and the old king Charles XIV John. Nicholas who at first planned to go to Poland changed his plans and joined his sons on their voyage to Stockholm. The emperor wanted to surprise Charles with his discreet arrival. Indeed, his appearance stunned both the royal family and public who awaited only the Grand Duke. The visit was widely covered in the newspapers and as some memoirs reflected, his presence totally absorbed the public discussion. The Swedish politicians' memoirs painted his arrival as the spectacular event, and the emperor as the stately figure of enormous energy. His appearance, 'one head higher than everyone', his manners, and attitudes were praised almost universally among the nobility.³⁸⁸

Bulgarin, who did not have a chance to see the emperor, noted the consequences of his stay: everybody was pleased with Nicholas I's short presence at the capital. He encountered numerous talks, toasts, and commentaries that praised the figure of the emperor and the friendship between Charles XIV John and Nicholas. Contrasted with the uncontrollable masses in the streets of Stockholm, the emperor and his mighty rule appeared as the glorious and powerful alternative, especially given Nicholas I's earlier calming of the cholera riots in Saint-Petersburg that became a part of his scenario of power.³⁸⁹ Alexander Armfelt who received the

³⁸⁷ Ibid, 210-211.

³⁸⁸ Vladimir Fel'kner, "Poezdka imperatora Nikolaja Pavlovicha v Stokgol'm v 1838 godu", *Russkaja starina* 12, (1875): 160-174; Ulfsparré, *Från Karl XIV Johans dagar*, 194-188. S.G. Troil, *Minnen från Carl XIV:s, Oscar I:s och Carl XV:s dagar*, vol. 2 (Norrköping 1884-1885), 45-67; Richard S. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy from Peter the Great to the Abdication of Nicholas II - New Abridged One-Volume Edition* (Princeton University Press, 2013), 144-5.

³⁸⁹ Bulgarin, *Letnjaja progulka*, 17-22.

news from Stockholm about the repeated riots in September while on his trip in Europe was not so optimistic about the tsar's arrival. He wrote: 'I am afraid that the voyage of the emperor temporarily harmed the today's dynasty!' The Swedish dynasty either as compared with the emperor's power as an autocratic monarch or as connected to the conservative Russia which annoyed the liberal opposition again appeared weakened and losing control over its population.³⁹⁰

As then minister state-secretary Rehbinder was quick to inform governor-general, the sorrowful events in Stockholm did not have any influence in Finland. The future of Sweden, however, appeared doubtful, especially in the case that the government would not tame the oppositional party.³⁹¹ Even if Finland was not affected, it was the very nature of its political landscape – still in close dependence from Sweden – that made the state-secretary react onto Swedish events and report on Finlandish echoes of them. Other administrators accordingly informed Menshikov on perilous events foreseeing most fatal expectations while some members of the government even speculated on the memory of the *coup d'état* of 1809 in Sweden. Many of them were able to capitalize on these tendencies and to request further distancing from Swedish political life and institutional dependence still intact, on which I will elaborate further.³⁹²

For a moment, let us return to Bulgarin, whose role in these events did not limit itself to travel writing on Sweden. First, his travelogue consisted of two parts, and a huge bulk of the first and smaller part of the second were devoted to Finland. Bulgarin pained Finland under the Russian rule in brightest colors, appreciating the Finlanders loyalty and solidarity that was partially fostered by the benefits provided by the Russian empire. Politics were completely missing from the narrative, while Swedish past surfaced rather in reconciliatory mode with

³⁹⁰ Armfelt – Menshikov. Received 5 / 17 October 1838. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 18, l. 11.

³⁹¹ Rehbinder – Menshikov, 22 August / 3 September 1838. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 259, l. 23-23ob.

³⁹² Haartman – Menshikov, 31 October 1838. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 81, l. 3ob.

present position under the Russian scepter. The population, according to the narrative, enjoyed the privileges of their current position.³⁹³ This was only one side of the story, while Bulgarin's agent notes for the Third Section pictured a much more depressive image.³⁹⁴

The note, attributed to him by *Rejtlat*, started by addressing the confusion: 'They think that Finland is absolutely satisfied and considers itself happy'.³⁹⁵ Bulgarin, however, elaborated that the connection with Sweden, contingent on history and culture, still persevered while Swedish politicians professed the idea of reannexing Finland, exacerbated by the weakness of the conservative government and the rise of the middle class, probably referring to the *Crustenstolpe* riots that he had a chance witnessed. The Ministry of Finance of the Russian empire worsened the situation by imposing restrictive tariffs on the import of Finnish goods into the imperial domains, prompting the population to keep their trade with Sweden. Bulgarin saw the only remedy in the recalibration of the financial policy of the Russian empire. Swedish Finlanders, the document asserted, could hardly ever forget their ties to Sweden, but the Russian empire was able to supply them such profits that Sweden simply could not allocate.³⁹⁶

Governor-general and other administrators elaborated on this text, supplied to Finnish administration by the Third Section, in their interests of cutting of Finland from its monetary alliance with Sweden, still preserved after the political break-up.³⁹⁷ The chancellery of the governor-general reinforced the critique levelled at the Ministry of Finance that strove to uphold severe tariffs on Finnish products thus making the inhabitants of the duchy reorient the trajectory of trade towards the neighboring shore. This connection resulted in the masses of Swedish banknotes that came into the duchy.³⁹⁸ Indeed, immediately after the

³⁹³ Bulgarin, *Letnjaja progulka po Finljandii i Shvecii*, vol. 1.

³⁹⁴ *Rejtlat*, *Vidok Figljarin*, 454–55.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 454.

³⁹⁶ GARF. F. 109 s/a, op. 3a, d. 1350. l. 1-6.

³⁹⁷ Hirn, *Alexander Armfelt, början av en statsmannobana, 1832-1841*, 314–22; Kalleinen, *Isänmaani onni on kuulua venäjälle*, 150–51; Engman, *Ett långt farväl*, 149–50.

³⁹⁸ GARF. F. 109 s/a, op. 3a, d. 1350. l. 7-10; Same edited reply in: KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto I, Df 1, l. 206-11.

Crusenstolpe riots, Lars Gabriel von Haartman wrote to governor-general that the only remedy to distance Finland from the critical political condition of Sweden was the introduction of the Russian currency.³⁹⁹

Finally, towards the end of 1830s, the decision to leave the monetary agreement was promulgated. It is notable that this administrative campaign was justified not only by its economic flaws but rather by political perturbations that were taking place in Sweden. The riots in Stockholm that erupted in the summer-autumn of 1838 became a favorable condition to demonstrate the unreliability of the Swedish political and economic organization. The amplification of the external trigger to reinforce internal reforms pointed to the special position of Finland as a composite part of the imperial domains. It was set in the juncture of internal and external policy of the empire while its administrators often performed along the diplomatic lines of communication, having in mind regional political dynamics. Financial policy appeared on the political loyalty lists of balance across the imperial domains.⁴⁰⁰

It was not only the political turmoil that brought this question to the fore but also messy exchange rates and tax collections that involved the calculation in many currencies simultaneously. However, the political magnitude of the events in Sweden were pivotal in the decision-making. Menshikov agreed with Hartmann, noting that ‘affairs with Sweden hardly help to cut off the sympathies of some regions of Finland from overseas neighbors,’ and emphasized that the government’s goal was to suppress such ‘limitrophe interests.’⁴⁰¹ The decision to introduce silver rubles as the only means of exchange instead of the Swedish banknotes became the first step in the programme aimed to dismantle established economic and institutional relations. Informing the Minister of Finance Egor Kankrin on this measure, Menshikov noted that the financial system of Finland was ‘in some way in the hands of

³⁹⁹ Haartman – Menshikov, 31 October 1838. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 81, l. 3ob.

⁴⁰⁰ Ekaterina Pravilova, *Finansy imperii: Den'gi i vlast' v politike Rossii na nacional'nyh okrainah. 1801–1917* (Moscow: Novoe izdatel'stvo, 2006), 7–101.

⁴⁰¹ Menshikov – Haartman, 4 / 16 November 1838. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 81, l. 11.

Sweden' and, therefore, any overhaul in this country could have a negative impact on the financial life of the Grand Duchy.⁴⁰²

Starting in 1840, Swedish banknotes in Finland were being gradually expelled from use and an all-imperial monetary system based on silver monometallism was introduced. Kankrin's financial reform of the budgetary unification in the imperial proper and in Poland also featured as a convenient opportunity for Finland to join the trend.⁴⁰³ In the report of 1844, Menshikov noted the successful withdrawal of Swedish banknotes from circulation as the main achievement that made it possible to terminate the monetary union with the country 'whose intentions for Finland could not and should not inspire confidence.'⁴⁰⁴ A few years later, Fischer presented a report to acting governor-general Rokassovsky, where, as a background, he also emphasized the ideological reasons for the financial reform: in Sweden, liberalism and hatred of the monarchy reached dangerous proportions, and 'the affinity of the [Swedish and Finnish] educated class' could challenge the existing order in Finland. Fisher noted that if earlier this connection did not produce much concern, everything changed when dangerous political views started to emerge across the sea. The eradication of the Swedish coin and the relaxation of tariffs with the empire was supposed to break the dangerous connection between Finland and Sweden.⁴⁰⁵

Economic connections, in the eyes of the local administration and the Third Section certainly featured as binding lines between Sweden and Finland that could be responsible for the circulation of political discourses, on the one hand, and social disturbances tied to industrialization, proletarianization, and debt, on the other.⁴⁰⁶ Moreover, this connection

⁴⁰² Menshikov – Kankrin, 14 / 26 March 1840. KA. KKK, Dd: 2, N. 252.

⁴⁰³ Pravilova, *Finansy imperii*, 41–80.

⁴⁰⁴ Vsepoddannejshij doklad general-gubernatora za 1844 god. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIb 34c, l. 135-136.

⁴⁰⁵ Fisher's report. GARF. F. R8091, op. 1, d. 2002, l. 1-5. On tariff changes: Lavonius, *Om tull-lagstiftningen i Finland*, 52–54.

⁴⁰⁶ Haartman considered credit system in Sweden contrary to the 'natural development': Extrait de la lettre de mr Haartman, du 28 août 1837. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 57, l. 49-51. Kankrin was concerned with the pace of

challenged the imperial attempt to pull Finland closer to Russia in other spheres. The protracted implementation of this measure, nevertheless, pointed to the state of profound dependency between Sweden and Finland. The end date for the exchange of Swedish banknotes for silver coins was constantly shifted up to 1849 since Swedish money was still in circulation in remote regions of the country which emphasized the depth of dependence that dominated over the financial system.⁴⁰⁷ In 1848, an anonymous Swedish-language pamphlet demanded that the financial laws of the principality be returned to the state before 1842: apparently, the break with Sweden was not so welcomed across the duchy as governor-general reported to the emperor.⁴⁰⁸

Moreover, the connectedness with Sweden in other spheres persisted regardless of the governmental political programmes. Apart from obvious ties of language, laws and trade, infrastructural dependence manifested itself most powerfully. When the special tariff with Sweden was terminated in 1844, which again might have been caused more by political than economic reasons, steelworks in Finland, originally designed to work on the Swedish ore, sent a request to change the tariff so that some of the raw materials were not subject to high duties.⁴⁰⁹ Many Finnish specialists travelled to Sweden to improve their skills, and Swedish instructors were sent out to train their Finnish colleagues.⁴¹⁰ Finally, the most ambitious construction project of the middle of the century, the Saima Canal, which was supposed to be a new economic driver after the break-up with Sweden, could not be built without exchange of knowledge and experience. Several Finlandish engineers were sent to Sweden to familiarize

industrialization and its social effects: Nikolaj Mihajlovich Arsent'ev, 'Dilemma Industrializacii Rossii v Xix v', *Jekonomicheskaja Istorija* 38, no. 3 (2017): 31–49.

⁴⁰⁷ Engman, *Ett långt farväl*, 149–53.

⁴⁰⁸ Of course, the year of 1848 produced new concerns and new financial problem due to the lack of monetary circulation. Nordenstam – Menshikov, 2 / 14 April 1848. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 205, l. 28.

⁴⁰⁹ Lavonius, *Om tull-langstiftningen i Finland*, 73-74; GARF. F. R8091, op. 1a, d. 1029.

⁴¹⁰ GARF. F. R8091, op. 1, d. 2114, l. 132-132ob; GARF. F. R8091, op. 1, d. 2115, l. 231.

themselves with the canals, while the chief engineer of the project in Finland was the Swede Ericson.⁴¹¹

Social relations could not be halted so easily as well. Kinship ties crossed the borders, and many requests for leave that passed through the office of the Minister of State Secretary were requested to visit relatives in the neighboring country.⁴¹² Most requests for the obtainment of Finlandish subjecthood also came from Swedish subjects, just as permission to move was most often requested to Sweden.⁴¹³ Finland's balance of trade, although mostly reoriented to market relations with the Russian empire, as affected by the new monetary policy and later tariff modernization, still retained close ties with the neighboring kingdoms, and the trade with 'Sweden and Norway' surfaced on a separate line away from 'the rest of the countries' in trade balance accounts.⁴¹⁴ Sweden was still deeply ingrained into the Finlandish public and private life with some spheres being politicized as a result of the administrative anxieties while others still remained ignored by or inaccessible for governmental intervention. The intensiveness of the Swedish political dynamics and Finlandish administrative alarmism would, however, affect the diminishing number of those spheres that previously could enjoy the lack of governmental suspicion in Finland, especially given the emperor's growing concerns about European political tendencies.

⁴¹¹ GARF. F. R8091, op. 1, d. 2106, l. 253-255. See on how canals and infrastructures often could play political role: Thomas Gauchet, *Le canal de Göta: projet technique et pouvoirs en Europe du Nord (1790-1832)* (Presses des mines, 2021); Björn Hasselgren, 'Une Histoire Politique Du Canal de Göta: Technique, Infrastructure et Pouvoirs En Europe Du Nord (Années 1790–1832) [A Political History of Göta Canal: Technology, Infrastructure and Power in Northern Europe (1790–1832)] by Thomas Gauchet (Review)', *Technology and Culture* 63, no. 4 (2022): 1192–94, <https://doi.org/10.1353/tech.2022.0200>.

⁴¹² See, for example: GARF. F. R8091, op. 1a, d. 303, 13 May 1853. Benckendorff and Bulgarin also highlighted the embrace of kinship in their texts.

⁴¹³ See, for example: GARF. F. R8091, op. 1a, d. 196, 9 August 1843.

⁴¹⁴ On trade balance of Finland see, for example: GARF. F. R8091, op. 1a, d. 197, 15 December 1843.

2.11. Finland and Norden: the jubilee of the Imperial Alexander University in 1840

In 1840, the festival in honor of the 200-years jubilee of the Alexander University in Helsingfors was planned with a big pomp by the local authorities and university staff. Among the planned activities, besides the meeting of Russian, Finlandish, and Swedish academics, promotions to honorary degrees were on the list both for the residents and for the outstanding representatives of the Nordic, primarily Swedish, academic world. The case of the university jubilee drew the lines of negotiation that situated the university simultaneously in the Nordic and the imperial abode, highlighting governmental care about the progress of education and culture.⁴¹⁵ Not everything, however, went according to the plan, and Nordicness of the event surfaced in the poetical aspects of representation and in quite bureaucratic concerns over the benevolence of the occasion.

First, many fears precluded the organization of the festival. The political situation in Sweden, never stabilizing and endemic to the existing regime, in the views of the local administration, emanated obvious threats.⁴¹⁶ The election to the Riksdag at the beginning of the year once again proved the growing power of the opposition, while the government and King Charles XIV John – old and weak, according to some administrative views⁴¹⁷ – recognized the necessity to change the representative system. The year of 1840 was commonly referred to as the ‘oppositional breakthrough’.⁴¹⁸ The union between Sweden and Norway – the latter usually regarded as an excessively liberal state – ostensibly contributed to the spread of republican ideas southward, and Haartman predicted towards the end of 1839 that the monarchy would not stand if not for the capable and nationally-approved ministry (*capable et national*).⁴¹⁹ The ‘foreign’ nature of Charles XIV John’s rule, who was invited to the throne

⁴¹⁵ Dhondt points to the preeminence of Nordicness and Finnishness in the scenarios of the event: Pieter Dhondt, *National, Nordic or European?*, 13–38.

⁴¹⁶ Rehbinder – Menshikov. 17 / 29 May 1840. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 259, l. 29ob.

⁴¹⁷ Matushevich – Menshikov, 26 May / 7 April 1841. RGAVMF. F.19, op. 2, d. 135, l. 93ob.

⁴¹⁸ Berglund, ‘Massans röst’, 342–48.

⁴¹⁹ Haartman – Menshikov, 9 November 1839. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 57, l. 64-5.

and never learned to speak the national language, must have added fuel to the fire in these calculations.

When these events were blooming in the Swedish political landscape with different groups partaking in political agitation, the students of the Upsala University expressed their desire to travel to Helsingfors to participate in the jubilee festivals, and in June 1840 many of them hoped that they would be invited to the event.⁴²⁰ The Finlandish administration, however, recognized the mobilizing role of students in the processes that were currently developing in Sweden, and during the next month they made clear that Swedish students were not welcome.⁴²¹ The administration worried that the students of the Upsala University were in close relations with Adolf Ivar Arwidsson, a famous Finlandish publicist who in the middle of the 1820s had to emigrate to Stockholm because of the outrage his newspaper produced in the governmental circles of Finland at the time.⁴²²

The new wave of his fame arose thanks to his 1838 publication *Finland och dess framtid* – whose publication some intellectuals of the duchy put on the same shelf with Crusenstolpe-related literature⁴²³ – under the pseudonym Pekka Kuoharinen that immediately reached the attention of the Swedish and Finlandish public.⁴²⁴ Curiously, Arwidsson's take on the political architecture in Finland resembled much later rhetoric of the late 19th century Russian legal scholars and historians who deprived Finland of any notion of statehood.⁴²⁵ Arwidsson's critique was directed against recently published essay by conservative Israel Hwasser on the so-called politics of 1812, meaning the alliance between Sweden and Russia. While Hwasser

⁴²⁰ Dhondt, *National, Nordic or European?*, 13-20.

⁴²¹ *Dagligt Allehanda*, 21.07.1840.

⁴²² Eino Karhu, *Finlåndskaja literatura i Rossija: 1800-1850* (Turku: Estonskoe gos. izd-vo, 1962), 42-81; Irina Takala, 'Ot Fennofil'stva k Fennomanii: Henrik Gabrijel' Portan i Stanovlenie Nacional'noj Mysli Finljandii', *Uchenye Zapiski Petrozavodskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta* 140, no. 3 (2014): 7-14.

⁴²³ Schauman, *Från sex årtionden i Finland*, 1: 52.

⁴²⁴ Kari Tarkiainen, "Bibliotekarien Adolf Ivar Arwidsson och spekulationerna om Finlands framtid," *Biblis* 46, (2015): 63-69; Wulfert – Menshikov, 22 January 1838. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 54, l. 15; Reh binder – Menshikov, 5 December 1838. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 196, l. 142-3. The excerpts were translated for Menshikov: F. 19, op. Finlyandskiy otd, d. 24, l. 64-68.

⁴²⁵ Borodkin reflected on this coincidence as well: Mikhail Borodkin, *Vasser i Arvidson* (Helsingfors, 1914).

argued that Finland and the Russian empire established a separate peace treaty and hence Finnish parastatal agency was recognized, Arwidsson opposed this view.⁴²⁶

In his narrative, Finland never became anything except a mere province of the Russian empire while its privileges and laws were recognized only to ensure the loyalty of its inhabitants in a similar way as other empires of the past and present expanded their territories by giving concession to the local population. The emperor was the only true ruler while Finnish administration was downplayed to the role of his marionets that concerned themselves with petty questions. The legal framework, according to the author, although generally preserved, gave way to Russian interventions, most prominently that of establishing new censorship regime. Arwidsson's position differed from the late 19th imperial scholars in one paramount aspect: it, contrary to later nationalist concerns, favored the tendencies of Finnish rapprochement with Sweden.⁴²⁷

Whereas Hwasser highlighted the pragmatic rationality of those Finnish inhabitants that quickly recognized the profitability of its connection to the Russian empire on the grounds of provided stability, Arwidsson asserted that several hundred years of common history and identity could not be demolished in such a short period of time. Moreover, Sweden granted Finland with education, culture, and legal framework, and Finnish inhabitants should have been grateful to the motherland for this gift. He also renounced cultural and political distancing that took place between Finland and Sweden, for this break-up could have led to dramatic consequences. While he stressed that his argument did not back up revanchist agenda of recapturing Finland, the duchy should have sought mutual understanding and negotiation with

⁴²⁶ Israel Hwasser, *Om Allians-tractaten emellan Sverige och Ryssland år 1812: Politisk betraktelse öfver Nordens nuvarande ställning* (Stockholm: Hörbergiska boktryckeriet, 1838), 15–16; Pekka Kuoharinen [Adolf Iwar Arwidsson], *Finland och dess framtid. I anledning af skriften: Om Allians-tractaten emellan Sverige och Ryssland år 1812*, (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt, 1840), 12–18.

⁴²⁷ [Arwidsson], *Finland och dess framtid. I anledning af skriften*, 24–28.

Sweden rather than set itself in the radical opposition to obtain its own nationality and history.⁴²⁸

The Hwasser-Arwidsson controversy for a moment captured central position in the public and private debates on the shores of the Baltic Sea, even though the censorship banned the import of both issues to Finland. Besides the conflicting visions of the Finnish political organizations provided, both texts appealed to the significance of Finland's position in the new order that took regional, pan-Nordic and in Hwasser's even global dimensions. The place of Finland referred to a larger question of the Norden's stability and peace, while Hwasser imagined Finland as a bridge that connected Slavic and Asiatic Russia to the European civilization, although its ameliorating function had not yet been recognized either by the government or by the public sphere.⁴²⁹

Hwasser and Arwidsson included Russia in the imagined *Norden*, then being a geopolitical reality established by the post-Napoleonic order, on the eve of the more exclusive renegotiation of this concept in Scandinavia. Another *Norden* was emerging as a culturally and historically homogenous area represented by the population of 'the three Nordic kingdoms', thus challenging the existing conceptions.⁴³⁰ In this new interpretation, the Nordic nations' united past also conditioned their preferably consolidated future, and the Russian empire appeared as an intruder in their historical horizon and geographic realm. At the beginning of the 1840s, the meeting of the Nordic naturalists became the main venue that fostered such understanding of the North. Characteristically, the meeting of naturalists in Copenhagen that happened the same month with the Alexander Imperial University jubilee in Helsingfors

⁴²⁸ Ibid, 42–64.

⁴²⁹ Hwasser, *Om Allians-tractaten emellan Sverige och Ryssland år 1812*, 83–90.

⁴³⁰ Ruth Hemstad, 'Scandinavian Sympathies and Nordic Unity: The Rhetoric of Scandinavianness in the Nineteenth Century' in *Contesting Nordicness* ed. by Jani Marjanen, Johan Strang and Mary Hilson (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2022), 35–57, <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110730104-003>; On contests of different 'Nordics' see introduction: Johan Strang, Jani Marjanen, and Mary Hilson, "A Rhetorical Perspective on Nordicness: From Creating Unity to Exporting Models," in *Contesting Nordicness*, ed. Jani Marjanen, Johan Strang, and Mary Hilson (Berlin: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2022), 1–34, <https://doi.org/doi:10.1515/9783110730104-002>.

elicited much more attention with regards to its Nordic character in the Scandinavian mass media of the time.⁴³¹

Perilous Scandinavian-wide framework of information circulation, as stated before, was persistent on the eve of the festival-planning and during its organization. The spread of Arwidsson's contribution alarmed the administration due to the inability to control its import through the border, that Rehbinder sorrowfully admitted. He viewed this publication as an act that sought to bring the population of Finland in opposition to its Russian government.⁴³² Even more devastating was the fact that the author was of Finlandish origin, although Rehbinder and other administrators initially were not sure that it was Arwidsson. While his contribution indeed espoused inflammatory rhetoric, the Swedish oppositional journals went further in their critique of the imperial appendage in Finland and the Swedish-Russian alliance of 1812.

The Arwidsson's case haunted the administration towards the days of the University bicentenary. Upon final preparations of the festival, Haartman warned Menshikov that the group of Upsala students, who were supposedly in intimate contacts with Arwidsson, planned to reach Helsingfors directly to avoid the police surveillance in Åbo. According to his opinion, their potential arrival surfaced as an extremely important case, for their plan was none other than to propagate the ideas of the 'false liberalism' in Finland. One had to contact the Russian mission in Stockholm, as in the case that the students reach their destination *en masse*, no surveillance would be able to halt such an arrival.⁴³³ While the sea border for the most part remained open for migration and travels of various sorts, this case prompted the administration

⁴³¹ Dhondt, *National, Nordic or European?*, 14.

⁴³² Rehbinder – Menshikov, 1 December 1838. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 196, l. 142. Haartman did not believe it was Arwidsson: Haartman – Menshikov, 16 / 28 March 1839. RGAVMF. F. 19, op 2, d. 57, l. 59.

⁴³³ Haartman – Menshikov, 28 May 1840. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 57, l. 1-4; Menshikov – Haartman, 29 мая 1840. Ibid, l. 5.

to alter their perception and intensify it through monitoring and ‘remote control’ operated by its variegated agents.⁴³⁴

Several days prior to that, announcing new ‘ridiculous scandals’ in the Swedish political life, Rehbinder drew governor-general’s attention to another aspect of the public life that he regarded as a problem: the easiness of travel from Finland to Sweden. While functionaries had to receive the emperor’s permission to embark on a trip abroad and abandon their voyage plans in case the permission was not granted, the Senate easily provided authorizations to subordinate employees to visit the ‘neighbors across the sea’. This anomaly affected mostly young men whom one had to stop from ‘breathing the poisonous air of the neighboring state’.⁴³⁵ Rehbinder was wondering whether general Thesleff, governor-general’s adjunct, could halt this practice, and Menshikov assured him that necessary instructions were provided. Moreover, Menshikov updated Rehbinder on the course of actions in case of the arrival of students from Upsala. First, the administration should have surveilled their route attentively and update him. Repressive measures were not advised and recommended only in case of political provocations. Menshikov regarded such provocations as a perfect justification to put them in prison or in Sveaborg castle until repatriation.⁴³⁶

The Swedish students from Uppsala indeed never came, since Menshikov contacted Russian representative in Stockholm Matushevich to prevent them from the departure.⁴³⁷ This happened to a great dissatisfaction of several journals in Sweden that were surprised by this measure. They announced that the Russian consulate apparently was ordered not to give passports to Swedish students, correctly recognizing the mode of action.⁴³⁸ In presence of many

⁴³⁴ Aristide R. Zolberg, “Managing a World on the Move,” *Population and Development Review* 32 (2006): 222–53.

⁴³⁵ Rehbinder – Menshikov. 17 / 29 mai 1840. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 259, l. 29ob.

⁴³⁶ Menshikov – Rehbinder. RGAVMF. F. 19. Op. 3. D. 259. L. 32

⁴³⁷ Menshikov – Matushevich, 29 May / 10 June 1840. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 135, l. 77-78; Matushevich – Menshikov, 13 / 25 June 1840. Ibid, l. 79.

⁴³⁸ *Aftonbladet*, 22.07.1840; Pieter Dhondt, *National, Nordic or European?*, 20–23.

dignitaries during the solemn moment of the university jubilee, the administration sought to avoid any possibility of unwanted manifestations that the Swedish students became famous for in the course of the 1830s.

Being alarmed by one type of cross border circulation, Finlandish elites established their own lines of informational exchange that could promptly distribute necessary knowledge and provide them with the adequate tools for tackling the issues of the porous borders. Maritime border and established institutions of passport control enabled them to establish 'remote control' through diplomatic representatives across the sea.⁴³⁹ Distancing Finland from Sweden also dialectically presupposed the deployment of new instruments that could penetrate deeper into Swedish politics, Finlandish society, and diplomatic communications. Konstantin Fischer later characteristically noted in his memoirs that while there were no legal challenges for him becoming a minister state-secretary for Finland, 'this was a political place, [...] at that time demanding close relations with Sweden'.⁴⁴⁰ Although local context was paramount for decision-making and administrative imagination, pan-imperial concerns about young subjects travelling abroad and getting education there spanned as far as to include Finland already in 1834, restricting their educational mobility to Europe and pulling them into the imperial abode.⁴⁴¹

Unlike their Swedish colleagues, many students from other imperial universities were encouraged to come, and the festival almanac that was published later, noted that Helsingfors never experiences such surge of educated public ever before.⁴⁴² The Finlandish authorities certainly tolerated one vision of the Swedish-Finlandish connectivity over another, and

⁴³⁹ On remote control see also: Aristide R. Zolberg, *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 264–67.

⁴⁴⁰ Fischer, *Zapiski*, 378.

⁴⁴¹ Menshikov – Rehbinder, 6 / 18 July 1834. KA. KKK, De 1, N. 158; Maksim Shevchenko, *Konec odnogo velichija: vlast', obrazovanie i pechatnoe slovo v imperatorskoj Rossii na poroge osvoboditel'nyh reform* (Moscow: Tri Kvadrata, 2003), 97–98.

⁴⁴² Jakov Grot, *Calender Till Minne Af Kejsersliga Alexanders-Universitetets Andra Secularfest* (Helsingfors: J. Simelii Enka, 1842), 108.

administrative sanitizing of the event did annoy some commentators, especially in Sweden.⁴⁴³ Among the outstanding guests who came from Sweden as honorary persons, France Michael Franzen, who left Finland in 1811, certainly appeared in the center of the public attention. The old *skald* in his sixties, Bishop Franzen was one of the most famous poets both in Sweden and Finland whose career started well in the previous century. Without doubt a living legend of the literary world, in the eyes of the Finlandish authorities and university staff he was a perfect figure for the embodiment of the ‘good’ Swedish connection whose art only relegated to the world of literature and religion. The Swedish press, however, complained that only the old poet had a chance to visit the festival, while the youth was banned from the voyage.⁴⁴⁴

Apart from practical and bureaucratic challenges on the way of its realization, the Nordicism of the event surfaced in the scenarios of the festival. The Imperial Alexander University became a zone of cultural rapprochement between the Russian and Swedish-Nordic. Although students from Upsala did not manage to come, Franzen and Upsala librarian Schroeder visited the scene.⁴⁴⁵ Inaugurating speeches were read in Latin, Swedish, and Russian. The genealogy of the university was also rhetorically situated in the bridging position, inheriting to the Swedish Åbo Academy while being a distinctly new imperial institution. Its founding ‘fathers’ included both Swedish Queen Christina and Russian Emperor Alexander I, whose busts were put against each other in the main hall. As the university building could not fit 3000 guests, who came to visit it, St. Nicolas’s church, still under construction, emerged as a proper place for the festive days, and the almanac author noted that in Sweden such events were traditionally held in churches. Jakov Grot, who also participated in the celebration and compiled the almanac, appreciated the cosmopolitan spirit that united the representatives of the educated public.⁴⁴⁶

⁴⁴³ Dhondt, *National, Nordic or European?*, 36.

⁴⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁴⁵ Grot, *Calender Till Minne Af Kejsarliga Alexanders-Universitetets Andra Secularfest*, 107–12.

⁴⁴⁶ Grot, *Calender*, 107–17; 122.

Finally, Franzen's long poem was published in the almanac devoted to the jubilee. In the pseudo-autobiographical style, Franzen sought to reconcile himself with the loss of Finland due to the defeat of Sweden in 1809, finding it presently prosperous and cheerful. While his memory sparked images of the Swedish past, the imperial present of Finland should not have been repudiated. 'As a mother who does not find her daughter at home anymore,' he wrote, 'she should be happy for the fruits it brings'. The Swedish heritage and education gave root to the new culture that was developing independently but still in dialogue with its ex-metropole and the whole Europe.⁴⁴⁷ Russian paternalistic rule thus emerged as civilized and justifiable through fostering cosmopolitan value of education.

Indeed, the correspondence between Jakov Grot, professor of Russian at the University of Helsingfors and the rector of Saint-Peterburg University Peter Pletnew, two of them mostly responsible for the almanac, sheds light on their shared enthusiasm about showcasing Finland to the Nordic and Russian public. They framed Finland as a yet undiscovered gem, and it was their enterprise to cultivate knowledge about its culture and nature in the transnational public sphere. They viewed the festivals as a perfect scene for cosmopolitan cultural rapprochement. Grot even lamented that Tegnér, the most famous Scandinavian poet at the time, if he was still in his sane mind, might have changed his antagonistic opinion on the Russian empire when witnessing the jubilee and reading the almanac so appealing for the broader, Nordic public.⁴⁴⁸ For Grot and Pletnew, the Russian empire was a part of *Norden*, connected by the means of universalist appeal of culture and sciences.⁴⁴⁹

Pletnew and primarily Grot became two of the most outspoken enthusiasts of Finnish and Scandinavian studies and arts, and Pletnew even thought about making a lecture course in

⁴⁴⁷ Frans Michael Franzen, "Resan til Juberlfesten 1840," in *Calender Till Minne Af Kejslerliga Alexanders-Universitetets Andra Secularfest*, 135-48.

⁴⁴⁸ Pletnew – Grot, 17 September 1840 in *Perepiska Ja. K. Grot a P.A. Pletnevym*, 1:56.

⁴⁴⁹ Pletnew – Grot, 17 August 1840 in *Ibid*, 1:19: "la belle idée qu'elle contient « du Nord réuni par les lettres et les sciences » "

Helsingfors on the intertwined history of Scandinavia with that of the Russian empire.⁴⁵⁰ Grot's pieces in their commonly edited journal *Sovremennik* as well as his translations of the Northern prose and verse paved the first path for the general interest of the imperial public sphere in the Nordic culture.⁴⁵¹ Moreover, they sought to distribute the journal among those Finlanders interested in the pan-imperial cultural debates.⁴⁵² They often challenged worrisome views of political figures who looked at Sweden with grave suspicion, joking at Thesleff's fear of everything Swedish, for example.⁴⁵³ It is doubtful that Finland or Scandinavia ever surfaced prominently in the focus of the cultural attention of Saint-Petersburg public, except for summer months when many respectable families went to Finland for a holiday, but they certainly sporadically emerged there, mostly targeting tourist destinations or cultural events. In Finland, however, the public and the administration looked more attentively at the political repercussions of the new Nordicness.

These encounters and expectation of the Finnish administration affected their later encounter with Scandinavianism, seen as continuation and intensification of the Swedish radical politics. Established specific channels of communication within the Finnish administration, language of rationalization usually applied to Swedish politics, recognized necessity to create a distance with contemporary processes in the neighboring kingdom, anxieties about middle class's rise to power and excesses of industrial development provided a matrix of perception that determined further reactions of the authorities on new products of Swedish-Scandinavian intellectual and political life. Finland was in the juncture of many tendencies that included centralizing gravity of Saint-Petersburg, aristocratic pan-imperial

⁴⁵⁰ Pletnew – Grot, 13 September 1840 in *Ibid*, 1:52.

⁴⁵¹ Karhu, *Finlåndskaja literatura i Rossija*, 113-96; Dmitrij Sharypkin, *Skandinavskaja Literatura v Rossii* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1980); Lijsa Bjukling, “Jakov Grot v Finljandii (1840-1853 gg.) ‘Sredovik mezhdur Rus’ju i Finljandiju,’” in *Finljandija i Rossija: obrazy obshhego proshlogo*, ed. Irina Takala and Alexander Tolstikov (Petrozavodsk: Petrozavodskij gosudarstvennyj universitet, 2014), 50–66.

⁴⁵² Grot – Pletnew, 17 August 1840 in *Perepiska Ja. K. Grota s P.A. Pletnevym*, 1:20.

⁴⁵³ Grot – Pletnew, 20 August 1840 in *Ibid*, 1:23.

visions of governor-general, local demands for the protection of the duchy's autonomy, cosmopolitan cultural interests, rising Swedish liberal and even revanchist pretensions together with Finnish-centered cultural tendencies that I will address further. Scandinavianism manifested its presence in this grid and contributed to its development.

2.12. First encounters with Scandinavianism: student festivals in Sweden in 1843

Small meetings of Scandinavian students at the end of the 1830 and first two years of the 1840s grew up in scale and changed in character in 1843. Usually considered the first Scandinavian student festivals, the meeting in Upsala in June 1843 for the first time forcefully manifested pan-Scandinavian agenda in the political sphere in Sweden. While it drew on pan-national mythologies and intermingled histories of the Nordic nations, its political programme explicitly posited liberal standpoints and republican echoes together with the idea of the (federative) union of the Scandinavian kingdoms.⁴⁵⁴ Moreover, the students and other participants of the festivals highlighted the antagonism between the 'free', liberal *Norden* and barbarous, Asiatic Russia that ostensibly sought territorial expansion in Scandinavia. Some ideologists of the pan-Scandinavian political consolidation envisioned eventual revanchist action to recapture Finland once the future united Scandinavia would have enough power to crush Russia.⁴⁵⁵

A year prior to that the Finnish administration apprehensively looked at the Convention of Scandinavian Naturalists, suspecting political disturbances upon their invitation of Finnish colleagues. It, however, finally proved an event unrelated to politics in the administrative reading, contrary to the ensuing tradition of student meetings.⁴⁵⁶ The weakening grip of Charles XIV John, solidifying liberal opposition, and ostensibly belligerent views of

⁴⁵⁴ See: Chapter 1.

⁴⁵⁵ Clausen, *Skandinavismen: historisk fremstillet*, 46–86; Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 162–65; 186.

⁴⁵⁶ Wulfert – Menshikov, 17/29 September 1842. RGAVMF. F. 19, op, 3, d. 71, l. 54.

Oscar I, however, contributed to the apprehension of the Finnish government and even expectations of war on the Northern front, as cabinet documentation testified.⁴⁵⁷

The student convention of 1843 that occurred in the moment of these diverse tensions, on the one hand, had a completely different political gravity but was contextualized against the backdrop of familiar processes. Newspaper debates for the first time concerned themselves with Scandinavianism and its political programme seriously that echoed in court cases with regards to censorship regulations in Denmark.⁴⁵⁸ Scandinavianism became well-known even beyond the regional borders. The administration of Finland and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly paid attention to the disturbances inflicted by the studying youth. While the existing historiography paid attention to Finnish reaction on Scandinavianism during this year, it failed to address decision-making and further considerations in detail that, however, were essential for situating governmental anxieties, public manifestations, and personal experiences.⁴⁵⁹

The qualifiers that were elaborated during the long and unpleasant encounter of the Finnish administration with the changing dynamics of political life in Sweden surfaced in their attempts to rationalize and, eventually, condemn the student convention of 1843. Their elaborated rhetoric that used to address the anxieties of revolution, political manifestation, and indictments against the empire was deployed to situate pan-Scandinavian festivals in the net of familiar categories of the political field. The meeting itself reassured the administration in the unfavorable trajectory that the Swedish government pursued and in the weakness of the monarchical power that was unable to prevent sorrowful outcomes of the convention. The

⁴⁵⁷ O vrazhdebnom dlja Rossii nastroenii shvedov. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. Finlyandskiy otd, d. 24, l. 164-167.

⁴⁵⁸ Clausen, *Skandinavismen: historisk fremstillet*, 75–85; Ruth Hemstad, "I 'Tidens Fylde'," 377–404.

⁴⁵⁹ Primarily with regards to this period: Hugo E. Pipping, "Finlands ställning till Skandinavismen," *Förhandlingar och uppsatser*, no. 34 (1921): 131–95. Best treated in: Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 1:92–97. But see also for later period: Runar Johansson, "Skandinavismen i Finland," *Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier*, no. 6 (1930): 256–68; Mikko Juva, "Skandinavismens påverkan på de politiska strömningarna i Finland," *Historisk Tidskrift (Stockholm)*, no. 77 (1957): 330–37.

encounter with Scandinavianism again pointed to the network structure of the Finnish administration and revealed the channels of knowledge-production and decision-making tied to the office of governor-general, on the one hand, and diplomatic representatives, on the other.⁴⁶⁰

The planning of the festival of Nordic students started in April when enthusiasts from Lund launched their negotiations with Copenhagen. Students from Copenhagen organized a meeting to decide on the fate of the enterprise, and the commission gave green light to the idea in the case that a reasonable number of students would express their willingness to visit Sweden by May 1.⁴⁶¹ Similar committee gathered in Lund and articulated their enthusiasm about the idea. The main challenge was transportation, but the organizing committee in Copenhagen quickly got a favorable deal with the steamship *Iris*. Again, in the 1840s the railroad planning was only nascent in Scandinavia, and maritime connection established by steamship passage figured as more consolidating. The imaginary of the sea as uniting featured prominently in the Scandinavian imagination.⁴⁶²

In May, the invitation to the festival was sent from Lund to Copenhagen, Christiania and Helsingfors. An anonymous author who later compiled an almanac about the festival mentioned both invitations in one and the same sentence, and the request to Helsingfors must have come as natural. Helsingfors featured as a knot in the network of the Nordic universities, and the Russian rule did not alter this situation, at least for the present moment.⁴⁶³ While the narrative in the almanac then jumped forward to the day of the departure of the Danish students from Copenhagen, the story in Finland developed along a more complicated trajectory. Whereas Danish and Swedish government were equally concerned about the travelling

⁴⁶⁰ About the latter see more in Chapter 3.

⁴⁶¹ *Beretning om studentertoget til Upsala i juni maaned 1843* (København: Berlingske, 1844), 1–15.

⁴⁶² Nilsson, *I rörelse*, 83–98.

⁴⁶³ *Beretning om studentertoget til Upsala i juni maaned 1843*, 12.

students, they were eventually unable to prevent the voyage, opening prospects for Finnish students to join as well.

Alexander Wulffert as a post-director occurred in the center of communication concerning the student festivals. As they took place during summer, a period when many bureaucrats sought to leave their usual locations for other environments, the communication slightly lagged behind the events. Wulffert, for example, found himself in Saint-Petersburg. This might have been the reason why several students from Helsingfors were able to travel to the Scandinavian festival, having bypassed direct surveillance and control on the ground, although its power should not be overstressed even under more plausible conditions. On 18/30 May, Wulffert informed Menshikov that upon the receipt of the invitation, rector Nils Abraham Ursin addressed the scholarly community saying that those who wished to embark on a trip were free to join. Only few, however, expressed their willingness to go, as the enterprise was considered an expression of youthful vanity without, however, any political background. Wulffert's letter seemed to imply that the rector addressed lecturers rather than students first.⁴⁶⁴

Wulffert also attached the invitation letter from Lund translated into German that addressed students at the University of Helsingfors. The letter welcomed all friends of 'the Nordic integrity and community' and highlighted the shared sense of the comradeship and youthfulness among the students, without invoking any political arguments or notions of historically determined Scandinavian union.⁴⁶⁵ In his next letter on 11 / 23 May, Wulffert noted that rector delivered the letter to the students.⁴⁶⁶ At the beginning, the convention of the Nordic students did not provoke much suspicion on the side of the university administration and other functionaries. Although one had to monitor it attentively, the information was not concealed

⁴⁶⁴ Wulffert – Menshikov, 18 / 30 May 1843. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 54, l. 118

⁴⁶⁵ Wulffert – Menshikov, Ibid, l. 119.

⁴⁶⁶ Wulffert – Menshikov, 11 / 23 May. Ibid, l. 120.

from students and the outright prohibition was not introduced at first. As this was the first festival of such scale, one could only assume the trajectory of its development, even those who aimed to participate in it.

The post-director then diverted from this topic, describing first the common enthusiasm about the arrival of Grand Duke Constantin Nikolayevich in Wasa on his name-day. Whereas Grand Duke Constantin's presence captured the paramount place in the letter, Wulffert noted that at least five Finlandish students embarked on a trip to Upsala. However, those students were *von gutem Renome*, and three of them informed Wulffert's associate that they would return as soon as they noticed any minimal presence of political tendencies at the festival.⁴⁶⁷ The administration worried, given the studentship's usual political tendencies that came to the forefront at the 1820s in Europe and slightly later in the Nordics, that the subjects of the Russian emperor could potentially be enmeshed in unwanted manifestations. Indeed, their intuition was correct, given both bold rhetoric of the participants and the administrative reading of it.

The political tendencies to a great dissatisfaction of the Finlandish administration rapidly surfaced in Sweden. 'In a possible hurry', Wulffert provided to Menshikov excerpts from Swedish newspapers that covered the meeting. In the same letter, he also noted that he had already orally informed Menshikov on the 'tendency of Scandinavian Union' prior to that.⁴⁶⁸ The two must have met in Saint-Petersburg in May or early June. Wulffert supplied the letter with excerpts from Swedish newspapers. The reason for choosing these pieces of text becomes clear from their content: all of them mentioned either Russia or Finland, Finlandish subjects of the emperor, or pertained to the political reification of the union. Thus, an author of the piece from *Phoenix* stated that the aspirations of the students should have been supported in diplomatic offices. The text included excerpts of Poulsen's speech, that called for a shift

⁴⁶⁷ Wulffert – Menshikov, 30 May / 11 June 1843. Ibid, 1. 42

⁴⁶⁸ Wulffert – Menshikov, 4 / 16 June 1843. Ibid, 1. 47-8

from theoretical reasoning to ‘bold action’ (underlined) for the common future of Scandinavia. Far more radical was an article from *Dagligt Allehanda*, in which the political unity of the ‘free’ and ‘enlightened’ Scandinavian civilization came into opposition to the eastern despotism and barbarism of the Russian empire.⁴⁶⁹

The central concern, however, focused on another piece of information. *Aftonbladet* published a speech given by bishop Mellin – a native of Finland, and at the time ‘an antagonist of Russia’, as Wulfert described him – in which he advocated the ideas of cultural rapprochement between the nations of the North, reinforced by their national and linguistic affinity. While Mellin’s speech could have been ignored, it was a reply to it that made the administration anxious. According to the article, a student from Finland responded ‘melancholically’ to bishops’ performance, having said that the germ of their education and common blood would never be forgotten in the principality.⁴⁷⁰ The short reply with debated content would eventually appear in the center of administrative discussion and later verdict on their voyage.

While previously it might have been contested, at this point it became clear that Finnish students took part in the festivals. Wulfert, however, tried to protect them, claiming that the crowd sang an insulting song against Russia and Finland during their departure, because Finnish students refused to sing Scandinavian Marseillaise prior to that.⁴⁷¹ He informed Menshikov that only three persons could potentially take part in the events in Upsala. Moreover, they had received their resignation documents from the rector, since the latter did not allow them to leave.⁴⁷² Thus, they could not officially represent students at the Imperial Alexander University. Earlier, in attached piece named ‘Skandinavische Union’, Wulfert

⁴⁶⁹ Wulfert – Menshikov, RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 54, l. 49-51.

⁴⁷⁰ Wulfert – Menshikov, Ibid, l. 49-50.

⁴⁷¹ Wulfert – Menshikov, 13 / 25 June 1843. l. 40.

⁴⁷² Rector was responsible for students’ whereabouts according to the University rules, see: *Ustav Imperatorskago Aleksandrovskago Universiteta v Finljandii* (Helsingfors: Tip. Dep. Nar. Prosvesheniya, 1829), 46-50.

collected various expressions made by oppositional journals in Sweden. The quotes contained references to the French revolution, described the idea of the ‘artificial’ Scandinavian union with enthusiasm, and manifested ideologies of constitutionalism and liberalism.⁴⁷³

The post-director, however, was not the sole source of information for the governor-general. Russian diplomat in Stockholm Dmitrij Glinka also updated Menshikov on the convention, sending his reports simultaneously in late May-June. Although Glinka, as he himself confessed, had already warned Count Nesselrode about the student festivals, he considered it necessary to inform Menshikov as well, pointing in this measure to the liminal status of Finland and paradiplomatic quality of its administration as governing over an autonomous territory. Glinka articulated the seriousness of the situation that the student convention produced and attached newspaper clippings that facilitated this impression. He situated the festivals in the longer continuum of upswinging political sympathies between Sweden and Denmark, ‘well known’ to the addressee. The sympathies, according to the letter, were talked about more and more and they would certainly have an impact on wider Europe, as the diplomat dramatically noted.⁴⁷⁴

In his account, Danish students accompanied by their Swedish colleagues were making political proclamations during their trip. More importantly, however, and much worse for the administration, was that the name of Finland was enmeshed in political demonstrations. Two students, ‘Olzoni and Asplund’, took part in the demonstrations ‘as representatives of the University of Helsingfors’. Glinka continued that the youth, of course, was only half conscious about the participation. Their thoughtlessness and lack of foresight were mainly to blame, but their inability to perceive serious consequences of the events surfaced as no better justification. On the other hand, these students’ involvement in the festivals also appeared as an ample point

⁴⁷³ Wulffert – Menshikov, 6 / 18 June 1843. RGAVMF. F. 19, op, 2, d. 54, l. L. 45-46.

⁴⁷⁴ Glinka – Menshikov. 27 May / 7 June 1843. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 82, l. 4-5.

for a better acquaintance with the ‘Scandinavian movement’ in the imperial cabinets. Since the name of Finland featured in the proclamation, no one could oppose the legitimate intervention of the Russian attention at that point.⁴⁷⁵

A few days later, Menshikov received a second message from Glinka, in which he warned of the existence of a ‘revolutionary directory’ at the University of Copenhagen whose goal was to establish communication with all Scandinavian universities, referring to the newly established organization *Scandinavian Community*.⁴⁷⁶ The ‘revolutionary’ metaphor, attached to the organization and to wider political action of the students and their leaders would become the main explanatory tool for the analysis of the Scandinavian festivals in the imperial cabinets. Glinka also recounted the narrative of Finlandish participation. According to it, students Olsoni and Aspelund asked the rector to let them pay a visit to the convention, but, having been refused, they decided to leave the university and, in the status of former students, travel abroad. What created even more issues was that King Charles XIV John became annoyed with the Finlandish participation, and Glinka would not be surprised if the Swedish government depicted them as genuine instigators of what had happened.⁴⁷⁷

The whirlwind of the events made the administration invent new measures of surveillance and control and intensify its channels of information, prompting the line of communication between imperial institutions in Sweden and Finland resurface again as in 1840.⁴⁷⁸ The events simultaneously revealed, even for a slight bit, their expectations from a loyal Finlandish subject. The one’s views not only should have conformed with the concepts of devoted subjecthood, but one also should have foreseen the disturbances from the

⁴⁷⁵ Ibid, l. 5.

⁴⁷⁶ See more in Chapter 3. See also on organizations under Scandinavianist banners: Ruth Hemstad, “I ’Tidens Fylde’. Panskandinaviske publisister og transnasjonale tidsskrifter,” 390-404.

⁴⁷⁷ Glinka – Menshikov. 3 / 15 June 1843. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 82, l. 2-3.

⁴⁷⁸ Besides politics, Finlandish administration often remained in contact with diplomatic agents in dealing with financial and trade-related issues: Lidija Lempijajnen, ‘Vneshnie kontakty Velikogo Knjazhestva Finljandskogo: 1809-1914 gg.’ (PhD diss., Saint-Petersburg, 2007).

appearance of the events. Menshikov replied to Glinka that his information provided the starting point for the elaboration of administrative measures ‘that are being taken and would be taken’ in this regard.⁴⁷⁹ The accusation that Glinka put on the shoulders of these students was then projected by Menshikov onto the rector as well who, lacking the ability of foresight, allowed the trip that became a whole diplomatic concern by that time.⁴⁸⁰

Menshikov made this projection in another letter exchange that he established with minister state-secretary Armfelt with regards to the student voyage. Armfelt mostly reiterated Glinka’s narrative about the festival and again highlighted that those who embarked on the trip lacked the student status since they resigned from the University. This line of argumentation was extremely important for the administration both in terms of diplomatic negotiations and, mainly, because they had to update the chancellor of the university, Grand Duke Alexander about it. This formalistic way of bureaucratic thinking converged significantly with on-the-ground practices and reality of the Scandinavian student festivals organization since they were visited not only by students but also by lecturers and persons who had only loose bonds with the academic sphere.⁴⁸¹

Menshikov’s reply also revealed his attitude towards pan-Scandinavian idea: ‘The desire to exhume the Kalmar Union does not concern us.’ It is debatable what exactly this utterance meant but it certainly sounded derisively given the reference to exhumation. On the one hand, Menshikov must have implied that the idea was not of the Finlandish administration concern but rather it situated itself in the sphere of diplomatic relations and hence within the responsibility of another institutional framework. Another interpretation could stress the fact

⁴⁷⁹ Menshikov – Glinka. *Projet de la lettre* 8 / 20 July 1843. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 82, l. 1: ‘toutes vous en accusant réception, je me fais un devoir de vous témoigner combien je vous suis reconnaissant de renseignement que elles continet. cet donnees ont servi et serviront de point de depart aux mesures gouvernementales qu'on a prises et qu'on prendra encore a cet sujet.’

⁴⁸⁰ Menshikov – Armfelt, 8 / 20 June 1843. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 18, l. 84.

⁴⁸¹ Armfelt – Menshikov, 5 / 17 June 1843. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 18, l. 16-17; *Beretning om studentertoget til Upsala i juni maaned 1843.*

that pan-Scandinavian ideologists for the most part concerned themselves with Sweden, Norway, and Denmark but not with Finland whose students' participation was just an accident. Menshikov continued that 'political proclamations', conversely, should not have been tolerated. He insisted, following Armfelt's suggestion, that the persons had to be expelled from the 'list of students if this had not been done already'. The students thus faced relegation from the university matricula, the strictest punishment reserved in the regulations. Grand Duke Alexander who was about to arrive at the duchy was to be updated on the fact that these persons were not listed among the students anymore.⁴⁸²

The Scandinavian idea itself as a vision of the Nordic cultural or even political integration at that point subdued to the dangers of students' participation in the events that the administration labelled as political agitation. It was rather a new format of collective action and mobilization in the Nordics, a practice of manifestation – meaning student conventions – that elicited the attention of the administration used to repress similar actions in its domains.⁴⁸³ The nature of administrative attention was contextually continuous – stretching from probable 'political manifestations' on the side of Swedish students expected to arrive in 1840 or drawing on even earlier patterns of Swedish liberal and anti-imperial agitation – rather than shaped immediately by the idea of Scandinavian unification that for the first time manifested itself on the political horizon. Qualitatively, it did not transform the preformulated image of Swedish political disturbances or that of the students as active but illegitimate agents of new politics. Again, it was the gravitating and dangerous whirlwind of the Swedish politics that could pull

⁴⁸² Menshikov – Armfelt, 8/20 June 1843. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 18, l. 84; *Disciplins-reglemente foer studerande vid Kejslerliga Alexanders-Universitetet i Finland* (Saint-Petersburg: Tip. Departamenta Narodnago Prosvěščenija, 1829), 5–6. In fact, students Adolf Emerik Olsoni and Carl Edvard Aspelund were only shortly suspended. We will return to their fate later. Ylioppilasmatrikkeli 1640–1852: <https://ylioppilasmatrikkeli.helsinki.fi/henkilo.php?id=15895> (Olsoni); <https://ylioppilasmatrikkeli.helsinki.fi/henkilo.php?id=15093> (Aspelund).

⁴⁸³ Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 1:65-77; Stenius, *Frivilligt, jämlikt, samfällt*, 161-2.

Finlandish subjects, especially thoughtless students, into its workings. Hence the restrictions that should have guarded them from participation in such events.

Coming back to Armfelt's letter to Menshikov, one can notice that it slightly diverged from Glinka's narrative, as he elaborated a bit more on one of the aspects of the events. Namely, Armfelt learned that one of the students ostensibly held a speech in Finnish at the convention. Although this observation finds no proof in other sources, Armfelt hinted into a right direction of the interpretation of these meetings from the side of the educated Finlandish public.⁴⁸⁴ Luckily, the archives preserved the opinions of those who managed to travel to Sweden to witness the festivals. Primarily, because they had to justify themselves in the eyes of the administration.

2.13. Students' opinions on the Scandinavian student festivals and Finnish national project

Towards the beginning of the 1840s, a new assemblage of ideas penetrated thoughts and dreams of Finlandish students. Romanticism-inspired imaginary of a nation became omnipotent in the discussion about the future of the newly discovered Finland-‘motherland’. The problem was, however, that the founding fathers of these ideas, that would later be labeled Romanticist, insisted that a national spirit should have been discovered in the national language. Hence the rift surfaced that separated the educated society that operated mostly in Swedish and was solidly attached to the Swedish cultural heritage and the masses of people whose mother tongue was Finnish. This would later prompt a pivotal debate on the question of what language should be dominating in Finland, but for the time being many students, of Swedish origins as well, became interested – much in lieu with other nation-building context of the time in Europe – in studying and promoting the use of the people's language, meaning

⁴⁸⁴ Armfelt – Menshikov, 5 / 17 June 1843. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 18, l. 16-17.

Finnish.⁴⁸⁵ Significantly, Finlandish identity could incorporate both Runeberg's Swedish-language poetry and growing interest in the Finnish language without any mutual antagonism.⁴⁸⁶

The interest for the Finnish language did not appear out of nowhere at the beginning of the 1840s. Already in the 1810s-1820s, there emerged proclamations that called upon the development of Finnish language. Turku Romanticism of the beginning of the 19th century also contributed to the interest in the Finnish language, historical sources, and heritage.⁴⁸⁷ It seems that already under his visit to the university in 1833, Emperor Nicholas I was presented with an address that pleaded for the introduction of the Finnish language in the education process without, however, any consequences.⁴⁸⁸ Associations were created – among them loyalist Finnish Literature Society as flagship⁴⁸⁹ – and petitions signed that in this or that aspect sought to facilitate the use of Finnish in print or in conversation. But the interest in Finnish, again, hardly obscured the Swedish-language heritage from dominating narratives about the quest for a Finnish identity.⁴⁹⁰ Thus, two events sometimes shaped the narrative of recollections as well into the formation of this identity. The first was the publication of Elias Lönnröt's *Kalevala* in 1835-6, the great Finnish mythological poem, half-collected half-composed by Lönnröt. The second was Johan Ludvig Runeberg's departure from the university in 1837. Same people took

⁴⁸⁵ Schauman, *Från sex årtionden i Finland*, 1: 156–57.

⁴⁸⁶ See, for example: Matti Klinge, *Runebergs två fosterland* (Helsingfors: Söderström, 1983).

⁴⁸⁷ Werner Söderhjelm, *Åboromantiken och dess samband med utländska idéströmningar* (Stockholm: A. Bonnier, 1915); Łukasz Sommer, 'A Step Away from Herder: Turku Romantics and the Question of National Language1', *The Slavonic and East European Review* 90, no. 1 (2012): 1–32, <https://doi.org/10.5699/slaveastorev2.90.1.0001>; Dmitrij Kolesnikov, 'Stanovlenie fennomanskogo dvizhenija v Velikom knjazhestve Finljandskom (1810-e – nachalo 1860-h gg.)' (PhD diss., Sankt-Peterburgskij institut istorii Rossijskoj akademii nauk, 2021), 53–85.

⁴⁸⁸ Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 1:60.

⁴⁸⁹ Ilkka Liikanen, *Fennomania ja kansa : joukkokärjestyymisen läpimurto ja Suomalaisen puolueen synty* (Helsinki: Suomen historiallinen seura, 1995), 88–90.

⁴⁹⁰ Grandell, *Från ett årtionde i Finland*, 46–68, 96–110.

part in the shared delight for the discovered Finnish heritage and in the drama of the national poet's depart.⁴⁹¹

The interest in the national language did not fashion itself as a political project in the 1820s-30s, although some of its enthusiasts did espouse political rhetoric, Adolf Iwar Arwidsson being the principal example. Moreover, the administration might encourage this interest, since the use of mother tongue by bishops and local authorities was paramount for the effective management and policy building. Persons who primarily came to be associated with this turn towards the 'motherland culture' counted Johan Vilhelm Snellman and Magnus Castrén among them. Snellman undisputedly became the most influential member of the student community by the 1840s. Already by the end of the previous decade, however, he was also considered a disturbing freedom-thinker by the university authorities but rather on the grounds of intra-university rivalry and diverging visions of educational practice than due to his support for Finnish language.⁴⁹²

In 1839, the Åbo court suspended Snellman's docent position at the university, and he opted to leave Finland for Sweden and Germany. Quickly, he established his reputation in Stockholm as well as in Germany as an outstanding Hegel-inspired philosopher and prolific author. Snellman was born in Stockholm and only after the Swedish-Russian war, did his family move to Finland. He certainly had connections across the sea, published his texts in Swedish journals and newspapers as well as visited the neighboring country multiple times.⁴⁹³ Indeed, the cultivation of the people's mother tongue in his correspondence was often fashioned as a cosmopolitan idea, simultaneously pursued in other contexts by other nations. Patriotism and nationalism came up as products of the politics of comparison, and Finland had

⁴⁹¹ Klinge, *Studenterna och idéer*, 1:64. Kalevala was quickly translated into Swedish, demonstrating the degree of interest: Kaisa Häkkinen, 'Matias Aleksanteri Castrén ja Kalevalan ruotsinnot', *Suomalais-Ugrilaisen Seuran Aikakauskirja*, no. 97 (2019): 237–62, <https://doi.org/10.33340/susa.79463>.

⁴⁹² Raimo Savolainen, *Med bildningens kraft: J.V. Snellmans liv* (Helsinki: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2019), 156–70.

⁴⁹³ Thiodolf Rein, *Johan Vilhelm Snellman*, vol. 1 (Helsingfors: Otava, 1895), 123–27.

to catch up with other nations that had already made significant progress on this path.⁴⁹⁴ The development of the Finnish language accordingly often underlined the translation of milestones of the global literature.⁴⁹⁵ Snellman's connections to Europe and Nordics – whether quite physical or spiritual – were spotted by the administration, and the general intervention of foreign ideas into the world of students, that he embodied, appeared threatening.

Snellman came back in late 1842, around the time when Swedish-centered concerns of the administration intensified, and continued to be one of the most influential thinkers in Finland who had a devoted group of followers, primarily among the students. The lectures he read on Hegel at the University of Helsingfors upon his arrival produced a sensation among the youth. As one of then impressed students wrote to his brother in Upsala: 'Everybody speaks about him. His lectures 'On the essence of Spirit' are so visited that there is hardly any room for more listeners.' Besides the students, they were visited by professors and 'representatives of other classes'.⁴⁹⁶ Even though the author of these lines, then young student from a family with Swedish ties, August Schauman did not yet have a chance to visit the lectures, the news spread among the learned public sphere and studentship quickly. In Sweden, Snellman rather received a reputation of a conservative-leaning intellectual but upon his return to the duchy, he was regarded with suspicion as a 'European head'.⁴⁹⁷

The broad revival of Finnish-centric ethnographic, linguistic, and historical interest among the students, fostered by quite universal appeal of the Hegelian's teachings and hence German *bildung*, formulated the context for the interpretation of Finlandish students' voyage to the Scandinavian festivals. While the existing historiography underlines the traditional antagonism between Fennomania, even Fennophilia, meaning Finnish national project in its

⁴⁹⁴ Snellman – F.Cygnieus and B.O. Lille, 1840. Snellman's Collection, URL : <http://snellman.kootutteokset.fi/sites/default/files/01251.pdf> (accessed 03.01.2023).

⁴⁹⁵ Snellman – F. Collin, 27 December 1843. Snellman's Collection, URL : <http://snellman.kootutteokset.fi/sites/default/files/03120.pdf> (accessed 03.01.2023).

⁴⁹⁶ A. Schauman – B.O. Schauman, 20 March 1843. Kansalliskirjasto, Coll 198.9.

⁴⁹⁷ Savolainen, *Med bildningens kraft*, 300–303.

many iterations, and Scandinavianism,⁴⁹⁸ at least in 1843 and throughout the decade, the picture was more complex, allowing for hybrid alliances between various Nordic-wide and Finnish-centered visions. The students, as I demonstrate further, contrary to the arguments of the existing historiography, highlighted the proximity and even kindred nature of the two (pan)national projects. Moreover, the Scandinavian student festivals in 1843 rhetorically featured as a point of inspiration for the development of internal nation-building processes.

One of the students who happened to visit the trip and fell on the radar of the administration, Carl Aspelund, preserved his reminiscences and contemporary materials about the voyage. As the rector prohibited the students' journey, they had to receive their resignation certificates from the university administration to embark on it after all. Upon their arrival and participation in the festivals, their identity was revealed in the Swedish newspapers and extensively published about. As Aspelund recollected, they never expected the festivals to draw so much attention, and many participants would have certainly seconded this opinion. Upon their arrival, the rector announced that it was impossible for them to enlist at the university again, as the festivals produced a grave sensation and 'were regarded as political in the highest places'.⁴⁹⁹

The way of dealing with the problem or rather its rhetorical framing was typical for the overall functioning of the Finnish political system, and rector Nils Abraham Ursin told Aspelund that their expulsion prevented harsher punishment from Saint-Petersburg: it was preferred to tackle the issue locally without widening the line of command to the imperial capital. While the students were informed that they were expelled 'forever', the reality happened to be milder and the institutional memory shorter. In autumn, Ursin proposed

⁴⁹⁸ H. Arnold Barton, 'Scandinavianism, Fennomania, and the Crimean War', *Journal of Baltic Studies* 36, no. 2 (2005): 131–56; Matti Klinge is usually more nuanced, but in this case I consider his interpretation slightly one-sided: Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 1:92-97. Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg was able to grasp the coexistence of two projects in her work devoted to a different period: Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg, *Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus und Liberalismus im politischen Leben Finnlands 1856-1863* (Helsinki: Finnischen Literaturgesellschaft, 1934).

⁴⁹⁹ Biografiska anteckningar af C.E. Aspelund. SLSA 146, 1. 218-24.

Aspelund to address minister state-secretary Armfelt with the explanation of the reasons for the trip and their behavior that could potentially facilitate their reintroduction. While this part of Aspelund's memoirs was written from oral recollections by his son, and it thus could miss some details – although he had Aspelund's trip diary and correspondence at hand – the general pattern of this communication can be proved by addressing other archives.⁵⁰⁰

Although Aspelund himself did not write the appeal to Armfelt, this fact did not put any obstacle on his later reintroduction to the university. There are, nevertheless, two texts of such self-apologetic nature preserved in Alexander Armfelt's archive. Besides Olsoni and Aspelund, at least two students embarked on a voyage to Sweden, namely Anders Ludvig Wendelin and Carl Johan Lövström, whose letters were addressed to the minister state secretary. There is little doubt that a genre of appealing to those in power prompted a degree of self-censorship and plausible formulations. Either way, the common interpretation of the voyage as a source of encouragement and inspiration for their own Finnish-centered Romanticist endeavors and cosmopolitan-propelled collaboration appeared to be shared by all of these students. Even if they might have agreed on these formulations beforehand, they did consider their rhetoric understandable and, moreover, justifiable to use in their appeal to the administration.

Wendelin addressed Armfelt after a personal encounter, as he noted in the letter, to milden the severe punishment that was put on his friends' and his shoulders. In doing so, he desired to confess of the reasons that prompted him to embark on the trip to Sweden. Appealing to European tendencies in culture and education, Wendelin appreciated the pace of the 'German culture' that was spreading to Finland through Sweden, arguably meaning Hegelian teachings on state and national culture. The author argued that Finland should have been grateful to Sweden for the development it once brought to the land, but attested loyally that Finland could not reach a certain level of self-awareness and nationality (*nationalitet*) under the political bond

⁵⁰⁰ Biografiska anteckningar af C.E. Aspelund. SLSA 146, Inledning (not numbered), I. 218-9.

with Sweden. When Finland was united (*forenas*) with one of the biggest and most powerful states of the world, the nationality received a new life. Under the Russian paternalistic care (*faderlig vård*), new tendencies surfaced that found inspiration in Finland's past, the cultivation of the Finnish language 'that even came to be considered national' being one of them.⁵⁰¹

'The light shone on scientific progress' as well, but even under this tremendous development Finland could not remain indifferent to the pace of other national endeavors, for they were all pursuing the same goal, albeit in their own ways.⁵⁰² The student festival in Sweden thus appeared to be one of the touching points (*beröringspunkter*) between the nations. While Wendelin in his own words could hardly represent the pinnacle of scientific endeavor in Finland, due to the lack of personal achievements, he rather wanted to display that the will for *bildung* and sciences lived in the duchy. Wendelin confessed that he was the one who replied to the toast for the University of Helsingfors, but he assured Armfelt that the interaction was stripped of any political connotations and only represented thankfulness to Sweden for the seeds of education and science.⁵⁰³

Another student, Löffström, must have aligned his message with Wendelin's, as he was alluding to similar rhetoric. The German *bildung* again surfaced as an engine for progress exemplified by the Nordic universities. The similarity of nations in their objectives, origin, and language together with the bond of arts and sciences brought them together. The idea of friendly ties that bound the Nordic universities was accepted with common delight, while the historical relations between Sweden and Finland could not be ignored. Therefore, when the invitation arrived from Lund to Helsingfors 'without any political connotations', he was eager to embark on the trip unable to foresee how it would be perceived by the authorities.⁵⁰⁴ While he acknowledged that the speeches pronounced varied in their content, and some even contained

⁵⁰¹ Wendelin – Armfelt, 21 October 1843. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto II 68a, I. 124-27.

⁵⁰² Wendelin – Armfelt, 21 October 1843. Ibid, 125-26.

⁵⁰³ Wendelin – Armfelt, 21 October 1843. Ibid, I. 126-27.

⁵⁰⁴ Löffström – Armfelt. 3 November 1843, Ibid, I. 128-31.

political allusions, Finland was tied to Russia with a thread of gratitude, and those utterances could not find any response in the 'chest of a fair Finn'.⁵⁰⁵ Again, the most contested point, the toast for the University of Helsingfors, ostensibly did not contain anything political. That was why his travelling partner answered to it with some words of gratefulness to Sweden for the embryo of Finnish science and government. The two left Sweden in several weeks and returned, completely unaware of the fate that awaited them.⁵⁰⁶

These letters exemplified both rhetorical devoutness and admiration for the Russian empire characteristic for this genre. However, they also stressed the cosmopolitical quest for education and national culture that echoed in Finland as well as in other Scandinavia kingdoms. Any mention of the Scandinavian union as a goal shared by the Finlanders was absent whereas disturbing political ideas could not affect the trustfulness of the Finnish subjects in their words. Characteristically, they discovered no opposition in simultaneous pursuit for the Finnish language and thankfulness to Sweden for the seeds of educational and political institutions. Moreover, the vastness and might of the Russian empire in no way stumbled over the growing national self-awareness in Finland. On the contrary, granted autonomy facilitated the development of this tendency. The convention of students surfaced as an expression of delightful pursuit of universal values through, however, diverging ways.

This combination surfaced even more conspicuously in Carl Aspelund's lecture that he gave for the Savo-Karelska nation of the Alexander Imperial University. Aspelund read it openly in 1844 as his impressions from the visit to Upsala. He reinforced all points made by his co-voyagers, sharpening the pursuit of Finnish nationality as a simultaneous, qualitatively similar but separate process to the development of the Nordic national unity. The very beginning of his speech established a general trajectory of the narrative: the cultivation of

⁵⁰⁵ Löffström – Armfelt. 3 November 1843. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto II 68a, 1, 130.

⁵⁰⁶ Ibid.

Finnish past and Finnish language captured the attention of many students, propagated by Castrén and Snellman. Snellman's journal *Saima*, 'as a reckless Viking'⁵⁰⁷, fought against prejudices and discouragements that hampered 'our national development'. He recognized the novelty these tendencies, as they appeared only around the time he was holding his lecture. Although the shared awakening happened among the students in their pursuit of the national, Finland could not yet be sufficed with its own internal doings.⁵⁰⁸

The example of the Scandinavian student meeting came as a paramount case of what fruits could be ripped through the national development. Scandinavian peoples, originally united and then pitted against each other through the centuries of bitter wars, according to the lecturer, finally found their path to reconciliation. Apart from the gift of civilization that Sweden granted to Finland, the history of Scandinavian nations previously was either indifferent for the rest of Europe or pictured as negative since their fragmentation and separation allowed Russia to get into prominence in the continent.⁵⁰⁹ Paralleling the student meeting to the annual jubilee of the Storming of the Bastille in its glorification of freedom, Aspelund recollected emotional scenes from the festivals. Handshakes, hugs, marching crowds of students welcomed everywhere on their way by the dwellers, painstaking speeches and songs saved for this event its outstanding place in the history, according to the speaker.⁵¹⁰

The interpellation of Scandinavian nationalities as embodied by the Nordic students provided a room for the emergence of friendship ties between these nations. In the lecture, Aspelund quoted numerous speeches, including the one fashioned as a toast for the university of Helsingfors. He considered himself obliged to answer to it with gratitude but also noted the national benefits of separation from Sweden, meaning the growing sense of self-awareness. As

⁵⁰⁷ Interesting comparison given Snellman's later anti-Swedish rhetoric and his struggle against Swedish-nationalist journal *Vikingen*.

⁵⁰⁸ Biografiska anteckningar af C.E. Aspelund. SLSA 146, 1. 393.

⁵⁰⁹ Ibid, 1. 394.

⁵¹⁰ Ibid, 1. 395-97

he stated, he even tried to disperse dark prejudices about Finland and demonstrate that the development took place there as well, even if not on the same scale as in other civilized nations.⁵¹¹

Aspelund fashioned himself as a spectator of great events developing before his eyes, a stranger of sorts that happened to be pulled in the whirlwind of history being made. However, he argued that this experience could be adapted to the situation in Finland by fostering self-consciousness and the feeling of belonging to the Finnish nation. Although Finns did receive their civilization from Sweden, their own self-awareness was neutralized under the Swedish rule and made them confusingly ‘consider themselves Swedes’. Slowly after the breakup, few enthusiasts discovered the national heritage and promoted its development. The primary hindrance lied in the fact that ‘[our] national language is not the language of education.’⁵¹² While Aspelund envisioned time and hard work required to formulate and propel the feeling of patriotism with regards to language, students as representatives of the youth had to pursue this goal.⁵¹³

At present moment, Aspelund argued, Finnish was to Swedish alike national languages to Latin in the Middle Ages, or even as mother tongues of nations under the Roman rule. Gifted with the present of the Roman civilizations, these tribes were able to produce their own cultures, and same fate awaited Finland. As the idea of the Nordic unity became grounded in the family ties that bound Scandinavian nations and languages together, Finnish sleeping nationality should have been awoken through the fostering of their own genuine mother tongue. Thoroughness and enthusiasm were required to make Finnish – in whatever distant future – into a language of civilization in speaking and writing to avoid seclusion. Only then it could be possible to bring all Finnish tribes together – although it is unclear what the author meant by

⁵¹¹ Ibid, l. 398-9.

⁵¹² Ibid, l. 405-7.

⁵¹³ Ibid, l. 407-8.

‘togetherness’ – currently dispersed from Siberia to America. Aspelund’s speech in his own words signified a starting point for the elaboration of the idea of Finnish nationality that could reach a proper place in the world history, as did Scandinavian students in their strive for the Nordic unity.⁵¹⁴

Even though the genre of these sources was obviously different, the argumentation followed similar patterns. The idea of the Nordic unity interested them as a pattern of thinking rather than as their shared goal. Moreover, these young Finns did not regard themselves as participants in the development of pan-Scandinavian idea. On the contrary, their own national project highlighted their exclusion from it since they were doing their best *not* to be Swedes – or Scandinavians – again. The festival thus surfaced as a point of comparison, a showcase of the future – similar but not the same – that potentially awaited the Finnish nation both with regards to the sparkled interest in the national and to the wider interest of the commoners. The Russian empire featured as a home for different nationalities, stripped, however, of any political endeavors. Although Finns became loyal subjects of the emperor, their cultural inclinations in no way depended on the Russian-centric world.

The students alluded to the emotional practices and language, characteristic for the Scandinavian student festivals, and referred to same pool of metaphors that included the notions of youthfulness, struggle, brotherhood, rebirth, and many others, projecting Scandinavian expectations of cultural revival onto Finland.⁵¹⁵ The local context of Finlandish and, in this case, Finnish affairs loomed as large in their texts, however. There is little doubt that the events of the period around 1844 affected the tone and sharpening of angles in Aspelund’s speech. That year Snellman’s crusade for the future of the Finnish language was

⁵¹⁴ Ibid, 1. 410-413.

⁵¹⁵ On emotional language in Finland see: Jani Marjanen, ‘National Sentiment: Nation Building and Emotional Language in Nineteenth-Century Finland’, in *Lived Nation as the History of Experiences and Emotions in Finland, 1800-2000*, ed. Ville Kivimäki, Sami Suodenjoki, and Tanja Vahtikari (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021), 61–83, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69882-9_3.

launched with his Swedish-written journal *Saima*. The release of this issue is usually associated with the emergence of Fennomania as a distinct cultural phenomenon.⁵¹⁶ Snellman's hawkish tone assaulted the prejudices of Swedish-leaning (pseudo-)aristocratic intellectuals who considered Finnish to be impotent of any civilized status. While supporting the spread of Finnish language in education and administration, *Saima* also focused on the issues that representatives of the lower classes and peasants faces in their daily life: national question was also a social one.⁵¹⁷

The social question thus loomed large in the issue often turning into criticism of the administration, and governor-general's attention first stumbled over it, until learning more about his Finnish-centric endeavors.⁵¹⁸ The administration often interpreted the strive for nationality and especially Snellman's social bias as cosmopolitical, hazardous, and contaminating trend, imported from Europe, in some regards approximating it with the 'radicalism' of Scandinavianism, especially since students themselves revealed their entangled nature, albeit in more plausible terms. In this sense, the meeting of the Nordic students in 1843 also could have been contrasted with the Imperial University jubilee in 1840. While the primary witnessed the participation of different classes of town and country dwellers together with unrestricted access of the students, the jubilee of the University of Helsingfors appeared administratively sanitized and restricted for many contemporaries, including Snellman.⁵¹⁹

To a certain satisfaction of the administration that exhibited itself in the fact that these students were reincorporated to the university, their pursuit of the national underlined cultural trajectories rather than political, either due to the self-censorship or their own understanding of the nation-building processes. However, Aspelund's unusually bold speech for Finlandish

⁵¹⁶ Liikanen, *Fennomania ja kansa*, 92. Karhu, *Finljangskaja literatura i Rossija*, 240-70.

⁵¹⁷ Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 98-126; Liikanen, *Fennomania ja kansa*, 90-2; Ilkka Mäkinen, 'From Literacy to Love of Reading: The Fennomaniac Ideology of Reading in the 19th-Century Finland', *Journal of Social History* 49, no. 2 (2015): 287-99.

⁵¹⁸ Menshikov – Wulffert, 21 June / 3 July 1845. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 54, l. 114.

⁵¹⁹ Dhondt, *National, Nordic or European?*, 36.

environment also drew the attention of the audience to the situation in Denmark where the national consciousness overcame obsolete and absolutist institutions of government thus promising the transformation of the political architecture in the future. Even though no parallels with the situation in Finland were drawn, and Finland obviously was lagging far behind Denmark in the development of the national self-consciousness in their eyes, the very framework of the national development presupposed political change that followed cultural progress.⁵²⁰

The binding between the fostering of Finnish language and a sense of encouragement discovered in the first large Scandinavian student convention was as well highlighted by the particular audience that Aspelund read his lecture for. Savo-Karelska nation of the university consisted primarily of students that came from Eastern part of Finland where peasant population was widespread while it counted little towns.⁵²¹ It was a predominantly Finnish speaking area, visited by many enthusiastic students who went on proto-ethnographic trips to learn language, history, and traditions of Finnish laymen. This section towards the 1840s also became one of the flagships of Finno-centric enthusiasm while having little to do with Swedish-leaning trajectories of public life and education. Other scholars noted, however, that Finnish-centered endeavors of this section espoused more reconciliatory trajectories that those pursued by Snellman and others in the shaping political sphere.⁵²²

At the beginning of the 1840s, Scandinavianism was certainly enthusiastically witnessed even by pro-Finnish devotees rather than practiced or preached domestically. Pan-Scandinavian idea pertained to the processes of nation-building through the practices of comparison that, as Jani Marjanen and Jussi Kurunmäki argue, was widespread in the

⁵²⁰ Biografiska anteckningar af C.E. Aspelund. SLSA 146, l. 407.

⁵²¹ See, for example: Heikki Waris, *Savo-karjalaisen Osakunnan historia, julkaisheet Savolainen ja Karjalainen Osakunta: Savo-karjalaisen Osakunnan historia 1833-1852* (Helsinki: Söderström, 1939).

⁵²² Gunnar Castrén, *Herman Kellgren: ett bidrag till 1840- och 1850-talens kulturhistoria* (Helsinki: Mercators tryckeri, 1945), 2.

Finlandish public sphere under the heavy censorship regime.⁵²³ Later, the centers of Scandinavianism-inspired public migrated to other intellectual environments with the changing modality of interest in the project. At this point, however, the administration – partially following the lead of these enthusiasts – had no incentive to draw a particular line of distinction or opposition between the two projects.

2.14. Censorship, Scandinavianism, and Fennomania

Both products of Scandinavianism and Fennomania quickly appeared under the inspection through censorship, perustration, and institutionalized monitoring. Censorship decree of 1829 introduced preventive censorship regime. Works prepared for publishing within the borders of the duchy and those imported via the post were subjugated to the same rules. Post-director Alexander Wulfert was responsible for monitoring and sanctioning of the imported newspapers while non-periodic publications were scrutinized by the censorship committee. The reasons for ban of a publication were not manifold but certainly flexible: a publication could not assault the foundations of evangelical religion, offend the emperor, royal family or government and laws, profane good manners, and, finally, contain personal insults against a person's honor. Menshikov also prescribed that domestic newspapers could not criticize any government actions, regardless of the conclusions drawn.⁵²⁴

In obvious cases of the breach of law, Wulfert himself reported to the committee on particular issues of newspapers that were suspended for import or articles that required clipping out of certain words or sentences, following the prescription of the censorship decree.⁵²⁵ He, however, often contacted Menshikov in border cases to ask whether a particular number should

⁵²³ Kurunmäki and Marjanen, 'Catching up through Comparison'.

⁵²⁴ Menshikov – Censorship committee, 11 / 22 February 1845. KA, KKK, Dd: 2, N. 507.

⁵²⁵ *Samling af placater, förordningar, manifest och påbud*, vol. 5 (Helsingfors: Gröndahl, 1831), 527; Päiviö Tommila, "Yhdestä lehdestä sanomalehdistöksi 1809–1859," in *Suomen lehdistön historia 1. Sanomalehdistön vaiheet vuoteen 1905*, ed. Päiviö Tommila, Lars Landgren, Pirkko Leino-Kaukiainen (Kuopio: Kustannuskiila, 1988), 77–266.

be permitted, banned completely, or a part of the text clipped out.⁵²⁶ Some journals, for example oppositional *Aftonbladet* and *Dagligt Allehanda*, were completely forbidden for import and there was no option for subscription provided to Finnish subjects, except for several members of the administration.⁵²⁷ Towards the 1840s, the amount of potentially dangerous newspaper numbers crossing the border rose as it is evident from the correspondence between Menshikov and Wulffert.⁵²⁸

The rules were to be followed closely, and Menshikov sometimes allowed the import of issues that appeared questionable for Wulffert, often referring to the decisions of Saint-Petersburg censorship committee.⁵²⁹ Once he even requested the latter to follow the censorship rules and not to disturb him with every potentially problematic issue.⁵³⁰ Some of the notions of the decree could be interpreted flexibly but it does not seem that the administration abused its power, except in tumultuous moments as was, for example, the year of 1848. Moreover, in the 1840s the subscription for foreign journals was widening and it included more issues published in Denmark and Norway. Nordic-wide context and the rhetoric of Scandinavianism thus manifested themselves not only through the import of one particular concept but also by building networks of informational exchange and communication, characteristic of its functioning.⁵³¹ When printed utterances did not espouse political proclamations – especially in the 'democratic spirit' – and if they did not assault the nature of the political regime in Finland and Russia, those publications that dealt with Scandinavianism could pass the filter legally. Given the poor control over the import, there is even less doubt that many crossed it illegally through smuggling.

⁵²⁶ For one of the first: Wulffert – Menshikov, 18 / 30 April 1840. KA. KKK, Dd 2, N. 315.

⁵²⁷ Krusius-Ahrenberg, 'Finland och den svensk-ryska allianspolitiken intill 1830/31 års polska revolution', 198.

⁵²⁸ See: KA. KKK, Dd 2.

⁵²⁹ For example, see: Menshikov – Wulffert. 18 / 30 August 1843. KA. KKK, Dd 2, N. 414.

⁵³⁰ Menshikov – Wulffert, 17 / 29 December 1845. Ibid, N. 550.

⁵³¹ Hemstad, 'Scandinavian Sympathies and Nordic Unity'.

However, several brochures that focused on Scandinavianism including those issues that covered the students conventions were banned by the censorship committee.⁵³² The committee usually marked particular pages that made this or that issue incompatible for import, and since Scandinavianism often paired with anti-imperial and Swedish revanchist stance, these two reasons most often prompted their prohibition. Such was the case, for example, with Christian Molbech's recollections of his voyage to Sweden. Molbech, a famous Danish linguist, in a 300-hundred pages long text reflected on the nature of present cultural and political situation in Scandinavia, describing events, persons, and cultural trends he witnessed. By no means an ally of political unification of Scandinavian states or their national amalgamation, Molbech appreciated cultural collaboration propelled by the burgeoning movement.⁵³³

The committee, however, specified three pages that made the text unsuitable for the import. Pages 236-238 that were marked contained Molbech's analysis of the situation in Finland. Although he valued the mild rule that Russia exposed Finland to, he envisioned that there could appear an 'ultra-parti' in the future that would strive for the independence of the Grand Duchy. As such articulations were incompatible with the Russian rule, Molbech argued that the government utilized harsh censorship to curb them. Alluding to the case of Arwidsson and referencing the debate over the constitution of Finland, Molbech made his piece flawed for the censorship committee.⁵³⁴ Rather characteristically for the relatively inefficient power of censorship measures and for the speed that it took for the committee to react on particular issues, Aspelund in his 1844 speech cited Molbech's disparaging take on Finnish language from exactly these three pages.⁵³⁵

⁵³² See, for example: Protocol of 20 September 1844. KA. Sensuurikomitean arkisto. Ca: 11; Protocol of 29 June 1846, Ibid.

⁵³³ Christian Molbech, *Lund, Upsala og Stockholm i sommaren 1842: nogle blade af en dagbog med et tillæg om den skandinaviske eenhed* (København: Gyldendal, 1844).

⁵³⁴ Protocol of 22 January 1845. KA. Sensuurikomitean arkisto. Ca: 11.

⁵³⁵ Biografiska anteckningar af C.E. Aspelund. SLSA 146, I. 412.

In Molbech's narrative these three pages were a part of a chapter under the title *Snellman og Finland. De gaar ikke an*, where he recollected the story of acquaintance with Snellman – another potential reason for the censorship ban – whom Molbech considered a kind of political émigré. Molbech waxed lyrical about Snellman's personality, focusing more on his Swedish-language activities that included a collection of short stories and a published voyage diary. Interestingly, Molbech dealt exclusively with his Swedish works, omitting any mention of Finnish-language struggle. Molbech's work also might have contributed to the solidification of Snellman's image as a cosmopolite wandering in the Nordics, at least for the Finnish authorities.⁵³⁶ Moreover, the administration had enough grounds to at least suspect that Snellman was interested in the activities of Scandinavianism.

In July 1843, when Snellman already returned to Helsingfors, Swedish professor Frederik Georg Afzelius addressed him in a letter. Some excerpts from it happened to appear on governor-general's table thanks to the activities of the postal perustration.⁵³⁷ The period when the letter arrived was pivotal in Snellman's life since he opted to leave the university to take a position at the provincial school in Kuopio. Afzelius regretted his friend's decision, since he considered his proper place to be a university. Afzelius noted that Snellman would have easily got a place in Lund as a philosopher that brought honor to 'Scandinavian Norden'. The excerpts that appeared before governor-general contained Afzelius' impressions from the Scandinavian students convention. Afzelius wrote that during the visit of the Danish students, many essential questions were addressed while students themselves were received with sympathy. The festivals marched with unusual splendor and scale, and even the 'elders' –

⁵³⁶ Molbech, *Lund, Upsala og Stockholm i sommaren 1842*, 236–38. The naming of the chapter referred to Carl Jonas Love Almqvist's controversial novel on woman emancipation *Det gaar an!* which spilled into the public discussion with Snellman's contribution under the title *Det gaar ikke an!* For context see: Gunhild Kyle, 'Married and Degraded to Legal Minority: The Swedish Married Woman during the Emancipation Period, 1858–1921', in *Autonomy and Dependence in the Family* (London: Routledge, 2003), 38-57.

⁵³⁷ Afzelius – Snellman, 8 August 1843. Snellman's Collection, URL: <http://snellman.kootutteokset.fi/sites/default/files/03096.pdf> (accessed 03.01.2023); Wulffert – Menshikov. Undated. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 271, l. 4-5.

meaning university professors and some higher bureaucrats – were pulled into the gatherings. Afzelius himself thought that the future of the Scandinavian kingdoms lied sooner or later in the unification, while this meeting represented an early bird of the tendency.⁵³⁸

The documentation that surrounded Snellman in the administration optics set him in a web of transnational connections. His origins, government-critical activities during his years at the university, cosmopolitan connections, Hegelian teachings, and experience of long travels abroad left a particular bureaucratic trace behind him. As the notion of Fennomania gradually appeared to be tied closely to his name, its own nature emanated ambiguous signals as seemingly bound to two different sources. The primary appeared to be a pool of dangerous cosmopolitan ideas, connected to the concepts of nationality, circulating under a disguise of German *bildung*, and spreading in waves from the cultural centers of contemporary Europe with Scandinavianism being one of its many instances. Another was the domestic concern for the encouragement of the use of Finnish in different spheres as well as certain anti-elitist stance against the prejudices that framed Finnish as a ‘plebian’ language. This latter position translated into a tool that could potentially alter Swedish-leaning trajectory of the Finnish public sphere in the administrative optics.⁵³⁹

Already in 1845, the head of the censorship department O.W. Klinkowström pinpointed this fact and showcased potential benefits in case the administration could properly harness it. Klinkowström wrote to Menshikov that Fennomania, in addition to the negative consequences associated with the ideas of nationality and independence, also had positive ones: it caused ‘jealousie of the Swedish nation towards Finland’.⁵⁴⁰ Even though the study of Finnish was

⁵³⁸ Wulfert – Menshikov. Undated. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 271, l. 4-5. He was not alone who addressed Snellman with such ideas, see: Bergfalk – Snellmann, 7 July 1843. Snellman’s Collection, URL: <http://snellman.kootutteokset.fi/sites/default/files/03084.pdf> (accessed 03.01.2023).

⁵³⁹ A curious anonymous document was deposited in the RGIA funds. RGIA. F. 1101, op. 1, d. 599, l. 1-3. Anonymous note on the means to establish the unity of the cultural development of Russia and Finland. The document expressed the view that only through the support of the Finnish language was it possible to bring Finland closer to Russia.

⁵⁴⁰ Klinkowström – Menshikov, 8 / 20 December 1845. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 135, l. 91.

supported in practice before as a means of necessary communication with the locals, in 1846, the documents of governor-general's chancellery revealed other potential reasons behind it: the interest of the population in the Finnish language was articulated as an aid to the study of Russian. Since the inhabitants of the principality were already demanding changes, it was possible to connect the demands of the government to them. The main trigger for the development of such a position, as revealed in the report, was the politicization of the press and propaganda spread from Sweden. The Finnish language was regarded as a tool for breaking-up with the ex-metropole and coming tighter into the imperial abode: 'A more and more growing love for the Finnish language could, it seems, serve as an important tool for the government to reconcile Finnish people with the idea that they should also learn Russian.'⁵⁴¹

It was certainly an opportunistic turn, as two years prior to that Menshikov argued that 'Finnish nationalism' would soon be forgotten in the province as substituted by the Russian-leaning trajectory, although Menshikov might have interpreted nationalism as based on independence-demanding tendencies.⁵⁴² Governor-general clearly preferred to act driven by practical necessities rather than by popular request presented in the form of a mixture between peasant emancipation and nationalism. Besides, pan-imperial concerns outweighed local enthusiasms. The administration often projected the situation in the Baltic provinces onto Finland, especially given that the native Baltic population was also often referred to as 'Finns'. Thus, governor-general took care of the lack of Finnish-speaking pastors and opened the issue of granting respective scholarships at the university in the Senate.⁵⁴³ Menshikov wrote to Klinkowström that this measure was taken to avoid replicating the situation with the conversion

⁵⁴¹ Anonymous note. GARF. F. R8091, op. 1, d. 2110, l. 179; Peter Scheibert, "Finland zur Zeit Kaiser Nikolaus' I," *Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas* 5, no. 1/2 (1940): 142–88.

⁵⁴² Vsepoddanejshiy doklad za 1844 god. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 4, d. 406, l. 166-169.

⁵⁴³ GARF. F. R8091, op. 1, d. 2110, l. 166.

of peasants to another (Eastern Orthodox) faith in the Baltic provinces, where German-speaking priests could hardly communicate with their parishioners.⁵⁴⁴

On the other hand, however, Fennomania was simultaneously tied to the notions of ‘Hegelianism’ as well as to ‘communism’ – arguably borrowing the label from the field of domestic imperial concerns about peasantry – through its apprehension for the conditions of the peasants and by the alleged although largely dismissed fostering of the idea of independence.⁵⁴⁵ Inevitable politization of Fennomania – through its transnational connections to other national and social movements, Scandinavianism among them – and even to the Swedish court under liberal-leaning Oscar I made its maintenance on the side of administration problematic.⁵⁴⁶ Moreover, the context of the Russian empire with perpetual growing disturbances and riots among the peasantry laid its seal on the perception of the Finnish national project.⁵⁴⁷

In Menshikov’s eyes, Fennomania and Snellman primarily targeted the lower classes as their audience and, since the control over the Finnish-language press was poor, this could lead to a dissent, potentially overlooked by the censorship.⁵⁴⁸ Menshikov’s position on the peasant question, his negative attitude towards education of the lower classes⁵⁴⁹ was reflected in his cautious positions towards the question of the Finnish language. The reading of Fennomania thus gravitated between culture-centric tool and class-centric danger. The situation was hardly unique for the imperial appendage, as the imperial rule faced similar

⁵⁴⁴ Menshikov – Klinkowström, 2 / 14 February 1846. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 135, l. 96; Daniel Cavender Ryan, ‘The Tsar’s Faith: Conversion, Religious Politics, and Peasant Protest in Imperial Russia’s Baltic Periphery, 1845–1870s’ (PhD diss., University of California, 2008); Robert Schweitzer, ‘Die “Baltische Parallele”: gemeinsame Konzeption oder zufällige Koinzidenz in der russischen Finnland- und Baltikumpolitik im 19. Jahrhundert’, *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* 33, no. 4 (22 December 1984): 551–77, <https://doi.org/10.25627/19843344620>.

⁵⁴⁵ Kalleinen, ‘The Nature of Russian Imperialism’, 97; Fisher, *Zapiski senatora*, 162-3.

⁵⁴⁶ Wulfert – Menshikov. 22 October / 3 November 1845. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 71, l. 21.

⁵⁴⁷ Jakov Linkov, *Ocherki istorii krest’janskogo dvizhenija v Rossii v 1825-1861 gg* (Moscow: Nauka, 1952).

⁵⁴⁸ See chapter 4.

⁵⁴⁹ See characteristic quote from his diary from summer 1855: A.S. Menshikov’s diary, RFAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d. 135, l. 116: “progress in the plebs (*chern*) amazed me and will not lead to good. Cursed literacy and typography for education to indignation.”

dilemmas in other composite parts, primarily in the ‘Western borderlands’.⁵⁵⁰ In case of Finland, however, the rules of the game were quite different, and the action of local agents appeared more legally powerful than in other areas of the empire.

Even prior to these debates in the variegated cabinets, the news of the death of Charles XIV John made the imperial government on all its levels – from the emperor to local administrators – worry about the future of the neighboring state.⁵⁵¹ Crown-prince and now King Oscar I was well-known in Russia and Finland as a liberal-supportive royal figure. His candidature on the throne did not promise anything positive – in the views from the other shore – with regards to widening freedom of the public sphere and politization of society in Sweden. Moreover, the year of his ascendance to the throne again brought the question over the principles of representation to the fore.⁵⁵² The similarity of the political organization of Finland and Sweden added fuel to the fire, and the administration as well as the public never forgot that Finland was organized along the principles of the ‘representative government’.⁵⁵³

As Menshikov noted in his diary, in November 1845, Alexander Armfelt even consulted with him on the potential suspension of acceptance of the Swedish king’s subjects into Finnish subjecthood, especially into the ‘urban estates’ – an idea that stood in the same line with making it harder to travel to Sweden for the Finlandish subjects – as they ‘spread the spirit of opposition and resistance to government measures.’⁵⁵⁴ In the same year, the proposal of Stockholm to reduce the tariff for the distribution of Swedish-language literature across the border – initially put forward by Finlandish scholars – was rejected on the grounds that Swedish publications

⁵⁵⁰ Daniel Beauvois, *Gordiev uz el Rossijskoj imperii: vlast', shljahta i narod na Pravoberezhnoj Ukraine, 1793-1914* (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2011), 205–35.

⁵⁵¹ Nicholas I – Paskevich, 7 / 19 February 1844 in Alexander Shherbatov, ed., *General-Fel'dmarshal Knjaz' Paskevich. Ego Zhizn' i Dejatel'nost'*, vol. 5: prilozhenija (SPb: Tip. R Golike, 1896), 517–18.

⁵⁵² Copie d’une conversation avec le C. D’État Glinka, 17 / 25 November 1845. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 82, l. 6-7; Armfelt – Menshikov, 6/18 September 1844. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d.18, l. 28ob.

⁵⁵³ Menshikov – Bludov, 22 January 1838. KA. KKK, Dd: 2, N. 176.

⁵⁵⁴ A.S. Menshikov’s diary. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d.134, l. 385ob.

predominantly covered the politics of the Russian Empire in a negative light.⁵⁵⁵ Finnish subjects' attendance of scientific events in Sweden also became suspicious due to fears that politization had also affected the academic environment. All major publications that covered Scandinavian student meetings, published in Denmark or Sweden were prohibited for the import, since they addressed the precarious position of Finland or barbaric and potentially dangerous nature of the Russian rule.⁵⁵⁶ Slow workings of the committee and inability to control the import of prohibited materials, however, must have allowed for some of these books to squeeze through.

Scandinavianism, then a nascent project, elicited the attention of the government in 1843 as a revolutionary tendency that emerged from the deteriorating political atmosphere in Sweden and Scandinavia, in general. Pan-Scandinavian idea as a heterogeneous project of political and cultural consolidation of the Scandinavian kingdoms, however, paled in comparison with patterns of self-organization and mobilization it drew upon. While revanchist thoughts, liberal and democratic inclinations, as well as aggressive rhetoric against the Russian empire worried the administration, the intensity of political manifestation – ostensibly nurtured in the modern Swedish political life – alarmed them. The reaction surfaced correspondingly, and the participation of Finnish students in the students convention – treated as a political demonstration – was punished. The idea of the Nordic consolidation – in various forms and contents – gradually surfaced in the Finnish public sphere, even if apprehensively covered as a friendly-driven idea of consolidation ‘in literary and economic, and possibly even in the political way’ that did not have anything to do, however, with the revolutionary examples of the ‘young Germany and Italy’.⁵⁵⁷

⁵⁵⁵ Hakapaa, ‘Internationalizing Book Distribution in the Early Nineteenth Century’; Nesselrode – Krüdener, 14 July 1845. AVPRI, F. 133, op. 496, g. 1845, d. 146, l. 339; KA. KKK, Fc: 18, N. 221.

⁵⁵⁶ Protocol of 20 September 1844. KA. Sensuurikomitean arkisto. Ca: 11; Protocol of 29 June 1846, Ibid.

⁵⁵⁷ See, for example: *Borgå tidning*, 14.08.1844.

The proximity of Finland and Sweden in geographical space as well as in legal, cultural, intrapersonal, and political dimensions made the Finnish administration invent certain strategies to deal with this bond. Moreover, Finland's status of the loyal imperial province had to be maintained at all costs, and gradually the spheres of economic exchange, knowledge-production, and subjecthood status appeared to be conditioned by spreading concerns of politization. The measures taken by different institutions included censorship, perustration, gradually restricting control of the border-crossing, close communication with imperial representatives in Stockholm, monitoring of the public opinion in Sweden and Finland, institutional distancing from and politics of comparison with Swedish political organization that certainly favored Finnish path within the imperial abode. Towards the second part of the 1840s, part of the administration apprehensively looked at the burgeoning Fennoman movement as a tool to be deployed in the public sphere against the Swedish-centered domination, but Menshikov simultaneously recognized the hazards of encouraging this trajectory that at certain point far outweighed potential benefits, especially since Snellman's figure as its leader was, in his eyes, enmeshed in European and, in particular, Swedish political disturbances.

For the Finnish educated public, Scandinavianism emerged as multifaceted phenomenon. Some Finnish students found inspiration in the set of ideas, rhetorical devices, and self-organization patterns that it came to be associated with. For them, Scandinavianism became a representation of the well-fostered idea of nationality and self-consciousness that 'educated nations' were seeking to achieve. They, as attentive spectators and participants, even envisioned the ways to use these impressions for their own national-building project that centered on Finnish language. Indeed, Finnish national-building project – as other similar projects across Europe – ambiguously drew on cosmopolitan impulse to encourage the narrowing of the public interest to the domestic cultural field. Its central proponent at the time,

Johan Vilhelm Snellman, also pursued different trajectories in self-representation and patterns of connections, playing into his image of cosmopolitan, Scandinavian-fostered, and dangerous intellectual in the eyes of the administration.

On the other hand, Scandinavianism as a nascent but geographically unclear vision of the region was challenged by other contemporary projects. The concept of *Norden* was interpreted differently in the public sphere, often including the Russian empire in the educated cultural dialogue with Scandinavian peers. Jakov Grot and many others enthusiastically built bridges between Scandinavian, Finlandish, and the Russian public. Hardly stripped of power relations, their enthusiasm over Russian presence in the Nordics, however, rather followed interest-driven paths. In Saint-Petersburg, new journal *Finskiy Vestnik* also advocated mutual recognition of the cultural regions of *Norden* that included the Russian empire, as well.⁵⁵⁸ Started in 1845 and edited by Fedor Dershau, who also enthusiastically looked at the Northern Europe, it collected works of intellectuals from Finland, Russian, and Scandinavia under the rubrics of ‘Nordens litteratur’ and ‘Nordiska historia’ as they were translated into Swedish.⁵⁵⁹ *Finskiy Vestnik*, less prominent than *Otechestvennie zapiski* or *Sovremennik*, stood together with them in the line of so-called progressive journals that opposed Moscow-based Slavophile *Moskvityanin*.

⁵⁵⁸ “Recension öfver prospekten till Finska Budbäraren” in *Borgå Tidning*, 29.11.1843; Oleg Jakovlev, “Periodicheskie izdaniya o Finljandii v Sankt-Peterburge (1845–1910 gg.)” in *Sankt-Peterburg i strany Severnoj Evropy: materialy shestoj ezhegodnoj Mezhdunarodnoj nauchnoj konferencii* (SPb: RHGI, 2005), 247–254.

⁵⁵⁹ *Helsingfors tidningar*, 25.01.1845.

Chapter 3. Russian diplomatic corps and the dangers of pan-Scandinavian idea

3.1. The Vienna system

Scandinavianism came to challenge not only other cultural and political visions in the burgeoning, transnational public spheres in the region but also preceding conceptions of geographical distribution of power, often referred to as the Vienna system. The Vienna system as a particular period of the state of European international relations was designed in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars to bring peace back to the continent after the prolonged turmoil. While some researchers claim that the Vienna system signaled conservative restoration of the pre-revolutionary establishment backed up by four (later five) Great Powers who could arbitrarily rule the continent, the system in fact was more complex.⁵⁶⁰ The Vienna order was not a restoration, and its architects understood well that it could not be.⁵⁶¹ Rather it was an attempt of accommodation – no doubt of conservative character – to the new conditions that surfaced in Europe, including the ideas of nationality. Explicitly anti-revolutionary, the Vienna order also sought to prevent most obvious causes of revolutions – wars.⁵⁶²

The Vienna order brought with it what Matthias Schulz calls the European culture of peace, meaning new methods of dealing with potential threats while other researchers underlined the change in perception of the international order by its most powerful agents.⁵⁶³ Based on the notions of the European equilibrium in its many interpretations and aimed at preserving concord, the repertoire of the culture of peace most prominently included European congresses, but apart from them, also practices of common demarche, naval demonstration,

⁵⁶⁰ Paul W. Schroeder, *The Transformation of European Politics, 1763-1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 517–82; Maksim Anisimov and Irina Rybachenok, eds., *Ot carstva k imperii. Rossiya v sistemah mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenij. Vtoraja polovina XVI – nachalo XX veka* (Moscow: CGI Print, 2015), 178–85.

⁵⁶¹ Miroslav Šedivý, *Metternich, the Great Powers and the Eastern Question* (Pilsen: Typos, 2013), 15-52.

⁵⁶² Beatrice de Graaf, Brian Vick, and Ido de Haan, eds., *Securing Europe after Napoleon: 1815 and the New European Security Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019); Matthias Schulz, 'The Construction of a Culture of Peace in Post-Napoleonic Europe: Peace through Equilibrium, Law and New Forms of Communicative Interaction', *Journal of Modern European History / Zeitschrift Für Moderne Europäische Geschichte / Revue d'histoire Européenne Contemporaine* 13, no. 4 (2015): 464–74.

⁵⁶³ Jack S. Levy, "The Theoretical Foundations of Paul W. Schroeder's International System," *The International History Review* 16, no. 4 (1994): 715–44.

third-party mediation, and other instruments of stability-management. The system certainly was imbalanced, and it did not preclude conflicts, which stemmed from the fact that it was maintained by five Great Powers and, perhaps less essentially, by the Holy Alliance, but these shared standards of diplomatic work and conflict-management did enter the field of practices.⁵⁶⁴ The Concert of Europe, as this establishment is often referred to, was being established throughout the late 1810s and 1820s through congresses that took place in Vienna (1814, 1815), Aix-de-la-Chapelle (1818), Troppau (1820), Laibach (1821), and Verona (1822). The map of Europe was redrawn, and imaginable but fragile balance recognized. This did not only mean territorial or resourceful concessions to the Great Powers but also protection over small states and their preservation as the foundation of the system.⁵⁶⁵

What its drivers, the Great Powers, sought to prevent were primarily wars and revolutions, often being the two sides of the same medal.⁵⁶⁶ The security arrangement established networks and communities that monitored the opinions and sought to eradicate any revolutionary conspiracies that really manifested themselves or appeared to be created by new security imagination.⁵⁶⁷ Claims for separation, independence, or unification were most often repudiated by the conservative concert, while revolutionary governments were rarely

⁵⁶⁴ Stella Ghervas, *Conquering Peace: From Enlightenment to the European Union* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2021), 82–147. Perhaps, the Holy Alliance was more important for domestic consumption: Vadim Parsamov, *Na putjah k Svjashhennomu sojuzu: idei vojny i mira v Rossii nachala XIX veka* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo VShJe, 2020), 265–361.

⁵⁶⁵ Matthias Schulz, *Normen und Praxis: Das Europäische Konzert der Großmächte als Sicherheitsrat, 1815-1860* (Oldenburg: Oldenburg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2009), 17-88; Matthias Schulz, “The Construction of a Culture of Peace in Post-Napoleonic Europe: Peace through Equilibrium, Law and New Forms of Communicative Interaction,” *Journal of Modern European History / Zeitschrift Für Moderne Europäische Geschichte / Revue d'histoire Européenne Contemporaine* 13, no. 4 (2015): 464–74; Matthias Schulz, “Cultures of Peace and Security from the Vienna Congress to the Twenty-First Century: Characteristics and Dilemmas,” in *Securing Europe after Napoleon: 1815 and the New European Security Culture*, ed. Beatrice de Graaf, Brian Vick, and Ido de Haan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 21–39, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108597050.002>.

⁵⁶⁶ Linda Colley has recently reactualized this binding between the two: Linda Colley, *The Gun, the Ship and the Pen: Warfare, Constitutions and the Making of the Modern World* (NY: Liveright, 2021), 9–16.

⁵⁶⁷ Ido de Haan and Jeroen van Zanten, ‘Constructing an International Conspiracy: Revolutionary Concertation and Police Networks in the European Restoration’, in *Securing Europe after Napoleon: 1815 and the New European Security Culture*, ed. Beatrice de Graaf, Brian Vick, and Ido de Haan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 171–92, <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108597050.010>; P. S. Squire, “The Metternich-Benckendorff Letters, 1835-1842,” *The Slavonic and East European Review* 45, no. 105 (1967): 368–90.

legitimized. Military interventions on the side of the Concert of Europe became a valuable mechanism often used to maintain the fragile balance. Moreover, interventions at the first half of the 19th century did not conceptually oppose to the notion of sovereignty, resulting in the fact that states in Europe rarely lost their independence upon intervention. The interventions were also negotiated at congresses and made ‘impersonal’, meaning that they stemmed from the shared decision of the Concert of Europe and not from one power that sought to usurp territories.⁵⁶⁸

The principal object of series of intrusions, often fashioned under the banner of ‘humanitarian interventions’, throughout the 19th century was the Ottoman Empire. Previously a part of the European community, the Ottoman empire was pushed into a liminal position by the Vienna establishment. Simultaneously, the question arose over who would dictate the conditions of the Ottoman existence. This empire, weakened by the series of crises, wars, and civil disturbances, supplied with externally projected visions of Eastern barbarity was, in the eyes of the European counterparts, either destined to vanish or to be guided by a strong hand of an outsider.⁵⁶⁹ The Eastern Question over the fate of the Ottoman empire thus became one of the primary zones of contestation of the Great Powers, and it prompted series of tensions.⁵⁷⁰ While new methods of dealing with them were introduced, the system did not prevent conflicts over particular state interests, but it rather provided repertoires and corridors of dealing with them.

The process of the conservative pacification that ensued after the Napoleonic Wars made the Russian empire into one of the most powerful international agents. Many researchers emphasize high level of prestige that the Russian army, diplomatic corps, and nobility enjoyed

⁵⁶⁸ Davide Rodogno, *Against Massacre: Humanitarian Interventions in the Ottoman Empire, 1815-1914*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 68–98.

⁵⁶⁹ Jeremy Black, *A History of Diplomacy* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010), 151–79.

⁵⁷⁰ Nina Stepanovna Kinjapina, *Vostochnyj vopros vo vneshnej politike Rossii: konec XVIII-nachalo XX v* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978); Matthew Smith Anderson, *The Eastern Question, 1774-1923: A Study in International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1966).

in the wake of the wars.⁵⁷¹ This imperial esteem to a degree defined their visions of Europe, empire, and of their place in it. The present state of the empire as well as new visions of nationhood and religious community proffered variegated scenarios of the Russian internal and foreign policy. Having entered the city of Paris, the outlook of the army command became more enthusiastic, which later resulted in the pursuit of proactive policy of territorial acquisition in Central Asia, Caucasus, and intensification of influence in the Ottoman provinces of Moldavia and Walachia.⁵⁷² Some powerful voices argued for more dynamic role in the European affairs, and Russian mediation as a part of the Concert of Europe became an expression of this desire, although then head of the foreign affair Count Karl von Nesselrode sought to curb far-reaching projections. Romanticist imaginations of the Eastern Orthodox religious commonality and Slavic brotherhood under the aegis of the Russian empire also soaked into the public sphere and cabinets, although they remained marginal and did not get much currency until the reign of Alexander II.⁵⁷³ The imagined politics of equilibrium, however, were not a simple appearance that disguised power geopolitics: its principles went beyond mere rhetoric.

The Vienna establishment, as long as we can adequately trace its existence, operated along particular conceptual lines and visions of the globality. Its guiding political language was centered on the problems of wars and revolutions. No matter what goal suspicious, conspirative societies and agents were trying to reach, whether it was geographically, politically, or socially oriented – the common denominator usually happened to be its ascribed revolutionary status in the eyes of the powers of Europe, and especially so in the eyes of the imperial diplomacy. From

⁵⁷¹ Glenda Sluga, *The Invention of International Order: Remaking Europe after Napoleon* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2021), 11–56; Ghervas, *Conquering Peace*, 82–127.

⁵⁷² Alexander Morrison, *The Russian Conquest of Central Asia: A Study in Imperial Expansion, 1814–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 52–82; Alexander Martin, ‘Russia and the Legacy of 1812’, in *The Cambridge History of Russia*, ed. Dominic Lieven, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 145–62, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521815291.009>.

⁵⁷³ Eduard Mühle, ‘Inventing Slavic Unity or the Political Use of a Romantic Concept. The Case of Mikhail P. Pogodin and Joachim Lelewel’, *Historia Slavorum Occidentis* 19, no. 4 (2018): 94–118.

Wartburg students and professors, Carbonari in Piedmont to members of the secret societies fighting for the Greek independence – these agents were most often deemed illegitimate and hazardous by the Russian authorities and the diplomatic corps.⁵⁷⁴ While the language was indeed universal, domestic scenarios of the public discourse reinforced this conservative trend by picturing all liberal and non-governmental societies as essentially regicidal after the Decembrist Revolt in 1825, putting these dangers on a higher level.⁵⁷⁵

3.2. Russian diplomatic corps at the beginning of the 1840s

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian empire was headed by Vice-Chancellor and since 1845 Chancellor of the Russian Empire, Count Karl von Nesselrode. The most long-standing minister of the foreign affairs, Nesselrode by that time was a very experienced politician, with ties binding him both to other heads of European diplomacy and to the courtly system of the Russian empire. Born on a ship near the shores of Portugal in 1780, baptized in an Anglican church, and rarely using Russian language throughout his life, Nesselrode had a particularly cosmopolitan background, that was simultaneously quite typical for the staff of the foreign ministry of the Russian empire. Up to the 1820s, contested by Ioannis Kapodistrias as the joint minister of the foreign affairs, who had contrasting views on many subjects of the imperial policy, later Nesselrode's power was challenged only by the monarchical one.⁵⁷⁶

The degree of influence that Nesselrode could exercise upon the trajectory of the imperial foreign policy in the presence of such figure as Nicholas I has long been questioned.⁵⁷⁷

⁵⁷⁴ Greek case is more complicated of course. See: Rodogno, *Against Massacre*, 99-129; Schulz, *Normen und Praxis*, 89-101; Grigorij Arsh, *Rossija i Bor'ba Grecii Za Osvobozhdenie: Ot Ekateriny II Do Nikolaja I. Očerki*. (Moscow: Indrik, 2013), 161-76; Ivan Ivanov, “‘Neshhastnoe i Postydnoe Priključenje’ Kak Predvestnik Vosstanija Dekabristov. ‘Semenovskaja Istorija’ 1820 g. V Zerkale Gosudarstvennoj Bezopasnosti,” *Peterburgskij Istoricheskij Zhurnal*, no. 4 (16) (2017): 32–44.

⁵⁷⁵ Ol'ga V. Jedel'man, *Sledstvie po delu dekabristov* (Moscow: Modest Kolerov, 2010), 170–89; Tat'jana Vasil'evna Andreeva, “Aleksandr i i Vnutrennjaja Bezopasnost' Rossijskoj Imperii: Pravitel'stvo, Tajnye Obshhestva i Dvorjanstvo,” *Peterburgskij Istoricheskij Zhurnal*, no. 1 (17) (2018): 65–88.

⁵⁷⁶ Patricia Kennedy Grimsted, *The Foreign Ministers of Alexander I: Political Attitudes and the Conduct of Russian Diplomacy, 1801-1825* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 226–86.

⁵⁷⁷ Lincoln, *Nicholas I, Emperor and Autocrat of All the Russians*, 110–12.

Indeed, the emperor steered the avenue the empire took in foreign affairs with his heavy hand. Nicholas, however, for the larger part of his rule, followed the path that Nesselrode with his colleagues once paved, meaning the Vienna order and its primary quest for the possible status quo in the European affairs, especially given his affection to the principles of legality. Moreover, Nicholas' conservative and explicitly anti-revolutionary stance played well into the discursive and practical field of the post-Napoleonic system. The emperor was aware of the intricacies of the European diplomacy as well as of the repertoire he could use to foster the maintenance of the existing order in the continent. The language within which he could autocratically operate was thus limited by the boundaries set during the pacification of the 1810-20s.⁵⁷⁸

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian empire operated via the imperial diplomatic corps abroad. Some of the most well-paid agents in the service of the Russian throne, diplomats by that time were also arguably the most educated group of the imperial society, as the field was progressively professionalizing since the beginning of the century.⁵⁷⁹ Enmeshed in the working of the diplomatic service, strictly organized by the Vienna treaty, they often had more to do with their colleagues from other European states than with the servicemen of the Russian empire.⁵⁸⁰ Spending most of their lives abroad did lay a mark of cosmopolitan outlook and particular network of communication that often encompassed broader and more dispersed nodes compared with those who worked most of their lives within the borders of the empire.⁵⁸¹ Diplomatic affairs often turned into a family business, and sons

⁵⁷⁸ Vladimir Degojev, *Vneshnjaja politika Rossii i mezhdunarodnye sistemy: 1700–1918 gg* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2004), 181-223.

⁵⁷⁹ Petr Zajonchkovskij, *Pravitel'stvennyj apparat samoderzhavnoj Rossii v 19 veke* (Moscow: Mysl', 1978), 78–80; Derek Offord, Vladislav Rjéoutski, and Gesine Argent, *The French Language in Russia: A Social, Political, Cultural, and Literary History* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018), 79–122; 263–326.

⁵⁸⁰ Black, *A History of Diplomacy*, 153.

⁵⁸¹ Wirtschafter, *From Victory to Peace*, 197–208; M. S. Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450 - 1919* (Routledge, 2014), 103–28.

followed the steps of their fathers. The diplomatic corps was a closed group until late into the 19th century, and it was primarily occupied by the offspring of the highest nobility.

When one encounters the neatly-structured fonds of the Archive of the Foreign Affairs of the Russian empire, one expects that their work functioned along these easily monitored channels. Representatives of the Russian empire abroad sent their dispatches (and later telegrams) to Saint-Petersburg, and the minister responded with instructions on this or that affair. This situation was occasionally complicated by the amount of time it took for a dispatch to reach Saint-Petersburg and vice versa, so the diplomats had a room for maneuver on their own in which they could divert from the general line the ministry was pursuing in case this line had been determined. On the ground, the diplomats communicated with royal figures, governments, their colleagues from other states, and courts, while their access to it depended on the rank, reputation, and social status that they enjoyed.⁵⁸²

But, overall, the picture is misleading. I have already demonstrated that the Finlandish administration could establish its own channels of communication that bypassed the hierarchy of the ministry, and in fact this side activity of the Swedish diplomats was prescribed by the emperor himself.⁵⁸³ Diplomats also established personal networks of correspondence, friendly ties, and circuits of information that diverted from the general structure. The documentation of special diplomatic missions could also be preserved in alternative storages, complicating the picture. When one analyses personal archives of diplomats or collections of RGADA, one is puzzled by the multitude of relations and communications that went beyond the AVPRI structure. This situation makes the answer to the question of when the minister was updated on a particular event or tendency slightly more problematic. For sure, dispatches played a central

⁵⁸² David Paull Nickles, *Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 79–134.

⁵⁸³ Krusius-Ahrenberg, 'Finland och den svensk-ryska allianspolitiken intill 1830/31 års polska revolution', 248. See also: Lidija Lempijajnen, 'Vneshnie kontakty Velikogo Knjazhestva Finljandskogo: 1809-1914 gg.'

role, but we can hardly ignore other avenues of informational exchange, especially given Nesselrode also had multiple personal transnational correspondence lines.

Given this picture, it is hard to answer questions that concern timings of a particular update or the primacy of produced information within or beyond the structure of the diplomatic corps. My primary focus thus relegates to the issue of language framings around the Scandinavian tendencies, while I do not ignore diverse channels of communication but just admit its potential fragmentary coverage in my work. First, on the basic level of a linguistic fact, the language of diplomatic correspondence was predominantly French. While French penetrated different communicative situations among the nobility that often went beyond the professional use, diplomacy was perhaps most tightly associated with it.⁵⁸⁴ Second, on a more abstract level of political language, it certainly alluded to the conceptual schemes elaborated under the dominance of the Vienna system. From the attempts of geopolitical redistribution to street manifestations, the diplomats had their language instruments at hand to picture those for Saint-Petersburg, and I argue that this instrument played crucial role in the interpretation of pan-Scandinavian activities and schemes in the diplomatic correspondence. This language to a degree shaped the pool of imperial reactions towards these tendencies.

3.3. Nordic lines of communication within the diplomatic corps

Norden (*le Nord*), or the Northern Europe, as a parcel of the European equilibrium, was conceived out of negotiations and contestations. Its boundaries were first negotiated and recognized at the Congress of Vienna. Norway was ceded from Denmark and united with Sweden, while Finland came under the Russian rule.⁵⁸⁵ The preservation of this new status quo

⁵⁸⁴ Offord, Rjéoutski, and Argent, *The French Language in Russia*, 263–311.

⁵⁸⁵ Päiviö Tommila, *La Finlande dans la politique européenne en 1809-1815* (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1962); Martin Hårdstedt, 'Decline and Consolidation: Sweden, the Napoleonic Wars and Geopolitical Restructuring in Northern Europe', in *Napoleon's Empire: European Politics in Global Perspective*, ed. Ute Planert, War, Culture and Society, 1750–1850 (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016), 213–26, https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137455475_15; Roald Berg, 'Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 1814: A Geopolitical

was deemed paramount. The perceived codependency of the Nordic kingdoms within the defined region shone especially bright during the periods of international conflicts. Perhaps, the first among those happened in the 1830s, when question concerning the control of the Black Sea straits pitted the Great Powers. The issue surfaced after Nicholas I signed the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi in 1833, gaining exclusive access to the control of the Dardanelles for the Russian empire. The British empire, offended by the measure, shifted the focus of activities to the Baltic Sea. In 1834, the renewed fortification of the Åland islands, a territory of the Grand Duchy of Finland, was used as a case to warn Swedish and Danish governments of ostensibly aggressive intentions of the Russian empire towards them and its aims of the domination in the Baltics.⁵⁸⁶

The twin tension over the Black and Baltic seas strained the relations so that many in the diplomatic corps and in the respective courts expected full-fledged European war in the middle of the 1830s.⁵⁸⁷ This could explain Charles XIV John's later interest in the details of the Eastern question, on which Russian representative reported to governor-general of Finland.⁵⁸⁸ In 1834, when the war was most anticipated, the question arose concerning the position that Sweden and Denmark would take in case of the conflict. When Sweden was pushed to issue its declaration of neutrality under the Russian pressure without consulting other powers, Danish politicians blamed its government for desynchronizing their policies that were meant to be common. Already by that time, governments and public intellectuals understood that the Nordic powers would have better act together, because it was only the joint demarches

and Contemporary Perspective', *Scandinavian Journal of History* 39, no. 3 (27 May 2014): 265–86, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03468755.2013.876929>; Max Engman and Åke Sandström, eds., *Det nya Norden efter Napoleon: 25:e Nordiske historikermötet, Stockholm den 4-8 augusti 2004* (Stockholm: Stockholms universitet, 2004).

⁵⁸⁶ Carl-Fredrik Palmstierna, *Sverige, Ryssland och England 1833-1855: kring Novembertraktatens förutsättningar* (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & söner, 1932), 7–56. Governor-general, however, credited these fortifications as militarily nonsensical: Konstantin Fisher, *Zapiski senatora*, 298-9.

⁵⁸⁷ On Black Sea see: Ajrapetov, *Istorija vneshnej politiki Rossijskoj imperii 1801-1914*, 148–50.

⁵⁸⁸ Matushevich – Menshikov, 9 / 21 February 1840. RGAVMF, F. 19, op. 2, d. 135, l. 37-37ob; Palmstierna, *Sverige, Ryssland och England 1833-1855*, 89–97.

of Denmark and Sweden-Norway that could surface as powerful agreements.⁵⁸⁹ Even though scholars argue that Russia took diametrically different foreign policy courses with regards to Sweden and Denmark,⁵⁹⁰ the entangled nature of the Nordic foreign policy was recognized both by domestic agents and external observers. However, even internal hazards that spread in the respective kingdoms posed questions about their mutual dependency.

As I have mentioned, imperial diplomats across the globe established ties that were prompted by kin or friendly relations, or by geographical and hence qualitative proximity of their fields of responsibility. Such was the situation with Russian representatives in Stockholm and Copenhagen towards the end of the 1830s. Baron Paul von Nicolay, one of the most experienced diplomats at the Russian service, by that time occupied a position of minister representative in Copenhagen for over 20 years.⁵⁹¹ From another shore of the Øresund, he was contacted by Adam Matushevich, Russian envoy of Polish origin who came to Sweden from Naples in 1839, at the very point when the political situation in the Nordic kingdom began destabilizing.⁵⁹² The peculiarity of this communication was amplified by the fact that both used English in their letters – then a rare language for a diplomatic correspondence in the Russian empire – and it was clear from their exchange that both shared a certain anglophone stance.

In a way, their communication was prompted by the deteriorating political situation – under which they implied the proliferation of oppositional parties and organizations together with general broadening boundaries of political participation – in both countries that ensued towards the end of the decennium, but also by the interconnectedness of relations between Denmark and Sweden that both recognized. Indeed, Matushevich's letters at the beginning of

⁵⁸⁹ Palmstierna, *Sverige, Ryssland och England 1833-1855*, 50-51. Palmstierna also adds that the lack of consultation between Denmark and Sweden helped Russia to avoid some sort of proto-Scandinavianism, the claim that I do not agree with.

⁵⁹⁰ Emanuel Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864: A Chapter of Russian Policy towards the Scandinavian Countries* (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1990), 13–51.

⁵⁹¹ See his correspondence with Mikhail Vorontsov, *Arhiv knjazja Voroncova: Bumagi fel'dmarshala knjazja Mihaila Semenovicha Voroncova* ed. by Petr Ivanovich Bartenev, vol. 37 (Moscow: Universitetskaja tip., 1891), 166-189.

⁵⁹² Palmstierna, *Sverige, Ryssland och England 1833-1855*, 99–107.

1840 read as a warning to his colleague. While the relations between the empire and ‘good old England’ became more peaceful towards the end of the 1830s,⁵⁹³ the situation in Sweden did not promise good outcomes. The parliamentary policy of the government failed, paving the way for the activities of the revolutionary party. The government, according to Matushevich, acted thoughtlessly: ‘I told you I thought they had the game in their own hands if they knew how to play their cards’.⁵⁹⁴ The cards, however, were not played that well as he expected.

The failure of picking Lord Otto Palmstjerna as marshal of the Diet, a figure lacking appropriate standing and skills for such position, played well into the opposition’s advantage. The government itself appeared weak and lacking a strong leader, while Charles XIV John’s behavior gave impetus to the oppositional outrage. As a result, the Riksdag committees – the bodies in fact responsible for the working of the estate assembly according to the envoy – would consist of the majority of the oppositional party due to the vote of all four estates, ‘of the most violent, and in some instances of the most radical and revolutionary opposition’.⁵⁹⁵ The administration and the council of ministers, in their turn, exhibited lack of energy and power, with the exception of Baron Gustav Stierneld, an old friend and a loyal ally of the Russian government. Matushevich even questioned the future of the Swedish monarchical line, since ‘the history shows us but too well how those sorts of events are managed in Sweden’, especially given the weakness of once brilliant but now old Bernadotte on the throne, who ‘dwindled into an old twaddle and remain an utter stranger to his nation.’⁵⁹⁶

Matushevich finished his letter about the political tendencies in Sweden, rhetorically setting the situation in Sweden and Denmark in the dynamics of mutual dependence:

As neighbor I was bound in duty and friendship to warn you of a danger which I hope and trust may blow over but which may at the same time give rise to serious wents of a

⁵⁹³ Matushevich – Nicolay, 24 December 1839. Kansalliskirjasto. Ms.Mf. 833, C.j.

⁵⁹⁴ Matushevich – Nicolay, 6 February 1840. Kansalliskirjasto. Ms.Mf. 833, C.j.

⁵⁹⁵ Matushevich – Nicolay, 6 February 1840. Kansalliskirjasto. Ms.Mf. 833, C.j.

⁵⁹⁶ Ibid.

dismal complexion. The state of this country and its furious agitation will not diminish the natural difficulties of the task which your new Danish Sovereign has to perform. His start, however, has been so good that it will win him his reign, happen what may in Sweden.⁵⁹⁷

His words clearly pointed to the understanding of the bonds between the public spheres, ‘oppositional parties’, and ‘revolutionary tendencies’ in both kingdoms together with the threats that these issues presented for the reigning persons. Moreover, he complained that the foreign ministry of the Russian empire did not take any pronounced stance with regards to these tendencies, and he insisted that those were his private opinions.⁵⁹⁸ However, monarchical power in Denmark rested on far more solid grounds, as Baron Nicolay sought to assure him in response.

Indeed, in Denmark Christian VIII inherited the throne after the death of Frederik VI in 1839. Frederik VI was known as a reformer in his younger years who managed to completely alter the social system in Denmark, abolish bondage, and thus give impetus to the change of the economic and political profile of the kingdom. Towards the second part of his rule, Frederik, however, became more conservative, restricting the freedom of the public sphere and political activities, while his management of the kingdom was deemed ineffective by many oppositional intellectuals.⁵⁹⁹ Under the external and domestic pressure, however, Frederik announced the establishment of advisory bodies, *stænderforsamlinger*, in 1831-4 for Denmark and the duchies. Rapidly, these bodies sought to challenge their limited status, often performing as an arena for pending public questions.⁶⁰⁰ Many of the nascent liberal intellectuals put a lot

⁵⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹⁹ Marcus Rubin, *Frederik VI's Tid: Fra Kielerfreden til Kongens Død. Økonomiske og historiske Studier* (København: P.G. Philipsen, 1895), 608–20; Bjørn, *Fra reaktion til grundlov*, 231–34.

⁶⁰⁰ See: Chapter 1; Bjørn, 193–211.

of hope on the candidature of Christian VIII who by that time was primarily known for the promulgation of a liberal Eidsvoll Constitution in Norway while for a short period of time occupying its throne in 1814.⁶⁰¹

His ascension to the Danish throne, to a great disappointment of the opposition and to the satisfaction of the Russian representatives in Copenhagen, did not promise any constitutional changes. On the contrary, as Paul Nicolay described his politics, he followed a conservative line, and the addresses of the oppositional party that were presented to the king – many of them referring to the success of the Norwegian Constitution – did not produce any result. Christian VIII and his administration could not, however, close their eyes on the pending issues of the state, as Russian representative witnessed. Already by the beginning of 1840, the new communal law for Copenhagen was issued that promulgated local representation,⁶⁰² expenditure cuts announced, including those related to the court, and the support for the naval ministry was also expressed by the king who sought to pacify previously disenfranchised groups turning them into loyal conglomerates.⁶⁰³

As Nicolay wrote, Danish subjects should have considered themselves blessed with new energetic monarch who sought to improve the kingdom. Although the activities of the ‘radical party’ went on, its extremities rather alienated the audience who cherished high hopes about the new monarch.⁶⁰⁴ Even though ‘Danish liberal press has of late been again more noisy’, their insolent language disturbed the society and they were ‘losing their ground more and more’, according to the Russian diplomat. The growing liberal opposition indeed intensified their agitation, protesting the strict censorship rules and political regime of autocracy. The results of

⁶⁰¹ Glenthøj and Nordhagen Ottosen, *Experiences of War and Nationality in Denmark and Norway, 1807-1815*, 208–56, <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137313898>; Bo Stråth, *Union och demokrati: de förenade rikena Sverige-Norge 1814-1905* (Nora: Bokförlaget Nya Doxa, 2005), 50–101.

⁶⁰² Flemming Dahl, *Københavns bystyre gennem 300 aar: hovedtræk af stadens forfatningshistorie fra Frederik III's til Christian X's tid udgivet af Københavns borgerrepræsentation* (København: I kommission hos, 1943), 106; Bjørn, *Fra reaktion til grundlov*, 239–46.

⁶⁰³ Nicolay – Matushevich, 12 January 1840. Kansalliskirjasto. Ms.Mf. 833, C.j.

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid.

their politics remained, however, limited up to end of the 1840s.⁶⁰⁵ Nicolay was satisfied with their failure and noted that all sensible people were determined to follow up the king's 'wise and determined course [...], taking no notice of the yelling dogs.'⁶⁰⁶

Clearly, the two diplomats recognized how tightly reactions of the public spheres were dependent on each other in both kingdoms, reading each other's newspapers, spreading each other's rumors. They also shared their attitude – quite typical for the overall staff of the diplomatic corps and conservative elites who opposed new understanding of politics as a common endeavor in principle – towards new bourgeoisie public spheres that posited their 'radical' demands, challenging, sometimes quite successfully, the monarchical and aristocratic power.⁶⁰⁷ When the tumultuous months seemed to have ended and the new Riksdag took a more compromise turn, Matushevich's letter outlined this embeddedness and mutual understanding in even more precise manner:

The wisdom of your new Danish Monarch and the quiet of his dominions will have contributed not a little to the preservation of internal peace and the present order of things in Sweden. On the other hand, the tranquil termination of the Swedish Diet, will have, I doubt not, a salutary influence on your domestic affairs.⁶⁰⁸

Nicolay replied accordingly but with a little reservation concerning the degree of this influence, pointing to more autonomous position of Danish politics as if downplaying the role of these connections based on bourgeois politics: 'No doubt the clearing of your horizon may

⁶⁰⁵ Glenthøj, *1864 – Sønnen Af de Slagne*, 66-147.

⁶⁰⁶ Nicolay – Matushevich, 12 March 1840. Kansalliskirjasto. Ms.Mf. 833, C.j.

See similar conservative reflections: J. N. Madvig, 'Et Par Erindringer Fra Christian VIII's Tid.', *Historisk Tidsskrift* 5, no. 5 (1885): 98-116, <https://tidsskrift.dk/historisktidsskrift/article/view/54418>.

⁶⁰⁷ Black, *A History of Diplomacy*, 173; Bertel Nygaard, 'Anti-Politics: Modern Politics and Its Critics in Denmark, 1830–1848', *Scandinavian Journal of History* 36, no. 4 (2011): 419–42, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03468755.2011.596652>.

⁶⁰⁸ Matushevich – Nicolay, 6 March 1840. Kansalliskirjasto. Ms.Mf. 833, C.j.

have some salutary influence on our affairs here; still I would not so far off satisfy the Swedish vanity, as to give them the last credit for our continuing to do well'.⁶⁰⁹

Even considering this reservation, the diplomats recognized the embedded state of the bourgeois public spheres and – rather as a result than by their own desire – high politics in the Scandinavian kingdoms. It was not only Scandinavianism that drew on the similarity, proximity, and familiarity of the Nordic states and Scandinavian-wide framework of action, but also those networks that would later be responsible for its monitoring. The mutual dependence of the political trajectories of Denmark and Sweden, recognized in the liberal public spheres was well understood and appreciated by the imperial agents. Political turbulence in Sweden might have echoed in Denmark, while Christian VIII's conservative rule might have improved the situation in Sweden in their eyes. Moreover, at the beginning of the 1840s, the Nordic region did not figure as an essential theatre of the imperial foreign policy, and the diplomats often lamented the lack of clear instructions from Saint-Petersburg or, alternatively, capitalized on their autonomy. Their eagerness to draw the attention of the ministry to their affairs might have resulted in sometimes exaggerated profile of the local trends.

The correspondence between Nicolay and Matushevich lasted almost until the death of the latter in 1842. Their communication was a private affair by no means imposed from above. Although we do not have any proof that the diplomatic line of correspondence between envoys in Copenhagen and Stockholm became a sort of tradition, there is enough evidence in other diplomats' private archives to assume that many imperial agents in this region established their own lines of information exchange to monitor closely what they perceived as an entangled public and political terrain.⁶¹⁰ Clearly, even in the personal exchange they recognized their

⁶⁰⁹ Nicolay – Matushevich, 7 March 1840. Ibid.

⁶¹⁰ See, for example, Jakov Dashkov's archive where there is evidence of diplomatic networking beyond the lines of the ministry hierarchy: Letters of the Russian consul in Copenhagen, Gershau: GARF. F. 912, op. 1, d. 369 or letters of Paul Nicolay's son, Nicholas Nicolay who would also become Russian representative in Copenhagen: GARF. F. 912, op. 1, d. 614.

statuses as imperial agents and lamented that Saint-Petersburg lacked a coherent programme with regards to the pending issues in the region. Nevertheless, their personal exchange where, as at least Matushevich wrote, they drew on their own opinion, allowed them to divert from the diplomatic language that both knew well and had to utilize in their dispatches. The discrepancy between the languages highlights the standardized and universal genre of the diplomatic dispatch.

3.4. Dispatch from abroad: multitude of problems and universality of language

For a long time in the history of diplomacy and international relations dispatches figured as neutral entities of information. Researchers used them to display the circulation of information and peculiarities of decision-making processes in the European capitals. The reflection of the new diplomatic history, however, drew our attention to the nature of the political language that the authors of these dispatches utilized to inform their superiors on the situations and processes they witnessed in foreign domains.⁶¹¹ The dispatch was and still is, finally, a specific genre that functioned according to its own set of rules and regulations, subordinate to the conceptual grammar of diplomacy. Moreover, the genre was collectively negotiated and hierarchically organized to fit the necessities of the profession.⁶¹²

This genre, at least in the 19th century, was twofold. On the one hand, it was or sought to become universal, at least when universal equaled to Europe, drawing on the established conceptual alphabet of post-Napoleonic system, whose postulates became a foundation of diplomatic education across Europe.⁶¹³ Dispatches were meant to be impersonal representations of the reality in all its detail, at least performatively so. However, subjective

⁶¹¹ Thomas Otte, 'The Inner Circle: What Is Diplomatic History? (And Why We Should Study It): An Inaugural Lecture', *History* 105, no. 364 (2020): 5–27, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-229X.12925>.

⁶¹² Laurence Badel et al., *Ecrivains et diplomates: L'invention d'une tradition. XIXe-XXIe siècles* (Paris : Armand Colin, 2012).

⁶¹³ August Heinrich Meisel, *Cours de style diplomatique*, vol. 1 (Paris, 1826), 13–25.

reflections could not be left aside so easily.⁶¹⁴ Many diplomats, often under the request of the minister, were to provide their *own* diagnosis of the political situation in their entrusted domains. Moreover, the textual nature of a dispatch inherited many aspects of their composition from other contemporary literary genres, whether diplomats were conscious about it or not.⁶¹⁵ Dispatches, finally, drew on the expectations of domestic perspectives and on the ways they were supposed to be read back in Saint-Petersburg, introducing an element of self-diagnosis. As other genres, dispatches were dialogical in their nature, and authoring one simultaneously meant expecting an answer and conforming to these expectations.⁶¹⁶

Diplomatic experience and language also drew on the dialectics of profession and vocation. On the one hand, it required bureaucratic skills, education, and standardization of norms and rituals across Europe.⁶¹⁷ On the other hand, however, only few could become diplomatic agents, since the requirements of this vocation went beyond professional skills and implied such notions as taste and manners that could have been acquired only through the experience of a noble, aristocratic lifestyle. The very presence and socialization at the European courts often demanded from the representatives noble status to be treated as equal and the special knowledge to navigate complex scenarios and rituals.⁶¹⁸ One had to have access to restricted arenas of aristocratic leisure to gain priceless insights into the workings of the

⁶¹⁴ Yves Bruley, '2 - Le diplomate français au xix e siècle, entre belles-lettres et littérature', in *Écrivains et diplomates* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2012), 43–56, <https://doi.org/10.3917/arco.badel.2012.01.0043>; Lucien Bély, '1 - L'écrivain diplomate des Temps modernes, entre nécessité politique et pratique culturelle', in *Écrivains et diplomates* (Paris: Armand Colin, 2012), 31–42, <https://doi.org/10.3917/arco.badel.2012.01.0031>.

⁶¹⁵ Ibid.

⁶¹⁶ In this, I primarily draw on: Mikhail Bakhtin, *Speech Genres and Other Late Essays* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986), 60–102. On self-diagnosis in diplomacy see also: Peter Stadius, 'Visiting Nordic Modernity Around 1900: Spanish Images', in *Rhetorics of Nordic Democracy*, ed. Jussi Kurunmäki and Johan Strang (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 2010), 194–217.

⁶¹⁷ Anderson, *The Rise of Modern Diplomacy 1450 - 1919*, 103–48; Alexander Kuznecov, 'Proobrazy MGIMO: Iz Istorii Special'nogo Diplomaticeskogo Obrazovanija v Rossii', *Vestnik MGIMO-Universiteta* 34, no. 1 (2014): 64–71, <https://doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2014-1-34-64-71>; Olga Lebedeva, 'Istorija i Jevoljucija Diplomaticeskoi Sluzhby Rossii' (Doctoral diss., Moscow: MGIMO, 2019), 185–251.

⁶¹⁸ Nickles, *Under the Wire*, 79–134; Karl von Martens, *Manuel diplomatique, ou précis des droits et des fonctions des agents diplomatiques, suivi d'un recueil d'actes et d'offices pour servir de guide aux personnes qui se destinent a la carrière politique* (Strasbourg : Treuttel et Würtz, 1822), 97.

diplomatic environment. Diplomacy thus gravitated between the notions of science and art, pertaining both to impersonal analysis and artistic improvisation.⁶¹⁹

Those who represented the Russian emperor at the European courts in the 1840s-50s were old enough to escape the processes of modernization and standardization of the diplomatic education in the Russian empire towards the mid-century, although some of them witnessed the birth of the ministry at the beginning of the century.⁶²⁰ Many of them grew in Europe and got private education, turning into diplomats by virtue of their genealogy. They were rather the architects or at least builders of the universal system that was being erected both in Europe and in the Russian empire after the Napoleonic Wars. Their dispatches were used as examples of clarity and style that their younger colleagues were supposed to imitate. Their behavior and autonomous decision-making laid down the bricks of the system to be inherited. Their contemporaries and colleagues compiled first guidebooks for the diplomatic service that were used across the continent for the education of the next generation of professionals.

One of the most wide-spread and acclaimed among those guidebooks was Karl Martens' *Manuel diplomatique* that came out first in 1822 and later came out in several editions, republished throughout the century.⁶²¹ Its adherence to the language and manifested practice of the post-Napoleonic establishment is telling from the introduction:

In the legitimate aim of its institution, diplomacy must provide for the safety and harmony of states; it must endeavor, by prompt explanations and friendly interventions, to prevent or promptly terminate wars [...].⁶²²

⁶¹⁹ See for example a letter from a distinguished Russian diplomat Peter von Meyendorff to his son Ernst on the nature of diplomacy as art: P. Meyendorff – E. Meyendorff, 11 September 1859 in *Peter von Meyendorff - Ein russischer Diplomat an den Höfen von Berlin und Wien* ed. Otto Hoetzsch, vol. 3 (Leipzig: De Gruyter, 1923), 222-26.

⁶²⁰ Lebedeva, 'Istorija i Jevoljucija Diplomaticeskoj Sluzhby Rossii', 211–51.

⁶²¹ On its importance see bibliography in other contemporary guidebooks, for example: Jonathan Elliot, *The American Diplomatic Code Embracing a Collection of Treaties and Conventions Between the United States and Foreign Powers: From 1778 to 1834* (Washington: Elliot, 1834); Andrei Nikolaevich Stoyanov, *Ocherki istorii i dogmatiki mezhdunarodnago prava* (Kharkiv: Univesitetskaja tip., 1875), 444.

⁶²² Martens, *Manuel diplomatique*, 2.

The state of peace, represented here by the harmony of states in the rhetorical tradition of the Vienna settlement, was the most desirable condition to be prolonged as far as the situation allowed to sustain against the chances of war. Many instruments were at diplomats' disposal to preserve those favorable conditions, according to the manual.

The text put a list of requirements for a diplomat who had to know the natural law, features of local politics, statistics, and history, the intricacies of diplomatic status, rights, and obligations. This diverse knowledge opened up ways for diplomatic negotiation but still left a room for a surprise of fortune or accident. Sometimes, the situation could even devolve into 'movement' and 'agitation', considerably blurring the prospects of reasonable politics.⁶²³ When discussing the responsibilities of a diplomatic agent, Martens again highlighted representative's personal obligation to maintain 'harmony' or 'union' between the governments of the states, although stressing the requirements for fidelity and clarity of the dispatches.⁶²⁴ A diplomat had to prevent ruptures, calm down spirits, and dissipate unfounded fears to establish a closer degree of understanding. The word use was not accidental, since Martens argued that the postulates, rights, obligations, and classifications he provided were based on the founding documents of the contemporary system of the international relations.⁶²⁵

In the last section, he provided long excerpts from these documents that included some parts of the Vienna settlements and later congress documentation where the dangers of 'agitation', 'movement', and 'revolution' unambiguously figured as main drivers of precipitated wars and unreasonable violence that in some cases legitimized external intervention.⁶²⁶ This language and its central concepts were used universally across Europe in

⁶²³ Ibid, 4-5.

⁶²⁴ Another influential guidebook also highlighted the universal conformity of diplomatic style: Meisel, *Cours de style diplomatique*, 1:3-6. He also refers to Martens on page 6.

⁶²⁵ Martens, *Manuel diplomatique*, 9-10.

⁶²⁶ Martens, *Manuel diplomatique*, 255-57, 319, 429, 474.

the analysis of the local conditions.⁶²⁷ The diplomats in the Russian service also used it to codify pan-Scandinavian project in familiar terms for Saint-Petersburg. From the ‘yelling dogs’ of the private correspondence, those in charge of the Russian foreign policy in Scandinavia appealed to the familiar and standardized vocabulary of ‘agitation’, ‘movement’, and ‘revolution’. On the one hand, this language, stripped of any local specificity, often recoded multifaceted project into a one-dimensional provocation, reconceptualizing it along familiar concepts. On the other hand, this very measure made sure that any political mobilization can be understood and acted upon in a universally accepted manner.

3.5. To interpret: Russian diplomats in Stockholm witness Scandinavian students festivals

Scandinavian students festivals as events of considerable magnitude that drew on restricted but still impressive mobilization of students, professors, public intellectuals, and city dwellers in general, became a point of great interest and suspicion for the imperial servicemen. At the first half of the 1840s, in 1843 and 1845, in particular, Scandinavian student meetings became central vehicles of Nordic unity manifestation, and, simultaneously of monitoring the rise and fall of the public interest towards the movement for the diplomats. Even if some concepts in the vocabulary of the students and diplomats intermingled, as for example, the term ‘movement’ (*bevægelse* in Danish, *mouvement* in French), their semantic qualities were different. Self-nomination of the movement among the students highlighted its mass status and unified diverging interpretations of the Scandinavian future under a single mobilizing umbrella, while the diplomats’ ‘movement’ surfaced as an alert, bridged it with ‘agitation’, thus informing Saint-Petersburg on unwanted radicalizing tendencies. Scandinavian student meetings emanated ‘revolutionary’ character, as the diplomats translated them into the

⁶²⁷ de Haan and van Zanten, ‘Constructing an International Conspiracy’.

language of the European culture of peace. In their texts, these conventions became products of rising bourgeois politics and gradual corrosion of the traditional institutions and hierarchies of rule in the North.

The beginning of 1843 in Sweden, according to senior secretary of the Russian mission Dmitrij Glinka's dispatches, did not promise anything extraordinary. The cabinet was reshuffled, and Glinka especially highlighted the figure of new minister of foreign affairs, Albert Ihre, whose candidature 'offers a guarantee to the continuation of the relations of deep harmony and friendship which for so long time exists between the two majestic courts', alluding to the longevity of the alliance of 1812 between the two states.⁶²⁸ Another event that should have made the new year was the 25th anniversary of Charles XIV John rule, and plans were made for many festive events across the kingdom, while official newspapers waxed lyrical 'in a burlesque tone' about the long rule of the present king.⁶²⁹ However, the workings of the ministry and its communication with the public soon made Glinka think that the strategy of the administration was to avoid setting itself into any opposition to the press, restriction the repertoire of its action.⁶³⁰

This inaction of the cabinet became especially evident towards the summer, when the administration, according to Glinka, consciously avoided applying any restrictive measures upon the Scandinavian students to avoid provoking the public. Even prior to these events, Glinka reported to Nesselrode about another avenue of the Scandinavian consolidation. As the Scandinavian kingdoms were paying tributes to the groups of Berber pirates around the shores of Morocco,⁶³¹ Danish cabinet approached their Swedish colleagues with an offer to act united against the pirates to get rid of the payment, since the Scandinavian states were virtually last

⁶²⁸ Glinka – Nesselrode. 22 December / 3 January 1843. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1843, d. 162, l. 3-4.

⁶²⁹ Glinka – Nesselrode. 2 / 14 March 1843. Ibid, l. 36-38

⁶³⁰ Glinka – Nesselrode. 13 / 25 May 1843. Ibid, l. 77-82.

⁶³¹ See more on this: Martin N. Murphy, 'The Barbary Pirates', *Mediterranean Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (2013): 19–42; Jakob Maliks, 'Corsairs and Constitutions', *Scandinavian Journal of History* 42, no. 2 (15 March 2017): 125–43, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03468755.2016.1270998>.

European states who paid it. While this proposal did not contain anything that could provoke Glinka's attention, the reverberations that this project received in the press sounded conspicuously: 'But this fact would nonetheless have real political significance. It would be of a nature to give a new impetus to the ideas of a Scandinavian union, which without that are already in progress both in Denmark and in Sweden.'⁶³²

Glinka asserted that if the united fleet would have succeeded against the pirates of Morocco, the partisans of the union idea would have discovered the proof there in the necessity of the unification. 'Since the imperial government cannot tolerate project of such genre', Glinka followed, he sought to persuade the foreign minister in the necessity to consult the five Great Powers before making any decisions, while notifying the ministry that Denmark and Sweden alone could hardly finish this affair satisfactory in isolation.⁶³³ While he did underline the righteousness of their cause and framed it as the struggle of 'civilization against barbarity', Glinka sought to make the government stick to the principles of the Vienna order and paternalism of the Great Powers. As the Swedish government was hesitant, Glinka said to Ihre that the imperial cabinet appreciated his decision to avoid taking any measures prior to consulting the Great Powers.⁶³⁴

It is clear from the text that the imperial cabinets were aware of the idea of the Scandinavian union even prior to 1843, since Glinka did not have to elaborate on that concept. Moreover, Glinka recognized potential reaction of the imperial government towards the 'projects of such genre', meaning steps taken towards Scandinavia alliance or union, preemptively striking against its development. To avoid any regional rapprochement, he proposed to align the activities of the Nordic cabinets with the Vienna system principles, highlighting the importance of consultation with the Great Powers. The imperial authorities

⁶³² Glinka – Nesselrode. 13 / 25 May 1843. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1843, d. 162, l. 87-88.

⁶³³ Ibid.

⁶³⁴ Glinka – Nesselrode. 13 / 25 May 1843. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1843, d. 162, l. 87-88.

certainly did not welcome the redistribution of the equilibrium in the Nordics, partially since the advocates of this idea closely related to the ‘radical parties’ in the respective kingdoms.

The festivals of the Scandinavian students, however, happened to be much more alarming. Not only did they draw on the idea of the Scandinavian unification but, in the eyes of the diplomats, also emanated revolutionary politics, a threat to the stability of the Nordic region within larger system of the foreign affairs. Although in fact, the Swedish cabinet and diplomatic corps sought to prevent the festival from happening, their efforts came to naught.⁶³⁵ The failure to prohibit the travel both from the Danish and from the Swedish side again pointed to the weakness of respective cabinets in the eyes of the Russian mission, especially since the latter successfully prohibited Swedish students from coming to Finland three years prior to these events.

In his next dispatch, Glinka drew the attention of Nesselrode to the Scandinavian student festivals whose procession traveled from the western shores of Sweden to the capital and the town of Upsala, the home of the ancient university. While Glinka mentioned previous practices of mutual travels of students from Copenhagen and Lund established ‘to testify their Scandinavian sympathies’, the new festival, though it fashioned itself as a renewal of this practice, in fact ‘took such a pronounced character that it would be difficult to deny its political significance.’⁶³⁶ Indeed, both for the contemporaries and for later scholars of Scandinavianism, the convention of 1843 stood as a turning point in the development of the movement, usually associated with its politization and mobilization, especially when compared to earlier mutual visits of students that barely provoked any attention.⁶³⁷ In the dispatch, Glinka briefly sketched the voyage of the students, paying attention to their engagement with city dwellers. The goals

⁶³⁵ Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme og politiske realiteter*, 103–6.

⁶³⁶ Glinka – Nesselrode. 27 May / 8 June 1843. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1843, d. 162, l. 90

⁶³⁷ Clausen, *Skandinavismen*, 46–86; Henrik Ullstad, “‘Med mjöd och manligt glam på fädrens sätt’: studentskandinavismen som ideologi och performativ praktik”; Nordhagen Ottosen and Rasmus Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 163.

of the ‘expedition’ were stressed by the fact that the convention started the procession in the town of Calmar, ‘where the union between the three Scandinavian kingdoms was signed in 1397’. The festivities in Stockholm, according to Glinka, witnessed a great surge of people and witnessed a series of toast and speeches, some of them held in a ‘strong language’, meaning provocative exclamations.⁶³⁸

Glinka highlighted another aspect of why the festival bore paramount importance for the imperial cabinet, namely the fact that the name of Finland was enmeshed in it.⁶³⁹ Two students took part in the events, according to the papers, and one even replied to the toast for the University of Helsingfors, although refraining from any political insinuations. Glinka himself abstained from taking any measures, waiting for the instructions. On the one hand, due to his lower status of senior secretary he could represent the Russian empire only in a limited capacity.⁶⁴⁰ On the other hand, as Glinka confessed, his demarche would have not resulted in anything considerable while compromising the benefits that have been acquired, meaning the involvement of Finland and Finlandish subjects into the festival as a vantage point for the potential imperial intervention. Whereas the empire previously could hesitate to interfere into such peripheral affairs as the march of the idea of the Scandinavian union, at this point Glinka was sure in the justified intervention, since the movement affected the empire directly, as ‘the partisans of the future Scandinavia fixed their attention on one of our provinces.’⁶⁴¹

It was his next report, however, that manifested greater hazards around the Scandinavian idea. Although the students left Stockholm, the surge of reflections in the Swedish newspapers as well as his informants’ accounts – we, unfortunately have no information on their personalities – reached the eyes and ears of the Russian representative a little later: ‘But at the time of writing, I was not yet aware of some details of this incident which

⁶³⁸ Glinka – Nesselrode. 27 May / 8 June 1843. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1843, d. 162, l. 90-91.

⁶³⁹ See chapter 2.

⁶⁴⁰ Glinka – Nesselrode. 27 May / 8 June 1843. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1843, d. 162, l. 92-92ob.

⁶⁴¹ Glinka – Nesselrode. 27 May / 8 June 1843. Ibid, l. 92.

are now known to me, and being thus better able to appreciate the extent of it, I now make it my duty to complete my last report'. This new information that he partially received from a trusted agent made him frame Scandinavianism as a conspicuously revolutionary tendency, probably referring to Carl Ploug's famous speech in Calmar.⁶⁴² The movement, to the great dissatisfaction and indeed great surprise of Glinka, turned its revolutionary enthusiasm against the empire: 'Neighbors with whom we were in a state of peace a few days ago were rising up against us, as if they want to challenge us, without the slightest provocation on our part.'⁶⁴³

As a matter of proof, Glinka quoted passages from Swedish newspapers and provided excerpts of those speeches and toasts that assaulted the Russian empire. While he predicted that the exaltation of the Swedish inhabitants would soon calm down, the repetition of these 'bad scenes', especially if they would become more frequent, 'can only lead to one result, that of lighting up one more revolutionary fire in Europe, and that in our immediate vicinity.'⁶⁴⁴ Even more puzzling for the Russian diplomat was the reaction of the Swedish authorities towards these events. Glinka mentioned that in general the government ignored dangerous tendencies of the festival, referring to his previous analytics where he highlighted the strategy of non-involvement that the cabinet was pursuing. Moreover, some members of the higher bureaucracy encouraged the idea of the union, partaking in the convention, although they ostensibly referred only to intellectual and cultural rapprochement of the nations.⁶⁴⁵

Appealing to his experience of long dwelling in Sweden and in Denmark, Glinka found it suitable to provide his opinion on the future policy with regards to the festivals. *Charge d'affaires* highlighted the need to calculate further actions and even 'use some indulgence' towards what have happened in Sweden. However, Glinka wished to be authorized:

⁶⁴² Glinka – Nesselrode. 31 May / 12 June 1843. Ibid, I. 96-97. See Chapter 1 and see below.

⁶⁴³ Ibid.

⁶⁴⁴ Glinka – Nesselrode. 31 May / 12 June 1843. Ibid, I. 101.

⁶⁴⁵ Ibid.

[...] to declare in firm and precise language, in the name of my powerful Emperor, that if the Swedish government allows in the future the students of Lund, Christiania, or Uppsala to travel *en masse* to Denmark to participate in political demonstrations, or if it allows Danish students to come and excite Sweden against us, and try to agitate Finland, we would make it a case of rupture, and that this rupture would not remain passive.⁶⁴⁶

Listing previous successful demarches of the imperial foreign ministry that made Sweden divert from selling vessels to newly recognized Spanish states,⁶⁴⁷ Glinka asserted that present circumstances were infinitely more important and directly relating to the interests of the empire. Only the intervention of the empire – not in the form of military affair but rather as a diplomatic pressure – could have saved Sweden from ‘falling into the abyss’: ‘For the moment, the Swedish government is undoubtedly strong enough to repress these revolutionary intrigues, but in some time from now, it will no longer be so’.⁶⁴⁸

The situation clearly appeared serious for Glinka, and his next reports also concerned the issue of the student convention, bringing in more details on its revolutionary trajectory. One of the most prominent details of such an avenue, besides newspaper publications, toasts, and speeches held, became the question of the students’ appearance. While Glinka ignored some manifestations of bourgeois modernity brought to the fore by the festivals, including, for example, the practices of handshakes and students’ mustaches,⁶⁴⁹ flowers handed from city dwellers as well as applauses from the crowd did find their place into the reports.⁶⁵⁰ These

⁶⁴⁶ Ibid, l. 102.

⁶⁴⁷ Höjer, *Den Svenska utrikespolitikens historia*, 3:2, 241-53.

⁶⁴⁸ Glinka – Nesselrode. 31 May / 12 June 1843. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1843, d. 162, l. 102.

⁶⁴⁹ Nilsson, *I rörelse*, 131–45.

⁶⁵⁰ Glinka – Nesselrode. 27 May / 7 June 1843. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1843, d. 162, l. 90-91.

details helped him to attest the growing favorable attitude towards the movement, accentuating its dangers.

One element of the students' cloths appeared in the center of his attention. When the delegation of students arrived to Upsala, they were given cockades (devises) 'in red and blue color with a word Scandinavia [Glinka's highlight] written on them, meant to be worn in the buttonhole'.⁶⁵¹ While the Swedish government was doing its best to ignore the political side of the events, the fact of cockade-wearing – clearly a reference to the French revolutionary outfit – unquestionably proved the political trajectory of the conventions in Glinka's eyes and justified his comparison of its leading figures to 'the Scandinavian Jacobins'.⁶⁵² Hence the question whether Finlandish students wore the cocarde was of paramount importance, 'because if they brought it in the presence of the Swedish authorities in Upsala, as I have some reason to suspect despite the denials of the Count de Lewenhaupt, this fact would have a decisive value to justify in the eyes of Europe our open opposition to the movement of Scandinavian union [...]'.⁶⁵³ The change of clothing did not only break the prescribed rules of the University but also pointed to the students' conscious participation in the politically provocative convention.⁶⁵⁴

Radical speeches directed against the Russian empire that targeted Finland as a future part of the Scandinavian realm, reinforced by public demonstrations that pulled in bourgeois dwellers, striking appearance of students, and characteristic weakness of the Swedish government piled up to produce an imaginary of the revolutionary movement, consuming the kingdom. Glinka, who spent a dozen years in the Nordic states, knew well about the recent Swedish past when the democratic reform was dangerously close from reification, and this

⁶⁵¹ Ibid, 1. 91.

⁶⁵² Glinka – Nesselrode, 31 May / 12 June 1843. Ibid, 1. 102; Glinka – Nesselrode, 10 / 22 June 1843. Ibid, 1. 117-118

⁶⁵³ Glinka – Nesselrode, 14 / 16 June 1843. Ibid, 1. 125.

⁶⁵⁴ *Disciplins-reglemente för studerande vid Kejsrerliga Alexanders-Universitetet i Finland*, 8-11.

background loomed large in the given context. Although his analysis highlighted the resilience of the Swedish cabinet, he left room for darker prospects with some odds being on the side of the trouble-makers, even though their numbers, 150 students, on the one hand, were not that impressive. But for Glinka, Scandinavianism was a part of a broader revolutionary programme hence making this calculation worse. The alarming student meetings consumed most part of Glinka's reports from the summer of 1843.

While Glinka proposed an active opposition to the movement, it is noticeable from his reports that the ministry took a more cautious stance and slightly downplayed some of the dangers he painted. When Glinka elaborated on the significance of the cockade for the Russian reaction towards late June, he added that it would be essential 'in case the Imperial Cabinet deems it necessary to make this determination'. Hence by the time no instructions were sent. While he was authorized to request some explanations from the minister of the foreign affairs and explicate the emperor's concerns about the events in most loyal terms – as were his colleagues in Denmark – his demands for a serious demarche were denied by the emperor, who concluded that 'what Glinka is asking is too hard'.⁶⁵⁵ Glinka was not the only source of information for the imperial cabinets in Stockholm, however.

The Ministry of War established its parallel circuits with a figure of a military attaché at the court of Sweden. Colonel Andrei Bodisco informed the minister of war Chernishev about military maneuvers, reforms, and other subjects that related to the Swedish army and fleet, sometimes even diverting to cover larger political perturbations.⁶⁵⁶ The coexistence of the two institutions – head of the Russian mission and military attaché – often prompted conflicts between their representatives because of the blurred responsibilities the two were devoted to. The festivities of the Scandinavian students paved way for one of such conflicts, when colonel

⁶⁵⁵ Copy of Glinka's dispatch from 31 May / 12 June. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1843, d. 162, l. 233. Nesselrode addressed both Glinka and Nicolay in Copenhagen with similar-worded dispatch. See below.

⁶⁵⁶ Bodisco's correspondence: RGVIA. F. 442, op. 1, d. 53, l. 1-24.

Bodisco for a moment occurred in the center of the public attention – a behavior unthinkable for a diplomat. Glinka had to write to the minister of war to complain about his behavior, since Bodisco during the ‘very serious demonstration under the name of the festival of the Scandinavian students’ ostensibly interfered in them. Swedish newspapers paid attention to this fact and described the actions of Bodisco as the activities of the ‘Russian police in Stockholm’, significantly affecting the public view of the Russian diplomacy. While Bodisco denied his participation in the events in his dialogue with Glinka, the latter still blamed him for the lack of discretion.⁶⁵⁷

The revolutionary-universalist character of the convention as it was presented to a degree obscured geopolitical visions of the reification of the union. They did appear, however, in the reiteration of Glinka’s conversation with his colleague from England. The latter asserted that the movement first targeted the Russian empire and only then it put forward the democratic change, supposing that it must have been backed up by France in these aggressive visions. He also added that in case of realization of the union, England could not approve of one strong state controlling the Sound Gulf, while Glinka elaborated that the imperial Baltic fleet would have been cut off.⁶⁵⁸

It must have been the broad public enthusiasm they witnessed in the case of the Scandinavian student convention and beyond it that could make the diplomats ponder on the chances and perspectives of the reification of the union. These geopolitical visions, however, paled in comparison with contemporary revolutionary practices of the students that challenged the legitimate power of the Scandinavian governments. And while the Swedish dynasty was not assaulted by the movement, Glinka alluded that it was the Danish throne that took more damage:

⁶⁵⁷ Glinka – Chernishev. 5 / 17 July 1843. RGVIA. F 442, op. 1, d. 53, l. 26-27ob.

⁶⁵⁸ Glinka – Nesselrode. 13 / 25 May 1843. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1843, d. 162, l. 87-88.

The liberal Danes are dissatisfied with their current dynasty, with the King and even more with the crown prince, it has already been mentioned in a Swedish newspaper and the young Danes who have just left us have expressed themselves in the most hostile sense towards their King.⁶⁵⁹

According to Glinka, that was why, following the events, the Danish government took a stricter position towards the travelling students, when compared to their Swedish counterparts. To the satisfaction of the Russian representative, the loyalty of the Danish cabinet was quickly reimbursed and the most radical speaker at the event, who also mentioned the fate of Finland in the Russian empire, Carl Ploug, was prosecuted while his revanchist speech – with its republican overtones that must have concerned the diplomat – was banned by the censorship.⁶⁶⁰

The situation stabilized towards the autumn, although the government did not take any punitive measures towards the participants, as Glinka complained: ‘previously Swedish government could not afford such rupture in communication with us’. Moreover, suspicious ‘Scandinavian’ organizations – *Skandinavisk Samfund* – were established in both capitals, using the disguise of literary pretensions, according to the diplomat.⁶⁶¹ While in Denmark this ‘revolutionary directory’ was quickly shut down, its Swedish counterpart persisted, and Glinka asserted that its aims were essentially political.⁶⁶² With a close eye on the neighboring state, the Russian representative pictured an alarming situation, following closely the language practices of the European culture of peace and promptly signaling about the paramount danger of revolutionary character hiding behind the idea of the Scandinavian union.

⁶⁵⁹ Glinka – Nesselrode. 31 May / 12 June 1843. Ibid, I. 103.

⁶⁶⁰ Glinka – Nesselrode. 14 / 26 June. Ibid, I. 124; On its republican allure: Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 131.

⁶⁶¹ Hemstad, “I ’Tidens Fylde”, 391–92.

⁶⁶² Glinka – Nesselrode. 25 October / 6 November 1843. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1843, d. 162, I. 194.

The participants' discourses and practices under the scrutiny of the diplomat comprised a mosaic of blurred social and political agitation, certainly exaggerating the radicalism of the students. Most conspicuously the discrepancy between the students' self-representation and Glinka's reading of the political must have in his interpretation of one poem. When the Danish students were about to leave, one of the Swedish students read a long romantic rhyme where two lines ran:

Yes, salute everything noble that Denmark possesses,
But first and last, the king, we mean – Oehlenschläger.⁶⁶³

While the poem alluded to the glory of the outstanding Danish author, and one of the pioneers of the Scandinavian rapprochement in the 1830s, Adam Gottlob Oehlenschläger, the Russian diplomat read it as nothing less than a 'direct impertinence against the King of Denmark.'⁶⁶⁴ Whereas Christian VIII did not enjoy much popularity among the liberal students,⁶⁶⁵ it would be an exaggeration to read this romantic ode to the poetic genius as a political manifesto in disguise. Glinka's colleagues from Copenhagen, in their turn, were no less alerted by the 'provocations' of the Scandinavian students.

3.6. From the streets of Copenhagen

The Russian foreign ministry in Copenhagen was represented by Baron Paul Nicolay as minister plenipotentiary and Gustav Stackelberg as his senior secretary.⁶⁶⁶ In Denmark, the background to the rise of pan-Scandinavian ideas combined with the spread of other alarming political trajectories, according to the envoys' information. The activities of the 'radical', or

⁶⁶³ *Beretning om studentertoget til Upsala i juni maaned 1843*, 56.

⁶⁶⁴ Glinka – Nesselrode. 31 May / 12 June 1843. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1843, d. 162, l. 103.

⁶⁶⁵ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 108.

⁶⁶⁶ *Adres-kalendar', ili Obshhij shtat Rossijskoj imperii*, vol. 1 (S-Peterburg: Imp. Akademia nauk, 1843), 154-155.

‘ultra-Danish’ party, later responsible for the intensification of pan-Scandinavian propaganda in the dispatches, challenged the power of the conservative king and provoked national aspirations of the German-speaking intellectuals of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein.⁶⁶⁷ This tension between Danish and German nationalism, as well as between different forms of nationalism and territorial organization of the composite state indeed surfaced in variegated social and legal spheres towards the 1840s. These tendencies did not evade the attention of the Russian mission.⁶⁶⁸

In late May/June, Scandinavian festivals that were about to take place in Upsala were for a moment overshadowed by local festivals in Denmark in the diplomatic documentation. Nicolay focused on the mass conventions that took place in Helsingør and, especially, at Skamlingsbanken which in his view was devoted to ‘the cult of nationality and the Danish language’. Nicolay blamed the tensions arising from the national superstitions, referring to the extravagances of the meeting as the expressions of ‘violent Danism’.⁶⁶⁹ Imperial, and especially aristocratic visions were conservative, leaning towards the preservation of existing composite states against the odds of rising nationalism embodied in the actions and representatives of the ‘Danish party’. The diplomats characteristically often referred to Denmark as a multinational empire, bringing its diagnosis closer to the practice of the imperial self-observation.⁶⁷⁰

Slightly earlier, in April/May, Nicolay informed Nesselrode at the end of his dispatch that a deputation of students from Lund came to Copenhagen to negotiate the invitation to voyage to Stockholm and Upsala. While the diplomat considered this communication

⁶⁶⁷ It is clear from Paul von Nicolay’s lapidary notes that he socialized mostly in the circle of German-speaking elites, and nationalist agitation thus must have been especially provocative for him: Paul Nicolay’s diary for year 1847. OR RNB. F. 519, op. 1, d. 140. Lists are not numbered.

⁶⁶⁸ Nicolay – Nesselrode, 20 February / 4 March 1843. RA. DUA, p. 2477, l. 48-49.

⁶⁶⁹ Nicolay – Nesselrode. 23 May / 4 June. Ibid, l. 65-66.

⁶⁷⁰ Stackelberg – Nesselrode. 1 / 13 August 1843. Ibid, l. 95-96; Later remark is most telling: Stackelberg-Nesselrode. 24 July / 5 August 1844. RA. DUA, p. 2477, l. 198: ‘[...] idées incompatibles dans une monarchie composee comme le Dannemarkc de nations diverses.’

insignificant, he mentioned that the organs of the liberal party sought to render all friendly exchanges between Swedish and Danish universities and research institutions into the symptoms of ‘Scandinavian sympathies’ framed politically.⁶⁷¹ On 18/30 June, Stackelberg opted to cover the Scandinavian student festivals in the absence of his elder colleague. He noted that the festival surpassed previous conventions ‘in extravagances, radical speeches, and expressions of loyalty towards the Kalmar Union, renewed today under the pompous name of the Scandinavian union’.⁶⁷² The festival ostensibly drew on the ‘revolutionary principles of France and Italy’ that became role models for the local students. Again, quite like their colleagues from Finland, they well understood the universalist patterns of nation-buildings and they entangled nature.

Stackelberg’s focus expectedly fell on Carl Ploug’s speech, which the diplomat only partially gained access to, where the latter discharged ‘injury and calumny against the imperial government’. Criminil, however, underscored that Ploug was prosecuted for his speech, ‘especially because of his attacks against a friendly and allied government’.⁶⁷³ Stackelberg, in his turn, expected that Ploug would not be punished hard, and all the journals sided with him, making him into a political martyr.⁶⁷⁴ Finally, by the beginning of July, Swedish diplomat Moerner provided Stackelberg with the contents of Plough’s speech. Reinforcing the framing of the students’ voyage into a radical revolutionary event, Stackelberg’s analysis of this text clearly espoused more of a class-centered conflict dynamics than a geopolitical clash.⁶⁷⁵

Stackelberg read the speech as the Danish liberals’ manifesto that properly reflected their ‘hatreds and hopes’. Among the primary Stackelberg listed aristocracy, Germans, Duke of Augustenborg among other German-leaning elites. The list went on with the established

⁶⁷¹ Nicolay – Nesselrode. 19 April / 1 May. Ibid, l. 54-55

⁶⁷² Stackelberg – Nesselrode. 18 / 30 June 1843. Ibid, l. 76-78.

⁶⁷³ Stackelberg – Nesselrode. RA. DUA, p. 2477, Ibid, l. 76-77.

⁶⁷⁴ Ibid, 77.

⁶⁷⁵ Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme og politiske realiteter*, 110–11.

powers, especially ‘strong governments opposing anarchy’, namely Russia. Their hopes, on the other hand, included political alliance between Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, which must be made ‘for people and against the rich’. Finally, he concluded that the text reproduced ‘the eternal war between those who had nothing against those who possess.’⁶⁷⁶ The tirade against Russia was less ‘strong’ as one would have expected but Stackelberg suspected that the real degree of hatred was concealed. Besides the speech, Stackelberg attached to the letter the charter of a new organization, *Skandinavisk Samfund*. He considered this establishment to be a fruit of the revolutionary agitation ensued during the festival. While the society proclaimed its adherence to ‘social and literary’ consolidation of the union, the diplomat discerned revolutionary principles behind the conceal.⁶⁷⁷

Nesselrode followed and strengthened this interpretation in his instructions to representatives in Copenhagen and Stockholm. He specified that initially the imperial government was not alarmed by the prospect of the festivals, expecting that they would not cross the appropriate boundaries of convention. However, the festivals quickly took an offensive character against Russia. While the students played the leading role in them, they were just a ‘docile instrument of the individuals known for their revolutionary principles and tendencies’ according to Nesselrode.⁶⁷⁸ The real coryphées of this convention appeared to be journalists, seeking to undermine the order. The festival, accordingly, was not a momentous burst of inconsiderate students, but a prepared spectacle by the men ‘well-versed in the art of intrigues’. They were seeding the germs of troubles across the three Nordic kingdoms and even in the province of the empire: ‘Scandinavian union had become their theme, and in their mouths this word proclaims the abolition of the existing order of things and appeals to the revolt of people who are loyal to it.’⁶⁷⁹

⁶⁷⁶ Stackelberg-Nesselrode. RA. DUA, p. 2477, l. 80-81.

⁶⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁷⁸ Nesselrode – Stackelberg. 22 June / 4 July 1843. Ibid, l. 17-22.

⁶⁷⁹ Nesselrode – Stackelberg. 22 June / 4 July 1843. Ibid, l. 17-22.

Drawing on this cosmopolitical picture of the student festivals as an example and result of the pan-European political debacle, Nesselrode specifically pointed to the examples of Wahrung in 1817 and Hambach in 1832, and the reclamations of the German princes who expressed their opposition towards the governments who allowed them. The Russian empire, however, did not seek to make any demands with regards to these events, as such measures would have contributed to the success of their leaders' 'sinful designs', implying, perhaps, that it would justify Scandinavianist imaginaries of the repressive empire. However, the emperor, Nesselrode wrote, fulfilling his friendly obligations, called for a serious attention from the side of the Scandinavian cabinets to the measures and consequences of the convention. Nesselrode asked Stackelberg to communicate his dispatch to the minister of the foreign affairs. Similar instruction was sent to Glinka in Stockholm.⁶⁸⁰

Nesselrode's instructions consciously took a form of a gentle notification but in fact were quite declarative. While he avoided making any demands, the emperor's 'friendly' gesture conveyed his irritation over the students' voyage and prompted the Danish government to reinforce its restrictive measures. Nicholas I in conversation with Swedish ambassador in Saint-Petersburg Palmstjerna expressed similar concerns, also drawing on provocative nature of Scandinavianism – especially in the light of the emperor's concerns about European revolutionary potential – rather than on geopolitical fears of the empire.⁶⁸¹ While the empire clearly espoused patriarchal rhetoric towards the governments of smaller states, its agents were conscious about the limitations of their power and potentially provocative status of their declarations. Whereas the imbalance of power was obvious, the rules of the game in the form of legitimate demarches and justified actions still applied to all agencies, and especially those who framed themselves as guardians of these rules, meaning the Russian empire.

⁶⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁶⁸¹ Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme og politiske realiteter*, 115–17.

Nesselrode's and Stackelberg's analysis of the situation drew on similar imaginaries. The geopolitical fears of Scandinavian unification were obscured by political practices of bourgeois intellectuals who espousing revolutionary principles. Stackelberg's class-centered assessment reinforced this impression, while Nesselrode also put more weight on the troubles the students and journalists were making than on the territorial dreams they were pursuing. The idea of the Scandinavian union and the enthusiasm that students attached to their mutual friendly relations were, in their eyes, ostensibly manipulated by the radical politicians, forging cosmopolitan revolution. The reference to Warburg pointed to the vision of connectedness of the European revolutionary youth, and the real drivers behind 'inconsiderate' students. The rising radical politics, as seen by imperial agents, was paving its way by the means of intrigues, conspiracies, and political, often secret, societies.

The Scandinavian Community (*Skandinavisk Samfund / Reunion Scandinave*), first established in Copenhagen and then in Stockholm, was once referred to as none other than a 'revolutionary directory' in the imperial diplomatic correspondence, accentuating politics of comparison with French revolutionary regime.⁶⁸² While the organization in Copenhagen and its twin in Sweden announced cultural goals, the Russian mission looked with suspicion at these establishments, regarding them as political organizations. Again, the analysis of its membership leaned towards the elucidation of their social status and class. When in the middle of July, the Danish minister of justice Stemann ordered director of police Bræstrup to halt the activities of the community, its provisional directory protested the decision. Stackelberg in his turn highlighted the social profile of the directory, that of 'journalists and petty radicals (*radicaux de bas etage*)'. Government's decision also provoked the reaction of journalists and 'men without recognition (*gens sans aveu*)'.⁶⁸³

⁶⁸² Glinka – Menshikov, 3 / 15 June 1843. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 82, l. 2-3.

⁶⁸³ Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme*, 110–17; Stackelberg – Nesselrode, 1 / 13 August 1843. RA. DUA, p. 2477, l. 95–96.

The suppression of the community in Copenhagen gave impetus to the discussion in the press, but to the satisfaction of the Russian representatives, the censorship policy of the Danish government in this case calmed down radical voices. When the Scandinavian organization was reestablished under the name of *Scandinavian Society (Skandinavisk Selskab)* in Copenhagen, Stackelberg was quick to note its renewed social profile: '[Established] not anymore by proletarians or men without recognition, but by professors and salaried servicemen of the state'.⁶⁸⁴ This fact gave it new legitimate foundation, even though many of its founding members espoused radical views.⁶⁸⁵ Stackelberg considered the only remedy appropriate to the sovereign and to the public spirit was to cut off all functionaries from the state service, accentuating the dangers that hid behind its peaceful appearance.⁶⁸⁶

Following the foundations of post-Napoleonic system in their political language, the diplomats framed the convention as a result of organized conspiracy. Secret societies indeed haunted both the internal monitoring of the Russian empire by variegated instruments of surveillance and the international conservative consensus. The Greek uprising, prompted by the secret organization *Filiki Eteria*, the Carbonari establishments in Piedmont, and the Decembrist revolt in Russia that all surfaced in the 1820s, pointed to the dangers of organized revolutionary societies.⁶⁸⁷ While the attention towards the organizations of any kind was thus partly justified, different establishments, groupings, networks of variegated intensity and quality of contacts, all emanated similar hazards of organized conspiracy and were represented as such, while the cabinets in the Russian empire often accused each other in the failure to promptly recognize such a threat.⁶⁸⁸ Doctrinal teachings of these societies were also

⁶⁸⁴ Stackelberg – Nesselrode, 4 / 16 September 1843. Ibid, l. 104–106.

⁶⁸⁵ Hemstad, 'I 'Tidens Fylde', 392–93.

⁶⁸⁶ Stackelberg – Nesselrode, 4/ 16 September 1843. Ibid, l. 104–106.

⁶⁸⁷ Richard Stites, *The Four Horsemen: Riding to Liberty in Post-Napoleonic Europe* (Oxford: OUP, 2014); Brian E. Vick, *The Congress of Vienna: Power and Politics after Napoleon* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014), 233–77.

⁶⁸⁸ Carl F. Graumann and Serge Moscovici, *Changing Conceptions of Conspiracy* (NY: Springer New York, 1987), 15–27; John L. Evans, *The Petraševskij Circle 1845-1849* (The Hague: Mouton, 1974); Shkerin Vladimir, 'Poedinok na shpionah': delo petrashevcev i političeskaja provokacija v Rossii (Moscow: Kabinetnyĭ uchenyĭ,

homogenized through the diplomatic reports, standardizing their practices and goals to their universal ‘revolutionary’ aspirations. This focus on organized groups, whether real or imagined, assists in understanding the diplomats’ preoccupation with Scandinavian societies of any kind.⁶⁸⁹

The diplomats recoded Scandinavianist pool of heterogeneous ideas into an organized revolutionary doctrine and student mobilization into an orchestrated political action. I want to highlight that such translation does not equal to a complete fabrication. The Russian mission registered tendencies that were noticeable for other agents as well. Indeed, the year of 1843 witnessed the largest student convention with pronounced political goals and first leaders who sought to mobilize their audience, consciously or not drawing on republican, constitutional, and oppositional rhetoric and irritating governments with conservative spectators.⁶⁹⁰ First Scandinavian organizations, while their role and degree of politization was overstressed in the dispatches, figured prominently in contemporary discussions and later memoirs of pan-Scandinavian intellectuals.⁶⁹¹ Inaccessibility of the diplomats to new political networks and decision-making processes on other levels must have supplied this image with the notions of conspirative planning.⁶⁹²

The diplomats’ translation, however, altered the image of pan-Scandinavianism. Their rhetoric made the heterogeneity of pan-Scandinavian scenarios into a single provocation, stripped of internal tensions, fixated on anti-imperial rhetoric, and drawing primarily on social and class struggle. These interventions worked as tropes to build a narrative that was meant to

2019), 145-72; Mihail Velizhev, *Chaadaevskoe delo: Ideologija, ritorika i gosudarstvennaja vlast' v nikolaevskoj Rossii* (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2022).

⁶⁸⁹ Beatrice de Graaf and Cornel Zwierlein, ‘Historicizing Security - Entering the Conspiracy Dispositive’, *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung* 38, no. 1 (143) (2013): 46–64.

⁶⁹⁰ Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme og politiske realiteter*, 91–132.

⁶⁹¹ See, for example: Henrik Nicolai Clausen, *Optegnelser om mit levned og min tids historie* (København: G. E. C. Gad, 1877), 275–86. Clausen, moreover, got to know that the Society was monitored by the government.

⁶⁹² Cornel Zwierlein and Beatrice de Graaf, ‘Security and Conspiracy in Modern History’, *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung* 38, no. 1 (143) (2013): 7–45; de Graaf and Zwierlein, ‘Historicizing Security - Entering the Conspiracy Dispositive’.

reproduce the images of revolution, agitation, and movement so dear to the Vienna order. Accentuating the social profile of the ‘radical’ pro-Scandinavian party in Denmark, the diplomats put too much weight on their imaginably socialist agenda in seeking to align their views with standardized revolutionary subjects, while also drawing on the rhetoric espoused in conservative Danish journals.⁶⁹³ In fact, most outspoken Danish advocates of the movement leaned towards restricted liberalism rather than to universal and democratic voting rights and were open to alliances with different social groups both from the left and from the right.⁶⁹⁴ The diplomatic corps was yet unable to grasp new meanings and avenues that the bourgeoisie public spheres were pursuing. Their reading of the national tensions, however, proved rather perceptive. Already at that point, Stackelberg explicated that the Scandinavian idea, besides assaulting the hierarchies of rule, surfaced as a provocation against German-speaking subjects of the Danish king, alienating them from Copenhagen and making them reorient their priorities towards the German Confederation.⁶⁹⁵

The language of analysis of the events that marched under the banner of pan-Scandinavian movement was consistent among the Russian diplomats who sought to make sense of it. Some of them previously took active part in the establishment of post-Napoleonic order, others were trained into its teachings. The preservation of this culture of peace that pertained to instruments and methods of dealing with hazards implied the unified language of signals, reactions, and analytics. The homogenization of this political language reduced its sensitivities towards regional, cultural, or national features and tended rather to draw parallels across the European political terrain.

⁶⁹³ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 231–32.

⁶⁹⁴ Palle Svensson, ‘Var vore forfatningsfædre demokrater?’, *Temp - tidsskrift for historie* 3, no. 5 (2012): 5–27; Bertel Nygaard, ‘Demokratibegrebets gennembrud i Danmark i 1848’, *Historisk Tidsskrift* 111, no. 1 (2011): 37–73, <https://tidsskrift.dk/historisktidsskrift/article/view/56521>.

⁶⁹⁵ Stackelberg – Nesselrode. 1 / 13 August 1843. RA. DUA, p. 2477, l. 95–96.

The translation of Scandinavianism from the language of the bourgeois public spheres of the Nordic kingdoms into the language of diplomatic communication changed its profile significantly. Often, when the advocates of the union idea discussed Finland, the diplomats were more concerned with these manifestations not as claiming an objective for the territorial acquisition by the Scandinavian kingdoms but rather as outlining a zone for the proselytism of the revolutionary ideas, as it becomes clear from their dispatches. Both with regards to temporality of this potential revolutionary avenue and content-wise, contemporary political outbursts overshadowed geopolitical dreams in the protocols of the Russian cabinets. In 1845, when another Scandinavian student festival took place in Copenhagen, their analysis drew on similar patterns.

3.7. Scandinavian students festival in 1845

Baron Alexander Krüdener, earlier a secretary of the Russian mission in Munich, arrived in Sweden in 1843 to substitute Glinka as a head of the mission. The start of his career in Stockholm partially coincided with the change of the political order: the old King Charles XIV John died in March 1844. Krüdener was quick to notice, as many other contemporaries were, that this change prompted other modifications in the political life of the kingdom. The politics of Oscar I came into opposition with his father's: 'The first thing that strikes one when considering the reign of King Oscar from a general point of view is its perfect dissimilarity to the preceding reign.'⁶⁹⁶ Some contemporaries and later biographers went as far as to call Oscar I a liberal king, although with some reservations.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹⁶ Krüdener – Nesselrode. 9 / 21 August 1845. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1845, d. 146, l. 194-197. Theodor Säve, *Sveriges historia från äldsta tid till våra dagar: Sveriges historia under den nyaste tiden, från år 1809 till år 1875* (Stockholm: Aktiebolaget Hiertas bokförlag, 1890), 134–37.

⁶⁹⁷ Eva Helen Ulvros, *Oscar I: En biografi* (Stockholm: Svenska Historiska Media Förlag AB, 2015); Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 289.

It became especially evident with regards to the political groups that the monarchs relied upon. Charles XIV John depended on the estates represented in the Diet, and especially on the nobility and industrial proprietaries contingent on privileges. Oscar I, on the contrary, lost this support base but relied heavily on the liberal party of modernizers and their press, according to the diplomat:

This fact alone indicates the true state of affairs. In Sweden there is a complete change in the attitude of the parties towards royalty. The conservative party is growing further and further away, while men of exalted opinion seek, by all means, to arrive at power.⁶⁹⁸

The year of 1844 witnessed new turn of the issue of the Riksdag reform with liberal group lobbying for the abandonment of the estate-based principle of representation: ‘Everyone in this country agrees [...] that this reform is indispensable, that it is inevitable.’⁶⁹⁹ The liberal propaganda, now backed up by the king’s power gained another momentum in the struggle.

While the student festival planned for the summer of 1844 was abandoned, next year witnessed the reiteration of the voyages under the banner of Scandinavianism.⁷⁰⁰ Already by the beginning of May 1845, as Krüdener reported, the preparations for the Swedish students’ voyage to Copenhagen were completed. As the festivities of 1843 emanated dangerous features, Krüdener opted to have a conversation with Albert Ihre about new instances. Ihre, in his turn, expressed his regrets about the fact that the government could not stop the trip from reification. He, however, assured the ambassador that this voyage would not result in any turmoil, since many professors accompanied the students.⁷⁰¹ Among other political shifts that happened during the reign of Oscar I, his sympathy to and later backing of the Scandinavian movement would become one of the most important trajectories of the foreign policy. It was

⁶⁹⁸ Krüdener – Nesselrode, 9 / 21 August 1845. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1845, d. 146, l. 194-197.

⁶⁹⁹ Krüdener – Nesselrode, 6 / 18 March. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1845, d. 146, l. 57-59ob.

⁷⁰⁰ Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme og politiske realiteter*, 133-54.

⁷⁰¹ Krüdener – Nesselrode, 7 / 19 June 1845. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1845, d. 146, l. 139-140.

not that obvious in 1845, but the fact that the voyage was not banned might have pointed in this direction.⁷⁰²

By and large, Krüdener delegated the coverage of the voyage to Copenhagen to the Danish mission but briefly pondered on its reinvigorated nature. While during the ‘break’ between 1843 and 1845, ideas of a Scandinavian union ‘fell asleep’, the demonstrations in Copenhagen awoke them again. Moreover, repeating earlier situation, the pretensions of the movement leaders to intellectual and cultural consolidation proved to be a disguise. ‘The mask was taken off’, and the speeches held in Copenhagen indicated their intention for political actions, dyed in revolutionary colors.⁷⁰³ While in 1843 it was Carl Ploug who politicized the project, in 1845 he was overshadowed by his associate, Orla Lehmann. Earlier prosecuted for his speech that favored the exclusion of Holstein from the realm and incorporation of Schleswig into Denmark,⁷⁰⁴ his Ridderhus-speech in 1845 turned to Scandinavian problematics.

Lehmann envisioned the unification of the three Nordic kingdoms regardless of dynastic or constitutional issues, setting himself into opposition to the throne. The speech ended in the interactive mode where he asked the audience whether they could promise to work and fight for the united Scandinavia, and the students, in their turn, extatically affirmed their positive answer. In the epilogue, Lehmann compared this oath-giving to the Tennis Court Oath the Third Estate took in 1789.⁷⁰⁵ In the eyes of the Russian diplomatic mission, this reverence presented the best proof of their concerns. Both anti-monarchical and revolutionary-backing tendencies that the diplomats discerned through their exegesis now presented themselves in full light.

⁷⁰² Åke Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige vid 1800-talets mitt (1843-1863)* (Stockholm, 1946), 85–96.

⁷⁰³ Krüdener – Nesselrode, 28 June / 10 July 1845. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1845, d. 146, l. 145-48

⁷⁰⁴ Orla Lehmann, *Orla Lehmann's efterladte skrifter*, ed. Carl Ploug, vol. 4 (København: Gyldendal, 1874), 261–68.

⁷⁰⁵ Orla Lehmann, *Orla Lehmann's efterladte skrifter*, ed. Carl Ploug, vol. 3 (København: Gyldendal, 1873), 155–63.

Lehmann, having stressed the power of the youth in the future reification of the union project, predicted that ‘in a couple of decades, the fate of the motherland will be in our hands.’⁷⁰⁶ Russian representative Krüdener surprisingly agreed with this statement and its timing, if the progress that had been reached would continue the same pace.⁷⁰⁷ The progress of the idea, as he noted, was evident both in Sweden and in Norway, while the government seemingly got more and more involved in its development:

At the reception given to the Swedish students at all points in Sweden where they stayed, in Malmö, Ystad, Calmar, Karlskrona and in the island of Gotland, one would think that the populations and the authorities saw there rather a royal delegation (*peuple souverain*) than a meeting of students traveling in private. Everywhere they were received with the sounds of cannon, and military honors were provided to them.⁷⁰⁸

Whereas Norway previously distanced itself from the movement, that year the deputation of 120 students embarked to visit Copenhagen, and next year the destination of the festival was planned to be Christiania.

In Denmark, Russian representatives attentively followed the development of ‘the Scandinavian festivals’ again. They drew the attention of the minister to high-ranking figures and political blocs that encouraged the meeting and even provided their resources for it.⁷⁰⁹ Besides the nobility and proprietaries willing to help, voluntary subscription was opened for the inhabitants of Copenhagen, and considerable sum was collected for the accommodation of the students. ‘The competition of attention’ did not encompass only bourgeoisie but also peasants who provided vehicles for the students: the festivals thus witnessed the participation

⁷⁰⁶ Ibid, 160.

⁷⁰⁷ Krüdener – Nesselrode, 28 June / 10 July 1845. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 496, g. 1845, d. 146, l. 145-148.

⁷⁰⁸ Ibid, 147ob.

⁷⁰⁹ Nicolay – Nesselrode, 11 / 23 June 1845. RA. DUA, p. 2478, l. 297-298.

of all classes. Indeed, several historians argue that in 1845 the festivals became more diplomatically plausible while also encompassing new politicized groups into a dialogue.⁷¹⁰

Whereas the participation of those of ‘mature age’ improved the general spirit, some of them were also bold enough to cross the boundaries of convenience at the festival. It was especially so about Orla Lehmann’s ‘ridicule’ parallel between the Scandinavian students and French revolutionaries in the eyes of the Russian diplomats.⁷¹¹ However, Rewentlow-Criminil in a dialogue with the secretary of the Russian mission Ewers appreciated the behavior of Swedish and Norwegian guests, especially when compared with the provocative nature of the Danish visit to Sweden in 1843. Moreover, the supreme court, to the satisfaction of the Russian mission, was going to prosecute several intellectuals for their speeches, Lehmann and Fr. Helveg, who pronounced an inappropriate toast for the University of Helsingfors among them, but the case later did not come to the desirable results for the Russian mission.⁷¹² While Ewers generally deemed the political consequences of this meeting negligible, he warned that the agitation of the spirits did not cease immediately after the event ended.⁷¹³

Ewers’s observation might have meant more than meets the eye, especially when contrasted with Krüdener’s note on earlier sleeping cycles of the Scandinavian project. While in Krüdener’s optics the idea was revived and awoken from sleep, Ewers implied that it would not come to rest again. This reading of continuous work and progress of the dangerous idea, that Krüdener also addressed, probably referred both to contemporary discourse on incessant work for the future of Scandinavia, most forcefully manifested by Lehmann, and to the practices of network-building and organization across the sea that proceeded even in the absence of larger festivities.⁷¹⁴ This fact constituted not only an ideological problem but also

⁷¹⁰ Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige vid 1800-talets mitt (1843-1863)*, 95.

⁷¹¹ Ewers – Nesselrode. 19 June / 1 July 1845. RA. DUA, p. 2478, l. 300-302.

⁷¹² Ewers – Nesselrode. 23 June / 5 July 1845. Ibid, 303-304.

⁷¹³ Ewers – Nesselrode. 19 June / 1 July 1845. Ibid, 302.

⁷¹⁴ Clausen, *Optegnelser om mit levned og min tids historie*, 275–87; Johnsen, ““Vi hafva ifrån morgon till qväll varit ute och agiterat”: Skandinavismen og Pressen 1848-1864”, 62–66.

an issue for proper surveillance, since, in a way, witnessed popular enthusiasm during the festivals was a single means to assess the popularity or obscurity of the movement, to trace its position and mode of dwelling. Otherwise, the diplomatic analysis of the convention did not particularly differ in terms of its framing. The suspicion towards its ‘revolutionary’ aspect was solidified and reaffirmed by rhetorical and practical choices made by pan-Scandinavian ideologists, often cherry-picked, or reinterpreted by the diplomats.

While student meetings lost their allure for several years after 1845, so that in 1848 the Russian representative in Sweden would almost surprisingly note that the idea of the union was exhumed after several years of oblivion. Indeed, it seems that the diplomats were unable to properly assess the pace of Scandinavianism in the absence of public manifestations. Some scholars argue, however, that the impulse of the idea spread as far as to involve royal figures and ministries into its whirlwind. The mutual travels of Oscar I to Copenhagen and later Christian VIII to Sweden in 1846 were framed – especially in the pro-Scandinavian contemporary press – and in some pieces of later research as a turning point in the development of the movement, levitating it up from the street demonstrations to royal politics.⁷¹⁵ Russian representatives, however, regarded these visits rather as representation of royal courtesy and did not assign any political significance to them, just as Swedish politicians hoped for.⁷¹⁶

Although they were quite aware of how the liberal newspapers and intellectuals fashioned the visits, for them Scandinavianism – a revolutionary programme undermining the principles of monarchical power – could hardly yet pertain to royal politics.⁷¹⁷ A day prior to Oscar I’s arrival to Copenhagen, Russian diplomats got to know the contents of the so-called

⁷¹⁵ Morten Nordhagen Ottosen, ‘Den dynastiske skandinavismens grobunn og grenser, ca. 1845-1870’ in *Skandinavismen: Vision og virkning*, 255–83; Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 118–211; Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige vid 1800-talets mitt (1843-1863)*, 101–6. Holmberg was more reserved with regards to these royal visits.

⁷¹⁶ Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige vid 1800-talets mitt (1843-1863)*, 105–6.

⁷¹⁷ See, for example: Ewers – Nesselrode. 3/15 July 1846. RA. DUA, p. 2478, l. 75-6.

open letter of Christian VIII – spurred by dynastic concerns – that manifested the similarity of inheritance rights for Denmark and Schleswig but admitted that the situation remained vaguer about Holstein. Expectedly, its publication produced various reactions in Denmark and in Northern Germany, where Holstein’s affairs were widely covered. The tensions were heating, and the agitation of the ‘radical party’ meaning the blurred group of constitutionalists and national-liberals capitalized on the news. Relative simultaneity of the arriving news from Krakow, where a ‘revolutionary movement’ of the Polish insurgents was spotted, might have provided the court, diplomats, and public with points of comparison and entanglement of radical momentum that spanned across Europe.⁷¹⁸

Scandinavianism and uprising in Krakow – substantially different endeavors – however, approximated each other in the language of the Russian diplomacy. There is little doubt that the diplomats well understood different stakes and efforts behind these projects but their rhetoric with omnipresent ‘revolutionary’ concerns brought the two outbursts closer together. Indeed, as Nicholas Riasanovsky poetically described Nicholas I’s aversion for the development of Europe, the hydra of revolution appeared many-headed and the emperor felt himself a legitimate suppressor of these tendencies far beyond the conventional foreign intervention into the affairs of other states.⁷¹⁹ Perhaps, Scandinavianism was a little ‘head’ during these years. Indeed, we see how the diplomats were trying to capitalize on the provocations that addressed empire or Finland to intervene into the affairs of sovereign states to suppress a movement with universalist, revolutionary, and anti-monarchical potential in their eyes. Revolution disguised itself by wearing many hats and pan-Scandinavian idea was one of

⁷¹⁸ Ewers – Nesselrode, 16 / 28 April 1846. Ibid, 1. 39. On Krakow uprising and Galician echoes see: Pieter M. Judson, *The Habsburg Empire: A New History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 173–78.

⁷¹⁹ Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825–1855* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 236–40, <https://doi.org/10.1525/9780520341449>.

them. Diplomatic exegesis provided it with characteristic notions of class-struggle⁷²⁰, conspirative workings, excessive radicalism, and aims to shatter the existing order. They would soon, however, face other modalities of Scandinavianism under the revolutionary dynamics of 1848 to see its other faces.

⁷²⁰ The notion was well known for liberal public: Bertel Nygaard, '»De phantastiske forskruede Forestillinger«. Introduktioner til Socialisme og Kommunisme i Danmark før 1848', *Historisk Tidsskrift* 109, no. 2 (2009): 336-68, <https://tidsskrift.dk/historisktidsskrift/article/view/56421>.

Chapter 4. The Echo of Revolutions: 1848 in Scandinavia, the Russian empire, and Finland

4.1. Revolutionary outburst

In Saint-Petersburg high society and court, first half of February 1848 marched with the series of balls and festivities due to the Maslenitsa week. As one of the high functionaries, baron Modest Andreevich Korf wrote in his memoirs, these cheerful events reflected the unexpectedness of the ‘grave political thunderstorm’ that happened to roll over Europe.⁷²¹ Another witness of these events, then 21-years old Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, however, noted some prospects of a turmoil and growing tensions in Europe already in the middle of February in his diary, before the abdication of Louis-Philippe in Paris. As his father Emperor Nicholas I told him, there were two scenarios of action in case of the general revolution in Europe. One option was to invade Germany ‘without waiting for a call’, another was to accumulate forces at the border provinces and wait until ‘the scary monster called revolution, having undermined everything, would reach us, and call us for a duel!’.⁷²²

Konstantin Nikolaevich learned of the abdication of Louis Philippe one day earlier than other members of the court, on February 21 / March 4, 1848. As he described the scene, his father was working with Nesselrode, and ‘nothing important was involved’, until Nesselrode received a dispatch from the ambassador in Paris. The dispatch informed them about bloody riots in the streets of Paris and ended up with the worst news possible: ‘*Tout est fini – le roi a abdique!*’ The Grand Duke described their state of mind: ‘We were as struck by lightning, and the paper fell out of Nesselrode’s hands. Only God knows what waits for us, but we can see only blood on our horizon.’⁷²³ The tight bond between revolutionary turmoil and expectations of war was characteristic for the intuitions of the Vienna order, and Russian position as one of

⁷²¹ Modest Korf, *Zapiski* (Moscow: Zaharov, 2003), 403.

⁷²² Konstantin Nikolaevich’s diary. GARF. F. 722, op. 1, d. 89, l. 27-29.

⁷²³ *Ibid*, l. 29-30.

the Great Powers that maintained the existing system certainly contributed to these daunting visions of the future.

Nicholas I never approved of the revolutionary King Louis Phillippe and at this point he claimed that he would not assist the abdicated monarch in the restoration of power. His son provided similar analytics and considered the French monarch destined to this: ‘What is not from God, cannot stand.’⁷²⁴ The next day, Nicholas I stormed into the dancing hall at one of the balls with the news from France, where republic was proclaimed, the throne was set aflame, and the royal family fled from the capital.⁷²⁵ The preparations for the war began immediately. By the middle of March, the revolutionary wave covered the whole Europe, and when the news about the adoption of the Austrian Constitution reached Russia, Konstantin wrote: ‘Thus, we now stand alone in the whole world, and the hope is only in God.’⁷²⁶

The Nordic kingdoms did not stand aside from the revolutionary turbulences. In Sweden, the liberal press delightfully welcomed the revolution as an icebreaker on the way of development and progress.⁷²⁷ Socialist and left-leaning journals competingly framed the revolution as a triumph of the proletarian classes against the aristocracy, proprietaries, and economical tyranny in general. The pace of the revolution reinforced the structural problems of the Swedish political system, primarily that of the estate-based Riksdag, while simultaneously highlighting horrific conditions of living of the poorer urban classes.⁷²⁸ Under this pressure, Oscar I established a new constitutional committee, but its workings were criticized by the conservative party who proposed their own compromise project, outraging liberal and democratic-leaning publics.⁷²⁹

⁷²⁴ Ibid, l. 27.

⁷²⁵ Korf, *Zapiski*, 410.

⁷²⁶ Konstantin Nikolaevich’s diary. GARF. F. 722, op. 1, d. 89, l. 34.

⁷²⁷ Mats Berglund, ‘Massans röst: Upplopp och gatubräk i Stockholm 1719–1848’ (PhD diss., Stockholms universitet, 2009), 354–55.

⁷²⁸ Ibid.

⁷²⁹ Björkman, “‘Må de herrskande klasserna darra’”, 119-129.

Finally, on March 18, thousands of Stockholm city dwellers gathered in the streets after the banquet devoted to the reform project, cheering the democratic constitution, and calling for the Riksdag reform. Their primary target was the house of the conservative member of Riksdag who thwarted the liberal reform projects, August von Hartmansdorff. The guards attempted to calm down the crowd, but the protesters responded with stone-throwing. King Oscar I himself appeared among the protesters on his horse, trying to quiet the masses. While the guards were able to disperse the crowds around the Hartmansdorff's place, the protesters turned to other streets. Next day, the government reinforced the guard with the military regiments, supplied artillery to the city streets and, as Mats Berglund writes 'turned from negotiation to action', meaning powerful suppression of the rioters. Protesters and the guards inflicted losses on both sides, while the liberal press sided with the conservative rhetoric and condemned the demonstrators and their violent way of action.⁷³⁰

Russian ambassador Krüdener witnessed these events and was almost accidentally attacked when the crowd took his home for minister Albert Ihre's one.⁷³¹ On March 19, he reported that the events in France produced great reverberations in Sweden. Primarily, he noted, the lower classes were affected by the news, but bourgeoisie in general welcomed the revolution, and everywhere in cafes and cabarets heroes of Paris were praised. The 'fermentation' agitated the students both in Lund and in Uppsala who joined the chorus of the protesters. In his next dispatch the following day he covered the protests that ensued around the city. While reproducing the general narrative of the events and highlighting the ameliorating role of the king and the army who acted with readiness and vigor, Krüdener

⁷³⁰ Berglund, 'Massans röst', 385–89.

⁷³¹ Krüdener – Nesselrode, 7 / 19 March 1848. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1848, d. 167. l. 33-35; Berglund, 388.

suspected that the riots must have been secretly prepared before, reflecting colloquial conviction in the preparedness of major uprisings across Europe.⁷³²

Indeed, in variegated revolutionary contexts, the conservative powers shared the idea that the upheaval had been prepared before by conspiracy groups and societies, drawing on a traditional conservative narrative that took shape in the aftermath of the French revolution of 1789.⁷³³ On the one hand, this was rarely the case and orchestrated uprisings figured rather as exceptions. On the other hand, political mobilization with slogans, marching crowds, and barricade buildings happened before across Europe, only in a lesser scale and non-simultaneously, producing the image of ‘rehearsed’ mobilization in 1848.⁷³⁴ Never before was the street politics so intense and powerful across the continent, and established authorities either fled or sought to find compromise with the demands of the crowd and their leaders.⁷³⁵

4.2. Finlandish echoes

The news of the French Revolution reached the Alexander University students on March 10. Since the situation across Europe was strained even prior to that, they monitored the tendencies attentively. As August Schauman recollected the moment, he and a group of students were completely stunned by the news about the overhaul of the European politics. Glasses of champagne were drunk, and debates immediately sparked about the future of Europe and Finland. Some liberal youngsters from Finland, like Emil von Qvanten turned their attention to Poland, expecting an upheaval of the imperial power there and opening of new futures for Finland.⁷³⁶ Schauman then confessed in his memoirs, opening a larger chapter on

⁷³² Krüdener – Nesselrode. 7 / 19 March 1848. AVPRI. F. 133. op. 469, g. 1848, d. 167. l. 33-35. He, however, could not make sense of the riot since the protesters simultaneously cheered the republic and expressed their loyalty to the king. Quite a typical blend for 1848.

⁷³³ Peter R. Campbell, Thomas E. Kaiser, and Marisa Linton, *Conspiracy in the French Revolution* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007).

⁷³⁴ Wolfram Siemann, *The German Revolution of 1848-49* (London: Macmillan, 1998), 11–52.

⁷³⁵ Jonathan Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 109–56.

⁷³⁶ Emil von Qvanten – B.O. Schauman, 11 May 1848. Kansalliskirjasto, Coll. 198.8.

the outcomes of the revolution, that its results in Finland rather appeared negative due to the line of restrictive imperial reactions.⁷³⁷

Indeed, the administration reacted quickly, taken especially by surprise with the events that happened in Stockholm. These events, given their proximity to the border of Finland, triggered an activation of the administrative monitoring. Even though the year of 1848 did not witness any political demonstrations in Finland, apart from small skirmishes and hand-written brochures,⁷³⁸ mass riots in Stockholm became the locus of the imperial attention. One of the first reports of Swedish incidents was a letter written by Armfelt to Menshikov around March 8 / 20, where he announced the suppression of the unrest, hoping that the peace remained. Armfelt stressed the participation of the Swedish students, reporting that they were subject to fermentation and agitation.⁷³⁹

On March 19 / 31, Menshikov, reacting on Armfelt's concerns, addressed his recently arrived adjunct at the duchy, Platon Ivanovich' Rokassovsky:

Universal liberal uprisings and riots in Europe should make us prepare some safety measures in Helsingfors, especially since the students most actively participated in the *coup d'état* in France, Austria, and Prussia, and now Upsala students have already began their radical proclamations that have always found an echo in the Imperial Alexander University. This inclinations among the Finnish students, in general, common for all students across Europe made the guard carry their guns loaded during the reign of Alexander Pavlovich.⁷⁴⁰

⁷³⁷ August Schauman, *Från sex årtionden i Finland*, 1: 268–69.

⁷³⁸ In March 1848, Rokassovsky sent Menshikov a copy of the newspaper, on the front page of which the slogan was printed in large ink: “Bort med Nicolai I, Ned med Menchikoff” (“Away Nicholas I, Menshikov - out!”). RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 261, l. 4. Menshikov did not pay much attention to the incident.

⁷³⁹ Armfelt – Menshikov, undated, received 19 / 31 March 1848. RGAVMF, F. 19, op. 3, d.18, l. 43.

⁷⁴⁰ Menshikov – Rokassovsky, 19 / 31 March 1848. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Iib 34c, l. 230-237.

The measures Menshikov commanded to cautiously take included the preparation of the point of platoon summoning, the establishment of garrisons in Tölö guarding the rifles, the selection of a proper shore position to have reinforcements from Sveaborg at hand, and the provision of live ammunition for the garrisons. The scale of preparations clearly pointed to the seriousness of his expectations.⁷⁴¹

While Menshikov was aware that the riots in Stockholm were suppressed, it was still unclear, as he stressed in the letter, whether the government of the neighboring state could hold this position: ‘Hence we cannot loosen safety measures’. Menshikov additionally asked to inform him on the state of mind in the armed forces, suspecting that some officers might not be acting ‘in the Russian spirit’. Overall, the administration had to perform these measures covertly to avoid inhibiting any thought of suspicion among the locals.⁷⁴² In the turmoil of March-April 1848 with nationalist, separatist, and constitutionalist demands proclaimed across Europe, the Grand Duchy might have been thought of as a potential zone of unrest.

Menshikov and other administrators understood well the stakes that were put on the board with the revolution rolling in Europe. The connection between Sweden and Finland, despite earlier proactive measures aimed to undermine it, still played paramount role in the preparation for a potential upheaval within the borders of the Russian empire. Menshikov’s particular stress on the role of the students conveyed his recognition of new agents of the bourgeois politics, that spilled out into the streets and acted vigorously in 1848, especially since he was well aware both about traditional ties binding the students at the Nordic universities and of the rising pan-Scandinavian tendencies that prompted new communication channels and suspicious revolutionary dogmatics. While earlier Menshikov might have belittled the hazards

⁷⁴¹ Ibid.

⁷⁴² Menshikov – Rokassovsky. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIb 34c, l. 234.

of Scandinavianism and cross-Nordic communications, the novel international situation demanded scrupulous attention to all potential avenues of propaganda.

In this critical moment, Menshikov communicated primarily with ex-army cadres that were in his eyes most loyal to the Russian throne, simultaneously suspecting even some higher members of the civil administration in spreading the ‘intrigues’ and potentially revealing the scale of conspirative concerns.⁷⁴³ Thus, another line of communication went through vice-chancellor of the university, Ivan Ivanovich’ (Johan Mauritz) Nordenstam who also recently came to the duchy. The latter informed Menshikov that some sailors and students pronounced toasts for the long life of the French Republic. Overall, however, he noted the insignificant influence of the ‘Stockholm events’ on the inhabitants there. The professors, according to him, did their best to prevent students from demonstrating, and students themselves remained calm. He still found it useful, however, to increase surveillance over the foreign subjects, most of whom, according to him, comprised of the Swedes.⁷⁴⁴

Swedish subjects emanated revolutionary intentions, and their presence at the duchy potentially gave rise to hazardous tendencies in the critical situation. Restrictive measures upon the travelling Swedes had been discussed earlier within the administration, and the fear of revolutionary contamination spreading into the duchy hastened the implementation of prepared designs. At that point, Menshikov prescribed the governors of Finlandish provinces to ban all subjects of the Swedish king from entering the duchy in case ‘the unrest in Stockholm were to take such a pernicious turn that the legitimate government was forced to yield to the violent force.’⁷⁴⁵ The spread of the radicalization appeared to be almost endemic to the current state of

⁷⁴³ Menshikov suspected that Lars Garbriel von Haartman – usually portrayed as his client in historiography – was spreading intrigues. While these intrigues might have related to monetary concerns that emerged due to the stoppage of trade and travel, in March 1848 everything appeared politically suspicious: Menshikov – Rokassovsky, 19/31 March 1848. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIb 34c. 235: ‘Haartman is spreading intrigues!’; On Haartman as Menshikov’s client: Raimo Savolainen, “Släktsenaten 1809-1870 - Senatorssläkterna i kollegialitetens bojar,” *Historisk Tidskrift för Finland* 77, no. 2 (1992): 173-210, <https://journal.fi/htf/article/view/66076>.

⁷⁴⁴ Nordenstam – Menshikov, 9/21 March 1848. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 205, l. 20-22.

⁷⁴⁵ Menshikov – Nordenstam and other governors, 20 March / 1 April 1848. KKK, Dd: 3, N. 659-662.

the Swedish administration and political system. Accordingly, those personalities who had close ties with the neighboring state, students among them, were to be closely monitored by the authorities. One of the most suspicious figures was the leader of the Fennoman movement, Johan Vilhelm Snellman.

4.3. Fennomania and Scandinavianism: together or apart?

Towards the tumultuous year of 1848, Fennomania and Scandinavianism came closer due to their ostensibly outward orientation and revolutionary potential in the eyes of the administration. Moreover, Johan V. Snellman himself appeared in the web of Swedish-centered networks, potentially sympathetic to Scandinavianism, as I have already demonstrated.⁷⁴⁶ The backing that the administration at least thought of providing to the Finnish language to downplay Swedish influence from abroad turned to be increasingly problematic towards the revolutionary year and in the wake of it. While some professors and even functionaries envisioned the bond between the encouragement of Finnish and the support of Russian language, hoping eventually to substitute the former with the latter, Fennomania-agitation ostensibly came to oppose not only Swedish cultural avenues but also those professed by the Russian side.

Students who opted to travel to Russia to learn the language were often criticized by their peers, and this tendency did not evade the eyes of the government.⁷⁴⁷ Moreover, in May 1846, new words for the Marseillaise written by young Zacharias Topelius were found among the students' papers, where Russian language surfaced as the 'enemy' of Finnish.⁷⁴⁸ Finally, and most significantly in 1846, the same year when there appeared programmes of Russian-Finnish language collaboration and new grants became available for the learners of Finnish at

⁷⁴⁶ See chapter 2.

⁷⁴⁷ Klinge, *Studenterna och idéer: 1828-1852*, 1:147–52.

⁷⁴⁸ Gustav Magnus Armfelt – Menshikov. 9 / 21 мая 1846. RGAVMF. F. 19. op. 3, d.18, l. 119-121.

the University, Snellman's newspaper *Saima* was closed – regardless of the contested nature of this decision – for the breaking of censorship rules following governor-general's personal request, who considered it a weapon of corroding the loyalty of peasants through the criticism of governmental decisions.⁷⁴⁹ In January 1847, governor of Vyborg, Casimir von Kothen reported to Menshikov that even though Snellman's newspaper *Saima* was shut down, it would not be easy to suppress the 'evil that had been spreading for so long': young people wanted to learn Finnish, and few were disposed to Russian. Exaggerated sympathy for the Finnish language, according to Kothen, put up barriers to rapprochement between Russia and Finland, and could have 'become fateful' for this connection.⁷⁵⁰

Later that year, Alexander Armfelt wrote that 'Finnishism' had taken over the minds, and he even heard rumors that a society of young people had been formed to oppose the study of the Russian language.⁷⁵¹ Conservative Swedish-speaking administration regarded the struggle for the emancipation of Finnish as a generally unworthy, plebian, and dangerous idea, potentially leading to class conflicts and peasant unrest.⁷⁵² Overall, the expectations of support towards the Finnish language as a tool that would help to distance the public sphere and the youth from Sweden ceased to be that optimistic. When the news about the revolution in Europe reached the administration of the duchy, both Fennomania and connections with Sweden emanated similar, if not singular, dangers. Especially since the Finlandish administration suspected that the turmoil in Sweden was driven by the lower classes, associated with Finnish language in the Grand Duchy.

⁷⁴⁹ On *Saima* newspaper ban: RGAVMF. F.19, op. 4, d. 432, l. 13-21; Menshikov – Censorship committee, 13 / 25 April 1846, KA. KKK, Dd: 2, N. 578.

⁷⁵⁰ Kothen – Menshikov, 5 / 17 January 1847. RGAVMF. F.19, op. 3, d. 146, l. 80.

⁷⁵¹ Armfelt – Menshikov, 7 / 19 April 1847. RGAVMF. F.19, op. 3, d. 18, l. 35-36.

⁷⁵² Yrjö Nurmio, *Vuoden 1850 kielisäännöksen yleispoliittista taustaa* (Helsinki: Historiallinen aikakauskirja, 1942), 246–57; Liikanen, *Fennomania ja kansa*, 90–96.

In April 1848, Kothen specifically referred to the Snellman's 'party' and their 'communist' agitation.⁷⁵³ While students travelling to learn Finnish among peasants only followed the goal of saving the Finnish nationality from the oblivion (*naufraige*) in his letter, Snellman and his allies emanated such perilous influence that it was hard to counterbalance it. While Kothen used these impressions to brag about the state of the local police and clergy who could not 'ameliorate the public spirit', Menshikov proposed more practical measures to be implemented with regards to the Finnish philosopher. After Nordenstam updated governor-general on the preparations made and surveillance organized over the students and foreigners, Menshikov drew his attention to another potential zone of contestation, Kuopio Gymnasium:

Snellman's contacts with Germany and Sweden, the direction of his editorial board [meaning, *Saima* – EE], the prophetism of Hegelianism whose fruits we can now observe in German students' actions, and nationality (*narodnost'*) which he uses make him if not a dangerous person than the one to be surveilled over. While previously there were no signs of accidents in Kuopio, many accidents in other places are referred to him. His banned newspaper *Saima* had a tendency to influence the lower class of the people. Snellman has strong echoes at the University [...] ⁷⁵⁴

Governor-general then asked Nordenstam to send a reliable person to sonder the ground in the province and to monitor the public opinion there. It is striking how well governor-general knew Snellman's biography and could navigate doctrinal references behind his works. Menshikov's comprehension of the revolutionary logic also revealed itself in boiling down Hegelianism, nationalist agitation, and present upheavals. Snellman's activities clearly appeared in the double light of both cosmopolitical ties with Sweden, his universalist doctrinal

⁷⁵³ Kothen – Menshikov, 12 / 24 April 1848. RGAVMF. F.19, op. 3, d. 146, l. 116.

⁷⁵⁴ Menshikov – Nordenstam, 6 / 18 April 1848, RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 205, l. 30.

standing and his inward-directed activities that operated via the category of nationality, and finally influence he ostensibly had over the lower classes within the duchy. The documental trace that was gathered around Snellman sheds light on his Scandinavian connections that at the point of crisis in Sweden became dangerous, especially given the role that was ascribed to lower classes in the riots. The dangers of Swedish-leaning university students and Fennomania were related to each other and categorized similarly in the administrative offices.⁷⁵⁵

Snellman, as many others, was interested in the revolution, and when the upheaval broke out in France, he considered it a way of emancipation of the ‘fourth estate’ brought with moderate measures: ‘As far as can be seen, the rise of the middle class cleared away a lot of progress also in mindset and customs. One should hope that the unspent forces of the masses will now complete the work.’⁷⁵⁶ While he must have been cautious not to overspread his take on the revolution in his correspondence, recognizing the scope of perustration activities, the June days in Paris, when crowds of workers and proletariats were forcefully suppressed, might have alienated the Finnish philosopher.⁷⁵⁷ While he did welcome the revolution at the beginning – perceiving it as the emancipation of the lower classes – he was not a political agitator, and he certainly did not plan on spreading the upheaval to Finland. The Russian administration regarded interest and involvement, however, as things lying very close to each other.

Nordenstam, who recently arrived in the duchy, only had time to make a few acquaintances, and primarily in Helsingfors. He, however, quickly became popular among

⁷⁵⁵ Menshikov’s disregard for the ethnic profile of the Grand Duchy might have also echoed in his insistence on *Saima*’s influence upon the lower classes. Many administrators, however, argued as early as 1846 that given *Saima*’s predominant Swedish-speaking audience, it could not really affect Finnish-speaking population, usually associated with peasantry and ‘lower classes’.

⁷⁵⁶ Snellman – Lönnrot, 28 March 1848. Snellman’s Collection : <http://snellman.kootutteokset.fi/sites/default/files/06117.pdf>; He was not alone in this perception: Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 1:155–56; Castrén, *Herman Kellgren*, 276–93.

⁷⁵⁷ Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851*, 209–15; Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann and Robert John Weston Evans, *The Revolutions in Europe, 1848-1849: From Reform to Reaction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 41–43.

professors and students for his mild views and thoughtful actions. He even allowed for a student festival at the outskirts of Helsingfors in May 1848 that became an expression of loyalty on the side of the youth.⁷⁵⁸ Among the university staff, Jakov Grot became one of his most reliable acquaintances, and the latter also characterized Nordenstam in a good light for his trusted correspondent in Saint-Petersburg, Pletnev.⁷⁵⁹ It was Grot whom Nordenstam picked for the mission that Menshikov ordered to implement. Grot by the virtue of his position as a university professor of Russian visited gymnasiums across Finland for yearly inspections, and Kuopio was on the list. When Nordenstam reported to Menshikov about the candidature for the mission, governor-general had some doubts reserved, however:

With regards to theories that are now shattering the whole Europe, professors-cosmopolites, even if they are of different nations and in the state of personal enmity, [they] act united when political illusions are at stake. This sickness is universal for educated and educating world.⁷⁶⁰

For the lack of a better one, the candidature of Grot was, however, approved. It is conspicuous, nevertheless, how Menshikov's suspicion crossed the national boundaries and relegated rather to other forms of groupness, be they class-based or profession-centered. Indeed, his analytics often pertained to class-centered categories and their combinations, rather than to national or ethnic features. In a way, the mistrust towards the Swedes was prompted rather by their exposure to the political life in the neighboring kingdom than by their inherent ethnic characteristics. The 'Russianness' of Jakov Grot thus accordingly did not put any obstacles on his potential to spread disruptive ideas.

⁷⁵⁸ Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 1:160–64.

⁷⁵⁹ Grot – Pletnev, 8 March 1848 in *Perepiska Ja.K. Grota s P.A. Pletnevym*, vol. 3 (Saint-Petersburg: Tipografiia Ministerstva Putei Soobshcheniia, 1896), 198-99.

⁷⁶⁰ Menshikov – Nordenstam. 6 / 18 March 1848. RGAVMF, F. 19, op. 2, d. 205, l. 39.

Jakov Grot knew Snellman beforehand, and they were in good relations. Grot clearly appreciated Snellman's talent both as a philosopher and an author, while his permanent correspondent Pletnew considered him to be a genius and one of the most important philosophers in Scandinavia.⁷⁶¹ Grot's mission also revealed the intermingled dynamics between the growing public sphere and the field of political, with agents migrating between them, cross-fertilizing, using each other's cultural or political capital, and monitoring each other. During his visit in Kuopio, Grot did not find anything suspicious in the philosopher's behavior or in the state of mind of the local population. Grot noted, however, that Snellman had a considerable influence upon everybody in Kuopio and beyond.

Forwarding Grot's report gave a chance to Nordenstam to inform Menshikov that there were high chances that Johan V. Snellman would take a position of the university lecturer in the coming autumn. His contestant for the post, Fredrik Germund Aminoff, had, according to Nordenstam, less chances, since Snellman significantly surpassed him in knowledge and talents.⁷⁶² In personal conversation with Grot, another high functionary Rokassovsky confessed, however, that he feared Snellman because of his enormous popularity and influence. Nordenstam argued that conservative professors would hardly like to see him among the lecturers.⁷⁶³ Menshikov did not want to see him there either, reflecting in his diary notes on the perilous popularity of Snellman even among the civil administration.⁷⁶⁴ As Armfelt reported later, Aminoff was chosen as a more conservative candidate.⁷⁶⁵

Snellman's status as one of the most popular intellectual celebrities in Finland, however, pointed to the emerging contestations between old politics based on legal authority and new dynamics that drew on the gravity of the popular affection and charisma. While

⁷⁶¹ Grot – Pletnew, 20 September 1848; Pletnew – Grot, 25 September 1848 in *Perepiska Ja.K. Grotta s P.A. Pletnevym*, 3: 322–24; 330–31; Karhu, *Finljandskaja literatura i Rossija: 1800-1850*, 253–70.

⁷⁶² Nordenstam – Menshikov, 1 / 13 June 1848. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 205, l. 42.

⁷⁶³ Ibid.

⁷⁶⁴ A.S. Menshikov's diary. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 6, d.6, l. 51.

⁷⁶⁵ Armfelt – Menshikov, 12 / 24 August 1848, RGAVMF, F. 19, op. 3, d.18, l. 50.

Snellman was not yet a politician in the same sense that young intellectuals became in Sweden and Denmark, he certainly came to embody a challenge that made the established authorities suspect him in anti-government plots. Witnessing once great powers that were crumbling under the pressure of the street politics, the Finlandish government perceived Snellman as a figure with cosmopolitan experience, Scandinavian networks, even potential pan-Scandinavian sympathies. His self-fashioning as a Finnish nationalist did not contradict these qualities. It could, perhaps, even reinforce them, given Menshikov regarded nationality-seeking and Hegelianism as cosmopolitan trends, imported from beyond the borders and spreading through the networks of intellectuals. During 1848, Menshikov, due to the mission he had to fulfill in Sweden and Denmark, would learn directly how public intellectuals, professors, and personalities with status similar to Snellman came into power across Europe and Scandinavia.

4.4. Russia, Denmark, and Scandinavianism

On March 31, 1848, Saint-Petersburg learned about the riots in the streets of Stockholm. Konstantin Nikolayevich reflected on these events in his diary, especially since other continental kingdoms were shattered by the revolutionary forces, and Sweden along with Russia surfaced as last outposts of legitimacy: ‘We have received a message that there happened a serious riot in Stockholm, but the king commanded so correctly and beat them [the protesters – EE] so good, that the revolt ceased in three days’.⁷⁶⁶ The diary mentioned that next day the deputations from city dwellers swarmed to the king’s residence with the letters of gratitude.⁷⁶⁷ The king, according to the received messages, was among the soldiers with his children, ignoring the hazards of the demonstrations. Konstantin delightfully concluded: ‘He is so good! I love the Swedes!’⁷⁶⁸

⁷⁶⁶ Konstantin Nikolaevich’s diary. GARF. F. 722, op. 1, d. 89, l. 39.

⁷⁶⁷ One of them was supplied by the diplomatic corps and authored by Krüdener: Krüdener – Nesselrode, 10 / 22 March 1848. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1848, d. 167, l. 52.

⁷⁶⁸ Konstantin Nikolaevich’s diary. GARF. F. 722, op. 1, d. 89, l. 39.

Although this explication did not in itself contain any clues to the future collaboration between Russia and Sweden during that year, in whose development Konstantin Nikolayevich would become a significant even if mostly symbolic agent, it did set things into context: the Russian empire and Sweden preserved their 'legal' governments, unlike many other European kingdoms. Several days prior to that, the notorious anti-revolutionary manifesto was published in Russia that announced the readiness of the Russian empire to crush revolutionary developments at its borders and beyond them.⁷⁶⁹ While some members of the court noted the general unwillingness to interfere into the European conflicts which they thought the manifest announced,⁷⁷⁰ the series of revolutions would prompt the Russian empire to focus on the affairs that were not even in its nearest vicinity, namely on the question of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein and their political loyalty.

In Denmark, the changes in the political architecture were announced even prior to the revolutionary days. When on January 20, 1848, the old King Christian VIII lied at death's door on his bed, he asked his son to implement constitutional changes in the kingdom. Even prior to his illness, he recognized that the design of the Danish monarchy should have been improved. In 1847, the committee was established to outline the project for a future constitution, but its workings did not yield any results before the monarch's death. When Frederik VII inherited the throne from his father, the preparations for the change of the regime architecture launched, even despite the opposition from the conservative ministers. Progressive intellectuals also took the chance to propose their own constitutional project for the wider public. 'Old' liberals J.F. Schouw and H.N. Clausen published their pamphlet *Ved Tronskiftet 1848* that called for a united constitution for Denmark and Schleswig, abolition of absolutism, civil liberties, but also

⁷⁶⁹ *Syn Otechestva* n. 4, April 1848.

⁷⁷⁰ A.S. Menshikov's diary, 15 / 27 March 1848. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 445.

sought to preserve restricted voting rights. The programme became extremely popular and sold in thousands of copies.⁷⁷¹

Upon the enthronement of Frederik VII, censorship was cancelled, gatherings became unrestricted, amnesty for political crimes announced, and the changes were promised by the king, although the ambiguous tone that his proclamations took worried competing political groups, including the Danish national-liberals and the schleswig-holsteiners, meaning German nationalists in the duchies, who both expected that their hopes might be dwindled. The streets of the capital came into movement, and variegated deputations, demonstrations, and processions took place, mostly in the liberal fashion, demanding ‘freedom and constitution’. The official rescript that launched the preparation for the change of the regime architecture was published on January 28, authored by conservative and experienced politician Carl Moltke who strived to preserve the integrity of the Danish monarchy.⁷⁷²

The rescript announced the establishment of the commission for the elaboration of the constitution, ‘consisting of the experienced men’, with equal number of members required both from Denmark and from the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. This equalization of the representation immediately sparked the charge of the opposition, since Denmark comprised a million and three hundred thousand inhabitants while the duchies ‘only’ eight hundred thousand. In the capital, the rescript was deemed an expression of the ‘Danish schleswig-holteinism’ and expected to bring the dissolution of the monarchy. Popular resistance against the rescript was widespread, and various groups via different mediums demanded wider voting rights, agricultural reforms and, most prominently from the national-liberal side, united constitution of Denmark and Schleswig that excluded Holstein.⁷⁷³

⁷⁷¹ Neergaard, *Under Junigrundloven*, 1: 90–137; Glenthøj, *1864 – Sønnen af de Slagne*, 147–52; Bjørn, *Fra reaktion til grundlov*, 325–32.

⁷⁷² Glenthøj, *1864 – Sønnen Af de Slagne*, 152–53.

⁷⁷³ Neergaard, *Under Junigrundloven*, 1: 112–14.

National visions challenged the architecture of the Danish composite state, the Danish empire, as some contemporaries and later scholars referred to the system of rule.⁷⁷⁴ Apart from the qualitative analysis performed by the nascent political groups that sought to demonstrate the archaic, loose, and unclear design of the existing policy, the encounter of modernity presupposed the operationalization of numbers. Statistics on population, language-use, tax collection, territorial incomes, and duties, generally produced by state chancelleries, became essential tools in the fight for the status of Denmark and the duchies in the hands of rivalling political camps. These analytics, deployed since the beginning of the 1840s, came to shine especially bright in 1848. The existing order of *helstat* ambiguously dwelled on different categories of diversity management and often ignored the principles of nationality altogether, irritating nationalist parties. The partisans of the coexistence of Denmark with the duchies came united under the label of *helstat*, meaning the consolidated state.⁷⁷⁵

When the news about the February revolution in France reached Copenhagen, it produced an uproar. The press covered every step of the revolutionary march, while the domestic demands became sharpened in the light of the shattering powers in Europe. The liberals in the capital rightly predicted that the revolutionary movement in Germany would ignite their nationalist-oriented rivals in Schleswig and Holstein, although they themselves contributed a lot to the irritation there. The leading representatives of the national-liberal wing held the first meeting at the Casino on March 11 where they proclaimed that the Danish nationality was in danger and called for the common constitution for Denmark and Schleswig.⁷⁷⁶ Again, thousands of city dwellers roamed the streets of Copenhagen and gathered for the meeting. Lehmann and Clausen held speeches on the necessity of the national consolidation, while left-wing and center-leaning voices who warned about the arising national

⁷⁷⁴ Michael Bregnsbo and Kurt Villads Jensen, *Det danske imperium: storhed og fald* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 171–82; Østergaard, “National-Building and Nationalism in the Oldenburg Empire,” 485–94.

⁷⁷⁵ Neergaard, *Under Junigrundloven*, 1: 90-138.

⁷⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 121-25.

tensions were scolded. Next day, when the craftsmen organization held their own convention, national-liberals were blamed for crossing the boundaries of the freedom of speech. When Orla Lehmann appeared on the scene that day, however, he announced their common struggle for the universal voting rights, thus allying nationalist demands and democratic programme of the left.⁷⁷⁷

In the duchies, the king's rescript was received with a similar irritation, almost mirroring the nationalist rhetoric of the leading liberals from Copenhagen. Only in the case of the duchies, the rescript ostensibly rendered them a mere appendix of the Danish monarchy. Moreover, the tendency of the nationalist groups in Copenhagen to prompt the exclusion of Holstein in their views went against the historical bonds between the two duchies, the united polity of Schleswig-Holstein that was crystallized through appeals to historical document and legal precedents. Immediately upon the receipt of the news about the revolution in France, various oppositional groups began mobilizing in Kiel and other localities. As in other German regions, the revolution in Schleswig and Holstein started independently of the imagined center but then came to be an all-national German endeavor, pivotal to the struggles of 1848.⁷⁷⁸

Leaders of the Schleswig-Holstein movement called for the popular mobilization and weaponization of the masses in the vein of self-defense. The authority of the Copenhagen government in the duchies was disappearing. While some gatherings were meant to be prohibited at gun point, the army began fraternizing with the protesters. While in Copenhagen the national-liberals demanded shared constitution for Denmark and Schleswig, in the duchies the demands pushed for the separate constitution for the historically crafted entity of Schleswig-Holstein under the possible aegis of the united Germany. The degree of radicalism grew with each day on both sides, and many became ready to protect their goals with forceful

⁷⁷⁷ Ibid, 130-160.

⁷⁷⁸ Siemann, *The German Revolution of 1848-49*, 148–52; Andreas von Bezold, *Die Schleswig-Holsteinische Erhebung 1848-1851: Im Spannungsfeld zwischen Deutschland und Dänemark* (Hamburg: Diplomica Verlag, 2014), 68–82.

combat. Finally, on March 18, at Rendsborg convention the resolution was adopted with the demands for a separate Schleswig-Holstein constitution, freedom of press and conventions, and the incorporation of Schleswig into the German confederation. In four days, the deputation was sent from Kiel to present these demands before the king, and Prince Frederik of Nør, a descendant of the royal sideline, wrote him a letter that ambiguously underscored his loyalty and called for the acknowledgement of the popular demands.⁷⁷⁹ Schleswig-holsteiners often alluded to their loyalty towards the Danish throne, stressing, however, that the king was restricted in his freedom of action by the Danish nationalists.⁷⁸⁰

The liberals from Copenhagen learned of the news from the convention on March 20 and immediately decided to hold a popular gathering on March 22: revolutionary practices mirrored each other in the rivalling camps.⁷⁸¹ This gathering happened to be a turning point in the development of the political dynamics in the Danish composite monarchy. Beforehand, the national-liberal leaders and the representatives of the Copenhagen burghers association adopted Orla Lehmann's improvised address to the king where he demanded the establishment of the new ministry with trusted representatives who enjoyed popular support. The address ended with famous words: 'We appeal to Your Majesty not to drive the Nation to the self-help of despair'. The convention again heated the public spirit, calling for arms.⁷⁸²

The cabinet knew well what had happened at the Casino convention, and next day, the change of the ministry had already been prepared by the king, who declared that the government had to change its course of action with regards to Schleswig in agreement with the Danish nation.⁷⁸³ The king and his environment recognized the belligerent state of mind of the capital dwellers, and recognized that if not for Schleswig, their demonstrations would have

⁷⁷⁹ Glenthøj, *1864 – Sønnen Af de Slagne*, 160–63; Neergaard, *Under Junigrundloven*, 1: 132–36.

⁷⁸⁰ Bregnsbo and Villads Jensen, *The Rise and Fall of the Danish Empire*, 182.

⁷⁸¹ Hans Vammen, "Casino 1848," *Historisk Tidsskrift* 88, no. 2 (1988): 253-81, <https://tidsskrift.dk/historisktidsskrift/article/view/53096>.

⁷⁸² Glenthøj, *1864 – Sønnen Af de Slagne*, 166–69; Lehmann, *Efterladte skrifter*, 1: 69–87.

⁷⁸³ Neergaard, *Under Junigrundloven*, 1: 138-187.

turned against the established powers. Conservative members of the ministry resigned. While the ministry resignation had been discussed, the inhabitants of the city were yet unaware of that. On the same day, the surge of people up to fifteen thousand gathered into procession to reach the Castle Square. There, the leaders of the procession handed to the king the address written by Lehmann. The king, in his turn, announced that the old ministry had already been discharged. When one of the procession leaders announced the king's decision to the demonstrators, the cheerful crowds shouted: 'Long live to the king!'.⁷⁸⁴

The new ministry was being prepared with great hardships, since it had to combine both the renewed popularity of the national-liberals with the experience of men well-versed in politics. The compromise March Ministry was formed after the deputation from Kiel arrived in Copenhagen with their demands and Prince of Nør's letter that outraged the king. The new ministry thus included both prominent members of the national-liberal party, namely D.G. Monrad as minister of religion and education, A.F. Tscherning as minister of war, L.N. Hvidt and Orla Lehmann as ministers without portfolio, their ally F.M. Knuth as minister of foreign affairs, and experienced men who agreed to follow a more active course, presided by A.W. Moltke. The empowerment of recently oppositional party simultaneously made Scandinavianism into one of the possible avenues of the Danish foreign policy, not even imagined but now quite real, and the diplomats were quick to notice this change.⁷⁸⁵

Baron Ernest Ungern-Sternberg who replaced Paul Nicolay as a head of the mission witnessed these events with great disappointment. Immediately after the death of Christian VIII, he informed the minister that Frederik VII was more disposed to serve the aspirations of the Danish nationalism. This fact, according to him, might have led to political issues and even to the eventual dissolution of the ancient monarchy. The publication of the king's rescript

⁷⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁸⁵ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 334–39; Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme og politiske realiteter*, 186–88.

produced sorrowful picture in the eyes of the diplomat, and he noted: ‘Through my previous reports, Your Highness would have been prepared for this serious event, which will place Denmark in the category of constitutional states.’⁷⁸⁶ The potential adoption of the constitution would have produced tensions between the nationalist groups in the capital and in the duchies, as the diplomat predicted. The formalization of the relations between Denmark and the duchies was another perilous avenue of the ensuing bourgeois modernity that sought to undermine the existing doxa of the loosely united composite state. Ungern-Sternberg noted that many inhabitants of the capital sided with the anti-German claims, especially since they were backed up by the ‘Scandinavian sympathies that are geminating here in many heads and serve as a foundation for this combination’.⁷⁸⁷ The diplomat correctly noted both the externally projected aspirations of the national-liberals and a new surge of popularity that Scandinavianism came to enjoy in March 1848.⁷⁸⁸

By the end of January, Ungern-Sternberg lost any trust that the Danish government had enough power to avert the dissolution of the integrated monarchy. He predicted that Denmark might have followed the path of the Netherlands in the 1830s, when Belgium became independent:

Such a catastrophe would weaken Denmark to the point of no longer being among the states which can maintain their independence and would force it to undergo protection, which would not fail to become eminently dangerous for Northern Europe and a threat to trade and rightful influence of Russia.⁷⁸⁹

⁷⁸⁶ Ungern-Sternberg – Nesselrode, 13 / 25 January 1848. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1848, d. 193, l. 50-54; Ungern-Sternberg – Nesselrode, 17 / 29 January 1848. Ibid, 70-70ob

⁷⁸⁷ Ungern-Sternberg – Nesselrode, 31 January / 12 February 1848. Ibid, l. 121-122.

⁷⁸⁸ Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme og politiske realiteter*, 187–90.

⁷⁸⁹ Ungern-Sternberg – Nesselrode, 31 January / 12 February 1848. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1848, d. 193, l. 121.

Referring to the principles established under the Vienna order, the diplomat feared that the dissolution of the monarchy could cause the breakup of the European balance that was sustained by the existing status quo of Denmark as composite monarchy. This could potentially lead to wars for the future of the remaining Danish possessions, while under ‘protection’ the diplomat might have meant new political combinations, Scandinavianism included. Finally, such a collapse, prompted by revolutionary powers, would render Russian anti-revolutionary influence – that demonstrated itself earlier during student conventions – null, contributing to the reorganization of the Northern Europe into a hostile Scandinavian policy.

The reification of Scandinavianism in its – quite new – political and territorial form became possible in the eyes of the Russian mission in 1848. Indeed, the year made all things previously considered impossible reified at once. During the tumultuous period when, in the eyes of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs, radical democratic, revolutionary, and liberal powers were challenging established governments, why could not Scandinavianism – previously presented as a similar revolutionary force paired with liberal and territorial claims – shape a new political reality? Pan-Scandinavian scenario in Ungern-Sternberg’s reports was associated with defeated Denmark. Relatively strong Danish monarchy – meaning well-integrated into the Vienna system – as it was prior to 1848, did not have any necessity to unite with Sweden-Norway. In the case of its loss in the ensuing hostilities, however, the aggrandizement through the Nordic consolidation surfaced as a probable means of the regional reorganization.

The goal of the Russian empire was thus to preserve the Danish monarchy against nationalistic prejudices and union aspirations.⁷⁹⁰ This aim, framed by perhaps most conservative among the guardians of the Vienna establishment certainly introduced tensions between different concepts of state survival in the 19th century. Nationalists sought to enlarge

⁷⁹⁰ Ungern-Sternberg – Nesselrode, 9 / 21 March. Ibid, I. 193.

territories and populations in the vein of ‘right-sizing’ states to survivable entities, as if aspiring to overcome the elusive threshold principle.⁷⁹¹ That is why, macro-nationalist politics often surfaced as reliable programmes,⁷⁹² and Scandinavianism was instrumentalized as a local scenario of this plan. The Russian empire, however, held tight to the vision of the European balance, where Denmark as a composite monarchy played its prescribed role. The strength in these visions thus emanated from the situation of European interconnectedness within the security regime and preservation of its composite parts. While pragmatically the foreign ministry might have just preferred to evade the Scandinavian union and Danish disintegration, their rhetoric drew on the Vienna principles, intervening to guard the established framework against the grain of the revolutionary aspirations.

Ungern-Sternberg, who was pessimistic already in the mid-February, became alarmed when the revolutionary March reached Denmark. At the beginning, the ‘native tranquility’ of the Danish inhabitants was not shaken by the upheaval, since the finances were in a good shape, and the attitude of the population towards the administration was not critical.⁷⁹³ When by the end of March, new ministry was formed that aimed at the incorporation of Schleswig, his tone dramatically changed. The ‘revolutionary party’, whose members took some ministerial posts and who were notorious for their nationalist doctrine would have led the monarchy to the ‘civil war, the violent separation of the duchies from the monarchy, and a considerable weakening of the latter.’⁷⁹⁴ In a state of total confusion, the diplomatic corps, usually socialized among the conservative elites, were now exposed to the new bourgeois politics that they had to navigate and adapt to.

⁷⁹¹ Rasmus Glenthoj, “Skandinavismen som en politisk nødvendighed: Politisk skandinavisme i et teoretisk og komparativt perspektiv,” in *Skandinavismen: Vision og virkning*, 227–55; Brendan O’Leary, Ian S. Lustick, and Thomas Callaghy, *Right-Sizing the State: The Politics of Moving Borders* (Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2001).

⁷⁹² Amotz Giladi, “Origins and Characteristics of Macro-Nationalism: A Reflection on Pan-Latinism’s Emergence at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century,” *History* 105, no. 365 (2020): 252–67, <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-229X.12972>.

⁷⁹³ Ungern-Sternberg – Nesselrode, 3 / 15 March 1848. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1848, d. 193, l. 185-186;

Ungern-Sternberg – Nesselrode. 4 / 16 March 1848. Ibid, l. 191.

⁷⁹⁴ Ungern-Sternberg – Nesselrode. 9 / 21 March 1848. Ibid, l. 194 ob.

In March, the centers of decision-making multiplied with deputations, gatherings at private places, ministerial conventions, and protests at the streets, while also being asynchronized and possessing imbalanced chunks of information to ponder on. This was the period when the temporality of decision-making became hardly navigable, since choices had to be made quickly but information circulated with considerable lags, due to courier stoppages and other challenges on the way of connections. While some agents were ready to abandon far-reaching demands, as for example, Orla Lehmann, who expressed his readiness to divide Schleswig along the imagined language line, others remained steadfast.⁷⁹⁵ Ungern-Sternberg was correct in his predictions, and on March 24 the provisional government was formed in Schleswig-Holstein, presided by Wilhelm Hartwig Beseler. This was an introduction to the civil war, and almost immediate German–Prussian intervention into it.⁷⁹⁶

Imperial ministry of the foreign affairs worried for the future of Denmark since the first news about the king’s constitutional rescript. Danish envoy in Saint-Petersburg, count Plessen, however, sought to calm down the minister and the emperor, insisting that the changes in the constitution would serve to tighten the bonds between different parts of the Danish monarchy, the intention appreciated by the Russian government.⁷⁹⁷ When the things started to go afoul towards late March, Nesselrode ordered Ungern-Sternberg to abstain from any initiative and to take *ad referendum* any offers and requests made by the Danish government. At the end of March, the imperial government took a waiting stance, closely monitoring the flow of events while restricting its assistance only to the ‘moral’ support, as the dangers loomed in the neighborhood.⁷⁹⁸

⁷⁹⁵ Erling Ladewig Petersen, “Martsministeriets Fredsbasisforhandlinger,” *Historisk Tidsskrift* 11, no. 4 (1953): 587-635, <https://tidsskrift.dk/historisktidsskrift/article/view/50405>.

⁷⁹⁶ Glenthøj, *1864 – Sønnen Af de Slagne*, 172–79.

⁷⁹⁷ Nesselrode – Ungern-Sternberg. 2 March 1848. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1848, d. 44, l. 81.

⁷⁹⁸ Nesselrode – Ungern-Sternberg. 25 March 1848. *Ibid*, l. 95.

The Russian administration and the emperor personally were more involved in the revolutionary processes that were deploying in Prussian province of Posen and Austrian province of Galicia, and Nicholas I was ready to intervene in the conflicts that happened in the vicinity.⁷⁹⁹ By the beginning of April, however, the emperor expressed his open disdain towards Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV who adopted the constitution and became ‘a doll’ in the hands of the ‘demagogs’.⁸⁰⁰ On April 9 / 21, he, however, wrote to his commander in Poland, later infamous among the liberal public for the suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, Ivan Fedorovich Paskevich, that ‘Danish episodes are shameful for Prussia’. He also noted that he could not provide his assistance at that point, if not for the joint demarche with England that remained neutral.⁸⁰¹ The ministry of the foreign affairs informed Danish representatives in a similar vein.⁸⁰² Even earlier, however, Nicholas ordered naval minister Menshikov to have two divisions ready to be sent to the foreign waters for a potential naval demonstration.⁸⁰³

Even though Nicholas I expressed his mistrust towards the new ministry in Denmark,⁸⁰⁴ the insurgent forces in Schleswig and Holstein, and especially the backing up of these activities by Prussia was an evil of another category. From the very beginning, even if not providing any assistance, Nicholas I perceived the uprising illegal, and he predictably sided with the Danish monarch.⁸⁰⁵ Reports were prepared in the cabinets of the ministry of foreign affairs that argued against any legality of the independence of Schleswig from Denmark. When Bunsen, Prussian

⁷⁹⁹ Oleg Ajrapetov, *Istorija vneshnej politiki Rossijskoj imperii 1801-1914: Vneshnjaja politika imperatora Nikolaja I: 1825-1855* (Moscow: Kuchkovo pole, 2017), 306-49.

⁸⁰⁰ Nicholas I – Paskevich, 15 / 27 March 1848. RGIA. F. 1018, op. 5, d. 316, l.1; Alexander Shherbatov, *General-Fel'dmarshal knjaz' Paskevich*, vol. 6 (S-Peterburg: Tip. R. Golike, 1899), 203–5.

⁸⁰¹ Nicholas I – Paskevich, 9 / 21 April 1848. RGIA. F. 1018, op. 5, d. 321, l. 2; Shherbatov, 6: 237; C. Paludan-Müller, “Udenrigsministeren Grev Knuths Fremstilling Af Danmarks Underhandling 1848 Indtil Vaabenstilstanden i Malmø.,” *Historisk Tidsskrift* 4, no. 5 (1875): 437, <https://tidsskrift.dk/historisktidsskrift/article/view/54259>.

⁸⁰² Hjalmar Haralds, *Sveriges utrikespolitik 1848, ett bidrag till belysning af danska frågans första skede*. (Uppsala: Akademiska bokhandeln, 1912), 24-25.

⁸⁰³ A.S. Menshikov’s diary. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 447-447ob.

⁸⁰⁴ A.S. Menshikov’s diary. Ibid, l. 449ob.

⁸⁰⁵ Haralds, *Sveriges utrikespolitik 1848*, 66–67.

envoy to London, presented his project that justified the Prussian intervention,⁸⁰⁶ Roman Osten-Sacken, Nesselrode's trustee, vigorously criticized his arguments.

The rebellion in the duchies, according to his report, was prepared by none other than 'terrorists' and 'revolutionary fanatics'. The addresses that were presented to the provisional government 'counted to nothing', since they were not handed to the legitimate sovereign, while addresses presented by the inhabitants of the Northern and Central Schleswig proved that the majority there preserved their loyalty.⁸⁰⁷ While the document was written later that year, it drew on the rhetoric that was characteristic for the attitude of the Ministry of the Foreign Affairs to the debacle in the duchies. The Danish government might have made many mistakes, but their rivals in the duchies did not enjoy any legitimacy in the eyes of the Russian administration at all, while Prussia, succumbed to the revolution and seeking aggrandizement, compromised their action even more.

By the beginning of April, Russian ambassador in Sweden informed Nesselrode that the public there explicitly sided with Denmark. While prior to that, the question of the representation obscured other issues, the tensions arising in the neighboring state gradually came to dominate the public debate.⁸⁰⁸ Already on April 5, Baron Ihre told Krüdener that the events in Denmark 'given the effervescence of the spirits, could become a source of much trouble and concern for Sweden.' Conservative Ihre reluctantly envisioned the chances that the public would affect the trajectory of the Swedish foreign policy, recognizing the dependency between the public spirit in two kingdoms.⁸⁰⁹ Indeed, later in April, Krüdener noted that the idea of the Scandinavian union – 'previously abandoned for years' – again came at the

⁸⁰⁶ Paludan-Müller, "Udenrigsministeren Grev Knuths Fremstilling Af Danmarks Underhandling 1848 Indtil Vaabenstilstanden i Malmø.," 482.

⁸⁰⁷ Osten-Sacken's review of Bunsen's note. RGADA. F. 1385, op. 1, d. 353, l. 68-78. I can hardly agree with Halicz's comments on Sacken's favorable relation to Holstein 'as a Baltic German': Emanuel Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864: A Chapter of Russian Policy towards the Scandinavian Countries* (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1990), 110.

⁸⁰⁸ Krüdener – Nesselrode, 24 March / 5 April. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1848, d. 167. l. 67.

⁸⁰⁹ Krüdener – Nesselrode, 24 March / 5 April. Ibid. 60-63.

forefront.⁸¹⁰ While covering the reform of the representation discussed in the democratic key, his following tirade also referred to the revival of Scandinavianism:

The impotence of the government against the invasion of the principles which seek to dominate the sovereign authority, Sweden, like so many other countries, is undermined by the rapid progress of doctrines, which throw the peoples to unknown destinies.⁸¹¹

In Denmark, the pressure of the so-called Scandinavian party was no less tangible for the Russian mission. The Russian empire clearly preferred the path of collective action supervised by the Great Powers – at least those who remained intact – rather than the regional consolidation between Denmark and Sweden. On March 29, Ungern-Sternberg informed Nesselrode that he was doing his best to ‘preserve the interests of Russia’ that appealed to the Vienna system. He, however, feared that the king could appeal directly to Stockholm bypassing other members, since the ‘Scandinavian party’ was lulling him with the hopes of the Calmar union revival and visions of the future Scandinavian kingdom with the capital in Copenhagen. Moreover, he was afraid – not without reasons – that the new minister of the foreign affairs, national-liberal sympathizer Knuth was not alien to this combination in case Denmark would lose its duchies.⁸¹² Indeed, Ungern-Sternberg foresaw the strategy of the Danish ministry.

On the same day, he wrote to Russian ambassador in London, Brunnow, to explicate the fact that the Danish king was close to engaging a military alliance with Sweden, thinking, perhaps, that this information could provoke England’s actions to assist Denmark as a Great Power in concert with the Russian empire. Knuth, however, sought to calm him down and insisted that the aid from the Swedish monarch, either material or moral, could not be elicited prior to the agreement of the two great maritime powers (England and Russia).⁸¹³ Even though

⁸¹⁰ Krüdener – Nesselrode, 5 / 17 April 1848. Ibid, l. 84.

⁸¹¹ Krüdener – Nesselrode, 5 / 17 April 1848. Ibid, l. 87ob.

⁸¹² Ungern-Sternberg – Nesselrode, 17 / 29 March 1848. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1848, d. 44, l. 232ob.

⁸¹³ Ungern-Sternberg – Brunnow., 17 / 29 March 1848. Ibid, l. 236ob.

Danish diplomacy indeed utilized the prospects of the Scandinavian consolidation in its appeals to the Swedish court,⁸¹⁴ they had to align it, at least in the appearance, with the Vienna principles or to conceal until the affair had already been made. But appearances and principles often intermingled in the diplomatic workings, especially when the hostilities were about to ensue.

Towards the end of April, the ambassador in Denmark again signaled the possibility of the Danish king appealing for the Swedish assistance. He was, moreover, sure that Sweden would respond positively on such a declaration.⁸¹⁵ While many hoped that Orla Lehmann's mission abroad to seek foreign assistance would yield results, the military situation, despite Tscherning's praised conscription reform, was pessimistic after the Danish defeat at the Battle of Schleswig.⁸¹⁶ This and other concerns prompted proactive measures taken by the Danish government. On April 22, when Prussia formally launched its military action, the ministry called to England and Russia for a joint demarche to protect Denmark in the unequal conflict against Prussia and other German states. The plea drew on the illegality of Prussian claims, its unlawful intervention into the affairs of Schleswig, and the duties of the Great Powers to protect the Danish kingdom.⁸¹⁷ Simultaneously, the Swedish cabinet expressed its readiness to intervene in case the Russian and English governments would take first steps in this direction.⁸¹⁸

In fact, as Krüdener wrote to Nesselrode, the joint demarche of the two Great Powers would help the king to 'avoid the embarrassment of siding with the sympathizers [of the Scandinavian union idea] which are manifested so loudly in [our] country in favor of the Danish

⁸¹⁴ Paludan-Müller, "Udenrigsministeren Grev Knuths Fremstilling.," 479.

⁸¹⁵ Ungern-Sternberg – Nesselrode. 7 / 19 April 1848. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1848, d. 44, l. 327.

⁸¹⁶ Ungern-Sternberg – Nesselrode. 23 March / 3 April 1848. Ibid, 247; Ungern-Sternberg – Nesselrode, 27 March / 8 April 1848. Ibid, l. 274; On the Battle of Schleswig which took place on 23 April 1848: Ungern-Sternberg – Nesselrode, 13 / 25 April 1848. Ibid, l. 389.

⁸¹⁷ *Den dansk-tydske Krig i Aarene 1848-50*, vol. 1:2 (Kjøbenhavn: Schultz, 1870), 667-673.

⁸¹⁸ Haralds, *Sveriges utrikespolitik 1848*, 80-93.

cause.⁸¹⁹ The king thus preferred to distance himself from the fleur of Scandinavianism, at least in the eyes of the Russian diplomatic mission, and rather to act under the aegis of established diplomatic protocols.⁸²⁰ Krüdener followed, stressing the fact that the public was anxious of the news of the conflict between Denmark and Germany:

The Scandinavian party, supported by the turbulent declamations of the periodical press, is more and more in favor of direct and active intervention; however, to date the government has taken no action that would indicate a definite intention in this regard. The rumor of a gathering of troops in Scandia had been circulating for some time, but this news was not confirmed.⁸²¹

Both England and Russia were still hesitant about their intervention, even though the senior secretary of the Russian mission in Copenhagen, Baron Ewers was sent to negotiate the armistice with the commander of Prussian troops, General Wrangel, however, to no avail.⁸²² In Sweden, on the contrary, the situation developed in favor of Denmark, especially after Frederik VII's letter was handed to Oscar I on April 29. On May 2, Oscar convened a secret committee to decide on the trajectory of the Swedish foreign policy with regards to Denmark.

While Sweden held to non-intervention when the Danish-Prussian affair touched only the fate of the duchies, the prospect of the territorial threats to Danish territory after some military defeats, changed the way the problem was perceived. King Oscar I opted for a proclamation stating that every threat to Jutland would be perceived as a threat to 'Norden's independence', alluding to a larger regional vision within the established international system and, simultaneously, capitalizing on the public delight about the Scandinavian assistance.

⁸¹⁹ Krüdener – Nesselrode, 17 / 29 April 1848. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, d. 167, l. 105.

⁸²⁰ Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige*, 172–73.

⁸²¹ Krüdener – Nesselrode, 17 / 29 April 1848. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, d. 167, l. 105.

⁸²² Otto Vaupel, *Kampen for sønderjylland* (Kjøbenhavn: Bianco Lunos, 1863), 217-227; *Den dansk-tydske Krig i Aarene 1848-50*, vol. 1:2, 647-8.

Military preparations included fifteen thousand troops ready to be sent to the Danish islands, four frigates and the rent of transport vehicles. The declaration was approved by the committee members and sent to Berlin on May 4.⁸²³

Krüdener, following the events attentively, notified Nesselrode the same day, that there was hardly any other way out of the situation, since the public agitated the government to take active measures to aid the neighboring state: ‘The only [public] issue now is that of rushing to the aid of the neighboring people, who are engaged in an unjust and unequal struggle. This feeling is so universal, it is so well shared by men of all conditions and of all opinions, that the King did not hesitate to take a decision in conformity with the desire of the Swedish nation.’⁸²⁴ Hence the Russian ministry was fully aware of the fact that it was the popular impulse directly related to pan-Scandinavian propaganda and the images of the Scandinavian consolidation that prompted the decision of the Swedish cabinet in favor of the assistance. Moreover, the diplomats also appreciated the power of the public press to shape the opinion and prescribe action for the government, another perilous sign of the year.⁸²⁵ And yet the Russian empire joined the ranks.

Upon the receipt of this declaration in Saint-Petersburg, another agent of the ‘Northern’ politics – Emperor Nicholas I – also opted for the change of his course with regards to Denmark. On April 27 / May 9, Nicholas convened with Menshikov. The emperor presented him the declaration of the Swedish king and said that he wanted to reply personally to it, and send the response with his son, Konstantin Nikolayevich. Menshikov was meant to accompany the Grand Duke. A day prior to that, the emperor added, the dispatch was sent to Berlin that warned Prussia of the consequences of rupture between the two governments in case the troops

⁸²³ Haralds, *Sveriges utrikespolitik 1848*, 104–5.

⁸²⁴ On public agitation see: Johnsen, “‘Vi hafva ifrån morgon till qväll varit ute och agiterat’”: Skandinavismen og Pressen 1848-1864’, 38-66; Krüdener – Nesselrode. 22 April / 4 May 1848. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, d. 167, l. 107-108.

⁸²⁵ Johnsen, 46–50.

would cross the border of Jutland, following closely the terms and rhetoric that the Swedish counterparts explicated.⁸²⁶ At that time, they did not know that Wrangel already invaded Jutland on May 2.⁸²⁷ Since that time onwards, the imperial government would closely collaborate with Sweden in all matters related to the Danish question. Although Russian intervention must have been equally prompted to avoid the alarming recourse of the Danish government to Scandinavian union plans in the critical situation, the empire paradoxically came to collaborate with the popular forces of the Nordic consolidation, if only apprehensively.

Orla Lehmann's previously mentioned mission to Berlin and London was exemplary with regards to this ambiguous Russian attitude towards Scandinavianism, that in the case of conflict might have become an associated force. Lehmann left for a diplomatic mission to Berlin and then London to negotiate with diplomats and search for allies in the late March, right after the new ministry had been established.⁸²⁸ Ungern-Sternberg immediately updated Meyendorff that Lehmann, whose 'dangerous principles' were well-known to the addressee, embarked on a diplomatic mission to Berlin.⁸²⁹ Nevertheless, Meyendorff, who at the beginning of the year alarmed Nesselrode about dangerous democratic and Scandinavianist doctrines, professed by Lehmann among others,⁸³⁰ at this point sought to adapt to the new combination.

He wrote to Nesselrode that both he in Berlin and Phillip Brunnow in London expressed their support to Danish diplomatic representatives, so that even in Copenhagen they could not be blamed for lukewarm attitude. He specifically added that even Orla Lehmann took a more plausible attitude, '[...] and with regards to Scandinavianism this can benefit us. It would better

⁸²⁶ A.S. Menshikov's diary. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 447ob-448.

⁸²⁷ Vaupel, *Kampen for sønderjylland*, 193-205.

⁸²⁸ Holger Hjelholt, "Orla Lehmanns Diplomatiske Mission Marts—April 1848 i Berlin og London," *Historisk Tidsskrift* 12, no. 1 (1966): 608-651, <https://tidsskrift.dk/historisktidsskrift/article/view/50656>.

⁸²⁹ Ungern-Sternberg – Meyendorff. 17 / 29 March 1848. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1848, d. 44, l. 241.

⁸³⁰ Meyendorff – Nesselrode, 16 / 28 January 1848 in Hoetzsch, ed., *Peter von Meyendorff*, vol. 2, 24–31.

turn against Germany than against Russia'.⁸³¹ Lehmann, in his turn, appreciated the attitude of the Russian representative in Berlin, and wrote in his memoirs that Meyendorff was much friendlier to him than even the Swedish diplomat.⁸³² If not allying itself with the popular forces of the Nordic consolidation, imperial agents at least sought to curb their anti-Russian stance and redirect their impulse against their common enemy.

The Russian-Swedish declarations presupposed not just words but also concrete actions. On May 10, Nicholas addressed Paskevich, informing him on the state of politics in Europe: 'The Prussian king, a blind tool of the party of the demagogues, wages an unjust war against Denmark. *Sweden and I* [my Italics – EE] had to declare that we cannot let that be and we would take [the war against Denmark] as *casus belli*'. The emperor mentioned the fact that the Swedish king was sending 15000 troops to Denmark, but he did not consider that would be enough to stop Prussia from invading Denmark, especially given the state of mind of the Prussian King Friedrich Wilhelm IV: 'Looks like the war is inevitable'. Thus, he ordered Paskevich to send one division to Lithuania: 'It is necessary that in case of war we could flood East Prussia so as not to let them wake up and gather [their forces].'⁸³³

The emperor expected that the general war was the most probable outcome of the Danish-German conflict, although he strived to avoid interfering into it at all costs. On May 11, Menshikov received an instruction on the course of the voyage with Konstantin Nikolayevich. The voyage itself was simultaneously meant as a naval demonstration supposed to 'sail menacingly along the Prussian shores'. The instruction mentioned that while the actions were not yet to be foreseen in case the war erupts, the crew of the two naval divisions should have collaborated most closely with their Swedish counterparts.⁸³⁴ The rapprochement between

⁸³¹ Meyendorff – Nesselrode, 28 April / 10 May 1848 in Hoetzsch, ed., *Peter von Meyendorff*, 2: 84–85.

⁸³² Lehmann, *Efterladte skrifter*, 1: 138–42.

⁸³³ Nicholas I – Paskevich. 28 April / 10 May 1848. RGIA. F. 1018, op. 5, d. 323, l. 1-2.

⁸³⁴ O plavanii 1 i 3 flotskih divizij u datskih i prusskih beregov v 1848 godu. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 4, d. 9, l. 5-6; See also: Evdokim Kvashin-Samarin, "Istoricheskaya spravka o dejstviyah rossijskogo flota v datskih vodah v 1848-50 godah," *Morskoj Sbornik* 362, no. 2 (1911): 89-104.

Russian and Sweden for the sake of assistance to Denmark paradoxically made both partners – implicitly or explicitly – divert from familiar or preferred lines of action, setting Russia into one boat with Scandinavianist forces and, conversely, making Oscar I act safely, avoiding any recourse to Scandinavianism in this collaboration.

Apart from drawing on the considerations of unjust war led by revolutionary Prussia, the later proactive policy of the Russian empire might have been prompted or assured by alarming information exchange from Russian representatives abroad. Thus, on May 10, Ungern-Sternberg dispatched the minister with his analysis of present complications. Both the ministry and the king were put under scrutinizing critique for reinforcing Danish nationalist claims. The diplomat, drawing on the recipient's knowledge of the Swedish assistance, however, painted it black. The assistance that Sweden promised to provide was too modest, the logistics of the landing unclear, and their participation in the operation costly. Moreover, the promised help, and the arrival of the two Swedish princes to Denmark revived the Scandinavian ideas:

It would not be surprising if this event brought about a closer union between the two kingdoms, perhaps even some decision concerning the succession to the throne of Denmark at the expense of the king's legal successors.⁸³⁵

He concluded that the Swedish assistance could not have any satisfactory results and would only lead to unnecessary bloodshed.

Ungern-Sternberg then asserted that the fate of Denmark was now 'in the hands of the Russian emperor, as well as the decision of the serious questions which relate to the independence and integrity of this monarchy.'⁸³⁶ While the emperor approved and sided with

⁸³⁵ Ungern-Sternberg – Nesselrode, 28 April / 10 May. AVPRI. F. 133. Op. 469. G. 1848. D. 44. L. 410ob. Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme og politiske realiteter*, 215.

⁸³⁶ Ungern-Sternberg – Nesselrode. 28 April / 10 May. AVPRI. F. 133. op. 469, g. 1848, d. 44, l. 411.

the Swedish king – a fact yet unknown to Ungern-Sternberg at that point – further proactive activities of the Russian administration might have as well related to the suppression of pan-Scandinavian reification and of the dynastic union – a new danger on their radars – as well.⁸³⁷ While this featured rather as a side-effect of the intervention, the empire asserted its preference for the preservation of the equilibrium in the North in its own interpretation and for Vienna order foundation behind collective actions. The imperial foreign policy could side with Scandinavianism in the form of public sympathy against Prussia, but the reification and even instrumental political steps in the direction of the Scandinavian union had to be prevented.⁸³⁸

On May 17, two days prior to the departure of the Russian mission with Konstantin Nikolayevich, Menshikov asked the emperor whether Russian forces – in case Sweden agreed to use their ships – should assist them during the landing if Prussia attacked and the empire was still in the state of peace with this kingdom. The emperor, however, commanded to avoid any combat against Prussia until there was ‘a rupture’ with its government. The troops, in case Sweden would agree, were to be delivered to Fyn and Zealand, that were not in the direct proximity to the battlefield.⁸³⁹ On May 19, the squadron left for Stockholm. On the other shore of the sea, Konstantin’s departure was discussed in the newspapers as a mission to ‘protect the Russian trade’ in the circumstances of war. Some newspapers even expected the emperor himself would arrive, as he did ten years ago.⁸⁴⁰

The delegation arrived on May 22. Prior to the voyage, Grand Duke Konstantin expressed his disdain against the Prussian government who first sided with ‘rioters and traitors’, meaning the provisional government in Schleswig-Holstein, and now threatened Denmark: his position – there is indeed little surprise – was fully aligned with that of the

⁸³⁷ Morten Nordhagen Ottosen, “Den dynastiske skandinavismens grobunn og grenser, ca. 1845-1870,” in *Skandinavismen: Vision og virkning*, 255–83; Johnsen, ““Vi hafva ifrån morgon till qväll varit ute och agiterat”: Skandinavismen og Pressen 1848-1864”, 41–42.

⁸³⁸ Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 98.

⁸³⁹ A.S. Menshikov’s diary. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 448-48ob.

⁸⁴⁰ *Korrespondenten*, 23.05.1848.

imperial government and his father. The delegation was met by ‘the thousands of people’ shouting delightfully at the harbor, ‘which was a seldom occasion here’, as the Grand Duke noted.⁸⁴¹ Menshikov also did not fail to appreciate the amelioration of the ‘public spirit’ towards the imperial delegation, that was usually hostile towards Russia. King Oscar I, in fact, informed him that he provided material benefits to the leaders of the opposition to milden the rhetoric and maintain tranquility.⁸⁴² Konstantin was warmly welcomed at the court, and he had a chance to hand Nicholas’ letter to Oscar I.

While the contents of this letter is unknown, it must have expressed the emperor’s appreciation for the course of the Swedish politics, since Oscar I told Konstantin: ‘Now we, the Northern states must act in a tight alliance to finally oppose this unbelievable pour of the revolution, and now, moreover, this stupid German spirit which selected poor Denmark as its prey.’⁸⁴³ Oscar’s reading of the political geography in this conversation clearly alluded to the fact that Russia stood on equal footing among ‘the Northern states’, thus converting pan-Scandinavian impulse in Sweden into Vienna order vision of the region. Konstantin characterized this remark as ‘the reiteration of speeches that I often heard at home’, meaning the similarity of the positions expressed by the emperor and by the king.⁸⁴⁴ But the Grand Duke was not even the most important member of the expedition. In fact, Menshikov was.

While Menshikov’s presence was almost totally obscured by Konstantin’s one in the public press, it was the naval minister who negotiated with the king on the potential plan of action in case of war. On May 24, Menshikov had a ‘3-hour audience with the king’, the

⁸⁴¹ Konstantin Nikolaevich’s diary. GARF. F. 722, op. 1, d. 89. l. 48; *Jönköpings Tidning*, 27.05.1848.

⁸⁴² Menshikov – Nesselrode. RGADA, F. 11, op.1, d. 1201, l. 11-12: ‘il se flatter de pouvoir maintenir cette tranquillite par des causerie avec les chefs des parties et avec les crieurs des Clubs au societes reformiste. Il a envoye dernièrement a celle de la capital 500 Thalers afin qu’elle peut se procurer un meilleur local pour tenir ses seances [...]’.

This is a long-debated point in the historiography whether Oscar consciously utilized the power of the public opinion in 1848, so I deem it necessary to provide the excerpt. For the overview see: Johnsen, “‘Vi hafva ifrån morgon till qväll varit ute och agiterat’: Skandinavismen og Pressen 1848-1864”, 46–47.

⁸⁴³ Konstantin Nikolaevich’s diary. GARF. F. 722, op. 1, d. 89, l. 48-49.

⁸⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 1.49ob-50; Konstantin Nikolaevich – Nicholas I. Not dated. GARF. F. 722, op. 1, d. 671, l. 39.

contents of which he communicated to Nesselrode.⁸⁴⁵ The crux of the conversation was the eventuality of the undertaking of common operation to assist Denmark in case their joint demarche did not produce desirable results. The discussion focused on the defense of Fyn, and Oscar I even articulated that the number of troops provided by Sweden could be doubled in case the circumstances deteriorated. Menshikov considered this number of troops substantial for the defense of the island, but their dislocation in no way blocked Prussia from moving forward into Jutland. Oscar I proposed as well to dislodge eight thousand troops to the island of Als that was the last remaining Danish military stronghold in the vicinity of Jutland. He added that if Denmark would send troops to Als, and ‘3000 *Scandinavian peasants* [my italics – EE] of that island were armed’, there were high chances to make Prussian army leave Jutland.⁸⁴⁶

The emperor’s offer of the Russian ships for the Swedish troops was unnecessary at this point, as Denmark provided them according to the treaty with Sweden. In case of war, however, the joint naval operations would imply the blockade of the Prussian ports in the Baltics. Menshikov’s presence in the capacity of the naval minister was thus essential for the collaboration between Sweden and Russia regarding the defense of Denmark. It is conspicuous that both saw the joint participation in the warfare as highly probable at that point. Konstantin Nikolayevich shared these thoughts, and while Nicholas hoped for the best, his son specifically drew his attention toward the issues of the readiness of the Swedish forces and their spirit. While he attested their fervent desire to assist their ‘brothers-Danes’ in the ensuing fight, he noted simultaneously that their number was insufficient, hinting, perhaps, that the Russian assistance would become crucial.⁸⁴⁷

⁸⁴⁵ Menshikov – Nesselrode. 22 May / 2 June 1848. RGADA. F. 11, op. 1, d. 1201, l. 14–15; A.S. Menshikov’s diary. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 450-452.

⁸⁴⁶ Menshikov – Nesselrode. 22 May / 2 June 1848. RGADA. F. 11, op. 1, d. 1201, l. 14–15.

These considerations sounded strikingly similar to what Oscar I would propose to Denmark in June 1848: Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige*, 173.

⁸⁴⁷ Konstantin Nikolaevich – Nicholas I. Not dated. GARF. F. 722, op. 1, d. 671, l. 39.

Navigating the seas of the diplomatic correspondence, regional collaboration, and preparations for warfare, he added that ‘the Scandinavian spirit has dimmed, and nothing is heard about it’, perhaps, seeking to calm the attention of the emperor in this regard.⁸⁴⁸ As did the Russian diplomats in 1848, Konstantin seemed to differentiate between the public spirit supportive towards Denmark and the concrete idea of the Scandinavia unification. While the primary surfaced as encouragement, the latter appeared as a dangerous idea better to be avoided. It is clear, however, given Meyendorff’s mention and Konstantin Nikolayevich’s specific attention that Scandinavianism and the idea of Scandinavian union surfaced as significant nodes in courtly and cabinet politics, with its gravitation appreciated by the diplomats, imperial agents, and the emperor himself. Konstantin’s words might have sounded as justification of the Russian participation, devoid of any unnecessary allusions to the union plans.

The next destination of the Russian delegation was Copenhagen. The arrival of Konstantin, together with Swedish Prince Oscar was awaited in Copenhagen and by some newspapers was treated as a gesture ‘to our advantage’ by the governments that they represented. The Danish population, according to the text of a provincial newspaper, was prepared to answer accordingly to it.⁸⁴⁹ The arrival of the two princes was greeted with masses of people awaiting and cheering them at the harbor, and their later visit to the theater produced a delightful scene among the city dwellers. While highest guests resided in the Frederiksborg Castle, several miles from Copenhagen, newspapers rumored that the Russian fleet had already begun the blockade of the Prussian ports – which was incorrect – but it did hint into the public expectations of the imperial involvement.⁸⁵⁰

⁸⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁴⁹ *Aalborg Stiftstidende og Adresse-Avis*, 29.05.1848.

⁸⁵⁰ *Almuevennen*, 2.06.1848.

Menshikov's engagement with the Danish court was less active and, unfortunately, less documented.⁸⁵¹ Some notes of his diary, however, characterized his attitude towards the new ministry. When members of the government and military command gathered in a parade uniform at the Frederiksborg castle, the appearance of some members fell out. New ministers who entered the cabinet 'by nationality' (*po narodnosti*) – presumably meaning their nationalist agitation and popularity gained by those means – were wearing tailcoats: 'Orla Lehmann, Monrad, and Hvidt, most abominable figures'.⁸⁵² It was not only the 'chimera of nationality' – as some members of the ministry of the foreign affairs characterized the nationalist agitation across Europe – but also middle-class politicians 'wearing tailcoats' that drew the attention of the imperial agents. Typically, the representatives of well-off aristocratic families Russian diplomats, and especially Prince Alexander Menshikov, in 1848 faced the necessity to negotiate with the offspring of diverse classes, whose minds were, in their eyes, occupied with fantastic ideas in democratic, liberal, communist, or pan-Scandinavian spirit.⁸⁵³

The Russian squadron then went to the Isle of Man and cruised between Man and Rügen. On June 12, Menshikov received the news about the elaborated basics of the armistice between Denmark and Sweden while on the roadstead.⁸⁵⁴ He got to know that Danish General Oxholm had headed to Russia to get them approved by the emperor, and the squadron set on the course back to Saint-Petersburg. A couple of weeks before, when the delegation only reached Copenhagen, commander of Prussian troops Wrangel commanded to leave Jutland on May 25. While the reasons must have related to the lack of provision and reinforcements, in Denmark it was commonly believed that the Russian emperor's note and the arrival of his son

⁸⁵¹ A.S. Menshikov's diary. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 449ob-50.

⁸⁵² Ibid. Given that he revised the Danish newspapers coming to Finland, he must have recognized at least Monrad and Lehmann who often wrote their articles for *Fædrelandet*. Before Menshikov left for Sweden, Wulffert, certainly aware of his mission, wrote to him about Orla Lehmann's letter to Hamburg about plausibility of the Russian and English assistance: Wulffert – Menshikov, 24 April / 4 May. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 3, d. 71, l. 32-33.

⁸⁵³ Bertel Nygaard, "Anti-Politics," 419–42, <https://doi.org/10.1080/03468755.2011.596652>.

⁸⁵⁴ Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige*, 174–79; Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme og politiske realiteter*, 215–19.

changed the flow of the tide. Moreover, Nicholas I was sure that it was indeed a result of his actions.⁸⁵⁵ The Danish counterattack at Nybøl on May 28, however, outraged the emperor who considered that Wrangel's retreat paved the way for diplomatic negotiations and armistice while Denmark compromised his and Swedish mediation.⁸⁵⁶ Nesselrode, following this events, as he described his actions to his trusted colleague Meyendorff, urged Russian representative in Copenhagen to 'pour some water on the Scandinavian fire' – referring to the new agitation campaign between Denmark and Sweden – and commended them to hold to the principles of negotiation.⁸⁵⁷

In July, however, it was the German side, and namely Wrangel who denied the armistice and expressed willingness to continue the warfare, disobeying the king's order and claiming his loyalty to the Frankfurt Parliament. This made the emperor address the Prussian king with the demand to 'command the generals loyal to their oath' to bring the forces back, otherwise he would consider it a signal for war with Russia.⁸⁵⁸ For Nicholas I, these nesting and contradicting new centers of decision-making in Germany and Prussia represented turmoil and the lack of authority enjoyed by the king. The situation in Prussia, however, was changing in favor of conservative restoration, and hence towards partial satisfaction of Russia. Prussian king was as well painfully hurt by the news of Wrangel's behavior. As Friedrich Wilhelm IV confessed, he was waiting for the army forces to return from Holstein to 'lead them to Berlin and cancel the anarchy'.⁸⁵⁹ Towards the end of August, Nicholas confessed to Paskevich that

⁸⁵⁵ Vaupel, *Kampen for sønderjylland*, 236-237; *Den dansk-tydske Krig i Aarene 1848-50*, vol. 1:2, 707-708; Nicholas I – Paskevich. 29 May / 10 June 1848. RGIA, F. 1018, op. 1, d. 325, l. 1-1ob.

⁸⁵⁶ Ibid, l. 1-1ob; Report of the ministry for year 1848. AVPRI. F. 137, op. 475, g. 1848, d. 22, l; Shherbatov, *General-Fel'dmarshal knjaz' Paskevich*, 6: 225; A.S. Menshikov's diary. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 451ob. Oxholm complained to Menshikov that Nicholas I was not sympathetic to the activities of Denmark, most probably implying the counterattack.

⁸⁵⁷ Nesselrode – Meyendorff, 5 June 1848 in *Lettres et Papiers du Chancelier Comte de Nesselrode, 1760–1850, extraits de ses Archives, publiés et annotés, avec une introduction*, ed. Anatole Nesselrode, vol. 9. (Paris: A. Lahure, n.d.), 106–109; Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige*, 168–72; Johnsen, “‘Vi hafva ifrån morgon till qväll varit ute och agiterat’”, 63–66; Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme og politiske realiteter*, 216–17.

⁸⁵⁸ Nicholas I – Paskevich, 12 / 24 July 1848. RGIA, F. 1018, op. 1, d. 331, l. 1-2.

⁸⁵⁹ Ibid.

he was ready to invade Prussia in case they would not leave Denmark: ‘I do not want it at all! But we can’t tolerate it for too long.’⁸⁶⁰

On August 26, 1848, the armistice was finally signed between Danish and Prussian representatives in Swedish Malmö, and in September it was ratified by the National Assembly in Frankfurt. The reverse march of the troops, however, caused a conflict between Prussian authorities – whose ministry of foreign affairs acted on its own – and Frankfurt where the parliament resided.⁸⁶¹ This ratification indeed signified a breach between belligerent forces that demanded the continuation of war and centralist politicians who held to more pragmatic positions. The news of the ratification of the armistice produced a popular uproar and irritation with the Assembly’s decision. The streets of Frankfurt came into movement, barricades were erected, and two conservative members of the Assembly were lynched before the rebellion was suppressed by artillery and infantry.⁸⁶² This event displayed the loss of popular trust towards the National Assembly and the weakness of democratic organization, crushed by Wrangel’s forces in Berlin. Similar conservative tendencies in France and the Austrian Empire gradually put an end to the revolutionary breakthrough in Europe.⁸⁶³ The memory of the revolution, however, persisted, and new regimes across the continent rather came as a new fragile compromise.⁸⁶⁴

The war between Denmark and rebellious duchies backed up by Prussia continued well into 1849 when again under the Russian ultimatum the armistice was negotiated and approved in July. Until late June 1850, Nicholas, however, was ready to invade Prussia, since Friedrich Wilhelm IV seemed a very unreliable and ambiguous ruler for him, and his policy might have

⁸⁶⁰ Nicholas I – Paskevich. 17 / 29 August 1848 in: Shherbatov, *General-Fel'dmarshal knjaz' Paskevich*, 6:247.

⁸⁶¹ Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851*, 229–31; Strandmann and Evans, *The Revolutions in Europe, 1848-1849*, 120.

⁸⁶² Siemann, *The German Revolution of 1848-49*, 153–65.

⁸⁶³ John Breuilly, *Austria, Prussia and The Making of Germany: 1806-1871* (London: Routledge, 2014), 102–9.

⁸⁶⁴ Pieter M. Judson, *Exclusive Revolutionaries: Liberal Politics, Social Experience, and National Identity in the Austrian Empire, 1848-1914* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 69–93; Breuilly, *Austria, Prussia and The Making of Germany*, 102–9; Christopher Clark, “After 1848: The European Revolution in Government,” *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 22 (2012): 171–97.

intensified conflict between Denmark and Prussia but as well as spark a new one between Prussia and Austria, in which the Russian empire sided with the latter. Russian squadron again roamed the sea along the Prussian shores, and the emperor considered any attack against it rightful *casus belli*.⁸⁶⁵ Towards July the news about peace treaty between Denmark and Russia reached Saint-Petersburg: ‘This happy event removed one of the main reasons that could have drawn us into the war. I may soon be able to begin to bring part of the army to a peaceful footing.’⁸⁶⁶

The history of the Danish-Prussian conflict and the Russian intervention into it in 1848-51, until the second London protocol was signed in 1852, was more intricate than the one usually reproduced about chivalrous imperial suppression of revolutionary forces.⁸⁶⁷ While the idealistic scenario indeed envisioned total restoration, in 1848 the Russian empire rather had to navigate different ‘revolutionary’ trajectories and make use of them for its own good. The March Ministry in Denmark was no less radical in the eyes of the diplomatic corps, than similar cabinets in Germany, the idea of Scandinavianism no less ‘fantastic’ than the one of the united Germany. Of course, the empire explicitly sided only with the legal precedent of the integrity of the ancient monarchy of Denmark, but, in some respects consciously, it had to collaborate with the new ministry and, partly, with the dogmatics that some of its members professed. Moreover, since it openly came to collaborate with Sweden, where – and it was no secret for the imperial agents – the public press heated the Scandinavian sympathies of its inhabitants and prompted the government to take proactive steps, the empire accidentally figured as an ally of the Scandinavian rapprochement.

⁸⁶⁵ Nicholas I – Paskevich, 9 March 1850. RGIA. F. 1018, op. 1, d. 408, l. 1-1ob; Nicholas I – Paskevich, 12 June 1850. RGIA. F. 1018, op. 1, d. 412, l. 1-1ob. Bo Vernersson Lundqvist, *Sverige och den slesvig-holsteinska frågan 1849-50* (Upsala: Appelberg, 1934), 304.

⁸⁶⁶ Nicholas I – Paskevich, 23 June 1850. RGIA. F. 1018, op. 1, d. 413, l. 1.

⁸⁶⁷ David Saunders, “A Pyrrhic Victory: The Russian Empire in 1848,” in *The Revolutions in Europe, 1848–1849* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 135-56, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199249978.003.0007>; Alexander Nifontov, *Rossija v 1848 godu* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe uchebno-pedagogicheskoe izd-vo, 1949), 214–309; More nuanced in: Oleg Ajrapetov, *Istorija vneshnej politiki Rossijskoj imperii 1801-1914: Vneshnjaja politika imperatora Nikolaja I: 1825-1855* (Moscow: Kuchkovo pole, 2017), 306-49.

Although the Scandinavian union figured as a combination that the empire sought to prevent from reification, it paradoxically demanded its rapprochement with Denmark, led by the new half-pro-Scandinavian ministry, and Sweden, where the assistance campaign was advocated vigorously by Scandinavianist propagandists. Scandinavian union came to be, in the eyes of the Russian administration, a potential unfortunate result of the Danish defeat or Danish isolated collaboration with Sweden on a regional scale. Hence Russian intervention aimed both to prevent Denmark from corroding nationalist claims and reframe the joined assistance as a Vienna order endeavor.

Public reactions in Scandinavia, however, relativized these one-sided visions. Konstantin Nikolayevich was welcomed in Stockholm as a bearer of the imperial assistance, and in Copenhagen, together with Prince Oscar, as a potential military ally of Denmark. It was not only Swedish, but joint Russian-Swedish squadron greeted by salutes that sailed to Copenhagen with two young princes onboard. When in several weeks the inhabitants of Copenhagen welcomed the Swedish troops arriving to assist Denmark in the war, weren't those greeting same people guided by same sympathies and expectations? Would they have changed their attitude if Russian ships carried the Swedish battalion, which could easily happen? For a moment, Russian assistance and Scandinavianist impulses, broadly interpreted, were tactically complimentary under the circumstances of war.

Indeed, many pan-Scandinavian ideologists, including Orla Lehmann, foresaw Russian full-fledged military intervention as desirable, overcoming early-bred panic of expected Danish/Scandinavian liberal hostilities against the conservative empire.⁸⁶⁸ Facing the war, many of them had to abandon their doctrinal opposition against Russia in favor of potential

⁸⁶⁸ Morten Nordhagen Ottosen, "Windows of Opportunity and the Political Anatomy of Scandinavianism, 1848–1858," in *Nordic Experiences in Pan-Nationalisms* (London: Routledge, 2023), 40-42. Students in Upsala were afraid about the threat 'from the East' appealing to the king for a military training: *Berättelse om Uppsala-studenternas skandinaviska fest: den 6 April 1848* (Upsala: Wahlström, 1848), 4–5; Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 343.

collaboration with its huge army and fleet.⁸⁶⁹ When Nicholas I and Oscar I pushed Danish ministry towards armistice and then peace negotiations that did not satisfy nationalist claims and Scandinavianist visions, and especially when the emperor threatened Denmark when the latter renewed the hostilities after Wrangel had left Jutland, both monarchical figures were compromised in the eyes of the nationalist press. There was too much of Vienna and too little of Scandinavia in the rhetoric and practice of Russian and Swedish cabinets, at least at that point.

Some scholars argue, however, that the Russian cabinet diverted Sweden from entering the war that could have built the united Scandinavia.⁸⁷⁰ Indeed, for the Russian emperor, Oscar I presented himself as an ardent follower of the Vienna establishment, while for the Swedish, Danish, and Norwegian public he, even if for a moment, was fashioned as a supporter of Scandinavianism and a potential dynastic unification figure. Whereas the imperial foreign ministry framed its participation in the war as a full-hearted agreement with all Swedish measures rather following the lead, even the presence of Russia in this duo must have averted the Swedish king and cabinet from pursuing risky trails. The ostensible Russian influence towards conservative peace at all costs might have prompted public silencing of the collaboration between Russia and Sweden in Denmark at the beginning of the conflict. The suppression of the Hungarian revolutionary troops by the imperial army fueled to this and led to final disenfranchisement of Scandinavian liberals with Russian politics.⁸⁷¹

In the overview of the imperial foreign policy in 1848, prepared by the cabinets of the ministry in March 1849, the year figured as one of the most dramatic in the history of Europe:

⁸⁶⁹ Knuth's politics and Orla Lehmann's mission are good testaments for this: Hjelholt, "Orla Lehmanns Diplomatiske Mission Marts—April 1848 i Berlin Og London"; Paludan-Müller, "Udenrigsministeren Grev Knuths Fremstilling Af Danmarks Underhandlinger 1848 Indtil Vaabenstilstanden i Malmø," 464-66.

⁸⁷⁰ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 357–63; Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige*, 172–79; Becker-Christensen, *Skandinaviske drømme og politiske realiteter*, 218–30.

⁸⁷¹ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 363; Emil von Qvanten's later expose of 1848: Emil von Qvanten, *Danska frågan*, SLSA 933, l. 23-26, 188.

The history of peoples, or at least contemporary history, offers few examples of a year so disastrous, so fruitful in ruins, as the one about which I am going to have the honor to report to Your Majesty.⁸⁷²

Among the principal reasons that instigated such outcomes, the report mentioned ‘democratic institutions’ and ‘the irate idea of reconstructing public law on the novel principle of race, language, and nationality.’⁸⁷³ Indeed, both liberal nationalists in Copenhagen and ‘separatists’ in the duchies were blamed in attempting to dismember the Danish monarchy. The narrative of the Russian assistance to Denmark followed the timeline of the dispatches, strongly highlighting the collaboration with Sweden: ‘Never since the memorable years of 1812 and 1813, have Russian relations with Sweden been so intimate and frequent as after the events of February and March 1848.’⁸⁷⁴

The ideas of the Scandinavian consolidation as drivers behind the assistance were expectedly downplayed in the report. The reasons for the imperial intervention, as it asserted, rested on the need to preserve the equilibrium in the North. Moreover, the foreign ministry could not allow Denmark ‘to follow the orbit of hostile foreign policy with regards to Russia’, perhaps echoing Ungern-Sternberg’s dispatch on the Danish turn towards pan-Scandinavian policies. The visions of the unrealized dynastic union between Sweden and Denmark also found their way into the report, being totally negated as a prerequisite for the Swedish and imperial assistance:

The motives which induced the Imperial cabinet and that of Stockholm to intervene in his favor, take their source not in dynastic interests, for *Sweden has none in the affair of the Duchies* [my italics – EE], nor even in acts of guaranties because there is none

⁸⁷² Report of the ministry for year 1848, 23 April / 5 May 1849. AVPRI. F. 137, op. 475, g. 1848, d. 22, l. 4-5.

⁸⁷³ Ibid, l. 5.

⁸⁷⁴ Report of the ministry for year 1848, 23 April / 5 May 1749. AVPRI. F. 137, op. 475, g. 1848, d. 22, l. 160.

on the side of Sweden, but in the political considerations of a higher order, considerations which are common to the two courts of Petersburg and Stockholm.⁸⁷⁵

The report cast the common assistance campaign as originated from the principles of the Vienna order and larger European balance, than as from regional impulses for consolidation or dynastic pursuits.

Framing the assistance as a part of the maintenance of the European order on the part of Russian and Sweden, the report briefly mentioned Prussian minister Canitz's dispatch that blamed Scandinavianism for heating up tensions against the German element when Sweden announced its assistance to Denmark.⁸⁷⁶ Russian foreign ministry, however, sided with the reply of the Swedish minister Ihre who asserted that the ideas of the German nationalism propagated aggression there, while pan-Scandinavian ideas were long suppressed by the manifest of 1837 that asserted conservative trajectory of the Swedish foreign policy.⁸⁷⁷ Indeed, the report did everything to distance the Russian empire from the popular impulse of Scandinavian consolidation. Imperial practices on the ground, as I sought to demonstrate, were more ambiguous and Meyendorff's claim that 'Scandinavianism would better turn against Germany' was shared by many agents in the field.

The Russian foreign policy and Scandinavianism-backed public campaign in Denmark and Sweden drew on different foundations. While the Russian cabinet in all accounts favored post-Napoleonic system of conflict-resolution via collective action of the Great Powers,⁸⁷⁸ significantly corroded by the march of the revolution in France and Prussia, Scandinavianism

⁸⁷⁵ Ibid, l. 152.

⁸⁷⁶ Ibid, l. 163.

⁸⁷⁷ Haralds, *Sveriges utrikespolitik 1848*, 85; Report of the ministry for year 1848, 23 April / 5 May 1849. AVPRI. F. 137, op. 475, g. 1848, d. 22, l. 165.

⁸⁷⁸ Schulz, *Normen und Praxis*, 201-251; Matthias Schulz, "A Balancing Act: Domestic Pressures and International Systemic Constraints in the Foreign Policies of the Great Powers, 1848-1851," *German History* 21, no. 3 (July 1, 2003): 319-46, <https://doi.org/10.1191/0266355403gh287oa>.

imagined the Nordic kingdoms as self-sustained political, military, and economic power. While the Russian ministry considered Denmark a significant piece in the mosaic of power balance in Europe, Scandinavian propagandist pictured it as too small and destined to die in the struggle for survival without consolidation with Sweden-Norway. Their rigidity, however, should not be overstressed. There was a potential for their overlap, singularity, and partial mutual understanding.⁸⁷⁹

4.5. Reactions on the Danish crisis in Finland and Russia

In 1848, following the news of the revolution in France, the censorship in Russia and Finland became more restricted. Censorship committees were established in Saint-Petersburg that functioned independently of the Ministry of Education, import of materials was limited, and post-directorate in Finland looked with caution at the arriving journals, banning even slightly suspicious materials.⁸⁸⁰ To hasten the import of materials, that were usually first sent to governor-general, and thus to prevent the possible bitterness of the Finlandish educated public, Menshikov instructed Wulfert to allow all materials that ‘contained news about contemporary facts’ and did not encompass any references to the imperial family and dynasty or accusations against personalities of the empire and Finland. Governor-general should have been involved only in case the newspapers contained such accusations or ‘general discussions in the revolutionary spirit’.⁸⁸¹

The reaction of the imperial authorities in Finland to the events of 1848 was the tightening of censorship and later introduction of stricter punishment for student misconduct, the permission to create societies only with the highest approval, and an increase in the staff of

⁸⁷⁹ For another example of collaboration between two completely different political systems of Russian and the US, see: Ivan Kurilla, *Zaokeanskije partnery: Amerika i Rossiya v 1830 - 1850-e gody* (Volgograd: Volgogradsk, 2005).

⁸⁸⁰ See communication between Menshikov and Wulfert in 1848 in KA. KKK, Dd 3, N. 664-668.

⁸⁸¹ Menshikov – Wulfert, 6 / 18 April 1848. Ibid, N. 669.

the Helsingfors police. From that point onwards, governor-general decided the fate of new periodicals and even typographies.⁸⁸² Menshikov's position as influential agent in Saint-Petersburg and local administrator, his participation in the secret imperial censorship committee – by which powers he reprimanded the editors for 'liberal and communist articles' – played a significant role in his policy regarding relations between Finland and Europe in 1848.⁸⁸³ In his view, as he confessed to Grand Duke Alexander, the work (*rabota*) of liberalism was making great progress in the empire via newspapers,⁸⁸⁴ and Finland must not have been an exception.

The disciplinary measures were reinforced by more ingenious tactics. One of the most notable among them was government support for a Swedish-language newspaper, *Finlands Allmänna Tidning*, which began to be backed up with significant funds. Menshikov insisted that other newspapers could reprint political news only from this issue, in a way centralizing the information flow. The 'efficiency' of the newspaper was calculated from the decrease in the number of subscribers to foreign periodicals, most of which without doubt were Swedish. The report claimed that if in 1849 there were about 900 of them, then with the spread of the official newspaper by 1852 this number dropped to 411.⁸⁸⁵ The project of creating a 'loyal' newspaper that could orient the public opinion was long nurtured in the empire itself, although Nicholas I and other elites opposed the measure and preferred repression to guided enlightenment.⁸⁸⁶ The revolutionary reverberations, however, many of them reconsider the pool of appropriate measures.

⁸⁸² Lars-Folke Landgren, "Censuren i Finland 1809–1919," in *Filologi og sensur*, ed. by Hilde Bøe, Christian Janss, Stine Brenna Taugbøl (Oslo: Novus, 2015), 53–68. On censorship power of governor-general: GARF. F. R8091, op. 1, d. 1553, l. 4; On the opening of typographies: GARF. F. R8091, op. 1, d. 2112, l. 298, 244, 246, 388.

⁸⁸³ A.S. Menshikov's diary. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 445. See also: James T. Flynn, "Tuition and Social Class in the Russian Universities: S. S. Uvarov and 'Reaction' in the Russia of Nicholas I," *Slavic Review* 35, no. 2 (June 1976): 232–48, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2494590>.

⁸⁸⁴ A.S. Menshikov's diary. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 7, d. 134, l. 443.

⁸⁸⁵ Egorov, "Perevod So Shvedskogo Na 'Finljandskij'," 203–37, <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2021.0097>.

⁸⁸⁶ Shevchenko, *Konec odnogo velichija*, 114–16.

These repressive measures, however, did not shut down the imperial and Finnish public from the news from the continent, Denmark and Scandinavia included. As if reflecting the ambiguity of the Russian rapprochement with popular forces of Scandinavianism, *Sankt-Peterburgskaya Gazeta* published Jakov Grot's notes from his voyage across Sweden in 1847. One of the central pieces among them was devoted to students' life in Upsala. Waxing lyrical about the ancient building and famous personalities who worked there, Grot mentioned 'mutual students' visits conceived recently by the enthusiasm of Scandinavomania':

Hundreds of Swedish students were received in Copenhagen as brothers, were getting free food and accommodation there during several days, partly even products at the street sellers, were freely enjoying all the pleasures; in short, they were enjoying all the favors and honors as most dear guests. Similar reception was given to Copenhagen students who visited Upsala. Now both are planning a visit to their brothers in Christiania [...].⁸⁸⁷

Grot's tone was at least neutral towards these products of *Scandinavomania*. While these lines did not contain any references to political goals of pan-Scandinavian movement, Grot understood that the article might have appeared problematic for the censorship. When it took too long for it to be published, Grot complained to Pletnev that this postponement might have been resulted from the censorship mistreating his article 'on students'.⁸⁸⁸

Finland, due to its geographical proximity to the theater of warfare and cultural bonds with Sweden and Denmark, was more directly involved into the regional Scandinavian media circuits and discussions. This curiously pertained even to the administrative personnel, and Paul von Nicolay, who used to represent the Russian empire in Copenhagen, resided in his

⁸⁸⁷ *Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti*, 17.04.1848.

⁸⁸⁸ Grot – Pletnev, 30 April 1848 in *Perepiska Ja.K. Grot s P.A. Pletnevym*, 3:230.

Monrepos hereditary estate near Vyborg since 1847, occasionally helping Wulffert with the translation and censorship of the Danish press.⁸⁸⁹ The topic of the Swedish assistance to Denmark gained prominence in the Finlandish public sphere, and some papers openly sided with the Danish, and larger pan-Scandinavian struggles. While editorials only rarely touched the theme, the fact that most of newspapers published news from Denmark from national-liberal *Fædrelandet* implicitly put them on the corresponding side of the barricades. On May 10, *Helsingfors Tidningar*, edited by prominent writer Zacharias Topelius,⁸⁹⁰ published a front-page article ‘Danmraks nöd’ where precarious position of the Nordic kingdom was pictured. Scandinavianism-inspired help, however, according to the article, amounted only to symbolic gestures, including balls, toasts, money-gathering and other insignificant activities. Ridiculing this approach, the article hoped for the Russian and English intervention in the case, which could not allow Denmark to be mistreated.⁸⁹¹

At this point yet unaware of the Swedish proclamation for the assistance to Denmark, the newspaper changed its tone at the beginning of June, after being criticized by Swedish pro-Scandinavianist paper *Post- och Inrikes Tidning*. On June 7, in the ‘Replik’ section, the article appeared that clarified the newspaper’s renewed position. First, positively surprised by the fact that the Swedish newspaper replied to a small Finnish issue, the author praised friendly connections between the two countries. The sarcastic tone towards Scandinavianism, the primary focus of the critique, also changed:

We admit that as great as Scandinavianism is for its idea, so sincere it appeared in Denmark, so artificially planted, hollow and sometimes caricatured it looked in Sweden, if viewed from a distance. [...] It began with balls and concerts and newspaper

⁸⁸⁹ Menshikov – Wulffert, 20 August 1847. KA. KKK, Dd 3, N. 627. Paul Nicolay’s diary, 25 November 1847. OR RNB. F. 519, op.1, d. 140.

⁸⁹⁰ Zacharias Topelius, ‘Ögonkast. Danmarks nöd’ [Helsingfors Tidningar 10/5 1848], in *Publicistik*, ed. Pia Asp, Mats Dahlberg, Jens Grandell, Maren Jonasson, Eliel Kilpelä & Frida Wickholm (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2021), URL: <https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:sls-9367-1623251290>.

⁸⁹¹ *Helsingfors tidningar*, 10.05.1848.

articles; that was all well and good, but in the meantime Denmark bled to death. And then the *corpus delicti* was seen in H:fors Tidn., on May 10, when nothing was known here but the vague rumor of an army in Skåne. Since then, Sweden has taken action and has therefore protected itself, we will not say against the outcome of a small newspaper, but against all the many who thought approximately what the newspaper said.⁸⁹²

The Swedish assistance campaign, according to the narrative, stemmed from pan-Scandinavian idea. Moreover, the Finnish newspaper took a friendly side both with regards to the idea of the Scandinavian consolidation and to the Swedish assistance campaign. Even under the conditions of restricted public utterances, variegated and ambiguous voices, directly related to the concerns of the empire, found their way to the audience.

Corresponding news from the front, usually reprinted from Danish newspapers, and notes about ‘Scandinavian’ and ‘Scandinavianist’ activities, festivals, sympathies circulated unabated in other newspapers, including official *Finlands Allmänna Tidning*.⁸⁹³ In Finland, the Danish case and pan-Scandinavian impulse were regarded with sympathy and even with some degree of a shared affair. Conspicuously, the Russian participation in the Danish affair was only slightly present, and often surfaced in sections with the news from foreign states and reprints, rather than on front pages.⁸⁹⁴ It could potentially derive both from the common cultural expectations that Finland shared with Sweden and Denmark rather than with Russia, or from the unwillingness to comment on the Russian politics due to censorship attention to such materials, and from the usually secret workings of the imperial foreign ministry that often did not seek to share its activities with wider public.

⁸⁹² *Helsingfors tidningar*, 7.06.1848.

⁸⁹³ *Finlands allmänna tidning*, 16.05.1848; *Åbo underrättelser*, 16.05.1848.

⁸⁹⁴ *Finlands allmänna tidning*, 19.06.1848.

In 1848, Finnish-language newspapers also published news from Denmark and Scandinavian region. Often edited by Swedish-speaking intellectuals or coedited between them and rising Finnish-speaking scholars, Finnish-language newspapers cared as much about the flow of events in Denmark and in the region. Already on April 24, Finnish-language newspaper *Suometar* pictured brave Danes, mobilizing under the circumstances of threat to their nationality: in context of Finland such enunciation might have sounded as allusions to more pronounced tensions between Swedish-speaking nobility and Finnish peasantry. The article also paid attention to the civil assistance of the Swedish and Norwegian ‘nations of the Scandinavian bloc’ provided to Denmark via collected resources, weaponry, and volunteering. German authorities in Schleswig and Holstein, according to the paper, sought to suppress the voice of Danish-speaking peasants in the duchies.⁸⁹⁵

Later, when the news of the fallen Norwegian and Swedish volunteers came out, the newspaper reprinted the article covering this sorrowful event from *Fædrelandet* that also referenced mobilization for the righteous cause across Scandinavia.⁸⁹⁶ Following the war, *Suometar* usually relied on information from this national-liberal source, many numbers of which were simultaneously destroyed by the post-directorate because of its radical rhetoric.⁸⁹⁷ Even Snellman, who had already risen the flag of Fennomania against the prejudices of Swedish-speaking society and its influence within the duchy, spoke about Scandinavianism-inspired literary enthusiasm with sympathy.⁸⁹⁸ After all, the internal struggle in the duchy did not make everything Swedish and Scandinavian into potential enemy, at least not yet.

Not only did these publications contribute to the spread of information about pan-Scandinavian ideas and their positive influence upon literary and political consolidation of the

⁸⁹⁵ *Suometar*, 22.04.1848.

⁸⁹⁶ *Suometar*, 30.06.1848.

⁸⁹⁷ Wulfert – Menshikov. KA. KKK, Dd 3.

⁸⁹⁸ Johan V. Snellman, ”Svenska siljoetter,” in *Litteraturblad* n:o 1-4, (1848). Snellman’s Collection : <http://snellman.kootuttekset.fi/fi/dokumentit/litteraturblad-nro-1-2-3-ja-4-tammi-helmi-maalis-ja-huhtikuu-1848-ruotsalaisia-silhouetteja>.

region, but they also certainly created points for the politics of comparison. The Danish nationality and its brave fight for existence provided patterns of nation-building for the ‘awakening’ Finnish nation, strengthening the forms of communication between Scandinavianism and Finnish nationalism visible from 1843.⁸⁹⁹ Zacharias Topelius noted in the review of newspapers later in 1850 – that also happened to appear before governor-general’s eyes – ‘Among the Danish newspapers, we had the opportunity to take note of, with great talent, and often with great national fervor, written *Fædrelandet*’.⁹⁰⁰

August Schauman, who came to Copenhagen in 1851, partially driven by the Scandinavianist spirit as he put it in his memoirs,⁹⁰¹ and stayed there long enough to document his impressions from Denmark, its national character, and political institutions, wrote to his brother Bengt Otto: ‘It is calming to know, and I know it, of course, that you follow *Fædrelandet*. You learn there of the air, which I breathe.’⁹⁰² Danish people, in his view, were modest and polite but overall lacked enthusiasm. Political institutions for him, however, were of great interest, and he visited sessions of *Folketinget* – the lower chamber of the Danish bicameral Rigsdag established in 1849 – to witness the debates and to see famous politicians, many of whom took part in the drafting of the liberal June Constitution of 1849 widely considered a great achievement, especially in this year.⁹⁰³

A long bulk of the text was devoted to the characters of the new ministry (Moltke IV). However, men from 1848-9 were most extensively covered. His encounters with N.F.S. Grundtvig, Anton Tscherning, and, especially Orla Lehmann, whom Schauman must have recognized from newspaper excerpts, was a delightful scene for him. The great men in the

⁸⁹⁹ See Chapter 2.

⁹⁰⁰ KA. KKK, Ha: 21, 1. 31-31ob. In governor-general’s papers, ‘национальная раздражительность’.

⁹⁰¹ Grandell, *Från ett årtionde i Finland*, 121–25; Schauman, *Från sex årtionden i Finland*, 2: 46.

⁹⁰² A. Schauman – B.O. Schauman, 8 October 1851. Kansalliskirjasto, Coll 198.9. The new designs of the Danish monarchy were being discussed with new October ministry – by many regarded too Eider-leaning – taking posts around these days, and August added: ‘The claws of reaction, already strained, would be cut’. On the events, see: Neergaard, *Under Junigrundloven*, 1: 559–61.

⁹⁰³ Bregnsbo and Jensen, *The Rise and Fall of the Danish Empire*, 183.

workings of fresh political institution under the aegis of the constitutional monarchy impressed the young traveler.⁹⁰⁴ This pleasant meeting also demonstrated relatively high degree of knowledge that Finlandish subjects possessed in the Danish affairs, probably prompted by the Prussian-Danish war and Danish-leaning coverage provided by the newspapers in Finland. Moreover, his impressions appeared in print in Finland, pointing to the broader interest in the affairs.⁹⁰⁵

In 1852, Schauman visited the traditional Nordic feast held each year on January 13 in Copenhagen.⁹⁰⁶ Enjoying the songs and toasts held for ‘Norden’, Schleswig, and Scandinavian university in the hall decorated with Nordic symbols, Schauman especially stressed a ‘good speech’ held by Carl Ploug on ‘Scandinavianism’s cousins, England and Finland’.⁹⁰⁷ Schauman family was, perhaps, a common phenomenon of Swedophile intellectuals caring for the Swedish heritage in Finland, and pan-Scandinavian ideas might have interested its younger offspring.⁹⁰⁸ August Schauman, apart from this short intervention that might have related to aesthetics as much as to politics, did not reference Scandinavian ideas in particular during his stay in Copenhagen. Partly, this might be explained by the withering dynamics of popular Scandinavian sympathies that considerably decreased already in 1849 and followed the trend later.⁹⁰⁹ Another explanation would, on the contrary, imply the banality, or ambience, of Scandinavianism, its constant background presence unworthy of mentioning or elaboration.⁹¹⁰

⁹⁰⁴ A. Schauman – B.O. Schauman. 18 October 1851. Kansalliskirjasto, Coll 198.9.

⁹⁰⁵ *Morgonbladet*, 19.01.1852.

⁹⁰⁶ On Nordic feast: Ruth Hemstad, “Scandinavianism: Mapping the Rise of a New Concept,” *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 13, no. 1 (June 1, 2018): 1–21, <https://doi.org/10.3167/choc.2018.130102>; *Fædrelandet*, 14.01.1852.

⁹⁰⁷ A. Schauman – B.O. Schauman, 25 January 1852. Kansalliskirjasto. Coll. 198. 9.

⁹⁰⁸ Grandell, *Från ett årtionde i Finland*, 55–59; Schauman, *Från sex årtionden i Finland*, 1: 4–17.

⁹⁰⁹ Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige* 94–95.

⁹¹⁰ On the ambience of Scandinavianism see: Tim van Gerven, *Scandinavism: Overlapping and Competing Identities in the Nordic World, 1770-1919* (Leiden: Brill, 2022), 261–316.

4.6. Aftermath: making sense of the revolution in Finland

After the European revolutions were suppressed by conservative restoration that could not, nevertheless, outright ignore explicated public demands, the consensus among the imperial administration in Finland was that the revolution became a product of the proletarian and lower classes' discontent.⁹¹¹ This fact had fatal, even if short-lived, consequences for the proliferation of the Finnish language. Fennomania's imagined bond with hazardous Swedish politics, reinforced by socialist concerns, deteriorated its assets in the eyes of the administration. In 1849, Platon Rokassovsky noted that while Europe was trembling because of new political ideas, Finland avoided this peril, because it lacked any significant number of disenfranchised proletarian classes.⁹¹² While this comparison certainly preferred the Finlandish path of development, the hazard of the politization of the lower classes became more pending than ever. In November of the same year, Kothen wrote to Menshikov that Snellman settled in Helsingfors, where he recruited young people to lecture on political economy 'flavored with socialist teachings'. He was, according to Kothen, among a radical clique of people, 'who interpret the laws of the country in a liberal sense, as *if they were in Sweden* [my italics – EE],' and propagated the idea of the development of the Finnish nation.⁹¹³

Besides these looming Swedish connections, the class-centered analytics since 1848 became inseparable from any discussion on the fate of the Finnish language. In the years 1848–1850, some administrators found the printing of any Finnish-language works dangerous due to the politicization of the European public sphere and widespread 'fermentation of minds'. Thus, for example, the publication of Finnish lexicon and reprint of the epic poem *Kalevala* in 1849, according to Ivan Nordenstam, was undesirable. Although there was 'nothing bad' in the texts themselves, their content could be misinterpreted. In his view, the reduction of the financial

⁹¹¹ Nurmio, *Vuoden 1850 kielisäännöksen yleispoliittista taustaa*, 252–67.

⁹¹² Rokassovsky – Menshikov, 13 June 1849. RGAVMF, F. 19, op. 3, d. 261, l. 13.

⁹¹³ Kothen – Menshikov, 9 November 1849. RGAVMF, F.19, op. 3, d. 146, l. 152.

support of the Finnish Literary Society would cool down the ardor of the Fennomania, clearly understood as a perilous tendency at this point.⁹¹⁴ Rokassovsky shared similar opinion regarding the biography of Swiss folk hero Wilhelm Tell – a famous fighter against feudal tyrants – translated into Finnish, and his message revealed a juxtaposition of ethnic and class-based markers: ‘This work cannot have consequences for the Swedish public but may be inappropriate for the peasantry.’⁹¹⁵

These reports, as well as the news about the Finnish translation of Eugène Sue’s novels, aggravated the widespread usage of the Finnish language in print, exacerbated by the fact that there were not enough censors with appropriate knowledge of language. In March 1850, the report by the governor-general drew on the fact that Finnish was spoken almost exclusively by representatives of the ‘working and rural class’, incapable of their own independent judgment. This argumentation that clearly referenced similar anxieties surfaced as the justification for a prohibition of widespread print in Finnish, apart from religious and educational literature.⁹¹⁶ In further cabinet paperwork, this class emphasis only intensified: for example, novels and other works in Finnish, it was argued, could distract the peasantry from useful activities, as well as discourage them from their natural industriousness.⁹¹⁷ The charter of the Finnish Literary Society also included a clause according to which representatives of the working and peasant class could count among its members.⁹¹⁸ Educated cosmopolitans and scholars – echoing Menshikov’s description of Snellman – had to be separated from the lower classes to avoid any areas of potential agitation and conspiracy.

⁹¹⁴ Nordenstam – Menshikov, 5 / 17 May 1849. RGAVMF, F. 19, op. 2, d. 205, l. 51.

⁹¹⁵ Rokassovsky – Menshikov, 26 February / 10 March 1849. RGAVMF, F. 19, op. 3, d. 261, l. 15.

⁹¹⁶ GARF. F. R8091, op. 1, d. 2112, l. 322–323; Kothen considered this measure unnecessarily harsh: Rolf Lagerborg, *Sanningen om Casimir von Kothen (1807-80) enligt aktstycken och brev* (Helsingfors: Söderström, 1953), 67-72. Nurmio, *Vuoden 1850 kielisäännöksen yleispoliittista taustaa*, 110–44.

⁹¹⁷ GARF. F. R8091, op. 1, d. 2002, l. 1-8.

⁹¹⁸ GARF. F. R8091, op.1, d. 2112, l. 336.

While some members of the administration considered the prohibition of Finnish print ill-advised and provocatively severe, Menshikov was assured in its necessity after the debacles of 1848.⁹¹⁹ Moreover, the news from Sweden that arrived in April, might have confirmed his expectations.⁹²⁰ Menshikov addressed Rokassovsky on April 26, 1850, informing him that ‘according to the information received by the emperor, democratic socialism had already managed to contaminate Sweden’. The prophets of this doctrine, according to the letter, unable to influence the educated classes who understood the sacredness of property and the necessity of well-ordered powers, turned to the uneducated masses of people. In Stockholm, there appeared newspapers – *Folkets Röst* and *Reform* – and clubs that even dared to propagate the labor rights.

Governor-general ordered Rokassovsky to inform the bishops to preserve the people from such corruption, addressed post-directorate to ban these journals, customs to surveil attentively the materials that travelers brought to Finland, and governors to prevent any spread of socialism.⁹²¹ Moreover, Menshikov separately mentioned the workings of the censorship committee which had to monitor closely the publishing of low-priced brochures that could easily spread among the lower classes: ‘The rescript on the publication of such texts in Finnish had already been signed’. However, governor-general considered that to extend this order to all texts of such scale would not be convenient. Apart from this, Menshikov wanted a list with the ‘excesses of the Finlandish journalists’ in socialist Swedish issues to have ‘an indication of relations between our socialists with foreign ones’.⁹²² The ban on Finnish publications and the spread of socialist doctrines clearly stood close in Menshikov’s mind and decision-making.

⁹¹⁹ Lagerborg, *Sanningen om Casimir von Kothen (1807-80)*, 67-72.

⁹²⁰ Erkki K. Osmonsalo, *Fabian Langenskiöld: valtiollinen elämäntyö*, vol. 1 (Helsinki: Suomen historiallinen seura, 1939), 233–35.

⁹²¹ Menshikov – Rokassovsky, 14 / 26 April 1850. KA. KKK, Fc: 38, d. 56, l. 3-4ob.

⁹²² Menshikov – Rokassovsky, 14 / 26 April 1850. KA. KKK, Fc: 38, d. 56, l. 4ob.

The analytics of the government connected the internal workings of the dangerous intellectuals oriented towards the masses and socialist propaganda in Sweden, associated with other radical ideas, Scandinavianism among them, especially given that one of the socialist societies was named *Skandinavisk sällskap*, although it did not have anything to do with pan-Scandinavian idea as such.⁹²³ Fennomania, fighting both for the spread of Finnish and improvement of the living conditions among the lower classes again surfaced as part and parcel of global dynamics of the potential upheaval. ‘The sickness of socialism’, as the emperor referred to it, should have been banned from entering Finland.⁹²⁴ Since the image of Fennomania was tightly bound to the figure of Snellman, there is little doubt that he was the primary suspect behind the potential eruption of the imagined socialist forces, especially since he had been previously labeled by Kothen and Menshikov as a ‘communist’. Ban on Finnish publications was, without doubt, a class-centered action – connected with concerns about socialism, rise of proletariat, and immigrant workers⁹²⁵ – and not an ethnically-colored one.⁹²⁶

However, apart from the strict ban on Finnish language publications, the administration was looking for other measures to prevent the country from alarming contaminations. Since the education of Finnish bishops was prioritized as a security measure to have the masses in the parishes under control, this decision-making confirm that language played a subordinate role in these analytics. With regards to Snellman, governor-general and his environment also sought to find a compromise and utilize his authority in the interests of the duchy. Konstantin Fischer, Menshikov’s right hand who visited Helsingfors in 1850, was keen on attracting him to cooperation. During his visit to Helsingfors, he learned that Snellman submitted his articles to the official newspaper, which Fischer considered necessary to accept ‘with many respects’

⁹²³ Björkman, “‘Må de herrskande klasserna darra’”, 83.

⁹²⁴ RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 4, d. 432, l. 22-23.

⁹²⁵ Some of them also suspected in spreading socialist ideas to Finland: On new rules for entering of the Swedish workers, 1852. KA. KKK, Fc 24, d. 299.

⁹²⁶ Edward C. Thaden, *Russia’s Western Borderlands, 1710-1870* (Princeton University Press, 2014), 287.

from now on. Moreover, Fischer was personally introduced to the Finnish publicist and informed Menshikov on this acquaintance:

Snellman is not a positive person: he has a love for order and modesty so confused with liberalism and perverse concepts about authorities that you can still make anything out of him, either Kossuth or Kothen. The latter was a big screamer (*bolshouj krikun*), but Snellman is smarter. In any case, it would not be a bad thing if Snellman decided to ask for a place in the office of F.G.G. (*Finlandish Governor-General* – EE) for the vacancy of Assistant Chief of the Expedition – even if Your Grace did not intend to accept him [...].⁹²⁷

Some representatives of the administration hence regarded it as an appropriate measure to illicit the support of the ‘oppositional’ intellectuals. It is conspicuous that the memory of the 1848 revolutions contextualized this rapprochement, at least rhetorically in opposing famous Hungarian revolutionary and independence-fighter Lajos Kossuth to extra-loyal governor Casimir Kothen, Fisher implied that administrative institutions might ameliorate Snellman’s ‘confused’ stance. Again, government and public figures did not exist in separate worlds but rather in the intermingled social and political relations, and echoes of the recent revolution prompted the intensification of these connections.

This encounter between Fisher and Snellman, which the latter described as an utterly negative experience, also sheds light on how imperial agents looked for the instruments to shape the public opinion.⁹²⁸ This repertoire ranged from tight censorship and government bans to state-sponsored newspapers and engagement with figures that were regarded as potent of shaping the public opinion. It also elucidates the path that the new imperial system of rule

⁹²⁷ Fisher – Menshikov, 12 August 1850. RGAVMF. F. 19, op. 2, d. 302, l. 49.

⁹²⁸ Thiodolf Rein, *Johan Vilhelm Snellman*, vol. 1 (Helsinki: Otava, 1895), 556–60.

would take during and after the Crimean War, collaborating closer than ever with prominent public intellectuals. However, this move demanded the remapping of the public debate and political discourse in the duchy in such a way that Fennomania and Scandinavianism became – at least on the level of the rhetoric – more and more opposed to each other, allowing still, of course, for more complex identities and voices.⁹²⁹

The Vienna order survived in the sound and fury of the revolutions across Europe. Indeed, Russia played significant role in its preservation not only as a ‘gendarme’ but also as a more adaptive agent ready to approach projects and tendencies that it previously regarded with greatest suspicion. When the advocates of once ‘radical’ and ‘revolutionary’ Scandinavianism took governmental posts in Denmark while their associates propagated Swedish assistance with obvious allusions to the ideas of the Nordic unity in 1848, the Russian empire, on the one hand, could afford to ignore or even capitalize on these sympathies in providing its own assistance. On the other hand, the idea of the Scandinavian union – perhaps for the first time manifesting itself with such intensity in the diplomatic dispatches that reflected the rise of respective manifestations – was to be averted, and Russian assistance, in this sense, pulled both Denmark and Sweden into the legalistic field of the Vienna establishment without, however, any recourse to direct suppression. For a short period of time, imperial actions were seen complimentary to the forces of Scandinavian consolidation by audiences in Denmark and Sweden.

Since summer 1848, however, it became clear for Danish and Swedish politicians that Russia did not want to realize the dreams of national-liberals but rather demanded an immediate armistice and reverse to status quo. Its influence on Oscar I appeared conservative, making Sweden abstain from active assistance in the warfare. From a relatively friendly agent, it again gradually appeared to be an expansive force, according to some authors, even seeking for

⁹²⁹ Jens Grandell is attentive to more heterogenous identities of Finlandish intellectuals: Grandell, *Från ett årtionde i Finland*, 96–153.

aggrandizements in Denmark.⁹³⁰ Paskevich's suppression of Hungarian insurgents made its image even worse for Scandinavianist freedom-fighters. Indeed, the restoration that followed with the London Protocols of 1851-2 that implied the preservation of the integrated monarchy with clarified inheritance for the whole kingdom – Christian Glücksburg as heir presumptive to Frederik VII – did not satisfy national-liberals in Copenhagen or schleswig-holsteiners in Kiel. Conservative restoration followed with A.S. Ørsted's July Ordinance in 1854 and then with monarchy-wide (*fælles*) constitution of 1855 that restricted voting rights for the middle-class representatives and created complicated lines of ministerial responsibilities, reinforcing monarchical power.⁹³¹

In Finland, Danish and wider Scandinavian struggles were followed with interest. From Aspelund's speech in 1843 to Schauman's impressions from new Danish institutions, in some regards this 'new' nation that struggled for its existence and triggered the impulse of the Scandinavian unity was closer to Finland and to Finnish-centered concerns than its ex-metropole. The administration, however, had its own concerns, learning its lessons – either right or false – from European experiences. Politization of the lower classes across the continent made the Finlandish government reorient its policies. Fennomania, seen as a potential instigation for wide and unmonitorable conspiracy, was, in their optics, was part and parcel of the global social upheaval that capitalized on the echoes from Sweden. Its leader Johan Snellman, in this sense, surfaced as a perfect embodiment of potential provocateur that could affect the masses, unable to differentiate between good and evil. These patriarchal concerns of the administration, worried about productivity of labor and calmness of the peasants, made them prohibit print in Finnish on a broad range of topics. Menshikov, in his role of a wartime diplomat and, no doubt, other members of the administration had an opportunity to learn more

⁹³⁰ Ludvig Kristensen Daa, *Danmark russisk eller skandinavisk, aftryk af en opsats i Christiania-Posten* (Christiania: C. A. Dybwad, 1849); Johnsen, ““Vi hafva ifrån morgon till qväll varit ute och agiterat””, 75–76.

⁹³¹ Bregnsbo and Jensen, *The Rise and Fall of the Danish Empire*, 189–91; Alexander Thorsøe, *Kong Frederik den Syvendes regering* (Kjøbenhavn: Gyldendal, 1889), 235–472.

of the European turbulences during that dramatic year. On the one hand, it made them widen the control for press, workers, migrants, and ideas. On the other, however, they also recognized the necessity to adapt and to approach – reluctantly – new public figures and tendencies, to invent instruments of public opinion control that would also go beyond mere repression. It must have been harder to push under aristocratic and stubbornly conservative Menshikov, but the times were changing, urging for new solutions and programmes to solidify the imperial resilience within and beyond its borders.⁹³²

⁹³² On pan-European modernization as opposed to reaction in the 1850s see: Clark, “After 1848.”

Chapter 5. The Crimean War and its aftermaths

5.1. Prelude

While the Austro-Prussian controversy over the unification of Germany resolved in Austrian favor – not without Russian intervention – and the latter preserved its formal role as the leader of the German Confederation towards the end of 1850, the Danish-Prussian crisis was regulated by the two London Protocols of 1850 and 1852. Those tensions in Europe were played down in conservative manner with an active involvement performed by the Russian emperor. In France, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte was proclaimed Emperor Napoleon III, also pushing forward the anti-democratic ‘restoration of the order’. Constitutions were thwarted, withdrawn, or edited across Europe to give them a more conservative content, restricting poorer or uneducated social groups from taking part in the elections and other forms of political participation. The pace of reforms was slowed down, reverted, or took a different turn into technocratic direction.⁹³³

Despite these tendencies seemed to have brought conservative peace back to Europe, it was hardly the case. Already in 1851, the conflict over the control of the holy places in Bethlehem erupted. It unexpectedly pitted political interest of France and Russia against each other. In 1852, under pressure from Napoleon III, Sultan Abdulmejid I granted more rights to the Catholics over the holy places thus setting Eastern Orthodox believers lower in the hierarchy in the religious landscape of Porte. Nicholas I, as a self-fashioned patron of the Eastern Orthodox population of the Ottoman empire, prompted a symmetrical demarche to make the sultan solidify the rights and privileges of this part of the population. Nicholas I initially looked through the pool of experienced diplomats to send on the mission to negotiate the matter, that included Alexei Orlov and Pavel Kiselev, both of whom found their ways to

⁹³³ Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851*, 241–56; Breuilley, *Austria, Prussia and The Making of Germany: 1806-1871*, 107–9; Christopher Clark, ‘After 1848: The European Revolution in Government’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 22 (2012): 171–97; David M. Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War* (London: Routledge, 2014), 61–68.

decline their participation. The next most fitting candidature happened to be Prince Menshikov. While he also did not have any wish to embark on the mission, he finally agreed. At the beginning of 1853, Menshikov, still in the capacity of governor-general of Finland, left for Istanbul as a head of the mission whose failure would set in motion the gears of the Crimean War.⁹³⁴

The historiography of the Crimean War still suffers from slightly inappropriate naming. In fact, battlegrounds under its banner stretched from the Black Sea to the Baltics and even the Far East. Among these theaters of operations, Finland is central for my inquiry, since many hopes and fears of the maritime powers, Russian empire, neutral states, Finnish administration and society revolved around military activities in this area.⁹³⁵ The Crimean War became a turning point both for the Finnish administration and for the population of the duchy. On the one hand, Finnish administration sought for the ways to solidify the allegiance of the population through providing ideological monitoring, implementing surveillance, giving concessions, and instrumentalizing public opinion on the scale unprecedented before. The population generally remained loyal to the Russian throne, but the course of the war and the prospects of Swedish involvement into it created ruptures among the intellectuals – at least in the eyes of those who surveilled them – with one loosely-tied group looking forward to the project of the Scandinavian federation reified with Finland in its borders and another, Fennomania-propelled, arguing sharply against Swedish propaganda and Scandinavian-leaning course either in cultural sphere or in politics.⁹³⁶ The war and its aftermath

⁹³⁴ Goldfrank, *The Origins of the Crimean War*, 131–63; Valerij Andreevich Zorin, *Istorija diplomatii* (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1959), 645–47.

⁹³⁵ Mikhail Borodkin, *Vojna na Finskom poberezh'e 1854-1855 gg.* (S-Peterburg: Tip. Glavnogo upravlenija udelov, 1904); Eero Auvinen, 'Krimin sota, Venäjä ja suomalaiset. Siviilit rannikoiden puolustajina ja sen vaikutus sotatoimiin sekä Venäjän suomensuhteisiin', (PhD diss., University of Turku, 2015); Andrew Rath, *The Crimean War in Imperial Context, 1854-1856* (London: Springer, 2015); Winfried Baumgart, *The Crimean War: 1853-1856* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020), 179–88.

⁹³⁶ H. Arnold Barton, 'Scandinavianism, Fennomania, and the Crimean War', *Journal of Baltic Studies* 36, no. 2 (2005): 131–56; Jussi Kurunmäki and Ilkka Liikanen, 'The Formation of the Finnish Polity within the Russian Empire: Language, Representation, and the Construction of Popular Political Platforms, 1863-1906', *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 35, no. 1/4 (2017): 399–416.

saw the encounter with modernity, both in terms of technologies of rule and in the visions that the government and population could profess.

During most part of the war, the Scandinavian kingdoms remained impartial, and this status created conservative geopolitical visions based on their shared principles of their non-involvement, a label of Scandinavian neutrality. Their neutrality, however, was not just a single declaration of status but rather a dynamic policy of seeking compromise and even opportunity between more powerful international agents. Moreover, their neutrality demanded ideological justification for the domestic audience. This reasoning often took form of the discursively framed economic profitability. While Danish government consistently held to its neutral status, both calming down the nationalist-Scandinavianist pressure in the capital and navigating between the maritime powers and Russia, Swedish foreign policy was much more opportunistic.⁹³⁷

Oscar I waited for the right moment to change its status from neutral to belligerent to pursue the goal of reintegrating Finland and, perhaps as a side-result, to suppress internal quarrels over the status of the union with Norway and the question of representation in the Riksdag. The tensions in the Swedish-Norwegian union arose due to the pending issues of state centralization and the position of Norway vis-à-vis Sweden. While many Stockholm newspapers argued in favor of scaled-up amalgamation in political and cultural spheres, Norwegian public accordingly protested in the name of their constitution that granted them special position within the union.⁹³⁸ External threats that the Russian empire ostensibly represented served as a convenient tool to draw the public attention in both composite parts of the union to the ‘common enemy’.

⁹³⁷ Halicz, *Danish Neutrality During the Crimean War*, 74-181; Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige*, 227-68; Allan Jansson, *Den Svenska utrikespolitikens historia*, vol 3:3 (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1961), 62-115; Møller, *Skandinavisk stræben og svensk politik omkring 1860*, 19-24.

⁹³⁸ Stråth, *Union och demokrati*, 169-202; Hildor Arnold Barton, *Sweden and Visions of Norway: Politics and Culture, 1814-1905* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2003), 58-86.

5.2. The beginning of the Crimean War in Finland

Although Menshikov left for a diplomatic mission to the Ottoman Porte and then resided in the southern provinces of the empire to organize the defense of the Crimean Peninsula during the ensuing war, he proceeded in his capacity as governor-general of the Grand Duchy of Finland. Most of the day-to-day operation, however, were delegated to the adjunct of governor-general, Platon Ivanovich Rokassovsky. The news about Menshikov's potential abstention from formally governing Finland spurred some of his close advisors, Konstantin Fisher among them, to assure him in the loyalty and affection of the governed inhabitants:

Finland hopes that Your Grace will not leave the governing of Finland, especially since perhaps this is the only province with which the Sovereign is completely satisfied, and which is satisfied with its governor-general. Others either consider themselves under the oppression of governor-general or are satisfied with them because they flatter them. Only Finland considers itself free but still follows the path directed by the emperor.⁹³⁹

Again, in October, when the rumors spread that Menshikov could substitute Prince Vorontsov in Novorossiia and Bessarabia, Fisher noted that in case Menshikov really opted to leave Finland, Platon Rokassovsky represented the best candidature to follow suit that would satisfy almost everyone, since he 'having been fed on your ideas, acts in your direction'. While the emperor could have other thoughts with regards to this matter, Fisher asked Menshikov to speak in favor of Rokassovsky.⁹⁴⁰

While rumors accelerated, and there were speculations that Mikhail Muraviev – already by that time known as a heavy-handed administrator⁹⁴¹ – would become the head of troops in

⁹³⁹ Fisher – Menshikov. 4 October 1853. RGAVMF. F.19, op. 2, d. 235, l. 51ob.

⁹⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁹⁴¹ Mikhail Borodkin, *Istorija Finljandii: Vremja imperatora Nikolaja I* (Petrograd: Gosudarstvennaja tip., 1915), 644; Konstantin Vadimovich Trojanovskij, 'Melkaja Shljahta Litovsko-Beloruskich Gubernij v Politike MN

Finland, Rokassovsky performed as adjunct until the end of 1854. One of the most important measures that Rokassovsky managed to launch was cancellation of censorship restrictions on the Finnish press in 1854. The emancipatory measure was aimed to solidify imperial positions among the Finnish-speaking population. Since the British fleet appeared in the vicinity of the shores of the duchy on 12 April 1854, the administration looked for measures to foster the loyalty of the locals, most of whom spoke Finnish. The measure was prompted by the address of the peasants from the province of Mikkeli that asked the administration to define a period when Finnish language would be introduced in the courts and education facilities, where the majority of the population spoke Finnish.⁹⁴²

Moreover, the address demanded the introduction of Finnish instead of Swedish, and governor-general tied this provocative claim with the ban on Finnish print and censorship of educational materials that caused their scarcity. Rokassovsky concluded, that 'considering these circumstances and *present political events* [my italics]' – meaning the dangers of warfare – he found it plausible to present the application for the emperor with his positive feedback.⁹⁴³ Nicholas I's recent visit to the duchy in March to monitor the preparations and bolster public spirit might have positively affected the course to the widened political and cultural participation provided for the Finnish-speaking inhabitants, and the rumors that spread around the issue confirm these speculations.⁹⁴⁴ This measure launched gradual relaxation of the Finnish-language print that since that time had to be supervised by governor-general or his adjunct directly. While Rokassovsky's following reports reproduced the tropes of perilous

Murav'eva Po" Slijaniju" Zapadnogo Kraja s Rossiej (1828-1834 i 1863-1864 Gg.),' in *Na Sluzhbe Otechestvu: Pamjati Mihaila Nikolaevicha Murav'eva (1796-1866)*, ed. Natalia Dunaeva and Elmira Fedosova (Saint-Petersburg: Prezidentskaja biblioteka, 2017), 75–83; Mikhail Dolbilov, "M.N. Murav'jov i osvobozhdenie krest'jan: problema konservativno-bjurokraticeskogo reformatorstva," *Otechestvennaja istorija*, no. 6 (2002): 67-90.

⁹⁴² KA. KKK, Fc 17, N. 369.

⁹⁴³ Rokassovsky – Armfelt, 3/15 April 1854. KA. KKK, Fc. 17, N. 369, l. 9-10.

⁹⁴⁴ Rokassovsky – Armfelt. 20 September / 2 October 1854. Ibid, l. 13; Sven Gabriel Elmgren, *S.G. Elmgrenin muistiinpanot* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura, 1939), 99.

literature that could divert the lower classes and peasants from hard work⁹⁴⁵ – justifying careful censorship of printed materials – this measure signified a gradual turn towards the necessity of reliance on broader masses of population – recognizing the requirements of resource provision and local communication – instead of the narrow foundation of the intermediary group of the Swedish-speaking elites.⁹⁴⁶

The measure and its significance did not remain unnoticed by the administration and Menshikov personally. Armfelt opposed the emancipation of the Finnish print, together with Haartman who always stressed his conservative skepticism about this idea.⁹⁴⁷ Fisher, who shared their thoughts, concluded that this measure revealed that Rokassovsky actually diverted from Menshikov's visions of the social and political dynamics in the duchy.⁹⁴⁸ Later Fisher's reminiscences of this episode pointed to his and, perhaps, broader conservative consensus on the uncivilized and plebeian nature of the Finnish-speaking classes in Finland as opposed to Swedish civilization and their unreliability that potentially drifted towards unrest, revolution, and secession.⁹⁴⁹ This viewpoint based on the principles of the estate solidarity, although significantly corroded in the times of the war, still hold tight during the ensuing decade.

The administration was anxious about the general spirit among the inhabitants, and suspicious sympathies of Swedish-speaking population came early on their radar, although mostly as rumors.⁹⁵⁰ As early as December 1853, Armfelt signaled Rokassovsky about speculations that spread in Saint-Petersburg regarding Finland's precarious sympathies in the war. While he deemed them unreliable, he, nevertheless, asked governor-general to convene

⁹⁴⁵ Rokassovsky – Armfelt. 20 September / 2 October 1854. KA. KKK, Fc. 17, N. 369, l. 14.

⁹⁴⁶ See also: Auvinen, 'Krimin sota, Venäjä ja suomalaiset. Siviilit rannikoiden puolustajina ja sen vaikutus sotatoimiin sekä Venäjän suomensuhteisiin', 7–8. In a way, the necessity of low-level communication reminded the warfare of 1808-9: Hårdstedt, *Om krigets förutsättningar*.

⁹⁴⁷ Katja Huomo, "*Perkeleen kieli*": *suomen kieli ja poliittisesti korrekti tiede 1800-luvulla* (Helsinki: Suomen tiedeseura, 2005).

⁹⁴⁸ Fisher – Menshikov. 16 / 28 February 1854, RGAVMF, F. 19, op. 2, d. 235, l. 90-99; Fisher – Menshikov. 28 January 1854. RGAVMF. F. 19, op.2, d. 235, l. 92ob.

⁹⁴⁹ Fisher, *Zapiski*. 163-164.

⁹⁵⁰ Rath, *The Crimean War in Imperial Context, 1854-1856*, 74–76.

with the governors of provinces and inquire them about public opinions in their respective domains.⁹⁵¹

The gathered governors estimated the attitude of the population as loyal towards the emperor, though several of them noted the spread of ‘insignificant’ but perilous talks. Some blamed the strict censorship regime for these speculations, since they began to spread ‘when Swedish newspapers arrived either clipped or with whole numbers missing’, reproducing the concerns that some contemporaries indeed reflected in their diaries and memoirs with regards to the Swedish ambiguous position in the war when reading clipped newspapers.⁹⁵² Newspapers that shed light on Swedish relations with Russia or those that argued in favor of the Swedish intervention into the war were indeed banned, but they also gave the administration a hint about the Swedish public opinion and the possible trajectory of the Swedish foreign policy with regards to Finland.⁹⁵³ Some newspapers, as, for example, Danish *Fædrelandet* that argued in favor of the Scandinavian interference against Russia, were completely banned for subscription.⁹⁵⁴

Already at the beginning of 1854 – several months before the arrival of the English-French squadron – rumors about Swedish preparations for the war began to spread in the coastal areas, ‘that produced a lot of anxiety among the commoners’. The governor of Wasa (Vaasa) Berndt Federley added that while younger generation could have acted thoughtlessly, the elders did not wish any changes in their ‘fortunate position’. He illustrated this claim with the quote he heard while travelling around the province: ‘We now have a strong Tsar, and no one would dare attack us. Previously we had a weak king, and our poor country was often devastated by war.’⁹⁵⁵

⁹⁵¹ Armfelt – Rokassovsky. 2 / 14 December 1853. KA. KKK. Fc. 17. N. 370.

⁹⁵² Cronstedt – Rokassovsky. 18 / 30 January 1854. Ibid.; Later Elmgren’s reaction on post-director activities: Elmgren, *S.G. Elmgrenin muistiinpanot*, 153–54.

⁹⁵³ KA. KKK, Fc. 20, N. 245.

⁹⁵⁴ Wulfert – Rokassovsky. 22 January / 9 February 1854. Ibid, l. 43

⁹⁵⁵ Federley – Rokassovsky. 17 / 29 January 1854. KA. KKK, Fc. 17, N. 369, l. 14-15.

In March, governor of Åbo (Turku) fueled to the rumors about Swedish invasion, reciting the news he heard about the Swedish mobilization and dislocation of troops in Norrbotten.⁹⁵⁶ When the news about potential Swedish intervention reached deeper into the country, Tavastehus (Hämeenlinna) governor assured Rokassovsky that in case the Swedes decided to invade the country, the male population of the province – consisting mostly of Finnish speaking peasants – would fight them fiercely.⁹⁵⁷ The situation of real and imagined warfare transformed social hierarchies in the duchy into potential oppositions – or even solidarities in a more optimistic scenario – stripped of the vertical order, as happened with Swedish-speaking elites and Finnish-speaking lower classes, the fact that the administration would not fail to utilize during and after the war.

In July, an ostensible Swedish spy was caught who, as the interrogation revealed, advised population of coastal town Brahestad (Raahe) to flee since the landing of the Swedish army was awaited, while Finland was expected to be united with Sweden on the same basis as Norway.⁹⁵⁸ As in 1848, Swedish subjects came under the spotlight and, due to expected Swedish alignment with the maritime powers, they were to be closely monitored in the duchy. Reports flooded the chancellery of governor-general that indicated those Swedes who dared to pronounce improper words about the imperial conditions in the war. Others were suspected in spying in English favor.⁹⁵⁹ Local population also came under the spotlight, ‘reprehensible actions and talks’ that concerned the prospects of war were investigated, and those involved were prosecuted, although the majority avoided any manifestations.⁹⁶⁰

⁹⁵⁶ Cronstedt – Rokassovsky. Ibid, l. 16-16ob.

⁹⁵⁷ Rehbinder – Rokassovsky. 1 / 13 March 1854. Ibid. l. 18-18ob.

⁹⁵⁸ Report 20 July 1854. KA. KKK, Fc. 25, N. 336.

⁹⁵⁹ Report 10 / 22 March 1854. KA. KKK, Fc 15, N 322.; On spying see: KA. KKK, Fc 15, N 324; KA. KKK, Fc 25. N. 328; Report 25 May / 6 June 1854. KA. KKK, Fc 16. N. 329; Report 5/17 June 1854. KA. KKK, Fc 16, N 332.

⁹⁶⁰ About reprehensible actions and statements of various persons. GARF. F. R8091, op. 1, d. 1611.

The situation deteriorated with the news about the Allied bombardment and seizure of Bomarsund fortress on the Åland islands in August 1854. While previous activities of the allied naval forces that started in May 1854 mostly comprised of ship seizure, limited landing operations, and bombardments of the coastal towns, the seizure of Bomarsund was publicly framed as their first big success in the Baltics.⁹⁶¹ The fact that the population of the islands was mostly Swedish-speaking produced suspicion among the administrative cadres in Finland, especially those concerned with the defense of the coast. The population of the islands was described as frivolous and mercantile, and thus quickly approachable for the enemies.⁹⁶² Internal loyalty thus had to be solidified through new means.

5.3. New governor-general F.F. Berg

Towards the end of the year the position of governor-general was filled by a newcomer to the duchy, Fedor Fedorovich (Friedrich Wilhelm) Berg. He substituted Rokassovsky in the late 1854 as a more 'energetic' and talented military commander. His short rule in the duchy (until 1861) both happened simultaneously and certainly contributed to the re-assemblage of Finnish political organization.⁹⁶³ In a way, Berg represented an opposition to Menshikov in many respects. Berg was not by far as distinguished and rich as the latter, and their attitude towards sensitive issues of imperial development collided. Berg sided with those who professed the emancipation of the Russian peasantry, while Menshikov relentlessly opposed its bold designs. Berg, graduated in Dorpat, was a member of the Imperial Geographical Society⁹⁶⁴ – a nurture house for early modernizing visions and practices – while Menshikov refused to

⁹⁶¹ Rath, *The Crimean War in Imperial Context, 1854-1856*, 56–76; Borodkin, *Vojna na Finskoy poberezh'e 1854-1855 gg.*, 31–57.

⁹⁶² Report 1 / 12 October 1854. KA. KKK. Fc. 26, N. 351, l. 54.

⁹⁶³ Paasivirta, *Finland and Europe*, 99-120; Jussila, Hentilä, and Nevakivi, *From Grand Duchy to a Modern State*, 38-56.

⁹⁶⁴ Lev Berg, *Vsesoyuznoe geograficheskoe obshchestvo za sto let: 1845-1945* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1946), 30.

participate in it, which I suppose, might have stemmed from his political disagreement with its course.⁹⁶⁵ Menshikov was notoriously an outspoken opponent of the railroad building while Berg was one of the most ardent supporters of the costly but promising technology.

Their policies in the duchy also witnessed sharp contrasts. Berg wished to be involved in every minute detail of the government processes and decision-making, irritating many members of the local administration, while Menshikov always had a distance, both geographical and content-related to the affairs of the duchy and understood the necessity to follow established procedures.⁹⁶⁶ Menshikov's rule created a norm that Berg came to shatter. The context of war must have affected Berg's vision for Finland. He himself was a distinguished commander, but also cartographer and statistician, characteristic of the emerging group of modernizers of the imperial domains.⁹⁶⁷ Recognized in battles in the Caucasus and against the Ottomans, at the beginning of 1854 Berg found himself on the Baltic shore in Riga and Reval, organizing the coastal defense there. He was instrumental in building the defense of Reval, although the allies recognized even earlier that it was extremely difficult to seize it without considerable landing forces.⁹⁶⁸

Some reminiscences of Berg securing the coast were made by then the pastor of Finnish and Swedish members of the naval division stationed there, Carl Aspelund – the same man who eleven years ago visited pan-Scandinavian student festivals. His description of Berg as overtly cautious, at times megalomaniac in his planning, technology reliant 'generalissimus'

⁹⁶⁵ Nathaniel Knight, "Science, Empire, and Nationality: Ethnography in the Russian Geographical Society, 1845-1855," in *Imperial Russia: New Histories for the Empire* ed. Jane Burbank and David Ransel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 108-141; Joseph Bradley, *Voluntary Associations in Tsarist Russia: Science, Patriotism, and Civil Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 86-122. Berg's autobiography, 23 March / 4 April 1872. GARF. F. 547, op. 1, d. 7, l. 11-22.

⁹⁶⁶ Kalleinen, *Suomen kenraalikuvernementti*, 110-17.

⁹⁶⁷ Steven Seegel, *Mapping Europe's Borderlands: Russian Cartography in the Age of Empire* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012), 65-88; Catherine Gibson, *Geographies of Nationhood: Cartography, Science, and Society in the Russian Imperial Baltic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022); Juliette Cadiot, "Searching for Nationality: Statistics and National Categories at the End of the Russian Empire (1897-1917)," *The Russian Review* 64, no. 3 (2005): 440-55.

⁹⁶⁸ Rath, *The Crimean War in Imperial Context, 1854-1856*, 47-50.

both drew on the existing narratives that surrounded the figure of the general but also provided hints into Berg's character and methods.⁹⁶⁹

Upon his arrival to Finland, Berg went in the footsteps of his predecessor Rokassovsky in deploying surveillance and monitoring the public opinion, while also introducing riskier measures. One of the first among those was a mission requested to monitor Swedish public opinion and preparations for potential warfare. The produced anonymous report painted an ambiguous picture. On the one hand, no significant preparations in weaponry, fodder, or personnel were spotted. On the other hand, military spendings were extended, and army exercises were scheduled earlier than usual.⁹⁷⁰ Translated report was forwarded to the emperor with longest part that discussed the public opinion in Sweden, however, omitted. The anonymous author ridiculed popular Swedish expectations of Finland joining ex-metropole in the struggle against the empire, pointing out the ignorance of the real situation among the Swedes. With regards to Russia, many Swedes ostensibly nurtured fears of its potential aggression in the Northern parts of Norway where its influence gained currency. The press thus agitated for war by joining the Western powers while the allies regarded Sweden as a valuable potential partner, according to the report.⁹⁷¹

Even earlier, in January 1855, extra rules for the control of incoming foreigners were being implemented, sharply restricting their access into the duchy, while some suspicious persons were even sent into the imperial proper so they could not spy on the potential frontlines.⁹⁷² Berg argued:

Among those orders that are being implemented for the defense of Finland in the coming year of 1855, one of the most important and essential conditions is the

⁹⁶⁹ Carl Aspelund's biografiska anteckningar. SLSA 146, l. 293-298.

⁹⁷⁰ It was spotted earlier by diplomatic agents as well: Sven Eriksson, *Svensk diplomati och tidningspress under Krimkriget* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1939), 124.

⁹⁷¹ KA. KKK, Fc 26, N. 357. l. 2-10. Indeed, the report grasped some tendencies of the Swedish media production: Eriksson, *Svensk diplomati och tidningspress under Krimkriget*, 179-252.

⁹⁷² Berg's report. 30 December 1854 / 11 January 1855. KA. KKK, Fc 17, N. 358, l. 1-2.

accommodation of most conscious measures to stop the military orders from travelling across the borders. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a secret surveillance in this country to monitor everyone who could potentially be suspected in the espionage, and *especially to monitor the Swedes who arrive here to make business* [my italics – EE].

While the chancellery of governor-general could not perform such tasks, Berg asked the emperor to send him a reliable man with Finlandish background so that with the help of local police and secret agents he could monitor two of the main localities where the Swedes arrived, namely Uleåborg (Oulu) and Åbo (Turku). Prior to that, Berg must have put forward even more ambitious plan, since Lars Gabriel von Haartman had to curb his visions, pointing to the fact that the organization of surveillance on the same scale as in the Russian proper could provoke the population of the country. Organized surveillance was associated with mistrust and ‘humiliation’ among the elites in the empire and in Finland, and gendarmes often understood this fact better than others.⁹⁷³ Haartman proposed that one person should be picked for the operation, assisted by the local police. The emperor approved Berg’s plan with Haartman’s corrections and special *chinovnik* von Herdten was sent to Finland to assist in the deployment of the secret surveillance.⁹⁷⁴

The rules restricting wartime mobility into Finland partly drew on measures already implemented for the control of the proletariat (*bobibly*) traversing Swedish-Finnish border,⁹⁷⁵ but they aimed more consistently to eradicate porous state of the boundary with new methods. Passports issued by Russian consulates abroad were demanded for all visitors coming into the duchy. The invitation of workers was restricted, since ‘natural’ Englishmen, Swedish peasants and ‘other men of the lower estate’, Italian subjects, and Orthodox missionaries from the

⁹⁷³ See, for example: Leontij Dubel't, “Dnevnik 1851 g.,” in *Rossijskij Arhiv: Istorija Otechestva v svidetel'stvah i dokumentah XVIII—XX vv.* (Moscow: Ros. Arhiv, 1995), 294.

⁹⁷⁴ KA. KKK, Fc 17, N. 358, l. 1-2.

⁹⁷⁵ See chapter 4.

Ottoman empire were banned from entrance. Travelling abroad also demanded passports issued by governor-general, except for the inhabitants of Uleåborg and Wasa – provinces where these documents could be issued by local governors. Given Berg’s observation that many Swedish newspapers began featuring negative materials concerning the empire and Finland, sent ostensibly from correspondents residing in the duchy, governors were ordered to reinforce the surveillance over all foreign subjects entering their domains.⁹⁷⁶

Territorial control over the border and passport control also expanded to the passages in Torneo, frozen passage between Umea and Uleåborg, and the Åland islands. As it was clear from the ongoing correspondence with regards to these measures, their trajectory aimed to prevent, first and foremost, the Swedish immigration, and some representatives of the administration even feared that they could provoke the government of the neighboring kingdom in formulating them so explicitly.⁹⁷⁷ Other foreigners, of course, were more rare guests in Finland, but rumored and messaged Swedish plans for the intervention, well-known for the Finlandish administration, played essential role in the increased surveillance towards the subjects of the Swedish king.

The operational necessity of more detailed control over the border also resulted in the desire to surveil closely the internal migration of the population. The problem resided in the simple inability to differentiate between a Finlandish subject and a foreigner. Berg proposed measures to navigate between the two statuses easier with the help of identity documentation: ‘Every Finlander leaving his town or *kirchspiel* for a travel to the places where he is personally unknown must have a document that could identify his personality’. The documents that could figure as a certificate of identity included ‘certificate produced outright by local lehnsman or church’, job contract, certificate of ownership, or ‘anything approved by the local

⁹⁷⁶ KA. KKK, Fc 17, N. 358, l. 14-22.

⁹⁷⁷ Ibid, l. 54.

authorities'.⁹⁷⁸ Passport system, while it existed prior to the Crimean War, previously regulated only crossing the border between the duchy and other political entities, including Russia, but during the war it aimed to control the mobility even within the country.⁹⁷⁹

The attempt to monitor the populace and to have the ability to differentiate between loyal and potentially dangerous agents was one of the early birds of the modernizing empire under the circumstances of warfare, producing anxieties about 'organized spy-regime' because of the local unfamiliarity with such measures.⁹⁸⁰ Many of the developed measures, perceptions of loyalty, and prejudices would be preserved further in the wake of the war, including more palpable opposition between native Swedish-speaking and Finnish-speaking subjects of the emperor in terms of their reliability.

Swedish ambiguous position in the war amplified by the rumors of its future intervention and proclaimed plans for the reinstatement of Finland under the aegis of the Scandinavian union, rendered all Swedish subjects potential spies in the eyes of governor-general and Finlandish administration. Moreover, the loyalty of the Swedish-speaking inhabitants of the coastal areas as well as of educated society in the capital accordingly came under suspicion.⁹⁸¹ Their ostensible rootedness in the Swedish culture and ties that still bound them to the neighboring state became vital as never before during the years of war, and governor-general Berg held tight to this analysis.

⁹⁷⁸ KA. KKK, Fc 17, N. 358. 1. 79-80.

⁹⁷⁹ Other scholars miss this governor-general's attempt, dating stable passport system as starting in 1862: Asko Lehmuskallio and Paula Haara, 'The Passport as a Medium of Movement', in *Varieties of Cooperation: Mutually Making the Conditions of Mutual Making*, ed. Clemens Eisenmann et al. (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien, 2023), 137–65, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-39037-2_7.

⁹⁸⁰ On anxieties: Elmgren, *S.G. Elmgrenin muistiinpanot*, 174–75.

⁹⁸¹ It runs counter to what Auvinen writes. While he argues that the Crimean War was a demonstration of the popular loyalty that solidified imperial trust, I would argue that there rather appeared new pockets of loyalty anchored in new practices of groupness: Auvinen, 'Krimin sota, Venäjä ja suomalaiset. Siviilit rannikoiden puolustajina ja sen vaikutus sotatoimiin sekä Venäjän suomensuhteisiin', 409–15. In this sense Juhani Paasivirta is right: Paasivirta, *Finland and Europe*, 99-120.

5.4. Foreign connections: the case of Swedish intervention and figure of Emil von Qvanten

While the Swedish government sought to save the appearance of a neutral state until the end of 1855, propaganda campaigns arguing in favor of Swedish intervention in the war to recapture Finland were launched both inside the kingdom and in Europe, and were orchestrated by the king himself.⁹⁸² The allied pressure on Sweden and Oscar I's beliefs contributed to the feeling that the moment was right for the Swedish revanche against Russia, even though many conservative ministers opposed these bold designs. Until November 1855, Oscar patiently waited for the pivotal turn in the war in favor of the maritime powers as well as for the allied guaranties in case the Swedish army would step up into the warfare.⁹⁸³ Heating up the public spirit by the means of the press under the royal aegis, many liberal revanchists bound their visions with Scandinavianism, and made the two into an often-inseparable entity.⁹⁸⁴

Surprisingly, the Russian mission in Stockholm until the very end of the year stood firmly on their conviction that Sweden would never intervene into the war. Russian envoy Jakov Dashkov highlighted that fact that the Scandinavian neutrality was the most satisfactory system for Sweden given the profits it provided by trade.⁹⁸⁵ While the nationalist agitation lamented about Swedish inconclusiveness, thoughtful politicians and audience recognized both the challenges of war against Russia and the benefits they were gaining through the neutrality. Moreover, Dashkov could not suspect King Oscar I – previously a devoted ally of the Russian emperor – in any intrigues, while Crown Prince Charles indeed explicated belligerent sympathies. The public opinion fluctuated with conservative newspapers revealing the

⁹⁸² Eriksson argues that Oscar I was bent for alliance with Western powers since 1853, methodically pursuing the goal: Eriksson, *Svensk diplomati och tidningspress under Krimkriget*, 293–94.

⁹⁸³ Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige*, 254–76.

⁹⁸⁴ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 420.

⁹⁸⁵ Dashkov – Nesselrode, 27 January / 8 February 1855. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1855, d. 167, l. 6-9; Dashkov – Nesselrode, 24 May / 5 June. Ibid, l. 135-139. Eriksson, *Svensk diplomati och tidningspress under Krimkriget*, 290–91.

weakness of the Swedish army so that by July, Dashkov could notify Nesselrode that the public spirit calmed down almost completely.⁹⁸⁶ Moreover, he constantly pointed to the tensions that were arising from intraunion relations between Sweden and Norway, where centralizing politicians in Stockholm opted for a more intimate union while autonomists in Norway opposed it.⁹⁸⁷

Dashkov in his dispatches almost completely ignored publications prepared by the small circle of intellectuals around King Oscar I. The campaign that sought to shape the public opinion against the Russian empire drew significantly on the prospects of the Scandinavian union that in their texts would stretch as far as to encompass the territory of Finland. Geffroy's contributions to *Revue du deux Mondes*, von Qvanten's *Fennomani och Skandinavism*, numerous belligerent articles in liberal journals did not find their ways into the diplomat's dispatches.⁹⁸⁸ The one notable exception was his mention of von Schinkel reminiscences that spurred heated debate in the Swedish public about the burdens of Russian-friendly foreign trajectory of Sweden.⁹⁸⁹ Those omitted scripts, however, became well-known for the Finnish society and administration.⁹⁹⁰ It was especially pertinent about von Qvanten's texts since he was still formally a subject of the Russian emperor, and while he wrote most of his pieces anonymously, his authorship quickly became recognized.

Emil von Qvanten, previously a student at the Alexander Imperial University, had to travel abroad due to health problems at the beginning of the 1850s. In Finland, he was well-known for a series of patriotic poems that glorified the land and Finnish nation. In 1853, he arrived in Stockholm and became a self-fashioned representative of the Finnish Swedish-

⁹⁸⁶ Dashkov – Nesselrode, 12 / 24 July 1855. Ibid, l. 161-162.

⁹⁸⁷ Dashkov – Nesselrode, 12 / 24 July 1855. Ibid, 166-167; Dashkov – Nesselrode, 2 / 14 August 1855. Ibid, l. 182.

⁹⁸⁸ On these texts see: Eriksson, *Svensk diplomati och tidningspress under Krimkriget*, 293-330.

⁹⁸⁹ Dashkov – Nesselrode, 11 / 23 October 1855. Ibid, l. 258-259; Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige*, 249–50.

⁹⁹⁰ Berg's report on the book and announcement of ban. 19 September / 2 October 1855. KA. KKK, Fc 27, N 373, l. 6-8. Both small volumes are attached to the report. Berg wrote that the first volume was published in the spring of 1855, but the second just recently.

leaning emigration. Von Qvanten became close to the liberal and Scandinavian-leaning as well as to some representatives of the royal family. His Scandinavianist visions became one of the trajectory-defining features of the Swedish royal foreign policy, although he took the leading role in these processes later in the 1860s.⁹⁹¹ Qvanten's pamphlet *Fennomani och Skandinavism* for a moment appeared in the center of the public debate in Sweden and became well-known in Finland.⁹⁹²

The text published in two parts painted the picture of Finland under the despotic Russian rule. The Russian empire, presented as an antipode of the West in moral, economic, and civilizational respects, should have been stripped of its military power and stopped in its ostensible plans about the seizure of the Northern Europe. Scandinavianism, despite the brochure's naming, featured only as a background that drove the Nordic kingdoms together, but Qvanten did not elaborate much on its nature, apart from the fact that it would ideally be a federative state (*forbund stat*) where Finland would acquire an equal footing.⁹⁹³ The pamphlet argued for the Swedish intervention into the Crimean War on the grounds, among others, of the national and cultural proximity of the Finlandish and Swedish populations.

Apart from that, Qvanten sought to explain to the Swedish audience the struggles of an often-misinterpreted Fennomani project.⁹⁹⁴ The movement, he argued, arose from the natural Finnish feeling of the national that made a long way from Romanticist fascination to contemporary times and functioned as a tool against the Russian dominance. Waxing lyrical about its cultural highlights, including *Kalevala*, Qvanten simultaneously criticized its 'excesses' that were directed against the Swedish culture.⁹⁹⁵ To reconcile the Swedish and

⁹⁹¹ Evgenii Egorov and Mikael Björk-Winberg Mikael, "Emil von Qvanten, Mikhail Bakunin and Pan-National Activist Networks," in *Nordic Experiences in Pan-Nationalisms*, ed. Ruth Hemstad and Peter Stadius (London: Routledge, 2023), 117–36.

⁹⁹² Elmgren, *S.G. Elmgrenin muistiinpanot*, 149.

⁹⁹³ Emil von Qvanten, *Fennomani och skandinavism*, vol. 2 (Stockholm: Z. Hæggström, 1855), 44–65; Arvid Mörne, "Kring Emil von Qvantens Fennomani och Skandinavism," *Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier*, no. 8 (1932): 16–20.

⁹⁹⁴ On numerous misinterpretations: Thiodolf Rein, *Johan Vilhelm Snellman*, vol. 2 (Helsinki: Otava, 1904), 176.

⁹⁹⁵ Emil von Qvanten, *Fennomani och skandinavism*, vol. 1 (Stockholm: Z. Hæggström, 1855), 35–43.

Finnish element, Qvanten argued – against the grain of Herderian-inspired nationalist logic – that the two languages could simultaneously prosper in one state.

Surpassing the restrictions of nationalist homogenous logic, Qvanten pointed to the fact that history was ripe with examples when members of one nationality established separate states, as was the case with German polities, and when different nationalities prospered within one state, namely Austria where national tensions arose only from the ill-advised centralizing attempts of the government: ‘It is clear, nevertheless, that the concept of nationality and state by no means coincide with each other.’⁹⁹⁶ It is not surprising that Qvanten’s argument in favor of composite formations on conditions that these states allowed the nationalities within them to develop independently, was faced with a backlash both from the advocates of the Swedish cultural domination in Finland and from the Fennomania-oriented national purist visions that became more and more opposed to each other during and after the war.⁹⁹⁷

Finlandish educated society also imagined different futures for the duchy, with the help of Qvanten’s text or, more often, without it.⁹⁹⁸ One small and scattered group of young pro-Swedish intellectuals regarded the war as a moment of opportunity where Finland could become free from the Russian domination, but the perspectives of the Scandinavian union, proposed by the Swedish journals and propaganda brochures, rarely featured in the correspondence at that point, not to mention heavily censored newspapers.⁹⁹⁹ Rather, the argumentation followed the principles of analogy, and the position of Norway in Swedish-Norwegian union featured as an example to follow in imperial-Finlandish relations in the

⁹⁹⁶ Qvanten, *Fennomani och skandinavism*, 1: 45, 43-45.

⁹⁹⁷ Barton, ‘Scandinavianism, Fennomania, and the Crimean War’.

⁹⁹⁸ Then student D.E.D. Europaeus’ voyage to Sweden and Norway for the establishment of the ‘perpetual peace’, perhaps, stands aside as a unique endeavor: Väinö Salminen, *D. E. D. Europaeus* (Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seuran, 1906), 96-105.

⁹⁹⁹ Margit Lindqvist, “1800-talets studentskandinavism och Finland: Ett litet bidrag ur en dagbok från 1855,” *Ord och Bild*, no. 51 (1943): 198-203; Mikael Björk-Winberg, “Opposition from Abroad: Emil von Qvanten and Finnish Scandinavism in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,” *Finnish Studies* 24, no. 1 and 2, 16-41; Grandell, *Från ett årtionde i Finland*, 117-53; Krusius-Abrenberg, *Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus und Liberalismus im politischen Leben Finnlands 1856-1863*, 7-103.

critical juncture.¹⁰⁰⁰ Scandinavianism – if we assume that some intellectuals used this label in their political navigation¹⁰⁰¹ – in its Finnish edition often put forward liberal ideas and downplayed geopolitical designs, either due to self-censorship or particularities of domestication of the idea.

Others, including Zacharias Topelius, stood on loyal grounds and defended Russian and Finnish participation in the war as a ‘genuinely European’ affair against the Ottoman barbarity.¹⁰⁰² Topelius refuted the ungrounded criticism that the Swedish newspapers, primarily *Aftonbladet* and *Folkets Röst*, directed against Finnish establishments during the war.¹⁰⁰³ Overall, after English bombardments of Finnish towns and reported atrocities committed by the occupation forces, most of the population displayed loyalty to the Russian throne, or at least kept their dissatisfaction hidden. Seven sharpshooter battalions (*skarpskytter indelta bataljoner*) were formed on the request of governor-general who wanted – as he declared to the emperor – to make this war into a ‘people’s [narodnaya]’ one.¹⁰⁰⁴ The battalions were manned through a kind of communal conscription, and governor-general insisted on the equal conditions for all men regardless of their origin.¹⁰⁰⁵ The establishment was presented to the emperor as if requested by the local patriotic population who shared hopes and fears of the Russian empire.¹⁰⁰⁶ While there was a degree of presentism enmeshed in this project, the

¹⁰⁰⁰ Matti Klinge, *Studenter och idéer: 1853-1871*, vol. 2 (Helsinki: Studentkåren vid Helsingfors Universitet, 1969), 30.

¹⁰⁰¹ I will address this problem later in the text.

¹⁰⁰² Topelius – B. O. Schauman, 5 August 1855. Kansalliskirjasto. Coll. 198. 9.

¹⁰⁰³ Zacharias Topelius, “Bref från Helsingfors. 5” [Helsingfors Tidningar 13/5 1854], in *Publicistik*, ed. Pia Asp, Mats Dahlberg, Jens Grandell, Maren Jonasson, Eliel Kilpelä & Frida Wickholm (Helsingfors: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland 2021), URL: <https://urn.fi/URN:NBN:fi:sls-9162-1623249240>. His later appointment as the lecturer of history at the university sparked debates among more liberal-minded students.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Berg’s report, 10 / 22 August 1855. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIb 8a, l. 647-656: “turn into a people’s war”; On the people’s war during Crimean crisis: Olga Maiorova, “Searching for a New Language of Collective Self: The Symbolism of Russian National Belonging During and After the Crimean War,” *Ab Imperio*, no. 4 (2006): 187–224, <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2006.0102>.

¹⁰⁰⁵ Berg’s report, 10 / 22 August 1855. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIb 8a, l. 647-656; Borodkin, *Vojna na Finskoi poberezh’e 1854-1855 gg.*, 44–45.

¹⁰⁰⁶ The idea to form battalions was conceived before Berg took his post, but he was its advocate and designer since he took post. On battalion plans: Armfelt – Haartman. 1 / 13 October 1854. KA, L.G. von Haartmanin arkisto, Ba 3-4, t.6; Pertti Luntinen, *The Imperial Russian Army and Navy in Finland, 1808-1918* (Helsinki: Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 1997), 92–93.

establishment of local military forces indeed made the war into a shared effort, appreciated by Saint-Petersburg.¹⁰⁰⁷

These expressions of loyalty, whether mediated by the administration or genuinely manifested by the population, did not distract the government from scrupulous monitoring of the public press, both domestic and imported. Von Qvanten's publications, among others, came early on the radar of the administrative attention. They must have produced anxiety among the authorities, so that during summer of 1855, Berg wanted to bring von Qvanten back into Finland, whether by legal means or not. Berg addressed the ministry of the foreign affairs with the request of Qvanten's deportation 'under the plausible reason' of his passport being long outdated. The justifications for the deportation included Qvanten's publications in the Swedish journals against Russian rule in Finland and his participation in the party of *Young Finland*, hostile to the imperial establishment. Moreover, Finlandish clandestine correspondence was almost universally, according to governor-general, addressed to von Qvanten.¹⁰⁰⁸

The ministry took the problem seriously in the times of continuous warfare and suspecting Swedish future turn and instructed Russian representatives in Sweden and in Denmark – where Qvanten reportedly found himself – to assist in the implementation of Berg's request. Berg went on explicating the dangers of von Qvanten working freely in Sweden, especially after the publication of *Fennomani och Skandinavism* that became popular both in Sweden and in even Finland where it was secretly distributed. Qvanten was an anti-Russian agitator and very dangerous person due to his connections in Finland and Sweden in Berg's eyes. Governor-general planned to send this 'traitor', as he referred to him, into the interim of

¹⁰⁰⁷ Auvinen, 'Krimin sota, Venäjä ja suomalaiset. Siviilit rannikoiden puolustajina ja sen vaikutus sotatoimiin sekä Venäjän suomensuhteisiin'.

¹⁰⁰⁸ Berg – Senyavin. 1 June 1855. AVPRI. F. Departament vnutrennikh shosheniy. Otd. 4. St. 4 t-4. Sekretniy arkhiv, op. 306, d. 39, l. 1–10.

Russia, so that his agitation could be curbed.¹⁰⁰⁹ The instruments of monitoring and neutralizing have already been sharpened with active surveillance deployed in the duchy, and at this point Berg claimed similar demands for those residing across the sea.

Russian envoy in Sweden Dashkov, however, considered the implementation of this plan impossible. Although he painted Qvanten's activities provocative, there was no option of sending Qvanten back into Finland. The Swedish government would not allow it, since it would place it under the harsh criticism of the public, while any attempt of forceful actions against Qvanten would provide him with an opportunity to present himself as a political martyr. Dashkov then argued to limit Russian intervention to surveillance over the perilous author.¹⁰¹⁰ While Berg's intervention did not come to the result that he himself envisioned, it was instructive of the degree of attention he paid to correspondence and printed press in Sweden, especially when the connection between Finland and Sweden remained in practice almost unrestrained. Moreover, this request helped Berg to establish direct communication with Russian diplomats in Sweden to counter transnational projects more effectively, and this connection would prove essential for Berg's later visions and practices.¹⁰¹¹ The fact that von Qvanten preached the benefits of the Scandinavian union also shaped the focus of governor-general's attention during and after the war.

Before and after his attempt to bring von Qvanten back to Finland through the channels of the ministry of foreign affairs, Berg alarmed Armfelt of the consequences of the clandestine correspondence practices by the Finlandish scholars with their Swedish colleagues and complained that the head of the Third Section Alexei Orlov refused to provide resources for the establishment of a secret police. Berg wanted to use its functionaries the role of *agent*

¹⁰⁰⁹ Berg – Senyavin. 20 June / 2 July 1855. Ibid, l. 5. Another figure also appeared in the correspondence, namely doctor Edvard Grönblad, ostensibly another member of the young Finnish party propagating against the Russian rule. Ideally, both had to be deported to Russia.

¹⁰¹⁰ Dashkov – Senyavin, 23 June / 5 July 1855, Ibid, l. 11.

¹⁰¹¹ Krusius-Ahrenberg knew of the correspondence but, perhaps, did not have access to it: Krusius-Ahrenberg, *Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus und Liberalismus im politischen Leben Finnlands 1856-1863*, 162-208.

provocateur to solicit the names of the Finlandish opposition.¹⁰¹² Governor-general of Finland was not the only bureaucrat in the empire who complained on the inadequacy of the police institutions that were not prepared for their monitoring functions, especially during the times of crisis.¹⁰¹³ After all, Berg reasoned to minister state-secretary, ‘we are not in the state of peace, and everything should appear dangerous’, justifying his anxious suspicion.¹⁰¹⁴

Not only Finlandish administration, but also monitoring institutions in the Russian capital thought that Berg occasionally exaggerated the degree of danger. The same Orlov, for example, was surprised when Berg reported to him about potential experienced English spy versatile in many languages, who under further investigation happened to be a 14-year boy who wanted to sail home to his parents.¹⁰¹⁵ Prince Dmitrij Obolenskiy, who visited Sveaborg for an inspection on August 1855, wrote that everybody ‘took Berg for an alarmist’, although he admitted that governor-general’s strategy worked well and he gained all necessary resources from the War Ministry through it.¹⁰¹⁶ Clearly, Berg’s activities appeared overdriven for many functionaries within and beyond the borders of the duchy. Berg, however, was not so easily stopped in his pursuits – especially given that they were reportedly bearing fruit – and parallel to legal measures he sought to bring or at least to spy over the ‘agitator’ with measures he covertly elaborated. This, in turn, produced one of the major public scandals between the students and governor-general, that plagued their relations during Berg’s rule, known as Tamelander affair.¹⁰¹⁷

Berg picked a son of the post-director Wulffert’s adjunct, Oskar Tamelander to spy over the suspected personalities. Oskar travelled to Sweden and occupied a room at the same hotel

¹⁰¹² Berg – Armfelt, 25 May / 6 June 1855. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Ila 15, l. 50-52.

¹⁰¹³ On similar demands see: Grigorij Bibikov, ‘Sozdanie zhandarmskih uchrezhdenij na Kavkaze v 1820-h – nachale 1840-h gg.’, *Rossijskaja istorija*, no. 3 (2018): 134–58, <https://doi.org/10.7868/S0869568718030123>.

¹⁰¹⁴ Berg – Armfelt, 26 October / 7 November 1855. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Ila 15, l. 137-38.

¹⁰¹⁵ Orlov – Berg, 8 April 1855. GARF. F. R8091, op. 1, d. 1611, l. 105-105ob.

¹⁰¹⁶ Dmitrij Aleksandrovich Obolenskij, *Zapiski knjazja Dmitrija Aleksandrovicha Obolenskogo, 1855-1879*, ed. Valentina Chernuha (Saint-Petersburg: Nestor-Istorija, 2005), 86.

¹⁰¹⁷ Carl von Philippaeus, Berg’s assistant on their relations: Carl von Philippaeus, “Generalguvernör Berg,” *Nya pressen*, 24.04.1889; Schauman, *Från sex årtionden i Finland*, 2: 126-31; Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 2:22–56.

where von Qvanten lived. Tamelander presented himself to Qvanten as a reliable correspondence mediator between Sweden and Finland and as a close acquaintance of Finnish publicist August Schauman. As historian Jens Grandell argues, Schauman's name must have surfaced in the dialogue since governor-general held him suspected in the clandestine correspondence with the Swedish editors, perhaps having learned of his family and earlier voyages. This explication prompted von Qvanten to address Schauman in a letter on June 6, 1855. The content of the letter gave Schauman enough evidence, amplified by the information he got from the personalities close to the authorities, to suspect Tamelander in espionage.¹⁰¹⁸

Upon Tamelander's return, he was inquired by the students of historical-philological faculty about the reasons of his voyage to Sweden.¹⁰¹⁹ During the scene he confessed that Alexander Wulffert offered him benefits for spying over von Qvanten. Governor-general, upon learning of the students' inquiry upon Tamelander, started a process over their behavior. He was provided with anonymous profiles over those students present at the Tamelander's examination. These reports mentioned their affiliations, characters, skills, potential connections with the Swedish public sphere, and pointed to their liberal or revolutionary inclinations.¹⁰²⁰ Tamelander himself filed a report over the process of the interrogation, enlisting persons present at the scene. Finally, Tamelander was relegated from the university by the group of students for the breach of rules, and, unexpectedly for Berg, the vice-chancellor general Johan Sebastian Munck sided with them. While Berg protested this decision to no avail, he managed to send Tamelander first to Viborg and then to the interior of Russia, where he

¹⁰¹⁸ Grandell, *Från ett årtionde i Finland*, 130–32; Schauman, *Från sex årtionden i Finland*, 2: 126–38. Indeed, archival sources confirm that Berg was informed on Schauman's activities: GARF. F. 547, op. 1, d. 27, l. 1-6.

¹⁰¹⁹ Grandell, *Från ett årtionde i Finland*, 132-34.

¹⁰²⁰ Reports on students and activities. GARF. F. 547, op. 1, d. 27, l. 1-6.

stayed under governor-general's patronage.¹⁰²¹ Qvanten, in his turn, was prohibited to return to the empire by Emperor Alexander II himself.¹⁰²²

The students' mobilization and self-organization was then exacerbated by the convention at Tölö restaurant where almost the same line-up who interrogated Tamelander, pronounced toasts for Queen Victoria, Napoleon III, and other 'enemies of Russia' and sang *Marsellaise* together with Swedish-Scandinavian anthem *Karl XII*. This time, students were punished with eternal and temporal relegations, punishment cells, and reprimands. Among the students punished, there were persons who would later outline the contours of the Finnish liberalism in the coming decade, including Edvard Bergh, Carl Wetterhof, J.J. Chydenius, Robert Monthomery, and Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld.¹⁰²³ While Qvanten's biographer Cecilia Bååth-Holmberg considers both Tamelander's interrogation and Tölö affair as actions representative of the early Finnish Scandinavianism,¹⁰²⁴ it was rather an illustration of the students' mobilization along the multifaceted specter of arising liberalism in Finland that was reinforced both by pan-Scandinavian and Finnish national visions.¹⁰²⁵

Governor-general Berg, however, amalgamated the problem of Finnish correspondents in Swedish newspapers, arising liberal rhetoric, Swedish sympathies, and pan-Scandinavian visions to produce an object of surveillance he would be fighting against during his whole career in Finland. While some of his intuitions were not unfounded, the insurmountable distance between the optics of monitoring institutions and those surveilled was enough for Berg to misinterpret, speculate, and imagine rather than discover various forms of doctrinal and organizational patterns of disenfranchised inhabitants. While there were many

¹⁰²¹ Ibid, 25-35; Klinge, *Studenterna och idéerna*, 2:32–56.

¹⁰²² Letter from F.W. Berg, 21 September 1856. KA. Biographica-kokoelma I, Qvanten, Emil von, C6 46.

¹⁰²³ Tobiesen – Dolgorukow, 8 November 1855. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 30, d. 346, l. 9-9ob; KA. KKK, Fc 27, N. 375

¹⁰²⁴ Cecilia Bååth-Holmberg, *Skaldedrämmor och skaldpolitik: Emil von Qvanten och hans tid* (Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt, 1906), 46-67; Runar Johansson, 'Skandinavismen i Finland', *Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier*, no. 6 (1930): 256–68.

¹⁰²⁵ Even governor-general knew that some of the students later embarked on learning Finnish: KA. KKK, Fc 27, N. 375, l. 21. Grandell, *Från ett årtionde i Finland*, 34.

markers of political mapping, group categorization and self-identification, Scandinavianism and Scandinavianist politics – often but not always referred to Swedish-Finlandish relations excluding Denmark – would become the central problem for Berg.

5.5. Final phases of the war and expectations of the future

Berg's bitter reaction against students' demonstrations resulted, among other things, from the critical juncture that the Russian empire and Finland was facing in the battlefield and beyond in 1855. First, the ascension of Alexander II to the throne, yet with unknown consequences in March 1855, signified a gradual turn towards peace negotiations and consequent reform. Then, Sveaborg fortress in the vicinity of Helsinki was bombed in August 1855 that made many city inhabitants flee in panic.¹⁰²⁶ Finally, the long siege of Sevastopol in Crimea finished in the allies' favor in September 1855 and was considered by many to be a turning point in the war. In Finland, Berg complained, this event negatively affected the minds of the population, especially of the students.¹⁰²⁷ And third, the negotiations that the French general Françoise Canrobert held with the Swedish king proved, despite Dashkov's assurance in their apolitical nature, to provide the entrance point for Sweden into the war with the signing of the November Agreement.¹⁰²⁸ Whereas the agreement did not contain any explicit notions of the Swedish involvement into the war, it made clear that Sweden abandoned the regime of neutrality by declaring the allied protection of the integrity of Norway.¹⁰²⁹

While Dashkov until the end of the year considered the agreement to be a measure that concerned only a local question of the Sami migration in the northern provinces of Norway and

¹⁰²⁶ Borodkin, *Vojna na Finskom poberezh'e 1854-1855 gg.*, 57–93; Elmgren, *S.G. Elmgrenin muistiinpanot*, 167–70.

¹⁰²⁷ Berg – Armfelt, 3 / 15 November 1855. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15, l. 140-151.

¹⁰²⁸ Dashkov – Nesselrode, 1 / 13 November. AVPRI. F. 133, g. 1855, op. 469, d. 167. l. 287-291.

¹⁰²⁹ Palmstierna, *Sverige, Ryssland och England 1833-1855*, 221-375; Mart Kuldkepp, "National Revanchism at a Critical Juncture: Sweden's Near-Involvement in the Crimean War as a Study in Swedish Nationalism," *Scandinavica* 58, no. 2 (2019): 115–33, <https://doi.org/10.54432/scand/RXJE7055>.

Finland, Berg was right in perceiving the agreement as an early bird in preparing Sweden for warfare, and Oscar I indeed envisioned that Sweden soon could join the allies by providing the landing army.¹⁰³⁰ Besides again agitating the spirit of the oppositional youth who bet on the imperial defeat that opened up variegated visions of the future, Canrobert's mission certainly affected the balance on the potential battlefield in the coming year.¹⁰³¹ Governor-general, responsible for the defense of Finland, thus had to consider Swedish participation in the war. As he confessed to the Naval Ministry, he believed that the primary goal of Sweden would be the seizure of the North-Eastern shores of the duchy, since:

The eastern coast of the Gulf of Bothnia is separated from Sweden only by a narrow branch of the sea, thinning between Vasa and the Swedish city of Umeå to 60 versts (Kvarken Strait) and therefore provides the possibility of close and constant communication with Sweden; the coastal part of the Vasa province, inhabited by the descendants of Swedish immigrants, represents all the benefits arising from a *common origin, language and faith* [my italics – EE] .¹⁰³²

The loyalty of the Swedish-speaking coastal population was questioned on the grounds of their cultural proximity with the potential invader.

His long address to the Ministry of War written on 9 October 1855 – predating Canrobert's mission to Sweden – surfaced as even more telling with regards to his concerns. Berg considered the results of the allied naval forces insignificant on the Baltic theater and expected that in 1856 they would not attack without the landing army. Concerning the sources of troops, governor-general argued that Denmark and Sweden could potentially change their

¹⁰³⁰ Carl Hallendorff, *Oscar I, Napoleon och Nikolaus: Ur diplomaternas privatbrev under Krimkriget* (Stockholm: Geber, 1918), 53-142; Berg's prognosis for the future at that point were quite pessimistic: Berg – Kiselev, 23 November / 5 December 1855. IRLI RAN. F. 143, op. 1, d. 126, l. 191-91ob.

¹⁰³¹ On student agitation: Berg – Armfelt, 5 / 18 November 1855. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Ila 15, l. 158-61.

¹⁰³² Berg's report 'O merah obespechenija Finljandii ot napadenija na onuju neprijatelja'. RGAVMF. F. 410, op. 2, d. 1214.

positions in the war, allying with the maritime powers. Among the reasons for this casting, Berg mentioned Denmark's strained relations with the Northern United States due to the Sound fees, its concerns for the colonies, but, most importantly, 'growing revolutionary propaganda aimed [...] at separation with Russia and at establishment of a dreamed (*mechtatel'noy*) allied Scandinavian state through the annex of Finland'. Stressing the interdependence of the two kingdoms, Berg assured the ministry that the Grand Duchy was the most probable theater of the allied operations in 1856. Given the Swedish troops' 'similarity of origins' (*odnorodnost' proishozhdeniya*) with the coastal population of Finland, Åbo and Ostrobothnia region surfaced as obvious aims for the army landing. While he stated that the majority's loyalty was solid, a part of passionate youth would be enough to captivate a crowd and thus provoke the population.¹⁰³³

Bridging the prospects of the Scandinavian union – he was well informed or speculating in the correct direction about Scandinavian participation¹⁰³⁴ – with domestic conspiracies and ambiguous loyalties, Berg requested additional battalions for the defense of the duchy which were approved by the ministry that seemed to have shared at least some points of his analysis.¹⁰³⁵ Connections with Sweden that still ostensibly pervaded the university students and the coastal population for the first time shaped the cabinet discourse about Finlandish loyalty more consistently along the ethnic qualities of language and origin, the categories that would gradually become as significant – and perhaps even more essential – as those of estate and class in the analytics of the imperial resilience.¹⁰³⁶ Moreover, this suspicion that arose from the political ambiguity of the Swedish government was scaled up to pan-Scandinavian level.

¹⁰³³ Berg's report in *Ob obshhem razmeshhenii vojsk 1855-7*. RGVIA. F. 38, op. 4, d. 1419, l. 60-117. Briefly mentioned in: Alexei Krivolapov, 'Fel'dmarshal I.F.Paskevich i russkaja strategija v 1848–1856 Gg.' (PhD diss., Moscow State University, 2014), 198–99.

¹⁰³⁴ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 438; Halicz, *Danish Neutrality During the Crimean War (1853-1856)*, 70–71.

¹⁰³⁵ RGVIA. F. 38, op. 4, d. 1419, l. 189-199.

¹⁰³⁶ They featured previously in statistical works: Gabriel Rejn, *Statisticheskij ocherk velikogo knjazhestva Finljandii* (Gel'singfors: Tipografija Vaseniusa, 1840), 25-55.

Governor-general was informed on the juncture between Sweden and Denmark by journals and agitation campaign that set the two kingdoms together in the visions of the Scandinavian union or at least a joint military alliance.

In January 1856, considering the prospects of the Swedish intervention among other things, the advisors of Emperor Alexander II sought to persuade the tsar in the futility of continuous warfare against the allies. Among the reasons to approach the maritime powers with peace negotiations, Count Alexei Orlov and Pavel Kiselev mentioned the precarious position of the imperial borderlands. Poland, some gubernias of the Western krai showed the signs of the local discontent with the burdens of war. The Grand Duchy of Finland, ‘despite the good will of its inhabitants demonstrated until the present point’, was put under the burden of sacrifices that the population had to endure, and, according to the *pro memoria* of the conversation, ‘was ready to return under the sovereignty of Sweden’.¹⁰³⁷ The precarious position of Finland – a large part of its trade fleet was indeed destroyed – as well as explicated trajectories of the public opinion there that revolved around the questions of Scandinavian union and Swedish revanchism, were well-known for the imperial governing elites, and, especially, for Alexei Orlov, the head of the Third Section who was constantly updated on the state of minds in Finland.

The peace was finally signed in March 1856.¹⁰³⁸ The aftermath of the Crimean War brought with it the resentment of the defeat but also the impetus to change the system that could not meet the needs of the modern times. Alexander II was no liberal, of course, but Alfred Rieber posits that the new reign was a fresh start, and both small circles in the highest cabinets and large societal groups – be those estates or nations – were to prove their loyalty and

¹⁰³⁷ Aufzeichnung Meyendorffs, 3 / 15 January 1856 in Otto Hoetzsch, ed., *Peter von Meyendorff*, vol. 3 (Berlin und Leipzig: De Gruyter, 1923), 214-217; Evgenij Tarle, *Krymskaja vojna*, vol. 2 (Moskva: Jurajt, 2021), 281–90.

¹⁰³⁸ W. E. Mosse, ‘How Russia Made Peace September 1855 to April 1856’, *Cambridge Historical Journal* 11, no. 3 (1955): 297–316;

efficiency in commanding affairs anew, redistributing the political, economic, and cultural capitals. The start of the new reign and the end of the Crimean War, although these two points were quite separate on the time scale, singularized into the public expectations of the new times and unprecedented hopes of catching up with the pace of progress in Europe.¹⁰³⁹ In the Russian proper, the changes signified the relaxation of the censorship and expanded public discussion over pending issues of the empire. The question of the serfdom became the most essential of them, while other reform projects that touched upon the institutions of education, church, provincial and urban governance, army, and finance loomed large both in the cabinets and in the broader public discussions that cross-fertilized each other.¹⁰⁴⁰

These changes echoed as clearly in other constituent parts of the empire as in the Russian proper itself. While Alexander II's visit to the duchy in March 1856 was still perceived by some witnesses as a continuation of a standard policy of the imperial self-demonstration, even lacking the 'imperial delirium' of his predecessor, the expectation of changes followed soon.¹⁰⁴¹ During his visit, Alexander II presented a broad reform programme to the Senate, elaborated by Haartman, Berg, and Armfelt, that touched upon the issues of trade and banking, transport communication, education, and censorship.¹⁰⁴² Others noticed these changes in different circumstances. Thus, the students' protest against new disciplinary rules at the university did not face outright suppression, and one of the witnesses jokingly claimed that

¹⁰³⁹ Alfred Rieber, 'Alexander II: A Revisionist View,' *The Journal of Modern History* 43, no. 1 (1971): 42–58; Alexander Shevyrev, 'Ottepel' 1855–1857 Gg.: Ot Nikolaevskogo Vremeni k Jepohe Velikih Reform', *Rossijskaja Istorija*, no. 4 (2022): 46–59.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Larisa Georgievna Zaharova, 'Autocracy and the Reforms of 1861-1874 in Russia' in *Russia's Great Reforms, 1855–1881* ed. Ben Eklof, John Bushnell, and Larisa Zakharova (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 19-39; Mikhail Dolbilov, 'Russification and the Bureaucratic Mind in the Russian Empire's Northwestern Region in the 1860s', *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 5, no. 2 (2004): 245–71, <https://doi.org/10.1353/kri.2004.0022>; Igor' Anatol'evich Hristoforov, *Sud'ba reformy: Russkoe krest'janstvo v pravitel'stvennoj politike do i posle otmeny krepostnogo prava (1830-1890-e gg.)* (Moscow: Sobranie, 2011), 17-177; Il'ja Gerasimov, Marina Mogil'ner, and Sergej Glebov, *Novaja imperskaja istorija Severnoj Evrazii: Chast' 2: Balansirovanie imperskoj situacii: XVIII – XX vv.* (Kazan': Ab Imperio, 2017), 219-66.

¹⁰⁴¹ J.J. Chydenius – Edvard Bergh, 28 March 1856. SLSA 357.

¹⁰⁴² The plan: KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIb 8 b, l. 136-139; Jussila, Hentilä, and Nevakivi, *From Grand Duchy to a Modern State*, 48-56.

under Nicholas I this could result in a Siberian exile, reflecting the administrative smoothening of grip.¹⁰⁴³

Berndt Otto Schauman wrote to his brother who during that time stayed in Paris, that in autumn 1856 the greatest political changes were taking place not in the French capital but in the ‘Norden, to which even Finland belongs’, meaning arguably the atmosphere of changes and new staff at the university but these words might have also referred to the plans of the Scandinavian union discussed during this period.¹⁰⁴⁴ One of the previously expelled university students, Edvard Bergh wrote to his friend August Schauman in May 1856 from Jakobstad, a town on the shore of Ostrobothnia:

I cannot possibly imagine what people in Helsingfors now have to think about or know. Everything starts to be more and more a matter of guessing. I have let myself say, however, that we have encountered a completely new time. But with how many atoms and of what quality we can enter the new time is a matter of debate which I engage with a society here.¹⁰⁴⁵

Indeed, the contours of the new time was a matter of argument and imagination both in the capital of the duchy and in its provinces. While a bulk of historiography of the imperial reform highlights the similarity of the imperial designs in the ‘borderlands’ during the reign of Alexander II,¹⁰⁴⁶ this scheme does not pay enough attention to the local agency. The latter often made Saint-Petersburg decide on pending questions before it could think of any consistent strategy with regards to the issue. Whether this agency resulted in emancipatory or restrictive tactics and strategies is another question.¹⁰⁴⁷

¹⁰⁴³ J.J. Chydenius – Edvard Bergh, 16 May 1856. SLSA 357.

¹⁰⁴⁴ B.O. Schauman – A. Schauman, 15 September 1856. Kansalliskirjasto, Coll. 201.6; On union plans: Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 448–64.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Edvard Bergh – A. Schauman, 15 May 1856. SLSA 357; In 1857, Bergh wrote to Schauman that ‘we’ve got a monarch, although he has his weaknesses, nevertheless is a human’: Bergh – Schauman, 11 March 1857, Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier 1863 - 1914* (Berkeley: Northern Illinois University, 2008), 3-110.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Krusius-Abrenberg, *Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus und Liberalismus im politischen Leben Finnlands 1856-1863*, 112-13.

5.6. Loyal modernization of Lars Gabriel von Haartman navigating between Fennomania and Scandinavianism

An example of local agency was Frans Ludvig Schauman's famous speech on the coronation of Alexander II and Maria Alexandrowna in August 1856. While the speech held to the principles of unquestioned loyalty to the monarch and empire, it sought to set demands before the Grand Duke – even if in the form of the lyrical disguise of the monarchical gift – in the preservation and maintenance of the Finnish nationality, Finnish language, and political autonomy (*sjelfstandighet*). Moreover, according to Schauman, everything proved that the emperor had already shown signs of his devotedness to these programmes.

What really appeared alarming in the speech was his explicit reference to the necessity of a functioning representative body. It was true, Schauman articulated, that the constitution of Finland did not specify any periodization of the convention, but he argued that the more the country became cultured, the more often such times had to occur.¹⁰⁴⁸ While he was cautious about the problematic nature of this issue, he still managed to lay the burden of decision onto Alexander II's shoulders, whose reform measures in Russia gave hopes to the Finnish population. The publication of this speech alarmed the administration, and the emperor personally expressed his irritation about it. It was too late, however, to call the publication back and it had to be distributed among the inhabitants of the duchy, although governor-general banned any discussion of the speech in the newspapers.¹⁰⁴⁹

Schauman was surely not alone in his expectations of the radical political change, and even conservative figures joined the chorus of the reform. While Lars Gabriel von Haartman was much less ambitious about the question of representation at that point,¹⁰⁵⁰ he certainly

¹⁰⁴⁸ Frans Ludvig Schauman, *Tal och uppsatser rörande statsrättsliga förhållanden i Finland* (Helsingfors: Söderströms tryckeri, 1876), 1–22.

¹⁰⁴⁹ KA. KKK, Fc. 28, N 381.

¹⁰⁵⁰ Thiodolf Rein, *Johan Vilhelm Snellman*, vol. 2 (Helsinki: Otava, 1904), 417–78.

considered the new rule a ripe period for the ensuing structural alterations, especially in the sphere of finance, agriculture, industry, and mores. In January 1856, in a panegyric devoted to the prospects of the peace, he confessed to his colleague Alexander Armfelt that even though he was no liberal or constitutionalist, the present moment demonstrated the advantages of the governments that searched for the moral appeal among the governed peoples.¹⁰⁵¹ Haartman explicated his modernization projects in numerous long addresses to Armfelt, while the latter must have demonstrated many of them to the emperor.

The core logic of the distribution of power in his programme surprisingly resembled – in some of its rhetorical constructions – that of the staunch opponent of the imperial rule in Finland, namely Emil von Qvanten’s. They both implicitly agreed that the general situation of the imperial system of rule in no way prevented the local national entity from its inner political, cultural, or economic development, although Haartman was much more skeptical about Finnish-centered culture than Qvanten. Haartman wrote: ‘The strength and advantage of great empires is to promote the individuality and specialization of nationalities’.¹⁰⁵² Moreover, his programme of development was aimed explicitly at fostering the loyal relations between the empire and Finland, and this focus went beyond mere rhetorical declamations.¹⁰⁵³

It did not mean, however, that the empire should have assimilated the duchy, but on the contrary, he argued, again as if echoing von Qvanten, that ‘forced centralization has proven that in the final analysis it leads to weariness and dissolution.’ He perceived the new rule as a possibility of reorientation of the imperial system in Finland, rhetorically opposing it to the one of Nicholas I: ‘Love takes the place of fear and the feeling of passive well-being gives way to the prospect of a freer and less controlled development.’¹⁰⁵⁴ Instead of outright suppression of

¹⁰⁵¹ Haartman – Armfelt. 7 / 19 January 1856. KA. L.G. von Haartmanin arkisto, C 2, t. 15.

¹⁰⁵² Note no. 4, 7 / 19 February 1856. L. G. von Haartmanin arkisto. C 2, t. 15.

¹⁰⁵³ Ibid; Kalleinen, *Isänmaani onni on kuulua venäjälle*.

¹⁰⁵⁴ Haartman – Armfelt. 16 / 28 November 1856. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIb 13 15, l. 799; On ‘centralization’ as an oft-used term to refer to perils of Nicholas’s rule see: Hristoforov, *Sud’ba reformy*, 108-9.

every ambiguous enunciation in the public sphere, Haartman cherished the government that could march together with the pace of progress and foster intellectual development of the duchy. This would, in his vision, constitute the ideal barrier against democratic demagogues and nationalist fantasies.¹⁰⁵⁵ Finnish politicians quickly adapted to the new political situation and political language, penetrated with the notions of progress and monarchical love.¹⁰⁵⁶

Haartman was, however, pessimistic about the state of mind and government apparatus in the duchy during and after the war. In his interpretation, the panic that the war brought revealed ‘the real physiognomy of present-day Finland’. Although he accentuated the fact that the majority of the population remained loyal to the sovereign and almost abandoned old sympathies towards Sweden, the coastal localities and the younger generation still cherished their dreams of rejoicing with the ex-center of power.

Haartman lamented that Finland in 1854 was less Russian than it was in 1820 after Emperor Alexander I voyaged across the country, learning the necessities of even its most distant inhabitants. The present situation was caused by the long absence of governor-general as representative of the imperial power, meaning Zakrevsky-Menshikov’s command from Saint-Petersburg. Governor-general did not know the desires of the local population and its needs. Neither empire had a proper representative, nor the inhabitants of the duchy had an opportunity to be represented: the younger generation recognized the imperial government only as an abstract idea.¹⁰⁵⁷ The revival of the principles that reigned shortly after the conquest of Finland, would have, according to the politician, reestablished the proximity of Finland and

¹⁰⁵⁵ Haartman – Armfelt. 16 / 28 November 1856. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Iib 13 15, l. 799-808.

¹⁰⁵⁶ Mikhail Dolbilov, ‘Loyalty and Emotion in Nineteenth-Century Russian Imperial Politics’, in *Exploring Loyalty*, ed. Schulze Wessel, Martin Osterkamp, and Jana Osterkamp (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017), 17–43; Richard S. Wortman, *Scenarios of Power: Myth and Ceremony in Russian Monarchy from Peter the Great to the Abdication of Nicholas II - New Abridged One-Volume Edition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 189–218.

¹⁰⁵⁷ On similar attitudes towards inspectorial voyages see: Alsu Biktasheva, ‘L’État c’est Nous? Mestnoe Grazhdanstvo, Imperskoe Poddanstvo i Revizija Gosudarstvennyh Uchrezhdenij v Kazanskoj Gubernii (1819–1820 Gg.)’, *Ab Imperio*, no. 4 (2006): 137–86, <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2006.0086>.

Russian in terms of power and its representation.¹⁰⁵⁸ Haartman did not mean the convocation of the estates, but rather espoused more conservative reading of the relations, based on the presence of charismatic-powerful figures embodied either by governor-general or by the emperor himself.

Among the ideas that corroded ‘social harmony’ – a term he might have borrowed from contemporary debates in Sweden-Norway¹⁰⁵⁹ – Haartman outlined two polarities that stemmed from the same root of the ‘national fanaticism’. The first was the Scandinavian idea that captured the heads of the youth through propaganda of the neighboring state, especially after the November Agreement with which Sweden ‘took of its mask’. Another was the Fennoman idea that preached against the real progress and development of the country in favor of provincial sympathies and plebian language.¹⁰⁶⁰

Haartman’s cultural conservatism persisted against the public mobilization, while the development that he preached was meant to be established by thoughtful administration. Moreover, Fennoman agitators, according to Haartman, also contemplated the idea of an independent state based on the Finnish race.¹⁰⁶¹ These two ideas, according to him, contaminated the public debate and even shaped arguments on internal issues that ranged from education facilities and the content of classes to the direction of railroad lines. While Haartman insisted that Finland had to be connected to Russia by the means of a railroad line, since it was the empire that played essential role in its material development, Scandinavian ‘party’ in his opinion errantly argued for the direction from Helsingfors to Swedish-leaning Åbo, while

¹⁰⁵⁸ Haartman – Armfelt. 1/13 February 1856. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIb 13 15, l. 774-796.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Göran B. Nilsson, ‘The Harmony Liberal Era, 1845–1880: The Case of Norway and Sweden’, in *Nation, State and the Economy in History*, ed. Alice Teichova and Herbert Matis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 80–95, <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511497575.005>.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Haartman – Armfelt, 5 March 1857. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIb 13 15, l. 478; Haartman – Armfelt. ‘En decembre 1858’. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIb 13 15, l. 379-413.

¹⁰⁶¹ Haartman – Armfelt. ‘En decembre 1858’. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIb 13 15, l. 379-413 ; At this point his anti-Fennoman views might have been as well influenced by his antagonism to Snellman and Berg: Savolainen, *Med bildningens kraft: J.V. Snellmans liv*, 565.

Fennomania-propelled advocates pointed to Tavastehus as the heart of the land. The latter, moreover, were supported in their struggles by governor-general Berg.¹⁰⁶²

Indeed, many of Haartman's writings explicitly or implicitly accused Berg in the problems that the duchy was facing in the wake of the war. The opposition stemmed both from concrete debates on pending issues, as Haartman, for one, fiercely opposed Berg's plans of preservation of the sharpshooter battalions after the war since they stalled financial development of Finland. He contested Berg's particular plans for industrial development, education, and financial measures. Most importantly, however, he contested the degree of power and its mode of operation that Berg came to emanate. Enabled with extraordinary powers during the war, according to Haartman, the figure of governor-general disbalanced the government system of Finland, obscuring other institutions.¹⁰⁶³ The 'government machine', initially founded on the collegial principle with governor-general as one of its parts, did not perform properly, completely outweighed by governor-general. The present governor-general in Haartman's writings was associated with artificial centralization that the empire could not afford and that could even potentially lead to its dissolution.¹⁰⁶⁴

Berg and Haartman disagreed on many issues during their administrative workings, and this dispute stemmed from different designs of the changing contours of the imperial power in Finland, and different understandings of modernity and loyalty the two exposed. Haartman insisted on the material incentives behind the rapprochement between Russia and Finland while stressing the fact that the government should not have sided with any politicized nationalist argument, especially the one that, according to him, provincialized its development. Towards the end of his life in 1859, pessimistic as never before and expecting the anarchy in Finland due to the social ruptures and institutional imbalance, Haartman stressed the existence of the

¹⁰⁶² Haartman – Armfelt. 'En decembre 1858'. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Iib 13 15, l. 398-413.

¹⁰⁶³ Haartman – Armfelt, 5 March 1857. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Iib 13 15, l. 476-491.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Haartman – Armfelt, 5 March 1857. Ibid.

Fennoman party as the most powerful danger, since it was able to recruit its cadres among the widest group of Finlandish population, meaning peasants. Scandinavian party, on the other hand, was a small and insignificant company better to be ignored than provoked. He even separated them from the ‘old Swedish party’ whose incentives and driving forces were quite different.¹⁰⁶⁵

It was not even the doctrinal standing of various groups, but their very emergence that concerned Haartman and other politicians in Finland.¹⁰⁶⁶ ‘Parties’ imagined as mobilized and doctrinally consistent groups brought with them and signified the arrival of politics, the word and practice condemned by conservative elites with their ideals of impartial rule. Others, however, and even Haartman apprehensively, utilized the public debate and the new cartography of these groupings to push forward their ideas. While Haartman appealed to the financial issues and countered Fennoman groups, governor-general Berg, agreeing with the point on economic benefits albeit in his own interpretation, had a completely reversed cartography of the imperial dangers and loyalties. He gradually came to appreciate the mobilization of Finnish-speaking groups as a counterweight against pan-Scandinavian visions, whether real or imagined, but that figured as the paramount political danger for him.

5.7. Monitoring loyalty, fighting dissent: governor-general Berg against ‘Swedish tendencies’ in the wake of the war

Unlike Haartman who seemed to have a consistent vision of the better path for the modernizing empire throughout the late 1850s due to his long experience in its workings, Berg was continuously searching for appropriate trajectories of modernization and stabilization of Finland, often improvising along the way. Like Haartman, Berg justified his measures in his

¹⁰⁶⁵ Haartman – Armfelt, 24 January 1859. L.G. von Haartmanin arkisto, C 2, t. 15.

¹⁰⁶⁶ Kurunmäki and Liikanen, ‘The Formation of the Finnish Polity within the Russian Empire’; Kurunmäki and Marjanen, “Catching up through Comparison: The Making of Finland as a Political Unit, 1809–1863.”

letters to Alexander Armfelt, who by the virtue of occupying the post of minister state-secretary of Finland, presented many of them to the emperor.¹⁰⁶⁷ During Alexander II's reign, Armfelt and his adjunct since 1857 Emil Stjernvall-Wallen enjoyed the tsar's favor in contrast to Nicholas I's times when Menshikov completely outweighed his colleague. It did not mean, however, that Alexander II ignored the opinion of governor-general. While Armfelt and, particularly, Stjernvall-Walleen sought to crumble Berg's power, especially towards the 1860s, it did not happen overnight, and until a certain point, the emperor preferred to listen to both sides of the dispute.¹⁰⁶⁸

In contrast to Menshikov, Berg was almost constantly present in the duchy, significantly changing the mode of power imposition. When he felt that his power was challenged, however, he opted to present Finlandish affairs for the emperor in person.¹⁰⁶⁹ One of the first measures that Berg took during his governor-generalship was the revival of inspectoral voyages across the country, abandoned by previous occupiers of the position. During his travels, as a contemporary of these events wrote, the local population was encouraged to address him directly, although this measure produced various reactions.¹⁰⁷⁰ The reports he filed during his visits across the land indeed demonstrated his intervention into small details of provincial life and quest for their improvement.¹⁰⁷¹ Berg was interested in modernizing the agricultural production in the duchy, improving the mores of the population often contaminated by alcohol addiction, preservation of the forestry, development of primary education, as well as local

¹⁰⁶⁷ Armfelt's right hand Stjernvall-Walleen poignantly remarked on Berg's long letters and the fact that gradually came to annoy the emperor: *Ur Friherre E. Stjernvall-Walléens efterlämnade papper* (Stockholm: O.L. Svanbäcks boktryckeri, 1902), 31.

¹⁰⁶⁸ Armfelt – Haartman, 10 / 22 February 1856. KA. L.G. von Haartmanin arkisto, Ba 3-4, t.6.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Rein, *Johan Vilhelm Snellman*, 2: 293–338; Krusius-Abrenberg, *Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus und Liberalismus im politischen Leben Finnlands 1856-1863*, 260–311; *Ur Friherre E. Stjernvall-Walléens efterlämnade papper*, 36–37; Mihail Dmitrievich Dolbilov, 'Rozhdenie imperatorskikh reshenij: monarh, sovetnik i "vysochajshaja volja" v Rossii XIX v.', *Istoricheskie Zapiski* 127, no. 9 (2006): 5-48, <https://www.elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=26590099>.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Edvard Bergh, *Var styrelse och vara landtdagar: Aterblick pa Finlands konstitutionella utveckling* (Helsingfors: Edlund, 1884), 11.

¹⁰⁷¹ See, for example: KA. VSV, Fa 560, N. 271. These reports passed to the Third Section.

industrial enterprise.¹⁰⁷² His conscious self-positioning as a person most proximate to the ‘people’ – a discoverer of sorts without intermediaries blurring the contact – with unique expertise made his stance solidified, especially in the new imperial situation where peasantry was being framed as the most loyal and morally pure group of the population across all imperial domains.¹⁰⁷³

The local press and clandestine correspondence with Sweden, however, often presented his efforts in grim light, as he confessed to Armfelt. While personally insulted, Berg also alarmed Armfelt and the emperor that these efforts of the Swedish press and their Finnish collaborators sought to undermine the Russian rule in the duchy. The whole period of Berg’s office was characterized by his constant efforts to surveil and suppress instances of what he broadly defined as Swedish-leaning or Scandinavian sympathies, often using the two interchangeably. As I have already demonstrated, the conditions of war and the chance of the Swedish intervention drew the attention of governor-general to the public agitation in Sweden as well as to those disguised voices in Finland who sided with them.¹⁰⁷⁴ The end of the warfare, however, did not milder Berg’s suspicion towards the circulation of hazardous ideas, as he thought that the peace might not have been solid, and the public spirit was still significantly affected by the Swedish newspapers.

Apart from the measures he improvised and from those that were not allowed to him to establish, Berg elaborated on the general question of balancing out the Swedish ‘element’ in the duchy, primarily in the public sphere but also beyond its scope. While he mainly became known in the historiography as a ‘divide and rule’ strategist who backed up Fennoman

¹⁰⁷² Bergh, *Var styrelse och vara landtdagar*, 41–43. Kalleinen, *Suomen kenraalikuvernemetti*, 118–24.

¹⁰⁷³ Mihail Dolbilov and Aleksej Miller, eds., *Zapadnye okrainy Rossijskoj Imperii* (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2006), 207–58; Krusius-Abrenberg, *Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus und Liberalismus im politischen Leben Finnlands 1856-1863*, 76–78; Schweitzer, *The Rise and Fall of the Russo-Finnish Consensus*, 45–46.

¹⁰⁷⁴ On Swedish press during this period: Rein, *Johan Vilhelm Snellman*, 2:158–225; Mihail Borodkin, *Istorija Finljandii: vremja Imperatora Aleksandra II* (Saint-Petersburg: Gosudarstvennaja Tipografija, 1908), 91–115.

arguments, his position was more complicated, as he sometimes had to display a distance from overtly politicized Fennoman claims and to propose other mediations as well.¹⁰⁷⁵ Since the university appeared to be the most spoiled institution in his reading of the situation – an explicit pun both against vice-chancellor general Johan Reinhold Munck, whom Berg repeatedly accused in supporting dreadful spirit among the youth, and Armfelt – it should have been improved first.

Introducing his plan with a look back at the war, Berg argued that while the population of Finland mostly remained loyal, the prospect of the Swedish intervention agitated the youth, journalists, and scholars, since ‘the Swedish element in Finland’ remained strong: ‘Not enough has been done in the 47-year Finland-Russia unification to weaken Swedish tendencies there.’ To counter the dominating ‘Swedish element’ – a new entity of surveillance and control in a way discovered through the application of ethnographic lens – in the duchy, Berg proposed to follow the footsteps of the Empress Catherine II and to introduce ‘German’ element among the lines of the university professors. Governor-general, referring to Catherine II’s successful Germanization of Viborg gubernia and suppression of the Swedish element there in the second half of the 18th century, proposed to introduce two German professors to the university, preferably to medical and geological faculties. This measure, according to him, would elevate the level of education and facilitate distancing from the Swedish ‘tendencies’.¹⁰⁷⁶

Another measure that he put forward concerned the public opinion and the press. Again, drawing on the experiences of the war, he argued that the Swedish press vainly sought to agitate the loyal Finlandish public, apart from a small group of youngsters. Another strong voice, however, emerged in the duchy that sought to ‘signal to Finland the truth on what its own dignity demands’:

¹⁰⁷⁵ See next sections.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Berg – Armfelt, 23 March / 4 April 1856. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15, l. 248-255; Berg – Armfelt, 20 June / 2 July 1856. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIb 14, l. 109-112.

This voice declared to Sweden, to the literary world, and to the political public of the *Scandinavian races* [my italics – EE] what was the true situation of Finland today. Without hurting honorable memories and without crushing a remnant of sympathy, it has clearly stated that Sweden is mistaken in her judgments on the spirit in Finland. It claimed that two million Finns were as conscious of their dignity and present attitude as the three million Swedes; that Finland had many reasons to be satisfied with this attitude; that she was far from complaining about it, as one can well imagine in Sweden; that the errors in Sweden with regards Finland are great and sometimes even ridiculous.¹⁰⁷⁷

The voice was held by Johan Vilhelm Snellman who in March-April published two articles against Swedish-leaning visions of Finland in his *Litteraturblad*.¹⁰⁷⁸ Berg appreciated Snellman's courage and merit to counter Swedish-propelled opinions in Finland and considered it to be the first step onto a new road, 'an intellectual and moral victory for us'.¹⁰⁷⁹

Snellman's optimistic prognosis for the long-term future of the Finnish nation was, however, refuted by governor-general: 'It seems to me that this race is not predestined to enjoy a role among the civilized peoples of Europe.' It was a perfect tool, however, to implement the most important goal in the views of governor-general:

It will, however, serve us to detach Finland gradually entirely from Sweden. We must take care to give the Finnish population what it badly needs: good religious and agricultural instruction. We can protect popular innocent poetry. We must make this people understand that our government is preferable to that of Sweden and give them constant proofs of our paternal solicitude for their well-being.¹⁰⁸⁰

¹⁰⁷⁷ Berg – Armfelt. 14 / 26 April 1856. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15, l. 282-296.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Rein, *Johan Vilhelm Snellman*, 2:226–93; Savolainen, *Med bildningens kraft*, 563–81.

¹⁰⁷⁹ Berg – Armfelt, 14 / 26 April 1856. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15, l. 282-296.

¹⁰⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

Moreover, the audience that Snellman addressed, Berg highlighted, spanned beyond Finland and Sweden to draw the attention of the ‘Scandinavian races’ and to oppose to the ‘Scandinavian press’, a vision informed by Berg’s close engagement with the Swedish periodicals and by the rising tides of the Scandinavianist diplomatic endeavors in Denmark and Sweden as well, often reported neutrally in Finlandish newspapers.¹⁰⁸¹

The programme, in case Armfelt agreed to it, was to be presented to the emperor. Indeed, the wording and style of both letters where Berg explicated his opinion on how to handle excessive ‘Swedish tendencies’ indicated that they were meant to be delivered to the highest institution. The two plans give a hint to his understanding of the imperial system of rule in Finland. While often blamed for the early attempts of centralization by his contemporaries, governor-general’s policy in fact drew on broader perspectives and resources provided by the imperial situation. His project of the German counterbalance at the university pointed to the fact that anti-Swedish policy might be sustained by more cosmopolitan visions than just Russian-driven. Berg, himself a Baltic German, articulated the necessity to elevate the Alexander Imperial University and bring it closer to Western Europe to overcome the provinciality of the ties that bound it to Sweden.¹⁰⁸²

The backing up he provided to the loyal Fennoman project pioneered by Snellman during the war, on the contrary, did not provincialize Finland in his opinion, since at that point the interest for peasantry, folklore, and agricultural development were regarded – opposite to Menshikov’s period – as a modern programme of the civilizing mission, honorable for the imperial agency.¹⁰⁸³ Moreover, Snellman figured as an internal ally against Berg’s archnemesis

¹⁰⁸¹ See, for example: *Helsingfors tidningar*, 11.06.1856.

¹⁰⁸² Berg – Armfelt, 23 March / 4 April 1856. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15, l. 248-255.

¹⁰⁸³ Nathaniel Knight, “Ethnicity, Nationality and the Masses: Narodnost’ and Modernity in Imperial Russia,” in *Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices*, ed. David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000), 41–64, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230288126_3.

Haartman, since he criticized Haartman's agricultural and economic measures as well as the overall nature of the previous regime that the bureaucrat came to embody.¹⁰⁸⁴ Armfelt and Munck also considered Snellman a figure who could smoothen students' spirits at the university, and his placing as a professor there was advocated by them even before Berg appreciated his potential.¹⁰⁸⁵ Fisher's earlier notes on the political usefulness of the cultural capital that Snellman represented must have been shared by many in the cabinets during and after the war in the new atmosphere of change.

Berg's disregard for the 'Finnish race' and its rhetorical inability to become equal with 'civilized European nations' revealed the modern hierarchy and understanding of the temporal hierarchy of nations that he, as well as other intellectuals and bureaucrats, came to be exposed to.¹⁰⁸⁶ Class-based explanations that dominated earlier were substituted by another language that drew more on ethnic qualities. The transition, however, presupposed different repertoire of actions and conditions of existence for the discovered imperial nations.¹⁰⁸⁷ Perhaps, his evaluation of the Finnish *race* also figured as a means to smoothen the emperor's concern with potential prospects of a new mobilized nation in the imperial borderland. The impotence in terms of state-building, the inability to stand equal with other nations and especially with Russian meant that the Finnish nation could not present any danger as contrasted, for example, to the Poles.¹⁰⁸⁸

The anthropology of race and nation came to play as major a role as the analytics of estate and class in terms of determining loyalty, morality, and other group qualities during his

¹⁰⁸⁴ Savolainen, *Med bildningens kraft*, 566.

¹⁰⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 550-70.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Nathaniel Knight insists that this hierarchy was more characteristic for 'German' section of the Russian Geographical Society, of which Berg was a part: Nathaniel Knight, "Seeking the Self in the Other: Ethnographic Studies of Non-Russians in the Russian Geographical Society, 1845-1860," in *Defining Self: Essays on Emergent Identities in Russia: Seventeenth through Nineteenth Centuries* ed. Michael Branch (Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society, 2009), 122-24.

¹⁰⁸⁷ See more on peasant-nations: Hristoforov, *Sud'ba reformy*, 114.

¹⁰⁸⁸ On examples of similar rhetoric: Karsten Brüggemann, 'Imperiale Und Lokale Loyalitäten Im Konflikt: Der Einzug Russlands in Die Ostseeprovinzen in Den 1840er Jahren', *Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas* 62, no. 3 (2014): 321-44; Staliūnas, *Making Russians*, 43-56.

governing period.¹⁰⁸⁹ In contrast to Menshikov's apprehension about Finnish language and the revolutionary potential of Fennoman influence on peasants, Berg came to instrumentalize the growing cultural potential of the emancipatory claims of the Fennoman movement, that were presented as singular and coexistent with emancipatory arguments in the Russian proper and in Poland.¹⁰⁹⁰ This rhetorical coexistence of the two projects, I would argue, was Berg's conscious strategy to advocate his policy. While his programme sounded in unison with the reform projects in Russia and other composite parts of the empire, it did not mean that it remained unchallenged by alternative analytics – again quite like in the empire itself¹⁰⁹¹ – that still reproduced class-centered approach and aimed to blame governor-general in siding with the revolutionary-democratic claims of potential agitators.

The rise of the public sphere and the smoothening of censorship made bureaucratic offices and powerful agents to appreciate its potential.¹⁰⁹² Newspaper materials became more reflective and analytical on the issues that concerned variegated policies in the duchy, and dignitaries did not hesitate to appeal to the public judgement in the matters that previously were discussed only behind the closed doors. But the phenomenon was double-edged, of course, and positions and programmes elaborated in the public sphere became discussed in the cabinets. If previously the predominant reaction to these public mobilizations was suppression, during and after the war some administrators sought to reconcile public enunciations with imperial politics. While redistributing resources in the form of various social and cultural capitals to loyal public

¹⁰⁸⁹ Charles Steinwedel, 'To Make a Difference: The Category of Ethnicity in Late Imperial Russian Politics, 1861–1917' in *Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices*, ed. David L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2000), 67–86.

¹⁰⁹⁰ The history of emancipation, in fact, starts with 'peripheral' action by Vilno governor-general Nazimov who inspired the nobility's initiative to change the conditions of the peasantry there: Hristoforov, *Sud'ba reform*, 104. See also following sections.

¹⁰⁹¹ Igor' Anatol'evich Hristoforov, *'Aristokraticheskaja' oppozicija velikim reformam: konec 1850-seredina 1870-h gg* (Moscow: Russkoe slovo, 2002).

¹⁰⁹² Jani Marjanen, 'Gränserna för det offentliga samtalet i Finland 1809–1863', in *Frie Ord i Norden?*, ed. Ruth Hemstad and Dag Michaelsen (Oslo: Pax forlag, 2019), 111–40; Landgren, "Censuren i Finland 1809 – 1919," 53–68.

intellectuals, the government simultaneously gave enough ground for their opponents to publicly suspect and denounce these claims as informed solely by mercantile desires.¹⁰⁹³

The intervention of the authorities in the public debate – although it was criticized in some cabinets – affected the nature of the ideological dispute, and often contributed to the formulation of more rigid and discreet programmes. If earlier the proponents of Scandinavianism and those who advocated Fennoman pursuits could collaborate, and often these positions were not mutually exclusive, power-imposition from both sides gradually made them more homogenous and antagonistic, at least in the broader public debate that prompted its participants and readers ‘to take sides’, while still allowing for more hybrid stances. It was not only the institutions of power that changed these dynamics, of course, but also experiences of war as well as more exclusive nationalizing visions professed both by Scandinavianism and Fennomania. Governor-general Berg was one of the first to mediate and utilize these changes in his visions of the future of the Grand Duchy of Finland.

5.8. Scandinavian clouds: Governor-general Berg, the Third Section, and the diplomatic corps in 1856

Towards the final episodes of the war and especially during its aftermaths, another center of political monitoring and administrative lobbying was reestablished in Finland, namely Third Section of His Imperial Majesty’s Chancellery headquarters.¹⁰⁹⁴ The headquarters, since late 1854 presided by field officer August Tobiesen of Baltic German descent – reinforced through governor-general’s request as an auxiliary power in discovering domestic conspiracies¹⁰⁹⁵ – became one of the essential alternative centers of surveillance and

¹⁰⁹³ Kurunmäki and Liikanen, ‘The Formation of the Finnish Polity within the Russian Empire’.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Marina Zagora, “Gendarme control in the Grand Duchy of Finland in the 19th century,” *Vestnik YarGU*. no. 3 (2020): 40–43.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Marina Zagora, “Portraying the Local Life? Gendarme Control in the Grand Duchy of Finland and the Gendarme Reports from the ‘Periphery,’ 1866–1881,” *Journal of Finnish Studies* 25, no. 2 (December 1, 2022): 226–52, <https://doi.org/10.5406/28315081.25.2.04>.; I must add that the figure of Tobiesen (or, Tobisen) surfaced

knowledge-production for the emperor in Finland that could even challenge the credibility and power of governor-general of the duchy.¹⁰⁹⁶ At that point, however, the Section's reports rather seconded governor-general Berg's concerns about the Swedish-leaning tendencies and pan-Scandinavian visions spread among the students and 'educated classes'.¹⁰⁹⁷

Joining Berg's alarm, Tobiesen drew the attention of the head of the Third Section, to the change of attitudes among the Finlandish population in the autumn of 1855: 'The news of the fall of Sebastopol have produced – judging by each and everyone's political stance – significant impression.'¹⁰⁹⁸ Even though the majority of the population mourned over the losses, as Tobiesen pointed out, there were 'ill-intentioned personalities, driven either by hatred to the Russian nation, or by fantasies of different kind', who 'are happy about these losses'. These 'fantasies' must have related to the political prospects of Swedish intervention or even Scandinavian union, since among those who indulged these feelings Tobiesen listed 'mostly men of the Swedish origin and young, inexperienced persons'.¹⁰⁹⁹ While his notes backed up Berg's rhetoric, Tobiesen confessed that he had no proof but based his investigation 'on the physiognomies met every day, minute rumors, and in general on a kind of *instinctive feeling* [my italics – EE].'¹¹⁰⁰ This distance between monitoring institutions and those held suspect characterized the activities of Berg and Tobiesen and gave enough maneuver for their broad speculations and specific justifications of the credibility of the information supplied.

Tobiesen's consecutive reports covered the events that accordingly scandalized the Finlandish public and administration: Tamelander affair, and the convention in Töölö.

much rarer in the public debate and even in the later reminiscences than, for example, that of governor-general Berg.

¹⁰⁹⁶ He reached the duchy only at the beginning of 1855. Tobiesen's report 3 January 1855. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 19, d. 247 ch. 58, l. 10.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Osmo Jussila, 'Keisarikunnan moraalilääkärit: poliittinen santarmivalvonta Suomessa 1800-luvulla,' in *Ajankohta: poliittisen historian vuosikirja 1994*, ed. Mikko Majander (Helsinki: Tutkijaliito ja kirjoittajat, 1993), 8–36.

¹⁰⁹⁸ Tobiesen – Tsukato, 28 October 1855. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 30, d. 346, l. 1-3.

¹⁰⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.* The emperor highlighted those lines where the lack of evidence was stressed.

Moreover, it was Tobiesen who reported to governor-general about the latter event that prompted Berg to conduct a ‘secret investigation’.¹¹⁰¹ ‘Secret and criminal communication (*snoshenie*) with Sweden’ was blamed by Tobiesen, while the death of post-director Alexander Wulffert later that year was put on the shoulders of the liberal public who accused him in designing the operation to solicit von Qvanten.¹¹⁰² Tobiesen’s suspicion over the representatives of the overlapping categories of ‘Swedish origin’ and ‘students’ went on, and his rhetoric, similarly to governor-general’s one, gradually supplanted analytics of loyalty with ethnicized categories of rule on par with class and estate-based labels. This mixture and dynamics often produced ambiguous results, as I will demonstrate further.

The problems of Finnish relations with Sweden went on puzzling Berg in 1856-1857, especially since they often scaled up to Scandinavian level. The attempt of two relegated students to travel to Sweden in the summer of 1856, supported by vice-chancellor Munck, was rejected by Berg since he considered that these students aimed to join the ‘Scandinavian youth’ in the student festivals whose agenda, in his view, was explicitly anti-imperial.¹¹⁰³ The student festivals of 1856 in Stockholm indeed were planned as reestablishment of the tradition that last time took place in 1852 in Christiania. While the Swedish liberal public remained utterly hostile towards Russia, and Dashkov noted that the news of the peace treaty was at best received with indifference there, he regarded the ensuing festivals as mere rituals and enjoyments of fanciful youngsters. Dashkov noted the political background of the meetings, but he stated that the dreams of the Scandinavians union did not find much support among the broader educated public.¹¹⁰⁴

¹¹⁰¹ Report 8 November 1855. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 30, d. 346, l. 9-9ob; Further reports on Tamelander and Tölö: 18 November 1855. Ibid, l. 10-10ob; 24 November 1855. Ibid, l. 12-13.

¹¹⁰² Tobiesen’s report 23 November 1855. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 30, d. 346, l. 22-23ob; 5 December 1855. Ibid, l. 25.

¹¹⁰³ Berg – Armfelt, 7 / 19 June 1856. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15, l. 375-378.

¹¹⁰⁴ Dashkov – Gorchakov. 2 / 14 May 1856. AVPRI. F 133, g. 1856, op. 469, d. 213, l. 230.

Dashkov, however, left for Russia during the summer months, and senior secretary Knorring covered the convention. The festivals of 1856 became – quite unexpectedly for the diplomats – one of the turning points in the Scandinavian agitation to a large degree due to Oscar I's participation and provision he made for the festivals. His speeches and ensuing diplomatic activities that involved Crown Prince Charles and Danish King Frederick VII signaled rising tides of the pan-Scandinavian idea.¹¹⁰⁵ This year also witnessed essential reinterpretation of the Scandinavian idea in the imperial cabinets. While earlier and especially after 1848, the diplomats looked condescending upon these students conventions, Ungern-Sternberg in Copenhagen and Knorring in Stockholm alarmed the emperor and asserted that the ministry should change its optics from regarding Scandinavian idea as ungrounded dreams to taking it very seriously.¹¹⁰⁶

This sharp turn was explained by uncovered schemes that Oscar I, his son Charles, and Frederik VII were pursuing under the aegis of Napoleon III. Knorring got to recognize the intrigues surrounding the Scandinavian union plans, mostly from his colleagues. What scandalized these schemes in the eyes of the emperor was the fact that they aimed at changing the line of succession of the Danish throne at the expense of the established successor Christian Glücksborg, and the emperor's comments proved that he was utterly concerned about it.¹¹⁰⁷

The ministry directly addressed the issue of Scandinavianism in a secret dispatch to Knorring. Aleksandr Gorchakov, who took Nesselrode's post, informed Knorring that Emperor Alexander II was worried with the news about Scandinavianism. While no demarche was prescribed, Gorchakov ordered to surveil the activities that concerned the union plans realization, and, most importantly, to curb these ideas from entering Finland. Apart from being

¹¹⁰⁵ Møller, *Skandinavisk stræben og svensk politik omkring 1860*, 27-41; Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige*, 254-282; Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 448-52.

¹¹⁰⁶ On Ungern-Sternberg's alarms see: Emanuel Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864: A Chapter of Russian Policy towards the Scandinavian Countries* (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1990), 99-105.

¹¹⁰⁷ Knorring – Gorchakov, 31 January / 12 February 1856. AVPRI. F 133, g. 1856, op. 469, d. 213, l. 151.

a potential bridgehead for enemy forces, the Grand Duchy figured as a zone of undesired contamination with hazardous trend of ideas. The triangle between the Russian mission in Stockholm (and occasionally in Denmark), Finlandish governor-general and the emperor was reestablished as to oppose these tendencies. Knorring wrote that he updated governor-general on the intensification of the union idea.¹¹⁰⁸ Berg, in his turn, would capitalize on these connections to accentuate domestic dangers in the duchy.

Later in November, when relegated student Wetterhof again appealed to the emperor for a trip to Sweden, Berg suspected him in the organization of the secret society tied up to Stockholm, which spread hatred against Russia and acted in the ‘exclusively Scandinavian spirit’. Berg thus wanted to prevent him from travelling to Sweden where he might have become a revolutionary agitator, drawing on the recently updated imaginaries of Scandinavianism. He proposed paternalistic measures that might have altered his stance:

I wish his father had the wit to marry him off and give him some land to cultivate. It would cure him in a very short time. A wife for companion in life, children to raise, fields to cultivate, that is what I desired for him with all my heart for his happiness.¹¹⁰⁹

Despite the political clashes looming between liberal Finlandish youth and autocratic power of governor-general, Berg often framed it as a subject of parents-children controversies. His patriarchal rhetoric addressed both Finnish lowers classes – usually pictured as uneducated – and liberal youth also lacking thoughtfulness and tact. Wetterhof, however, would leave Finland for Sweden even before he received the official permission.¹¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰⁸ Knorring – Tolstoy, 15 / 27 June. AVPRI. F 133, g. 1856, op. 469, d. 213, l. 260.

¹¹⁰⁹ Berg – Armfelt. 11 / 23 November 1856. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15, l. 439-445.

¹¹¹⁰ Berg – Armfelt, 12 / 24 January 1857. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15(2), l. 62-63.

5.9. The interpretation of Scandinavianism in Finland

The year 1857 witnessed Berg's activities in the implementation of his visions of modernizing Finland. The railroad from Helsingfors to Tavastehus was approved by the emperor after the fierce debates that, as governor-general complained, even left the Senate walls to open the discussion in the newspapers. The military concerns pushed forward by Berg outweighed financial profitability argued by Haartman in this case.¹¹¹¹ The support that this project found among the Finnish peasantry featured as a legitimation of Berg's vision. The use of Finnish, apart from that, was facilitated in local government offices, while Finnish newspapers that presented government measures were read in churches.¹¹¹²

The official newspaper *Suomen julkisia sanomia* was launched in Finnish, 'edited in the monarchical spirit and benevolent for the people'. This devotedness of the Finnish reading public to the throne, according to governor-general, made the newspaper popular among them. Berg even posed the journal as a counterweight against Fennomans, whose ostensibly provocative and politicized writing left a lot to be desired. The situation among the Swedish-reading public, however, was not as optimistic:

It is often influenced by the tendencies of the small party of our liberals and ideologies, which the university brings up here as everywhere else. This is the inevitable result of the organization of universities in general. It is less the fault of the men of whom these learned bodies are composed, than of the character and the spirit in which they were founded centuries ago. [...] Our task would be to recognize the error of the past and remedy it.¹¹¹³

¹¹¹¹ Berg – Armfelt, 23 December / 4 January 1857. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15(2), l. 1-12; Armfelt – Haartman. 6 March 1857. KA. L.G. von Haartmanin arkisto, Ba 3-4, t. 6.

¹¹¹² Berg – Armfelt, 23 December / 4 January 1857. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15(2), l. 1-12.

¹¹¹³ Berg – Armfelt, 31 December 1856 / 12 January 1857. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15 (2), l. 22-31. Berg even nurtured plans of transporting university from the city.

Moreover, the challenges of the year piled up due to bad crops. One of the main efforts of the administration during that year was the organization of relief for the starving population in the North of the country that happened due to scarce harvest and early frosts. Donations were being gathered across the country with Berg's wife organizing the donation convention in Helsingfors.¹¹¹⁴ Emperor himself provided a huge bulk of resources to be delivered to the affected regions. Even in this case, however, the spirits of Scandinavianism concerned governor-general. The collections of money that were being gathered in Sweden for the affected provinces of Finland surfaced as an example of the political propaganda in disguise, and, perhaps, not without a reason. Dashkov also doubted the 'innocence' of these activities, but he could not refuse them to be raised, and even himself engaged in the collection.¹¹¹⁵ Berg, in his turn, dismissed a symmetrical Finlandish attempt to collect a sum of money for the Northern regions of Sweden, also affected by the bad harvest, since in his eyes it aimed to reestablish former sympathies between the two lands.¹¹¹⁶

These mutual efforts made Berg address Dashkov in private correspondence. He complained to the diplomat about the aggressive rhetoric in the Swedish newspapers that set Finland and Russian government in a bad light. Regarding Sweden as an enemy since the times of the war, Berg argued that every declamation in the press sought to affect the minds of the Finlandish population, and the relief campaign surfaced as a continuation of this programme. The Swedish propaganda, moreover, drew on global patterns: 'The journalism and our enemies would like to agitate this country as Piedmont sought to agitate Italy!'¹¹¹⁷ This logic of the revolutionary scaling he found in the Italian case was indeed familiar to the Scandinavianist propaganda, and the image of the unifying Italy became a pattern and an inspiration for the Nordic consolidation. The imaginaries of *Risorgimento* penetrated student culture in

¹¹¹⁴ Ibid; Berg – Armfelt, 14 / 26 January 1857. Ibid, l. 68-75.

¹¹¹⁵ Dashkov – Gorchakov. 22 January / 3 February 1857. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1857, d. 157, l. 23.

¹¹¹⁶ Berg – Armfelt, 31 December 1856 / 12 January 1857. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15 (2), l. 22-31.

¹¹¹⁷ Berg – Dashkov. 21 March / 2 April 1857. GARF. F. 912, op. 1, d. 274, l. 6-11ob.

Scandinavia and in Finland as well.¹¹¹⁸ In this case, the liminal position of Finland between internal management and international dangers again prompted its administration to navigate both domestic and foreign circuits and visions.

Apart from the tragic events of starvation, this year also saw one of the largest festivities of the decade in the duchy, devoted to the university promotions and to the 700-years Jubilee of the Christianization of Finland. The festivities were requested by the Senate as early as January 1857. The emperor, as a patron of his subjects' confessions, also wished the festivities to be so grand that 'the memories of them should have gone to offspring'.¹¹¹⁹ Indeed the festivities came to be memorable, although hardly due to the reasons that their organizers hoped for. Swedish guests, invited thanks to the activities of Finlandish emigrants in Stockholm and initially looked at favorably even by Dashkov,¹¹²⁰ made the festivals into a delightful symbol of reconciliation between Finland and Sweden. Indeed, the liberal-minded contemporaries witnessed their arrival with delight.¹¹²¹ Moreover, the arrival of the Swedish guests in late May 1857, regardless of their small number, and later publication of their impressions from the jubilee visit framed the festivals as one in the line of other pan-Scandinavian conventions.¹¹²²

Governor-general Berg desired to postpone the festivals to November, as he must have learned about the arrival of the guests, but his requests faced opposition and were finally denied.¹¹²³ Samuel Henrik Antell, director of governor-general's chancellery, wrote to Armfelt that even though at the beginning of the festivals Berg was in a good mood, he soon became

¹¹¹⁸ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 509–10; Kerttu Saarenheimo, 'Risorgimentorunoudestamme', *Sananjalka* 18, no. 1 (1976): 146–60, <https://doi.org/10.30673/sja.86407>.

¹¹¹⁹ KA. KKK, Fa: 1045, N. 230. On the emperor's role as a guardian of religions: Paul W. Werth, *The Tsar's Foreign Faiths: Toleration and the Fate of Religious Freedom in Imperial Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

¹¹²⁰ Dashkov – Gorchakov, 14 / 26 May 1857. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1857, d. 157, l. 135. He hoped that the voyage would help dispel myths about Finlandish conditions.

¹¹²¹ See, for example: K.E.F. Ignatius' autobiography. KA. K. F. Ignatiuksen arkisto, 5 C 10/II, l. 13.

¹¹²² Klinge, *Studenten och idéer*, 2:83–92.

¹¹²³ An anonymous request not to postpone the promotions. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Iib 14, l. 338-354. Judging by the fact that the emperor scripted to ask for governor-general's opinion, the paper was written by an influential figure.

furious when he learned about the way the Swedish delegation was received by the crowds of shouting inhabitants that in governor-general's eyes represented a degree of preserved sympathies between the two countries.¹¹²⁴ Moreover, relegated students that took part in Tölö affair were responsible for the organization of the guests' stay, the fact that Berg certainly knew about. Some of the activities held also aimed to exclude the participation of the representatives of the government, annoying governor-general.¹¹²⁵ The speeches held as well as the way they were received by the students must have concerned him even more.

Overall, their message was ambiguous, and five days of the festivals witnessed variegated and even opposing interpretations of the past and future of Finland. Virtually all speakers highlighted the necessity of the proliferation of the Finnish national project that would simultaneously be compatible with the Swedish heritage.¹¹²⁶ The convention witnessed toasts in loyal fashion for the health of the emperor and heir. Speeches were held by Johan Snellman and Fredrik Cygnaeus, ardent ideologists of Fennomania, and the latter even accused pan-Scandinavian student festival of 1856 – thus discursively setting the convention in Finland along with it – in the claims about backward nature of Finland, provoking Sweden-favoring participants and especially Adolf Nordenskiöld by this claim.¹¹²⁷ Others, however, highlighted the foundations of the Swedish heritage that allowed Finland to develop its nationality and education.¹¹²⁸

The Swedish assistance provided for the starving regions of Finland surfaced multiple times as a reason for gratitude. Moreover, the liberal path of the Scandinavian kingdoms, as

¹¹²⁴ On Antell's tensions with Berg see: Carl von Philippaeus, "Generalguvernör Berg," *Nya pressen* 27.04.1889; Extrait des lettres de Gouverneur Antell et de quelques autres personnes. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIB 14, l. 87-96.

¹¹²⁵ C. G. Estlander, "Ungdomsminnen. XIII," *Finsk Tidskrift* 17, no. 4 (1913): 256.

¹¹²⁶ Elmgren appreciated its warm tone for Fennomania: Elmgren, *S.G. Elmgrenin muistiinpanot*, 297.

¹¹²⁷ Ibid, 255-60; Theodor Magnus Fries, *Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld och hans upptäcktsfärder 1858-1879: jemte en lefnadssteckning af ångaren Vegas chefkapten Louis Palander; tvenne uppsatser* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1881), 12-15.

¹¹²⁸ Anton Rosell, *Studentbesöket i Finland, 1857* (Stockholm: C.A. Leffler, 1858), 9-10.

some stressed, opened prospects for the gradual reform of rule in Finland.¹¹²⁹ Their rhetoric drew on the family metaphors, characteristic for the Scandinavianist discourse, and in several accounts framed Swedes and Finlanders as brothers. Others referred to the growing rapprochement between the Scandinavian kingdoms and their universities, explicitly referencing the impetus of Scandinavianism. Finally, the songs were sung that usually accompanied Scandinavian student festivals while flags of the Scandinavian kingdoms awaited the guests in the halls. The trope of long-awaited reconciliation between the Swedes and the Finns, halted by the ‘external circumstances’, penetrated the discursive landscape of the convention, again signifying strong resemblance to Scandinavian student meetings.¹¹³⁰ These references, whether explicit or not, attracted the attention of governor-general.

The first victim of Berg’s attention happened to be Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld, future famous geologist and Arctic explorer, who held the most radical and pessimistic speech that painted Finnish future under the Russian scepter black while alluding to the strong historical bonds between Sweden and Finland. Nordenskiöld recognized beforehand what the reaction of the authorities would be. Since he had already been temporarily relegated due to his participation in Tölö affair, he was made leave Finland for Sweden, and the emperor was promptly notified about his misdemeanors.¹¹³¹ Magister of philosophy Carl Gustaf Estlander, his brother candidate of medicine Jakob August, and notary Karl Gustaf Ehrstöm who held speeches during the festival were called to rector Rein and at the time get off with reprimand. Armfelt then personally convened with professors to scold them for the inability to stall the spread of ‘Scandinavian sympathies’ among the students.¹¹³² Governor-general addressed Dashkov again in June to note that while the intrigues of the ‘Scandinavian youth’ – certainly

¹¹²⁹ Ibid, 39.

¹¹³⁰ Ibid, 15.

¹¹³¹ One must note that Berg was not the only one alarmed by the speech. See Armfelt’s memoria: Pro memoria 11 June 1857. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Iib 14, l. 79-80.

¹¹³² C. G. Estlander, “Ungdomsminnen. XIII,” *Finsk Tidskrift* 17, no. 4 (1913): 252-264; Emil von Qvanten, ed., *Finska förhållanden*, vol. 2 (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1858), 14.

referring to the festivals – did not appear dangerous, they still deserved an attentive surveillance. He even provided the latter with two lists of names of Finnish subjects travelling to Sweden to be closely monitored, as it is clear from the text of the letter, but the lists, unfortunately, are missing from the folder.¹¹³³

Berg himself remembered those persons who ostensibly expressed Scandinavian-leaning thoughts. Paradoxically, it was the publication of the voyage account – immediately prohibited but clandestinely spread in Finland – that helped Berg to recognize the content of all speeches held during the convention in detail. Ehrstöm, for example, had to address Armfelt in 1859, since governor-general still suspected him in the lack of loyalty to the throne due to ostensibly Scandinavianist speech held at the convention. Moreover, as Ehrström put it, the mistrust stemmed both from his participation in Tölö affair in 1855 and in festivities in 1857. He had to assert that his participation in Tölö convention was accidental while his speech at the festivals hinted in favor of separate trajectories of development destined for Finland and Scandinavian kingdoms. He then – traditionally for the genre – stressed his expressions of loyalty to the emperor and lamented in case he would not be able to serve the throne again.¹¹³⁴

Jakob August Estlander similarly faced challenges when applying to the seat of professor of surgery in Helsingfors in 1860.¹¹³⁵ As he put it, vice-chancellor Munck hinted to him that some of the words pronounced in 1857 stopped him from acquiring the place. Again, it was his reference to the consolidation of bonds between the Nordic universities that he had to address and a phrase that followed: ‘the dreams that could come true in the future’. He complained that his speech was misinterpreted as a political claim. He articulated, however, that he would have corrected the phrase in the present moment but during the student conventions the words were not precisely weighted. Estlander then justified his thoughts about

¹¹³³ Berg – Dashkov. 24 August / 5 September 1857. GARF. F. 912, op. 1, d. 274, l. 14-15.

¹¹³⁴ Ehrstöm – Armfelt. 22 December 1859. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Iib 14, l. 97-100.

¹¹³⁵ Estlander – Armfelt. Ibid, l. 112-115. The letter is not dated, but he referred to the speech he held *three* years ago.

the rapprochement between Swedish and Finlandish universities, positing that they were grounded on same foundations and organized along the same rules. He hoped that this explanation was enough to certify his loyalty to the Russian throne.¹¹³⁶

Both letters were originally written in Swedish and then translated into Russian, as I assume, to be presented before the emperor.¹¹³⁷ Since Estlander took the professorship in 1860 and Ehrström entered the lines of lecturers the same year to the grave dissatisfaction of governor-general,¹¹³⁸ their appeal must have succeeded. Their rhetoric and the fact that they were addressed to Armfelt bypassing Berg pointed to two facts. First, the administrative fear of Scandinavianism was felt in Finland well into the 1860s, and Berg's repeated alarms of the existence of a pro-Scandinavian propaganda piled in the chancellery of minister state-secretary and the Third Section until his resignation in 1861. Ehrström and Estlander, well-versed in the public debate and recognizing suspicion that governor-general exposed, easily guessed what phrases made them suspects, perhaps, hinted by other members of the administration. Second, Armfelt as a temporary chancellor of the university and as minister state-secretary who stood close to the emperor could challenge Berg's decisions, and the authors of these letters played on the different viewpoints the two politicians held with regards to their behavior and ideas towards the end of the decade.

Indeed in 1857, the second Committee for the Finlandish Affairs was established in Saint-Petersburg, which included Armfelt as its head, his adjunct Emil Stjernvall-Wallen, Platon Rokassovsky and Senate-elected Johan Axel Cedercreutz with Frans Olof af Bruner. The body, as scholars have argued, was designed to balance the power of governor-general, and it quickly started to play the role of an alternative think-tank and advisory organ for the emperor. Berg initially opposed its establishment, but the emperor stood with another side of

¹¹³⁶ Ibid.

¹¹³⁷ I referred to their Russian language copies.

¹¹³⁸ Berg – Armfelt, 10 / 22 June 1859. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15 (2), l. 311-317.

the debate, arguing that the committee establishment went in line with the creation of similar bodies for other composite parts of the empire.¹¹³⁹ Alexander II, nevertheless, to the disappointment of ministry state-secretary, still demanded both his and governor-general's opinion on all the matters concerning the Grand Duchy. It was not until 1860, when Armfelt, backed up by several bureaucrats, could challenge the credibility of governor-general's information.

The festivities of 1857 bared new modality the Finlandish administration had to adapt to. The arrival of the guests from Sweden could not be simply halted as it was done almost twenty years prior, since this act would have provoked not only the Finlandish public and university youth – a power to be recognized in the new configuration – but also the Swedish audience and journalists who, according to Berg, significantly affected the minds of the youth, despite the measures he sought to implement. Vice-chancellor Munck again presented himself as a guardian of the students and could stand in opposition against governor-general, since legally Berg was not responsible for the university. The disturbing atmosphere of the convention, however, allowed governor-general to accumulate the censorship of the periodical press in his hands. Moreover, Stjernvall-Walleen mentioned that governor-general managed to persuade Alexander II in the unreliability of the Finlandish subjects – arguably meaning Swedish-speaking members – due to their Scandinavianist sympathies, and his framing of the festivities must have played a major role in this endeavor.¹¹⁴⁰ Drawing on the hazardous images of the student convention and royal conspiracies backing it in 1856 Sweden, Berg projected this vision onto Finlandish society, politics, and culture.

¹¹³⁹ Krusius-Abrenberg, *Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus und Liberalismus im politischen Leben Finnlands 1856-1863*, 132–35; *Ur Friherre E. Stjernvall-Walléens efterlämnade papper*, 8.; Indeed, Armfelt made everything, so the committee was established under the legal principles of the empire: Schweitzer, *The Rise and Fall of the Russo-Finnish Consensus*, 48–72.

¹¹⁴⁰ *Ur Friherre E. Stjernvall-Walléens efterlämnade papper*, 8. Schweitzer correctly argues that this source might be unreliable, since it was written as memoirs rather than as a diary, but I assume we can trust it when Stjernvall-Walleen admitted his and Armfelt's defeats. On Schweitzer's observation: Schweitzer, *The Rise and Fall of the Russo-Finnish Consensus*, 62.

Some passively positive public reflections on the contemporary Scandinavian student life and Scandinavianist-friendly features of the convention in Helsingfors might have prompted governor-general to implement stricter measures in the public sphere.¹¹⁴¹ Overall, however, even if the notion of Scandinavianism appeared in the Finnish newspapers, it predominantly figured as a Danish and Swedish-Norwegian affair, unrelated to Finland. Moreover, the attitude towards the project of the Scandinavian union, especially in the state-sponsored *Finlands Allmänna Tidning*, became consistently critical, mostly dismissing it as a fantasy of inexperienced politicians through reprints from conservative newspapers.¹¹⁴² ‘The Scandinavian question’, according to a more independent-standing *Helsingfors Tidningar*, became one of the essential issues of the European foreign politics. The newspaper alleged that the idea of the union grew in popularity in all three Scandinavian kingdoms, and the dynastic situation with the Danish throne, where King Frederik VII had no direct offspring, opened window of possibilities for a dynastic union.¹¹⁴³

Scandinavianism that concerned Berg in Finland certainly had its own dynamics that was not determined only by the internationally debated project of the union. The temporality of its Finnish edition gravitated between diplomatic and public dynamics of Scandinavianism in the Nordics and local events, specifically and often competitively framed by the administration. The festivals and doctoral promotions loomed as more important Nordic-driven events in Finland than any rapprochements between king Oscar I and Frederick VII during this year. It was especially evident given that the year of 1857 signified a gradual weakening of the diplomatic Scandinavianism, paved by conservative circular dispatch of the Danish foreign minister Scheele on 21 February and then with the regency of Prince Charles,

¹¹⁴¹ Although *Helsingfors Tidningar* stressed that Finnish spirit dominated, Scandinavian was not pictured as opposite to this: *Helsingfors tidningar*, 03.06.1857.

¹¹⁴² See, for example: *Finlands allmänna tidning*, 3.09.1857.

¹¹⁴³ *Helsingfors tidningar*, 9.01.1858.

who was indeed a loyal partisan of Scandinavianism but preferred to act along his own networks, disbanding those shaped previously around Oscar I.¹¹⁴⁴

Paradoxically, while students and intellectuals only privately and in a very limited capacity discussed the idea of Finland joining Sweden or Scandinavian union, it was primarily the government that coined, used, and debated Scandinavianist vocabulary for its own purposes, drawing extensively on occasional Swedish-leaning orientation of the liberal camp in Finland,¹¹⁴⁵ that provided fertile soil for governor-general's speculations. If the rhetoric of the Scandinavian unity was appropriated in Finland,¹¹⁴⁶ it was the cabinets that primarily appealed to it to gain currency, resources, and political capital in the dialogue with Saint-Petersburg. Scandinavianism became a contested phenomenon in the bureaucratic debate and not in the restricted public sphere, apart from its rare appearances.¹¹⁴⁷ Qualities and features of 'spotted' Scandinavian ideas determined the scope and rightfulness of consecutive actions.

From formalistic reading of the Scandinavian idea, the administration turned to interpretation and bound or unbound different trajectories of the public opinion or actions under the umbrella of Scandinavianism. The breadth and fluidity of pan-Scandinavian rhetoric worked both for its advocates and for those who sought to undermine it. Scandinavianism became viewed as a trajectory of thought associated with particular positions in the debates that opened up concerning the modernization of Finland. Scandinavianism as a kind of Swedish-leaning, liberal impulse was internalized and tied up to the local needs, whether they

¹¹⁴⁴ Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 84–144; Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 463–74.

¹¹⁴⁵ Jussi Kurunmäki, 'On the Difficulty of Being a National Liberal in Nineteenth-Century Finland', *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 8, no. 2 (1 December 2013): 83–95; Jussi Kurunmäki, "Kan en nation byggas på politisk vilja? Debatten mellan J. V. Snellman och August Schauman 1859–1860," *Historisk Tidskrift för Finland*, no. 1, (2007): 63-89.

¹¹⁴⁶ Grandell argues that Swedish orientation and liberalism were not always the same: Grandell, *Från ett årtionde i Finland*, 137.

¹¹⁴⁷ See, for example: Arvid Mörne, *Axel Olof Freudenthal och den finlandssvenska nationalitetstanken* (Helsinki: Svenska folkpartiets centralstyrelse, 1927).

related to the issues of representative institutions, education facilities, cultural trajectories, and even the direction of railroad lines.

The boundaries of the contested concept thus determined the logic of reasoning and resource allocation with regards to the subjects who ostensibly preached the idea. The intermingled but independent circuits of information established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Finnish administration, reporting on two often different projects that operated under the label of Scandinavianism, however, approximated and tied them up together or opened prospects for such conceptualizations. In drawing this picture, I do not want to assert that the administration outright fabricated Scandinavianism in Finland, but there was a discrepancy in the ways the administration and those whom it surveilled related to the term and invoked it.¹¹⁴⁸

It was not only notions of Scandinavian sympathies, connections, and relations that appeared in the core of the discussion, but primarily the problem of groupness behind it. Who preached and who could potentially become ‘Scandinavianist’? Was there an organized group behind it? Was it powerful or weak? What qualities defined its membership? If the group existed, who performed its recruiting operations? Partially, such attention to variegated forms of groupness reflected administrative concern for the growing tendency of self-organization among different classes and professional communities that indeed became pronounced in Finland towards the 1860s.¹¹⁴⁹ Of even greater importance, however, was the rhetorical power of such enunciations. Forms of groupness – be they political parties or secret organizations – underscored corresponding explanatory trajectories for the situation in the duchy and prescribed resources to utilize.

¹¹⁴⁸ I think Krusius-Ahrenberg had this intuition as well, since she referred to those Scandinavian-leaning as ‘Scandinavian-friendly’ and not as ‘Scandinavianists’ Krusius-Ahrenberg, *Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus*.

¹¹⁴⁹ Stenius, *Frivilligt, jämlikt, samfällt*, 144–231.

Lastly, the festivals of 1857 might have witnessed one of the latest attempts of the reconciliation between Fennomania and Scandinavianism. Indeed, the narrative of the guests' voyage published by Rossell followed some of the paths that von Qvanten outlined in his *Fennomani och Skandinavism*. The participants accordingly tried to envision a polity where both languages and both nationalities could coexist and prosper, while some tensions still arose as, for example, one between Cygnaeus and Nordenskiöld. Towards the end of 1850s, however, the solidification of the nationalist vision as bound primarily to language was taking place in Finland with Snellman at the head of the nationalist-loyalist cohort who would later come to dominate the discursive brand of Fennomania with simple motto 'one land – one language'. Other younger intellectuals who could imagine the Finnish nationality a member of the Scandinavian cultural field and political landscape – not necessarily union – gradually became marginalized.¹¹⁵⁰

5.10. Piling challenges of the empire

Governor-general's attention was consumed by what he interpreted as Scandinavianist propaganda and clandestine correspondence, and he watched the agitation in Sweden as thoroughly as in Finland, since the problem with the monitoring of the printed materials across the border was unsolved in practice. Another front of the popular discussion concerned the issue of the representation. As the Third Section headquarters in Finland reported to Saint-Petersburg in December 1857, the talks about the convention of the *Seim* – as the estates representative body was often referred to in the Russian language materials – were growing everywhere across the country. While Berg was mostly concerned with the university and

¹¹⁵⁰ See, for example: Castrén, *Herman Kellgren*, 2-5.

minds of the capital dwellers, Tobiesen's vision encompassed broader social groups and issues.¹¹⁵¹

Tobiesen, reporting on the state of minds in the duchy at the beginning of 1858, appreciated the loyalty of Finlanders towards the monarch. Nevertheless, he articulated the hatred that bolstered among them against the representatives of the Russian nation. Whereas the middle class was accustomed with the Russians through trade, the lower classes exhibited unconscious hostility that the officer could explain only through a particular kind of collective memory. The higher classes – inaccessible for Tobiesen's information gathering as he himself confessed – expressed it through their pride and independence. Whereas his language often gravitated between appealing to the notions of class and relatively new optics that operationalized ethnicity and language-use, it is conspicuous that his report focused not only on the loyalty to the monarch but also on its attitude towards the Russian nation. These analytics might have been prompted by the changing political landscape in the Russian empire where the figure of the monarch was being reinforced by the image of the Russian nation that solidified his sacred position with popular sovereignty.¹¹⁵²

While we know that the officer and governor-general collaborated, setting Tobiesen's reports alongside Berg's letters to Armfelt reveals the degree of discrepancy in the provided information. On the one hand, Tobiesen often seconded Berg's suspicion towards the 'educated classes', or 'Swedish-speaking' part of the population, and some members of the administration later suspected them in collaborative efforts on this front.¹¹⁵³ On the other hand, as often he clearly challenged opinions supplied by Berg. For example, while governor-general repeatedly complained about vice-chancellor Munck who backed up liberal students, Tobiesen painted

¹¹⁵¹ Tobiesen's report. 7 December 1857. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 32, d. 321 ch. 32, l. 1-2.

¹¹⁵² Ibid; Wortman, *Scenarios of Power*, 189-219; Dolbilov, 'Loyalty and Emotion in Nineteenth-Century Russian Imperial Politics'.

¹¹⁵³ *Ur Friherre E. Stjernvall-Walléens efterlämnade papper*, 41.

him as one of the most respected and influential men.¹¹⁵⁴ Another figure of mistrust for Berg was the professor of Russian language Stepan Baranovsky, since he was held responsible for the generally bad knowledge of Russian language among the students and bureaucrats.¹¹⁵⁵ Tobiesen, in his turn, gave an exceptionally good characteristics of the professor, noting that he was respected by students and even Russian officers.¹¹⁵⁶ Moreover, while Berg suspected a secret organization to spread dangerous teachings, Tobiesen up to 1860 rather presented oppositional rhetoric as a result of some unconscious, historically-crafted and, most essentially, disorganized feeling.¹¹⁵⁷ The emperor and his environment must have been puzzled by the inconsistency of information provided to him with regards to Finland.

The anxiety of the Finlandish population that in Berg's and Tobiesen's reports often resulted in the emergence of oppositional political projects and public demonstrations, was partly a byproduct of the larger global and imperial crisis that ensued in the second part of the decade. First, the global financial crisis of 1857 that significantly affected the markets of Europe and the US brought imperial finances to a critical state. Finlandish economy, tied to the course of the Russian ruble, fell prey to dramatic deficit, and the lack of the 'ringing coin' (*zvonkaya moneta*) in the duchy exacerbated the situation.¹¹⁵⁸ The fluctuation of the Russian currency annoyed the population of Finland, especially, as Tobiesen noted, among the 'unproductive classes' and governor-general had to considerably cut the spendings in the late 1850s. The situation, worsened by the bad harvest the same year made the population vulnerable for ideological interventions, according to the information supplied.

¹¹⁵⁴ Tobiesen's report 5 / 17 January 1858. GARF. F. 109, op. 19, d. 247 ch. 58, l. 23-24.

¹¹⁵⁵ Berg – Armfelt. 6 / 18 December 1858. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15(2), l. 425-426.

¹¹⁵⁶ Tobiesen's report 1 / 19 July 1858. Ibid. GARF. F. 109, op. 19, d. 247 ch. 58, l. 25-26.

¹¹⁵⁷ Adding up to this, Tobiesen, lacking access to many public arenas and groups, often confessed that he had nothing or nobody to report about.

¹¹⁵⁸ J. R. T. Hughes, 'The Commercial Crisis of 1857', *Oxford Economic Papers* 8, no. 2 (1956): 194–222; Dietrich Geyer, *Der russische Imperialismus: Studien über den Zusammenhang von innerer und auswärtiger Politik 1860-1914* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1977), 31–42; Ivan Blioh, *Finansy Rossii XIX stoletija: istorija-statistika*, vol. 2 (S-Peterburg: Tipografija M. M. Stasjulevicha, 1882), 23–50.

Financial difficulties and agricultural challenges corroded even the most reliable part of the population in Berg's eyes, the peasantry. While manifesting his reliance on broader masses of the population, Berg complained that poor peasants were more easily indoctrinated into hazardous ideas than the educated public when addressing the fact that the Swedish brochure *Finska Förhållanden* (*Finnish circumstances*) must have been prepared to be translated into Finnish. Apart from that, the emergence of this booklet again highlighted the dangers of the Swedish organized agitation spread into Finland, as Berg complained to minister state-secretary, revealing the practical proximity of Finns and Swedes rather than their normative opposition.¹¹⁵⁹ The publication of the collection in four parts, that mostly consisted of the Finlandish correspondents' texts of various degree of reliability previously printed in *Aftonbladet* and Emil von Qvanten's articles on the future of Finland, caused major debate both on the figures behind the Finlandish emigration in Stockholm and on the future of the Finnish nationality in 1857-1860.¹¹⁶⁰

Qvanten and his anonymous correspondents reproduced their views on the perilous and repressive nature of the imperial rule, and, what especially concerned the Finlandish administration, they singled out personalities responsible for the implementation of this rule. Moreover, these correspondents exhibited some administrative conflicts that were taking place in Finland for wider audience. The credibility and detail of some of these messages convinced Berg and others that these correspondents must have been real. Even if they misinterpreted the picture in the duchy, they did so from the position of a witness and not a foreigner.¹¹⁶¹ While encouraging the development of the Finnish nationality, these contributions called for the Finlanders to pay cultural and political debts to Sweden, since it was the latter that bestowed

¹¹⁵⁹ Berg – Armfelt, 11 / 23 November 1857. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Ila 15 (2), 1. 356-358.

¹¹⁶⁰ Elmgren, S.G. *Elmgrenin muistiinpanot*, 293-95; Schauman, *Från sex årtionden i Finland*, 2: 165-66.

¹¹⁶¹ On the attempts to identify them: Margit Lindqvist, '1800-talets studentskandinavism och Finland: Ett litet bidrag ur en dagbok från 1855', *Ord och Bild*, no. 51, (1943): 198-203; Mikael Björk-Winberg, 'Opposition from Abroad: Emil von Qvanten and Finnish Scandinavism in the Mid-Nineteenth Century', *Journal of Finnish Studies* 24, no. 1-2 (1 July 2021): 16-41, <https://doi.org/10.5406/28315081.24.1.2.03>.

Finland with political and social institutions, law, and education. These texts sought to reveal the illusion of the imperial benign rule and if did not directly proclaim than at least implied that Finland had to preserve its Scandinavian-leaning impetus developing it into liberalism to counter the ‘usurper’. The image of the Scandinavian federative state as an ideal figured in the texts as well.¹¹⁶²

In 1858, Snellman fought back with bashing critique against von Qvanten, Wetterhof, and – most surprisingly for the Finlandish audience – against much older émigré J.J. Nordström, accusing them in the lack of patriotism and contrasting them with noble emigrants, who did not seek to vilify Finland or the Russian empire. Qvanten and his ‘clique’, according to Snellman, mixed various degrees of truth and lie in their observations of the Finlandish circumstances, giving rise to rumors, talks, and accusations of innocent persons. The final blow, of course, landed on their dismissal of the Finnish language and nationality that they ignored, and Snellman famously marked this group as ‘bloodless’ (‘blodlösa’), a label that became popular among the Finnish-centered intellectuals and later appreciated as self-brand by liberal circles as well.¹¹⁶³ Whereas some Finlandish intellectuals credited Snellman’s reaction as exaggerated, others at least shared his resentment with the Swedish public.¹¹⁶⁴

The Qvanten-Snellman quarrel gave rise to debates on the future of the Finnish nationality and Swedish heritage in Finland. Different contributions to it, whether published in Sweden or –in a more limited capacity – in Finland not only operated in modern political terms often introduced from contemporary European media spheres, but also provided clues on what political groups they targeted in Finland to those in power. Again, opposing camps, whether to

¹¹⁶² Qvanten, *Finska förhållanden*, 1:82–83.

¹¹⁶³ Johan V. Snellman, ‘Finska Emigrationen i Sverige,’ *Litteraturblad* no 2, 1858. Snellman’s Collection, URL: <http://snellman.kootuttekset.fi/sites/default/files/08037.pdf>; Grandell, *Från ett årtionde i Finland*, 34. Ignatius wrote that he ascribed himself to ‘bloodless’ group: K.E.F. Ignatius’ autobiography. KA. K. F. Ignatiuksen arkisto, 5 C 10/II. Besides, he argued that the fights in newspapers were not as bitter at that period, and while certain ‘camps’ existed, reconciliation between them often pushed back conflicts.

¹¹⁶⁴ Björk-Winberg, ‘Opposition from Abroad: Emil von Qvanten and Finnish Scandinavism in the Mid-Nineteenth Century’.

reinforce their argument or to produce an imagined enemy, found on their radars a blurred entity – an organized and functioning, national-liberal, anti-Finnish, Svekomman (in case Fennoman advocates were talking) or tiny radical pan-Scandinavian (in case of Scandinavianist intellectuals) political group.¹¹⁶⁵ Some Finnish administrators, the Third Section, and, especially, governor-general were happy to draw on these statements to picture this danger for Saint-Petersburg – since the Crimean War anxious about the dangers of dismemberment of the empire¹¹⁶⁶ – in darkest colors, as I will demonstrate in the next section. In this sense, the language of the press and the language of Berg’s reports creatively approached each other.

Somewhat unnoticed by the contemporaries remained the fact that Snellman’s answer to Qvanten, despite its negative connotations, again reaffirmed the proximity of public debate between Sweden and Finland. The years of 1858-60 demonstrated Berg’s continuous fixation on the Swedish propaganda that, according to him, was responsible for the state of minds in the duchy. Governor-general’s concerns found their reflection in the conservative and anti-Scandinavian rhetoric that the official newspaper *Finlands Allmänna Tidning* espoused during the end of the decade. In 1858, in four consecutive numbers the newspaper covered the problematic nature of the movement in the section under the title ‘Scandinavism’. The materials consisted mostly of the translated Danish brochure with a telling title *The Scandinavian Union is Illusion, or Denmark's Downfall*.¹¹⁶⁷ The brochure as well as the newspaper editors who agreed with its contents pictured the potential union as almost unrealizable fantasy. In the case of its realization, however, it was specifically Denmark that would suffer the most. Again, this edition of Scandinavianism mostly targeted foreign affairs and specifically Danish issues. Indeed, mostly the term surfaced in the coverage of foreign

¹¹⁶⁵ See, for example: Qvanten, *Finska förhållanden*, 1:72; Åbo underrättelser, 9.04.1858. See also Elmgren’s impressions: Elmgren, *S.G. Elmgrenin muistiinpanot*, 293-96.

¹¹⁶⁶ Alfred J. Rieber, *The Imperial Russian Project: Autocratic Politics, Economic Development, and Social Fragmentation* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2017), 117.

¹¹⁶⁷ *Finlands allmänna tidning*, 28.04.1858; *En skandinavisk Union er en Illusion, eller Danmarks Undergang. Betragtninger af en Ikke-Skandinav i Jylland* (København: Gyldendal, 1857).

issues, but even there it was addressed as a problematic and unreliable project, perhaps, alluding to the edition of Scandinavianism that some professed in Finland.

The ascension of Crown Prince Charles first to the position of Prince Regent in September 1857 and his consequent rule as Charles XV since 1859 in Sweden gave Berg enough new ground to suspect the intensification of pan-Scandinavian propaganda. While he was right about Charles' far-reaching intentions,¹¹⁶⁸ his speculations skyrocketed. He accused the late émigré Arwidsson – warmly welcomed even by conservative intellectuals¹¹⁶⁹ – who travelled across the country in enlisting correspondents for the Swedish oppositional newspapers. Departed Nordenskiöld was held suspect in the attempts to organize a 'kind of Finlandish *Kolokol*'.¹¹⁷⁰ Later, Berg's 'reliable sources' coming back from Sweden, notified him that the idea of the Scandinavian union was burgeoning there, and even primary education was being reorganized to foster the idea of the Scandinavian consolidation.¹¹⁷¹

This Scandinavianist propaganda – Berg had no doubts about it – served as a preparation for the struggle that could erupt in the future under the 'favorable opportunities.'¹¹⁷² This alarm served as a means to request an allocation of resources or establishment of a secret police, but again to no avail. Armfelt, Stjernvall-Walleen, and even the emperor was growingly tired of Berg's panic about Scandinavianist-propelled fears, dismissing them as exaggerations.¹¹⁷³ Finally, when Charles XV ascended to the throne, Berg got an opportunity to travel to Sweden as a representative of Finland in the capacity of governor-general. Justifying his voyage by the example of Prince Menshikov who witnessed Oscar I's ascension, Berg found it a suitable opportunity to sonder ground there. His visit was approved.¹¹⁷⁴

¹¹⁶⁸ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 511–78.

¹¹⁶⁹ Elmgren, S.G. *Elmgrenin muistiinpanot*, 306.

¹¹⁷⁰ Meaning Alexander Herzen's famous newspaper. Berg – Armfelt. 9 / 21 December 1858. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15 (2). 1. 451-456.

¹¹⁷¹ Berg – Armfelt. 11 / 23 June 1859. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15 (2), 1. 322-324.

¹¹⁷² *Ibid.*

¹¹⁷³ *Ur Friherre E. Stjernvall-Walléens efterlämnade papper*, 31.

¹¹⁷⁴ Berg – Armfelt. 27 June / 9 July 1859. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 15 (2), 1. 351-354.

5.11. Usual suspects? Not quite: Nyland section of the Alexander Imperial University and Scandinavianism

One could argue that there was a society in Finland that could potentially be considered Scandinavian-oriented and quasi-secret at the initial stages of its existence thus partially conforming to governor-general's identikit. Nyland section (nation) of the Alexander University studied by famous Finnish historian, and member of the nation Arvid Mörne as partially Scandinavianist-leaning community, agitated by charismatic intellectual Axel Olof Freudenthal, surfaced as a cradle of future Swedish-oriented political forces in the Grand Duchy. Freudenthal, who for a period occupied a post of its elected chairman, on numerous occasions pronounced his staunch anti-Fennoman sentiment coupled with Scandinavianist constitutional and geopolitical expectations. As an editor and eager contributor to the nation's journal *Nylandska Dragon*, he pushed forwards these ideas repeatedly there.¹¹⁷⁵

The analysis of protocols of the section meetings held regularly since 1857 rather produces the image of conflicts and negotiations about trajectories that the section was meant to pick, involving pending issues of national self-identification and language use in administrative and educational facilities. In April 1858, the discussions, for example, centered around Snellman's critique of the Finlandish emigration residing in Stockholm, and one of the students, Emil Böök spoke and wrote in favor of Snellman's contributions. The protocol mentioned that during the meeting there appeared opinions that sided and opposed to Böök's thesis thus already at this point providing a picture of diversity of opinions rather than sterile Stockholm-friendly environment.¹¹⁷⁶

¹¹⁷⁵ Arvid Mörne, *Axel Olof Freudenthal och den finlandssvenska nationalitetstanken* (Helsinki: Svenska folkpartiets centralstyrelse, 1927). URL: <http://www.loffe.net/finland-mainmenu-94/3319-axel-olof-freudenthal-och-den-finlandssvenska-nationalitetstanken-barndomungdomi-nylands-nation-1857-1861-del-1-2.html> (accessed 13.03.2023)

¹¹⁷⁶ Protocol of the conventions of Nyland nation 18 April 1858. Kansalliskirjasto, NN: Ca 1, 2.

In May 1858, Freudenthal assaulted the claims that Swedish-speaking inhabitants should abandon their culture in Finland, since he considered Finnish culture secondary compared with Swedish one. His tirade ended with the prospects of Finland joining the Scandinavian union as the fourth state, ‘the only thinkable independent position for Finland.’¹¹⁷⁷ While those present at the meeting sided with the thought that the university section had to promote cultural development of the Swedish population, Freudenthal, who authored the protocol mentioned that his report produced a lively discussion, and it seems that Scandinavianist sympathies fostered by Freudenthal did not find broad support, since they were dropped in the concluding remarks. While Freudenthal enjoyed some degree of popularity among the peers, he was often overshadowed by other members as voting procedures for administrative posts demonstrate.¹¹⁷⁸

Moreover, during the same meeting, one of the students, recalling the festivals of 1857, proposed to discuss professor Cygnaeus’s remarks on the Scandinavian students festivals, arguing that the professor did not imply anything insulting during the notable scene, certainly diverting from the Swedish-leaning radical line, paved by Nordenskiöld. To reinforce this rebellious stance, the student proposed to discuss practical outcomes of Nyland section’s work, arguing that it had done nothing significant.¹¹⁷⁹ It was not only Swedish/Scandinavianist or rather aggressively anti-Fennoman position that often fell under criticism within the audience, but even the very pattern of organization was debated, as some students preferred faculty-oriented community to a section-based one.¹¹⁸⁰

In November, Freudenthal again faced an opposition levelled by chairman Sederholm who opposed his positive treatment of the Swedish colonization and Christianization of Finland along with Freudenthal’s assault against Snellman and ‘ultra-Fennomans’. Sederholm stressed

¹¹⁷⁷ Protocol of the conventions of Nyland nation 2 May 1858. Ibid.

¹¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁸⁰ Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 2:48-82.

that the author might have first ‘do a one tenth part’ of what Snellman had done for Finland before throwing such assaults. Freudenthal’s ally Höijer also complained that his article ‘A Scandinavian’s conversion’ that appeared as an annex for the *Nylandska Dragon* was criticized by the sections’ members, and Freudenthal went as far as to label this an establishment of censorship committee for the journal. Most members of the section, however, protested and argued that they utilized their right to discuss the participants’ works openly.¹¹⁸¹

The nationality-related disputes within the section again became a point of discussion in February 1859 when it was proposed that ‘anti-Fennoman’ articles be exempted for oral discussion, because most of the audience would assault the author for such content.¹¹⁸² While the proposal was later denied, the author of anti-Fennoman text got an opportunity to request a scripted answer from his opponent.¹¹⁸³ Another discussion erupted in April 1859 when Freudenthal, that time in a capacity of the section’s chairman, again highlighted the unsurvivability of Finnish nation and culture without more refined and civilized Swedish element that granted Finland with institutions and laws. The protocol proceeded noting that the agreement was not reached, and everybody left with as much ‘Fennoman or Scandinavian’ feelings that one had brought. Most of the participants, the protocol continued, however, held themselves to Fennoman views.¹¹⁸⁴

Nyland nation in 1857-60 can hardly be described as a Scandinavianist-leaning community, while it rather became an arena for diverse debates about national identity in Finland, as did other sections and faculties of the university.¹¹⁸⁵ Governor-general Berg seemed to be more concerned with elder members of the student community who by that time became

¹¹⁸¹ Protocol of the conventions of Nyland nation, 10 November 1858. Kansalliskirjasto, NN: Ca 1, 2.

¹¹⁸² Protocol of the conventions of Nyland nation, 23 February 1858. Ibid.

¹¹⁸³ Ibid.

¹¹⁸⁴ Protocol of the conventions of Nyland nation, 27 April 1859. Kansalliskirjasto, NN: Ca 1, 2.

¹¹⁸⁵ Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 2:83–92; Kurunmäki, ‘On the Difficulty of Being a National Liberal in Nineteenth-Century Finland’; Kurunmäki and Liikanen, ‘The Formation of the Finnish Polity within the Russian Empire’; Grandell, *Från ett årtionde i Finland*, 11-35.

prominent public figures, scholars, and publicists. The names of the Nyland section participants rarely figured in his reports, although Freudenthal was, perhaps, the most consistent ideologist of Swedish cultural domination in Finland that also bridged with political project of the Scandinavian union. It is conspicuous, however, that Swedish-leaning cultural trajectories did not always end up in the political visions of Finlandish reunification with its ex-metropole and Scandinavian union, and many students preferred to foster Swedish identity without these radical consequences. Others regarded Swedish culture compatible with the progressive rise of Finnish-centered culture.

The positions were blurry and hardly mutually exclusive, although the attempt to formulate groupness markers even within the Nyland section was conspicuous, and Freudenthal consistently separated smaller Scandinavian group from Fennoman within the section, perhaps, reducing smaller discrepancies in respective positions. ‘Scandinavian’ label might have referred to the range of ideas from the goals of preservation of Swedish-Scandinavian institutions in Finland against both Finnish and Russian assimilation to politicized projects of the Scandinavian union and Finlandish separation from the Russian empire. Even Freudenthal himself used ‘Scandinavian’ label flexibly, adapting it to particular situations and often referring to it as a synonym of Swedish trajectory against the growingly dominant Finnish-centered discourse.

I doubt that these young group of the University, and then practically obscure figure of Axel Freudenthal drew any particular attention of governor-general at this time period. Berg was much more concerned with those who demonstrated their political inclinations in public actions and whose documental trace he could navigate himself or with the help of the Third Section information. Freudenthal’s visions would, however, become instrumental for a group of Sweden-leaning liberal intellectuals who backlashed against Finnish culture in 1870s, and his arguments about racial inferiority of the Finnish people surfaced as early as in 1850s, surprisingly mirroring those presented by governor-general Berg to Alexander II.

5.12. Speaking imperial

Berg's visits to Sweden in 1859 and again in 1860 persuaded him in the dramatic consequences of the ongoing contacts between Sweden and Finland. As he confessed to Armfelt: 'My stay in Stockholm convinced me that Sweden takes care of everything that happens in Finland much more than we have supposed so far.'¹¹⁸⁶ Berg's continued alarms on that front that he used as a reason to justify the attempt of cancellation of the university promotions in 1860,¹¹⁸⁷ bitterly affected his communication with Alexander Armfelt and Emil Stjernvall-Walleen, who considered Berg's calls exaggerated and even fictitiously crafted to excuse his hold onto power.¹¹⁸⁸ The tensions between the institutions erupted during the spring-summer of 1860, but their history is of a longer durée.

Several scholars have perceptively demonstrated how Armfelt, disenfranchised in Berg by that point, sought to undermine the credibility of governor-general by providing critical observations on his actions to the emperor.¹¹⁸⁹ While the work was sluggish in the 1850s, towards the new decennium Armfelt and his adjunct Stjernvall-Wallen gained enough currency to compete with Berg in the eyes of Alexander II. The role that the Third Section played in this contention was, however, neglected largely due to the location of the archival repository.

What I want to highlight, however, is not only the variety of institutions that the locals and even those hired from outside the duchy used to provide feedback on the higher body of power, but also the recognition of the functions of these institutions. The Third Section that

¹¹⁸⁶ Berg – Armfelt. 24 May / 5 June 1860. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Ila 16, 1. 232-234. Schauman, *Från sex årtionden i Finland*, 2: 241–44.

¹¹⁸⁷ Krusius-Abrenberg, *Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus und Liberalismus im politischen Leben Finnlands 1856-1863*, 162–208; Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 2:110–31. Berg was irritated as he was not invited to the ball organized by students and their sympathizers.

¹¹⁸⁸ Stjernvall-Wallen was writing as if reflecting their shared opinion: *Ur Friherre E. Stjernvall-Walléens efterlämnade papper*, 35–37.

¹¹⁸⁹ Schweitzer, *The Rise and Fall of the Russo-Finnish Consensus*, 40-72; Krusius-Abrenberg, *Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus und Liberalismus im politischen Leben Finnlands 1856-1863*, 127-208; Rein, *Johan Vilhelm Snellman 2*: 293-338; Borodkin, *Istorija Finljandii: vremja Imperatora Aleksandra II*, 91–115.

executed monitoring functions also worked as a credible channel to sip the info from the population to the emperor, bypassing the executive body, and the population recognized and utilized this function, possibly affected in this way by the general atmosphere of popular reflection, debate, and participation that encompassed governing institutions as well. The dangers that Berg spotted in the¹¹⁹⁰ duchy – Scandinavianism among them – unexpectedly found their ways into the reports that challenged the power of governor-general. The logic and the chronology of their emergence in the narrative were presented to picture governor-general as the trigger who spurred the conception of these dangers.

Some of the reports, as I have mentioned, were requested by Armfelt and the committee. Others, however, seemed to have been a genuine expression of their authors. However, even those requested by Armfelt would have hardly been written, were their authors in better relations with governor-general: the bureaucracy became polarized, and the mapping of tensions became well-known for other cabinets and broader public. Berg, who was a bit of a character himself, according to various accounts, and who intervened in many details where the presence of governor-general was not sensible before, made many of the duchy's powerful inhabitants into his enemies. Some assaulted him, others criticized his projects, but this criticism rhetorically undermined his capacities to govern over the entrusted population. While many agreed on the diagnosis, conclusions and programmes of improvement differed.

Haartman was, perhaps, Berg's most outspoken critic but hardly the only one. Consider, for example, another influential personality, professor of Russian at the Alexander Imperial University, Baranovsky. He recognized that Berg accused him in the lack of skill, absenteeism, and overall poor knowledge of Russian among the bureaucratic cadres that he was responsible for. Baranovsky, unable to speak with the tsar directly, quickly recognized the capacity of the

¹¹⁹⁰ On participation see, for example: Charles Steinwedel, *Threads of Empire: Loyalty and Tsarist Authority in Bashkiria, 1552–1917* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 115–47.

Third Section as the institution of vertical communication. He, as other contributors to Armfelt's and Third Section's folders, presented the report as a necessary call of a loyal subject. Baranovsky argued that while under more benevolent representative of power in the duchy, the 'ages-long animosity' was smoothing, and 'the small-numbered and scattered side of the advocates of Scandinavianism was weakening' while the ties to Russia were getting stronger.¹¹⁹¹

The arrival of governor-general Berg, however, fully suspended these processes. He was accused in deceit, egoism, and acting in disagreement with existing laws: 'One cannot trust the word of governor-general at all (*ni na volos*)'.¹¹⁹² His promises faded while his benevolence spread unevenly onto those closer to him whereas the danger of Scandinavianism 'found its support in the hatred towards the current representative of the highest power'. Baranovsky, however, insisted that the Finlanders were sure that governor-general acted in disaccord with the emperor. The population, according to the professor's note wondered how the emperor could temper such a servant and why the latter could still hold his post. Baranovsky assured his highest addressee that other reliable persons could provide similar characteristics of governor-general.¹¹⁹³

The emperor read the report, as a sidenote proves, but he still hesitated whether he could trust those who accused Berg. Similar reports filled the folders of both the chancellery of minister state-secretary and the Third Section in different periods when the relations between governor-general and other bureaucrats appeared especially strained. In 1860, Berg sought to cancel the festival of promotions of the university members under the justification of the Scandinavianist scandal in 1857 and, as some argued, under the pretensions of the 'spirit of the revolution'.¹¹⁹⁴ Armfelt, seconded by Stjernvall-Walleen, however, fiercely opposed governor-

¹¹⁹¹ Baranovsky – Alexander II, 14 May 1858. GARF. F. 109 s/a, op. 3a, d. 1353, l. 1-3.

¹¹⁹² Ibid.

¹¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁹⁴ Baranovsky – Armfelt, 26 May 1860. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 13, l. 91-93.

general's claims even though they agreed that the festivities had to be supervised closely, reinforcing their stance by accusation directed against Berg.¹¹⁹⁵ The promotions were approved, albeit with a strict disciplinary recommendation, but mutual allegations and Berg's interventions into the university life exacerbated by the students' unwillingness to invite him to the ball, made Armfelt deploy a whole cabinet campaign against governor-general.¹¹⁹⁶

First powerful blow against Berg was authored by Casimir von Kothen, this time requested by Alexander Armfelt.¹¹⁹⁷ Kothen, a retired Finnish officer and bureaucrat with long list of designations, provided bashing critique against the policies of present governor-general. The government, according to him, lost its prestige and fell into disorder, while the magic word 'the emperor' lost its allure due to Berg's compromising actions. Whereas, essentially, in Berg's reports the most dangerous impetus was the one of Swedish-centered Scandinavianism, Kothen reverted this picture, arguing that in fact it was Snellman's democratic Fennomania that hypnotized governor-general into their Jacobin-styled programmes:

Since that time Finnish journalism has assumed so much more remarkable character, that the Finnish people's party, which formerly contented itself with reading the Bible and other little religious and economic pamphlets, was thus called upon to judge questions of politics and economics of both internal and external administration. It is quite natural that the Finnish people were at first flattered by these attentions, as well as by the promises and assurances which the governor-general, while traversing the country in all directions, hastened to give to the masses.¹¹⁹⁸

¹¹⁹⁵ Armfelt – Berg. 1 / 13 May 1860. KKK, Fa: 1088, N. 99.

¹¹⁹⁶ Baranovsky – Armfelt on the ball in 1860, 24 May 1860. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 13, l. 83-90.

¹¹⁹⁷ Borodkin, *Istorija Finljandii: vremena Imperatora Aleksandra II*, 102–3. One must add that Kothen himself irritated many of the duchy's intellectuals, and his conduct of the *indelta* sharpshooter forces spilled into a big public scandal.

¹¹⁹⁸ Personal voyages of governor-general – who bypassed other institutions in tackling problems of the population across the country – also disturbed many, see below.

Systematic opposition thus arose from this alliance of governor-general with the disturbing ideology that only disguised itself under the cloak of innocent nationality and Finnish language. While Berg argued that Fennomania was an invaluable tool against Swedish intrigues, Kothen found that in reality Fennomania and Swedish propaganda rather approached each other to produce disorder in the duchy:

The fact is, on the contrary, that these symptoms and this movement are very agreeable to Sweden, and that now every Finn who goes there is received with open arms, which was by no means the case formerly, when Finland was dominated by a conservative spirit.

The ‘moral’ problem exacerbated by material challenges was so pending, according to Kothen, that many inhabitants openly speculated whether the situation under the Swedish scepter would have been better. The group that Kothen referred to as *Young Finland* (*Jeune Finlande*) – the term Berg usually used to denote Stockholm liberal émigré circles – in his treatment developed under the protection of governor-general and sought to shatter the chains that bound Finland and Russia together. Consisting of democrats and ‘all this *canaille*’, the group sought to revive the nationality, ‘which it itself invented’. The very idea of nationality, according to Kothen, was linked to dangerous tendencies that pulled Finland into Scandinavia. Moreover, their ideas antagonized ‘Finlanders’, those inhabitants that did not speak Finnish. The remedy, again, was to immediately replace the governor-general and regulate his power as other measures were too late to instrumentalize.¹¹⁹⁹

¹¹⁹⁹ Kothen’s report. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIb 8b 1, l. 225-253.

The report had its roots in the personal conflicts that Kothen had with governor-general and Snellman, and Armfelt capitalized on these antagonisms.¹²⁰⁰ Kothen's report launched another line of reactions. Armfelt, under the emperor's command, requested Berg's answers on main points of Kothen's criticism, especially on those that tied Fennomania and Scandinavianism together, since governor-general's main political programme revolved around countering pro-Swedish arguments with Finnish-leaning ideology.¹²⁰¹ Berg hastened to reply in his usual style, highlighting his deep personal knowledge of the province and its populations. His knowledge of the opinions of all reliable classes and groups – especially Finnish-speaking – said that Armfelt's suspicion did not find any proof on the ground. The problem that Armfelt touched, however, demanded serious examination, and governor-general promised that he would sonder the state of mind of Finnish-speaking population and their attitude towards the empire. The investigation Berg assured to complete by September 1, 1860.¹²⁰²

In parallel to that, the emperor decided to utilize quasi-independent analytics of the Third Section with regards to the situation in Finland. In June 1860, recently appointed head of the 1-st okrug of the gendarmerie, Ivan Annenkov personally traveled around Finland to monitor the situation there. On the positive side, that might have also served as a traditional introduction, he assured the emperor that all groups of the population – especially the lower classes – were devoted to the Russian throne. Russian authorities' intervention into the Finlandish affairs was, however, as unanimously repudiated, since the population feared that any change prompted by Saint-Petersburg against the laws of the duchy would corrode its autonomy and 'independence'.¹²⁰³

¹²⁰⁰ Lagerborg, *Sanningen om Casimir von Kothen (1807-80)*, 138-56.

¹²⁰¹ Armfelt – Berg. 14 / 26 May 1860. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 16, l. 239-243.

¹²⁰² Berg – Armfelt. 24 May / 5 June 1860. Ibid. S. 244-247.

¹²⁰³ Annenkov – Dolgorukow. 2 July 1860. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 32, d. 321 ch. 32, l. 18-26.

The animosity towards the Russians surfaced in different ways. The peasantry, according to Annenkov, could not even explain the reasons for it and acted rather unconsciously, but he expected their hostility to vanish gradually. While peasants still remembered the limitations that the Swedish rule previously imposed upon them, Finlandish Swedish-speaking aristocracy looked back at that epoch with nostalgia and preserved ‘strongest sympathies’ (*samoe silnoe sochustvie*) for Sweden. They openly declared their animosity towards Russia, and this sentiment was growing among the broader society. For Annenkov, these descendants of the old Swedish kin surfaced as most hazardous group of influence to be constantly monitored, albeit he confessed that the surveillance was hard to establish due to exclusive nature of their community. In trying to find the roots of the general discontent towards Russia among the higher and middle classes, Annenkov concluded that it emerged from three sources: the university, the foreign (Swedish) press, and decisions made by governor-general Berg.

Students at the university ostensibly spread their teachings of independent Finland across the country when they were staying in their localities during holidays. Recalling the students’ convention of 1857 and citing Nordenskiöld’s Scandinavian-leaning speech, Annenkov demonstrated growing sympathies for Sweden in public debates and collective memory.¹²⁰⁴ The Swedish press was fueling this tendency in seeking to encourage Swedish-speaking inhabitants to imagine independent future of the duchy. Governor-general, despite his acknowledged aspirations to improve living conditions, lacked the affection of the local population. His unrestricted power, although he usually behaved friendly with the inhabitants of the duchy, annoyed the society and administration, as these actions contrasted with his predecessor’s ostensible non-involvement. The party of the Swedish-speaking nobility

¹²⁰⁴ Berg, according to Annenkov, was even dreaming of moving the university away from Helsingfors where its influence could not affect the population.

reinforced by students, according to Annenkov, stood behind the campaign aimed to undermine Berg's power.¹²⁰⁵

Concluding his report, Annenkov noted that the peasantry did not share any animosity against the government and governor-general. This fact proved that the interests of the peasantry went in disagreement with the interest of 'middle and higher classes of the population'. The emperor left a note on the report: 'The picture is sad but must be true, as it corresponds to the messages I receive from everywhere', meaning, most probably, those text prepared under Armfelt's patronage.¹²⁰⁶ While Annenkov's report did picture governor-general as a provocative figure, the reliance on peasantry that Berg professed seemed justified in the eyes of both Annenkov and the emperor. Moreover, his mention of the mediation of the Swedish-speaking nobility in the staged campaign against governor-general and hence its artificial nature might have smoothed Alexander II's expectations, who during the summer of 1860 was ready to mediate Berg's discharge from the post.¹²⁰⁷

Berg, however, resisted and defended himself from Armfelt's attacks again in July. Minister state-secretary accused Berg in breaking his public promises – including the central that concerned the convocation of the Diet – thwarting the trade and pursuing costly enterprises, unwillingness to remedy those proprietaries damaged during the war, abuse of power, intervention into the affairs of the university, and, most essentially, in provoking conservative groups of society with his pro-Finnish and peasant-leaning strategy.¹²⁰⁸ Berg's long reply to these accusations perhaps most explicitly tied the dynamics of his actions to the broader scope of politics of the empire. Again, relying on his ethnographic knowledge of the situation in Finland that he gained – 'not through the Swedish coterie' – but rather in the process of a

¹²⁰⁵ Annenkov – Dolgorukow. 2 July 1860. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 32, d. 321 ch. 32, l. 18-26.

¹²⁰⁶ Ibid, l. 18. Emperor: 'kartina vesma grustnaya'.

¹²⁰⁷ Rein, *Johan Vilhelm Snellman 2*: 339-80; Krusius-Abrenberg, *Der Durchbruch des Nationalismus und Liberalismus im politischen Leben Finnlands 1856-1863*, 204-8.

¹²⁰⁸ Armfelt – Berg. n.d. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Iib 16-19, l. 200-211.

personal interaction with the people of the duchy, he defended his stance on the subjects of Armfelt's inquiry.

Governor-general refuted most accusations either pointing to his active assistance to the affected inhabitants of the duchy, including proprietaries and the lower classes that appealed to him, or referring to the bureaucratic procedures that stalled his actions. In some cases, as in the issue of the costly railroad, he showed himself as an equal member of the discussion whose voice did not significantly affect the result of the debate. He assured that he did not in principle oppose to the convocation of the estates. Moreover, he was among those who launched the process of preparation for their assembly already in 1859. Present imperial complications, Berg argued, most importantly in Poland and in central Russia that concerned the designs of the future political organization, did not allow for their immediate establishment, and required more time for their preparation.¹²⁰⁹

While the impetus for the establishment of the Diet indeed came from the duchy, overall imperial diagnosis, that considered other domains, figured as one of the justified arguments for its delay.¹²¹⁰ Even more explicit this connection was postulated in Berg's rationalization of his assistance to the masses of the Finnish population. He framed his role in the advocacy of the broader use of Finnish, establishment of Finnish-speaking education, especially in agricultural schools, and the creation of the Finnish-language newspapers as an effort similar to and singular with the programmes of the emancipation of the Russian peasantry:

Nowadays the denomination of conservative is strangely abused. The men who wish to maintain an often atrocious and inhumane slavery in Russia, are also designated by the denomination of conservatives. They too see a total upheaval of the existing ideas in the individual freedom of people and a tendency which they send as very dangerous for

¹²⁰⁹ Dmitrij Milyutin seconded these observations on postponement, although his later observations on Berg's role in the April manifest are not credible: Dmitrij Miljutin, *Vospominanija general-fel'dmarshala grafa Dmitrija Alekseevicha Miljutina: 1860-1862* (Moscow: Rossijskij fond kul'tury, 1999), 87.

¹²¹⁰ Some papers of the Third Section pointed to rumors on the emperor's hesitancy about the Diet. See below.

the future. The conservatives in Finland of whom you speak would therefore be even worse than the petty conservatives of slavery in Russia. Your conservatives would not even allow a free people the official use and development of their native language.¹²¹¹

Berg followed on with his diagnosis of the notion of conservatives, surprised by their desire to preserve most appalling institutions, while he himself used to stand under the banner of conservatives, but rather with those who sought to preserve only those institutions that were fair and humane.¹²¹²

With regards to the university, Berg reproduced his views on the existence of an organized conspirative propaganda in Finland and Sweden that agitated the secession of the former from Russia and its entrance into the union with its ex-metropole. Governor-general reiterated the fact that Armfelt consistently opposed the establishment of the secret police and reminded the latter of the Tölö affair, promotions of 1857 and 1860 in the line of scandals that sought to agitate Finlandish public. He again compared the relations between Sweden and Finland to those between Piedmont and Venice while also highlighting how popular the theme of the Italian unification became in Sweden and Norway, hinting towards the idea that Finland was viewed there as a smaller piece of the future puzzle. In such troubled times, Berg cautioned, one should not have been deluded, and simple measures were to be implemented. The emperor, judging by the side note, agreed to Berg's cautiousness.¹²¹³

It must have been this very report that Sjernvall-Walleen described as Berg's overwhelming success.¹²¹⁴ Its rhetoric combined many of the imperial concerns and expectations, including technocratic modernization, emancipation of the peasants regarded as most loyal subjects, reduction of intermediary groups and direct communication between the

¹²¹¹ Berg – Armfelt. 25 July / 7 August 1860. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Iib 16-19, I. 62-192.

¹²¹² *Ibid.*, 132-133.

¹²¹³ *Ibid.*, 166-167.

¹²¹⁴ *Ur Friherre E. Stjernvall-Walléens efterlämnade papper*, 36–37.

empire and its subjects.¹²¹⁵ Its imperial appeal was reinforced by its mediation. While the report textually addressed only minister state-secretary, it managed to get a wider currency in the court and progressive bureaucratic environment. It is significant that the report was, as Stjernvall-Walleen wrote, handed to the emperor through the chancellery of the Ministry of War that in 1860-1 took the role of the driver of progressive reforms, and especially of the peasant emancipation.¹²¹⁶ Moreover, there are signs that the connection between governor-general and the Ministry of War proliferated even earlier, when the latter published statistical data on the provinces of the empire, including Finland in 1859. There, the struggle for the Finnish language already figured as a just cause propelled by governor-general.¹²¹⁷

Berg's framing of his activities resulted in the turning of the tides in his favor both in the court environment and, as the latter was dependent on this opinion, in the Alexander II's view of the situation as well. The emperor left a commentary that deemed governor-general's explications 'very reasonable' on the fields where those statements that touched the issue of the emancipation.¹²¹⁸ Later memorandums and conversations that Armfelt and Stjernvall-Walleen held with the emperor assured them in the tactical failure, but Armfelt and Berg's later conversations proved that he, in fact, could not defend himself in person on many raised points. For a moment, the tensions calmed down, but they did not cease completely. Although Stjernvall-Walleen posited that Berg ceased to complain about Swedish-leaning sympathies to the emperor, hinting to the fact that their exaggerated or even imagined nature must have been

¹²¹⁵ Hoffmann and Kotsonis, eds., *Russian Modernity*; Yanni Kotsonis, "'Face-to-Face': The State, the Individual, and the Citizen in Russian Taxation, 1863-1917", *Slavic Review* 63, no. 2 (ed 2004): 221-46, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3185727>; Eugene M. Avrutin, *Jews and the Imperial State: Identification Politics in Tsarist Russia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018), 25, 51. Schweitzer provided a very short sketch of Berg's government but totally on point: Schweitzer, *The Rise and Fall of the Russo-Finnish Consensus*, 9-19, 40-72.

¹²¹⁶ *Ur Friherre E. Stjernvall-Walléens efterlämnade papper*, 36-37. I initially thought that it might have been Milyutin himself, but he resided in Borjomi during the summer of 1860: Dmitriij Miljutin, *Vospominanija general-fel'dmarshala grafa Dmitrija Alekseevicha Miljutina: 1856-1860* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2004), 462-66.

¹²¹⁷ *Materialy dlja statistiki Finljandii, izdannye Departamentom General'nogo shtaba Voennogo ministerstva* (Sankt-Peterburg: tip. Dep. Gen. shtaba, 1859), 199-203.

¹²¹⁸ Berg – Armfelt. 25 July / 7 August 1860. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Iib 16-19, 1. 139.

one of the crucial points of the debate, he noticed that governor-general utilized the Third Section as a channel to supply this information through.¹²¹⁹

He was right. Since the animosity between governor-general and minister state-secretary was growing during the summer of 1860, instead of repeating his concerns to Armfelt, Berg opted to collaborate closely with the Third Section, especially since its head Vasily Dolgorukov got to know Berg's reply to Armfelt and appreciated it.¹²²⁰ He then chose to notify the Third Section, about the existence of a secret freemasonic society in Finland in August 1860: 'I have reason to believe that there is a secret society in Finland, which is the main source of pushing the youth and the country in a direction hostile to Russia.'¹²²¹ Berg wished *haute police* to be established to locate the members of this society. Similar societies, he posited, could have been easily discovered in Stockholm, Paris, and London.

In the next letter presented to the emperor, governor-general elaborated on the linkages the society had with Sweden and larger transnational oppositional network. The first suspect that Berg discovered in the duchy was Swedish consul in Finland and a personal friend of Charles XV, Carl Ludvig Dahlfelt who occupied his post there since 1859. Commenting on the organizational framework of the group, Berg elaborated that while in Russia freemasonic societies were banned, in Sweden, Berg rightly posited, the king was the head of the organization. Dahlfelt ostensibly was responsible for the functioning of the cell in Finland, although Berg had no proof behind these claims. Moreover, his contacts with the opposition were hard to prove since the consul recognized that he could compromise himself by establishing this communication. Governor-general added that Dahlfelt's recent voyages to Denmark and France went under the auspices of the clandestine organizations that burgeoned

¹²¹⁹ *Ur Friherre E. Stjernvall-Walléens efterlämnade papper*, 42.

¹²²⁰ Berg mentions it in Berg – Dolgorukov. 10 / 22 September 1860. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 35, d. 206, l. 3-6. Moreover, the emperor himself mediated these contacts, as it is clear from his commentary on Berg's long letter besides the information on the university: Berg – Armfelt. 25 July / 7 August 1860. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIb 16-19, l. 166.

¹²²¹ Berg – Dolgorukov. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 35, d. 206, l. 1-2.

across Europe, hinting, at least in the case of Denmark, to Scandinavianist-propelled activities.¹²²²

In framing the activities of the oppositional groups in Finland through the trope of a freemasonic secret society, Berg certainly succeeded in eliciting the attention of the Third Section and the emperor. Indeed, the existence of secret societies was consistently one of the main fears of the imperial regime throughout the long 19th century, and Polish underground societies in Europe fueled this apprehension. Framing that governor-general used rendered any half-organized group with broad range of doctrinal standings into a dangerous underground instrument aimed to undermine the foundation of the imperial regime. Again, it was not only a matter of doctrine – that only implicitly surfaced as Scandinavianist here – but also the rhetoric of particular groupness that assisted Berg in drawing the attention of Saint-Petersburg to Finland, bypassing the committee. The well-known participation of the Swedish king in freemasonic activities supplied governor-general's application with the image of secrecy, thus unattainable for the untrained eye and demanding resources in the form of clandestine surveillance.¹²²³

In setting the scene, Berg drew on well-known but slightly outdated information. While Dahlfelt indeed earlier functioned as an emissary of Scandinavianism, his activities burgeoned under the aegis of Oscar I who in 1855-6 instrumentalized his paradiplomatic networks to secure Swedish intervention into the war. Charles XV took pronounced distance towards this network in 1858-9, and Dahlfelt's mission to Finland was read rather as resignation and a sign of *défaveur* among the diplomatic corps of the Russian empire.¹²²⁴ Speculatively, Berg's assault on Dahlfelt might have been read as a blow against Finnish bureaucrats who were responsible for negotiating the staff of consulates with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.¹²²⁵

¹²²² Berg – Dolgorukov. 10 / 22 September 1860. Ibid, 1. 3-6.

¹²²³ On freemasonry in the Swedish court: Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 399.

¹²²⁴ Ibid, 302–12. Dashkov – Gorchakov, 2 / 14 June 1859. AVPRI. F. 133, g. 1859, op. 469, d. 174, l. 75-76ob.

¹²²⁵ Lempijajnen, 'Vneshnie kontakty Velikogo Knjazhestva Finljandskogo: 1809-1914 gg.', 216-223.

Finally, around these years the activities under pan-Scandinavian and even revanchist banner in Denmark and Sweden-Norway were relatively weak, as the Russian diplomatic mission satisfyingly informed the emperor.¹²²⁶ Dahlfelt's previous career and the alarming imaginary of a secret society, however, worked perfectly as a red flag for the monitoring institutions.

The Third Section reacted accordingly, and its agent in Paris, count Dmitrij Tolstoy was ordered to monitor Dahlfelt's contacts with the subjects of the emperor and especially with Finnish representatives.¹²²⁷ Moreover, another functionary A.K. Hederstern proposed that the organization had to act after the governor-general's request but pursue this operation independently of him. In October 1860, he suggested to Dolgorukow, first, to send two reliable agents to Finland to sounder the ground there and discover the secret society, and second, to use Russian consul in Christiania Adolf Mechelin – a native of Finland – to implement the surveillance 'beyond our borders'.¹²²⁸ Clearly, the threat was taken seriously which might have stemmed from the emperor's favor to Berg after his report.

Berg went on complaining and proposed to Dolgorukow to use August Tobiesen as a reliable agent for recruitment of loyal locals to spy over the organized Swedish activities in the duchy.¹²²⁹ Tobiesen, however, envisioned greatest difficulties in his capacity to enlist reliable persons or penetrate the lines of the secret society, although at that point he seconded Berg on the fact of its existence and on the perilous connections with Sweden.¹²³⁰ Such an agreement between Berg and Tobiesen might have resulted from their closer communication after Berg's troubling relations with Armfelt. While Dolgorukow launched some internal processes, it is only towards the summer of 1861, again after repeated alarms from governor-general about

¹²²⁶ See last section of the chapter.

¹²²⁷ Timashev – Tolstoy. 16 September 1860. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 35, d. 206, l. 7-7ob. On Tolstoy see: Petr Cherkasov, *Russkij agent vo Francii: Jakov Nikolaevich Tolstoj, 1791-1867* (Moscow: KMK. Tovarishhestvo nauchnyh izdaniij, 2008); Oleg Abakumov, *'Chtob npravstvennaja zaraza ne pronikla v nashi predely': iz istorii bor'by III Otdelenija s evropejskim vlijaniem v Rossii (1830-e - nachalo 1860-h gg.)* (Moscow: Nauchnaja Kniga, 2008).

¹²²⁸ Unsigned pro memoria. October 1860, GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 35, d. 206, l. 8-10.

¹²²⁹ Berg – Dolgorukov. 6/18 October 1860. Ibid, l. 11-15.

¹²³⁰ Dolgorukow – Berg. 26 October 1860. Ibid, l. 16-18.

perilous spirit and tendencies towards independence in Finland spread along the Swedish networks that the reconnaissance mission was approved. Its results, however, would not satisfy Berg, but they were gained in a different situation that I elucidate further.

Those who played against Berg might have shared the latter's overall diagnosis of the state of minds in the duchy and at the university. The causality of this situation was, however, reversed. While Berg put all blame on the propaganda spread at the university and across the Swedish-Finlandish border, Armfelt and others saw Berg as a trigger who provoked the reaction of the irritated students and public by his abuse of power and, especially, by the censorship and espionage measures. Berg's allusions to the ideas of Scandinavianism and Finlandish independence was opposed by the committee and those around it who declared that there was little ground for such speculations. While Berg presented public provocations as organized workings of the secret society, Armfelt framed them as spontaneous bursts of broader dissatisfaction. The two sides were trying to navigate in the situation when imperial political languages of rationalization and concepts tied to them were being reconfigured during the process of reforms. It is in this cabinet wars that we can see the difference not only in the discussion of administrative decisions, be they financially futile or politically challenging, but also in the languages that these diverse analytics used to address the emperor.

The discrepancy of these languages primarily concerned regimes of groupness and categorization on different scales. The terms used to describe larger social reality in the duchy gravitated between class-centered and, eventually, ethnically-colored paradigms. It is, perhaps, especially conspicuous in Kothen's criticism and Berg's replies. Kothen still held tight to the gradually extruded language of class that supplied him with relevant metaphors of potential peasant revolt, lower classes unreliability, and Finnish-centered democratic upheaval, reproducing the conservative fears that Menshikov explicated some fifteen years before. This analysis also gave enough ground to Kothen and Armfelt to conflate Fennomania and

Scandinavianism, since nationality or ethnicity did not play a major role in their analysis but both projects rather drew on dangerous political visions of democratization and Finnish independence. Even Berg's closeness to peasants during his voyages and his call to direct appeals disturbed many conservatives since this was the prerogative of other local and central institutions.

Berg, on the other hand, sought to redraw this picture by closely engaging with different, modern language that drew both on the principles of emancipation and, consequently, brought ethnic features in the analysis. As Mikhail Dolbilov has demonstrated, the peasant reform in Imperial Russia both depended on and opened the prospects of the *national* mobilization, and it certainly led to more ethnicized visions of the composite parts of the empire, including the Kingdom of Poland and the Western borderlands. These languages of class and ethnicity went on existing simultaneously, but it is conspicuous how Berg and other imperial agents found more resilience in Finnish-speaking population, or, to put it in a different conceptual language – in the figure of peasant – than in Swedish-speaking intermediaries with the latter ostensibly clinging to geopolitical visions of Swedish-Finnish and pan-Scandinavian unification.

5.13. Profession and trust

Berg's conflict with the committee erupted again when the question of the head of the agricultural commission of the Senate came to the fore in 1860-1. Berg argued in favor of Nordenstam who shared military training with governor-general, while the committee wanted to pick the person based on his expertise in the agricultural field that commander Nordenstam lacked.¹²³¹ Although Berg, in general, represented a modernizing figure in his style of rule that

¹²³¹ Adolf Törngren, 'Ur Friherre Emil Stjernvall-Walleens Brev till Aurore Karamzine', *Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier*, no. 15 (1939): 150.

implied the reduction of intermediaries between state and the population¹²³² – in case of Finland between governor-general and masses of Finnish population, – his paternalist attitude with a desire to secure governmental positions by trusted personalities resembled the practices characteristic for Nicholas I's time. In this case, the committee, on the other hand, justified their candidate on the grounds that were more pertinent for the present time, and the emperor's talks and decision-making highlighted the expertise-driven choice.¹²³³

The committee's decision was approved, and Johan Gripenberg was asked to compile a preliminary report on the agricultural situation in Finland. While the report indeed covered aspects of soil working and necessity of technical improvement, it also diverted to encompass some aspects of social and political conditions. Gripenberg accused governor-general in strict censorship, chaotic financial policy, and delays in the convocation of the estates that was necessary to renew the legal framework of economic and agricultural state.¹²³⁴ While the majority of the Finlanders again featured as loyal subjects of the emperor, all these measures provoked educated classes, spread to other groups and made them cherish the ideal of the reunification with Sweden, which, according to the author, indeed made great progress in intellectual and material respects.¹²³⁵

Another member of the committee F.O. af Bruner, who was asked to provide his opinion, was optimistic about the loyalty of the Finnish nation, although he deemed it yet uncivilized.¹²³⁶ He stressed that a community of educated men – underlining, however, the absence of a any party – was keen on making the duchy into a more developed province both materially and morally. Necessary changes of outdated legal codes that had to be implemented

¹²³² Kotsonis, "Face-to-Face".

¹²³³ Alfred J. Rieber, "Bureaucratic Politics in Imperial Russia," *Social Science History* 2, no. 4 (1978): 399–413, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1171155>; Rieber, *The Imperial Russian Project*, 105–98.

¹²³⁴ Gripenberg's report translated into Russian. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto I Ib 8b (2), l. 22-32.

¹²³⁵ Gripenberg's report translated into Russian. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto I Ib 8b (2), l. 22-32; Borodkin, *Istorija Finljandii*, 105-108; Rein, *Johan Vilhelm Snellman*, 2:316-23.

¹²³⁶ Rein and Borodkin argue that the script was authored by F.O. af Bruner. In the archival folder, however, it is anonymous and undated: Af Bruner's report translated into Russian. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto I Ib 8b (2), l. 224-267.

through the convocation of the estates surfaced as the most suitable instrument to navigate between the Scylla and Charybdis of ‘Fennomania and Scandinavianism’ on the way to the general improvement of conditions. These progressive community, the text continued, wished no revolution or upheaval and, on the contrary, they represented a loyal agency capable of a limited change.

Moreover, the author highlighted that the foundations of the future Diet in Finland in no way resembled those of Riksdag in Sweden. Parties that challenged the legitimate rule in Sweden could not be formed in Finland since there was no condition for it. The emperor, however, feared that nobody could guarantee that the questions of the broader responsibility of the Diet would not be raised by ‘malevolent persons’ once it is convened, as it stemmed from his side note.¹²³⁷ Political parties that could unite members across the estate boundaries also featured as a particular form of groupness that should have been avoided, especially when dealing with the issues of the representation. Nobody, of course, could blame emperor for delays in the administrative correspondence, but it seems that he sought to slow down the process.

Simultaneously, the text continued, Finlandish society expressed their dissatisfaction with present situation in Finland and, especially, with governor-general. The people – referring rather to the lower classes – knew him well, while the educated classes scorned him for unreliability, distrustfulness, inconsistency, vanity, and carelessness, ‘who had no respect either for the laws and orders of the duchy, or for others’ views and opinions’.¹²³⁸ The author was convinced that the reasons for the political tensions were to be discovered in Berg’s arrival to the duchy during the war, since governor-general came with established viewpoint that there existed a revolutionary party that leaned towards Sweden. Whether this thought was Berg’s

¹²³⁷ Ibid.

¹²³⁸ Ibid.

initial conviction, or it was inspired later, it was his search for disloyal subjects with espionage measures that fueled conflicts. Severe punishment that the students faced after the Tölö affair produced the final rupture between the educated society and Berg and gave rise to numerous, either well-founded or fantasized, rumors about him. Governor-general was accused in censorship interventions and the hastily introduced reforms and indifference towards their consequent revocation.¹²³⁹

While some researchers stressed this text as instrumental in Berg's downfall, the emperor remained hesitant and noted that while there was lot of truthful data in the report, he disagreed with some ideas.¹²⁴⁰ Berg, in his turn, hastened to solidify his position again in October. He addressed the emperor with his investigation of the state of mind of the Finnish-speaking population. Profiting by constant voyages across the country, Berg argued, he acquired deep knowledge of the inhabitants' ways of thinking. Countering Armfelt's suspicion, governor-general assured the emperor that the spirit of the Finnish-speaking population was loyal, calm, appreciative of the governmental measures, and fully devoted to the throne.

Correspondence that he established with distinguished and reliable persons confirmed these impressions. From the Finnish people Berg turned to the 'party of Fennomans' that, according to him, was negligible. Some of its members indeed were professed dangerous ideas, but only because they had received their education from the Alexander University. Berg then argued that Fennomania generally lost its credit after 1854 and was by far not that influential as it used to be, since government measures fulfilled the hopes of the majority of the Finnish population. Scandinavianism, on the other hand, evaporated from his report completely, rhetorically proving the absence of any interdependence between the two projects. Alexander II appreciated Berg's report and scribed that 'if this was true, one should be satisfied'.¹²⁴¹

¹²³⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁴⁰ It was argued by Rein and Borodkin: Borodkin, *Istorija Finljandii*, 109-112.

¹²⁴¹ Berg – Alexander II. 16 / 28 October 1860. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Iib 16-19, l. 303-318.

The instruments of Berg's rhetoric remained the same, appealing to his field-knowledge of the community and counterweighting Armfelt's pretensions with references to the university. Contrary to the satisfaction of the emperor, Berg – who did not stop in his pursuits of the secret society – was not yet satisfied. His suspicion, apart from growing politization of the Finnish society especially in the capital, must have stemmed from the larger imperial concerns that were strained in the aftermaths of the peasant reform and demonstrations in the Kingdom of Poland. Stockholm-centered Finnish emigration rhymed well with Paris-based Polish committee for freedom, while their ideas that preached territorial independence converged. At that point Berg's communication went through the Third Section, and his suspicion of the Swedish organized propaganda was only reinforced during 1861, when the emperor pronounced the convocation of the estates commission in the duchy, albeit in the manner that did not correspond to the Finnish expectations.

5.14. The April manifest and its interpretations

The February Manifest of 1861 that cancelled serfdom in the Russian empire echoed not only in the cabinet struggles in Finland but as well among the broader audience. While at first the public was not involved into the affairs, as officer Tobiesen reported, in February and March the news of the manifesto was received delightfully in Helsingfors.¹²⁴² The manifesto was reprinted in the newspapers, and its consequences were tracked accordingly.¹²⁴³ More disturbing news, however, arrived from Poland, where in February-March 1861 thousands of people marched along the streets of Warsaw and mobilized in other localities. During the jubilee of the battle of Olszynka Grochowska on February 13/25 when crowds gathered across the city, several people were shot dead and wounded by the imperial forces. Finnish

¹²⁴² Tobiesen – Dolgorukow. 23 February / 7 March 1861. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 32, d. 321 ch. 32, l. 89.

¹²⁴³ *Finlands allmänna tidning*, 22.03.1861.

administration was aware of potential disturbances that could be paralleled to those in Poland, resulting in more restrictive and paternalistic policies from the center. Since many higher bureaucrats saw the reasons of Polish disturbances in the desire to draw the attention of France, thus referring to an external agency of provocation,¹²⁴⁴ the dynamics between Sweden and Finland accordingly might have been associated with similar hazards.¹²⁴⁵

As in Poland, Alexander II initially sought to calm down the population in other borderlands as well. The manifest of April 10 that proclaimed the convention of the consultative committee, consisting of the deputies of four estates of Finland, however, produced opposite effect – which some of the administrators predicted¹²⁴⁶ – and worried Finnish liberal public. Its wording that implied ‘cooperation’ between the authority of the Grand Duke and that of estates was vague and did not correspond to the legal reality of the Diet. The manifest explicitly mentioned the inability to convene the Diet according to the laws of Finland at that moment, although its future convocation was mentioned without clear dates. The prescribed novel voting system for the committee, the restricted number of deputies, perhaps advised to avoid any political groupings, and unclear political weight accordingly resulted in the burst of anxiety of the educated public in Finland.¹²⁴⁷ The liberal minority of the Senate expressed their worries about the manifest that could potentially disturb Finnish constitutional privileges.

Monitoring bodies in the duchy quickly recognized a potential threat in the public reactions towards the manifest. Tobiesen reported that the manifest produced bitterness among the lines of a ‘well-known party of the Helsingfors inhabitants, their imitators, and among those

¹²⁴⁴ Petr Aleksandrovich Valuev, *Dnevnik P. A. Valueva ministra vnutrennih del. 1861-1864 gg.*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1961), 69–84; Boris Nosov, “Nakanune Janvar'skogo Vosstaniia,” in *Mezh dvuh vosstaniij: Korolevstvo Pol'skoe i Rossija v 30-50-e gody XIX v.*, ed. Svetlana Fal'kovich (Moscow: Indrik, 2016), 655–734.

¹²⁴⁵ Törnngren, ‘Ur Friherre Emil Stjernvall-Walleens brev till Aurore Karamzine’, 150–52.

¹²⁴⁶ Zacharias Topelius, *Finlands krönika 1860-1878* (Helsinki: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 2004), 47–49.

¹²⁴⁷ Wilhelm Erik Svedelius, *Om Finlands Landtdagar och Landtdagsordningen gifven i St. Petersburg den 15 (3) April 1869: Inbjudningskrift till morgondagens philosophie doktors-promotion af promotor Wilhelm Erik Svedelius* (Helsingfors: Berling, 1872), 3–8; Bergh, *Var styrelse och vara landtdagar*, 48–60.

who awaited the convention of the popular (*narodnogo*) Seim'. He added then that such resentment against the measures of the imperial government was a particular trait of 'Finlanders of the Swedish descent'. He expressed his hopes, however, that even this part of the population would soon recognize the benefits of the emperor's decision. His expectations, however, were thwarted by demonstration that took place on April 22.¹²⁴⁸ Politicizing society of the capital with student and handcraft groups at the forefront of the organized mobilization spilled this anxiety into the streets.

Collaboration between the university sections and, overall, variegated forms of organization within the university, made the demonstration both disciplined and appealing, and members of other professional groups joined the ranks.¹²⁴⁹ The number of the participants overcame one thousand, as reported by Tobiesen, who was expectedly worried about the convention. The participants, however, behaved cautiously, distancing themselves from any comparison with revolutionary symbolics. The crowds cheered those senators who refused to sign benevolent address to the emperor, sang national songs – Runeberg's long-time popular *Wårt land* and recently published *Björneborgarnas marsch* – and shouted 'Long live Finland's Basic Laws (*Grundlagar*)', 'without insulting any personality', as Tobiesen noted. The political character of the convention, however, was obvious for him, especially given the number of participants that could only be reached 'by collusion'.¹²⁵⁰

The imperial institutions suspected conspiracy behind any pattern of social mobilization, especially given the Polish echoes, where the network of the Agricultural Society indeed established proper infrastructure for organized political manifestations and coordinated action.¹²⁵¹ Baron Fabian Langenskjöld, who was primarily responsible for the drafting of the

¹²⁴⁸ Tobiesen – Dolgorukow, 9 / 21 April 1861. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 32, d. 321 ch. 32, l. 94-95.

¹²⁴⁹ K.E.F. Ignatius' autobiography. KA. K. F. Ignatiuksen arkisto, 5 C 10/II; Klinge, *Studenter och idéer*, 2:132–49; Stenius, *Frivilligt, jämlikt, samfällt*, 212–93; Topelius, *Finlands krönika 1860-1878*, 49–50.

¹²⁵⁰ Tobiesen – Dolgorukow, 11 / 23 April 1861. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 32, d. 321 ch. 32, l. 96-96ob.

¹²⁵¹ Nosov, "Nakanune Janvarskogo Vosstanija", 655–734.

controversial committee programme, even had to assure the emperor that the street protest was not a result of any foreign influence, while those present consisted of ‘people of the dregs’, students, workers, onlookers and even women, thus depriving the demonstration of any political weight. Moreover, he mentioned that the dissatisfactions of the inhabitants were reinforced by the presumption that the committee was designed by governor-general Berg. Langenskjöld thus utilized the popular agitation as a means to again undermine governor-general’s political capital who, in fact, had nothing to do with its establishment.¹²⁵²

In Finland, unlike in the Kingdom of Poland, the manifestation came to be a result of intragroup negotiations, broad public interest, and growing political and legal awareness of the society in the capital and beyond. Overwhelmed by the events in Poland and in a way following the line of pacification there, Alexander II quickly assured the Senate and publics that the committee was a temporal measure that was planned to give place to a properly convened Diet responsible for the legal procedures and new laws. According to Tobiesen, this news significantly quieted the anxiety in the duchy, leading to the absence of any public demonstrations.¹²⁵³ Finnish proclamations, however, for the first time resonated in Saint-Petersburg high society, and the Imperial Senate bureaucrat Alexander Polovtsov noted in his diary in September that ‘Finlanders openly declare their wish to join Sweden’. His remark, however, underlined the necessity for reconciliatory measures within the empire instead of hardline suppression.¹²⁵⁴

At the beginning of June similar concerns about Finland gravitating towards Sweden again surfaced in the Third Section folders. The report traditionally presented Berg’s policy as a challenge for reconciliation between Finland and Russia due to his illegal usurpation of power that circumscribed other institutions, on the one hand, and rudeness with state officials, on the

¹²⁵² Lettre du baron Langenskjöld, undated. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto, IIb 1, l. 142-4.

¹²⁵³ Tobiesen – Dolgorukow. 18 / 30 April 1861. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 32, d. 321 ch. 32, l. 99-100.

¹²⁵⁴ Alexander Polovtsov, *Dnevnik. 1859-1882*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Fond «Svjaz' Jepoh», 2022), 67-8.

other. Besides, the text addressed a spy-system – yet uncovered – that governor-general ostensibly used to solicit information. His opposition to the convention of the Diet was ostensibly based on the expectation that his conspirative measures and illegality would appear in the spotlight. Governor-general's suppressive politics thus contributed to the fact that Finnish population turned their eyes to Sweden with flourishing liberal institutions again.¹²⁵⁵ Accidentally or not, Berg was given a health leave in June that year that many regarded as an act of defavoritization by the emperor.

In December, a minor provocation against censorship by liberal politicians in Helsingfors again reached eyes and ears of Saint-Petersburg. A member of State Council of the Russian Empire, Admiral Vasilij Ivanovich Melikhov – earlier a proponent of more liberal relations between Russia and Finland¹²⁵⁶ – left his remarks on the state of Finnish affairs that were meant to be presented for the emperor. His rhetoric built on the vision of ethnic groupness, alluding to the fact that the dominating Swedes could not be in charge of the duchy anymore, compromised by their twisted political loyalties. Alluding to the dangers of the potential warfare – explicitly exacerbated by the dangers of Scandinavianism – Melikhov argued that Swedish invasions would hardly face any resistance during the invasion, given cultural and political bonds that still tied Finland to Sweden.¹²⁵⁷

Such dim prospects served as grounds for emancipatory politics with regards to the Finnish population that remained almost in a medieval servitude for the Swedish Finlanders. Swedish-speaking elites initially found their support among the Russian bureaucrats, 'obscuring the Finns'. The latter group had to be strengthened in the present circumstances when 'everybody became equal before the law': 'It is time to give an equal place for a Finn

¹²⁵⁵ Anonymous report, 2 June 1861. GARF. F. 109 s/a, op. 3a, d. 1354, l. 1-4.

¹²⁵⁶ Leo Suni, *Finljandsko-russkie torgovyje otnoshenija vo vtoroj polovine XIX veka : (1858-1885)* (Tartu: Tartu Riiklik Ülikool, 1963), 34–35.

¹²⁵⁷ Melikhov's note for Bludov. RGIA. F. 1250, op. 1, d. 4 G ch IV. l. 152-168.

before a Swede'.¹²⁵⁸ Melikhov insisted that the government should give preferences to ethnic Finns in all spheres from language education to property rights to secure the loyalty of the borderland province, without, however, allowing injustices towards the Swedes.¹²⁵⁹ The time of inherited privileges had passed, giving way for just interventions of the imperial government.¹²⁶⁰

Although Berg's position was crumbling under the pressure of Armfelt and Stjernvall-Walleen, his vision remained vital for the imperial government. Melikhov note, recapitulating governor-general's fears, also sought to build bridges between the changing gears and principles of the pan-imperial rule and Finnish politics. The notions of emancipation, legal equality, ethnicity, and direct intervention of the imperial apparatus bypassing intermediary groups, shaped the conceptual paradigm for policies of social engineering to solidify the imperial resilience. Swedish-Scandinavian perilous orientation of Finland appeared to be the main card in the hands of both Berg and those who worked against him, and often the logic of argumentation gravitated around this issue with variegated programmes of treatment surfacing around it.

Of course, there is a degree of normativity in all of these programmes. In practice, on the level of personal relations between the bureaucrats or in their communications with the locals, the suspicions against Swedish-speaking population hardly always converted itself into a social fact of suspicion or alienation. Neither Berg nor Melikhov really wanted to get rid of the Swedes and even if their social visions were underpinned by the notions of ethnicity, it did not presuppose the 'elimination' of estates or social divisions but rather often relied on another conceptual intervention of the reforming empire, namely the 'all-estate' principle

¹²⁵⁸ RGIA. F. 1250, op. 1, d. 4 G ch IV. l. 162ob-163.

¹²⁵⁹ The note revealed Melikhov's lack of proper knowledge on Finnish legal situation and property rights.

¹²⁶⁰ Petuhova briefly mentions the text: Alexandra Petuhova, "'Otsel' grozit' my budem...": voennyj faktor vo vzaimootnoshenijah Rossii i Velikogo Knjazhestva Finljandskogo v konce xix - nachala hh vv', *Chelovecheskij Kapital* 143, no. 11 (2020): 97.

(*vsesoslovnost*’) as embodied by their legal equality.¹²⁶¹ The reality of the ruling and ruled was complex and dynamic, drawing on palimpsest of legal norms, customary practices, and new languages of rationalization. The effort of social, moral, ethnic, and hierarchical mapping was in itself a political act aimed to demonstrate the ability of a particular agent to calculate and organize the chaos of the social, especially so distant and impenetrable for monitoring institutions.

Governor-general found himself between the two poles with one demanding the conservative restoration and another – the immediate introduction of representative institutions.¹²⁶² Technocratic, autocratic modernizer Berg ran counter to the desires of intermediacy of the past with Menshikov often surfacing as the best example¹²⁶³ and to impersonal bureaucratic and, most essentially, legalistic procedures of local institutions. Interestingly, both Berg and disenfranchised public mirrored each other in their suspect of, on the one hand, organized conspiracy and, on the other, spy-system spanned across the land. It is essential that these concerns addressed not only accidents – political manifestations or traitor-identification – but rather regularity of these workings, their systematic and organized function, their modernity writ large. Berg – we know it – did not get the secret police installed in the duchy. The third party – the Third Section – tried to.

¹²⁶¹ Grigorĭi Dzhanshĭev, *Jepoha velikih reform* (S-Peterburg: Tipografija Vol’fa, 1907), 122, 137, 165. See how this principle worked later: Mariia Gulakova and Alexander Semyonov, “Imperial Citizenship and Political Representation in the Russian Empire, 1905–1906,” *Ab Imperio* 2021, no. 2 (2021): 139–52, <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2021.0049>. See on estates in the Russian empire: Gregory L. Freeze, “The Soslovie (Estate) Paradigm and Russian Social History,” *The American Historical Review* 91, no. 1 (1986): 11–36, <https://doi.org/10.2307/1867233>; Michael Confino, “The ‘soslovie’ (estate) paradigm: Reflections on Some Open Questions,” *Cahiers Du Monde Russe* 49, no. 4 (2008): 681–99; Elise K. Wirschafter, “Social Categories in Russian Imperial History,” *Cahiers Du Monde Russe* 50, no. 1 (2009): 231–50.

¹²⁶² I have little doubt that many of them knew about the projects of reorganization of the imperial government along constitutionalist lines. For that see: Valentina Chernuha, *Vnutrennjaja politika carizma s serediny 50-h do nachala 80-h gg. XIX v* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1978), 15–45; Snellman, on the other hand, later reflected that only strong monarchy was a remedy for Finlandish autonomy since pan-imperial representation would have rendered it a mere province: Johan V. Snellman, “Memoaranteckningär (30.12.1876),” in Snellman’s Collection, URL: <http://snellman.kootutteokset.fi/sites/default/files/12383.pdf> (accessed 03.03.2023).

¹²⁶³ Anonymous report, 2 June 1861. GARF. F. 109 s/a, op. 3a, d. 1354, l. 1-4.

5.15. The Third Section's quest for pan-Scandinavian secret society

Berg's repeated concerns to Dolgorukow finally resulted in the outlining of the operation by the Third Section that was, however, meant to be deployed independently of governor-general. Berg's appeals for the establishment of the secret police under his supervision in the duchy were cancelled, but other trajectories were instrumentalized. The Third Section enlisted its experienced agent Alexander Hederstern – a learned gendarme whose identity was no secret for the oppositional circles within and beyond the imperial borders¹²⁶⁴ – for the mission with the task to sonder the ground in the duchy himself and to enlist Russian consul Adolf Mechelin in Christiania with the task to create a network of reliable agents in Stockholm and Finland. Interestingly, Hederstern argued that the latter part was no difficult task, since the Norwegians were antagonized by the Swedes, and thus could have been easily recruited to monitor the situation. The agents recognized the context of apparent tensions within the Swedish-Norwegian union concerning the issues of representation, autonomy, and rule and were ready to capitalize on these dynamics in their operations.¹²⁶⁵

Hederstern's voyage that started in the summer of 1861, took him first to Helsingfors and then to Copenhagen, Stockholm, and Christiania. First in Helsingfors and then throughout his reports, the doctrinal stance of the ostensibly existing secret society was deemed to be Scandinavianism, since Hederstern suspected that in the duchy oppositional projects revolved mainly around the idea of the Nordic union. In Copenhagen, he witnessed a political demonstration in favor of the incorporation of the duchy of Schleswig into the Danish kingdom. While the demonstration was peaceful and the general stance of the Danish population was favorable to Russia, some younger agitators still drew on the fears of the Russian expansionism to justify their projects. In Sweden, the situation was much worse since the

¹²⁶⁴ *Kolokol*, 15.05.1860, l. 71. URL : <http://gertsen.lit-info.ru/gertsen/public/kolokol-1857-1860/article-199.htm> (accessed 03.01.2023); *Kolokol*, 15.09.1858, l. 22-23. URL: <http://gertsen.lit-info.ru/gertsen/public/kolokol-1857-1860/article-83.htm> (accessed 03.01.2023).

¹²⁶⁵ Hederstern's report. 8 May 1861. GARF. F 109, 1-eks, op. 35, d. 206, l. 30-34.

democratic propagandists argued in favor of the reform of representation, while national agitation praised the successes of the Italian struggle for unification.¹²⁶⁶

Acquainted with Russian consul of Finlandish descent Alexander Georg Mollerius in Stockholm, Hederstern held a conversation with him on the prospects of political agitation in Finland and on the sympathies of its population towards Sweden. Mollerius, who recently visited the duchy, argued that the majority of the Finlandish population did not want to return under the aegis of Sweden given the material benefits offered by the empire. He put more weight on the currency exchange issue and the demands for the Diet that agitated the public there. He confirmed, however, that there were rare adherents of the idea of Scandinavianism but mentioned that ‘its realization faces a lot of difficulties.’¹²⁶⁷ The group thus did not present any real challenge to the imperial power. Neither foreign consuls, nor student organization embodied any danger in his view, and Berg’s suspicion surfaced as ungrounded. Hederstern, however, was not easily persuaded and when Russian diplomat Minciaky told him that Mollerius was an optimist, he concluded that the consul must have been deceived by those he did not want to suspect.

Hederstern’s further voyage to Christiania assured him in the destabilized nature of Scandinavian politics. He happened to travel together with Gustaf Lallersted, the author of famous Scandinavianist brochure *La Scandinavie, ses craintes et ses espérances*¹²⁶⁸ and a contributor to *Aftonbladet*. Hederstern knew the political profile of his co-voyager and described him as a distinguished radical politician. As their conversation concerned political matters, Lallerstedt opined that as a Swede he could not like Russia, ‘which since the reign of Peter I did a lot of harm to his motherland’.¹²⁶⁹ Norway, he continued, could never compensate

¹²⁶⁶ Hederstern’s report part 1. 24 July / 5 August 1861. Ibid, l. 39-41.

¹²⁶⁷ Hederstern’s report part 2. 8 / 20 August 1861. Ibid, l. 43-47.

¹²⁶⁸ Gustaf Lallerstedt, *La Scandinavie, ses craintes et ses espérances* (Paris : E. Dentu, 1856).

¹²⁶⁹ Hederstern’s report part 2. 8 / 20 August 1861. GARF. F 109, 1-eks, op. 35, d. 206, l. 45-46ob. The ancient surname of Swedish origin helped him to get acquainted with the Swedish politician.

for the loss of Finland. Lallerstedt lamented that the perfect opportunity to regain Finland was lost during the Crimean War, while another chance would hardly appear soon on the horizon. Hederstern then pulled the dialogue towards the question of Scandinavianism, and Lallerstedt appeared ‘an ardent partisan’ of the idea who believed that ‘sooner or later’ the three Scandinavian kingdoms were destined to unite. For this, however, a reshuffle of the European politics was needed, as, for example launched by the secession of Holstein from Denmark. This would accordingly lead to the supremacy of Sweden in Scandinavia, the disputed question that at the moment prevented the formation of the Scandinavian union.

This conversation, Hederstern continued, made him recognize that the question of Scandinavianism was ‘at least not dead’ in Sweden. Moreover, since the reification of the project seemed imminent for the individuals such as his interlocutor, it could be assumed that the discreet measures were being implemented to realize the project both in the Nordic kingdoms and in the Grand Duchy of Finland. Russian consul Mechelin generally shared his opinion. Mechelin also highlighted the workings of the foreign consulates in Helsingfors and Åbo and opined that the appointment of Dahlfelt to Finland must have had some foundation in the personal relations between him and the king. Finally, Mechelin proposed to travel to the duchy himself to sonder the ground there, and especially among the university students.¹²⁷⁰

Mechelin, sponsored by the funds of the Third Section, arrived in the duchy in September 1861. His report pointed to the proliferation of the idea of nationality in Finland, albeit developed competingly by two political groups of Fennomans and ‘so-called Swedish party’. Both, however, united their voices for the convocation of the legal representative organ in Finland. Fennomans pushed forward the idea of moral and material development understood in ‘pure national’ and hence exclusive form. The ‘anti-Fennoman’, Swedish party capitalized on the ‘favorable elements’ of Scandinavianism. According to Mechelin, they framed

¹²⁷⁰ Ibid.

themselves as opponents of Russia, while regarding Sweden as a model. Generally, however, the material proclivities provided by the empire overshadowed these dreams, but the contemporary financial crisis contributed to the dissatisfaction with the Russian rule. If the empire fixed its financial problems and provided the legal representative body, the general spirit, according to Mechelin, would improve. If Finland would acquire the institutions it demanded, it would as well downgrade the influence of Scandinavianism that fascinated the inhabitants by a 'bait of liberal institutions and independence'. His conclusion based on the observation and communication with persons indicated by Hederstern, however, contradicted Berg's claims. Mechelin assured:

There does not exist any organized or exercised by accredited agents Scandinavian propaganda in Finland, but the ideas of Scandinavianism find there an easy access, both through the Swedish press, which none of the prohibitive measures can stop from circulation in Finland, and by the personal contact.¹²⁷¹

He noted that much of the dissatisfaction stemmed from the performance of the executive powers, and especially governor-general. Mechelin, however, posited that it was rather the general atmosphere of crisis that made any administration unpopular, while the quality of governance hardly changed.

Another anonymous report, made by one of the correspondents that Hederstern enlisted, in general, sounded similarly to Mechelin's arguments.¹²⁷² While no organized propaganda of Scandinavianism existed, the general discontent was fueled by the monetary crisis and by the

¹²⁷¹ Mechelin – Dolgorukow. GARF. F 109, 1-eks, op. 35, d. 206, l. 57-59. Adolf Mechelin was in good relations with his nephew Leo Mechelin, who stood behind the emergence of new liberal newspaper *Helsingfors Dagblad*. His 'plausible' treatment of Scandinavianism as a feature of public opinion might have stemmed from his conversations with Leo and environment around him. See, for example: Sigurd Nordenstreng, *L. Mechelin, hans statsmannagärning och politiska personlighet* (Helsinki: Mercators tryckeri, 1936), 18.

¹²⁷² Anonymous letter. *Ibid*, l. 55. He himself noted that he was a 'stranger'.

convocation of representative body that did not conform to the legal procedures of the duchy. That was the reason why Scandinavianism made some progress in the duchy:

Scandinavianism, as the ideas of liberalism are [...] in the air and a bit in the blood of the descendants of old Scandinavian families. A Swedish agent thus does not need to work very hard, even if it was his mission. But like a good Scandinavian he would fail in his duty if he did not blow where he saw a spark; and the sparks are numerous in Finland at the moment.¹²⁷³

In present circumstances, however, those persons with dangerous views did not present much danger since the tranquility persisted in the North, according to the author. If, however, the upheaval erupted in the vicinity, this balance might have been shattered.

The secret society, to the dissatisfaction of the governor-general, was not discovered in the duchy, but the yearly report of the Third Section pointed to the growing sympathies of the population towards Scandinavianist ideas and translated highlights from Mechelin's report, prompted by the growing dissatisfaction with the Russian rule.¹²⁷⁴ The results of the mission, however, pictured Scandinavianism as a symptom that could have been cured through conscious – mainly emancipatory – government measures. Again, it was the form of groupness that initially concerned the government, meaning the organized secret society, rather than its particular doctrinal standing. The absence of the organized society thus opened ways for less intrusive measures to be implemented to get rid of the Swedish-leaning sympathies, and even those persons picked to surveil the situation – as most of those who provided reports under Armfelt's patronage – argued in favor of the imperial power to seek compromise with the local

¹²⁷³ Ibid.

¹²⁷⁴ Maria Sidorova and Ekaterina Shherbakova, eds., *Rossija pod nadzorom: otchety III otdelenija: 1827-1869* (Moscow: Rossijskij fond kul'tury, 2006), 548–50.

population. In this sense, political emancipation – contrary to Nicholas I’s repression – served the necessities of distancing from Sweden.

The framework of the reforming empire opened ways for the introduction of more sensitive instruments for the monitoring of the population. While Berg held to the images of organized secret society, the agents rather discovered a trajectory of the public opinion, a new category to be instrumentalized and reckoned with in the modernizing empire. It was revealing, however, both for the emperor and for the Third Section to observe in Finland a popular sentiment of Scandinavianism as a feature of its burgeoning public sphere that in the case of the duchy reportedly more often aimed for institutional change rather than for geopolitical shatter.¹²⁷⁵ The new institutional framework of the imperial system of rule both opened up ways for the proliferation of the public debate and could attune its monitoring bodies to differentiate between century-old threats and new tendencies of imperial dwelling.

The umbrella-like phenomenon of Scandinavianism made it into an object of interpretation both among its advocates and – even more so – among those who opposed it. From what we know, the notion of Scandinavianism rarely featured in the correspondence of those oppositional intellectuals whom Berg suspected in clandestine workings.¹²⁷⁶ In the censored press, it related squarely to the Danish-Swedish dynamics. In the public demonstrations and talks, be that Tölö affair, or promotions of 1857, it figured as an implicit background, and references to Scandinavian idea were so ambiguous that they could easily become a matter of debate and deduction in the administrative cabinets. It was the administration and personally governor-general that more often set them in the framework of

¹²⁷⁵ Kurunmäki, ‘On the Difficulty of Being a National Liberal in Nineteenth-Century Finland’; See also how educated imperial agents faced similar challenges in the Russian proper: Valentina Tvardovskaja, *Ideologija poreformennogo samodержavija: M.N. Katkov i ego izdanija* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 21-22.

¹²⁷⁶ But see: Björk-Winberg, ‘Opposition from Abroad: Emil von Qvanten and Finnish Scandinavianism in the Mid-Nineteenth Century’.

the Scandinavian movement while these intellectuals preferred to allude with metaphors rather than openly declare their belonging to any project.¹²⁷⁷ Even the Third Section agents on the mission in 1861 – indeed a year of reestablished Scandinavianist hopes¹²⁷⁸ – had to interpret the political dynamics before designating it under the label of Scandinavianism. Perhaps, if not for Hederstern’s initial fixation on the idea of the Nordic unity, those who supplied the reports might have put the ideas of liberalism, economic profitability, legalism, and autonomy under a different label.

But Scandinavianism became a sticky symbol, especially in the imperial and Finnish cabinets. Its temporalization and intensification came to depend on the international gravitation of the project in Denmark and Sweden as well as on the internal dynamics of ambiguous public provocations and administrative interpretations. The notion became internalized and defined by the changing grid of internal cultural and political hopes. Initially related to geopolitical visions of the Swedish potential aggression, Scandinavianism came to embody different things: Northern direction of the railroads to Swedish-centered prosperous Åbo, demands for the representative institutions defined by the once Swedish legislature, ostensibly more effective financial policy, cultural tendencies, personal sympathies, and visions of Finnish independence. It accordingly shaped the pool of measures that the politicians thought they could use to counterbalance it.

Haartman, Armfelt and Stjernvall-Walleen considered that Scandinavian advocates would have better been ignored than provoked, while Berg insisted that the secret society working under its label should have been uncovered by the measures of the secret police. He discovered Scandinavianist roots in the morally corrupted institution of the Alexander University in Helsingfors and in the unchallenged circulation of rumors, journals, and

¹²⁷⁷ There were notable but rare exceptions: Mörne, *Axel Olof Freudenthal och den finlandssvenska nationalitetstanken*. See Grandell on self-identification: Grandell, *Från ett årtionde i Finland*, 117–53.

¹²⁷⁸ See below.

newspapers across the Finlandish-Swedish border – remnants of the past privileges and neglect. His strategy differed, since Berg favored surveillance, secrecy, and heavy-handed censorship to filter the public debate only to discover their limits. Moreover, his social engineering tactics instrumentalized Finnish press and Fennoman argument as appropriate tools to counterbalance the Swedish-centric influence. The invocation of Scandinavianism in the reports became a means to draw the attention of the emperor. Its abuse, however, might as well lead to the contestation with those administrators who deemed those calls exaggerated if not fictitious.

Another conceptual intervention concerned the public sphere, where previously collaborative ideologies of Fennomania and Scandinavianism became antagonized. Moreover, the association play erroneously made Fennomania into the voice of the Finnish-speaking population, and Scandinavianism thus related solely to the ‘Swedish element’. This associations made the policy of the public sphere with censorship interventions, university suspensions, and Finnish-language promotion essentially into a national policy.

Whereas these larger groups were necessary to categorize and create, mobilized political groups – that often went under denominators of coterie, secret society, or even party – were instrumentalized to draw the emperor’s attention to the dangers of agitation and propaganda. Consequently, it was the rhetorical absence of dangerous things organized from below that paved ways in favor of less intrusive actions or even creation of new institutions, including the Diet. The absence of parties, and even the absence of conditions for their emergence figured as arguments that facilitated the image of the convocated estates as a body that could not potentially challenge the power of the throne. Berg’s alarm about the secret society, in its turn, launched the activities of the Third Section.

But the imperial situation is always the one of uncertainty. Surprisingly, the mission of the Third Section that Berg himself requested in 1861, although its final format diverted from his expectations, contributed to the last blow against his governor-generalship. Both Mechelin

and Hederstern highlighted the animosity that existed between the educated society of the duchy and Berg. Hederstern's correspondent stressed that the liberal youngsters saw Berg as an obstacle on the path towards liberty while those who sought to share power with governor-general blamed him in nepotism. Already in June 1861, Hederstern himself reported to Dolgorukow that the establishment of the secret policy on Berg's request might be in vain since the tensions in the duchy derived rather from the hostility towards the head of the administration.

Berg, according to Hederstern's informants, annoyed the population by his arbitrariness, opposition towards legal representative institution, and his favoring of espionage measures loathed by the locals. The only remedy Hederstern saw was the replacement of governor-general with a reliable figure who could 'rehabilitate earlier attachments of Finlanders towards the government of the emperor, who has just opened for them the path of desired reforms'. The figure of present governor-general, according to Hederstern, 'paralyzed the effect of this sovereign's grace'.¹²⁷⁹ The absence of any organized propaganda or secret society, that was highlighted in all the mission's reports, might have tilted the emperor's trust towards Armfelt's environment. Finally, the committee's report that presented Berg's informing on Scandinavianism as extremely exaggerated and his conduct provocative for the population put an end to the story.¹²⁸⁰ Berg was discharged on November 8, and when Platon Rokassovsky arrived in the duchy with the news of the Diet planned to be convened after the committee, the public delightfully welcomed these changes.¹²⁸¹

¹²⁷⁹ Hederstern's report 10 June 1861. GARF. F 109, 1-eks, op. 35, d. 206, l. 30.

¹²⁸⁰ Rein, *Johan Vilhelm Snellman*, 2:361-80; Borodkin, *Istorija Finljandii: vremia imperatora Aleksandra II*, 108-110.

¹²⁸¹ Tobiesen – Dolgorukow, 1 / 13 December 1861. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 32, d. 321 ch. 32, l. 171-72; Rokassovsky – Armfelt, 23 December 1861 / 4 January 1862. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIa 23b, l. 32-34.

5.16. Russian diplomacy in Scandinavia before 1863

Apart from that, the year 1861 was not as eventful in Finland for monitoring institutions, and Tobiesen often had nothing particular to report about, as he confessed in his dispatches. Some activities that went under Scandinavianist banner, however, were spotted, and Swedish consul Dahlfelt again came under the spotlight for ostensible communication with Scandinavian secret society in Paris in an undated anonymous report supplied to the Third Section around October-November of that year that closely resembled governor-general's rhetoric. Moreover, the text put Dahlfelt's activities in the larger context of King Charles XV's voyage across Europe and France that had obvious Scandinavianist echoes in press.¹²⁸² Another outburst spotted by other cabinets was a lecture given by then young Lorenz Dietrichson, future famous Norwegian art historian, in October 1861. In the liberal newspapers, the lecture was praised for its elucidation of Norwegian prose and poetry as well as its comparison with Finlandish cultural tendencies.¹²⁸³

Dietrichson, who came to Finland to complete his biography of Runeberg's works, paralleled Norwegian debates on nationality of the 1830-40s with Finlandish identity strife of the 1860s.¹²⁸⁴ August Schauman, whom Dietrichson described as one of the guardians of Finlandish autonomy among other 'young' politicians, attested that never before did any lecturer produce such delightful impression to the audience and noted that perhaps for the first time the literature classroom witnessed ovations.¹²⁸⁵ The parallels that the lecturer stressed not only amazed the audience, but as well made the administration worry. The university rector Nils Arppe had to calm down the authorities, noting that the lecture pertained solely to literary matters, and its comparative perspective that set Norway and Finland together not possess any

¹²⁸² Anonymous undated report. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 32, d. 321 ch. 32, l. 153-154ob.

¹²⁸³ *Barometern* 18.10.1861; *Papperslyktan* 21.10.1861.

¹²⁸⁴ Lorenz Dietrichson, *Svundne tider: af en Forfatters Ungdomserindringer. 2: Fra Upsala til Rom 1859-1862*, *Svundne tider* (Kristiania: J.W. Kappelens forlag, 1899), 304-27.

¹²⁸⁵ Reinhold Felix von Willebrand, "L. Dietrichson," *Finsk tidskrift* 82, no. 3 (1917): 167-178.

political qualities. The ovations, according to him, referred rather to the quality of the lecture than to the ‘sympathies to Scandinavia’. Arppe insisted that if not for brilliance of the lecture, its ‘Scandinavian source and content’ alone could not produce such delight among the public.¹²⁸⁶

None of the contemporaries who were present at the lecture, however, alluded to its Scandinavian-leaning content, although Dietrichson was well-known as an eager advocate of the union and had connections with Finnish émigré circle in Stockholm.¹²⁸⁷ While it is understandable with regards to contemporary newspapers, even later reminiscences were silent on this matter, and Dietrichson himself mapped political contest in Finland as between ‘young’ and ‘old’ political groups without any ‘Scandinavian’ framing involved.¹²⁸⁸ It seems that the authorities’ visions of public gestures as pertaining to Scandinavianism had a broad interpretative freedom, and even narratives about other Scandinavian literatures or those aiming to bring a comparative background between Scandinavian kingdoms and Finland – especially when the conflict between Swedish centralizing power and Norway’s autonomy manifested itself prominently in these years – could fall under the label of Scandinavianist.¹²⁸⁹ Indeed, in autumn 1861, the public press, ministerial workings, and emissaries voyages in the altered the dynamics of the Scandinavian project, and Scandinavian politics thus deserve a particular attention.

Berg’s reports must have been exaggerated, but the press in the Nordics and – what is essential – far beyond its borders indeed tackled the future of Scandinavia with renewed interest, and Berg must have been affected by the intensity of these discussions. It is intriguing,

¹²⁸⁶ Excerpts from Arppe’s letter to af Bruner, translated into Russian. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto, IIb 12, l. 15-17.

¹²⁸⁷ Dietrichson, *Svundne tider*, 304.

¹²⁸⁸ *Ibid*, 304-327.

¹²⁸⁹ Ironically, relations between Norway and Sweden often surfaced as exemplarily non-violent ideal for Polish-Russian complexities in Alexander II’s views: Vasilij Dudarev, *Bismark i Rossija. 1851-1871 gg.* (Saint-Petersburg: Aletejja, 2021), 165.

however, that governor-general's correspondent on the other shore of the Baltic Sea, Russian diplomat Jakov Dashkov, provided quite a different narrative about Scandinavianism at the beginning of the 1860s. He, contrary to Berg, sought to discredit even Gorchakov's concerns coming from other European capitals about potential consolidation in the North. Dashkov, even though he constantly updated the ministry on Charles XV's unfavorable attitude towards the Russian empire, posited that the popular base for the union was missing, while conservative ministers and general 'sensible' public recognized the difficulties that stood on the way of the union realization.

Many aspects of the Swedish-Norwegian political life made him draw this conclusion, but Norwegian-Swedish tensions at the beginning of the decade surfaced as decisive in this respect. The strife around *stattholder* (governor-general) position plagued the debates both in Norway and in Sweden, according to diplomatic dispatches and pointed to the weakness of the Scandinavian idea in 1860, 'which made so much noise several years ago'.¹²⁹⁰ Indeed, the question antagonized political groups in Norway and in Sweden around the question of autonomy and accredited degree of intervention within the existing framework of the union with bitter struggles between them, especially when the opinions were sounded in the Swedish Riksdag.¹²⁹¹ Dashkov was not alone in this treatment, and Finlandish liberal J.J. Chydenius who stayed in Stockholm in spring 1860 also noted the sorrowful effects of the Norwegian question 'on each and every one who is interested that all free states in the North should increasingly unite to build a strong entity', reflecting, perhaps, his own disenfranchisement.¹²⁹²

¹²⁹⁰ Dashkov – Gorchakov. 8 / 20 March 1860. AVPRI, F. 133, op. 469, g. 1860, d. 177, l. 55-57.

¹²⁹¹ Stråth, *Union och demokrati*, 202-28; Barton, *Sweden and Visions of Norway*, 60-65; Raymond E. Lindgren, *Norway-Sweden: Union, Disunion, and Scandinavian Integration* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 45-61.

¹²⁹² J.J. Chydenius – Bergh, 11 May 1860. SLSA 357; In Finland at the beginning of 1862, Snellman also pointed to the Swedish-Norwegian strife that landed heavy blow on the Scandinavian idea, although his conservative conclusions were obviously different: J.V. Snellman, "Nyåret 1862. Utlandet", *Litteraturbladet*, no. 1 (1862). Snellman's Collection, URL: <http://snellman.kootuttekset.fi/sites/default/files/10043.pdf> (accessed 03.02.2023).

Even if the Norwegian question, as Dashkov highlighted, landed a heavy blow onto the idea of the union, Scandinavianism, however, persisted as the national bond and line of mutual help between Denmark and Sweden. At the beginning of 1861 when the tensions around Schleswig were on the rise – whose expressions Hederstern accidentally witnessed in Copenhagen – the Russian diplomat envisioned Swedish intervention into the hostilities, basing his conclusions on the conversations he held with minister Manderström.¹²⁹³ The tensions happened to be a result of C.C. Hall's ministry and its activities aimed at closer binding of Schleswig with Denmark. Ironically, during the ministerial crisis that happened in Copenhagen in February 1860, it was Russian ambassador Baron Ungern-Sternberg – earlier a proponent of the absolutism restoration in Denmark – asked by influential national-liberal D.G. Monrad, who persuaded Hall to assemble new ministry under his presidency among others.¹²⁹⁴ His negotiations with Hall were repudiated by the emperor who ordered not to intervene into the affairs that did not touch the Russian interests: a characteristic sign of the changing times.¹²⁹⁵

While under Nicholas I, Russian diplomats could intervene more decisively and pull foreign governments ideally towards pre-1848 status quo, the internal reforms in the Russian empire under Alexander II redistributed the resources, and excessive interventions were denied or reprimanded. A similar change of the tides was notable in Sweden as well. Conservative and powerful Charles XIV John was an ideal adversary for Nicholas I, but the Russian foreign ministry could hardly cherish the dreams of his grandson becoming as autocratic a ruler, since the constitutional ministry led by De Geer, Gripenberg, and Manderström functioned as a counterweight for Charles XV's Scandinavian and Finland-centered ambitions. Manderström repeatedly assured Dashkov that the Scandinavian union was not on his list of political

¹²⁹³ Dashkov – Gorchakov, 13 / 25 January 1861. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1861, d. 143, l. 10.

¹²⁹⁴ Ungern-Sternberg – Gorchakov, 11 / 23 February 1860. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1860, d. 204, l. 239-242.

¹²⁹⁵ Ibid.

preferences, but in case Denmark would have been defeated and ceased to exist, Swedish sovereignty might have expanded to include the Danish islands under the public pressure.¹²⁹⁶

This scenario, however, was meant to be avoided, and Dashkov together with Ungern-Sternberg and then Nicholas Nicolay, who came to substitute the latter in late 1860, worked on that. The reification of the union, again, was regarded as highly unlikely to happen, and even mutual voyages of Danish and Swedish royal figures did not surface as events of serious political gravity. Charles XV's trip to Europe during the summer of 1861 alarmed the spectators, but overall, it was again discredited as a decisive step towards the union, even though Gorchakov was informed on potential negotiations from other capitals, and the foreign press discussed the results of the voyage in Scandinavian-favorable terms.¹²⁹⁷ Dashkov's later investigation found this suspicion futile.

While governor-general Berg was afraid of Sweden playing the role of Piedmont in Scandinavia, and while Garibaldi and fight for the Italian unification enjoyed unprecedented acclaim in Swedish press, Dashkov's conversation with Charles XV on 2 November 1861 proved that Italian imaginaries could also play an opposite role. The king confessed to Dashkov that his impressions of the present state of Italy were far from fascinating, and many obstacles piled on the way of the national unification. The Russian diplomat hoped that these views reverberated with the king's Scandinavian visions and that he would realize how many challenges stood on the way of such projects, even if the nations were united by the commonality of their origin.¹²⁹⁸ The politics of comparison thus played a double role, and even if the principles of nationality gradually paved their way through the obstinacy of ancient laws and loyalties, the shift did not come as easy and unproblematic.

Although the Russian diplomats in Stockholm and Copenhagen considered the union unrealizable without political perturbations in the North, the lines of communication that surfaced in Russian diplomatic communication during Charles XV's voyage involved other

¹²⁹⁶ Dashkov – Gorchakov, 14 / 26 March 1861. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1861, d. 143, l. 55.

¹²⁹⁷ Dashkov – Gorchakov, 25 August / 5 September 1861. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1861, d. 143, l. 159.

¹²⁹⁸ Dashkov – Gorchakov, 21 October / 2 November 1861. *Ibid*, 187ob.

representatives in supplying information on pan-Scandinavian project. Indeed, at the beginning of the new decade Scandinavianism became deterritorialized, meaning that decisions and pivotal discussions at this point could occur beyond the borders of Scandinavia. Moreover, external governmental agreement on the project of the union was regarded as a necessary precondition for its establishment. Dashkov's and Ungern-Sternberg's placating narrative thus could be challenged by alarms supplied to Saint-Petersburg from other capitals. Or, as Berg's case demonstrated, even from the imperial peripheries.

Chapter 6. Towards the flame: The Polish Uprising and the Second War for Schleswig

6.1. Russian Great Power politics before 1863

While I have already touched on some matters of Alexander II's foreign policy in the previous chapter, it is necessary to give broader context to understand the dynamics of the Russian policy with regards to the issue that would become central for Scandinavianism after the Polish Uprising of 1863, namely the Schleswig question in 1863-4. I would argue that the exposure of the Russian empire to new principles, combinations, and factors of the international politics it had to adapt to during the 1850s and 1860s to a large degree affected its position towards Austrian-Prussian-Danish crisis and to the eventuality of the Scandinavian union as its consequence. The Russian empire and especially its Ministry of Foreign Affairs turned to be more adaptive to the changing landscapes of the European diplomacy than it was previously argued.

Although Karl von Nesselrode and Alexander Gorchakov are often opposed to each other in scholarly literature,¹²⁹⁹ as if they followed diametrically different foreign trajectories, the picture is more complicated than that. Gorchakov's policy was certainly different in many aspects, more attuned to the dynamics of the mid-19th century and less doctrinally cohesive than that of Nesselrode. On the other hand, Gorchakov followed some of the lines paved by his predecessor, especially those that set Russia – however apprehensively – closer to France after the Crimean War, given that geographical position ostensibly made their state interests approach each other.¹³⁰⁰ In 1863, Gorchakov even referred to Nesselrode's recommendations of 'anti-polish' vector of politics as prophetic in times of the January Uprising. Another aspect of the ex-minister's programme, namely the search of compromise with German states was harder to follow immediately after the Crimean War, as Gorchakov put it, given the

¹²⁹⁹ See the introduction, for example: Evgenij Primakov, *Kancler A.M. Gorchakov: 200 let so dnja rozhdenija* (Moscow: Mezhdunar. otnoshenija, 1998); Valerij Zorin, *Istorija diplomatii* (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1959), 691.

¹³⁰⁰ The two, after all, remained in correspondence that related to foreign issues: GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 605.

effervescence of the public spirit and its hostility to Austria and Prussia.¹³⁰¹ The desires of the public, unlike in his predecessor's views, played an important role in Gorchakov's argumentation around the designs of his foreign policy, and his language, often described as overtly solemn in historiography,¹³⁰² rather recalled that of newspaper rhetoric.

Finally, new minister of foreign affairs wanted the empire to play less active role in the growing tide of new European perturbations.¹³⁰³ The internal reforms and the necessity to accumulate resources to implement them became a new variable in his and the emperor's calculus, often demanding a more contemplative position in the European politics or used as a justification of such a stance. Indeed, besides the suppression of the Polish Uprising – an endeavor that is hard to qualify as a foreign conflict *per se* – and later involvement in the war against the Ottoman empire in 1877-8, Russia abstained from active participation in what it regarded as European foreign politics, and internal demands perhaps for the first time dictated this modesty.¹³⁰⁴ It did not stop the imperial endeavors in the Caucasus, Central Asia and Far East, however, although those were qualified and assessed differently. Finally, there were limits to such abstention from active involvement, and isolation was regarded as an opposite extreme to be avoided.¹³⁰⁵

After the promulgation of the Paris Treaty in 1856, Gorchakov sought to approach Napoleon III not only as a means to consolidate Russian-French relations, but also inclining to make a distance between the politics of France and those of Great Britain in new set of

¹³⁰¹ Gorchakov's memo. 3 May 1863. GARF. F. 828, op.1., d. 1428, l. 65-89.

¹³⁰² Ol'ga Vasil'evna Serova, *Gorchakov, Kavur i obedinenie Italii* (Moscow: Nauka, 1997), 33-40; Emanuel Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864: A Chapter of Russian Policy towards the Scandinavian Countries* (Copenhagen: Reitzel, 1990), 56-67; Nina Kinjapina and Alexei Ignat'ev, eds., *Istorija Vneshnej Politiki Rossii. Vtoraja Polovina XIX Veka*. (Moscow: Mezhdunar. otnoshenija, 1999), 52.

¹³⁰³ Zorin, *Istorija diplomatii*, 691–93; Anisimov and Rybachenok, *Ot carstva k imperii. Rossija v sistemah mezhdunarodnyh otnoshenij*, 208-10. It was not declared only in 1856 but repeated in different contexts later: Gorchakov – Brunnow, 21 June 1862. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1424, l. 91-97.

¹³⁰⁴ Geyer, *Der russische Imperialismus*, 20–55; Rieber, *The Imperial Russian Project*, 165-98.

¹³⁰⁵ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 21 June 1862. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1424, l. 91-97.

circumstances usually referred to as a Crimean system.¹³⁰⁶ The alliance of the latter two proved disastrous for the Russian empire, so the new minister was trying to prevent it at all costs. Of course, this was the grand strategic view, but tactically Gorchakov and the representatives abroad could weave different combinations, coming closer and distancing from other foreign powers: the mobility of Russian position and possibility to change it under different circumstances was regarded by the minister as one of the most important foundations of modern successful politics. His motto in this regard was telling: ‘There is nothing right (vrai) in politics, except for what is possible.’¹³⁰⁷

The first manifestations of the new vector came in the form of Stuttgart Convention between Alexander II and Napoleon III in 1857 and then in the Russian favorable neutrality towards France during its war against Austria in 1859. Siding with France meant that Russia exposed Prussia and Austria to peer-pressure by means of deploying forces at its borders to localize the conflict with the ultimate goal of altering the principles of the Paris Treaty. Napoleon proposed the annexation of Galicia into the Russian empire as a point of interest for Alexander II in case of a large-scale conflict.¹³⁰⁸ Gorchakov and the emperor, however, considered this expansion unnecessary and even problematic.¹³⁰⁹ Mutual misunderstandings and opposing expectations led to gradual cooling of the relations between the two powers.

The relations with Napoleon III, especially during the years of 1859-61 when Italy was being united by methods that Alexander II considered revolutionary and illegal came to be strained. Saint-Petersburg considered the French emperor an adventurous politician with unpredictable strategies and insincere, conspirative methods of diplomatic procedures.

¹³⁰⁶ Lidia Narochnickaja, *Rossija i vojny Prussii v 60-h godah XIX v. za obedinenie Germanii “sverhu”* (Moscow: Gos. izd-vo polit. lit-ry, 1960), 9–16; Serova, *Gorchakov, Kavur i obedinenie Italii*, 8–138; Vladimir Georgievich Revunenkov, *Pol'skoe vosstanie 1863 g. i evropejskaja diplomatija* (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1957), 19–43; Kinjapina and Ignat'ev, eds., *Istorija Vneshnej Politiki Rossii. Vtoraja Polovina XIX Veka*, 49-50.

¹³⁰⁷ Gorchakov's memo. 3 May 1863. GARF. F. 828, op.1., d. 1428, l. 65-89.

¹³⁰⁸ Serova, *Gorchakov, Kavur i obedinenie Italii*, 187.

¹³⁰⁹ Gorchakov's memo. 3 May 1863. GARF. F. 828, op.1., d. 1428, l. 74.

Nevertheless, Gorchakov persisted to justify close relations between the two empires, since their common good was precipitated by the principles of geographic distribution of power and thus could not be destroyed by extravagances of a single ruler. By the beginning of 1862, however, the minister had to declare that the alliance with France existed only in theory, but not in practice. Adventurous politics of Napoleon III that made Russia recognize Italy as a sovereign state – later considered one of the greatest mistakes of the ministry by Gorchakov himself – made it either demand Napoleon’s clear declarations on the matter of the alliance or to seek other combinations in foreign politics.¹³¹⁰ Alexander II seemed to lose trust to Napoleon even earlier, turning gradually to more conservative combinations with Prussian government and, while perhaps more reluctantly, even with the Austrian empire.¹³¹¹ The breakup with Napoleon III that followed in 1863 was thus hardly surprising for the Russian government.

Russia’s proximity to France during the years 1856-1862, however, exposed it to new languages and diplomatic combinations that it previously could hardly utilize. Although the empire always took a pronounced distance to the principles of nationality and popular vote, especially in the case of Piedmont and Italian unification, its relations with the main apologist of this programme made it ambiguously approach these trends. Even if it declined Napoleon’s proposals for Galicia, and Gorchakov was utterly hesitant about encouraging Slavic uprisings and conspiracies in the Balkans, the ministry appreciated Russian influence on these groups in the Balkans and East-Central Europe and regarded it as an important instrument during potential conflict, although these connections were predominantly framed as confessional rather than ethnic.¹³¹² Lastly, legitimism fostered previously by Nicholas I and Nesselrode who

¹³¹⁰ Gorchakov’s report for Alexander II, 13 February 1862. GARF. F. 828, op.1., d. 1422, l. 320-339.

See also: Tatiana Goncharova, “Jeduar Tuvemel’ i Otnoshenie Rossijskikh Pravjashhikh Krugov k Obedineniju Italii,” *Trudy Kafedry Istorii Novogo i Novejshego Vremeni*, no. 13 (2014): 73–98.

¹³¹¹ Dudarev, *Bismark i Rossija. 1851-1871 gg.*, 102–45.

¹³¹² Serova, *Gorchakov, Kavur i obedinenie Italii*, 293; Gorchakov – Balabine, 16 March 1863. GARF. F. 828, op.1., d. 1427, l. 117-118. Perhaps, Pogodin’s programme of action upon Slavic tribes in Austrian and Porte made more impression on Alexander II and Gorchakov than on Nicholas I and especially Nesselrode. The programme can be found among Gorchakov’s papers: GARF. F. 828, op. 1., d. 1337.

in most cases stood firmly on the principles of laws and treaties were losing much of its capital in Alexander II's and Gorchakov's calculations. The sporadic evocation of the principles of legitimacy came to be challenged by pragmatics of political geography, and the 'spirit of the time' justified new combinations by making older prescriptions rhetorically and then practically obsolete.

The empire thus approached new times, whose arrival was at least partially unpredictable,¹³¹³ in a highly uncertain position. The French vector, which consumed much of Gorchakov's efforts, was crumbling before his eyes, while new rapprochements with Prussia and Austria as well as partially with Great Britain existed only as bold designs of the future measures. The Polish crisis demonstrated startlingly the isolated and fragile position of Russia that, however, managed to establish new relations with Prussian government being threatened by the common danger. These new combinations, forged during the times of crisis and warfare, contributed to the accentuation of the Russian position with regards to Schleswig and Holstein in late 1863-4.

6.2. Before the storm: Finland, Sweden, and Russian preliminary position in Schleswig issue

In Finland, at the beginning of 1862, the society was mostly consumed by the establishment of the estate committee. Whilst some radical politicians sought to use the ostensibly unlawful precedent of the committee as a point of criticism against the imperial rule, overall, the public focused on the pending social, economic, and legal issues of the duchy.¹³¹⁴ Moreover, Rokassovsky was a much more popular governor-general than Berg, capitalizing on the difference of their approaches to politics in the duchy. Rokassovsky relaxed censorship

¹³¹³ In October 1862, several months before the Polish Uprising, Gorchakov was sure that the political situation in Poland had stabilized. Gorchakov – Knorring, 3 October 1862. GARF. F. 828, op. 1., d. 1425, l. 194-95.

¹³¹⁴ Topelius, *Finlands krönika 1860-1878*, 70–72; Elmgren, S.G. *Elmgrenin muistiinpanot*, 46–47.

practices while he socialized among the wealthy elites of the duchy. He even complained that under his command the censorship of the local newspapers was practically absent – certainly exaggerating its freedom – and discussion of various issues that related to politics proceeded almost unabated.¹³¹⁵

The growing politization of the Finlandish society and especially of the Finnish-speaking groups who previously remained at the periphery of the political debate appeared open for explanations, and Tobiesen provided his analytical interpretation at the beginning of 1862, again distancing from class-based analysis and recoding it into an ethnic matrix. While the Swedish element was dominant in the duchy after its annexation to Russia, the indigenous population, the Finns, rarely and in a very limited capacity participated in the political life and administration given the latter was dominated by Swedish language. However, as the university provided career possibilities for the Finns, they gradually came to recognize the ‘injured feeling of the nationality’ as well as basic challenges of bureaucracy being made in Swedish.¹³¹⁶

Since he conceptualized the two nationalities as opposed to each other, Fennomania in his report also became a product of educated Finnish-born intellectuals. Such framing would have sounded surprisingly both for Snellman and other intellectuals, who were born to Swedish-speaking families, and for the public figures of the duchy in the 1860s who vigorously debated the boundaries and concepts of nationality in Swedish press, often untying it from the primacy of language. The monitoring institution of the Third Section, however, requalified these debates into a struggle of ethnographically separate entities thus reducing the dynamics of its complexities. The newspaper polemics on the issues of language use in administrative and educational institutions was followed by broad masses of population, Tobiesen argued,

¹³¹⁵ Rokassovsky – Armfelt, 25 October / 6 November 1864. KA. Alexander Armfelin arkisto IIa 23b (6), 1.56-8.

¹³¹⁶ Tobiesen – Dolgorukow, 29 January / 10 February 1862. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 32, d. 321 ch. 32, l. 177-9.

hinting to the fact that it already became one of the central issues in the recently opened January Committee and would certainly affect the debate in the coming Diet.¹³¹⁷

The doubts about the convention of the Diet, however, persisted. Among Armfelt's pro memorias, for example, there was a short notice of certain 'docteur Beloff' who reported on the doubts about the Diet given the persistency of 'Swedish emissaries' and their agitation about Finland joining the Scandinavian union. He also mentioned that there was a party who sought to combat these views, but it hardly professed a better option since it propagated 'self-government' and contested the broad responsibilities of governor-general.¹³¹⁸ These concerns must have related to the environment that consolidated around Finlandish liberal newspaper *Helsingfors Dagblad*. The newspaper was founded by a circle of young intellectuals that included Edvard Bergh, Otto Reinhold Frenckell, Theodor Sederholm, Carl Gustaf Estlander, and Leo Mechelin in 1861.

Its programme articulated the principles of constitutionalism, economic and political liberalism, Finlandish autonomy and later even neutrality during a potential conflict that might have erupted during the Polish Uprising. While historian Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg argued that their maximum program related to separatism and Scandinavianism, I tend to agree with Lars-Folke Landgren who wrote that even if this programme existed, it by no means could be propagated on the pages of the newspaper.¹³¹⁹ Scandinavianism in Finland, perhaps again, was predominantly an inquisitorial marker that the authorities and critics used to designate potentially dangerous groups. Later it would certainly become a red rag for the nationalist press in Russia. Surprisingly, in Beloff's reading the advocates of self-government opposed Scandinavianists. *Helsingfors Dagblad*, however, rather appealed to the images of Sweden-

¹³¹⁷ Ibid; Lars-Folke Landgren, *För frihet och framåtskridande: Helsingfors dagblads etableringsskede, 1861-1864* (Helsinki: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 1995), 106.

¹³¹⁸ Pro memoria N. 10. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto IIb 8a 1, l. 241. While the document is not dated, Nordenskiöld's visit surveilled by Rokassovsky's agents is also mentioned there. It happened in 1862 when the ex-student visited Åbo. Fries, *Adolf Erik Nordenskiöld och hans upptäcktsfärder 1858-1879*, 52.

¹³¹⁹ Landgren, *För frihet och framåtskridande*, 112–16.

Norway and England, praising the Swedish heritage in Finland, and encouraging the spread of liberal institutions characteristic for England thus bringing the two doctrines closer together.¹³²⁰

The public reading of this programme obviously might have differed.

In Sweden, the political situation was complicated in 1862. Nevertheless, Dashkov usually smoothed sharp angles, and Finland-centered propaganda reportedly dwindled. According to him, the news about the future introduction of the Diet to Finland have produced an essential impact on Swedish politics and press, destroying remnants of what Swedish liberals could criticize in Finland, while previous kinship ties were gradually loosened by the workings of time.¹³²¹ Even though Dashkov reported on the arrival of some Polish insurgents with Zygmunt Jordan enjoying the attention of the liberal press, their influence did not seem to affect the trajectory of court or cabinet politics significantly. In fact, the mildly reformist cabinet with Minister of Foreign Affairs Manderström gave Dashkov enough ground to assure Gorchakov that Sweden would not follow any fanciful trajectories in its foreign politics.¹³²²

Scandinavianism was accordingly losing its political capital, according to the diplomat. Even though new student convention in Copenhagen was being prepared, and King Charles XV provided resources for it, internal strife that concerned the position of Norway in the Swedish-Norwegian union still overshadowed the prospects of the union between the three kingdoms:

¹³²⁰ Jussi Kurunmäki, "On the Difficulty of Being a National Liberal in Nineteenth-Century Finland," *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 8, no. 2 (December 1, 2013): 83–95, <https://doi.org/10.3167/choc.2013.080205>; Jussi Kurunmäki and Ilkka Liikanen, "The Formation of the Finnish Polity within the Russian Empire: Language, Representation, and the Construction of Popular Political Platforms, 1863-1906," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 35, no. 1/4 (2017): 399–416. Apart from agitating the legal and political consolidation of autonomous institutions, *Helsingfors Dagblad* propagated the currency reform, arguing for independence of Finnish markka from the volatility of the Russian ruble. After the Crimean War and disastrous crisis of 1857, the discrepancy between the real value of the paper ruble and silver ruble was still creating problems for the Finnish economy where they simultaneously circulated. On the first sight, the demands for Finnish own currency were not treated as disrupting, and the emperor even promulgated some of the demands pushed forward by the noble delegation reluctantly assisted by governor-general. While the Third Section reported on the developments of this trend, the message was neutral. With growing tensions in Poland and in Europe, economic questions, however, would be instrumentalized in political debates.

¹³²¹ Dashkov – Gorchakov, 12/24 March 1862. AVPRI, F. 133, op.469, g. 1862, d. 135, l. 56ob.

¹³²² Dashkov – Gorchakov, 1 / 13 March 1862. AVPRI, F. 133, op.469, g. 1862, d. 135, l. 51ob.

It is to be assumed that this time less than ever the meeting of the four Universities in Copenhagen contributes to advancing the idea of the Scandinavian Union, which one can consider for the moment [...] rather in a period of decline.

Upon their return, Dashkov reiterated his views, highlighting the fact that the voyage pertained to the mutual enjoyment rather than to the political idea of Scandinavianism that at that point faced broad indifference.¹³²³

Some tensions persisted, and when Alexander II cancelled all festivities bound to Russian military victories with a notable exception of Poltava, Swedish liberal press framed this measure as a symbolic attack on their fatherland. This led to a popular campaign aimed to accelerate money to erect the statue of Charles XII, but the imperial diplomats noted challenges that the activist faced when gaining resources for it, since entrepreneurs did not consider Charles XII a decent ruler.¹³²⁴ Polish and Italian sympathies continued, and the press covered Garibaldi's campaign with delight, while also reprinting addresses of Polish emigration in Europe. The aspirations of Scandinavianism, as the diplomats noted, were explicitly tied to Italian and Polish projects. However, the survivability of the union idea was questioned when during the Riksdag debates influential members proposed the alteration of the constitution that would assure that the Swedish monarch could not occupy the throne of a different state without the approval of 'the national representation'. Minciaky, who substituted Dashkov for several months, read this – as many others did – as a sign of opposition towards Scandinavianism and towards the king's personalized conduct of politics through his own emissaries.¹³²⁵

Nicholas Nicolay generally reproduced Dashkov's impressions of withering tides of Scandinavianism. In Nicolay's treatment, the project rather functioned to produce tensions with

¹³²³ Dashkov – Gorchakov, 11/ 23 June 1862. Ibid, I. 110.

¹³²⁴ Dashkov – Gorchakov, 18 / 30 September 1862. Ibid, I. 171.

¹³²⁵ Minciaky – Gorchakov, 6 / 18 December 1862. AVPRI, F. 133, op. 469, g. 1862, d. 135, I. 248.

German-speaking population of the duchies, German states and Prussia than as to reify the union, especially since the Swedish nation, in his opinion, would not encourage such unionistic plans.¹³²⁶ The presence of Swedish and Norwegian students during the summer festivals only confirmed his expectations, since the students sought to avoid making political manifestations, at least in Nicolay's understanding of the term.¹³²⁷ These observations indeed grasped the growing ruptures between different groups within the Scandinavian project, mainly between those who demanded immediate establishment of the union and those who called to patience in delicate matters that could provoke war.¹³²⁸

With changing dynamics of the public discussion in the empire itself, the diplomats seemed to become both more sensitive to the evaluation of the popular sympathies and more accustomed to politicized discussions in the press. In 1860s, envoys in Denmark and Sweden only rarely supplied the ministry with materials that criticized Russia or Finland, perhaps recognizing the minor level of danger that these texts represented. Together with that, public manifestations that in the 1840s were read simply as revolutionary demeanors towards the 1860s appeared more nuanced and analytically processed in these dispatches, reflecting, perhaps, the changing public regimes in the empire itself. Now flags, drapes, and flowers surfaced only on the background, giving more space for the analysis of political choices, measures, and moves. Moreover, recognizing the public sympathies or lack thereof within the context of constitutional kingdoms revealed significant variables in the final equation on probability of the union reification.

However, with Scandinavian centers now more pertaining to thin environments around courts and secret emissaries cruising between the capitals,¹³²⁹ it became harder for the Russian

¹³²⁶ Nicolay – Gorchakov. 24 January / 5 February 1862. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1862, d. 162, l. 38ob.

¹³²⁷ Nicolay – Gorchakov. 4 / 16 June 1862. Ibid., l. 193.

¹³²⁸ Morten Ottosen and Rasmus Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang* (Gads forlag, e-book, 2021), 563.

¹³²⁹ Allan Jansson, *Den Svenska utrikespolitikens historia*, vol. 3:3 (Stockholm: Norstedts, 1961), 153-58; Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige*, 358-95.

mission to follow the dynamics of decision-making around the project, whose realization, though it was considered exceptional, still pertained to the domains of political reality. Moreover, deterritorialized nature of Scandinavianism made cross-communication between the diplomats mediated by Saint-Petersburg more necessary than ever. The head of the imperial foreign policy raised the issue in an encrypted telegram to Nicolay, where he alluded to the prospects of a treaty of some sort planned to be elaborated between the monarchs with the help of Danish Scandinavianists that counted D.G. Monrad and C.C. Hall among their ranks. The army and fleet of both kingdoms were regarded as forces that would support such an ‘offensive or defensive’ alliance. According to Gorchakov’s insecure information – the fact he himself alluded to – English Prime Minister Palmerston gave his consent for the project and supplied it with Carl Frederik von Blixen-Finecke, who became a kind of emissary of dynastic Scandinavianism. In Gorchakov’s telegram, Scandinavian union plans surfaced as precursors of the most pending problem, that of Schleswig and Holstein, since the prospects of the Scandinavian union that would include only Schleswig made Hall give no concessions to Prussia and German states.¹³³⁰

Even the prospects of Charles XV’s personal visit, however, did not change Nicolay’s opinion, and he notified Gorchakov that the idea of a dynastic union lost its credit as demonstrated by the students’ festivals that abstained from the world of politics while the royal voyage was dismissed as an act of courtesy: ‘Everything is more sentimental than practical’.¹³³¹ Charles XV’s voyage to Denmark was competitively covered in the newspapers with speculations proposing different framings, but even the liberal *Fædrelandet*, as the envoy highlighted, was not satisfied with the results of the royal visit. The absence of ministers around the monarchs, with a notable exception of C.C. Hall, proved that nothing important was

¹³³⁰ Gorchakov – Nicolay. 25 June 1862. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1862, d. 162, l. 363.

¹³³¹ Nicolay – Gorchakov. 3 / 15 July 1862. Ibid, l. 202.

discussed, according to the diplomat.¹³³² Indeed, Scandinavianist circles in the Danish government did everything they could to conceal their intentions as long as it was possible, and D.G. Monrad characteristically said that much should be done for Scandinavianism, but little talked about.¹³³³

While Nicolay discredited Scandinavian-focus suspicion, Hall's course regarding the incorporation of Schleswig persisted – although thanks largely to the broad public pressure – and hinted to the prospects of the conflict. In fact, modern historiography gives enough credit to at least some speculations behind the ‘insecure secret data’ that Gorchakov obtained by means that remained unknown: C.C. Hall indeed bet on Scandinavian union in his ministry's course towards Holstein, hoping to capitalize on these provocations but still being hesitant about the prospects of war.¹³³⁴ The imperial ministry sought to prevent the war and to preserve the integrity of the Danish monarchy, holding tight to the principles of the Warsaw and London protocols of 1851-2 as the only solid ground in the discussion about the future of the duchies, Prussia and Denmark.

Gorchakov already at the beginning of the year saluted to the British prime-minister John Russell's pacifying course regarding the duchy which was later expressed in the notorious – for Danish nationalists – Gotha dispatch, that put responsibility for rapprochement between Denmark and German states on the Danish shoulders.¹³³⁵ The Russian government manifested its ultimate agreement with Russel's analysis.¹³³⁶ In September, Gorchakov again addressed the Danish ministry about the measures that Hall was pursuing and warned that in case the

¹³³² Nicolay – Gorchakov. 14 / 26 July 1862. Ibid, 1. 207.

¹³³³ Aage Friis, “Skandinavismens Kulmination. Ministeriet Halls planer om en nordisk union forud for udstedelsen af Martskundgørelsen 1863,” *Historisk Tidsskrift* 10, no. 3 (1934): 593, <https://tidsskrift.dk/historisktidsskrift/article/view/49850>.

¹³³⁴ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 635–72; Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 219–94.

¹³³⁵ Friis, “Skandinavismens Kulmination. Ministeriet Halls planer om en nordisk union forud for udstedelsen af Martskundgørelsen 1863,” 585; Gorchakov – Kiselev, 26 January 1862. GARF. F. 828, op. 1., d. 1422, l. 250-52.

¹³³⁶ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 25 September 1860. GARF. F. 828, op. 1., d. 1425, l. 164-65.

Danish government would not follow the word of the London protocol, the imperial intervention had to restrict its assistance solely to moral support.¹³³⁷ This message was forwarded to Stockholm as well, and it remained the foundational line of the imperial authorities in Schleswig case. The issue of Schleswig-Holstein, however, became overshadowed by events of larger gravity for the imperial government, namely the January Uprising in Poland.

It is, however, essential to note that the Russian position with regards to Schleswig stressed the avenue of reconciliation between Denmark and the German states well before its later rapprochement with Prussia. This time, unlike in 1848, the burden of responsibility mostly lied on Denmark which in the eyes of Gorchakov sought to provoke Prussia and states of the German Confederation with its incoherence in dealing with German-speaking subjects in Holstein. The nationalist Danish party that certainly had Scandinavianist overtones in the eyes of the Russian mission agitated the population, while Alexander II and his minister recommended Denmark to hold onto the principles of the London protocols and express some indulgence towards the Holsteiners. Speculatively, these recommendations sounded as echoes of the imperial own internal policy with regards to the Polish population.

6.3. Revolutionary Finland?

Finland did not immediately fell under the suspicion of authorities when the Polish struggle for independence – as proclaimed by the leaders of the uprising – was launched in January of 1863. Even though the diplomats and Finlandish administration were aware of the parallels that the liberal press in Sweden drew between the Polish struggle and Scandinavianism, Finland remained quiet.¹³³⁸ Although the liberal group of *Helsingfors*

¹³³⁷ Gorchakov – Nicolay, 29 September 1862. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1862, d. 162, l. 375ob.

¹³³⁸ Kristiina Kallejnen, 'Rabota v parlamente vmesto mjatezhnichestva: Velikoe knjazhestvo Finljandskoe v 1863 godu,' *Russkij Sbornik*, vol. 15 (Moscow: Modest Kolerov, 2013), 333-343.

Dagblad proposed a neutral stance of Finland in potential European controversies, and the newspapers diversified their sources of information, including more reports about the warfare from the foreign press, the majority of the duchy's population initially remained indifferent towards the Polish events.¹³³⁹ Overwhelmed again by the disastrous yields of 1862-3, internal problems appeared more pending than distant battles. Moreover, since many officers of Finlandish origin pursued their careers in the Imperial Army, part of the population sided with the tendencies of suppression.¹³⁴⁰

Imperial fears rather were related to potential external interventions. Apart from France and Britain, neighboring Sweden surfaced as a potential enemy and, much more clearly, as a bridgehead for conspiracies aimed to undermine the imperial power. Dashkov, as a rule, played the concerns down. Even the presence of Jordan and the arrival of Constantin Czartoryski in March 1863, according to Dashkov, pertained only to the circle of liberals and radical press, who opted to challenge the power of the present ministry and promulgate Swedish intervention on the side of Poland through the Riksdag given Sweden's duties that followed from the Vienna treaties.¹³⁴¹ The king warmly welcomed Czartoryski, and a banquet was given to honor the Polish guest with drapes of Scandinavian, Polish, and Lithuanian flags, but Dashkov considered it a noble gesture rather than a demonstration of political allegiance. Manderström, attacked by the press and liberal publics for his inaction, revealed to the Russian diplomat that these demonstrations could not affect the trajectories of the foreign policy and dismissed any rumors that spread concerning Swedish intervention into the war.¹³⁴²

¹³³⁹ Topelius, *Finlands krönika 1860-1878*, 89. On Helsingfors *Dagblad* line see more in: Lauri Hyvämäki, *Suomalaiset ja suurpolitiikka: venäjän diplomatia Suomen sanomalehdistön kuvastimessa 1878-1890* (Helsinki: Helsingin Yliopiston, 1964), 41–49; Landgren, *För frihet och framåtskridande*, 168–73.

¹³⁴⁰ Anders Edvard Ramsay, for example, was Berg's right hand in Poland.

¹³⁴¹ Dashkov – Gorchakov. 11 / 23 March 1863. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1863, d. 139a, l. 208. Leokadia Postén, *De polska emigranternas agentverksamhet i Sverige 1862-1863* (Malmö: Gleerup, 1975), 119–84.

¹³⁴² Dashkov – Gorchakov. 11 / 23 March 1863. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1863, d. 139a, l. 213-4.

The arrival of another figure, revolutionary émigré Mikhail Bakunin to Stockholm in late March 1863 and his desire to transport weaponry to Polish insurgents and to sonder the ground in Finland produced new imperial concerns for the diplomats and for Alexander II personally.¹³⁴³ While Bakunin and his collaborators ultimately failed in their mission, his reconnaissance with Danish and Swedish radical politicians, their brief collaboration, and attempts to reconcile their differences, demonstrated how the year of 1863 became a new window of opportunity for shaping new communication webs and intermingling previously distant projects, political languages, and aspirations. The revolutionaries, Polish insurgents, Scandinavianist advocates, and imperial administration with Russian conservative press took part in the diverging processes of recalibrating their languages and practices to the new situation, seeking for respective consolidation. But the story of the imperial emigration and its entangled action with Scandinavianism in the 1860s demands a deeper explanation.

6.4. Imperial exile and Scandinavian struggles

When young Orla Lehmann, a future famous Danish liberal political, travelled around Europe in 1842, one of the highlights of the journey of any liberal young man in Paris was a visit to a fabulous house in Faubourg-du-Roule.¹³⁴⁴ This was the residence of one of the most well-known imperial emigrants, Adam Czartoryski, the aristocratic leader of the Polish resistance in Europe who emigrated with thousands of insurgents in the wake of the uprising of 1830-1. Lehmann's later acquaintance, Aron Meir Goldschmidt, also recollected in his memoirs that his first political impressions from schoolyears was a strife with a classmate in which Goldschmidt stood for Poland while his rival rooted for the imperial forces during the uprising.¹³⁴⁵ Goldschmidt enthusiastically followed the Polish struggles, as did many liberals

¹³⁴³ See next sections.

¹³⁴⁴ Lehmann, *Orla Lehmanns efterladte skrifter*, 1: 145–46.

¹³⁴⁵ Meir Goldschmidt, *Livs erindringer og resultater* (København: Gyldendal, 1877), 140–41.

in Europe and the Scandinavian kingdoms. Even though Lehmann, writing in his later years from a more conservative position, dismissed Czartorisky's politics as phantom-seeking, the visit itself was telling for the European atmosphere of 1830s-40s: Polish emigres enjoyed widespread popularity in liberal and left-leaning circles.¹³⁴⁶

While Polish exiles indeed constituted the core of the imperial émigré population, although many of them eventually married western women and socialized in new contexts, those of Russian descent acted no less prominently. Initially socialized in literary *kruzhki* with variegated philosophical sources of inspiration, but primarily Hegel, many of these youngsters opted to travel to Europe to sonder the ground there and happened to establish contacts with new political trends there. For example, previously conservative Mikhail Bakunin approached leftist Hegelians in Germany during his study trip in 1840.¹³⁴⁷ Others, persecuted by ever more vigilante imperial regime after the Decembrist revolt, decided to seek for a better fate in Europe: Alexander Herzen, exiled to Russian provincial town, perceived a better future for his endeavors in Europe.¹³⁴⁸

Alexander Ivanovich Herzen was one of the central figures of the Russian emigration, who functioned as a guiding light for others willing to settle in Europe, at least until the 1860s when his position became contested by other émigré communities. His and Nikolai Ogarev's Free Russian Press in London established itself as a main voice of the emigration, while his main newspaper *Kolokol* circulated in Europe and in the Russian empire, read there by educated classes and even court members. With his knowledge of several European languages, literary talent, and political sharpness, Herzen established close ties with other revolutionary, liberal, and nationally-emancipative circles, proposing a broad and entangled programme of pan-

¹³⁴⁶ Faith Hillis, *Utopia's Discontents: Russian Émigrés and the Quest for Freedom, 1830s-1930s* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 14–28.

¹³⁴⁷ Yuri Steklov, *Mihail Aleksandrovich Bakunin, ego zhizn' i dejatel'nost*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Kommunist. Akad., 1926), 31-63.

¹³⁴⁸ Aileen M. Kelly, *The Discovery of Chance: The Life and Thought of Alexander Herzen*, Illustrated edition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 1–34, 134–260.

European and Slavic emancipation from the relics of despotic rule, serfdom, and domination of conservative bourgeoisie.¹³⁴⁹

Herzen was as much nurtured in the intellectual atmosphere of the 1840s in Moscow and Saint-Petersburg, socializing with prominent scholars, authors, and publishers, as he was later influenced by the revolutionary and socialist trends in Europe. Having sharpened his arguments on the past and future of Russia against Slavophiles as well as against Westerner's despairs, Herzen came to a kind of in-between position, cherishing the greatest future of the Slavic people but insisting on the present necessity to absorb modern European ideas.¹³⁵⁰ His exposure to the European revolutions of 1848 initially inspired him but their suppression that came as a compromise between bourgeois liberals and conservatives later made him rethink his intellectual position and put even more weight on the future radicalism of the Slavic peoples.¹³⁵¹ The radicalism was paradoxically preserved in ostensibly ancient institutions, and peasant commune appeared central among them.¹³⁵²

Around the same time, Mikhail Bakunin was active in France, then in German states and Austria. Besides the apologetic prophecy about the future of the Russian and Slavic peoples, Poland also appeared in the revolutionary propaganda of the Russian émigré circles. In 1847, Bakunin was sent out from France for his speeches in support of the Polish political freedom from the imperial usurpation. Like Herzen, he welcomed the revolutions of 1848, standing on the barricades of Paris, he then travelled to Prague and took part in the First Pan-Slavic Congress. The participants prepared their manifest of pan-Slavism that proclaimed

¹³⁴⁹ Martin Edward Malia, *Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism, 1812-1855* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 388-426.

¹³⁵⁰ Martin Edward Malia, *Alexander Herzen*, 306–8; Kelly, *The Discovery of Chance*, 228–60.

¹³⁵¹ Kelly, *The Discovery of Chance*, 261–88.

¹³⁵² Alexander Herzen, "Rossiya" in *Sobranie sochinenij*, vol. 6 (Moscow: AN SSSR. Institut mirovoj literatury im. A. M. Gor'kogo), 187-222. URL: <https://russian-literature.org/tom/34149214>.

national freedom and future unity of the Slavic peoples, since their weakness was deemed to be preserved in their separation from each other.¹³⁵³

The same year and further on, when the revolutions were crushed, the antagonism of the Slavic and German tribes, where ‘German’ was often associated with conservative bourgeoisie, was more and more pronounced both in Herzen’s and in Bakunin’s works. While Russian and Slavic tribes represented ambitious underdogs with promising radical futures, German culture appeared obsolete, rotten, and worn-out bureaucratic swamp that reached its highest points in the past and thus spilled all its energy. Although Herzen and Bakunin had friends and comrades of German origin, their overall diagnosis for the German and, indeed, Western European political world sounded dramatically upsetting. Moreover, even Russian highest political organization, in fact, appeared of German descent with German monarch ruling over the Russian suppressed masses and thus remained alienated from the people.¹³⁵⁴

This strategy of philosophizing history and drawing the horizon of the future later affected Bakunin’s close associations with Slavic-centered emancipatory projects and might have as well influenced his appreciation of Scandinavianism. Moreover, while in Cologne in April 1848, Bakunin briefly covered Schleswig-Holstein problem in his letter to a friend. He dismissed Schleswig-Holstein movement as ‘completely reactionary’ and reinforced by the king, while he wondered why Germans considered Schleswig their land, when it was half-populated by Danes.¹³⁵⁵ Overall, Bakunin considered German revolutionary beginnings weak, as they were mostly bourgeois talking and little action. He expected peasantry and proletariat joining the movement and changing its nature. Later, he praised his friend Alfred Ruge who blamed ‘Danish-eaters’ in the Frankfurt Parliament, insisting that Germany should not enlarge

¹³⁵³ Otakar Odlozilik, “The Slavic congress of 1848,” *The Polish Review* 4, no. 4 (1959): 3–15; Mihail Bakunin, “Osnovi Novoj Slavyanskoj Politiki,” in *Sobranie sochinenij i pisem, 1828-1876* (Moscow: Izd-vo Vsesojuznogo obshhestva politkatorzhan i ssyl’no-poselencev, 1935), 301.

¹³⁵⁴ Bakunin, “Rech na sobranii...” in *Sobranie sochinenij, 1828-1876*, 274.

¹³⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 299.

at the expense of others.¹³⁵⁶ Again, these starting points, his attitude towards Schleswig problem and versatility in pan-projects prepared fertile ground for future negotiations with Scandinavianist intellectuals.

In 1849, Bakunin was detained by the Saxon and then Austrian police. Finally, he was delivered to the hands of the Russian authorities and sentenced to life-long exile to Siberia. Alexander Herzen stayed in Europe and became a celebrity among the imperial emigres as well as among the international revolutionary leaders. The two, however, were destined to meet again some 13 years later, when Bakunin famously fled from Siberia through the US to arrive to his old comrade's home in London in 1861.¹³⁵⁷ While Herzen and his associate Ogarev welcomed Bakunin, they both sensed that their old-new colleague might affect the working processes of their enterprise: Bakunin's methods relied much more on conspiracy and 'instinctive' action, while Herzen and Ogarev preferred methodical preparation of minds for the revolution by means of their publishing activities. Mikhail Bakunin expressed his desire to publish on 'Polish-Slavic case' in their enterprise, and while he readily embarked on the task, his financial situation was dire, and Herzen despised Bakunin's frivolous relations with money while paying for his subsistence.¹³⁵⁸ These tensions of political and financial nature would surface especially bright in 1863-4 when Bakunin went to Sweden to sonder the ground there and find allies that would share their visions of the future.

¹³⁵⁶ Ibid., 315-16.

¹³⁵⁷ On Bakunin's life in exile see: Vyacheslav Dolzhikov, *M.A. Bakunin v natsional'no-regional'nom politicheskom protsesse epokhi "otpepli": rubezh 1850-1860-kh gg.: monografiia* (Barnaul: Izdatel'stvo Altaiskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 2018).

¹³⁵⁸ Aleksandr Herzen, *Mikhail Bakunin i pol'skoe delo* (Geneve: izd. M.K. Jelpidina, 1904).

6.5. Revolutionary pan-Slavism and Scandinavianism: imperial emigres search for allies

Bakunin's *idea fixe*, as he himself described it – the Slavic federation – rested on the vision of simultaneity of European and Slavic democratic revolutions. Upon his arrival to London in 1862, he became significantly more anti-German than ever before, explicitly stating that the unity of the Slavic peoples was directed against German states and, especially, against the Austrian empire where Slavic tribes were suppressed by German power.¹³⁵⁹ Italian struggles for independence – another point of later rapprochement with Scandinavianists – were vigorously supported by Bakunin who even authored a letter to Garibaldi, a long time comrade of Alexander Herzen.

In 1862, Bakunin authored two pieces for *Kolokol* and supplementary issues of the Free Russian Press, where he reiterated the main points of his vision that implied the freedom of all nationalities from the imperial yoke, federal organization of free Slavic states on the principle of national self-determination, including Ukraine and Belorussia, and redistribution of the arable land for peasants.¹³⁶⁰ The yoke again was formed by the 'German' alliance of Prussia, Austria, and the absolutist-bureaucratic political system of the Russian empire. Future freedom of the peoples thus implied the demolitions of these empire, and the Ottoman one. With regards to the Russian empire, its break-up would not be as dramatic in consequences as Austrian, since its core was a great suppressed nation of Russians. Other imperial 'foreign' borderlands were also implied to be freed from the imperial domination, including Finland. Bakunin's ideal was, of course, nationalist, and he looked for the destiny of the people in the political reorganization along the national borders, stating, perhaps allegorically, that the Russians must sent out 'our

¹³⁵⁹ Yuri Steklov, *Mihail Aleksandrovich Bakunin. Perehodnyj period*, vol. 2 (Moskva: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1927), 8–9.

¹³⁶⁰ Steklov, 2:30–35; Mihail Bakunin, *Russkim, pol'skim i vsrøm slavjanskim druž'jam* (Geneve: M. Elpidine, 1888).

Germans and our Tatars' – the symbols of the repressive political mechanism – to build a prosperous future.¹³⁶¹

Bakunin asserted that the reforms Alexander II and his ministers implemented were insufficient. Alexander Herzen, however, was more adaptable to the situation on the ground, and since 1856 he appreciated the pace of reforms in the Russian empire, insisting that the emancipation of peasants overshadowed all other issues at the moment, including the freedom of other nations of the imperial domains. Bakunin, although he approached Herzen in another pamphlet published later in 1862, again put a lot of weight on the freedom of foreign peoples, 'stuck' within the borders of the empire. This text, however, was much less anti-monarchical and its perspective centered on the potential – although he did not seem to believe in the will of the present emperor – of the Romanov dynasty to unite with the Russian people through the representative body of *Zemsky Sobor*, because the alternative was a bloody national revolution.¹³⁶²

While Bakunin seemingly took a more reformist stance, perhaps, under the influence of Herzen and Ogarev, the two parties still acted in disagreement concerning the measures necessary for a change. Herzen repudiated Bakunin's favors for conspiracy and underground organization, especially in Russia, while Bakunin responded with criticism about Herzen's and Ogarev's inaction during 1862.¹³⁶³ In general, Herzen was much more skeptical about the prospects of the Russian revolution than his collaborator, and thus called for conscious measures, patience, and reformist rather than revolutionary tone. Both, however, were pulled by the whirlwind of 1863: Bakunin with readiness, Herzen with hesitation.¹³⁶⁴

¹³⁶¹ Bakunin, *Russkim, pol'skim i vsem slavjanskim druž'jam*, 30.

¹³⁶² Mihail Bakunin, *Narodnoe delo: Romanov, Pugachev ili Pestel'* (London: Trübner & Company, 1862).

¹³⁶³ Steklov, who authored Bakunin's biography, was himself a revolutionary of a later generation, and he incessantly mocked Bakunin's conspirative methods in his work.

¹³⁶⁴ Steklov, *Mihail Aleksandrovich Bakunin. T. 2. Perehodnyj period*, 2:103–47.

Again, Bakunin and Herzen supported the Polish Uprising, and even prior to January 1863 they condemned the atrocities committed by the imperial army troops and ambiguous politics of Saint-Petersburg. What differed was their wish to participate in the uprising. While they enjoyed the trust of some Polish intellectuals and insurgents, quarrels about the future of the Russian Western borderlands persisted in the revolutionary environments. Bakunin expected the twin revolution ignited by Polish peasants and then joined by Russian to establish a federation of Slavic tribes. Polish intellectuals often scaled the future sovereignty of their territory to the borders of 1772, aiming at the lands populated by Belarusians and Ukrainians (*Malorosi*). Herzen, in his turn, wanted to abstain from taking part in the Polish Uprising, declaring it ‘their own business’, unrelated to the agenda of *Kolokol* and Russian emigration, in general.¹³⁶⁵

As early as September 1862 Bakunin declared his wish to take part in the insurrection on the Polish side, hoping for the response uprising across the Russian empire and planning to establish the Russian Legion that would fight on the side of the Polish insurgents. After the first bells of the Uprising rang, he embarked on a trip to Sweden awaiting the invitation from the Polish side to join their affair. In Sweden, Bakunin’s plans initially seemed to be twofold. First, he envisioned Finland as another potentially revolutionary zone, perhaps learning of the Swedish political tendencies from London newspapers and personal correspondence. Thus, he confessed that he wanted to collaborate with ‘Swedish patriots’ to launch the insurrection in Finland. Second, he served as Herzen’s emissary there, searching for the lines of *Kolokol* delivery to Finland and Russia. He left for Sweden in mid-February, coming across Northern Germany and Denmark to reach Stockholm at the beginning of March 1863.¹³⁶⁶

¹³⁶⁵ Herzen, *Mihail Bakunin i pol'skoe delo*; Steklov, *Mihail Aleksandrovich Bakunin. T. 2. Perehodnyj period*, 2:148–70.

¹³⁶⁶ Steklov, *Mihail Aleksandrovich Bakunin. T. 2. Perehodnyj period*, 2:222–23.

6.6. Bakunin's path to Sweden

Bakunin's arrival to Scandinavia happened during the crucial moment. Besides the Polish Uprising, welcomed by the liberal circles in Denmark and Sweden, the issue of the Scandinavian military alliance that according to its designs could eventually lead to full-scale union was on the table.¹³⁶⁷ While researchers are divided on the fact whether Polish Uprising reinforced Scandinavianist claims or functioned as a counter-weight, Bakunin seemed to draw on both trajectories of the public opinion. The fact that he first visited Copenhagen and then reached Stockholm often evades the attention of scholars, but it might have been a significant feature of the voyage, since Bakunin met there with Carl Ploug, as it becomes evident from one preserved letter. In the letter, Bakunin proposed a new meeting with Ploug, arguing that it was a rare case that 'men of my country and of my party, especially' visited Copenhagen. Bakunin hoped that Ploug would share with him contacts in Sweden he could trust.¹³⁶⁸

It is unknown if the meeting ever happened, but the wording suggests that they had a chance to see each other before it was compiled. The two had a lot to discuss and enough grounds for mutual sympathies. Carl Ploug was among the first of those who envisioned political potential of Scandinavianism, arguing for Swedish revanchism against the Russian empire as early as 1843. By 1863, he was one of the most influential members of the left-leaning national liberals, radical in their pursuit of the Danish nation state and widened liberalism. Besides, Ploug desired a more comprehensive Scandinavian union to be established against the pretensions of Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Bakunin, in his turn, was a living legend of the revolutionary perturbations of 1848, while his antagonism against German states as well as his vision of freed Finland established common grounds with Ploug's interests. While, again, it is not known whether Ploug shared any information, his newspaper *Fædrelandet* painted a

¹³⁶⁷ Friis, "Skandinavismens kulmination."; Holmberg, *Skandinavismen i Sverige*, 395-405.

¹³⁶⁸ Bakunin – Ploug, 1 March 1863 in Mikahil Bakunin, *Oeuvres complètes* CD-ROM (Amsterdam: IISG, 2000). Cd-rom.

very favorable picture of the Russian revolutionary and later defended him from conservative assaults.¹³⁶⁹ Bakunin's further rapprochement with leading Scandinavianist intellectuals in Stockholm, even if it was to a very significant degree coordinated by Polish insurgents there,¹³⁷⁰ might have partially resulted from his conversations with Ploug, whom he visited again during the failed *Ward Jackson* expedition.¹³⁷¹

The expedition on the ship *Ward Jackson* was planned and executed by Polish insurgents, who desired to deliver weapons and ammunition from London to Poland in March–April 1863. Their voyage lied through Sweden, and while Bakunin learned of it in the last moment without significant time for better preparations, he readily embarked on the dangerous affair, still dreaming of the Russian Legion establishment, and hoping on the revolutionary inflammation in central Russia, led by radical intellectuals and eventually joined by peasants. The expedition happened to be a disaster because of the unloyal crew, intervention of the Russian diplomatic corps and conservative Swedish minister of foreign affairs Manderström, as well as disaccord between the members of the expedition and poor organization.¹³⁷²

The ship, instead of reaching Baltic gubernias of the Russian empire, turned to Copenhagen, since the captain argued that the provisions of water were insufficient. While realizing that the expedition was not going according to the plan, Bakunin still used the opportunity to meet Carl Ploug again, although the contents of the conversation are unknown. Bakunin's awareness of the notorious Gotha dispatch that messaged English conservative stance on Holstein issue, however, reveals that Ploug or other Danish national-liberals updated him on the matter. The coldness of English diplomacy towards the Danish national affair made

¹³⁶⁹ The newspaper seemed to make a pause before publishing, assumably not to compromise Bakunin's disguise. *Fädrelandet*, 9.05.1863.

¹³⁷⁰ Elena Rudnickaja, "Herzen, Ogarev, Bakunin i Pol'skoe vosstanie 1863 goda," *Literaturnoe Nasledstvo* 96 (1985): 363–98; Postén, *De polska emigranternas agentverksamhet i Sverige 1862-1863*, 45–118.

¹³⁷¹ Bakunin – Herzen and Ogarev, 31 March 1863 in Mihail Bakunin, *Pis'ma M.A. Bakunina k A.I. Herzeniu i N.I. Ogarevu* (Geneve: Ukrainskaja tip., 1896), 111–17.

¹³⁷² Steklov, *Mihail Aleksandrovich Bakunin. T. 2. Perehodnyj period*, 2:215–75.

its government rely more on the Russian assistance and thus the latter enjoyed significant influence in Copenhagen, according to Bakunin.¹³⁷³

While Bakunin had to abandon his plans of participation in the Polish Uprising, and the failure of the expedition bittered his relations with Polish intellectuals in Stockholm, his endeavors of revolutionizing Finland and propagating Sweden went on, and the focus on the unification of Scandinavia surfaced as significant foundation for these plans. Bakunin enlisted important figures in Sweden among whom he spread his thoughts. Those included August Sohlman, the editor of *Aftonbladet*; Emil von Qvanten, the unofficial leader of the Finnish émigré circles in Stockholm, as well as August Blanche and Harald Wieselgren, all of them sharing pan-Scandinavian visions in this or that edition. Bakunin's proximity to Emil von Qvanten who became one of the King Charles XV's paradiplomatic agents, opened many doors for the Russian revolutionary who came to know at least some representatives of the royal family.¹³⁷⁴

His activities during spring-summer of 1863 included both private communications with the leaders of Swedish liberal environments and public explications of his goals. The figure of Bakunin, by that time a high, stout, and bearded man with revolutionary background and potential communist overtones, gravitated some intellectuals and repelled others. Conservative and even liberal newspapers – some of them under the personal aegis of minister Manderström – pictured him as a Russian agent or communist radical, while radical intellectuals praised his experience and visions, defending him from these attacks.¹³⁷⁵ At the beginning of his stay in Stockholm, his closest companions happened to be Finnish émigré representatives, judging from his letters.

¹³⁷³ Bakunin – Herzen and Ogarev, 31 March 1863 in Bakunin, *Pis'ma M.A. Bakunina*, 111–17.

¹³⁷⁴ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 592; Bååth-Holmberg, *Skaldrömmar och skaldepolitik*, 58-69.

¹³⁷⁵ Nils Erdmann, *August Blanche och hans samtid* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1892), 358–66.

Bakunin's first broad programme of actions was outlined in a letter he sent to 'Finlandish patriots' under which title, I assume, we should imply Emil von Qvanten, Adolf Erik Nordenskjöld, J.J. Nordström and those who stood near them. In the letter, Bakunin outlined the tensions that were erupting in the Russian empire. Alexander II, even if he tried to preserve the image of a liberator, in fact was restrained by the very system of government. This system was introduced by Peter I, and it sought to apply German and in particular Prussian bureaucratic institutions on the Russian nation to restrain its freedom. The people, however, revolted against these burdens, and in 1863 the timing was particularly ripe for a major uprising. Underground revolutionary group, *Zemlia i Volia* (Land and Liberty) together with religious dissenters, the Old Believers, constituted the core of the future resistance that was preparing to rise, instigated by the Polish example.¹³⁷⁶

Speaking on behalf of the secret organization, Bakunin proposed an alliance to his new friends that would imply their collaboration in spreading the propaganda in Finland and Russia and consequent united action against the 'common oppressor'. Bakunin insisted that all the nations under current imperial rule should be freed, including, of course, Finland, while also highlighting his admiration of the federal principles that the future Russian political organization would be based on. Interestingly, and perhaps, surprisingly, Bakunin required assistance in spreading propaganda in the Baltic provinces among the Estonians and Latvians, assuming that Qvanten and his collaborators had trustful friends there. While Scandinavian dimension was absent from the letter, the Baltic connection surfaced more prominently there. Finally, Bakunin proposed to establish a secret organization that would organize the workings of propaganda and uprising.¹³⁷⁷

¹³⁷⁶ Bakunin's letter to Finlandish patriots, 25 April 1863. KB, Emil von Qvanten Collection, KB1/Ep. Q 1.

¹³⁷⁷ Bakunin's letter to Finlandish patriots, 25 April 1863. KB, Emil von Qvanten Collection, KB1/Ep. Q 1.

The protocols of the Swedish Riksdag indicate that Bakunin's in many ways fanciful proclamation did not fall on deaf ears. Emil von Qvanten, as a descendant of a Swedish noble family and with a status of a Swedish subject by that moment, had a right to represent the noble estate in the Riksdag. During its session on May 2, he called upon the intervention into the Polish affair. He justified it by the fact that the dawn of the Russian imperial power has arrived and peasant uprisings as well as the activities of the revolutionary party in Russia undermined the government. Internal groups that were destroying Russia thus became the allies of Sweden. Von Qvanten claimed that Finland preserved Swedish cultural heritage as well as sincere sentiment for laws and independence, and it should have been voluntarily joined with Sweden again as a union-state. Finally, Sweden should have consolidated the Scandinavian forces and jointly assault Russia. Von Qvanten supported the Polish case earlier in the Riksdag, but the reference to the revolutionary party in Russia came only at this point.¹³⁷⁸

Bakunin, in his turn, pictured von Qvanten in most plausible terms in his correspondence with Herzen and Ogarev, and the latter two even addressed their Nordic colleague with their letters of respect and trust. Herzen even sent his son, Alexander, whom he prepared for the revolutionary activities, to Sweden in late May, although he protested against Bakunin's vain demands, haste, and turmoil. All of them hoped to distribute *Kolokol* through Sweden to Finland and Russia, and some preparations were indeed made, while their end happened to be less satisfactory. The international politics, while there were credible visions about European intervention into the Russian-Polish affair, happened to be much more apprehensive than what Russian and Finlandish emigres hoped for. Besides, internal rivalries plagued the relations of different groups, and while we do not have all of Bakunin's letters

¹³⁷⁸ *Protokoll hållna hos högloflige ridderskapet och adeln vid lagtima riksdagen i Stockholm år 1862-1863*, vol. 4 (Stockholm: Westrell, 1864), 10-12. Postén, *De polska emigranternas agentverksamhet i Sverige 1862-1863*, 101-18.

from Sweden, Herzen's and Ogarev's make clear that Scandinavianist and Finnish circles in Sweden were ripe with internal intrigues and confrontations.¹³⁷⁹

Indeed, scholars note the tensions that surfaced between different interpretations of Scandinavian rapprochement and future politics in 1863-4 when European and regional situation became especially strained.¹³⁸⁰ But in late May, many public intellectuals still relied on the prospects of the future intervention and took part in defending Bakunin from conservative insinuations. He himself read a speech in French at the convention devoted to him. The speech pointed to the specific juncture that the empire found itself at the moment, when the Polish Uprising gave impetus to internal revolutionary activities within the empire, led by a broad underground society Land and Freedom that ostensibly united thousands of men of every estate and professional position. The society was ready to give its hand to Finland to fight united against the imperial repressions. To defend himself from the conservative criticism in Sweden, Bakunin rhetorically framed himself as a true conservative, who fight against revolutionary violence of the empire. He even asserted that if Alexander II changed his politics to embrace the necessities of the Russian nation, he and his associates were ready to become him most trustful servants. Finally, the speech ended with a toast for the future of the great union of federative Scandinavia.¹³⁸¹

These dynamics of collaboration were, however, soon thwarted by the conflicts of various scale. One rupture certainly appeared between Bakunin and von Qvanten as early as June-July 1863, and, as Qvanten confessed to another Scandinavianist intellectual, Oscar Patrick Sturzen-Bekcer, he perceived any alliance with Bakunin threatening, since while Swedes, Finlanders, and Poles wished to trump the empire, Bakunin, according to him, had

¹³⁷⁹ Bakunin – Herzen and Ogarev, 17 / 29 August 1863 in Bakunin, *Pis'ma M.A. Bakunina*, 132-140

¹³⁸⁰ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 579-634.

¹³⁸¹ Bakunin, *Pis'ma M.A. Bakunina*, 134–38.

something completely different on his mind.¹³⁸² Indeed, Bakunin's flexible position regarding the institutions of monarchy and his insistence on the redistribution of land within the communal institutions were often looked at with criticism that stemmed either from liberal or from conservative standpoints. His Slavic-centered visions of the future federative state might have puzzled many contemporaries who suspected that this might have been just a redressing of the Russian empire, and perhaps even empowerment of the latter. Alexander Herzen-junior, who arrived at Stockholm in the middle of May, was, on the contrary, received with more warmth from Qvanten, and this led to conflicts between Bakunin and Herzen.

Herzen and Ogarev had a lot to reprimand Bakunin for. Despite the hopes for establishing a channel of book spread into Russia, the idea failed due to unknown reasons. Bakunin's absolute sincerity and quick rapprochement with men he met for the first time in his life led to future embitterment, lack of credibility, and spreading intrigues about Russian émigré establishments. His exaggeration of the quality and quantity of the revolutionary elements in the empire – 'masses, birds, and bees' as Herzen referenced these overstatements – caused distrust. Bakunin's haste, inconsistency in action and speech, lack of a real programme or vision, and inability of conspirative action annoyed Herzen, who insisted on grounded workings and slower pace of the enterprise.¹³⁸³

Herzen mocked the way Bakunin interacted with Swedish politicians, and Qvanten surfaced as a paradigmatic example of a person whom Bakunin initially praised but then turned completely hostile due to his intrigues against him. The situation became especially comedic since Herzen's 24-year-old son became in Bakunin's letters his main antagonist together with 'my current enemy Qvanten'.¹³⁸⁴ The tensions among different groups were growing due to the

¹³⁸² von Qvanten – Sturzen-Becker, 22 June 1863 in Evgenii Egorov and Mikael Björk-Winberg, "Emil von Qvanten, Mikhail Bakunin and Pan-National Activist Networks," in *Nordic Experiences in Pan-Nationalisms* (London: Routledge, 2023), 126.

¹³⁸³ Herzen – Bakunin, 1 September 1863 in Bakunin, *Pis'ma M.A. Bakunina*, 144–47.

¹³⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

inactions of the European powers and violent suppression of the Polish insurgents by the imperial forces, leading to a complete break between Polish emigres and Russian revolutionaries in Stockholm. Qvanten and J.J. Nordström who collaborated closely with the Poles accordingly distanced themselves from Bakunin.

After Bakunin left Sweden in October – in a status much less favorable compared to his arrival – as Russian envoy in Stockholm noted,¹³⁸⁵ the criticism was voiced on both shores of the sea, and Dane Carl Rosenberg, advocate of the Scandinavian union and close associate of Qvanten, authored one of the most interesting among them. While Rosenberg appreciated Bakunin’s charisma and passion for the destabilization of the empire, the outcomes of the expected Russian revolution did not placate the author. He deemed Bakunin a radical intellectual whose ideas hardly found any adherents in Sweden. He added that Bakunin was alienated from the Finnish group in Stockholm, probably referring to his conflict with Qvanten. Second, Bakunin’s views of the post-imperial order that espoused the Slavic federation, atheism, and communal ownership of the land might have cost more for Scandinavia than the existing imperial regime. Rosenberg rather envisioned that the Scandinavian nations should have united to counterbalance this future political body.¹³⁸⁶

From the visions of the future Scandinavian-Slavic collaboration, the perception of Bakunin’s ideas could migrate to hostility against his projects even within pan-Scandinavian discourse. The extravagance of Bakunin’s personality as well as his ideas left a lot of space for their interpretation. The proximity between his nationalist rhetoric, though he denied its pan-Slavic roots, and the self-representation of the imperial regime reinforced the suspicion that many entertained. In Europe, imperial reformism and the ‘awakening’ of the Russian nation also attracted attention not only as a positive tendency but also as a dangerous trajectory of its empowerment after the heavy blow of the Crimean War.

¹³⁸⁵ Steklov, *Mihail Aleksandrovich Bakunin. T. 2. Perehodnyj period*, 2:247.

¹³⁸⁶ Carl Rosenberg, “Et par Erindringer fra Sverig,” *Dansk Maanedskrift* 2 (1863): 283–308.

6.7. Imperial reactions in 1863

Bakunin's 'Columbus trips' – using Herzen's phrase – quickly fell under the scrutiny of the Russian diplomacy in Stockholm.¹³⁸⁷ The fact that he established contacts with Finnish émigré circles and with radical politicians of all sorts – Scandinavianists included – also became known for Alexander II. Dashkov quickly grasped the programme of Bakunin's activities in Sweden, and the latter's focus on Finnish agitation appeared dangerous for the diplomat. Swedish conservative ministers, principally Manderström, approached Dashkov with a plan to send Bakunin out of the kingdom given his revolutionary background.¹³⁸⁸ While the plan was abandoned due to the political consequences it might have caused, to the dissatisfaction of the emperor, the diplomatic corps preserved their vigilante eye on the figure of Bakunin as well as on the growing agitation tied to the Polish Uprising and potential war against Russia.¹³⁸⁹

The main problem of the Russian position vis-à-vis Sweden surfaced not only in the fact that the press was dominated by the liberal-revanchist discourse, but in the fact that this anti-imperial and pro-Polish agitation was encouraged by the king himself. In these militaristic endeavors, often bonded with pan-Scandinavian projects, he was firmly opposed by minister Manderström, according to Dashkov. Other representatives at the Swedish court generally seconded this opinion about the diversity of visions at the court and ministry.¹³⁹⁰ Oppositional newspapers openly criticized the minister's inaction in the light of the Polish crisis, and the press campaign was launched that aimed to remove him from the office. By the end of April, Dashkov, however, reported that the public tended to prefer neutrality over intervention. Provincial population and peasantry regarded war as their personal burden, and if not for the

¹³⁸⁷ Steklov, *Mihail Aleksandrovich Bakunin. T. 2. Perehodnyj period*, 2:243–75.

¹³⁸⁸ Louis Gerhard De Geer, *Minnen*, vol. 1 (Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt, 1892), 242–45.

¹³⁸⁹ Dashkov – Gorchakov, 3 / 14 April 1863. AVPRI. F. 133. op. 469, g. 1863, d. 139a, l. 277.

¹³⁹⁰ Fournier – Drouyn De Lhuys, 27 December 1863 in *Les Origines Diplomatiques de La Guerre de 1870-1871 : Recueil de Documents*, vol. 1 (Paris : Imprimerie nationale, 1910), 28.

minority composed of the king, small officers' environment and radical editors, the preponderance for peace would have been dominant.¹³⁹¹ The news received from Hamburg about less favorable conditions for the Swedish credit – taken to reify Oscar I's dreams about the railroad network – in case it falls for the war path reinforced the impressions of favorable neutrality, as the diplomat put it.¹³⁹²

Even though the Russian diplomat seemingly downplayed many dangers and presented Polish conspiracy in Stockholm as futile endeavor in 1862-3, Russian Ministry of War was not satisfied with the data it had in its hands at that period with regards to Swedish military capacities. After the death of military agent Bodisco, information was not updated since 1853, and the aggressive rhetoric of the Swedish press that enjoyed explicit support of the monarch, its earlier inclination to intervene in the course of the Crimean War expectedly worried military circles in the new period of European and imperial crisis.¹³⁹³ The reforms of the Swedish local government in 1862, the organization of the volunteer sharpshooter formations, and the plans to modernize its fleet¹³⁹⁴ made the ministry react and send an experienced officer who could gather enough relevant information with regards to the novelties and aims of this reform.

Senyavin, ex-adjunct of governor-general Berg, was picked as an appropriate candidate for the task. Indeed, experienced and knowledgeable, Senyavian provided reports with great detail, covering Swedish army and fleet organization, technical innovations, budget spendings and other aspects, finishing his workings in October 1862.¹³⁹⁵ Among the issues that interested the ministry, apart from obvious data on the quality and quantity of army and fleet, intellectual aspects of the public life also found prominence, and 'the spirit of forces' together with 'the

¹³⁹¹ Dashkov – Gorchakov, 16 / 28 April 1863. AVPRI. F. 133. op. 469, g. 1863, d. 139a, l. 316.

¹³⁹² Dashkov – Gorchakov, 23 April / 5 May 1863. F. 133. op. 469, g. 1863, d. 139a, l. 320.

¹³⁹³ Report on the collection of information about military aspects of Sweden and Norway. RGVIA. F. 442, op. 1, d. 67, l. 1-3.

¹³⁹⁴ Claes Ahlund, "Skarpskytterörelsen, litteraturen och samhället," in *Tanke/Världar*, ed. Hilda Forss, Hanna Lahdenperä, and Julia Tidigs (Helsinki: Helsingfors universitet, 2022), 225–41, <https://doi.org/10.31885/978951515069>; Senyavin – Milyutin. 17/29 September 1862. RGVIA. F. 442, op. 1, d. 67, l. 86-86ob.

¹³⁹⁵ Senyavin – Milyutin. 24 September / 6 October 1862. Ibid, l. 91-91ob.

way of thinking of the higher officers' appeared in the request list, hinting to the expectations of potential aggression towards the Russian empire.¹³⁹⁶ Senyavin's knowledge, however, became especially crucial in the spring-summer of 1863, when the ministry addressed him with a simple question: 'What army is Sweden-Norway capable to put forward for offensive operations?'¹³⁹⁷

Senyavin argued that, while the forces of Sweden and Norway were significant for the defensive operations, they could hardly supply an efficient attacking army without foreign subsidies, and the tensions between Norway and Sweden contributed to this difficult situation. The officer also noted that the provision of forces depended heavily on the public opinion in Sweden. Quite contrary to Dashkov, Senyavin argued that the public debate was dominated by those personalities who wished to take revanche against the Russian empire to recapture Finland. They were opposed by a minority of those who hoped for a quiet and prosperous future of Sweden and thus demanded a conservative trajectory of the foreign policy. The radicals, however, were reinforced by influential members of government and the king himself, and thus in this regard the formation of the army was possible and even plausible. Senyavin concluded that Sweden could supply forty to fifty thousand troops as an attacking force and preferably it would do so under the financial aegis of the foreign coalition.¹³⁹⁸

The concerns were not unfounded. The emperor and the broader publics in Russia and elsewhere pondered on the possibilities of a broad European alliance under French leadership against the Russian empire in spring-summer of 1863. France, Britain, and Austria addressed their concerns to Gorchakov, in different wordings calling upon the upholding of the Vienna principles with regards to Polish autonomy, which the minister vehemently opposed and pictured the uprising as a revolutionary conspiracy without broad public support in Poland

¹³⁹⁶ Instruction for Senyavin, 14 April 1864. Ibid, I. 25-25ob.

¹³⁹⁷ Request for Senyavin's reply. Ibid, I. 155.

¹³⁹⁸ Senyavin's undated report. RGVIA. F. 442, op. 1, d. 67, I. 155-62.

itself, delegitimizing the insurgents and denying any attempts to categorize them as a belligerent side.¹³⁹⁹ In Sweden, there were circles around the monarch that envisioned the new war as a potential for Scandinavian consolidation, belligerent voices sounded in the Riksdag and Polish emigres in Stockholm possessed great political capital. Their representatives were even trusted with a task to draft a constitution for the united Scandinavian state.¹⁴⁰⁰ The potential coalition of France, England, and Austria, however, remained fractured and hesitant about the prospects of European war.

The task of the Russian diplomacy thus, on the one hand, was to deepen these ruptures and utilize controversies between these states, and, on the other, to suppress the rebellious groups as fast as possible, which was no easy task given the guerilla and partisan nature of the warfare. In this aspect, the rapprochement made on the side of Prussia, led by recently appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs Otto von Bismarck, was essential for the latter course of the imperial foreign policy. Alvensleben Convention, signed on 8 February 1863, implied the possibility of Russian and Prussian forces to cross to each other's territory to pursue the insurrection forces. Prussia, given the accumulation of Polish-speaking population in its Eastern province of Posen, shared the threats of the establishment of the Polish state. Although the convention signaled better relations with its Western neighbor, the position of Russia remained fragile, and scholars have argued that the practical implementation of the treaty was limited by internal political struggles in Prussia.¹⁴⁰¹

Sweden with its proximity to Finland surfaced as a perfect member of a potential hostile coalition, especially given Charles XV's rhetoric and visions of both Scandinavianism and

¹³⁹⁹ Gorchakov – Konstantin Nikolaevich, 5 March 1863. GARF. F. 828, op. 1., d. 1427, l. 159-60; Gorchakov's dispatches were highly appreciated not only by the broader public (see next sections) but also by the members of the diplomatic environment, and old Paul Nicolay wrote to his son Nicholas about the minister's brilliant rhetoric while he also – 'as an old friend of Copenhagen' – scolded the subscription that liberal *Fædrelandet* opened for the Polish insurgents: Paul Nicolay – Nicholas Nicolay, 7 / 19 May 1863. Kansalliskirjasto, Ms.Mf. 850, f.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 593; Postén, *De polska emigranternas agentverksamhet i Sverige 1862-1863*, 119-84.

¹⁴⁰¹ Revunenkov, *Pol'skoe vosstanie 1863 g. i evropejskaja diplomatija*, 114-45; Dudarev, *Bismarck i Rossija. 1851-1871 gg.*, 173-99.

Finlandish revenge. Again, Dashkov on several occasions mentioned that he forwarded information concerning Finland directly to governor-general Rokassovsky, but the lines of the Russian Ministry of War and, perhaps, of the Third Section appeared more decisive in case of Finland.¹⁴⁰² The pacification or, in other cases, the suppression of the Finlandish public opinion and the search for balancing out internal interests against Swedish pretentions appeared crucial during this year. Although in late February, Tobiesen wrote to Saint-Petersburg that he did not spot any changes in state of mind and people's spirit in the duchy, seconded in these impressions by Zacharias Topelius who wrote that other concerns, primarily that of starvation in the northern areas, predominated in late January,¹⁴⁰³ the situation was changing towards the spring.

Already on March 15, 1863, the head of gendarmes addressed a secret telegram to governor-general of Finland. The text was short but its content menacing: 'Beware the landing of the Poles from Sweden somewhere in Finland'.¹⁴⁰⁴ While this message rather pictured Sweden as a platform for insurgent conspiracies, probably referring to *Ward Jackson* expedition, later full-scale conflict with the neighboring kingdom was being expected.¹⁴⁰⁵ Rokassovsky, however, assured the emperor that the neither the weapon contraband nor any insurrection was possible, since even if there were personalities who could be suspected in Polish sympathies, overall Finlandish population remained loyal to the emperor.¹⁴⁰⁶ The

¹⁴⁰² Dashkov – Gorchakov, 12 / 24 April 1863. AVPRI. F. 133. op. 469, g. 1863, d. 139a, l. 304. In 1863, head of gendarmes Dolgorukow and minister of war Milyutin regularly met each morning to provide reports for the emperor: Dmitrij Alekseevich Miljutin, *Vospominanija general-fel'dmarshala grafa Dmitrija Alekseevicha Miljutina: 1863-1864* (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2003).

¹⁴⁰³ Topelius, *Finlands krönika 1860-1878*, 89–90.

¹⁴⁰⁴ Dolgorukow – Tobiesen, 15 March 1863, GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 38, d. 23 ch 82, l. 3.

¹⁴⁰⁵ Sergej Kurochkin, "Podgotovka Oborony Baltijskogo Poberezh'ja Rossijskoj Imperii V Gody Pol'skogo Vosstanija 1863-1864 Gg.," *Sankt-Peterburg I Strany Severnoj Evropy*, no. 23 (1-2) (2022): 91-106, <https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=48491984>; Aleksandra. Petuhova, "'Otsel' Grozit' My Budem...': Voennyj Faktor Vo Vzaimootnoshenijah Rossii I Velikogo Knjazhestva Finljandskogo V Konce XIX - Nachala XX Vv.," *Chelovecheskij Kapital* 143, no. 11 (2020): 96-108, <https://doi.org/10.25629/HC.2020.11.08>; Lev Suni, *Ocherk obshhestvenno-politicheskogo razvitija Finljandii, 50--70-e gg. XIX v* (Leningrad: Nauka, 1979).

¹⁴⁰⁶ Rokassovsky – Armfelt, 19 / 31 March 1863. KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Iia 23b, l. 101-103 (537)

prospects of war, together with the remnants of starvation in the northern parts of the duchy, nevertheless, aggrieved the spirits in the duchy.

In late March, Tobiesen informed his chief that the sympathies of the educated estates in Finland gravitated towards Poland, given their connectedness to Sweden, where Polish struggles were welcomed and encouraged.¹⁴⁰⁷ Later the rumors spread there that the Swedish army was being prepared for an attack against the duchy.¹⁴⁰⁸ Quite against the grain of such interpretations, the Third Section in Saint-Petersburg received rumors from certain Elfström, who stated in the company of his compatriots that Finlanders were prepared to fight against the Swedes ‘with delight’ given their unquestionable loyalty to the Russian throne. While some Poles agitated Helsingfors students in the opposite direction, their influence, according to the note, could be dismissed. Besides, the visions of Finland joining Sweden surfaced as political fantasies with little chance for reification, and both sides, according to the information in the text, realized this fact.¹⁴⁰⁹ The imperial administrations thus, as often happened in the moments of crisis, had to navigate these polarizing flows of information.

Russian troops were dislocated to Finland in April and later reinforced in June to defend the province from potential coastal attacks and landings, and their amount bordering on forty thousand armed men that must have echoed Senyavin’s analysis.¹⁴¹⁰ The mobility of the Russian troops produced some internal conflicts with regards to their command that became characteristic for the overall debated position of Finland in 1863-4. The issues piled around the question whether it was the Ministry of War and other central institutions or Finnish governor-general who was responsible for their command.¹⁴¹¹ Apart from that, the cohabitation

¹⁴⁰⁷ Tobiesen – Dolgorukow, 30 May / 11 April 1863. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 32, d. 321 ch. 32, l. 245-245ob.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Tobiesen – Dolgorukow, 1 / 13 April 1863. Ibid, 246-246ob.

¹⁴⁰⁹ Anonymous report, 12 April 1863. GARF. F. 109 s/a, op. 3a, d. 1355, l. 1-2.

¹⁴¹⁰ On the dislocation of troops. RGVIA. F. 1019, op. 1, d. 21, l. 1-25; Miljutin, *Vospominanija general-fel'dmarshala grafa Dmitrija Alekseevicha Miljutina*, 205–7; *Vsepoddannejšij otčet o dejstviah Voennogo ministerstva za 1863 god* (Sankt-Peterburg: Tip. Ju.A. Bokrama, 1865), 8–13. They numbered approximately 33000 that might have echoed Senyavin’s calculations about 40000 ostensibly coming from Sweden.

¹⁴¹¹ RGVIA. F. 1019, op. 1, d. 21, l. 15-16.

of the troops with the local population caused some conflicts and tensions, although conservative newspapers sought to dispel the suspicion that Finnish population inhibited and represent the relations between the troops and locals as harmonious.¹⁴¹² Finally, even conservative intellectuals, J.V. Snellman among them, considered the deployment of troops a sign of mistrust, inspired by Swedish and Finnish liberal press.¹⁴¹³ Similar but scaled concerns circulated in ministries and newspapers with regards to general relations between Finland and the empire in 1863-4.

Overall, Alexander II must have preserved his trust to Finnish loyalty even during the crucial moments of potential formation of the European coalition. In late May, Rokassovsky went to Saint-Petersburg to sound the ground and returned with the promising news of the approval of the future Diet convention in September, long awaited by politicians and intellectuals in the duchy. The convocation of the estates according to Finnish legal procedure was not, as it is often claimed, an extraordinary measure or a gift of sorts aimed to affect the loyalty of Finlanders but rather signaled that nothing changed in the pace of relations between the emperor and the duchy: things went as planned.¹⁴¹⁴ While the emperor appreciated Finnish situation, he, however, was concerned by the foreign press accounts that presented Finland as potential revolutionary zone ready for twin insurrection.¹⁴¹⁵

The refusal of the Finnish estates to provide a loyal address to the emperor in line with other similar notes from imperial estates and corporations contributed to a certain dissatisfaction in the capital but did not result in any measures.¹⁴¹⁶ Some miniscule events like the demonstration of the Swedish flag in the theater during the presentation of Runeberg's

¹⁴¹² For example: *Russkiy Invalid*, 23.10.1863.

¹⁴¹³ Johan V. Snellman's letter to his brother, 8 June 1863, Snellman's Collection: <http://snellman.kootuttekset.fi/sites/default/files/11132.pdf> (accessed 04.02.2023).

¹⁴¹⁴ Miljutin, *Vospominanija general-fel'dmarshala grafa Dmitrija Alekseevicha Miljutina*, 210. Milyutin also noted that other affairs proceeded unabated across imperial domains.

¹⁴¹⁵ Edvard Bergh, *Var styrelse och vara landtdagar*, 111-14; Miljutin, *Vospominanija*, 213-214.

¹⁴¹⁶ Tobiesen – Dolgorukow, 4 / 16 May 1863. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 38, d. 23 ch. 82, l. 5.

piece, and the debate over the outline of the Finnish trading flag that, as proposed by *Helsingfors Dagblad*, should in some way repeat the Swedish color scheme, were read both by some members of the administration and by conservative intellectuals as Sweden-centered and even Scandinavian union-oriented programmes, while others, including governor-general Rokassovsky, tended to dismiss such far-flung interpretations.¹⁴¹⁷

It seems that during the context of the Polish Uprising and under the danger of foreign intervention, any pro-Swedish enunciation might have been read as Finnish claim for its part in the future Scandinavian union. The circle around *Helsingfors Dagblad* with its demands for Finnish neutrality, and primarily those who stood close to Edvard Bergh were considered by some contemporaries to form a certain Scandinavian party,¹⁴¹⁸ but it is hard to say, given their cautious rhetoric, still monitored and sanctioned by strict censorship, whether they consciously envisioned some kind of pan-Scandinavian union or just the context of European tensions made witnesses perceive their bold programme as Scandinavian-oriented. Governor-general himself considered this group weak and, moreover, mentioned, that the danger was alleviated since its members were well-known for the administration: perhaps, Rokassovsky's access to the higher society in the duchy provided him with this information.¹⁴¹⁹ The very possibility of Scandinavian-leaning domestic perceptions, however, tells much about intellectual expectations and radicalized political visions of the future in Finland and in the Northern Europe, in general.

On a less public level, meaning that of university sections, the tensions also surfaced around the question of the polarizing political groupings, although Polish Uprising did not figure prominently even on this level, perhaps due to the dangers of such public discussions.

¹⁴¹⁷ Topelius, *Finlands krönika 1860-1878*, 94.

¹⁴¹⁸ Topelius, 94–95; Snellman as well saw the public as divided between Scandinavian sympathies and Finnish question: J.V. Snellman, “Finska frågan” in Snellman’s Collection, URL: <http://snellman.kootuttekset.fi/fi/dokumentit/suomen-kielen-kysymys-ja-muutamia-esityksi%C3%A4-erin%C3%A4isist%C3%A4-asioista-sek%C3%A4-s%C3%A4%C3%A4tyjen-anomuksia> (accessed 01.03.2023)

¹⁴¹⁹ Rokassovsky – Armfelt, KA. Alexander Armfeltin arkisto Iia 23b, l. 108-9.

One of the students of the Nyland section accused the group that preached the alliance with Sweden as Finnish future in spreading intrigues and rumors. Primarily, this suspicion intensified due to the group's opposition against Finno-centric tendencies of other members of this section. The self-proclaimed leader of this group, Axel Olof Freudenthal, stood up to counter such blatant accusations, and the conflict seemed to have been downplayed towards the end of the year.¹⁴²⁰ It is characteristic, however, that during the pan-European tensions, even groups on smaller level came to be defined by larger political expectations. Another pro-Swedish group within the section was separated from radical Scandinavianist advocates, revealing sensitivity of these categorizations.

Swedish-leaning and neutrality-preaching prospects were countered by established members of the conservative Fennoman wing, led by Snellman who by that time became a member of the Senate and the head of its economic department, making some attentive witnesses remember the years when Snellman was persecuted and ostracized.¹⁴²¹ While in his writings and correspondence the possibility of war surfaced as utterly destructive for Finland, he insisted on the loyalty to the throne and in the case of warfare he manifested the necessity to unite around the monarch who did so much for prosperity and future of Finland. Snellman, recognizing the imperial fears, wrote that public debates demonstrated 'the conflict of the parties' that drew the attention of Saint-Petersburg and foreign witnesses: again, groupings, apart from those established by law, were to be avoided, especially when they piled around explicitly political and even geopolitical issues with Scandinavianist allure.¹⁴²² As earlier,

¹⁴²⁰ Protocol for Nyland section meeting, 7 October 1863. Kansalliskirjasto, NN: Cal 2.

¹⁴²¹ Topelius, *Finlands krönika 1860-1878*, 92–93.

¹⁴²² J.V. Snellman's letter to his brother, 8 June 1863, Snellman's Collection.

<http://snellman.kootuttekset.fi/sites/default/files/11132.pdf>; Johan Snellman, "Krig eller fred för Finland." *Litteraturblad för allmän medborgerlig bildning*, no. 5 (1863): 193–202. See, especially: 197: "ett Skandinaviskt Finland vore och förblefve enligt Napoleons ord Rysslands "geografiska fiende"".

The text was even translated by the Third Section: GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 38, d. 23 ch 82, l. 11-14.

Snellman's audience, apart from Finnish intellectuals, certainly included Swedish liberal Scandinavianist who bet on the changing tides of the duchy's loyalty.

These public debates, even though they implied ethnic groupings and ethnic divisions, rather appealed to these categories as to features-in-the-making. They became in the focus of the public intellectual attention precisely because their nature still pertained more to performative enunciation, debated qualities, and blurred sources of identity. In fact, origin and mother tongue of the debaters rarely played a decisive role, since the public debate was rather dominated by Finlanders from Swedish speaking families while many of them learned Finnish only in adult years, although the situation was changing. The juncture of the imperial crisis and strained foreign relations opened new horizons of larger geopolitical alternation and provided ways of solidarizing with these divergent opportunities on different levels. In this situation, debates about ethnic qualities were simultaneously disputes on political trajectories and vice versa. Russian imperial authorities, however, read these diverse tensions and articulations as distinctively ethnic struggle between the suppressed Finns and dominating Swedes, often succumbing to the simplified narrative and respective analysis.

6.8. The manifestation of ethnographic difference

The imperial crisis in Poland and in the Western Krai, where the authorities immediately recognized social tensions behind political rhetoric and as a result created the image of a loyal peasant, ethnically different from the Polish elites whose activities were ostensibly premeditated by Paris diaspora, echoed in the extrapolation of a similar matrix onto Finland.¹⁴²³ Dmitrij Miljutin, the minister of war and one of the ideologists of the imperial modernization along the nationalist lines, demonstrated such a turn most explicitly in his

¹⁴²³ Theodore R. Weeks, "Defining Us and Them: Poles and Russians in the 'Western Provinces,' 1863-1914," *Slavic Review* 53, no. 1 (1994): 26–40, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2500324>; Mihail Dolbilov, *Russkij kraj, chuzhaja vera: Jetnokonfessional'naja politika imperii v Litve i Belorussii pri Aleksandre II* (Moscow: Novoe Literaturnoe Obozrenie, 2014), 163–226; Miller and Dolbilov, eds., *Zapadnye Okrainy Rossijskoj Imperii*, 207–58.

memoirs. When in July, the emperor opted to visit Finland to conduct the review of troops, followed by Miljutin and others, the moment appeared right for such manifestations.

While already governor-general Berg fashioned himself as a defender of peasantry and Finnish language, this position had not yet enjoyed a universal approval neither in Finland, nor in the Russian proper during the heated debates over the peasant emancipation issues. In 1863, when the revolt in Poland was read by the imperial administration as an exclusively upper-class endeavor, the figure of peasant became the foundation of the imperial resilience across the domains. Miljutin, immersed in the foreign and domestic trajectories of the imperial politics, recognized the Swedish pan-Scandinavian propaganda, revanchist claims, and warm welcome provided in Stockholm for Polish insurgents. In Finland he discovered heated tensions between ‘Swedish and Finnish nationalities’, referring to the latter as ‘locals’ (*tuzemci*) and thus opposing them to the colonizers-Swedes.¹⁴²⁴

The position of the Finnish population appeared unjust under the oppression of the privileged Swedish one, and Alexander II’s policy thus sought to redistribute political and social capital in favor of the Finns, equalizing the position of two languages in documentation, among other emancipatory measures. This move was, moreover, justified by different pools of loyalty the two nationalities demonstrated since ‘the dominating class gravitated towards Scandinavianism’, while ‘the masses of simple people’ appeared as much more solid foundation given its conservative and anti-Swedish sentiment.¹⁴²⁵ The narrative of the imperial emancipation of those oppressed Finns, surely, overlooked the activity of the local advocates of the introduction of Finnish language into administrative offices, and Snellman’s communication with Armfelt and Stjernwall-Wallen played no lesser role in this turn.¹⁴²⁶

¹⁴²⁴ Miljutin, *Vospominanija general-fel'dmarshala grafa Dmitrija Alekseevicha Miljutina*, 218–19.

¹⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁴²⁶ Savolainen, *Med bildningens kraft*, 638–42.

Finally, the opening of the Diet in September 1863 pulled the attention and fortified the loyalty of the population in the duchy, according to Miljutin's analysis and others' impressions.¹⁴²⁷

The workings of the Finlandish Diet echoed in Sweden as well, but there the ethnic distinction did not figure as prominently in the public discussions. The dispatches from Stockholm pictured the opening of the Diet as an essential trigger of breaking 'moral bonds' with its ex-metropole and thus upsetting many 'liberal Scandinavians', as Dashkov's dispatches gladly informed.¹⁴²⁸ Dashkov reported that Swedish intellectuals hoped that the bold steps taken by the Finlandish deputies would be rebuffed by the imperial authorities. The provision of the Diet thus might have also been regarded as a measure distancing Finland from the Swedish public sphere and political life, given Dashkov's earlier and current treatment. In this case, the distance, as opposed to seclusion and censorship insisted on by Nicholas I, was created by the broadening boundaries of domestic political participation.¹⁴²⁹

Later, however, when these hopes were thwarted, the framing of the Diet changed and pan-Scandinavian and liberal intellectuals in Sweden suggested that, on the contrary, the proximity of the institutions put two polities closer together.¹⁴³⁰ Although Dashkov mocked these thoughts as fanciful dreams, indeed a Swedish subject entering the Finlandish Estate Diet would recognize many of its features, since its ceremonial and working process were aligned with earlier laws inherited from Sweden. Given the novelty of the institution, the debates about its working processes often referred to the Swedish establishments in clarifying the issues. Apart from that, in questions concerning the reform of local administration, finances, and other issues, respective Swedish establishments and practices surfaced as potential borrowings or

¹⁴²⁷ Miljutin, *Vospominanija general-fel'dmarshala grafa Dmitrija Alekseevicha Miljutina*, 218–25. Kristiina Kallejnen, 'Rabota v parlamente vmesto mjatezhnichestva: Velikoe knjazhestvo Finljandskoe v 1863 godu,' *Russkij Sbornik*, vol. 15 (Moscow: Modest Kolerov, 2013), 333–343.

¹⁴²⁸ Dashkov – Gorchakov, 6 / 18 September 1863. AVPRI. F. 133. op. 469, g. 1863, d. 139a, l. 469–70.

¹⁴²⁹ I use Karin Sennefelt's term of 'boundaries of political participation' that she coined here: Karin Sennefelt, "The Shifting Boundaries of Political Participation: Introduction."

¹⁴³⁰ Dashkov – Gorchakov, 8 / 20 October 1863. AVPRI. F. 133. op. 469, g. 1863, d. 139a, l. 488.

references. Finally, the Swedish provisions for Finland during another tragic famine in the North were applauded by some deputies.¹⁴³¹

While rhetorically the provision of the Finlandish Diet figured in opposition to the suppression of rebellious Poland, given the references to maturity and modesty of Finlandish subjects,¹⁴³² in terms of concepts of rule and loyalty-mapping the analysis of Poland, Western Krai and Finland rather approached each other in the administrative mind. Miljutin's rhetoric, although giving preponderance to ethnic distinctions, still combined class and even party politics in the picture of multilayered tensions. In September, a couple of weeks before the opening of the Diet, however, the chief of gendarmes Dolgorukow received an absolutely ethnographic reading of the political situation in the duchy, prepared by Tobiesen with a characteristic introduction:

The population of the country consists of two sharply distinct ethnicities: native Finns and Finlanders of Swedish descent. [...] These tribes (*plemena*) represent different characters with regards to education and morality.¹⁴³³

Their areas of habitation also differed since the Finns populated the core of the country while the Swedes mostly occupied coastal areas. Most significantly, however, the difference manifested itself in their morals and education. Local Finns remained simple-minded and ascetic nation, 'prone to physical and intellectual inactivity'. Finlanders of Swedish descent were completely opposed to this idleness, demonstrating their energy and industriousness. This inequality in characters resulted in the fact that the Swedes dominated in all spheres of the

¹⁴³¹ Jansson, "Between Two Worlds: Nordic Political Cultures in a Comparative Perspective"; Jansson, *Riksprängningen som kom av sig: finsk-svenska gemenskaper efter 1809*. See, for example: *Borgareståndets protokoll vid Landtdagen i Helsingfors*, vol. 1 (Helsingfors: J.C. Frenckell, 1864), 80–82, 316–17, 375.

¹⁴³² Bergh, *Var styrelse och vara landtdagar*, 112-14; Even in the text of the provision: *Sbornik postanovlenij Velikogo Knjazhestva Finljandskogo 1863* (Helsingfors: Senatskaja tip., 1864), n 22.

¹⁴³³ Tobiesen – Dolgorukow. 27 August / 8 September 1863. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 32, d. 321 ch. 32, l. 248–51.

public life, although the situation was gradually changing. The dominating influence of the Swedes gained through network and richness, however, negatively affected the local Finns. The growing awareness and education of the Finns pushed them towards ‘the emancipation from moral advantage and influence [...] of the Swedish element’. Fennomania, favored by Berg, according to Tobiesen, thus became a result of this struggle and the question of administrative language came to dominate the public debate.

In describing the Swedish population, the officer highlighted that their main characteristic was ‘lust for power and inclination to intrigues’. While their loyalty to Alexander II was solid, they regarded him only as a Grand Duke, denying any relations with the Russian state, separating the interests of Finland from those of the Russian empire, and deploring the imperial central government. This position resulted in the radical visions of a separate constitutionalist state under the rule of the Grand Duke or even more dangerous imaginaries of becoming a part of the federative Scandinavian union. These influences appeared even more hazardous since these Finlanders owned and edited most of the newspapers and the rhetoric there was unfriendly towards Russia, significantly affecting the public opinion, according to Tobiesen.¹⁴³⁴

The tone of this dispatch was descriptive rather than prescriptive, but the social-political mapping provided by the officer clearly implied the way the empire had to act or solidify the trajectory that it had already manifested. The text must have for the first time put such weight on the issues of nature rather than nurture in its essentialist reading of ethnic qualities with such intensity within the monitoring institution.¹⁴³⁵ The preponderance of ethnographic explanation made the political field of the duchy into a simple two-sided model, significantly reducing the

¹⁴³⁴ Tobiesen – Dolgorukow. 27 August/8 September 1863. GARF. F. 109. 1-eks. Op. 32. D. 321 Ch. 32. L. 248–51.

¹⁴³⁵ On similar projects see: Leonid Gorizontov, *Paradoksy imperskoj politiki: poljaki v Rossii i russkie v Pol'she* (Moscow: Indrik, 1999), 119-90; Miller and Dolbilov, eds., *Zapadnye Okrainy Rossijskoj Imperii*, 207-58; Gerasimov, Mogil'ner, and Glebov, *Novaja imperskaja istorija Severnoj Evrazii, Chast' 2: Balansirovanie imperskoj situacii: XVIII – XX vv.*, 219-66.

complexity of the group composition and nuances of their respective arguments. Now the story became the one of emancipation of the suppressed nationality against dominating corrupted ethnicity, that remained largely unpalpable by external interventions and profits provided by the empire, in many regards seconding Melikhov's note from 1861. The only remedy from the Swedish Finlanders' internal conspiracy that drove them to geopolitical projects of the Scandinavian union was thus the support of the Finns – uneducated and idle enough for their own political projects – who were regarded as a new foundation of the duchy's loyalty.

Tobiesen's analysis as well as similar ethnocentric visions, besides their empirical material and principles of political rationality, drew on contemporary academic ethnographic research as well, which presented the Finns – an entity of population discovered by the means of linguistic grouping – as naturally trustworthy and traditionally patriarchal but insufficiently developed *race* presumably originating from Mongoloid family. These quasi-barbaric roots predetermined the inability of the Finns to organize their own statehood, and they thus had to rely on more civilized nations, either Swedes or Russians.¹⁴³⁶ Besides, it must have been the ultimate inability to properly surveil and monitor suspected groups and personalities that made Berg, Tobiesen, and others to speculate on analytical languages that implicitly already possessed answers to the pending issues of loyalty and trust. While academic research itself had ambiguous relations with political decision-making, the incorporation of this language into the practices of political monitoring reinforced novel administrative visions of the situation in the duchy and required tools for positive interventions.

6.9. Scandinavian tides

The change of the focus that switched from Polish sympathies to Scandinavian visions was symptomatic in late summer of 1863.¹⁴³⁷ Towards the autumn, the issue of Schleswig-

¹⁴³⁶ Leskinen, *Poljaki i finny v rossijskoj nauke vtoroj poloviny XIX v.*, 250–307.

¹⁴³⁷ In what follows I do not seek to rewrite completely the canonical narrative of Russian-Danish and Russian-Scandinavian relations during these years provided by Emmanuel Halicz. I think that he is right on many regards,

Holstein and later of Scandinavian alliance or union surfaced as paramount questions of the European politics.¹⁴³⁸ The Danish ministry presided by C.C. Hall, despite the Prussian demands and Great Powers recommendations to return to the principles of the London protocols, since March set the course for the reforms that aimed at bringing Schleswig closer to Denmark and pushed Holstein away, relying on the promises made by the Swedish interlocutors, specifically diplomat Henning Hamilton.¹⁴³⁹ Prussian and Austrian governments were ready to capitalize on these tensions to force Denmark to comply. Swedish government unexpectedly took an ambiguous position, especially due to the divisions that shaped between the king and the ministry. While Charles XV was ready to embark on bolder activities, envisioning the future possible dynastic union with Denmark, the ministry and the Riksdag, as the Russian diplomats dispatched, sought to curb such trends.¹⁴⁴⁰

At the beginning of September, Dashkov informed the Russian ministry of the rumors that the king was ready to provide up to fifty thousand troops in case Prussian forces crossed into Schleswig. Again, Ludvig Manderström and the Riksdag did not want to indulge into risky and resource-demanding affairs that would challenge Swedish financial profile. The minister was afraid that the *provocations* of the German Confederation – the wording that certainly collided with that of the Russian empire – might in the future force Sweden to react, even though no formal agreement between Sweden and Denmark was established. By the middle of September, moreover, the Russian diplomatic mission in Stockholm, had no doubts that Sweden would intervene to assist Denmark if the German intervention ‘exceeded certain

and his brilliant archival work is more than exhaustive. I am bound to repeat some of his arguments and narrative turns but by expanding the context and source base, I am drawing new conclusions from this story.

¹⁴³⁸ Revunenkov, *Pol'skoe vosstanie 1863 g. i evropejskaja diplomatija*, 294–350; Narochnickaja, *Rossija i vojny Prussii v 60-h godah XIX v. za obedinenie Germanii “sverhu”*., 31–38; Dudarev, *Bismark i Rossija. 1851-1871 gg.*, 200–212.

¹⁴³⁹ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 579–634; Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 219–95; Louis Gerhard De Geer, *Minnen*, 1: 249–50.

¹⁴⁴⁰ Dashkov – Gorchakov. 20 August / 1 September 1863. AVPRI. F. 133. op. 469, g. 1863, d. 139a, l. 452.

limits'.¹⁴⁴¹ In fact, however, the Swedish cabinet and the king were debating the principles and the very necessity of assistance at around the same time, seeking for compromise.¹⁴⁴²

Baron Nicolay in Copenhagen accordingly approached C.C. Hall for elaborations with regards to the potential Nordic alliance. Nicolay warned Hall that such an alliance might pull Denmark in an unwanted war, waged by a 'sovereign with ambitious views', meaning Charles XV and his plans regarding Finland. Hall, however, explicated that the alliance and even the potential union, determined by geographical position and common interests of the Scandinavian kingdoms, would be purely defensive and insisted that all ambitions that Sweden cherished regarding Finland were abandoned, given the latter's attitude towards it, perhaps referring to the explications of loyalty connect to the opening of the Diet there. These negotiations, Hall sought to assure Nicolay, concerned exclusively Swedish assistance in case of Danish war with German states.¹⁴⁴³ It is conspicuous that the fears of the Swedish revanchism and recent agitation there that centered on Finland affected the expectations of the Russian diplomatic corps or could serve as appropriate justification for intervention into the union-focused affairs.

Minciaky, who substituted Dashkov for several months in 1863 in Stockholm, did not believe that any treaty was signed, but Manderström, who previously stood in opposition to the formal rapprochement, let him understand that the negotiations were launched, and a certain agreement reached about the conditions for the Swedish action. Nicolay was concerned, and partially rightly so, that the Swedish cabinet to a considerable degree affected the decision-making of their Danish counterparts in favor of forceful break up with Prussia.¹⁴⁴⁴ The news

¹⁴⁴¹ Minciaky – Gorchakov, 30 August / 11 September 1863. Ibid, 1 466.

¹⁴⁴² De Geer, *Minnen*, 1:250–51.

¹⁴⁴³ Nicolay – Gorchakov, 12 / 24 September 1863. RA. DUA, Håndskriftsamlingen XVI Danica, N. 860, l. 229–30.

¹⁴⁴⁴ Nicolay – Gorchakov, 19 September / 1 October 1863. Ibid, 1. 336; Friis, "Skandinavismens Kulmination. Ministeriet Halls planer om en nordisk union forud for udstedelsen af Martskundgørelsen 1863.;" Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 579–634; Møller, *Skandinavisk stræben og svensk politik omkring 1860*, 261–76.

of the agreement, rumored and spread, led to the rise of Scandinavian agitation, which perceived an alliance as the first definitive step towards the Scandinavian union. Dashkov in October, however, was much more reserved and insisted that both Manderström and broader public opinion were not as enthusiastic to go to Danish assistance, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs still hoped that the intervention of the Great Power could divert Prussia from interventions.¹⁴⁴⁵

In November, Hall's ministry decided on the adoption of a new constitution for Denmark and Schleswig that would tie the duchy considerably closer to Copenhagen relying on the promises of material assistance given by the Swedish king as the first step towards full-scale unification and separation of Holstein from Schleswig and Denmark. Even if the measure did not legally imply a total incorporation of the Duchy, it did surface as an obvious provocation in the times of strained relations between Denmark on the one side and Prussia with Austria on the other.¹⁴⁴⁶ The tensions spiked, and European diplomacy faced a new crisis with looming prospects of warfare.

The death of Frederik VII in Denmark surfaced as a moment of potential reconciliation between Denmark and Prussia, since Russian diplomatic mission wanted Christian IX Glücksburg to introduce changes to the constitution, but to no avail.¹⁴⁴⁷ The tensions persisted, and Dashkov highlighted that Manderström desired immediate Great Powers assistance with Sweden, while the king called for moderation in Riksdag.¹⁴⁴⁸ Nicolay, however, lamented that the Danish government did not want to smoothen their grip, and given the imbalance of the military strength, Prussian invasion would have dire consequences for Denmark.¹⁴⁴⁹ The

¹⁴⁴⁵ Dashkov – Gorchakov, 18 / 30 October 1863. AVPRI. F. 133. op. 469, g. 1863, d. 139a, l. 499; Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 295–325.

¹⁴⁴⁶ Nicolay – Gorchakov, 9 / 21 November 1863. RA. DUA, Håndskriftsamlingen XVI Danica, N. 860, l. 13-15.

¹⁴⁴⁷ Gorchakov – Oubril, 8 / 20 December 1863. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1430, l. 55.

¹⁴⁴⁸ Dashkov – Gorchakov, 26 November / 8 December 1863. AVPRI. F. 133. op. 469, g. 1863, d. 139a, l. 534-535.

¹⁴⁴⁹ Nicolay – Gorchakov, 22 November / 4 December 1863. RA. DUA, Håndskriftsamlingen XVI Danica, N. 860, l. 29-30.

establishment of the new ministry in Copenhagen towards the end of the year with D.G. Monrad in charge did not, unfortunately, produce a desired result, while Prussia and Austria declared military intervention after the term of two weeks if constitution was not edited.

Russian course on the issue of Holstein did not change much, and the recalibration of its foreign course that aimed at approaching Prussia and Austria ensured it in its rightfulness. Gorchakov presented his policy as a search for balance between the two sides of the conflict in which one side, Denmark, did not want to reconcile: ‘We did not want to be either ultra-Danish or ultra-German’.¹⁴⁵⁰ As the conflict progressed, Gorchakov stated in one of his dispatches that the affairs of Europe were of secondary significance for the empire whose aspirations were concentrated on internal progress, manifesting imperial unwillingness to intervene into the spiraling tensions.¹⁴⁵¹ Finally, the minister considered German Confederation intervention into Holstein and then Prussian and Austrian to Schleswig – only in the role of the Great Powers – as legitimate, anti-revolutionary, and stemming from the principles of the London protocols:¹⁴⁵² although he might have suspected that the two powers – especially Prussia – had expansionist goals on their minds, he tended to believe that this was not the case.¹⁴⁵³

Moreover, the occupation of Holstein, as he explicated in one of his dispatches, prevented the revolutionary fermentation spreading there on the nationalist basis, perhaps, aligned in interest and intention with what the empire sought to accomplish in Poland.¹⁴⁵⁴ While a couple of years prior to that Gorchakov advised the Copenhagen cabinet to revise its policy with regards to German-speaking population and to seek reconciliation both with the king’s legal subjects and external agents of German Confederation, Prussia, and Austria, in 1863 the minister seemed to have lost all hope both in the Danish government and in reconciliatory policies in the duchies.

¹⁴⁵⁰ Gorchakov – Oubril, 24 November / 4 December 1863. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1430, l. 21; 20ob-22ob. See also on repeated notions of ‘balance’ between the two parties: Gorchakov – Dashkov, 20 November / 2 December 1863. Ibid, l. 1-1ob; Gorchakov – Knorring, 23 November / 5 December 1863. Ibid, l. 9-11.

¹⁴⁵¹ Gorchakov – Budberg, 28 November / 8 December 1863. Ibid, l. 29-35ob. 140817

¹⁴⁵² Gorchakov – Brunnnow, 22 December 1863 / 3 January 1864. Ibid, l. 110ob-115ob; Gorchakov-Oubril, 10 / 22 January 1864. Ibid, l. 195-197. Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 334.

¹⁴⁵³ I think Halicz exaggerates the ability of Gorchakov to read between the lines here: Halicz, 323–30.

¹⁴⁵⁴ Gorchakov – Budberg, 6 / 18 January 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1430, l. 159-167.

6.10. Russian diplomacy and public from Poland and Finland to Schleswig in late 1863-4

Apart from Poland and then Denmark-Germany, Finland also appeared in the center of the imperial public discussions in 1863-4. It was not only contrast between Berg's rule and Rokassovsky's one or the establishment of new political institutions in the duchy that produced bitter reactions from the Russian conservative press with regards to Finland. The context of the Polish Uprising made many intellectuals rethink the very foundations of the empire. The wider openness of the public discussion – *glasnost'* – in the empire up to the point when journals could criticize administrators and governors together with the situation of the imperial crisis resulted in the radically new discourses on the issues of the imperial rule, and politics as opposed to literature became in the focus of the public interest. Mikhail Katkov, the editor of *Moskovskie vedomosti* and the leader of the conservative programmes of the imperial integration took a prominent voice on these issues and even formulated many of them.¹⁴⁵⁵

Finland, after some decades of negligible presence in the Russian newspapers, in 1863 appeared in the center of the public attention, praised by liberals or constitutionalists, and criticized by conservatives of all sorts. The focus of this attention, however, did not simply 'migrate' to encompass Finland. The Grand Duchy was deliberately created as a problem within a large issue of borderlands in the system of the imperial rule.¹⁴⁵⁶ The very manifestation of the press to indulge into the issues of the autonomous political entity with its distinct institutions was met with delight by Russian conservatives and nationalists, and with bitterness

¹⁴⁵⁵ Valentina Tvardovskaja, *Ideologija poreformennogo samodержavija: M.N. Katkov i ego izdaniya* (Moscow: Nauka, 1978); Alexander Kotov, "Konservativnaja pečat' v obshhestvenno-politicheskoj zhizni Rossii 1860-h - 1890-h godov: M.N. Katkov i ego okruženie" (Doctoral diss., Moscow State University, 2023); Ala C. Graff, "The Editorial Profession: The Rise of Private Newspaper Press in Late Imperial Russia: 3rd Contribution to the Forum: Journalism as a Profession in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union: New Questions and Approaches in Russian Press History," *Russian History* 48, no. 3–4 (2022): 349–67, <https://doi.org/10.30965/18763316-12340037>.

¹⁴⁵⁶ Aleksandra Petuhova, 'Russkoe Nacional'noe Dvizhenie i Finljandskij Vopros Vo Vtoroj Polovine XIX - Nachale XX Veka' (PhD diss., Moscow State University, 2022), 78–90; Keijo Korhonen, *Autonomous Finland in the Political Thought of Nineteenth Century Russia* (Turku: University of Turku), 46–71.

and irritation by most Finlandish intellectuals, regardless of their political orientation.¹⁴⁵⁷ This reflection also brought it closer to Poland, since they both – in line of other exceptional areas – appeared to be borderlands that challenged the regularity, consistency, and, finally, integrity of the imperial system.¹⁴⁵⁸

While several historians argued that the July Revolution of 1830 and the Polish Uprising of 1830-1 became pivotal points in terms of public debate in Europe, making many intellectuals intervene into the discussion of the foreign policy and diplomacy with such intensity for the first time, the year of 1863 may be seen in similar light for the Russian empire.¹⁴⁵⁹ The establishment of newspaper correspondents, usage of telegraph, and relaxed censorship paved the way for timely and sharp discussions of the trajectories of the imperial foreign policies.¹⁴⁶⁰ The tone of the press, unlike earlier descriptive language of the political commentary, also transformed, at this point pertaining to the genres of advice, recommendation, insistence, and even demand in disguise. The newspaper analysis also took upon more independent trajectories of thought that could diverge from the general line preferred by the government, and bitter conflicts that occurred between ministers and editors became testament to these changes.¹⁴⁶¹

Gorchakov, upon the final diplomatic battles of the Polish Uprising in September 1863, was, however, almost universally praised for his wit, solidness in arguments, and overall demonstration of the Russian character, as *Moskovskie vedomosti* put it. The same article of September 9 (21) continued with the news of the opening of the Finlandish *Sejm*. Even though these events were ‘not Russian’, and the document of its opening considered foreign, the news still pertained to the Russian public, since the Grand Duke was simultaneously the Russian

¹⁴⁵⁷ See next sections of the chapter for their reactions.

¹⁴⁵⁸ Richard Wortman, “The ‘Integrity’ (Tselost’) of the State in Imperial Russian Representation,” *Ab Imperio*, no. 2 (2011): 20–45, <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2011.0035>.

¹⁴⁵⁹ Renaud Meltz, “Vers Une Diplomatie Des Peuples ? L’opinion Publique et Les Crises Franco-Anglaises Des Années 1840,” *Histoire, Économie et Société* 33e année, no. 2 (2014): 58–78.

¹⁴⁶⁰ Paull Nickles, *Under the Wire*, 79-134.

¹⁴⁶¹ See, for example introduction to: Petr Aleksandrovich Valuev, *Dnevnik P. A. Valueva ministra vnutrennih del. T. 1. 1861-1864 gg.*, vol. 1 (Moscow: Izd-vo AN SSSR, 1961); Mikhail Dolbilov, “Loyalty and Emotion in Nineteenth-Century Russian Imperial Politics,” 17–43.

emperor. Although Katkov reluctantly congratulated Finlandish public with the establishment of the intuition and generally praised trustfulness and quietness of Finland, the blurred character of the relations between Finland and the empire appeared for him anomalous and dangerous. They, moreover, hinted to a certain ‘federative’ design of the empire which should have been avoided at all costs, since this made the state fragile, alien to the Russian spirit and character.¹⁴⁶²

The events of the Civil War in the US, perhaps, made many commentators reassess the foundations of the political system that it stood upon, while the weakness and fragility of the German Confederation must have persuaded them that the federative system laid in the core of the problem. Interestingly, this Katkov’s assessment that, again, must have been shared by many intellectuals, pertained as well to the thoughts of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It might have not been a coincidence that Gorchakov insisted on the federative form of the unifying Italy in seeking to preserve its relative weakness or to detain its ‘revolutionary’ impulses.¹⁴⁶³ Later, when the shadows of the Scandinavian union appeared forcefully on the horizon of the political possibilities, it was hardly again a coincidence that its potential federative form made it less threatening for the Russian empire in the eyes of Gorchakov and his advisors.¹⁴⁶⁴

Peaceful Finland, however, turned more problematic for the Russian conservative press with the workings of the Sejm and with freer public debate that surrounded it. Katkov’s intuitions about the ‘atmosphere of political separateness’ that endangered the integrity of the imperial body, found its proofs later when he got to read *Helsingfors Dagblad* article on the desirability of neutrality for Finland in the situation of the war between Russia and European powers. In Katkov’s reading this article tended to present the relations between Russia and the

¹⁴⁶² Mikhail Katkov, *Sobranie peredovyh statej Moskovskih vedomostej. 1863 god* (Moscow: Tip. V.V. Cicherina, 1897), 522–4, 534.

¹⁴⁶³ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 21 March / 2 April 1862. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1423, l. 98-99.

¹⁴⁶⁴ See next section.

duchy as those bound by personal union. Katkov sought to discredit these separatist tendencies by stating that the relations, on the contrary, were those of a unitary state in which Finland enjoyed a relative administrative autonomy as a mere province.¹⁴⁶⁵ In several days, the debate in the noble estate that concerned the question of whether three nobles currently employed in Russia could participate in the workings of the Diet again drew the attention of the conservative commentator, who saw the grains of political separatism and unloyalty that surfaced due to the opening of the representative body. He was appalled that Finlandish nobles considered the Russian empire a foreign state and on this ground tended to restrict the possibility of political participation for those occupied there.¹⁴⁶⁶

Katkov's views, although they enjoyed significant credit among the ruling bureaucracy, were not, however, left unchallenged in the public discussion. Saint-Petersburg newspaper *Golos*, on the contrary, perceived the opening of the Sejm as one of the most distinct features of the present political progress that the Russian empire and Finland was making. Katkov, however, replied that any Russian would find little reason to be happy with these events, since, again, they were treading the lines of separatism into the imperial system, and the separate position of Finland, meaning its conscious self-alienation rather than administrative autonomy. His lambasting about the perilous influence that Finland exhibited went on and touched upon the issues of its privileges in financial and political sphere.¹⁴⁶⁷ Generally, *Moskovskie vedomosti* rather surfaced as an exception in line of delightful expression in other Russian newspapers that appreciated the degree of freedom that an autonomous territory could enjoy under the scepter of the Russian emperor.¹⁴⁶⁸

Schleswig came relatively late on the board of *Moskovskie vedomosti* which up to the end of 1863 still focused on the reverberations of the Polish Uprising. In December, however,

¹⁴⁶⁵ Katkov, *Sobranie peredovykh statej Moskovskih vedomostej. 1863 god*, 535.

¹⁴⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 563-565.

¹⁴⁶⁷ Katkov, *Sobranie peredovykh statej Moskovskih vedomostej. 1863 god*, 647-48.

¹⁴⁶⁸ *Otechestvenie Zapiski* 151, (1863): 132.

the Danish-German issue manifested itself with full force and if earlier on could not help but laugh on the complexity and ancient origins of the issue, by the beginning of 1864 everybody understood that it took on another dimension.¹⁴⁶⁹ While Katkov only briefly introduced the problem and pondered on the reactions of the European governments, other commentators were more explicit. The last issue of *Otechestvennie Zapiski* – a journal which often criticized reactionary rhetoric of *Moskovskie vedomosti*, although in most plausible forms – for the year 1863 outlined major tensions to be decided upon in the following year, and the question of the duchies expectedly appeared central for the author. Even though *Zapiski* put forward progressist aspirations regarding the internal development of the empire, the legitimacy of the Polish Uprising suppression came as a universal consensus, regardless of the political spectrum. The end of it, however, drew their attention to farther-lying problems, and especially that of Schleswig-Holstein.¹⁴⁷⁰

The issue of the duchies appeared essential for the editor, since large European interests grouped around it, and, more importantly, ‘it possesses thousands precious lessons for us’.¹⁴⁷¹ In covering the complicated history of the duchies’ loyalties, alliances, and combinations, the author’s sympathies were certainly on the side of Denmark, which, moreover, ‘had twin rights to danificate Schleswig’, legitimized by the Vienna Treaties and from the statistics of population.¹⁴⁷² Finally, the case of Schleswig and Holstein provided fertile soil for the politics of comparison, in which the duchies reminded the position of Poland in the Russian empire and its international reverberations: ‘In Europe [...] they picked a side of the most impudent, absolute and brazen aristocracy in the whole world which stood, moreover, in an unbreakable

¹⁴⁶⁹ Vladimir Baryshnikov, Anatolii Smolin and Nikita Kozlov, “The Russian Newspapers and the Struggle for Independence of the German Population of Schleswig-Holstein 1863-1864,” *Bylye Gody* 2, no. 52 (2019): 726-35, <https://doi.org/10.13187/bg.2019.2.726>.

¹⁴⁷⁰ “Political digest of Europe,” *Otechestvennie Zapiski* 151, (1863): 52-76.

¹⁴⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 52-3.

¹⁴⁷² “Political digest of Europe,” *Otechestvennie Zapiski* 151, (1863): 64-65

bond with most fanatical theocracy'.¹⁴⁷³ The unloyalty of the German knighthood and aristocracy approximated that of the highest strata of the Polish society in these analytics.

'At present minute, at the end of November, the case begins to smell gunpowder and blood', – the author went on, blaming the excesses of German nationality and its exaggerated pretensions to the Danish government.¹⁴⁷⁴ After the death of Frederik VII, those who envisioned a separate political future for the duchies did not rush to swear their allegiance to Christian IX, considering the Duke of Augustenburg their legitimate head. 'The diplomacy is silent or, at least, its achievements remain unseen'. Again, the author bridged this case with that of Poland, stating dramatically that the German nationalism exaggerated the scale of repressions, and the character of violent and half-wild Danes as did Polish conspiracy about the Russian rule. These oppositions, forged also by the stubbornness and solidness of the 'Scandinavian character', would hardly give way for some kind of negotiation between Denmark and Holstein. For Russia as well as for Great Britain, the author envisioned, the integrity of Denmark remained pivotal given its control over the gulfs, while Napoleon III with his adventurous character might have embarked on a new conflict against Prussia aiming at ceding Rhein province.¹⁴⁷⁵

The two issues, that of Finland and that of Schleswig, developed together on the pages of the newspapers in late 1863 to 1864, and the case of the duchies, explicitly and implicitly, illustrated the issues that could stem from the excesses of the autonomy or, depending on what position a newspaper took on the political spectrum, provide commentaries on the extravagancies of the democracy. Gorchakov blamed both the excesses of the nationalism and revolutionary tendencies in Holstein, where a large part of the population considered Christian IX an illegitimate ruler, and the evils of the Danish government that, under the pressure of the

¹⁴⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷⁴ Ibid, 72-3.

¹⁴⁷⁵ Ibid, 75-76.

public opinion, could not pursue a more conciliatory line in dealing with the issue.¹⁴⁷⁶ Senior secretary Ewers, who in 1848 unsuccessfully negotiated an armistice with Wrangel, was sent to Denmark to persuade Christian IX to make amendments in the constitution and later instructed to demand its abrogation, reinforced in this request by the British diplomacy.¹⁴⁷⁷

The Great Powers, however, could not come to a single agreement on the course of their action, and the planned intervention of Prussia and Austria, initially under the principles of the London protocols, came to be prepared unchallenged in December and January. British cabinet appeared more ready to intervene under the pressure of the public opinion and more precipitative in seeing that Prussia and Austria might want to secede the duchies and not just to pacify them to then deliver back to Denmark, but Gorchakov remained stubborn and trusted the assurances provided by Bismarck. While British government already in mid-January requested some sort of agreement between the Great Power in case Denmark would be dismembered,¹⁴⁷⁸ Gorchakov envisioned these possibilities, although largely discredited them, only at the beginning of February when joint Prussian and Austrian intervention began in Schleswig without delays requested by the Foreign Office.¹⁴⁷⁹

In a letter to Russian representative in Vienna, Karl von Knorring, Gorchakov explicated fears about events that could potentially pull the Russian empire into the conflict. While the eventuality of modification of the Russian non-intervention position remained low, he and the emperor saw that one particular combination that entered in the views and measures of a certain party could be decisive:

We mean the dismemberment of the Danish monarchy that would bring the downfall of the present dynasty and territorial changes according to the idea called Scandinavian.

¹⁴⁷⁶ Gorchakov – Grand Duchesse Olga Nikolaevna, 24 November / 6 December 1863. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1430, l. 12-15.

¹⁴⁷⁷ Gorchakov – Oubril, 8 / 20 December 1863. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1430, l. 55; Nicolay – Gorchakov, 4 / 15 January 1864. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1864, d. 34. l. 19.

¹⁴⁷⁸ Gorchakov – Oubril, 16 / 28 January 1864. Ibid, l. 221-9.

¹⁴⁷⁹ Gorchakov – Knorring, 1 / 13 February 1864. Ibid, l. 299-301.

If against all possibility, such an event was to materialize, His Majesty must reserve his full freedom of action. Then He would take counsel only of the duties imposed on him by the interests of his own country.¹⁴⁸⁰

While Gorchakov's explications were not meant to be provided for Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Johann Bernhard von Rechberg, especially given Russian minister's assurance in the sincerity of Vienna which was not a favorable terrain for the 'dreams of Scandinavianism'. If, however, in a personal conversation Rechberg would touch this issue, Knorring was permitted to sound the ministry's concerns.¹⁴⁸¹

One must note that already in November 1863, a representative of the Russian mission in France, Baron Budberg, assessed the reification of the Scandinavian union as threatening for Russia due to the potential seizure of the Baltic Sea in the hands of the Scandinavian state. Surprisingly, in his communication the protocols of 1851-2 at the moment of their establishment aimed precisely at avoiding the secession of the duchies and specifically the downfall to the Scandinavian union, but the comparison with the results of the Crimean War and the Black Sea regime that the diplomat alluded to, rather reveals the work of reinterpretation that took place in 1863-4.¹⁴⁸² Minister Gorchakov, however, must have for the first time addressed the question in the instruction and the seriousness with which it was assessed by the emperor: Scandinavian union surfaced as the most significant war-pulling factor for Russia that could even make it ignore the communication with foreign governments and only take into account 'the interests of his own country'.

¹⁴⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸¹ Ibid. Knorring did not seem to report to Rechberg on Scandinavianism given that Halicz does not mention it: Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 360–64.

¹⁴⁸² Narochnickaja, *Rossija i vojny Prussii v 60-h godah XIX v. za obedinenie Germanii "sverhu"*, 40; *Die Auswärtige Politik Preussens 1858-1871 : Diplomatische Aktenstücke Abt. 2 : Vom Amtsantritt Bismarcks Bis Prager Frieden*, vol. 4 (Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1938), 217–19.

While here the reverberations of the revolutionary upheaval, traditionally tied to the Scandinavian project in the discourse of the Russian diplomacy, still loudly manifested themselves, the geopolitical perspectives of the territorial change, perhaps, for the first time were pronounced as clearly and they would be even more present in later reflections both in the press and in the diplomatic correspondence. Gorchakov's instruction to Knorring should best be read as a mild precaution for the Vienna cabinet and, given its communication with other capitals, for other decision-making centers across Europe: the Russian minister clearly recognized that other European governments might weave their own combinations with the visions of the united Scandinavia.¹⁴⁸³ In fact, I would argue that even under the dangers of the Scandinavian unification, the Russian empire was ready to hold to non-interventionist principles.

The fears, both dynastic and territorial, were indeed not unfounded. By the end of January, Russian diplomat in Copenhagen wrote to Saint-Petersburg that the national fervor captured the minds of the Danish nation, and the inevitability of war seemed to be universally accepted in the capital. Nicolay even put it in a sentimental manner, usually alien to the diplomatic voice:

I see passing before my eyes every day the reserve men called up to arms – all individuals in the vigor of life, taken away from their families, from their peaceful work – and I could only be struck of their liveliness, of their good countenance, and of the influence of the feelings which lead them to yield to the call of the government for the defense of their country.¹⁴⁸⁴

¹⁴⁸³ Hedin, *Sverige-Norge och Preussen: 1860 - 1863 ; projekt till Danmarks delning*, 151-205; Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 533-38.

¹⁴⁸⁴ Nicolay – Gorchakov, 19 / 31 January 1864. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, d. 34. l. 55; Reading these dispatches, it is hard to overlook a certain affection of diplomats for the place of their residence, a kind of diplomatic patriotism, especially bright in Nicolay's correspondence given his family's close ties with Denmark. Paul Nicolay, who resided in Copenhagen up until late 1840s, also attested his sympathies for Denmark in the ensuing conflict while living in his Monrepos estate in Finland: Paul Nicolay – Nicholas Nicolay, 29 December 1863. Kansalliskirjasto, Ms.Mf. 850, f.

Around the same day, Austrian and Prussian diplomats left Copenhagen, another sign of the inevitability of the conflict, while the State Council declared that the crossing of the Eider River would not be faced without resistance.¹⁴⁸⁵ The hostilities started on 1 February 1864, and the imperial concerns about their outcomes spiraled from there.

The plans of the dissection of Denmark and consequent establishment of the Scandinavian union in 1863-4 were secretly shared and negotiated by a broad group of politicians, from Napoleon III to Otto von Bismarck.¹⁴⁸⁶ Although they were largely negated, and the ascension of Christian IX put a stop to many ambitious projects, the unpopularity of the new king, and the lack of authority that he enjoyed might have opened premises for a *coup d'état* given the anxiety of the public and popularity of the democratic and nationalist rhetoric.¹⁴⁸⁷ Perhaps, it was not a coincidence that Christian IX on several occasions highlighted the absence of foreign assistance in the present conflict, alluding to the indecisiveness and unreliability of Sweden and those who earlier fervently backed up Scandinavianist visions.¹⁴⁸⁸

The longer the conflict struck Denmark, and the more Gorchakov and Alexander II came to realize that Prussia and Austria would not be satisfied with the return to the London protocols, the more eager they insisted on the establishment of armistice and negotiations, fearing the politico-geographical reshuffle that could result from the conflict and echo in Europe. Gorchakov sought to preserve good relations with Prussia and Austria and thus negated British requests for military demonstrations as 'extreme' action.¹⁴⁸⁹ Both English and Russian

¹⁴⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁸⁶ Hedin, *Sverige-Norge och Preussen*, 151-205; Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 533-37.

¹⁴⁸⁷ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 12 / 24 February 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1431., l. 10-15.

¹⁴⁸⁸ Nicolay – Gorchakov, 11 / 23 March 1864. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, d. 34. l. 187.

¹⁴⁸⁹ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 12/24 February 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1431, l. 10-15; Nicolay – Gorchakov. 10 / 22 March 1864. AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, d. 34. l. 183; Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 364–73.

cabinets pressed Copenhagen for agreement to negotiation from February to mid-March, but the Danish government remained firm in its desire for a military action.¹⁴⁹⁰ Ewers, who by that time left Copenhagen for Saint-Petersburg, wondered what the Danish government was relying on in their calculations aimed at the prolongation of the conflict. The longer the war continued, the more burdensome the demands of the German powers would become, so he saw the best outcome in the armistice and conference as opposed to battlefield.¹⁴⁹¹ Simultaneously, Gorchakov repeatedly requested the confirmation of the London protocols from Austria and Prussia, noting that their promises, especially those from Berlin, were becoming vaguer.¹⁴⁹²

Although the Danish ministry finally agreed on the establishment of the London conference mediated by the Great Powers, it could not approve the armistice that in their views would favor the attacking force and allow it to resupply: the warfare continued. Russian programme maximum for the conference – planned to open on April 12 – as Gorchakov informed Brunnow residing in London on March 16, was to preserve the integrity of Denmark, the order of succession, and reestablish peace in the North. Brunnow was supposed to take the position of a middleman between the polarities, since the Russian minister simultaneously wanted to preserve the moral bond that united the empire with the two Great German Courts.¹⁴⁹³ After the defeat of the Danish army in the Battle of Dybbøl on April 18, the Russian ministry hoped that German effervescence would cool down, but contrary to this, Bismarck began exploiting the victory as a precondition for the final breakup with earlier protocols.¹⁴⁹⁴ For Gorchakov he explained that external forces, be that the king's opinion or public pressure,

¹⁴⁹⁰ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 12/24 February 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1431., l. 10-15; Gorchakov – Knorring, 10 / 22 March 1864. Ibid, 128-133.

¹⁴⁹¹ Ewers – Nicolay, 7 / 19 March 1864. OR RNB. F. 519, op. 1, d. 83, l. 1-1ob.

¹⁴⁹² Gorchakov – Knorring, 10 / 22 March 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1431, 128-133.

¹⁴⁹³ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 16 / 28 March 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1431, l. 152-59.

¹⁴⁹⁴ Gorchakov – Grand Duchesse Olga Nikolaevna, 7 / 19 April 1864. Ibid, l. 278-80.

made Prussia leave the conflict with honor. This hinted to the possibility of making duchies independent, and Bismarck's allusions to Belgium and Greece left little room for doubt.¹⁴⁹⁵

Imperial newspapers attentively watched the pace of the affairs. *Moskovskie vedomosti*, echoing the critique that *Otechestvennie zapiski* levelled earlier against the German pretensions, also saw the similarities between Poland and Schleswig, although the Moscow newspaper found proximity between them in the perilous influence of the tractates and congresses that let other states intervene into the affairs of their peers.¹⁴⁹⁶ At the beginning of January, however, the issue was treated enthusiastically, and British preparation for the military assistance together with the Russian emperor's legal rights for Holstein would not have allowed the German states to deal alone with the duchies, according to the editor's opinion. With the passage of time the clouds gathered over the European peace, and Katkov stated that the intentions of Prussian and Austrian remained blurred. The text saw the role of the Russian empire in protecting, if necessary with force, the foundations of the European peace and the territorial status quo in the North.¹⁴⁹⁷

Scandinavian fears appeared there at the beginning of February, when French journals began tackling the problem of the future potential Scandinavian union that would be beneficial both for Danes and for larger Nordic Europe. *Moskovskie vedomosti* relentlessly disagreed and, dispersing any claims that approximated French and Russian non-interventionist line, argued that France sought to create new states while Russia protected peace and prevent collisions that might have stemmed from the disintegration of Denmark.¹⁴⁹⁸ Scandinavianism was persistently tied with the activities of the main foreign antagonist of the Russian empire, meaning Napoleon

¹⁴⁹⁵ Gorchakov – Oubril, 13 / 25 April 1864. Ibid, 1. 312-19; Gorchakov-Oubril, 18 / 30 April 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1432, l. 4-11. Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 362–64; Dudarev, *Bismarck i Rossija. 1851-1871 gg.*, 207–42.

¹⁴⁹⁶ Mikhail Katkov, *Sobranie peredovyh statej Moskovskih vedomostej za 1864 god* (Moscow: Tip. V.V. Chicherina, 1897), 50.

¹⁴⁹⁷ Katkov, *Sobranie peredovyh statej*, 75.

¹⁴⁹⁸ Ibid, 85.

III, and this imaginable bond had some grounds. Great Britain in these calculations, however, should have opposed the formation of the ‘Scandinavian empire’ given the latter’s potential powerful fleet and control over the Baltics.¹⁴⁹⁹

When Berlin and Vienna ambiguously reflected on the future destiny of the duchies, in February-March Katkov considered that Denmark would not survive without Schleswig and would be made to join Sweden. The excesses of democracy and extravagancies of the Scandinavian party in Denmark set the country in the perilous position of its potential future non-existence. The reflections that were characteristic for the diplomatic corps, meaning the inconvenience of the Scandinavian Baltic Sea control, surfaced in *Moskovskie vedomosti* as well, which stated that neither Russia nor England could tolerate such combination.¹⁵⁰⁰ Perhaps, this proximity of the argumentation revealed the degree of connection that was established between the press and the diplomatic workings by the means of telegraph, printed dispatches, diplomatic collections, and the personal – even if rather performative – orientation of Gorchakov on the public voice.

Otechestvennie Zapiski that covered first three months of political life in 1864 in March expectedly focused on Danish-German crisis as well, putting the blame on the shoulders of Germans and Holsteiners who capitalized on the national anxieties and abused principles of nationality. English participation in the crisis appeared highly ambiguous, and the protective tone of the prime-minister turned out to be unrealized, while Austrian and Prussian legalistic intervention was regarded as a disguise for expansive politics. France remained even more confusing, favoring both Danish nationalist visions and Augustenburg pretensions on the duchies’ throne. While Prussia capitalized on nationality principles in justifying expansions, Sweden, according to the text, also exhibited false understandings of the principle. While all

¹⁴⁹⁹ Ibid, 99.

¹⁵⁰⁰ Ibid, 113.

Europe expected it to assist Denmark, Sweden turned out to pursue vague politics and, potentially, waited for Denmark to be dismembered to annex its islands driven by the ‘Scandinavian idea’. The reification of the latter, however, faced unsurmountable challenges since the Baltic Sea would turn into – surprisingly – ‘Swedish-Russian lake’ contrary to Prussian and German interests.¹⁵⁰¹

The dangers of the Scandinavian union that drew on geopolitical alterations around the Baltic Sea were quite flexible and contradictory, regardless of the eminent solidness of the rhetoric that referred to the political geography. The sea was simultaneously seen as a future ‘Scandinavian’, ‘Prussian’, or ‘Swedish-Russian’ domain as a result of the proposed union and hence each time rhetorically touched the interests of different agents – be that England, Russia, or Prussia. In each of these scenarios the union, however, was universally seen as practically unrealizable or extremely burdensome for other powers concerned and thus, eventually, short-lived. Overall, however, the lack of clear vision of the geopolitical future around the Baltic Sea pointed to the novelty of the geopolitical discussion with regards to this usually calm and unproblematic area.

6.11. Between London conference and visit to Kissingen

The news of the convocation of the London conference in mid-April did not clear the horizon significantly. The question still stood about what future lied ahead for the duchies prepared by Prussia and Austria. By and large, Katkov saw Austrian position more pertinent to the principles of the Danish integrity, while cunning and energetic activities of Bismarck caused speculations about real goals of the joined occupation.¹⁵⁰² England, Austria, and Russia were seen as forming a conservative alliance – but not an outdated relic of the Holy Alliance

¹⁵⁰¹ “Political digest of Europe,” *Otechestvennie Zapiski* 153, (1864): 32-45, 69-71.

¹⁵⁰² Katkov, *Sobranie peredovyh statej Moskovskih vedomostej za 1864 god*, 198–201.

that the European press imagined – that would protect the integrity of the Danish state against any pretensions of Augustenburg line or territorial expansion of the German states, and this vision did not particularly diverge from what the empire was pursuing.¹⁵⁰³ It would be, as its editor explicated, a great mistake for Europe to let Prussia cut off pieces from Denmark either for its own extension or for creation of a puppet state.¹⁵⁰⁴ The tone of *Moskovskie vedomosti* as well as of several other issues again sounded like a demand in disguise since it prescribed certain actions best made by the Russian government, and the discrepancy between initial expectations and later reality must have been startling for many witnesses.¹⁵⁰⁵

Finland figured alongside the Schleswig crisis in these diverse publications, and other journals, including the official newspaper of the Ministry of War *Russkiy Invalid*, which also blamed the inclinations of a certain separatist party but criticized *Moskovskie vedomosti* for its aggressive rhetoric as well.¹⁵⁰⁶ Its separatist potential, however, was rarely bridged with the current Scandinavianist juncture in Denmark and Sweden. Nevertheless, in March 1864 first *Russkiy Invalid* and then *Moskovskie vedomosti* spotted the fervent agitation with which Finlanders collected money for the Danish soldiers.¹⁵⁰⁷ *Russkiy Invalid* considered it unfair that the subjects of the Russian emperor had not opened similar collections for Russian soldiers. Both newspapers ‘warned the youth’ against their Scandinavian sympathies. While *Invalid* hoped that the opening of the political life in Finland gifted by the emperor would milder the aspirations of the youth, *Vedomosti* characteristically signaled the opposite: political life nurtured opposite inclinations in their views.

It is at this moment when the authorities in the duchy started feeling threatened, for the first time, not by Scandinavian sympathies and separatist tendencies but by the nationalist and

¹⁵⁰³ Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 380–406; Dudarev, *Bismark i Rossija. 1851-1871 gg.*, 212–37.

¹⁵⁰⁴ Katkov, *Sobranie peredovyh statej Moskovskih vedomostej*, 221–31.

¹⁵⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 223.

¹⁵⁰⁶ *Russkiy Invalid*, 27.11 / 09.12.1864.

¹⁵⁰⁷ *Russkiy Invalid*, 14 / 26.03.1864; Katkov, *Sobranie peredovyh statej Moskovskih vedomostej*, 158.

conservative criticism of this sort coming from the capital. While Scandinavian party possessed negligible influence in the affairs of the duchy, according to Rokassovsky, by late May 1864, ‘the Russian party’, consisting of young officers and medics became his main problem, as he himself confessed to Armfelt. The tensions between the locals and deployed troops produced conflicts and given the scope of political attention, these conflicts were perceived by conservatives as signs of separatism, conspiracy, and anti-Russianness. This party, as presented by Rokassovsky, saw revolutionary conspiracy behind every Finlandish political manifestation, demanding the homogenization of the political landscape of the empire by tying Finland closer to the Russian core. This group, he noted, followed closely the doctrines professed by Katkov.¹⁵⁰⁸

In the diplomatic correspondence Finland, however, enjoyed much less attention. Only once during the Danish-German crisis its name surfaced, and the problem concerned the army that, according to some information that the English diplomatic corps possessed, was being enlarged there ostensibly threatening Sweden.¹⁵⁰⁹ Gorchakov hastened to shatter this suspicion, and ensured British colleagues that, on the contrary, the troops were being redeployed into the central Russia. To dispel the foundations behind this suspicion, that must have been related to the expectations of Swedish or Scandinavian aggression, the minister stated that Swedish sympathies to adventurous politics towards Finland considerably dwindled, while under conservative guidance of minister Manderström, Gorchakov could not expect the neighboring kingdom to pursue any whimsical objectives.¹⁵¹⁰ Sweden, in the eyes of the emperor and

¹⁵⁰⁸ Rokassovsky – Armfelt, 14 / 26 May 1864. KA. Alexander Armfelin arkisto IIa 23b (6), l. 131-133; Moreover, Russian journalists were aware of Rokassovsky’s sympathies, and one contributor to liberal *Golos* wrote to governor-general about his texts on Finland, blaming the rhetoric of *Moskovskie Vedomosti* and seemingly expecting governor-general to share this perception: Lavrentjev – Rokassovsky, 11 / 23 October 1863, KA. KKK, Fa: 1088, N. 100.

¹⁵⁰⁹ Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 376–79.

¹⁵¹⁰ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 30 March / 11 April 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1431, l. 222ob-225.

Gorchakov, was pacified while Finland, despite the lamenting criticism of conservative newspapers, remained loyal and satisfied with its new institutions in their eyes.

Another front of the Scandinavian visions, however, was not that predictable. The proceedings of the London conference made it clear both for Brunnow and the emperor that it would be extremely hard to preserve the Danish Kingdom with the duchies intact. The vagueness of the Prussian position, a sort of strategic ambiguity Bismarck pursued to widen the demands, made it hard to achieve any agreement. Moreover, the minister wanted to preserve the established relations between Russia, Prussia, and Austria ‘for the sake of European great interest’.¹⁵¹¹ England was ready to protect Copenhagen with its fleet at the beginning of May, but Gorchakov considered these preparations potentially provocative.¹⁵¹² Desperate to find any compromise between those who partook in the conference and acknowledging the inability to preserve the agreements of 1851-2, the Russian side was ready to accept the division of Schleswig, although Brunnow was instructed not to take initiative in these regard: the measure obviously contradicted the imperial contempt for the principle of nationality and previous insistence on the letter of the London protocol.¹⁵¹³

Since the duchies were by many supposed to become a quasi-separate polity and politicians together with the public press in Holstein and Germany pushed forwards the candidature of Prince Friedrich VIII Augustenburg, the Russian Emperor, following the cancellation of previous treaties of Warsaw and London, claimed his rights to the throne of Holstein-Gottorp and presented the candidature of Prince Peter II of Oldenburg as a legal pretender for the throne there, transferring his rights to the candidate.¹⁵¹⁴ Gorchakov justified this measure by alluding to the perfect moral qualities of Oldenburg that would make the duchies’ relations with neighboring kingdoms easier, but, perhaps, the calculations of influence

¹⁵¹¹ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 26 April / 8 May 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1432, l. 49-51.

¹⁵¹² Gorchakov – Brunnow, 24 April / 6 May 1864. Ibid, 40-43.

¹⁵¹³ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 2 / 14 May 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1432, l. 71-83ob.

¹⁵¹⁴ Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 390–424.

that Russian could potentially exhibit in this case also played their role, although Alexander II gave a vast freedom of action to Oldenburg himself.

The diplomats must have overlooked a huge part of the zealous activity of pan-Scandinavian advocates that proceeded through channels, inaccessible for them in 1864 but they were right in noticing ruptures and tensions withing the groups loyal to the project.¹⁵¹⁵ Some activities under Scandinavianist banner still, however, came on their radar, and after several days since Gorchakov addressed Brunnow, Nicolay reported to the minister on von Qvanten's arrival and negotiations he had with Danish politicians. Qvanten, according to him, elaborated a project of the constitution and even presented it confidentially with Charles XV's letter attached. Since the affair became known for the broader public, both Danish and Swedish governments dismissed the issue, given that the matters pertaining to foreign affairs should have been first discussed through respective ministries.¹⁵¹⁶

This news of the persistency of Scandinavian idea, each year pronounced dead, scared the Russian government, especially towards the summer, when the principles of the previous treaties appeared threatened both in the assemblies of the London conference and in the diplomatic correspondence. On May 12 / 24, Gorchakov again addressed Brunnow with his instructions for potential pessimistic outcomes. Since the integrity of the Danish monarchy, as it became obvious even for the Danish diplomats, could not be preserved, the minister requested Brunnow to do his best to prevent two potential lines of development:

1. The Scandinavian combination, which moreover seems to us devoid of vitality 2.

The handing over of the Holstein with appendix into the hands of P[rince of] Augustenburg¹⁵¹⁷

¹⁵¹⁵ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 635–73.

¹⁵¹⁶ Nicolay – Gorchakov. 7 / 19 May 1864. AVPRI. F. 133, g. 1864, op. 469, d. 34. l. 257.

¹⁵¹⁷ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 12 / 24 May 1864. Ibid, 136, 135-137.

Even though the minister considered the second problem the most pending, and thus devoted to it a great deal of the instruction, it was clear that the fears of the Scandinavian unification manifested themselves on the horizon. The dispatches from the Nordic capitals, however, mildened these suspicions, and ‘the lack of vitality’ as a trope often was ascribed to the project during the 1860s, only partially, however, pertaining to the true nature of things.

As scholars have correctly pointed out, Russian press mostly focused on the inconsistency of the European powers’ positions with regards to the issue.¹⁵¹⁸ This criticism, however, also turned inwards. The fact that the Russian position of non-intervention opened ways for adventurous combinations of Prussian foreign policy and even for potential Scandinavian aggrandizements, surprised many conservative intellectuals. On May 19 / 31, Katkov argued that the weakness exhibited by the Russian foreign policy since the Polish Uprising made its neighbors push forwards their projects forcefully. Under these circumstances, he lamented, ‘we had to allow many things that could not happen in different circumstances’:

Germany has crossed Eider, Scandinavian union has become a possibility, our position in the North is threatened with considerable damage, our naval position, purchased so expensively, is under a new hazard.¹⁵¹⁹

Apart from dramatically losing its stance in the North, the empire was also overweighted by Great Britain in the East. To prevent the empire from falling even deeper, Katkov insisted that Russia had to at least argue for the establishment of an independent state consisting of Holstein and Southern Schleswig. The logic of the European balance demanded that neither German

¹⁵¹⁸ Baryshnikov, Smolin and Kozlov, “The Russian Newspapers and the Struggle for Independence of the German Population of Schleswig-Holstein 1863-1864.”

¹⁵¹⁹ Katkov, *Sobranie peredovykh statej Moskovskih vedomostej za 1864 god*, 300.

Confederation nor Prussia had any pretensions on these territories and especially its port cities.¹⁵²⁰

In the middle of June, *Moskovskie vedomosti* stated that Schleswig issue was pivotal for the European politics at the moment, and all other questions depended on it. The text criticized European states for their indecisiveness that let German states push their agendas too far. The editor again reiterated his views that the independent state in place of the duchies should be established, while Oldenburg's claims on its throne were legal and favorable for Russia.¹⁵²¹ Scandinavianism again appeared on the radar, and Qvanten's affair was extensively covered, though with a considerable time lag. In opposition to that, Katkov also discussed an article from the Swedish *Nya Dagligt Allehanda* that argued against any provocations or tensions with the Russian empire, acclaiming its conciliatory tone.¹⁵²²

Gorchakov proceeded to hope that Danish government finally recognized that no European state was ready to 'take out a sword' for its protection and thus would yield to more peaceful actions. Contrasting Augustenburg and Oldenburg in a letter to the plenipotentiary in Berlin Pavel Oubril, he highlighted that the former had certain revolutionary and democratic allure, while the latter represented conservative and historical principles. He thus was sure that no government in Europe would doubt a choice in favor of Oldenburg.¹⁵²³ These negotiations, apart from demonstrating understandable conservative stance of the empire, also shed light on the seriousness of the affair and on the weight of the expectations of the new state – or potentially two of them if Scandinavian visions reified – that might have appeared on the map of Europe.

To negotiate matters personally, Alexander II and Gorchakov embarked on a European voyage at the beginning of June, and the minister's first conversation happened to be with

¹⁵²⁰ Ibid, 301, 305, 311-313.

¹⁵²¹ Ibid, 338-41.

¹⁵²² Ibid, 375.

¹⁵²³ Gorchakov – Oubril, 18 / 30 May 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1432, l. 165-67.

Wilhelm I and Bismarck in Berlin. He was surprised to see the anxiety that both shared with regards to Great Britain, and the perspectives of a war were pronounced.¹⁵²⁴ Gorchakov thought to persuade his interlocutors not to take any adventurous measures that might have brought European war closer. While Bismarck envisioned that France might take the side of Prussia in the ensuing tensions – playing on Russian anxieties – Gorchakov argued that this calculation might have appeared wrong, especially given the vague position of Austria in case of a possible conflict. Seeking to preserve established relations with Prussia, the minister, however, made it clear that in case of Prussian-English clash, German power could not count on the empire as its ally in battle. In his turn, he proposed a kind of quadruple conservative alliance consisting of Russian, Prussia, Austrian, and Great Britain that would oppose revolutionary prospects.¹⁵²⁵

Even more pending this issue became towards the end of June, when England was one step from sending its squadron to the Baltic Sea, aggravated by the debates in the Parliament and requesting similar measures taken by Alexander II, and Gorchakov now sought to calm down the spirits in London as well.¹⁵²⁶ As he confessed to one representative of the court environment, his presence in Germany aimed to divert the powers from escalating into the European war,¹⁵²⁷ and English request was denied with a remark that Russian intervention could provoke a land war, unlike the favorable English insular position.¹⁵²⁸ Simultaneously, he lost all hope in the Danish government, acknowledging the domination of the democratic party there, and thus the inability to reconcile with its enemies. He thus envisioned that the duchies in their entirety would be established as an independent state, hoping that Oldenburg would be able to ensure the throne for the sake of the peace in the North. He added that the candidature of Augustenburg did not promise any guarantees for this, while the resurrection of the Scandinavian idea ‘can prompt us to take different duties and a different attitude’.¹⁵²⁹

¹⁵²⁴ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 1 / 13 June 1864. Ibid, 233-45.

¹⁵²⁵ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 1 / 13 June 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1432, l. 247.

¹⁵²⁶ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 18 / 30 May 1864. Ibid, l. 269-75.

¹⁵²⁷ Boris Chicherin, *Vospominanija. Tom 2. Moskovskij universitet. Zemstvo i Moskovskaja дума*, vol. 2 (Moskva: Izdanie Sabashnikovyh, 2010), 98–99.

¹⁵²⁸ Report of the Ministry for the year 1864. AVPRI. F. 137, op. 475, g. 1864, d. 53, l. 62-3.

¹⁵²⁹ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 15 / 27 June 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1432, l. 261-62.

As the London conference ended without reaching any practical solution, and the hostilities continued, the dangers of the Danish monarchy losing its sovereignty and its consequences again loomed large, especially given the ‘blindness’ that the Copenhagen cabinet exhibited in this regard. Gorchakov, unable to prejudge the political consequences of the revival of the warfare, reiterated two main points ‘to which we attach greater importance’, one of them being:

- 1) Prevent the upsurge of the Scandinavian idea which, moreover, does not seem to be either in the views of the Great Britain and the two Great German Courts, nor as well in the intentions of the present ministry of Sweden.¹⁵³⁰

Another point concerned the rapprochement between France and England that could lead to the establishment of a hostile alliance.

It is, however, clear that the revived visions of Scandinavianism, that as usual surfaced at the moment of crisis, highly concerned the ministry.¹⁵³¹ Given the deterritorialization of Scandinavianism, it was crucial that these concerns usually surfaced not in Saint-Petersburg – Copenhagen/Stockholm line of communication but through Gorchakov’s correspondence with the representative in London, Brunnow, since the precedent of other government sharing these ideas would be crucial for its potential reification. Although the minister considered that the Danish question ‘more or less abandoned the chances of war’, the threatening rhetoric of changing attitudes that implied ‘the material intervention’ in case ‘Russia’s direct interests’ would have been concerned hinted to the prospects of the military intervention under the threat of the Scandinavian consolidation, especially, as some influential commentators wrote, when Russia was busy with consolidating its position in the Caucasus.¹⁵³² This attitude, however, mildened in the middle of summer or, perhaps, has never even been considered.

¹⁵³⁰ Gorchakov – Brunnow, 18 / 30 June 1864. Ibid, l. 272, 269-276.

¹⁵³¹ Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 84–143.

¹⁵³² Leontiy Nicolay – Nicholas Nicolay, 25 July / 6 August 1864. OR RNB. F. 519, op. 1, d. 59, l. 97-98. Nicholas Nicolay’s brother Ludwig Ernst (Leontiy) served as a Russian general in the Caucasus: Kinjapina and Ignat’ev, eds., *Istorija Vneshnej Politiki Rossii. Vtoraja Polovina XIX Veka*, 67.

6.12. Scandinavian union as a future neighbor

At the beginning of July, the fall of the D.G. Monrad's government in Denmark brought, according to Gorchakov, by the denial of the material support requested by Copenhagen from neutral states, significantly relaxed the tensions that were about to blow. Some scholars even argue that Gorchakov participated in the line of crisis that led to Monrad's leave.¹⁵³³ In the outline of politics that Gorchakov provided to the emperor on July 1 / 13, he succinctly put what the ministry was trying to achieve this whole time. While the London conference failed due to Copenhagen's blindness, the larger conflict was averted by negating English proposal for a joint naval demonstration. The destiny of the duchies was vague, but with some certainty the minister concluded that they would not be a part of the Danish monarchy anymore. This fact together with possible consolidation of monarchical and conservative principles after the war might have provided even stronger base for the independence of Denmark – surprisingly for the minister's usual rhetoric – when compared to the previously guarded principles of integrity that, the minister argued, constantly provoked the German states and the different of interests of the groups that it contained.¹⁵³⁴

Another trajectory, however, still might have been realized. Even if, Gorchakov proceeded, Scandinavianist or republican ideas prevailed, he believed neither in their solidity nor in their durability, implying that in both cases the political project would not be powerful enough to threaten the imperial interests in the Baltics.¹⁵³⁵ Thus, distancing his visions from any potential intervention, the minister concluded that these projects could not directly and seriously affect the interests of the Russian empire, and the coexistence of a potential Scandinavian polity on the same map with the Russian empire was reluctantly envisioned. Quite contrary to previous explications, here the ministry not only envisioned the reification of

¹⁵³³ Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 444-50.

¹⁵³⁴ Gorchakov – Alexander II. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1432, l. 297-298, 296-310.

¹⁵³⁵ Gorchakov – Alexander II. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1432, l. 298-299.

the project but also its relative unimportance for the Russian empire, which, according to many minister's dispatches had to concentrate its resources for internal reforms and the enhancement of progress.

Both conservative Russian newspapers and even the ministry was thus ready to reconcile their visions with expected geopolitical changes. The newspapers were, perhaps, more anxious about the future of Finland in case of the reification of the union, while the government seemed to retain expectations about the loyalty of the borderland, fostered by new political institutions and social reforms. The readiness to expect and to accept such a radical change in the North is startling for the usually conservative polity which previously hinted to the dangers of military intervention. The official mind of the empire must have been prepared for it by various circumstances of both internal and external nature. The financial crisis, and necessity to foster the series of profound reforms expectedly required the pulling of governmental resources.¹⁵³⁶ Externally, the new guiding principles of rapprochement with Prussia and Austria together with the need to divert European government from larger conflicts, in which the empire expectedly could not stand aside, prescribed the flexibility of its demands.

The bond between nationality and politics became more pronounced, and the imperial authorities admitted 'the proximity of races' in the North on several occasions that did not, however, concern their future consolidation, but even the acknowledgement of this fact meant a lot.¹⁵³⁷ Besides, even though Gorchakov fostered a rapprochement with Prussia, Austria, and Britain as explicitly conservative, the foreign ministry was able to navigate and negotiate with those governments who build their guiding principles on different foundations, the US being, perhaps, the most emblematic example, as well as the continuous affair with France after the

¹⁵³⁶ Rieber, *The Imperial Russian Project*, 165-98; Geyer, *Der russische Imperialismus*, 20-70.

¹⁵³⁷ See, for example: Dashkov – Gorchakov, 21 March / 2 April AVPRI. F. 133, op. 469, g. 1861, d. 143, l. 60-1.

Crimean War. Finally, Gorchakov's judgement about the credibility and durability of 'Scandinavianist or republican' project demands broader reflections.

Since there was a tension between eventual intervention – repeatedly surfacing in the instructions – and recognition or, at least, acknowledgement of potential Scandinavian polity, the latter strategy seem to have won out the contest by mid-July. However, given the patterns of the distribution of these messages and the chronology of events, I would argue that there have hardly been real belligerent intentions behind the rhetoric: it must have served as a precaution for foreign decision-makers, but I have doubts that it was going to be realized in practice. Since the threats of intervention surfaced predominantly in the instructions for the diplomats, and reluctant reconciliation appeared in the internal documentation, I assume that the latter was a genuine line of action. Another document, compiled on June 6 / May 25 for the Grand Duke Heir Nicholas Alexandrovich, reinforces my assumptions.

21-years old Nicholas Alexandrovich joined his father and Gorchakov during their European journey in June 1864. He would later visit Copenhagen twice during the summer to propose to the Danish princess Dagmar and he would receive her and her family's acceptance in September.¹⁵³⁸ While some researchers argue that this marriage served exclusively political goals of securing the Danish monarchy and diverting political circles there from eventual downfall to Scandinavianism,¹⁵³⁹ I remain more reserved in this case. Indeed, the timing seemed perfect for such political measures, but first, as those who followed the Grand Duke on the journey attest, his visit to Copenhagen happened to be a coincidence, allowed only by the armistice established between Denmark and Prussia-Austria.¹⁵⁴⁰ Second, nowhere in the diplomatic correspondence that I looked through his potential alliance with Dagmar surfaced,

¹⁵³⁸ Chicherin, *Vospominanija. Moskovskij universitet. Zemstvo i Moskovskaja дума*, 2: 98–120.

¹⁵³⁹ See, for example: Julija Kudrina, *Imperatrica Marija Fedorovna* (Moscow: Prometej, 2022).

¹⁵⁴⁰ Fedor Oom, *Vospominanija Fedora Adol'fovicha Ooma 1825-1865* (Saint-Petersburg: Universitetskaja tipografija, 1896); Although it was obvious that the Grand Duke desired to visit Copenhagen to see Dagmar: Ewers – Nicolay, 29 April / 11 May 1864. OR RNB. F. 519, op. 1, d. 83, l. 3-4ob.

to say nothing about its political consequences.¹⁵⁴¹ Third, while one should be critical about romantic rhetoric of affection between the royal figures in the 19th century, it is hard to deny the emotional aspect of their alliance, especially since Nicholas expressed his desire to see Dagmar based on the portrait he had ever earlier.

Even if I am not convinced in purely political calculations tied to Scandinavian fears in this regard, there was indeed a political aspect to it. The fact that Nicholas Alexandrovich was informed about the primacy of the Scandinavian problem for the Russian empire upon his voyage made him an agent who was aware of potential political repercussions of his choice. I would argue that his agency and subjecthood rather pertained to awareness of these consequences than to cold blood matrimonial politics that predestined him to this marriage. As an heir to the Russian throne, Nicholas was well-educated and deeply involved into internal and external processes related to the imperial affairs.¹⁵⁴²

A broad overview of the Russian foreign policy for the heir was prepared by Gorchakov's right hand, who also joined the minister on the journey, Alexander Jomini. One of the most important persons in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jomini was often responsible for the authorship of conceptual texts that reflected general outlines of the imperial policy.¹⁵⁴³ Judging by other texts that he prepared for internal use, the note for the Grand Duke must have been preemptively reviewed and edited by Alexander II and Gorchakov: there is no doubt that it reflected their way of seeing present European complications.¹⁵⁴⁴ The note 'Present politics' was dated May 25, two and a half weeks prior to the start of the Grand Duke's voyage.¹⁵⁴⁵

¹⁵⁴¹ It went through private correspondence, see: Ewers – Nicolay in OR RNB. F. 519, op. 1, d. 83; Kansalliskirjasto. Ms. Mf. 839. D. d.

¹⁵⁴² Nicholas Nicolay provided a report on Danish-German crisis specifically for Cesarevich: Nicolay – Gorchakov, 26 April / 8 May 1864. AVPRI. F. 133, g. 1864, op. 469, d. 34. l. 245; Valentina Chernuha, "Utrachennaja al'ternativa: Naslednik prestola velikij knjaz' Nikolaj Aleksandrovich (1843-1865)," in *Problemy social'no-jekonomicheskoi i politicheskoi istorii Rossii XIX-XX vekov* (Moscow: Aleteja, 1999), 236–46; Tat'jana Verbickaja, *Nesostojavshijsja imperator: velikij knjaz' Nikolaj Aleksandrovich, 1843-1865* (Moscow: Izd-vo "Centropoligraf," 2010).

¹⁵⁴³ Aleksandr Rjabov, *Dinastija Zhomini na sluzhbe Rossii* (Saransk: Tipografija "Krasnyj Oktjabr'," 2015).

¹⁵⁴⁴ See his correspondence with Gorchakov in: GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 480.

¹⁵⁴⁵ Oom, *Vospominanija Fedora Adol'fovicha Ooma 1825-1865*, 82–83.

The mobility of imperial foreign policy, seconding Gorchakov's thought, was regarded there as one of the main conditions of its success. Its main goal was a rest from enmeshing into European tensions, that would allow for the implementation of internal reforms. Its foreign policy thus had to be conservative in its principles, and defensive in its goals. The section on the immediate interests opened with the Northern vector: 'In the North [we are concerned with] the Scandinavian group':

Danish-German crisis has revived the ideas of Scandinavianism, hatched in 1848. To the traditional solicitude that the integrity of Denmark inspired to us joined the fear of seeing Denmark merging into the Scandinavian union, if it is going to be reduced to Jutland and the islands. This combination which places the market of the Baltics in the hands of a considerable power is contrary to our interests.¹⁵⁴⁶

Jomini continued that the empire had to take care of it without, however, exaggerating its practical changes and eventual dangers. The idea of the union was, according to him, coldly perceived in Denmark and seemed to enjoy little sympathies in Sweden. Its lack of success was reinforced by the opposition of the Great Britain.¹⁵⁴⁷

Although Jomini mentioned that the diplomats in Copenhagen and Stockholm were instructed to combat the spread and realization of these plans without, however, specifying particular tactics, he still could envision the reification of the Scandinavian union against all odds. If reified, Jomini suggested that the Scandinavian union would be established under federative form that alleviated its hazardous importance for the interests of the Russian empire. In this case, it would not present much of a danger for the Russian interests in the Baltics: the trade would proceed unabated through Sound and the Belts in peacetime, since too much

¹⁵⁴⁶ Alexander Jomini, "Present politics", 25 May (6 June) 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1360. l. 1-3.

¹⁵⁴⁷ Ibid, 3.

general interest was invested in it. In the times of war, however, England controlled the access to these channels, and thus the Scandinavian union did not really change the nature of this equation.¹⁵⁴⁸

While the interests of the Danish integrity prevailed, the eventual establishment of the Scandinavian union did not necessarily result in the intervention of the Russian forces, as Jomini concluded in this section. With regards to Prussian interests, Jomini pointed out that until its aggrandizement did not pose any threat to the Russian interest, Russian had no need to oppose its expansionist tendencies. On the contrary, the empire found its closest ally in Prussia. These deliberation during the German-Danish crisis certainly meant that regardless of the outcomes of the war, the Russian empire would not intervene to prevent even most dramatic of them, being prepared to deal both with enlarged Prussia and with federative Scandinavian state. Another powerful neighbor, the Austrian empire – while it existed in a certain antagonism with the Russian empire – had to be placated for the time being. Its future, however, was painted black, since the tensions of nationalities within the empire would eventually erupt, but Jomini warned that it should better happen later when these diverse races would be ready to partake properly in the European affairs. At this moment, the existence and solidness of the Habsburg Empire, however, was an essential prerequisite for the Russian prosperity.¹⁵⁴⁹

Jomini's outline of politics, unusually bold for the diplomatic papers, sheds light on many aspects of official documentation and decision-making in the times of this European crisis. Scandinavian union in the eyes of the imperial diplomacy had a slight potential of reification, but, unlike in later critical and historiographical reflections, the Russian authorities were far from mocking the project or considering it fanciful dreams of the youngsters. On the contrary, its calculations point to their relative preparedness to such changes on the map of

¹⁵⁴⁸ Alexander Jomini, "Present politics", 25 May (6 June) 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1360. l. 3-4.

¹⁵⁴⁹ Ibid, 4-9.

Europe. One thing that Gorchakov and his advisors clearly understood was that the stability of status quo guarded by Nicholas I in ‘chivalrous’ fashion resulted in the Russian defeat in the Crimean War.¹⁵⁵⁰ The new strategy was to recognize the dynamism of the international relations and to navigate these unpredictable seas. This outline must have been prepared even earlier. The incoming correspondence article published on March 20 in Paris-based Russian-backed *le Nord* – an unofficial mouthpiece of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – exhibits strikingly close wording and logic behind the text¹⁵⁵¹ I have little doubts that it was prepared by Jomini, who repeatedly published his texts in the journal.

Preparing itself for the eventual reshuffle, the imperial authorities justified their inaction by pointing to relative weakness of the future Scandinavia. The lack of durability and solidness was associated with its potential federative form. In insisting that the Scandinavian union would become a federation, Jomini demonstrated his recognition of contemporary debates in Europe and in the Northern kingdoms, where federation was seen as one of the most popular forms of its realization.¹⁵⁵² The vision of weakness of federations might have stemmed from many sources, and earlier Gorchakov’s proposals about federative form of polity in Italy must have resonated with this aspect of political imagination. Perhaps, the Civil War in the US and the relative weakness of German Confederation, coupled with conservative criticism of any proposals that underpinned federative beginnings for Russia, made the government perceive federation as lacking centralizing potential, firmness of decision, and forceful imposition of sovereignty: federations were lacking that integrity characteristic for unitary states.

The pattern of political consolidation of the nationalities that were considered proximate to each other also conformed to imperial expectations. Besides, when dealing with

¹⁵⁵⁰ Jomini on ‘chivalrous politics’ of Nicholas: Alexander Jomini, “Present politics”, 25 May (6 June) 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1360. l. 3-4.

¹⁵⁵¹ *Le Nord*, 20.04.1864; Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 473–501.

¹⁵⁵² John Danstrup, “Den politiske Skandinavisme i Perioden 1830-1850,” *Scandia: Tidskrift för historisk forskning* 16, no. 2 (1944), 207-286, <https://journals.lub.lu.se/scandia/article/view/1547>; Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 192.

Austrian far-flung but eventual break-up, Jomini argued that during this period the empire had to develop moral elements that would fortify the relations with ‘our brothers of race and religion’. While he did not elaborate on the consequences of this fortification, one might suppose that a certain political combination was on his and others’ minds.¹⁵⁵³ In this sense, the rapprochement of the Scandinavian nations was not regarded as a perilous thing as such, but its geographical position, democratic tendencies that underpinned it as well as usual hostility of the rhetoric towards Russia made the imperial government calculate the balance of profits and threats.

Finally, the situation with the blockade of the straits that Russia might have found itself in the Baltics, no doubt, had allusions with its defeated position in the Black Sea. The dangers, however, were presented from two angles, military and market-related. Military bottleneck in which the Russian Baltic fleet might appear was considered by many as one of the primary dangers of the Scandinavian union, but Jomini dismissed this line of thought.¹⁵⁵⁴ The market-related argument, dominating in the Jomini’s presentation, however, might have pointed to new role of the state in the securitization of the supply of raw resources and goods that sounded as an echo of the cotton crisis that loomed large during the years of the Civil War in America, when the trade of the South was blockaded by the Northern naval forces. The empire found itself in the modernizing and globalizing world, where it was increasingly becoming a dependent knot in the larger grid of the global markets and circulations of products.¹⁵⁵⁵

The intervention of administrative and bureaucratic apparatus into the shaping of industrial and economic development was, perhaps, more pronounced in the Russian empire than in other contemporary European states, especially during the looming financial crisis of

¹⁵⁵³ Alexander Jomini, “Present politics”, 25 May (6 June) 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 1360, l. 6-9.

¹⁵⁵⁴ Quite contrary to what Halicz was arguing: Halicz, *Russia and Denmark 1856-1864*, 546–54.

¹⁵⁵⁵ Marija Rozhkova, *Jekonomicheskie svjazi Rossii so Srednej Aziej, 40-60-e gody XIX veka* (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1963); Sven Beckert, “Emancipation and Empire: Reconstructing the Worldwide Web of Cotton Production in the Age of the American Civil War,” *American Historical Review* 109, no. December (2004): 1405–38.

the 1860s.¹⁵⁵⁶ And taking the role of an ice-breaker on the hard road to progress as well as the guardian of the well-being of its subjects, the empire could agree or rather justify to itself its neighboring position with the Scandinavian union only on particular terms that would have allowed for regular passing of ships with raw materials, colonial goods, industrial machineries, and fine arts.

The Russian empire was thus quite adaptable – at least in its expectations of itself and the world – to the shifting dynamics of power in the North. Its non-intervention was dictated both by its internal situation with deploying reforms and spoiled finances and by the government's modernizing vision of its role in the international relations and principles that they were built upon, apart from obviously recognizing the limitations of its own position after the Crimean crisis and Polish Uprising. It was with this luggage of reflections, expectations, and visions that Alexander II came to negotiate with Prussia and Austria, while Gorchakov set up his diplomatic workings across Europe. The same background pertained to well-informed Nicholas Alexandrovich who came to Copenhagen to propose to Dagmar. Updated on the trajectories of the imperial politics but not manipulated into the affair, he, perhaps, understood that his marriage with Princess Dagmar might have alleviated the dangers of the Scandinavian dynastic union and preserve if not the integrity than at least the sheer existence of the Danish monarchy.

The expectations of both sides, however, were not realized in full. Grand Duke Nicholas suddenly died during his voyage later in 1865 in Italy. A year later, Dagmar, however, would become a wife to his brother Alexander Alexandrovich, future Emperor Alexander III. While the dangers of the Danish state non-existence had already disappeared by that time, this marriage tied the two monarchies closer together, perhaps, to a degree affecting the trajectories of their internal and external policies that towards the end of the century became significantly

¹⁵⁵⁶ Rieber, *The Imperial Russian Project*, 199–235.

more conservative.¹⁵⁵⁷ Scandinavianism, although it stayed on the table even after the signing of the Vienna Treaty on October 30, also was never realized in practice, despite the bold planning and readiness for action expressed by some members of the political establishment in Copenhagen and Stockholm.¹⁵⁵⁸

Russian newspapers, interested in the outcome of the Danish-German controversy, were able to capitalize both on new technologies of information-distribution, telegraph being the most essential, and on the relative relaxation of the censorship that allowed them to voice their requests and concerns forcefully. Obtaining the information almost on the same pace as diplomatic offices, ministerial and private imperial newspapers could formulate their own visions of the measures Russian foreign policy had to implement before consistent programmes were elaborated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this case, guessing and predicting in the newspapers could also be read as requests in disguise.

Either putting blame on the excesses of the Danish democracy or repudiating Prussian drive towards expansion, virtually all imperial newspapers considered Scandinavian union as a threat, incompatible with the Russian interests or at least producing nuisances for the empire. Many, however, saw the establishment of the union as an extremely complex endeavor that could hardly be implemented.¹⁵⁵⁹ Towards the summer, however, the risks of Scandinavian combinations manifested themselves on the horizon. In envisioning the Russian intervention into the affair in case the reification of the union would become probable, some Russian newspapers voiced their criticism, perhaps not directly posed, against the inaction of the imperial foreign ministry. The criticism was rather inexplicit, as it focused on general qualities of the empire, its weakness and relative poverty, while rarely pertaining to persons and

¹⁵⁵⁷ Ditlev Tamm, *Konseilspræsidenten: Jacob Brønnum Scavenius Estrup, 1825-1913* (København: Gyldendal, 1996); Henning Nielsen, *Dansk udenrigspolitik 1875-1894. med særligt henblik på beslutningsprocessen*, (Odense: University of Odense, 1975).

¹⁵⁵⁸ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 673-798.

¹⁵⁵⁹ *Russkiy Invalid* in particular.

decision-makers in the ministry, but diplomatic officials clearly recognized that their affairs came under the spotlight.

After the visit to Kissingen, Jomini compiled a report on 6 / 18 July with the examples of criticism levelled against the imperial foreign ministry. Although it primarily concerned the criticism formulated by European public and foreign representatives, arguably also referencing internal administrative criticism levelled by Budberg among other diplomats,¹⁵⁶⁰ some lines clearly pertained to the domestic public debates about imperial trajectories of its European policy. The points of criticism ranged from the recognition of Italy to partaking in unpromising conservative alliances. Apart from that, Russian performance in the Danish question also fell under attack. The initial negligence to the question and the indecisiveness about firm British-Russian programme of action allowed this question to exacerbate. Apart from endangering Denmark, loosening the alliance with Britain and aggravating Germany, this indecisiveness allowed the planting of two potential revolutions: one in the duchies, and another – in the Baltics that might went in the hands of Scandinavianism.¹⁵⁶¹

These accusations echoed the anxieties of the imperial newspapers about the discrepancy of Russian manifestations as guardians of the Danish integrity on the one hand and the ministry's hesitations about the necessity of military involvement when the integrity was challenged. Capitalizing on diverse examples of this criticism, Jomini called upon the calmness of the imperial foreign policy, modernization of the diplomatic corps, and professionalization of its diplomatic agents: the main goal was to adapt to the changing patterns of the world and leave the 'old ruts' that still plagued the way the ministry pursued its affairs.¹⁵⁶² The rising threats of Scandinavianism could only be avoided or alleviated by the modern empire and

¹⁵⁶⁰ Chicherin writes about it: Chicherin, *Vospominanija. Tom 2. Moskovskij universitet. Zemstvo i Moskovskaja дума*, 2: 99-100.

¹⁵⁶¹ Jomini – Gorchakov, 6 / 18 July 1864. GARF. F. 828, op. 1, d. 480, l. 28, 27-31.

¹⁵⁶² *Ibid*, 30-31.

corresponding diplomatic corps that needed to leave the idle outlooks of aristocratic world and become professionals fulfilling their duties for the state.

Katkov ventilated other but related concerns towards the end of the year in his articles devoted to the integrity of the empire. While he argued that wars and revolutions could hardly result in the disintegration of the Russian empire, the internal separatism and proliferation of ‘states within the state’ concerned him much more. Autonomies and privileges that were granted to some territories and populations eventually might have resulted in the disintegration of the empire, while plans of federative redistribution of power applied to Russia frightened Katkov even more. The editor of *Moskovskie vedomosti* argued that the silent distancing of these territories from the imperial core under blurred hierarchies of power and authority presented primary hazard for the state. The example of Schleswig and Holsteins that were by several neutral states proposed to be united with Denmark by the means of a personal union revealed much of the national treatment of such visions: the ‘civic feeling of the small monarchy would have been more harmed by this proposals’ than by the outcomes of the warfare. Katkov argued that the Russian nation, the only true and powerful nation within the empire, should have united all other tribes under its wings, especially those who demonstrated most outrageous examples of separatism, Finland among others.¹⁵⁶³

6.13. Schleswig in Finland, Finland after Schleswig

At the beginning of September 1863, when the tensions around Poland began to calm down, while Danish-German and Scandinavian issues surfaced with unprecedented intensity, the rector of the Alexander Imperial University in Helsingfors Adolf Arppe glorified the Russian empire for exactly those things that Katkov blamed it for. In his speech read at the beginning of the school year and on the eve of Alexander II’s arrival for the opening of the

¹⁵⁶³ Katkov, *Sobranie peredovykh statej Moskovskih vedomostej za 1864 god*, 710–40.

Estate Diet, Arppe contrasted the experiences of Finland under Swedish and Russian rule, highlighting the desire towards the assimilation and acculturation espoused by the Swedish conquerors that almost finished with total swedization of Finland.¹⁵⁶⁴ While Katkov treated the position of Finland as mere province, Arppe argued that the reign of Alexander I provided a path for Finns to be counted in the list of nations, implying the degree of cultural and even political self-sufficiency. The rector opposed those voices who stated that under the Swedish rule Finland would have reached the same path, arguing that the national revival would only sporadically touch Finnish province:

Even less than at present time could they [Finnish national tendencies] measure up to the Scandinavian sympathies, these dark memories and even darker hopes which among educated and powerful classes, and in public took so deep roots and still give reason for fragmentations [within the society], that must harm every patriot (*fosterlandsvännen*).¹⁵⁶⁵

Arppe's decision to address Scandinavian sympathies must have reflected the juncture of the internal and external tensions that surfaced around Polish Uprising and Danish-German crisis. Moreover, he implied that the perilous sympathies were still wide-spread, although they were more notable before. Finally, the Russian abode also implicitly provided resources for the Finnish culture to stand equal to Swedish-centered tendencies by providing enough space for the development of the Finnish nation. These words, however, would hardly placate Katkov who desired the alignment of the national sentiments and political systems along the Russian-core example.

¹⁵⁶⁴ Adolf Arppe, *Två tal hållna å K.A. universitetets Solennitets-sal den 12 september 1863 och den 23 januari 1864 af Universitetets n.v. rektor* (Helsingfors, 1864), 1-5.

¹⁵⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 6.

I have already demonstrated that the intervention of the Russian newspapers into the discussion of political practices of the duchy produced different reactions there. Liberals around *Helsingfors Dagbladet* expectedly readily partook in the debate with *Moskovskie vedomosti*, denying most of its allegations.¹⁵⁶⁶ But blatant intrusion of the Russian conservative newspapers into the autonomous position of Finland triggered not only those who ostensibly shared Swedish-leaning tendencies, but also those who opposed them in internal struggles, namely Fennomans in late 1863. *Helsingin Uutiset*, edited by Yrjö Sakari Yrjö-Koskinen (Georg Forsman), one of the leaders of new generation who supported Finnish-centered political project, also voiced his irritation about the ‘noise’ that the Moscow newspaper was producing with regards to the working of the Sejm.

He assaulted Katkov’s arguments about Swedish roots of the Finnish ‘state’ as well as his rhetoric about the ethnic distinction between the Finns and the Swedes. To counter this ethnographic-driven vision, characteristic both for the conservative press and for the monitoring institutions, Yrjö-Koskinen argued that the language strife was not a question contested by different nationalities, but a strife within one nation about its defining features. He pointed that Finnish enthusiasts were often originally Swedish-speaking and putting them in different camps based on their nationality was a misrepresentation. Although he clearly repudiated liberal and Scandinavian-leaning texts published in Sweden about Finland as well as *Helsingfors Dagblad*’s rhetoric, he argued that after all the idea of the autonomous Finland was neither Swedish nor particular to *Dagblad*’s language, but a national idea common to different parties and groups.¹⁵⁶⁷ Other Finnish newspapers also vehemently opposed the

¹⁵⁶⁶ *Helsingfors Dagblad*, 22.10.1863; *Helsingfors Dagblad*, 31.12.1863. See also: Landgren, *För frihet och framåtskridande*, 112-18; Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg, ”Dagbladsseparatismen” år 1863 och den begynnande panslavismen,” *Skrifter utgivna av Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland* 346, n. 30 (1954): 170-214.

¹⁵⁶⁷ *Helsingin Uutiset*, 21.12.1863.

poignant critique that *Moskovskie vedomosti* and personally Katkov enunciated, blaming him in ignorance and the desire to halt Finnish progress of state.¹⁵⁶⁸

The transborder debate allowed for the Finnish side and different groups within it to formulate its principles of statehood, constitutionalism, and autonomy in modern terms,¹⁵⁶⁹ while Katkov, as I have already demonstrated, used the opportunity to present the logic of integrity of the empire that implied the homogeneity of its constituent parts, drawing on the symptoms of separatism in Finland among other autonomies. Perhaps, the public tension even sharpened the rhetoric so that *Helsingfors Dagblad* insisted on the legitimacy of the Finnish ‘separatism’ – poignantly echoing Katkov’s wording – that grounded itself on the difference of constitution, subjecthood, tariffs, and the existence of the Diet which was regarded as parliament.¹⁵⁷⁰ This bold vision, however, was contested by other newspapers in Russia and in the duchy itself, while the imperial government in Finland censored many of the newspaper’s articles.¹⁵⁷¹

The authorities exhibited variegated reactions to these discussions. Rokassovsky, apart from putting *Helsingfors Dagblad* under the scrutiny, blamed Katkov for his ignorance about the duchy’s system and eventually came to see the Russian party in Finland as central menace to him and to the calmness in the duchy.¹⁵⁷² As he underlined that this party consisted primarily of the Russian officers and doctors, it must have been military doctor Nikolskiy’s affair treated by the Third Section that resulted in Rokassovsky’s characteristics. The doctor was initially called as a witness about the case of local merchant’s blowing in the face of the Russian officer. He, however, provided a long political note for the court that made locals of Borgå appeal to governor-general about sending Nikolskiy back to imperial domains, to which Rokassovsky

¹⁵⁶⁸ *Päivätär*, 24.12.1863; *Suometar*, 28.12.1863.

¹⁵⁶⁹ Jussila, Hentilä, and Nevakivi, *From Grand Duchy to a Modern State*.

¹⁵⁷⁰ *Helsingfors Dagblad*, 24.11.1863.

¹⁵⁷¹ See, for example: *Finlands Allmänna Tidning*, 12.01.1864.

¹⁵⁷² Rokassovsky – Armfelt, 14 / 26 May 1864. KA. Alexander Armfelin arkisto IIa 23b (6), l. 131-133.

reacted by reprimanding the doctor. The note, supplied for the court, fashioned the case of an attack as a result of political controversy between a party of Swedish Finlanders and Russian officers stationed in the city. Nikolskiy argued that the party was responsible for political manifestations and aggressive tone in the local newspaper, and Sergeev – Swedized descendant of a Russian family that had migrated to Finland – attacked Russian officer Larionov under these political pretentions.¹⁵⁷³

The Swedish party that Nikolskiy described as a ‘green party’, perhaps, referring to ostensibly adolescent age of its members – a term that later spread across the Russian newspapers, – apart from antagonizing the Russians, certainly had larger, geopolitical allusions. First, the doctor found its roots in the rhetoric of *Helsingfors Dagblad*, that preached ‘unrealizable fantasies, crushed by the common sense of the Finns’. Second, in listing the manifestation that this party was responsible for, he specifically underlined their public singing of ‘Ur vågen, Moskoviter’ – a song often associated with pan-Scandinavian student conventions.¹⁵⁷⁴ He might have been unaware of the present political references of the song, but he clearly hinted to the larger political society that had established relations with Swedish agitators across the sea.

Characteristically, while only ethnically framed Swedish-Russian tensions were formulated as political, in fact most physical tensions occurred between locals with distinctively Finnish surnames and Russian officers or soldiers: in that case the imperial newspapers turned their attack on injustice and sluggishness of Finlandish courts presided by Swedish-speaking elites.¹⁵⁷⁵ The tragicomedy of ethnic markers and their bindings to unquestionable loyalty or, in the case of Finlanders ‘of Swedish race’ to ambiguous political

¹⁵⁷³ Tobiesen – Dolgorukow, 29 April / 11 May 1864. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 39, g. 1864, d. 39, l. 28-29; Copy of the note. Ibid, l. 30-40ob.

¹⁵⁷⁴ Ibid. On the song see: Matti Klinge, *Den politiske Runeberg* (Helsinki: Söderström, 2004), 342; Clausen, *Skandinavismen: historisk fremstillet*, 50.

¹⁵⁷⁵ *Helsingfors Dagblad*, 09.07.1864.

agenda, perhaps, most startlingly manifested itself in the fact that doctor Nikol'skiy 'as a Russian' – as he referred to the causes of his appeal – had to elaborate several pages on why 'Sergeev' – a typical Russian surname – in this case was not an appropriate marker for any positive label but rather a disguise for a Swedish-leaning agitator. The fact that Finnish newspapers also voiced their visions of Finlandish autonomy made these ethnic divisions increasingly more problematic.

While Rokassovsky saw greatest danger in Russian interventions that explicitly concerned the political situation in autonomous Finland, a certain Scandinavian political entity or party, on the other hand, completely vanished from his correspondence with Armfelt. Surprisingly by the end of the year the logic of separatism was rather tied to Fennoman and 'literary' endeavors in the duchy, reflecting the growing power of Finnish-centered manifestations in the political debate of the duchy.¹⁵⁷⁶ The Third Section, on the other hand, appreciated 'pungent' Russian newspaper articles and argued that the change in the understanding of the nature of Russian-Finnish relations was partially triggered by this conservative criticism. By August 1864, Tobiesen assured Dolgorukow that the situation in the duchy was quiet, and 'the party of those dissatisfied with everything played down its claims for political independence of Finland'.¹⁵⁷⁷

Apart from these discussions that concerned the political system of Finland and its relations with the 'imperial core', Danish-German crisis also produced tensions in the public sphere and in the cabinets. Before the war, Finlandish newspapers usually demonstrated their position with regards to Scandinavian issue by quoting particular messages from other newspapers: *Helsingfors Dagblad*, for example, usually referred to Scandinavian-friendly issues, while official *Finlands Allmänna Tidning* – to conservative and anti-Scandinavianist

¹⁵⁷⁶ Rokassovsky – Armfelt, 26 December 1864 / 7 January 1865. KA. Alexander Armfelin arkisto IIa 23b (6), l. 153-55. This reorientation must have been related to the project of monetary reform in Finland propagated by Snellman.

¹⁵⁷⁷ Tobiesen – Dolgorukow, read 17 August 1864. GARF. F. 109, 1-eks, op. 32, d. 321 ch. 32, l. 252-252ob.

journals abroad, including Russian-French *Le Nord*.¹⁵⁷⁸ Sometimes, Fennoman and conservative newspapers particularly addressed the issue of Scandinavianist ‘dreams’ in Finland. While *Suometar* noticed the presence of ‘those who wants to see united Scandinavian from Eider to Neva’ and attacked them with the progress of Finnish, *Finlands Allmänna Tidning* mocked these fanciful dreams and negligible political presence of their advocates in late December 1864, on the eve of the Second War for Schleswig.¹⁵⁷⁹

Although Scandinavian and Danish issues were interrelated, they remained profoundly different problems. Most Finlandish intellectuals, as during the times of the First War for Schleswig, expressed their support for the Danish cause, and even those who opposed Scandinavian-leaning tendencies in Finland at this point shared the broad sympathy for the Danish kingdom.¹⁵⁸⁰ Apart from launching fundraising campaigns for the Danish soldiers,¹⁵⁸¹ several young enthusiasts opted for partaking in the hostilities as volunteers on the Danish side. Rudolf Estlander and Herman Liikanen were the first to cross the sea to reach their destination. The problems of ‘ethnographic’ political analysis performed by the Third Section were most obvious in case of Liikanen, adventure-seeking volunteer who earlier participated in Hungarian Legion and Garibaldi’s army and who would become a prominent and eager Fennoman later.¹⁵⁸² Support for Denmark transgressed ethnic and politically-based boundaries.

On 5/17 March, Tobiesen reported on the echoes of the Danish crisis in Finland: ‘Military events in Denmark attracted the sympathy of Finlanders – especially among younger generation – for the Danes’.¹⁵⁸³ He informed on the case of a Danish student in Helsingfors who was proposed to read a lecture on the relations between Denmark and Schleswig. The

¹⁵⁷⁸ See for ex: *Finlands Allmänna Tidning*, 04.09.1863; *Finlands Allmänna Tidning*, 24.11.1863; *Finlands Allmänna Tidning*, 07.01.1864; *Helsingfors Dagblad*, 29.12.1863

¹⁵⁷⁹ *Suometar*, 21.01.1864; *Finlands Allmänna Tidning*, 25.01.1864.

¹⁵⁸⁰ Surely, *Helsingfors Dagblad* was the locomotive in this sense. See: *Helsingfors Dagblad*, 19.02.1864.

¹⁵⁸¹ *Helsingfors Tidningar*, 10.03.1864; *Åbo Underrättelser*, 15.03.1864.

¹⁵⁸² Bernhard Estlander, ‘Finländska frivillige i danska kriget 1864,’ *Historiska och litteraturhistoriska studier*, no. 2 (1926): 91-136; *Helsingfors Tidningar*, 12.02.1864.

¹⁵⁸³ Tobiesen – Dolgorukow, 5/17 March 1864. GARF. F. 109, 1-esk, op. 39, g. 1864, d. 39, 1-eks, op. 1. 8-8ob.

students were supposed to support the lecture by singing Danish patriotic songs, and gathered funds were to be delivered to the families of deceased soldiers. In analyzing the reasons for such sympathy, Tobiesen articulated that it must have been related to Scandinavianism, to which ‘many young men of the country are devoted to’. The case was illustrated by Liikanen’s and Estlander’s decision to partake as volunteers in the war. Tobiesen thus narrowed down the dangers to a well-known label, but Finnish language newspapers were as eager to inform the audience about fundraising and volunteering for the Danish side as their Swedish-language colleagues. Finnish-speaking audience clearly participated in gathering these funds as well.¹⁵⁸⁴

Despite *Suometar* and other Finnish newspapers argued against *Helsingfors Dagblad*’s political and cultural agenda in Finland, they reprinted the news about Finlandish volunteers from this rivaling issue.¹⁵⁸⁵ Alongside letters and telegrams from Finlandish volunteers who struggled through the warfare – Sanmark was captured, Carlson and Liikanen wounded – the newspapers brought diplomatic correspondence and covered extensively the pace of hostilities in Denmark. *Helsingfors Dagblad*, which previously regarded the issue of Scandinavian alliance and union with excitement, established its correspondent in Copenhagen in spring-summer 1864 to provide fresh news for interested readers. The newspaper also reprinted many Swedish and Danish articles almost *in extenso*, at the beginning those that pointed to Scandinavian agitation and union-projects, and later those concerning the failure of the Swedish-Norwegian assistance to the neighboring kingdom.¹⁵⁸⁶

Suometar already at the end of February did not pull its strikes against Scandinavianness (*skandinawilaisuus*), blaming the lack of Swedish assistance to Denmark and concluding that the movement that praised itself as a vanguard of the North did nothing when the help was so acutely required, partially echoing Topeluis’ impressions from yearly

¹⁵⁸⁴ *Suomen Julkisia Sanomia*, 24.03.1864; *Suomen Julkisia Sanomia*, 24.03.1864; *Helsingfors Dagblad*, 21.03.1864; *Suometar*, 13.02.1864; *Suometar*, 15.03.1864.

¹⁵⁸⁵ *Suometar*, 01.04.1864; *Suometar*, 21.01.1864.

¹⁵⁸⁶ *Helsingfors Dagblad*, 19.07.1864.

1848 when Sweden at the beginning did little to save Denmark.¹⁵⁸⁷ *Helsingfors Dagblad*, however, called to patience, pointing to the complex internal and external situation that Sweden-Norway had to navigate to provide its assistance.¹⁵⁸⁸ *Helsingfors Tidningar*, edited by August Schauman since 1862, reported on March 8 about the rumors of Swedish army mobilization, adding excitingly that every Finn regarded the idea of the Scandinavian consolidation with sympathy. His newspaper simultaneously pushed forward Finnish-centered agenda, and Scandinavianism in this sense implied Nordic consolidation without Finland, while Schauman remained an enthusiast of the Scandinavian rapprochement. *Helsingfors Dagblad*, earlier counting on the Swedish assistance, however, came to blame the inaction of its government on April 21.¹⁵⁸⁹

In general, the newspapers proceeded to cover Scandinavianism according to earlier political sympathies or necessities: the official newspaper reprinted excerpts from *Le Nord* or other journals that discredited the idea of the union, *Helsingfors Dagblad* counted on the reification of Swedish assistance in one way or another, while *Suometar* mocked the unreliability of the idea. However, the failure of the assistance or union also provided enough material for Fennomans-leaning newspapers to dwell on Finlandish politics and cultural affiliations. *Suometar* and *Helsingfors Tidningar*, which sympathized with Scandinavianism but ‘on a distance’ and often pushed forward Finnish cultural agenda, concluded that the excessive reliance of one nation on others lead to this sort of disillusionment: ‘A nation should never count on other forces, except those that it possesses in the pursuit of its goals.’¹⁵⁹⁰ This conclusion was explicitly formulated as a lesson for Finlanders to learn, and sounded as a call to concentrate on its own internal development.

¹⁵⁸⁷ *Suometar*, 26.02.1864.

¹⁵⁸⁸ *Helsingfors Dagblad*, 04.03.1864.

¹⁵⁸⁹ *Helsingfors Dagblad*, 21.04.1864.

¹⁵⁹⁰ *Helsingfors Tidningar*, 11.05.1864; *Suometar*, 26.02.1864.

Up until August-September the newspapers pondered on the rumors about the results of the war and still envisioned the potential of the union reification. *Helsingfors Tidningar* reprinted an article that professed new future for the Scandinavian idea that would be more organized, solid, and mutually beneficial for the kingdoms of the North.¹⁵⁹¹ The hopes of the unification, however, were thwarted by the mid-Autumn, and pro-Swedish journals at that point reflected on the reasons of the ineffectiveness of assistance and on the potential future of the project.¹⁵⁹² The hope for its future realization, however, rested intact, and some even pondered that the idea might be regenerated with renewed or even larger force.¹⁵⁹³ As the agitation of national-liberal newspapers against peace negotiations in favor of Scandinavian dynastic union continued in Copenhagen, the news about these events reached Finland as well, where some still cherished the visions of the union being realized.¹⁵⁹⁴ The special series of articles ‘Letter about Denmark’ in *Helsingfors Dagblad* extensively covered the history and present of the Scandinavian question during autumn-winter of 1864.¹⁵⁹⁵

On November 17, *Åbo Underrättelser* informed its audience on the contrast between the festivities in Sweden-Norway devoted to the union establishment that passed on November 4 and the desperate Danish public – a ‘missing link’ in the chain of Scandinavianism – that learned of the news of Vienna peace treaty signed on October 30.¹⁵⁹⁶ Although newspapers, mostly those printed for Swedish-speaking audience, continued to ponder on the futures of Scandinavianism even after that, and, perhaps, not without reasons as the agitation and political workings in that direction continued in Copenhagen and Stockholm, the majority must have understood that the moment was lost.

¹⁵⁹¹ *Helsingfors Tidningar*, 18.08.1864.

¹⁵⁹² *Helsingfors Dagblad*, 30.08.1864; *Helsingfors Dagblad*, 23.09.1864.

¹⁵⁹³ *Helsingfors Dagblad*, 23.09.1864.

¹⁵⁹⁴ *Finlands Allmänna Tidning*, 27.09.1864; *Helsingfors Dagblad*, 27.09.1864.

¹⁵⁹⁵ *Helsingfors Dagblad*, 08.11.1864.

¹⁵⁹⁶ *Åbo Underrättelser*, 17.11.1864.

Conclusions drawn were different, but they hardly pleased those who guarded Swedish foundations in internal and, to an extent, external policy in Finland. Fennoman newspapers, although they looked at the Danish case with sympathy, were assured in their moral cause of Finnish-centered, independent cultural project that would not rely on external agents, apart, of course, from the empire which served rather as a provider of new possibilities. Although most of them underscored loyalty to the Russian throne, rare advocates of Fennomania were ready to agree with Katkov's nationalist and anti-autonomist rhetoric. Indeed, the image of Finlandish autonomy and even statehood – grounded both on the principles of the Swedish laws and present political institutions – crossed political boundaries and was shared by agents from both Svekomman and Fennoman camps.

Scandinavianism, while manifesting itself as a geopolitical and dynastic opportunity, also served as a label in internal debates. The Russian newspapers and the Third Section gradually stick to ethnographic principles, presenting Scandinavianism-Fennoman strive as a battle between clearcut ethnic entities of Swedes and Finns. On the ground, however, the dynamics was much more complex. Political positions were matters of choice, affiliation, social networking, and rather depended on trajectories of interactions, and rarely they were precipitated by birth. It was especially clear with Fennoman camp, whose leaders or prominent members were often descendants of Swedish-speaking families. Scandinavianism was obviously not appealing for all the Swedish-speaking Finlanders accordingly, and in fact only a minority was labeled as followers of this idea. There were myriad positions between relative Fennoman and Scandinavianist stance that included, for example, political indifference, cultural cosmopolitanism, 'old Swedish' aristocratic view that often stood loyally for the benefits of the empire, and many more.

Although it was a relatively rare case when someone referred to himself as 'a Scandinavian', there were examples of such public mapping that went beyond the usual centers

of its activity, as Nyland section. One of the most telling examples was a letter published by *Åbo Underrättelser* in February 1864, framed as an appeal to an old friend from Åbo. Alexei, the author of this letter, left the coastal city for the countryside, and his friend was afraid that by doing so he could lose a certain outlook, characteristic for a coastal city dweller. Alexei's friend called him a cosmopolite, because on the one hand his knowledge of Finnish was insufficient to count among Fennomans, while his underappreciation of what Swedish journals held for the future of Finland 'and its possible or impossible position' prevented him from listing among the Scandinavians.¹⁵⁹⁷

The global tensions again produced a range of different emotional and doctrinal reactions in Finland. Finnish administration and public provided diverging interpretations of Polish Uprising, War for Schleswig, and the failure of the Scandinavian union or at least Swedish assistance to Denmark in 1864. These readings of the global and regional processes were projected onto local dynamics and proffered different conclusions ranging from the hopes for the establishment of the Scandinavian federative state with Finland in its borders during the decisive months of the Polish Uprising to Fennoman moral victory against Swedish-centered pretensions during the Danish-German crisis. The projections concerned not only group-categorizations but also self-identification processes in which, contrary to the simplistic and essentialist ethnographic treatment of the Third Section of *Moskovskie vedomosti*, many persons were making their choices of becoming a Swede, Finn, or even Scandinavian.

The complexities involved not only self-identification but also externally projected classifications and expectations. In March 1865, a piece in *Nylands Dragon*, a handwritten journal of the Nyland section, told a dramatic story about Berlin society of Scandinavian, a member of which refused to drink for Finland, arguing that it had nothing to do with

¹⁵⁹⁷ *Åbo Underrättelser*, 02.02.1864.

Scandinavia as such.¹⁵⁹⁸ Although his mistake was corrected, it did reveal tensions between sharpening national identities of Scandinavian and Finns. In Sweden and Norway, to the astonishment of Finlandish press, the presence of ethnic Finns in the Northern parts of the realm gradually came to be associated with ‘Schleswig within our borders’, referring to potential unloyalty or justification of invasion tied to this part of the population giving rise to what would be called ‘the Finnish danger’.¹⁵⁹⁹ While there was indeed a space for personal choice, external projections that often divided ethnically Scandinavian from ethnically Finnish came to proliferate in the public debate.

Scandinavianism failed in the years 1863-4 when the international situation was ripe for it. Or it did not? The conclusion depends on the definition we provide for the term. If Scandinavianism meant exclusively political unification then it certainly lost a good chance. However, some global powers were prepared to see it realized. Napoleon III ambiguously supported such endeavors; Bismarck might have also approved this combination.¹⁶⁰⁰ Even the Russian empire reluctantly prepared to encounter a new neighbor across the Baltic Sea. The imagined neighboring state, however, was weak and loose, given its proposed political composition. Moreover, Finland in which earlier administration was trying to excavate pan-Scandinavian conspiracies and threats, was, in the eyes of the imperial government, secured by means of new ethnographic balancing that favored suppressed tribe of the Finns to outweigh the influence of corrupted Swedes. The broadening of the political participation, in its turn, also aimed to untie Finlanders from their ex-metropole. Why would they need Sweden if same modern and liberal institutions were deployed in the duchy?

¹⁵⁹⁸ *Nylands Dragon*, 8.02.1865. Kansalliskirjasto, NN: Hd 3.10.8.

¹⁵⁹⁹ *Helsingfors Tidningar*, 17.06.1864; Knut Einar Eriksen and Einar Niemi, *Den finske fare: sikkerhetsproblemer og minoritetspolitikk i nord 1860-1940* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981).

¹⁶⁰⁰ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 5-7.

The modernizing empire was ready to meet the new rival or, perhaps, a neutral power. Jomini's criticism of the diplomatic corps and the lack of political anticipation exhibited by the imperial agents might have referred to the Russian diplomats' constant overlooking or negligence of the Scandinavian danger. Through the early 1860s they informed the ministry that the idea of the union did not enjoy broad sympathies and it was withering from the public life. In 1863-4, the idea manifested itself alive and well, however, so that the empire had to oversee the measures to get prepared for its existence. Aristocratic diplomats who socialized in salons – although rarely were instructed to overlook – had no affordable means to determine the scope of the new negotiations that went behind the closed doors with few persons aware of the importance of these talks. Although to a degree they adapted to new rules of the game, a complete transformation was demanded to secure such tendencies. Besides personnel policy, the ministry had to adapt to new principles of diplomacy, to the withering power of the treaties, the consolidation of the nationality principle, and, as a result, growing tensions around the issues of ethnicity and politics. In this sense, the discovery of ethnic balance in the borderlands – Finland in particular – and the recognition of 'ethnic', 'national', or 'racial' programmes of other states that resulted in new alliances or conflicts was simultaneous and dependent on each other.

As an idea, Scandinavianism made its loyal friends and potential rivals adapt to it, modernize, and find ways of repression or cohabitation. As an idea, it made intellectuals in Finland identify themselves with global aspirations in local political contestations. It even made some of them to volunteer and fight for a distant land they barely knew. Small groups and particular personalities were associated with Scandinavian politics in Finland without, however, partaking in the grand schemes of the Nordic union or Swedish military assistance to Denmark. The Third Section, Russian newspapers, and governors-general were differently qualifying intentions, composition, and practices of the Scandinavian politics in Finland to

secure – again in diverging ways – the imperial resilience either by allocating political and public capital to the duchy or, conversely, by proposing to align the political system of Finland with that of the Russian core. For a time being, again, the broadening of political participation and ‘emancipation’ of the peasant Finns from intermediaries that were necessary due to the language barrier, won out as a modernization strategy. As a reaction on broader range of stimulus – Scandinavianism among them – the emperor discursively and practically allowed for new institutions to burgeon in Finland. For the lack of a better word, Finlanders would discover that they live in a modern institutional terrain, in a state.

Finally, those who were loyal to or felt threatened by the prospects of Scandinavianism – whatever it meant in different situations – did not drop it from their radars after the Danish defeat in the war. The Finlandish administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of War, Russian nationalists, revolutionary emigres, Finlandish Swedophiles took note of its presence long after the last battles for Schleswig were over.

7. Conclusion

7.1. Epilogue: Scandinavianism always dying but never dead

In early 1865, Baron Otto Ewers, by that time an advisor to Gorchakov, wrote a personal letter to Nicholas Nicolay, residing in Copenhagen: ‘You tell me that you have no subjects for your official reports apart from those that worry you’.¹⁶⁰¹ While a look at the dispatches from 1865 would have certainly clarified the situation,¹⁶⁰² I assume that Nicolay earlier alarmed the government about the popular discontent with Christian IX and nationalist agitation that capitalized on the unfavorable conditions of peace. He might have as well pondered on Christian IX’s abdication plans or even on new efforts to build Scandinavian union – either thorough *coup d’etat* or through collaboration between the royal families of Denmark and Sweden-Norway.¹⁶⁰³

Ewers’ answer, however, underscored the level of interest enjoyed by these affairs in Saint-Petersburg:

Since the conclusion of the Peace of Vienna our political interest in Denmark has considerably diminished, we are not very curious about the parliamentary debates of your deliberative assemblies, and for us there is only one interest in Copenhagen, that is Princess Dagmar.

Indeed, in September Dagmar was officially engaged with Nicholas Alexandrovich, while this reply also articulates concerns of the monarchical house rather than deliberate attempt to influence the pace and trajectory of the Danish politics, contrary to the expectations and fears of the nationalist and Scandinavianist politicians there. Ewers argued that public and cabinets

¹⁶⁰¹ Ewers – Nicolay, 29 January 1865. OR RNB. F. 519, op. 1, d. 83, l. 11.

¹⁶⁰² I have not done this yet.

¹⁶⁰³ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 761–90.

concerns were consumed by internal issues, concluding that ‘this is not advantageous for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but it is better for Russia.’¹⁶⁰⁴

Ewers’ reply, however, might be less representative of the range of imperial interactions with Scandinavianism at this period. Many agents still tied their respective hopes and fears to the specters of the project, either projecting their anticipations or revealing anxieties. Bakunin came back to Sweden in September 1864 to find some of his earlier acquaintances in despair, others, quite contrary, remaining ambitious about variegated trajectories to pursue. Mikhail Bakunin arrived in Stockholm from Italy where he got inspired by rituals and practices of freemason lodges and revolutionary work performed by those.¹⁶⁰⁵ In Sweden and, broader, in Scandinavia his new visions found fertile soil at the crucial moment when Scandinavianist politicians were ready to go as far as to arguably execute *coup d’etat* in Denmark in favor of Charles XV, and according to Glenthøj and Ottosen this was not just talking.¹⁶⁰⁶ The global revolutionary, in his turn, proposed to scale their endeavors to pan-European level by establishing a network of secret organizations. This time, he contacted exclusively Swedish radical politicians like August Sohlman, Adolf Hedin, and August Blanche, ignoring Finlandish emigres completely.

Recognizing the level of tensions boiling in Stockholm and Copenhagen, Bakunin saw it ripe to capitalize on those in proposing the establishment of ‘Scandinavian family’ cell under the aegis of the International Revolutionary Brotherhood. The brotherhood, although Bakunin acknowledged that nothing serious yet existed under the label, was meant to unite dispersed national, or in the case of Scandinavia – regional struggles for the universal justice, freedom, abolition of religion, classes, privileges and armies, modification of the labor conditions, and

¹⁶⁰⁴ Ewers – Nicolay, 29 January 1865. OR RNB. F. 519, op. 1, d. 83, l. 11.

¹⁶⁰⁵ Yuri Steklov, *Mihail Aleksandrovich Bakunin. T. 2. Perehodnyj period*, vol. 2 (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1927), 302–3; M. Kun and K. Vargyas, “Un Tournant Décisif Dans La Vie de Bakounine Données Inédites Sur Son Évolution Idéologique et Sur Son Activité Conspiratrice,” *Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae* 26, no. 1/2 (1980): 27–75.

¹⁶⁰⁶ Nordhagen Ottosen and Glenthøj, *Union eller undergang*, 762–90.

foreign politics based on just principles. Guided by the central committee of the brotherhood, local cells should have abandoned any alliances with established governments and royal figures to fight for their agenda independently of those, especially of Napoleon III, whom many Scandinavianist politicians perceived as a sort of a guardian of their cause in Europe.¹⁶⁰⁷

While the goals were universal, local struggles had to adapt to the situation on the ground, and the Scandinavian brotherhood was not an exception. Bakunin stated explicitly that it had to capitalize on the political ideas that already manifested themselves there, namely, in case of Sweden, reform of representation and the idea of Scandinavian union:

The Scandinavian question [...] correspond, if not as a well-understood idea, then as a very deep sentiment to the general instinct of the whole Swedish nation. This instinct finds expression in the hatred against Russia, common to all Swedes without exception, and in the newer but no less passionate hatred against the Prussians in particular and against the Germans in general. The Swedish nation feels enveloped in immense danger and caught between two enemy powers, as in a vise.¹⁶⁰⁸

Bakunin who knew little Swedish and even less Danish, captured well the emotional capital that Scandinavianism still accumulated. Moreover, he was aware that Christian IX remained unpopular in Denmark paving the way for potential unification of the kingdoms under Charles XV, although Bakunin preferred republic to monarchy.¹⁶⁰⁹

Although he saw contemporary Swedish politics as weak, indolent, and apathetical, perhaps as compared to Italy, Scandinavianism could reinvigorate the public spirit. Finland also found a prominent place in his imagination of the future union, despite the unwillingness

¹⁶⁰⁷ Mikhail Bakunin, *Projet d'une organisation secrète internationale*, 14-23. KB, Sven Hedins arkiv, KB1/Ep. H. 7:1.

¹⁶⁰⁸ Mikhail Bakunin, *Projet d'organisation de la famille des frères scandinaves*, 4-6. KB. Sven Hedins arkiv, KB1/Ep. H. 7:1.

¹⁶⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 1-2.

of some of his interlocutors about it. Bakunin insisted that Scandinavianist politicians had to issue an appeal to Finland to make the population of the duchy know their cause and their goals of the Scandinavian liberal federation. Otherwise, Finnish population would only have connection through the Swedish king thus making a great national cause into an intrigue ‘a la Qvanten et a la Nordström’ – a pun that revealed persisting conflict between Bakunin and Finnish environment in Stockholm.¹⁶¹⁰

Bakunin was informed that Swedish politicians were seeking to establish another society – Nordiska Nationalföreningen (the Nordic national association) – much less radical than Bakunin’s proposal but aligned in a sense that it also pursued the consolidation of the Scandinavian kingdoms into a union by ‘legal means’.¹⁶¹¹ He, however, protested against its ‘Nordic’ title arguing that the label of *Scandinavian* was well known around Europe while *Northern* could include points as far ideologically and geographically distant as Arkhangelsk and Berlin, unacceptable for such an organization.¹⁶¹² Bakunin, even though his vision of secrecy and vertical hierarchy of the organization were clear in the proposal, saw these societies as potentially collaborating for the common good.

Since regional cells had to generally align their goals with the International Brotherhood, Bakunin’s visions grounded in the notions of cosmopolitan revolution must have been unprecedentedly radical even for his interlocutors, and their agency in correcting his views are most conspicuous in the rituals of their indoctrination. There were only three indoctrinated members upon Bakunin’s departure in October but only the replies of *Aftonbladet*’s editor August Sohlman must have been preserved.¹⁶¹³ Sohlman agreed with the

¹⁶¹⁰ Ibid, 6-8.

¹⁶¹¹ Hans Lennart Lundh, *Från Skandinavism till neutralitet: utrikespolitik och utrikesdebatt i Sverige under Carl XV:s sista år* (Stockholm : Trollhättans tryckeri, 1950), 23–29.

¹⁶¹² Bakunin, *Projet d’organisation de la famille des frères scandinaves*, 5. Sven Hedins arkiv. KB, KB1/Ep. H. 7:1

¹⁶¹³ Silvio Furlani, “Bakunins Svenska förbindelser,” *Historisk Tidskrift (Stockholm)*, no. 1 (1985): 4–25. See also on individuals that were close to this community: Victor Lundberg, “The Violent Democrat – and the Radical Tradition in Sweden,” in *Political Outsiders in Swedish History, 1848-1932*, ed. Lars Edgren and Magnus Olofsson (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 39–54.

principles of political and economic emancipation but remained reserved about forced organization as potentially deteriorating personal freedom. He also protested against ‘abjuring his fatherland’ to the cosmopolitan ideals of the global revolution. Finally, although he seconded Bakunin in developing Scandinavianism into a revolutionary project, he had doubts about strict organizational hierarchy of the International Brotherhood and wished to preserve his freedom to decline orders emanating from the center that would be contrary to the local workings.¹⁶¹⁴

Upon his indoctrination on 12 October 1864, Sohlman swore to do everything in his powers to propagate, strengthen and extend the principles and power of the secret society-in-the-making.¹⁶¹⁵ After Bakunin left Sweden several days later, Sohlman, however, soon ceased to reply to his letters and put only one article in his journal among several Bakunin sent to him, embittering the revolutionary coordinator.¹⁶¹⁶ In his correspondence with Carl Ploug, another Scandinavianist leader in Denmark, Sohlman was silent about Bakunin’s organization either due to conspiracy needs or, perhaps, given his indifference.¹⁶¹⁷ However, in mid-October Sohlman might have been sincere about his fervent desire to partake in the organization, while later news of the Vienna Treaty signed on October 30 dispelled his expectations or turned them into a less radical avenue.

From Bakunin’s text prepared in September-October 1864 in Stockholm it is clear that he was informed on the pace of workings made by Scandinavianist politicians. Even though he must have prepared the outlines of these texts earlier, he grasped the situation on the ground correctly, capitalizing on the readiness of these politicians for a radical action driven by despair

¹⁶¹⁴ Procès-verbal de réception d’August Sohlman comme membre de la Fraternité Internationale, 12 October 1864 in Mikhail Bakunin, *Oeuvres Complètes* (Amsterdam : IISG, 2000), Cd-rom.

¹⁶¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶¹⁶ Michel Mervaud, “La ‘Société Internationale Secrète de l’émancipation de l’humanité’ (Bakounine et Sohlman),” in *Bakounine - Combats et Débats* (Paris: Institut d’Etudes Slaves, 1979), 107–13. He also did not burn the letters, while Bakunin specifically asked him about this.

¹⁶¹⁷ Sohlman – Ploug. Sohlmans arkiv, KB, KB1/L 10.

that Denmark and their project was facing in the final stages of war. In this sense, his visions might have been less fantastical when read along the grains of the Scandinavian context with revolutionary windows of opportunity regarded as open for variegated plans and programmes of action.¹⁶¹⁸ This particular burst appeared to be short-lived, but conservative politicians on the other side of the Baltic Sea still nurtured their anxieties.

In 1864, two committees were established in Finland with a goal to revise the legal system under Baron Nordenstam and to modify the central administration of the duchy presided by Senator Cronstedt. The Committee for Finlandish Affairs was responsible for drafting respective programmes for the two subordinate committees and on 7 / 19 December its outline was approved for the Nordenstam's committee that launched its workings. While those were studied in detail by Lolo Krusius-Ahrenberg and later by Robert Schweitzer,¹⁶¹⁹ I would like to stress only one tension that arose from its workings. Although the final result espoused rather conservative principles of the legal system and political position of the duchy vis-à-vis Russia, it sought to curb the range of responsibilities performed by governor-general by securing the position of Senate chair for a 'Finlandish subject' diverting from usual practice. Although previously Rokassovsky stood close to Armfelt and Stjernvall-Walleen, at this point he found his position fragile.

Commenting on the workings of the committee responsible for the creation of the new legal system (*ulozhenie*) on 19 / 31 May 1865, governor-general articulated the publication of such document might have contributed to the 'general fermentation' and solidify 'incorrect views' about the independence of the country. Concluding his remarks on the project that, in his views, sought to considerably limit the powers of governor-general, he articulated persistent workings of the conspirative 'radical party' that propagated the ideas of independence and

¹⁶¹⁸ Rasmus Glenthøj, "Highwater for Political Scandinavianism, 1863–1865," in *Nordic Experiences in Pan-Nationalisms* (London: Routledge, 2023), 57-74.

¹⁶¹⁹ Schweitzer, *Autonomie und Autokratie*, 31–64.

separatism, dangerous for the integrity of the realm.¹⁶²⁰ While some administrators in the duchy blamed Rokassovsky for surprisingly approaching the rhetoric of *Moskovskie Vedomosti*¹⁶²¹ – his commentaries quickly became well-known despite the confidential status – I would argue that his anxiety about so-called Russian party and its assaults on Finlandish autonomy and, perhaps implicitly, on governor-general himself, might have prompted him to secure his position and public status in this case.

Since the War for Schleswig ended with the Danish defeat, some intellectuals recognized that the rhetoric of separatism was losing its political capital. Anonymous remarks on Rokassovsky's commentaries – that became known for Alexander II – articulated exactly this point in rhetorically asking what governor-general meant under separatism. Elaborating on this point, the anonymous author stated that if governor-general meant the establishment of an independent state or a state within the federative union of the Scandinavian kingdoms, then such speculations had no grounds under them since such visions were cherished only by 'crazy dreamers'.¹⁶²² Alexander II scripted that he found both Rokassovsky's commentaries and these remarks reasonable, but finally the work of the codification was halted and these concerns might have contributed to such result. Besides, the specters of the Scandinavian union haunted other cabinets as well.

The implementation of the financial reform in 1865 made Finnish and Russian silver coins the only acceptable payment currency in the duchy and since the Russian return to the silver standard largely failed, in fact the reform meant that Finlandish monetary system appeared independent with economic and political consequences looming large.¹⁶²³ Although the reform was vigorously debated, Johan Snellman, responsible for its implementation after

¹⁶²⁰ Borodkin, *Istorija Finljandii: vremena Imperatora Aleksandra II*, 527–29.

¹⁶²¹ F.O. af Bruner – Snellman, 17 June 1865. Snellman's Collection, URL: <http://snellman.kootutteokset.fi/sites/default/files/11462.pdf> (accessed 03.01.2023).

¹⁶²² Borodkin, 533.

¹⁶²³ Antti Kuusterä and Juha Tarkka, *Bank of Finland 200 Years: Imperial Cashier to Central Bank* (Helsinki: Otava, 2011), 236–37.

Fabian Lagenskiöld, got it approved by the emperor. August Tobiesen described the reform as a result of the separatist tendencies of the Swedish party, omitting the fact that it was pushed forward by Fennoman Snellman. As late as 1866, Rokassovsky's resignation and the monetary reform were discussed in the context of Swedish-leaning sympathies and persisting Scandinavianist dangers due to the implementation of representation reform in Sweden where modern parliamentary system was introduced instead of the estate-based convention. Tobiesen again insisted that ethnic Finns sided with the imperial political and monetary system, while Swedes opposed to its expansion to Finland.¹⁶²⁴

The organization of the industrial exposition in Stockholm in 1866 also produced Scandinavian-related anxieties, when the invitation was sent to Finnish manufacturers, some vigilante citizens deemed it to be an expression of Scandinavianist tendencies.¹⁶²⁵ Russian consul in Stockholm Mollerius, charged with commissar responsibilities, dispatched to new governor-general Nicholas Adlerberg during the exposition:

On the occasion of these industrial festivals, several dinners and suppers were given in high cabinets. I am pleased to point out to Your Excellency the perfect convergence and the tact which presided over these meetings where not the slightest word was pronounced which had to do with general policy or Scandinavian ideas.¹⁶²⁶

Helsingfors students' telegrams exchange with the university of Uppsala, reviews of Russian foreign policy performance in 1864 published during Prussian-Austrian war, and new fundraising in Sweden and Denmark under the banners of Scandinavian commonality during

¹⁶²⁴ Tobiesen's report. 17 / 19 November 1866. GARF. F. 109, op. 41, d. 5 ch. 1, l. 40-45; Baranov's report, l. 47-60.

¹⁶²⁵ Anonymous letter to governor-general, 11 / 23 October 1865. KA. KKK, Fa: 1207, N. 47, l. 26-60b.

¹⁶²⁶ Mollerius – Adlerberg, 17 / 29 June 1866. AVPRI. F. 193, g. 1866, op. 817/1, d. 186, l. 8. On Finnish participation see: Kerstin Smeds, *Helsingfors--Paris: Finlands utveckling till nation på världsutställningarna, 1851-1900* (Helsinki: Svenska litteratursällskapet i Finland, 1996).

the Finnish Great Famine of 1866-8 came to be associated with the political project of Scandinavianism whose capital in the Northern kingdoms was already withering.¹⁶²⁷

Ministry of War and rising group of Russian entrepreneurs who regarded the North as a valuable area for their activities also capitalized on the Scandinavian dangers to push forward their respective agendas.¹⁶²⁸ Although Katkov pronounced the ideas of Scandinavian union long-dead in 1873,¹⁶²⁹ new reproduction of Scandinavianism-related fears started at the beginning of the 20th century when Nicholas II reinforced policies of administrative homogenization across the imperial domains.¹⁶³⁰ In 1904, for example, governor-general Obolensky wrote in his report that radical representatives of the Swedish party still cherished their dreams about Scandinavian confederation.¹⁶³¹ Governor-general's chancellery under notorious Bobrikov earlier also alarmed Saint-Petersburg about these ideas, tracing the genealogy of contemporary Finnish independence ideas from Qvanten's famous *Fennomani och Skandinavism*, giving it a new life in modern context.¹⁶³²

While political imaginaries of the Scandinavian union were long gone from the range of possible futures in Sweden, Norway, and Denmark, Russian assault on Finnish autonomy reinvigorated non-governmental associations and organizations and prompted new entrepreneurial connections across the region under the banner of its freedom and

¹⁶²⁷ On telegrams: Johansson, "Skandinavismen i Finland." On review of Russian foreign policy: Tobiesen's report 3 / 15 October 1866. GARF. F. 109, op. 41, d. 5 ch. 1, l. 35-5ob; On fundraising and Scandinavian allusions, although they were rather used by fundraisers themselves: Russian consulate in Copenhagen – Adlerberg, 20 February / 3 March 1868. KA. KKK, Fa: 1288, N. 7. See also: Andrew G. Newby, "External Philanthropy 1856–1868," in *Finland's Great Famine, 1856-68* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023), 131–66, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-19474-0_5.

¹⁶²⁸ Rostislav Fadeev, *Vooruzhennye sily Rossii* (Saint-Petersburg: Izd. Komarova, 1868), 256–57; Mihail Agapov, "'Zagovor' Protiv Severa Rossii: Nacionalizacija Predprinimatel'skogo Diskursav 60-e Gg. XIX v.," *Ab Imperio* 2019, no. 4 (2019): 73–96, <https://doi.org/10.1353/imp.2019.0113>.

¹⁶²⁹ Mikhail Katkov, *Sobranie peredovyh statej Moskovskih vedomostej. 1873 god* (S-Peterburg: Tip. V.V. Chicherina, 1897), 7.

¹⁶³⁰ Tuomo Polvinen, *Imperial Borderland: Bobrikov and the Attempted Russification of Finland, 1898–1904*, trans. Steven Huxley (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995).

¹⁶³¹ RGIA. F. 1538, op. 1, d. 4, l. 2-2ob.

¹⁶³² Kratkij obzor protivopravitel'stvennogo dvizhenija v Finljandii s konca 1898 goda. GARF. F. 601, op. 1, d. 2344, l. 9-9ob.

independence.¹⁶³³ The persistence of Scandinavianism in the Russian cabinets owed much to the imperial anxieties about the loyalty of the composite parts, integrity of the realm, and political imagination that still reproduced fears of alternative organization of power in the North. Scandinavianism might have died, Scandinavian-wide framework of thinking and acting, however, persevered.

7.2. Scandinavianism as a moving target

There is no doubt that Scandinavianism was changing in the period from 1843 to 1864. It was adaptive to the kaleidoscope of political and cultural constellations in Scandinavia, cross-fertilizing with contemporary liberal, constitutionalist, nationalist, revanchist, emancipatory, and numerous other projects in Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. Politically, it was not particularly bound to charismatic leadership but rather to organizational, networking, and performative practices that went under its banners. This fact made it flexible and prone to endless reinterpretation by variegated groups and individuals able to associate their needs and desires with this sticky symbol and to declare their loyalty to the project, albeit in diverse interpretations. Scandinavianism for a long time rejected doctrinal readings, allowing for intellectual unity even under conflicting interpretations. Indeed, conflicts surfaced as soon as Scandinavian union manifested itself as a political idea, alienating those who envisioned cultural or entrepreneurial collaboration. Nevertheless, the emotional potential of the project contributed to its survivability, connecting groups across intellectual cordons.

Finland also appeared to be a dynamic asset in the political capital of Scandinavianism. It might have been at the outskirts for Danish intellectuals and politicians, figuring as an unnecessary burden, especially when its ethnographic and cultural difference were articulated in the 1840s. On the other hand, altruistic rhetoric of the cultural rapprochement was often

¹⁶³³ Hemstad, *Fra Indian Summer til nordisk vinter*, 200, 261.

sidelined to give way for political exchange, and alliance between Denmark and Sweden-Norway was regarded as mutually beneficial in fighting the twin battle for Schleswig and Finland. In Sweden, this revanchist vision appeared to be in the center of public and even cabinet discussions, again prompting variegated reactions that ranged from delightful readiness to demands for caution and safety.

Finlandish intellectuals who found themselves in different institutional and political circumstances, compared to those in Scandinavia especially after 1848, were also able to incorporate Scandinavian-leaning vocabulary in their local cultural and political contestations. Contrary to the traditional reading of Scandinavianism in Finland, I argue that initially cultural and emotional potential of the project was appreciated by rising Fennophile and Fennomans intellectuals. While they did not perhaps regard Finland as a part of the future Scandinavian cultural or political commonality, it was precisely this distance that enabled them to interpret the project as witnesses but not advocates. Scandinavianism was regarded as a result of the flourishing national feeling, the latter being a universal result that each culture aimed for. It could be read as a source of inspiration, and students were able to borrow its instruments – including rhetorical and emotional – to pursue their own national project based on Finnish culture.

Besides, Scandinavian-wide framework, solidified and bolstered by Scandinavianism, allowed for some intellectuals in Finland to orient their visions of local political organization towards practices established in Denmark and Sweden-Norway, articulating the pace of progress, freedom, institutional development in the neighboring political entities. Scandinavian regions manifested itself as a field of the politics of comparison, and in this sense, Finland could enjoy little advantage in the rhetoric of liberal politicians. Even the idea of a Scandinavian union with Finland in its borders might have found some adherents among Finlandish public – more so among Finlandish émigrés in Stockholm – but they had to restrict

their explications of loyalty to the project to gestures, symbols, and signs available for their interpretations by the limited audience. Others, however, might have read something excessive into this figurative language.

Finlandish press was adapting not only to Scandinavian fluctuation but also to the imperial transformations, and the introduction of relaxed censorship after the Crimean War along with new political language that drew on the notions of monarchical love, legality, and emancipation allowed them to strengthen their demands, while rhetorically approximating their needs with those gifted by the monarch and thus bypassing governor-general when needed. Conversely, bureaucratic cabinets also recognized the need to back up their projects with the power of the newly discovered public opinion, showcasing cabinet struggles to wider audience and contributing to reorganization of the public debates along more solidified political and cultural lines, although leaving enough space for hybrid positions and heterogeneous arguments.

7.3. The Russian empire as a moving angle of vision

The Russian empire was changing as well and its perception of Scandinavianist dangers depended as much on its languages of rationalization of the imperial political, legal, and ethnic diversity as well as on its visions of the diplomatic relations, political geography, and its position in it. Russian annexation of Finland in 1808-9 exposed it to new intellectual and administrative landscape that it had to navigate, while new elites of the Grand Duchy of Finland capitalized on the opportunity in the role of the imperial intermediaries that had proper knowledge about its designs and workings to secure their privileged position as *translators* between the two worlds. The Swedish legal system was preserved and presented as foundation of Finlandish autonomy while unquestioned loyalty to the Russian throne served as a pledge of its special position.

Indeed, in the 1810s-20s its position was not as unique since Poland, Bessarabia, and Baltic provinces, although in a lesser degree, enjoyed various systems of estate privileges and rights. The imperial abode rested on the principles of estate solidarity forged by the proximity of benefits that they enjoyed. When Alexander Menshikov was appointed to the position of governor-general of Finland, however, new bureaucratic visions surfaced that were challenging these 'outdated' pillars of the imperial system of rule within the Russian proper but especially in other composite parts where estate categories often intermingled with those of ethnicity. Prince Menshikov, however, collaborated with Finlandish elites to overcome these challenges prompted by new conceptualizations of the imperial resilience. Menshikov who rarely visited the duchy relied on the intermediary group of most Swedish-speaking Finlandish elites securing pan-imperial noble rights that encompassed Finlandish autonomy.

Challenges also came from across the sea where modern politics was being performed by the masses in the streets and on the pages of progressive journals, many of them smuggled to Finland. In the 1830s, Finlandish ties with Sweden were still sensible in many spheres, from kinship relations to cultural orientation and industrial path dependence. To secure political loyalty of the population, the administration initially relied mostly on repressive means, intensifying control for the circulation of material objects, newspaper materials, personalities, and their ideas. Economic system, still tied to the Swedish market, was gradually reoriented to prioritize trade with Russia due to the political concerns for the ongoing relations. Finlandish administration, governing the liminal composite part with insecure border regime, also played paradiplomatic role communicating both with Saint-Petersburg and Russian representatives in Stockholm.

First encounters with Scandinavianism must be treated against the backdrop of these concerns that stemmed from general suspicion of Swedish trajectory in politics and economic development that might lead to upheavals and revolutions. The idea of a Scandinavian union,

ironically perceived by Menshikov as an exhumation of a medieval polity, appeared dangerous because of the political practices and rhetoric that it drew upon with regards to the Russian empire and Finland. It was rather the idea of revolutionary ‘contamination’ than geopolitical expansion that produced concerns for the imperial administration. Moreover, since the students explained their behavior by alluding to Fennoman concerns while its main proponent, Johan Snellman appeared in the surveillance bureaucratic trace which led to Sweden and even to Scandinavia, Fennomania and Scandinavianism at this point appeared to be dangerously close to each other rather than seen as ‘counterweights’.

The diplomatic corps in Stockholm and Copenhagen reinforced these suspicions, addressing Scandinavian students conventions as revolutionary manifestations prepared by conspirative organizations with cosmopolitan ties. The language of post-Napoleonic securitization across Europe was still vital for their conceptualization of present threats that stemmed from class conflict and sought to assault the established order embodied in respective monarchical institutions. The allusions to revolutionary directory, Scandinavian three-colored cockade, and Jacobin dangers also recast political visions of Scandinavian consolidation into a security threat.

In 1848, the Russian empire faced challenges of European revolutionary politics. Unable to secure the status quo across Europe, it had to navigate new principles and practices of political action. Denmark appeared in the fire of the civil war precipitated by nationalist tendencies, while Prussian intervention – sanctioned by the Frankfurt parliament – exacerbated the threat. Since March 1848, Danish cabinet was led by half-Scandinavianist ministry while Swedish king manifested his military assistance to Denmark under the pressure of pan-Scandinavian slogans. The Russian empire was aware of both facts, and yet it intervened on the side of those, whom its diplomats earlier credited as revolutionaries in disguise. The empire, siding with Sweden, however, alluded exclusively to the principles of Vienna order. Its agents

in Europe, nevertheless, could argue for alignment, even if temporal, of the imperial and Scandinavianist trajectories. Paradoxically, the imperial intervention was also reinforced by the necessity to avoid new political combinations in the North and manifesting its role as an intermediary, Nicholas I diverted other agents from pursuing suspicious tendencies. The imperial administration and diplomatic corps, however, demonstrated flexibility in this apprehensive proximity to Scandinavianist avenues of thought.

Underlining the participation of proletarian classes in the European upheavals, Finnish administration sought to curb any socialist-leaning foreign indoctrinations of the masses, and Fennomania appeared in the center of these concerns, even though earlier it could be regarded as a tool in the imperial repertoire of distancing from Sweden. After 1848, however, its peasant-centered focus and administrative inability to control the spread of it spilled into imperial anxieties about lower classes unrest while the figure of cosmopolitan intellectual Snellman emerged in the focus of imperial suspicion in 1848 and shortly after.

Governor-general Friedrich Berg who replaced Menshikov during the Crimean War reshaped the mapping of political loyalties in the duchy. Fashioning himself as a representative of a regular government without any necessity for recourse to intermediary rule, Berg argued that representatives of Swedish-speaking population, suspected not even in unloyalty but rather in possibilities of it during the wartime, appeared to be less reliable than the masses of Finnish peasants. Scandinavianism appeared to be one of the main dangers for the imperial abode in Finland, although Berg and the reestablished headquarters of the Third Section in Finland constantly complained that they lacked enough data to reveal conspirative workings or even genuine tendencies of the Swedish-speaking publics.

Scandinavianism – although in the public sphere it referred exclusively to foreign affairs and Swedish-Danish dynamics – emerged as a contested term used by different members of the administration in their communication with Saint-Petersburg to request resources,

consolidate power, criticize the opponents, or showcase unprofessionalism. Scandinavianism was projected onto local demands, again rather in the cabinets than in public, that concerned cultural, economic, or political tendencies in the duchy. Administrative opponents of governor-general were also able to successfully capitalize on the danger, presenting it as a result of Berg's repressive politics. Both sides, moreover, were experimenting with new imperial languages of rationalization, alluding to ethnographic proximity, direct rule, legality and even decency of government institutions, professionalism, emancipation, trust, party politics and progress. Suspicion in conspiracies gave way for recognizing the tendencies of the public opinion, political repression – for participation through representation.

Even though the 'calmness' of Finland was often contrasted to political passions of the Poles, in fact, new imperial matrix of loyalty spread to the duchy as well, redistributing imagined and real assets to allegedly conservative peasantry as opposed to Swedish-leaning elites. Moreover, this opposition was gradually leaving the domains of class-centered explanation, turning into the dynamics of ethnic conflict between the suppressors Swedes and the oppressed Finns and thus aligning emancipation of Finnish peasants through language reforms and representation with Russian peasants freed from their serfdom. Swedes, on the other hand, were pictured as naturally antagonistic towards Russia, and even material profits could not outweigh their original sins, discovered by the means of modern ethnography.

In the domain of foreign politics, the Russian empire sought to remain uninvolved into conflicts as a belligerent side, allocating all affordable resources for internal reforms. The Polish Uprising of 1863 made it reorient its diplomatic relations from alliance with Napoleon III's France towards collaboration with conservative Prussia. In Danish-German conflict over the destiny of Holstein, Minister Gorchakov, however, put burden of placating the tensions onto Danish shoulders even earlier. When the Second War for Schleswig started, Alexander II and Gorchakov took a position in-between the two sides, seeking to preserve the integrity of

the Danish monarchy while justifying Prussian-Austrian intervention into Schleswig as a means to avoid revolutionary developments there.

While the ministry received the dispatches that declared the withering tides of Scandinavianism from Stockholm and Copenhagen since 1860, Scandinavian union idea forcefully and, perhaps, unexpectedly manifested itself as a project with real chances for reification in the blazing crisis. Aristocratic diplomats were mostly unable to monitor secret negotiations launched on both sides of the Øresund by the means of doppelganger diplomacy that often went against the grain of official ministerial politics. In the imperial public domain, the threat of Scandinavian union manifested itself on the pages of conservative and progressive newspapers that pictured it as a danger for Russian military and economic might in the Baltic area. Newspaper editors, moreover, recognized their new public role as a lobbying group that in the 1860s was able to formulate and dictate, although sometimes in disguise, their visions of the imperial politics in domestic and foreign domains.

Alexander II and Gorchakov also recognized the dangers of Scandinavian union reified, and in their formulations it pertained to Russian ‘direct interests’ in the region without, however, clear explications of the concrete consequences of such combination. The path of non-intervention that they took must have annoyed conservative intellectuals who were ready for Russian forceful intervention to secure the region and they had to justify potential presence of the Scandinavian union in the neighborhood, at least in their own eyes. In doing these, they appealed to the expected weakness of its future political organization precipitated by its federative form – seconding general conservative analysis of it – and to the relative impotence of the Scandinavian polity to control the Baltic economic market. Although the ministry recognized that their abstinence from action in this case fell under criticism, their calculations that drew on new principles of political organization and transformed role of the state as security provider of the regularity of trade promised lesser evils.

Public discussions of the imperial integrity principles in the wake of the Polish Uprising and War for Schleswig drew the attention of the audience, albeit mostly conservative, to the general issues of political autonomy, heterogeneity of institutions, legal regimes, and political systems that existed under the imperial abode. Finnish institutions in particular drew the attention of conservative spectators, irritating many by the ostensible abuse of political freedoms in this mere 'province' of Russia. Mikhail Katkov, perhaps, the most outspoken critic of the imperial heterogeneity that spurred internal separatism and inclined towards federative forms, argued in favor of the regularity and homogeneity of a modern state, the ideal that the government had to pursue.

Finnish liberals and even more conservative Finnish newspapers guarded the privileges granted to Finland by the emperor and articulated the legality of their political practices. Almost simultaneously, Finnish witnesses of the Danish defeat underlined the necessity to abandon ambitious projects, primarily addressing Scandinavianism, and to concentrate resources on the internal development of the autonomous duchy. Navigating both pan-imperial debates and new internal institutional regime many of these intellectuals came to see in Finland what Katkov wished to see in Russia, namely – a state. Paradoxically, Finnish imaginations of statehood was not only conceived in their opposition against Russian conservative pretensions, but also in some respect together with pan-imperial transformations that operationalized new channels of communication and modern languages of rationalization.

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