The distribution of keys in a computer network using single key or public key encryption is discussed. We consider the possibility that communication keys may be compromised, and show that key distribution protocols with timestamps prevent replays of compromised keys. The timestamps have the additional benefit of replacing a two-step handshake.

Timestamps in key distribution protocols

SACCO, Giovanni
1981-01-01

Abstract

The distribution of keys in a computer network using single key or public key encryption is discussed. We consider the possibility that communication keys may be compromised, and show that key distribution protocols with timestamps prevent replays of compromised keys. The timestamps have the additional benefit of replacing a two-step handshake.
1981
24:8
533
536
security; key distribution; cryptoanalytic attack
D. Denning; G. M. Sacco
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/114562
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