This paper determines the optimal ownership share held by a unit into a second unit when both face a tax-bankruptcy trade-off. Full ownership is optimal when the first unit has positive debt, because dividends help avoid its default. Positive debt is, in turn, optimal when its corporate tax rate exceeds a threshold, and/or thin capitalization rules place an upper limit on the debt level in the second unit, and/or the Volcker Rule bans bailout transfers to the second unit. Full ownership is no longer optimal only if there is a tax on intercorporate dividend. This theory rationalizes observations on multinationals, financial conglomerates, and family groups.

A Trade-Off Theory of Ownership and Capital Structure

Nicodano, Giovanna;Regis, Luca
2019-01-01

Abstract

This paper determines the optimal ownership share held by a unit into a second unit when both face a tax-bankruptcy trade-off. Full ownership is optimal when the first unit has positive debt, because dividends help avoid its default. Positive debt is, in turn, optimal when its corporate tax rate exceeds a threshold, and/or thin capitalization rules place an upper limit on the debt level in the second unit, and/or the Volcker Rule bans bailout transfers to the second unit. Full ownership is no longer optimal only if there is a tax on intercorporate dividend. This theory rationalizes observations on multinationals, financial conglomerates, and family groups.
2019
131
3
715
735
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X18302538
Ownership Leverage Taxes Thin capitalization Groups
Nicodano, Giovanna; Regis, Luca
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/1694879
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