This article on Axel Hägerström’s theory is presented in four sections. First, focus is on his meta-ethics, a perhaps lesser explored, but no less important aspect, which earned him the title of “father of modern non-cognivism”. His inaugural lecture at the Uppsala University, On the Truth of Moral Propositions from 1911 will be examined. Some very hot debates in the thirties and forties originated from this lecture that gave Hägerström his notorious nickname “axiological nihilist”. In section two, I will explain why his position cannot be properly understood as nihilism. This enables us to avoid a common misinterpretation and to illustrate in a more appropriate way Hägerström’s view of Hume’s law. By pointing to the specific features of Hägerström’s theory, the aim in section three is to determine what arguments of his can be considered the first form of modern non-cognitivism, as distinct from both classical moral relativism and Hobbes’ conventionalism. In section four, light is shed on the argumentative strategies used by Hägerström in defending the four meta-ethical theses that make up his “axiological nihilism”. This exposition enables further critical assessment on where to locate Hägerström in the contemporary debate on entanglement.
À l'origine du non-cognitivisme moderne : Axel Hägerström
MINDUS, Patricia Maria
2009-01-01
Abstract
This article on Axel Hägerström’s theory is presented in four sections. First, focus is on his meta-ethics, a perhaps lesser explored, but no less important aspect, which earned him the title of “father of modern non-cognivism”. His inaugural lecture at the Uppsala University, On the Truth of Moral Propositions from 1911 will be examined. Some very hot debates in the thirties and forties originated from this lecture that gave Hägerström his notorious nickname “axiological nihilist”. In section two, I will explain why his position cannot be properly understood as nihilism. This enables us to avoid a common misinterpretation and to illustrate in a more appropriate way Hägerström’s view of Hume’s law. By pointing to the specific features of Hägerström’s theory, the aim in section three is to determine what arguments of his can be considered the first form of modern non-cognitivism, as distinct from both classical moral relativism and Hobbes’ conventionalism. In section four, light is shed on the argumentative strategies used by Hägerström in defending the four meta-ethical theses that make up his “axiological nihilism”. This exposition enables further critical assessment on where to locate Hägerström in the contemporary debate on entanglement.
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