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**THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF CATEGORIES OF  
EXPERIENCE IN EARLY HEIDEGGER  
A STUDY**

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## Introduction

The aim of this work is to outline the nature and the structure of early Heidegger's categories of our experience and their functioning within the worldly domain. I will argue that they reveal to have a non-subjectivist and non-predicative nature but rather a hybrid one. They demonstrate to be indicative operative syncategorematic structures that articulate our experience within its worldly context.

Following Husserl's categorial intuition and gathering from it the useful hints about the status of categories, I shall show how Heidegger's categories should be located within the experience of a self-structured environmental context, in which we participate and contribute, as those "median" elements that interconnect the dimensions of world and language. In order to study the nature and structure of categories, I will base my investigation on those passages of early Heidegger's lectures in which the author, thanks to the analysis of concrete examples taken from our everyday life, is concerned with describing our experience and unpacking its articulation. In these passages, we will be able to trace the implicit categorial structure at work together with the elements that contribute to it.

It is well known that Heidegger's ontological project is animated by the wish for a renewal of philosophical thought. Accordingly, his attempt is characterized by the need for a renewal of the philosophical instruments employed within the metaphysical tradition. It has been widely acknowledged that Heidegger, in order to accomplish this task, elaborates new categories and uses new concepts, to avoid the traps and prejudices of traditional thought and grasp the phenomena without entrapping them in schemas or projections that would not show the inner and proper dynamic and articulation of our experience in the world. Especially in his early phase, Heidegger was not yet focused explicitly on the question of the meaning of *Being* – which would be of pivotal importance starting from *Being and Time* onwards – but he was mainly animated, at this stage, by methodological concerns in striving to achieve a new categorial apparatus and to elaborate adequate instruments to gain an access to our experience – which Heidegger understood in terms of *life, facticity* or *Dasein* as a being-in-the-world – and a proper understanding of its structure.

The purpose of this thesis is to follow Heidegger's efforts in describing our experience in the world, and to understand the nature and structure of the categorial articulation that we find in it, by asking: what is the nature and structure of Heidegger's categories?

In many studies on Heidegger, we find many contributions that recognize and list Heidegger's categories or pinpoint his new conceptual instruments, but there is not a specific debate about their proper nature and function. While we might say that in every Heideggerian study as such, given the pivotal role of Heidegger's new categories within his project, we potentially find some parts dedicated to commenting on Heidegger's categories, we also can say with Tepley<sup>1</sup> that relatively little energy has been spent explaining what these categories are or focusing on what kind of nature we should ascribe to them, or how they function in the articulation of our experience. This question does not find a direct answer in Heidegger's texts, since Heidegger does not furnish us with an explicit account of their nature. Furthermore, to render the task even more difficult, Heidegger oscillates in referring to his new categories, variously defining them as "structures", "determinations" (*Bestimmungen*) and "characteristics" (*Charaktere*)<sup>2</sup>, but also "concepts"<sup>3</sup> or even "properties" (*Eigenschaften*)", while explicitly stating that ontological categories are not properties<sup>4</sup>. Thus, the indications we find about the characterization of Heidegger's categorial research are differently, and hence problematically, defined. Heidegger recognized that the difficulty in defining these philosophical instruments is directly embedded in their very nature.

This uncertainty of philosophical concepts is not, however, exclusively founded upon this alteration of standpoints. It belongs, rather, to the sense of philosophical concepts themselves that they always remain uncertain. The possibility of access to philosophical concepts is fundamentally different from the possibility of access to scientific concepts. Philosophy does not have at its disposal an objectively and thoroughly formed material context into which concepts can be integrated in order to receive their determination. There is thus a difference in principle between science and philosophy.<sup>5</sup>

Heidegger's oscillations in defining his categories are surely the symptom of a difficulty connoted in the nature of philosophical inquiry, but I will consider them not merely as the sign of a general problem but as those hints, so to speak, that may lead us to conceive of his

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<sup>1</sup> Tepley J., "Properties of Being in Heidegger's Being and Time", in *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol.22, No 3, 2014, 461-481.

<sup>2</sup> Scattered throughout Heidegger M., *The Concept of Time*, trans. Farin I, London, Continuum, 2011; Ga 64, *Der Begriff der Zeit*, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 2004.

<sup>3</sup> Heidegger M., *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity*, trans. van Buren J., Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1999 15; Ga 63, *Ontologie. Hermeneutik der Faktizität*, ed. Bröcker-Oltmanns K., Frankfurt am Mein, Klostermann, 1988, 19.

<sup>4</sup> Heidegger M., *Being and Time*, trans. Macquarrie J. and Robinson E., New York, Harper and Row, 1962, 84; Ga 2, *Sein und Zeit*, ed. von Herrmann F.W, Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1976, 57.

<sup>5</sup> Heidegger M., *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, trans. Fritsch M. & Gosetti-Ferencei J., Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2004, 3; Ga 60, *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens*, ed. von Herrmann F.W, Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1995, 4.

categories as having a hybrid nature, as I shall argue when trying to give an answer to the question of the nature and structure of categories of our experience. In order to understand the nature of categories, I will mainly focus on early Heidegger – from Heidegger's text on *Duns Scotus's Theory of Categories and Meaning* (1916) to *Being and Time* (1927) –, by privileging the so-called phenomenological decade of his thought, in which Heidegger's primary concern is directed to finding the right categorial and conceptual instruments to renew the philosophical account, in order to distance it from the tradition of metaphysics and its features. In this preparatory phase, we may appreciate more closely Heidegger's search for new instruments for the analysis of the dimension of facticity – namely our concrete experience in the world. In this phase, Heidegger's philosophical framework and the features of his reflection are more clearly deployed than in his later works. In fact, early Heidegger is characterized by his lectures: in these, we find Heidegger's distinctive language and style together with Heidegger's own ontological thought, but the didactic nature of the lectures, together with the several notes and drafts (included in the *corpus* of his lectures), represents a good place to follow Heidegger's steps in progressing and formulating his questions, answers and his philosophical tools. Differently from late Heidegger, who is mainly represented by the production of texts for conferences or brief essays than lectures, early Heidegger gives us the possibility to see the inner mechanism of his work and it is resultantly more open to be a stimulating base for further reflections to develop also beyond Heidegger.

As we have said, in early Heidegger, we do not find as the primary concern the question of *Being* but rather the question of our experience. Therefore, we will not have to deal with the question of the meaning of *Being*, while trying to resolve one of Heidegger's unresolved questions, but rather we will analyse the categories and the structuring of our experience, a question that may go beyond Heidegger's own ontology, and can possibly be used as a suggestion as to how we can interpret categories and the experience in which we find them.

Given the lack of Heidegger's account of the nature of his categories and the lack of clarity in defining them, to accomplish the aim of the thesis, I will not proceed to a full exegesis of Heidegger's early texts, but I will instead extract the categorial element from Heidegger's description of experience, focusing on a few passages of his works in which we can find a model of the nature and structure of categories.

In the first chapter, I will outline the proper meaning I intend to maintain, in this analysis,

of the term ‘categories’ as structures of our experience in the world. I will focus mainly on early Heidegger’s so-called phenomenological decade in which we can trace more easily Heidegger’s description of our concrete experience – facticity – in an overt criticism of the metaphysical tradition. In chapter 2, I will identify Heidegger’s main criticism of *subjectivism* and *predicationism*. I shall clarify the meaning of these criticisms – that may be thought of as represented by Kantian and Aristotelian conceptions of categories – in order to frame Heidegger’s problem with the renewal of categories and effort to overcome both tendencies. In early Heidegger’s texts, in accordance with Heidegger’s criticism of tradition and his attempt to renew the account of ontology and experience, we can outline more explicitly the categorial renewal and see Heidegger’s categories of experience at work.

In order to sustain our purpose in focusing on the nature and structure of categories that articulate our experience in the world I shall claim, in chapter 3, that we may find a fertile source in Husserl’s categorial intuition presented in the *Sixth Logical Investigation* to outline the nature of categories. I shall claim that Husserl’s doctrine of categorial intuition is of fundamental importance not only for the question of *Being*, as Heidegger explicitly states, but also for the understanding of his account of categories, working as the implicit engine in Heidegger’s demonstration of the functioning of categories. I shall maintain that in Husserl’s categorial intuition Heidegger finds a third path between the two main models of categorial conception – namely the Aristotelian and Kantian conceptions. Therefore, I will focus on Husserl’s categorial intuition in order to acquire those elements to use in Heidegger’s account of the nature and structure of categories. I will meticulously analyse Husserl’s account of categories within the doctrine of categorial intuition from what I will call a bottom-up and a top-down perspective, from the level for materiality to language and *vice versa*. I will analyse the status of categories with respect to materiality and language, by highlighting and stressing the various ambiguities and oscillations we find in the doctrine of categorial intuition, considering them not as philosophical obstacles to the coherence of the theory of categories but rather as useful indications for our comprehension of the issue of categories. Not without stretching Husserl’s categorial intuition, stressing the oscillations we can find within it, and while not necessarily framing the doctrine within Husserl’s original purpose, we can find that categories have a hybrid nature and are characterized as syncategorematic and operative. Thus, in the chapter concerning Heidegger’s categories, I will follow the suggestions gathered from Husserl, and will analyse the nature of Heidegger’s categories, in those texts and passages in which Heidegger explicitly and

implicitly recalls the Husserlian categorial intuition, considering it as the engine with which it is possible to pursue the investigation of the status of categories and their relationship with worldly experience.

In chapter 4, I will consider Heidegger's study on Duns Scotus' categories and his lectures about categorial intuition presented in *History of the Concept of Time*, in which Husserl's categorial intuition is explicitly recalled. Heidegger's study of Scotist categories may be conceived as a first draft of the nature and structure of categories, to enrich with Heidegger's specific indications about categories that we find in his interpretation of Husserl's categorial intuition. We will see that Heidegger's interpretation of categorial intuition is mainly characterized by two distinctive statements that give us new information about the relationship between categories and perception and categories as expression, furnishing us the direction to follow in order to grasp the nature of Heidegger's categorially structured experience. Following Heidegger's interpretation of categorial intuition, we will turn to two examples that demonstrate the actual structuring of categories with the experience, in which we can gain their hybrid nature and syncategorematic operative structure to find within our experience, in which they work as the median element of connection between the dimensions of world and language. More specifically, I will use the famous example of the lectern, presented in *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, to analyse the categorial articulation of context and our environmental practical everyday life – in order to highlight the nature of categories within the world – and the example of the picture, presented in *Being and Time*, as the starting point to understand the relationship between categories and the dimension of language. These two examples will help us to unpack the elements that are involved in the categorial structure of experience, especially perception and meaning, of which Heidegger offers a special interpretation. As in the analysis about Husserl's categorial intuition, following the bottom-up and top-down perspective, the former will help us to see the categories in the experience and how categories embrace the dimension of perception while intertwining the dimension of language, while the latter, starting from the linguistic expression, will shed a light on the relationship between language and world, both contributing to frame the nature of categories as indicative operative syncategorematic structures that articulate our experience within its worldly dimension.



## Chapter 1. Categories

The aim of this work is to outline the nature and the structure of Heidegger's categories of our experience and their functioning within the worldly domain. I will argue that they demonstrate a non-subjectivist and non-predicative nature but a hybrid one. They reveal themselves to be hybrid operative syncategorematic structures that articulate our experience within its worldly context. As operative structures it is essential to the study of their nature to find the domain where we can see them at work. In order to analyse the nature of categories, I will focus on early Heidegger's work – the so-called phenomenological decade – in which Heidegger is concerned with finding new conceptual instruments to frame our experience, in an open criticism of traditional metaphysics and epistemology. In this phase, therefore, we can find a fertile *locus* to extract the working elements for the understanding of the nature of categories in Heidegger. The purpose of this thesis is to follow Heidegger's effort in describing our experience in the world, and to understand the nature and structure of categorial articulation that we find in it. Before going any further in understanding the nature of categories in Heidegger, as categories of our experience, and identifying all the elements that are entailed in their structure, we need a preliminary and brief clarification regarding the term "categories".

### 1.1 "Categories" – A clarification

What can we mean here by "categories" in Heidegger?

As I have already pointed out in the *Introduction*, while Heidegger, in his early phase, is seeking for new categories to frame his ontological project and get adequate tools to frame the structure of experience in the world, he is not directly concerned in defining explicitly their nature and function. Regarding this question, we have said that we may register various oscillations in the labelling of categories in Heidegger's corpus, and find "categories" now defined as "structures", "determinations" (*Bestimmungen*) or also "characteristics", "concepts"<sup>1</sup>, "properties" (*Eigenschaften*), while explicitly stating that ontological

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<sup>1</sup> For sake of accuracy, throughout early Heidegger's texts – especially before *Being and Time* – we need to pay attention to the terms "categories" and "concept", since they are both used with a double meaning. Sometimes these two terms are used to indicate the philosophical instruments (and their nature) of epistemology and metaphysics, meaning, therefore, those elements to overcome. See for example the notion

categories are not properties<sup>2</sup>. These vacillations implicitly testify to us Heidegger's progressive struggling not only in finding new categories but also in identifying their nature under a different light. In *Being and Time*, probably Heidegger's most famous work, Heidegger distinguishes "categories" (*Kategorien*) and existentials (*Existenzialen*)<sup>3</sup>, referring by the former to the "determinations" (characteristics) of entities, and by the latter to the structures of Dasein.

I will use the expression "categories" in a broader sense, without meaning this distinction between categories of entities and categories of Dasein. I will use the term to indicate more generally those articulations that we find in our experience in the world, as analysed in early Heidegger's texts. In fact, we should note that this precise distinction occurs in *Being and Time*, while in the previous works of early Heidegger "categories" is variously used and does not indicate this specific separation.

In *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, Heidegger uses the term "categories" as "categories of life"<sup>4</sup>, indicating a wide class of phenomena. In this text we can see that Heidegger basically defines as categories every kind of modality in which we experience our life in the world – such as "care", the plethora of categories of movement, categories of relationality and so forth<sup>5</sup> – also including the very notion of facticity and "world". In this

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of "categories" in Heidegger M., 'Conclusion of Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning', trans. Stewart R. M. and van Buren J., in Heidegger M., *Supplements. From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2002, 61–68, 64; Ga 1, *Frühe Schriften*, ed. von Herrmann F. W., Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1976, 402. At some other times, they indicate Heidegger's own anti-traditional and metaphysical tools.

<sup>2</sup> Many authors have pointed out, especially regarding the notion of *Being*, that Heidegger does not intend to understand his ontological categories and *Being* as properties. See, Carman T., *Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, 200; Mulhall S., *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time*, London, Routledge, 1996, 10; Philipse H., *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being: A Critical Introduction*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998, 41. Differently, Tepley, in his analysis of the nature of categories in "Properties of Being in Heidegger's Being and Time", supports what he himself labels the "Property Thesis", *ivi*, 462. He bases his controversial argument on two main points: "the fact that Heidegger refers to kinds and structures of being as 'characteristics' and 'determinations', which are just two different words for 'properties'", and on the fact that "kinds and structures of being play three roles that properties are supposed to play: they account for similarities between entities, they are what predicates express and they are what abstract nouns refer to", *ivi*, 467. Even if Tepley's thesis is stimulating, I do not think that from Heidegger's oscillations in defining categories we should infer that they are synonymous with properties, but take that as the sign of a work in progress of the problem; similarly I will try to show that Heidegger's categories do not have the nature of predicates, but they intend to frame our experience in opposition to this view.

<sup>3</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 70; Ga 2, 44.

<sup>4</sup> Heidegger M., *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, trans. Rojcewicz R., Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2001, Part III; Ga 61, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, ed. Bröcker W. and Bröcker-Oltmanns K., Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1985.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*.

text Heidegger's use of "categories" is very broad and mirrors by and large his use of the term in his early phase<sup>6</sup>. To define the categories of our experience in the world, Heidegger clarifies what we should intend by categories.

The categories are not inventions or a group of logical schemata as such, "lattices"; on the contrary, they are alive in life itself in an original way: alive in order to "form" life in themselves.<sup>7</sup>

In this passage we can appreciate Heidegger's indication regarding the nature of categories. They are not artificial schemas, external to our experience, to be applied<sup>8</sup> to it, but rather we should find them within our life and our experience. This means that our factual life and our experience in the world show us their categorial structure. Following this indication regarding the nature of categories, I will use the term "categories" in a broader sense than their narrow meaning in *Being and Time*. In this work, categories are intended to be the articulations of our experience framed in our environmental world that early Heidegger's works show us<sup>9</sup>. We can identify the broadening of the concept of

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<sup>6</sup> Heidegger uses category in a very broad sense, sometimes to indicate – rather than a proper category – a dense technical notion as "world" (see especially *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*), which in Heidegger acquires a specific meaning and a fundamental role. However, I will consider "world" not as indicating a category but as the dimension in which to trace Heidegger's application of categories – "the field of action of Dasein" (my translation). Chiurazzi G., *Teorie del giudizio*, Aracne, Roma, 2005, 117. As a final remark on the liberty of labelling Heideggerian terms as categories in secondary literature, we shall consider Brandom's contribution on *Being and Time*, which may be listed, with Tepley, as one of the few contributions mainly focused on Heidegger's categories. In his essay, Brandom identifies three as Heidegger's main categories: *Dasein*, *Zuhandenheit* and *Vorhandenheit*. See Brandom R., "Heidegger's Categories in Being and Time", in Brandom R., *Tales of the Mighty Dead Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of Intentionality*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2002, 298-323. However, as Haugeland correctly points out, Dasein is not a category, but an entity, the entity that we always are. Haugeland J., "Reading Heidegger Reading Brandom", in *European Journal of Philosophy*, Volume 13, 2005, 421-428. However, I will not use Brandom's essay, not because Brandom's interpretation is strongly characterized by his own project to develop a *Normative Pragmatism*, forcing Heidegger into his frame, but mainly because Brandom's contribution is only focused on *Being and Time* and on the relationship *Zuhandenheit* between *Vorhandenheit* that here I will not deal with.

<sup>7</sup> *Ivi*, 66; Ga 61, 88.

<sup>8</sup> "For the moment, we can just note that here the notion of category is not called to the task of an organization of "life" (meaning thereby "experience" in its broadest sense), but to its proper self-clarification. Categories are like predicates, the consolidation, hence the formal structure of both distensive movement towards things and on the self, which is proper of life itself", (my translation). Gardini M., *Filosofia dell'enunciazione*, Quodlibet, Macerata, 2005, 46.

<sup>9</sup> Heidegger feels the need to recall the etymological notion of categories trying to disengage it from its epistemological characterization which it had gained within traditional philosophy: "[d]epending on the matter at hand, the terms *category*, *class*, or *sort* are used to delineate a region, schema, or pigeonhole into which something is deposited and so classified. This use of the word category corresponds neither to its original concept nor to the related meaning that it has preserved as a key philosophical word (...), *Katagorein* therefore means that, in an explicit view on something, we reveal what it is and render it open. Such revelation happens through the word insofar as the word addresses a thing-any being at all-with regard to what it is, and identifies it as being in one way or another". Heidegger M., *Nietzsche*, vol. 4, trans. Farrell Krell D., San Francisco, Harper, 1982, 36; Ga 6. 2, *Nietzsche*, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1996, 71.

“categories” – which I want to use in my research - as indicating the open “articulation” of our experience in the world in Heidegger when, while talking about the categorial frame of life, he starts by showing us what I take to be the basic structuring of our experience, in the most technical and general way:

Life is always “to live “in” something, to live “out of something, to live “for” something, to live “with” something, to “live against” something, to live “following” something, to live “from “something.””<sup>10</sup>

I take this as an expression indicative of Heidegger’s understanding of the nature of categories, an expression that already hints at their structure. In fact, Heidegger adds, “the ‘something’ whose manifold relations to ‘living’ are indicated in these prepositional expressions (...) is what we call ‘world’”<sup>11</sup>.

I will follow this indication to study the nature of categories, since this indication points to the nature and structure of categories – as articulations of our experience in the world – more broadly, before specifying any particular categories. Therefore, in analysing the nature and structure of categories in Heidegger, I will not analyse one by one the specific categories used by Heidegger. I will not thematise them in order to provide a comment on each one. I will, following the broader conception of categories that early Heidegger allows, try to extract their common nature and structure, focusing on their functioning within the experience and the elements that they articulate.

The exemplar and paradigmatic categories that mainly and more explicitly show the nature of categories – as broadly construed articulations of experience that we here want to investigate – are to be found in those categories that Heidegger uses, whose proper expression already indicates the structuring of experience in the world, such as: “being-in-the-world” (*In-der-Welt-sein*), “being-in” (*In-sein*), “being-with”, “speaking-to”, “speaking-about”, “living-for”, “upon-which”, “as” (*als*), in-order-to, (*Um-zu*), and so forth.

In order to understand the nature of categories and how categories work, we can take these expressions as those exemplar kind of categories that may direct our inquiry into the nature of categories. They can be thought of as the prototypes to which the results of our inquiry should conform.

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<sup>10</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, 65; Ga 61, 85.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*.

## 1.2 Early Heidegger

In order to outline the nature and structure of categories, we shall look at the early Heidegger. In this phase, the so-called “phenomenological decade”<sup>12</sup> which starts with Heidegger’s book on Duns Scotus (1916) and continues until *Being and Time* (1927) and is characterized by the method of phenomenology. Heidegger’s philosophical effort is addressed to finding new categorial and conceptual instruments to describe our concrete experience in the world, what Heidegger calls facticity<sup>13</sup>, which corresponds to Dasein’s experience as being-in-the-world<sup>14</sup>. In this phase, Heidegger’s lectures can be conceived of as constant preparatory attempts to formulate the proper object of philosophy and the question of philosophical access to and instruments to grasp it. Therefore, in this phase, which is mainly a methodological one, we find Heidegger’s research for new categories and conceptual instruments clearly deployed, representing a fertile terrain for our purpose. In fact, in this early phase, Heidegger’s first concern is not the question of *Being* as it will emerge, starting from *Being and Time* onward, in which Heidegger will claim that *Being* as such<sup>15</sup> has been forgotten<sup>16</sup>, neglected or at least misunderstood (misinterpreted) by the Western philosophical tradition. In this phase, rather, the question of ontology – which in our inquiry into the nature of categories will not be taken into account as such – appears as connected to the phenomenological method, so that ontology in this phase indicates a methodological question, more a direction to follow to renew our conception of experience<sup>17</sup> and the instrumental apparatus to grasp it, than a thematic question<sup>18</sup>. In the

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<sup>12</sup> Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s “Being and Time”*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1993, 59.

<sup>13</sup> For the analysis of *Facticity*, see Heidegger, *Ontology*; Ga 63; *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle*; Ga 61 and also, Heidegger M., *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, trans. Sadler T., New York and London, Athlone Press 2000; Ga 56/57, *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, ed. Heimbüchel B., Frankfurt am Mein, Klostermann, 1987.

<sup>14</sup> This equivalency is made explicit by Heidegger, who states that “the being-there of Dasein (factual life) is being in a world”. Heidegger, *Ontology*, 62; Ga 63, 80.

<sup>15</sup> As Edwards puts it, “[t]he starting point of Heidegger’s quest is almost invariably a set of reflections about the puzzling status of ‘is-ness’ or ‘Being’ or ‘being-ness’, of what we normally call ‘existence’”. Edwards P., “Heidegger’s Quest for Being”, in *Philosophy*, Vol. 64, No. 250, October 1989, 437-470, 442.

<sup>16</sup> “Being is in fact ‘the most forgotten, so immeasurably forgotten that this forgottenness is sucked into its own vortex’”, Heidegger, *Nietzsche. Vol. 4*; 36; Ga 6.2, 252. Heidegger writes, “Seen metaphysically, *we are staggering*. Everywhere we are underway amid beings, and yet we no longer know how it stands with Being. We do not even know that we no longer know it”, in Heidegger M., *Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Polt R., New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2000, 217; Ga 40, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, ed. Jaeger P., Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1983, 154-155.

<sup>17</sup> See also Keller: “Heidegger thinks that philosophy is concerned with the manner in which human beings make sense of what they experience”. Keller P., *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, 112.

<sup>18</sup> In fact, Heidegger’s texts, lectures and essays usually start by claiming the need to set the structure of the research before moving any further. Therefore, Heidegger’s first moves concern the methodological keys that

phenomenological decade, Heidegger finds in Husserl's phenomenology the method with which to take on the ontological issue<sup>19</sup>. However, if from *Being and Time* the ontological problem is directed by the question of the meaning of *Being*, in this phase, Heidegger is worried about the problem of the definition of philosophy, the identification of its object and the problem of the access to it<sup>20</sup>. Phenomenology in this sense is the method, and ontology the key word for an investigation that frames categories of experience overcoming the schemas of epistemology and metaphysics and their prejudice (see chapter 2)<sup>21</sup>. In this early phase, phenomenology or better "existential phenomenology" – another definition that Heidegger ascribes to his version of phenomenology – has its proper task the "category

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should be set: the preliminary explication on the meaning of the terms involved in the analyses, the adequate questions to pose, the right philosophical attitude to maintain towards the investigation, and the correct instruments that shall be employed in the inquiry. See for example: "The first thing we must do is to come to an understanding of the theme of this lecture course and the way in which it is to be approached. We shall do this by clarifying its subtitle [...]", in Heidegger M., *History of the concept of Time. Prolegomena*, trans. Kisiel T., Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1985, 1; Ga 20, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, ed. Jaeger P., Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1979, 1; "Phenomenology must develop its concept out of what it takes as its theme and how it investigates its object", in Heidegger M., *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Hofstadter A., Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1982, 1; Ga 24, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, ed. von Herrmann F.W., Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1975, 1; "How do we obtain the essential elements (...)? On which methodological path are they to be found?", in Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 14; Ga 56/57, 15.

<sup>19</sup> In this period, phenomenology and ontology go together, representing for Heidegger methodological questions that should indicate a direction of research. "Phenomenology is the name for the method of ontology", in Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 20; Ga 24, 27; "phenomenology is always only the name for the procedure of ontology", a procedure "that essentially distinguished itself from that of all other, positive sciences", in Heidegger M., *Phenomenology and Theology*, in *Pathmarks*, ed. McNeill W., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, 53; Ga 9, *Wegmarken*, ed. von Herrmann F.W., Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1996, 43. In *Ontology*, Heidegger himself argues for this kind of interpretation when he gives his definition of the term "ontology" and "ontological": Heidegger says that "Ontology" means doctrine of *Being* and that we should "hear in this term only the indefinite and vague directive", in Heidegger, *Ontology*, 1; Ga 63, 1. Criticizing the traditional definition, Heidegger argues against the conception of ontology as a discipline: "[t]he terms "ontology" and "ontological" will be used only in the above-mentioned empty sense of nonbinding indications. They refer to a questioning and defining which is directed to being as such. Which sort of being (*Sein*) is to be questioned after and defined and how this is to be done remain utterly indefinite." Heidegger, *Ontology*, 1; Ga 63, 1; "The expression 'phenomenology' signifies primarily a concept of method. It does not characterize the what of the objects of philosophical research in terms of their content, but the how of such research [...] the term 'phenomenology' expresses a maxim that can be formulated: 'To the things in themselves!'. It is opposed to all free-floating constructions and accidental findings [...] The expression has two components: *phenomenon* and *logos*". Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 26; Ga 2, 27-28.

<sup>20</sup> "The two questions asked in philosophy are, in plain terms: 1. What is it that really matters? 2. Which way of posing questions is genuinely directed to what really matters? What is discourse about when it is discourse in the most proper sense? And what should and will must discourse in philosophy, as a matter of principle, be uncompromising?" Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, 11; Ga 61, 10.

<sup>21</sup> Phenomenology is the "*Urwissenschaft*" or the "*Ursprungswissenschaft*" of life. Scattered throughout Heidegger M., Ga 58, *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/20)*, ed. Gander H.H., Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1993, and Heidegger M., Ga 59, *Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks*, ed. von Herrmann F.W., Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1993.

research”<sup>22</sup> and the identification of the structure of life<sup>23</sup>.

However, as we will see (chapter 3 and chapter 4), Husserl’s importance for our inquiry into the nature of categories will be represented by his doctrine of categorial intuition. I shall argue that Husserl’s doctrine of categorial intuition will be a main source of inspiration in understanding the nature of Heidegger’s categories operating within his analysis of facticity in the early phase, since facticity represents the dimension to consider in order to start the “phenomenological research into categories”<sup>24</sup>.

### 1.3 Facticity

In this early phase, Heidegger also talks about phenomenological hermeneutics<sup>25</sup> or hermeneutic ontology, distinguishing his phenomenological approach from the Husserlian epistemological one<sup>26</sup>. Hermeneutics in Heidegger connotes a wider understanding compared to its traditional meaning as theory of interpretation<sup>27</sup>, becoming the distinctive sign of Heidegger’s direction of the inquiry; the qualification of phenomenology as hermeneutics gives ontology its direction and, thereby, its domain. In fact, hermeneutics in Heidegger is oriented towards facticity<sup>28</sup>. That hermeneutics is oriented to facticity means, in the sense relevant for us, that the notion of hermeneutics represents an antidote to the epistemological approach – that Heidegger considers still under the influences of the prejudices of metaphysics – and it fosters the readmission of the primary concreteness characterized in terms of particularities that frame our practical everyday life.

The term facticity is a technical term that will correspond to Dasein and indicates a precise philosophical operation, involving the understanding of categories and their domain of function. The term “*Faktizität*”, in fact, is borrowed from neo-Kantian terminology and

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<sup>22</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, 17; Ga 61, 20.

<sup>23</sup> Heidegger, Ga 58, 42.

<sup>24</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, 16; Ga 61, 18.

<sup>25</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 112; Ga 56/57, 131.

<sup>26</sup> See especially, Crowell S.G., “Husserl, Heidegger, and Transcendental Philosophy: Another Look at the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article”, in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 50, No. 3, 1990, 501-518.

<sup>27</sup> See especially, Heidegger, *Ontology*; Ga 63, or Heidegger, *Being and Time*; Ga 2, §32.

<sup>28</sup> Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s “Being and Time”*, 21 ff. “The theme of facticity is what Heidegger identifies at the very start of his lectures as initially described using the term “ontology””. Malpas J., “The Beckoning of Language: Heidegger’s Hermeneutic Transformation of Thinking”, in Farin I. and Bowler M. (eds.), *Hermeneutic Heidegger*, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 2016.

“played” against it<sup>29</sup>. Regarding it, Kisiel states that the phenomenology of facticity constitutes “a radical reversal of classical neo-Kantianism, which coined the term”<sup>30</sup> (we will deal with a similar stylistic and philosophical reversal in section 4.4.2). Kisiel continues by recalling that “‘facticity’ first appears in Fichte, who uses it to describe our encounter with the ‘brute’ face of reality not amenable to rational thought”, so that facticity indicates “the irrational *par excellent*, the sign of the insuperable irrationality of the ‘matter’ given to thought”<sup>31</sup>. Neo-Kantian philosophy (and especially the school of Baden), which was one of the main philosophical currents of Heidegger’s time, distinguished that dimension of facts (and facticity) and the dimension of ideality and categories. Following Lotze, who had first proposed the necessary distinction between these two “worlds”, they had separated the temporal flux of fact and matter, and the “supersensible” world of logic, to which categorial elements belong<sup>32</sup>. By means of this, they proposed a duality in which our experience in and of the world is the experience *of* the context and *in* the context of life<sup>33</sup>. Therefore, Heidegger’s proposal to develop a phenomenology of facticity (which is also a category research), reverses the neo-Kantian attitude and understand our factual and concrete<sup>34</sup> life in the world as the dimension in which we should investigate the categorial function of experience. However, Heidegger warns us that facticity does not indicate life or our experience as a mere fact or a sequence of facts. In *Being and Time*, he distinguishes *Faktizität* from *Tatsächlichkeit*<sup>35</sup>, meaning by the latter what which Heidegger intend to indicate simple, mere, brute factuality. Facticity of life, on the contrary, should not be understood as mere fact – biological, psychological or historical<sup>36</sup>. While investigating the structure of facticity, we do not ask *what* happens and occurs in our life but *how*<sup>37</sup>, namely we are inquiring into its structure.

In defining facticity, Heidegger holds that “‘*facticity*’ is the designation we will use for

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<sup>29</sup> Fabris A. and Cimino A., *Heidegger*, Carocci, Roma, 2009, 26.

<sup>30</sup> Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s “Being and Time”*, 27. For the conceptual history of “facticity,” see particularly Kisiel T., “Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask”, in Kisiel T., *Heidegger’s Way of Thought: Critical and Interpretative Signposts*, Denker A. and Heinz M. (eds.), Continuum, New York, 2002, 101-136; Kisiel T., “On the Genesis of Heidegger’s Formally Indicative Hermeneutics,” in Raffoul F. and Nelson E. (eds.), *Rethinking Facticity*, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2008, 41–67.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>32</sup> For an in-depth analysis of the neo-Kantian influences on Husserl and Heidegger, see Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger and the Space of Meaning*, chapter 1 “Neo-Kantianism: Between Science and Worldview”.

<sup>33</sup> See Fabris, *Heidegger*, 24.

<sup>34</sup> Heidegger, Ga 58, 66.

<sup>35</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*; Ga 2, §12.

<sup>36</sup> Esposito C., *Heidegger*, Il Mulino, Milano, 2013, 34.

<sup>37</sup> Heidegger, Ga 58, 84.



the character of the being of "our" "own" Dasein. More precisely, this expression means: *in each case* ‘this’ Dasein in its being-there *for a while at the particular time* (...) [namely] being-there-involved-in”<sup>38</sup>. Therefore, facticity cannot be identified with simple punctual facts, but it is our experience in constant dynamic movement<sup>39</sup> in the worldly domain. Therefore, a phenomenology of facticity is not a description of mere fact but represents the effort to trace a logic of facticity<sup>40</sup> of something that is not static but constantly involved the motion of our experience-in-the-world, of which we have to find the structure<sup>41</sup> (an enterprise that for neo-Kantian school would appear as a contradiction – namely, paraphrasing Caputo, seeking categories in the non-categorical dimension<sup>42</sup>).

Similar to facticity, the “world”, in which we move, is not a mere fact or a spatial frame. In early Heidegger, it is the elected dimension in which we can exercise the phenomenological analysis, to capture the structure of experience. The world is presented as a triple articulated dimension. The world in fact is: environmental world – *Umwelt*; shared-world – *Mit-Welt*; and “my”-world – *Selbst-Welt*, which are correspondingly, “landscapes, streets, cities, deserts”; “parents, siblings, acquaintances, teachers, students, but also that elegant man there, that child and its doll and so forth”; and our own personal life<sup>43</sup>. These articulations are not separated, nor does one have a specific explicit relevance over the others to sharply distinguish one from the other, but all three compose our experience in the world in our everyday life<sup>44</sup>. The world or context of experience is that domain “which environs or surrounds us and also that toward which we are oriented, about which we are concerned and to which we attend”<sup>45</sup>. So that “in the encounter with the thing,

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<sup>38</sup> Heidegger, *Ontology*, 5; Ga 63, 7.

<sup>39</sup> Esposito, *Heidegger*, 37.

<sup>40</sup> “We need a ‘subjective logic’ with a *concrete* subject”. Friedman M., *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger*, Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, 2000, 46.

<sup>41</sup> “Facticity is motility and the structure of this motility” (my translation). Mazzarella E., “Introduzione”, in Heidegger M., *Interpretazioni fenomenologiche di Aristotele. Introduzione alla ricerca fenomenologica*, trans. De Carolis M., Guida MicroMegas, Napoli, 1985, 7-31, 22.

<sup>42</sup> “hermeneutics of factual life”, was an attempt to find a new conceptuality in which to “indicate”, however “formally”, the character of pretheoretical, prephilosophical, indeed even preconceptual life. This (is a) provocative and paradoxical task, to find a concept for the preconceptual”. Caputo J., “People of God, People of Being: The Theological Presuppositions of Heidegger’s Path of Thought”, in Falconer J. and Wrathall M. (eds.), *Appropriating Heidegger*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2000, 85-100, 85.

<sup>43</sup> Heidegger, Ga 58, 33.

<sup>44</sup> As Kisiel puts it “surrounding-world, with-world, self-world: these three relief characters permeate each other in the flux of life so as to give it its unique and ‘labile circumstantiality’, the very rhythm of life of my life”. Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s “Being and Time”*, 118.

<sup>45</sup> Malpas J., “Heidegger’s Topology of Being”, in Crowell S. and Malpas J. (eds.), *Transcendental Heidegger*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2007, 119-134, 121.

we also encounter ourselves and others”<sup>46</sup>. However, the notion of *Umwelt* will be the one which will play a major role in early Heidegger and in our inquiry into categories. As we will see, the notion of *Umwelt* is not just a spatial frame – nor just indicates landscapes – but a rich and complex notion that embraces the other dimensions and could be considered as the domain in which to pursue our inquiry. In fact, we will see (from section 4.4.1) that the main place in which we can find the categorial articulation at work is our factual life, namely our concrete experience which takes place in our environmental world, in which we encounter concrete, particular things and not mere, homogenous data.

In his very early work on Duns Scotus, Heidegger appreciates that

Medieval man's manner of thought is more closely approached if the singular fact is remembered that I would like to earmark as the absolute devotion and submission in temperament to the material that was known to be handed down by tradition. This bent to hand oneself over to the material as it were, keeps the subject bound to one orientation and takes from him the inner possibility and the desire for easier flexibility. The value of a state of affairs (object) moreover, dominates over the values of the ego (subject).<sup>47</sup>

In fact, one of the main features that Heidegger strongly appreciates regarding the Medieval philosophical attitude is its principle of *immersion* into the material of the experience. This reflects, in more Heideggerian terms, the attempt to achieve closeness to the concreteness of experience in which *Dasein* is inserted as *being-in-the-world*. Consequently, Medieval thought does not have an essential ingredient of Modern thought: “the freeing of the subject with his ties to the environment, with his fixation in his own life”<sup>48</sup>. This lack, in this context, symbolizes the fact that the subject is not an ego detached from the flux of experience, whose attitude is characterized by the tendency mainly to seek universal norms and general principles

[...] staying clear of individual peculiarities (*Besonderheiten*).<sup>49</sup>

By recalling the problematic nature of a philosophical negligence towards “individual peculiarities”, Heidegger's text shows a specific concern for particulars<sup>50</sup> that compose the

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<sup>46</sup> *Ivi*, 122.

<sup>47</sup> Heidegger M., *Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, trans. Robbins H., Illinois, De Paul University Chicago, 1978, 7-8; Ga 1, *Frihe Schriften*, ed. von Herrmann F. W., Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1976, 198.

<sup>48</sup> *Ivi*, 10; Ga 1, 198.

<sup>49</sup> *Ivi*, 9; Ga 1, 198.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibidem*.

concreteness (facticity) of experience, an experience in-the-world, taken as a qualitative (material) and not quantitative sphere. Particulars, particularity and peculiarities represent, contrary to the metaphysical attitude to reduce our experience to something homogenous, the character of what we encounter in our experience in our everyday practical dealings.

In order to acquire the first elements of the nature of categories we will turn to Heidegger's criticism of *subjectivism* and *predicationism*, as the two main attitudes belonging to metaphysics that characterize the traditional understanding of our experience and categories that Heidegger tries to overcome.

Our next step will be to turn to Husserl's categorial intuition. I shall argue that Husserl's categorial intuition furnishes Heidegger with a third option for conceiving categories. Moreover, I shall analyse categorial intuition as the main source of inspiration for Heidegger's account of categories<sup>51</sup>. Stretching Husserl and exploiting the various oscillations that we find in his presentation of categorial forms within categorial intuition, I will outline their hybrid nature and also those other features to be retraced in Heidegger's work (chapter 3).

In the sections on Heidegger's categories (chapter 4), I will maintain the importance of categorial intuition, tracing the nature of categories within those passages in which categorial intuition still functions as an implicit engine within the structure of experience within the world.

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<sup>51</sup> Cobb-Stevens notes that in the *Logical Investigations* we find, "Husserl's transformation of the categories of modern philosophy", in Cobb-Stevens R., *Husserl and Analytic Philosophy*, The Hague, Kluwer, 1990, 132.

## Chapter 2. Heidegger's Criticism

In this chapter, I will deal with Heidegger's criticism of metaphysics in terms of *subjectivism* and *predicationism*. Just as almost every question in Heidegger's work might be open to various interpretations and understandings, the question of categories may also be very complex and slippery. Therefore, we need to establish some solid basis on which to pursue the inquiry, or at least to indicate some less problematic topics that can help guide our reflection about categories and their functioning. Among all the multiple themes that we find in Heidegger and the several readings we can have about each of them, we can claim quite confidently that Heidegger's criticisms of *predicationism* and *subjectivism* represent those "certain" constants that frame Heidegger's *pars destruens* regarding his ontological project. They both eminently represent two different, although partially interwoven, examples of how classical philosophy has been focused on the question of "what".

For Heidegger, traditional metaphysical thought is guided by the question "What are beings?"<sup>1</sup>. More precisely, this question is double-sided. "The twofold question, What are beings? Asks on the one hand, What are (in general) beings? The question asks on the other hand, What (which one) is the (ultimate) being?"<sup>2</sup>. While asking "what there is", metaphysics also looks for the ultimate units that compose our experience, aiming at grasping and determining them in their *what-ness*, putting aside their *how*, fixing them as a base for the creation of a hierarchy. Schematically speaking, the history of philosophy can be characterized by the constant confrontation between the question about *what* and the question about *how*, as the main dichotomy that has dominated the other philosophical divisions<sup>3</sup>. By and large, philosophy has ascribed a role of pivotal importance to the dimension of *what* and a merely dependent function to the dimension of *how*. Metaphysics follows this direction, searching for the ultimate *substratum* of reality as a necessary universal foundation. The overall idea is that at the very base, despite all the possible stratifications, there is a hard core, a unity of sense that is the fundamental *substratum*, essential, absolute, immutable and unrelated. In order to reach this result, metaphysics has

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<sup>1</sup> Heidegger, *Kant's thesis about Being*, in *Pathmarks*, 340; Ga 9, 277.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>3</sup> Chiurazzi has exploited the dichotomy *what* and *how* in his studies on Heidegger. See especially, Chiurazzi G., *Modalità ed esistenza. Dalla critica della ragion pura alla critica della ragione ermeneutica: Kant, Husserl, Heidegger*, Aracne, Roma, 2009, and also Chiurazzi, *Teorie del giudizio*.

neglected the dimension of *how*, namely it has considered it as a secondary issue, subordinated to the *what*, the question of how things appear, namely in a time, in a context, in a modality, among relational connections with other beings and so forth. Metaphysics considers the what-ness the proper identification of a thing, and their *how* a secondary determination. Prioritizing the *what* over the *how*, as the general attitude of metaphysics, which Heidegger registers, is also the general attitude lying within two objects of Heidegger's criticism: *subjectivism* and *predicationism*.

Schematically speaking, by *subjectivism* I mean that specific epistemological approach that puts the subject at the foundational centre of reflection about the process of knowledge and experience. By *predicationism* I mean to indicate those philosophical approaches that give a primary role to predicates (as attributes *de re*) and propositional attitudes as the main tools for the conception of reality (and its features) in terms of *res* and substance. As I shall explain in the sections about *subjectivism* and *predicationism*, they share a similarity by representing two ways, not necessarily mutually exclusive but possibly conjoined, of offering a metaphysics that is based on a logic of *what* instead of a logic of *how*.

For Heidegger, we have two main traditional models that for him represent the two main attempts to frame our experience<sup>4</sup>, – which are Kant's and Aristotle's doctrine of categories, in which, correspondingly, categories are conceived as *a priori* ideal synthetic forms of intellect<sup>5</sup> and as predicates of reality<sup>6</sup>, respectively. Although Aristotle and Aristotelian philosophy play a multifaceted role<sup>7</sup> in Heidegger, as well as Kant<sup>8</sup>, their conceptions

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<sup>4</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 63; Ga 56/57, 79.

<sup>5</sup> See, the chapter 2 “Transcendental Logic”, especially sections of Transcendental Analytics and *Transcendental Deduction* in Kant I., *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Kemp Smith N., London, Macmillan, 1968; *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Riga, J. F. Hartknoch, 1781, 2nd (B) ed: 1787.

<sup>6</sup> See Aristotle, *Categories and De Interpretatione*, trans. Ackrill J. L., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1963, Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. Ross W. D., Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1953. Heidegger holds that in Aristotle's, “the guideline for the understanding of the Being of what is attributed to the being (is) what stands in the predicate of the sentence. The categories are therefore the *most general predicates*”. See Heidegger M., *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, trans. by Rojcewicz R., Indiana University Press, Bloomington and Indianapolis, 2008, 133; Ga 22, *Die GrundBegriffe der antiken Philosophie*, V. Klosterman, Frankfurt am Main, 1993, 159. Categories for Aristotle are what is predicated or belongs to substance (a distinction that corresponds on the grammatical level to the distinction subject-predicates that in the apophantic judgment find their relation of belonging). See Chiurazzi, *Modalità ed esistenza*, 22.

<sup>7</sup> Aristotle has a multifaceted role within Heidegger's work and interpretations. Kisiel defined Aristotle as an “ambiguous figure” in Heidegger's thought. Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's “Being and Time”*, 225. See also, chapter 5 “What did Heidegger find in Aristotle”, *ivi*. Chiurazzi has pointed out that in Heidegger there exist two Aristotles: one is the one of the book of metaphysics that had a main influence over the tradition of philosophy, and the other is non- metaphysical, of the book of *Physics*, *Ethics* and *De Interpretatione*, to which Heidegger dedicates part of his lectures. See Chiurazzi, *Modalità ed esistenza*. One of the main contributions to the relationship between Heidegger and Aristotle and how this develops throughout Heidegger's career, is made by Volpi, F., *Heidegger e Aristotele*, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2010.

<sup>8</sup> Relationship between Heidegger and Kant is complex too, and so intertwined that Kisiel asks: “When was Heidegger not a Kantian? It is almost like asking “When was Heidegger not a German?””. Kisiel, *The Genesis*,

represent the two different paradigms for categories (or even alternative – since they could be thought of as representing realism and idealism’s versions of categories). However, we have to remark that for Heidegger these two models are linked by the centrality of predication and judgment<sup>9</sup>. The thread that connects them is the fact that Kant, in his logic, still refers to the Aristotelian table of judgment to deduct his categories. By this move, even if interpreting categories as synthetic functions of intellect, Kant is inheriting the Aristotelian privilege accorded to predication and apophantic judgment<sup>10</sup>. For this reason, together with the insertion of Cartesian subjectivism in Kant’s system<sup>11</sup>, both conceptions fail in opening the categorial apparatus for the understanding of our experience, representing two versions to include under the sign of epistemology and metaphysics<sup>12</sup>.

Therefore, the criticisms of subjectivism and predicationism will represent the two philosophical tendencies to which Heidegger tries to give an alternative by conceiving new categories and new conceptual instruments<sup>13</sup>. For this reason, we can start with his analysis of *subjectivism* and *predicationism* as indicating that we will have to outline an account of categories which are not merely subjectivist or predicative.

## 2.1 Heidegger’s Criticism of *Subjectivism*

Heidegger’s criticism of *subjectivism* has been thought of as one of the main criticisms that characterizes *Being and Time*. The specific subjectivism at which Heidegger is looking, is that arising from Descartes and his *ego cogito*, which has influenced the whole of philosophy from Descartes, through Kant and Hegel, until Husserl<sup>14</sup>. We can take Descartes, and his metaphysics<sup>15</sup>, as paradigmatic of what concerns the main features of *subjectivism*,

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408. For what concerns Heidegger’s criticism towards Kant, this is mainly led by the revival of Kant in neo-Kantian schools, that used him in an subjectivistic and epistemological perspective. However, Heidegger devoted many studies on Kant’s Critique. See *Logic, Kant, Kant*, in which Heidegger shows his appreciation of transcendental Schematism, in which categories are thought of in connection to experience and time.

<sup>9</sup> Heidegger, ‘*Conclusion Duns Scotus’ Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, 64; Ga 1, 403.

<sup>10</sup> Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, §9 (b95) ff.

<sup>11</sup> For Heidegger Kant is “steeped in Aristotelian conceptuality and settled in Descartes’ basic position”. Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, 5; Ga 61, 4.

<sup>12</sup> Esposito, *Heidegger*, 33.

<sup>13</sup> See also, Costa V., *La verità del mondo*, Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 2003, 39.

<sup>14</sup> See “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” in Heidegger M., *On Time and Being*, trans. Stambaugh J., New York, Harper & Row, 1972, 64; Ga 14, *Zur Sache des Denkens*, ed. von Hermann F.W., Frankfurt am Mein, Vittorio Klostermann, 2007, 79. Using Moran’s words: “the Cartesian legacy”. See Moran D., “Heidegger’s Transcendental Phenomenology”, in Crowell S. and Malpas J. (eds.), *Transcendental Heidegger*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2007, 135-150, 136.

<sup>15</sup> We need to recall that Heidegger’s interpretation of Descartes’ thought is essentially based on Descartes’

which is also strictly tied to the predicative conception of *res*.

Heidegger states, in fact, that with his doctrine of *ego cogito*, Descartes is at the centre of Modern thought<sup>16</sup>, which finds its contemporary correspondents in the notion of consciousness and mind<sup>17</sup>. The problem that Heidegger registers is that philosophy, while thinking to have put “philosophy on a new and firm footing”<sup>18</sup> with the Cartesian *ego*, has lost the proper meaning of our experience. Through the method of doubt, Descartes arrives at the certain principle of *cogito ergo sum* as the undoubtable *fundamentum* that cannot be further investigated. Found by losing all the references to the world and every relation to anything else which is not the *cogito*, Cartesian *ego* becomes the certain (*inconcussum*)<sup>19</sup> absolute, self-sufficient, unrelated, closed foundation which should be considered the main principle from which we have to establish our reflection.

For Heidegger, from this declared certainty, there derives a plethora of consequences. Apart from the fact that establishing the *cogito ergo sum* as the ultimate principle and foreground of metaphysics has left unquestioned the meaning of *sum*, and therefore that of *being*, more importantly, given Heidegger’s insistences, Cartesian *ego* puts at the basis of philosophy an entity identified by a de-worlding process and thought in terms of a thinking subject (*cogito*) for which everything else is external and doubtable. For Heidegger, Cartesian *ego* is responsible for *subjectivism* which inaugurates a conception of subject as a solipsistic inner space which relates to an external object.

From the detached nature of *cogito*, which is defined in isolation, the tradition of metaphysics and epistemology are committed to the dualism of subject-object and the

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books of *Meditations on First Philosophy* and *Principiae Philosophiae* (Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies*, trans. Cottingham J., Cambridge University Press, 1996; Descartes, *Principia philosophiae (Principles of Philosophy)*, trans. Rodger V. and Miller R.P., Dordrecht, Reidel, 1983) and that it shows development and modifications throughout Heidegger’s texts. However, Descartes’ notion of *ego* as *cogito* and his use of *res* are the main elements that in Heidegger’s inquiry into Descartes are the most relevant to his own thought and of main influence with regard to the metaphysical post-Cartesian tradition. For an in-depth analysis of the variations of Heidegger’s interpretation of Descartes, see De Biase R., *L’interpretazione heideggeriana di Descartes*, Guida, Napoli, 2005.

<sup>16</sup> Heidegger recalls that Hegel considered that with Descartes “thinking reaches ‘terra firma’ [*einen festen Boden*] for the first time”. See, Heidegger M., *Four Seminars*, trans Mitchell A. and Raffoul F., Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press, 2003, 37; Ga 15, *Vier Seminare: Le Thor 1966, 1968, 1969—Zähringen 1973*; ed. Ochwad C., Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1977, 329.

<sup>17</sup> Dreyfus H., *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I*. Cambridge, Mass MIT Press, 1991, 3-5. “Mind” is the term used by Anglo-American school to refer to *ego* and used in Heidegger-inspired debates. For pragmatist scholars such as Dreyfus, Heidegger’s thought represents one of the most important efforts to overcome mentalism and representationalism that characterized metaphysical tradition. In one of his articles, Dreyfus begins by boldly saying: “*Being and Time*, as is well known, is an attempt to outgrow the tradition of subjectivity begun by Descartes”. Dreyfus H., “The Priority of the World to My World: Heidegger’s Answer to Husserl (and Sartre)”, in *Man and world*, 8, 1975, 121-130, 121.

<sup>18</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 46; Ga 2, 24.

<sup>19</sup> Heidegger, *Four Seminars*, 37; Ga 15, 329.

respective dichotomy of internal-external, and, consequently, has committed itself to the problem of explaining the relationship between something internal (subject) and something external (object). For Heidegger, this chain of consequences comes from the original prejudice of identifying the principle of any experience in a notion of subject – which can be called *ego*, consciousness<sup>20</sup> or mind – characterized by being a *cogito*, a thinking subject; as something “absolute”, closed and fixed (*punctum firmum*), from which all other entities are set apart<sup>21</sup>, de-contextualized, self-sufficient substance<sup>22</sup>, indifferent to anything other than itself, for any change does not alter its nature.

For Heidegger, *mutatis mutandis*, this picture of subjectivity reflects Husserl’s conception of consciousness and transcendental *ego*. In his lectures about phenomenology, while admiring Husserl’s categorial intuition (together with Husserl’s notion of intentionality and *a priori*), Heidegger directly accuses the Husserl of *Ideas* of having returned to Cartesianism<sup>23</sup>, transforming phenomenology into a sort of philosophy of consciousness in which all the prejudices of Cartesianism nest. More precisely, for Heidegger, the process of *epochè* (bracketing), – together with the other phenomenological reductions – which suspends our natural concrete experience, or my living in our everyday world, similarly to Cartesian doubt, aims at finding that absolute, certain region which is consciousness<sup>24</sup>. For Heidegger, Husserl’s notion of consciousness has the same features of Cartesian *ego*<sup>25</sup>. It is a primary, absolutely given, immanent, “self-contained”<sup>26</sup> region, quoting Husserl, “not affected in its own existence by an ‘annihilation of the world of things’”<sup>27</sup>, a consideration which – as is well known – Descartes had already employed”<sup>28</sup>. In other words, Husserl’s consciousness is absolute in the sense that *nulla re indiget ad existendum*: “it needs no *res* in order to be”<sup>29</sup> – with this formula, Heidegger establishes the

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<sup>20</sup> See Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*; Ga 20, §11.

<sup>21</sup> *Ivi*, 102; Ga 20, 141.

<sup>22</sup> Dreyfus claims that the Cartesian “I” or “Subject” is a “self-sufficient substance” and that “*Being and Time* is dedicated to undermining our belief that we are such self-sufficient Cartesian Subjects”. See Dreyfus H., “Being-with-Others”, in Wrathall M. (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger’s Being and Time*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 145-156, 145.

<sup>23</sup> *Ivi*, 11.

<sup>24</sup> See Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 99 and ff; Ga 20, 135 and ff.

<sup>25</sup> “With Husserl, the sphere of consciousness is not challenged, much less shattered”, Heidegger, *Four Seminars*, 70; Ga 15, 383.

<sup>26</sup> Husserl E., *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy: First Book*, trans. Kersten F., The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1983; Hua III/1, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie: Erstes Buch*, ed. Biemel W., The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1950, §49.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>28</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 104-105; Ga 20, 144.

<sup>29</sup> *Ivi*, 103; Ga 20, 141.



union between Descartes and Husserl's *Ideas*<sup>30</sup>.

Even if Heidegger acknowledges Husserl's important contribution to his philosophical evolution and the complexity of his thought, this reading and criticism of Husserl's *Ideas* and phenomenology is so frequent and pervasive in Heidegger's subsequent work that Descartes and Husserl start to represent the same polemical target. Dreyfus's reading of *Being and Time* as a project that mainly tried to release philosophy from the Cartesian subjectivist *spectrum*, simply equates the figure of Descartes with that of Husserl, as representative of the same "theoretical approach" which conceives as prior the dimension of the detached mind and the schema of subject-object<sup>31</sup>. Heidegger's reflection on our experience maintains that we do not find anything like a detached *ego*<sup>32</sup>, or subject against an object.

This schema must be avoided: What exists are subjects and objects, consciousness and being - being is the object of knowledge- being in the authentic sense is the being of nature - consciousness is an "I think," thus an ego, ego-pole, centre of acts, person- egos (persons) have standing opposite them: beings, objects, natural things, things of value, goods. The relation between subject and object needs to be explained and is a problem for epistemology.<sup>33</sup>

Descartes has inaugurated a tradition that answers the metaphysical question "what there is" with the schema of subject-object, internal-external, which pervades the epistemological field, but which in turn does not respect the phenomenology of our experience, in which we cannot see anything like a detached de-worlded absolute unrelated independent<sup>34</sup> *ego* against an external object<sup>35</sup>. In so doing, the Cartesian schema proposes the dualism subject-object that, in turn, imposed the difficulty of re-uniting the experience and finding a bridge to reconnect these two spheres.

To disentangle this problem, in *Being and Time* we do not find the notion of consciousness<sup>36</sup> (as well as the epistemological schema of subject-object, internal-external)<sup>37</sup>, but a being, Dasein, which is not identified by depriving it from its concrete

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<sup>30</sup> It is a matter of discussion whether Heidegger used Descartes to criticize Husserl as his first polemical target or, *vice versa*, Descartes was his actual first criticism, then extended to Husserl.

<sup>31</sup> See mainly Dreyfus H., *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*.

<sup>32</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 55; Ga 56/57, 68-69.

<sup>33</sup> Heidegger, *Ontology*, 62; Ga 63, 81.

<sup>34</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenology and Theology*, 58; Ga 9, 7.

<sup>35</sup> On the relationship between subject and object as *subjectum* and *objectum* (*Gegenstand*) see also, *Ivi*, 58; Ga 9, 72-73.

<sup>36</sup> Heidegger, *Four Seminars*, 64; Ga 15, 372.

<sup>37</sup> "Heidegger has a wide reputation for his effort in breaking down the inner-outer distinction of post-Cartesian epistemology and philosophy of mind. Instead of thinking of understanding on the model of a subject that

experience in the world but which is constitutively in-the-world and open to it<sup>38</sup>.

For our purpose, this means that we can take Heidegger's criticism of subjectivism as a first negative clue. To understand the categories and the conceptual instruments that shape our experience and how it is framed, we have to outline an account of categories that give reason to an experience which does not ascribe a primary role to the detached, de-worlded subject, nor can we understand this kind of subjectivity as the source of categories.

Regarding the issue of categories, Kant's categories represent the subjectivist version of them. In fact, Kant's account of categories conceives them as intellectual *a priori* forms and functions of the understanding and judgment of a spontaneous *ego* – which, for Heidegger, represents another version, probably more sophisticated, of the Cartesian *ego* in which is nested the same epistemological bias<sup>39</sup>. As Heidegger makes clear in the *Zähringen* seminar, to twist Gadamer's words slightly, one might speak of *the subjectivization of the categorial* in Kant<sup>40</sup>. Therefore, our understanding and analysis of Heidegger's categories cannot be obtained from the Kantian account of them.

However, as we will also see regarding the question of *predicationism* (next section), the account of subject is not entirely deleted in Heidegger's ontology – so we can still use and conceive a subject in Heidegger, but we have to clarify our terminology. We can talk about Heidegger's criticism of *subjectivism* instead of subject or subjectivity *tout court*, to indicate

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confronts an object, he suggests that we understand human existence as being-in-the-world". Keller, *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience*, 111. Carman also highlights that "For Dasein there is no outside, which is why it is also nonsensical to talk about an inside". Carman, *Heidegger's Analytic*, 128-129.

<sup>38</sup> "In contrast with the immanence to consciousness expressed by 'being' in consciousness [*Bewusst-sein*], 'being' in *Da-sein* says being-outside-of (...). The domain in which everything that can be termed a thing is encounterable as such is a region which grants the possibility for that thing to manifest itself 'outside'". The being in *Da-sein* must preserve an "outside." This is why the mode of being of Dasein is characterized in *Being and Time* by ek-stasis. *Da-sein* thus rigorously means: ek-statically being the there". Heidegger, *Four Seminars* 71; *Ga* 15, 383. Keller states that, "The primacy of being-in-the-world expresses what might be called Heidegger's externalist conception of what it is to understand things and to be a human being. But it is not quite correct to describe his position as externalism. Externalism presupposes the traditional inner outer distinction and argues for the dependence of the inner on the outer, whereas Heidegger thinks that the traditional inner-outer distinction is based on a mistaken ontology of human existence." Keller, *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience*, 112. For an in depth-analysis for the issue internalism and externalism in Heidegger, see Crowell S. G., *Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger*, Cambridge University Press, 2013, Chapter 5, or also Crowell S. G., "Phenomenological Immanence, Normativity, and Semantic Externalism", *Synthese*, Vol. 160, No. 3, 2008, 335-354.

Crowell agrees with Keller that generally the debate does not fully grasp the feature of both Husserl and Heideggerian phenomenology. Of the same opinion, Murchada F.O., "Review of Pierre Keller", in *Husserl Studies*, 19, 2003, 93-100.

<sup>39</sup> Heidegger, *On the Essence of Ground*, in *Pathmarks*, 108; *Ga* 9, 138.

<sup>40</sup> See Gadamer H.G., *Truth and Method*, trans. Glen-Doepel W., London, Sheed and Ward, 1979, 39; see also, Critchley S., Schürmann R., *On Heidegger's Being and Time*, Routledge, 2008, 19.

Heidegger's criticism of a specific, although traditional and pervasive, concept of subject which is the Cartesian subject broadly construed. By the criticism of subjectivism, I also wanted to stress that this criticism refers not only to that specific kind of subject (along with its philosophical implications) but also to the role that it ascribes to subject as the absolute principle we should employ to understand the structure of experience in both its epistemological and ontological meaning.

We can concede the notion of subject, and Heidegger's Dasein, which explicitly contrasts Cartesian *ego*<sup>41</sup>, may be still thought of as subject, but only if we mean it in a weaker sense than the detached Cartesian one or the spontaneous Kantian one. We can readmit it and use the notion if we are aware that Heidegger's subject Dasein is being-in-the-world and does not represent the subjective side of the epistemological schema of subject-object<sup>42</sup>.

Consequently, in early Heidegger and *Being and Time*, we may trace Heidegger's account of subjectivity in Dasein, and see the articulation of its being-in-the-world in the dimension of practical facticity, which contrasts the dimension of detached *ego*, representing the dimension in which we can talk of some sort of active subjectivity in the world, which participates to it without being a creative, spontaneous *ego* which projects its intellectual forms upon the world.

The other side of subjectivism is the question of objectivism: Heidegger states that we need: "an ontological interpretation of the subjectivity of the subject, an interpretation that must constantly be renewed and that actively opposes "subjectivism" in the same way that it refuses to follow "objectivism"<sup>43</sup>. I will not talk about objectivism but of *predicationism*, as a broad philosophical tendency that Heidegger criticizes under various aspects.

## 2.2 Heidegger's criticism of *Predicationism*

Heidegger's second main criticism is what we may call the criticism of *predicationism*.

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<sup>41</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*; Ga 2, §9.

<sup>42</sup> "If one chooses the title of 'subject' for that being that we ourselves in each case are and that we understand as 'Dasein', then we may say that transcendence designates the essence of the subject, that it is the fundamental structure of subjectivity", in Heidegger, *On the essence of ground*, 108; Ga 9, 138. The readmission of the notion of subjectivity or the use of the term is not entirely forbidden, once we face the criticism of it and we re-interpret a different quality of subjectivity. "The subject never exists beforehand as a 'subject', in order then, if there are objects at hand, also to transcend. Rather, to be a subject means to be a being in and as transcendence"; "Beforehand" here can be understood both ontological and logical. We can reinsert the notion of subject once we have changed the traditional paradigm and its hierarchy", *ibidem*.

<sup>43</sup> *Ivi*, 125; Ga 9, 162.

Compared to the criticism of subjectivism, which is more explicit, direct and clearer in its target – the Cartesian subject – the criticism of *predicationism* gathers different, although interconnected, issues.

Briefly, by *predicationism* I mean to indicate the central tendency that implicitly also involves the previous notion of *subjectivism*, characteristic of metaphysics, to conceive entities in terms of *res* and define them as objects to which belong specific attributes. This identification entails conceiving the *beings* as ontologically circumscribed, unrelated and autonomous, in order to provide an attributive definition *de re*, which would encapsulate their what-ness and essence<sup>44</sup>. This kind of determination is the result of the prejudices that animate metaphysics, that beings should be understood by their *what* and this *what* should be found through a process, as in the criticism of subjectivism, of a de-worlding, in which must emerge the whatness in a pure isolation<sup>45</sup>. This metaphysics of *res*, which implies different sub-notions and also involves, for Heidegger, epistemology and science, finds its translation on the level of linguistic expression in the apophantic judgement “S is P”. This kind of judgment, apophantic and declarative, which has been thought of as, since Aristotle, the primary form of judgement, has been by and large interpreted as the form which shows the relation of *belonging* between a subject and its attributes predicatively expressed. As a *res* includes its attributes, so within the predicative judgement is shown the relation of *inclusion* between a subject and its predicates<sup>46</sup>.

Heidegger states that the *predicative* function has been thought of traditionally as the proper function of judgment (see section 4.4.4). This primacy of the predicative function of apophantic judgement as the form to show the predicates that belong to a subject is not something that merely pertains to our linguistic expressions, but rather it also represents a model in correspondence with the ontological or epistemological one<sup>47</sup>.

### 2.2.1 Notion of *res*

Let us start again from Descartes. Once undoubtable *ego* is discovered, reality and experience are broken into the schema of subject-object. Then, Descartes asks *what* exactly

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<sup>44</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*; Ga 20, § 22. Here Heidegger talks about Descartes’ use of the notion of attribute.

<sup>45</sup> See Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*; Ga 56/57, §17.

<sup>46</sup> Heidegger M., *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. Heim M., Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1984, 31; Ga 26, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, ed. by Klaus Held, Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1978, 40.

<sup>47</sup> Chiurazzi, *Teorie del giudizio*, 16.

subject and object are and defines them in terms of *res* (*res cogitans* and *extensa*)<sup>48</sup>. With this, Descartes is still using a Medieval terminology of *res* and *realitas*. The notion of *res*, as Heidegger's criticism of metaphysics notices, runs through the whole tradition, from Descartes to Husserl<sup>49</sup>. The notion of *res* and the related notion of *realitas* traditionally responds to the question of “what there is”. In *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, Heidegger explains what we should understand by *res* and, therefore, what kind of ontology it presents. Analysing Kant's thesis that “being is not a real predicate”, Heidegger states that, here,

“real” should be conceived literally as “thingness”, “thing-determinateness”. The real pertains to the *res*. When Kant talks about the *omnitudo realitatis*, the totality of all thing-contents or real-contents, essences, possible things (...) Realities are the what-contents of possible things in general without regard to whether or not they are actual, or “real” in our modern sense. The concept of reality is equivalent to the concept of the Platonic idea as that pertaining to a being which is understood when I ask: *Ti est?*, what is the being? The what-content of the thing, which Scholasticism calls the *res*, then gives me the answer.<sup>50</sup>

*Res* indicates the *quidditas*, the substantive content of a thing (*Ding*): hence “a real predicate is such as belongs to the substantive content of a thing and can be attributed to it. We represent and place before ourselves the substantive content of a thing in its concept”<sup>51</sup>. A *res* is a unit, an *ens* which is identified, circumscribed and defined by its essential positive attributes<sup>52</sup> that give us the complete definition of its *quidditas*, its what-ness or thing-ness. A *res* is a delimited *ens* positively determined by its predicates<sup>53</sup>.

In Descartes and in metaphysics, when we ask *what* is something, we identify it as a

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<sup>48</sup> Descartes, *Second Meditation*.

<sup>49</sup> Heidegger remarks: “We must first of all see in what way modern philosophy conceives the distinction between subject and object or, more precisely, how subjectivity is characterized. This distinction between subject and object pervades the problems of modern philosophy and even extends into the development of contemporary phenomenology. In his *Ideas*, Husserl says: “The theory of categories must begin absolutely from this most radical of all distinctions of being - being as consciousness [*res cogitans*] and being as being that ‘manifests’ itself in consciousness. ‘transcendent’ being [*res extensa*].”, “Between consciousness [*res cogitans*] and reality [*res extensa*], there yawns a veritable abyss of meaning”. Husserl continually refers to this distinction and precisely in the form in which Descartes expressed it: *res cogitans-res extensa*”. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 124-125; Ga 24, 175. Husserl E., *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. Kersten F., *Collected Works: Volume 2*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1982, 212 and 153; Hua III.1, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie* (1. Halbband: Text der 1.-3. Auflage—Nachdruck) (ed. by Karl Schuhmann), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977, 174 and 117.

<sup>50</sup> Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 34; Ga 24, 45.

<sup>51</sup> Heidegger, *Kant's Thesis about Being*, in *Pathmarks*, 341; Ga 9, 279.

<sup>52</sup> Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 37-38; Ga 24, 49-50.

<sup>53</sup> Heidegger *History of the Concept of Time*, 175; Ga 20, 236.

thing, a *res* which has attributes, and we express this situation in a judgment in which the subject is connected to its predicates, whose predicative function is that of fixing and setting. From this perspective, the apophantic judgment “S is P” reflects the frame of *realitas*. It translates into the nominal-predicative parts of language and identifies a definite subject and its predicates, expressing predicatively the what-ness of a *res*, of an independent entity isolated by its contextuality and recognized in its attributes<sup>54</sup>.

### 2.2.2 *Res and the Given.*

Heidegger also indicates that another characterization of *res* as something ultimate is to think of it in terms of *aistheton*<sup>55</sup>, of sensations. Heidegger reads this interpretation of our experience and reality in terms of sensory *data*, considered as what is immediately given within our experience, as mainly typical of epistemological areas of philosophy that he criticizes in his lectures about the structure of experience, trying to demonstrate that this conception is the product of a theoretical reduction<sup>56</sup>. Reducing our experience in the world to *hyletic* sensory data is the product of a theoretical abstraction<sup>57</sup>, which in order to find an ultimate solid basis in terms of raw data actuates a process of de-worlding and de-vivification<sup>58</sup>. This reduction performed by what Heidegger calls the “theoretical attitude”<sup>59</sup>, we may add, has the same purifying process as the metaphysics of *what*; in that its purpose is to identify the ultimate units of being that can serve as the foundation of knowledge or ontology, characterizing them in terms of *hyletic* data<sup>60</sup>. Heidegger accuses this conception of manifesting the epistemological prejudice, which can be considered a *Myth of the Given*<sup>61</sup>, which does not grasp the proper complex structure of what and how we actually experience, reducing the concreteness of our experience in-the-world, in which we encounter different and particular entities, to de-contextualised homogeneous *data*.

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<sup>54</sup> “[R]eal – that is, as an independent *thing* that bears properties in the traditional philosophical sense, but the mark of reality in that sense is *independence*: a thing is at *all* also is *what* it is *all by itself*”. Haugeland J., *Dasein Disclosed: John Haugeland's Heidegger*, Rouse J. (ed.), Harvard University Press, 2013, 57.

<sup>55</sup> Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, in *Off the Beaten Track*, trans Young J. & Haynes K., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, 9; Ga 5, *Holzwege*, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1977, 12.

<sup>56</sup> See Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 75; Ga 56/57, 96-97.

<sup>57</sup> Dahlstrom D., *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001.

<sup>58</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 59; Ga 56/57, 74.

<sup>59</sup> *Ivi*, 67; Ga 56/57, 87.

<sup>60</sup> Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, 8; Ga 5, 11.

<sup>61</sup> This notion has been used by Sellars in Sellars W., “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, in Feigl H. and Scriven M. (eds.), *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, vol.1, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1956.

Just as we have no experience of a detached subject, in our experience we do not find isolated, decontextualized *res* or mere sensations. As we will see in section 4.4, Heidegger's phenomenology of experience shows us that we, as Dasein in the world, find ourselves among other beings in a context (*Umwelt*)<sup>62</sup> within which we encounter things not as mere *res* defined in isolation by attributes or sensations, but always inserted in this context of experience in which we find them as always meaningfully interconnected with others beings<sup>63</sup>. Heidegger recognizes such a strict relationship between the metaphysics of *res* (and of the *Given*) and the predicative function of judgement that he states that:

we must ask: is the structure of the simple declarative sentence (the nexus of subject and predicate) the mirror image of the structure of the thing (the union of substance and accidents)? Or is it merely that, so represented, the structure of the thing is a projection of the structure of the sentence?<sup>64</sup>

### 2.2.3 Metaphysics and science

The ontology of *realitas* defines a positive entity (*ens*)<sup>65</sup> – namely by ascribing a nominal definition to an entity that expresses its core essence with positive attributes, saying what something *is*. An entity posited as something which is, leads us to the possibility of thinking that Heidegger would also extend the notion of *res* and its predicative expression to the dimension of science, which for Heidegger deals with positively identified entities. Referring mostly to natural science, Heidegger states that all the sciences refer to “beings themselves and nothing besides”, namely, they examine “beings only and beside that – nothing; beings alone, and further – nothing; solely being and beyond that – nothing”<sup>66</sup>. They study and refer to beings as positive entities and nothing else. They adopt the same *positum* that characterizes the attitude of the philosophy of *realitas*, translating the feature of their approach and the nature of their object by means of (with the term of) “exactness [*Exaktheit*]”<sup>67</sup>.

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<sup>62</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 58; Ga 56/57, 72.

<sup>63</sup> Scattered throughout Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*; Ga 56/57, Heidegger, Ga 58, *Ontology*; Ga 63, and *Being and Time*; Ga 2.

<sup>64</sup> Heidegger, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, 6; Ga 5, 8.

<sup>65</sup> Heidegger, *Introduction to 'What is Metaphysics?'*, in *Pathmarks*, 277; Ga 9, 195.

<sup>66</sup> Heidegger, *What is Metaphysics*, in *Pathmarks*, 84; Ga 9, 105.

<sup>67</sup> *Ivi*, 83; Ga 9, 104.

Apart from their specific terminology, the sciences demonstrate to be ruled by the same positive attitude of *realitas*, ruling out the *nothing*, or I would say, any other conception of experience apart from that where it is reducible in terms of real fixable entities. On this basis, logic as formal logic becomes the language and the code with which to study the world, its content, and our experience<sup>68</sup>. From a logical perspective, the nothing becomes a negation, a formal operator which is thought of as “a specific act of intellect”<sup>69</sup>. (As we will see in those sections dedicated to the role of *syncategoremata* in chapter 3 and 4, this reading of the logical operator will be transformed by the doctrine of categorial intuition in both Husserl and Heidegger).

Another point that characterizes metaphysics and science – which we obtain from Heidegger’s reflections on science – is that both fix their elements and thematise them<sup>70</sup>.

We call the sciences of beings as given – of a *positum* – positive sciences. Their characteristic feature lies in the fact that the objectification of whatever it is that they thematise is oriented directly toward such beings.<sup>71</sup>

As subjectivism transforms experience into the relation with an *ob-jectum*, as *realitas* establishes the object as the *res* to which to refer, so too science, for Heidegger, provides us with an objectification of “what there is” in our experience, trying to fix it by thematization.

The aim of “Thematization” is “to free the intra-worldly entities we encounter, and to free them in such a way that they can ‘throw themselves against’ a pure discovering – that is, that they can become ‘objects’. Thematizing objectifies”<sup>72</sup>. Thematization is the approach (a positing or thetic approach) performed by science which it shares with metaphysics, and which renders what we encounter in our life as ob-ject context-independent. It follows that the thematization, typical of science and generally of the “theoretical approach”, is in line with the tradition of *realitas* and predicationism that fixes its object through a positive thematization. For Heidegger, philosophy has ascribed a primary role to this process of

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<sup>68</sup> For an in-depth analysis of Heidegger and *logic*, cf. Jitendranath N. Mohanty, “Heidegger on Logic”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 26 (1), 1988, 107-135 and also Käufer S., “On Heidegger on Logic”, *Continental Philosophy Review*, 34, 2001, 455–476. On this topic: Fay T. A., “Heidegger on logic: A genetic study of his thought on logic”, *Journal of History of Philosophy*, 12, 1974, 77-94; Fay T. A., *Heidegger: The Critique of Logic*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1977; Bröcker W., “Heidegger und die Logik”, *Philosophische Rundschau*, 1, 1953-54, 48-56.

<sup>69</sup> Heidegger, *What is Metaphysics?*, 85; Ga 9, 108.

<sup>70</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenology and Theology*, 41; Ga 9, 48.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>72</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 414; Ga 2, 363.



objectification (which is a process of de-vivification)<sup>73</sup>, thematization and predication so that our manner of thinking must conform to it<sup>74</sup>.

Given the pivotal influence of metaphysics – as well as the Theoretical thinking and science –, it may appear that the only understanding we can have of thought and language is that they are objectifying tools. So, Heidegger raises a question that we usually forget:

[i]s objectifying thinking and speaking a particular kind of thinking and speaking, or does all thinking, all speaking as speaking, necessarily have to be objectifying.<sup>75</sup>

Thinking that thought and language are naturally objectifying is “without foundation”<sup>76</sup>, “untenable and arbitrary”<sup>77</sup>. Heidegger states, in fact, that there is a “widespread, uncritically accepted opinion that all thinking, as representing, and all speaking, as vocalization, are already ‘objectifying’”<sup>78</sup>. Heidegger states that it is our prejudice to reduce the multiple possibilities of how to conceive and use thinking and speaking, and in general conceptuality and language to one manner or form<sup>79</sup>.

By Heidegger’s criticism of *predicationism*, I mean *predicationism* as a general label to gather the metaphysical, epistemological and scientific attitude and the primary interpretations of judgment as predicative and objectifying, as a specific target for what concerns the criticism of judgment, language, conceptuality and thought.

The apophantic predicative judgement or the “technical-scientistic view of language”<sup>80</sup>, aims to “subjugate all thinking and speaking (...)”<sup>81</sup> to objectifying acts. However, Heidegger states that “[t]hinking rather is that comportment that lets itself be given, by whatever shows itself in whatever way it shows itself, what it has to say of that which appears. Thinking is not necessarily a representing of something as an object. Only the thinking and speaking of the natural sciences is objectifying”<sup>82</sup>.

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<sup>73</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 59, Ga 56/57, 74.

<sup>74</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenology and Theology*, 60; Ga 9, 76.

<sup>75</sup> *Ivi*, 55; Ga 9, 70. “Is objectifying thinking and speaking a particular kind of thinking and speaking, or does all thinking as thinking, all speaking as speaking, necessarily have to be objectifying?”

<sup>76</sup> *Ivi*, 59; Ga 9, 74.

<sup>77</sup> *Ivi*, 60; Ga 9, 75.

<sup>78</sup> *Ivi*, 56; Ga 9, 71.

<sup>79</sup> Regarding this tendency, Heidegger recalls Nietzsche: “the means of expression in language cannot be used to express “becoming”; to posit continually a more crude world of what is permanent, of things, etc. is part of our irredeemable need for preservation”. *Ivi*, 57; Ga 9, 72.

<sup>80</sup> *Ivi*, 56; Ga 9, 70.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibidem*. “The first position desires to subjugate all thinking and speaking, (...), to a sign-system that can be constructed logically or technically, that is, to secure them as an instrument of science.”

<sup>82</sup> *Ivi*, 59; Ga 9, 74.

If we consider that original experience is not necessarily objectifying, it does not follow that it is a contingent a-logic dimension, “mute” because every act of thinking or speaking is already predicatively objectifying. With Heidegger, we can think that there is the possibility of conceiving thought and language as not necessarily objectifying and fixing tools. It may occur that we can include thinking and language, within our experience in-the-world, which are not understood as tools of metaphysics and theoresis with a *mere* objectifying, thematising and fixing function. However, “our everyday experience of things, in the wider sense of the word, is neither objectifying nor a placing over against. When, for example, we sit in the garden and take delight in a blossoming rose, we do not make an object of the rose, nor do we even make it something standing over against us in the sense of something represented thematically”<sup>83</sup>. In this living experience “we think it and tell of it by naming it”<sup>84</sup>. For Heidegger, the great influence of the metaphysics of *realitas* and the primary role ascribed to predication has lead philosophy to think that these are the main models to follow and which tradition has set for itself, but “outside this field thinking and speaking are by no means objectifying”<sup>85</sup>. In our experience there is still the chance to think, talk and even name, without in this sense conforming the nature of our experience to the categories of metaphysics, science or *theoresis*<sup>86</sup>.

#### **2.2.4 Predicationism and categories**

For what concerns categories, this criticism shows us that Heidegger’s renewal of categories is linked to a renewed respect for, not only *subjectivism*, but also *predicationism* – which tries to determine reality and experience in terms of *what-ness and thing-ness*, with the notion of *res*, of *aesthesis* and *objecthood* and seek to fix them with predication and thematization within the form of apophantic judgment.

The other paradigmatic model for the understanding of categories that Heidegger mentioned is Aristotle’s doctrine of categories, whose nature is predicative. In his study of Duns Scotus, *Duns Scotus’ Doctrine of Categories and Meaning*, in which he focuses on the issue of categories, Heidegger denounces the insufficiency of the ten Aristotelian

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<sup>83</sup> *Ivi*, 58; Ga 9, 73.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>85</sup> *Ivi*, 60; Ga 9, 76.

<sup>86</sup> “[P]hilosophy is ‘not theoretical science’”. Heidegger, *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 43; Ga 60, 62.

categories: they represent only a determinate class in a determinate domain<sup>87</sup>, whose nature is *predicative*<sup>88</sup> and whose role – I might add – is to circumscribe the events of reality by *attribution/predication*. This claim can be considered as a criticism of *predicationism*, as the privileged dimension for answering the metaphysical question about *what*. In section 4.2, we will see that Heidegger's study of Duns Scotus may be read as a first draft of the understanding of categories in Heidegger. Heidegger's appreciation of Duns Scotus and his categorial theory derives from the appreciation that Duns Scotus' philosophy distances itself from the subjectivist attitude, and from the denouncement of the insufficiency of the Aristotelian predicative account of categories. In Heidegger's comment on Duns Scotus, therefore, we will find a fertile base for an understanding of categories which is neither subjectivist nor predicative.

In order to outline Heidegger's account of categories, we should take into account this first hint about his criticism of Aristotelian categories and see that Heidegger's understanding of categories cannot be a predicative, attributive one<sup>89</sup>. Heidegger's categories are not predicative properties of objects as in the *predicativism* tradition<sup>90</sup>. The nature and structure of categories must conform to our experience which cannot be framed in terms of mere *res*, or mere sensations.

However, as we have said regarding the criticism of subjectivism, the criticism of *predicationism* is not the criticism of predication *tout court*, or judgment *tout court*. It is the criticism of giving a primary role to predication – as the main distinctive function of language and thought – and to judgement, understood as objectifying tools in determining reality. In Heidegger's analysis of our experience in the world we can appreciate that Heidegger is not completely disregarding the account of subjectivity, nor that of predication nor the account of *what*. In Heidegger's project we see a change in the main metaphysical paradigm that ascribes to the question of *what* – along with the model of *subjectivism* and *predicationism* (as here specifically understood) – a priority role (we will see in section 4.4.4 that predication does not disappear from Heidegger's understanding of logos and language, but it receives another characterization and role). In Heidegger the question of *what* or *realitas* is not a leading question<sup>91</sup>, and neither is Dasein understood as an *ego*

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<sup>87</sup> The natural domain. See Heidegger, *Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, 24; Ga, 211.

<sup>88</sup> Heidegger, 'Conclusion Duns Scotus' *Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, 64; Ga 1, 403.

<sup>89</sup> See also Fehér I., "Lask, Lukacs, Heidegger: the problem of irrationality and the theory of categories", in Maccan C., *Martin Heidegger. Critical Assessments*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 373-405, 387.

<sup>90</sup> Haugeland, *Dasein Disclosed*, 106.

<sup>91</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*; Ga 2, §7.

*cogito*, and nor are apophantic judgment and predication primary tools. Nonetheless, in Heidegger's conception of experience – as well as of categories – we still find the element of subjectivity, as well as the element of predication, language, and concept, and also the determination of *what*, but all reconceived within a new framework. The presence of the form of predication and of a certain kind of subjectivity, as well of the dimension of “what”, is not completely eradicated in Heidegger's ontology. As we will see, once the ontological project re-elaborates its understanding of categories and its related issues of determination and reference, within a new kind of ontological setting, the traditional notion of predication, subject, and the role of the question about “what” are relocated and find their renewed role. So, for the sake of accuracy, predication and subject will not disappear from the investigation of categories. Both subjectivity and predication will find their function, in a new context, in the structure of categories within context.

We might say, with Heidegger himself, that the ontological phenomenological approach proposed by Heidegger functions “as corrective”<sup>92</sup>: “[t]he function of ontology here is not to direct but only, in ‘co-directing’, to correct”<sup>93</sup>, that is to say to free our understanding from the prejudice of tradition and to indicate a new path – which once it has changed the general framework can reintroduce traditional notions in a new light.

The criticisms of *subjectivism* and *predicationism* represent for us the certain constants that we can consider in our investigation of Heidegger's categories, which accordingly cannot be reduced to predicative categories *à la* Aristotle, nor to subjectivist categories *à la* Kant. To find an alternative to these two options we can look elsewhere, namely to Husserl's categorial intuition, which in Heidegger's thought has an important role<sup>94</sup>.

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<sup>92</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenology and Theology*, 52; Ga 9, 64.

<sup>93</sup> *Ivi*, 52; Ga 9, 65. Heidegger is talking about this special characterization of ontology with respect to theology, but we can broad this function to all those disciplines that reveal to use concept that the ontology should not just delete but re-conceive and show their origin.

<sup>94</sup> “Husserl opens to Heidegger a path between idealism and realism”. Esposito, *Heidegger*, 35.

## Chapter 3. Categories in Husserl's Categorial Intuition

As a starting point, therefore, and from a negative point of view – following Heidegger's suggestions –, Heideggerian categories should be understood not merely as predicates of reality (since the Aristotelian attributive conception of categories is not sufficient), nor as forms of the intellect *à la* Kant (since those derive directly from the misleading prejudice created by Cartesian subjectivism<sup>1</sup>). This means that we should identify a third, alternative comprehension of categories that should be able to avoid being a version of categories reducible to some previous tradition.

So, Aristotelian categories as predicates of reality and Kantian categories as synthetic *a priori* forms of intellect, represent the two models that Heidegger confronts. As we will see, the structure and the nature of categories in Heidegger will take their major inspiration from the possibilities offered by the Husserlian doctrine of categorial intuition, which gives to Heidegger a renewed account of categories. Nevertheless, if Husserl's categorial intuition established a new conception of the nature of categories – albeit highly complicated and problematic – we will see both in Husserl and Heidegger that categories are not only enriched by new diverse proposals but will also maintain a structure linked to reality (as in the Aristotelian fashion) and a particular synthetic nature (as in the Kantian fashion). In this respect, therefore, Heidegger's third option, to be found in Husserl, is also intertwined in a very peculiar way with some aspects of the traditional conceptions of categories.

### 3.1 Husserlian elements in Heidegger

In order to elucidate the issue of categories in Heidegger and to acquire the principal elements for the understanding of his new conception, my suggestion is to look at the doctrine of categorial intuition, presented by Husserl in the *Sixth Logical Investigation*<sup>2</sup> and reinterpreted by Heidegger in many passages of his philosophical thinking. I shall argue that categorial intuition can be thought of as a new source for the re-elaboration of the status of

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<sup>1</sup> See Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 58-59; Ga 20, 78-79.

<sup>2</sup> In Husserl E., *Logical Investigations*, trans. Findlay J. N., New York, Humanities Press, 1970; Hua XIX/2, *Logische Untersuchungen (Zweiter Band: Elemente einer phänomenologischen Aufklärung der Erkenntnis. II. Teil)*, Halle a.d.S.: Max Niemeyer, 21921.

categories, as it appears as a third, alternative solution rich in various knotty elements, but yet inspiring in terms of categorial conception.

The question of the relationship between Husserl and Heidegger's phenomenology has seen a huge number of studies of every sort. The main dichotomy that still characterizes the debate is between scholars who try to understand and show Heidegger's debt to Husserl<sup>3</sup>, or a mutual interaction, albeit recognizing their own peculiarities – and those who, conversely, emphasise and sign the fractures and differences between the two<sup>4</sup>. This dichotomy usually also coincides with an appreciation of Heidegger as a phenomenologist (or not), with a preference for the early or late<sup>5</sup> Heidegger, and so forth. My thesis tends to side with the former perspective, following the phenomenological Heidegger. As I have already said in section 1.2, my intent is to privilege Heidegger's "phenomenological decade" as a more fertile and productive phase of his thought, in which we may find the nature and structure of his new categorial apparatus. Therefore, although acknowledging the inner difference of their phenomenological projects, I will not put Husserl and Heidegger at odds with one another but rather use the one to illuminate the other.

### 3.2 Categorial intuition within Heidegger's thought.

As we know, among all the different Husserlian influences we might identify in Heidegger<sup>6</sup>, the text of the *Logical Investigations* has a pivotal importance. Husserl's text is

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<sup>3</sup> On this side, we can count those scholars that have shown the connection and mutual interaction confronting Husserl and Heidegger's phenomenology on different subjects (the notion of "experience", "truth", "meaning", "world" and so forth) such as Costa, Crowell, Gardini, Keller, Overgaard, Sokolowski, Theodorou, Øverenget. Their contributions are employed and mentioned throughout this work.

<sup>4</sup> Kisiel and Van Buren state that Heidegger developed his *hermeneutic* phenomenology in opposition to Husserl's *transcendental* phenomenology. See especially, Kisiel, *The Genesis of "Being and Time"*, and Van Buren J., *The Young Heidegger*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1994. Dreyfus, *mutatis mutandis*, also reads and stresses throughout his work a strong opposition between Heidegger and Husserl. He conceives Heidegger's project and especially *Being and Time* as representing a convincing effort to contrast Husserl's conscientialism as belonging to the current of Cartesian approaches to experience. Similarly, von Herrmann compares and contrasts Husserl's notion of conscience and Heidegger's notion of Dasein as the crossroad of phenomenology, in von Herrmann F-W., *Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl*, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main, 1981. See also, Tugendhat E., *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger*, 2. Unveränderte Auflage, Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1970.

<sup>5</sup> The distinction between an early phenomenological Heidegger and a late non-phenomenological Heidegger is more or less a valid distinction from general point of view that indicates a change in Heidegger's investigation and style. However even if the name of phenomenology is mainly absent in late Heidegger and he does not stress the issue of method, we still can argue whether he really abandons the phenomenology or not, whether rather he transforms and internalizes it. In his last Seminars, the account of phenomenology reappears, especially in Heidegger M., Ga 19, *Zollikoner Seminare*, ed. von Herrmann F.W, Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1972.

<sup>6</sup> In particular, the important role of Husserl's intentionality, regional ontologies, pure grammar etc.

often explicitly recalled by Heidegger, as the book to which he ascribes a special role in his philosophical maturation, and in particular the *Sixth Investigation* represents a special place within both Husserl and Heidegger's projects. From a merely general consideration of textual evidence, the importance of the *Logical Investigations*, for Heidegger's philosophical development, is frequently mentioned by the author himself. Heidegger starts referring to Husserl's *Investigations* from the very beginning, in his book on *Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning*<sup>7</sup>; we find it mentioned throughout the first part of his work<sup>8</sup> – where the reference to the book is cited in relation to various key topics that I shall identify later (chapter 4) – in his lectures about phenomenology (especially *History of the Concept of Time*), in *Being and Time*<sup>9</sup> and up to and including one of his final seminars<sup>10</sup>. In his *Mein Weg in die Phänomenologie*, Heidegger says: “as I myself practiced phenomenological seeing, teaching and learning in Husserl's proximity after 1919 [...] my interest leaned anew toward the *Logical Investigations*, above all the *Sixth Investigation* in the first edition. The distinction which is worked out there between sensuous and categorial intuition revealed itself to me in its scope for the determination of the ‘manifold meaning of being’<sup>11</sup>. Stating the importance of categorial intuition for Heidegger is not something new. Following Heidegger's own suggestions, many commentators have pinpointed the connection between categorial intuition and Heidegger's reading of it. In one of his last seminars, Heidegger retrospectively states that categorial intuition of the *Sixth Investigation* was one of the most fertile notions and “the focal point of Husserlian thought”<sup>12</sup>, specifically for his ontological project. In fact, in his Zähringen seminar (1973), Heidegger clearly reiterates the point that, “[i]n order to unfold the question concerning the meaning of Being, Being must be *given* in order to inquire after its meaning”<sup>13</sup>. This is something that, as

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<sup>7</sup> Heidegger, *Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Meaning*, 16; Ga 1, 203.

<sup>8</sup> Especially in Heidegger's texts of *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*; Ga 56/57, Ga 58, Ga 59, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle*; Ga 61 and *Ontology*; Ga 63.

<sup>9</sup> In *Being and Time*, Heidegger cites the *Sixth Logical Investigation* in a footnote of his section about truth (§44). I will analyse this reference in the section on relation, later in section 4.4.4.

<sup>10</sup> In “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer” of 1953/54, Heidegger mentions Husserl's *Logical Investigations* as the propulsive initiating text for his phenomenology. See Heidegger M., *On the Way to Language*, trans. Hertz P. D., San Francisco, Harper and Row, 1971, 5; Ga 12, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, Frankfurt am Main, Klostermann, 1985, 86. Moreover, Husserl's categorial intuition was one of the main objects of discussion of the *Zähringen Seminar* held in 1973. The Seminar lasted 3 days and was composed by two main questions. The first one about Husserl's categorial intuition and the second about the role of world and being-in-the-world. For a meticulous analysis of the three days, see Giordani A., *Il problema della verità. Heidegger vs Aristotele*, Vita e pensiero, Milano, 2001, the chapter “Interpretare Heidegger fino alla fine”.

<sup>11</sup> Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, 78; Ga 14, 98.

<sup>12</sup> Heidegger, *Four Seminars*, 65; Ga 15, 373.

<sup>13</sup> *Ivi*, 67; Ga 15, 378.

Heidegger says, was ensured by Husserl's phenomenology of the *Sixth Logical Investigation* and the doctrine of "categorial intuition" since, "with the concept of categorial intuition he touches or brushes against the question"<sup>14</sup>[of Being].

While in his early lectures, Heidegger is hinting at, mentioning or explaining the doctrine of categorial intuition, considering it to be one of Husserl's three most important discoveries, along with intentionality and the new conception of the *a priori*<sup>15</sup>, in these last considerations Heidegger seems to furnish us with his own reading of the actual role played by categorial intuition. Following Heidegger's indications as to how categorial intuition played a decisive role regarding his general ontological project, categorial intuition has acquired its meaning for him with regard to the renewed conception of *Being*, concealed in the doctrine of categorial intuition (as interpreted by Heidegger), in line with Heidegger's own purpose. In fact, as we will see, categorial intuition proposes a new interpretation of the function and meaning of the copula, leading Heidegger, as he himself says, to appreciate Husserl's discovery as the starting point for a new consideration of the question of *Being*, a question that, nonetheless, Husserl has only briefly "touched". Specifically, categorial intuition proposes, in Heidegger's eyes, an interpretation of *Being* that releases it from merely representing the copula of an assertive judgement. As I will show, this is not a point of mere secondary importance, and I will suggest how reflection on the copula (with the other syncategorematic components that I deal with in section 3.6.5) takes place within the research on the structure of categories.

Given this explicit link between Husserl's categorial intuition and Heidegger's ontological project, many readings of the relation between them, even if achieved by offering other useful insights that will help us to comment on categorial intuition in Husserl and Heidegger, generally have as their main goal the presentation of Husserl's doctrine as one of the starting points for Heidegger's question of Being (*Seinsfrage*) and ontological difference<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> Heidegger, *Four Seminars*, 65; Ga 15, 373.

<sup>15</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*; Ga 20, § 7.

<sup>16</sup> "Now, what precisely is the meaning of this influence? How might that Husserlian doctrine have helped Heidegger shape the way in which he treated the sole concern of his entire philosophical career, namely the question of *Being* (*Seinsfrage*)?", in Theodorou P., *Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordality, and the Categorial: Phenomenology Beyond its Original Divide*, Springer, 2015, 246; see Watanabe J., "Categorial Intuition and the Understanding of Being in Husserl and Heidegger", in Sallis J. (ed.), *Reading Heidegger, Commemorations*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1993, 109-117; Taminiaux J., "Heidegger and Husserl's *Logical Investigations*: In remembrance of Heidegger's last seminar (Zähringen, 1973)", in Taminiaux J. (ed), *Dialectic and Difference: Finitude in Modern Thought*, trans. Crease R. and Decker J. T., Atlantic Highlands, Humanities Press, 1985, 91-114; Øverenget E., *Seeing the Self, Heidegger on subjectivity*,



Even if it is Heidegger himself who has provided us with this “ontological reading” of the categorial intuition, and though the secondary literature about this issue represents an important and relevant contribution for this present study, I would nonetheless like to explore the potential of categorial intuition in a different direction.

### 3.3 Categorial intuition – A divergent reading

I would now like to pursue the analysis of categorial intuition from another perspective, by exploiting the richness of the doctrine without focusing on its role for the formulation of the problem of *Being*. As I have said in section 1.2, the question of *Being* is not treated as a question of content. Rather, I am using Heidegger’s question of *Being*, and his concern about *Being* and what it is related to, as the sign of a broader methodological approach. Accordingly, the question of *Being* is to be taken as the indication for a deeper investigation into the structure of experience, namely into the structure of categories<sup>17</sup>.

Categorial intuition represents a fertile avenue for our inquiry. Gardini has rightfully defined it as a “protean (*proteiforme*)” notion<sup>18</sup>. Thus, thanks to its nature, categorial intuition provides us with multiple connections helpful in pursuing an inquiry into the structure of Heidegger’s categories. I will analyse the doctrine while trying to extrapolate

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Kluwer Academic Publisher, Dordrecht, 1998, chapter II. An important contribution is made by Dahlstrom, who links the issue of categorial intuition with Heidegger’s conception of truth: “Yet Heidegger links the question of categorial intuition to the question of truth much more emphatically than Husserl does. The reason for this greater emphasis is undoubtedly Heidegger’s strategy; his exposition of Husserl’s discoveries is designed to demonstrate how Husserl uncovers the basis and the limitations of the logical prejudice. But the link is by no means artificial. For, as Heidegger was quick to see, the question of categorial intuition is precisely the question of the sustainability of the idea of truth, elaborated in the preceding chapter of the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, that is to say, its sustainability with respect to assertions themselves”, in Dahlstrom, *Heidegger’s Concept of Truth*, 80. Here, Dahlstrom uses categorial intuition to study truth in Heidegger. With the same aim, Keller in *Husserl, Heidegger on Human Experience*, analyses the “way Heidegger appropriates and transforms Husserl’s theory of categorial intuition in order to study Heidegger’s conception of truth as disclosure”, *ivi*, 84. I shall use Heidegger’s example of the picture in *Being and Time*, in the section about truth, as another element for the understanding of categories. For more references, see Dastur F., “Heidegger und die Logischen Untersuchungen”, in *Heidegger Studies*, 7, 1991, 37-52; Dastur F., *Heidegger et la question du temps*, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1990, 22 ff., and Bernet R., “Transcendance et intentionnalité: Heidegger et Husserl sur les prolégomènes d’une ontologie phénoménologique”, in Volpi F. et al. (ed.), *Heidegger et l’idée de la phénoménologie*, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1988, 195-216. On categorial intuition and intentionality in Heidegger’s *History of the Concept of Time*, see Stapleton T. J., “Heidegger and Categorial Intuition”, in Stapleton T. J. (ed.), *The Question of Hermeneutics. Essays in honour of Joseph J. Kockelmans*, Springer, Dordrecht, 1994, 209-236.

<sup>17</sup> We can say with Watanabe that, “we may suppose that the young Heidegger first learned the phenomenological way of thinking through his study of the *Logical Investigations*”. Watanabe, “Categorial Intuition and the Understanding of Being in Husserl and Heidegger”, 109.

<sup>18</sup> Gardini, *Filosofia dell’enunciazione*, 43.

those elements implied in it which can frame an alternative structure and nature of categories, and can be applied to Heidegger's categories. In fact, we might say that in the passages in which we can track the issue of categories in Heidegger, a certain reinterpretation of categorial intuition is working as the main engine of Heideggerian categorial conception. Nevertheless, as we will see, we have to underline the fact that Husserl's categorial intuition does not find its place in Heidegger without being rethought, dislocated and changed in scope.

Despite this, the doctrine of categorial intuition, even if strongly reinterpreted by Heidegger, who ascribes to it a different value from Husserl's original intention, can still be conceived of as the basis for our investigation of categories<sup>19</sup>. In fact, apart from the explicit references to categorial intuition, especially in Heidegger's lectures on the matter<sup>20</sup>, and his considerations in his seminar mentioned earlier, I would say that categorial intuition appears implicitly, to varying degrees, in those passages in which (I maintain) we can follow the reflection on categories. I might therefore argue that categorial intuition, or better what is implied in it, and the kind of categorial conception it suggests to Heidegger, is at work not only in his analysis of categories in Duns Scotus and *History of the Concept of Time*, but is also implicitly significant in some other fundamental passages scattered within his texts, especially in the notion of "hermeneutical intuition" and the famous example of the lectern (*Towards the Definition of Philosophy*), within his lectures on logos in Aristotle (*Logic. The Question of Truth*), and the section about truth in *Being and Time*.

As I have said, following Gardini's definition, and as we will see, categorial intuition appears as a "protean" notion, albeit highly complex both in Husserl and in Heidegger's reception of it. When discussing the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl himself characterizes his work as "a breakthrough and thus not as an end, but a beginning"<sup>21</sup>. In fact, the book, while offering insightful philosophical contributions, abounds in *aporiai* (*Rätsel*) and, as Sokolowski notes, "[t]he effect of the book is not to settle but to stir"<sup>22</sup>. This seems to be especially apt regarding the *Sixth Investigation* (and the doctrine of categorial intuition),

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<sup>19</sup> Gardini states that the notion of categorial intuition, "shows all the ambivalence of the philosophical relation between Husserl and Heidegger [...] it offers a singular mix of progressive and regressive aspects" (my translation). *Ibidem*.

<sup>20</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*; Ga 20, §6.

<sup>21</sup> Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Vol 1, (second edition) 43; Hua XIX/I, viii.

<sup>22</sup> Sokolowski R., *Husserl's Sixth Logical Investigation*, 109. As Moran recalls, Husserl describes his method as "zig-zag" (im Zickzack, Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, Introduction §6; Hua XIX/1, 22), so that, "this zigzag method sometimes gives a disorderly appearance to discussions. The effect is cumulative, and illumination comes slowly." Moran D., *Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology*, Malden, MA, Polity Press, 2005, 95.

which collectively addresses the topics presented in the other *Investigations*<sup>23</sup>. Given the highly problematic nature of Husserl's reflections, and in particular that regarding categorial intuition, my aim is not to provide an exhaustive answer to, or a coherent theory of, the problems that categorial intuition raises or to furnish a resolution, but to exploit its versatile and multifaceted nature. This peculiarity, which on the one hand might be thought a weakness, gives us the opportunity to interpret the doctrine, to trace it in Heidegger. As recalled by Moran, the *Logical Investigations* (and Husserl's phenomenology) is a "patchwork" (*Stückwerk*)<sup>24</sup> or, better, a *work in progress*) that shows us various ways of engaging with it, both in Husserl's phenomenology or in Heidegger's philosophical project<sup>25</sup>. This complex character of the phenomenology in general, and of categorial intuition in particular, gives us the space to use and connect Husserl's diverse elements by "manipulating" them with a certain degree of freedom.

Thus, in order to elucidate the contributions offered by Husserl's categorial intuition to the Heideggerian account of categories, I shall continue in the next section with a digression into Husserl's texts to illustrate the structure of categorial intuition, its nature, its implications and the various oscillations we may find. My aim is to acquire and identify those elements that will be useful for conducting an inquiry into Heidegger's categories.

### 3.4 Categorial Intuition – A brief portrait

Before analysing the actual content of categorial intuition<sup>26</sup>, I would like to make a further general remark about the philosophical context in which the doctrine finds its place.

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<sup>23</sup> "[...] [B]ringing the entire arsenal of distinctions developed in the previous investigations to bear on the theme of knowing". See Dahlstrom D., "Introduction", Dahlstrom D. (ed), *Husserl's Logical Investigations*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 2003, 1-15, 10. Sokolowski states that, "The entire Logical Investigation culminates in the second section of Investigation VI", Sokolowski R., "The logic of parts and wholes in Husserl's Investigations", in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 28 (4), 1968, 107.

<sup>24</sup> Moran, *Edmund Husserl*, 94.

<sup>25</sup> "One can say, without hyperbole, that categorial intuition constitutes one of the most important fundamental questions shared by Husserl and Heidegger". Watanabe, "Categorial Intuition and the Understanding of Being in Husserl and Heidegger", 110.

<sup>26</sup> Among several important commentators on categorial intuition, the following contributions should be emphasized: Bernet R., "Perception, Categorial Intuition and Truth in Husserl's *Sixth Logical Investigations*", in Sallis J., et al. (eds.), *Collegium Phaenomenologicum. The First Ten Years*, Kluwer: Dordrecht, 1998, 33-45; Cobb-Stevens R., "Being and Categorial Intuition", in *The Review of Metaphysics*, 44(1), 1990, 43-66; Sokolowski R., "Husserl's Concept of Categorial Intuition", in *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences: Supplement to Philosophica Topics*, 1982, 127-141; Lohmar D., "Husserl's Concept of Categorial Intuition", in Zahavi D. (eds.), *One Hundred Years of Phenomenology*, Kluwer, 2002; Benoist J., «Intuition catégoriale et voir comme», in *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, Louvain-la-Neuve, 99, 2001/4, 592-612.

Firstly, categorial intuition is posited within the framework that inspires Husserl's text, namely the criticism of "psychologism". The doctrine of categorial intuition appears in the *Sixth Logical Investigation* with the aim of giving an answer to the question of the *fulfilment* of those syntactic syncategorematical elements that are present in judgement<sup>27</sup>. Thus, the doctrine tries to offer an explanation of the categorial parts of judgement that articulate it into a meaningful unity so that it can bear truth-values. This purpose is connected to Husserl's general goal in the *Investigations* of defending the possibility of scientific knowledge against the threats of psychologism – which represents for Husserl the latest modern version of scepticism<sup>28</sup>. In fact psychologism conceives the laws of logic as a dimension of the factual conscious dimension of human thinking, and, "it replaces the question about the right kind of thinking with what is essentially a scientific, empirical description of thought processes"<sup>29</sup>. By reducing logical laws, their normativity, to the merely empirical contingent laws of connection of the mind, as opposed to conceiving them as mind-independent *a priori* laws, the ideal of scientific knowledge as the notion of valid truth is at risk of being lost.

The anti-psychologist attitude, as we will see, also embraces the discovery of categorial intuition, offering us a special account of categories whose characteristics are suitable for the investigation into Heidegger. The reason why Husserl's criticism of psychologism represents a good starting point is that, not only does it meet with Heidegger's appreciation and agreement<sup>30</sup>, but the anti-psychologist frame and Husserl's consequent consideration might also lead towards what we can interpret, even if cautiously<sup>31</sup>, as a non-subjectivist

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<sup>27</sup> The notion of *fulfilment* indicates the synthesis of identification between a signive act with its intuition. Namely that "the signifying act is bounded to an intuitive act, and the simple being directed towards a thing fulfils in the evidence of the object". Costa V., Franzini E. and Spinicci P., *La fenomenologia*, Einaudi, Torino, 2002, 93. In other words, empty intention of just saying "S is P" finds its fulfilment in the actual experience, "a mere empty intending finds fulfilment in the act that brings its object into view". See Pietersma H., "Intuition and Horizon in the Philosophy of Husserl", in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 34, 1973, 95-101, 97.

<sup>28</sup> See Husserl E., *Prolegomena to Pure Logic*, in Husserl E., *Logical Investigations*, trans. Findlay J.N., New York, Humanities Press, 1970; Hua XIX/1, *Logische Untersuchungen (Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik; Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, I. Teil)*, Halle a.d.S., Max Niemeyer, 1984.

<sup>29</sup> Held K., "Husserl's Phenomenological Method", in Welton D. (ed.), *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader*, Indiana University Press, 2003, 3-31, 11.

<sup>30</sup> See Heidegger's concern about this and criticism, as explicitly inspired by Husserl, in his thesis, *Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus*, in Heidegger, *Frühe Schriften*, Ga 1. This concern also animates his book on Duns Scotus. Later, the issue of psychologism disappears, but one can still see it as transformed in terms of Heidegger's criticism towards subjectivism and naturalism.

<sup>31</sup> Held states that Husserl's critique of psychologism was perceived as a liberation: his scholars "understood phenomenology to be a "turning toward the object", and they made his maxim "to the things themselves" into their battle cry. Adhering to this maxim was supposed to free philosophy from its modern bent toward

account of phenomenology and categories in which the principle “to the things themselves” can gain meaning. More precisely, we might say that the *Logical Investigations* belong to a pre-subjectivist phase of Husserl’s phenomenology, previous to the one of *Ideas*, in which Heidegger will accuse Husserl’s phenomenology of having been a return to a revised form of Cartesian subjectivism<sup>32</sup>. Therefore, we may consider categorial intuition as a discovery that finds itself within an anti-psychologistic setting, in line with Heidegger’s criticism of subjectivism<sup>33</sup>. However, to connect Heidegger and Husserl’s perspectives more closely, we can still argue that Husserl’s pre-subjectivist phase can be thought of as non-subjectivistic, if by this we mean subjectivism in the sense that we have seen in section 2.1, namely as the subjectivism of Cartesian tradition. Following this specific configuration of subjectivism, we can consider Husserl’s project of *Logical Investigations* as having a non-subjectivistic intention, in line with Heidegger’s project. In both Husserl’s *Logical Investigations* and early Heidegger, the subject, or some form of it, is not present in the strong Cartesian fashion but not yet eradicated – rather reformulated.

From this first brief configuration, which of course does not exhaust the complexity and the features of Husserl’s project, we can follow the indications given by categorial intuition knowing that we can trace the discovery of categories within a general picture that addresses Heidegger’s criticism of subjectivism.

Therefore, we can consider the doctrine of categorial intuition an adequate source for Heidegger’s account of categories. The conception of categories presented by categorial intuition at first leads us to a new understanding of it. The new account of categories, as we will see in subsequent sections, offers an alternative to the empirical and subjectivistic tradition, retrieving a sort of Aristotelian inspiration. However, it presents a categorial nature that does not merely collapse into being sheer categories of reality, and at the same

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subjectivism. However, while stating this, Held continues by saying that, “Husserl himself in no way understood his anti-psychologism to be anti-subjective in this sense.” See Held K., “Husserl’s Phenomenological Method”, 12.

<sup>32</sup> The non-Cartesian character seems also to belong to genetic phenomenology: “The Husserl which emerges at the end of this study is the ‘other’ Husserl, the Husserl after the collapse of the Cartesian program, a collapse which he could never admit but which he himself affected in the various working texts of the 1920’s”. See Welton D., *The Origins of Meaning – A critical Study of the Thresholds of Husserlian Phenomenology*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1983, 2 and Landgrebe L., “Husserls Abschied von Cartesianismus”, in *Philosophische Rundschau*, IX, 1961, 133- 177. This is a further element that gives us the chance to connect Heidegger’s project and Husserl’s genetic phenomenology.

<sup>33</sup> As Costa notes, “[h]istorically, the discovery of categorial intuition was one of those elements that had attracted the attention of (Husserl’s) contemporaries, since it allowed them to distance themselves from modern subjectivism”, (my translation). Costa, *La verità del mondo*, 141.

time does not delete the role of subject. The further analysis in the next sections regarding Husserl's categorial intuition will give us the opportunity to propose an interpretation of categories. I shall argue that they will show to have what I call a *hybrid* nature. This will be the basis for comprehending Heidegger's reading of categorial intuition and for understanding Heidegger's conception of categories, which we have to outline.

I will present a brief portrait of categorial intuition, showing how the nature of categories has been renewed in the form of hybrid structures which manifest what Costa has called an already *self-structured experience*. This first acquisition of the nature of categories will be also the first connotation of the structure of Heidegger's logic of categories.

### 3.5 Categorial intuition – A question or an answer?

The *Sixth Logical Investigation*, which gathers to itself all the other topics presented in the previous *Investigations*<sup>34</sup>, is divided into two connected sections. Husserl elaborates the doctrine of categorial intuition in the second section [*Sense and Understanding*], in order to give an answer to the question of the relation between the expressive act and its intuitive fulfillment<sup>35</sup>, addressed in the first section of the *Investigation* (entitled *Objectifying intentions and their fulfilments: knowledge as a synthesis of fulfilment and its gradations.*) In other words, categorial intuition will be engaged to solve what Husserl would translate, "to speak traditionally" and although "ambiguously" (*sic*), as "the relationship between 'concept' or 'thought' on the one hand, understood as mere meaning without intuitive fulfilment, and 'corresponding intuition', on the other"<sup>36</sup>. The relation between expressions and their fulfilments becomes particularly clear when, in the first passages of his inquiry, Husserl focuses specifically on the judgement of perception. In assertions such as, "[t]here flies a blackbird"<sup>37</sup>, the contribution of the perceptual act (*Erlebnis*) seems to infiltrate the space of its expression. Husserl makes clear that we have to distinguish between the actual perception and the meaning of the expression. When I see and say, "[t]here flies a

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<sup>34</sup> Sokolowski R., "Husserl's Sixth Logical Investigation", in Dahlstrom D. (ed.), *Husserl's Logical Investigations*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 2003, 109-122.

<sup>35</sup> Already, in the *First Investigation*, Husserl has addressed the problem of the relation between expression, meaning, and object. "Each expression not merely says something but says it of something: it not only has a meaning but refers to certain objects. This relation sometimes holds in the plural for one and the same expression. But the object never coincides with the meaning". Husserl E., *First Logical Investigation*, in Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol 1, 197; Hua XIX/1, 46.

<sup>36</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 184, Hua XIX/2, 3.

<sup>37</sup> *Ivi*; Hua XIX/2, § 4.

blackbird”, the meaning of my expression cannot be contained in the actual perception, since the meaning of the state of affairs<sup>38</sup> in question can be understood by other people even if they are not actually perceiving it. The assertion would preserve its meaningfulness even if the perception is lacking. Despite this, after having clarified the distinction between the expression of a perception in the form of judgement and the actual perception<sup>39</sup>, Husserl admits that, “[i]t remains, of course, incontestable that, in ‘judgements of perception’, perception is internally related to our statements’ sense”<sup>40</sup>. This becomes especially clear if, “instead of speaking quite indefinitely of a blackbird”, we “proceed to speak of this blackbird”<sup>41</sup>. This relation is so much intertwined that Sokolowski says that, “the content of the empty act blends with, is identified with, the content of the intuitive act”<sup>42</sup>. This blending and intertwined relation will play a fundamental role in the understanding of the nature and structure of the categorial intuition.

Coming to the proper content of the doctrine of categorial intuition, we have to explore in more detail the relation between judgment and perception. Even if we should ascribe, in Husserl, the pivotal role to actual perception, judgement cannot be considered as something that merely copies reality. In fact, judgement does not merely mirror factual reality but rather within it, new states of affairs emerge, advancing new claims of truth that may be satisfied whether the expressive acts, directed towards perceptual dimension, find their intuitive fulfilment or not. However, we find the first difficulty as soon as we look at judgement in the whole, because,

[...] in the case of perceptual statement, not only the inwrought nominal presentations are fulfilled: the whole sense of the statement finds fulfilment through our underlying percept.<sup>43</sup>

This means that within the relation between expression and perception, we do not have to limit our observation to the relation between nouns (the nominal parts of the expression)

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<sup>38</sup> “In every judgment should be distinguished the act of judging, the meaning of judgment and the correlate of the act of judgement (the state of affairs)” (my translation). Salice A., “Stati di cose”, in Ferraris M., *Storia dell’ontologia*, Bompiani, Milano, 2008, 187-209, 201.

<sup>39</sup> See also Husserl’s examples in §4 of the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, in which Husserl notes that on the base of the same perception, we can elaborate different sentences with different meanings and that the understanding of the meaning of a perceptual judgment can occur even if the actual perception does not.

<sup>40</sup> *Ivi*, 196, Hua XIX/2, 15. “We have good reason to say: the statement expresses the percept, i.e. brings out what is perceptually ‘given’”. *Ibidem*.

<sup>41</sup> *Ivi*, 196-197; Hua XIX/2, 17.

<sup>42</sup> Sokolowski, “Husserl’s Sixth Logical Investigation”, 111.

<sup>43</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 271; Hua XIX/2, 128.

and the objects they refer to – as a relation allegedly simply direct. We have, rather, to consider the whole judgement, noticing that it presents categorial and syntactic elements. The judgement, in fact, is an expression grammatically articulated; it is made up of two kinds of linguistic component<sup>44</sup>. It involves “content” words (or *categorematical*) such as *house, paper, white*, that are the nominal part of language, and *formal* or *syntactic* or *syncategorematic*, also called *categorial* particles, such as *the, a, some, many, few, is, not, and, or* and so forth. (Generally, we can include within the label of *syncategorematical* or *categorial* forms the following: prepositions, conjunctions, deictic, cases and the copula).

Observing the fact that the whole judgment, in order to be meaningful and therefore to bear a truth-value, needs to be syntactically articulated<sup>45</sup>, in turn leads Husserl to inquire into the role of *syncategorematicata* that apparently do not show themselves in our perceptual experience. They are necessary as logical connections for judgement but there is nothing sensible they can be referred to. The doctrine of categorial intuition tries, therefore, to give an answer to fill this “large gap”<sup>46</sup> (*Lücke*), in order to find a justification for the presence and the role of the categories of judgement. Husserl is asking:

What may and can furnish fulfilment for those aspects of meaning which make up propositional form as such, the aspects of ‘*categorial form*’ to which e.g. the copula belongs?<sup>47</sup>

The starting point of Husserl’s analysis is the observation that judgement, apart from its nominal parts, is composed by “formal” or “syntactic” or “syncategorematical” components of language. Those elements, through their connective function, facilitate a whole and therefore meaningful judgement. Whilst contributing to the meaning of the judgement, at the same time, they seem not to correspond to anything perceivable in our experience. In judgement, the nominal parts directly receive their fulfilment from the correspondent perception (“bird” from the actual perceived bird), in contrast to what happens to the syncategorematical particles:

We shall come down to certain primary elements of our terms – we may call them elements of stuff – which find direct fulfilment in intuition (perception, imagination, etc.), while the supplementary *forms*, which as forms of meaning likewise crave fulfilment, can find nothing that ever could fit them in perception or acts of like order.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Sokolowski, “Husserl’s Sixth Logical Investigation”, 114.

<sup>45</sup> Without categorial, logical parts of discourse, judgment would be just a meaningless bunch of unrelated words.

<sup>46</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, §40, 271; Hua XIX/2, 128.

<sup>47</sup> *Ivi*, 271; Hua XIX/2, 129.

<sup>48</sup> *Ivi*, 276; Hua XIX/2, 136.



In fact, using Heidegger's words, in a perceptual statement such as "this chair is yellow and upholstered"<sup>49</sup>, not only do the nominal parts find their fulfillment but also the entire sentence. More precisely, we need to ask in detail:

Are the 'this,' the 'is,' the 'and' perceptually demonstrable in the subject matter? I can see the chair, its being-upholstered and its being-yellow but I shall never in all eternity see the 'this,' 'is,' 'and' as I see the chair. There is in the full perceptual assertion a *surplus of intentions* whose demonstration cannot be borne by the simple perception of the subject matter.<sup>50</sup>

This *surplus of intentions that characterizes the judgement*, compared to what it is perceptually given, seems to be of no concern to the nominal categorematical forms of language; the sight of a white paper seems to correspond to the statement "white paper". This bi-directional and perfect correlation, however, should be revisited:

The intention of the word 'white' only partially coincides with the colour-aspect of the apparent object; a surplus of meaning remains over, a form which finds nothing in the appearance itself to confirm it. White paper is paper which *is* white. Is this form not also repeated, even if it remains hidden, in the case of the noun 'paper'?<sup>51</sup>

In these lines, Husserl shows that the categorial component does not only entail the syncategorematical parts, but also involves the nominal parts of the statement. Therefore, the interrogation, originally reserved to the conjunctive, prepositive, copulative and deictic parts of discourse, will also be extended to the nominal forms of judgment. Behind their apparent simplicity, which can lead us to think of a "photocopy-relation", directly connected to the experience, is hidden a more complex syntactic – categorial articulation.

This question also applies to nominal meanings, in so far as these are not totally formless (...) The name, like the statement, even in its grammatical appearance, possesses both 'matter' and 'form'.<sup>52</sup>

Each part of the judgment is discovered in its inflection (articulation), also showing how

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<sup>49</sup> This example is in Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 56; Ga 20, 76. I choose here to use a Heideggerian example and to refer to this quotation because this passage is quite faithful to the Husserlian model and quite concise and effective in expressing the problem at stake.

<sup>50</sup> *Ivi*, 58; Ga 20, 77.

<sup>51</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 273; Hua XIX/2, 131.

<sup>52</sup> *Ivi*, 271-272; Hua XIX/2, 129.

what was thought of in terms of simple perceptual *adaequatio*, possesses conversely a more complex inner articulation. The empiricist tradition, as also the Kantian and neo-Kantian one, would have resolved the problem by conceiving each nexus of synthesis and the other categorial elements within the dimension of mindness, considering the categorial *apparatus* as something that belongs to the intellect. The empiricist tradition had assigned the solution of the problem to the sphere of inner consciousness, in which the connections for the composition of impressions into ideas were possible<sup>53</sup>. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same location of the forms of synthesis of the experience within the intellect had been maintained by Kant, who understood categories as pure *a priori* forms of the intellect. In the same vein as in the anti-psychologist perspective of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl is here overturning the solution regarding categories. He rejects the psychological- empiricist and the subjectivist (especially Kantian) position. When we say, “the house is green”, and we find the house “*being green*”, then “the being of the house is not a predicate of the house, but it is also not a predicate of the psychological activity”<sup>54</sup>. In saying the “house is green”, we are not projecting our *a priori* intellectual forms, but we are thing-directed<sup>55</sup>. With this shift, the question of categories, opened up by the question regarding *syncategoremata*, finds its answer in the doctrine of categorial intuition. For Husserl, we can see more than the sensible data: we can *see* the categorial articulation because categories are *already given* within the experience. Following Costa’s reading, we can say that while the Kantian tradition conceives forms and categories as belonging to the subject, Husserl considers the categorial acts “immanent to the *experience* itself”, searching for “the fulfilment of categories in the *experience* itself”<sup>56</sup>.

I will return to Costa’s reading and to the notion of *experience* here employed (section 3.6.3 and 3.6.4). However, now let me specify the first elements that we can recognize regarding the nature of categories from this brief introduction. As we have said at the outset, categorial intuition is placed within Husserl’s anti-psychologism, which leads Husserl to

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<sup>53</sup> Sokolowski, in this regard says, “[t]here is, of course, one way to avoid Husserl’s question entirely. It is to say with John Locke that words like ‘is’ and ‘and’ express ideas of reflection, not ideas which things impress upon us. The place to look for what such syntactical terms mean is in the mind, not in the things known by the mind. (...) Such words name what we experience in inward perception, while words like ‘house’ and ‘green’ express what we experience in outward perception.” Sokolowski, “Husserl’s Concept of Categorial Intuition”, 127. Heidegger himself says in his lessons about the discovery of categorial intuition that, “[t]he origin of these non-sensory moments lies in *immanent perception*, in the *reflection* upon consciousness. This is the argument of *British empiricism* since Locke.” Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 58; Ga 20, 78.

<sup>54</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*; Hua XIX/2, §44.

<sup>55</sup> Sokolowski, “Husserl’s Concept of Categorial Intuition”, 194.

<sup>56</sup> For the last two quotations, see Costa, *La verità del mondo*, 144 and 143 (my translation and my emphasis).

conceive of categories in what we can call a not-subjectivist way. We shift from the categorial forms of judgement to their being given within the experience. Husserl's anti-psychologism here can be seen as consistent with Heidegger's antisubjectivism. Husserl's account of categories that do not, at least by nature, belong to the mental domain, suggests trying to find them "outside" and not "inwardly". This latter characterization of the categories is in line with the categories we may think of as belonging to a subject – as Dasein, that is, eminently being-in-the-world and "outside oneself"<sup>57</sup>. From this first analysis, we can say that categorial intuition furnishes the chance, for Heidegger, to re-conceive categories and to relocate<sup>58</sup> them outside the inner sphere of mind. The categories are given already in the experience, as we are able to see them as conjoined to the sensible material.

### 3.6 The functioning of categorial intuition.

Before going any further, following the idea of such a categorial apparatus already given within the *experience*, and understanding what we must intend by *experience*, we should analyse in more detail the functioning of *categorial* intuition, focusing on how we may schematize it, and finding out what other issues are at stake. In order to clarify the role of *categorial* intuition within the process of knowledge, Husserl distinguishes between a sensible and *categorial* intuition,<sup>59</sup> and analyses their relation and articulation in §§46, 47 and 48 of the *Sixth Investigation*. With the doctrine of *categorial* intuition, Husserl claims that we can perceive the "categorial forms" – which means that we can see the relations<sup>60</sup> and the structures that articulate perceptual experience. Thanks to *categorial* intuition and *categorial* forms, for example, one does not only see *this book* but also *that the book lies on the table*.

By stating this and by distinguishing between a *sensible* and a *categorial* intuition, Husserl is implying a widening of the notion of intuition and perception. Or better, Husserl

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<sup>57</sup> Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, 165; Ga 26, 210.

<sup>58</sup> Regarding Husserl's transformation of categories, Benoist states that here the question of categories represents, "the theatre of a very significant delocalization". (my translation), Benoist J., *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie, Husserl et la tradition logique autrichienne*, Parigi, P.U.F., 1997, Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*, 111.

<sup>59</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*; Hua XIX/2, §45.

<sup>60</sup> Sokolowski R., *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution*, Springer- Science-Business Media, Dodrecht, 1970, 65; see also Huemer W., *The Constitution of Consciousness: A Study in Analytic Phenomenology*, London Routledge, 2005.

holds that the extended concept of perception and intuition still makes it possible to maintain a “wider” interpretation, in which even *categorical* forms, different sorts of relations, or states of affairs can be said to be perceived, and a “narrower” interpretation, in which perception, as sensible perception, “terminates upon individual, and so upon temporal being”<sup>61</sup>. To use other words that characterize Husserl’s terminology (which is admittedly not immune to conceptual difficulties and ambiguities) we can perceive the *sensible real material* object and also the *ideal* non-sensible *categorical* relational objects. We can already appreciate that this variety of definitions will be problematic for the understanding of the notions that Husserl is proposing to us. In addition, and as a consequence of this, the distinction between the dimension of sensible and categorical, though apparently unproblematic, will also be shown to acquire several theoretical “knots” that may influence our comprehension of the nature and structure of categories in Husserl, and especially in Heidegger. The analysis of these oscillations in Husserl will serve to identify those implicit tensions that characterize both Husserl’s categorical intuition and Heidegger’s interpretation of it. They will turn out to be, instead of problems to solve, fertile leads to follow in order to shed light on the complicated status of categories in *categorical* intuition, and thus in Heidegger’s understanding of categories via Husserlian *categorical* intuition. Before scrutinizing these ambiguities of Husserl’s terminology, we shall briefly see what we can read in the *Logical Investigations* about sensible and categorical intuition.

As intuition, both sensible and categorical intuition grasp their object *directly* and in *itself*; going towards the *things in themselves* with no intellectual mediation. Nonetheless, the character of their grasping differs<sup>62</sup>. In sensuous perception,

An object is directly apprehended or is itself present, (...) in an act of perception in a straightforward manner. What this means is this: that the object is also an immediately given object in the sense that, as this object perceived with this definitive content, it is not constituted in relational, connective, or otherwise articulated acts (...). Sensuous objects are present in perception at a single act-level.<sup>63</sup>

Simple intuition as sense perception presents its object “directly”, “immediately”, in a “single step” (*in einer Aktstufe*), “in one blow” (*mit einem Schlag*)<sup>64</sup>. In this first kind of intuition, we perceive the object as immediately given in its specific content as a “real,

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<sup>61</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 281; Hua XIX/2, 144.

<sup>62</sup> *Ivi*, 282; Hua XIX/2, 145.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>64</sup> *Ivi*, 283; Hua XIX/2, 147.

concrete object such as an ordinary material thing”<sup>65</sup>, as for example “this individual book” or “this tree”<sup>66</sup>. To the simplicity of the intuition, corresponds the simplicity of the object, which shows itself in a unitary act, namely as a single object characterized by its matter, not yet considered with any other further relations or articulations. In sensible intuition the object is given in its *material content* as the traditional conception of *realitas* would identify it. This sense perception represents the founding base upon which we can have *categorial* intuition. While the sensible perception and its object represent the basis for the process of knowledge, *categorial* intuition is founded upon the simple one<sup>67</sup>. *Categorial* intuition does not refer to its object in terms of simple, one-rayed acts but always in terms of composite, higher-order acts, which rest on founding acts. Here the object is not only intended as a sensible object, but is categorially structured and, “it is set before our eyes in just these forms”, namely, it is not thought of but is “intuited or perceived”<sup>68</sup> in these *categorial* forms.

Acts of conjunction, of disjunction, of definite and indefinite individual apprehension (that something), of generalization, of straightforward, relational and connective knowledge, arise, we do not then have any sort of subjective experiences.<sup>69</sup>

Thanks to *categorial* intuition, I can see, not only *this book* but *this book that lies on the table*. With *categorial* intuition we perceive the internal articulations of the object, which can be made explicit, together with its relations with other objects and its context, as embedded in the sensible, and recognized without any intervention of the intellect. In fact, when we say that categorially structured meanings, such as those that we find in judgement, find their fulfilment in perception, this, “means only that they relate to the object in itself in its categorial structure [*Formung*]”<sup>70</sup>. Upon the sensible object of the simple perception we find those categories that, in *categorial* intuition, fulfil the categorial forms of *syncategoremata* and give us new objects to intend. Whilst simple intuition offers the object in a single and simple step, categorial intuition furnishes new synthesis and articulations through which we can have new states of affairs.

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<sup>65</sup> Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution*, 65.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>67</sup> Even if Husserl talks about acts of simple and categorial intuition, we can establish a correspondence with their objects: “Husserl’s description of categorial constitution amounts to showing how categorial acts are built up on the basis of acts of simple perception, and how, consequently, categorial objects are built up on the basis of objects of simple perception.” *Ivi*, 67.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>69</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 282; Hua XIX/2, 144.

<sup>70</sup> *Ivi*, 280; Hua XIX/2, 143.

Schematically speaking, we have to distinguish the sensible intuition of a *sensible material* object and the *categorial* intuition of *categorial* forms (or categories). The latter, on which we want to focus, gather many different kinds of relations and articulation, which on the one hand are founded upon the simple *sensible material* and at the same time find their expression in the component of judgement, especially in the *syncategoremata*. Thus, we can see that categories occupy a double position which we will have to discuss: on the one hand they are founded on a material basis, on the other they are linked to expressive forms of *syncategoremata*. However, for now let us continue the description of categorial intuition, focusing on its relationship with simple intuition.

Starting from this distinction between simple and categorial intuition, we can understand the functioning of the latter. Through the analysis of the functioning of categorial intuition, in which we see the definitions proposed by Husserl put into an “operative” relation, we will gain further details for the understanding of categories.

Following Lohmar’s reading<sup>71</sup>, we can divide the functioning and articulation of categorial intuition into three phases<sup>72</sup>. First of all, sensible intuition grasps the object which offers itself in a “blink”. We intend the object in one “unstructured glance”; we perceive it as a whole, not yet structured and articulated in its parts and constituents. We shall say that the latter are, at this level, only *implicitly* intended<sup>73</sup>. What we experience in simple perception is the object as a whole, presented to us in a continuous synthesis of appearances, that forms a “homogeneous unity that gives the object “presence” in a simple, immediate way”<sup>74</sup>. In this constant synthesis of the partial aspects and profiles that compose the object, its parts, moments and internal or external articulation are not thematised, not yet made explicit<sup>75</sup>.

In the second step, the object is now intended in an *explicit* manner: namely its parts, which were implicitly constitutive of it, are highlighted by our interest with respect to them. The object is intended as subdivided into its parts. While still intending the object as a whole, we now focus on its components as belonging to it.

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<sup>71</sup> Lohmar, “Husserl’s Concept of Categorial Intuition”.

<sup>72</sup> See, Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*; Hua XIX/2, §48. Husserl says, “[i]n straightforward perception we say that the whole object is explicitly given, while each of its parts (in the widest sense of parts) is implicitly given”. Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 286; Hua XIX/2, 151.

<sup>73</sup> Lohmar, “Husserl’s Concept of Categorial Intuition”, 131.

<sup>74</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 284; Hua XIX/2, 148.

<sup>75</sup> The object, “stands as it were simply before us: the parts which constitute it are indeed in it, but are not made our explicit objects in the straightforward act”. *Ivi*, 286; Hua XIX/2, 152.

In acts of articulation we put its parts 'into relief', in relational acts we bring the relieved parts into relation, whether to one another or to the whole. And only through these new modes of conception do the connected and related members gain the character of 'parts' or of 'wholes'.<sup>76</sup>

So for example, when I see a “white paper”, I see the paper as a whole, at one blow, and then a second perception focuses on *being-white*, as a part (or a dependent moment) that belongs constitutively to “the paper”<sup>77</sup>. In the third phase, we intend the object, as subdivided into its parts and moments, synthetically in the new categorial intention. By articulating the sensible content intended in one blow, within the categorial frame, we have a new invitation: it is possible to “see” *perceptually* not only a paper and the whiteness, but also “see” their categorial synthesis. At this level, which we can say opens the categorial synthesis to language and judgment, we can see – and therefore we are enabled to judge – the paper-which-is-white<sup>78</sup>. We must notice that these acts and levels of perception are not disjointed but are “bound together” in a synthesis that allows “A” as a whole to appear as containing “a” within itself, so that I see the paper as containing the colour *white* and judge that “the paper is white”.

As Lohmar sums the matter up, in the functioning of synthetic categorial intuitions, we will find these three interconnected steps: 1) the initial, simple perception of the whole – the sensible intuition in which the given object is intended as “unstructured”, only “implicitly articulated”, “unthematically” identified. 2) The first articulation of the whole in its parts, now made explicit – in this first articulation the object acquires, thanks to the categorial synthesis, a categorial structure and a “thematic”, “explicit” identification. 3) This makes possible the final categorial synthesis that leads to the state of affairs that is expressed by the judgement<sup>79</sup>.

Taking this first draft of the structure of categorial intuition as the basis for further considerations, I shall now investigate in more depth what other clues we can obtain as to how we should understand the nature and structure of categories. However, as we can

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<sup>76</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>77</sup> *Ivi*, 287; XIX/2, 153.

<sup>78</sup> Lohmar, “Husserl's Concept of Categorial Intuition”, 133.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibidem*. Another way to define the triple dynamic of categorial intuition has been proposed by Dahlstrom who distinguishes these three steps and kinds of acts, respectively, as the *sensory*, *unthematically* categorial and *thematically* categorial level. See Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*, 85.

already foresee, a lot of difficulties lurk within this picture that Lohmar has so well schematized in three steps.

Once again, it is not my purpose to resolve them or to propose an answer. I will rather try to enucleate these difficulties and to extract those elements and tensions that we may find important for Heidegger's understanding of categories. In order to do so, we shall analyse Husserl's *categorial* intuition, focusing on those fluctuations of meaning that will serve as a basis to understand Heidegger's own reading of categorial intuition, which in turn is one of the fundamental elements that can help us to outline Heidegger's account of categories. Hence, probably taking a different path from the one Husserl follows, we will have to identify the elements, the fluctuations and the problems within Husserl's account of categories, that may help us in commenting on Heidegger's reception of categorial intuition, looking especially at the main claims that characterize the Heideggerian lecture. The core of Heidegger's interpretation of categorial intuition, as we will see in section 4.3.2 and 4.3.4, is contained in two statements which are considered to be those passages that most distance Heidegger's reading from Husserl. Heidegger says that:

[e]ven simple perception, which is usually called sense perception, is already intrinsically pervaded by categorial intuition.<sup>80</sup>

In another statement about categorial intuition, Heidegger maintains that, "our perceptions are already expressed"<sup>81</sup>. These are the main points that represent Heidegger's "translation" of Husserl's theory, implying as such, a sort of "regulated infidelity"<sup>82</sup>. Usually this infidelity has been thought of as the result of the intersection between categorial intuition and Heidegger's hermeneutics, with all the philosophical consequences that this mix implies. Scholars usually see in these statements an overturning of Husserl's original intentions, since on the one hand it removes the level of simple perception, maintaining that categories pervade our experience. On the other, meanwhile, it blends categories and language. I will argue, instead, that Heidegger's understanding of categorial intuition finds its justification not only in his hermeneutical inspiration, but also in the complexity of categorial intuition, in the fluctuation of the notions related to it, and in the nature of categories that may emerge from it, although locating them in a different framework. To

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<sup>80</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 60; Ga 20, 81.

<sup>81</sup> *Ivi*, 56; Ga 20, 75.

<sup>82</sup> Gardini, *Filosofia dell'enunciazione*, 44.



understand something more about categories, we should in fact understand them *within the web of suggestions*, although problematic, that categorial intuition opens up to us, especially in relation to the two dimensions that it connects: that of sensibility and that of language, highlighting how we can identify categories in respect to their relationship with materiality and *syncategoremata*.

From the analysis of the double link that categories appear to have, I will try to identify those elements that will help us in delineating the nature and structure of Heideggerian categories.

In the next section, I will address the first side of the problem, namely the relation between materiality and category, which corresponds to the elements – sense perception and categories – mentioned in Heidegger’s first claim.

### **3.6.1 Sensibility and categories – The intersection.**

From the schema just presented of categorial intuition, we should now try to address the multiple questions that it reveals. As I have said, categorial intuition is a *protean* notion and it is both a problematic place within Husserlian doctrine and a fertile one from which we can take inspiration and find elements to enrich our analysis of Heidegger’s categories. First of all, we have to understand where to locate categories as suggested by categorial intuition. On a first reading, we may say that they are to be transferred from intellect to *experience*. We now need to specify what that could mean. From the three steps of the functioning of categorial intuition, categories are those articulations that are founded on the sensible – from which they must be distinguished. To analyse the main distinction that characterizes Husserl’s theory, between the sensory and the categorial level, and, at the same time, to simplify and stress the main difference between them, we can also consider Sokolowski’s reading of Husserlian doctrine. Sokolowski argues that Husserl still seems to employ, within the articulation of sensible and categorial intuition, at least a sort of, matter-form schema<sup>83</sup>, since the sensory dimension can be identified as form-less<sup>84</sup>, as the dimension of *raw material data*, by contrast with the formal level of categorial intuition<sup>85</sup>. Husserl himself suggests, in order more easily to understand the difference between the simple and

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<sup>83</sup> Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution*, 54; see also, Alweiss L., *The world unclaimed: A challenge to Heidegger’s critique of Husserl*, Athens, Ohio University Press, 2003, 38.

<sup>84</sup> Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl’s Concept of Constitution*, 67.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibidem*.

categorical level and to indicate their opposition, using the binomial *stuff* (matter) - form<sup>86</sup>. In this regard, Husserl states that we have to give a reason for the distinction between “categorical form and sensuously founded matter”<sup>87</sup>.

Nonetheless, on a more precise view, this sharp distinction that we can understand on a definitional level<sup>88</sup>, seems difficult to maintain phenomenologically<sup>89</sup>. First of all, we must note that the three steps just presented as the skeleton of the functioning of categorial intuition, are not to be understood as merely juxtaposed, but are founded one upon the other in such an interconnected way that they show themselves as strictly co-implicated. This tied co-implication, which we shall now investigate a little more, makes the sharp distinction appear (for our understanding) problematic and weak, once we put the distinction in motion. By highlighting this problem, I want to present a view about the relocation of categories and their nature in view of Heidegger’s understanding of categorial intuition. This argument will be fundamental for the understanding of Heidegger’s conception of categories.

I shall now focus on the status of matter and form, and their relation. My aim is to demonstrate that the distinction is quite blurred and weak and, while acceptable in terms of a definitional role, it does not appear to reflect the proper phenomenology of its function. I will draw from it a first characterization of categories, as conceived of as being within experience. I shall then pass on to the relationship between categories and language.

### 3.6.2 The status of materiality

I shall now analyse the sensible-categorial distinction that recalls, as Sokolowski claims, that of matter-form, which characterizes Husserl’s doctrine of simple and categorial intuition but also runs through his idea of knowledge, in which the level of sense material data is maintained as distinct from those of categories<sup>90</sup>.

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<sup>86</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 276; Hua XIX/2, 136. Husserl claims to prefer using the term “stuff” instead of matter and material to differentiate it from the use of the notion of materiality which he employs in the *Fifth Investigation*. However, I will not refer to the notion of materiality as thought of as in the *Fifth Logical Investigation*, and I will consider matter/materiality and “stuff” as synonyms, which despite Husserl’s concerns, happens *passim* in the *Sixth Investigation*.

<sup>87</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 282; Hua XIX/2, 143.

<sup>88</sup> Mohanty claims that we can conceive Husserlian *hyle* as a “boundary-condition’ for noematic discourse, as the notion of the bare given”. Mohanty J. N., *The Possibility of the Transcendental Philosophy*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 1985, xvii; see also, Føllesdal D., “Brentano and Husserl on intentional object and perception”, in *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 5, 1978, 83-96, 93-94.

<sup>89</sup> See also Taminiaux’s reading of the relationship between simple and categorial intuition in Taminiaux, “Heidegger and Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*”.

<sup>90</sup> Smith D. W, McIntyre R., *Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language*, Dordrecht

It would be rash to reduce Husserl’s effort regarding categorial intuition as just another re-proposition of the schema “form-matter”, without some prior clarifications. Following tradition, and the two authors we have indicated as paradigmatic for the understanding of Husserl’s categorial intuition and how categories can be understood in this framework, we can refer to the Aristotelian and Kantian matter-form schema. I shall argue that in both cases we will find it complicated to define the level of materiality and to set a neat contraposition with that of categories. From this complication and the consequent implication, I try to define the framework in which we can acquire more details about the status of categories, especially highlighting those tensions that can help us in understanding Heidegger's categories.

### 3.6.2.a Materiality as hyletic formless data

One way to see the application of the schema “matter-form” to the relation “sensible-categorial” intuition is to note that, according to the definition of “stuff” as formless, and some passages about unstructured nature, the categorial dimension, by contrast, should be conceived of as the “level of concepts absolutely not blended with sensibility”<sup>91</sup>. Thus, categories, “would be defined through the exemption of any concrete materiality”<sup>92</sup>. Accordingly, the sensible dimension should be seen as this sheer, categorically untouched materiality, or stuff, as some kind of raw *data*, which represent the pure basis of the functioning of categorial intuition. In line with the Aristotelian attitude to understand categories as a non-intellectual form, but given in experience with materiality, one way to understand the relation of matter-form is to appeal to the classical distinction between *morphè-hyle*, which we find mentioned in *Ideas*<sup>93</sup>. Even if this distinction appears later on in Husserl’s works<sup>94</sup>, scholars have highlighted how the idea of a sensuous perception, understood as stuff (or matter) can be thought of as synonymous to *hyle*<sup>95</sup>– as opposed to

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and Boston, Reidel, 1982, 137.

<sup>91</sup> Benoist, *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie*, 115.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>93</sup> Husserl distinguishes in §85 of *Ideas* between a sensuous *hyle*, described as formless, and *morphè*.

<sup>94</sup> Regarding the analysis of perception, Smith establishes a continuity between Husserl’s *Ideas* and *Logical Investigations*: “[t]his basic analysis of perceptual acts is an enduring part of Husserl's philosophy: it is already present, in somewhat different terms, in *Logical Investigations* (see especially V, § 14) and is reaffirmed as well in works long after *Ideas*”. Smith, *Husserl and intentionality*, 137.

<sup>95</sup> “Putting Aristotle's matter-form distinction to a novel use, Husserl calls the sensory phase of a perception its *hyle* ('matter') - or its *hyletic phase*, or *hyletic data* – and the noetic phase its *morphe* ('form'). Husserl thus

*morphè*, indicating the categorical apparatus<sup>96</sup>. It is important to notice that Heidegger also recognizes that “the ground” of sensuous perception, “is what Husserl calls *hyle*, which means, that which affects sensibility, in short the sense data [*Gegebenheiten*] (blue, black, spatial extension etc.)”<sup>97</sup>. The sensuous object, in terms of *hyle*, corresponds to the pure raw data that stay at the basis of the process of knowledge and correspond to what Heidegger criticizes as the philosophical prejudices corresponding to a sort of *Myth of the Given* (see especially 4.4.1.a).

However, by following the schema of form-matter in terms of *morphè-hyle*, we encounter the first difficulty of what should be the proper meaning of sensuous stuff as formless matter, and how this can correspond to the level of simple perception and its object. The first ambiguity is to find, among the multiple definitions Husserl gives us about its object (as already briefly noted in section 3.6), a coherent description and explanation of the object of simple intuition. In fact, while asserting the formless character of “stuff”, which is also suggested by the notion of *hyle*<sup>98</sup>, Husserl provides us with several explications and examples in order to clarify the difference and the functioning of simple and categorial intuition that, rather than exemplifying the nature of stuff, and with it its relationship with categories, have a blurring effect.

To describe the object of the simple perception, which should represent the unstructured, unthematic, uncategorised type of perception, Husserl gives us some definitions and examples that are not consistent among themselves, and the question seems quite controversial.

Husserl says that we begin with the undifferentiated, continuous experience of an object<sup>99</sup>. In the first level of intuition we intend what can be called sensuous material elements<sup>100</sup>. The first difficulty is that by the opposition between this level and the

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conceives the sensory phase as a 'formless stuff [*Stoff*] and the noetic phase as a 'stuffless form"', *Ibidem*. See Husserl, *Ideas*, vol 1; Hua III/1, §85.

<sup>96</sup> In this regard, Theodorou defines the intuition of categorial as “supra-sensuous morphic”, in Theodorou, *Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordiality, and the Categorical*, 230.

<sup>97</sup> Heidegger, *Four Seminars*, 65; Ga 15, 374.

<sup>98</sup> Hintikka states, “Husserl occasionally also uses the term 'sense data' (*Sinnesdaten*) but only as a synonym or near-synonym for his normal term 'hyletic data' or simply 'hyle' (...) hyletic data (...) are (...) unstructured raw materials (...)”. Hintikka J., “The phenomenological dimension”, in Smith B., Smith, D.W., *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1995, 78-105, 97-98. “As far as empirical experience is concerned, there is a component in the immediately given that has the character of unstructured raw materials, the hyle (or hyletic data)”, in Hintikka J., “The notion of intuition in Husserl”, in *Revue internationale de philosophie*, n° 224, 2003/2, 169-191, 179.

<sup>99</sup> Sokolowski, “Husserl's Concept of Categorical Intuition”, 130.

<sup>100</sup> *Ivi*, 132 -133.

categorical, Husserl vacillates regarding what we have to understand by it, whether it is a thing or not and how it should be characterized. In some passages of the *Investigation*, as Taminiaux remarks, Husserl sometimes seems to suggest that simple perceptions are intuitions of sensory givens rather than of things<sup>101</sup>. In his reading of sensible intuition, quoted above, Heidegger continues asking “What is perceived sensibly? The sense data themselves. Now along with these sense data, an object becomes visible in perception. The object is not given in the sensuous impression. The objectivity of the object cannot be perceived sensibly. In summary, the fact that the object is an object does not arise from a sensuous intuition”<sup>102</sup>.

If the insistence on describing sensuous objects in terms of their being undifferentiated and unstructured leads us to think that sensible intuition refers to sensory givens, echoing British empiricism, that does not present to us “a thing”. However, later on in the same chapter, Husserl makes it clear that the object itself is genuinely perceived through the mediation of the sensory givens.

Each single percept in this series is already a percept of the thing. Whether I look at this book from above or below, from inside or outside, I always see this book. It is always one and the same thing, and that not merely in some purely physical sense, but in view of our precepts themselves.<sup>103</sup>

From these lines, we acknowledge that we do not simply perceive sheer sensuous materiality, but we actually perceive *this book*. This shifting movement has been registered by Heidegger, who after having stated that the object is an object, and does not arise from sensuous intuition, continues by observing that, “and yet this object is in fact perceived”<sup>104</sup>.

Husserl himself warns us to avoid misinterpreting *hyle* in an empiricist/Kantian way. In fact, another possible understanding of *stuff* can be thought of in terms of something real (*reell*)<sup>105</sup>, intending *reell* as Heidegger would, namely as the characterization of something conceived in terms of a *res*, which is an entity defined by its attributes. The object of simple perception is therefore hyletic (*reell*) content<sup>106</sup>. Through the clarification of what we should

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<sup>101</sup> Taminiaux, “Heidegger and Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*”, 106.

<sup>102</sup> Heidegger, *Four Seminars*, 65; Ga 15, 374.

<sup>103</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 284; Hua XIX/2, 149.

<sup>104</sup> Heidegger, *Four Seminars*, 65; Ga 15, 374. I agree with Taminiaux who calls this tension a *productive paradox* in Husserl’s discussion of the founding-founded relationship between straightforward perception and categorical perception. See Taminiaux, “Heidegger and Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*”, 70-71.

<sup>105</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*; Hua XIX/2, §46.

<sup>106</sup> Lohmar, “Husserl’s Concept of Categorical Intuition”, 133.

intend by *reell*, Husserl warns us against the empiricist reading of “stuff” mentioned above. In §5 of the appendix he says: “In misleading fashion we also call the real (*reellen*) constituents of appearance, 'the presentative sensations, the experience moments of colour, form etc'”<sup>107</sup>. The hyletic “stuff” therefore cannot be thought of as a cluster of mere sensations, but a concrete thing. Given that we have to notice that immediately after making the distinction stuff-form, Husserl declares himself to be willing to start the analysis of this first level of perception by scrutinizing, “the sensuous *concreta* and their sensuous constituents”. This concrete real stuff, although still formless, is exemplified by mentioning the perception of *this book*, *this* individual book.

I am not alone in reading a paradox into this last example. It appears difficult to acknowledge the example, *this book*, as representing the object of a pure simple perception intending a formless *hyle*, deprived of categories. Before continuing the inquiry into this example as paradigmatic of the impossibility of having a neat distinction between matter and form, matter and category, or even to have it at all, let me recapitulate the oscillations which Husserl is using. The hyletic stuff of the simple perception is formless; it seems to be sensory givens, real *concretum*, *individuum* and “this book”. These definitions and the final example do not appear to be fully consistent between themselves. It becomes problematic to understand in a straightforward manner what formless pure stuff, in contrast with categories, should be.

One might argue that, on the one hand, interpreting *hyle* in terms of sensory elements could be a misinterpretation, which reduces Husserl to some sort of sensuous empiricism, and that on the other the example of “this book” is coherent with Husserl saying that while simple intuition intends something concrete and individual, categorical intuition intends relations. As we said in section 3.6, with the former I perceive *this book*, with the latter *this book on the table*. In this regard simple perception would be linked to what Heidegger called a *res* and which he criticizes in terms of an unrelated substance, which may correspond to Husserl’s real individual *concretum*. However, it remains difficult to understand how *this book* could represent an unstructured and unarticulated formless *objectum*. Moreover, by referring to the example of *this book*, and using an indexical, namely one of those syncategorematic particles that are linguistic devices of categorial structure, we are presented with an example that might lead us to think that *this book* is already articulated.

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<sup>107</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 342; Hua XIX/2, 234.

In addition, as Mohanty recalls, Husserl later in *Ideas*, “defines an “*individuum*” as a “this-there” whose material essence is a concrete one”<sup>108</sup>, which is our case of a single concrete book conceived of as single *individuum* which is representative of the object of a simple intuition. But Mohanty continues by saying that, “[a]n individual is not a bare this-the, but is a so - and - so constituted one”<sup>109</sup>. As we will see in the next section, the complicated notion of constitution can be understood in Husserl as a categorial constitution. Therefore, we might interpret the previous passage as meaning that an *individuum* is already categorized.

The problem of matter and *hyle*<sup>110</sup>, as well as that of categories, is a complicated one, and Husserl’s logical investigations are full of indications which are partially ambiguous or vacillating. By what I have said up to this point, I wanted only to show the general difficulty of identifying and isolating a proper materiality within Husserl’s project and how this should be kept sharply distinct from categories: it seems to suggest that the separation is weaker, in terms of Husserl’s will to maintain a level of formless “stuff”. If materiality does not seem so pure, how should categories be conceived as a higher secondary level to grasp with a higher type of intuition?

### **3.6.2.b Materiality à la Kant**

The other way to apply the schema of matter-form is the Kantian way. This option is easier to put aside, as the interpretation that we do not have to choose to comprehend categorial intuition and categories. Nonetheless, a brief comment on the Kantian version of the schema and Husserl’s *categorial* intuition will give us some other elements to shed light on the peculiar status of categories. Moran has criticized Sokolowski for having proposed reading, in Husserl’s theory of intuition, the schema of matter-form, since, “Husserl’s conception of categorial intuition [...] involves rethinking the Kantian oppositions of sensibility and understanding, intuition and concepts”<sup>111</sup> – and therefore that

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<sup>108</sup> Husserl, *Ideas*, vol I., 36; Hua III/1, 29.

<sup>109</sup> Mohanty J. N., *Phenomenology and Ontology*, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1970, 156.

<sup>110</sup> I will not further insist on the issue of *hyle*, which is a very difficult and controversial one. Some other references for a criticism of Husserl’s notion of *hyle*: McKenna W., “The Problem of Sense Data in Husserl’s Theory of Perception”, in L.Embree, *Essays in Memory of Aron Gurwitsch*, Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology & University Press of America, Washington, 1983, 223-239; Gurwitsch A., *Das Bewusstseinsfeld*, Walter De Gruyter, Berlin, New York, 1975.

<sup>111</sup> Moran, *Edmund Husserl*, 126.

of matter-form. From this perspective, Moran is right in claiming that reducing Husserl's sensible and categorial intuition to the terms of a Kantian distinction between form and matter, means misreading Husserl's very innovation and understanding of these terms<sup>112</sup>. In fact, the schema of matter-form, as understood by Kantian tradition, would present a misunderstanding of the notion of categorial intuition – and more generally that of intuition *tout court* – which belongs to Husserl's non-subjectivist and anti-psychological project of the *Logical Investigations*.

Heidegger himself recalls that in Husserl's lessons about categorial intuition<sup>113</sup>, in line with the re-location of categories from the intellect to the experience, we cannot use this schema in a Kantian or neo-Kantian fashion<sup>114</sup>. Sensible material is not a manifold to be ordered by *a priori* forms which, as in Kant, belong to the intellect. As Heidegger says, by applying to the discovery of categorial intuition the (neo)-Kantian understanding of the dualism of form-matter as corresponding to that of sensibility/intellect,

in a stroke we have the old mythology of an intellect which glues and rigs together the world's matter with its own forms. (...) The categorial "forms" are not constructs of acts but objects that manifest themselves in these acts.<sup>115</sup>

Among all the possible interpretations and the *aporiai* we might trace within Husserl's proposal about the status of categories, the fact that they are not to be intended as having a subjectivist nature *à la* Kant, is a firm point that we can consider as granted. Thus, whilst Husserlian categories are not an *a priori* form of synthesis, the sensible material (the point bears repeating) is not a manifold to be ordered by *a priori* forms which, as in Kant, belong to the intellect. In Kant the manifold is not structured but is synthesized by the forms and categories of intuition and intellect. The manifold finds its ordering principle in something different from itself: there is another, external principle, which is represented by intellectual functions, and which provides them with a form and an order. But, as we have seen, the great value of the doctrine of categorial intuition lies in the fact that, by means of it, Husserl is offering us a new account of categories, without conceiving them as intellectual forms that synthesize the sensible manifold. Categories or "categorial 'forms' are not something made by acts, but rather objects that in these acts become visible in themselves"<sup>116</sup>.

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<sup>112</sup> See also, Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed*, 11.

<sup>113</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*; Ga 20, § 6.

<sup>114</sup> *Ivi*, Ga 20, § 6 d. α). *Averting misunderstandings*.

<sup>115</sup> *Ivi*, 70; Ga 20, 96.

<sup>116</sup> Quoting Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 71; Ga 20, 97.



However, in Husserl, the hyletic matter is not some a-logic “stuff”<sup>117</sup> that needs an external principle of ordering. There is no a-logic manifold to be synthetised by an intellect. The matter-form schema, thought of in terms of the opposition between the Kantian manifold and *a priori* forms, does not represent the distinction between the sensible and categorial dimension. Matter does not need an external principle of ordering and categories are not intellectual forms.

Turning to the question of categories, we meet the following situation. Categories are not intellectual forms, rather they show themselves within experience. At the same time, they must be kept distinct from sensible materiality, which in turn has some kind of internal order. Given that statement, which is the proper place of categories? What is their nature and role if they are not something that belongs to the intellect – and yet matter, which has an internal order, must be kept separated from it?

Before going any further into the analysis of the schema of matter-form, focusing this time directly on the notion of form and categories (section 3.6.2.c), I want to devote some words to the non-intellectual nature of categories and of categorial intuition.

Given the non-subjectivist nature of categories, the notion of intuition should be understood not as a faculty but in a sort of pre-Kantian meaning<sup>118</sup> of the term. The experiencing, perceiving subject of categorial intuition does not coincide with a creative spontaneous *ego*, but is a subject which is *thing-directed*. In this regard, it is interesting to mention what Sokolowski suggests calling categorial intuition. Since categories are not a product of mind, but something that we intuit, namely something that we perceive and see, Sokolowski proposes using “registration” as a synonym of categorial intuition<sup>119</sup>. In my opinion, this term can represent a temporarily useful solution to avoid recalling the Kantian notion of intuition and its implications, while still contemplating some kind of experiencing subjectivity that is there and intends categories. The notion of registration does not suggest an active subject in traditional terms nor a manifold given to synthesize. “To see, or better, to register a state of affairs (*Sachverhalt*) (...) is not to create it. Insofar as a state of affairs is registered (i.e., categorially intuited), it is not the result of a way we happen to assemble or process data (sensory input) into an aggregate, indeed, it is not manufactured at all but given originally as a composite whole.”<sup>120</sup>. So, in Sokolowski’s proposal, we might find a

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<sup>117</sup> See also Mohanty, *The Possibility of the Transcendental Philosophy*, 162.

<sup>118</sup> See Hintikka, “The notion of intuition in Husserl”, 173.

<sup>119</sup> Sokolowski, “Husserl’s Concept of Categorial Intuition”, 128.

<sup>120</sup> Dahlstrom, “Introduction”, 10.

useful concept to indicate an experiencing subject as a subject thing-directed. As Sokolowski puts it, “I register something that I find in it. I say something about what I suddenly notice in it”, and that is the meaning of categorial intuition<sup>121</sup>. The notion of *registration* indicates that the world, towards which I turn and that I have noticed, is structured and – as we can infer from the proposal of equating *registration* to categorial intuition –, this world that I have noticed is *categorically* structured.

This use of *registration* as a kind of attitude related to categories, if we want to use the traditional taxonomy, seems to conceive the role of the experiencing subjectivity neither in terms of *spontaneity* (which is explicitly what the notion of categorial intuition wants to avoid) nor in terms of pure *passivity*. We can hazard an assumption that here, the subjectivity related to categorial intuition, connoted within the notion of *registration*, more adequately corresponds to the type of subjectivity that represents the level of receptivity. Thus, the term *registration* should not be thought of as a mere passive *registration*, but as something framing the co-presence of categorial structure and a subject, to be understood as a weaker subject compared to the one conceived of as spontaneous subject<sup>122</sup>.

Just as an indication, while going back to our discussion of *registration* as categorial intuition, the dimension of registration, as well as that of receptivity, inserts a sort of “weaker” subjectivity. This weaker kind of subjectivity possesses a “median” nature between being merely passive and being a strong Cartesian subjectivity as indicating something creative and spontaneous. This median nature of receptivity recalls the nature of categories that, as we have said, are characterized by being double linked to the distinct and allegedly opposite dimension of materiality and language.

In the previous section, by recalling Mohanty quoting Husserl on the notion of individuality, as related to the example of *this book*, representing the object of simple intuition, I have briefly mentioned the notion of *constitution*. The notion of *constitution* is another central and yet slippery idea in Husserlian phenomenology whose proper understanding is, once again, very difficult. I will not go any deeper into the examination of the notion of *constitution* but I will highlight its meaning as *categorial* constitution – hence,

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<sup>121</sup> Sokolowski, “Husserl’s Concept of Categorial Intuition”, 129.

<sup>122</sup> It would be worthwhile to compare the Husserlian notion of “registration” and doctrine of the categorial intuition with McDowell’s Kantian account of receptivity, categories and concepts in McDowell, J., “Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality”, in *Journal of Philosophy* 95, no. 9, 1998, 431–91 and McDowell, J., *Mind and World*. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1994.

as related to the notion of categorial intuition and therefore to the nature of categories that we have to comprehend. For these reasons, I will refer mainly to Heidegger's comment about the notion of constitution, since, indeed, Heidegger mentions it in his reading of categorial intuition. At first the notion of *constitution* recalls, probably even more than the notion of *intuition*, a creative act that seems to come from a creative subject<sup>123</sup>. However, just as he did for the matter-form schema, Heidegger warns us that we should not conceive the notion of constitution in a subjectivist manner<sup>124</sup>.

'Constituting' does not mean 'producing' in the sense of 'making' and 'fabricating'.<sup>125</sup>

In a similar vein with the non-subjectivist nature of categorial intuition and categories, constitution does not mean to produce, but rather,

[...] it means 'letting the entity be seen in its objectivity'.<sup>126</sup>

Corresponding to the two-sided definition of *constitution* – in a negative sense, it should not be employed to indicate a production, while in a positive sense, it is defined as something that lets the entity show itself – Heidegger's definition of categories, as presented by the doctrine of categorial intuition, follows the same definitional structure.

[Categorial forms] are not constructs of acts but objects [*Gegenstände*] which manifest themselves in these acts. They are not something made by the subject and even less something added to the real objects, such that the real entity is itself modified by this forming.

[...] Rather, they actually present the entity more truly in its 'being-in-itself'.<sup>127</sup>

According to our reading, in Heidegger's lessons the notion of *constitution* is strictly tied to the dimension of categoriality. His definition of *constitution* and, accordingly, of

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<sup>123</sup> Some commentators, interpreting this notion as indicating an activity, have translated Husserl's concept of constitution as "creation" (see Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 252) or "restitution" (see Biemel W., "Die entscheidenden Phasen der Entfaltung von Husserls Philosophie", in *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung*, 13, 1959, 187-213, 200. For a criticism of these two interpretations of the notion of constitution, see Overgaard, *Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World*, 65 ff.

<sup>124</sup> Overgaard rightly remarks that, "[c]onstitution is not basically a process in which I am active. The point is not that there is no such thing as an active constitution – because there certainly is, according to Husserl – but that all such 'active' constitution presupposes underlying passive constitution [...]. In other words, with regard to the most fundamental levels of constitution, it would be wrong to say that *I constitute*". Overgaard, *Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World*, 65.

<sup>125</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 71; Ga 20, 97.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>127</sup> *Ivi*, 70; Ga 20, 96.

categories, indicates that their meaning is to present the entity, by letting it show itself, in its categorial structure. Even if by employing the semantics of *letting* be, which is the expression of a very Heideggerian jargon<sup>128</sup>, Heidegger is actually paraphrasing Husserl. In fact, in the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, Husserl, while mentioning the difference between the foundational acts of simple perception and categorial acts, claims that the latter “set up new objects” since they are “acts in which something appears as actual and self-given, which was not given, and could not have been given, as what it appears to be, in these foundational acts alone”<sup>129</sup>.

Sokolowski, echoing Heidegger, says that to constitute a categorial object simply means to bring the perceptual object, as an already categorially constituted object<sup>130</sup>, “to light, to articulate it, to bring it forth, to actualize its truth”<sup>131</sup>. It has been rightfully noted<sup>132</sup> that with this comment, Sokolowski contributes to the undermining of Husserl’s wish<sup>133</sup> to keep apart the (one-rayed) givenness of the perceptual object from the (many-rayed) givenness of the categorial object that is founded upon the perceptual object.

Given the possibility of understanding categorial intuition as *registration* or *constitution*, once again the problem of the collocation of categories, and therefore of their nature, emerges in this perspective. The comments on registration, but especially those on the notion of *constitution* (*categorial* constitution), while restating the non-subjectivist nature of categories, and ascribing to them the role of presenting the entity in itself, reinforce our doubts about the status of matter as separated from categories and its relationship with them. In fact, the combination of the notions of *registration* and *constitution* seems to suggest that it is exactly through categorial intuition that we see and experience a proper entity, which in itself, therefore, is categorially structured. I take these reflections as another sign that we have to question the distinction between matter and categories. However, this doubt, instead of being an obstacle, will serve the understanding of categories that we can gain from Husserl and, moreover, that we have to transpose to the Heideggerian structure and nature of categories.

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<sup>128</sup> On this regarding, see Haugeland J., “Letting Be”, in Crowell S. and Malpas J. (eds.), *Transcendental Heidegger*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2007, 93-103.

<sup>129</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Investigation*, 282; Hua XIX/2, 144. Heidegger comments these lines in *History of the Concept of Time*, 57; Ga 20, 60.

<sup>130</sup> Theodorou, *Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordially, and the Categorial*, 215.

<sup>131</sup> Sokolowski R., *Introduction to phenomenology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 208.

<sup>132</sup> Theodorou, *Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordially, and the Categorial*, 215.

<sup>133</sup> This is actually also Sokolowski’s intention. See Sokolowski, *Introduction to phenomenology*.

With this perspective, let us go back to the example of *this book*. We have seen that it is the chosen example to represent the uncategorized object, since it indicates a concrete *individuum*. However, it has been recalled that the *individuum* is not a mere *this*, but is something *constituted*. This final consideration can serve as the “clue” that we have good reason to think the example of *this book* should increase our doubts about how we should understand it, as the object of a simple perception deprived of any categorial structure. Thus, if we have good reason to say that *this book* should also be conceived as categorially articulated, how shall we conceive the separation of matter and categories? How shall we understand categories?

### 3.6.2.c Forms and categories

I now wish to make a final remark, while continuing to take into account the dichotomy of matter-form from another angle, focusing on the side of *form* which, in the established parallelism, corresponds to the side of categories. We have already seen the fluctuating meaning of the notion of sensible *matter*, given the variety and the ambiguity of the definitions we can ascribe to it. Now, we shall turn to the meaning of the notion of *form* and *categories*, more precisely to that of “forms” as “categories” and *vice versa*. If the status of matter is not fully clear, the same problem now has to be addressed by analysing the aspect of the *form*, its meaning and its relationship with matter. From this perspective, too, the definition and the status of forms/categories and their relation with matter/sensible matter, will be revealed to be uneasy and difficult to specify.

As we have said (3.6.2.b), matter is not an a-logic chaotic manifold, but rather has some kind of internal order. As demonstrated by Husserl’s examples describing the pure level of materiality as the founding basis for the structuring of categories, this material “stuff” is not pure and sheer sensuous matter as traditional empiricism would say. Husserl holds that sensible matter has an internal mind-independent order: it evinces some kind of internal articulation that is not yet categorial, and which offers us the sensible object.

While we say that the matter of sensible intuition possesses its own forms, if we wish to maintain the separation between matter and categories, we have to admit that materiality has *forms* that articulate it but which are not categories. In this way, we make sense of a non-logic material that is not yet categorized. So, the schematic contraposition of matter-form should be seen more accurately as the contraposition of a formed matter – namely that

which has in itself forms, features and a general order – and categories – as something different from the forms that animate the matter. But what are forms? What are categories? How do they actually differ from each other?

By and large, we can count as *forms* of materiality the different “profiles” and adumbrations that, as we saw in the first step of the functioning of categorial intuition<sup>134</sup>, characterize the sensible object. In sensible perception, the object is given by continuous synthesis of the different “profiles” (the different sides and aspects, as it were) that offers us the sensible object. However, this continuous synthesis is not a mere succession<sup>135</sup>, but has a ruled order. To characterize the formed but not yet categorized nature of matter, Husserl uses the theory of wholes and parts that he presents in the *Third Logical Investigation*<sup>136</sup>. By describing the different relations between wholes, independent parts and dependent parts (moment), Husserl enriches the idea of an internal, non-mind derived complexity, nexus and order which are implied within the proper content of objects. In the *Third Investigation* this theory could be conceived of as Husserl’s reflection on the ontological structure of objects. We may point out that, whereas the various relations of wholes-parts belong to the object, they do not represent a categorial structure, but rather they indicate the relation between the different kinds of forms of an object. When we say that matter has *forms*, we do not mean merely that it has a *shape*<sup>137</sup>, but rather that it possesses an internal order linked to the self-instituted relation between wholes and parts: i.e. this horse as a *whole* has as its *independent part* the head, and the head has as its *dependent part* a colour<sup>138</sup>. For now, after these few hints, it should suffice to appreciate the fact that forms are not just shapes but an internal articulation related to the content of the object. *Forms* are more than mere shapes but yet “less” than categories: they indicate that basic nexus that regulates matter, so that the foundational matter is not given to us deprived of any articulation.

Given that, it follows that categories are not forms and *vice versa*. Even if Husserl does not provide us with an official list of his categories (as in Aristotle or Kant do), it is customary to consider Husserl’s categories, for a basic understanding of them, as the

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<sup>134</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*; Hua XIX/2, § 47.

<sup>135</sup> See, *ivi*, 286; Hua XIX/2, 153.

<sup>136</sup> Husserl, *Third Logical Investigation*, in Husserl E., *Logical Investigations*; Hua XIX/2.

<sup>137</sup> Husserl distinguishes only the forms of the type “triangle,” etc., which he calls “sensuous forms”. See Husserl E., *Second Logical Investigation*, in Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, 270; Hua XIX/1, 156.

<sup>138</sup> Husserl, *Third Logical Investigation*, Hua XIX/2, §2 ff.. See also Piana G., “La tematica husserliana dell’intero e della parte. Introduzione alla Terza ed alla Quarta Ricerca logica”, in Husserl, *L’intero e la parte: Terza e Quarta Ricerca*, Il Saggiatore, Milano, 1977.

categories of “unity”, “plurality”, “state of affairs”<sup>139</sup>, and so forth.

However, behind these distinctions between form and categories, further oscillations are rooted within Husserl’s application of this terminology, giving us the impression that this distinction is questionable, and blurring the dichotomy just proposed between forms of matter and founded categories.

### 3.6.2.d Categorical forms

If we reflect on how we have talked about categorical intuition and categories, it cannot have escaped our attention that we – with Husserl – have often referred to categories using the expression “categorical forms”. In this regard, Benoist has highlighted the fact that Husserl actually prefers to use the expression “categorical forms” instead of “categories”<sup>140</sup>. Moreover, he also seems to use *categorical forms* and *categories* as synonyms<sup>141</sup>, to the point that we may ask if categories are *forms*, and indeed, what should be the relation between *forms* and categories? And from this interrogation, I would, then, continue to enquire about the relation of matter and categories.

As we saw for the definition of *matter*, the definition of *categories* as *categorical forms* suggests another weakening of the distinction between *formed matter* and categories, which in their turn should be understood as something different from *forms*, and yet are defined in terms of *categorical forms*.

Conversely, we must note some other terminological and conceptual fluctuations: not only are *categories* conceived of as *categorical forms*, but we can also find in Husserl that some things *not* thought of as *categorical forms* are sometimes called “categorical”. For example and eminently, Husserl refers to part-whole relations (among either independent or dependent elements) in terms of *categories*<sup>142</sup>, stating that “all specific forms of the relation between a whole and its parts”, all “such relations are of categorical”<sup>143</sup> nature. In fact, we find that parts-wholes relations are used in a double sense: on the one hand, they represent those relations that Husserl uses to exemplify the *forms* possessed by the content of the object. At the same time, Husserl uses them to show the proper function of categorical

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<sup>139</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*; Hua XIX/2, §§ 48-49.

<sup>140</sup> Benoist, *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie*, 133.

<sup>141</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 280; Hua XIX/2, 143. Here Husserl directly equates “categorical forms” and “categories”, 282, 303; Hua XIX/2, 145, 179.

<sup>142</sup> Husserl, *Third Logical Investigation*, 155; XIX/2, 280.

<sup>143</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 288; Hua XIX/2, 155.

intuition, when we shift from the level of simple perception to that of the categorical forms which are articulated upon it (see section 3.6). Husserl applies the term “categorical” to the founding relations on the level of *sense* perception<sup>144</sup> (as well as to the relations of parts-wholes, namely to what represents the level of simple object), and also to the founded relations on the level of categorical intuition.

These kinds of terminological overlapping may be taken as hints of conceptual overlapping to take into account the weak nature of the distinction between matter, forms and categories within Husserl’s doctrine of categorical intuition, which are nonetheless useful handholds and tools to understand the nature of categories, especially in regard to how we can outline Heidegger’s conception of it, *via* his interpretation of Husserl’s categorical intuition.

All the ambiguities that we can trace in Husserl’s doctrine of categorial intuition and regarding the status and relation between matter and categories, lead us to think that the distinction between what is not articulated by categories and what is, is not a sharp distinction but is actually quite weak, since the simple level of perception seems to be very intertwined with that of categories<sup>145</sup>. In Heidegger’s reading of categorial intuition, the statement that perception is already pervaded by categories, as I shall argue later, follows from this weakening of that distinction which Husserl would like to maintain. Hence, all these conjoined intricate overlapping fluctuations about the notions that are connected in categorial intuition, lead us to think that “a categorial form is just an explicit equal of what is already implicitly formative in the appearing perceptual object”<sup>146</sup>. However, the implicit-explicit relation, used to differentiate the level of perception from that of categories (as implicit in the sensible object and explicitly thematised through categorial acts and finally linguistically expressed in judgment, section 3.6), gives us another reason to think that if categories are implicitly given within the sensible dimension, it could mean that they are already *there*. Categorical forms and their articulations seem to be more “glued” to the sensible object that founded upon it.

To give a final remark on the question of categories as categorial forms, we can again

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<sup>144</sup> See, Theodorou, *Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordially, and the Categorial Phenomenology Beyond its Original Divide*, 220.

<sup>145</sup> For, if “categorial constitution” means simply to “bring it”— i.e., the perceptual object as already categorially constituted object—to light, there can be no substantial difference between the one-rayed perceptual and the multirayed categorial object. Sokolowski, in this sense, seems to want to simultaneously step on two boats. Sokolowski, *Introduction to phenomenology*, 218 and Theodorou, *Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordially, and the Categorial Phenomenology Beyond its Original Divide* 215.

<sup>146</sup> *Ivi*, 220.



take into account Benoist's observation about Husserl's preference for saying "categorial forms" instead of categories. Benoist recalls what the peculiarity of the phenomenological reflection of categories actually is. Whilst the tradition thinks of categories as "the properties" of objects "deprived of genre"<sup>147</sup>, conversely, the very original contribution of phenomenology is, so to speak, to offer back to the objects their "colours"<sup>148</sup>. Namely, as I think Benoist means, to locate categories, as indeed categorial intuition does, in experience instead of conceiving of them through some kind of abstraction<sup>149</sup>. In Benoist's reading, defining categories in terms of categorial *forms* implicitly indicates something that I consider important for the comprehension of the function and nature of categories. For Benoist, in fact, what Husserl calls categorial *forms* and not categories indicates the paradigm of a dependent moment.

What Husserl calls categorial forms and not categories represents, in effects, the proper paradigm of the dependent moment. A categorial form, in a way, does not exist by itself. The categorial form is realized only within its incarnations in different concrete figures that display its necessity. Outside the inherence to such figures we cannot properly say that it exists.<sup>150</sup>

Talking about categorial *forms* instead of categories means, therefore, to stress their intertwined nature with concrete matter. Their non-independent character makes it more difficult to conceive of categorial forms as something separated from their matter. As Sokolowski puts it, one might say that "like concrete phenomenological objects", categorial objects, "are not abstractions, nor are they simply logical forms. They are what result from concrete realization of such forms"<sup>151</sup>. In these last passages, we read that categorial *forms* are not the result of an abstraction, but rather the result of a realization, and they are not detachable from the elements that they relate to and articulate. Moreover, their "dependent" nature, as Benoist suggests, leads us to say that their proper nature is to be grasped in their functioning. In line with their non-subjectivist nature, "categorial forms are not constituted before experience, as Kant's *a priori* forms are. They are articulated upon what is experienced and are functions or moments of direct experience"<sup>152</sup>. The proper nature of

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<sup>147</sup> Benoist, *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie*, 116, (my translation).

<sup>148</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>149</sup> *Ivi*, 118.

<sup>150</sup> Benoist, *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie*, 133, (my translation).

<sup>151</sup> Sokolowski, *The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution*, 66. Sokolowski also adds that, "[a] categorial object is as individual, concrete, complex object". Here, from our perspective, Sokolowski, in describing the nature of a categorial object as individual and concrete, and testifies, once again, to the closeness between simple the perceptual level – *which should belong to the simple object* (this book) – and categories.

<sup>152</sup> Sokolowski, *The Logic of Parts and Wholes in Husserl's Investigations*, in Mohanty J.N., *Readings on*

categories, therefore, is to be grasped in their functioning, in their activity, since they are not subjective forms, prior to experience applied to matter, and nor are they independent forms to be obtained via abstraction from their concrete matter. Thus, the distinction between matter and categories becomes even more problematic, once we understand that their proper nature is to be appreciated within their functioning, so that they reveal themselves as something to be grasped in what we may call their *operative* nature, as they articulate the object of experience in their broadly construed categorial forms.

Thinking of categories as categorial *forms* has multiple implications: this leads us to think that they are embedded not just generally within the experience (a notion that we have still to clarify) but also within the material. By conceiving them as *forms* and ascribing to them a “dependent” character, it means that they are not separable from the matter that they categorize. But furthermore, it implies that their nature acquires its proper meaning when we understand them as already *operative* and functioning within the concrete material. Accordingly, to their dependent nature (which as we will see paradigmatically recalls that of *syncategoremata*, which indeed, represent the syntactic and linguistic device for the discovery of categories), we have to conceive of them as already *operative*, in motion, in their own dynamic of structuring the given matter<sup>153</sup>.

Finally, as an implicit issue connoted in our analysis, defining categories as forms, especially after the analysis of all the oscillations that frame the notion of simple and categorial objects, may lead us to broaden the notion of categories. Husserl does not provide us with a definitional listing of categories; there is an official deduction of categories, and it does not look like they are just a class of properties or a class of specific relations. It is Husserl himself who says that with categorial intuition we are able to see *relations*. In line with this, I believe, Husserl’s readers have advanced a broadening definition of what categories are. Heidegger, for instance, adds to categorial concepts, the concepts of “being” (as an ontological category), “this,” “and,” “or,” “one,” “several,” “aggregate,” etc”<sup>154</sup>.

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Edmund Husserl’s *Logical Investigations*, 101.

<sup>153</sup> If we want to exploit a classic *locus* of Kantian philosophy, we can say the meaning of categorial intuition and the nature of categories that we start to frame, represents a sort of schematism. In fact, as we have said, one of the main purposes of the doctrine of categorial intuition is to actuate a re-articulation of understanding and sensibility - which were separated in Kant, where they find their connection in the doctrine of schematism – by locating categories within experience. The operative nature of categories, as strictly conjoined with the matter they articulate, might recall the operative meaning of schematism. Melandri suggests that the notion of categorial intuition can be understood as a sort of “schematism”, since it re-articulates the dimension of sensibility and intellect. See Melandri E., *Logica ed esperienza in Husserl*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1960.

<sup>154</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 79; Ga 20, 59.

More widely, Drummond equates categorial forms to being forms of “articulation”<sup>155</sup>. Benoist, moreover, bluntly states that “the categorial element is structured-ness”<sup>156</sup>.

Categories are therefore elements of structuring, ordering, connection, relation, expressed by syncategorematical parts that cannot be thought of as attributes *de re*.

### 3.6.2.e Brief recapitulation

Let us summarize what we have said until now. In order to understand the nature of categories implied in the doctrine of *categorial* intuition, which I claim to be of fundamental importance for Heidegger’s conception of categories, I have tried to outline, and to extract from the discussion about categorial intuition, those first elements that can be useful hints for our purpose.

We have focused on the functioning of categorial intuition in order to highlight the components that are connected within it. Therefore, we have followed the distinction of matter-form (categories) to show the fluctuation of meaning of the terms involved, in order to pinpoint specifically how, through the examination of the relationship of matter-categories, we may interpret the role and nature of categories. Putting our first considerations in order, we can say the following.

a. The distinction between simple and categorial intuition, between a pure *hyletic* matter which represents the level of sensible perception, and categories, is a differentiation that Husserl wishes to maintain in order to guarantee a support – i.e. sensible matter – for the whole process of knowledge. However, the definition of pure *hyletic* matter seems problematic to clarify. The meaning of sensible matter may be interpreted as recalling different kinds of materiality that are not consistent with each other. If some scholars, Heidegger included, claim that this *hyletic* matter is to be equated with a *sensuous* given that has no specific structure, we have to recognize that this does not seem to be the case when we acknowledge that sensible matter is not an assortment of mere raw, a-logic *data*, but gives us an object, like *this book*. With this example, Husserl shows us that the sensible object is not to be understood as raw data but a real (*reell*) *concretum individuum*. At the same time, this example offers us a clue for questioning the *status* of matter along with the

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<sup>155</sup> Drummond J., “Pure Logical Grammar: Anticipatory Categoriality and Articulated Categoriality”, in *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, Vol 11, issue 2, 2003, 125- 139, 131/132.

<sup>156</sup> Benoist, *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie. Husserl et la tradition logique autrichienne*, 127.

kind of relationship with categories and the status of categories as founded and differentiated from it. Even if we can say that thanks to simple intuition, we see this book and through categorial intuition, we see *that the book is on the table*, the functioning of categorial intuition additionally tells us that categorial forms are also articulating a whole in its parts - therefore also an individual entity in itself. We might be led to see the *individuum* not as a bare “this and that” but as something categorially *constituted*.

b. In line with a non-subjectivist non-Kantian conception of categories, for Husserl, categories are not *a priori* functions of the intellect and, accordingly, simple matter is not an a-logic manifold but possesses internal forms of articulation. Nonetheless, if matter is not a-logic but has *forms* (adumbrations, profiles, independent and non-independent parts), these forms, which enable the matter to offer itself to us as a proper object, are not yet necessarily categories.

c. However, the notion of *form* in Husserl also conceals some ambiguities. On the one hand, Husserl talks about categories in terms of categorial *forms*; on the other he oscillates in defining *categorial*, that which represents the internal formal relations of the content of an object<sup>157</sup>. Another way to understand this difficult relationship is by recalling that these vacillations represent another clue to the weak nature of the distinction of matter-categories, leading us to think that categories are *implicit* in the level of perception. Moreover, referring to categories as categorial *forms* suggests that, as Benoist maintains, categorial *forms as such* have a dependent nature: their status and meaning can be grasped in their concrete realization, in combination with what they articulate<sup>158</sup>. Thus, the proper way to appreciate their nature and role is to conceive them in their dynamic functioning, namely as elements whose nature is embedded in their *operative* role within the matter of experience<sup>159</sup>. Because of all the conceptual oscillations of what categories or categorial forms are, we can suggest broadening their meaning and nature. Categories, if we look properly at categorial intuition, reveal themselves to be not a class of attributes or a class of relations. Rather, they show themselves to have a synthetic, relational, articulating operative nature, namely to be those

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<sup>157</sup> See especially the relationship of parts-wholes.

<sup>158</sup> In a sense, intuition must already be formed by the category in order to be able to fill it and give it intuitive fullness. Here intuition ceases to be the inert element indefinitely linked by categorial forms, which would be foreign to it, pure products of the spontaneity of a non-sensible understanding, following the framework of classical categorial thinking”, (my translation). Benoist, *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie*, 136.

<sup>159</sup> “The point of the thesis of categorial intuition, and what makes it unheard of in the history of the categoriality and relation of sensibility and understanding, is the idea that there is a possible intuition of a form, not taken apart, in isolation, but insofar as it informs a certain sensible content, in its categorial function”, (my translation). Benoist, “Intuition catégoriale et voir comme”, 603.

elements whose function is the structuring of matter of experience in which we can find them.

From all these considerations, I have aimed to pinpoint the nature of categories, by stressing their contrapositive relationship with matter, in order to highlight an internal difficulty in the understanding of this relationship and of the terms involved in it. In fact, categories can be understood in contraposition with *matter*: the simple object of perception is the founding, sensible material basis, not categorized, upon which categories are founded; categories are those relational elements that are applied to matter. If the contraposition between simple object and categories seems on a first cursory reading a reasonable one, and easy to understand as the premise to follow, it is less clear how the distinction should be maintained once we see the interconnection and interdependence of the two levels, the ambiguity of their respective definition and roles, the proper functioning of *categorial* intuition and the puzzling examples that Husserl proposes to us.

### 3.6.2.f The definition

Husserl's attempt to clarify the difference between matter and categories seems to have a preliminary definitional role. While the difference that Husserl establishes and is willing to maintain is expressed in definitions that are not especially difficult to understand or unusual for philosophy, it is difficult to retrace the same neat contraposition within the description of the terms involved and especially in the operative functioning of *categorial* intuition. In fact, instead of a sharp division we see that categorial forms and categorial structuring seem to insinuate and be present in matter, namely in what, from a definitional perspective, should be uncategorized<sup>160</sup>. Thus, the neat separation between matter and categories may possess a definitional role as a preliminary clarification of terms<sup>161</sup>: a useful

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<sup>160</sup> Alweiss states that, "Only abstractly can we differentiate between *hyle* and *morphe*, for the *hyletic* datum as such does not exist, having no being independently of its form". Alweiss, *The World Unclaimed*, 40.

<sup>161</sup> "In Husserlian terms, simple acts are founding or low-level acts, where an object is simply given to perception. Multi-level acts are those founded or complex acts, where an object is articulated through an assertion or categorial intuition. Now, although *de jure* the distinction between simple and multi-level acts can be made, it is always the case *de facto* that the founding moment of simple sensuous intuition is articulated through an assertion that employs multi-level categorial forms—the sensuous is always already shot through with the categorial. Hence, the relation between simple and multi-level acts or sensuous and categorial intuition is characterized by *interdependence*, where founded categorial acts—the *being-brown* of the chair—are dependent upon founding perceptual acts—the *brownness* of the chair—but where the founding only becomes accessible, one might even say meaningfully visible, for the first time in the founded articulation that takes place in the assertion". Critchley, *On Heidegger's Being and Time*, 25. Also, "[t]his is how it is *de facto*;

tool, however, that loses its usefulness as soon as we look at the structuring of categories within experience.

I shall argue that these “oscillations” in Husserl are what may lead us to understand categorial intuition and categories in a way that may appear to contradict Husserl’s own purpose in maintaining the difference. This reading of the oscillation of matter-categories is a possible interpretation that we may ascribe to Heidegger’s reading of Husserl, when Heidegger says that perception is already categorially structured. I have tried to show that this statement can be attributed to Husserl himself, rather than only to some hermeneutical tendency that neglects the role of perception and reality, in favour of language falling into some form of idealism. In fact, Husserl himself raises the very same doubts. In one of the last paragraphs of the *Sixth Investigation*, he states that,

One might now try to pin down the concept of a category by saying that it comprises all objective forms arising out of the forms, and not out of the matter, of conceptual interpretation. The following misgiving no doubt might arise. Ought we not also to attribute to sensuous intuition the character of a categorial act, in so far as through it the form of objectivity is constituted?<sup>162</sup>

The possibility of broadening the presence of forms to the sensuous level is a possibility that Husserl hints at, and that Heidegger may have picked up on. For now, we can say that the weak line between categories and matter may have inspired Heidegger.

### 3.6.3 Categories and experience – First part

As we have said, Husserl’s novelty is to locate categories within *experience*. With this general indication, which marks the main difference between the empiricist and Kantian conceptions of categories, we have still not yet specified the meaning of the notion of *experience*. Costa says that Husserl looks for categories “in the experience itself”<sup>163</sup> and that categorial forms are “immanent into the experience”<sup>164</sup>, and implicitly present in the “structuring of the experience”<sup>165</sup>. Moreover, he says that categorial objects are not “pure forms of synthesis but synthetically formed matters”, and that “categories hence cannot exist

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however, *de jure*, one can distinguish between the sensuous and the categorial and rest one's focus on the real or ideal moment in the total meaning-situation.” Critchley, *On Heidegger's Being and Time*, 28.

<sup>162</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 304; Hua XIX/2, 180.

<sup>163</sup> Costa, *La verità del mondo*, 143.

<sup>164</sup> *Ivi*, 144.

<sup>165</sup> *Ivi*, 141.

separated from sensuous materials”<sup>166</sup>. Linking the considerations of the *Sixth Investigation* with Husserl’s genetic phenomenology, Costa says that, “experience shows forms of self-structuring”<sup>167</sup>. From all these indications, we can acquire a preliminary meaning or conception of categories as given into the experience. By *experience*, Costa is mainly referring to the non-subjectivist nature of categories and to the intertwined relation with material that we have stressed. From this perspective, the structuring of experience, conceived of as self-structuring, is the non-subjectivist structuring of categories within the material, namely the self-structuring of *reality*. This kind of experience may also be understood as a pre-predicative experience, in which the non-subjective related *data* find their mind-independent order<sup>168</sup>. From this point of view, categorial intuition is directed to the complexity of a categorially structured reality<sup>169</sup>. In line with this, we can appreciate the Aristotelian component of *categorial* intuition that evokes Aristotle’s spirit in conceiving categories within a self-structured reality<sup>170</sup>.

### 3.6.4 Categories and experience – Second part

However, categories are not just linked to materiality, but also demonstrate a specific relation with language. We now turn to this relation, since we have to remember that whereas the doctrine of *categorial* intuition locates categories in the pre-predicative experience of reality, the *categorial forms* “*emerge only thanks to judgement*”<sup>171</sup>, which possesses the function of rendering them explicit.

As previously said, categories point to the two different dimensions of sensibility and judgement or, more broadly, to the dimension of mind-independent reality and the dimension of language. In other words, categories are those elements that connect the structure of the world with the structure of language, conceptuality or expression, which in this context we can consider to be the sign of the dimension of some sort of subjectivity –

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<sup>166</sup> *Ivi*, 148.

<sup>167</sup> *Ivi*, 149.

<sup>168</sup> See also, *ivi*, 130 and ff.

<sup>169</sup> Benoist, *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie*, 120.

<sup>170</sup> On the relationship between Husserl and Aristotle in the *Logical Investigations* see, Cobb-Stevens, “Being and Categorial Intuition”, and also Cobb-Stevens R., “ ‘Aristotelian’ Themes in Husserl’s Logical Investigations”, in Bernet and Zahavi, (eds.), *One Hundred Years of Phenomenology*, Kluwer, 2002, 79-92, in which the author says that “Husserl’s principal contribution to philosophy was his restoration and revitalization of this Aristotelian realism”, *ivi*, 82.

<sup>171</sup> Costa, *Husserl*, 89.

which in line with the non-subjectivist nature of categories is not a mere spontaneous subjectivity<sup>172</sup>.

Accordingly, following Costa, we have appreciated only one side of categories which, while linked to pre-predicative materiality, are also linked to the dimension of language in which they are explicitly expressed. Costa's notion of *experience*, as related to the structure of reality, while highlighting categories as embedded in matter, does not develop what is actually connoted by the very notion of experience, namely the fact that the notion of experience entails some sort of *experiencing* subject. As Heidegger says,

[e]xperience designates: (1) the experiencing activity, (2) that which is experienced through this activity.<sup>173</sup>

We have suggested, in section 3.6.2.b that while the doctrine of categorial intuition considers categorial forms and categorial constitution as something different from creative production, this does not completely eradicate some form of subjectivity, even if in some weak sense, as suggested by the notion of *registration* and categorial *constitution*. The experience in which categories are given should also contemplate a kind of experiencing entity. In order to take into account this second acceptance of experience, we shall turn to the dimension of language, which (in contrast to that of pre-predicative reality), is the dimension in which categories become explicitly expressed and in which we can acknowledge them. In fact, as we have said, categories within *experience* rearticulate the relation between the dimension of sensibility and understanding, which here may be conceived as the relation between reality and language. They are, on the one hand, embedded in the material of reality, which shows itself as self-structured, but on the other, they explicitly emerge in judgement, or even more broadly in language.

To understand the nature of categories we have to look at the dimension of reality, in which they are embedded, but also at the dimension of language that gives us the chance to trace them and to direct our attention to the structuring of experience *in its double meaning*.

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<sup>172</sup> "The 'is' therefore has to do with the objective situation, rather than with some 'inner psychological happening. Of course, use of the copula does indicate to an interlocutor that the speaker is executing an articulation and tacitly assenting to its truth." See Cobb-Stevens, *Husserl and Analytic Philosophy*, 149; see also, Sokolowski R., *Presence and Absence*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1978, 100.

<sup>173</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenology of Religious Life*, 7; Ga 60, 8.



### 3.6.5 Categorical intuition and language

The relation between categories and language also characterizes Heidegger's reading of categorial intuition. As we have anticipated in section 3.6, Heidegger's reception and interpretation of it is represented by the two statements that have been indicated by scholars as the sign of Heidegger's strongly curved reading of Husserl's categorial intuition. Next to the claim that perception is already pervaded by categories, Heidegger also claims that our perceptions are already expressed. In this sense, language acquires a major role for the understanding of categorial intuition and categories in Heidegger. Actually, language and expression also have this main role in Husserl's understanding of categorial intuition<sup>174</sup>.

#### 3.6.5.a Categories and language

In fact, the nature of categories should be understood by looking at the dimension that they articulate. Categories evince a kind of double arrow, pointing to the mind-independent level of reality and to that more "subjectively" characterized level of judgment. Taking into account both these dimensions, categories will show that they are the median element between the objective level of reality and the subjective one of language. By taking into account the relation between categories in these two opposite dimensions, the proper nature of categories reveals a tension, since they are at the crossroads between world and language. They are within the world but they emerge within judgement. Categories reveal a double-sided nature<sup>175</sup> and, as I shall argue, a hybrid one.

We shall now turn to this second aspect of categories as related to the dimension of language, in order to frame more accurately their nature. In fact, not only do we have to consider the proposition that categories emerge in judgement, but also that in the *syncategoremata* of judgement they find their devices (since they are signs of the presence

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<sup>174</sup> "Husserl's conception of categorial formation suggests that language plays a role in experience or understanding, and this idea is important for Heidegger's conception of the phenomenon." MacAvoy L., "Meaning, categories, subjectivity in the early Heidegger", in *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 31(1), 2005, 21- 35, 23-24. The phenomenological inquiry "has a multiplicity of dimensions upon which it can be exercised, however the linguistic dimension maintains a central role" (my translation), La Rocca C., "La cattedra. All'incrocio tra fenomenologia ed ermeneutica", in Amoroso L., Ferrarin A. and La Rocca C. (eds.), *Critica della ragione e forme dell'esperienza. Studi in onore di Massimo Barale*, Pisa, Edizioni ETS, 2011, 245-262, 247.

<sup>175</sup> "The categorial appears in fact in a double sense, whose relation is never clearly formulated", (my translation). Benoist, *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie*, 119.

of categories) and their paradigm (of their structure and function). If categories are, as in Aristotle, given in matter, they seem not to have an attributive-predicative nature, but rather, as forms of articulation, a synthetic one, as Kantian categories. From this point of view, language furnishes us with the model through which we can understand categories within categorial intuition and Heidegger – showing how categorial intuition gives Heidegger the chance to reconceive categories as a third alternative between Kantian subjectivism and Aristotelian predicationism, which at the same time intersects them.

I shall now continue the inquiry about the nature and structure of categories, taking into account their relationship with judgment and language. I shall focus on those elements that will help us, while stretching Husserl’s original project, in order to outline the double, hybrid nature of categories and in order to obtain useful hints for framing Heidegger’s account of them. We should keep in mind that neither Husserl nor Heidegger provide us with an explicit study or an account of their conception.

### **3.6.5.b Bottom-up and top-down perspectives**

The second “arrow” of categories points to the dimension of judgement or, more generally, of language. The relation between categorial intuition and judgment, therefore, like that between categories and language, should now be analysed to complete our discussion about the nature and functioning of categories that, I maintain, demonstrate a hybrid nature, since they are connected to the “opposite” dimensions of the material world and language.

Firstly, we should note that language plays a fundamental role, in the sense of having a methodological role. In the previous sections, the functioning of *categorial intuition*, following Husserl, has been understood as starting from the distinction between sensible matter and categorial forms. This leads to the analysis of the three stages, starting from the founding level, progressing to that of the categorial and then to that of judgment. In doing so, we have followed, so to speak, a *bottom-up* procedure. However, at the beginning of the *Sixth Investigation*, the methodological access<sup>176</sup> to the discovery of categories within experience is represented by judgment. In fact, starting from the question of the relationship between actual perception and judgement of perception, we were interrogating what could

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<sup>176</sup> Language “unfolds” rather than “enfolds”; see Welton D., “World as Horizon”, in Welton, *The New Husserl: A Critical Reader*, 223-232, 227.

be the fulfilment of the different components of judgment, and especially of the *syncategoremata*, when for example I say, “this paper is white”. In section 3.5, the syncategorematic forms such as “this” or “is” represented the linguistic devices to understand that there was a *surplus* within the judgement that corresponded to categories. Even if, as Husserl is willing to maintain, judgement is not to be conceived of as mirrors of experience, so that we cannot regard expression as the translation of material or materials as the mere projection of expressions, language represents at least a methodological form of access for the inquiry<sup>177</sup>. For the doctrine of categorial intuition, language is at first a necessary tool, since it represents for us the preliminary access to categories, revealing a “propaedeutic function”<sup>178</sup>. We can therefore, methodologically speaking, proceed from the dimension of language and judgement to that of categories as given in the experience, following a *top-down* procedure.

### 3.6.5.c Language as translation

However, for categorial intuition, language does not represent only a starting point, but rather a necessary dimension<sup>179</sup> without which categories will not emerge and be acknowledged. As in the relationship of matter-form, wherein the difference between the two elements is easy to grasp *de jure* but hard to maintain *de facto*, a similar problem may arise for the relationship between categories and judgement. In fact, categorial forms, while related to the materiality of reality, are strictly tied to the structure of judgement and linguistic forms, so that language appears not only to be a point of access, pointing towards reality, but the dimension that principally furnishes us with the categorial apparatus and its structure. This specific role of judgment, by comparison with categories, may be seen in some passages of the *Sixth Investigation*, in which Husserl seems to suggest a very tight connection between categories and language that leads to saying that categorial objects are “packaged and wrapped with grammar”<sup>180</sup>. In fact, in support of this, we may notice that Husserl himself, while stating that, “the percept, which presents the object, and the statement which (...) thinks and expresses it, must be rigorously kept apart”, also says that “even

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<sup>177</sup> “The intuition of the form is led by language”, (my translation). Benoist, *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie*, 133.

<sup>178</sup> Gardini, *Filosofia dell'enunciazione*, 43.

<sup>179</sup> *Ivi*, 44.

<sup>180</sup> Sokolowski, “Husserl’s Sixth Logical Investigation”, 116.

though (...) they (now) hold to each other in the most intimate relations of mutual coincidence”<sup>181</sup>. This means that, even if Husserl distinguishes between actual perception and judgment, he suggests that they seem to blend into each other, revealing an intricate bond<sup>182</sup>. Given all these oscillations, the role of language acquires a central role. Not only do categories emerge with judgment, but we might also be led into thinking that judgment directly replicates the structure of perceptual experience, showing us perceptual structure in its linguistic structure. Following this correspondence, the dimension of language becomes the condition for access to the object<sup>183</sup>. Language not only gives us access, but also the structure of experience, so that logic expressed in syntax and grammar does not just govern our thought but also enters into the manifestation of things<sup>184</sup>. In effect, this strict correspondence between the form of judgment and the structure of perceptual experience might be directly suggested by some passages of the *Sixth Investigation*.

The object does not appear before us with new real (*realen*) properties; it stands before us as this same object, but in a *new manner*. Its fitting into its categorial context gives it a definite place and role in this context, the role of a *relatum* and in particular of a subject- or object-member. These are differences that are phenomenologically evident.<sup>185</sup>

Anticipating the dynamic that will be characteristic of Husserl’s genetic phenomenology of showing how the forms of judgment and spontaneity find their roots in pre-predicative experience, and how concepts arise from it<sup>186</sup>, here Husserl is pointing out how the members of the judgement, subject and object, are already given in the context of the categorial articulation of sensible experience. As Sokolowski puts it, “[s]ubject, predicate, and copula are not simply grammatical conventions but structural elements in the way things can be intended and presented. Because they are presentational transformations of things, they can be cut loose from any particular thing and achieved in respect to anything whatsoever”<sup>187</sup>. This may allow us to consider grammatical forms of judgment as mirroring the structure of

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<sup>181</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 196; Hua, XIX/2, 15-16.

<sup>182</sup> Theodorou, *Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordality, and the Categorial*, 205; see also Critchley, “[s]ensuous intuition is articulated and rendered meaningful through acts of synthesis where it is combined with categorial, linguistic forms. The two elements in the act of synthesis always come together, they are inextricably linked and immersed in each other”. Critchley, *On Heidegger's Being and Time*, 28.

<sup>183</sup> Benoist, *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie*, 121.

<sup>184</sup> Dahlstrom, “Introduction”, 10.

<sup>185</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 289; Hua XIX/2, 157.

<sup>186</sup> This task is carried out as a “genealogy of logic”. See especially Husserl E., *Experience and Judgment*, trans. Churchill J. and Ameriks K., Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973; EU, *Erfahrung und Urteil: Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik*, ed. Landgrebe L., Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985.

<sup>187</sup> Sokolowski, “Husserl’s Concept of Categorial Intuition”, 132.

experience, equating categories (and the structure of experience within reality) with the linguistic forms that compose judgement, saying with Benoist that categories are, “syntactic forms, the fundamental forms of syntax”<sup>188</sup>.

Therefore, I will continue to explore the second aspect of categories, the aspect of their relationship with the dimension of language, in which we must deepen the analysis of categories; I shall argue that they have a synthetic, syncategorematic structure. Moreover, I shall argue that categories, as a median hybrid element between being an articulation of experience and being made explicit by language, also indicate the presence of some sort of subjectivity as language – and conceptuality – are essential to the recovery of categories.

#### **3.6.5.d Language – Second part**

Even if judgment and its constituent parts are not detached linguistic products, but remain in relation with the pre-predicative, sensible, categorially articulated experience, they are not an expression of a mere mirroring of experience, as Husserl, despite some significant vacillations, informs us<sup>189</sup>. The linguistic dimension seems to maintain a certain freedom in expressing an actual perception. Indeed, when we see, for example, a black bird, “we could base different statements on the same percept, and thereby unfold a quite different sense”<sup>190</sup>. Thus, if the categorially-articulated perception gives us the experience of seeing a bird, nonetheless the states of affairs that our judgment can express are multiple. In fact, “I could, e.g., have remarked: ‘That is black!’, ‘That is a black bird!’, ‘There flies that black bird’, ‘There it soars!’ and so forth”<sup>191</sup>. There is an experiencing subjectivity that, through language, expresses an experience in different possible ways, and which in its turn may be expressed in multiple ways. Therefore, and despite the intimate relation between perception and language, judgement is not a mere translation of perception but always has a certain freedom – the freedom that pertains to subjectivity in receiving and elaborating its experiences – in expressing and composing linguistically the experience given in the structured materiality of the world. The level of judgment should not be thought of as collapsed into that of perception. Rather, these two dimensions are separated but still articulated by a median element – categories – whose structure and nature should be

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<sup>188</sup> Benoist, *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie*, 124 (my translation).

<sup>189</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*; Hua XIX/2, §§4 ff.

<sup>190</sup> *Ivi*, 195; Hua XIX/2, 14.

<sup>191</sup> *Ibidem*.

investigated while looking at both of these two dimensions.

A last remark on the relationship between perception and language within the doctrine of categorial intuition might be worthwhile if we return to the bottom-up procedure that we have followed in describing the functioning of categorial intuition. In that context, we might have received the impression that from the level of sensibility, through categorial articulation, to judgement, we assist in a sort of shrinkage of the various sensible possible *data*, from the bottom, to the dimension of judgment that expresses them. It is not by accident that Lohmar, in commenting on the functioning of categorial intuition in its three stages, following Husserl's interest in stressing the importance of material data, has used the metaphor of the pyramid to give us an image of the relation between the levels of simple perception, categorial intuition and judgment:

[w]e might interpret this complex founded structure as a kind of Egyptian pyramid. If one component of the foundation of the pyramid is missing, then one cannot completely construct the next floor.<sup>192</sup>

Lohmar proposes this metaphor to exemplify the founded structure of categorial intuition in the sensible structure. Nonetheless, this metaphor, despite Lohmar's intention of using it only in a specific perspective, meets its limitations because it also allows us to think of the image with another meaning which may be misleading. It is not clear if and how the base of the pyramid, representing sensible perception is wider than the summit, which should represent the level of judgment. In other words, it is not clear if the path (process) from the sensible material, to a categorial articulated form and judgement is a shrinkage of what we have found "at the bottom" of the experience.

In fact, as various as sensible experience can be, while showing internal order in its formal categorial articulations, judgement and language (even if under the rules of the composition of meaning) also represent a wide dimension in which the perceiving subject has multiple possibilities in expressing the same experience ( if we saw a bird, we can judge "this is a bird" but also compose an almost infinite variety of sentence for difference state of affairs). Given the variety of expressions that may be related to a single perception, the pyramid may be overturned: multiple different statements and judgements, with different meanings or compositions, may be referred to the same single perception. Nonetheless, in both kinds of pyramid, the median stage and articulating element which we have to analyse

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<sup>192</sup> Lohmar, "Husserl's Concept of Categorial Intuition", 129.

are categories. In any way we may put it, we can say that judgement is related to perception in a particular way, and that being given, categories are understandable both from a bottom-up perspective as related to matter, or from a top-down perspective as related to language.

Given their double-sided nature, categories should not merely be equated with linguistic forms. Rather, linguistic forms should be taken as *paradigmatic models* for the understanding of the functioning and nature of categories<sup>193</sup>. However, what kind of linguistic forms may be taken as representative of the structure of categories?

### 3.6.5.e Paradigm for categories

Cobb-Stevens, in order to show how Aristotelian features influence Husserl's conception of categorial intuition, not only maintains that categories, which are not intellective forms, are a "presentation of things"<sup>194</sup>, but also tells us that Husserl is using *predication* as the paradigm to conceive the nature of categories.

Finally, combining Husserlian and Aristotelian terminologies, we may describe categorial intuition as the presentation of figures of predication. Rather than presenting some particular thing, say a red chair, categorial intuition presents the chair's being red, the red quality's belonging to the chair. In short, categorial intuition makes present the modes of presentation of things.<sup>195</sup>

In effect, as will be the case in his entire phenomenological project, in the *Sixth Investigation* Husserl also ascribes a primary role to the nominal and predicative parts of language. By virtue of this, Husserl may be seen as perpetuating, in accordance with Aristotelian *predicationism*, an understanding of experience in terms of *res and attributes* (see section 3.6.2). For example, as Cobb-Stevens suggests, when we say, "This paper is white", it is because we find that the property "white" belongs to the paper"<sup>196</sup>, conceiving the categorial articulation as the relation between a *res* - "paper" – and its property (*de re*)

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<sup>193</sup> Language may be thought of as an indication towards experience but it should not be equated with it. "[It] is (...) inscribed in the process of linguistic signification a different and further context in which it is destined to be fulfilled. This dimension is not, in a strict sense, a linguistic dimension, and yet it should not be understood as a simple reference to "things in the world", to sensations or external inputs even when it is sensible perception is the issue at stake", La Rocca, "La cattedra", 249-250.

<sup>194</sup> Categorial intuitions thus effectively present the work of presentation expressed by syntactical terms and by the surplus senses of terms for objects and features. See Cobb-Stevens, "Being and Categorial Intuition", 53.

<sup>195</sup> *Ivi*, 43-44.

<sup>196</sup> Cobb-Stevens, *Husserl and Analytic Philosophy*, 149.

– “white”.

In the previous quotation from the *Sixth Investigation* (on the role of a subject/object members, in section 3.6.5.c) the observation about how subject and object are members found within the structure of experience, seems to give us the model for understanding the structure of experience and its relationship with language. Actually, the privilege accorded to subject and object is in line with Husserl’s accorded primacy of the model of perception<sup>197</sup> and predication in his epistemology<sup>198</sup>. The understanding of *reality* as the relation between a *res* (whole) and its parts in terms of subject and predicate, which compose judgement, is what characterizes the metaphysical attitude. From this perspective, Husserl would be in line with metaphysical tradition. Stressing this aspect, Cobb-Stevens, therefore, suggests seeing in Husserl’s categories a sort of revival of Aristotelian predicative categories, since, especially in the categorial articulation between a whole and its parts, categorial articulation recalls that relationship of *belonging* between a subject and its attributive properties, which is traditionally translated in the relation subject-copula-predicate and expressed by the apophantic judgement. For Cobb-Stevens, “categorial intuition explicitly (...) renders objective the 'belonging' of the profiled feature to the object”<sup>199</sup>. In accordance with the Aristotelian conception of judgement, and also within the context of a categorial intuition whose function is to highlight the features that belong to a subject, the articulated relationship between parts and wholes becomes the relationship of the predicated features “belonging to” the object<sup>200</sup>. Cobb-Stevens concludes that: “[t]o judge is therefore not to assent to a synthesis of intramental contents, but rather to articulate in an assertive manner the mode of 'belonging to' that obtains between things and their looks”<sup>201</sup>.

From this perspective, Husserl’s position on categories would belong to the metaphysical tradition that focuses on the primacy of the notion *res* and the apophantic judgment conceived of as the relationship between a subject and its attributes. However, Sokolowski observes that the analyses of the relation between expression and categories should be “confined to our analysis of subject, predicate and copula but there are many other kinds of categorial that modulate presences in different ways and generate syntactical differences in speech:

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<sup>197</sup> “Husserl faces the problem of the categorial perception in the context of the theory of knowledge, focused on the problem of fulfilment between proposition and what is intuitively shown” (my translation), Costa, *La fenomenologia*, 103.

<sup>198</sup> See Gardini, *Filosofia dell'enunciazione*, 49.

<sup>199</sup> Cobb-Stevens, *Husserl and Analytic Philosophy*, 152.

<sup>200</sup> *Ivi*, 149.

<sup>201</sup> Cobb-Stevens, “Being and Categorial Intuition”, 47.



demonstratives, prepositions, conjunctions of various sorts, various cases of the noun, and so on”<sup>202</sup>. We shall claim not only that there are many other types of linguistic elements to connect to categories, along with the subject and predicate, but also that these elements are of central importance. *Syncategoremata* will be our methodological key and our paradigmatic element in understanding categories (both in Husserl and especially Heidegger). In fact, I believe that Husserl’s “novelty” is his consideration of *syncategoremata*, or at least it lies in how we can use the hints he gives us, even if this means going beyond his primary intention. In fact, when Husserl started his inquiry into categories, the problem was represented by the fulfilment of *syncategoremata*. *Syncategoremata*, among all other components, are the very elements that directly demonstrate the question of categories. By looking at their presence in judgment and by looking for their fulfilment in perception, we end up, with Husserl, by finding categories in experience. *Syncategoremata* give us the hints to find the inner articulation of the experience. In addition, based on the articulation that *syncategoremata* indicates, we have seen that we should also broaden the implicit categorial structuring to those parts of language that at first suggested a simple direct fulfilment. As we have said (section 3.5), the nominal and predicative parts, i.e. “the white paper”, are also found not to be simple, but are articulated as *being-a-paper* and *being-white*. Hence, we may claim that among all the linguistic components, *syncategoremata* are the methodological devices that signal to us the presence of categories. Moreover, they can be our paradigmatic model in finding the categories in the experience and also in conceiving their nature, since, as we will see in the next section, *syncategoremata* reveal (in the linguistic dimension) a structure and a nature which is the closest to categories – thought of as categorial forms and articulations<sup>203</sup>.

### **3.6.5.f *Syncategoremata* as a paradigm for categories**

I propose looking at the syncategorematic parts of language as linguistic devices to “get to” categories, but I also propose looking at them in order to clarify the nature of categories, considering *syncategoremata* as the paradigmatic model upon which the structure of categories (both in Husserl and, as we will see, in Heidegger) is to be conceived.

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<sup>202</sup> Sokolowski, “Husserl’s Sixth Logical Investigation”, 132.

<sup>203</sup> “Categories are objectifications for Husserl of the connections established in and between objects by logical constants functioning in propositions as syncategorematical expressions”. See Keller, *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience*, 9.

As I shall argue, categories have a *hybrid* nature linked to reality and language. They are Aristotelian non-subjective forms within matter, but their nature is synthetic and they emerge also in judgment – the sign that experience is “experience within the world”, but also the experience of an “experiencing subject”. They are especially connected to the logical constants of judgement, since the latter are effectively linguistic devices for them. As Keller states, “[t]he categories that we intuit in categorial intuition, such as *being*, have their basis in the syncategorematic terms that are needed in order for us to be able to make sense of what we perceive”<sup>204</sup>.

Now, therefore, let us turn to the question of the nature and role of *syncategoremata*. We can study *syncategoremata* while looking at Husserl’s *Fourth Investigation*, in which Husserl directly addresses the question of *syncategoremata*<sup>205</sup>. In this text, Husserl provides a theory of meaning and pure grammar. However, we will not follow Husserl’s theory and general aim, but will instead focus on the notion of *syncategoremata* to clarify the nature of categories.

### 3.6.5.g Syncategorematic functions

Judgment and language are meaningful unities formed by a combination of *categorematic* and *syncategorematic* parts. In the *Fourth Investigation*, Husserl defines *categorematic* expressions as those linguistic expressions that have a complete, independent and autonomous meaning<sup>206</sup>. In particular, *categorematic* expressions are represented by the nominal and predicative parts of language that have a complete and independent meaning, even if taken in isolation – like the noun “bird”.

*Syncategorematic* expressions, on the other hand, do not possess a proper independent meaning – as, for example, do nouns or predicates. The *syncategorematic* elements are parts of speech “that are merely co-signifiers, that is, which do not have any meaning in themselves, but obtain it only in conjunction with other meanings”<sup>207</sup>. Among the *syncategoremata* we can count everything that, on a grammatical level, is included in the

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<sup>204</sup> Ivi, 89.

<sup>205</sup> We can also find further elements regarding the nature of *syncategoremata* in the *First Investigation*, under the label of *essentially occasional expressions*, in § 26. See Husserl E., *First Logical Investigation*, in Husserl E., *Logical Investigations*, trans. Findlay J.N., New York, Humanities Press, 1970; Hua XIX/1, *Logische Untersuchungen (Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik; Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis, I. Teil)*, Halle a.d.S., Max Niemeyer, 1984.

<sup>206</sup> Husserl E., *Fourth Logical Investigation*, in Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, vol 2; Hua XIX/1, §4.

<sup>207</sup> Ivi, Husserl, *Fourth Logical Investigation*, 54; Hua XIX/2, 302.

classes of articles, prepositions, conjunctions, deictic, indexical, adverbs and copula, and also prefixes, suffixes, grammatical inflexions<sup>208</sup>, and so forth. More concisely, *syncategoremata* are all those elements that can be called logical operators and that are not nominal categorematic expressions – such as nouns and predicates.

*Syncategoremata* do have a certain type of meaning<sup>209</sup>, since they are not merely a collection of sounds with no sense<sup>210</sup>. However, *syncategoremata* have non-independent meanings that, “may occur only as ‘moments’ of certain independent ones, so the linguistic expression of non-independent meanings may function only as formal constituents in expressions of independent meanings: they therefore become linguistically non-independent, i.e. ‘incomplete’ expressions”<sup>211</sup>.

*Syncategoremata* have a non-independent meaning, or, as one might say, a non-independent nature. They are felt to carry definite ‘moments’ of meaning-content, ‘moments’ that look forward to a certain completion.<sup>212</sup>

This non-independent nature leads us to see that, while categorematic expressions also have a meaning if taken in isolation, *syncategoremata* acquire their full meaning when they achieve integration, which means: when they are functioning within judgement in combination with other parts of language.

But where a syncategorematic expression functions normally, and occurs in the context of an independently complete expression, it has always, as illustration will testify, a determinate meaning-relation to our total thought; it has as its meaning a certain non-independent part of this thought, and so makes a definite contribution to the expression as such.<sup>213</sup>

We realize the proper meaning of *syncategoremata* when we conceive them within judgement, in their *operative* function. However, we have to remark that even if *syncategoremata* obtain their meaning in their operative function, revealing their dependent nature and their “need” for completion, they are necessary particles for judgement and

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<sup>208</sup> *Ivi*, 56; Hua XIX/2, 304.

<sup>209</sup> Mohanty J.N., *Edmund Husserl's Theory of Meaning*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands, 1976. “The syncategorematic expressions have their own meanings no doubt, but their meanings are ‘dependent’ whereas those of categorematic expressions are ‘independent’”. *Ivi*, 87.

<sup>210</sup> Husserl, *Fourth Logical Investigation*, 55; Hua XIX/2, 304.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>212</sup> *Ivi*, 56; Hua XIX/2, 306.

<sup>213</sup> *Ibidem*.

language, in order for these to be meaningful. Thus, even if we insist on the autonomous nature of the meaning of categorematic parts, allocating to them for this very reason a central role, so we may also claim – in line with philosophical tradition of *predicationism* – that they represent the necessary base for judgment and language. We must also emphasize that what makes possible the meaning of a judgment, the unity of its expression, are those particles, called *syncategoremata*. Thanks to *syncategoremata*, judgement is not a collection of unrelated words, but a unity provided with meaning. *Syncategoremata*, within the general laws of meaning that Husserl analyses in § 12 ff of the *Fourth Investigation*, make possible the composition of judgement and language by their syntactic modalities of articulation, connecting words and disposing of them in an order within the discourse which gives a meaning to that discourse.

By and large, even if the operations of various *syncategoremata* are multiple, depending on the specific kind of *syncategoremata* we consider, their role is that of articulating, flexing, giving order and a structure, relating and synthesizing the other linguistic parts of discourse in a meaningful unity. Schematically speaking, to summarize the characteristics of *syncategoremata*, they are:

- non-nominal, non-attributive-predicative parts of language;
- vehicles of meaningful moments that require integration, since they cannot properly exist by themselves, but only as parts of a whole<sup>214</sup>, which is the judgment in its entirety; they are non-independent parts;
- they achieve their proper meaning in their operative functioning; the role they have within the language, however, is extremely important, since their operative nature is to articulate;
- we may say that the proper meaning of *syncategoremata* coincides exactly with their operative nature, which allows the composition of meaning in judgment and language.

Therefore, even if *syncategoremata* may appear to have a secondary role (given their dependent, incomplete nature), a language without syncategorematic parts, declination, forms of partition, conjunctions, etc, would not have those fundamental particles for the synthetic articulation of meaning. The importance of the strategic role of *syncategoremata* is such that, as Chiurazzi says,

it would be necessary to ask whether, at the very end, the entire pure grammar, of which Husserl sketches the general laws, does not have at last no other object than

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<sup>214</sup> *Ivi*,58, Hua XIX/2, 311.

syncategorematical connection, (...). A similar hypothesis would find its limit only where, as Husserl seems problematically to claim, it would be possible to have something like a “simple meaning or a simple object”, a thing absolutely independent, a substance having an intrinsic meaning, apart from any contextual connections. This kind of “semantic atomism” is the premise, more or less explicit, of the objectivism of the *Logical Investigations*.<sup>215</sup>

It is true that Husserlian phenomenology constantly dedicates to simple perception (as in categorial intuition), or to the name and categorematic parts (as in judgment), a privileged role as the pure models upon which any other articulation is based. However, we have seen that the boundaries between pure sensuous intuition and categorial intuition are very weak. As regards language, the nominal categorematic parts will also take priority in representing the principal element; nonetheless, the alleged simplicity of nouns and predicates has been challenged in the *Sixth Investigation*, by revealing (starting from the question of *syncategoremata*) that there is hidden within them a form of categorial articulation (see section 3.5): namely, the simplicity of “paper” and “white”, which has been articulated in “being-paper” and “being-white”. So, as with the slippery relationship between pre-sensible matter and categories, we may also say that regarding language, all “categories of meaning owe their existence to the syncategorematic functions which permit the synthesis and unity of language, which, in turn, cannot ever be conceived of as the sum of different kinds of meaning existing by themselves”<sup>216</sup>.

With this disquisition about *syncategoremata*, I aimed at outlining the structure of them in order to show how their nature recalls that one of categories. Categorial forms and *syncategoremata* have a dependent nature that can be fully grasped not in isolation but in combination with the other parts of experience that they articulate. They both have what we can call an *operative* nature. Even if on a definitional level, they seem to possess a founded dependent nature that implies that they apply to the autonomous primary element of sensibility and *categoremata*, nonetheless it is through their operative action that experience gets its structure.

Such that, if categories, as in an Aristotelian fashion, are non-intellective structures of reality, they show to possess more of a syncategorematic and synthetic nature rather than a predicative one. In fact, they do not add any further content or feature in terms of *attributes* to the experience; they do not indicate predicative properties. Thus, we should conclude that

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<sup>215</sup> Chiurazzi, *Modalità ed esistenza*, 187 (my translation).

<sup>216</sup> Benoist, *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie*, 127 (my translation).

categories do not find their paradigmatic model in the *categorematic* parts of language, rather in the *syncategoremata*. Categories, like *syncategoremata*, are not forms of predication but forms of relation and articulation. While they are not subjectivist *a priori* forms of intellect, nonetheless, as *syncategoremata* they have a synthetic function<sup>217</sup> – as Kantian categories – proving an articulation, an order and a structure to experience. *Syncategoremata* are the linguistic devices that signal the presence of categories<sup>218</sup> to be found in the experience<sup>219</sup>. We find the paradigmatic model for the understanding of the nature of categories in the structure of *syncategoremata*, since they both express the manner in which a thing appears, namely they express relations<sup>220</sup>. Categories are embedded within materiality and they possess a syncategorematic nature; in addition, they are the median element that has the role of connecting world and language, since they have to be found within self-structured reality but they emerge in language.

The interest in *syncategoremata* and their paradigmatic role for the understanding of the nature of categories was to outline the structure of categories that will be useful in both Husserl and Heidegger. Especially in Heidegger, as we will see, *syncategoremata* have a main role in the categorial structuring of experience.

However, we shall say something more about the relation between categories and judgement in order to highlight how the non-subjective syncategorematic nature of categories is also to be conceived of as *hybrid*.

### 3.6.5.h Further observations on language and categories

We can consider syncategorematic parts of language paradigmatic for the understanding of the nature of categories within the doctrine of categorial intuition, making it possible to speak of the categories as syncategorematic functions. Now, for a better understanding of the hybrid nature of categories, we have to focus a bit more on the role of language for the conception of categories in the categorial intuition and in view of Heidegger's project.

We have showed the affinity between their role and structure, drawing from it that

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<sup>217</sup> “These categories are implicit in the ways in which we process (“synthesize”) objects of perception”. Keller, *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience*, 89.

<sup>218</sup> “Prepositions such as “upon” refer to particular relations between things or phenomena, and by means of logical constants, we can refer to certain categorial (non-real) aspects of state of affairs”. See Philipse H., “The problem of occasional expression in Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations”, in *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, vol. 13 No.2, May 1982, 168-185, 170.

<sup>219</sup> See also, Welton, *The Origins of Meaning*, 144.

<sup>220</sup> Sokolowski, “Husserl's Sixth Logical Investigation”, 116.

categories within the experience have a synthetic non-attributive nature that does not alter or add any feature in predicative terms to the content of the perceptual object itself<sup>221</sup>. As we have said (section 3.6.2.d), we might broaden the understanding of categories and think of them as forms of relation or articulation, which contribute in giving a structure to the experience. With the same spirit, we may reflect on the role of language. From the question of *syncategoremata*, we have found that the categorial articulation concerns also the nominal parts of language – “paper” means *being*-paper – as well as the simple object to which they refer. We can see that through the doctrine of categorial intuition every part of the judgement or language indicates an articulation<sup>222</sup>. The same broadening we saw in conceiving categorial not as a class of categories but as indicating articulations may be applied to language. Starting from Husserl’s analysis of the revelatory role of logical operators with respect to categories, we can stretch, especially in view of Heidegger’s conception of categories, Husserl’s reflection on the relation between language and categories. We may broaden and extend the reflection about categories and *syncategoremata*, and see that every part of language may represent and be used to indicate a categorial articulation.

One of Heidegger’s appreciations about Husserl’s categorial intuition is that it provides an account of categories by *showing* them, with no need for a proper “deduction of categories” as in Kant. For Heidegger the merit of Husserl’s categorial intuition is to have furnished a philosophical “*demonstration*” of categories<sup>223</sup>. Categorial intuition does not involve “an attempt to derive categories from basic logical notions (as, for instance, in Kant’s use of the purported completeness of his table of judgment to derive a complete table of categories as forms of objects corresponding to the basic forms of judgment)”<sup>224</sup>. Heidegger considers too “abstract”<sup>225</sup> Kant’s deduction of categories since it selects what categories are in abstraction from experience conceiving them as only determinate functions of intellect<sup>226</sup>. Even if Heidegger is not explicit about it, I think that there is a further reason which may have led to Heidegger’s appreciation of reaching categories without deduction. Namely that also Kant’s deduction of categories as synthetic forms of intellect is based on

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<sup>221</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*; Hua XIX/2, § 49.

<sup>222</sup> Gardini states: “if in perception only “material” data seemed to appear, in the judgement “the chair is yellow”, looking closely, only categorial forms now appear” (my translation), Gardini, *Filosofia dell’enunciazione*, 48.

<sup>223</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 48; Ga 20, 64.

<sup>224</sup> Keller, *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience*, 89.

<sup>225</sup> Heidegger, *Four Seminars*, 69; Ga 15, 380.

<sup>226</sup> *Ibidem*.

an identification that still uses Aristotle's tables of judgment and therefore it still pursues an understanding of categories starting from a predicative approach and representing, for Heidegger, only a limited class of possible categories we may conceive (chapter 2).

In the categorial intuition, however, even if there is not a traditional deduction from the table of judgments, the judgment may still be used to identify what categories are. Language, once we discover the articulations of its parts, may be conceived of as the dimension in which every part indicates a category. Going beyond Husserl's original purpose, we may think to extend to all the possible linguistic configurations of language the role of indicating categories. Without a proper deduction that selects and gathers a specific kind and number of categories, we may ascribe to every part of language the role of furnishing us categorial elements. Starting from the syntactic forms of *syncategoremata*, which eminently represent the nature of categories, also what is nominal, what represents the "semantic" side of language, if discovered in its articulation, may be used to understand and identify categories<sup>227</sup>. Not only "this", "and", "is" etc. but also "being-paper", "being-this-book", "being-white" may indicate categories.

Such that, if language is the dimension in which we find the element to conceive categories, and also the dimension in which they emerge, the line that differentiates language and categories is not so neat. From this point of view, as somehow opposite to the conception of categories within reality, categories may acquire a *conceptual* nature, so that if from the bottom-up they become explicit with the judgement, from the top-down it is language that identifies them using linguistic elements.

Even if this last reflection is going far from Husserl's proper intentions with the categorial intuition, it is true that Husserl vacillates about the fact that the structure of judgment seems to replicate the categorial structure of the world. To distance the dimension of reality and language that do not have to overlap, we may recall the median role of categories and their double arrows, one pointing towards reality and one pointing towards language. Thanks to their operative nature, there is the chance to conceive a structured world and a structured experience of it. However, if we have to define their nature, given their dependency on the level of matter and reality, and also on the level of language and conceptuality, we may say that they have a hybrid nature in line with their median and operative role of connection.

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<sup>227</sup> For the analysis of the strict relationship and co-implication between semantics and syntax, see Chiurazzi, *Modalità ed esistenza*, chapter one.



### 3.6.5.i Categories, language and conceptuality

To comprehend the hybrid nature of categories, pinpointing their conceptual or semi-conceptual side, we may say a last remark. As I have sometimes recalled, judgment and language are also the dimension in which we may find the indication of a sort of subjectivity involved into the experience in which we have located the categories<sup>228</sup>. In Husserl's anti-psychologist project of *Logical Investigations*, categories are to be understood as non-subjective à la Kant so that we cannot think of a spontaneous *ego* which possess categories as *a priori* forms of intellect<sup>229</sup>. Nonetheless, we may include a “weaker” subjectivity, as implied in the doctrine of categorial intuition, that *registers*, so that within the judgement categories may emerge (see section 3.6.2.b). The hybrid nature of categories which partially depends on the fact that categories are related to language is also a direct consequence of the widening of the concept of seeing and perception that Husserl makes in the categorial intuition.

[o]ne also speaks of ‘perceiving,’ and in particular of ‘seeing,’ in a greatly widened sense, which covers the grasping of whole states of affairs.<sup>230</sup>

This wider meaning of *seeing* and *perceiving* is always a seeing *as*<sup>231</sup>. I see this paper *as* this-paper. The *as*-structure of the seeing that characterizes categorial intuition relates perceptual experience and language<sup>232</sup> and demonstrates having the same hybrid nature as categories. In fact, the “*as*”, which indicates the categorial moment, while being a pre-predicative structure, shows to be strictly connected to language and conceptuality.

This tension is present in a passage in which Husserl, introducing the categorial intuition, states that “we do not merely say ‘I see this paper, an inkpot, several books’, and so on, but also ‘I see that the paper has been written on, that there is a bronze inkpot standing here, that several books are lying open’, and so on”<sup>233</sup>. This passage is usually used to show the

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<sup>228</sup> On the ineradicable presence of subjectivity from ideal and categorial objects, see also Mohanty J.N., *Heidegger on logic*, in Mohanty J. N., *Logic, Truth and Modalities*, Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1999, 247.

<sup>229</sup> Bernet recognizes that categories are not completely independent from subjectivity but he still talks of to it in terms of spontaneity. “Categorial acts are mainly synthetic acts in which pregiven stuffs are given logical form or in which the resultant logical forms are transformed. This formational activity, however, is not an absolutely independent and spontaneous activity of the understanding”. Bernet, “Perception, Categorial Intuition, and Truth in Husserl's *Sixth Logical Investigation*”, 43.

<sup>230</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 227; Hua XIX/2, 138.

<sup>231</sup> Benoist, «Intuition catégoriale et voir comme», 593.

<sup>232</sup> *Ivi*, 595.

<sup>233</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 271; Hua XIX/2, 128.

difference between simple seeing and categorial seeing, between seeing *as* and seeing *that*<sup>234</sup>. As Smith says, when I express a perception as “this book”, “this paper” and I express what I see as, “it is natural to form a phenomenological description of a perception of an object by use of the demonstrative pronoun ‘this’ (or ‘that’): I see this black bird – or, in line with Husserl’s talk of an object intended ‘as’ such-and-such.”<sup>235</sup>. I see *this as* a black bird. So that, as Benoist confirms, the structure of the object as such and such, is the as-structure<sup>236</sup>.

However, in these passages we can see a couple of difficulties. First of all, both simple seeing and categorial seeing appear to need language in order to be fully grasped. The difference between when I say that I see this paper, and when I say that I see that the paper has been written on, seems a difference at the level of definitions but actually they are both seeing that are expressed and articulated in language. Moreover, just after having made these distinctions, Husserl shows us that “beyond seeing that the paper is white, even seeing white paper is already categorially formed: “white paper”, that means paper that is white”<sup>237</sup>.

In addition, it may appear odd to use the demonstrative *this* to differ the simple perception from a categorial perception of the articulated relations given in the context. In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl had said the “content of a perception is expressible by means of a demonstrative pronoun such as ‘this’, which refers to an object ‘directly’”<sup>238</sup>. Nonetheless, we have to notice, first of all, that *this* is a syncategorematic particle, which as such indicates a category. Furthermore, the peculiar nature of the deictic is just right to be linked to contextuality. The deictic *this* is what Husserl calls in the *First Investigation* an “essentially occasional expression”<sup>239</sup>, which only becomes fully meaningful when we have regard to the circumstances of utterance, namely when there is an experiencing subject that indicates something *as this* in a given context. But the function which furnishes us relations amongst things within a context is the role we should ascribe to categories.

From these reflections about the as-structure we can draw some conclusions. The difference between simple seeing *as* and categorial seeing *that* seems once again not very

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<sup>234</sup> This difference is what Mulligan defines as the difference between a “simple” and a “propositional” seeing. See Mulligan K., “Perception”, in Smith B. and Smith D. W. (eds.), *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, 168-238.

<sup>235</sup> Smith, *Husserl and Intentionality*, 214.

<sup>236</sup> Benoist, *Phénoménologie, sémantique, ontologie*, 134.

<sup>237</sup> Benoist, «Intuition catégoriale et voir comme», 606, (my translation).

<sup>238</sup> Smith, *Husserl and Intentionality*, 213.

<sup>239</sup> In Husserl, *First Investigation*; Hua XIX/1, §26.

sharp. We may claim that seeing something *as* such-and-such already means to ascribe a categorial structure to that something (section 3.6); on the other hand, seeing *that* as categorial seeing is not just equal to propositionality but it is a seeing *as*, given that seeing something *as* this paper leads us to understand it as categorially articulated. Categories do not merely overlap with language or proposition since they are given in experience. However, when we see-as we complete the as-structure with language (I see this as paper), and we start from the expression of our experience to indicate our seeing-as. The structure of seeing-as, while given into pre-predicative experience, still depends and entails conceptuality. As-structure – which has in Heidegger a main role (see section 4.4.3.c.) – as categorial structure is partially dependent on how things present themselves, but it has also a conceptual nature, since seeing-as has always a conceptual characterisation to apply on the thing, the *as* is derived or even obtained from language and our use of it. I see things as-after the *as* we can *potentially* put any concept we gain from language. It follows that, as we said, the dimension of language, which is also the sign of that subjectivity that is always entailed in the registration of its own experience and formation of judgment and linguistic configurations, is not just the peak of the pyramid whose function is an inert fixing in language the categories of experience, but it is also the dimension that gives us, with no deduction, those categories.

The as-structure which characterizes categorial intuition and categories gives us another element to understand that categories have a hybrid nature, which goes along with their median role between language and world. As-structure is the clue that we may ascribe a conceptual nature to categories, while they are also structures given within reality. And this conceptuality does not belong only to language, it shows to belong to the nature of categories and somehow to our experience and reality.

No surprise, then, that Critchley bluntly states that:

What are categories? Categories are what we might call "meta-concepts", which are required in order to explain the way in which human beings understand the things presented in experience. That is, categories are required in order to explain the way in which the perceptual experience of things is de facto conceptually articulated or made intelligible.<sup>240</sup>

I tried to gain the elements to understand the nature of categories within Husserl's

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<sup>240</sup> Critchley, *On Heidegger's Being and Time*, 18.

doctrine of categorial intuition which has a main role for our understanding of Heidegger's categories. Categorial intuition is a complex theory that shows various conceptual oscillations as soon as we try to unpack the different elements, and their reciprocal relations, that play in it.

The proper meaning of categorial intuition should be acquired by reading the doctrine within Husserl's anti-psychologist and epistemological project of the *Logical Investigations*. Categorial intuition as thought by Husserl aims at showing how the whole judgment can be truth-bearing without falling into psychological interpretations of it, which would bring it into the risk of scepticism, undermining the idea of a scientific knowledge. In order to understand the nature of categories, I focused only on the doctrine of categorial intuition without putting it in its broader philosophical context. Moreover, I have exploited Husserl's oscillations not as problems to solve but rather as indications to frame, not without difficulties, the account of categories.

To understand the nature of categories, which is not explicitly discussed by Husserl, we have focused on the *functioning* of categorial intuition and we have stressed and exploited the various oscillations in order to define the nature and structure of categories. Categories are the connective median element between sensible matter and judgment. Following Husserl, categories are not subjectivist forms of intellect, rather, as Costa says, they are given within the *experience*. However, *experience* means two things: experience *in* the world and experience of an experiencing subjectivity.

On the one hand, Husserl says that categories are founded on the material of simple object of simple perception and they articulate it, they emerge in the judgement. Following a bottom-up perspective, categories are *de jure* given with materiality and separated from it. As we saw, categories are *de facto* hard to separate from materiality and the sharp distinction between matter and categories appeared weaker than how Husserl would wish to maintain; Husserl's vacillations about the supposed uncategorized status of materiality and the dependent, non-attributive, nature of categories, have lead us to understand the categories as operative articulations that structure the material reality from which they cannot *de facto* be separated. From this point of view, we may conclude, pace Husserl, that materiality shows forms of self-structuring which is given by the combination of categories and matter. From this perspective, category in an Aristotelian spirit is understood as non-subjectivist articulation of material and world, which contribute in ordering it.

On the other hand, categories have a peculiar and complex relation with judgment and,

more generally, with language. I took language to be the dimension of “some sort” of subjectivity. In fact, if categories are excluded from being products of a spontaneous mind, it is implicit that in the experience of categorial intuition there is a subject that registers the articulation of the self-structuring world and expresses it in the judgment. The latter in fact is the dimension in which categories emerge. If we focus on the relation between language and categories, we may gain some other indications about their nature. We have seen that, from a top-down perspective, the linguistic devices to signal the categorial elements are the *syncategoremata* and that their structure and role within the language recalls that one of categories. Such that *syncategoremata* may be thought of as paradigmatic of the nature of categories. From this, we may say that categories, while being non-subjectivist *à la* Kant, have a synthetic nature, as *syncategoremata*, and they may be broadly conceived as articulation and structure *tout court*.

However, language has also a central role. The dimension of language is a wide dimension whose parts, on the basis of *syncategoremata*, may be thought as internally articulated and indicating a categorial configuration. Without a deduction of categories, every part of language and every concept we may employ, if understood as articulated, may serve us to recognize a category or a categorial configuration. Even if the categorial as-structure is pre-predicative and pre-linguistic, nonetheless it is strictly connected to language and concepts that, in turn, give us the proper *as* that we see.

Given the median role of categories and the complex relation that they have with the dimension of reality and language, I have stretched Husserl’s original intention in order to gain an account of categories to use in the understanding of Heidegger, in order to show that we may conceive them as having a hybrid nature, being operative articulations that structure the experience.

In the next chapter, I shall follow Heidegger’s passages about categories, mainly lead (explicitly and implicitly) by the link to Husserl’s doctrine of categorial intuition as the engine that moves Heidegger’s understanding of categories and the tool, for us, to highlight their nature and structure. I will use the findings of this chapter to unpack the structures and the elements that participate in Heidegger’s understanding of categories. We will see that in Heidegger, the oscillations and the tensions will acquire another value since they will be located in a different framework in which the notion of perception and language receive another reading. Husserl’s ambiguities, that in Husserl’s doctrine of categorial intuition – within his project – represents a problem, do not represent a problem to fix in Heidegger.

If the various vacillations, detected in Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition, emerge when his definitions and steps are put at work and seem to blend, and categories appear to exceed their dimension, in Heidegger we will face the opposite problem. Since Heidegger refuses to divide experience into pieces in virtue of the unity of experience and the interconnection of its elements and he does not provide us with an analytical study of his understanding of categories, we will need to use the findings to unpack the categorial structure of experience in its dynamic.

## Chapter 4. Heidegger and Categories in Experience

As we have said (section 1.2), the early Heidegger's project during its phenomenological decade is characterized by the question of the method of philosophy and research into the correct categorial and conceptual instruments to employ, in order to analyse the structure of Dasein's experience into the world. In this phase, rather than focusing and insisting on the question of the meaning of *Being*, as will be the case in *Being and Time* and later, Heidegger's inquiry is trying to establish a new framework to understand the nature of experience, and new categories and instruments in order to describe it as experience which is categorially structured<sup>1</sup>.

Our purpose in seeking to understand the nature and role of Heidegger's categories, therefore, will follow Heidegger's consideration of *experience*. In Heidegger's early lectures, experience in the world is defined in terms of "pre-theoretical" *facticity*<sup>2</sup> or simply *life*<sup>3</sup>. With these terms, Heidegger is indicating a kind of experience (*Erfahrung*) that is not the epistemological relationship between *cogito* and *cogitata* or the Husserlian *Erlebnis*<sup>4</sup>. By "facticity" and "life", Heidegger means an experience of a living entity in its world, since, "life (...) exists always in the form of its world, its surrounding world, its shared world, its own world"<sup>5</sup>. This experience in the world, conceived of as ontological and hermeneutical rather than epistemological, has a non-subjectivist and non-objective, non-predicative texture, so that we also have to overcome the limitations of a language whose subject-predicate structure lends itself to the traditional metaphysical subject-object dichotomy rather than the Dasein(as being-in-the-world)-world interdependence characteristic of lived experience<sup>6</sup>.

In our experience in-the-world, we are not subjects against objects as mere *res*, sensory data or homogeneous things, nor is the world an external frame in which we move. Our factual experience, as we will see, takes place in a structured environment with which we

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<sup>1</sup> Dasein's experience, "is not a Heraclitean flux but rather a categorially structured meaningful whole." See, Burch M., "The Existential Sources of Phenomenology: Heidegger on Formal Indication", in *European Journal of Philosophy*, 2011, 1-21, 9.

<sup>2</sup> See, Heidegger, *Ontology*; Ga 63; Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle*; Ga 61.

<sup>3</sup> See for example, Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle*; Ga 61.

<sup>4</sup> On the difference between the Husserlian *Erlebnis* and Heidegger's *Erfahrung*, see Keller, *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience*, 2.

<sup>5</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle*, 76; Ga 61, 100.

<sup>6</sup> Burch, "The Existential Sources of Phenomenology", 13.

co-participate, in which we encounter concrete particularities. Hence, our inquiry into Heidegger's categories will focus on that account of categorial articulation that shapes this kind of experience. However, Heidegger does not provide us with a fully explicit study or argument about his account of categories. We will have to outline it by extracting the different elements from early Heidegger's texts which may help us in our project.

As we have already said (chapter 2), we can consider as useful foundations Heidegger's criticism of metaphysics and its logic of "what", which is mainly represented in Heidegger's case by the criticism of philosophical subjectivism and predicationism. These latter represent the two tendencies that are implied in the tradition of metaphysics and epistemology and that Heidegger's project tries to avoid. Consequently, we can take them to be negative instructions to understand the renewal of Heidegger's categories. By subjectivism, we mean all those philosophies that posit a subject – a subject understood as Cartesian *ego* – as the principle of experience and follow the dualistic schema of subject-object, thus encountering the prejudices of Cartesian metaphysics. By predicationism, we mean the tendency of traditional philosophies that consider the predicative paradigm as the main one for the understanding of the structure of the object of their inquiry, namely the conception of object in terms of *res* and attribute, in terms of isolated givens that should be posited at the foundation level of experience.

Thus, Husserl's categorial intuition<sup>7</sup> can be thought of as the place in which Heidegger can find the inspiration for conceiving of non-subjectivist, non-predicative categories. The hybrid nature of categories, which we have highlighted in Husserl's categorial intuition, and which we have to find within experience, will help us in adumbrating Heidegger's account of them.

#### 4.1 Heideggerian categorial intuition

Husserl's categorial intuition has a major role in Heidegger's thought. Heidegger's explicit claim is that Husserl's categorial intuition was important because it, "freed the *Being* from judgment"<sup>8</sup>. We may say that categorial intuition was important for Heidegger's understanding of categories, working as an implicit operative engine, even if there is no

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<sup>7</sup> "One can say, without exaggeration, that categorial intuition constitutes one of the most important fundamental questions shared by Husserl and Heidegger". Watanabe, "Categorial Intuition and the Understanding of Being in Husserl and Heidegger", 110.

<sup>8</sup> Heidegger, *Four Seminars*, 67; Ga 15, 377.



direct mention of this specific contribution of categorial intuition. Just as, after all, there is no explicit account of Heidegger's understanding of it. Thus, we will have to work by trying to extract the elements regarding Heidegger's understanding of categories, following and using those passages in which we may recognize the operative engine of categorial intuition, in order to ascertain their nature.

However, categorial intuition – or more generally the *Sixth Logical Investigation* – is explicitly, variously, but also implicitly recalled in many of Heidegger's texts, and especially in those in which we may trace his account of categories. We find the explicit reference to the *Sixth Logical Investigation* and categorial intuition in Heidegger's interpretation of Duns Scotus' categories, in which we may find a first draft of categories as non-subjectivist and non-predicative categories, and in his reading of categorial intuition in chapter 6 of his *History of the Concept of Time*, in which he dedicates his lecture to Husserl's phenomenology and pursues his own phenomenological propositions. In this lecture, we find Heidegger's own interpretation of categorial intuition, an interpretation that has been the centre of attention for many Heideggerian scholars, together with one of his last *Seminars*, testifying to the importance of this doctrine. However, while categorial intuition and the *Sixth Investigation* are explicitly recalled in Heidegger's comment on Duns Scotus' categories and in *Being and Time*, we may also indirectly detect the presence of categorial intuition implicitly working in other areas of Heidegger's early work. For example, we may find references to categorial intuition, even if scattered, in Heidegger's early works in which he analyses experience. We may find it especially in his lecture on what he terms *hermeneutical intuition*<sup>9</sup>, in which the reference to categorial intuition appears obvious, and also in his lecture on the structure of experience (especially *Towards the Determination of Philosophy and Ontology*) and the structure of judgment (*Logic. The Question of Truth*) and in section §44 of *Being and Time*, in which Heidegger uses certain examples that may be reconnected to those he uses when he explicitly refers to categorial intuition. Following Heidegger's reception of categorial intuition, I would like to show how Heidegger's account of categories takes shape. By focusing on the various oscillations that we may detect in Husserl's categorial intuition, I wanted to show how we could stretch the understanding of categories within it. I will maintain that those oscillations may help us in reading Heidegger's understanding of categories, starting from his reading of Husserl.

In the Introduction and in chapter 1, we have not only seen that Heidegger does not

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<sup>9</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 89; Ga 56/57, 117.

provide us with an explicit account of categories and their structure and functioning within experience, but we have also noted that Heidegger often vacillates in defining them in his texts, defining them variously as *structures* and *determinations* but also as *concepts* or even *properties*. These oscillations are the direct consequence of the complex nature and structure of Heidegger's categories. As in Husserl, Heidegger's account of categories to be outlined reveals a tension. They are given in the world and in what Heidegger calls "pre-theoretical" experience, but they are also related to conceptuality. Heidegger's categories are structures of articulation of experience, and they demonstrate a syncategorematic nature<sup>10</sup>. They have an operative nature that can be sketchy but that finds its proper meaning in their function. I wish to show that categories are indeed categories of experience, concerning both world and subject, Dasein as being-in-the-world", and that their structure is syncategorematic, so that they articulate the dimension of reality, of worldliness, understood in terms of structured context (*Umwelt*) and experiencing subjectivity (Dasein), which is not a Cartesian detached *ego* but being-in-the-world.

I shall thus, analyse Heidegger's comment on Duns Scotus' categories, which can be conceived as a first draft on the nature of categories in terms of non-subjectivist non-predicative categories; analyse Heidegger's reception of categorial intuition and further investigate it in Heidegger's texts, in order to show how categories appear to Heidegger and what elements they involve.

#### **4.2 The structure of categories – Non-subjectivist, non-predicative account of categories – first draft of their formal structure from Heidegger's Duns Scotus**

The first text in which Heidegger discusses the issue of categories is the dissertation for his post-doctoral teaching qualification (*Habilitationsschrift*) on *Duns Scotus' Theory of Categories and of Meaning*. Heidegger's reading of Scotus' categories, which are called *transcendentalia* (*unum, verum and bonum*), represents his first attempt to reformulate in new terms the account of categories<sup>11</sup>. I will start from this very early work, not for

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<sup>10</sup> The syncategorematic character of Heidegger's categories has been highlighted by Chiurazzi especially in *Modalità ed Esistenza*, chapter IV on Heidegger, "Comprensione ed Esistenza".

<sup>11</sup> For a comment of Heidegger's Duns Scotus, see Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"*; Iannicelli U., *Le ricerche logiche di Martin Heidegger*, Giannini, Napoli, 2009; McGrath S.J., "Heidegger and Duns Scotus on Truth and Language", in *The Review of Metaphysics* Vol. 57, No. 2 2003, 339-358; McGrath S.J., *The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy: Phenomenology for the Godforsaken*, The Catholic University of America Press, 2014; Tonner P., "Haecceitas and the Question of Being: Heidegger and Duns Scotus", in *Kritike*, Volume, No2, 2008, 146-154; Tonner P., *Heidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of*

chronological reasons, but rather because this work, tackling the Scotist categories and not those that will later be Heidegger's, gives us the opportunity to study the formal structure of categories<sup>12</sup>. We can gain from Heidegger's interpretation of Scotus' *transcendentalia* a first draft of how the structure of categories should be conceived, furnishing us with a non-subjectivist, non-predicative account of them.

In Duns Scotus, we do not find Heidegger's typical categories directly at work, in the way he has formulated them, or in the way with which we may be familiar, or indeed in a strictly Heideggerian context. This fact allows us to analyse Scotus' categories, focusing directly on their structure and, thereby, to acquire purely formal, structural elements to assist us in understanding Heidegger's categories, in line with his criticism of subjectivism and predicationism. In his work on Duns Scotus' categories, which Heidegger will later recognize as the first work on the ontological question<sup>13</sup>, we may find as "operating in filigree"<sup>14</sup> the indications about categories to assemble for a general reflection on Heidegger's categories.

Heidegger's book on Duns Scotus is not a simple exegetical work, but rather a reading in which we can appreciate Heidegger's vivid interpretation<sup>15</sup>. Although, at first glance, it seems very far from the perspective of *Being and Time* or any of Heidegger's other work, the Heideggerian interpretation of Duns Scotus contains *in nuce* some points that will be developed in his future works. Therefore, my aim, here, is not to insert the Scotist transcendental categories as such into Heidegger's project, but to consider the features of their structure as a first model for the Heideggerian one. The Heidegger-Scotus<sup>16</sup> categories represent a first draft that offers some important contributions to our study on categories, giving us the first model in non-subjectivist, non-predicativist terms.

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*Being*, Continuum, 2011.

<sup>12</sup> For Kisiel, Heidegger's *Towards the Definition of Philosophy* represents the "zero point of Heidegger's development toward *Being and Time*". Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"*, 16. He considers the *Habilitation* as the "prehistory to a 'hermeneutics of facticity'", *Ivi*, 19. I might suggest, to paraphrase Kisiel, considering Heidegger's Duns Scotus as the zero point (both chronologically and theoretically) for the understanding of Heidegger's categories.

<sup>13</sup> In "A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer", Heidegger states that "doctrine of categories" is the usual name of the discussion of the Being of beings. See, Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, 6; *Ga* 12, 87.

<sup>14</sup> Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"*, 20.

<sup>15</sup> What McGrath calls violent reading: "The first of Heidegger's many 'violent' interpretations." McGrath, *The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 89.

<sup>16</sup> Poggi prefers to use the expression "Heidegger-Scotus", given Heidegger's highly-characterized interpretation of Scotus' theory. See Poggi S., *La logica, la mistica e il nulla. Una interpretazione del giovane Heidegger*, Edizioni della Normale, Pisa, 2006, 74.

#### 4.2.1 Heidegger-Scotus' premises

Heidegger's book on Duns Scotus represents good terrain on which to start an investigation into Heidegger's categories, especially if we consider Heidegger's criticisms of subjectivism and predicationism as a negative starting point in the conception of new categories.

In the *Introduction* to his work, Heidegger presents the general Medieval Scotist framework that corresponds to his and, in fact, we can find in the *Introduction* some general key considerations that we have mentioned in previous sections. Let us briefly summarize them.

1. First of all, Scotist categories are conceived of by Heidegger as a valid alternative to Aristotelian categories. In fact, one of the first indications of the general framework in which Heidegger-Scotus moves is Heidegger's denunciation of the insufficiency of the ten Aristotelian categories<sup>17</sup>: they reveal themselves to be only a determinate class of a determinate domain<sup>18</sup> (the physical natural domain) whose nature is *predicative*<sup>19</sup> and whose role – as we have seen in section 2.2.1 and 2.2.4 – is to recognize and circumscribe the events of reality by attribution, that we can say with Tonner are not appropriate to grasp the experience of Dasein<sup>20</sup>.

2. As we have said, Heidegger states, surprisingly, that in Medieval (and Scotus') thought we find some *ante litteram* phenomenological aspects. Namely,

- a) Heidegger observes that medieval thought is, by and large, distinguished by the absence of a “consciousness of method”<sup>21</sup>, which characterizes modern philosophy. This lack does not denote an incapacity of Medieval thought to be free from the *ipse dixit* but it does indicate the absence of Modern subjectivism, here exemplified by the expression “consciousness of method”. As previously noted (section 2.1), the criticism of subjectivism, especially the Cartesian version of subjectivism, which is a constant in Heidegger's thought, does not correspond to a

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<sup>17</sup> It has been said that Heidegger's Duns Scotus is a, “veiled challenge to Aristotelianism”. Backmann J., *Complicated Presence. Heidegger and the Postmetaphysical Unity of Being*, New York, SunyPress, 2015, 70.

<sup>18</sup> Heidegger, *Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, 24; Ga 1, 211.

<sup>19</sup> Heidegger, *Conclusion Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, 64; Ga 1, 403.

<sup>20</sup> Tonner, “Haccceitas and the Question of Being”, 149.

<sup>21</sup> Heidegger, *Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, 8; Ga 1, 198.

criticism of the subject *tout court*, but rather of the subject “of theoretical cognition”<sup>22</sup>, far removed from the richness of experience.

b) The Medieval attitude is “absolute devotion and submission in temperament to the material”, (already quoted in section 1.3), which in more operative terms means that Scotist reflection is led by the principle of *immersion* into the material of the experience, following the phenomenological principle of the *things in themselves*, namely in their concreteness.

3. As we saw in Husserl’s categorial intuition, and that we have recognized gains Heidegger’s appreciation, here, as Heidegger’s remarks, the identification of categories does not occur *via* deduction. Categories are not acquired through an *a priori* deductive process<sup>23</sup>, but “can only be demonstrated”<sup>24</sup>. This means that categories and their functioning should be shown with “no *detour* through something else”<sup>25</sup>, and immediately grasped.

The general framework in which Heidegger’s interpretation of Scotus’ categories is placed is completely coherent with the general features that shape Heidegger’s thinking, Scotist categories offer Heidegger the possibility of an alternative conception of categories: they exceed the predicative nature of Aristotelian categories<sup>26</sup> and find their place within a non-subjectivist (in traditional terms) theoresis. As in Husserl’s categorial intuition<sup>27</sup> – which strongly influences Heidegger’s reading of Scotus’ categories<sup>28</sup> – they represent a first alternative to subjectivism and predicationism, and a good model for the general question of categories.

The Scotist notion of *immersion* corresponds in Heideggerian terminology to the proximity to facticity; the Heidegger-Scotus categories that do not need any deduction, seek to grasp reality while observing this immersion, and represent the attempt to combine the

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<sup>22</sup> Lafont C., *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*, Cambridge, University Press, 2000, 2.

<sup>23</sup> Heidegger, *Duns Scotus’ Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, 27; Ga 1, 213.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>26</sup> “Scotus (...) discloses semantic layers not accessed through Aristotle’s ten categories, indications of what Heidegger will later call the ‘fore-theoretical’, or ‘primordial understanding’.” McGrath, *The early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy. Phenomenology for the Godforsaken*, 42.

<sup>27</sup> The text is strongly influenced by Husserl’s categorial intuition and by Lask’s interpretation of it. More precisely, the text might be regarded as the syncretic result of the philosophical environment in which Heidegger was moving when he wrote this work. At that time Heidegger was, indeed, particularly influenced by the neo-Kantian school, especially Rickert, Lask and Husserl.

<sup>28</sup> McGrath, *The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 119.

theory of categories with the alleged “ineffable” character of particularities that constitutes the emergence of our experience in the world<sup>29</sup>. In other words, we can say that Heidegger's challenge is to elaborate a categorial framework that mirrors, on one hand, the concrete need to have categories that do not entrap the stream of experience and, at the same time, the need not to dissolve it. Heidegger's appreciation for Scotus' categories is therefore motivated by that internal tension which animates Scotus' approach. For Heidegger, Scotus

has a more extensive and accurate nearness (*haecceitas*) to real life, to its manifoldness and possible tensions than the scholastics before him. At the same time, he knows how to turn, with the same ease, from the fullness of life to the abstract world of mathematics. The “life-forms” are as familiar to him (...) as the “gray on gray” of philosophy.<sup>30</sup>

Aside from the metaphor, this means that Heidegger is interested in contemplating two different, and apparently opposed, elements and their tensions: on the one hand, the attention to the *haecceitas* (thisness, the individual) of life, namely the *facticity* of life<sup>31</sup> – that represents a core notion that indicates how Heidegger is focused on finding a categorial instrument to frame the logic of *haecceitas* and *Besonderheiten* that later will be name facticity and Dasein (see section 1.3) –, which seems to conflict with the schema of traditional categories, and on the other hand the conservation of the logical-theoretical aspect. Categories need to find their nature, structure and articulation in this peculiar equilibrium.

#### 4.2.2 Scotist Categories.

I shall now focus on some passages from the chapter about the *ens* and *unum transcendental*, which takes into account the issue of categories in the domain of reality. Initially, we will have to deal with the Scotist terminology, following Heidegger's presentation of Scotus' categories, but I will try to extract the formal structure of categories and those indications that we may need to characterize it.

Let us now consider the transcendental categories as Heidegger presents them. The reflection starts from the matter of fact observation that our experience is always an

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<sup>29</sup> See also *ivi*, 91.

<sup>30</sup> Heidegger, *Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, 15-16; Ga 1, 203.

<sup>31</sup> See also, Tonner, “Haecceitas and the Question of Being”, 153.

experience of *something*, of a *being*, of an *ens* – but *this* Scotist *ens*, as we will see, is not to be intended as a mere *res*. In every experience, before any other type of determination, we have in front of us *something* objective. This phenomenological evidence, understood from a logic-ontological point of view, indicates that the notion of *ens* (being-something) is the permanent and pervasive moment in the objective, as “the objective has no more proximate categorial determination”<sup>32</sup>: the *ens* is the category of categories<sup>33</sup>, it is a *maxime scibile*, as what is primordially known<sup>34</sup>. *Ens* is the basis of the categorial framework of the *transcendentia*. Schematically speaking, in Scholastic-Scotist terminology a *transcendens* is, “that which has no genus beyond it in which it inheres”, and “nothing more can be predicated of it”<sup>35</sup>. A *transcendens*, therefore, does not respond to a hierarchy of genera and species<sup>36</sup> and their relationship of “belonging”, as in the Aristotelian doctrine of categories and judgment<sup>37</sup>. Hence, *ens*, is a non-predicative determination; it is related to reality outside of attributive-predicative logic. Given this general information, we need to clarify and analyse the sense of the *transcendentia* – taking into account the relationship between *ens* and *unum* and trying to comprehend their meaning, their inter-relation and the implications of their inner content.

As previously noted, the *ens* tells us that our experience is an experience of a *being*, of *something* (*Etwas*) in general; the *unum transcendens* indicates that something is *a* something. In this shift of emphasis, we consider the “something” as a being and then as a determined unity. This shift means that we are sketching out some minimal information without attaching to the being any predicative characterization:

*unum* (and *ens*) doesn't add a new object any more to *ens* in the way that somehow being white adds to the substance. Every object is one object in itself and by itself. *Unum* is immediately given, rather, with what-ness as its form (determination).<sup>38</sup>

As with the Husserlian categories, *ens* and *unum* do not impose an attribute, they do not alter by using predicates, but rather they illuminate something properly characteristic of any being. An *ens* is always an *unum transcendens*, and *vice versa*: this kind of mutual

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<sup>32</sup> Heidegger, *Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, 29; Ga 1, 214.

<sup>33</sup> Todisco defines *ens* as a “functional supercategory”, in Todisco, O., “Il carattere oggettivo dell'ente scotista nella lettura di Martin Heidegger”, in *Quaestio 1*, Brepols, Turnhout, 2001, 245-274, 249.

<sup>34</sup> *Ivi*, 30; Ga 1, 215.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>36</sup> Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"*, 36.

<sup>37</sup> (And also of the doctrine of substance and accidents).

<sup>38</sup> Heidegger, *Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, 36-37; Ga 1, 221.

intercategorical implication is one of the main signs of the *transcendentia*. Indeed, “[o]nly that which is convertible with *ens* may be reckoned with the transcendentals in the strict sense”<sup>39</sup>. *Convertibility* is the criterion for deciding what can be considered a *transcendens*. Even if *ens* is more originary than the others, we might say that *transcendentia* do not respond to a vertical hierarchy, but stand in a horizontal relation of mutual implication; they are equi-primordial categories<sup>40</sup>, since “[t]here is no established order of rank among them”, and, “[n]o one of the transcendentals can be explicated (...) without a circular argument”<sup>41</sup>. Transcendental categories create a logical chain that they exhibit, by the principle of convertibility, with no need of any metaphysical deduction.

Thus far, we know that categories as *transcendentia* have no predicative dispositions, but rather, as I will demonstrate, a formal-indicative one, and that their criterion of individuation is convertibility, a sort of anti-hierarchical device which entails an internal organization in terms of reciprocal connection.

At first, recognizing and disposing of these categories seems to lead only to very general and vacuous considerations, so trivial as to appear useless to philosophical inquiry. Or rather, since *ens* and *unum* are such primitive notions, they are usually conceived of as ultimate concepts with no content to communicate. “There is nothing apparently that can be done with *ens* as 'anything at all' (something general). Everything stops at this as at the ultimate. Or have we still not exhausted the significant content of *ens*?”<sup>42</sup>. But, behind the simplicity of *ens* and *unum* we shall, instead, discover their implicit articulation. When I acknowledge something, “to what extent is something a something? Because it isn't another. It is something and in its being something it is not-other-being”<sup>43</sup>. Within the category of *ens* there does not only lie a general positive affirmation of existence, but rather, “there is in this sentence a productive moment, that of *relation*”<sup>44</sup>. Thanks to the *ens*, the one and the other are given in their relation, more precisely, “not the one or even the one in antithesis to two, but the one and the other: the *heterothesis*”<sup>45</sup>. So, as soon as we investigate, we realize that the ontological determination of *ens* synthesizes in itself the existence of something as

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<sup>39</sup> *Ivi*, 31; Ga 1, 216.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>42</sup> *Ivi*, 32; Ga 1, 217.

<sup>43</sup> *Ivi*, 33; Ga 1, 218.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibidem*; Ga 1, 217.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibidem*; Ga 1, 218.



a being-and-not-other. The apparent tautology *ens est* (“a being is”) necessarily involves a heterology<sup>46</sup>. It conceals a relation between *something* and its negation; it identifies a being by setting a limit. This limit in turn is not fixed once and for all as a circumscribing predication would be, but it is flexible, precisely because *ens* suggests a type of determination that does not prescribe any essential attributes or a strict cataloguing. The “something” in general is not the abstract general, but it is a “formal” *Etwas* that is characterized as itself-and-not-another thanks to its qualities, thanks to its being-particular. *Ens* individuates something, providing an ontological determination by indicating a modal relationship between two not yet specified members.

As a convertible non-predicative category, the transcendental *unum* displays the same inner structure as the *ens*: it does not add to the concept of the object any positive-attributive factor, since, “the convertibility of *unum* with *ens* cannot relate to the object's essential content”<sup>47</sup>. Given the distinctive relationship of convertibility, between *ens* and *unum*, even if they communicate different nuances of meaning, there is no sharp separation as, “convertibility doesn't infer an absolute difference of two objects, but merely a different aspect and determination by which its content can be regarded”<sup>48</sup>. For this reason, furthermore, the *unum* does not affect the what-ness of the object but is, “necessarily conjoined to it as an essentially fundamental determination”<sup>49</sup>. Thanks to the *unum*, an object can be discerned in its being-one as already implied in its being. Moreover, the fact (and the possibility) of being-one is synchronized with the fact of not-being-another object. Like the *ens*, the *unum* hides the reference to an internal relation – in this case between *one* and *multiplicity*. In their minimalistic expression, the *ens* and the *unum* represent two different perspectives, two different modalities to consider the same object, as they have a slightly different meaning and role: the *ens* gives the first determination in terms of *relation*, while the *unum* brings more clarity to the object, for it donates an “order” to the manifold fullness of the objective, an order that is not permanently fixed, mono-directional or unchangeable.

To summarise what Heidegger's book says about the theory of categories, we might outline some of their fundamental features. The transcendental categories have a non-

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<sup>46</sup> Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"*, 37.

<sup>47</sup> Heidegger, *Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, 37; Ga 1, 221- 222.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibidem*; Ga 1, 221

<sup>49</sup> *Ibidem*; Ga 1, 222.

subjectivist and non-predicative nature but an indicative one<sup>50</sup>. Such a nature does not entail the *what* of a circumscribed entity, but concerns the dimension of *how* of phenomena, since the various identified objects are considered not as fixed members but as singular, particular somethings involved in mutual and plastic relations<sup>51</sup>. The peculiarity of *transcendentia* is the capacity to support a formal-indicative kind of determination that liberates the specific material content that qualifies different entities. These categories do not prescribe a static delimitation for demarcating substances, *as* essential, absolute, and unrelated monads. On the contrary, they operate a modal-flexive distinction, always bound to a variable *respectus*: being one-something and not-another depends on the intrinsic relation between a singular identity and its alterity, whose reciprocal limit, even if it is ontologically clear, always has a dynamic character. The notion of limit (presented within the notion of *ens* but also ascribable to the category of *unum*) does not set on an unmovable basis what a thing should be and what it should not be, but rather allows an on-going dialogue between the two elements. It is precisely through the limit which is reciprocally given from one to the other, that beings in such a relationship can gain their own configuration as particularities and their proper qualitative difference. As Heidegger states by quoting Hegel, “[s]omething is what it is only in its bounds”<sup>52</sup>.

Even though, as I have already mentioned, categories do not involve a determination which directly penetrates the material content of reality, nevertheless they entail such material components indirectly. Their indicative instruction suggests an implicit (and also necessary) reference to the material which is what, in truth, individuates the concrete particularities and the differences of various objects. The determination and the order, communicated by *ens* and *unum*, “automatically” cause the ontological inquiry to take into account the material components of experience, discovering that the formal-indicative articulation of the transcendental categories is structurally linked with the facticity of reality, of worldly experience. To conjecture regarding the proper formal-indicative function of categories, we might hold that it is the *material being* of objects that offers, in the end, the *ens* as *ens*, the *one* as *one*. In the domain of reality, in fact, the different *respectus*, from which *ens* and *unum* are given, take place thanks to the emergence of the qualities of

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<sup>50</sup> Kisiel states that *unum transcendens* as an eminent indicative role, close to the formal indication (*Formale Anzeige*). See Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"*, 26.

<sup>51</sup> Regarding the category of *ens*, Iannicelli states that “*ens* is not something closed in itself and immobile, but it entails a relational character” (my translation). Iannicelli, *Le ricerche logiche di Martin Heidegger*, 46-47.

<sup>52</sup> Heidegger, *Duns Scotus' Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, 33; Ga 1, 218.

*concreteness* presented by the notion of *haecceitas* – whose peculiarity is to have “specific qualitative determination”<sup>53</sup>. As already noted in the *Introduction*, *theoresis* should recall what is often forgotten, namely those individual particularities that the search for universal generality would disregard. A theory of renewed categories needs to grasp a reality that reveals itself as a domain constituted by the emergence of qualitatively connoted, and yet articulated particularities.

After this *excursus* into the Scotist doctrine, I would like to extract those elements that will be useful for the understanding of categories, by elucidating their particular nature. Firstly, categories are circularly connected, without a strict taxonomy, as they mutually recall themselves. To give a clarifying example, using Heidegger's terminology, let us consider the implications that derive from, but are yet included in, the notion of *Dasein*. *Dasein* means being-in-the-world, which in turn means living *in* a *world* and being-with-others, which means talking-to, living-for, and so forth. Their proper structure can be rediscovered with respect to the role of categories regarding reality. We might think of them graphically as open and flexible structures that indicate and pinpoint, with no other predicative prescription, the domain of material whose qualities contribute to set a clear, but yet mobile limit. They “wait” for the material to fulfil the functional meaning of transcendentals, since they are the different qualities in material that individuate the *ens*, and give sense to the categorial architecture. They “wait” for and articulate a material which is self-structured and ordered.

I would like to stress once again the nature of this kind of categorial-diagram. Categories are linked to each other by relationships of mutual implications among them, and categories are directed to reality, as qualitatively ordered material, which is the concreteness towards which the non-predicative categories refer<sup>54</sup>.

We can now say that we have acquired an initial characterization of categories. Duns Scotus' account of categories gives Heidegger a new version of categories. For the purposes of our inquiry, it provides us with what we may consider a first draft for the understanding of the nature of Heidegger's categories. Even if covered by the Scotist terminology which we have been obliged to ruminate on a little (we will not find and use any more notions such

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<sup>53</sup> D'Angelo A., ““Le azioni riguardano i singoli”. A proposito di Heidegger e Duns Scoto”, Ardovino A. (ed.), *Heidegger e gli orizzonti della filosofia pratica. Etica, estetica, politica, religione*, Guerini Studio, Milano, 2003, 53-72, 57-58.

<sup>54</sup> See, McGrath, *The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 93.

as *ens-unum-heterotesis*), the Heidegger-Scotus' account of categories gives us the first instrument to outline categories as non-subjectivist, non-predicative, and non-hierarchical. Nonetheless, these categories are able to determine the structure of reality, without on the one hand reducing reality to *res*, or on the other causing its decomposition into some chaotic material dimension. Scotist categories indicate that there is an order and a structure to reality which is not necessarily to be conceived in terms of the metaphysics of *res* or by the opposition of subject-object. These categories reveal an indicative and flexible structure. One implies the other, and they are all operatively connected to the structure of reality that they articulate, without altering it in a predicative way. Heidegger-Scotus' categories show a preliminary affinity with the operative syncategorematic categories of categorial intuition. Therefore, to enrich our understanding of the nature of Heidegger's categories, we should continue following the lead offered by categorial intuition.

### 4.3 Categorial intuition in Heidegger

Heidegger's interpretation of categorial intuition is presented in his lecture of 1925, in which he presents the meaning of phenomenology by introducing the notions of *intentionality*, *categorial intuition* and *a priori*. Heidegger's exposition of Husserl's categorial intuition, in broad strokes, is quite close to Husserl's own presentation of it<sup>55</sup>. The importance of categorial intuition for Heidegger's account of categories is that it represents "[t]he concrete path of research into categories, genuine research that identifies them"<sup>56</sup>. It represents, as for Husserl, the idea that we can grasp categories without an intellectual *detour*.

The discovery of categorial intuition is the demonstration, first, that there is a simple apprehension of the categorial, such constituents in entities which in traditional fashion are designated as categories and were seen in crude form quite early [in Greek philosophy, especially by Plato and Aristotle].<sup>57</sup>

Heidegger takes Husserl as having shown that we can directly apprehend categories without thinking of them, "as projections of the mind. The categories, and even being and truth, have their source in the process of the activities through which we make sense of the

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<sup>55</sup> Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*, 74.

<sup>56</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 97; Ga 20,

<sup>57</sup> *Ivi*, 48; Ga 20, 64.

world”<sup>58</sup>. As for Husserl, categorial intuition gives the basis for a non-subjectivist understanding of categories<sup>59</sup>. And also from Heidegger's perspective, “categorial intuition provides a way of seeing how a general ontology could be developed that does not depend on a subjectivization of the subject-matter of ontology”<sup>60</sup>. From this point, which Heidegger shares with Husserl’s categorial intuition, Heidegger continues to present the concept of categorial intuition while following Husserl in the analysis of judgement and the question of fulfilment of *syncategoremata* that we find in the *Sixth Investigation*<sup>61</sup>. Nonetheless, this presents some important differences. We may say that Heidegger’s reading represents a “translation” of Husserl’s theory and, as such, by nature, it implies a sort of “regulated infidelity”<sup>62</sup>. It represents an insightful perspective on how the proper structure and nature of categories and categorial intuition can be understood.

#### 4.3.1 Heidegger’s distinctiveness

The main elements that represent Heidegger’s specific contribution in reading and transforming the notion of categorial intuition, compared to Husserl’s original thought in this area, are to be seen in two statements (see section 3.6) from Heidegger on which we will focus more properly in the next section. In Heidegger’s analysis of categorial intuition, we read that categorial intuition,

is above all the demonstration that this apprehension is invested in the most everyday of perceptions and in every experience.<sup>63</sup>

One of the first things that Heidegger states in presenting the doctrine of categorial intuition is that categorial intuition indicates that every perception is already pervaded by categories. Later, after having revealed the details of categorial intuition starting from the form of judgement, Heidegger concludes that,

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<sup>58</sup> Keller, *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience*, 91.

<sup>59</sup> Heidegger stresses this character of categorial intuition and points out that Being, although non real and non-sensuous, cannot be identified “straightaway” with “the spiritual in the subject” that is, with the “immanent, the conscious, the subjective”, he insists that this precisely is “the original sense of the discovery of categorial intuition”, see Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 58; Ga 20, 78 ff.

<sup>60</sup> Keller, *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience*, 89.

<sup>61</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, § 6.

<sup>62</sup> Gardini, *Filosofia dell’enunciazione*, 44. About Heidegger’s reading and absorption of Husserl’s categorial intuition, Esposito has talked about a “radicalization”. See Esposito, *Heidegger*, 59.

<sup>63</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 48; Ga 20, 64.

[I]t is also a matter of fact that our simplest perceptions and constitutive states are already expressed, even more, are interpreted in a certain way.<sup>64</sup>

Thus, in his interpretation, Heidegger paraphrases Husserl's categorial intuition and states that our perceptions are already categorially structured and, indeed, already expressed. In these claims, Heideggerian readers have recognised the main passages that establish distance from Husserl's categorial intuition, as well as the specific transformation of the original understanding of categorial intuition performed by Heidegger. These statements, taken together, have been interpreted as "consistent conceptual slippages"<sup>65</sup> that Heidegger makes, while intending to re-frame categorial intuition, and Husserl's original intentions, within a hermeneutic project – that is, with a non-epistemological purpose. More specifically, Lafont has talked about an actual "overturning" of the original meaning of categorial intuition, in which language and linguistic expression takes primacy over perception, namely in which our experience is ruled by language entailing what Lafont calls "hermeneutic" or "linguistic idealism"<sup>66</sup>.

I want to focus more closely on these two statements, in order to show that Heidegger's interpretation is not only the result of a hermeneutic attitude that privileges language and interpretation over perception. Rather, it is also the result of the various oscillations we have found in Husserl's categorial intuition which may have opened themselves to Heidegger's interpretation. The analysis of these statements, and the terms involved in them, will help us, not in highlighting the hermeneutic, but rather in illuminating the nature and function of categories in Heidegger.

#### 4.3.2 Heidegger's first statement

Let us analyse the first of Heidegger's distinctive statements in which he holds that every

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<sup>64</sup> *Ivi*, 56; Ga 20, 75.

<sup>65</sup> Gardini, *Filosofia dell'enunciazione*, 44.

<sup>66</sup> Lafont's reading of Heidegger is presented in her book Lafont C., *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*, but also in Lafont C., "Précis of Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure", *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* 45, 2002, 185–189.

perception, even simple sense perception<sup>67</sup>, is already permeated by categorial elements<sup>68</sup>. In this statement, at first it seems that the status of simple perception is governed by the categorial dimension, or even, that the status of a pure perception is refuted. As Dahlstrom puts it, “Heidegger, we read, places so much weight on the role of categorial intuition that the difference between it and sensory intuition is obscured or even effaced”<sup>69</sup>. From this point of view, Heidegger’s negligence about the status of perception is one of the main differences with Husserl, for whom the level of perception as simple perception, by definition, in the functioning of categorial intuition, was a pure necessary founding level not yet categorised. The primacy of perception as giving us the materiality that serves us as the basis for the process of knowledge seems to be denied by Heidegger’s non-epistemological hermeneutic interpretation. This fact might be seen as unproblematic to understand in Heidegger given that in Heidegger we do not find an account of perception, especially if we consider that perception or even more sense perception is the main object of an epistemological inquiry rather than an ontological one<sup>70</sup>.

However, I want to argue that this treatment of the relation between perception and categories in Heidegger, which seems to put aside the role of perception, has a direct relation with categorial intuition and categories taken in their operative functioning. Throughout chapter 3, we have seen that the difference between a pure, non-categorized material object and a categorized one, even if it can be held definitionally, is not that sharp and clear once we see the function of categories as operative forms within the experience and matter of reality. From this point of view, given the oscillations we have observed in Husserl, it is no surprise if we find Heidegger following this path in questioning the pure independence of the level of perception and not respecting the difference that Husserl would like to maintain. So, from this perspective, Heidegger’s treatment of perception as already categorially

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<sup>67</sup> Heidegger, *History of Concept of Time*, 60; Ga 20, 81.

<sup>68</sup> Costa remarks that this idea is also filtered by Emil Lask. From Lask, Heidegger inherits the notion that: “categories are not given in another world, they do not belong to the thinking-sphere, but rather they are given with the sensible datum, although they are not reducible to it, in others words: categories are given, and they are within the experience. There is no experience not already dense with categories” (my translation). Costa, *La verità del mondo*, 40; on this point, Mohanty, “[o]n the one hand, [Heidegger] was impressed by Husserl’s theory of categorial intuition and understood it to imply that our most elementary perceptions are permeated by the logical”. See Mohanty, *Logic, Truth and Modalities, from a Phenomenological Perspective*, 6-7.

<sup>69</sup> Dahlstrom, *Heidegger’s Concept of Truth*, 84, 99.

<sup>70</sup> See Schacht R., “Husserlian and Heideggerian Phenomenology” in *Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition*, Springer, 1972, 293-314, 295, 304. Categorial intuition “was interpreted by Heidegger as providing access to the categorial sphere and as underlying all kinds of everyday perception and experience”. Fehér, “Lask, Lukacs, Heidegger: the problem of irrationality and the theory of categories”, 391.

structured is not the symptom of a “hermeneutical turn”<sup>71</sup> which would forget the role of perception and the role of perceptual experience – which refers to the external world – in the name of understanding and interpretation<sup>72</sup>. In Heidegger, conceiving of categories as non-subjective forms to be found within experience, may lead one to blur the neat separation of materiality and categories, once we are phenomenologically directed to the understanding of the functioning of categories.

Generally speaking, it is true that Heidegger does not base his ontological reflection on the analysis of perception, nor ascribe to perception a primary role<sup>73</sup>. But it is a common idea<sup>74</sup> that he totally neglected the role of perception, especially if we do not clarify what we mean by *perception*. Actually, in Heidegger we find criticism of perception when he argues against the de-living experience of perception when epistemology reduces the living experience into mere sensory hyletic raw data (see next section). This sense perception which is mere *aesthesis*, recognizes the uncategorized, unarticulated, de-contextualized, homogenous units (the same conception proposed by the metaphysics of *realitas*) that provide us with the basis of what there is and how it is composed, essentially, our world and our experience. This reduction of experience to a cluster of sensory perceptual data or *res*, may also be conceived as the result of a theoretical *abstraction*<sup>75</sup> and for Heidegger this is the epistemological prejudice which can be considered a *Myth of the Given* that does not grasp the proper complex structure of what and how we actually experience. But, even if all this is true, it is also true that Heidegger by no means wants to deny that perception has a part to play in our everyday life. He is emphasizing only “that perception hardly ever

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<sup>71</sup> See also, Couzens Hoy D., “Heidegger and the Hermeneutic Turn,” in Guignon C. (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993.

<sup>72</sup> Scholars have claimed that one of the main shifts from Husserl’s epistemological phenomenology to Heidegger’s ontological one is represented by the shift from “intuition” and “thetic perception” to “understanding” and “interpretation” as non-thetic and holistic concepts. See Mazzarella., “Introduzione”, 3; Chiurazzi, *Modalità e esistenza*, 273, see also, Chiurazzi G., “L’ipotesi del senso”, in Chiurazzi G, and Benoist J. (eds.), *Le ragioni del senso*, Milano, Mimesis, 2010, 51-74; and also chapter 8 “From Intuition to Understanding: On Heidegger’s Transposition of Husserl’s Phenomenology”, in Kisiel T., *Heidegger’s Way of Thought. Critical and Interpretative Signposts*, Continuum, New York, 2002. I shall show, however, that, even if Heidegger refuses the idea of a pure sensuous perception, the meaning of the shift should be mitigated, and the perception relocated.

<sup>73</sup> On the possibility of identifying a phenomenological account of perception in Heidegger, see Kontos P., *La possibilità d’une phénoménologie de la perception chez Heidegger*, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1996.

<sup>74</sup> Taminiaux J., “On Heidegger’s Phenomenology of Perception”, in Moran D. and Embree L. (eds.), *Phenomenology: Critical Concepts in Philosophy II. Themes and Issues*, Routledge, 2004, 90-101.

<sup>75</sup> Dahlstrom, *Heidegger’s Concept of Truth*, 84 ff.



appears as an independent act”<sup>76</sup> .

Natural perception as I live in it in moving about my world is for the most part not a detached observation and scrutiny of things but is rather absorbed in dealing with the matters at hand concretely and practically. It is not self-contained; I do not perceive in order to perceive but in order to orient myself, to pave the way in dealing with something. This is a wholly natural way of looking in which I continually live.<sup>77</sup>

Heidegger does conserve, use and include the dimension of perception in his reflection when he describes our “pre-theoretical” concrete experience, and especially our practical experience. He does include the kind of perception mentioned in the above quotation, which is not a mere sense perception product of a thetic theoretical construction but is, rather, a categorial perception, namely a perception given in an articulated context in which we move. This kind of perception, which recalls the level of categorial intuition, rather than the simple one, in which an experiencing subject orients itself within the world is what Heidegger will call “circumspection (*Umsicht*)”<sup>78</sup>.

However, even if Heidegger’s treatment of perception as *circumspection* is explicitly mentioned in *Being and Time*, this understanding of perception is also implicitly maintained in other early Heidegger’s texts. In fact, while criticising simple perception as an abstraction furnished by a theoretical approach, in his lectures Heidegger nonetheless variously uses examples taken from perceptual experience to show the structure of our factual experience.

These examples that we are going to examine in section 4.4 will be fundamental for the understanding of categories and they implicitly include this kind of circumspective perception. They all contain perceptual features although interconnected with the element of categories and language.

### 4.3.3 Categories and perception

Thus, for what concerns this first blunt statement about the fact that our perception (also sense perception) is already categorially structured, we have to understand the terms used and the relation between perception and categories, in light of, on the one hand, the oscillations we trace within Husserl’s categorial intuition and, on the other, Heidegger’s criticism of epistemological understanding and use of sense perception.

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<sup>76</sup> Overgaard, *Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World*, 12.

<sup>77</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 30; Ga 20, 38.

<sup>78</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*; Ga 2, § 15.

Husserl's wish to maintain simple perception as the uncategorized base for the understanding of categories, is based on a distinction that reveals itself to be quite weak, so that we may claim categories are not separable from the matter they articulate. We can say that Heidegger's claim about perception as already categorized derived from this possible reading of the relation between materiality and categories in which the independency of simple perception is questioned. Accordingly, in contrast to Husserl, Heidegger considers, as we will more closely see in section 4.4.1.a, the conceiving of experience in terms of simple perception to be a prejudice derived from an approach that does not respect the structure of our experience in-the-world. However, this does not seek to negate the role of perception. Heidegger still includes it but in terms of categorized perception, namely as categorially structured perception that articulates the context in which we move and thanks to which we move.

We can say that Heidegger is not overturning Husserl by "negating" the role of perception, but rather is conceiving categories based on an ambiguity present in Husserl's disquisition. So, regarding Heidegger's account of categories from this first statement, the true reversal we can indicate, if for Heidegger categories do not belong to intellect but to objects<sup>79</sup>, is that categories are not implicit in perception, as in Husserl, but *vice versa*, perception is implicit in the functioning of categories. If we want to outline the structure and the functioning of categories of our experience, even if perception will not be our model, a structured perception will be implicitly involved in Heidegger's account of categories, a perception which is always, as shown in early Heidegger and in the concept of circumspection, Heidegger's version of perception, as contextual, relational perception.

In a non-subjectivist spirit, Heidegger locates categories within experience. This first statement regards categories as given within reality. As in Husserl, Heidegger's world is categorially structured. But instead of categories being implicit in perception, perception is to be implicit in Heidegger's account of categories. By this reversal, we can now combine more strictly the relationship between categories and materiality that we have mentioned within our reading of Heidegger's Duns Scotus. Categories are linked to reality, they pervade it, and their nature and structure implicitly include the perceptual moment and what is implied in it, namely the material elements that are not to be conceived of as basic

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<sup>79</sup> "The categorial forms (syntactical forms and meaning categories) cannot be identified with the immanent forms of consciousness, they belong to objects. Categorial acts constitute a new sort of objectivity. This new sort of objectivity—a *priori*, to be sure—is apprehended in a categorial intuition". See Mohanty, *Logic, Truth and the Modalities*, 455.

moments in isolation but as embedded in the structure of the world.

As we have seen in Husserl, categories are linked to the dimension of reality and we have considered this to be the first aspect of the nature of categories as the median element that connects reality and language. In this first statement, we can appreciate Heidegger's interpretation of this first link to reality. In this first link, we might see Heidegger's bottom-up interpretation of the nature of categories and their relationship with reality, by expressing this as a strict link, pinpointing the categorial structure of perception, indicating that our experience takes place in a categorially structured world.

#### 4.3.4 Heidegger's second statement

As we have said, Husserl's categories show to have a hybrid nature. They connect the two dimensions of matter and language. In principle, in Husserl categories are founded on materiality and emerge with judgment. Given the various oscillations that we found in Husserl, categories might be thought of as structures of experience that articulate reality and our experience in it, having a syncategorematic nature which is partially derived from language, so that also demonstrate a conceptual nature. These oscillations reveal the strict relation between categories and the dimensions that they connect, which we have to consider in order to understand the peculiar nature of categories. In Heidegger, both of these relations are presented more strictly. In his lecture, after saying that perceptions are pervaded by categories, Heidegger states that every perception is already *expressed*. We can here appreciate Heidegger's treatment of what we have called the second side of categories from a top-down perspective. More precisely, he says that,

our compartments are in actual fact pervaded through and through by assertions, that they are always performed in some form of expressness<sup>80</sup>

and

the discovery of categorial intuition for the first time concretely paves the way for a genuine form of research capable of demonstrating the categories.<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 56; Ga 20, 75.

<sup>81</sup> *Ivi*, 71; Ga 20, 97.

In these last sentences, Heidegger starts to question the primacy of the connection between perception and language.

What is primary and original here? It is not so much that we see the objects and things but rather that we first talk about them. To put it more precisely: we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what one says.<sup>82</sup>

Our “apprehension and comprehension” of the whole world happens through this expressness; it is “already having been spoken and talked over”<sup>83</sup>. For our inquiry into categories, these statements represent the question of whether categories are something linguistic or of how they are related to expression or language in general. In fact, if perception is already categorially pervaded and also already expressed, this may lead us to think that categories are related to the domain of expression. About this relation between expression and perception, Critchley states that:

for Heidegger, and this is arguably his difference with Husserl, it is highly misleading to speak of the priority or antecedence of perception over expression, or of intuition over concept, as if one first looked at a thing and then, and only then, articulated this perception in an assertion. If anything, the order of priority should be reversed, and Heidegger suggests, in an anticipation of the disclosive function of *Rede* in *Sein und Zeit*, that we first see things when we talk about them, “we do not say what we see, but rather the reverse, we see what one says about the matter” “*sprechen wir nicht das aus, was wir sehen, sondern umgekehrt, wir sehen, was Man über die Sache spricht*”).<sup>84</sup>

In a similar spirit, Lafont has focused on Heidegger’s second statement. For Lafont, Heidegger’s strong claim that we see what we say is not just the reversal of Husserl’s doctrine of categorial intuition but is the first symptom of what she calls Heidegger’s “hermeneutic” or “linguistic idealism”. In her reading of Heidegger, Lafont stresses how in Heidegger our access to the world, and to anything that might show up within the world, is structured by language<sup>85</sup>. Schematically speaking, Lafont argues that in the name of his criticism of mentalism, subject–object model, and epistemological approach, Heidegger ascribes priority to the mode of access of understanding and over perception and intuition. Lafont refers to many crucial points in which Heidegger suggests that our access to the world is possible via understanding and language and seems to pursue what Lafont labels

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<sup>82</sup> *Ivi*, 56; Ga 20, 75.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>84</sup> Critchley, *On Heidegger's Being and Time*, 24. For the quotation see Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 56; Ga 20, 75.

<sup>85</sup> Lafont, *Précis of Heidegger, Language and World-Disclosure*, 185.

linguistic idealism; but to cut to the bone, one of the points she focuses on is when Heidegger says in his interpretation of Kant that “[b]eings are in no way accessible without an antecedent understanding of being. This is to say that beings, which encounter us, must already be understood in advance in their ontological constitution”<sup>86</sup>. For Lafont, Heidegger’s claim that there can be no access to entities without a prior understanding of their being “is thus the core of his hermeneutic transformation of Kant’s transcendental idealism”<sup>87</sup>. Lafont holds that Dasein always understands itself and the world through that “symbolic medium” (that “controls and distributes” our possibilities)<sup>88</sup>, namely, language as a system of sign-relations, so that, this understanding is fundamentally linguistic<sup>89</sup>. From this point of view, going back to Heidegger’s interpretation of categorial intuition, when Heidegger holds that we *see* what we *say*, we might be led to think that the world is opened by our understanding, and actually from our language. Thus, following a Lafontian reading, Heidegger’s reversal of Husserl would start a chain of important consequences. This reversal<sup>90</sup> would lead us to ascribe to language the role of access to the world and because of this “change of perspective, Heidegger no longer has at his disposal any standard of reference that would stand outside of the world”<sup>91</sup>. In fact, one of the main implications – and one of Lafont’s main theses – is that “meaning” determines “reference”, namely that linguistic content has priority over (as its condition of possibility) the account of reference, conditioning our link to the external world<sup>92</sup>. The lost connection with an outside world, which is opened by our comprehension and language, which projects its linguistic meaning over the world, would lead Heidegger to a sort of idealism<sup>93</sup>. This idealism is not the

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<sup>86</sup> Heidegger M., *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Emad P. and Maly K., Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1997, 38; Ga 25, *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*, ed. von Herrmann F. W., Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1977, 55.

<sup>87</sup> Lafont C., “Heidegger and the Synthetic *A Priori*”, in Crowell S. and Malpas J. (eds.), *Transcendental Heidegger*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2007, 104-118, 105.

<sup>88</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 211; Ga 2, 168.

<sup>89</sup> Lafont, *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*, 47. Against this reading, see Carman T., “Was Heidegger a Linguistic Idealist?”, in *Inquiry* 45, 2002, 205-215.

<sup>90</sup> See also Gardini, *Filosofia dell'enunciazione*, 54.

<sup>91</sup> Lafont, *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*, 16-17.

<sup>92</sup> Lafont claims that in Heidegger there is no an account of direct reference, comparing Heidegger’s notion of meaning and reference to Frege’s *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*, reading him in contrast with the theorist of direct reference such as Donnelland, Kripke and Putnam. See chapter 4, “The Conception of Meaning and Reference Implied by the Ontological Difference” in Lafont, *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure* and Lafont C., “Heidegger on Meaning and Reference”, in *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, Volume 31, 2005, 9-20. On the issue of reference, against Lafont, Dreyfus has argued that in Heidegger there is an account of reference. Heidegger’s formal indication would represent the notion of a “non-committal” reference. See Dreyfus H., “Comments on Cristina Lafont’s Interpretation of *Being and Time*”, in *Inquiry*, 45, 191-194, 192-193.

<sup>93</sup> McManus has highlighted one of the main consequence of Lafon’s reading. “She argues that Heidegger’s claims about the need for ‘disclosures’ of ‘being’, which ‘found’ propositions and the possibility of propositional truth, undermine ‘the idealization of a *single, objective world*’: ‘the supposition of a single

idealism connected to consciousness but to Dasein's understanding and language which rules our experience, and which Lafont calls "linguistic idealism". From this point of view, if we follow Lafont, the subjectivism (and the idealism) refused by categorical intuition would reappear here through language. While Heidegger claims, with Husserl, that categories are not mental products, it may seem that categories, and our experience in the world, are a projection of our understanding and language, which are the "sign" of our subjectivity. From this perspective, Heidegger's claim that perception is already expressed and that we see what we say, would ascribe to language and its forms a primacy that rules the world and includes it. I will not argue that this point of criticism is not present in Heidegger who, in the name of his criticism of epistemology, does not ascribe to perception a primary role and considers expression and language very important elements that contribute to shaping our experience. However, the Lafontian path would lead us to negate one of the main qualities that Heidegger appreciates regarding categorial intuition. Lafont reaches the thesis of linguistic idealism by diminishing the role of those passages in Heidegger in which he implicitly (but constantly) pursues a phenomenology based on examples modelled on the perceptual experience, and all those passages in which he stresses our worldly involvement, by using syncategorematical particles that, as we shall see, indicates the categorial web in the world as a structured dimension<sup>94</sup>. Moreover, we will see that the notion of meaning (*Sinn* and *Bedeutung*) that will be implied in our inquiry into categories are not simply linguistic notions.

The concept of categorial intuition permits Heidegger to show that the categorial forms employed in assertions are not unfulfilled constructions or functions of the intellect. Rather, Heidegger writes:

[t]he categorial "forms" are not constructs of acts but objects which manifest themselves [sichtbar werden] in these acts. They are not something made by the subject and even less something added to the real objects, such that the real entity is itself modified by this forming. Rather they actually present the entity more truly in its "being-in-itself".<sup>95</sup>

However, as we did for perception, we have to make clearer what *expression* can mean here. As we saw, also in Husserl language and more precisely judgment was of fundamental importance for indicating categories and understanding their nature. So, Heidegger's

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objective world of entities independent of language". McManus D., "Heidegger and the Supposition of a Single, Objective World", in *European Journal of Philosophy*, 23:2, 2012, 195–220.

<sup>94</sup> See also Dreyfus' reply to Lafont, "Comments on Cristina Lafont's Interpretation of *Being and Time*".

<sup>95</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 70; Ga 20, 96.

intricate statement about the expression of our perception and how we see what we say, corresponds to what we have seen to be the language-side of categorial intuition.

#### 4.3.5 Perception and expression

To understand what we can mean by *expression* and how this is linked to the world, we can follow Heidegger's exposition of categorial intuition. Heidegger starts from the sentence, "[t]his chair is yellow and upholstered". What are we to understand here by expression? There are two possibilities<sup>96</sup>. First of all, to express a perception means to *announce* and *communicate* that I have performed that kind of perception. In this case, I am expressing an act. Secondly, giving expression to a perception may not signify giving notice of the act but the *communication* of what is perceived in the act. Even if language refers to the dimension of subjectivity that expresses its experience, we can see that both definitions of *expression* – "*announcing/announce*" and "*communication*" – as Heidegger continues, do not represent "an assertion about a mere representation, about something subjective"<sup>97</sup> but are linked to what they indicate within the pre-predicative experience. In early Heidegger, as we will see (section 4.4.4.a), expression, language and *logos* are not just predication nor do they merely indicate the predicative form of judgement.

The beings which are expressions of something demand of themselves that the proper mode of accessing and appropriating them lies in pursuing and observing the characteristics of reference (*Verweisungsscharaktere*) found in these objects which have been defined in such a manner.<sup>98</sup>

To be an expression is to be an expression *of* something. From expression we have an indication, a reference to something which is "outside" the linguistic expression but yet which is expressed. Expression is not a mere linguistic projection. It involves a reference. The reference is toward the world which shows an articulation, an articulation that the first statement about our categorially structured perception has already hinted at. However, as it was for language and *syncategoremata* in Husserl, the dimension of expression does not only refer to the world but also to an expressing subject. In categorial intuition, we locate categories in the dimension of experience, which is always also the dimension of an

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<sup>96</sup> *Ivi*, 57; Ga 20, 76.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>98</sup> Heidegger, *Ontology*, 41; Ga 63, 52.

experiencing subject that, even if it is not to be equated with a detached *ego* or a creative spontaneity, is not merely passive. In fact, more precisely, Heidegger says that even the simplest perceptions are already *expressed*, namely, are *interpreted* in a certain way. This does not mean that we perform projection of our linguistic forms, but that in the categorial structuring of experience we co-participate in our perceptual experience. The question about the relationship between language and experience is far from being resolved, but in the investigation about categorial intuition and categories, it certainly plays a central role both in Husserl and in Heidegger. In this context, the role of expressivity and language may be considered the sign of the presence of a subject that lives in a structured world and participates in it. We will see more closely in the next section how language is implied in the categorial structuring of our experience, and how we should understand its role. For now, let us just say that expression, interpretation and language might here represent the second side of categories which in Husserl have been shown to have a hybrid nature related to language and *syncategoremata*.

#### 4.3.6 *Syncategoremata* in Heidegger

As we saw in Husserl, categories represent the median element of connection between the two different dimensions of language and world. In Heidegger's reading of categorial intuition, we find Husserl's same reflection on language – more specifically on judgement and *syncategoremata*, that may lead us to see the *syncategoremata* as devices and paradigms for categories, but also to recognize the fundamental and revelatory role of language<sup>99</sup>, through which we can recognize the presence of categories. Heidegger continues following Husserl, analysing the strict relation between expression and perception by focusing on the judgement of perception, and on the question of syncategorematic forms. In a Husserlian spirit, Heidegger states:

[w]e wish to ask what exactly is here at first left unfulfilled: the 'this,' the 'is,' the 'and.'<sup>100</sup>

As we know, *syncategoremata* represent a *surplus*; elements like “this”, “is”, “and” and

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<sup>99</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>100</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 58; Ga 20, 77.



“or”, are categorical not sensory<sup>101</sup>, just as “thisness”, “unity” and “plurality”<sup>102</sup>, and indicate categorial structures that for Heidegger too, cannot be found in the internal space of mind<sup>103</sup>. Recalling Husserl’s lecture, questioning the articulation of judgment and the issue of *syncategoremata*, Heidegger continues that the kind of articulation that belongs to *syncategoremata* pertains also to “the less complicated expression of a simple naming, a so-called nominal positing of the kind “the yellow upholstered chair”<sup>104</sup>. Clearly drawing upon Husserl’s original point in §§ 43–44 of the *Sixth Investigation*, Heidegger immediately adds,

upon closer inspection we find a surplus even here. I can see the colour yellow but not the being-yellow, being-coloured; and the expressive element 'yellow,' that is, the attribute, in its full expression in fact means "the chair being yellow." And this 'being' in this expression and in the one above in the form 'is' cannot be perceived.<sup>105</sup>

As we saw for Husserl, thanks to the question of *syncategoremata*, the simple nominal parts also reveal themselves to be concealing an inner articulation. As Øverenget remarks, “[t]he surplus is not something that is added at a certain level of sophistication, it is present even on a nominal level. Thus, according to Heidegger, the way to solve this problem is not to break a complicated assertion down into a set of less complicated nominal statements, each of which can be fulfilled through simple perception”<sup>106</sup>. The analysis of judgment and *syncategoremata*, especially of copula, have shown that *chair* and *yellow* are properly a *being-chair* and *being-yellow*. We assist in the same broadening of the peculiar articulation of *syncategoremata* to the other parts of language. Following the trace-mark indicated by the copula, we can ascertain the nature of these articulations,

[t]he reason for this is that, as “Kant already said,” the existential “being” *being-real*, is not a real predicate of the object; it is not a “real moment in the chair” like its colour, its hardness, etc., and “this also holds” for the “being” in the sense of the copula.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> See Theodorou, *Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordiality, and the Categorial*, 206.

<sup>102</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 58; Ga 20, 78.

<sup>103</sup> McGrath remarks that “the categories embedded in the intentional structures of ordinary language are not merely psychological; they are ontological”. See McGrath, *The Early Heidegger and Medieval Philosophy*, 98.

<sup>104</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 57; Ga 20, 77.

<sup>105</sup> *Ivi*, 58; Ga 20, 77.

<sup>106</sup> Øverenget E., *Seeing the Self, Heidegger on subjectivity*, 55.

<sup>107</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 58; Ga 20, 77-78.

As in Husserl, *syncategoremata* are the devices of the presence of categories, which must be found within experience. As in Husserl, every part of the judgment is discovered in its syncategorematic articulation, so that every part of it indicates a categorial articulation. Heidegger makes it clear by stressing the role of copula and *being* that “chair” or “yellow” are being-chair and being-yellow. From this, Heidegger reveals the character of *being* as not that of a real predicate and that copula is not a simple conjunction within judgement<sup>108</sup>. As we see in section 2.2.1, not being a *real* predicate means not being an attribute of a *res*. Hence *being*, which as a copula belongs to the class of *syncategoremata*<sup>109</sup>, is not to be understood as an attribute of a *res*, but as a “structural moment”<sup>110</sup>, a “relational factor”<sup>111</sup>. By the analysis of the copula and *being*, Heidegger offers us the analysis of its non-attributive nature, an analysis that we can of course extend to all *syncategoremata*, but also to the nominal parts of language, showing how categories are not attributive functions. We have already stressed in Husserl the nature and the functioning of *syncategoremata* as those particles that have an *operative articulation* that always needs an integration. They are not attributes but articulation, so that, as in Husserl, categories, even if non-subjective as in an Aristotelian fashion, represent synthetic articulations that, as we read in Heidegger, pervade our experience, and emerge in our expression of it in our language<sup>112</sup>.

The articulative and relational nature of *syncategoremata* has already appeared *mutatis mutandis* in Heidegger’s reading of Scotus’ categories, whose function was to indicate and articulate into ordered relations the structure of reality. So that, as we will see, also for Heidegger we can take *syncategoremata* as the main device to indicate the presence of categorial articulation and as the paradigm to understand their nature and functioning.

However, the question of *syncategoremata* is intertwined with the question of language as the dimension in which categories emerge, so that language seems to have not only a revelatory role<sup>113</sup> but also to contribute to the identification of the categories that structure our experience. We have, in fact, to remember that experience is also the experience of an

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<sup>108</sup> See, Øverenget E., *Seeing the Self, Heidegger on subjectivity*, 50 ff.

<sup>109</sup> “The possibility of conceiving, in general, the verb “being” as a *syncategorema* –in both its copulative and existential function- seems more appropriate, in virtue of its co-significative function (...), of its non-predicative character, as Kant writes” (my translation). Chiurazzi, *Modalità e esistenza*, 40.

<sup>110</sup> Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*, 54; Ga 20, 72.

<sup>111</sup> Theodorou, *Husserl and Heidegger on Reduction, Primordiality, and the Categorial*, 231.

<sup>112</sup> *Ivi*, 259.

<sup>113</sup> See Gardini, *Filosofia dell’enunciazione*, 55. “Just as Heidegger overcomes the Husserlian intentionality with the concept of “disclosure”, he conceives judgment in a dynamic way, as a form of openness” (my translation). Tugendhat E., “L’idea heideggeriana di verità”, in Poggi S. and Tomasiello T. (eds.), *Martin Heidegger. Ontologia, Fenomenologia e Verità*, Zanichelli, Milano, 1995, 313-327, 318.

experiencing subject that expresses its experience. Language is the sign that we are not just a passive subject but that we participate as an experiencing entity, and via language we compose our experience.

In Heidegger, categories are intertwined with perception but also with language, in such a tight connection that the two dimensions seem to overlap, as Heidegger's two distinctive statements may suggest. However, I would like to maintain that we have to insert the median element of categories and to clarify the meaning of this relationship between perception and language. As in Husserl, I suggest understanding the nature of Heidegger's categories as hybrid and operative within the structured domain of our experience, in which we move in a structured world.

I did not want to argue that Heidegger's categories should be understood as a copy of Husserlian ones. I wanted to claim that categorial intuition in Husserl, despite Husserl's original intentions, is characterized by various oscillations that may be followed by, and lead to, Heidegger's interpretation of categorial intuition and categories. The two statements we have highlighted show Heidegger's distinctive interpretation of Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition. Considering categorial intuition as the main engine that operates within Heidegger's framing of categories, I have tried to mine Heidegger's interpretation in order to ascertain Heidegger's proper understanding of it. The two statements that represent the distinct character of his reading are two statements that concern the relationship between categories and perception, and between categories and language.

I have tried to read Heidegger's interpretation not just as the result of his linguistic - hermeneutical turn in phenomenology, nor by trying to subordinate the dimension of perception to that of language and interpretation. I have rather indicated that Heidegger's interpretation is the result of a strict stressing of those very oscillations we may register in Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition. We have seen that categories are not subjective, not predictive, that they pervade experience: they articulate our perception, so that the world in which we move shows itself to be in its turn articulated, an articulation that also depends on how we move and interpret our experience. Categories are both linked to perception and to language in a peculiar intertwined manner that we have to unpack following Heidegger's concrete examples of the functioning of categories in our factual experience.

#### 4.4 Examples of categories

In the chapter on Husserl, I have tried to point out that categories manifest a hybrid nature by highlighting their interconnection with the domain of self-structured reality and with the forms of language from which categories may be revealed. As I have already said, Heidegger, when it comes to qualifying his categories, oscillates between defining them variously as “structure” but also as “properties” or “concepts” (see Introduction). Reading Heidegger’s reading of Husserl’s categorial intuition, especially his two specific novelties, we may find that Heidegger’s understanding of categories offers us the basis for the idea that we may ascribe to Heidegger’s categories a hybrid nature that may be an answer to Heidegger’s oscillations when it comes to defining the nature of his categories. In Heidegger’s interpretation of categorial intuition, we have seen that his reading is mainly characterized by two statements that represent the two sides of categories – namely their relation with perception and their relation to language. We can recognize in Heidegger’s statements the double bottom-up and top-down perspectives (as we did for Husserl) with which we can elucidate the structure and nature of categories.

In order to find more hints about the functioning of categories in relation to their two sides following the path opened by Heidegger’s interpretation of categorial intuition, we can take into account those texts of early Heidegger in which, even if Heidegger does not explicitly mention the categories or categorial intuition, the terminology and the examples he employs are nonetheless very typical of, and echo the language and examples of phenomenology, especially of the *Sixth Logical Investigation*<sup>114</sup>.

I propose to consider those passages and examples in which Heidegger *suo modo* recalls the categorial intuition as signs that they are those places in which we can find categorial elements involved in Heidegger’s reflections and as those we should analyse in order to grasp further elements about the structure and nature of categories. In fact, in his analysis of the structure of experience and judgment Heidegger uses key examples to demonstrate how, on the one hand, our experience in the world is categorially articulated as well as the world itself and, on the other, how judgment is linked to that categorially structured experience.

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<sup>114</sup> See La Rocca, “La cattedra”, 257.

Thus, in the next sections, I will analyse the functioning of categories by focusing on two key examples, namely the example of our experience of the *lectern*, in *Towards the determination of philosophy*<sup>115</sup>, and that of the *picture* in *Being and Time*<sup>116</sup>. Both examples occur in texts in which categorial intuition is in the air. In fact, in his lectures about the structure of our experience in *Towards the Determination of Philosophy*, he mentions the notion of *hermeneutical intuition*<sup>117</sup>, a notion that echoes Husserl's categorial intuition, explaining it by using the example of the *lectern*, while the example of the *picture* in *Being and Time*<sup>118</sup> occurs in a section in which Heidegger refers (in a footnote) to the section on categorial intuition in *Logical Investigations*. In these two examples, we can appreciate the role of categories – even if not explicitly mentioned – and their operative functioning in the articulation of our experience. The former provides us with a bottom-up example: starting from the analysis of our concrete experience in the world, dispensing with a verbal formulation<sup>119</sup>, Heidegger proposes to analyse the perceptual experience of seeing a lectern. We will see how the movement of the example begins from the perceptual experience of the lectern, and continues, intersecting language. *Vice versa*, the example of the *picture* in *Being and Time* describes the experience of looking at a picture on the wall from a top-down perspective. In this context, Heidegger asks us to imagine someone whose back is turned to the wall saying, “[t]he picture on the wall is askew”<sup>120</sup>. Here the example starts from an assertion and moves to the direct actual experience of the *picture* as such, so that the categorial elements will be found moving from the dimension of language to that of perception. Both these examples do not mention any categorial account, but given their structure and their echoing of categorial intuition, I take them as representative of examples in which we may find the categories at work, revealing their operative functioning. In the next sections, I will analyse the first example that is presented in Heidegger's lectures of '19 in which Heidegger analyses how our everyday concrete experience is given in a self-structured context. Then, I will turn to the example of the *picture* and enrich it with

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<sup>115</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 58; Ga 56/57, 73.

<sup>116</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*; Ga 2, §44 a.

<sup>117</sup> Kisiel defines it a “hybrid notion”. See Kisiel T., “The Paradigm Shifts of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: From Breakthrough to the Meaning-Giving Source”, in *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual*, 4, 2014, 1-13, 9. Crowell considers the notion as an “amalgamation of phenomenological reflection and interpretation operating in unity”. See, Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths Toward Transcendental Phenomenology*, 134.

<sup>118</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*; Ga 2, §44.

<sup>119</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 56; Ga 56/57, 71.

<sup>120</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 259-260; Ga 2, 218.

Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of *logos* and judgment<sup>121</sup>, in which Heidegger shows that the propositional structure refers back to the context of our pre-predicative experience. I will focus on these examples – together with the reflections surrounding them – in order to indicate the operative role of categories, implicitly working in the articulation of our experience, and to understand their nature.

#### 4.4.1 Categories and facticity

Let us start by analysing the example of the *lectern* that Heidegger presents in his lecture of the winter semester of 1919<sup>122</sup>. Here, Heidegger investigates the original structure of our experience by analysing our concrete life, proposing what he will later call the *hermeneutic of facticity*<sup>123</sup>, in which we move in the environmental context of our everyday practical dealings.

The example of our perceptual experience of the *lectern* is quite long and conceptually dense<sup>124</sup>. This example exemplifies the functioning of what Heidegger labels “hermeneutical intuition” and furnishes us with several indications about the structure of our environmental experience, and every indication represents for our inquiry a hint to follow to signal how the categorial elements encounter our experience. To unpack the various aspects that the example shows, we can divide it into two parts. Following the bottom-up perspective, the first part concerns the relationship between our experience of the *lectern* and the world, and the second part conversely will bring our reflection to the question of whether this experience of the lectern intersects the dimension of conceptuality.

Let us start with the first issue.

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<sup>121</sup> Heidegger M., *Logic. The question of truth*, trans. Sheehan T., Indiana University Press, 2010; Ga 21, *Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, 1976.

<sup>122</sup> For Kisiel this lecture represents Heidegger “Hermeneutic Breakthrough”, see Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's “Being and Time”*, 18.

<sup>123</sup> The expression appears in Heidegger's text *Ontology*, in which he remarks that: the expression ‘hermeneutics’ “[...]is used here to indicate the unified manner of engaging, approaching, interrogating, and explicating facticity”, Heidegger, *Ontology*, 6; Ga 63, 9. In *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, Heidegger briefly mention the notion of a hermeneutic phenomenology, see Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 112; Ga 56/57, 131.

<sup>124</sup> For a further analysis of the example of the lectern see also, Sheehan T., *Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift*, Rowman and Littlefield, 2015, 118 ff.

#### 4.4.1.a Categories and sense data

In this lecture, Heidegger starts by criticizing the various forms of prejudices that animate metaphysics and the contemporary (for him) philosophical debate<sup>125</sup> about the nature of our original experience. In inquiring about how our experience is articulated and what we find in it, Heidegger tries to free our conception from some philosophical prejudices. Besides telling us that we do not find in our everyday experience something like an isolated *ego*<sup>126</sup>, as subjectivism claims, Heidegger mainly focuses on the criticism of those philosophical conceptions that recognized our original experience in terms of mere thinghood or sensory givens. Hence, in this lecture the key criticism is of what Heidegger calls “the theoretical” which, in order to find what we properly experience and perceive, reduces the complexity of our environmental world into mere *things* or hyletic sensory raw units conceived of as the ultimate primitive given data that compose what we experience. This theoretical attitude can be thought of as a version of the *Myth of the Given*<sup>127</sup>. The first lines of the example of the lectern are directly dedicated to contradicting this view. With the example of the lectern, Heidegger proposes that we start the analysis of our perceptual experience from a bottom-up perspective. Heidegger, dispensing with a verbal formulation of our experience of the lectern, asks us to focus on the perception of the lectern.

What do 'I' see? Brown surfaces, at right angles to one another? No, I see something else.  
A largish box with another smaller one set upon it? Not at all. I see the lectern at which  
I am to speak.<sup>128</sup>

In these first lines, Heidegger claims that what is given to our perception is the *lectern*.

Instead of recognizing the lectern as such, the theoretical approach starts from the lectern, following the series “box, brown colour, wood, thing”, and proceeds to theorize: “it is brown; brown is a colour; colour is a genuine sense datum”. Following this path, the theoretical attitude reaches what it thinks is immediately given without realizing that this notion of given is already a theoretical product, which derives from a distortion<sup>129</sup> of the nature of our environmental experience. In reaching this distorted result, Heidegger observes that the theoretical explanation methodologically employs a “fragmentation” and

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<sup>125</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*; Ga 56/57, § 2.

<sup>126</sup> *Ivi*, 55; Ga 56/57, 69.

<sup>127</sup> See also Courtine, *Reduction, Construction, Destruction. Of a three-way Dialogue: Natorp, Husserl, and Heidegger*, 3 (without reference).

<sup>128</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 56- 57; Ga 56/57, 71.

<sup>129</sup> *Ivi*, 86; Ga 56/57, 112.

“destruction” of the experience:

[t]he firm fixing as an experience is still only a rudiment of vital experience; it is a de-vivification [Ent-leben]. What is objectified, what is known, is as such re-moved [entfernt], lifted out of the actual experience.<sup>130</sup>

In this de-vivification, everything which appears within our experience is reduced to the empty homogenising notion of *thing*. Taking out of the environmental framework of our experience, the given gets “diluted to a mere thing with thingly qualities such as colour, hardness, spatiality, extension, weight, etc”<sup>131</sup>. The theoretical process is a process of objectification that converts the richness of the environment into a formal, empty, de-worlded thinghood. The process of de-vivification indicates that process of impoverishment<sup>132</sup> that reduces the multiplicity of the elements that composes the world into basic de-contextualised homogeneous units conceiving them as those primitive data that are immediately given in our experience. This theoretical process that Heidegger is pinpointing as a misleading picturing of our living experience, reiterates the metaphysics of *res*, either reducing what we encounter in terms of thinghood or of hyletic *aisthesis*. By bracketing their contextual worldly character, the thing is merely there as such, “i.e. it is real”, where “it exists”. Reality is therefore not an environmental characteristic but lies in the essence of thingliness<sup>133</sup>. In our everyday experience we do not encounter or perceive mere things or sensory data; in our concrete experience, we encounter particular and specific things such as the lectern, book, blackboard, notebook, fountain pen, caretaker, student fraternity, tram-car, motor-car, etc<sup>134</sup>, that do not consist just of mere empty *things*, or objects, but rather, we encounter them in our context of experience as *Besonderheiten*. We do not perceive general things.

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<sup>130</sup> *Ivi*, 59; Ga 56/57, 73-74.

<sup>131</sup> *Ivi*, 70; Ga 56/57, 89.

<sup>132</sup> Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"*, 46.

<sup>133</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 75; Ga 56/57, 89.

<sup>134</sup> *Ivi*, 58; Ga 56/57, 72.



#### 4.4.1.b Categories and context

In the first lines of the example of the lectern, we have seen how Heidegger's first concern was to free the understanding of our perceptual experience from the idea that this may be composed by mere *data*. When I see the lectern,

I see the lectern at which I am to speak. You see the lectern, from which you are to be addressed, and from where I have spoken to you previously. In pure experience there is no 'founding' interconnection, as if I first of all see intersecting brown surfaces, which then reveal themselves to me as a box, then as a desk, then as an academic lecturing desk, a lectern, so that I attach lectern-hood to the box like a label. All that is simply bad and misguided interpretation, diversion from a pure seeing into the experience. I see the lectern in one fell swoop, so to speak, and not in isolation, but as adjusted a bit too high for me. I see — and immediately so — a book lying upon it as annoying to me (a book, not a collection of layered pages with black marks strewn upon them), I see the lectern in an orientation, an illumination, a background.<sup>135</sup>

The experience of the lectern is not described in terms of mere hyletic data “I see it as such, I do not see sensations and sense data”<sup>136</sup>. When I directly see the lectern, I see the lectern “at which I am to speak”, “from which you are to be addressed” and “where from I have spoken”; I see the lectern within the relations – *at which, from which, from where* – that articulate it within the context of experience. I see the lectern in one blow (“one fell swoop”), and I see it not as a simple unarticulated thing but within the context of its relationships. What I see “in one blow”, which in Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition is indicating the modality in which we approach the object of the simple perception, is here related to what in Husserl belongs to the dimension of the categorial level (see section 3.6). I see the lectern “in one blow” – as it was for the access of the simple perception to its simple uncategorized object, but conversely, I do not see sensory *data*, or isolated *res* or *individuum*. Rather, I see the lectern within the various connections whose description directly recalls Husserl's description of the object of categorial intuition, when he claims that, thanks to categorial intuition, we do not just see, “‘his paper, an inkpot, several books’, and so on, but also ‘I see that the paper has been written on, that there is a bronze inkpot standing here, that several books are lying open’, and so on”<sup>137</sup>. Here, Heidegger is implicitly intertwining Husserl's terminology, taking the level of categorial intuition as the

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<sup>135</sup> *Ivi*, 57; Ga 56/57, 71.

<sup>136</sup> *Ivi*, 66; Ga 56/57, 85.

<sup>137</sup> Husserl, *Sixth Logical Investigation*, 271; Hua XIX /2, 128.

dimension in which we move and removing the level of simple intuition. In fact, Heidegger continues, recalling the founding relationship of matter-categories that we analysed in Husserl's doctrine, saying that: "[i]n pure experience there is no 'founding' interconnection"<sup>138</sup>. We do not see at first merely brown surfaces, "which then reveal themselves to me as a box, then as a desk, then as an academic lecturing desk, a lectern, so that I attach lectern-hood to the box like a label"<sup>139</sup>. There is no founding structure as in Husserl's categorial intuition, in which categories were founded articulations of the simple level of perception.

As we have said in section 4.3.3, in Heidegger the separate level of simple perception is not the starting base but is included within this kind of circumspective categorized perception which for Heidegger represents the structure of our original given experience. Our first encounter with the world should not be thought of in terms of simple perception; here it is presented as articulated perception in which relations are orientative of our practical everyday life.

In Heidegger's example of the lectern, we find our experience already categorized, namely already structured. By means of this example, we can now obtain the concrete demonstration of Heidegger's statement in *History of the Concept of Time*, that perception is already categorially pervaded. This perceptual example tells us that Heidegger is not deleting the status of perception in our primordial experience, but rather he is criticizing those conceptions that pose at the basis of our reality the hyletic data or the simple uncategorized intuition which are theoretical products obtained in a metaphysical isolation and do not respect the proper given structure of our experience.

Thus, this example shows us that perception is categorially structured, namely that our experience of the lectern is given as articulated within its context to us. We can detect the categorial elements in the articulation that the example expresses as *at which, from which, from where*. These syncategorematic expressions are the devices that hint at the categorial element, which we have to find within the context itself. Our environmental experience shows us, thanks to syncategorematic prepositional devices that categorial components are not subjectivist forms nor predicates of a *res*. Rather, they are located within our experience and within our context itself, representing those relations among beings that orientate our

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<sup>138</sup> For Overgaard this is the point from which Heidegger and Husserl take two different directions, see Overgaard, *Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World*, 181.

<sup>139</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 57; Ga 56/57, 71.

practical dealing and seeing. As the syncategoremata, the articulation syncategorematically expressed has an operative nature, it works in “integration” of the various things that it connects.

Starting from a bottom-up perspective looking for categorial elements implicitly operative in Heidegger’s understanding of experience, we have found as a first result that our perception and environmental experience are articulated – categorially articulated – and that these articulations are given as already operative in the context and expressed by syncategorematic formulas.

The articulation of experience is made possible because, as Sheehan says “there is a priori operative a context of lived experience that already ‘places’ things in relation to my needs and interests.”<sup>140</sup>

#### 4.4.2 *Es weltet*

The categorial dimension is given within the context of our experience that Heidegger “designates (...) by the technical term ‘world’”<sup>141</sup> — we can see that there is a self-structured reality, which is our environmental world of experience. We can now turn briefly to the self-structuring of the context, which Sheehan says, is the operative a priori that “places” our experience.

In the experience of seeing the lectern something is given *to me* from out of an immediate environment [*Umwelt*]. This environmental milieu [...] does not consist just of things, objects, which are then conceived as meaning this and this; rather, the meaningful is primary and immediately given to me without any mental detours across thing-oriented apprehension. Living in an environment, it signifies to me everywhere and always, everything has the character of world. It is everywhere the case that ‘it worlds’ [*es weltet*], which is something different from ‘it values’ [*es wertet*].<sup>142</sup>

Thus, the world – the environmental world or context – is not just a box that merely contains or places the things that we encounter in our living habitat, but rather it is a structured dimension that articulates our experience. The fact that we can see that the world possesses a categorial structure is here indicated by the expression *Es weltet*. This

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<sup>140</sup> Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, 119.

<sup>141</sup> *Ivi*, 118.

<sup>142</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 58; Ga 56/57, 73.

expression includes several critical allusions and innovative suggestions. *Es weltet* is an impersonal expression in which the noun “Welt” (“world”) is transformed into a verb – “*weltet*” (“worlds”)<sup>143</sup>. The proper structure of the impersonal<sup>144</sup> eludes the traditional form of the apophantic judgment “S is P”, so that “world” does not represent the predicative subject of the apophantic assertion to be defined by the attribution of its properties<sup>145</sup>. The meaning of the *es weltet* indicates that we cannot conceive of the world as an object, as a *res*. It indicates that the world “is not something given once and for all, static, closed”<sup>146</sup>, but it is something that is transforming and moving together with our experience, something that has a dynamic and *operative* character<sup>147</sup>. In our “environmental experience there is *no theoretical positing* at all. The 'it worlds' is not established theoretically, but is experienced as “worlding”<sup>148</sup>, namely, “it’s contextualizing, it’s articulating itself”<sup>149</sup>.

Furthermore, the expression *Es weltet* represents the specific stylistic reversal of the neo-Kantian expression *es wertet* (“it values”)<sup>150</sup> whose underlying principle Heidegger wants to overcome<sup>151</sup>. The neologism *Es weltet* does not simply play on the assonance with *es wertet*<sup>152</sup>, but it also represents a stylistic operation with a specific target. As already mentioned in section 1.3, the Neo-Kantian school of values, following Lotze’s doctrine of two worlds, in order to preserve the validity of knowledge as independent from the empirical condition of the world, distinguishes the absolute, universal and atemporal dimension of values from the inconstant contingent dimension of the empirical world. To indicate the difference between the two dimensions, the former, which concerns the dimension of values, categories, judgment and truth, is expressed by the expression *es wertet*, while the latter is indicated by the verb *Sein* (to be), so that the dimension of the mundane world does not “value” (*wertet*) but “is” (*ist*). By *es weltet*, therefore, Heidegger gives to the *world* the

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<sup>143</sup> For another interpretation of the expression *es weltet*, see Capobianco R., *Heidegger's Way of Being*, University of Toronto Press, 2014, 9.

<sup>144</sup> The importance of impersonal forms in early Heidegger has been noticed by Kisiel in *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"*, 24.

<sup>145</sup> See also Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"*, 162.

<sup>146</sup> Caputo A., *Pensiero e effettività. Heidegger e le Stimmungen 1889-1928*, F. Angeli, Milano, 2001, 108-109.

<sup>147</sup> “Life and world are two correlative and interdependent realities. Life is deeply related to its environmental world and the horizon of other individuals”. Escudero J. A., “Heidegger’s early Philosophical Program (About the lectures of 1919. The idea of philosophy and the problem of the conception of the world)”, Electronic ISSN: 2011-7477, Department of Humanities and Philosophy Universidad del Norte, Spain, 2009, 169.

<sup>148</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 73; Ga 56/57, 93-94.

<sup>149</sup> Kisiel, “The Paradigm Shifts of Hermeneutic Phenomenology”, 1.

<sup>150</sup> See also Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"*, 54.

<sup>151</sup> Caputo, *Pensiero e effettività. Heidegger e le Stimmungen 1889-1928*, 108-109.

<sup>152</sup> See also, Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"*, 197.

linguistic formula destined to the value-categorial dimension, performing a reversal: with *es weltet*, Heidegger is claiming that *Umwelt* is not just a simple frame, secondary for experience, but is the essential horizon and context for any experience: *Es weltet* denotes the world as a “certain ordered realm within which one stands in a certain orientation and directness”<sup>153</sup>. The *es weltet* suggests that the world is not just transient flux<sup>154</sup>, but it is provided with its own categorial framework, representing a self-structured domain. The element that suggests to us the categorial structure is to be found in the “*weltet*”. The verbal declination of *Welt* does not only indicate the intrinsic movement of the world, *weltet* is also the stylistic translation of the category. The verb *weltet*, which is not a predicate, thanks to the suffix – “et”, indicates the categories. Once again, a syncategorematic particle (the suffix) indicates the articulation. The verbification gives a temporal tone to the categorial of the world, which is not a mere predicate or a subject’s projection, but an open structured dimension that manifests itself in time and space, as an articulated dynamic operative domain.

From this first part of the example, we see that categorial articulation intersects our perceptual experience, which is never a simple sensuous perception that sees things as mere things but is always already ambivalent and articulated. The articulations are indicated by syncategorematic expressions that signal the categorial elements thanks to which we can have a direction and orientation in the domain of our experience. For this first part, we can appreciate that categorial articulations are not subjective projections but are embedded in the structure of the world, which in its turn shows itself to be a self-articulated dimension. As in Husserl, categories are articulations and relations of the self-structured reality, to be found with the experienced world. However, compared to Husserl here the expression *es weltet* indicates that the categorial articulation evolves in time, thereby adding the temporal factor to the categorial function.

We can see in the example of the lectern a bottom-up perspective on the functioning of the categories in action, and we can comment on the first of Heidegger’s statements. In this first part, we see that categories intersect perception and how they are embedded in the world; the level of pure perception and materiality is not denied, rather it is embraced and implicit in the categorially structured perceptual experience.

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<sup>153</sup> Malpas J., *Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2006, 55.

<sup>154</sup> “[T]his implies that the pre-predicative experience is not an unarticulated chaos waiting to get its sense and order from judgement”, (my translation). Costa, *La verità del mondo*, 58.

In the second part of the example we will see how from this basis we should add more details. We will see that our experience is not perceptual in the traditional meaning, but it is fraught with meaning. This characterization will hint at language and the conceptual dimension, reminding us that experience is also the experience of an experiencing subject.

#### **4.4.3 The second part of the example**

In the first part of the example, we have seen how categories cross the dimension of perception. We have seen that the categorial element should be found in the articulation, syncategorematically expressed, that runs through the dimension of the context, which shows itself to be a self-structured dimension. However, the example of the lectern continues.

Certainly, you will say, that might be what happens in immediate experience, for me and in a certain way also for you, for you also see this complex of wooden boards as a lectern. This object, which all of us here perceive, somehow has the specific meaning 'lectern'.<sup>155</sup>

The lectern appears in a structuring context, which is also a meaning-giving context<sup>156</sup>, in which we see the lectern *as* a lectern. In this second part of the example, we see how the structure of context is characterized by meaningfulness and the “as-structure”. Following the bottom-up procedure, we are reaching the problem of the connection between the categorial articulation – which given in the context pervades our perception – and meaning (*Bedeutung*).

#### **4.4.3.a Meaning in the world**

My perception of the lectern is not a composition of mere sensory data but I perceived the lectern as such as something meaningful, whose specific meaning is to be a lectern. Categories at work in the structure of context do not merely articulate a spatial context but

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<sup>155</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 60; Ga 56/57, 71. Here the translator translates ‘*Bedeutung*’ with ‘meaning’.

<sup>156</sup> Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, 119.

a context of meaningfulness (*Bedeutsamkeitszusammenhänge*)<sup>157</sup>. The notion of “meaning” (*Bedeutung*) as something rooted in the structure of the context and that pervades our experience does not represent a mere linguistic issue – as Lafont claims – but is a more “plastic” notion. Before focusing on the role of meaning in the example of the lectern and on its role with regard to categories, we should recall that, in Heidegger, we find both the notions of *Sinn* and *Bedeutung*, that in English are translated with various combinations. Rarely we find, “*Sinn*” as “sense”<sup>158</sup> and more frequently, they are both translated with “meaning” – and *Bedeutsamkeit* with “meaningful”<sup>159</sup> (which I will follow) – contributing further difficulties in following the problem of meaning of “meaning” (whether *Sinn* or *Bedeutung*) and its nature<sup>160</sup>.

First of all, meaning as *Sinn* (the notion that we find in the “question of the meaning (*Sinn*) of Being) is defined by Heidegger as what “first makes it possible for entities as such to manifest themselves”<sup>161</sup>. Carman, while asking what Heidegger mean by “meaning”, states that this should be understood “not as linguistic meaning but intelligibility more broadly construed: “Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself. That which is articulable in an understanding disclosure we call ‘meaning’ . . . *Meaning is that . . . in terms of which something as something is intelligible*”<sup>162</sup>. In these passages, meaning as *Sinn* does not seem to suggest to have a mere linguistic content, but the as a prelinguistic condition<sup>163</sup> that makes our experience having a meaning, but also a sense –

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<sup>157</sup> See Heidegger M., *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology Winter Semester 1919/1920*, trans. Campbell S. C., London, Bloomsbury Academic, 2013; Ga 58, *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1919/20)*, ed. Hans-Helmuth Gander, Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1993.

<sup>158</sup> Findlay translates “*Sinn*” as “sense” and “*Bedeutung*” as “meaning”.

<sup>159</sup> See for example Kisiel, *The Genesis of “Being and Time”*, and Lafont, *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*.

<sup>160</sup> Macquarrie and Robinson translate “*Sinn*” with “meaning” and “*Bedeutung*” with “signification”. Sometimes, we find, as for example in Pippin R., “Necessary Conditions for the Possibility of What isn’t. Heidegger on Failed Meaning”, in Crowell S. and Malpas J. (eds.), *Transcendental Heidegger* Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2007, 199-214, “*Sinn*” as “meaning” and “*Bedeutung*” with “significance” (similarly does MacAvoy in “Meaning, categories, subjectivity in the early Heidegger”). However, it is also possible to read in Parvis E., “Reference, Sign, and Language: Being and Time, Section 17”, in Sallis J., et al. (eds.), *Collegium Phaenomenologicum. The First Ten Years*, Kluwer: Dordrecht, 1998, 175-190, “*Bedeutung*” as “meaning” and “*Bedeutsamkeit*” with “significance”.

<sup>161</sup> Heidegger, *Pathmarks*, 158; Ga 9, 155. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger says: “if we say that entities ‘have meaning’, this signifies that they have become accessible in their being”. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 371; Ga 2, 324.

<sup>162</sup> Carman T., “The Question of Being” in Wrathall M. (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to “Being and Time.”*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 84-99, 85 quoting Heidegger, *Being and Time*; Ga 2, 15.

<sup>163</sup> In his book, Crowell study the notion of meaning (*Sinn*), claiming that “what has distinguished philosophy in the twentieth century is not that it has concerned itself with language, but that, whether through the prism of language or not, it has concerned itself with *meaning*”. Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, 3.

an ordering and direction. Similarly, the notion of meaning (*Bedeutung*) and meaningfulness (*Bedeutsamkeit*) – which I will consider – do not seem to belong exclusively to language. Chiurazzi holds, referring to what Heidegger says in *Being and Time*<sup>164</sup>, that “meaning (*Bedeutung*) and meaningfulness precedes the word”<sup>165</sup> and that “interpretation” occurs also without words<sup>166</sup>. In early Heidegger meaning (*Bedeutung*) is variously analysed and represents one of the main topic of his lectures<sup>167</sup>. In one of those, he states that

[m]eaningfulness is a categorial determination of the world; the objects of a world—“worldly” or “world-some” objects—are lived inasmuch as they embody the character of meaningfulness.<sup>168</sup>

The articulation of the context, shows itself as a particular configuration of meaning – a context of meaning (*Bedeutsamkeit*) and meaningful involvements (*Bewandtnis*)<sup>169</sup>, that makes possible the fact that the lectern may emerge as such and not as a mere neutral thing. In this passage, Heidegger is donating to the notion of meaning a worldly character rather than linguistic. Heidegger variously stresses the intimate pre-predicative nature of meaningfulness as the structure of world and context.

The lived world is present not as a thing or object, but as meaningfulness.<sup>170</sup>

We have now identified the basic character of encountering the world: meaningfulness.<sup>171</sup>

We identify meaningfulness as the world’s primary ontological characteristic.<sup>172</sup>

[...] the primary character of encountering the world—meaningfulness.<sup>173</sup>

The fact that meaning is related to context may be appreciated if we consider that when we de-contextualize the lectern and take it as a mere thing, it loses its meaning<sup>174</sup>. Hence, meaning is not only related to context but is also what specifies the peculiarity of a lectern

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<sup>164</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 120; Ga 2, 87.

<sup>165</sup> Chiurazzi G., *Hegel, Heidegger e la grammatica dell’essere*, Laterza, Roma, 1996, 73.

<sup>166</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 199-200; Ga 2, 157.

<sup>167</sup> Especially in Heidegger, Ga 58, Ga 59 and Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*; Ga 61.

<sup>168</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, 90; Ga 61, 68.

<sup>169</sup> Malpas, *Heidegger’s Topology: Being, Place, World*, 55. With reference to *Welt weltet*, Sheehan says: “When Heidegger says that ‘the world worlds’ (*die Welt weltet*), he means that the world allows for the meaning of whatever is found in it”. Sheehan T., “The Turn”, in Davis B.W. (ed.), *Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts*, Durham, Acumen Publishing, 2009, 82-101, 98.

<sup>170</sup> Heidegger, *The Concept of Time*, 65; Ga 64, 55.

<sup>171</sup> *Ivi*, 23; Ga 64, 17.

<sup>172</sup> *Ivi*, 24; Ga 64, 17.

<sup>173</sup> *Ivi*, 25; Ga 64, 19.

<sup>174</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 70; Ga 56/57, 89.



as such, while the theoretical approach would take it under the homogenising category of thinghood.

You should put aside all theorizing and reject what epistemologists say about the matter. Instead, see the sense in which factual experience ever and anew has what it experiences in the character of meaningfulness. Even the most trivial thing is meaningful (even though it remains trivial nonetheless). Even what is most lacking in value is meaningful.<sup>175</sup>

The simple neutral datum to be subsumed under a general cataloguing, never presents itself<sup>176</sup>. Thanks to the meaningfulness of context, I see the lectern not as a general thing but as *this* specific lectern<sup>177</sup>. “The ‘objective’ comes forth in the meaning-context of one’s factual life-situation”<sup>178</sup>. In our factual life, we do not encounter general *res* but *Besonderheiten*, and meaning (*Bedeutung*) always refers to the meaning of a *particular thing*<sup>179</sup>.

The character of the being-there of this world can be terminologically designated as meaningfulness (*Bedeutsamkeit*). “Meaningful” means: being, being-there, in the mode of a signifying which is being encountered in a definite manner.<sup>180</sup>

As Keller highlights, while Heidegger agrees with Husserl that meaning is to be understood in terms of the way that things are given to us, “he rejects Husserl’s thesis that we can analyse those meanings in abstraction from the actual “real” environment and social context in which we understand them the way we do”<sup>181</sup>. The structure of the world can be orientative because its relational articulation is one in which things emerge as meaningful, so that meaning is also an ordering<sup>182</sup> “telic vector of sense”<sup>183</sup>.

We have to observe that, for Heidegger, meaning cannot be equated only with linguistic meaning (as Lafont claims), even if the notion of meaning (*Bedeutung*) may recall the dimension of language and conceptuality which I believe, despite Heidegger’s claims (or

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<sup>175</sup> Heidegger, *Ga* 58, 83.

<sup>176</sup> La Rocca, “La cattedra”, 259.

<sup>177</sup> “Meaningfulness [is] the reality character of factic life”, Heidegger, *Ga* 58, 83.

<sup>178</sup> *Ivi*, 89.

<sup>179</sup> Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, xviii.

<sup>180</sup> Heidegger, *Ontology*, 74; *Ga* 63, 96.

<sup>181</sup> Keller, *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience*, 114. This corresponds to a general attitude that Keller remarks: Heidegger “rejects the endeavour to elicit the structures of intentionality in abstraction from the environment or world in which human beings exist. The nature of intentionality cannot be understood by abstracting from the existence of the very objects to which consciousness is directed in intentionality. This is why Heidegger comes to argue that intentionality is based on transcendence”. Keller, *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience*, 116.

<sup>182</sup> Gardini, *Filosofia dell’enunciazione*, 61.

<sup>183</sup> Kisiel, “The Paradigm Shifts of Hermeneutic Phenomenology”, 7.

Carman, Chiurazzi, or Kisiel's – see next section), is still linked to it.

#### 4.4.3.b The implicit character of meaning

Kisiel has remarked that the meaningful context operates only tacitly, implicitly as the background of human experience<sup>184</sup>. In everyday life, meaningfulness mostly remains implicit and need not be thematically expressed. In one's daily life "[m]eaningfulness as such is not explicitly experienced, even though it can be experienced"<sup>185</sup>. In line with this, Kisiel holds that the basic task of a hermeneutic phenomenology, is the phenomenological re-duction to the tacit level of meaningfulness. In the tacit pre-predicative dimension<sup>186</sup>, meanings are not immediately given and available for phenomenological examination, since they operate only tacitly and implicitly as the background of human experience. "Meaningfulness is not experienced as such, expressly and explicitly" and so must be explicated out of its precedent latency so that "we can then first fully understand what it 'is' and means to live factually 'in' meaningfulness"<sup>187</sup>. In order to move within the tacitly meaningful context, we need to have a familiarity with its structure. We see the lectern as such because we are familiar with it. We still perceive the lectern as such even with the dispensing of verbal inference, because our environmental context conserves as cemented the familiarity we live in (since our experience in the world is also an experience in the *Mit-Welt*, see section 1.3). As Golob briefly summarises, "to intend an entity one must locate it within a meaningful context. This requires a prior familiarity with that context"<sup>188</sup>. This familiarity and our Being-in-the-world-of-meaningfulness (as *In-der-Bedeutsamkeit-sein*) "is what makes possible the existential-personal aheadness-and-return of our everyday activities. In practical matters, for example, we understand this-thing-here in terms of the purpose we have already projected, and we do so within a world of meaningfulness that shapes our understanding of things"<sup>189</sup>.

Now we have seen that the articulation of our experience takes place in a meaningful

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<sup>184</sup> *Ivi*, 2.

<sup>185</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, 93; Ga 61, 70.

<sup>186</sup> Kisiel, "The Paradigm Shifts of Hermeneutic Phenomenology", 7.

<sup>187</sup> Heidegger, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, 93; Ga 61, 70.

<sup>188</sup> Golob S, *Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, 90.

<sup>189</sup> Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, 146.

context with which we are familiar. We have seen that meaning does not indicate something solely linguistic but is implicitly embedded in the articulation of context<sup>190</sup>. This implicit character indicates that to see the lectern as such we do not need to “thematize” it as a *res* or to use propositional tools to recognize it. We recognize it not through a reductive, abstractive or demarcating process, but rather we see it within the environmental context, thanks to the familiar relationship we have with it.

Meaning and familiarity can be considered here as key notions to understand the implicit ordering of experience<sup>191</sup>. However, they both hint at the side of the experiencing subjectivity. The world is structured according to meaningfulness [*Bedeutsamkeit*] which itself is the totality of signifying relations with which Dasein is familiar<sup>192</sup>. This familiarity consists in an understanding of how things are interconnected such that the world hangs together in a meaningful way as a whole<sup>193</sup>. Paraphrasing Lohmar’s analysis of the phenomenology of *habits* in Husserl, familiarity sometimes appears to be quite conservative and inflexible because it adjusts only very slowly to changing circumstances<sup>194</sup>. However, we also have to note that “the conservatism” of familiarity is only one side of the coin<sup>195</sup>. It can change in the further course of experience within the temporal articulation of context. Even if, from a bottom-up perspective we see how in Heidegger categories are within experience and within the structured world, through the notion of meaning and familiarity, we see how this experience, as in Husserl, has to be conceived in its double meaning. The categorial articulation of context is also an articulation in which we participate. Familiarity indicates that subjectivity contributes to the categorial articulation of experience; at the same time, it suggests to us that this subjectivity is not the individualistic *ego* or creative spontaneity, but that some kind of subjectivity which we have already glimpsed in the notion of *registration* while analysing Husserl’s categorial intuition.

However, in the dimension of familiarity, habits and everyday practical dealings (our

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<sup>190</sup> As Shirley remarks, “hermeneutics locates meaning fundamentally neither in a ‘phenomenological immanence’ nor a ‘transcendental consciousness’ but in the world itself, conceived anew”, Shirley G., *Heidegger and Logic: The Place of Lógos in Being and Time*, Continuum, 2010, 13.

<sup>191</sup> As Shirley summarizes, “Dasein is characterized by an understanding of being as an implicit familiarity with the possibilities of the world, where the world is the unified meaning structure and overall context in which entities intelligibly show themselves.” Shirley, *Heidegger and Logic*, 6.

<sup>192</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 120; *Ga 2*, 87.

<sup>193</sup> MacAvoy, “Meaning, categories and subjectivity in the early Heidegger”, 24.

<sup>194</sup> Lohmar D, “Types and Habits. Habits and their cognitive background in Hume and Husserl”, in *Phenomenology and Mind*, IUSS Press, n 6, 2014, 40-51, 43.

<sup>195</sup> *Ibidem*.

facticity), we are not mute. This dimension is neither a-linguistic or a-conceptual<sup>196</sup> nor characterized, on the other hand – even if not a-linguistic – by the traditional form of judgement<sup>197</sup>, but rather by communication (see section 4.4.4.a) which represents another model of language (section 4.4.4.b). As we may see, we are slowly shifting the articulation of the experience of the world to the side of subjectivity. Now we shall see how categorial articulations intersect the conceptual dimension, revealing themselves to be the median hybrid element that connects the two dimensions of world and language.

### 4.4.3.c The as-structure

The articulation of meaning is represented by the “as”. I see the lectern *as* a lectern. The *as*<sup>198</sup> represents the structural moment of meaning that, as we have said, characterizes the structure of our context of experience in which we have to find categories as operative relational articulations.

Here we see that we see the lectern *as* a lectern. Thus, the *as*, since it represents the articulation of meaning within context, represents the categorial moment; once again, it is a syncategorematic particle. Compared to the other syncategorematically expressed categorial moments, which indicate the structure of the world in which we orientate (*from which, at which, from where*) and the self-structuring of context (*es weltet*), the *as*, I shall claim, is the device of that categorial structure that connects the structure of our perception to the dimension of language.

The *as*, as a *syncategorema*, operates and articulates when in the presence of what it does articulate. The *as* operates in combination with our understanding of the lectern as such. Furthermore, we may say that the articulation of the lectern as a lectern emerges when the particle *as*- operates in combination with the concept of the lectern. Properly speaking, we

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<sup>196</sup> Pace Dreyfus, who typically reads Heidegger’s the primary dimension of Dasein’s experience – namely the dimension of practical dealings, habits, everyday coping – as a “nonconceptual, nonpropositional, nonrational and nonlinguistic” dimension. Dreyfus H., “The Return of the Myth of the Mental”, in *Inquiry*, 50, 2007, 352-365, 352.

<sup>197</sup> Fultern, analysing the notion of language, criticised Brandom’s insistence on the primacy of form of judgement, that he ascribes also to Heidegger’s understanding of language and Dasein in Brandom R., “Dasein, the Being that Thematises”, in Brandom, *Tale of the Mighty Dead*. “Human beings are essentially beings that talk – not, pace Brandom, beings that assert”. Fultner B., “Pragmatic-Existential Theory of Language and Assertion”, in Wrathall M., *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger’s “Being and Time”*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, 201-222, 216.

<sup>198</sup> Carman states that the ‘as’ is the “deep central concern of Heidegger’s argument in *Being and Time*”, Carman, *Heidegger’s Analytic*, 21.

do not perceive *the* lectern, we do perceive the lectern *as* lectern. We see something as-a-lectern (as that non-general this-and-that which we discussed in the section on *ens* and *unum transcendens* – section 4.2.2). I might claim that, here, we see from a bottom-up perspective what we could appreciate in the analysis of judgement of categorial intuition, namely the discovery of the syncategorematic articulation i.e. of being-a chair, revealing how every part of our language implies an inner categorial articulation. In our analysis of Husserl's categorial intuition, we had already seen the notion of *as*- related to the question of categories, stressing how the “as”, which indicates the categorial moment, shows to be strictly connected to language and conceptuality. This could be appreciated in the passage in which Husserl states that “we do not merely say ‘I see this paper, an inkpot, several books’, and so on, but also ‘I see that the paper has been written on, that there is a bronze inkpot standing here, that several books are lying open’, and so on.”. This passage, which we already mentioned in order to understand the first part of the example of the lectern, is usually employed to show the difference between simple seeing and categorial seeing – between seeing *as* and seeing *that* (section 3.6.5.i). However, in this Husserlian passage, we detect some problems in maintaining the difference between simple seeing and categorial seeing, since they both appeared to need language in order to be fully grasped. The difference between when I say that I see this paper, and when I say that I see that the paper has been written on, seems a difference at the level of definitions, but actually they are both forms of seeing that are expressed and articulated in language. However, when we see-as we complete the *as*-structure with language (I see this as paper), and we need the expression of our experience to indicate our seeing-as. The structure of seeing-as, while placed within pre-predicative experience, still entails conceptuality<sup>199</sup>.

We have already said that the distinction between a simple and categorial intuition in Husserl is not very sharp, while in Heidegger it is rejected. Accordingly, in Heidegger we do not find Husserl's wish to maintain the difference between a simple seeing-as and the categorially expressed seeing-that. It seems rather that the *as* in Heidegger which appears in the example of the lectern, and therefore in a categorially articulated dimension, has the same features which we highlighted in Husserl's oscillations about this very notion.

In the example of the lectern, we see the actualized re-location of categories within experience. On the one hand, we see that the context of our experience is a structured

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<sup>199</sup> “But what exactly does it mean to see something ‘as’ something? One way to motivate the problem is this: how does seeing the object in front of me ‘as a table’ differ from seeing that it is a table?”. See Golob, Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity, 73.

domain, whose articulations orientate it; moreover, we move in the context because it is for us familiar and meaningful<sup>200</sup>. By this feature, Heidegger is slowly inserting the sign of our contribution to the structuring of context. The categorial device of this interplay between the experienced world and the experiencing subjectivity is indicated by the *as*. The *as*- (or also *as*-structure), which we can take as a categorial articulation, does not operate by disposing our orientation in the context as the other components we have found within the context of our experience do, but it does so by combining itself with the meaning that can emerge when it is conceptually expressed.

In the “*as*-structure” (*Als-Struktur*), namely “the structure of something as something”<sup>201</sup>, “[t]he ‘*as*’ makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is understood. It constitutes the interpretation”<sup>202</sup>. The interpreting of something as something, or the making explicit of something that is understood<sup>203</sup>. In fact, our being-in-the-world is not merely passive, since our “being in the world is nothing other than this already-operating-with-understanding”<sup>204</sup>.

The *as*-structure as categorial structure is partially dependent on how things present themselves, but it has also a conceptual nature (I will discuss this in more detail in section 4.4.4.b). Since seeing-as always has a conceptual characterisation to apply to the thing, the *as* is derived or even obtained from language and our use of it. I see things as-; after the *as* we can *potentially* put any concept we gain from language (that *via* habits we find appropriate to). In other words, to see a lectern as a lectern, if this particular thing has to emerge from the context to which it belongs, means that we are familiar with it and we understand the lectern as such, or better, that we interpret and express the lectern as such.

#### 4.4.3.d Context and concepts

The proper connection of the *as*-structure, as the articulation of meaning, to how

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<sup>200</sup> Sheehan describes the structured meaningful context (world) as a “dynamic matrix of relations that orientates things to human purpose” which “enables things to be significant”. Sheehan T., “Dasein”, in Dreyfus H. and Wrathall M. (eds.) *A Companion to Heidegger*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2011.

<sup>201</sup> Heidegger, *Being and time*, 189; Ga 2, 149.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>203</sup> Leung K., “Heidegger’s concept of fore-structure and textual interpretation”, *Phainomena, Diapositiva*. *Phainomena*, November 2011, 23-40, 26.

<sup>204</sup> Heidegger, *Logic*, 123; Ga 21, 144.

subjectivity may conceive its experience involving some level of conceptuality, can be seen in the following lines that conclude the example of the lectern.

It is different if a farmer from deep in the Black Forest is led into the lecture-room. Does he see the lectern, or does he see a box, an arrangement of boards? He sees 'the place for the teacher', he sees the object as fraught with meaning. If someone saw a box, then he would not be seeing a piece of wood, a thing, a natural object. But consider a Negro from Senegal suddenly transplanted here from his hut. What he would see, gazing at this object, is difficult to say precisely: perhaps something to do with magic, or something behind which one could find good protection against arrows and flying stones. Or would he not know what to make of it at all, just seeing complexes of colours and surfaces, simply a thing, a something which simply is? So, my seeing and that of a Senegal Negro are fundamentally different. All they have in common is that in both cases something is seen.<sup>205</sup>

In this second part of the example, we see that our perceptions are not only invested with a meaning, but they are already interpreted. As we have said (see section 4.3.4), in Heidegger's second statement these two dimensions seem to overlap, and language appears to have a heavy primacy to the point of risking falling into some sort of linguistic idealism. Here we can appreciate the engine that should be seen as implicit in Heidegger's second statement, observing the categorial framework that we can insert within the relationship between perception and expression. Going back to the example, this relationship is made possible by the structure of the *as* which articulates our meaningful experience by attaching the difference kinds of concepts that we can have of something, in respect to the given categorially structured context in which we move and are familiar with. The *as*-structure, in connection with this last part of the example, renders clearer the fact that we do not see *the* lectern but *as-the* lectern. While for students the lectern is a lectern, for a farmer it is a table, we cannot properly see this difference of meaning without expressing the different seeing-*as*, without gathering the structures of context and the familiarity we have with it and making them emerge in the concept *of-*. However, the *as*, as the particle that makes possible this emerging<sup>206</sup>, warns us that this kind of conceptuality is not abstract from the context, but bound to it (see also section 4.4.4.b); at the same time it indicates, in accord with the temporal and open structure of the context (*es weltet*), that it is not given once and for all, but may change it accordance with the connection to the structuring of experience in its

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<sup>205</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 57; Ga 56/57, 71-72.

<sup>206</sup> Heidegger M., *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*, trans. McNeill W. and Walker N., Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1995, 333; Ga 29/30, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt, Endlichkeit, Einsamkeit*, ed. von Herrmann F.W, Frankfurt, Vittorio Klostermann, 1983, 484.

double meaning. The *as* does not determine in the *predicationist* way; it does not isolate the lectern to indicate its absolute definitional meaning to be translated into apophantic judgment. Moreover, here we do not see the articulation of our experience in terms of judgements or propositions, but rather the conceptuality articulated by the *as-* is not the predications-thematised-isolated conceptuality.

We do not meet things by taking on board dumb sense data; rather, we always encounter things *as* something or other, even if (as in the example above) it is as something we cannot figure out. If the simple perception identifies homogeneous units of data, the *as*-structure leads us to the differentiation of experience. In fact, the *as-* indicates that we encounter a *modus*, we encounter a *what* in its *how*. The syncategorematic of the *as-* also indicates the articulation of the context, but this time in connection with the dimension of conceptuality. The *as*-structure, as a syncategorematic structure, is operative and needs integration; the specific integration that the *as* is waiting for is given by a conceptuality that varies and that is the sign of the contribution of subjectivity, a subjectivity which is neither merely passive nor explicitly active *à la* Kant.

The *as*-structure, noticed in this bottom-up example, already leads us towards the domain of conceptuality – a conceptuality expressed here by empirical concepts in connection with the particularities that emerge from the context. However, even if the *as* is hinting at a conceptual domain, it does not determine in the traditional predicative way, nor is it yet linked to the level of apophantic judgement and proposition<sup>207</sup>.

This peculiar nature and functioning of the *as*-structure may also be seen by looking at another feature of the example: we do not understand the proper functioning of the *as-* since we do not repeat the same experience in different modalities. The example of the various possibilities we may have for seeing the lectern, shows how the syncategorematic structure of context, as well as the *as-structure*, is connected to the structure of what-how and conceptuality<sup>208</sup>. By the process of repetition, we grasp the open, temporal, differentiating categorial structures of our experience in the context, and how categories actually work in their operation. In other words, the experience of the meaning of something *as* something is bound to the different meanings given in different contexts and shows us that the

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<sup>207</sup> Carman calls this the “assertoric paradigm”: the attempt to model all meaning on assertions. See Carman, *Heidegger’s Analytic*, 216; *cfr.* Golob, *Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity*, 105.

<sup>208</sup> Heidegger tries “through the different kind of ‘subjective’ and cultural approach to identify a formal universal structure”. (my translation), La Rocca, “La cattedra”, 257.



conceptuality entailed by the categorial structure of our experience is not the one grasped in a decontextualized isolation, nor dependent on the experience of *res*.

In the example of the lectern, we find what Heidegger calls *hermeneutic intuition*; in a synthetic sense, the hermeneutic intuition shows us the structure of our living experience - as it is given to us without any theoretical *detour* – prior to any deworlding process. By the process of hermeneutic intuition, we have discovered that categories located in our experience connect in their articulations world and subjectivity, world and language.

Regarding the latter, Heidegger states, commenting on the hermeneutic intuition, that

linguistic expression, does not need to be theoretical or even object-specific, but is primordially living and experiential, whether pre-worldly or worldly.<sup>209</sup>

Moreover,

[w]hat is essential about the pre-worldly and worldly signifying functions is that they express the characters of the appropriating event, i.e. they go together (experiencing and experiencing experienced) with experience itself, they live in life itself and, going along with life, they are at once originating and carry their provenance in themselves. They are at once preceptive and retroceptive, i.e. they express life in its motivated tendency or tending motivation.<sup>210</sup>

The tacit meaningfulness and the expressed conceptuality articulated by the *as-* are to be found in experience, since, “[u]niversality of word meanings primarily indicates something originary: worldliness of experienced experiencing”<sup>211</sup>. We saw that the example of the lectern gives us many indications about the structuring of our perceptual experience within a context. The example of the lectern is the concrete demonstration, from a bottom-up perspective, of Heidegger’s statement that our perceptions are already categorially structured. In the example of the lectern, we have seen at work Heidegger’s categorial intuition in terms of *hermeneutical intuition* in which we find clues for the understanding of the nature of categories. They are operative, they are in the context expressed by syncategorematic forms, they are relational and linked to the particularities we encounter in our concrete life.

In the first part of the example, we have detected the categorial element within the relational structure of context. We have seen that the lectern is given in an articulated context, so that our perception does not offer mere data or simple *res* as Husserl’s simple

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<sup>209</sup> Heidegger, *Towards the Definition of Philosophy*, 89; Ga 56/57, 117.

<sup>210</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibidem*.

seeing would do, but is already categorially structured, namely everything is given within its relational articulation syncategorematically experienced. Our perceptual experience is given to us as already categorial while implying the level of simple material perception. Categories are not subjective projections, but rather they are given within the context which reveals itself to be a self-structured reality, open, temporal and in motion; as prescribed by categorial intuition, categories are given within experience. We do have access and contribute as subjectivity to this categorially structured operative reality thanks to the fact that the context is always a meaningful and familiar context. Meaning and familiarity find their articulation in the syncategorematic particle *as*, which I maintain should be considered as a categorial articulation which, like the hybrid categories in the categorial intuition, connects our experience in and of the world to the forms of subjectivity, which we can recognize in the elements of language and conceptuality.

In the second part of the example, we shift to the problematic notion of *as*- as a structure that again is not to be found in our intellect but in our experience. The *as* is another syncategorematic particle provided by the context; it is a categorial articulation context-dependent. But, at the same time, it seems linked to the conceptuality that in turn contributes to identifying the *as*-structure. As *syncategoremata*, the *as* also functions properly in connection *with* different meanings. It operates, without an isolation of the datum, in conjunction with those conceptually expressed forms which correspond to a certain understanding and interpretation that we may have of a given particular thing. Since context is evolving, so conceptuality is not given once and for all; it is not to be found on the predicationist level of *apophasis*, but instead as articulated within the context according to which it may change<sup>212</sup>. We can appreciate that the second part of the example hints at the dimension of language and conceptuality, giving us some clues about the strict relation instituted by Heidegger between perception and expression. We find that the categorial apparatus within the context is linked to both world and conceptuality. Therefore, categories located in the experience are the median element that connects these two different dimensions.

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<sup>212</sup> “In doing so we make sense of the thing—or, in traditional language, we ‘understand its being’. But why do we need such a prior openness in order to make sense of something? Making sense of something is a matter of synthesizing it with a possible meaning: ‘Socrates is a Theban’—no, wait: *that* possible meaning is wrong. So we might try another possible meaning: ‘Socrates is an Athenian’”. Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, 58.

#### 4.4.4 Categories and language

As we have said (section 3.6.5.b), in Husserl the bottom-up procedure proceeds from the material level of simple intuition, through categorial intuition, to their explicit expression within the forms of judgement. We shall now turn to the relationship between language and categories. We have seen that in his interpretation of categorial intuition, Heidegger had claimed that our perceptions are already expressed and that we see what we say rather than the opposite. We have seen that this statement might lead us to analyse the relation between categories and language, as well as the fact that the *as*-structure of the perceptual experience in the example of the lectern makes us reflect upon the relationship between the structure of our experience in context and some sort of conceptuality. I propose that when Heidegger holds that *we say what we see*, we can see in it the movement of the top-down procedure of the identification of categories. In Husserl, the judgment was the access to the categorial elements within experience, here, more generally, it is what we say, our talking (*Rede*) or more generally the forms of language as broadly construed.

The example of the picture in *Being and Time* is the corresponding example of this top-down understanding of categorial intuition. In this example, Heidegger asks us to imagine someone whose back is turned to the wall saying, 'The picture on the wall is askew' and then when we turn we see the picture as such.

Let us suppose that someone with his back turned to the wall makes the true assertion that 'the picture on the wall is hanging askew.' This assertion demonstrates itself when the man who makes it, turns around and perceives the picture hanging askew on the wall. What gets demonstrated in this demonstration?<sup>213</sup>

We start from what we say and find out what we say in what we see. I think that in this example several issues are implicitly combined related to the question of categories. We ask about the picture and we see it on the wall. This very simple experience, which is used in Heidegger to understand the notion of truth, seems very trivial, but actually it conceals in itself several elements<sup>214</sup>.

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<sup>213</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 259; Ga 2, 217.

<sup>214</sup> This passage of *Being and Time* is one of the most debated ones. The examples that we are going to analyse occur in the section about truth. The chapter on Heidegger's notion of truth as *aletheia* has been discussed since, while talking about truth in these sections, he claims that "only as long as Dasein is . . . 'is there' Being"

I would claim that in this example we should read that categories as (hybrid) forms of articulation between my experience in the world and language at work, show from a top-down perspective their relation with expression. Therefore, we should understand the example as an example in which we can grasp how categories are linked not only to our environmental context but also to what *we say* (namely to the subjective side).

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(Heidegger *Being and Time*, 255; Ga 2, 212) and “[t]here is’ truth only insofar as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is”. (*ivi*, 269; Ga 2, 226). Around these two sentences, scholars have read Heidegger as committed to idealism or have tried to understand how these sentences – that sound idealistic – should be properly framed within Heidegger’s notion of truth, and Heidegger’s project. To complicate the question, in fact, just after having mentioned the example of the picture, in which Heidegger refers in a footnote to Husserl’s *Sixth Logical Investigation*, he talks about “direct realism”. According to the triviality of the example, that I am going to unpack, Heidegger seems to suggest a sort of basic realism. By this, the problem of how to combine the different passages and different tendencies in Heidegger arises, and Heideggerians have debated whether Heidegger was a realist or an idealist. It is well known that Heidegger repeatedly claims that “we must set aside terms such as ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’, ‘realistic’ and ‘idealistic’”. Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, 107; Ga 40, 77. However, this claim of intentions could not be enough to save Heidegger from both these tendencies. Nonetheless, we should remember what Heidegger mainly means by realism and idealism. The problem of realism and idealism, often mentioned together as strictly interconnected, as the two faces of the same coin, emerges explicitly in Heidegger as a problem that entails two issues: 1, his cultural environment, 2, two currents to overcome. Early Heidegger recognized realism and idealism in the revival of Aristotle and Kant that he lived through the neo-Aristotelian and neo-Kantian schools. Both schools were intending Aristotle and Kant’s philosophy in an epistemological perspective. Therefore, Heidegger locates the problem of both realism and idealism within the problem of epistemology and theory of knowledge (Cerbone 249). Hence, Heidegger’s effort to overcome realism and idealism is inscribed in his effort to debunk the primacy of epistemology and its schemas. However, this could be an insufficient answer for those Heideggerians who have stressed the problem of realism and idealism under the question of the criticism of the schema subject-object and Heidegger’s criticism toward knowledge and scepticism (see Guignon C., *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis-Indiana, 1983; McManus, “Heidegger and the Supposition of a Single, Objective World”, Philipse H., “Heidegger’s ‘Scandal of Philosophy’: The Problem of the *Ding an Sich* in *Being and Time*”, in Crowell S. and Malpas J. (eds.), *Transcendental Heidegger* Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2007, 169-198); the problem of access to the world *via* understanding and language (Carman, *Heidegger’s Analytic*, Lafont, *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*); the problem of Heidegger’s conception of truth as *aletheia* (Cerbone D. “Realism and Truth” in Dreyfus H. and Wrathall M. (eds), *A Companion to Heidegger*, Oxford: Blackwell, 2005; Parrini, P., *Il valore della verità*, Guerini, Milano, 2011., Wrathall M., “Truth and Essence of Truth in Heidegger’s Thought”, in Guignon C., *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 241-267.) These three perspectives gather around the problem of truth as the focus point in which Heidegger’s supposed unclarity about realistic and idealist accounts comes across stronger. It is not the case that all studies mention the same quotation as the core question that reveals the puzzling position of Heidegger, in which he demonstrates, paraphrasing Parrini, a swinging movement between realism and idealism. For what concerns the question of categories, we have said that the categorial intuition gives Heidegger the chance to follow a third path between subjectivism and predicationism, which is to say between subjectivism and objectivism (section 2.1) – or as Esposito said (footnote 94, page 36) between idealism and realism. So, the tension revealed by Heideggerian scholars between realism and idealism in Heidegger – combined with his refusal of both – mirrors the tension that animates the question about categories, which in Heidegger, *via* Husserl, looks for a third nature between being predicates *de re* and functions of subject.

#### 4.4.4.a Status of *logos*

Heidegger asks us to imagine someone whose back is turned to the wall saying, “[t]he picture on the wall is askew”. Here the example starts from an assertion and goes to the direct actual experience of the picture as such. Here the assertion *refers* to the picture and “*nothing* else than *that* this”<sup>215</sup>, its function is to direct us towards, to point out. Cerbone, commenting on this example states that “it involves an assertion, an overt statement, which removes the aura of interiority that clung to the psychological act of judgement. The assertion, unlike the act of judgement, is something out there, open to view, and easily shared among two or more interlocutors. Indeed, the aim of making an assertion is typically to point out something to someone else”<sup>216</sup>.

In his lecture on judgments (*Logic. The Question of Truth*), Heidegger analyses the structure of apophantic judgement, trying to show the prejudices that are nested in the traditional theory of judgment and truth, and how judgment should be understood. First of all, Heidegger reminds us that language is not just judgment. *Logos* means something broader than the tradition has transformed into its narrower meaning as *ratio* and apophantic judgment<sup>217</sup> which for Heidegger represents a derivative kind of *logos*. Heidegger, appealing to the original meaning of *logos*, broadens the meaning of language.

We will understand why once we have a natural and unbiased understanding of what is meant by *λόγος* or “speech,” just as we do of those other two realms of beings: the world and human beings. We understand speaking (*Reden*) not in the narrow and specialized sense of “giving a speech,” but simply as “speaking to each other” for the sake of interacting and working with each other.<sup>218</sup>

The English translation here misses the articulated nature of *Reden*: “*Reden — nicht in dem engen und betonten Sinne von: eine Rede halten — sondern als Miteinanderreden — im und für das Miteinanderhandeln und wirken; dieses Miteinanderreden ist Mit-einander-be-reden*”. In the German version, *logos* as speech is expressed by the hyphenated and prepositional *Mit-einander-be-reden*, showing us that *logos* should be understood as implying an inner articulation.

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<sup>215</sup> Ivi, 259-260; Ga 2, 218.

<sup>216</sup> Cerbone D.R., *Heidegger: A Guide for the Perplexed*, Continuum International Publishing Group, London-New York, 2010, 74.

<sup>217</sup> Heidegger, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*; Ga 29/30, §69.

<sup>218</sup> Heidegger, *Logic*, 2; Ga 21, 2.

Language (*logos*)<sup>219</sup> here does not primarily indicate judgment nor its structure of *belonging*. Translating *logos* as a structured speech, as the hyphens show us, *logos* is here thought of as an open and relational language, since what is essential about speaking is that it is experienced as speaking *to* others *about* something<sup>220</sup>. As we have already seen for the perception in which the lectern was not conceived as a mere *res*, here language is identified as a relational dimension rather than an objectifying predication.

Appealing to our practical everyday life, Heidegger recalls that

[t]alking to each other in this way means speaking about what's going on, what could go on, and how to do things. It means discussing plans, projects, relationships, events, the ups and downs of life. To go back to what we said before: it means<sup>221</sup> discussing how the world is and how human beings are.<sup>222</sup>

Language is not a tool among the others since “[s]peaking is also the way that humans direct and guide all their other kinds of behaviour. It is in and through speaking that the modes and the objects of human action are disclosed, explained, and determined”<sup>223</sup>. From this point of view, the first presentation of language directs our understanding of it to outside of what for Heidegger is the traditional predicativist understanding of it in terms of apophantic judgment as the basic form to understand truth and to translate the structure of world and

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<sup>219</sup> I will use “language” as the term that indicates the most general meaning of *logos*. Here Heidegger is translating “logos” with *Rede* (“discourse”), here translated by Sheehan with “speaking”. Haugeland prefers to translate *Rede* in “telling”, “a word that means talk”, remarking that “Heidegger introduces *Rede* as the foundation of language and then explicitly defines it as the articulation of intelligibility”. See Haugeland, *Dasein Disclosed*, 195. We have to notice that Heidegger’s understanding of *logos* varies. “The latter is translated as *Rede* or talk, whereas in the 1924 lecture *Der Begriff der Zeit*, Heidegger renders it as *das Sprechen*, or speech. We should also note the way Heidegger deals with this issue in the *Sophist* lectures, where he claims that the Aristotelian notion of *logos*, which is there rendered as *Ansprechen* (speaking to or address) is rediscovered by Husserl in the intentionality thesis, where “*jedes Ansprechen ist Ansprechen von Etwas*”, “every address is an address about something”. Heidegger defines the function of talk as making manifest what the talk is about, a function that he describes with the verb *apophainesthai*, which is translated as *lassen sehen*, to let see. Talk therefore lets us see what it is that we are talking about, it has a necessarily disclosive function, as Heidegger puts it in § 34 of *Being and Time*: “*der Mensch zeigt sich als Seiendes, das redet*” (“the human being shows itself as the being that talks”, Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 209 ; Ga 2, 165. Wrathall notices that from the ’30 Heidegger starts using *Rede* (discourse) and *Sprache* (language) interchangeably. He also notices that both expression represent Heidegger’s translation of *logos*”. See, Wrathall M., *Heidegger and Unconcealment*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, 133.

<sup>220</sup> “The original meaning of *logos* is ... the connecting, the relationship ... what holds together that which stands within it ... *Logos* is the regulating structure”. Heidegger M., *Aristotle’s Metaphysics* Θ 1–3: *On the Essence and Actuality of Force*, trans. Brogan W. and Warnek P., Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1995, 104; Ga 33, *Aristoteles, Metaphysik* Θ 1–3: *Vom Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft*, Ed. Heinrich Hüni, 1981; lecture course, summer, 1931, 121.

<sup>221</sup> Heidegger, *Logic*, 2; Ga 21, 2.

<sup>222</sup> *Ibidem*; Ga 21, 2-3.

<sup>223</sup> *Ivi*, 2-3; Ga 21, 3.

knowledge<sup>224</sup>. In fact, *logos* consists of speaking *about* something, speaking *of* something.

That which the discourse is *about* [das *Worihher* der Rede] does not necessarily or even for the most part serve as the theme for an assertion in which one gives something a definite character.<sup>225</sup>

For Heidegger,

the basic achievement of speech consists in showing or revealing *what* one is speaking about, *what* one is discussing. (...)In such acts of revealing, whatever one is speaking about shows up, becomes perceivable, and, as something perceived, gets *defined* in and by the discussion about it. This revelatory defining of what is experienced and perceived is the very same thing that we generally call “thought”.<sup>226</sup>

Starting from this broad characterization of *logos* whose main function is to reveal, to indicate, we may say that we can extend it to the dimension of conceptuality and thought. While there is an objectifying language and manner of thinking, Heidegger is suggesting having a broad understanding of language and thought, starting from *logos* conceived of as that talking *to* and *about* which we perform in our practical dealings<sup>227</sup>. The open character and revelatory “ostensive function”<sup>228</sup> of language does remind us that language as a distinctive feature of human action and interaction is not only the form of judgment in terms of predications. Predication and determination are linked to ostensive functions of the language which reveals something that we refer to, since we say what we perceive. Here language and expression are both defined in their reference to the world. In the traditional interpretation of judgment this reference is lost. The apophantic judgement, which is just one specific form of language, has been taken by tradition since Aristotle as prior to any other forms.

From what we have said, it is clear that from the very beginning, philosophical reflection took *λόγος* (speech) primarily as expressed speech; and within that, it took *λόγος* in what appeared to be its simplest manifestation: the statement, where “uttering” and speaking take the linguistic form of sentences in the form of statements such as, “The sky is blue.”<sup>229</sup>

Heidegger registers the transformation of *logos* from its broad meaning to the level of

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<sup>224</sup> See *ivi*, 7; Ga 21, 8.

<sup>225</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 204-205; Ga 2, 164.

<sup>226</sup> Heidegger, *Logic*, 6; Ga 21, 6.

<sup>227</sup> See also Gardini, *Filosofia dell'enunciazione*, 153.

<sup>228</sup> In *Being and Time*, Heidegger states that “the function of *logos* lies in merely letting something be seen”, Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 58; Ga 2, 34.

<sup>229</sup> Heidegger, *Logic*, 9; Ga 21, 10.

*apophansis*.

Formulated as simple “propositions,” statements about the world that reflect on and determine the world, came to be the simplest, most general, and likewise the most basic form of speech. Even the determination of truth now gets oriented, primarily and in principle, to this kind of speech, the propositional statement.<sup>230</sup>

In the traditional understanding of judgment, Heidegger states that many prejudices are lurking<sup>231</sup>. The one I want to pursue is that one regarding predication. In fact, the main function traditionally ascribed to this form of judgment is predication, “that is, asserting that a ‘predicate’ belongs to a subject. A subject is that to which we give a determination. In this instance, therefore, ‘statement’ has the meaning of ‘an act of determining’”<sup>232</sup>. Heidegger’s interpretation of judgment, in line with his description of language, taking into account the meaning of *logos apophantikos*, ascribes a triple function to judgment. “The various determinations of “statement” are 1. showing, 2. determining, and 3. communicating<sup>233</sup>. These three characterizations are interconnected, but the first one – “showing”, “indicating” – is what makes the other two possible. Heidegger does recognize the role of predicative determination in assertive language, but he gives priority to the function of showing or indicating.

That λόγος is ἀποφαντικός whose distinctive possibility as an act of speech is to show something as, whose mode of expression can bring something into view—that is, only if it is an ἀπόφανσις, a “statement,” or more exactly, an “indicating . . . as.”<sup>234</sup>

The primary function of judgement, as we saw for the notion of expression in the second

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<sup>230</sup> *Ibidem*; Ga 21, 11.

<sup>231</sup> Heidegger recognizes three prejudices “1. The place of truth is the proposition, 2. Truth is the correspondence of thought with beings, 3. These two statements originated with Aristotle.” See Heidegger, *Logic*, 108; Ga 21, 128. Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle theory on *logos* as proposition and its elements is based on Aristotle’s *De Interpretatione* (Aristotle, *Categories and De Interpretatione*) Heidegger also presents the analysis of this text in *The Basic Concepts of Metaphysics*, Ga 29/30, § 72, in which Heidegger takes into account the nominal and verbal parts of discourse, the copula and seeks the original meaning of *logos* itself.

<sup>232</sup> *Ivi*, 112; Ga 21, 133.

<sup>233</sup> Communication, here, should not be intended in a mere instrumental perspective. Heidegger warns us against this holding that: “[c]ommunicating does not mean the handing over of words, let alone ideas from one subject to another, as if it were an interchange between the psychological events of different subjects. To say that one Dasein communicates by its utterances with another means that by articulating something in display it shares with the second Dasein the same understanding comportment toward the being about which the assertion is being made. In communication and through it, one Dasein enters with the other, the addressee, into the same being-relationship to that about which the assertion is made, that which is spoken of. Communications are not a store of heaped up propositions but should be seen as possibilities by which one Dasein enters with the other into the same fundamental comportment toward the entity asserted about, which is unveiled in the same way”. Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 210; Ga 24, 299.

<sup>234</sup> Heidegger, *Logic*, 112; Ga 21, 133.



of Heidegger's statements, is not to predicate and project predicative meanings over the structure of experience, thereby losing the reference to the world. Focusing on the indicative notion of judgement does not imply that language does not have a part in structuring our experience; but it is a sign that the assertive judgment leads our inquiry from the linguistic parts of predication to "outside" the boundaries of proposition, to which the judgment refers<sup>235</sup>. For Heidegger, propositions should be understood as indicative showing-something-as<sup>236</sup>; this means that "*the world is already presupposed*" in any understanding of entities<sup>237</sup>, and moreover that it can indicate and refer to reality because, as we have seen, the world and context of our experience is already articulated thanks to categorial elements, among which we also find the *as*, whose nature hints to conceptual forms. Echoing Costa (analysing the notion of truth in Heidegger), for Heidegger the propositional dimension and truth are sustained since they emerge from "an already given categorial disclosedness"<sup>238</sup>, they are linked to that disclosedness that in our inquiry we intended as the contextually articulated dimension of our experience<sup>239</sup>. In fact, we read in a similar example to the one of the picture,

[s]uppose someone here in the classroom states the proposition "the board is black" and does so in an immediately given context of question and answer. To what do we then attend in understanding the statement? To the phonetic articulation? Or to the representation that performs the making of the statement and for which then the sounds uttered are "signs"? No, rather we direct ourselves to the blackboard itself, here on the wall! In the perception of this board, in making present and thinking about the blackboard and nothing else, we participate in the performance of the statement. What the statement immediately presents is that about which it states something.<sup>240</sup>

Hence, when we say "The board is black", we are making an assertion not about some ideas or representation but about "what itself is meant". All further structural moments of assertion are determined by way of this basic function, its character of display"<sup>241</sup>, or

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<sup>235</sup> As Wrathall holds "the primary sense of *Rede* or discourse is that which performs the function of establishing and stabilising the referential relations of meaningfulness". Wrathall, *Heidegger and Unconcealment*, 2011, 131.

<sup>236</sup> Heidegger, *Logic*, 112; Ga 21, 133.

<sup>237</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 417; Ga 2, 365.

<sup>238</sup> Costa, *La verità del mondo*, 69. See also, Heidegger, *On the essence of ground*, in *Pathmarks*, 103; Ga 9, 130.

<sup>239</sup> Regarding truth and categorial intuition, Keller states that for Heidegger "the ultimate source of meaning and truth is in the objects of intuition themselves. For we only succeed in referring to an object or stating a true proposition when the object itself displays itself to us as it really is". Keller, *Husserl and Heidegger on Human Experience*, 99; see also, Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time*; Ga 20, §6.d .

<sup>240</sup> Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, 125-126; Ga 26, 157.

<sup>241</sup> Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 209; Ga 24, 297-298.

exhibition/indication. Stressing the indicative role of proposition, in line with the articulation of *logos* as broadly construed in terms of talking and speaking *to-* and *about-*, leads us to our experience in the world, of things that emerge from it. This possibility is linked to the idea of a structured world. Moreover, this characterization tries to disengage language from the understanding of it only in terms of assertive propositions and, at the same time, to renovate the understanding of proposition, showing how from the dimension of language, from a top-down perspective we may be conducted to the dimension of our structured experience. This connection is possible thanks to the articulation of the as-structure that reappears in Heidegger's reflection about *logos*, language and judgment.

#### 4.4.4.b The as-structure – Second part

In the judgment, we indicate something as something. We find the same as-structure which we see in the example of the lectern, but this time from a top-down perspective. Heidegger distinguishes between the apophantic and hermeneutic *as*<sup>242</sup>. In order for something like a “predicative highlighting and determining to be possible”, in order to make an assertion, we need to have prior access to the entity we want to determine. In the example of the blackboard “the usable thing in front of us must be already familiar, already accessible”<sup>243</sup>. For example, it might be “familiar” in terms of the service it can render, what it can be used for, the use for which we meet up with it at all—in a word, its “for-writing-on.” This end-for-which [*Wozu*] is itself already comprehensible and known, as is the thing itself that is there *for* this purpose and *as* this: the chalkboard”<sup>244</sup>. This kind of prior familiarity that gives us access to the specific entities we find in our experience – or more generally to the structure of the world *as* such<sup>245</sup>—is here in practical terms; we are familiar with the blackboard in regard to its end-for-which (*Wozu*).

Speaking indicatively about something— “this table here,” “that window over there,” “the chalk,” “the door”—already entails [their prior] disclosure. What does this disclosure consist in? Answer: the thing we encounter is uncovered in terms of the end-for-which of its serviceability. It is already posited in meaning—it already makes sense [*be-deuter*]. Do not understand this to mean that we were first given a something that is free of meaning, and then a meaning gets attached to it. Rather, what is first of all “given”—and we still have to determine what that word means—is the “for-writing,”

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<sup>242</sup> Heidegger, *Logic*, 121; Ga 21, 145, see also Heidegger, *Being and Time*; Ga 2, §33.

<sup>243</sup> *Ivi*, 120; Ga 21, 143.

<sup>244</sup> *Ibidem*; Ga 21, 144.

<sup>245</sup> See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 78 and 91; Ga 2, 53 and 63.

the “for-entering-and-exiting,” the “for-illuminating,” the “for-sitting.” That is, writing, entering-exiting, sitting, and the like are what we are *a priori* involved with. What we know and learn when we “know our way around” are these uses-for-which we understand it.<sup>246</sup>

We do encounter the meaningful world in its structure syncategorematically expressed within our practical dealings; in these practical dealings we possess a familiarity with the in-order-to as such<sup>247</sup>. In this practical familiarity, as-structure is primarily enacted in dealing with something<sup>248</sup>. In Heidegger's analysis of this phenomenon, the term “as” (to understand or project something as such and such) expresses the structure of this primary understanding or, equivalently, way of relating (behaving, comporting ourselves)<sup>249</sup>. Within the structured familiar contextuality, we see something as-such. This as-structure, as Heidegger remarks, does not have a predicative character but a pre-predicative nature<sup>250</sup>.

The judgement, therefore, indicates something that is already revealed in its multiple articulations, which here we see syncategorematically expressed as those articulations that belong both to the world and to our practical familiar dealings. From a top-down perspective, judgment might be taken as the basis to refer to and discover the articulation of experience that may be opened in its categorical structure and not as an unruléd materiality if we maintain that the judgment and subjective forms – in virtue of Heidegger's criticism of subjectivism and predicationism – are not the principle of structure our experience. Even if the as-structure, which has a pre-predicative structure, and our “comportment,” which is related to the as-structure, are not something subjective<sup>251</sup> – so that the as-structure appears to be in accordance with the non-subjectivist non-predicationist account of categorial articulation of experience – nonetheless, to see something *as* something is a matter of how we can comprehend and interpret something meaningful<sup>252</sup>. The as-structure that we find in the world when we turn from judgment to the world is what Heidegger calls the hermeneutic *as* which, as we saw in the example of the lectern, is not something propositional, is not what Heidegger calls the apophantic *as*<sup>253</sup>. For Heidegger, there is a primary *as* that offers us the entities we deal with in the structured world, which we have seen involved in the

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<sup>246</sup> Heidegger, *Logic*, 121; Ga 21, 144.

<sup>247</sup> Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, 293; Ga 24, 415.

<sup>248</sup> Heidegger, *Logic*, 123; Ga 21, 146.

<sup>249</sup> Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Concept of Truth*, 189.

<sup>250</sup> Ivi, 190.

<sup>251</sup> Heidegger, *Logic*, 123; Ga 21, 146.

<sup>252</sup> Ivi, 126; Ga 21, 150.

<sup>253</sup> See also, Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 200; Ga 2, 158.

example of the lectern and indicated by our *logos*; the apophantic *as* represents its modification in the form of fully thematic, predicative assertions. As we have said, the hermeneutic *as* shows us something as, namely a *what* in its *how*. The apophantic *as* is a derived *as*, founded on the hermeneutic one.

Only now are we given any access to *properties* or the like. When an assertion has given a definite character to something present-at-hand, it says something about it *as* a "what"; and this "what" is *drawn from that* which is present-at-hand as such. The *as*-structure of interpretation has undergone a modification. In its function of appropriating what is understood, the 'as' no longer reaches out into a totality of involvements.<sup>254</sup>

In the de-worlding and de-contextualising process, which we have seen applied by the theoretical approach to the lectern in the example, experience was reduced, at bottom, to mere sensory data or *res*; we see the same attitude, within the shift from the hermeneutic *as* to the apophantic *as*, the what-how of our experience is here translated in terms of predicativist judgement. As we said in section 2.2, Heidegger's criticism of predicationism does not entail the criticism of any form of predication, conceptuality or language, nor the complete exclusion of these forms from the original structure of our experience. Rather, as shown by Heidegger's lectures on *logos*, his criticism concerns the idea of considering the apophantic judgment the primary model to represent both the multifaceted dimension of language and the translation of our worldly experience. More specifically, Heidegger criticizes a specific interpretation that tradition has of the apophantic judgment, in terms of the static relation between a subject and its attributes that corresponds to the metaphysical reduction of our experience in terms of basic units defined in their *what*. From this perspective, we can readmit the dimension of language and conceptuality, if we are aware that there is another possible interpretation of their nature and function. In this way, we may insert them within the inquiry into the articulation of our experience and the nature of its categories. In fact, even if the hermeneutic *as*, which in the example of the lectern we recognized as the categorial structure of experience suggesting a link to conceptuality, has a pre-predicative nature, we may say that this kind of pre-predication is more precisely a pre-apophantic – namely pre-assertive, pre-predicative in predicationist fashion.

In fact, even if, in experience, we perceive and understand things as something in their *what* and *how* without an intellectual *detour* or subjective projection, and without needing to involve the judgmental dimension, nonetheless the *as*-structure is linked to how we do see something *as* such, namely it is linked to how we interpret it. In the second statement of

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<sup>254</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 200; Ga 2, 158.

Heidegger's interpretation of categorial intuition, Heidegger said that our perceptions are already expressed and interpreted. Expression and interpretation which are forms of language, as we learn from Heidegger's lecture on *logos*, are not only to be understood as apophantic-predicative judgements, but they are linked to our experience, as shown by the analysis of hermeneutic *as*. However, as we said in the example of the lectern, in this experience we contribute and we do it by talking, saying and interpreting, without meaning to capture reality within the form of predication or judgement.

We can say with Blattner that the *as*-structure is an ambivalent notion, as is Heidegger's discussion of expression and interpretation<sup>255</sup>. I take this to be a hint towards the thesis that *as*-structure has a hybrid nature, contributing to qualifying categories as hybrid articulations. In fact, Blattner has stated that in *Being and Time* there is a fairly clear connection between the *as*-structure, conceptuality, propositionality and the fore-structure of interpretation<sup>256</sup>. As remarked by Blattner, in §32 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger states that interpretation entails a triple structure. It entails a fore-having (*Vorhabe*). Interpretation is grounded in forehaving, namely on a prior unthematic non-predicative understanding of our everyday life's totality of involvements<sup>257</sup>. It entails a *foresight* which makes it possible for the interpretation to "fix" the object previously unthematically understood. Heidegger says that foresight "'cuts' what has been taken in forehaving 'down' to a determinate interpretability"<sup>258</sup>. By these two phenomena, *as*-structure emerges – namely it emerges from the context in which we move thanks to categorial structures that entail in their concrete articulation both the circumspective perception and interpretation. As already suggested by the example of the lectern, in which we see the lectern *as* a lectern or as a table depending on the contextuality we are familiar with, this *as*-structure seems to require a certain kind of conceptuality, a *fore-*, or *proto-conceptuality*<sup>259</sup>.

Interpretation can create the conceptuality that belongs to the entity to be interpreted in terms of this entity itself, or it can force the entity into concepts that it resists in accordance with its sort of being. As always, interpretation has in each case already, either with finality or with reservations, decided itself in favour of a determinate conceptuality; it is grounded in a foreconception.<sup>260</sup>

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<sup>255</sup> Blattner W., "Ontology, the A Priori, and the Primacy of Practice: An Aporia in Heidegger's Early Philosophy", in Crowell S. and Malpas J. (eds.), *Transcendental Heidegger* Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 2007, 10-27, 15.

<sup>256</sup> *Ivi*, 14.

<sup>257</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 191; Ga 2, 150.

<sup>258</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>259</sup> Blattner, "Ontology, the A Priori, and the Primacy of Practice", 15.

<sup>260</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 191; Ga 2, 150.

Blattner states that there is an ambivalence in Heidegger between conceptuality and proto-conceptuality, and he links this ambiguity to Heidegger's comment that perception is an act of interpretation and "this is to say that all seeing, for Heidegger, is seeing-as"<sup>261</sup>. As we have already stressed, seeing *as* in Husserl is used to mark the uncategorized level of simple perception and materiality compared to the seeing *that* which indicates our categorial perception. By virtue of Husserl's vacillation between these separated levels, we can see in Heidegger that simple perception is entailed in a perception which is already categorially structured. Accordingly, we can say that seeing-as and the as-structure in Heidegger are not the mark of simple perception but are embedded in our experience which is already categorially pervaded. Therefore, in Heidegger the as-structure may be thought of as a categorial device. Heidegger does not need to employ the difference between a seeing-*as* and a seeing-*that* to stress a difference which in his conception of experience is rethought.

In Husserl, we see that the seeing-*that* leads to a categorial state of affairs expressed by propositions and judgment, while the seeing-*as* is completed by single objects expressed by single concepts. However, as we saw in the analysis of judgement in both Husserl and Heidegger's categorial intuition, single concepts also demonstrate that they can be thought of as indicating an inner articulation to trace within experience.

Thus, in Heidegger the as-structure indicates a categorial structure and entails some sort of conceptuality even if not yet propositional. Regarding the nature of fore-conception, which is the phenomenon that in as-structure links to the conceptual side, Carman has stated

Fore-conception in Heidegger's sense, it seems to me, involves nothing like fully articulated concepts, that is, recurring and reidentifiable constituents of propositional contents. For example, Heidegger nowhere says that fore-conceptual aspects of interpretation correspond to particular linguistic predicates.<sup>262</sup>

As-structure entails conceptuality even if not predicative assertion<sup>263</sup>. So that we may say that as-structure entails a pre-predicative structure, meaning not that it is not conceptual, but that it is not predicatively propositional in the predicationism-way. May it be that Heidegger could possibly understand, or at least may it be possible to find in Heidegger a suggestion of, conceptuality different from predicative assertive conceptuality, fixed in isolation from experience and eminently expressed by the form "S is P"?

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<sup>261</sup> Blattner, "Ontology, the A Priori, and the Primacy of Practice", 15.

<sup>262</sup> Carman, *Heidegger's Analytic*, 214.

<sup>263</sup> Golob, *Heidegger on Concepts, Freedom and Normativity*, 68.

As we said in our chapter regarding predicationism, Heidegger seems to criticise a specific kind of conception of the nature of predication, conceptuality and thought – that of metaphysics and science that only predicatively and positively thematises – wishing for another conception of them. In *Ontology* we read that

A "concept" is not a schema but rather a possibility of being, of how matters look in the moment i.e., is constitutive of the moment-a meaning drawn out of something-points to a *forehaving*, i.e., transports us into a fundamental experience-points to a *foreconception*, i.e., calls for a how of addressing and interrogating-i.e., transports us into the *being-there of our Dasein* in accord with its tendency to interpretation and its worry. Fundamental concepts are not later additions to Dasein, but rather ex-press it in advance and propel it forward: grasping Dasein and stirring it by way of their pointing.<sup>264</sup>

In this passage we may appreciate a Heideggerian version of the concept of concept that we may include within the syncategorematic, articulative structure of categories of experience and especially that of *as*. We may think of the dimension of concept as emerging from the context and contributing to it. From a bottom-up perspective, the *as*- combined with the concept *of*, emerges with expression. From a top-down one, every concept is not only the top of a pyramid, but a broad dimension that directs our talking and understanding of reality, not only guiding our comprehension and action but also contributing to the meaningful structure of context, therefore participating in its categorial articulation<sup>265</sup>.

In our everyday experience and practical dealings, we move in a world, "having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing; evincing, · interrogating, considering, discussing, determining"<sup>266</sup>. In our everyday life, Heidegger lists a series of actions and he includes those of talking and determining, which

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<sup>264</sup> Heidegger, *Ontology*, 12-13; Ga 63, 16.

<sup>265</sup> From what we have called a top-down perspective, Heidegger offers us in his early lectures on the phenomenology of intuition and expression, Ga 59, the analysis of the concept of "history", which presents a multiplicity of meanings (*Bedeutungen*). Apart from the study of the concept of history in itself – that does not directly interest us – through this example, Heidegger shows us what is concealed within the form of the concept. Every concept has a concept's tendencies or directions of signification [*Bedeutungsrichtungen*], and these are belied in the signification-contexts or connections [*Bedeutungszusammenhänge*] provided by the different expressions involving the concept. Phenomenological analysis of these signification-contexts will reveal the meaning or sense of the term which lies behind them. The meaning of a concept should not be understood in isolation since it always refers to its context of expression, which ultimately is a context of experience. See Heidegger, Ga 59, 3-91.

<sup>266</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 83; Ga 2, 57, see also Heidegger, *The Concept of Time*: "dealing with the world; tarrying alongside it in the manner of performing, effecting and completing, but also contemplating, interrogating, and determining by way of contemplation and comparison" Heidegger, *The Concept of Time* 7e; Ga 64, 7.

of course frame our experience. In our practical dealings and concrete life, therefore, we have practical actions<sup>267</sup> of doing but also of thinking and talking. That is the general framework in which we shall locate our experience and categories – if we follow the idea of the relocation of categories within experience. Therefore, categories conceived of as articulations of experience should be considered as those structures that connect our experience in its variety. So, after having discovered the categories in the syncategorematic structures of the context as an open, temporal, meaningful dimension, we have found the articulation of the as-structure, which shares the same nature and function of other categorial elements, bringing the dimension of language and conceptuality into the structure of categories in experience.

Categories show themselves to be the median element between world and language, they are to be found within the experience, in the double meaning of it. They indicate a self-structured reality of context. In the environmental context, categories should be thought of as articulations that enable the web of relations that shapes our everyday practical experience, in which we deal with particular entities that emerge from context. In this context, which is a self-structured domain, the nature of categories is also linked to the forms of meaning, familiarity and conceptuality; we encounter specific particularities in our concrete life not only thanks to the syncategorematic articulation of context and our categorially structured perception that directs our movements, but also thanks to our interpretation, linked to the meaningful forms of familiarity and to the expression of seeing and interpreting as- different *what* in their *how*, namely thanks to our pre-predicativist language and conceptuality, articulated by the syncategorematic operative structure of context and linked to it.

Context as a meaningful and familiar dimension gathers some kind of conceptuality and conceptuality indicates experience in the world, in an ongoing process that is made possible by categories whose nature is hybrid.

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<sup>267</sup> “Being- in- the- world is living: it is essentially not static but rather active, engaged, involved. The ‘in’ of ‘being- in’ is ultimately and most basically the ‘in’ of engaging-in, participating-in, actively involving-oneself-in. Such active, engaged living- in is what being-in is all about”. Haugeland, *Dasein Disclosed*, 95.



## Conclusion

In this work, I have tried to outline the nature of Heidegger's categories focusing on his early texts in which we can find Heidegger's account of facticity, namely of our concrete experience in the world, in which we can trace the idea of categories relocated within our experience – in its double meaning. Following the traces of Heidegger's criticism of subjectivism and predicationism, and the traces of Husserlian categorial intuition, in Heidegger's comments on Duns Scotus' categories we found a first draft of categories that may reflect Heidegger's attempt to renew the traditional account of them. In his study of Scotist categories we find a first conception of how we might picture the structure of categories as non-subjectivist and non-predicative, and not even disposed on a hierarchical order. In Duns Scotus, we found that categories must be conceived of not as determinations of properties of reality, but as categorials whose role is to indicate reality in terms of ordering *relations*<sup>1</sup>, entailing not the *what* of a circumscribed entity but the dimension of *how* of phenomena. A theory of renewed categories needs to grasp a reality that reveals itself as a domain constituted by the emergence of qualitatively connoted, and yet articulated particularities. I have tried to enrich this indication – given by Heidegger-Scotus' account of categories via Heidegger's interpretation of categorial intuition –, especially focusing on two distinctive statements that characterize Heidegger's reading, and which we might unpack using Heidegger's actual examples of the functioning of categories in describing our perceptual and linguistic experience in the world.

In Heidegger's two statements, we have seen how categories are located within experience, entailing perception and expression. From these statements, we have perceived the direction towards which we could turn in order to find the nature and structure of categories within the context of our experience.

In the example of the lectern we have seen that our perceptual experience is already categorially structured, namely that categories are articulations and relations that we find in the environmental context of our experience. Context and world show themselves to be self-structured open and temporal dimensions, as indicated by the expression *es weltet*. In our perceptual experience categories are those relations that are operative in context, orienting our everyday life and which are expressed by syncategorematic prepositional

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<sup>1</sup> Indicated by *ens* and *unum*.

particles, which in turn suggest the operative and articulative structure that characterizes them.

However, we have seen that experience is also the experience of some sort of subjectivity which is not merely passive or egotic. The context is also shaped by the forms of meaning and familiarity, thanks to which we see, recognize and interpret something *as*. The *as*, another syncategorematic particle, has shown us how the movement from perceptual experience leads us towards the dimension of language and conceptuality, and how it is linked to and changes with its context. In the example of the picture and his analysis of logic, Heidegger furnishes us with a broadly construed notion of language and conceptuality. The articulated and open character of language shows us that its function is to indicate the prior experience it refers to, showing that there is a structured domain of experience whose link to logos is represented by the *as*-structure. The *as*-structure, which may be thought of as a pre-predicativist pre-propositional categorial articulation, shows as how the categories of experience, to frame the articulation of our everyday life, combine the perceptual experience with interpretation and expression, with a flexible conceptuality which is linked to the context in an ongoing process.

Categories of experience are median elements that connect and articulate the dimensions of context and language, whose nature is to be found as linked to both these dimensions, manifesting a hybrid nature, as an indicative syncategorematic and operative structure. Considering Husserl's categorial intuition as a fertile source of inspiration for Heidegger's understanding of the renewal of categories, I have tried to identify those elements that could be useful for the analysis of the nature and structure of categories in Heidegger. In order to achieve the result of picturing the hybrid nature of categories and their operative and syncategorematic structure, I have exploited Husserl's ambiguities and "oscillations" that may be detected in the doctrine of categorial intuition, concerning the relationship between simple and categorial intuition and their respective objects, as well as the relationship between categorial intuition and language. In so doing, I admitted that I was somewhat stretching Husserl's doctrine of categorial intuition and the general framework in which it is posited along with the reflections and the elements that sustain it. Focusing on a few passages of Heidegger's early works, trying to follow the Husserlian indications gathered in the section on categorial intuition, I have tried to extract the structuring of experience and the categorial elements operating within it. However, it is my opinion that, to fully understand the hybrid nature of Heidegger's categories, we should choose a more specific

field of application, by analysing Heidegger's notion of *praxis* (akin to that of facticity) that we find in early Heidegger but especially in *Being and Time*, in which *praxis* is analysed in its structure under the name of *Zuhandenheit*. The latter, around which Heideggerian scholars have started a huge debate (over everyone, Dreyfus), may open – once re-interpreted – new possibilities for the understanding of the nature of categories, that would find their proper “application” and dynamic (as a sort of schematism) within the practical domain. It is my opinion that *praxis* reveals itself to be a median dimension, in which we could find a weak account of subjectivity immersed in the self-structured world, giving us, through the examples of practical tools and dealings, a more complete picture of the nature of the categorial web that frames our experience in the world. In the dimension of *Zuhandenheit* we could have the chance to see the hybrid categories at work, and to re-read, as already suggested in this work, the notion of perception and the concept of concept, that within the practical domain could acquire more clearly an alternative meaning compared to that one traditionally ascribed to them.

I might also admit that in using these Husserlian indications to unpack the dynamic of Heidegger's understanding of categories, I also stretched Heidegger's passages probably getting more closely, rather than to Heidegger's account of categories, to a Heideggerian account of the nature and categories of experience. I would like therefore to conclude with a brief reflection about the implicit aim and meaning of this effort, which is inscribed in what is not actually spelt out in this thesis. There are some broader horizons around which this work can take place. One of the implicit aims of the inquiry into the nature of categories would be to outline an account of categories that may go beyond Heidegger's project. Starting from Heidegger, I think it would be worthwhile, following Heidegger's indication, to outline a new understanding of categories or new categories for a new conception of our experience in the world. I did appreciate Haugeland's metaphor in describing Heidegger's categories as, “a complex of rigid members attached to one another at flexible joints – like the bones in a skeleton, the rods and shafts in an engine, or (more figuratively) the words and phrases in articulate speech”<sup>2</sup>. I think that Haugeland furnishes us with graphic picture of the categorial structure of our experience in the world, and one that may be exploited within or beyond Heidegger.

Similarly, I think – even if there we do not find a major contribution of it in Heidegger –

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<sup>2</sup> Haugeland, *Dasein Disclosed*, 55.

it would be worthwhile to consider those passages in which Heidegger seems to suggest not to free the phenomenology of experience from the dimension of conceptuality but rather, through a criticism of traditional conceptualism, to hint that we should be radical and rethink the nature of the concept of concept itself. This would bring Heidegger, under a renewed light, into the contemporary debate about conceptuality (especially the so-called McDowell-Dreyfus debate).

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