


Routledge Research in Race and Ethnicity

NATIVIST AND ISLAMIST RADICALISM

ANGER AND ANXIETY

Edited by Ayhan Kaya, Ayşenur Benevento
and Metin Koca



Nativist and Islamist Radicalism

This book analyses the factors and processes behind radicalisation of both native and self-identified Muslim youths. It argues that European youth responds differently to the challenges posed by contemporary flows of globalisation such as deindustrialisation, socio-economic, political, spatial, and psychological forms of deprivation, humiliation, and structural exclusion.

The book revisits social, economic, political, and psychological drivers of radicalisation and challenges contemporary uses of the term “radicalism”. It argues that neoliberal forms of governance are often responsible for associating radicalism with extremism, terrorism, fundamentalism, and violence. It will appeal to students and scholars of migration, minority studies, nationalisms, European studies, sociology, political science, and psychology.

Ayhan Kaya is Professor of Politics and Jean Monnet Chair of European Politics of Interculturalism in the Department of International Relations, Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey.

Ayşenur Benevento works as a postdoctoral researcher in the European Research Council advanced grant project, PRIME Youth, conducted at Istanbul Bilgi University, Turkey.

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Nativist and Islamist Radicalism

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Edited by
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Abbreviations

AfD	<i>Alternetive für Deutschland</i> (Alternative for Germany)
AIVD	<i>Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst</i> (General Intelligence and Security Service)
BVD	<i>Binnenlandse veiligheidsdienst</i> (Domestic Security Service)
CDU	<i>Christlich-Demokratische Union</i> (Christian Democratic Union)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CMO	<i>Contactorgaan Moslims Overheid</i> (Contact Muslims Government)
CNRS	<i>Le Centre national de la recherche scientifique</i> (French National Centre for Scientific Research)
DITIB	<i>Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion</i> (Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs)
EU	European Union
FORNET	Narrative Exposure Therapy for Forensic Offender Rehabilitation
GDR	<i>Deutsche Demokratische Republik</i> (Democratic Republic of Germany)
GREASE	Radicalisation, Secularism and the Governance of Religion: Bringing Together Diverse Perspectives
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
MET	Muslim Empowerment Tilburg
MRWN	Muslim Rights Watch Netherlands
NCTV	<i>Nationale Coördinator Terrorisme en Veiligheid</i> (National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism and Security)
NET	Narrative Exposure Therapy
NPD	<i>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i> (National Democratic Party of Germany)
P/CVE	Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism

PEGIDA	<i>Patriotische Europäer Gegen Islamisierung Des Abendlandes</i> (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Western World)
PYI-BEL	PRIME Youth Interview – Belgium
PYI-FR	PRIME Youth Interview – France
PYI-GER	PRIME Youth Interview – Germany
PYI-NL	PRIME Youth Interview – Netherlands
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ZEP	<i>Zones d'Education Prioritaire</i> (Educational Priority Areas)
ZUP	<i>Zone à urbaniser en Priorité</i> (Priority Urban Development Areas)
ZUS	<i>Zones Urbaines Sensibles</i> (Sensitive Urban Areas)



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Introduction

Nativist and Islamist Radicalism

Anger and Anxiety

Ayhan Kaya, Metin Koca, and Ayşenur Benevento

Introduction

This edited volume aims to contribute to the scholarship that has so far studied European youth in ethno-culturally, and religio-politically divided separate clusters, such as “migrant-origin” and “native” youths. In this context, the contributors of this edited volume accord to a single optical lens to analyse the factors and processes behind the radicalisation of both native and self-identified Muslim youths. Accordingly, this introductory chapter lays the groundwork by arguing that European youth respond differently to the challenges posed by contemporary flows of globalisation, such as deindustrialisation, structural exclusion, and socio-economic, political, spatial, and psychological forms of deprivation and humiliation. In responding to existential threats and challenges, social groups exploit what their cultural repertoires offer. In our cases, these cultural repertoires are ethno-national (for native) and religious (for self-identified Muslims) repertoires. The underlying idea here is to challenge the hegemony of culturalist and civilisational discourse prevailing in Europe over the last three decades, and revisit social, economic, political, and psychological drivers of radicalisation – a term that has become overstretched, thus, an empty signifier. Challenging the contemporary ways of using the term radicalism interchangeably with extremism, terrorism, fundamentalism, and violence, we take radicalism as a quest for the democratisation of democracies rather than a pathological issue. We argue that it is the neoliberal forms of governance that often associate radicalism with extremism, terrorism, fundamentalism, and violence.

The edited volume analyses the current political, social, and economic context of the European Union, hit by four fundamental crises – namely, the global financial crisis, the refugee crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the war in Ukraine, which have together led to the escalation of fear and prejudice among some segments of the European public *vis-à-vis* others who are ethno-culturally and religiously different. The main question posed in this volume is as follows: How and why do some European citizens generate a radical populist and Islamophobic discourse to express their discontent

regarding the current social, economic and political state of their national and European context, while some members of migrant-origin communities with a Muslim background generate an essentialist and radical form of Islamist discourse in the same societies? In such a manner, the volume is novel as it attempts to analyse two sides of the same coin to understand the sources of discontent of populist young native groups on the one hand, and radical young self-identified Muslims with migration background on the other hand. So far, social scientists have studied these groups separately from more culturalist, civilisational, and religious perspectives. The main strength and novelty of this edited volume is to understand and explain the malaise of both native and immigrant origin youth simultaneously through a scientific method by de-culturalising and de-religionising what is socio-economic, political, and psychological in origin. So far, existing studies have focused on one or the other of these two phenomena, while this volume analyses them together. The volume tries to understand and explain the relationship between nativist-populist radicalism and Islamic radicalism.

At the background of the volume is globalisation, playing a key role in the formation, diversification, and solution of the problems behind radicalisation. Various segments of the European public – be they native populations or Muslim-migrant-origin populations – have been alienated and swept away by the flows of globalisation, which appears in the form of deindustrialisation, mobility, circulation, migration, social-economic inequalities, international trade, tourism, “greedy bankers”, and automation. In reaction, many are inclined to adopt two interrelated political discourses, which have become pivotal along with the rise of civilisational rhetoric since the early 1990s: *Islamophobia* and *Islamism*. To put it differently, this neoliberal age appears to have led to the *nativisation of radicalism* among some groups of the disenfranchised native populations while also leading to the *Islamisation of Radicalism* among some segments of the disenfranchised migrant origin populations. The common denominator of these groups is that they are both downwardly mobile and inclined towards *radicalisation*. Existing studies have so far revealed such findings in a way that clusters these two groups of youngsters in separate ethno-cultural and religious boxes (Mudde, 2007, 2016; Roy, 2015, 2017; Kepel, 2017). Based on the idea of offering *one single scientific optical lens* to closely look at some native and migrant-origin youth at the same time, the novelty of this volume lies in its attempt to *de-culturalise* and *de-religionise* social-economic, political, and psychological phenomena. Be the reaction comes in a populist rhetoric or the Islamist rhetoric, they are both employed by radicalising groups of people who have been alienated and swept away by the current neoliberal forms of governance. It is the processes of radicalisation, which need to be understood better. Hence, this volume analyses the social-economic, political, and psychological processes leading to the nativisation of radicalism among the native European youth on the one hand, and the Islamisation

of radicalism among migrant-origin youth with Muslim background on the other.

It seems that some social groups belonging to the majority societies are more inclined to express their distress resulting from insecurity and social-economic deprivation through the language of Islamophobia, even in cases that are not related to the perceived threat of Islam. Several decades ago, Seymour Martin Lipset (1960) stated that the social-political discontent of people is likely to lead them to anti-Semitism, xenophobia, racism, regionalism, supranationalism, fascism, and anti-cosmopolitanism. Suppose Lipset's timely intervention in the 1950s is transposed to the contemporary age. In that case, one could then argue that Islamophobia has also become one of the paths followed by those in a state of social-economic and political dismay. Islamophobic discourse has resonated greatly in the last decade, and its users have been heard by both local and international communities. However, their distress has not necessarily resulted from a Muslim grievance. The first-generation migrants in Europe used left-wing universalist rhetoric to express their problems, whereas the second generations shifted gradually to the particularist language (Roy, 2007). For any troubling situation in the meantime, Muslims have become popular scapegoats. For over a decade, Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants have been primarily seen by large segments of the European public as a financial burden and virtually never as an opportunity for the member states. They tend to be associated with illegality, crime, violence, drug abuse, radicalism, fundamentalism, conflict, and many other ways, represented negatively (Kaya, 2015, 2014).

In addition to using an Islamophobic discourse by some native groups, the agency of populist political figures is also essential in understanding the growth of the radical right in Europe. Populist leaders tend to use different elements of past, heritage, tradition, culture, religion, gender, myths, and memories accumulated in the repertoire of the nationalist imagination (De Cesari and Kaya, 2020; Kaya, 2020). In this regard, it is imperative to examine the implications of the global financial crisis, refugee crisis, COVID-19 pandemic, and EU accession politics on various groups of the European public, be they native or migrant origin groups who are inclined to politically express themselves, respectively, through Islamophobic or Islamist elements coupled with strong populist rhetoric. It seems that those hit by the socio-economic, political, and psychological detrimental effects of globalisation are expressing their anger and disenchantment through ways that undermine the European motto of "unity in diversity".

On the other side of the coin, the volume explores migrant-origin youngsters with Muslim backgrounds who generate an Islamist discourse of empowerment in times of social, economic, and political turmoil. They incorporate themselves into a counter-hegemonic global political narrative, namely Islamism. Then, it becomes essential to find out about the legitimising sources of this discourse, originating partly from the homeland of

migrant origin-people and other spheres of global and regional political and economic contestation. It is also imperative to study how European states have so far accommodated migrant-origin people with a Muslim background and how their attempts to institutionalise Islam have contributed to the Islamisation of radicalism among Muslim-origin migrant populations and their descendants. In this vein, Martijn de Koning problematises the Dutch integration and minority policies, which define Muslims as a threat to social security. Accordingly, racial securitisation has led to two main avenues of Muslim reaction: one that avoids confrontation with the state and one that actively seeks confrontation. Focusing on the Moroccan-origin youths in France, Mehdi Lahlou analyses how marginalised youths were influenced by the Wahabi strand of Islamism, which had penetrated Moroccan society since the end of the 1970s. Finally, with a broader focus on four European states, Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, Metin Koca argues that the new religiosities in the migrant-origin Muslim communities challenge state-led religious reform and conservation projects, be them coming from their countries of origin or residence. Focusing on the new intercultural policies adopted in Italy, Roberta Ricucci lays down a series of emotional support activities that assist the second generation of Muslims in their personality formation and self-expression.

Hence, the volume mainly analyses the ways in which radicalised groups from both native and migrant-origin populations express their discontent using different cultural repertoires (Tilly, 1977). The main premise of the volume is that these groups, respectively, employ Islamophobic or Islamist discourses to express their social-economic, political, and psychological deprivations in the public sphere, which mainly result from the processes of modernisation and globalisation (Calhoun, 2011). In this volume, two chapters have specific importance in our attempt to stress the commonalities between both groups. In her chapter, Ayşenur Benevento identifies Muslim women and right-wing native women in Belgium and discusses their similar reasonings for participation in and support of the two conventional gendered practices – wearing a veil and being a homemaker. Finding and highlighting similar meaning making processes between both native and migrant-origin populations, who also have very little opportunity to contact one another, is important to challenge the mainstream “civilisational discourse” (Brubaker, 2017) that sets European native and Muslim groups apart in two culturally, religiously, and civilisationally defined distinct boxes (Kaya and Benevento, 2021).

The Front Side of the Coin: Nativist-Populist Radicalism Hauling European Citizens

In 1967, researchers at the London School of Economics, including Ernest Gellner, Isaiah Berlin, Alain Touraine, Peter Worsley, and others organised a conference with a specific focus on populism. Following this pivotal

conference, the proceedings were edited by Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (1969) in a rather descriptive book covering several contributions on Latin America, the USA, Russia, Eastern Europe, and Africa. One of the crucial outcomes of the book, which is still meaningful, was that “populism worships the people” (Ionescu and Gellner, 1969: 4). Another outcome was that populism was not really a European phenomenon. However, the conference and the edited volume did not bring a consensus beyond this tautology, apart from adequately displaying particularist characteristics of each populist case.

Today, *populism* has become a global phenomenon. However, the state of play in the scientific community is not very different from the one in the late 1960s with regard to the definition of populism. Rather than having a comprehensive definition of the term, scholars have only come up with a list of elements defining different aspects of populism, such as anti-elitism, anti-intellectualism, and anti-establishment positions; anti-globalism and anti-international trade; affinity with religion and past; racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, anti-Islam, anti-immigration; promoting the image of a socially, economically and culturally homogenous organic society; intensive use of conspiracy theories to understand the world we live in; faith in the leader’s extraordinariness as well as the belief in their ordinariness that brings the leader closer to the people; statism; nativism; and the sacralisation of “the people” (Ghergina et al., 2013: 3–4). One could argue that the global financial crisis, the refugee crisis, and the pandemic may have played a role in the ascendance of nativist-populist rhetoric. Still, they are, at best, catalysts, not causes. After all, if resentment as a social concept posits that losers in the competition over scarce resources respond in frustration with diffuse emotions of anger, fear, hatred, and anxiety, then there have been several other factors in the last three decades which may have triggered the resentment of the European public, such as de-industrialisation, unemployment, growing ethno-cultural diversity, multiculturalism, terrorist attacks in the aftermath of September 11, humiliation as well as the gender social change and the transformation of the gender order and norms challenging hegemonic masculinity (Berezin, 2009: 43–44; Kaya, 2020).

Many definitions of nativism include differentiation between two groups: natives and immigrants. Migrants have been framed in many European countries as a threat since September 11, even earlier, since they have been perceived as a challenge to the societal, national, economic, and cultural security of the nation. The differentiation between natives and immigrants has become even stronger along with the so-called 2015 refugee crisis. This differentiation is mainly based on their respective temporal relation to the nation, the boundaries of which have been often prescribed. Peter Hervik (2015) defines nativism as favouring established inhabitants over newcomers, eventually leading to the marginalisation of immigrant minorities. Hans-Georg Betz’s definition also includes this temporal hierarchy between the two groups. Accordingly, nativism is a political doctrine that prioritises the

interests and the will of the native-born population. The nativist doctrine also dictates that the inhabitants of long standing should reign supreme over those of newcomers (Kešić and Duyvendak, 2019). Mostly, this temporal differentiation between natives and immigrants is coupled with an element of cultural threat by the latter. Betz (2017: 171) posits that nativists regard the nation as grounded in a particular historically evolved culture and system of values that must be preserved and defended at any cost. Both temporal and cultural elements of nativism underline the fear of a loss of identity as a result of being “overrun” by culturally alien foreigners (Betz, 2017: 177). This kind of logic of nativism is represented very well by the polemical thesis of great replacement, which has become prevalent not only in France, but also elsewhere in the West (Camus, 2011). The logic of nativism rests on the demarcation between outsiders and insiders, between foreigners and *the native-born*, acknowledged as bearers of a culturally superior civilisation (Betz, 2017; Kešić and Duyvendak, 2019). In the volume, Ayhan Kaya contributes to these studies by scrutinising heritage populism, utilised by the German nativist party Alternative for Germany (AfD). Based on the testimonies of young AfD supporters, the chapter explains AfD’s exploitation of both dissonant and distant past for the masses in an identity crisis.

However, rather than simply recapitulating on the symptoms, one needs to understand the underlying causes of nativism leading to contemporary societal, political, psychological, and ideational divides emerging in Europe where mainstream political parties are becoming less and less credible by their constituencies while previously marginal populist parties, right or left, are becoming more popular. Kaya’s chapter questions these causes with a localised focus on the formation of populism in the German state of Saxony, suffering from socio-economic, spatial, and nostalgic deprivation. Analogously, there are three main approaches to analysing typologies of populism in Europe as well as in the other parts of the world: a) anti-globalism approach; b) anti-elitism approach; and c) political style approach.

The first approach explains the populist vote with socio-economic factors. This approach argues that populist sentiments come out as the symptoms of detrimental effects of modernisation and globalisation, which are more likely to imprison working-class groups in states of unemployment, marginalisation, and structural outsiderism through neoliberal and post-industrial sets of policies (Betz, 2015). Accordingly, the *losers of globalisation* respond to their exclusion and marginalisation by rejecting the mainstream political parties and their discourses as well as generating a sense of ethno-nationalist, religious and civilisational discourse against migrants (Fennema, 2004). *The second approach* tends to explain the sources of (especially right-wing) extremism and populism with reference to *ethno-nationalist sentiments rooted in myths about the distant victorious past*. This approach claims that strengthening the nation by emphasising a homogenous ethnicity and returning to traditional values is the only way of coming to terms with the challenges

coming from outside enemies, be it globalisation, Islam, the European Union, or the refugees (Rydgren, 2007; Miller-Idriss, 2009). This approach assumes that it is the elites who created all this “mess” resulting from discourses of diversity, multiculturalism, mobility, free international trade, and Europeanisation. *The third approach* has a different stance concerning the rise of populist movements and political parties. Rather than referring to the political parties and movements as a response to outside factors, this approach underlines the *strategic means* employed by populist leaders and parties to appeal to their constituents (Beauzamy, 2013; Kaya, 2020). The populist leaders often attract their followers by means of appealing to the people versus to the elite, generating some bad manners and a political-incorrecness, presenting themselves as both ordinary and extraordinary persons, constantly relying on a crisis, breakdown, or threat, and trying to explain local and global realities through conspiracies (Moffit, 2016: 29).

All three approaches highlight different aspects of populism, but they all agree that there is growing social-economic inequality and injustice in the contemporary world. OXFAM’s findings show that the prosperity of the eighth richest person on earth equals the sum of the prosperity of 3.6 billion people.¹ A growing number of people in Europe criticise the elites, including the scientists, for becoming detached from the realities of everyday life of billions of people and for not leaving their Ivory towers. Nativist-populist rhetoric comes out as a protest and a symptom of these structural inequalities and disparities resulting from social-economic, political and spatial conditions. The scientific translation of radical populist rhetoric in everyday life should be carefully made. Instead of understanding it as an anomaly and disease, scholars should try to understand the messages behind it and the outcries of individuals resorting to it. Populism seems to be one of the radical critics of the neoliberal status quo, which seems to have failed with regards to the redistribution of justice and fairness. Hence, radical populism may be interpreted as an individual tactic to fight back against the meta-narratives (strategies) of globalism and neoliberalism. This is a trend that one could see among many native European citizens. Whereas among some of the subaltern, subjugated “wretched of the earth”, to use Franz Fanon (1965)’s words, who are mostly Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants, Islam becomes the alternative rhetoric to be exploited against globalisation and neoliberalism, a point which will be revisited shortly.

Scientific research has already demonstrated that native youths who are labelled as “far-right extremists” are the off-springs of independent farmers and small shopkeepers who primarily reside in politically, geographically remote places (Rodrigues-Pose, 2018). Buffeted by the global political and economic forces that have produced global hegemonic masculinities, they have responded to the erosion of public and domestic patriarchy with a renewal of their sense of masculine entitlement to restore patriarchy in both arenas. That ancient patriarchal power has been stolen from them by

the liberal and Europeanised political elite and staffed by legions of the newly enfranchised minorities, women, immigrants, and refugees who have become visibly more active in contemporary international economic and political life. Downwardly, mobile rural and/or lower-middle-class youth are now squeezed between the jaws of global capitalism and a political elite that is at best indifferent to their predicament and, at worse, facilitates their further demise. “The losers of globalisation” apparently resent global capitalism, Europeanisation, diversity, mobility of labour, cosmopolitanism, and international migration by capitalising on masculinity, imagined patriarchy, heritage, national past, nationalism, nativism and looking backwards nostalgically to a time when they could assume the places in society to which they believed themselves entitled. The exploitation of masculinity, patriarchy, nativism, past, and heritage as a cultural capital against the detrimental effects of globalisation is undertaken by the mediated acts of populist political figures (Kimmel, 2003; Kaya and Kayaoğlu, 2017; Köttig et al., 2017). In this volume, an interdisciplinary understanding of these approaches is deployed to analyse the rationale behind the radicalisation of nativist-populist youth as well as Muslim-origin youth in Europe.

The Back Side of the Coin: Self-Identified Muslim European Youth with Migration Background

It has become common in Europe to label migrants of Muslim origin as persons with a “Muslim identity”, the boundaries of which remain unchanged over time (cf., Heitmeyer *et al.*, 1997; Laurence, 2012; Nielsen, 2013). One could trace the genealogy of the ways in which migrants have so far been named by host societies and states. Migrant workers were first simply called “workers” in the early days of the migratory process in the 1960s. Then, in the aftermath of the official ban on recruiting migrant labour in 1974, a sharp discursive shift can be observed in their identification by the host societies and states. They have become “foreigners”, “Turks”, “Algerians”, or “Moroccans”. In other words, their ethnic labels have become the primary reference for the host societies. *Ethnicisation* of immigrant workers goes in tandem with the process of deindustrialisation in western European countries, where unemployment started to become a common phenomenon for migrant workers, who were mostly left outside the processes of integration to the spheres of education, politics, housing, and labour market (Lipsitz, 1994; Kaya, 2001).

The latest categorisation made by the majority societies and states in Europe to identify migrant origin groups and their descendants derives from the hegemony of the *civilisational and religious paradigm*, which has become popular since the early 1990s. Since then, migrant groups and their descendants with a Muslim background are unquestionably and homogeneously labelled as *Muslims*. There are several reasons for this discursive

shift in identifying Muslim origin migrants and their descendants primarily with their religious identity as Muslims. We limit ourselves here to name just two specific developments to explain the sources of this shift: the dissolution of the Socialist Block and the war in the former Yugoslavia fuelling the discourses of the end of multiculturalism and the rise of the discourse of the clash of civilisations.

It was mainly the processes of securitisation and stigmatisation of migration that have brought about the ascendancy of political discourse renown as *the end of multiculturalism* – a discourse, which has often been revisited over the last three decades since the war in Bosnia in 1992, leading to the birth of the Huntingtonian clash of civilisations paradigm, which assumes that civilisations in general, and Christianity and Islam in particular, cannot coexist (Huntington, 1996). In contradiction to the earlier sociological and philosophical trends defining civilisation on the basis of the material processes of industrialisation, capitalism, colonialism, and urbanisation (Elias, 1998), Huntington's attempt to reduce civilisation to religion and culture apparently attracted a large audience across the world, including the European Union. The discourse of the end of multiculturalism is often built upon the assumption that the nation's homogeneity is at stake. Thus, it has to be restored at the expense of alienating those who are not ethno-culturally and religiously from the prescribed definition of the nation on the basis of linguistic, religious, and cultural tenets. Today, such a culturalist paradigm, coupled with the unfavourable elements of the global financial crisis, the current refugee crisis and the pandemic, is likely to fuel radical right-wing populism, which highly invests in the revitalisation of ethno-cultural and religious boundaries between native majorities and minorities (Mudde, 2014; Kaya, 2020).

Along with the growth of a neoliberal and culturalist paradigm over the last three decades, many western European states are increasingly inclined to accommodate migrants and their descendants originating from Muslim-origin countries through some representative form of Islamic institutions. It is now a common practice to see that modern states, be it imperial states or nation-states, are inclined to generate a similar pattern in accommodating centrifugal religious communities that are becoming more visible in the public space. One could see parallels between the ways in which the Jews in France in the early 19th century and the Muslims in Germany, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands in the early 21st century (Safran, 2004; Koenig, 2005; Berkovitz, 2007; Kaya, 2012). The *Conseil Français du culte musulman* in France (2003), Islam Summit in Germany (2006), *Exécutif des Musulmans de Belgique* (1995) and the long-lasting Pillar system in the Netherlands have so far contributed to the institutionalisation of Islam and the construction of parallel societies in these countries through the creation of religious-based liaison bodies. The formation of such religious institutions has also prevented Muslim-origin individuals from seeking civic opportunities to represent themselves through existing political parties,

labour unions, and civil society organisations where the members of the society are represented on the basis of their civic identities (Ireland, 2000; Koenig, 2005; Fetzer and Soper, 2005).

Attempts to institutionalise Islam in Europe for the sake of creating *liaison* bodies mediating between Muslims and the central and local state actors go along with the labelling of migrant-origin individuals with Muslim backgrounds simply as “Muslims” by an overwhelming majority of private citizens, political actors, media and even by the academia. The labelling of those individuals through a religious identity at both political and societal levels seems to be very reductionist and simplistic since their self-identifications are extremely diverse, oscillating between “Muslim”, “secular”, “atheist”, “agnostic”, and other identifications (Kaya and Kentel, 2005). Such forms of labelling imposed on migrant-origin individuals and their descendants seem to overshadow the processes of individualisation and democratisation of Islam among younger generations, who have been raised in the European Union countries interacting with individuals of different denominations (Sunier, 2009; Kaya, 2012). Furthermore, the institutionalisation of Islam is also likely to be contributing to the perception of Islam by radical right-wing populist movements as a threat to their authentic way of life.

Religion and ethnicity offer attractive “solutions” for people entangled in intertwined problems. It is not surprising for the masses, who have a gloomy outlook of the future, who cannot benefit from society, and who are cast aside by global capitalism, to resort to honour, religion, ethnicity, language, tradition, and myths, all of which they believe cannot be pried from their hands, and to define themselves in those terms (Eliade, 1991; Clifford, 1994). However, a detailed analysis must be made to decipher the employment of Islam by young Muslims with migration backgrounds in frequent acts of violence. If the analysis is not made rigorously, it will affirm and thus reproduce the existing “clash of civilisations” thesis. Therefore, it is genuinely important to underline that the Islamic identity used by the youth, who show their resistance to the social-economic, cultural and political regimes of truth through different ways (music, graffiti, dance, looting, and arson) in Europe, is not only essentialist, or radical, but also primarily symbolic and democratic (Vertovec, 1995; Kaya, 2014; Martiniello, 2015; Roy, 2015, 2017; Kepel, 2017). The Islamic reference used in such acts of opposition is expressive primarily of the need to belong to a legitimate counter-hegemonic global discourse, such as that of Islam, and derive a symbolic power from that. It seems that religion is now replacing the left in the absence of a global leftist movement. Michel de Certeau (1984: 183) reminds us of the discursive similarities between religion and the left: religion offers a *different world*, and the left offers a *different future* – both offering solidarity. Moreover, it should be remembered that recent acts of violence, such as in Paris (7 January and 13 November 2015), Nice (14 July 2016), Istanbul (1 January 2017), Berlin (28 February 2017), London (2017), Paris (2018) and rapidly spreading to

other cities and countries, are also an indication of the solidarity among the members of the newly emerging transnational Islam, who are claimed to be engaged in religious fundamentalism.

Gilles Kepel (2008, 2017) and Olivier Roy (2007, 2015) are two leading experts working on the Jihadist groups in the EU. While Kepel mostly concentrates on France, Roy has recently extended his research to other European countries, trying to understand the causes of Islamist radicalism and Jihadism. Kepel addresses the social-economic exclusion and colonial memories of Muslim-origin youngsters as well as the promotion of Salafism by the Gulf countries (mainly Saudi Arabia and Qatar) to explain their affiliation with radical Islam and Jihadism. His main assumption is that Islam is becoming radicalised among young Muslims who are exposed to structural outsiderism in the west. Roy (2015, 2017), on the other hand, argues that the issue is not the radicalisation of Islam but rather “the Islamisation of radicalism”. Roy claims that the Jihadists, mostly second-generation immigrants, were caught between the tradition-bound world of their parents and the secularism of their French society. Unable to find a place, they adopted a nihilistic rejection of society, expressing through Islam the absence of a strong Marxist language in the contemporary world (Roy, 2015, 2017).

Yet, what Olivier Roy (2015) has already indicated with regards to the analysis of such forms of radicalism, is very important for us to diagnose what is happening. As one of the leading scholars working on the concept of radicalisation, Olivier Roy scrutinises the relevancy and the excellence of the book with a commentary in [Chapter 10](#). Roy corrects the misdiagnosis, arguing that what is happening is not the radicalisation of Islam, but rather the Islamisation of radicalism in the age of neoliberalism. Combining the analyses of Roy (2015) and de Certeau (1984), it is more likely to understand better what is happening in diasporas: *Islamisation of radicalism* among some young Muslims, mostly converts and second/third generations with a Muslim background, in the absence of a counter-hegemonic global left-wing ideology.

The growing popularity of Islam among younger generations in transnational spaces is partly a consequence of the processes of globalisation. *However, only a small minority of young Muslims become radicalised in the diaspora.* The majority of them generate moderate forms of religious identities in a way that liberates them from the confines of their patriarchal culture. The global circuitry of modern telecommunications also contributes to forming a *digitalised umma* within the Muslim diaspora, which is based on the idea of a more homogeneous *community of sentiments* (Appadurai, 1990), shaped by a constant flow of identical signs and messages travelling across cyberspace. A *digitalised umma* (Muslim community) shaped by electronic capitalism tends to get engaged in various forms of *ijtihad* (an Arabic word, meaning interpretation of the Quran) because each individual dwells in a different social, political or cultural context within the diaspora. Whilst the signs and messages disseminated across the diaspora are rather more homogeneous, their impact

on individual lives differs greatly. The signs and messages form a more heterogeneous and individualised form of the *umma*. This kind of *ijtihad*, built up by the media, has the potential to turn recipients into a virtual *alim* (an Arabic word for intellectual) who can challenge the authority of traditional religious scholars (Mandaville, 2001: 160). As Appadurai (1997: 195) rightly says, “new forms of electronically mediated communication are beginning to create virtual neighbourhoods, no longer bounded by territory, passports, taxes, elections, and other conventional political diacritics.” These new *communities of sentiments* are constructed in cyberspace, a space often occupied by modern transnational subjects (Vertovec, 1999).

The reality in Europe today is that young Muslims are becoming politically mobilised to support causes that have less to do with faith and more to do with global communal solidarity with their peers in Gaza, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere, the manifestation of which can be described as an identity based on *vicarious humiliation* (Buruma and Margalit, 2004: 10). Some European Muslims develop empathy for Muslim victims elsewhere in the world and convince themselves that their exclusion and that of their co-religionists have the exact root cause: *The western rejection of Islam*. The rejection of Islam has recently become even more alarming due to the rise of nativist-populist movements in Europe that are often capitalising on the growing institutional visibility of Islam in public space and are not likely to observe the individualisation and democratisation of Islam in everyday life. However, the difficulties of the migration context, to which the migrants with a Muslim background are being exposed, do not only stem from the ways in which they are framed and represented by the political and societal actors of the receiving countries, but also from the state actors of their homeland country. In the chapter written by Metin Koca, the readers have the opportunity of going through a discussion of globalisation mechanics influencing the complex religious making processes of migrant-origin communities in Belgium, Germany, France, and the Netherlands. Mehdi Lahlou, on the other hand, examines a specific population, the Moroccan origin youth, to examine the intertwined relationship between community practices, messages, values, past events, and the global form of *umma*, creating a particularly interesting case in France.

An Interdisciplinary Approach to Radicalism

Radicalism cannot be understood as a stable ideological position. Ideas that are radical at some point could be liberal or even conservative for another. Liberals and democrats of the 19th century were the radicals of their age. It is no longer possible to call them as such. The 1968 generation was also radical in the sense that they challenged the patriarchal socio-political order. The radicals of the 1968 generation were different from the radicals of the 19th century. Similarly, the radicals of the present are also very different

from the former ones. Departing from the theory of social movements, Calhoun (2011) claims that the defence of tradition by nationalist, nativist, populist, or religious groups has also become a radical stance today. He even continues to suggest that this sort of populism and conservatism “has been important to struggles for democracy, for inclusion in the conditions under which workers and small proprietors live” (Calhoun, 2011, p. 250). The present volume contributes to Calhoun’s earlier attempts to challenge the current ways of reducing radicalism to different forms of extremism, which neglect socio-economic, philosophical, political, and psychological determinants of radicalism.

Charles Tilly’s explanation of collective action is also instrumental for social scientists to understand better the distinctive characteristics of mobilisation at the present time and radical mobilisation in this case. He makes distinctions among three different forms of mobilisation: defensive, offensive, and preparatory. Defensive mobilisation is often bottom-up. A threat from outside, such as globalism, capitalism, or injustice, induces the group members to pool their resources to fight the enemy. Tilly classifies the radical food riots, tax rebellions, invasions of fields, and draft resistance in contemporary Europe as defensive forms of mobilisation. One could also list nativist and Islamist youth mobilisations in the same cluster. Offensive mobilisation is often top-down. This could be a political alliance between bourgeois and artisans to produce the Great Reform Bill of 1832 that introduced radical changes to the electoral system of England and Wales (Tilly, 1977, p. 34). One could also argue that the new political alliances organised by some European right-wing populist parties among various social groups such as working-class groups, precarious groups, women, and LGBTI groups that generate a growing stream of Islamophobic sentiments may also fall into this category (Kaya, 2020). Eventually, the last category of mobilisation, according to Tilly (1977), is preparatory mobilisation, which is also a top-down one. In this kind of mobilisation, the group pools resources in anticipation of future opportunities and threats. For instance, labour unions store some money to cushion hardships that may appear in the future in the form of unemployment, or loss of wages during a strike. This is a kind of proactive mobilisation planned for future threats. Accordingly, one could argue that PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the Occident), established first in Dresden, can be named as preparatory form of mobilisation as they seek to protect the Occident from the Muslim “invasion” (Kaya, 2020). In the book, Ayhan Kaya examines the presence of yet another right-wing populist organisation, AfD, through its supporters in Dresden. His chapter stresses that ideological features shared by the right-wing populist organisations in Dresden are used to justify specific political demands such as the stronger regulation of immigration and the exclusion of Muslims.

There is also a strand of research in psychology that relies on socio-economic characteristics to understand factors that influence the process

of radicalisation. This strand is also covered by the contributors in the volume coming from Psychology (Catarina Kinnvall, Tereza Capelos, Poppy Laurens, Constantina Badea, and Ayşenur Benevento). Some scholars acknowledge that pathways into radicalisation are multilevel and involve layers of factors, including intra-individual, community-based, and contextual with global ideological forces such as socio-economic grievance, conflicting identities, injustice, oppression, or socio-economic exclusion, marginalisation, alienation, discrimination, civil war or deep-rooted conflicts, invasion and occupation by foreign military forces, economic underdevelopment, bad governance and corruption penetrating the state at all levels, rapid modernisation, de-industrialisation and technological developments such as the rise of the internet and social media (e.g. Allport, 1954; Tajfel, 1981; Taarnby, 2005; Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2008; Ferguson and Binks, 2015; Maskaliūnaitė, 2015; Ferguson and McAuley, 2020a; Coolsaet et al., 2019). The chapter authored by Roberta Ricucci contributes to the body of literature by examining the influence of religiosity among migrant-origin individuals from Italy and their values towards secularisation as an indicator of their acculturation attitudes as well as leanings towards radicalisation. In addition, while many radicalised individuals share similar experiences, there exist research accounts that show no direct link between becoming ideologically and politically radicalised and engaging in extremist violence (e.g. Della Porta and La Free, 2012; Ferguson and McAuley, 2020b). Such accounts that challenge the previously confirmed constructs urge psychologists to forego positivistic and normative claims. By introducing the term “relational radicalisation”, Constantina Badea identifies the interactive arenas from which marginalisation of Muslims emerges and discusses how these mechanisms influence each other and concatenate to constitute radicalisation processes.

The importance of a comprehensive and culturally sensitive approach for the study of radicalisation is also crucial for the implications the research might have in deradicalisation efforts. To date, research-led and government-led initiatives address the challenge of deradicalisation through a combination of education, training, cultural and religious dialogue that helps members of distinct small communities to have financial and educational freedom, build empathy for each other, etc. Research or government-led initiative that is deaf to the socio-cultural norms and the local economic and political realities not only have little chance of being accepted by individuals who already have a high perception of political grievance but also might widen the trust gap between those individuals and authorities. Therefore, a community-based approach might also have a lot to offer to those who plan to move beyond understanding the radicalisation process in a unique context and study patterns of differences and similarities with others who share similar characteristics (Benevento, 2021). In different ways, all the chapters provide implications for locally and culturally sensitive deradicalisation

efforts at the policy level. More specifically, however, [Chapter 3](#), written by Denis van de Wetering and Tobias Hecker and [Chapter 7](#), authored by Martijn de Koning, have specific importance for scholars and policymakers interested in professional deradicalisation work. Based on his 20 years of work, Koning critically examines the purpose and the consequences of counter-radicalisation efforts targeting Dutch Muslim communities. Bringing a clinical psychology perspective to the book, Wetering and Hecker explore the possibilities and limits of the use of clinical interviews based on their interviews with former far-right extremists in Germany. The latter is significant for including interviews with female far-right extremists, a hard-to-access population and, thus, less represented in scholarly writing.

To recapitulate, this edited volume is based on an interdisciplinary perspective bringing scholars and their empirical research together to have a critical stance on the notions of radicalisation and radicalism. Based on the empirical and theoretical works of sociologists, anthropologists, political scientists, and psychologists, this volume demonstrates the socio-economic, political, spatial, and emotional root causes of radicalisation among different young segments of the European population who are exposed to various challenges resulting from detrimental effects of globalisation such as de-industrialisation, socio-economic deprivation, spatial deprivation, nostalgic deprivation, structural outsiderism, alienation, and humiliation.

Scope of the Volume

This collection includes empirical investigations, literature reviews, practitioner testimonies, secondary analyses, and theoretical reflections to evaluate the radicalisation of both native populist youth and Islamist Muslim youth in Europe. The authors are a mixture of senior academics, early-career researchers, and specialists with a history in practice who are located throughout Europe and beyond. The authors' various roles as academics, youth specialists, or practitioners result in a variety of texts, from theory-guided interpretations to chapters written from the research field. We appreciate the contributors who tackled the delicate subject of radicalisation and provided their perspectives on how and why the youth might be radicalising.

While we acknowledge the complex system of radicalisation processes affected by multiple levels of the surrounding factors, from the immediate settings of the individual to broader religious, economic, political, and cultural issues; we found it useful to categorise the chapters in accordance with their core message about the underlying causes of radicalisation. The first section of the volume is entitled "Spatial Deprivation and Geographic Contexts". This section aims to invite the reader to rethink existing conceptualisations and approaches to studying radicalisation and discover the way they are rooted in local and regional factors. In [Chapter 1](#), Roberta Ricucci

demonstrates a shift in tone, identifying the tell-tale indicators of a division between first- and second-generation associationism in the Muslim community in Turin, Italy. Ayhan Kaya brings empirical evidence from Dresden, Germany in [Chapter 2](#) to investigate the popularity of the AfD in eastern Germany. The analysis includes AfD's effective communication strategies that exploit the social-economic problems of the local inhabitants. He further argues that the places that experience geographical and nostalgic deprivation might be at risk of becoming the hub of extremist discourse the most. As such, [Chapters 1 and 2](#) zoom into understudied yet extremely intriguing places – Dresden and Turin – to contextualise the settings in which radicalisation matters. Following Kaya's chapter that identifies the local drivers of the nativist radicalism in Dresden, Wetering, and Hecker on the narratives of 13 former right-wing extremist men in Germany in [Chapter 3](#). Questioning the identity-related challenges to their disengagement, Wetering and Hecker reveal the role of the social environment, which is marked by anger, hatred, aggression, and outbursts of violence.

The second section focuses on mental processes more specifically, drawing on the contributions from the discipline of psychology. This section is akin to Wetering and Hecker's approach in narrowing down on the individuals and questioning what else, alongside the spatial factors, triggers individuals' radicalisation. In [Chapter 4](#), Constantina Badea reviews the psychology literature to investigate the role of intergroup dynamics behind Islamophobia and Islamist "extremisation" in Europe. Badea argues that these dynamics could be reversed by "deconstructing" the perceptions that all Muslims are segregationists and all members of the majority society are Islamophobic. In [Chapter 5](#), Catarina Kinnvall, Tereza Capelos, and Poppy Laurens bring forward the intersectionality of gender, religion, and nationalism as drivers and inhibitors of nativism and extremism. The chapter contributes significantly to our understanding of the everyday tensions between French-Muslim women and the majority society in France. Allured by the women's perspective, Ayşenur Benevento ([Chapter 6](#)) also consults women in Belgium to speak of their personal gendered choices. Benevento questions whether those choices could be labelled as radical or not based on their justifications and identities. The chapter provides a case study of both self-identified Muslim women and right-wing native women and recognises the rarely heard voices of the latter group in research.

The third section aims to reassess the received wisdom over Islamist radicalisation critically, given the widespread focus on Islamism(s) in the academic literature and beyond. In [Chapter 7](#), Martijn de Koning focuses on the Dutch state's use of radicalisation as an ideological imperative by "racialising" governance against Muslims. Focusing on the practices and technologies of governing, Koning problematises the mechanisms through which the state defines those who belong to the nation and those who do not. Focusing on the French case, Mehdi Lahlou's [Chapter 8](#) delves into

the history of Moroccan-origin Europeans' radicalisation. Lahlou lays down the political-economic internal and external factors behind youths' religious radicalisation. Metin Koca (Chapter 9) seeks migrant-origin European Muslims' agency in their engagement with various globalisation mechanics. Despite participating in religious activities promoted by their countries of origin, their religious sense-making goes beyond, and sometimes against, these activities. Koca concludes that the process saturates the religious field in Europe to the extent that researchers and policymakers shall identify the radicalisation possibilities outside the scope of violent radicalisation. In his commentary, Olivier Roy analyses the alternative claims on the causes of radicalisation into violent extremism, the motives behind radicalisation, and deradicalisation as a "religious question" in Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority contexts.

Note

- 1 <https://www.oxfam.org/en/pressroom/pressreleases/2017-01-16/just-8-men-own-same-wealth-half-world>, accessed on 15 September 2022.

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Part I

Spatial Deprivation and Local Contexts



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Please, Don't Blame Us

It Is Possible to Be Both Muslim and a Good Citizen in a Catholic Country

Roberta Ricucci

Introduction¹

Immigrant religiosity is alive, as evidenced by the existence of mosques and prayer halls in several European immigrant-hosting countries like Italy. Welcoming centres also offer a kind of social-support system both for new arrivals and irregular immigrants (Portes and Hao, 2002; Berking et al., 2018). On the other hand, migrants feel at ease in places of worship – there they find clergymen speaking their native language, sharing (or at least understanding) their cultural and ethnic background, and being aware of the difficulties of the meeting/clash between familiar ways of life and those expected by the host society (Bruce, 2017). If this is the situation for the first generation of immigrants, what happens with the second generations?² Are they following the secularisation process spreading among youth in Europe? Are they religious in the same way as their parents or are they embracing the European “lay” way? Scientific studies have focused on the growing presence of Muslims through observations and insights carried out from different perspectives: religious beliefs and practices, hope for a certain type of society (secular versus Islamic), definition of identity (religious, Italian, and cosmopolitan), orientation regarding the education of children, inter-marriage, and requests made to educational institutions (recognition of holidays and religious teaching in school) (Allievi, 2009; Cesari, 2014). In addition, attention to the religious variable has often been correlated with that dedicated to labour issues (Are Muslims discriminated against in the labour market, compared to other religious affiliations?), schooling (Does the increasing number of Muslim students give rise to claims against secularisation and changes in education?), urban schedules, and spaces, with specific requests regarding nutrition, places of worship, and areas for the burial of the dead (Giorgi, 2020).

The debate on Muslims in Europe sometimes overlaps with that on migration. Indeed, even though an increasing part of Muslims are nowadays European citizens, in the public debate, they are still considered migrants and, among the various migrant categories (asylum seekers, highly skilled

migrants, and unaccompanied minors ...), the less integrable in Western societies due to their religious belonging. In this perspective, Muslims seem to be the most important group, which has challenged the national integration models, highlighting their lack of pursuing socio-economic and cultural inclusion (Kurien, 2021). The discussion on integration has shifted from national to local levels and also affected the debates on Muslims and their rate of inclusion in the various societal domains (Emerson, 2009; Burchardt and Michalowsky, 2015; Martínez-Ariño, 2017; Caponio et al., 2019). To some extent, the local dimension has been overlooked. This means, on the one hand, that local policies intervene in managing Muslim communities' daily lives and, on the other hand, that it is the arrival of the second generation that modifies (strengthening or weakening; modifying or erasing) their fathers and mothers' recognition demands, which had sometimes provoked a public reaction on the part of the citizenry.

The chapter attempts to view these two aspects through the experience of Turin, which qualifies as a privileged observatory for seeing how Islam is managed at the local level due to its history of immigration, the volume of Muslim presence, and immigration policies.³ There are two elements that give pause for reflection. The first is that Turin is one of the few Italian contexts containing a mature Muslim community with children and adults, old and young, neo-Italians, and converts. Within the city's Muslim universe, the Moroccan (first-arrived and most numerous) and Egyptian collectives are examples of "complete migratory cycles" (Castles and Miller, 1973). The second is that the (negative) effects of the economic crisis are reverberating on the social fabric, bringing back to the fore tensions, and unresolved knots coming from intercultural as well as interreligious cohabitation, two elements that may affect the dynamics between local policies and managing Islam (Frisina, 2008).

Setting the Scene: Being Muslim in an Italian Multicultural and Still Strong Catholic City

For a long time, in Italy and in its main towns and cities, immigration has been synonymous with North Africa, especially Morocco: this was because Italians started to meet migrants selling small things along the city centres that were mainly from Morocco. So, Moroccans easily became – per antonomasia – synonymous with immigrants (Cingolani and Ricucci, 2014). Later, others who were less invisible in the street started to populate Italian dreams (Filipinas and Peruvians as health caretakers) and nightmares (Chinese, Senegalese, and Tunisian as competitors in the labour market). But, for scholars and service operators, North Africa also means growing numbers of Egyptians and Tunisians in one of the main Italian cities, Turin.

However, Turin has been above all the city of Moroccans. In 2002, the registry office recorded 10,796, about one-tenth of them being Egyptians. There were 6,637 Rumanians (Omedè and Procopio, 2002) – destined to become, in a few years, the national group most representative of immigration. In two decades, the scene had been radically transformed: the Europeanisation of flows brought to the fore Rumanians, Ukrainians, and Moldovans, putting in the shade the city's traditional provenances upon which the spotlight of researchers, social workers, and the media had been focused. Indeed, the last years of the old Millennium, and the first years of the new, saw Moroccans particularly under the microscope. One looked to them for signs of immigration stabilising and taking root in the city. This explains the research on employment insertion, family characteristics, socio-cultural insertion (from associationism⁴ both ethnic and faith-based to religious participation), future prospects through the eyes of second generations, and, finally, religion and relations with Islam, which greatly worried and upset the citizenry.

However, within several years, the attention paid to them faded, creating space for curiosity about, and sometimes fear of, the growing presence of Rumanians and other East European citizens. This meant that the focus shifted to the new ethnic communities from the Muslim communities. In the meantime, the Muslim population increased mainly due to family reunions and continuing their insertion dynamics (Ricucci, 2021b). Thus, scholars continued to be interested in how the second generations grew and how things changed in Muslim communities.

It is difficult to outline the characteristics of the Muslim population because there are no available statistics based on religion (Table 1.1). The above table shows data on people settled in Italy from countries with a Muslim population. Focussing on the Turin scenario, which is in tune with the national context, according to the most recent qualitative studies

Table. 1.1 Estimates of Muslims in Italy by January 1, 2021 (first main ten national groups)

Albanian	440,854
Moroccan	432,458
Bangladeshi	147,872
Egyptian	136,113
Pakistani	127,101
Senegalese	111,380
Tunisian	98,321
Gambian	21,887
Turkish	20,247
Algerian	19,447

Source: Idos – Confronti (2021).

(Bossi and Ricucci, 2022), the Muslim population in Turin can be divided into three groups:

1. Albanians: They have a very low rate of attendance at the mosque. It is logical that following the negative stigmatisation suffered by Albanians during the 1990s, they have chosen an “assimilation strategy” of integration (Romania, 2004).
2. Moroccans, Egyptians, and Tunisians: They represent the majority of the Muslim population in Turin. There are no significant differences among these three groups in their way of being Muslim in Turin.
3. People from sub-Saharan countries: The most numerous are immigrants from Senegal, the Ivory Coast, and Somalia, followed by Cameroon, Ghana, Mali, and Nigeria. They represent the most secularised group of the Muslim population, both in the first and second generations. A large and well-known Muslim brotherhood, the so-called Murid Brotherhood has played an important role in the integration process of Senegalese who arrived in Turin in the 1980s (Castagnone et al., 2005).

Recently, more attention has been dedicated to youth, those who are still foreigners, and those who have already become Italians. According to various qualitative studies (Ricucci, 2017; Premazzi, 2021), an interesting development among second-generation immigrants is the polarisation that is taking place in relation to the significance of religion in their own lives. Indeed, there is a growing number of second-generation youngsters who opt for a more secular way of life, while an increasingly large group is choosing a more conscious form of Islam (Crescenti, 2021). For young people of the second generation who often have little ethnic social network compared with the links they have with Italians and other peers with various ethnic and religious backgrounds, Islamism can provide a transparent, supportive, and all-embracing frame of reference (Cingolani and Ricucci, 2014).

Socio-economic status varies among the various Muslim communities. Some Moroccans come from the poorest areas of their country (Khouribga), with very low educational attainment and an unqualified job profile; others are qualified and work in Turin as cultural mediators or self-employed persons. Upon their arrival in Turin and the rest of Italy, the Senegalese were generally peddlers. In Ambrosini's (2005) words, they have gone “from peddler to plumber to professional”. Egyptians and Tunisians started out working in restaurants and the construction sector, and now a lot of them are entrepreneurs. Albanians are spread out in various sectors, and many of them are women. This is the main difference in comparing the socio-economic status of the various Muslim communities (Prefettura – UTG del Governo and Città di Torino, 2006, 2008).

In the eyes of the city administration, there is no Muslim religious organisation that is more important than the others. In this perspective, the

administration interacts with these organisations stressing their role as an important bridge between the host society and the specific ethnic communities they refer to. Indeed, the administration is interested in supporting the role as an actor in promoting the inclusion of Muslim organisations (Mezzetti and Ricucci, 2019).⁵ Activities promoted by Muslim religious organisations are considered by the city administration as useful support for the welfare of local Muslim communities. They offer meeting places and provide after-school activities for children and adolescents, representing an important information point for neo-immigrants.

Young Muslims in the Mirror

What is happening among the younger generations? Are the children of immigrants born abroad and reunited during compulsory schooling or born and socialised entirely in Italy, following their parents' footsteps? Or do they share with their peers an attitude that oscillates between indifference and an autonomous way of believing in God, often removed from organisational ties? In order to answer these questions, the chapter refers to the results of a research activity that delved into the biographies of over 200 migrant-origin young people, with a prevalence of female components. Specifically, here we reflect on 80 specific interviews, collected in several Italian cities, 36 interviews with Moroccans (first and second generations), Tunisians, Senegalese, and Egyptians living in Turin, carried out in 2019–2021, divided equally by sex. These were young people, mainly high school, or university graduates, from a Muslim milieu, residing in different Italian towns and cities and with a heterogeneous degree of participation in religious associations.⁶ This diversity made it possible to collect entries that were different in terms of socio-cultural background and family migration history, such as the Muslim component's move to Italy. The analysis of the semi-structured qualitative interviews with those young people and the author's participation in meetings and events organised by cultural, religious, and community-based associative environments in offline and virtual environments form the basis of this chapter. The quotation below⁷ brings us back to the migratory reality that Italy knows today, built through a history of almost half a century. Here, for some communities, the so-called Herberg paradox is being realised: *what the first generations want to transmit, the second ones try to forget, and the third ones want to recover.*

There is a group of active young adults. We make many initiatives; we want to link the association and the mosque to the territory. We organize activities for Muslim families and the children who attend, but also initiatives that take us outside and make us known. It is not an easy generational change. However, at a certain point it is as if the adults, who are also showing the hardships of migration and sacrifices,

give up. I don't want to exaggerate, but we are better prepared, we have more tools to talk to young people born or raised in Italy. It is not a lack of respect or trust. It's natural. We also had some discussions, and sometimes we were not warned about certain events or appointments with the constituency. I guess it's a phase for all organizations. I know of associations where there was no agreement and the younger ones who wanted to continue their involvement but then decided to break away and either found their own association or join others that already existed. Personally, I think it's an inevitable process and it's not that important where you are, but not to stop dedicating yourself to the ideals that guide us. We want a more inclusive society, to be active participants in the processes and decisions that affect us, to be citizens who are aware even if we don't all have the city, but that's another story and another commitment.

(F, 29, Morocco)

For many young people about to assume roles and functions in the adult world, the feeling is that they are in the middle of a ford: they have heard and learned stories and times permeated from elsewhere or told by their parents or other adults who have performed educational tasks. Even before 2020 and the dating restrictions brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, they experienced celebrations. They participated in events in their family's country of origin through the mediation of the Internet, sharing online demonstrations of protest, occasions of celebration, and, sometimes, suffering. Experiences certainly left marks – the emblematic nature of which can nevertheless be debated. In some cases, what counts is the desire to be “*other*” from what one is perceived to be on a daily basis and to claim one's own multifaceted identity. As another interviewee points out, feelings are particularly strong when confronted with young Muslims because of their religious identity:

When my Romanian friend said that women go to mass wearing white veils, no one reacted. On the contrary, the teacher said that even in Italy they used to do that. When I told them about the veil, one of my classmates immediately said that the veil is not permissible in Italy, that all should be forced to take it off. Some girls also intervened. I tried to explain what the veil means to us, the idea behind it, the choice, but they wouldn't even let me speak. In the end, I banged my fists on the table and told them about Muslim countries where you don't have to wear the veil, like Tunisia, about the women MPs in Morocco, Muslim women who are not enslaved as many think. There is a lot of ignorance and schools do not do much. There is little talk about Islam, no room for discussion. And even the teachers don't seem to want to. It is good with the Romanian students who don't cause problems or those from

Catholic countries, like the Ukrainian girl who came to my sister's class or the Peruvian girls I had. It's all simple, no flashy symbols, no special requests or holidays that are not celebrated in Italy. In the end you have to survive: either you choose to be stronger and so you do like my cousin, she is not afraid, she wears the veil, she argues, even in the street, when someone is being funny; or, you choose my way, you keep quiet, you don't say anything and you try to be invisible.

(F, 21, Morocco)

For the Muslims, at the centre of attention are the symbols, the traditions, and also the necessary changes that could be occurred in a migratory experience of believers of a religion that, for every attack, far or near, puts Muslims under scrutiny, reserving for its main actors – Italian citizens or even just long-term residents – the treatment of “*unwelcome guests to be treated with suspicion*” (Premazzi and Ricucci, 2016, 4). The theme of prejudice re-emerges and is often reinforced, demonstrating that migration is still an issue tolerated by many, but interjected as a figure of the new millennium only by a part of the citizenry, hopefully not a small minority. It is undeniable – and the data from the most recent polls on Italians' fears confirms this – how immigration and some of its principal actors (especially those we assume to be Muslims because they hold the passport of a country where Islam is the majority religion) represent a growing concern. This is not surprising. It is enough to watch a news program, leaf through a newspaper, or open its online version to realise that better information and education on coexistence and diversity would be necessary for everyone – children and adults, natives, and immigrants.

In the last five years (also confirmed during the pandemic period), there has been a re-emerging need for places, activities, and projects to develop knowledge, promote debates, update ideas, and verify impressions that, if wrong, risk triggering dangerous social conflicts (Premazzi, 2021). At the same time, there is, paradoxically, a step backwards in the demands that Muslim citizens make of institutions: mosques and legal recognition, important issues that could be placed in the background. More significant, or perhaps more urgent and cannot be postponed, are issues such as becoming an important and recognised interlocutor for local administrations, for schools, and for the rich and articulated world of the private social sector that deals with assistance, information, and socio-cultural promotion as well as the theme of local protagonism and rootedness, which translates into developing activities of economic support, accompanying the integration of new arrivals or reunited women. Similarly, the focus on the socialisation of the youngest, from an intercultural perspective, with an important and robust perspective aims at taking up the tension – peculiar to the younger generations – of developing a religious affiliation that is able to combine their feeling of being Italian (or in some cases no longer linked to their

parents' homeland) and the teaching of faith transmitted by their mothers and fathers. Therefore, there are new priorities among young Muslims in the demands to be worked on and invested in. It is particularly in this phenomenon that the differences between the first and second generations, between fathers (and backstage, mothers) and sons (and, not always backstage, daughters), emerge.

Generational Passage: Religious Socialisations and Outcomes

For the children of immigration, even in the field of faith, migration capital is a burden – a “burning” capital, difficult to manage (Molteni and Dimitriadis, 2021). Among the Muslims who are more involved in associations, there is a greater awareness of the issue; among the others, who are more interested in blending in and not underlining their religious affiliation through active practice, there is a feeling of bewilderment and a clear distance from their parents and their teachings on religion.

Our parents do not understand that religion does not have the same value for us. We attended classes at the mosque, my younger sister is preparing for the Koran recitation competition. When you become a teenager, you confront other worlds, the world of your friends, your schoolmates, you read. Religion often becomes what others see of you, a label that others see on you, but that means nothing to you, yes, we celebrate the main festivals, but in this we are perfectly Italian: we celebrate but do not believe as many of our Catholic peers do with Christmas. And I can say the same about many of my Romanian or Bengali friends, who are also Muslim in the family.

(M, 24, Tunisia)

The Tunisian interviewee clearly explains a classical mechanism in several children of immigrants' life stories, i.e. of taking the distance from parental cultural background and values, at least in the broader society, from school to sport associations to peer-group activities. The goal is to be “invisible” and to be “not-distinguishable” from their peers according to how they used to behave, how they believed, and what they used to do as traditions at home, especially during adolescence. This attitude has become particularly widespread after 9/11 and the entire subsequent event labelled as a “terroristic attack”, which enforced stereotypes and prejudices towards all Muslims, independently from their religious ideas.

We know who we are, we are Italian Muslims. We are not Arabs, we are not terrorists, and we are not foreigners. Perhaps it is you who have not understood who we are, who have problems with our identity. Even our

parents are unclear about who we are and are surprised when they only hear us speak Italian or say we are Italian.

(F, 22, Egypt)

For some young Muslim people being able to cope with stereotypes means strongly stressing the Italian part of their identity. This is also an exercise they often have to do with their parents and the elderly people of their ethnic community: the latter group invites young people to be more and more involved in associations with the idea of feeding – their image – them; the youth, indeed, have various ideas of how to manage the religious identity in a country where Islam not only is a minority religion but also not welcomed. In addition to this, youth are well aware of the multi-facets of religious identity: there are several options from being “a strong believer” to being “a totally secular one”.

For me and many of my friends, religion is a cultural trait, a piece of my upbringing; nothing more. We learnt to respect our elders and we learnt the rules of Islam. We live here, this is our place and our time is a time when religion is different from what it represented for our grandparents or for some parents. We are Muslims by tradition, but not because we always go to the mosque or because we are respectful of all the rules. It is curious that you don't understand this, the Italians, the French, and the Germans who don't have foreign origins behave the same way. You keep thinking that we are like our parents, bewildered, who need to find in religion a hook to resist. We are Italians, we feel Italian, this is our country and we do not need religion to feel at home. We must not be discriminated against because you do not know what Islam is and you are afraid of everything.

(M, 24, Senegal)

The generational passage can be noted in the relationship that young people develop with religious belonging even more than practices and dynamics in the public arena (Granata, 2010). To synthesise and simplify, young interviewees can be divided into two groups: the first group refers to those who have been religiously socialised without developing a strong religious identity and defining themselves as Muslim by education (they rarely attend the mosque, any religious value as a life-guide); the second one gathers those who show a religious identity in their religious practices and in how they orient their life.

Among the first group, there are those for whom religion is little more than education received in the family Guolo (2005). They would call them secularised young people who take part in some rituals, maintaining a collective Muslim identity in the face of relative indifference on the level of faith. Religion becomes a reference to the family environment exclusively,

with a relationship of some intensity until adolescence, and then a distancing. In these cases, being Muslim is a (small) piece in the identity mosaic.

My father is very religious. I was practicing from the age of eight to 18. I always did the five prayers a day, Ramadan etc., because my father had passed on his faith to me. Then at a certain point, I started thinking a little bit in my own way. I don't know, going dancing, watching certain programmes, going out a lot, not going to mosque every week or drinking alcohol, I had to choose. So, I didn't pray anymore; on the other hand, I continued to do Ramadan. Obviously, this displeased my father, but it is my choice. It is useless to go and pray just to please your father. I don't do the five prayers anymore and I don't go to a mosque on Fridays. When you're outside of Muslim countries you can't do certain things anymore, also because going to school or working you can't do that unless you have Fridays off. Some of our parents live as if nothing has changed, for them it is as if in a painting, you change the frame, but the rest remains the same. Here, it is different, the frame is the same, and the rest has changed. We have changed, colleagues, friends, schedules, neighbourhoods, holidays are different. My sisters have also followed the same path as me: one stopped long before me, one resumed after years of interruption, the other two believe but do not pray. However, we all do Ramadan. In short, there are small differences but more or less we have all chosen the same path. My father, on the other hand, continues to go to the mosque, during Ramadan he goes every day; during the rest of the year, because he works, he prays at home in the evenings. However, he has remained very practicing Muslim.

(M, 24, Morocco)

The above words are once again emblematic not only of how adults and young people live their relationship with religion but also of how this relationship cuts across backgrounds. The difference in approach that accompanies the two generations is the same as that found in many Italian families: the outcome of religious socialisation can sometimes result in a younger generation continuing the tradition of their parents' religious behaviour and practices; at other times, they give rise to processes of distancing, to autonomous paths of relating to the sacred (Martino, 2016), *as the next quotation illustrates*.

My parents tried to pass on their culture and religion to me, but I realized from the very beginning that it was no good. However, I am attached to some things and I want them to stay with me for the rest of my life, because it is something that binds me to them and identifies me. Even if I am not a believer, I identify with them and I like them.

(M, 18, Egypt)

For a second group of Muslim youngsters, religion is a key element of identity, sometimes even in contrast with their parents' generation, which has developed a more private, less visible, religiosity.

My mother does not wear the veil. I decided to put it on after a trip to Egypt. Even though we were born in Italy, we cannot deny our roots. And religion is part of those roots. I am not afraid of saying that I come from a country rich in culture, important in Mediterranean history. I'm proud to be the daughter of Egyptians, proud to be Muslim. My mother has made a different choice. She has stopped struggling. We know that life is not so easy for Muslims here in Italy. Today it is a little different: many of us now wear the veil at university, and nobody makes smart cracks or looks askance when we go around and about, to the cinema, shops and pizzerias. Twenty years ago, it was different so, to cut a long story short, my mother stopped wearing the veil so as no longer to be always a target.
(F, 22, Egypt)

Compared with a few years ago, the girls whose behaviour seems to be an interesting weathervane in the complex reality (including religious) of the children of immigration are more visible (Salih, 2009). Their adherence is convincing, visible, proud, and active: being Muslim is bound to associational involvement where the religious theme joins those of social cohesion, discrimination, and citizenship. In developing such lived and active religious identity, it is important to stress how the issue of radicalisation is rejected by all the interviewees. As the word of a Moroccan girl graduated in psychology and an active member in the mosque she used to attend:

We totally reject any discourse on radicalization. We are day-by-day strongly involved in presenting our groups as good citizens and to show to what extent this is possible jointly with our religious belonging. Since 9/11 several activities and project have been promoted and organized by various Muslim association in each Italian city to show the real life of Muslims in Italy: we used to work, to be enrolled at school, to meet friends, to go out for shopping, to go out for a dinner, to organize holidays, to celebrate sport and cultural events as any Italian or Italian associations used to do. Why we have to be evaluated only for our religious life? We do not use to evaluate our Italian or Rumanians or Filipinos friends according to their religious life. Why you do this with us? It seems that we must prove everyday our loyalty to the country. This is our country, why we have to blame it?
(F, 27, Morocco)

These words underline the awareness of being always under-observation. In the meantime, the interviewee points out two crucial issues: 1) the youngest

generation of Muslims feels to belong to Italy due to its socialisation within Italian schools and 2) the fact that Italy is the only country some of them really know, as an Egyptian girl has said along a very passionate answer:

We are really proud of being Italian. This is our country and several times I have to discuss with my father who do not understand why I so love a country where its inhabitants and politicians still consider those with a migratory backgrounds as unwelcomed people. I can understand my parents thinking at their troubles as immigrants at their first arrivals, but now we are quite wealthy, we live in a residential area, I've been graduated, and I've finished my PhD in political science and my brother is working as an IT expert in a bank. We have to stop to continue to think that we are the wrong side of this country. We are too loud, we are Italians, well inserted in the society and put efforts in present our side of the truth to the media, otherwise only news on terrorism and poor people would be used to describe Muslims in Italy [...] yes I know there are families in economic troubles and young people at risk. It is the same in all ethnic groups, including the Italian ones. So, there is only one way: train the citizens, advise them, organize public event for displaying the real life of Muslim and inform all the people, both Muslims and not-Muslims, that a European and Italian way of being Muslim is possible, without abandon democracy or gender-equality as several political slogans used to mention stressing the incompatibility of Islam with Western country. They are uneducated at all.

(F, 27, Egypt)

The most significant transformations within the Muslim world are recorded in this group: an increase in youth protagonism, the activism of girls, interreligious events, and initiatives for debate on Italian and European Islam. One can then grasp the revolution – also on a religious level – dictated by the growth of the second generations. As well as an advance, in the agenda of the internal confrontation within the associationism, on the themes of leadership and the role that the sons of immigration have to carry forward, instances of recognition and enhancement are genuine to their fathers' generation. The desire of some to pose as leaders, proposing an Islam different from that of their parents, is not, however, without obstacles: it is very difficult for young people to be recognised as representatives of the community, threatening to overshadow figures who have long held roles of responsibility. Therefore, the game, still to be played, concerns the ability of second-generation Islamic associationism not to remain “eternally young” and to be able to combine the needs of new Italians with those of the older generations. In other words, having overcome the season of retreat to the origins, the focus has turned to the future. A new season is looming in which young people can be the main actors.

On the other hand, young people can sometimes count on the support of local administrations (Caponio and Ricucci, 2015): perhaps unconsciously due to the anxiety of assimilation from which immigrant societies suffer, the exponents of second generations are sought and promoted, even on the religious side. Once the season of the presentation of different cultures, religions, and languages as alternative elements in the city's daily life has ended, a phase opens in which attention is devoted to how a person of foreign and Muslim origin can increasingly consider themselves Italian citizens without necessarily relegating the expression of their religiosity to the private sphere (Bossi et al., 2020).

Those who are involved with religious associations are aware of the distance separating their generation and their parents with regard to living and interpreting their faith as well as relations with Italy and their country of origin. Intergenerational comparison of religious aspects shows up a deep reflective capacity on the part of the young, especially those with a higher level of education, in understanding the challenges facing them as children of immigration (Yoon et al., 2008). They also perceive the differences regarding their parents' education and socialisation, which took place in environments permeated with religion where cultural, religious, and national belongings were forged together into a unique affiliation – without distinctions within the local community, distinctive vis-à-vis interaction with the world outside.

In every migratory experience, at the generation shift, parents' associationism faces up to that of the young: the young are recalled to give new energy to their activities and, at the same time, the elderly do not want to leave them the power: so, second generations are considered as a "labour force in the lower positions", not as a future managerial generation. Is this also true for Muslim associationism? An initial point of difference concerns the characteristics of associationism. Among young people, it is a matter of a reflection and commitment path transversal to their origins: the criterion of access is that of recognising Islam as their cultural-religious point of reference. As one of them recalls:

We don't ask our members for a certificate testifying that they are good Muslims. Our association is called "Young Muslims of Italy," so the access criteria are clear. We are not bound to any particular country: Italy is our common reference and that of our section is Turin.

(M, 22, Morocco)

Another point of difference attains to the way of understanding how leadership should be set up: for young people, they are interested in putting election-type mechanisms into the associations based on election programs, on candidates' CVs, on activated proposals, and social ties shown in the wider socio-cultural context, whereas their parents relied on personal ties and community consensus: in one case, we find elections, directives, and

pre-established deadlines; in the other, reputation (as a good Muslim above all, but also endowed with elevated cultural and social capital) is the determining criterion in being appointed as association representatives (ASGI and FIERI, 2005). The third element of difference has to do with the gender component: girls are an active part (although they have not yet reached the presidency), sometimes leading in organising activities; mothers, on the other hand, keep a low profile.⁸ Here we see not only a generational but also a gender revolution.

The Dreams Come True: It Is Time to Act as the Main Actors on the Stage

So, how do young Muslims respond to the aforementioned demands: do they stand alongside their parents or do they keep their distance by offering their own vision and interpretation of the issues at hand? The mosque question may serve as a prism dividing the positions of the first and second generations. As a young interviewee reminds us, the mosque represents – in a context of mature immigration, for backgrounds firmly settled – a request which may no longer be postponed.

There is no religious life here. It doesn't exist. If I am religious and want to practice, I can't. Italian mosques are the ugliest places in the world. This is one of the main reasons why I want to go back to Egypt. Here, I can't practice the way I would like to. There are neither instruments nor structures. Relationship with religion is difficult here because you are in a different society. Islam is a religion for the whole world but if you have no mosque, you suffer because it's hot and smelly with people shamefully packed together, and if they close the mosques it will be extremely hard to practice one's religion and develop one's religious ideas.

(M, 26, Egypt)

Parents and children are in agreement about this demand, but with a different approach and attributing different meanings to it. For the latter, a mosque is now only a religious point of reference and should be considered as such in its structure and its décor. For men, above all, it is also for “recovering status” (Dassetto, 1994). Parents, seeing their authority under threat as their children rush into integration and social insertion, try “to recover status as members of the mosque and find the symbolic motivational strength to transfer it within the family” (Ibid., 73). This different approach implies a logical evolution from one generation to the next: all the younger interviewees reduced the mosque to a mere religious function, thereby creating clear discontinuity with the first generation.

How do they intervene in the local arena? How do they participate in the life of the city and promote associationism's socio-cultural role? For the

parents' generation, the cognitive framework within which this relationship is set is that of immigration, which levers the dialectic between a community whose cultural-axiological roots are sunk deep in various elsewhere but are one as to religious reference and a hostile environment with which they are having trouble communicating. Their children would like to drop the references to immigration and diversity: the game is played among equals, between (almost) citizens and residents committed to the common good of the collective and the city. The change of tone is meaningful: as Borkert and Caponio (2010) and Scholten (2011) claimed, the passage is from being destined to be the object of interventions to being fellow actors in developing policies. In this sense, the intercultural variation in the meaning (which we shall see in the following section) of "inclusive intercultural policies", drives relations between Islamic associationism and local institutions to abandon the explosive, reductive immigrants-versus-citizens dichotomy. What is more, for children of immigrants (i.e. "the new actors" on the stage), it is no longer a matter of forwarding demands, which limits Islam to a question regarding immigrants looking back nostalgically towards the past but of inserting the religious debate into the broader discourse of religious pluralism, unchaining it from its nexus with immigration. Energy is spent on constructing relations of partnership, on gaining credibility, and recognition: in other words, on becoming trustworthy interlocutors of institutions and schools. Indeed, the new actors often have no migration experience and are often Italian citizens finding space, expressing the desire to participate in their city's intercultural and interreligious politics.

Turin was one of the first Italian municipalities to develop initiatives and projects to manage the increasing flows of migrants. In the last 30 years, the municipality has shifted from "action on demand", generally multiculturally oriented, to a more coherent and specific intercultural policy. Attention to the second generations emerged mainly in the last ten years of the city's policy evolution. In fact, recently, a new era seems to have come about: the consolidation of intercultural discourse has taken place in tandem, generating a large number of practices, projects, and experiences mainly based on the notions of dialogue, mutual exchange, and social interaction. The centrality of this policy was confirmed by the creation of a Department for Integration, dedicated to defining a coherent intercultural policy for promoting integration: the goal is to embed the discourse on integration in all city policies, reinforcing the shift from special initiatives and ad hoc projects for migrants to policies capable of considering the various facets of the city's residents. This shift was part of the last four mayoral programmes (since 2011), where it was considered necessary to develop the intercultural dimension as an approach affecting all policy areas and to promote the involvement of immigrants in the city's life in various fields: social, cultural, and economic. Immigrants should be metamorphosed from being (or being perceived as) recipients to being pro-active participants in promoting activities.

In this phase, attention to second generations – particularly those with a Muslim background – and their civic involvement come onto the stage. These young people are considered the drivers of the integration process on both sides: on the one hand, supporting immigrants to be engaged with the city and, on the other hand, helping Italian citizens understand the multiple aspects of immigration in the city. This new approach toward juvenile activism has been supported financially in the framework of two calls for projects that the Municipality developed in agreement with a bank foundation. The initiatives acknowledged are primarily directed at second-generation Turin people to whom the city looks for guidance in developing its own intercultural policies. The activities carried out in order to train second generations to become active citizens may be divided into three groups according to their functions: 1) initiatives directed towards useful or practical assistance: concrete help by offering services of orientation and counselling; 2) gathering together emotional support activities, which may at times be defined as assistance towards self-expression and the formation of one's own personality. In this sense, we should also recall improving youths' communicative and expressive capacities and the consequent development of relational skills in free time; and 3) activities directed towards information and educational support to offer moments of updating, reflection, and education on subjects relevant to minors and young people, to cope with educational challenges posed by adolescents, as well as to provide both young people and adults with useful information about educational and training paths (Stoll and Wong, 2007; Taurini et al., 2017).

The result of all these initiatives was the active involvement of young people as organisers, animators, and educators of other foreign minors who are following insertion and growth paths in the city of Turin. In the meantime, these activities have strongly involved second generations in the city's life by considering them active citizens of Turin, even if their citizenship is not Italian.

Conclusion: New Generations on the Move

To summarise, a diachronic perspective reveals areas of strength and weakness in the city's relationship with first- and second-generation associationism. In the former case, the rapport was mainly on demand: associations, organisationally weak, and ill-prepared to interact with administrations and to belong to a prevalently "by-request" dimension, whether for spaces or funds for small initiatives. With younger people, the relationship shifts toward partnership; new generations want to be recognised as reliable interlocutors, both linguistically and in terms of how administrative mechanisms work. They make a point of being present and active in the city's cultural events and intervening – whenever possible – in decision-making processes in order to reinforce their thesis that Islam is compatible with being

active citizens. Even in an immigration laboratory city like Turin, their aspirations clash with reality because, no matter how much appreciated they are by the majority of political groupings, second-generation associations are not yet seen as being capable of replacing their parent's associations as reference points for institutions. But we should be careful not to confuse absence from the decision-making process with absence from the debate inherent to questions of interest: children of immigration broadcast their view of how they define Muslim belonging by taking part in congresses, organising public events, and – above all – the Internet.

The Turin experience appears to reveal a change of tone and to capture the signs of a split between first- and second-generation associationism. Demands are more general, connected as they are with recognition as actors in, and an important part of, the city's socio-cultural environment. Concerns are related to the sensibilisation and updating of the citizenry as to generational changes taking place in the Muslim community.⁹ One seems to be moving on the ground of "symbolic religiosity", where second-generation religious identities are only tenuously connected with beliefs and practice and are rather designed to strengthen common belonging to an association. By means of symbolic religiosity, belonging to Islam can be translated into recognition of a common Muslim identity, which is shared and practiced within associational activities but not necessarily tied to the observance of practices. There is thus a distancing between a practicing Muslim and one who sees Islam as an identity and a cultural marker. Based on this distinction, new demands and new relations (on the side of collaboration and sharing rather than that of breakdown and contrast) with local realities take shape. The goal is no longer just recognising each person's practices and uniqueness. Instead, the goal is to promote each person's right to be different and intercultural policies in which religious diversity is just one part of the social fabric of the city and not a source of conflict.

What is at stake is the ability of second-generation Islamic associationism to move on from its condition of eternal youth and learn to conjoin the needs of the neo-Italians with those of the older generations. Once the time of falling back on their origins has passed, the future beckons. It is a future in which they are already on the threshold of becoming adults, adopting family responsibilities once again, and the appearance of an elderly generation, which once more questions religious associationism and the city about needs that go well beyond caring for the soul.

Notes

- 1 In this chapter, I refer to my previous presentations held in several conferences in 2021 (Ricucci, 2021a; Ricucci and Pinna Pintor, 2021) and parts of this chapter, which have been partly revised here, have been already published in Ricucci (2021b).

- 2 There is a wide debate on how children of immigrants should be labelled. In this chapter, I refer to Rumbaut's definition (1994), who defines second generations as those who are born in a country where at least one parent has immigrated. The use of plural tries to take into account that children of immigrants, even when they share the same generational belonging, may differ by family background, parents' nationalities, and level of integration in the parental immigration country.
- 3 According to the methodology, these issues will be discussed using a general sample of 80 qualitative interviews collected in several Italian cities, 36 interviews with Moroccans (first and second generations), Tunisians, Senegalese, and Egyptians living in Turin, carried out in 2019–2021, divided equally by sex. Interviews included not only questions on religious belonging, religious participation, and association involvement but also various aspects of life and family's migration experience. Respondents were reassured about the confidentiality of information and the ethical uses of the collected interviews. In the interview quotations, they are recalled in the following way: sex (F = Female; M = Male), age, and citizenship. The analysis will also be enriched by seven interviews with experts, local administrators, and key informant on both Muslims in Italy and at local level where information has been collected.
- 4 In migration studies, the role of both ethnic and faith-based associations in supporting the various phases of the integration process, from the first arrival to the needs of family reunion to the educational requests in maintaining cultural and religious links across generations have been researched (Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2000; Diehl and Koenig, 2013).
- 5 In addition to this, it should be clarified that the same attitude is developed – by the Turin and all Italian local administrations – to the other migrant (and non-migrant) religious associations, including the Catholic ones (Ambrosini et al., 2018).
- 6 All the entries were anonymised by entering fictitious names, followed by citizenship, as indicated by all the interviewees.
- 7 All the interviews have been collected in Italian and managed through *Atlas.ti* for their analyses. Concerning the used language, which is sometimes not grammatically correct, and the insertion of some slang, they indicate a specific and conscious choice to give the voice directly to the interviewees who are young people, asking to express personal feelings. Some linguistically wrong expressions make the content really interesting in terms of the scientific analysis of identity issues and legacies.
- 8 There are obvious exceptions that appear, above all in the world of ethnic-national associationism, whenever women become stakeholders. A Turin example is the Moroccan female president of the *Diafa Al Maghreb* association.
- 9 In this connection, it is worth reading the theatrical work developed by the Turin section of Young Muslim of Italy: “*Richiami Lontani*” (Distant Echoes), aimed at introducing possible modalities of integration and intercultural dialogue to the Islamic public.

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