

NAGOYA STUDIES IN INDIAN CULTURE AND BUDDHISM  
SAMBHĀṢĀ

Vol. 31 2014

Special Issue for Papers Presented at the 15th World Sanskrit  
Conference edited by Kamaleswar Bhattacharya

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*Editors*

TOSHIHIRO WADA  
Dept. of Indian Studies, Graduate School of Letters  
Nagoya University, Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku  
Nagoya, 464-8601, Japan

TOSHIYA UNEBE  
Dept. of Indian Studies, Graduate School of Letters  
Nagoya University, Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku  
Nagoya, 464-8601, Japan

JUNSHO KATO  
Professor Emeritus  
Nagoya University

MUSASHI TACHIKAWA  
Professor Emeritus  
National Museum of Ethnology  
Japan

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First published in March 2014 by the Department of Indian Studies, Nagoya University, Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya, 464-8601, Japan, and sold by Nagoya University Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies.

Order should be sent to Nagoya University Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies, c/o Department of Indian Studies, Graduate School of Letters, Nagoya University, Furo-cho, Chikusa-ku, Nagoya, 464-8601, Japan. One issue of the NSICB: Sambhāṣā is U.S. \$35 or ¥3,500 including postage. Please remit payment either by international postal money order in U.S. dollar or Japanese yen or by 25 international reply coupons.

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Printed by Chubu Nippon Kyoiku Bunkakai Corp., Nagoya, Japan.

ISSN 0285-7154

Correspondence regarding all editorial matters should be sent to the Head of the Department of Indian Studies, Nagoya University, Nagoya.

# IS THERE ANY NEED FOR DOUBT?: THE *INCIPIT* OF *ADVAITASIDDHI*

Gianni PELLEGRINI

## 1. Introduction

In this paper I shall try to present some points of argumentation between the Advaitin Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (hereafter Madhusūdana, 1540-1600 ca., Sharma, 1981: 375) and the Dvaitin Vyāsa Tīrtha (hereafter Vyāsa, 1478-1539, Sharma, 1981: 286), which stand as the background for “the inference of the falsity of the phenomenal world” (*prapañcamithyātva-numāna*) and for the formulation and defence of “the five definitions of falsity” (*pañcamithyātva*). My preliminary investigation concerns, in some ways, also how Madhusūdana uses Navya Nyāya material and its consequent adaptation to Advaita tenets.

I am not going to strictly follow the order proposed by Madhusūdana but, starting from the *prapañcamithyātva* inference itself, I shall analyse the main disagreement sentence (*vipratipattivākya*) and the consequent doubt which the Advaitins maintain to be a constitutive part (*aṅga*) of the debate or of the reflection (*vicāra*), and of the inference itself (*anumāna*).<sup>1</sup>

## 2. General Premises

The main concern of the Advaitins is to establish non-duality (*advaitasiddhi*). Of course *advaitabrahman* is always a self-established reality (*svataḥsiddha*), auto-luminous (*svaprakāśa*), pure consciousness (*śuddhacaitanya*), so no proof is necessary to establish

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\* I would like to thank Prof. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya for his precious advices and guidance. Many thanks also to Prof. Toshihiro Wada, Prof. Alberto Pelissero, and Dr. Elisa Freschi. Of course, every shortcoming is due to my own understanding.

<sup>1</sup> I will, obviously, just introduce the subject hence I shall skip over the complex discussion concerning *pakṣatāvaccchedaka*, briefly glancing through the analysis of *pakṣatā*.

it. As consciousness requires no proof, the falsity of the world alone is to be established. Once established the falsity of the world, the non-duality becomes automatically established (Chakraborty, 1967: 41). That's why at the very beginning of *Advaitasiddhi* (hereafter AS), Madhusūdana underlines that for establishing non-duality we must first prove the falsity of the world:<sup>2</sup> “Now,<sup>3</sup> since the establishment of non-duality is possible only having previously established the falsity of duality, *in primis* the falsity of duality alone should be proved.”<sup>4</sup>

Madhusūdana<sup>5</sup> adapts to the present context an inference utilized by Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka<sup>6</sup> and, adding two *probans* (*hetu*), slightly improves it:<sup>7</sup> “the subject under consideration is false, because it is an object of cognition, because it is insentient, because it is limited, just as the silver [super-imposed] on the nacre.” (Pellegrini, 2011: 442-443). Here the term “*vimata*” is obviously the inferential subject (*pakṣa*), falsity (*mithyātva*) is the *probandum* (*sādhya*), the three *probans* (*hetu*) are “the property of being an object of cognition” (*drśyatva*), “the property of being insentient” (*jaḍatva*) and “the property of being limited” (*paricchinnatva*) and the example (*drṣṭānta*) is the silver super-imposed on the nacre (*śuktirūpya*).

### 3. *Vipratipattivākya*

Let's now focus the attention on the subject, the *pakṣa* of this inference, expressed by the term “*vimata*”. I have roughly translated it as “the subject under consideration”, even if it more precisely means “the subject of disagreement”. The term *vimata* has been glossed as

<sup>2</sup> AS/SV/LC (p. 8): “*tatrādvaitasiddher dvaitamithyāvasiddhipūrvakatvād dvaitamithyātvam eva prathamam upapādanīyam*”.

<sup>3</sup> I could have interpreted the adverb “*tatra*” according to the reading of Madhusūdana direct disciple Balabhadra's gloss, the *Siddhivyākhyā* (SV; AS/SV/LC, p. 8): “*tatreṭi tasyām advaitasiddhau ...*”, “**There**, that is ‘in that *Advaitasiddhi*’ ...”

<sup>4</sup> This same attitude is connected with some earlier Advaitins' statements, just like in the *Brahmasiddhi* (III.106a, p. 119): “*avidyāstamayo mokṣaḥ sā ca saṃsāra udāhṛtaḥ!*”, “The liberation consists in the setting of ignorance. That [= ignorance] is said to be the bondage ...”; or in the *Tattvapradīpikā* (TP/NP, IV.8a, p. 602): “*nivṛttir ātmā mohasya jñātatvenopalakṣitaḥ!*”, “the Self is the withdrawal of delusion, indicated by the property of being the known ...”

<sup>5</sup> At this point, obeying to the principle “*lakṣaṇapramāṇābhyāṃ hi vastusiddhiḥ*”, Madhusūdana's next step to prove the falsity of the world is to furnish the means of knowledge to determine the real nature of falsity (Pellegrini, 2011: 442, n. 3).

<sup>6</sup> The text is referring to Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka *Nyāyadīpāvalī* (p. 1) “*vivādapadaṃ mithyā drśyatvāt. yad itthaṃ tat tathā. yathobhayavādyavivādapadaṃ rajatam. tathaitat tat tathā.*” (Pellegrini, 2011: 442).

<sup>7</sup> AS/SV/LC (pp. 30-31): “*vimataṃ mithyā drśyatvāt, jaḍatvāt, paricchinnatvāt śuktirūpyavat.*”

“*vimativīśeṣya*”, “the [element] having as its qualificand the disagreement”. The word *vimati* is a synonym of the term *vipratipatti*. *Vipratipatti* is that kind of statement which, at the opening of a debate, expresses a divergence of opinions on a given subject.<sup>8</sup> Into AS, this sentence presents an incompatibility of views between the falsity and the reality of the world. The *Laghucandrikā* (LC, p. 30) of Brahmānanda Sarasvatī (18 cent.) glosses the term *vimata* as *vipratipattiviśeṣya* “the [element] whose qualificand is the disagreement sentence”. Accordingly, *vipratipatti* is the qualificand portion of a certain statement. Therefore, that same sentence should also have a qualifier part, a *viśeṣaṇa*. This is clearly set forth in the *Bālabodhinī-vyākhyā* of Yogendranath Bagchi, as the doubt born out from the double option proposed by the disagreement sentence.<sup>9</sup>

Madhusūdana showed two main *vipratipattivākyas*,<sup>10</sup> even though the discussion is especially focused on the first one: “that [kind of entity which] is qualified by the property of being not sublatale by a valid knowledge different from that of *brahman*, that is worthy of being cognised as real and different from consciousness, is [this entity] the counter-positive of a triple-time negation in the [same] locus where it is cognised?”<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> The definition proposed by AS (p. 2) is “*viruddhakoṭidvayopasthāpakaṃ vākyam*”; see also the passage of AS/BB (p. 16): “*ekadharmikaviruddhakoṭidvayaprakāraḥkajñājanakavākyasya vipratipattirūpatvāt*”, “... since the nature of the disagreement sentence is to be a sentence producing a cognition having two sets of mutually contradictory determinations regarding one single subject ...” See also *Nyāyakośaḥ* (1978: 765-766).

<sup>9</sup> AS/BB (p. 26): “*vimatam ity asya vipratipattivākyajanyasamśayaviśeṣyam ity arthaḥ*.”

<sup>10</sup> Madhusūdana adds also another type of *vipratipatti* “*pāramārthikatvākāreṇoktaniṣedhapratiyogi, na veti?*”, “Is the counter-positive of the mentioned negation endowed with an absolute degree of reality, or not?”, clearly inserted due to the upholders of the *vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhāva*. A *vyadhikaraṇa* property with reference to a thing is said to be that property which exists only in a different entity. Hence a *vyadhikaraṇadharmāvacchinnapratiyogitākābhāva* is that absence in respect of which the counter-positiveness is determined by a property (*pratiyogitāvachchedakadharmā*) which is not present in the relevant *negatum* but is something else. Here the word *pāramārthikatva* means “the property of having the same degree of reality as *brahman*” (*brahmasamasattākatva*) and it is related with the property of being a counter-positive (*pratiyogitva*). For example, in the sentence “the cloth does not exist as endowed with the property of being a pot” (“*ghaṭatvena paṭo nāsti*”; or “*ghaṭatvena paṭābhāvaḥ*”, “the absence of the cloth as endowed with the property of being a pot”) Naiyāyikas, taking the property *ghaṭatva* which does not share the same locus with its counter-positive [= the cloth (*paṭa*)] (*vyadhikaraṇa*), say that the *paṭa* is endowed with “the property of being a counter-positive of the absolute absence whose counter-positiveness is determined by the property of being a pot” (*ghaṭatvāvachchinnapratiyogitākātyantābhāvapratiyogitva*). In the same way, this second *vipratipatti* can be re-written as “*brahmasamasattākatvena prapañco nāsti*”, “the phenomenal universe does not exist as endowed with the same degree of reality as *brahman*”, where the *brahmasamasattākatva* has been considered a *vyadhikaraṇa* property (*dharma*) in respect to the phenomenal world (*prapañca*), and consequently the phenomenal world is endowed with “the property of being a counter-positive of the absolute absence whose counter-positiveness is determined by the property of being endowed with the same level of reality of *brahman*” (*brahmasamasattākatvāvachchinnapratiyogitākātyantābhāvapratiyogitva*).

<sup>11</sup> AS/SV/LC (pp. 20): “*tatra mithyātvē vipratipattiḥ — brahmapramātiriktābhādhyatve sati satvena prāṭītyarhaṃ cidbhinnam pratipannopādhanau traikālikaniṣedhapratiyogi, na vā?*”

This sentence can be divided in two main portions “*brahma-pramātiriktābādhyatve sati sattvena pratītyarhaṃ cidbhinnam*” is the qualificand part (*viśeṣyabhāga*) and “*pratipannopādhanau traikālika-niṣedhapratiyogi na vā*” is the qualifier part (*viśeṣaṇabhāga*). In the qualificand part as well, we distinguish three different portions: “*brahmapramātiriktābādhyatva*”, “*sattvena pratītyarhatva*” and “*cidbhinnatva*”. Generally speaking, when seen in the body of the inference, the *vipratipattivākya*’s qualificand part (*viśeṣyabhāga*) constitutes the inferential subject (*pakṣa*), which also is the *viśeṣya* or *dharmin* of an inference, whilst the qualifier part (*viśeṣaṇabhāga*), namely the *probandum*, together with the *probans* constitutes the *viśeṣaṇa* or *dharma* of the inference. Unfortunately, there is no room here to treat more thoroughly the first among these properties, since it would involve the concept of the determiner of the inferential subjectness (*pakṣatāvachedaka*).<sup>12</sup> However, the first adjective “*brahmapramātiriktābādhyatva*” is added to avoid “the flaw of proving what is already proved” (*siddhāsādhana*) into apparent entities (*prātibhāsikapadārtha*);<sup>13</sup> the second “*sattvena pratītyarhatva*”<sup>14</sup> is to

<sup>12</sup> For that discussion glance through AS/SV/LC (pp. 20-27).

<sup>13</sup> Without including in the body of the disagreement sentence the adjective “the property of being sublatale [by a valid knowledge] different from the knowledge of *brahman*” (*brahmapramātiriktābādhyatva*) there will be the flaw of proving what is already proved (*siddhāsādhana*) into apparent entities, like the silver projected on the nacre (*suktirūpya*), the snake on the rope (*sarparajju*), etc. Of course here the explanation involves the concept of the “determiner of the inferential subjectness” (*pakṣatāvachedaka*). There are two ways to establish (*siddhi*) the occurrence of a *probandum* in an inferential subject. In the first option, technically called “*pakṣatāvachedakasāmānādhikarāṇyena sādhyasiddhiḥ*” (“establishment of the *probandum* as sharing the same locus with the determiner of the inferential subjectness”), only a limited number of *pakṣas* with a particular and specific form are chosen for this establishment, those which are homogeneous with the proposed inferential subject, that is “some inferential subjects qualified by the determiner of the inferential subjectness” (*pakṣatāvachedakaviśiṣṭayatkiñcītpakṣa*). In the second instance the establishment of the *probandum* is done in all the *pakṣas* as such (*pakṣatāvachedakāvachinnapakṣa*), and this is named, “establishment of the *probandum* determined by the determiner of the inferential subjectness” (“*pakṣatāvachedakāvachedena sādhyasiddhiḥ*”; K/NSM, pp. 500-504; Vattanky, 2003: 204-205, 210-214). If the aim (*uddeśya*) of the debater is to establish the *probandum* according to the first instance (= *pakṣatāvachedakasāmānādhikarāṇyena*) we have two options: before formulating the inference we should verify whether the *probandum* is established all over the *pakṣa* (*sakalapakṣa*) or just in a portion of it (*pakṣaikaśeṣa*). The AS/BB (2000: 20-21) points out a difference among old (*prācīna*) and modern (*navīna*) Naiyāyikas about the establishment of the *probandum* through *pakṣatāvachedakasāmānādhikarāṇyena*. According to the modern the qualifier must be admitted as useful, because when a *probandum* is already established (*siddha*) in an inferential subject determined by a certain property, the resulting inferential knowledge (*anumiti*) — namely the establishment of the *probandum* (*sādhyasiddhi*) — does not occur in another inferential subject determined by that property. Thus, the inferential knowledge produced by proving the *probandum* as sharing the same locus with the determiner of the inferential subjectness is obstructed by that very establishment. On the other hand, according to the old view, there is no need to accept the said qualifier, because when the *probandum* is established in a certain inferential subject determined by a certain property, then therein there will not be *anumiti*. Nevertheless, *anumiti* will occur in another inferential subject determined by that property. Hence the *anumiti* produced by proving the *probandum* as sharing the same locus with the determiner of the inferential subjectness is not obstructed by that establishment. In the present case, the inferential subject can be either the entire phenomenal world (*vyāvahārikaprapañca*) or the apparent world (*prātibhāsikaprapañca*) as

prevent the contradiction (*bādha*) into unreal entities (*alīka/tuccha*) and the third “*cidbhinnatva*”<sup>15</sup> to avoid the contradiction with *brahman*.<sup>16</sup>

At any rate, to present the same *vipratipatti* in a simplified way, it could be stated that the sense of the entire qualificand part is merely “the phenomenal world” (*vyāvahārikaprapañca*): because it is sublatale only by the knowledge of *brahman* (*brahmapramābādhyā* = *brahmapramātiriktābādhyā*), because it is perceivable as real (*sattvena pratītyarha*) and because it is different from the supreme consciousness (*cidbhinna*). Besides, the qualifier part corresponds exactly to Prakāśātman’s definition of falsity, defended in AS’s *dvittiyamithyātva* (Pellegrini, 2011: 444-445). So, it simply coincides with *mithyā*. Consequently, the *vipratipattivākya* will be reduced to this straightforward sentence: “Is the phenomenal world false or not?” (“*vyāvahārikaprapañco mithyā na vā?*”, AS, p. 5).

Advaitins consider this *vipratipatti* sentence the seed out of which sprouts the germ of doubt (*saṃśaya*) because, without suggesting a final solution, it presents two mutually contradictory positions: the falsity of the world (*prapañcamithyātva*) *vis-à-vis* the reality of that world (*prapañcasatyatva*).

To understand the entire issue we must get back to the beginning of AS, where Madhusūdana clearly states that “proving a position by arguments (*upapādana*) takes place through the establishment of one’s own view and the rebuttal of the opponent’s view. Both these acts are

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well. The *probandum* is not yet established in the phenomenal world, but it is already established in the apparent realm, by others means of knowledge. So, if we try to ascertain the presence of the *probandum* in the inferential subject through *pakṣatāvaccchedakasāmānādhikaranyena*, then according to the point of view of the modern Naiyāyikas there will be the flaw of proving what is already proved in a part of the inferential subject, namely the silver-nacre, because also the apparent entities are cognisable as real and different from supreme consciousness. Therefore, in order to avoid this flaw it is compulsory to add the qualifier under discussion, namely *brahmapramātiriktābādhyatva* (AS, p. 3).

<sup>14</sup> Here the main purpose is to highlight the nature of falsity (*mithyātva*). If we do not insert the adjective “the property of being cognised as real” (*sattvena pratītyarhatva*) it will result a contradiction flaw with the absolutely unreal entities (*alīka/sat/tuccha*), like the son of a barren woman, the hare’s horn, etc. These “entities” are not false (*mithyā*) because they are not sublatale by any knowledge different from the knowledge of *brahman*, and, since they are absolutely non-existent, they are not cognisable by any cognition whatsoever. Moreover, they are different from supreme consciousness. Therefore, this qualification is necessary to avoid the said contradiction.

<sup>15</sup> The last adjective “the property of being different from supreme consciousness” (*cidbhinnatva* = *cidbheda*) is necessary to avoid a contradiction of the disagreement sentence with the nature (*svarūpa*) of *brahman* itself, which is pure (*suddha*) and infinite (*niravacchinna*) consciousness (*cit/caitanya*). Thus, the property of being different from supreme consciousness is a distinctive mark of a false entity.

<sup>16</sup> AS/SV/LC (p. 27): “*itaraviśeṣaṇadvayaṃ tu tucche brahmaṇi ca bādhavāraṇāyādarāṇyam eva*”. These three flaws, that of proving what is already proved (*siddhasādhana*) and the two contradictions (*bādha*), from another standpoint can simply be viewed as *ativyāptis*.

accomplished by resorting to one among three kinds of debate (*kathā*):<sup>17</sup> discussion (*vāda*, NyS I.2.1),<sup>18</sup> sophistry (*jalpa*, NyS I.2.2)<sup>19</sup> and cavil (*vitaṇḍā*, NyS I.2.3).<sup>20</sup> (Potter, 2006: p. 208).<sup>21</sup> The conclusion (*paryavasāna*) of *vādakathā* is the ascertainment of the truth (*tattvanirṇaya*); the conclusion of *jalpa* is the victory (*viḥaya*) or the defeat (*nigraha*); while the conclusion of *vitaṇḍākathā* is the mere refutation of the opponent's view (*khaṇḍanamātra*) without presenting one's own (AS/BB, p. 9).

At the beginning of the *vāda* and *jalpa* types of *kathā*, the judge of the debate (*madhyastha*) must utter the *vipratipattivākya*, because such a disagreement sentence generates a doubt (*saṃśaya*) into the debaters and into the audience. This initial doubt, according to Madhusūdana, is a constitutive part of the reflection (*vicāra*).<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, if we interpret the term *vicāra* as inference (*anumāna*), then doubt becomes a fundamental element in formulating the subject of the inference (*pakṣa*) (Śukla, 2004: 21-23). In more simple words, it could be said that till the initial doubt (*saṃśaya*) is not clearly expressed, the debate cannot be undertaken (Matilal, 1999: 4).<sup>23</sup>

Several centuries before Vātsyāyana, commenting on NyS (I.1.1), wrote that also the object of an inference should be a doubted one:<sup>24</sup>

17 SV: "Debate is the extent of the sentences presenting the opponent's and the proponent's views as distinctly authored." (p. 14: "*kathā nāma nānakartṛkapūrvottarapakṣapratipādakavākyavistārah*"); or LC "Debate is the sentence aided by the five-members [of the syllogism]." (p. 14: "*pañcāvayavaparīkaropetavākyaṃ kathā*").

18 The word *vāda* is translatable as "discussion", and in *Nyāyasūtra* (NyS, I.2.1) is defined: "*pramānatarkasādhanopālambhasiddhāntaviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣapratipakṣa-parigraho vādaḥ*"; in LC takes a shorter and more useful shape (p. 14) "*tattvabubhutsunā saha kathā*."

19 The *jalpa* is a "sophistry" (NyS, I.2.2): "*yathoktopapannaś chalaḥjātini-grahasthānasādhanopālambho jalpaḥ*"; in LC (p. 14) "*vijigīṣunā saha [kathā]*."

20 The third type of debate-mode is *vitaṇḍā*: "cavil" (NyS, I.2.3): "*svapratipakṣasthāpanahīno vitaṇḍā*"; in LC (p. 14) "*svapakṣasthāpanahīnā [kathā]*."

21 AS/SV/LC (pp. 8, 14): "*upapādanaṃ ca svapakṣasādhanaparapakṣanirākaraṇābhyāmbhavatīti tadubhayaṃ vādajalpavitaṇḍānām anyatamām kathām āśritya sampādanīyam*."

22 AS/SV/LC (p. 14): "*tatra ca vipratipattijanyasaṃśayasya vicārāṅgatvān madhyasthenādaupratipattih pradarśanīyā*," "Among them, since the doubt generated from the disagreement sentence is a constitutive part of the reflection, at the beginning the judge should show the disagreement sentence."

23 According to Balabhadra's SV, AS follows the discussion type of debate: "*tasyāṃ vādakathāyām ity arthaḥ, tatrety asya vipratipattih pradarśanīyety anenānvayaḥ*". In addition, Madhusūdana himself further in the text will use the word "*ahaṃkāriṇaḥ*" in the sense of "arrogant debater" (AS/SV/LC, p. 17) in order to designate someone who resorts to the *jalpakathā* and for showing his lack of interest towards sophistry. By his own admission, Madhusūdana intended to produce a work of *vāda* (Gupta, 2006: 12). However, in AS's fourth *maṅgala* verse it is said that the purpose of the text is twofold "*bodhāya vādivijayāya ca*" ("for the comprehension and the victory on the proponent") where, if the term "*bodhāya*" refers to *vādakathā*, the compound "*vādivijayāya*" is undoubtedly connected with *jalpakathā*.

24 NySB (ad NyS, I.1.1): "*nā 'nupalabdhe na nirṇīte 'rthe nyāyaḥ pravartate. kim tarhi? saṃśayīte 'rthe ...*" See also NySB ad NyS I.1.41.



“the syllogism does not proceed towards an entity not perceived, or towards an entity already established. [Objection:] What’s then? [Answer:] [The syllogism proceeds] towards what is doubted ...”<sup>25</sup>

#### 4. *Dvaitins’ position*

Following in the text, from “*yady api*”,<sup>26</sup> Madhusūdana starts to present Dvaitins’ point of view as developed in Vyāsa’s *Nyāyāmṛta* (NyĀ). Even if Vyāsa himself presents the *vipratipatti*, he does not accept it as useful (*upayogin*) in the reflection/debate (*vicāra*). He writes that the *vipratipatti* sentence is used in accordance to the style of logicians, not because it is really useful.<sup>27</sup> In fact, it does not generate a doubt, since those who are involved in the debate have already ascertained their respective positions and do not have any kind of doubt about them. So, from the disagreement sentence does not arise a real doubt to be dispelled and the *vipratipatti* itself is not necessary. If, notwithstanding, the rise of such a doubt would be accepted for a while, it cannot be maintained as fundamental part of the discussion and neither as indispensable constituent for inferential subject or inferential subjectness (*pakṣatā*) considered in the sense demonstrated by Gaṅgeśa’s *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (hereafter TC).

I personally think that since the beginning Vyāsa aims at preventing the very formation of the *mithyātvānumāna*, showing that there are not the necessary causal presuppositions for constituting any inference whatsoever: nor the need of any doubt, neither any relevance of the *vipratipatti* sentence, and not even the formation of inferential subjectness.

Even the Navya Naiyāyikas do not accept doubt as constituent of the inferential subjectness (*pakṣatāghaṭaka*). According to them, whose methodology and technical terminology is fully utilized by Madhusūdana, the starting point is the definition of consideration

<sup>25</sup> Worth mentioning are some earlier connections with Madhusūdana’s view, at the beginning of *Bhāmattī* (BSBB, p. 2) Vācaspati Mīśra points out that the object of debate among expert philosophers should be something “doubted” (*saṁdigdha*) and “useful” (*saprayojana*): “*atha yad asaṁdigdham aprayojanaṁ ca na tat prekṣavatpratipitsāgocaraḥ, yathā samanaskendriya-saṁnikṛṣṭaḥ sphītālokamadhyavartī ghaṭaḥ, karaṭadantā vā ...*” Another analogous instance is found at the very opening of the *Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī*.

<sup>26</sup> AS/SV/LC (pp. 14-15): “*yady api vipratipattijanyasaṁśayasya na pakṣatāsampādakatayopayogaḥ. śiṣādhayīṣāviraahasahakṛtasādhakamānābhāvarūpāyās tasyāḥ saṁśayāghaṭitatvāt.*”, “Even though the doubt generated by the disagreement sentence is not useful in constructing the inferential subjectness, because that [inferential subjectness] whose shape is of an ‘absence of an establishing means of knowledge aided by the desire to infer’ is not constituted by the doubt...”

<sup>27</sup> NyĀ/AS (p. 3) “*idaṁ ca vipratipattipradarśanaṁ tārkkikarītyaivoktaṁ na tu vastutaḥ.*”

(*parāmarśajñāna*)<sup>28</sup> which basically involves two notions: *vyāpti* (invariable concomitance) and *pakṣadharmatā*,<sup>29</sup> that is the occurrence (*vṛttitva*) of the *probans* in the inferential subject (*pakṣa*).<sup>30</sup> This last concept is based on the notion of inferential subjectness (*pakṣatā*) and is directly responsible for the rise of the inferential knowledge (*anumiti*).

A question arises: what does make something fit to be the substratum of *pakṣatā*, namely, the subject or the *pakṣa* of an inference? Roughly speaking *pakṣatā* or inferential subjectness is the property of being the inferential subject, which is directly responsible for the rise of inferential knowledge (*anumiti*). This is a psychological requirement for inference: before inferring something there should be certainty concerning the conditions under which inference is possible and, among them, *pakṣatā* has an essential importance (Bhattacharya, 1978: 76). What's more, if *parāmarśa* is the positive cause of the inference, *pakṣatā* can be viewed as the negative one (*abhāvīyākāraṇa*) (Dravid, 2007: xvii-xix).<sup>31</sup>

Gaṅgeśa discusses four different definitions of inferential subjectness (*pakṣatā*). Three are refuted whilst the last results flawless. The first definition analysed and refuted is the so-called “doubt-subjectness” (*saṁśayapakṣatā*), accepted by ancient (*prācīna*) Naiyāyikas:<sup>32</sup> “inferential subjectness is being endowed with the property of a doubtful *probandum*”.<sup>33</sup> Gaṅgeśa rejects this definition

<sup>28</sup> The *Kārikāvālī* (K/NSM, II.68a; Vattanky, 2003: 88-91) defines consideration (*parāmarśa*) as: “*vyāpyasya pakṣavṛttitvadhīḥ parāmarśa ucyate*”, “consideration is said to be the cognition of the occurrence of the pervaded [= *probans*] in the inferential subject”; while TS/D/NyB (p. 34): “*vyāptiviśiṣṭapakṣadharmatājñānaṁ parāmarśaḥ*”, “consideration is the cognition of the occurrence of the *probans* in the inferential subject, qualified by the invariable concomitance [between the *probans* and the *probandum*]”. Consideration is the direct cause of inferential knowledge (*anumiti*): “inferential knowledge is the cognition born out of the consideration” (TS/D/NyB, p. 34: “*parāmarśajanyaṁ jñānam anumitih*”).

<sup>29</sup> TS/D/NyB (p. 34) directly adapts the definition to the *locus classicus* of the inference (*parvato vahnimān, dhūmāt*): “*vyāpyasya parvatādivṛttitvaṁ pakṣadharmatā*.”

<sup>30</sup> While the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) has been treated in the preceding part of TC, in order to explain *parāmarśa*, *pakṣadharmatā* must be properly understood (TCP, p. 1: “*vyāptinirūpaṇānantaraṁ pakṣadharmatā nirūpyate ...*”).

<sup>31</sup> I'd just like to remind that among the nine types of common causes (*sādhāraṇakāraṇa*) regarding all the effects, Naiyāyikas accept also the causality (*kāraṇatva*) of the absence (*abhāva*), namely the antecedent absence (*prāgabhāva*) and absence of the obstructing element (*pratibandhakābhāva*).

<sup>32</sup> The TCP (p. 3) presents the definition in this form: “*saṁdigdhasādhyadharmatvaṁ pakṣatvam*”. The same definition is also expressed as “*saṁdigdhasādhyadharmavattvaṁ pakṣatvam*” (translated above) and alternatively translatable as “inferential subjectness is the property of being endowed with a doubtful *probandum*” (AS, p. 2; TCP, Introduction: 2). In the second instance the possessive (*matvarthīya*) *vat*UP affix (*pratyaya*) clearly helps to understand the definition. The first one might be viewed as a *bahuvrīhi* compound as well. For a thorough explanation of the several interpretative options see Rāmānuja Tātācārya's *Bālabodhinī* (TCP, pp. 5-8).

<sup>33</sup> The closest occurrence to this definition is in Śivāditya's *Saptapadārthī* (SP, p. 113):

arguing that doubt cannot have any direct involvement in the emergence of inference, since the perception of the inferential mark (*liṅgadarśana*), the recollection of *vyāpti* (*vyāptismaraṇa*), etc., occur in the wake of doubt about the *probandum*. Only then inference arises. Hence, inference is not dependent on doubt. *Ergo*, since the cause is immediately antecedent to its effect (*kāryaniyatapūrvavṛtti*), between them there should not be any time-gap (*avyavahita*). In our example doubt ceases to exist two moments before inference, because it has to leave room for other psychical events constitutive of the consideration (*parāmarśa*) and the subsequent inference (Bhattacharya, 1978: 78).<sup>34</sup> Then Gaṅgeśa, after refusing other two definitions,<sup>35</sup> proposes his own, which is adopted also by Madhusūdana and Vyāsa: “the inferential subject is where there is the absence of an establishing

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“*saṃdigdhasādhyadharmavattvenopāttatvaṃ pakṣatvaṃ*”. In the *Nyāyakośa* (p. 452) it is also found a reference to Janakīnātha’s *Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī* (NySMA, p. 111) “*sā ca sādhyavattvena saṃdihyamānatvaṃ*”. It should be noted that TS/D/NyB (p. 43) keeps the old definition: “*saṃdigdhasādhyavān pakṣaḥ*”.

<sup>34</sup> For explaining this passage I need to refer to a few Nyāya tenets. First of all, it is well known the rule according to which a specific quality (*viśeṣagaṇa*), having as its locus (*adhikaraṇa*) a pervasive substance (*vibhudravya*) worthy of being perceived (*yogya*), is destroyed by the emergence in that same locus of another immediately subsequent specific quality (NSM ad K I.27, p. 244): “*yogyavibhuviśeṣagaṇānām svottaravartiguṇanāśyatvāt ...*” The Self (*ātman*) is this kind of pervasive substance and doubt is one among its specific qualities (*viśeṣagaṇa*). Besides, it should be kept in mind that each and every specific quality lasts for three instants (*kṣana*): emergence (*utpatti*), permanence (*sthiti*) and destruction (*nāśallaya*). This is the process: in the first instant a specific quality is born, in the second persists and in the third is destroyed. Two specific qualities cannot emerge in the same instant (*ekakālāvachchedena*) and in the same locus (*ekādhikaraṇāvachchedena*), but once one *viśeṣagaṇa* arises, it passes to its second instant and, only during the second instant of the first *viśeṣagaṇa*, another *viśeṣagaṇa* can arise in that same locus. Thus, when the second *viśeṣagaṇa* is in the *sthitikṣaṇa*, then the first is in the third moment, the *layakṣaṇa*, so it is destroyed. This same displaying order pertains to any other *viśeṣagaṇa* arising in the third instant of the first *viśeṣagaṇa*, and in the second of the second *viśeṣagaṇa*. Now, let’s briefly analyse the present situation: if *pakṣatā* were the doubt (*saṃdeha*) regarding the *probandum* and the cause of inferential knowledge, it should be present in the first moment. After that, following the inferential process, there is the perception of inferential mark (*liṅgadarśana*), subsequently the recollection of the invariable concomitance (*vyāptismaraṇa*), then the consideration (*parāmarśa*) and, at last the inferential knowledge (*anumiti*). So, according to the previously mentioned rules, doubt is destroyed at the emergence of *vyāptismaraṇa*, *ergo* it cannot be considered a direct cause of *parāmarśa*, and even least of *anumiti* (TCP, Introduction: 3).

<sup>35</sup> Then Gaṅgeśa (TCP, p. 55) cites this definition: “*sādhakabādhakapramāṇābhāvaḥ*”, “the absence of an establishing or contradicting prove”. Gaṅgeśa rejects it saying that in presenting both – the absence of *siddhi* and *bādha* – there is a redundancy: just either is enough for inference. The other definition called *icchāpakṣatā* might have been formulated by Vācaspati “*siśādhayiṣita-sādhyadharmā dharmī pakṣaḥ*” (TCP, pp. 57, 63), “the inferential subject is the qualified element (*dharmīn*) having as property the *probandum*, which is the object of the desire to infer” (Bhattacharya, 1978: 78-79). Although someone knows the nature of the Self from scriptures and accordingly aims at liberation, if he desires to infer (*siśādhayiṣā*) Its existence he might take recourse to inference. In fact, TCP (p. 63) adds “the lovers of inferential arguments desire to know through inference also an entity already well cognised by means of a direct perception” (*pratyakṣaparikalpitaṃ apy artham anumānena bubhutsante tarkarasikāḥ*). Gaṅgeśa refutes also this option, because the desire to infer is separated by a time-gap, so it cannot be direct cause. Conversely, even without any *siśādhayiṣā* whatsoever, through the roar of a cloud that very cloud or rain can be inferred. In fact, desire to infer does not precede the inference for one’s own sake (*svārthānumāna*) (Bhattacharya, G. M., 78-79; Rai, 1995: 3-4).

means of knowledge aided by the absence of the desire to infer”.<sup>36</sup> As a consequence, the property residing into the *pakṣa*, capable of making such an inferential subject a *pakṣa*, is indeed *pakṣatā*. This definition clarifies the occurrence of inference in such cases where causal factors of perception, such as the ascertainment of a *probandum* etc., are present and accompanied by a desire to infer. It has two parts: the qualifier one “*siṣādhayiṣāviraahasahakṛta*”, which means “qualified by the absence of the desire to infer” (*anumitsābhāvaviśiṣṭa*) and the qualificand one “*sādhakapramāṇa*”, corresponding to “ascertainment” (*siddhi/niscaya*). This is the reason why this definition involves a qualified absence (*viśiṣṭābhāva*): absence of a causal factor coupled with the absence of the desire to infer. This qualified absence is conditioned by three possible alternatives (Rai, 1995: 1):

1. *viśeṣyābhāvaprayuktaviśiṣṭābhāva*: absence qualified by the absence of the qualificand (*viśeṣya*);
2. *viśeṣaṇābhāvaprayuktaviśiṣṭābhāva*: absence qualified by the absence of the qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*);
3. *ubhayābhāvaprayuktaviśiṣṭābhāva*: absence qualified by the absence of both [qualificand and qualifier] (*ubhaya*).

Once these cases are applied to the definition of inferential subjectness (*pakṣatā*) we are lead to four options:

- A. the ascertainment of the *probandum* (*sādhyasiddhi* [= *niscaya*]) qualified by a desire to infer (corresponding to *viśeṣaṇābhāvaprayuktaviśiṣṭābhāva*);
- B. absence of the ascertainment of the *probandum* (*sādhyasiddhi*) qualified by the absence of desire (corresponding to *viśeṣyābhāvaprayuktaviśiṣṭābhāva*);
- C. absence of the ascertainment of the *probandum* (*sādhyasiddhi*) qualified by the desire to infer (corresponding to *ubhayābhāvaprayuktaviśiṣṭābhāva*).

In all these cases we shall get the conditions for *pakṣatā*, so that the inferential judgement arise; but not in the fourth case:

- D. the ascertainment of the *probandum* is not qualified by the desire to infer (TCP, Introduction: 5-6).

As a consequence, Vyāsa says that on accepting as *pakṣatā* the

<sup>36</sup> TCP (pp. 64, 66): “*siṣādhayiṣāviraahasahakṛtasādhakapramāṇābhāvah yatra asti sa pakṣah*”; K/NSM (II.70; Vattanky, 2003: 201): “*siṣādhayiṣayā śūnyā siddhir yatra na vidyate / sa pakṣas tatra vṛttitvajñānād anumitir bhavet //*” and the following remark of NSM (pp. 496-497; Vattanky, 2003: 201-205) “*siṣādhayiṣāviraahaviśiṣṭasiddhyabhāvah pakṣatā, tadvān pakṣa ity arthah ...*”

doubt regarding the *probandum* in the *pakṣa*, we will have to face a severe flaw. Supposing that someone has realised the highest liberating knowledge “I am *brahman*”, through the constant meditation on the meaning of *mahāvākyas*, if he successively has the desire to establish again the same by means of an inference like “I am *brahman*, because I am of the nature of Being, Consciousness and Beatitude” (AS, p. 3: “*ahaṃ brahma saccidānandarūpatvāt*”), then, since there is no more a doubt regarding the *probandum* in the *pakṣa*, it will result impossible to have such an inference.<sup>37</sup> But we know that also such an inference might occur. In fact, on that occasion the definition of *pakṣatā* is present in its form as “absence qualified by the absence of qualifier” (*viśeṣaṇābhāva- prayuktaviśiṣṭābhāva*): there is the ascertainment of the *probandum* and also the desire to infer (*anumitsā*), thus we have *pakṣatā* and the following inferential knowledge.

But, as maintained by Vyāsa, by Navyas and, to some extent, by Madhusūdana as well, this definition it is not tenable, so it cannot be admitted that doubt is a constitutive part of inference. Furthermore, the *vipratipatti* itself is not able to cause the rise of doubt in the proponent (*vādin*) and in the opponent (*prativādin*), because they are already sure about their respective positions. Therefore, for the debate or the inference, there is not any relevance of the doubt generated by uttering the *vipratipattivākya*.

Furthermore, *pūrvapakṣin*<sup>38</sup> goes on postulating a possible utility of doubt: if in the debaters, because of their ascertainment about their own points of view (*viśeṣadarśanasadbhāvena*), does not appear a spontaneous doubt, then why not to admit a hypothetical doubt?<sup>39</sup> In

<sup>37</sup> These remarks recall the discussion of TCP (pp. 55-57) concerning the rebuttal of *saṃśayapakṣatā*. As explained earlier, this kind of *pakṣatā* is not accepted by Navyas, because according to the scriptural passage “*śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*” (“should be heard, should be reflected, should be meditated upon”, BrU II.4.5) once something has been perceived and comprehended through hearing (*śravaṇa*), there is a subsequent reflection (*manana*). Here the word “*manana*” conveys nothing but inference (*anumāna*). So, *saṃśayapakṣatā* contradicts the quoted upaniṣadic passage. In fact, once gained the scriptural knowledge whose content is the Self, it is not likely to have a doubt about the same. Moreover, there cannot even be an inference with the same object, because there is no trace of its cause, namely *pakṣatā* in form of *saṃśaya*.

<sup>38</sup> AS/SV/LC (p. 15): “*anyathā śrutyātmaniścayavato 'numitsayā tadanumānaṃ na syāt, vādya-dīnām niścayavattvena saṃśayāsambhavād āhāryasaṃśayasyātiprasaṅjakatvāc ca.*”, “Otherwise, someone who has realised the Self through [the teachings of] *śruti*, will not formulate Its [= of the Self] inference [even] with a desire to infer [It], and since the debater and others [= the proponent and the opponent] have ascertained [their own positions], the doubt will not be possible and there will be an undue extension into hypothetical doubt (*āhāryasaṃśaya*).”

<sup>39</sup> The hypothetical kind of doubt (*āhāryasaṃśaya*) is defined as: “*bādhasamakāltnecchā-janyajjānam. yathā 'vahnyabhāvavān hrado vahnimān na vā' ity ākarakam*”, “[the hypothetical doubt is] a cognition produced by a desire, simultaneous with its [own] contradiction. For example, it has this shape: ‘is the lake endowed with the absence of fire, possessed of fire or not?’” (AS, p.

fact, considering the statement of Vācaspati Miśra's NyVTT (*ad NySBV I.1.1*) "only two persons who have an ascertained knowledge carry on a discussion" (*niścitaḥ hi vādaṃ kurutaḥ*) according to which the *vādin* and the *prativādin* involve themselves into a debate only having ascertained their respective positions about a certain subject, there is no room for the rise of any effective doubt. And, if we were to accept for a while the utility of the doubt, then this doubt would acquire a hypothetical nature (*āhāryatvena*). Consequently, if the hypothetical doubt were a causal constituent (*prayojaka*) of the inferential subjectness (*pakṣatā*), then we will also have to face the undesired event of the hypothetical consideration (*āhāryaparāmarśa*) being the cause of the inferential knowledge (*anumiti*). In fact here the hypothetical judgement wouldn't be obstructed (*pratibandhita*) by a specific ascertainment. Thus, we will have to face the problem (*āpatti*) of explaining the rise of the consideration and of the inferential knowledge out of the hypothetical doubt (*āhāryasaṃśaya*).<sup>40</sup> But this is clearly impossible, because if someone has already established the *probandum* and has not any desire to infer something, he will surely not infer anything. Actually, in that situation there is no kind of *pakṣatā*, be it considered as Prācīnas do or according to Navyas. The conclusion of the *pūrvapakṣin* is therefore that the doubt born out of the disagreement sentence cannot be accepted as a part of the reflection/inference.

At last, the *pūrvapakṣin*<sup>41</sup> intends to show that the *vipratipatti* isn't a part of the reflection/inference, not only indirectly, but also directly (*sākṣāt* = without generating the doubt). The *vipratipattivākya* serves to make accept (*parigraha*) to the *vādin* and the *prativādin* their own specific positions (*pratipakṣa* = *pratiniyatapakṣa*) about one single issue (*pakṣa* = *dharmin*). For this reason, it cannot be main-

3). See also *Nyāyakośa* (pp. 135-136) and the remarks on the fact that *āhārya* "cognition is perceptual and it is supposed to take place in defiance of the contradictory perception ..." (Dravid, 1996: 166-167).

<sup>40</sup> LC (p. 15): "*saṃśayasya saṃśayahetutvasvīkārasya. atiprasaṅghakatvāt āhāryaparāmarśāder hetutvāpādakatvāt.*" The AS/BB (p. 12) interprets the passage stating that as far as the cause of the inferential knowledge is concerned, the hypothetical doubt cannot be a constitutive criteria of the inferential subjectness, since it is exceedingly extensive: "*āhāryasaṃśayasyānumitihetutve 'tiprasaṅgena pakṣatvāprayojakatvāt.*"

<sup>41</sup> AS/SV/LC (pp. 15-16): "*nāpi vipratipatteḥ svarūpata eva pakṣapratipakṣaparigrahaphalakatayopayogaḥ. 'ivayedam sādhanīyam', 'anenedam dūṣaṇīyam' ityādimadhyasthavākyaḥ eva tallābhena vipratipattivaiarthyaḥ.*" "Moreover, the disagreement sentence is indeed of no-use even by its own nature, [namely] by producing as result (*phalakatayā*) the acceptance [of their own positions] by the opponent and the proponent. In fact, since we get it [= the position of both] simply from the sentence of the judge such as 'You should establish this', 'he should refute this', there will be no relevance at all of the disagreement sentence."

tained that it must be first uttered by the judge (*madhyastha*), because this result — i.e., the acceptance of respective positions — happens through command sentences (*ājñāvākya*) of the *madhyastha*, such as: “You must establish this”, “He must refute this”, so the utterance of the *vipratipattivākya* is irrelevant (*anyathāsiddha*). Vyāsa<sup>42</sup> also writes that the *vipratipatti* is useless not only in the formation of *pakṣa* but also as far as the *probandum* is concerned, because both are actually presented by the proposition (*pratijñāvākya*).<sup>43</sup>

### 5. Madhusūdana’s reply

The word “*tathāpi*”<sup>44</sup> marks *siddhāntin*’s reply.<sup>45</sup> He says that, since the definition of *pakṣatā* is not constructed around the concept of the doubt (*saṁśaya-aghāṭita*) and even though the doubt generated by the utterance of the *vipratipattivākya* is not a constitutive part of the inferential subjectness, nevertheless the doubt is a part of the reflection/inference. This is why it presents the property of being a counter-positive of the absence of the doubt, and this absence of doubt is caused by the reflection/inference, which brings about certainty.

Here, in my opinion, the pivotal word for the entire explanation of Madhusūdana is *vyudasanīyatayā*. As pointed out in *Viṭṭhaleṣṭya* (a gloss on LC), this word cannot merely be interpreted as “because the

<sup>42</sup> NyĀ/AS (pp. 3-4): “*nāpi sādhyopasthityarthaṃ vipratipattivākyaṃ, pratijñāvākyenaiva tatsiddheḥ ...*”, “The disagreement sentence [is not relevant] even for the presentation of the *probandum*, because that [function] it is entirely satisfied by the proposition sentence.”

<sup>43</sup> NyS I.1.33. The proposition is the first member of the syllogism, which mentions together the subject (*pakṣa*) as well as the *probandum* (*sādhyā*). That’s why in traditional circles it is also defined: “*sādhyaviśiṣṭapakṣabodhajanakavacaṇam*”, “the sentence which produces the knowledge of the subject qualified by the *probandum*.” (Śukla, 2005: 21-23).

<sup>44</sup> Here, the *pūrvapakṣin* could have posed a question. There is a clear mutual contradiction (*parasparavirodha*) in the two parts of this AS’s sentence: first it is said “*anumityanaṅgatve ’pi*” and a few words later “*vicārāṅgatvam asty eva*”. The purport of the sentence results: even though the doubt generated by the *vipratipatti* is not a part of the inference, it is nevertheless a part of it. But the *siddhāntin* wants to say that the doubt generated by the *vipratipatti*, being a part of the reflection, must consequently be also a part of the inference, namely the *pakṣa*. In order to avoid this incongruence (*asaṅgati*) LC (pp. 16-17) interprets the adverb “*tathāpi*” as “*tathāvidham*”. The opponent has stated that doubt is not a part of reflection/inference in two ways: as a constituent of the *pakṣa* and as having as result the capacity of making accept their respective positions to the *vādin* and the *prativādin*. But he failed to note that for the same two reasons also the *siddhāntin* does not accept the doubt as a part of the reflection/inference. On the contrary, he accepts the *vicārāṅgatva/anumityaṅgatva* of the doubt as *vyudasanīyatayā*. According to LC the twice repeated indeclinable “*api*” (the first in “*tathāpi*” and the second in “*anumityanaṅgatve ’pi*”) has different meanings: the first means “*eva*” (*evakārārthaka*), while the second, not used in a concessive sense as could be intended from its position, indicates a mere conjunction (*samuccayārtha*).

<sup>45</sup> AS/SV/LC (pp. 16-17): “*tathāpi vipratipattijanyasaṁśayasyānumityanaṅgatve ’pi vyudasanīyatayā vicārāṅgatvam asty eva*”, “Anyway, even though the doubt risen from the disagreement sentence is not a constitutive part of the inferential knowledge, it is surely endowed with the property of being a part [of the inference], being it to be negated (*vyudasanīyatayā*).”

doubt has to be dispelled, eliminated” (*nirākaraṇīyatayā/nivartanīyatayā*).<sup>46</sup> But as explained in LC as “*vicārasādhyābhāvapratiyogitayā*”.<sup>47</sup> This means that what is to be accomplished (*sādhya*) by the *vicāra* is the result (*phala*) of *vicāra*. This result is the absence of doubts (*saṁśayābhāva*) and the counter-positive (*pratiyogin*) of the absence of doubt is doubt itself, and the *pratiyogitā* resides in doubt. Therefore, doubt becomes a part of the *vicāra* since it is endowed with the property of being a counter-positive of its own absence (*pratiyogitayā*). The sense of this reasoning is that without reflecting it is not possible to dispel (*nivṛtti*) the doubt generated by a sentence like “*prapañco mithyā satyaṁ vā?*”. Consequently, it is the duty of the judge to generate a doubt concerning the reality or the falsity of the world through the utterance of *vipratipattivākya*. If the judge (*madhyastha*) does not utter the *vipratipatti* doubt does not arise, so the debate results useless, being the purpose of the debate the eradication of every doubt. Therefore, doubt generated by the *vipratipatti* is a constitutive part (*aṅga*) of the *vicāra*.

Moreover,<sup>48</sup> even though somewhere the doubt is not generated by the *vipratipattivākya* due to the presence of an obstructing agent (*pratibandhaka*) in form of ascertainment about a specific view (*niścayādirūpa*), it has anyway to be accepted that *vipratipatti* sentence, maintained as constitutive part of the reflection/inference, still conveys an immanent quality towards doubt, which represents that type of causality (*kāraṇatva*) called innate capability (*svarūpayogyatā*).<sup>49</sup>

<sup>46</sup> Viṅṭhaleśṭya on LC (p. 17): “*vyudasanīyatayety atra vyudāso na nivṛtīḥ, tatrāpi vipratipatter anupayogāt*”, “Here in the term ‘*vyudasanīyatayā*’ the word ‘negation’ is not an ‘elimination’, because in that eventuality there would not be any use of the disagreement sentence ...”

<sup>47</sup> LC (p. 17): “*vyudasanīyatayā vicārasādhyābhāvapratiyogitayā ...*”

<sup>48</sup> AS/SV/LC (p. 17): “*tādṛśasaṁśayaṁ prati vipratipatteḥ kvacin niścayādinā pratibandhād ajanakatve ’pi svarūpayogyatvād, vādyādīnāṁ ca niścayavatve niyamābhāvāt*”, “But somewhere [= in some cases] even if the disagreement sentence has not the capacity to generate [the doubt], because of the opposition [represented] by an ascertainment etc., [anyhow] there is an innate capability [to generate such a doubt]; in fact, there is not a fix rule concerning the proponent and the other [persons involved in a debate] as being endowed with a [precise] ascertainment (8).” According to LC’s interpretation, with the term “*svarūpayogyatvād*” Madhusūdana intends “*svarūpayogyatvarūpakāraṇatvāt*”. Among the several classifications of causality, we also have *svarūpasatkāraṇatva* and *jñātasatkāraṇatva*. When a cause is such only by being present (*varṭamāna*) even without the need of knowing its causality, it is called *svarūpasatkāraṇa*. For example, without knowing that fire burns, it is nevertheless the cause of burning (*dāhakārya*). On the other hand, some causes have a direct bear to the emergence of an effect only by knowing their specific causality. These are called *jñātasatkāraṇas*. For instance, if we need to know Madhusūdana’s reply to Vyāsa, we must read AS. So, to know the effect, namely Madhusūdana’s reply, we must have the knowledge of AS, which is the cause.

<sup>49</sup> That is the reason why Vācaspati Mīśra in his NyVTT (*ad NySBV I.2.1*) wrote: “*anadhigata-tattvabodhaḥ, saṁśayanivṛtīḥ, adhyavasāyābhyanujñānam iti phalāni trīṇi*”, “Three are the results [of the debate]: comprehension of a reality not previously known, dispelling of doubts, and



Subsequently, Madhusūdana refutes the previous statement according to which the *vādin* and the *prativādin* must be sure of their respective positions.<sup>50</sup> He says that there is not such a rule (*niyama*). In fact it is not possible to formulate this invariable concomitance (*vyāpti* = *niyama*),<sup>51</sup> because it deviates (*vyabhicārita*) towards the position of that arrogant (*ahaṃkārin*)<sup>52</sup> opponent (*parapakṣa*) who, to show his dialectical skills, assumes for a while the position of his own adversary resorting to the *jalpa* type of debate.<sup>53</sup> In the sentence written by Vācaspati Miśra “*niścītau hi vādaṃ kurutaḥ*”, the word “*niścītau*” is used for those who have an “*ābhimānikaniścayābhiprāyam*”. I believe that this compound can be interpreted in two ways: “those who just pretend to have the certainty about something” or, it can be better paraphrased, in the sense that even if the two debaters are actually without a real ascertainment, they address each other in this way “I’m sure of the reality of duality”, “I’m sure of the falsity of duality”, and only then their debate begins.

Concluding his introductory remarks, Madhusūdana says that having established that the *vipratipatti* sentence is a cause of the reflection/inference, in order to accomplish his duty, the *madhyastha* should utter this very sentence, together with all the other rules and regulations of the debate (*samayabandhādi*).<sup>54</sup>

## 6. Conclusion

Later on in the text, Madhusūdana seems to come back to an

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final acceptance of what has been previously ascertained.”

<sup>50</sup> AS/SV/LC (p. 17): “... ‘*niścītau hi vādaṃ kurutaḥ*’ ity *ābhimānikaniścayābhiprāyam*, *parapakṣam ālambyāpy ahaṃkāriṇo viparītanīścayavato jalpādaḥ pravṛttidarśanāt.*”, “... ‘Only two persons having an ascertained knowledge carry on the discussion’ this is the meaning given by someone who pretends to have an ascertainment; because the arrogant [debater], endowed with an opposed ascertainment taking up [for a while] the rival’s point of view, is seen to resort to sophistry (*jalpa*) and other [similar methods of debate].”

<sup>51</sup> AS (p. 4) proposes this kind of invariable concomitance: “*yatra yatra vādyādīnām anyatamatvaṃ tatra tatra svapakṣaniścayavattvam*”, “wherever there is one among the proponent and the others, there, there is the possessing of the ascertainment of one’s own point of view...”

<sup>52</sup> Using this word Madhusūdana shows that the seeker or the knower of truth doesn’t behave like that. See note 19.

<sup>53</sup> LC (p. 17): “*ābhimānikaniścayābhiprāyam. niścayavān asmīti jñāpayantau vivadete ity arthakam. tathā ca vādinor niścayakāle sabhāpatyādīnām saṃśayābhāvam uddīśya vicāre pravṛttir iti bhāvah.*”, “[The expression] ‘*ābhimānikaniścayābhiprāyam*’ means that two persons debate addressing [each other] in this way ‘I have an ascertainment!’. So, while the debaters are in their time of ascertainment, they approach discussion with regard to the absence of doubt of the president of the assembly [judge = *madhyastha*] and the other [members]. This is the idea.”

<sup>54</sup> AS/SV/LC (p. 18): “*tasmāt samayabandhādivat svakartavyanirvāhāya madhyasthena vipratipattiḥ pradarśanīyaiva*”, “Therefore, in order to accomplish his own duty, the judge should surely present the disagreement sentence just like [other] rules and regulations [of the debate].”

alternative suggestion, precisely that an essential condition for inference, if not doubt itself, is at least the absence of certainty or want of proof, since every operation of the means of knowledge presents an acquisition of some novel knowledge, which was not earlier available (Sundaram, 1984: 67).<sup>55</sup>

At any rate, what clearly emerges from Madhusūdana's analysis is that there is not any kind of obstruction or logical flaw in uttering the *vipratipatti* sentence, which is useful in generating a doubt, essential for the formulation of the inferential subject (*pakṣa*) and the *probandum* (*sādhyā*) of the *mithyātvānumāna*, as well as the consequent continuation of the debate.

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<sup>55</sup> AS/SV/LC (p. 29): “*pakṣatvaṃ tu sādhyasamdehavattvaṃ sādhyagocarasādhakamānā-bhāvavattvaṃ vā.*”, “But the inferential subjectness is the property of being endowed with a doubtful *probandum* or the property of being endowed with the absence of an establishing means of knowledge whose content is the *probandum*.”

## IS THERE ANY NEED FOR DOUBT?

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*Lecturer*  
*Dept. of Humanities*  
*University of Turin*  
*Italy*