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The Transition of People's Preferences for the Intervention of the Government in the Economy of Re-unified Germany

Matteo Migheli*

Abstract

Covering the first fifteen years immediately after German reunification, this paper analyzes the people's support to the transition. The focus is on individuals' preferences for the intervention of the government in the economy and on the opinion about competition *per se*. Eastern German data are compared with Western German data. Using suitable data that allow for interpersonal comparisons, the paper shows that Eastern Germans have always preferred an intervention of the public hand in the economy deeper than Western Germans; these different positions have hardly converged during the examined period of time. However there are no significant differences with respect to how Germans perceive competition *per se*: it is considered as a good by the people living in both parts of the country.

Università di Torino, Department of Economics and Statistics "Cognetti de Martiis" Lungo Dora Siena, 100 10153 Torino (TO) Italy. Tel. +39 11 6709630 email: matteo.migheli@unito.it

1. **Introduction**

On November the 9th 1989 the Wall of Berlin felt. During twenty-seven years it had been the material symbol of the post-war division of Germany and Europe into two blocks: the communist one strictly controlled by the U.S.S.R. on the East side, and the liberist one linked to the U.S.A. on the West side. Eleven months later, Germany and Berlin were again united after a division lasted more than forty years. The challenge of the new German government was now the harmonisations of the two parts of the unique body; better, the need was to render the eastern *Länder* market-oriented in the shortest time as possible. Before restructuring the industry and building a new financial system, it was necessary and mandatory to re-build the culture of the citizens (for the second time in less than half a century). And perhaps this latter task was the most challenging and the most important to carry on: the depth and the radicalism of the reforms to be implemented require a strong people's support in order to be successful (Williamson, 1994). It must also be noted that while the institutional and socio-economic changes in Eastern Germany were very deep, Western Germany had to bear the most of the costs of the transition.

Alesina et al. (2001) and Alesina et al. (2004) show the link between people's preferences about the organization of an economic system and the policies actually implemented. This is not surprising for a democratic country, since when the majority of the electors does not support the reforms implemented by the government, they are likely to vote for a party (or a coalition of parties) which slows down, stops, or even reverses the process (Kim and Pirttilä, 2006, find further empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis).

The implementation of the reforms in Germany has been a success, and today the eastern *Länder* are approaching the western standards of industrialization, economic development and standard of living. This paper aims at understanding whether, during the first years of the transition process, this people's support was strong and present among the citizens of the East. Secondly this paper aims at analyzing the presence (if any) of different preferences for a market economy among eastern and western citizens of unified Germany. I will show that, at least during the very early stages of the integration, eastern Germans were even more prone to support the exit of the public hand from the economy than their western brothers were. Secondly I will show that the existing support has declined along the time, as predicted by Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) and by Blanchard (1997) in their theoretical models. However Blanchard (1997) finds a U-shaped time path for the support to economic reforms; this means that the phase of decline is just transitory (and this will be my interpretation of the results). Although the success of the integration (which is still on the way) is clearly under the eyes of everybody, very few has been said about the actual political support, that Williamson (1994) views as an indispensable ingredient of any process of reform such as the German integration.

Using three waves of the *World Value Survey*[1] (WVS), I analyze the individual preferences of Germans for four broad concepts linked to a market economy (see the next section for full details). Namely I will deal with: 1) opinion about competition *per se*, 2) preference for a public ownership of firms large than the current situation, 3) responsibility of the government for citizens' provision of services and 4) the strength of state regulation for firms.

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[1] www.worldvaluesurvey.org

The literature tends to find different preferences among Germans, when these are clustered according the past East-West division. Several articles, which focus on preferences for redistribution among Germans, highlight that the support to redistributive policies is stronger among eastern than western Germans (Corneo, 2001). Corneo and Grüner (2002) provide further evidence in favour of this finding: they show that the same conclusion holds, when eastern and western Europeans are compared. Ockenfels and Weimann (1999) and Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) attribute this difference between preferences to the effects of more than four decades of communist regime[2]. However the last two authors consider a rather short time span (i.e. 1997 – 2002), which does not allow them to compare the situation examined in their paper with the situation at the very beginning of the transition (i.e. 1990). The results of my investigation are based on a longer time range (1990 – 2004) and show that, during the first fifteen years of the integration process, the eastern German population has followed the U-shaped path predicted by Blanchard (1997). The data used in my inquiry are from a different dataset than Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln's; while they use the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), I use the WVS, which is not a panel, as the interviewees change from one wave to another. While this does not allow for analysing how the single individual's preferences have evolved over time, it increases the number of independent observations. Unfortunately the data I use do not allow for establishing whether the people interviewed in the former Easter Germany already resided there before the reunification. This could be a weakness, however the socio-economic context of the place of residence should influence preferences more than the birthplace[3], and furthermore Heiland (2004) shows that the migration rates between the Eastern and Western States in the period 1989 – 2002 have been around 1,5% of the population. Although this means large absolute numbers, the fluxes are relatively small and therefore any possible noise introduced in the data I used should not be very relevant. In addition, while the GSOEP contains questions which are specific for Germany, the WVS covers more than 80 countries, hence a strength of using the data from it is that it allows for easier cross-country comparisons.

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[2] On the "communist legacy" see also Blanchflower and Freeman (1997).
[3] Indeed what matters for a person is the environment where he/she lives rather than the other possible words around him/her.

Claiming, as Giavazzi and McMahon (2005) do, that a lack of support was present is not correct; better, it should be highlighted that eastern Germans' support diminished (reaching figures that indicate opposition to a market economy) during the hardest period of economic restructuring. Then this trend reverted. However a *caveat* is necessary: the nature of the data does not allow for absolute, but only for relative comparisons[4]; and these are with respect to the *status quo* at the time of the interview. This means that people evaluate the situation as it is when they are interviewed and are partially influenced by it. So the support to a given institutional structure usually changes with the results that it produces. Consider for example a financial market: people will be favourable to it, when prices raise and less favourable when prices decline. However, this does not attenuate the strength of the results, nor undermine them, and does not change the conclusions of the paper. These are still valid for at least two reasons: the first is that I offer a sound comparison term: West Germans' preferences; the second is that the trend of the preferences (and the preferences themselves) with respect to the *status quo* is (are) meaningful and clearly interpretable *per se*.

My results can be interpreted as an enrichment of the evidence offered by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), but I also offer a partially contrasting reading. Namely I claim that the manifest difference of preferences between western and eastern Germans is not (completely) directly related to the effects of a communist legacy, but rather to the period of economic distress that immediately followed the reunification.

This paper enriches the extant literature for at least two reasons: first it examines some preferences for a market economy that the previous works have not taken into consideration; second it provides some empirical support to Blanchard (1997). A third contribution (though minor with respect to the other two) is to try to offer some empirical support to Williamson (1994) too: in absence of people's support, the reforms in Germany should not have been so quick and successful.

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[4] This will be better explained later in the paper. Namely, see section 2.

2. Data and methodology

Data are from 1989–1993, 1994–1999 and 1999–2004 waves of the World Value Survey (WVS)[5]. The responders are almost evenly distributed across these waves and across the two parts of Germany. World Value Survey is not a panel, but a collection of cross-sections, where the interviewees change from wave to wave. Of course this impedes the use of panel data analysis and obliges to use cross-sectional approaches.

The first variable that I consider measures the individual evaluation of competition *per se*; it is the answer to the following question: "*Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between[6]. Sentences: Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop new ideas vs. Competition is harmful. It brings the worst in people*". In this case 1 means to consider competition as good and as stimulating people to work and to develop new ideas, whilst 10 means to think that competition is harmful.

The second and the third questions attain the role of the government in the economy. Specifically, they ask the respondents to grade the following couples of sentences: "*Private ownership of business should be increased vs. Government ownership of business should be increased*" and "*People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves vs. The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for*". In both cases answering 10 definitely means to support the intervention of the government in the economy. In both cases the responder's preference against the rules of competition and of a free market is stronger as the grade increases.

The fourth question is again about the intervention of the government in the economy, but it refers to a different and more modern approach of intervention: regulation. The question asks the interviewee to

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[5] On the validity of survey data see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). However I performed the same tests as Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), and I found results that corroborate the reliability of the data used for this paper.
[6] This part of the question is equal also for the following quotes. As a consequence I will not report it, but I will only quote the sentences to be graded.

grade his/her preference for the strength of the public regulation over firms. The couple of sentences to be graded is: "*The state should give more freedom to firms vs. The state should control firms more effectively*". Here 1 means to prefer freedom vs. strong regulation (10). Although regulation is not necessarily a negative aspect for competition and free market, I interpret high marks mistrusting a market left to be completely free and competitive. Notice that this question was asked in the third wave only, so no time path can be discussed in this case. Although not exhaustive, the analysis of these four variables sheds some light on the preferences of German citizens about some fundamental characteristics of a market economy. I must, however, underline that the meaning of "control the firms more effectively" can vary across different interpretations. On the one hand an effective control could be represented by effective antitrust policies, environmental regulation, fiscal inspections, and so on. On the other hand one might interpret that sentence as direct control of the government over the firms. In either case the preference expressed for the second sentence involves a public intervention in the economy, as opposed to deregulation and in this broad sense the answer has to be interpreted throughout the paper[7], having in mind all the possible nuances.

The nature of the data used in this paper is such that they are suitable for the present analysis and for the goals of this paper. They are not mere absolute grades assigned to a specific preference. Respondents are required to grade a couple of sentences of opposite meaning; this induces the interviewee to identify the present situation as the reference (median) point and hence to compare his/her preference/opinion with this. This easies the comparability of subjective answers, as it is reasonable to assume that the respondent has a good knowledge of the current situation. Theoretically the questions used in this paper are interrelated, in the sense that a person who has strong preferences for a market vs. a planned economy will likely have also strong preferences against the public intervention in the economy. However other works (for example Migheli 2010) show that the correlation may be weaker than supposed. In particular people who are in principle favourable to a market economy and to competition, nevertheless ask their governments to regulate the market and to sustain extensive welfare systems (the socio-

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[7] Given that the communist system was on its way to be dismantled and substituted with a capitalist system, my personal interpretation is that the answer to the question has rather the first than the second of the proposed senses.

democratic Scandinavian countries are a clear example of this). Hence the answers to the questions used in the present paper aim at analysing and disentangling preferences over different aspects of a market economy, assuming that they are less linear and more multifaceted that what one might expect in principle.

The investigation involves both univariate and multivariate analysis. In the latter I include income and gender as controls. Several studies on eastern European countries (for example Vecernik, 1995; Orazem and Vodopivec, 1995; Rutkowski, 1996 and Brainerd, 1998) show that returns on education are higher in a market economy than in a central planned economy, therefore more educated people would tend to be in favour of reforms more than others; also Duch (1993), Gabel and Palmer (1995), Gabel (1998a and 1998b), Eble and Koeva (2002) and Hayo (2004) find support for this conclusion in a sample of formerly communist European countries. Here I do not use the level of education as a control for the following reason: I would be comparing two different educational systems and two different types of ideological education within the same country, and furthermore the data implicitly attach the same value to the same formal educational level (i.e. a university degree is graded the same for both a western and an eastern citizen). This would undermine the reliability of the results and therefore their interpretation. The reference category for the computation of the marginal effects in the case of income is the first decile of the distribution of incomes.

Additional regressors[8] are: age (and its squared value in order to control for a U-shaped effect), the size of the interviewee's town, his/her marital status, individual income and the respondent's employment status (divided into four categories: self-employed, full-time employed, part-time employed or unemployed – taken as reference). Differently from Grier (1997) and Guiso et al. (2003) I do not control for religious denominations, but for religious orientation for two reasons. On the one hand the largest majority of the Catholics live in the western *Länder*, thus the inclusion of a dummy for them would just identify the south-western respondents. On the other hand the government of the DDR[9] not only had never banned religion,

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[8] See also Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).

[9] German acronym for *Deutsche Demokratische Republik* (German Democratic Republic), the official name of Eastern Germany from 1949 to 1990.

as it happened in other communist countries, but officially recognized also the activity of a Christian political party (namely the CDU). Therefore the inclusion of the two dummy variables for the respondent's religious orientation (i.e. religious or atheist) does not introduce the same bias as religious denomination and is meaningful. The attitude towards religiosity/atheism is retrieved from a specific question of the *WVS*: *"Independently of whether you go to church or not, would you say you are…"*; there are three possible answers to this question: *"a religious person"*, *"not a religious person"* and *"a convinced atheist"*. I take the intermediate group (those who classify themselves as non religious) as the reference group and introduce two dummies: one for those respondents who classified themselves as religious persons and one for those who declared to feel convinced atheists[10].

I control also for the size of the town in which the responder lives: Firebaugh and Sandu (1998) find that Romanian urban residents are more in favour of marketization than people living in the countryside; Doyle and Fidrmuc (2006) find that people living in suburban districts are more likely to support accession of their country (and therefore the implied continuation of reforms) to the EU than inhabitants of the countryside are. The *WVS* classifies villages and towns according to a discrete scale from 1 (villages with less than 2,000 inhabitants) to 8 (towns with more than 500,000 people); the reference category for the computation of the marginal effects is the first.

Age is another important control: old people have experienced more institutional changes, and thus their preferences are based also on a strong experience in addition to education. At the same time, they tend to regret the past. Among others Hayo (1999) finds a U-shaped pattern for age: support for a market economy first increases and then decreases. Here I expect the same result at least for Eastern Germany, also in the light of Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007). Some nostalgia of the past regime (see Easterlin and Plagnol, 2008 in the case of eastern German States) could then affect the preferences of the people belonging to the central age cohorts and, to a lesser extent, the elderly as they should balance nostalgia with the experience of the market institutions before the

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[10] Notice that in regressions (and hence in the tables) the reference category is represented by atheist and non religious people.

War. However this non-linearity of age can also derive from the fact that expected income losses from transition may vary with cohorts.

The time path is identified through a discrete variable coding the waves. This variable takes the values 1, 2 and 3, which are increasing in time. This means that the 1989 – 1993 wave is coded as 1, the following wave as 2, and the last one as 3. This allows for assessing whether there is a change of these preferences over the time, which is not captured by the previous controls (wave 1 is taken as reference category).

I analyze firstly the whole sample in order to answer the main question of this paper, i.e. whether eastern and western Germans support competition and the free market and if they do to a different extent. Secondly I analyze the two sub-samples (the western and the eastern blocks) in order to check if the effects of the individual characteristics detected in the full-sample analysis vary or are the same across the sub-samples. The most appropriate technique to apply is the ordered probit analysis. A relevant note is that the twofold nature of the dependent variables implies the existence of a "turning point", i.e. a value of the variable such that the sign of the marginal effect of each control changes.

3. Results

The tables show both the coefficients and the marginal effects so that the reader can see the magnitude of the effect of each control on a discrete "jump" of the dependent variable. Table 1 presents the evolution of Germans' preferences over the time. For each considered variable, for each of the two historical blocks of current Germany and for each wave of the *WVS*, I calculated the mean grade; then the significance of the difference between each pair of means is calculated. It is possible to notice that in the eastern *Länder* the aversion to competition has increased from the first to the second wave, and then has kept statistically unchanged. The interpretation for this result is that is that in 1990 eastern Germans viewed competition as the dream of freedom from the dictatorship, so they wanted to pass from the past regime to the new model and for this reason

looked for the institutions of a market economy. Competition was something near to a synonymous for freedom. Thereafter they got the wished institutions and learnt that competition is good, but is not the heaven or the solution to all the problems inherited from the past regime. However their opinion about competition *per se* has never attained a value that may indicate opposition to it and the means are different from western Germans' only for the first wave, suggesting two remarks. First: considering the second and the third waves, we can conclude that the opinion about competition was the same in both parts of Germany, and it is plausible to assume that around 2000 both western and eastern Germans had the same concept of competition (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). Second: excluding the first wave (when eastern Germans had a better opinion of competition than western Germans had – but we have to remind that in 1990 the neutral preference was likely to mean different things in the two parts of the federation), there is no statistical difference between the eastern and the western average grades. Therefore it is not true that, over the time, eastern Germans have had a worse opinion about competition than their western compatriots.

In the first wave eastern Germans showed a (rather strong) preference for private rather than state ownership of firms. Between 1990 and 1995 their preference changed dramatically: the mean shifted towards a (very weak) preference for state ownership and five years later they were, on average, indifferent (the mean was statistically not different from 5). Moreover if in 1990 western Germans were less favourable to private ownership than the eastern, this situation reversed[11] in the following years. Here we can weakly detect the U-shaped path predicted by Blanchard (1997). The table shows also the same tests for the preference over the public intervention to ensure that no citizen is in need. Here the U-shaped time path is very evident. Moreover there is an appreciable jump from some preference for no intervention to a strong opposite position, which appears much mitigated in the third wave.

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[11] And the difference between East and West was significant at 99% level.

The next tables report the results of the ordered probit regressions (notice that the marginal effects are reported at medians[12]). The dependent variables are the questions summarized in the previous section. Each table reports the coefficients of the controls in the fist column, and the respective marginal effects in the other nine columns. These results support those commented previously. Considering the opinion about competition (see tables 2, 2bis and 2ter), the "East" dummy takes a negative and significant value. According with the same table, the coefficient for the wave is positive and significant, and it is driven by both parts of the country. This means that competition has lost some appeal in all the *Länder*. The dummy capturing the respondents living in the former DDR is always highly significant, indicating that the opinion about competition and the preferences for a stronger public intervention in the economy are different between the two blocks. In particular eastern Germans have a better opinion of competition than western Germans have. Notice that this result is highly significant, even after controlling for the wave of the survey. This suggests that, once data have been depurated by the effect of the other controls included in the regression, the results shown in Table 1 are reinforced. The marginal effects show the magnitude of the effect captured by the sign of the coefficients. It is interesting to notice that while influent among Western citizens, income does not exert any effect on the opinion about competition of the Eastern respondents (tables 2bis vs. table 2ter).

Beyond the geographic ideological partition highlighted by the tables, another difference between East and West is worthy to be mentioned. One of the pillars of the communist doctrine is the absence of any difference between the genders. In general the economic literature (see for example Camerer, 2003) finds women to be more risk averse than men. As a consequence women are expected to favour the intervention of the government in the economy more than men do. This is exactly what I find in the case of the whole German sample and of western German respondents; but when the East block is isolated, the dummy capturing the gender of the interviewee looses its significance (see tables 2bis and 2ter, and 5bis and 5ter, though in these two last tables the effect is

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[12] This choice is due to the high number of dummy variables included in the analysis.

weaker). This means that opinions and preferences about competition and related topics are not affected by gender within eastern Germans. Although I do not provide (as my data do not allow me for) conclusive evidence that this outcome results as a legacy of the communist regime, this result seems to be stronger than a simple coincidence.

The self-classification of the respondent as a religious person is generally associated with a preference for competition, rather than state intervention; this holds in both Eastern and Western Germany, without significant differences.

The coefficients and the marginal effects for age (and its squared value) show a reversed U-shaped effect only in the case of the preference for an increasing state ownership of firms (tables 3, 3bis and 3ter). In the case of the preference about firm regulation, the effect of age has a different sign in Western than in Eastern Germany. In particular these signs suggest that the old in the West and the young in the East perceive a stronger regulation of private firms as desirable. The effect of age is then significant in Western Germany (but not in the other part), when the dependent variable is the opinion about competition: the younger the interviewee, the worse the grade of competition as a good. Furthermore, and basically in disaccord with Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), I do not find any significant effect of age on the preference about the intervention in the government to ensure basic welfare.

Eventually it is worthy to briefly comment about the effect of the type of work contract. In general self employed people and full time workers[13] show a strong and significant preference for competition and its related aspects. This is apparently not the case for Germans (see tables 2, 3, 4 and 5), although among self-employed workers many are professionals: in principle these categories could be positively affected by a high level of market regulation, as more subjects would need their services. Hence this results does not suggest that entrepreneurs are less pro-competition than unemployed and pensioners, but may simply a consequence of the composition of the category. The position of people working part-time is not very clear and almost never significant. This could result

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[13] The reference category represents all the non-working interviewees: unemployed and retired people, housewives and students.

as a consequence of the fact that some workers in this group chose this type of contract voluntarily (for example in the case of young mothers), and some found only this kind of employment, while they would have preferred a full-time job. It is possible (and perhaps likely) that these two components of the group have different preferences about competition, and that summing them up makes the coefficient scarcely significant.

At this point it is important to add a consideration. The differences detected between eastern and western *Länder* can be imputable to several different factors, with are likely present all in a while. The aim of the paper is not to disentangle them with surety; nevertheless some results are interpretable as possible legacies of the past communist regime. Of course also other interpretations are possible: so for example eastern women may be more prone to work than western because the economic conditions of the households are worse in the East than in the West.

4. Conclusions

In this paper I provide substantial support for the findings of Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2009), but I also highlight a time path, which is somewhat more complex than the one found by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln. In particular I show that overall eastern Germans are less market-oriented than western Germans are. Overall eastern Germans have a worse opinion of competition *per se* with respect to the responders of the western *Länder*. In addition they prefer more than western responders an intervention of the government in the economy through state ownership and regulation of firms and provision of essential welfare.

After more than a decade of since reunification, the two parts of Germany seem still divided with respect to some focal topics of economic policy. In particular, although both the western and the eastern Germans have the same opinion about how beneficial competition is (or could be), in the East Germans still show preferences for an intervention of the government in the economy, which are stronger than those expressed in the West. Although this situation could be easily ascribed to the recent past, and these results can be interpreted as a legacy of the communist regime, I thinks that

another interpretation is possible. If before the unification everybody was almost sure to find a job, afterwards this was no longer true, both because some factories needed closing as they were too obsolete[14], and because in the West the employers mistrusted the quality of the eastern manpower. Therefore, as unemployment rates were much higher in the East than in the West, it is not surprising that eastern Germans claimed for more public intervention, than western Germans did. And this is not necessarily related to some communist legacy: the same behaviour can easily be found in any other country (included the U.S.A. and the U.K.) that has never known a communist regime. A point in favour of this interpretation is the absence of any difference between the eastern and the western opinion about how beneficial competition is.

As a conclusion, although the two parts of Germany still show evident and significant differences, I claim that this does not reflect only an ideological position somewhat linked to the recent past of (some states of) the country. There are causes linked to the transition process (and thus transitory by definition), which can justify the actual distance between the preferences. As a consequence this distance is going to disappear faster than generally thought, provided that the current economic problems of the eastern *Länder* will be solved in a short period of time. The results of this paper allow for considering this reading of the data as a valid and robust complement (or alternative) to the current and widespread interpretation of an ideological communist legacy. Eventually the fact that in 1990 the support for a market economy was apparently larger among eastern than western interviewees should be largely ascribed to two causes: first to the fact that the eastern hopes and dreams were built on the idealization of the western market economy as a synonym of freedom, and, second, to the nature of the used data, which represent relative preferences with respect to a *status quo*, rather than absolute preferences. In any case the German road towards a complete homogenization of the two parts is only a matter of time, perhaps and likely shorter than expected.

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[14] An example for all is Trabant.

Table 1. Comparison of average answers by wave and geographic partition

Competition is harmful	Mean	Significance		Competition is harmful	Mean	Significance
East	3.40	***		East first wave	2.97	***
West	3.46			East second wave	3.61	
East (first wave)	2.97	***		East second wave	3.61	-
West (first wave)	3.26			East third wave	3.76	
East (second wave)	3.61	-		West first wave	3.26	***
West (second wave)	3.62			West second wave	3.62	
East (third wave)	3.76	-		West second wave	3.62	-
West (third wave)	3.70			West third wave	3.70	
State ownership of firms				**State ownership of firms**		
East	4.27	***		East first wave	3.10	***
West	3.80			East second wave	5.12	
East (first wave)	3.10	***		East second wave	5.12	-
West (first wave)	3.69			East third wave	5.06	
East (second wave)	5.12	***		West first wave	3.69	***
West (second wave)	4.03			West second wave	4.03	
East (third wave)	5.06	***		West second wave	4.03	***
West (third wave)	3.79			West third wave	3.79	
Public intervention to ensure people's provision				**Public intervention to ensure people's provision**		
East	5.46	***		East first wave	4.12	***
West	4.42			East second wave	7.05	
East (first wave)	4.12	**		East second wave	7.05	***
West (first wave)	4.20			East third wave	5.60	
East (second wave)	7.05	***		West first wave	4.20	***
West (second wave)	5.38			West second wave	5.38	
East (third wave)	5.60	***		West second wave	5.38	***
West (third wave)	3.89			West third wave	3.89	
Increasing regulation over firms						
East	5.50	***				
West	4.42					

Table 2. Opinion about competition: ordered probit regression for all Germany

	Coefficients	y = 2	y = 3	y = 4	y = 5	y = 6	y = 7	y = 8	y = 9	y = 10
						Marginal effects				
Male	-0.129	0.012	n.s.	-0.008	-0.014	-0.008	-0.006	-0.006	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.030)***	(0.003)***	n.s.	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(7×10^{-4})***	(0.001)***
Degree of happiness	-0.103	0.010	n.s.	-0.007	-0.011	-0.006	-0.005	-0.005	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.025)***	(0.002)***	n.s.	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(6×10^{-4})***	(9×10^{-4})***
Income	-0.028	0.003	n.s.	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-7×10^{-4}	-9×10^{-4}
	(0.006)***	(0.001)***	n.s.	(4×10^{-4})***	(7×10^{-4})***	$(4\times10{-4})$***	$(3\times10{-4})$***	$(3\times10{-4})$***	(1×10^{-4})***	(2×10^{-4})***
Size of the town	-0.003	3×10^{-4}	n.s.	1×10^{-4}	3×10^{-4}	1×10^{-4}	1×10^{-4}	1×10^{-4}	7×10^{-5}	1×10^{-4}
	(0.006)	(6×10^{-4})	n.s.	(4×10^{-4})	(7×10^{-4})	(3×10^{-4})	(3×10^{-4})	(3×10^{-4})	(1×10^{-4})	(2×10^{-4})
Age	-0.004	4×10^{-4}	n.s.	-3×10^{-4}	-4×10^{-4}	-3×10^{-4}	-2×10^{-4}	-2×10^{-4}	-9×10^{-5}	-1×10^{-4}
	(0.001)***	(9×10^{-5})***	n.s.	(6×10^{-5})***	(1×10^{-4})***	(6×10^{-5})***	(4×10^{-5})***	(5×10^{-5})***	(2×10^{-5})***	(3×10^{-5})***
Self employed	-0.358	0.025	-0.012	-0.029	-0.040	-0.021	-0.013	-0.014	-0.006	-0.008
	(0.101)***	(0.004)***	(0.006)*	(0.009)***	(0.011)***	(0.005)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***
Full time contract	-0.109	0.010	n.s.	-0.007	-0.012	-0.007	-0.005	-0.005	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.036)***	(0.003)***	n.s.	(0.002)***	(0.004)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(8×10^{-4})***	(0.001)***
Part time contract	0.114	-0.012	n.s.	0.007	0.012	0.007	0.005	0.006	0.003	0.004
	(0.056)**	(0.006)**	n.s.	(0.003)**	(0.006)**	(0.004)**	(0.003)**	(0.003)**	(0.001)**	(0.002)*
East	-0.115	0.011	n.s.	-0.007	-0.013	-0.007	-0.005	-0.006	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.031)***	(0.003)***	n.s.	(0.002)***	(0.004)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***	(7×10^{-4})***	(0.001)***
Wave	0.121	-0.012	n.s.	0.008	0.013	0.008	0.005	0.006	0.003	0.004
	(0.018)***	(0.002)***	n.s.	(0.001)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(9×10^{-4})***	(0.001)***	(5×10^{-4})***	(7×10^{-4})***
Married	-0.069	0.007	n.s.	-0.004	-0.008	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.030)**	(0.003)**	n.s.	(0.002)**	(0.003)**	(0.002)**	(0.001)**	(0.001)**	(7×10^{-4})**	(0.001)**
Religious	-0.076	0.007	n.s.	-0.005	-0.008	-0.005	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.032)**	(0.003)**	n.s.	(0.002)**	(0.003)**	(0.002)**	(0.001)**	(0.002)**	(7×10^{-4})**	(0.001)**
Pr(y = n)		0.186	0.201	0.145	0.126	0.051	0.029	0.027	0.011	0.013

Dependent variable: opinion about competition (10 digits): 10 = harmful; 0 = useful.
Observations: 5428
Pseudo R-squared: 0.014

Table 2bis. Opinion about competition: ordered probit regression for Western Germany

	Coefficients	y = 2	y = 3	y = 4	y = 5	y = 6	y = 7	y = 8	y = 9	y = 10
						Marginal effects				
Male	-0.213	0.023	0.003	-0.014	-0.026	-0.015	-0.009	-0.010	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.042)***	(0.005)***	(0.001)**	(0.003)***	(0.005)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
Degree of happiness	-0.115	0.012	0.002	-0.008	-0.014	-0.008	-0.005	-0.006	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.035)***	(0.004)***	(7×10^{-4})**	(0.002)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(8×10^{-4})***	(9×10^{-4})***
Income	-0.039	0.004	5×10^{-4}	-0.003	-0.005	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-7×10^{-4}	-9×10^{-4}
	(0.008)***	(0.001)***	(2×10^{-4})***	$(6\times10{-4})$***	(0.001)***	(6×10^{-4})***	(4×10^{-4})***	(4×10^{-4})***	(2×10^{-4})***	(2×10^{-4})***
Size of the town	-0.012	0.001	2×10^{-4}	-7×10^{-4}	-0.001	-8×10^{-4}	5×10^{-4}	6×10^{-4}	2×10^{-4}	$3\times10{-4}$
	(0.009)	(0.001)	(1×10^{-4})*	(6×10^{-4})	(0.001)	(6×10^{-4})	(4×10^{-4})	(5×10^{-4})	(2×10^{-4})	$(2\times10{-4})$
Age	-0.006	7×10^{-4}	9×10^{-5}	-4×10^{-4}	-8×10^{-4}	-4×10^{-4}	-3×10^{-4}	-3×10^{-4}	-1×10^{-4}	-2×10^{-4}
	(0.001)***	(1×10^{-4})***	(3×10^{-5})***	(9×10^{-5})***	(2×10^{-4})***	(1×10^{-4})***	(6×10^{-5})***	(7×10^{-5})***	(3×10^{-5})***	(4×10^{-5})***
Self employed	-0.357	0.030	-0.007	-0.030	-0.043	-0.022	-0.013	-0.014	-0.005	-0.006
	(0.134)***	(0.008)***	(0.007)	(0.010)**	(0.016)**	(0.007)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
Full time contract	-0.015	0.002	2×10^{-4}	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	7×10^{-4}	8×10^{-4}	3×10^{-4}	4×10^{-4}
	(0.048)	(0.005)	(6×10^{-4})	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(8×10^{-4})***	(0.001)
Part time contract	0.103	-0.011	-0.002	0.006	0.012	0.007	0.005	0.005	0.002	0.003
	(0.070)	(0.008)	(0.002)	(0.004)*	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Wave	0.100	-0.011	-0.001	0.007	0.012	0.007	0.004	0.005	0.002	0.002
	(0.024)***	(0.003)***	(5×10^{-4})**	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(6×10^{-4})***	$(7\times10{-4})$***
Married	-0.034	0.004	5×10^{-4}	-0.002	-0.004	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002	6×10^{-4}	8×10^{-4}
	(0.042)	(0.005)	(6×10^{-4})	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(8×10^{-4})	(0.001)
Religious	-0.092	0.010	0.001	-0.006	-0.011	-0.006	-0.004	-0.005	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.043)**	(0.005)**	(9×10^{-4})*	(0.003)**	(0.005)**	(0.003)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(9×10^{-4})**	(0.001)**
Pr(y = n)		0.182	0.206	0.161	0.138	0.053	0.027	0.026	0.008	0.009

Dependent variable: opinion about competition (10 digits): 10 = harmful; 0 = useful.
Observations: 2896
Pseudo R-squared: 0.012

Table 2ter. Opinion about competition: ordered probit regression for Eastern Germany

	Coefficients	y = 2	y = 3	y = 4	y = 5	y = 6	y = 7	y = 8	y = 9	y = 10
						Marginal effects				
Male	-0.063	0.005	-8×10^{-4}	-0.004	-0.006	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.044)	(0.004)	$(7\times10{-4})$	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Degree of Happiness	-0.099	0.008	-0.001	-0.006	-0.010	-0.006	-0.004	-0.005	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.035)***	(0.003)***	(6×10^{-4})**	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
Income	-0.014	0.001	-2×10^{-4}	-9×10^{-4}	-0.001	-8×10^{-4}	-6×10^{-4}	-7×10^{-4}	-4×10^{-4}	$-6\times10{-4}$
	(0.010)	(8×10^{-4})***	(1×10^{-4})	(6×10^{-4})	(0.001)	(6×10^{-4})	(4×10^{-4})	(5×10^{-4})	(3×10^{-4})	$(4\times10{-4})$
Size of the town	0.006	-5×10^{-4}	8×10^{-5}	4×10^{-4}	6×10^{-4}	4×10^{-4}	3×10^{-4}	3×10^{-4}	2×10^{-4}	$3\times10{-4}$
	(0.008)	(7×10^{-4})	(1×10^{-4})	(5×10^{-4})	(8×10^{-4})	(5×10^{-4})	(4×10^{-4})	(4×10^{-4})	(2×10^{-4})	$(3\times10{-4})$
Age	-0.001	8×10^{-5}	-1×10^{-5}	-6×10^{-5}	-9×10^{-5}	-6×10^{-5}	-4×10^{-5}	-4×10^{-5}	-3×10^{-5}	$-4\times10{-5}$
	(0.001)	(1×10^{-4})	(2×10^{-5})	(9×10^{-5})	(1×10^{-4})	(9×10^{-5})	(6×10^{-5})	(7×10^{-5})	(4×10^{-5})	$(6\times10{-5})$***
Self employed	-0.324	0.019	-0.013	-0.024	-0.032	-0.017	-0.012	-0.013	-0.007	-0.010
	(0.159)**	(0.004)***	(0.010)	(0.013)*	(0.015)**	(0.008)**	(0.005)**	(0.005)**	(0.002)**	(0.003)***
Full time contract	-0.174	0.015	-0.002	-0.011	-0.017	-0.010	-0.008	-0.008	-0.005	-0.007
	(0.053)***	(0.004)***	(0.001)**	(0.003)***	(0.005)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
Part time contract	0.174	-0.017	4×10^{-4}	0.009	0.017	0.010	0.008	0.009	0.005	0.009
	(0.097)*	(0.010)*	(0.002)	(0.004)**	(0.009)*	(0.006)*	(0.005)*	(0.005)*	(0.003)	(0.006)
Wave	0.144	-0.012	0.002	0.009	0.014	0.008	0.006	0.007	0.004	0.006
	(0.028)***	(0.002)***	(7×10^{-4})**	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
Married	-0.084	0.007	-9×10^{-4}	-0.005	-0.008	-0.005	-0.004	-0.004	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.045)*	(0.004)*	(6×10^{-4})*	(0.003)*	(0.004)*	(0.002)*	(0.002)*	(0.002)*	(0.001)*	(0.002)*
Religious	-0.065	0.005	-9×10^{-4}	-0.004	-0.005	-0.004	-0.003	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.048)	(0.004)	(9×10^{-4})	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Pr(y = n)		0.192	0.196	0.127	0.113	0.048	0.030	0.028	0.014	0.017

Dependent variable: opinion about competition (10 digits): 10 = harmful; 0 = useful.
Observations: 2532
Pseudo R-squared: 0.011

Table 3. Preference for the owner of firms (state vs. private): ordered probit regression for all Germany

	Coefficients	Marginal effects								
		y = 2	y = 3	y = 4	y =5	y = 6	y = 7	y = 8	y = 9	y = 10
Male	-0-147	0.013	0.009	-0.001	-0.014	-0.012	-0.008	-0.010	-0.005	-0.007
	(0.030)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(4*10^{-4})***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***
Degree of happiness	-0.104	0.009	0.006	-9*10^{-4}	-0.010	-0.009	-0.006	-0.007	-0.004	-0.005
	(0.025)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(3*10^{-4})***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***	(9*10^{-4})***	(0.001)***
Income	-0.004	3*10^{-4}	2*10^{-4}	-3*10^{-4}	-4*10^{-4}	-3*10^{-4}	-2*10^{-4}	-3*10^{-4}	-1*10^{-4}	-2*10-4
	(0.006)	(6*10^{-4})	(4*10^{-4})	(5*10^{-4})	(6*10^{-4})	(5*10^{-4})	(4*10^{-4})	(4*10^{-4})	(2*10^{-4})	(1*10-4)
Size of the town	0.015	-0.001	-9*10^{-4}	1*10^{-4}	0.001	0.001	9*10^{-4}	0.001	5*10^{-4}	7*10-4
	(0.006)**	(6*10^{-4})**	(4*10^{-4})**	(6*10^{-5})**	(6*10^{-4})**	(5*10^{-4})**	(4*10^{-4})**	(4*10^{-4})**	(2*10^{-4})**	(3*10-4)**
Age	0.021	-0.002	-0.001	2*10^{-4}	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	-7*10^{-4}	0.001
	(0.005)***	(5*10^{-4})***	(3*10^{-4})***	(6*10^{-5})***	(5*10^{-4})***	(5*10^{-4})***	(3*10^{-4})***	(4*10^{-4})***	(2*10^{-5})***	(3*10-4)***
Age squared	-2*10^{-4}	2*10^{-5}	1*10^{-5}	-2*10^{-6}	-2*10^{-5}	-2*10^{-5}	-1*10^{-5}	-1*10^{-5}	-7*10^{-6}	-1*10^{-5}
	(6*10^{-5})***	(1*10^{-5})***	(1*10^{-7})***	(1*10^{-7})***	(1*10^{-5})***	(1*10^{-7})***	(1*10^{-7})***	(1*10^{-7})***	(1*10^{-7})***	(1*10^{-7})***
Self employed	-0.457	0.033	0.011	-0.016	-0.054	-0.037	-0.023	-0.024	-0.011	-0.014
	(0.100)***	(0.005)***	(0.002)***	(0.005)***	(0.013)***	(0.007)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
Full time contract	-0.191	0.017	0.011	-0.002	-0.019	-0.016	-0.011	-0.012	-0.007	-0.009
	(0.037)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(6*10^{-4})***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***
Part time contract	-0.091	0.008	0.005	-0.001	-0.009	-0.008	-0.005	-0.006	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.056)*	(0.005)*	(0.003)*	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.005)*	(0.003)*	(0.003)*	(0.002)*	(0.002)**
East	0.106	-0.009	-0.007	8*10^{-4}	0.010	0.009	0.006	0.007	0.004	0.005
	(0.032)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(3*10^{-4})***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***
Wave	0.207	-0.018	-0.013	0.002	0.020	0.017	0.012	0.014	0.007	0.010
	(0.018)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(5*10^{-4})***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(9*10^{-4})***	(0.001)***
Married	-0.073	0.006	0.005	5*10^{-4}	-0.007	-0.006	-0.004	-0.005	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.033)**	(0.003)**	(0.002)**	(3*10^{-4})**	(0.003)**	(0.003)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.001)**	(0.002)**
Religious	-0.168	0.015	0.010	-0.001	-0.016	-0.014	-0.010	-0.011	-0.006	-0.008
	(0.032)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(4*10^{-4})***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***
Pr(y = n)		0.115	0.181	0.132	0.195	0.087	0.046	0.042	0.018	0.020

Dependent variable: preference for the owner of firms (10 digits): 10 = state; 0 = private.
Observations: 5222
Pseudo R-squared: 0.017

Table 3bis. Preference for the owner of firms (state vs. private): ordered probit regression for Western Germany

	Coefficients	Marginal effects								
		y = 2	y = 3	y = 4	y =5	y = 6	y = 7	y = 8	y = 9	y = 10
Male	-0.207	0.021	0.012	-0.004	-0.026	-0.019	-0.012	-0.010	-0.005	-0.005
	(0.043)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.001)***	(0.006)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
Degree of happiness	-0.138	0.014	0.008	-0.003	-0.017	-0.013	-0.008	-0.007	-0.004	-0.003
	(0.037)***	(0.004)***	(0.002)***	(9*10^{-4})***	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
Income	-0.025	0.003	0.001	-5*10^{-4}	-0.003	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-6*10^{-4}	-6*10-4
	(0.008)***	(9*10^{-4})***	(5*10^{-4})***	(2*10^{-4})***	(0.001)***	(8*10^{-4})***	(5*10^{-4})***	(4*10^{-4})***	(2*10^{-4})***	(2*10-4)***
Size of the town	0.017	-0.002	-0.001	4*10^{-4}	0.002	0.002	0.001	9*10^{-4}	5*10^{-4}	4*10-4
	(0.009)**	(9*10^{-4})**	(5*10^{-4})**	(2*10^{-4})*	(0.001)**	(9*10^{-4})*	(5*10^{-4})*	(3*10^{-4})*	(3*10^{-4})*	(2*10-4)**
Age	0.013	-0.001	-7*10^{-4}	3*10^{-4}	0.002	0.001	7*10^{-4}	6*10^{-4}	3*10^{-4}	3*10^{-4}
	(0.008)	(8*10^{-4})	(5*10^{-4})	(2*10^{-4})	(0.001)	(8*10^{-4})	(5*10^{-4})	(4*10^{-4})	(2*10^{-5})	(2*10^{-5})
Age squared	-1*10^{-4}	2*10^{-5}	2*10^{-5}	-3*10^{-6}	-2*10^{-5}	-2*10^{-5}	-1*10^{-5}	-8*10^{-6}	-4*10^{-6}	-4*10^{-6}
	(8*10^{-5})**	(1*10^{-5})**	(1*10^{-5})**	(1*10^{-7})**	(1*10^{-5})**	(1*10^{-5})**	(1*10^{-7})**	(1*10^{-7})**	(1*10^{-7})**	(1*10^{-7})**
Self employed	-0.345	0.031	0.031	-0.015	-0.048	-0.030	-0.017	-0.014	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.139)**	(0.010)***	(0.010)***	(0.009)*	(0.020)**	(0.011)***	(0.006)***	(0.004)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***
Full time contract	-0.036	0.004	0.002	-7*10^{-4}	-0.004	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002	-9*10^{-4}	-8*10^{-4}
	(0.052)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Part time contract	0.016	-0.002	-0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	8*10^{-4}	4*10^{-4}	4*10^{-4}
	(0.070)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Wave	0.007	-7*10^{-4}	-4*10^{-4}	-0.001	0.001	7*10^{-4}	4*10^{-4}	4*10^{-4}	2*10^{-4}	2*10^{-4}
	(0.024)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(6*10^{-4})	(6*10^{-4})
Married	-0.016	0.002	0.001	-3*10^{-4}	-0.002	-0.002	-9*10^{-4}	-8*10^{-4}	-4*10^{-4}	-4*10^{-4}
	(0.048)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Religious	-0.101	0.010	0.006	-0.002	-0.013	-0.010	-0.006	-0.005	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.044)**	(0.005)**	(0.003)**	(7*10^{-4})**	(0.005)**	(0.004)**	(0.003)**	(0.002)**	(0.001)**	(0.001)**
Pr(y = n)		0.130	0.196	0.151	0.201	0.082	0.039	0.027	0.012	0.009

Dependent variable: preference for the owner of firms (10 digits): 10 = state; 0 = private.
Observations:2754
Pseudo R-squared: 0.009

Table 3ter. Preference for the owner of firms (state vs. private): ordered probit regression for Eastern Germany

	Coefficients	Marginal effects								
		y = 2	y = 3	y = 4	y =5	y = 6	y = 7	y = 8	y = 9	y = 10
Male	-0.124	0.010	0.008	9*10^{-5}	-0.009	-0.009	-0.007	-0.010	-0.005	-0.008
	(0.044)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(4*10^{-4})	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***
Degree of happiness	-0.106	0.009	0.007	1*10^{-4}	-0.008	-0.008	-0.006	-0.008	-0.004	-0.007
	(0.03)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(3*10^{-4})	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.001)***	(0.002)***
Income	0.028	-0.002	-0.002	-4*10^{-4}	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002
	(0.010)***	(8*10^{-4})***	(6*10^{-4})***	(8*10^{-4})	(7*10^{-4})***	(8*10^{-4})***	(6*10^{-4})***	(8*10^{-4})***	(4*10^{-4})***	(7*10-4)***
Size of the town	0.019	-0.002	-0.001	-2*10^{-4}	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	8*10^{-4}	0.001
	(0.009)**	(7*10^{-4})**	(6*10^{-4})**	(5*10^{-4})	(7*10^{-4})**	(7*10^{-4})**	(5*10^{-4})**	(7*10^{-4})**	(4*10^{-4})**	(6*10-4)**
Age	0.021	-0.002	-0.001	-3*10^{-4}	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.002	9*10^{-4}	0.001
	(0.008)***	(6*10^{-4})***	(5*10^{-4})***	(6*10^{-4})	(6*10^{-4})***	(6*10^{-4})***	(4*10^{-4})***	(6*10^{-4})***	(3*10^{-4})***	(5*10^{-4})***
Age squared	-1*10^{-4}	2*10^{-5}	2*10^{-5}	2*10^{-7}	-2*10^{-5}	-1*10^{-5}	-1*10^{-5}	-1*10^{-5}	-7*10^{-6}	-1*10^{-5}
	(8*10^{-5})**	(1*10^{-5})**	(1*10^{-5})**	(1*10^{-7})	(1*10^{-5})**	(8*10^{-6})**	(8*10^{-6})**	(8*10^{-6})**	(1*10^{-7})**	(8*10^{-6})**
Self employed	-0.563	0.034	0.011	-0.015	-0.059	-0.043	-0.029	-0.034	-0.016	-0.023
	(0.150)***	(0.006)***	(0.005)**	(0.008)*	(0.018)**	(0.011)***	(0.007)***	(0.007)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***
Full time contract	-0.239	0.019	0.015	3*10^{-4}	-0.018	-0.018	-0.014	-0.019	-0.010	-0.016
	(0.056)***	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(7*10^{-4})	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.005)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***
Part time contract	-0.117	0.009	0.007	-6*10^{-4}	-0.010	-0.009	-0.007	-0.009	-0.004	-0.007
	(0.102)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Wave	0.422	-0.034	-0.027	-5*10^{-4}	0.031	0.032	0.025	0.033	0.017	0.028
	(0.028)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.001)	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(3*10^{-4})***
Married	-0.068	0.005	0.004	1*10^{-4}	-0.005	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005	-0.003	-0.005
	(0.048)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(2*10^{-4})	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Religious	-0.205	0.016	0.012	-6*10^{-4}	-0.016	-0.016	-0.012	-0.016	-0.008	-0.013
	(0.048)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(7*10^{-4})	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***
Pr(y = n)		0.102	0.170	0.114	0.193	0.093	0.054	0.055	0.023	0.030

Dependent variable: preference for the owner of firms (10 digits): 10 = state; 0 = private.
Observations: 2468
Pseudo R-squared: 0.040

Table 4. Preference for the degree of responsibility of the government in order to insure that everybody is provided for: ordered probit regression for all Germany

	Coefficients	Marginal effects								
		y = 2	y = 3	y = 4	y =5	y = 6	y = 7	y = 8	y = 9	y = 10
Male	-0.087	0.009	0.006	0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.005	-0.008	-0.005	-0.013
	$(0.030)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(5*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(5*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(9*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{***}$
Degree of happiness	-0.144	0.014	0.011	0.002	-0.002	-0.004	-0.008	-0.012	-0.009	-0.022
	$(0.024)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(5*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(4*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(8*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(0.001)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$
Income	$9*10^{-4}$	$-9*10^{-5}$	$-7*10^{-5}$	$-1*10^{-5}$	$1*10^{-4}$	$3*10^{-5}$	$5*10^{-5}$	$8*10^{-5}$	$6*10^{-5}$	$1*10{-4}$
	(0.006)	$(6*10^{-4})$	$(5*10^{-4})$	$(1*10^{-4})$	$(1*10^{-4})$	$(2*10^{-4})$	$(3*10^{-4})$	$(5*10^{-4})$	$(3*10^{-4})$	$(1*10{-4})$
Size of the town	-0.021	0.002	0.002	$3*10^{-4}$	$-3*10^{-4}$	$-6*10^{-4}$	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003
	$(0.006)^{***}$	$(6*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(5*10^{-4})^{**}$	$(1*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(9*10^{-5})^{***}$	$(2*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(3*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(5*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(4*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(9*10{-4})^{**}$
Age	0.007	$-7*10^{-4}$	$-5*10^{-4}$	$-1*10^{-4}$	$1*10^{-4}$	$2*10^{-4}$	$4*10^{-4}$	$6*10^{-4}$	$5*10^{-4}$	0.001
	(0.005)	$(5*10^{-4})$	$(4*10^{-4})$	$(9*10^{-5})$	$(8*10^{-5})$	$(2*10^{-4})$	$(3*10^{-4})$	$(5*10^{-4})$	$(3*10^{-4})$	$(8*10^{-4})^{***}$
Age squared	$1*10^{-4}$	$1*10^{-5}$	$8*10^{-6}$	$2*10^{-6}$	$-2*10^{-6}$	$-3*10^{-6}$	$-6*10^{-6}$	$-9*10^{-6}$	$-7*10^{-6}$	$-2*10^{-5}$
	$(6*10^{-5})^{**}$	$(7*10^{-6})^{**}$	$(1*10^{-7})^{***}$	$(1*10^{-7})^{*}$	$(1*10^{-7})^{*}$	$(1*10^{-7})^{**}$	$(1*10^{-7})^{**}$	$(1*10^{-7})^{**}$	$(1*10^{-7})^{**}$	$(1*10^{-5})^{*}$
Self employed	-0.456	0.041	0.020	-0.003	-0.016	-0.019	-0.027	-0.038	-0.025	-0.051
	$(0.096)^{***}$	$(0.007)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	(0.003)	$(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.006)^{***}$	$(0.007)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.007)^{***}$
Full time contract	-0.268	0.026	0.019	0.004	-0.004	-0.008	-0.014	-0.023	-0.017	-0.040
	$(0.037)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(7*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(7*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(0.001)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.006)^{***}$
Part time contract	-0.021	0.002	0.002	$3*10^{-4}$	$-3*10^{-4}$	$-7*10^{-4}$	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001	-0.003
	(0.058)	(0.006)	(0.004)	$(8*10^{-4})$	$(9*10^{-4})$	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.009)
East	0.279	-0.028	-0.021	-0.005	0.004	0.008	0.014	0.024	0.017	0.043
	$(0.031)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(8*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(6*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(0.001)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.0052)^{***}$
Wave	0.133	-0.013	-0.010	-0.002	0.002	0.004	0.007	0.012	0.008	0.020
	$(0.017)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.001)^{***}$	$(3*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(4*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(6*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(0.001)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.001)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$
Married	-0.066	0.007	0.005	0.001	$-9*10^{-4}$	-0.002	-0.003	-0.006	-0.004	-0.010
	$(0.033)^{**}$	$(0.003)^{**}$	$(0.002)^{**}$	$(5*10^{-4})^{**}$	$(4*10^{-4})^{**}$	$(0.001)^{**}$	$(0.002)^{**}$	$(0.003)^{**}$	$(0.002)^{**}$	$(0.005)^{**}$
Religious	-0.100	0.010	0.007	0.002	-0.001	-0.005	-0.005	-0.009	-0.006	-0.015
	$(0.031)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(5*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(5*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{***}$
Pr(y = n)		0.109	0.152	0.104	0.112	0.082	0.085	0.094	0.051	0.083

Dependent variable: preference about the responsible agent to ensure that everybody is provided for (10 digits): 10 = government; 0 = private citizens.
Observations: 5224
Pseudo R-squared: 0.016

Table 4bis. Preference for the degree of responsibility of the government in order to insure that everybody is provided for: ordered probit regression for Western Germany

	Coefficients	Marginal effects								
		y = 2	y = 3	y = 4	y =5	y = 6	y = 7	y = 8	y = 9	y = 10
Male	-0.127	0.014	0.009	$1*10^{-5}$	-0.005	-0.006	-0.009	-0.012	-0.007	-0.012
	$(0.042)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(3*10^{-4})$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	(0.003)	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$
Degree of happiness	-0.151	0.016	0.010	$1*10^{-4}$	-0.006	-0.007	-0.011	-0.014	-0.008	-0.014
	$(0.034)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(4*10^{-4})$	$(0.001)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$
Income	-0.002	$2*10^{-4}$	$2*10^{-4}$	$2*10^{-6}$	$-8*10^{-5}$	$-1*10^{-4}$	$-2*10^{-4}$	$-2*10^{-4}$	$-1*10^{-4}$	$2*10{-4}$
	(0.008)	$(9*10^{-4})$	$(6*10^{-4})$	$(1*10^{-5})$	$(3*10^{-4})$	$(4*10^{-4})$	$(6*10^{-4})$	$(8*10^{-4})$	$(4*10^{-4})$	$(8*10{-4})$
Size of the town	-0.026	0.003	0.002	$2*10^{-5}$	$-9*10^{-4}$	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002
	$(0.009)^{***}$	$(9*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(6*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(7*10^{-5})$	$(3*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(4*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(6*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(8*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(5*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(9*10{-4})^{***}$
Age	-0.005	$5*10^{-4}$	$4*10^{-4}$	$4*10^{-6}$	$-2*10^{-4}$	$-2*10^{-4}$	$-4*10^{-4}$	$-4*10^{-4}$	$-3*10^{-4}$	$-5*10^{-4}$
	(0.008)	$(8*10^{-4})$	$(5*10^{-4})$	$(2*10^{-5})$	$(3*10^{-4})$	$(4*10^{-4})$	$(5*10^{-4})$	$(7*10^{-4})$	$(4*10^{-4})$	$(7*10^{-4})$
Age squared	$-2*10^{-4}$	$3*10^{-6}$	$2*10^{-6}$	$2*10^{-8}$	$-1*10^{-6}$	$-1*10^{-6}$	$-2*10^{-6}$	$-3*10^{-6}$	$-1*10^{-6}$	$-3*10^{-6}$
	$(8*10^{-4})$	$(1*10^{-5})$	$(1*10^{-5})$	$(1*10^{-7})$	$(1*10^{-6})$	$(1*10^{-6})$	$(1*10^{-5})$	$(1*10^{-5})$	$(1*10^{-6})$	$(1*10^{-5})$
Self employed	-0.364	0.035	0.015	-0.007	-0.019	-0.019	-0.026	-0.031	-0.016	-0.026
	$(0.136)^{***}$	$(0.011)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	(0.005)	$(0.009)^{**}$	$(0.008)^{**}$	$(0.009)^{***}$	$(0.010)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.007)^{***}$
Full time contract	-0.117	0.012	0.008	$-7*10^{-5}$	-0.004	-0.006	-0.008	-0.011	-0.006	-0.011
	$(0.049)^{**}$	$(0.005)^{**}$	$(0.003)^{**}$	$(3*10^{-4})$	$(0.002)^{**}$	$(0.002)^{**}$	$(0.003)^{**}$	$(0.005)^{**}$	$(0.003)^{**}$	$(0.004)^{**}$
Part time contract	0.108	-0.012	-0.008	$-7*10^{-4}$	0.004	0.005	0.007	0.010	0.006	0.011
	(0.072)	(0.008)	(0.006)	$(9*10^{-4})$	$(0.002)^{*}$	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Wave	-0.016	0.002	0.001	$1*10^{-5}$	$-6*10^{-4}$	$-8*10^{-4}$	-0.001	-0.002	$-8*10^{-4}$	-0.002
	(0.023)	(0.002)	(0.002)	$(5*10^{-5})$	$(8*10^{-4})$	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Married	-0.031	0.003	0.002	$3*10^{-5}$	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.003
	(0.046)	(0.005)	(0.003)	$(1*10^{-4})$	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Religious	-0.043	0.005	0.003	$7*10^{-5}$	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.004	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.041)	(0.004)	(0.003)	$(1*10^{-4})^{***}$	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Pr(y = n)		0.124	0.173	0.126	0.120	0.080	0.082	0.077	0.034	0.046

Dependent variable: preference about the responsible agent to ensure that everybody is provided for (10 digits): 10 = government; 0 = private citizens.
Observations: 2935
Pseudo R-squared: 0.009

Table 4ter. Preference for the degree of responsibility of the government in order to insure that everybody is provided for: ordered probit regression for Eastern Germany

	Coefficients	Marginal effects								
		y = 2	y = 3	y = 4	y =5	y = 6	y = 7	y = 8	y = 9	y = 10
Male	-0.081	0.008	0.006	0.002	$6*10^{-4}$	-0.001	-0.003	-0.006	-0.005	-0.017
	$(0.043)^{*}$	$(0.004)^{*}$	$(0.003)^{*}$	$(0.001)^{*}$	$(4*10^{-4})^{*}$	$(6*10^{-4})^{*}$	$(0.001)^{*}$	$(0.003)^{*}$	$(0.003)^{*}$	$(0.009)^{*}$
Degree of Happiness	-0.166	0.016	0.013	0.004	0.001	-0.006	-0.006	-0.013	-0.011	-0.035
	$(0.034)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.001)^{***}$	$(5*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(0.001)^{***}$	$(0.001)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.007)^{***}$
Income	0.010	$-9*10^{-4}$	$-8*10^{-4}$	$-2*10^{-4}$	$-7*10^{-5}$	$1*10^{-4}$	$3*10^{-4}$	$7*10^{-4}$	$7*10^{-4}$	0.002
	(0.009)	$(8*10^{-4})$	$(7*10^{-4})$	$(2*10^{-4})$	$(8*10^{-5})$	$(1*10^{-4})$	$(3*10^{-4})$	$(7*10^{-4})$	$(6*10^{-4})$	(0.002)
Size of the town	-0.011	0.001	$8*10^{-4}$	$3*10^{-4}$	$8*10^{-5}$	$-1*10^{-4}$	$-4*10^{-4}$	$-8*10^{-4}$	$-7*10^{-4}$	-0.002
	(0.008)	$(8*10^{-4})$	$(7*10^{-4})$	$(2*10^{-4})$	$(7*10^{-5})$	$(1*10^{-4})$	$(3*10^{-4})$	$(6*10^{-4})$	$(6*10^{-4})$	(0.002)
Age	0.012	-0.001	-0.001	$-3*10^{-4}$	$-1*10^{-4}$	$2*10^{-4}$	$4*10^{-4}$	$9*10^{-4}$	$8*10^{-4}$	0.003
	$(0.008)^{*}$	$(7*10^{-4})$	$(6*10^{-4})^{*}$	$(2*10^{-4})^{*}$	$(7*10^{-5})$	$(1*10^{-4})^{*}$	$(3*10^{-4})^{*}$	$(6*10^{-4})^{*}$	$(5*10^{-4})^{*}$	$(0.002)^{*}$
Age squared	$-1*10^{-4}$	$1*10^{-5}$	$8*10^{-6}$	$3*10^{-6}$	$8*10^{-7}$	$-1*10^{-6}$	$-4*10^{-6}$	$-8*10^{-6}$	$-7*10^{-6}$	$-2*10^{-5}$
	(0.008)	$(1*10^{-5})$	$(1*10^{-5})$	$(1*10^{-6})$	$(1*10^{-6})$	$(1*10^{-6})$	$(1*10^{-5})$	$(1*10^{-5})$	$(1*10^{-5})$	$(2*10^{-5})$
Self employed	-0.563	0.047	0.027	0.002	-0.001	-0.018	-0.027	-0.046	-0.035	-0.084
	$(0.141)^{***}$	$(0.009)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	(0.002)	$(6*10^{-4})^{*}$	$(0.007)^{***}$	$(0.008)^{***}$	$(0.012)^{***}$	$(0.008)^{***}$	$(0.014)^{***}$
Full time contract	-0.339	0.031	0.026	0.008	0.002	-0.005	-0.011	-0.025	-0.023	-0.071
	$(0.056)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(9*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(0.001)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.012)^{***}$
Part time contract	-0.147	0.014	0.011	0.003	$1*10^{-4}$	-0.003	-0.006	-0.011	-0.010	-0.028
	(0.104)	(0.010)	(0.007)	$(0.002)^{*}$	$(7*10^{-4})$	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.018)
Wave	0.275	-0.026	-0.022	-0.007	-0.002	0.004	0.009	0.021	0.019	0.057
	$(0.027)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.001)^{***}$	$(7*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(7*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(0.001)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.006)^{***}$
Married	-0.026	0.002	0.002	$6*10^{-4}$	$2*10^{-4}$	$-3*10^{-4}$	$-9*10^{-4}$	-0.002	-0.002	-0.005
	(0.047)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.001)	$(4*10^{-4})$	$(6*10^{-4})$	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.010)
Religious	-0.133	0.012	0.011	0.003	$7*10^{-4}$	-0.002	-0.005	-0.010	-0.009	-0.027
	$(0.046)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.001)^{***}$	$(4*10^{-4})^{**}$	$(9*10^{-4})^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.009)^{***}$
Pr(y = n)		0.094	0.129	0.080	0.104	0.084	0.087	0.112	0.068	0.127

Dependent variable: preference about the responsible agent to ensure that everybody is provided for (10 digits): 10 = government; 0 = private citizens.
Observations: 2589
Pseudo R-squared: 0.026

Table 5. Preference for the degree of regulation of firms (strong vs. weak): ordered probit regression for all Germany

	Coefficients	Marginal effects								
		y = 2	y = 3	y = 4	y =5	y = 6	y = 7	y = 8	y = 9	y = 10
Male	-0.077	0.009	0.006	0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.004	-0.007	-0.005	-0.010
	(0.060)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.007)
Degree of happiness	-0.124	0.014	0.009	0.002	-0.002	-0.005	-0.007	-0.012	-0.009	-0.016
	(0.043)***	(0.005)***	(0.003)***	$(9*10^{-4})**$	$(7*10^{-4})***$	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.006)***
Income	-0.034	0.004	0.002	$6*10^{-4}$	$-5*10^{-4}$	-0.001	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004
	(0.020)*	(0.002)*	(0.001)*	$(4*10^{-4})*$	$(3*10^{-4})*$	$(7*10^{-4})*$	(0.001)*	(0.002)*	(0.001)*	(0.003)*
Size of the town	0.015	-0.002	-0.001	$-3*10^{-4}$	$2*10^{-4}$	$5*10^{-4}$	$8*10^{-4}$	0.001	0.001	0.002
	(0.011)	(0.001)	$(8*10^{-4})$	$(2*10^{-4})$	$(2*10^{-4})$	$(4*10^{-4})$	$(6*10^{-4})$	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age	$-4*10^{-4}$	$5*10^{-4}$	$3*10^{-4}$	$7*10^{-6}$	$-6*10^{-6}$	$-2*10^{-5}$	$-2*10^{-5}$	$-4*10^{-5}$	$-3*10^{-5}$	$-5*10^{-5}$
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	$(3*10^{-5})$	$(3*10^{-4})$	$(7*10^{-5})$	$(1*10^{-4})$	$(2*10^{-4})$	$(1*10^{-4})$	$(2*10^{-4})$
Self employed	-0.476	0.050	0.021	-0.004	-0.017	-0.024	-0.029	-0.043	-0.028	-0.043
	(0.208)**	(0.018)***	(0.003)***	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.013)	(0.013)**	(0.017)***	(0.010)***	(0.013)***
Full time contract	-0.108	0.012	0.008	0.002	-0.002	-0.004	-0.006	-0.010	-0.007	-0.013
	(0.071)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.009)
Part time contract	0.148	-0.017	-0.012	-0.004	0.001	0.005	0.007	0.014	0.011	0.021
	(0.105)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.003)	$(5*10^{-4})$	(0.003)*	(0.005)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.016)
East	0.416	-0.047	-0.030	-0.007	0.006	0.015	0.022	0.039	0.029	0.054
	(0.062)***	(0.007)***	(0.005)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.007)***	(0.005)***	(0.009)***
Married	0.087	-0.010	-0.006	-0.002	0.001	0.003	0.005	0.008	0.006	0.011
	(0.064)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Religious	0.015	-0.002	-0.001	$-3*10^{-4}$	$2*10^{-4}$	$6*10^{-4}$	$8*10^{-4}$	0.001	0.001	0.002
	(0.062)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.001)	$(9*10^{-4})$	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.008)
Pr(y = n)		0.122	0.145	0.115	0.111	0.095	0.083	0.099	0.052	0.065

Dependent variable: preference for the degree of regulation of firms (10 digits): 10 = more effective regulation; 0 = more freedom to firms.
Observations: 1357
Pseudo R-squared: 0.014

Table 5bis. Preference for the degree of regulation of firms (strong vs. weak): ordered probit regression for Western Germany

	Coefficient	Marginal effects								
		y = 2	y = 3	y = 4	y =5	y = 6	y = 7	y = 8	y = 9	y = 10
Male	-0.162	0.016	0.011	$-6*10^{-4}$	-0.008	-0.011	-0.010	-0.014	-0.009	-0.011
	(0.084)*	(0.009)*	(0.006)*	(0.001)	(0.004)*	(0.006)*	(0.005)*	(0.007)*	(0.005)*	(0.006)*
Happiness	-0.167	0.017	0.012	$-5*10^{-4}$	-0.008	-0.011	-0.010	-0.014	-0.009	-0.012
	(0.066)**	(0.007)**	(0.005)**	(0.001)	(0.003)**	(0.005)**	(0.004)**	(0.006)**	(0.004)**	(0.005)**
Income	-0.059	0.006	0.004	$-2*10^{-4}$	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.005	-0.003	-0.004
	(0.025)**	(0.003)**	(0.002)**	$(4*10^{-4})$	(0.001)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.002)**	(0.001)**	(0.002)**
Size of the town	-0.031	0.003	0.002	$-9*10^{-5}$	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.002
	(0.017)*	(0.002)*	(0.001)*	$(2*10^{-4})$	$(8*10^{-4})*$	(0.001)*	(0.001)*	(0.001)*	(0.001)*	(0.001)*
Age	-0.007	$7*10^{-4}$	$5*10^{-4}$	$-2*10^{-5}$	$-3*10^{-4}$	$-5*10^{-5}$	$-4*10^{-5}$	$-6*10^{-4}$	$-4*10^{-5}$	$-5*10^{-4}$
	(0.003)***	$(3*10^{-4})**$	$(2*10^{-4})**$	$(5*10^{-5})$	$(1*10^{-4})**$	$(2*10^{-4})**$	$(2*10^{-4})**$	$(2*10^{-4})**$	$(2*10^{-4})**$	$(2*10^{-4})**$
Self employed	0.069	-0.007	-0.005	$-1*10^{-4}$	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.006	0.004	0.005
	(0.302)	(0.031)	(0.024)	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.018)	(0.024)
Full time contract	-0.024	0.002	0.002	$-9*10^{-5}$	-0.001	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001	-0.002
	(0.102)	(0.010)	(0.007)	$(5*10^{-4})$	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Part time contract	0.314	-0.032	-0.027	-0.005	0.010	0.019	0.019	0.028	0.020	0.029
	(0.142)**	(0.015)**	(0.015)*	(0.005)	(0.003)***	(0.007)**	(0.009)**	(0.013)**	(0.011)*	(0.017)*
Married	0.095	-0.010	-0.007	$4*10^{-4}$	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.008	0.005	0.007
	(0.091)	(0.009)	(0.006)	$(8*10^{-4})$	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Religious	0.161	-0.016	-0.011	0.001	0.008	0.011	0.010	0.013	0.009	0.011
	(0.085)*	(0.009)*	(0.005)**	(0.001)	(0.004)*	(0.006)*	(0.005)*	(0.007)*	(0.005)*	(0.006)*
Pr(y = n)		0.118	0.176	0.147	0.127	0.097	0.063	0.064	0.034	0.032

Dependent variable: preference for the degree of regulation of firms (10 digits): 10 = more effective regulation; 0 = more freedom to firms.
Observations: 689
Pseudo R-squared: 0.011

Table 5ter. Preference for the degree of regulation of firms (strong vs. weak): ordered probit regression for Eastern Germany

	Coefficient	Marginal effects								
		y = 2	y = 3	y = 4	y =5	y = 6	y = 7	y = 8	y = 9	y = 10
Male	$2*10^{-4}$	$-3*10^{-5}$	$-2*10^{-5}$	$-7*10^{-6}$	$-2*10^{-6}$	$3*10^{-6}$	$9*10^{-6}$	$2*10^{-5}$	$2*10^{-5}$	$5*10^{-5}$
	(0.086)	(0.012)	(0.006)	$(8*10^{-4})$	$(7*10^{-4})$	$(9*10^{-4})$	(0.003)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.016)
Happiness	-0.098	0.013	0.007	0.003	$9*10^{-4}$	-0.001	-0.004	-0.009	-0.008	-0.018
	(0.057)*	(0.010)	(0.004)*	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.005)*	(0.005)	(0.010)*
Income	-0.030	0.004	0.002	$8*10^{-4}$	$3*10^{-4}$	$-3*10^{-4}$	-0.001	-0.003	-0.002	-0.005
	(0.032)	(0.005)	(0.002)	$(8*10^{-4})$	$(5*10^{-4})$	$(7*10^{-4})$	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.006)
Size of the town	0.044	-0.006	-0.003	-0.001	$-4*10^{-4}$	$5*10^{-4}$	0.001	0.004	0.003	0.008
	(0.015)***	(0.002)**	(0.001)**	$(9*10^{-4})$	$(8*10^{-4})$	$(7*10^{-4})$	$(7*10^{-4})**$	(0.001)***	(0.003)	(0.003)***
Age	0.005	$-7*10^{-4}$	$-4*10^{-4}$	$-1*10^{-4}$	$-5*10^{-5}$	$6*10^{-5}$	$2*10^{-4}$	$5*10^{-4}$	$4*10^{-4}$	0.001
	(0.002)**	$(3*10^{-4})**$	$(2*10^{-4})$	$(1*10^{-4})$	$(1*10^{-4})$	$(8*10^{-5})$	$(8*10^{-5})**$	$(2*10^{-4})**$	$(4*10^{-4})$	$(5*10^{-4})**$
Self employed	-1.007	0.102	0.017	-0.012	-0.028	-0.039	-0.057	-0.093	-0.059	-0.097
	(0.262)***	(0.015)***	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.014)*	(0.014)***	(0.016)***	(0.020)***	(0.012)***	(0.014)***
Full time contract	-0.171	0.023	0.012	0.004	0.001	-0.002	-0.007	-0.016	-0.013	-0.030
	(0.101)*	(0.014)*	(0.007)*	(0.002)*	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.010)*	(0.008)*	(0.017)*
Part time contract	-0.116	0.016	0.008	0.003	$5*10^{-4}$	-0.002	-0.005	-0.011	-0.009	-0.020
	(0.148)	(0.020)	(0.009),	(0.003)	$(5*10^{-4})$	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.024)
Married	0.076	-0.010	-0.006	-0.002	$-6*10^{-4}$	$8*10^{-4}$	0.003	0.007	0.006	0.014
	(0.092)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.002)	$(8*10^{-4})$	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.017)
Religious	-0.130	0.018	0.009	0.003	$9*10^{-4}$	-0.002	-0.005	-0.012	-0.010	-0.023
	(0.091)	(0.013)	(0.006)	(0.002)	$(7*10^{-4})*$	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.015)
Pr(y = n)		0.130	0.120	0.082	0.089	0.087	0.099	0.132	0.072	0.105

Dependent variable: preference for the degree of regulation of firms (10 digits): 10 = more effective regulation; 0 = more freedom to firms.
Observations: 668
Pseudo R-squared: 0.014

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