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## STIGMA AND RISKY BEHAVIORS AMONG CLIENTS OF PROSTITUTES

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# **Stigma and Risky Behaviors among Clients of Prostitutes**

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## **1. Introduction**

Sex work has been widely studied in the social sciences along a variety of dimensions including violence, immigration and sex tourism (Susanne Thorbek and Bandana Pattanaik 2002), identity and rights (Joanna Brewis and Stephen Linstead, 2000), drug abuse and HIV risks and regulatory concerns (Marina Della Giusta and Vanessa Munro, 2008; Jane Scoular, 2010). The economic literature has also approached a number of issues related to both selling and buying sex: prices and supply characteristics (Samuel Cameron, Alan Collins and Neill Thew et al 1999; Peter Moffatt and Simon Peters 2001; Lena Edlund and Evelyn Korn 2002; Samuel Cameron, 2002), demand determinants (Samuel Cameron and Alan Collins 2003), health risk and the effect of condom use on prostitute's earnings (Vijayendra Rao, Indrani Gupta, Michael Lokshin and Smarajit Jana 2001; Paul Gertler, Manisha Shah and Stefano Bertozzi 2003), the evolution of paid sex markets and the ways in which urban spaces favor sexual transactions (Alan Collins 2004), the effect of

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men in transit on the demand for paid sex (Scott Cunningham and Todd Kendall, 2011) the connections with trafficking (Maura Laura Di Tommaso, Isilda Shima, Steinar Strøm and Francesca Bettio 2009), the role of asymmetric information and transaction costs in bargaining over price and working conditions (Debra Satz 2010; Neha Hui 2012; Amy Farmer and Andrew Horowitz 2013).

Studies focusing on the supply side have engaged with wages as partly reflecting compensation for social exclusion, risk (assault, disease, arrest, punishment), front loading in wage profile (informal pension scheme or insurance), boredom and physical effort, distaste (potential psychological and physical costs), loss of recreational sex pleasure, anti-social and inconvenient hours, possible excess demand and prices used to screen quality, taboos, and agent fees (Cameron, 2002), and, more controversially the loss of position in the marriage market (Edlund and Korn, 2002). An important role in both demand and supply is played, as argued in previous work (Marina Della Giusta, Maria Laura Di Tommaso, and Steinar Strøm 2009a), by social stigma, which has been studied in the literature in connection with barriers faced by prostitutes when wanting to enter other professions (or the marriage market), but Della Giusta et al. (2009a) argue social stigma is fundamentally related instead to the nature of the transaction between prostitute and client. Attitudes towards the exchange of paid sex fundamentally shape the dynamics of demand and supply and the resulting markets as they affect regulation, location, prices, and risk for both sex workers and clients, as well as the institutional form of organisation of the trade (brothels, pimps, escort services etc.) and the entry mode (including trafficking). Stigma has always been associated with sex work from Victorian concerns with the evil personality of prostitutes to the concern prevalent from the nineteenth century of prostitutes as victims (Ine Vanwesenbeeck 2001), and partly associated with sex of a non-reproductive nature which is seen as threatening marriage

(Simone de Beauvoir, 1949). More recent debates have focused on objectification of the body and whether the selling the body and the selling of the self are inextricably linked (Caroline Pateman 1983; Martha Nussbaum 1999) and feminist debates on the issue have been heated with strong divisions between pro-sex work and abolitionist camps.

Although there are papers in the literature addressing the effect of stigma on supply (Lena Edlund, Joseph Engelberg and Christopher Parsons 2009 on escorts and Sara Peracca, John Knodel and Chanpen Saengtienchai 1998 on Thai prostitutes' ability to remarry), little work has addressed the effect it has on demand. The model of sex work proposed by Della Giusta et al. (2009a), is in the standard rational action tradition (based on the idea that agents make decisions based on the information available to them and having evaluated possible alternatives), but builds on the literature on social interactions (Mark Granovetter 1985; Pierre Bourdieu 1986; James Coleman 1988; Charles Mansky 2000) and social sanctions (George Akerlof 1980; Richard Arnott and Joseph Stiglitz 1991), and discusses stigma as a loss of reputation which affects social standing for both clients and sex workers, as well as pay and working conditions in the sex trade and access to services and other jobs for sex workers. The model also incorporates personal differences in concern for reputation depending on agents' personal characteristics and the specific moment at which they exercise choice (so that people are allowed to differ and also to be inconsistent in their choices). This is important in order to describe situations of individuals with high reputation who disregard the effects of their actions, which would be otherwise construed as irrational behavior. We considered both the case in which reputational endowments are exogenous (that is not affected by behavior within the sex industry) and the situation when those endowments are considered endogenous, that is a situation in which if a higher quantity of prostitution is sold or bought in the economy the stigma effect decreases. Marina Della Giust, Maria Laura Di Tommaso, Isilda Shima

and Steinar Strøm. (2009b) attempted to test some of the predictions of their model in an empirical exercise using data from a survey of US clients of street prostitutes (), which although wide in its scope contained only clients. In this paper, we look explicitly at how attitudes and risky behaviors affect demand for paid sex in a sample drawn from the British National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles (Natsal) conducted in 2000-2001 by the Centre for Sexual Health and HIV Research at University College London, interviewing 12,110 people aged 16-44 years. As this sample contains both clients and non-clients and is representative of the population, the results we infer are more robust for policy prescriptions. A set of recent studies conducted by Niklas Jakobsson and Andrea Kotsadam (2011) using Swedish and Norwegian data is to our knowledge the only other attempt at addressing the role of attitudes in demand for paid sex, and we compare wherever possible our results to theirs.

## **2. The determinants of demand**

Findings from empirical studies of clients suggest that personal characteristics (personal and family background, self-perception, perceptions of women, sexual preferences), economic factors (education, income, work), as well as attitudes towards risk (health hazard and risk of being caught where sex work is illegal), lack of interest in conventional relationships, desire for variety in sexual acts or sexual partners, and viewing sex as a commodity, are all likely to affect demand. Cameron and Collins (2003) model male clients' decision to enter the market for prostitution services, where he has the choice to derive utility from one relationship partner and/or one paid sex partner. They distinguish between the motivations of men in relationships (variety, specific acts, frequency, outlet for stress) and single men ('relative search costs of finding willing sexual partners, or partners willing to engage in specific sexual activities in an ad hoc or formal social context, and in

a given time period.’ Marian Pitts, Anthony Smith, Mary O’Brien, and Sebastian Misson (2004) surveyed a sample of 1225 men and women in Australia<sup>4</sup> and found that 23.4% had paid for sex at least once. They reported paying for sex to satisfy sexual needs (43.8%), because paying for sex is less trouble (36.4%), and because it is entertaining (35.5%). Significantly, the researchers found that there were not many significant differences between men who had paid for sex and those who had not, except that the ones who had were on average older, less likely to have university education and to have had a regular partner in the previous year. The motivations of sex workers’ clients in the UK (who were all males and appeared to be representatives of all sectors of society) studied in the course of a programme<sup>5</sup> on the sex industry presented by Channel 4 appeared to convey the impression that a connection existed between the effort and costs associated with finding a sexual partner who would readily satisfy their sexual preferences, and the straightforward and readily accessible option of sex work. Similar findings are reported by Maddie Coy, Miranda Horvath and Liz Kelly (2007) on buyers of sex in East London,<sup>6</sup> as well as by Rosie Campbell (1998) and Teela Sanders (2008). This is confirmed by Thorbek and Pattanaik (2002), who draw a sort of “psychological” profile of male sex tourists on the basis of their own descriptions of themselves and accounts of their experiences. This indicates that many of them are finding relationships with others very difficult (either because they do not have the time or the skills required to meet people) and choose sex tourism as an “easier” alternative, which does not imply

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<sup>4</sup> The sample was taken by distributing a survey to customers of a Sexpo exhibition held in Melbourne 2001. This is a commercial event hosting a wide range of exhibitors of products associated with sex; of 4,905 respondents, 1225 received a version of the questionnaires with questions on sex workers. Among 1225 respondents, 612 were men and 601 were women.

<sup>5</sup> Dispatches: Sex on the Street; Channel 4 season Prostitution –The Laws Don’t Work, Channel 4, September 2002

<sup>6</sup> [http://www.cwasu.org/displayAuthorsPublications.asp?author\\_key=51](http://www.cwasu.org/displayAuthorsPublications.asp?author_key=51)

any responsibility towards the person providing the sexual service. As for the views they held of sex workers, it appears that both sexism and racism mix in determining a very marked distancing, which allow sex tourists to practically ignore and show no interest in the lives and working motivations of the sex workers whose services they buy. Wider phenomena connected to consumerism and globalization are also clearly related to this industry, which reflects multiple power structures: Anna-Maria Marttila (2003) concludes from her study of Finnish clients that: “the sex business is first and foremost about gendered, economic, social and cultural – global and local – power structures.” (Marttila 2003, 8). Thus, different intersections of gender, race and class all contribute to the creation of ‘othering’ mechanisms that serve to both distance the parties to an exchange and justify the assertion of economic power within it. This phenomenon is obviously not limited to paid sex exchanges, and has been widely documented across a range of personal services. Stigma is not just at play with men: women clients are also engaging in sex tourism, as documented both in Thorbek and Pattanaik (2002), and in Jacqueline Sanchez Taylor (2001). The latter, in particular, offers a more in-depth analysis of North American and Northern European women buying sex work services of young men in the Caribbean, in what they themselves describe as ‘romance holidays’. Responses to her interviews suggest that, on the one hand, women clients are mostly reluctant to define what they engage in as prostitution, and, on the other, that their ideas about the young men whose service they buy are deeply rooted in racist ideas about black men and black men’s sexuality. The theme of inequality appears to be at the core of the relationship: prejudices that allow the stigmatization of another person as fundamentally “different” and inferior to oneself appear again and again in customers’ accounts (Hanny Ben-Israel and Numi Levenkron 2005; Pitts et al 2004; Roger Kern 2000; Karen Blanchard 1994). Studies have recently begun to appear that address more explicitly attitudes and their relationship to the regulation of prostitution:



Jari Kuosmanen (2011) reviews existing studies of attitudes to prostitution in Sweden finding more support for criminalization as a result of the introduction of the law, and also conducts a random sample study finding more support for the current Swedish law among women and younger respondents and a small effect of higher education on women's attitudes. Jahnsen (2008), reviewed in Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2011) finds for Norway that women and those living in the capital region are more in favor of criminalizing clients, as are feminists, left-wing sympathizers, and Christians. Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2011) use data for Norway and Sweden find that men and sexual liberals are more positive toward prostitution, that both conservatives and those supporting gender equality are more negative toward prostitution, and that holding anti-immigration views is correlated with more positive attitudes toward buying sex.

### **3. The theoretical model**

The theoretical basis for the present paper is an economic model of sex work developed in Della Giusta et al (2009a), which incorporates both stigma and inequality between client and sex worker. Stigma is modelled as the effect on reputation from participating in this market, and we use insights on modelling reputations from both the economic and sociological literature (Granovetter, 1985; Bordieu, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Mansky, 2000), which point to two distinct ways in which reputations matter to economic agents: firstly because as social beings they derive utility from a positive evaluation by others in the social groups they belong to (Mark Casson 1991), and secondly because they are aware of the costs that social sanctions may impose on their material progress (Akerlof 1980; Arnott and Stiglitz 1991). Reputation has thus both intrinsic and

instrumental value: it is desired per-se (provider of utility) and can be used to access other earning opportunities. Stigma is a loss of reputation, which can affect social standing and therefore both pay and working conditions (particularly personal risk) as well as access to services and other jobs for sex workers. Following Akerlof (1980), we include reputation in agents' preferences in our model and allow agents to have a different concern for their reputation depending on their personal characteristics and the specific moment at which they exercise choice. The demand for sex in general and the demand for sex with a sex worker are not considered perfect substitutes reflecting the fact that clients' may have other motivations when buying sex than otherwise, something we aim to explore empirically in the present paper.

Focusing on the demand side of the model, and following Della Giusta *et al* (2009b), let

$$(1) \quad U(S_0, S, C, r, X)$$

denote the utility of buying sex.  $S_0$  is the amount of freely exchanged sex that the client has, whereas  $S$  is the amount of sex that the client has with sex workers. Amounts of sex can be measured in terms of number of sexual events (number of visits) during a certain period.  $C$  is consumption of other goods and services than sex,  $r$  is a variable related to reputation and stigma effects, and  $X$  is a vector of individual characteristics. The utility function is assumed to be increasing in  $\{S_0, S, C, r\}$  and strictly quasi-concave.

Let  $w$  denote the price per event with a sex worker and let  $I$  denote disposable income. The budget constraint is given by

$$(2) \quad I = wS + C.$$

We define a variable,  $L_r$ , as the capacity for reputational losses.  $L_r$  is given for each individual and it depends on his professional status, his position in the community, and his marital status. A judge, a politician, or a priest has a low capacity for reputational losses (a low  $L_r$ ) because he is vulnerable reputation-wise. Even a small amount of prostitution can ruin his reputation potential.

A high  $L_r$  means that clients have little to lose reputation-wise i.e. they have a higher capacity for reputation losses. An individual with a low social status may have a high  $L_r$ .

A reputation loss can also include the intrinsic feelings of shame and guilt that result from buying sex, especially if the buyer is being unfaithful to a spouse. Thus, we may assume that a married person has a lower capacity for reputational losses,  $L_r$ , than a single.

Individual reputation ( $r$ ) is reduced when prostitution is bought in the market. We do not model the probability of being seen as a client; therefore, we assume that when prostitution is bought it is also observed in the community.

So we define individual reputation ( $r$ ) equals to the capacity for reputational losses ( $L_r$ ) minus the amount of prostitution bought on the market ( $S$ ):

$$(3) \quad r = L_r - S$$

Given that the utility function is assumed to be increasing in  $\{S_0, S, C, r\}$  the higher the capacity for reputation loss ( $L_r$ ), the higher the utility. From (1) we note that prostitution and freely exchanged sex may be substitutes from a client's point of view. This does not preclude the existence of people for whom these are two very distinct types of goods.

Given that sex is bought, which means that the client has passed the moral and emotional threshold of buying sex, the amount of sex bought that maximizes utility (1) under the constraint (2) and (3) is given by the following demand function

$$(4) \quad S=f(w,I,R,S_0,X)$$

We expect that the amount of sex bought is decreasing in the price  $w$ , increasing in income and in the capacity for reputation losses. If demand for paid sex decreases with regular sex,  $S_0$ , paid sex and free sex are substitutes. Otherwise they are complements.

Della Giusta et al. (2009b) explored empirically whether the assumptions regarding the motivations for demand are valid, by developing an econometric model of client's demand with data from a US survey of clients of street sex workers. They analyzed the demand for paid sex using an ordered logit where the dependent variable was the number of times the client paid for sex in a year. Among the explanatory variables were personal characteristics, attitudes towards sex workers, and preferences for relationships. The results of their empirical analysis confirm the behavioural assumptions behind the theoretical framework: stigmatisation of clients and sex workers are important characteristics of this market (as reflected in the attitudes of clients in the sample towards prostitution, towards sex workers, and towards being caught), demand for paid and unpaid sex are indeed not perfect substitutes, they vary according to personal profiles and attitudes (especially regarding power asymmetries between clients and sex workers). There appear to be two distinct groups of clients whose personal characteristics and attitudes are radically opposite: experimenters, to whom street prostitution is a complement to stable relationships, and who hold negative views of women, of prostitution, and of sex workers; and regulars, who hold more liberal views, they like variety and find relationships a burden, and view paid sex as a normal good whose demand increases with income. The experimenters demand for sex increases with the need for control, while for regulars the opposite applies. Risk aversion is also correlated to our two client profiles, with experimenters being more risk loving and regulars more risk averse.

The main problem in Della Giusta et al. (2009b) is the selection bias in the data. In fact the data were collected among arrested male clients of female street sex workers in four USA cities (San Francisco, Portland, Las Vegas, Santa Chiara). Arrested clients who agreed to participate in an intervention program, were asked to fill a questionnaire. The data therefore had three levels of selection: individuals in the sample were the ones who were caught, agreed to participate to the rehabilitation program, and filled the form. Therefore the results from that empirical study are strongly biased.

The innovative approach of this paper consists in the use of a data set focusing on attitudes and risky behaviors that contains representative information of the entire British population, containing both clients and non-clients.

#### **4. Data set and modeling strategy**

In this paper we utilize the British National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles (Natsal II) conducted by the Centre for Sexual Health and HIV Research at University College London (<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/sexual-health/research/sex-attitudes.htm>). This is the second cross section of a series of surveys, of which the first was conducted in 1990-91. The sample size is 12,110 individuals aged 16-44 interviewed in the period 2000-2001, living in private households. The data were collected through face-to-face interviews.

For the purpose of this paper we selected only male individuals, because only men were asked whether they had paid for sex<sup>7</sup>. Moreover we selected only men between age 26 and 44. We assume

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<sup>7</sup> We underline that it would be important in the future to ask the same questions about paying for sex to women, given the increasing female demand for paid sex.

that young men could still be studying which could introduce some bias in the estimates of the education and professional variables. The resulting sample includes 3084 observation.

Some descriptive statistics of the clients versus non clients are shown in table 1. In this table we define a client as a man who declares to have paid for sex at least once.

#### TABLE 1 APPROXIMATLY HERE

Men who have paid for sex constitute 12.9 percent of our sample. Since our sample is representative of the entire British population between age 26 and 44, we can infer that 13 percent of British men have paid for sex at least once in their life. Moreover, we notice that clients are on average 34.9 years old, while non-clients are on average 34.8 years old. The difference is small because the sample only includes men below 44 years old. A previous study of US clients (Della Giusta et al 2009b) shows that age is positively correlated with paying for sex.

We can therefore reasonably expect that if the dataset had included older men, the percentage of men who have ever paid for sex would increase above 13 percent.

Educational levels are very different for clients and non-clients. For instance, 30 percent of the clients have a university degree, while only 27 percent of the non-clients have a university degree. Among the clients only 13 percent do not have any education, while this is the case for 17 percent of the non-clients.

Table 1 shows that there are more unskilled and partly skilled among clients than among non-clients. For instance, 7 percent of the clients are unskilled, while this is the case for only 5 percent

of the non-clients; 7 percent of clients have a professional or managerial position as opposed to 9 percent of non-clients.

Clients have on average 0.2 children less than non-clients. Moreover, Table 1 shows that clients are on average less risk averse than non-clients; they smoke more (45 percent of clients are smoker and only 37 percent of non-clients), they had more unsafe sex last year (13 percent of clients against 6 percent of non-clients), and they use more drugs (6 percent of clients have ever injected drugs as opposed to 3 percent of non-clients). Clients are also on average more likely to have a high or medium level of alcohol consumption (19 percent as opposed to 13 percent).

Finally, 61 percent of clients are married or co-habiting as opposed to 75 percent of non-clients.

Clients had less heterosexual sex in the last 4 weeks, but they had more sex partners in the last year. In addition clients are slightly more religious: 46 per cent versus 44 percent of non-clients.

As mentioned earlier, the main advantage of this data set with respect to the ones utilized for previous studies is that it is a national representative sample of sexual attitudes and it includes questions on paying for sex. This implies the possibility of studying clients versus non clients while most papers (including Della Giusta et al. 2009b) analyze clients with data sets that only contains clients. A drawback of our data is that there are no questions related to frequency of paid sexual encounters. The questions regard only if the (male) individual has ever paid for homosexual or heterosexual sex, and with how many sex workers. In the following, we estimate a probit model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the man has ever paid for sex, and include all the variables reported in Table 2 as explanatory variables. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the estimation.

## TABLE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE

In order to test the model presented in Section 3, we need some variables related to individual income, price of paid sex, capacity for reputation losses, amount of freely exchanged sex and other personal characteristics.

Unfortunately the British National Survey on Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles does not contain data on income or price for paid sex. In order to have a proxy for income we use data on educational levels and number of children (a higher number of children implies less disposable income to be spent on paid sex).

In addition, we assume that the variables related to professional status are a proxy for reputation capacity or stigma. We assume that men with a high professional status (managers or professionals) have a small capacity for reputation losses ( $L_r$ ) and therefore that their reputations can be easily damaged.

In order to test if paying for sex is correlated with risky behavior, we use the five questions related to: sex with foreign partners, unsafe sex, smoking habits, use of injected drugs, and alcohol consumption.

The hypothesis that there is a correlation between demand for paid sex and free sex is tested using three variables: number of heterosexual partners in the last year, number of occasions of heterosexual sex in the last 4 weeks and a dummy for marriage or co-habitation.

Finally, we included some dummies for age of first heterosexual intercourse because the sociological literature on clients (Sanders 2008) shows that paying for sex is more frequent among those individuals who had their first intercourse at a younger age. We also included age of clients.



We expect this variable to be positively correlated with paying for sex because in previous studies age was an important determinant of the demand for paid sex.

## **5. Results**

The results of the probit model for demand of paid sex are reported in Table 3. We report both the estimated parameters and the marginal effects, and their standard errors.

### TABLE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE

Age has the expected (positive) sign which confirms previous results (Della Giusta et al. 2009b). Each year increases the probability of ever having paid for sex by 0.5 percent. The positive effect of age does not necessarily mean that older men demand more paid sex; this result could also be due to a longer spell of life for older men and therefore it is more likely that they have paid for sex in the course of their life.

The education dummies that we use as a proxy for income are significantly different from zero; having a university degree increases the probability of having paid for sex by 8 percent with respect to uneducated individuals; a high school diploma increases the probability of having paid for sex by 10 percent with respect to uneducated individuals. These results confirm the findings for the US clients in Della Giusta et al. (2009b).

One more child decreases the probability of having paid for sex by 1.4 percent. This effect could be due to both an income effect and a time constraint.

The variables related to the professional status show that the higher the status of the client, the lower the probability of paying for sex. These variables are interpreted in our models as representative of the reputation capacity ( $L_r$ ). In our theoretical model, we defined a capacity for reputational loss, which is lower for individuals with a high status (judges, politicians) than for others. In our empirical estimation, we interpret the negative sign associated with professional status as a confirmation that stigma and reputation matter for the demand for paid sex. Individuals with a professional/managerial position are 7 percentage points less likely to pay for sex than unskilled individuals; similar results to those of Della Giusta et al. 2009b.

The indicators for risky behavior show there is a high correlation among different types of risky behavior and paying for sex; for instance, smokers have a probability of paying for sex which is 2 percent higher than for non-smokers. Having injected drugs implies a probability of paying for sex which is 7 percent higher than for those who have not injected drugs. We find similar effects for alcohol consumption and unsafe sex.

We also find a negative and weakly significant (10%) effect from the frequency of sex in the last week, which confirms the hypothesis of a partial substitution effect between free and paid sex. The number of new heterosexual partners in the last year is positively and significantly related to the demand for paid sex, confirming that another component may be the desire for variety (as in Cameron and Collins, 2003). Being married or co-habiting is not statistically significant.

Having had the first intercourse between 13 and 15 years old increases the probability of having paid for sex by 5 percentage points.

Having conservative views regarding abortion, homosexuality or sex before marriage is not significantly correlated with having paid for sex. Also the effect on paying for sex of belonging to

a religion is not significantly different from zero. These results confirm that there is often a double standard regarding attitudes towards sex work: while on one hand the most conservative groups hold the most prohibitionist views on sex work, on the other hand they do not demand less paid sex with respect to the less conservative groups in society. This is consistent with the view that while there are differences in attitudes between those who are religious and those who are not, there are no significant differences in their actions regarding paying for sex. This may be seen to run counter to the results in Jakobsson and Kotsadam (2011), who find a connection between degree of conservatism and views on prostitution, though they do not connect degree of conservatism to actual demand as we are doing here. They test the effect of being religious and being from the right or the left on attitudes towards prostitution among a representative sample of Norwegians and Swedes.

## **6. Conclusion**

This paper builds on existing theoretical work on sex markets (Della Giusta, Di Tommaso, and Strøm, 2009a). Using data from the British Survey on Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles for 2001, we replicate the analysis of the demand for paid sex previously conducted for the US (Della Giusta, Di Tommaso, Shima and Strøm, 2009b). In fact one of the main limitations of this previous paper was the lack of a national representative sample with data collected among clients who had been arrested and agreed to participate to a rehabilitation program. This self-selection problem meant the estimates were biased. The estimates presented in this paper are not biased in this way, because they are based on a national representative sample, which contains both clients and non-clients. In this representative sample, 13 percent of British men have paid for sex at least once in their lifetime.

We test the effect of attitudes, risky behaviors and personal characteristics on the demand for paid sex. Findings from empirical studies of clients suggest that personal characteristics (personal and family background, self-perception, perceptions of women, sexual preferences), economic factors (education, income, work) as well as attitudes towards risk (both health hazard and risk of being caught where sex work is illegal), and attitudes towards relationships and sex are all likely to affect demand. Previous theoretical work has argued that stigma plays a fundamental role in determining both demand and risk, and that, due to the presence of stigma effects when paying for sex, the demand for unpaid and paid sex are not, as argued elsewhere, perfect substitutes.

We find a positive effect of education (proxy for income). As for the variables that our theoretical model had focused on, we do indeed find that stigma matters as the dummy reflecting professional status is negatively and significantly related to demand suggesting that professionals may indeed worry about the effect of paying for sex on their reputation. Risky behaviours are found to be positively and significantly related to demand; alcohol use, unsafe sex, smoking and drugs use are all positively and significantly related to demand for paid sex, which confirms the view that part of the demand is motivated by the thrill of engaging in risky behavior. We also find no significant effects of variables which measure the relative degree of conservatism in morals.

The policy implications from these findings are not straightforward and more analysis is needed to be able to offer robust suggestions. However, it seems clear that stigma plays a role in demand (at least the stigma potentially suffered by a client), as does attitudes to risk. Regarding the latter, a policy to reduce the risk associated with paid sex might be more effective in reducing demand than one that makes paid sex more dangerous (and hence potentially more enticing).

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Table 1: Average values of the variables used in the probit of table 3 for 399 clients and 2685 non-clients (3084 British men).

	Mean	
	Clients	Non-client
Age	34.9	34.8
Number of children	0.89	1.19
<b>Education dummies</b>		
=1 if degree level qualification; =0 otherwise	0.30	0.27
= 1 if a-levels/as-levels/slc higher grade; =0 otherwise	0.16	0.11
=1 if o-level/other; =0 otherwise	0.42	0.44
=1 if no education; =0 otherwise	0.13	0.17
<b>Professional status</b>		
=1 if professional/managerial; =0 otherwise	0.08	0.09
=1 if technical/managerial; =0 otherwise	0.34	0.34
=1 if skilled manual or non-manual; =0 otherwise	0.39	0.41
=1 if partly skilled; =0 otherwise	0.13	0.11
=1 if unskilled; =0 otherwise	0.07	0.05
<b>Risky behavior</b>		
=1 if had partner outside UK in the last 5 years; =0 otherwise	0.33	0.11
=1 if had unsafe het. sex in last year; =0 otherwise	0.13	0.06
=1 if ever a smoker; =0 otherwise	0.45	0.37
=1 if ever injected drugs or other substances; =0 otherwise	0.06	0.03
=1 if high or medium alcohol consumption; =0 otherwise	0.20	0.13
<b>Free Sex</b>		
Number of occasions of het. sex in last 4 weeks	5.12	5.54
Number of new het. sex partners, last year	1.35	0.45
=1 if married or cohabiting or widow or divorced; =0 if single & never married	0.61	0.75
<b>Conservative opinions/religion</b>		
= 1 if belongs to any religion now; =0 otherwise	0.46	0.44
=1 if sex before marriage always, mostly or sometimes wrong; =0 otherwise	0.13	0.15
=1 if sex between 2 men always, mostly or sometimes wrong; =0 otherwise	0.52	0.55
=1 if abortion always or mostly wrong; =0 otherwise	0.27	0.30
<b>Age at first het. intercourse</b>		
Aged 13-15	0.34	0.24
Aged 16-17	0.32	0.39
Aged 18-19	0.19	0.20
Aged 20+	0.15	0.16
<b>Dependent variable</b>		
=1 if ever paid for sex; =0 otherwise	1	0

Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the estimation sample: 3084 British men

	Obs.	Mean	St.Dev	Min	Max
Age	3084	34.81	5.25	26	44
Number of children	3084	1.15	1.26	0	8
<b>Education dummies</b>					
=1 if degree level qualification; =0 otherwise	3084	0.27	0.45	0	1
= 1 if a-levels/as-levels/slc higher grade; =0 otherwise	3084	0.12	0.32	0	1
=1 if o-level/other; =0 otherwise	3084	0.44	0.50	0	1
=1 if no education; =0 otherwise	3084	0.17	0.37	0	1
<b>Professional status</b>					
=1 if professional/managerial; =0 otherwise	3084	0.09	0.29	0	1
=1 if technical/managerial; =0 otherwise	3084	0.34	0.47	0	1
=1 if skilled manual or non-manual; =0 otherwise	3084	0.41	0.49	0	1
=1 if partly skilled; =0 otherwise	3084	0.11	0.32	0	1
=1 if unskilled; =0 otherwise	3084	0.05	0.21	0	1
<b>Risky behavior</b>					
=1 if had partner outside UK in the last 5 years; =0 otherwise	3084	0.14	0.35	0	1
=1 if had unsafe het. sex in last year; =0 otherwise	3084	0.07	0.25	0	1
=1 if ever a smoker; =0 otherwise	3084	0.38	0.49	0	1
=1 if ever injected drugs or other substances; =0 otherwise	3084	0.03	0.18	0	1
=1 if high or medium alcohol consumption; =0 otherwise	3084	0.14	0.35	0	1
<b>Free sex</b>					
Number of new het. sex partners, last year	3084	0.57	1.82	0	55
Number of occasions of het. sex in last 4 weeks	3084	5.49	6.01	0	56
=1 if married or cohabiting or widow or divorced; =0 if single & never married	3084	0.73	0.44	0	1
<b>Conservative opinions/religion</b>					
= 1 if belongs to any religion now; =0 otherwise	3084	0.45	0.50	0	1
=1 if sex before marriage always, mostly or sometimes wrong; =0 otherwise	3084	0.15	0.36	0	1
=1 if sex between 2 men always, mostly or sometimes wrong; =0 otherwise	3084	0.54	0.50	0	1
=1 if abortion always or mostly wrong; =0 otherwise	3084	0.30	0.46	0	1
<b>Age at first het. intercourse</b>					
Aged 13-15	3084	0.26	0.44	0	1
Aged 16-17	3084	0.38	0.49	0	1
Aged 18-19	3084	0.20	0.40	0	1
Aged 20+	3084	0.16	0.37	0	1
<b>Dependent variable</b>					
=1 if ever paid for sex; =0 otherwise	3084	0.13	0.34	0	1

Table 3: Probit estimates on 3084 British men.

Dependent variable=1 if ever paid for sex; =0 otherwise.	Coeff.	Std. Err	Marginal Effect	Std. Err
Age	0.025***	0.007	0.005***	0.001
Number of children	-0.077**	0.031	-0.014**	0.006
<b>Education dummies</b>				
=1 if degree level qualification; =0 otherwise	0.398***	0.117	0.083***	0.027
= 1 if a-levels/as-levels/slc higher grade; =0 otherwise	0.451***	0.121	0.104***	0.033
=1 if o-level/other; =0 otherwise	0.226**	0.095	0.043**	0.019
<b>Professional status</b>				
=1 if professional/managerial; =0 otherwise	-0.484***	0.175	-0.071***	0.019
=1 if technical/managerial; =0 otherwise	-0.385***	0.143	-0.067***	0.023
=1 if skilled manual or non-manual; =0 otherwise	-0.324**	0.134	-0.059**	0.024
=1 if partly skilled; =0 otherwise	-0.216	0.152	-0.037	0.023
<b>Risky behavior</b>				
=1 if had partner outside UK in the last 5 years; =0 otherwise	0.655***	0.078	0.160***	0.023
=1 if had unsafe het. sex in last year; =0 otherwise	0.320***	0.106	0.071***	0.027
=1 if ever a smoker; =0 otherwise	0.114*	0.065	0.022*	0.013
=1 if ever injected drugs or other substances; =0 otherwise	0.323**	0.147	0.072*	0.038
=1 if high or medium alcohol consumption; =0 otherwise	0.197**	0.082	0.040**	0.018
<b>Free sex</b>				
Number of occasions of het. sex in last 4 weeks	-0.012**	0.005	-0.002**	0.001
Number of new het. sex partners, last year	0.054***	0.013	0.010***	0.003
=1 if married or cohabiting or widow or divorced; =0 if single & never married	-0.081	0.078	-0.016	0.015
<b>Conservative opinions/religion</b>				
= 1 if belongs to any religion now; =0 otherwise	0.083	0.063	0.016	0.012
=1 if sex before marriage always, mostly or sometimes wrong; =0 otherwise	-0.009	0.097	-0.002	0.018
=1 if sex between 2 men always, mostly or sometimes wrong; =0 otherwise	0.035	0.066	0.007	0.012
=1 if abortion always or mostly wrong; =0 otherwise	-0.032	0.072	-0.006	0.013
<b>Age at first het. intercourse</b>				
Aged 13-15	0.266***	0.077	0.054***	0.017
Aged 18-19	0.025	0.087	0.005	0.017
Aged 20+	0.039	0.097	0.007	0.019
Constant	-2.170***	0.281		
Number of Obs.	3084			
Pseudo R squared	0.096			
LR Chi2(24)	228.5			

\* p&lt;0.1, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \*\*\* p&lt;0.01

Base category: No education, no skilled, Age of first heterosexual intercourse 16-17.