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Rorschach Nomological Network and Resting-State Large Scale Brain Networks

Introducing a New Research Design

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Abstract: Despite advances in neuroscience, the field of personality assessment has not yet taken full advantage of the progress in neuroimaging techniques. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is one of the most widely used neuroimaging techniques and allows the detection of brain processes and their anatomically detailed correspondences. In the last fifteen years, few studies have developed research designs using the Rorschach test in fMRI settings, analyzing the relationship between Rorschach variables and brain neural circuits. Although their findings were promising, some methodological issues related to fMRI research design have been outlined. Recently, personality neuroscience is emerging as a new field of research that attempts to deepen and refine neurobiological and psychological theories of personality using fMRI in resting state conditions. Recent studies report that resting state networks show a direct relationship with psychological traits. The aim of the present article is to propose a new research design that employs resting-state functional connectivity analyses to explore the brain's functional architecture in relation to psychological constructs of Rorschach variables related to perceptual styles and personality traits.

Keywords: fMRI, nomological networks, resting state, Rorschach

The nomological network (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) is a system of laws that relate theoretical constructs to observable data, observable data to each other, and theoretical constructs to each other. This network is necessary for providing a conceptualization of psychological constructs and for highlighting that only a network of meaningful associations between theoretical constructs and observable data may determine the validity of a single variable. For the Rorschach, construct validity concerns the parallel between the construct of interest as measured by Rorschach variables and behaviors and processes involved in the production of coded responses (Bornstein, 2012; Mihura, Meyer, Dimitrascu, & Bombel, 2013). For example, according to the Rorschach literature, human movement (M) responses are a measure of the respondent's mental abilities, such as empathy, planning,

43 and imagination, because of the implied ability to identify with a human being
44 (Exner, 2003; Exner & Erdberg, 2005; Meyer, Viglione, Mihura, Erard, & Erdberg,
45 2011; Mihura et al., 2013). Thus, construct validation of M responses should be
46 sustained by the relationship between this Rorschach variable and the construct
47 of empathy. Given the weak relationship between most Rorschach scores and
48 introspective self-reports, recent studies have linked Rorschach variables to find-
49 ings from the field of cognitive neuroscience. By conducting an EEG study,
50 Giromini, Porcelli, Viglione, Parolin, and Pineda (2010) have shown that EEG
51 mu suppression, a proxy biomarker for mirror neuron activation, occurred con-
52 comitantly with the participants attributing human movement to the Rorschach
53 stimuli. Using repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), a recent study
54 (A  et al., 2015) has shown that temporary disruption of activity in the left infer-
55 ior frontal gyrus, which is thought to include a large amount of mirror neurons,
56 yielded a statistically significant reduction in the attribution of human movement
57 to the Rorschach cards. These studies demonstrate that neuroimaging and brain
58 stimulation techniques may be employed to investigate construct validity of
59 Rorschach variables.

60 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) is one of the most widely used
61 neuroimaging techniques (Hamilton, Chen, Thomason, Schwartz, & Gotlib, 2011;
62 de Ruiter, Veltman, Phaf, & van Dyck, 2007; Seminowicz et al., 2004; Walter,
63 Berger, & Schnell, 2009). This technique relies on blood flow and blood oxygen-
64 ation changes (i.e., Blood-Oxygen-Level Dependent [BOLD] signals) occurring in
65 the brain over time, which are closely related to neural activity. Thus, fMRI tech-
66 niques allow the detection of brain processes and their anatomically detailed cor-
67 respondences. fMRI studies have been conducted in different experimental fields
68 and, more recently, they have been used to investigate neural correlates of person-
69 ality structure, measured by psychological tests, within more complex clinical
70 contexts.

71 The aim of the present paper was to explore and review the literature related to
72 the Rorschach and fMRI in order to introduce a new research design to investigate
73 the construct validity of the Rorschach. The increasing use of neuroimaging tech-
74 niques, in particular fMRI, has introduced a revolution in terms of research design,
75 since the activation of specific brain areas can be mapped while subjects are per-
76 forming cognitive tasks (Van Horn & Ishai, 2007). Thus, neuroimaging techniques
77 may be used in a multidisciplinary perspective and may contribute to the study of
78 the neurophysiological substrates of psychological variables associated with the
79 Rorschach. We reviewed the most important findings related to studies in which
80 the Rorschach was administered in a fMRI setting and focused on different issues
81 emerging from the methodology used by the authors.

82 **Rorschach and fMRI Studies**

83 In the last fifteen years, two research groups have developed research designs
84 using the Rorschach in fMRI settings. Kircher and colleagues (Kircher, Brammer,
85 Williams, & McGuire, 2000; Kircher, Liddle, Brammer, Williams, Murray, &
86 McGuire, 2001; Kircher, Liddle, Brammer, Williams, Murray, & McGuire, 2002;
87 Kircher, Brammer, & McGuire, 2005) presented seven Rorschach cards on a
88 screen during fMRI scanning to elicit fluent speech in patients with schizophrenia
89 and in healthy participants. They correlated different components of fluent speech
90 production (e.g., thought-disordered speech, lexical retrieval and articulation, syn-
91 tax processing) to BOLD signal changes and, thus, investigated the neural corre-
92 lates of the process of language generation. The authors demonstrated that
93 patients with schizophrenia showed different patterns of brain activation and pro-
94 duced a lesser rate of complex sentences and more thought-disordered speech
95 compared to healthy participants. Despite the fact that the studies mentioned
96 above represent an innovative use of the Rorschach in fMRI settings, the authors
97 did not examine the relationship between Rorschach variables and patterns of
98 brain activation.

99 More recently, Asari and colleagues (2008, 2010a, 2010b) investigated the
100 interaction between emotion- and perception-related neural circuits during the
101 administration of the Rorschach. The Japanese research group hypothesized that
102 unique responses on the Rorschach were generated by the interference of emo-
103 tions during perceptive and projective processing (Exner, 2003). Sixty-eight
104 healthy subjects were exposed to the Rorschach during fMRI scanning and were
105 instructed to say what the inkblot looked like. The authors then classified the
106 Rorschach responses as “frequent,” “infrequent,” or “unique” (Form Quality
107 minus, or FQ-), based on the frequency rate of each response in a matched control
108 group. According to Exner, they adopted a frequency criterion of 2% to classify
109 “frequent” (above the criterion) and “infrequent” (below the criterion) responses,
110 whereas “unique” responses were those that did not occur in the control group.
111 The studies reported by Asari et al. are closely linked together, with each study
112 being based on the findings of the previous one.

113 The first study (Asari et al., 2008) focused on the neural substrates that underlie
114 unique responses on the Rorschach. Results revealed that unique responses were
115 associated with the activation of the right temporal pole, which is anatomically
116 proximal to limbic structures (e.g., the amygdala). In a recent review (Olson,
117 Plotzker, & Ezzyat, 2007), the temporal pole has been considered as a paralimbic
118 region and is related to the social and emotional processing of sensory stimuli, to
119 the storage of perception-emotion linkages, and to personal semantic memory.
120 Given the link found by the authors between unique (FQ-) responses, temporal

121 pole functions, and the anatomically proximal amygdala, Asari and colleagues
122 hypothesized that unique perception on the Rorschach may be produced by the
123 integration of emotional and perceptual processes.

124 In the second study (Asari et al., 2010a), based on the anatomical proximity of
125 the amygdala to the temporal lobe and in accordance with the literature, they
126 tested the hypothesis that amygdala volume was related to the production of
127 unique responses on the Rorschach. They found a positive correlation between
128 the unique response ratio (URR; i.e., the number of unique responses divided
129 by the total number of responses), c volume, and other components of the limbic
130 system (e.g., cingulate gyri, which is involved in emotional processing). Thus,
131 results seemed to indicate that emotion-related neural circuits (in particular the
132 limbic system) might underlie the frequent production of unique perception and
133 FQ- responses to the inkblot stimuli. In the third and last study (Asari et al.,
134 2010b), and based on previous results, Asari et al. investigated whether the amyg-
135 dala was involved in the modulation of the cortical network while participants
136 were involved in the task of finding suitable representations to the inkblot stimuli.
137 The Rorschach variable WSumC (i.e., the weighted sum of responses determined
138 by color) was used as a score for emotional sensitivity. A positive correlation
139 between the URR and WSumC was found, indicating that emotion may play a role
140 in the perception of unique and uncommon percepts on the Rorschach. Moreover,
141 results revealed a significant modulatory effect of the amygdala on the temporo-
142 polar region, confirming the interference of emotion on perception during the
143 Rorschach task.

144 Despite the fact that the abovementioned findings were promising, some meth-
145 odological issues related to fMRI research design deserve mentioning. The main
146 limitation of using fMRI techniques has to do with the numerous artefacts gener-
147 ated, which can lead to errors in analyzing the results. Firstly, significant scanner
148 noise may undermine the ecological validity of the performance of the subject.
149 For example, subjects may not be able to hear themselves speak clearly. However,
150 Kircher et al. (2005) reported that all participants were able to hear themselves
151 speak in spite of the noise. Secondly, the principal issue related to overt speech
152 responses during fMRI scan concerns artefacts associated with head motion and
153 air volume changes in the sinus cavities and in the pharynx during phonation.
154 The head-motion correction during fluent speech has recently become a real mat-
155 ter of debate because it has been shown that inadequate correction for these arte-
156 facts can result in spurious correlations in many fMRI analyses (Lee & Theriault,
157 2013). Thus, researchers need to quantify and control for head movements to
158 manage this methodological issue. Thirdly, the method of defining the neural
159 regions of interest (ROI) has been reported by Asari et al (2010b) as a methodo-
160 logical concern. The ROI is a subset of an image or a dataset of cerebral regions

161 identified to test a particular hypothesis. Previous neuroimaging studies investigat-
162 ing personality that have used an a priori selection of ROI (Adelstein et al., 2011;
163 Canli, Amin, Haas, Omura, & Constable, 2004; DeYoung, 2010; Eisenberger,
164 Lieberman, & Satpute, 2005; Kumari et al., 2007; Wright et al., 2006) identified
165 this condition as a methodological limitation considering the complexity of the
166 construct investigated: personality traits. Given that personality traits are associ-
167 ated with extended distributed networks of regions, rather than being localized
168 in a few specific regions, dynamic interactions of large-scale networks, including
169 low-level sensory and high-order cognitive brain regions, form the basis of com-
170 plex thought and behavior (Adelstein et al., 2011). Thus, the inclusion of large-
171 scale data-driven methods is necessary to investigate the neural correlates of per-
172 sonality traits more comprehensively (Kunisato et al., 2011). Lastly, the adminis-
173 tration of the Rorschach is no longer standardized. The plates are presented on
174 a screen and, because subjects are not allowed to move, they cannot hold and
175 rotate the cards. Moreover, the inquiry is not conducted, so analyses are based
176 solely on spontaneous responses. Asari et al. (2003, 2010a, 2010b) tried to bypass
177 these limitations by providing participants with a MRI-compatible button press, so
178 that they were able to rotate the image while in the scanner. Furthermore, the
179 authors conducted post-experimental interviews outside the scanner to inquire
180 as to where the percepts were seen.

181 Introducing a New Research Design

182 Recently, personality neuroscience is emerging as a new field of research that
183 attempts to link biological variables to existing stable patterns of emotion, cogni-
184 tion, motivation, and behavior (Canli, 2008; DeYoung, 2010, DeYoung & Gray,
185 2009). The aim of personality neuroscience is to deepen and refine neurobiologi-
186 cal and psychological theories of personality using techniques such as fMRI in rest-
187 ing state conditions (Ciuciu, Varoquaux, Abry, Sadaghiani, & Kleinschmidt, 2012;
188 Lei, Yang, & Wu, 2015). Personality neuroscience “entails the examination of how
189 variability among individuals on cognitive, emotional, motivational, or behavioral
190 dimensions (e.g., extraversion, intelligence, empathic ability) is related to neural
191 variables” (Mar, Spreng, & DeYoung, 2013, p. 674). However, personality con-
192 structs underlying numerous personality tests, and the Rorschach in particular,
193 are explained by a pattern of various underlying factors that mostly vary together.
194 Early research conducted on the detection of cognitive and somatosensory brain
195 processes (de Ruiter et al. 2007; Hamilton et al. 2011; Seminowicz et al., 2004;
196 Walter et al., 2009) have mainly investigated aspects of functional segregation.

197 However, a change in perspective has been introduced, so that recent literature
198 has focused on the study of functional integration and patterns of brain connectiv-
199 ity, instead of investigating aspects of functional segregation and isolating regions
200 functionally specialized in performing specific tasks. Moreover, given that several
201 studies of cerebral metabolism (Raichle & Gusnard, 2002; Raichle et al., 2001)
202 revealed a low energy increment of cerebral task activity (about 0.5–1.0%) com-
203 pared to resting state conditions (about 60–80%), the examination of resting state
204 neural activity has been introduced. In order to outline a new research design
205 allowing us to better understand the psychological functions underlying Rorschach
206 variables, we examined the concept of cerebral intrinsic activity, resting-state, and
207 large scale resting state brain networks (rs-lsbn).

208 Resting-state neuroimaging is based on the identification of low-frequency spon-
209 taneous fluctuations in broad cerebral areas while the subject does not perform a
210 specific task. A large part of the daily activities of the mind are internal and per-
211 formed without external stimuli (Buckner & Vincent, 2007). During this particular
212 state of consciousness, the subject is monitoring information such as feelings and
213 body position, free association of thoughts that relate to past experience, inner
214 speech, mental images, emotions, working memory, and planning for future
215 events (Bar, 2009; Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2010; Raichle, 2010; Shulman,
216 Hyder, & Rothman, 2009). The brain at rest, then, engages in intrinsic activity,
217 defined in the literature as the default mode network (DMN), baseline state,
218 and conscious resting-state (Raichle & Snyder, 2007). The DMN consists of spon-
219 taneous and simultaneous neuronal oscillations of anatomically segregated areas
220 of the brain that are more metabolically active at rest when a person is not focused
221 on external demand. Thus, the DMN turns off during goal-oriented activity and
222 the task positive network (TPN) is activated.

223 In addition to the DMN, the literature has highlighted the presence of important
224 rs-lsbn with visual, motor, linguistic and attentive functions at rest (Raichle et al.,
225 2001). Several of the most recent resting-state networks studies have in fact
226 reported inter-individual differences in functional intrinsic connectivity related
227 to psychological traits, such as social competence (Di Martino et al. 2009), risk-
228 taking (Cox et al., 2010), aggression (Hoptman et al., 2009), and cognitive effi-
229 ciency (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2007). Although there is still a lack of complete
230 agreement with regard to what could be a unique measure of rs-lsbn and the data
231 are continuously updated, 10–11 principal networks have been identified (Rosazza
232 & Minati, 2011): DMN, sensorimotor component, executive control component,
233 visual components, auditory component, temporo-parietal component, and later-
234 alized fronto-parietal components.

235 Currently, resting-state fMRI has been extensively used in neuroscience because
236 of its advantages (He, 2011; Lei et al., 2015; Lei, Zao, & Chen, 2013; Smith et al.,

237 2009). The most important requisite of resting-state spontaneous oscillations is
238 their high test-retest reliability, indicating that rs patterns are stable across time
239 (DeYoung et al., 2010; Van Dijk et al., 2009; Zuo et al., 2010). Moreover, this
240 technique allows the detection of a wide range of brain regions correlated with
241 psychological traits simultaneously (Lei et al. 2015). Crucial to introducing our
242 innovative research design is the finding that most of the major brain networks
243 that are involved in a task are also detectable in the brain at rest, and that these
244 patterns are impressively similar to the networks activated by a wide spectrum of
245 cognitive-behavioral tasks (Laird et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2009). Moreover, mod-
246 els of functional connectivity during rest summarize coactivation patterns that
247 reflect individual history and experience (Sporns, 2013). Recent experiences, as
248 well as consolidated abilities, may leave a “memory trace” within brain function
249 and spontaneous fluctuations may be involved in the process of memory
250 consolidation.

251 Recent studies in personality neuroscience hypothesized that rs-lsbn may have a
252 direct relationship with psychological traits (Adelstein et al., 2011; Canli, 2004;
253 DeYoung et al., 2010; Lei et al., 2013). In a very recent study, resting-state neuro-
254 imaging was employed as a powerful tool to analyze the brain structure and the
255 neuronal correlates of the Big-Five constructs and extraversion-introversion traits
256 (Lei et al., 2015). Researchers found a significant relationship between the DMN
257 and Extraversion. Moreover, Adelstein and colleagues (2011) found that personal-
258 ity domains measured by the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992) correctly pre-
259 dicted resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) between hypothesized
260 patterns of regions. In particular, Neuroticism predicted RSFC involved in self-
261 referential processing, emotional regulation, and fearful anticipation; Extraversion
262 predicted RSFC involved in social attention, face recognition, motivation and
263 reward; Openness to Experience predicted RSFC implicated in working memory
264 and creativity; Agreeableness predicted RSFC involved in social and emotional
265 attention; Conscientiousness predicted RSFC implicated in planning and future-
266 oriented episodic judgment. Generally, personality neuroscience studies con-
267 firmed the utility of examining the synchronous cerebral connectivity at rest to
268 identify neural markers of complex traits, such as personality traits.

269 On the basis of the aforementioned neuroimaging evidence, we have high-
270 lighted that rs-lsbn appear to be linked to psychological functioning and to spe-
271 cific personality features. Based on these findings, we propose a new research
272 design that employs RSFC analyses to explore the brain’s functional architecture
273 in relation to psychological constructs of Rorschach variables related to perceptual
274 styles and personality traits. In this research design, each fMRI scan should be a
275 measure taken in rest condition and participants should be instructed to rest with
276 their eyes open in passive fixation. The administration of the Rorschach would be

277 assessed outside the fMRI scanner, ensuring a more ecological setting, and the
278 cerebral intrinsic activity would be analyzed without a task condition. Therefore,
279 this new research design would allow bypassing most of the critical issues related
280 to the administration of the Rorschach during fMRI scans. Moreover, investigating
281 resting states would allow researchers to avoid artefacts related to phonation, flu-
282 ent speech, and movements of the head.

283 At this point, our attention should be directed to formulating hypotheses about
284 Rorschach variables (Exner, 2003). As we discussed above, resting state patterns
285 are stable over time and recent research has related these patterns to personality
286 traits. Thus, the first group of hypotheses concerns the relationship between the
287 RSFC analyses identified by Adelstein and colleagues (2011) and Rorschach vari-
288 ables considered to identify trait characteristics. The intrinsic connectivity
289 between regions involved in the evaluation of self and others, as well as in socially
290 directed thought, such as determining or inferring the purpose of others actions
291 (dorsomedial prefrontal cortex of the DMN), may be predicted by Rorschach vari-
292 ables from the Self Perception and Interpersonal Perception clusters. Moreover,
293 Affect cluster variables (particularly WSumC) may predict the intrinsic connectiv-
294 ity between regions involved in the processing of positive emotions (orbitofrontal
295 cortex, insula, and amygdala areas; Lei et al., 2015), as well as the processing of
296 reward and motivation (DeYoung et al., 2010). We also hypothesize a negative
297 correlation between a high lambda style and regions involved in cognitive flexibil-
298 ity (anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; DeYoung et al.,
299 2009; Jung et al., 2010). Particularly, variables of Interpersonal Perception and
300 the Coping Deficit Index (CDI) may predict connectivity with regions involved
301 in altruism and social information processing (cortex and posterior temporal cor-
302 tex; Kober et al., 2008). Finally, we hypothesize that the Controls cluster may pre-
303 dict the activity of regions involved in planning and self-discipline (lateral
304 prefrontal cortex and medial temporal lobe; DeYoung & Gray 2009; DeYoung
305 et al., 2010).

306 Further hypotheses may arise from the recent resting state literature related to
307 specific diagnostic groups. For example, the DMN has been investigated in
308 patients with schizophrenia. Broyd et al. (2009) reported that weak regulations
309 of competition between the DMN and the task-positive network in patients with
310 schizophrenia reflected over-mentalizing and excessive vigilance to the external
311 environment. Therefore, a suitable hypothesis would be that of a relationship
312 between excessive competitions between networks and the Hypervigilance Index
313 (HVI). Moreover, increased connectivity between the DMN and other resting state
314 networks is associated with attention deficits related to the intrusive role of
315 hallucinations and delusional experiences. This last finding may contribute to
316 the hypothesis of a relationship between increased connectivity and the

317 Perceptual-Thinking Index (PTI). The DMN has also been associated with depres-
318 sion and anxiety (Broyd et al., 2009). It is involved in free mental processes and in
319 cognitively passive tasks. Its activation correlates with the human ability to roam
320 with the mind, to think about past experiences, or to imagine the future (Rosazza
321 & Minati, 2011). DMN connectivity is related to ruminative and self-referential
322 thinking, and patients with depressive mood disorders show increased functional
323 connectivity in affective regions (e.g., the thalamus) that may interfere with cog-
324 nitive processing (Greicius, Supekar, Menon, & Dougherty, 2007). Consistently,
325 Sheline et al. (2010) found that people with a diagnosis of depression presented
326 deficiency in the suppression of the DMN (particularly the medial prefrontal cortex)
327 and that they experienced long periods of intense negative rumination. These
328 findings suggest a relationship between increased functional connectivity or deficit
329 in the suppression of the DMN and Vista (V) responses, as well as the Depression
330 Index (DEPI).

331 Using fMRI techniques to investigate construct validity in the psychological and
332 clinical domains is a recent field of research developed over the past 20 years. The
333 research design presented here seems to us of particular interest for future studies
334 in the field of resting-state fMRI, which has not yet been sufficiently explored in
335 relation to psychological testing in general, and to the Rorschach test in particular.
336 The aim of this new research design is to identify the latent structures that shape
337 the resting-state lsbn and that simultaneously predict Rorschach variables. This
338 research design would ensure methodological rigor of the standardized adminis-
339 tration of the Rorschach in a more “natural” setting, and may avoid technical arte-
340 facts related to the sources of noise involved in fMRI. To our knowledge, the
341 Rorschach and fMRI literature has not yet explored the relationship between
342 neural correlates detected during the recording of intrinsic activity at rest and
343 Rorschach variables. Thus, correlating resting-state networks to Rorschach vari-
344 ables may contribute to the growing literature on the validity of the Rorschach
345 and may provide a biological foundation for some Rorschach variables.

346 Conclusion

347 How can neuroimaging techniques be concretely of use with respect to issues so
348 far articulated? Is it possible to contribute to the Rorschach nomological network
349 through the analysis of resting-state large-scale brain networks? Cognitive psychol-
350 ogy has long adopted neuroimaging techniques to study brain functioning at the
351 level of simple phenomena, such as memory, language, or sensorimotor tasks,
352 but exploring more complex phenomena, such as psychopathology and

353 personality, is more challenging. Neuroscience and clinical psychology have often
354 traveled in parallel, avoiding possible points of contact but are often moving in the
355 same direction. Indeed, on closer inspection, this fracture was in part a conse-
356 quence of Freud's "failed attempt" to substantiate his theory through the use of
357 neuroscience, hampered by a lack of appropriate tools (Northoff, 2012a, 2012b).
358 From this point of view, it is likely that Freud would today be very interested in
359 neuroscience and that he would finally have available tools to investigate the psy-
360 che in more sophisticated ways. On the other hand, Pulver (2003) draws attention
361 to the importance of having realistic expectations with regard to the potentiality of
362 neuroscience. Faced with a technology enabling the observation of the brain
363 in vivo and providing us with images of its functioning, we risk falling into the
364 opposite error of that mentioned above, considering that neuroimaging is to men-
365 tal health what radiography is to a bone fracture. In this case, beyond the initial
366 blind enthusiasm for the potential of neuroimaging (McCabe & Castel, 2008),
367 the risk would be a subsequent total distrust. So what is the correct position?
368 Rather than talking about a correct position, we could talk about a beneficial
369 location.

370 It seems, in fact, that these two paths will cross at a point beyond which, in order
371 to make progress together, they will need each other. Clinical approaches formu-
372 late theories to explain psychological phenomena; neuroscience shows the brain
373 functions that underlie these processes and human behavior by providing access
374 to information that would otherwise not be available. Fonagy and Target (2003),
375 speaking of clinical and research approaches, consider that we should not see a
376 evolutionary relationship between conceptual research (which generates hypothe-
377 ses) and empirical research (which evaluates assumptions), but rather a comple-
378 mentary one. One could consider these two positions as being in a state of
379 reciprocal tension: each induces the other to clarify itself. From those premises
380 it is our opinion, therefore, that the progressive development of neuroimaging
381 techniques, both with respect to the accuracy and to the enlargement of the objec-
382 tives of investigation, can effectively contribute to the development of knowledge
383 in psychopathology and psychodiagnosis. This could help put both the Rorschach
384 and the dialogue between neuroscience and clinical practice, as well as the rela-
385 tionship between mind and brain, in a new light.

386 In conclusion, in the present review we aimed to investigate how neuroimaging
387 and brain stimulation techniques may contribute to the development of knowl-
388 edge about the psychological functions underlying Rorschach variables. The inno-
389 vative research design that we have proposed and discussed may significantly
390 contribute to the nomological network of the Rorschach. However, some limita-
391 tions are worth noting. First, within the field of neuroscience, it is still not clear
392 which are the specific psychological functions involved in resting state networks

(Read et al., 2010). Second, given that Rorschach variables tap both implicit and explicit psychological processes, the constructs related to Rorschach variables are not easy to define. As Mihura and colleagues (2012) stated in their recent meta-analysis of Rorschach variables:

Appropriate criteria in the nomological network for Rorschach variables need to be specified to parallel the performance-based coding of inkblot-delimited attribution and behaviors [...] The coding of these response behaviors produces valid constructs but also constructs that are uniquely shaped (and limited) by the task. (Mihura et al., 2012, p. 32)

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Summary

627 Neuroscience and clinical psychology have often traveled in parallel, avoiding possible points of
628 contact but often moving in the same direction, at least because they are anchored to each other
629 by having a common object of study: the human mind and its manifestations. Recently, neuroim-
630 aging techniques have completely revolutionized the way we conceive the study of the brain,
631 allowing us to switch from an anatomical-segregation position to a more functional integration
632 view of brain mechanisms, based on networks between various cerebral areas not necessarily ana-
633 tomically close to each other. The aim of this article was to explore and review the neuroimaging
634 fMRI literature on the Rorschach in order to contribute to the knowledge base on psychological
635 and personality traits that form the basis of the Rorschach. Therefore, we point out the principal
636 methodological issues related to free flow speech responses during scanning and artefacts associ-
637 ated with head motion and changes in the sinus cavities and the pharynx during phonation. The
638 conscious resting state in humans is supported by an extensive network of associative parietal
639 areas that can be further hierarchically organized in a network of fronto-parietal working memory,
640 driven in part by emotions, and working under the supervision of prefrontal executive networks. At
641 rest, in addition to the default mode network (DMN), the literature reports the presence of other
642 important networks with visual, motor, linguistic, and attentive functions. Indeed, these networks
643 seem to be linked to the psychological functioning of individuals. Crucially, most of the networks
644 detectable in the brain involved in a task are also identifiable in the brain at rest. Thus, we intro-
645 duce a resting state fMRI research design to compare the diagnostic meaning of some Rorschach
646 variables and the structure and functions of resting-state state brain networks (rs-lsbn). Specifi-
647 cally, we aimed to relate Rorschach variables to rs-lsbn by using fMRI to analyze cerebral intrinsic
648 activity. With this research design, the administration of the Rorschach test (The Comprehensive
649 System, Exner, 1993) would take place outside the fMRI. This condition would allow the bypassing
650 of important methodological limitations, such as the presence of fMRI artefacts during fluent
651 speech, the non-ecological setting for Rorschach administration, and, finally, the low temporal res-
652 olution due to the nature of the BOLD signal detected during scanning.

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Sintesi

654 Neuroscienze e psicologia clinica hanno spesso viaggiato parallelamente, evitando il più possibile
655 punti di contatto ma muovendosi tuttavia molto spesso nella stessa direzione, se non altro perché
656 ancorate l'una all'altra dal fatto di avere un comune oggetto di studio: la mente umana e le sue
657 manifestazioni. Attualmente le tecniche di neuroimaging hanno completamente rivoluzionato il
658 modo di concepire lo studio del cervello, consentendo di passare da una posizione di *segregazione*
659 anatomica ad una visione del cervello e dei suoi meccanismi di *connettività* funzionale più ampia,
660 basata cioè sui network di aree cerebrali non necessariamente anatomicamente contigue. L'obiet-
661 tivo di questo articolo è di esplorare e percorrere nell'ambito della letteratura sul neuroimaging
662 una revisione degli studi condotti con l'utilizzo dell'fMRI e il test di Rorschach, al fine di contri-
663 buire allo sviluppo delle conoscenze relative al funzionamento mentale e di personalità che stanno
664 alla base del test. Abbiamo dunque sottolineato le principali criticità ed i problemi metodologici
665 relativi all'analisi del fluire libero dell'eloquio durante una scansione fMRI e agli artefatti associati
666 al movimento del capo e alla fonazione. L'esistenza di stati consci di resting state negli individui è
667 supportata in letteratura dall'individuazione di un'estesa rete associativa di aree parietali gerarchi-
668 camente organizzata in una rete fronto-parietale di working memory, guidata in parte dalle com-
669 ponenti emotive, sotto la supervisione di una rete prefrontale esecutiva. In condizioni di rest, oltre

670 al DMN, la letteratura evidenzia la presenza di altri importanti network con funzioni visive, moto-
671 rie, linguistiche ed attentive che risultano essere collegati con il funzionamento psicologico. Il dato
672 più interessante consiste nel fatto che la maggior parte dei network che sono rilevabili nel cervello
673 durante l'esecuzione di un compito possono essere identificati nel cervello anche in condizioni di
674 rest. Abbiamo dunque proposto un nuovo disegno di ricerca in cui alcune variabili Rorschach pos-
675 sono essere messe in relazione con i resting-state state brain networks (rs-lsbn), identificati attrav-
676 verso l'uso della fMRI per analizzare l'attività cerebrale intrinseca. Questo disegno di ricerca
677 prevede che la somministrazione del test di Rorschach sia condotta all'esterno dello scanner, con-
678 sentendo in questo modo pertanto di evitare le limitazioni metodologiche relative agli artefatti im-
679 plicati nell'analisi del fluent speech durante la somministrazione del test in macchina, le
680 caratteristiche scarsamente ecologiche di tale setting di assessment ed infine la bassa risoluzione
681 temporale da attribuire alla natura intrinseca del segnale BOLD durante la rilevazione del fluire
682 libero dell'eloquio.

683 Résumé

684 La neuroscience et la psychologie clinique ont souvent voyagé en parallèle, évitant les points de
685 contact possibles, mais se déplaçant souvent dans une même direction, étant liées l'une à l'autre
686 par un objet d'étude commun: l'esprit humain et ses manifestations. Les techniques de
687 neuro-imagerie ont complètement révolutionné la façon dont nous concevons l'étude du cerveau
688 et nous permettent de commuter entre une position de *ségrégation anatomique* et une vue plus
689 fonctionnelle des mécanismes cérébraux, basée sur les réseaux entre aires cérébrales diverses.
690 L'objectif de cet article est d'effectuer une revue de la littérature sur la neuro-imagerie et les
691 études cliniques réalisées avec l'imagerie par résonance magnétique fonctionnelle (IRMf), afin
692 de contribuer au développement de la connaissance relative au fonctionnement mental et de per-
693 sonnalité basé sur le test du Rorschach. Nous avons donc souligné les principales difficultés et les
694 problèmes méthodologiques relatifs à l'analyse du flux libre de l'élocution pendant l'examen
695 d'IRMf, ainsi qu'aux artefacts associés au mouvement de la tête et à la phonation pendant cet exa-
696 men. L'existence d'états conscients de repos ("resting state") chez les individus est abordé dans la
697 littérature par la découverte d'un vaste réseau associatif des zones pariétales organisées hiérar-
698 chiquement dans un réseau fronto-pariétal de la mémoire de travail, dirigé en partie par des com-
699 posantes émotionnelles, et sous la supervision d'un réseau exécutif préfrontal. Pendant les
700 conditions de repos, en plus du réseau du mode par défaut (RMD), la littérature signale la présence
701 d'autres réseaux importants avec fonctions visuelles, mnésiques, linguistiques et d'attention qui
702 sont liées au fonctionnement psychologique. L'élément le plus intéressant est le fait que la plupart
703 des réseaux qui sont détectables dans le cerveau pendant l'exécution d'une tâche peuvent être
704 identifiés dans le cerveau également dans des conditions de repos. Nous avons donc proposé
705 une nouvelle méthodologie de recherche dans laquelle les variables Rorschach peuvent être mises
706 en relation avec les réseaux détectables en condition de repos, identifiés en utilisant l'IRMf pour
707 analyser l'activité cérébrale intrinsèque. Cette méthodologie de recherche prévoit que l'adminis-
708 tration du Rorschach soit effectuée à l'extérieur de l'appareil IRMf, permettant ainsi d'éviter les pro-
709 blèmes méthodologiques relatifs aux artefacts liés à l'administration du test dans le scanner, aux
710 caractéristiques peu écologiques de ce contexte d'évaluation, et enfin à la basse résolution tempo-
711 relle du signal BOLD pendant des tâches de fluence verbale et d'élocution libre.

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Resumen713
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Neurociencia y psicología clínica a menudo han viajado en paralelo, evitando lo más posible puntos de contacto pero al mismo tiempo moviéndose en la misma dirección, eso porque están conectadas por el mismo objeto de estudio: la mente humana y sus manifestaciones. Actualmente las técnicas de neuroimaging han revolucionado totalmente la forma en que se concibe el estudio del cerebro, permitiendo el pasaje desde una posición de segregación anatómica hasta una visión del cerebro y de sus mecanismos de conexión funcionales más amplia. El objetivo de este papel es el de explorar y actuar una revisión de la literatura sobre el neuroimaging y los estudios del fMRI y del test de Rorschach, para contribuir al avance del conocimiento del funcionamiento mental y de personalidad que representan la base del test. Entonces hemos estresado las principales críticas y los problemas metodológicos del análisis del libre flujo del discurso durante una sesión de fMRI y los artefactos conectados al movimiento de la cabeza y a la fonación. La existencia de estados conscientes de *resting state* en las personas está apoyada en la literatura por la individuación de una larga red de asociación de las áreas parietal organizada jerárquicamente en una red fronto-parietal de *working memory*, conducida en parte por las componentes emotivas, bajo la supervisión de una red prefrontal ejecutiva. En condiciones de *rest*, más que al DMN, la literatura muestra la presencia de otros importantes *networks* con funciones visivas, motorias, lingüísticas y de atención que están conectados con el funcionamiento psicológico. El dato más interesante es el hecho que la mayoría de los *networks* que se pueden detectar en el cerebro durante la ejecución de una tarea pueden ser identificados en el cerebro también en condición de *rest*. Entonces hemos propuesto un nuevo dibujo de búsqueda en que algunas variables Rorschach pueden ser puestas en relación con los *networks* detectados en condiciones de *rest* (*rs-lsbn*), identificados a través de la análisis de la actividad cerebral intrínseca. Este dibujo de búsqueda implica que la administración del test de Rorschach sea hecha fuera de lo scanner, permitiendo así de evitar las limitaciones metodológicas cerca los artefactos implicados en el análisis del *fluent speech* en la administración del test en la máquina, las características poco ecológicas de este *setting* de *assessment* y además la baja resolución temporal que se pueden atribuir a la naturaleza de la señal BOLD durante la relajación del flujo libre del discurso.

740