

AperTO - Archivio Istituzionale Open Access dell'Università di Torino

Differentiating jāti from upādhi: towards a further exegesis of the six jātibādhakas according to Navya Nyāya

This is the author's manuscript

Original Citation:

Availability:

This version is available <http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1652900> since 2017-11-23T20:01:35Z

Terms of use:

Open Access

Anyone can freely access the full text of works made available as "Open Access". Works made available under a Creative Commons license can be used according to the terms and conditions of said license. Use of all other works requires consent of the right holder (author or publisher) if not exempted from copyright protection by the applicable law.

(Article begins on next page)

DIFFERENTIATING *JĀTI* AND *UPĀDHI*. TOWARDS A FURTHER EXEGESIS OF THE SIX *JĀTIBĀDHAKAS* ACCORDING TO NAVYA NYĀYA

GIANNI PELLEGRINI

1. INTRODUCTION

As a basis to my analysis, I should like to open with two presuppositions: 1) for Naiyāyikas every category (*padārtha*) in general and, in the specific, every substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) and action (*karman*),¹ is a reservoir of properties, usually expressed through abstract terms (*bhāvavācaka*);² 2) in the philosophical lexicon the word *upādhi* has several meanings, not only in the different philosophical branches but also within a single discipline.

In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Navya Nyāya the word *upādhi*, in addition to its logical and epistemological purport,³ also conveys an ontological meaning, namely “conditional property, additional character, accidental or adventitious condition”, which stands in opposition with the word *jāti* “species, class, universal” and *sāmānya* “generality, general property, common character”.⁴ It is my conviction that this on-

¹ It is important to recall: the *jāti/sāmānya* inheres (*samaveta*) in the first three categories, namely *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karman*. See *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī ad karikā* 14 (Sastri 1988: 174-176), *Tar-kasamgraha* (2007: 17-18, 167-168), Dravid (2001: 22).

² Roughly speaking, according to the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, from an ontological point of view, reality is a complex of substances and attributes and, epistemologically speaking, the content of a determined (*viśiṣṭa*) cognition is a complex *ensemble* of qualifications or qualifiers (*prakāra/viśeṣana*) and qualified substantives or qualificands (*viśeṣya*). The qualifications/qualifiers which occur on a substrate (see also Matilal 1968: 6-15, 35 and Pellegrini 2015) are properties, which could be either a *jāti* or an *upādhi* (Dravid 2001: 27-28).

³ In order to understand the real purport of the term *upādhi*, it is not enough to translate it as “condition”, because it has a too wide and ample range (Phillips 2002: 22-27; see also Apte’s Dictionary 1957: 471). Matilal rightly distinguishes between the inferential *upādhi* “condition” in the context of *vyāpti* (Matilal 1968: 84) and the *upādhi* as “imposed property” (Matilal 1968: 33, 41-42, 49, 50, 84, 137), which is an ontological issue (see also Phillips 2012: 170). Ingalls (1988: 40-42, 45 fn. 62, 47, 75-76, 78) translates “imposed property” (also Gaekoop 1967: 14-15, ff.; Tachikawa 1981); Gangopadhyay (1971: 148ff) “extraneous condition, vitiating condition”; Dravid (2001: 141, 198, 280, 296) uses different translators “general characteristic, common property, adventitious property”; Phillips (1997: 58-61; Phillips 2002: 22-27); Phillips (2012: 25-28, 63-64, 168) “quasi universal, mind imposed property/kind, accidental property”.

⁴ The principal translations of the terms *jāti/sāmānya* are: “generic character” (Ingalls 1988); “universal nature, class character” (Gaekoop 1967); “generic property” (Matilal 1968); “genus, species” (Chakrabarti 1975: 363-382); “generic character” (Tachikawa 1981); “common feature, generic feature” (Sastri 1998); “universal, class-essence, class nature” (Dravid 2001); “generality” (Phillips 1997); “universal, natural kind, a property occurring in more than a single instance or *locus*, common characteristic” (Phillips 2012); “universal” (Poddar 2013).

tological understanding of *upādhi* was late to enter in the Nyāya terminology; *ergo* its semantic and textual history has an interesting development, which I shall try to portray. In this article, accordingly, I will briefly present the textual development and, the nodal moment from which, I believe, the notion of *upādhi* became independent from that of *jāti*. We will see, furthermore, that such independence must be considered through a peculiar Navya Nyāya lens.

2. *JĀTI* VIS-À-VIS *UPĀDHI*: A TEXTUAL SURVEY

Until a late period, the contra-*jāti* nuance of *upādhi* does not seem to have an autonomous existence or, at least, in the earlier period it is not problematized but is usually evoked as the dark side of the conceptual cluster *sāmānya/jāti*. In fact, although not clearly nominated, the word *upādhi* intended in an ontological sense – likewise in an inferential one – had a negative meaning from the beginning. It was viewed as an accidental or “surplus” property, an entity whose importance is measured by its influence on something else or, in other words, a property designated in a certain way by means of a relation which links it with the thing it conditions.⁵ What is evident, however, is that the word *upādhi* is, by its own nature – linguistic as well as conceptual – decidedly vague and elusive.

We should keep in mind that *sāmānya*⁶ is one of the six or seven⁷ categories of the Vaiśeṣika system and the term itself is used interchangeably with the word *jāti* (Sastri 1998: 18). Unlike *upādhi*, the twin terms *sāmānya/jāti* have a long textual history beginning with the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* and *Nyāyasūtra* and lasting until, at least, the XIX century. Nevertheless, in the earlier textual levels of both Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, roughly until the X-XI century,⁸ and specifically with Udayana’s *Kiraṇāvalī*,⁹ the terms *sāmānya* and *jāti* are used synonymously. Conversely, from the middle of the XII century, probably with Śivāditya’s *Saptapadārthī* (1934: 37), the word *sāmānya* is divided into two main acceptations: *jātisāmānya* or simply *jāti* and *upādhisāmānya* or *upādhi*:

⁵ From the inferential point of view the *upādhi* negatively conditions the cognition of something else because it blocks the knowledge of the relation between two *relatas* (*sambandhin*) in the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*). From the perceptual point of view an *upādhi* can make us perceive something as different from what it is, such as a transparent crystal which appears red due to the proximity of a red hibiscus flower.

⁶ See the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.1.4, 1.1.8, 1.2.3-5, 1.2.10, 1.2.12, 1.2.14, 1.2.16, 6.2.13, 8.1.5.

⁷ Six categories if we exclude absence (*abhāva*) as in the earlier layers of the system; seven categories including absence.

⁸ The problem of Udayana’s date is linked up with the concluding stanza of *Lakṣaṇāvalī*. See the issue as summarized by Chemparathy (1972: 19-21). See also Tachikawa (1981: 14-16).

⁹ Perhaps the *Kiraṇāvalī* is the last work of Udayana and, since it is incomplete, death probably prevented him from concluding it. The *Kiraṇāvalī* is a commentary on Praśastapāda’s *Padārthadharma-saṃgraha*, which makes substantial contributions on several issues (Chemparathy 1972: 23, 25; Visweswari 1985: 12-18). Two among the important commentaries on the *Kiraṇāvalī* are Vardhamāna Upādhyāya’s *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* and Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa’s *Kiraṇāvalīrahasya*.

*sāmānyam jātirūpam upādbhirūpaṃ ca | jāti[rūpaṃ] sattādravyaḡuṅakarmatvādi | upādbhirūpaṃ pācakatvādi || 41 ||*¹⁰

“The general character may have the form of a universal and the form of a conditional property. The universal [form] begins with existence, substancehood, qualityness, actionhood, etc.; [while] conditional property form begins with cookness, etc.” || 41 ||

Notwithstanding this late specification, as shown in the early uses of *Nyāyabhāṣya* (2.1.36, 2.2.59-2.2.68) the term *jāti* as “universal” is connected to and almost interchangeable with the word *sāmānyā* “general property”. This connection, however, leaves out – without naming it – the other type of general property (*sāmānyadharmā*), which merely resembles a *jāti* and which later on – perhaps from the *Kiraṇāvalī* (1989: 132, 160, 169) – will be called *upādhi*.¹¹

A remarkable curiosity involves two earlier works of Udayana: the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* and the *Lakṣaṇamālā*. Both these texts consist in a series of definitions, but the *Lakṣaṇamālā* is precisely a short primer which deals with the sixteen categories of Nyāya, inserting the six (except *abhāva*) categories of Vaiśeṣika within *prameya* “the object of cognition”, which is the second category of Nyāya. Although the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* resembles the *Lakṣaṇamālā* in structure and purpose, it treats only Vaiśeṣika categories but is far from merely reproducing the *Lakṣaṇamālā* (Tachikawa 1981: 18-24). It is worth mentioning that in these two texts we find the definition of *jāti/sāmānyā*¹² but not that of *upādhi*. This eloquent silence, leads us to believe that it is likely that during his earlier operating phase Udayana did not feel the need to define *upādhi*, and this is at the least unusual within a system that since its earliest stages has programmatically stated the importance of the definition (*lakṣaṇa*).¹³

¹⁰ A few commentaries on *Saptapadārthī* (1934: 37; Mādhava’s *Mitabhāṣiṇī*, Śeṣānanta’s *Padārthacandrikā* and Balabhadra’s *Sandarbhā*) present simply the division within *jāti* in higher (*parā*) – existence (*sattā*) – and lower (*aparā*), like *ghatātva* etc., and the higher-lower (*parāparā*) class, like *dravyatva*, *karmatva*, etc. For instance, *Mitabhāṣiṇī* (1934: 37, *pākādikriyāsambandhāt pācakatvādi aupādhikam* [...]) does not present a definition of *upādhi*, but simply rephrases the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣyavārttika* 2.2.64 (Thakur 1997: 304). See *Padārthadharmasamgraha* (Bronkhorst, Ramseier 1994: 81-83), *Saptapadārthī* (1934: 63), *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* (Shastri 1988: 114-118), *Tarkasamgraha* and commentaries (2007: 16-18), Dravid (2001: 29-33), Sastri (1998: 23-24). See also fn. 50 on *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.2.3.

¹¹ Udayana also uses the derivative adjective of *upādhi*, *aupādhika* “conditional”, with a predicative meaning. On *aupādhika* (and *aupādhikasāmānyā*) as derivative from *upādhi* see Phillips (1997: 143-144; fn. 73, 75-76). Raghunātha Śiromaṇi calls these *upādhis* “distributive” (*vibhājaka*) properties. See also Chakrabarti (1975: 375), according to whom Udayana was the first to develop a solid distinction between *jāti* and *upādhi*: «a distinction which is never made in earlier Nyāya philosophy».

¹² The definitions of *jāti/sāmānyā*, and their short discussions, in the *Lakṣaṇāvalī* and *Lakṣaṇamālā* are respectively: «*nityam ekam anekasamavāyī sāmānyam | nityam iti samyogādīnirāsaḥ | ekam iti salilādīyanekaparamāṅsamavetānekasitarūpādīnāṃ nīrāsaḥ | anekasamavāyīti pratyekam nityānāṃ dravyānāṃ*» (*Lakṣaṇamālā* 2008: 4); «*samavetarābitasarvānyonyābhāvasamānādhikarāṇasamavetaṃ sāmānyam* || 202 ||» (*Lakṣaṇāvalī*, 2011: 44-45; Tachikawa 1981: 84-85).

¹³ See *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya ad* 1.1.3.

Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya (mid XIV cent.), however, normally uses the compound *jātibādhaka* “opposing agent of the universal property”¹⁴ without using the word *upādhi*, while analysing the definition of *pramā*.¹⁵ Later, Gaṅgeśa’s son Vardhamāna Upādhyāya, glossing over Udayana’s *Kiraṇāvalī*, uses the term *sāmānya* to indicate precisely the universal *jāti*, while the word *upādhi* is usually inserted to identify a common character, an abstract, generic and conditional property (*sāmānyadharmā*). This tendency will further crystallize with the next generation of Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas.

Beginning with the definition (*lakṣaṇa*) of *sāmānya/jāti* given in the popular Navya Nyāya primer of Viśvanātha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya, the *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* (XVII cent.),¹⁶ I shall now propose a few readings and present the peculiar point of view taken by Naiyāyikas while looking at the concept of *upādhi*.

Here we have *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*’s definition of *sāmānya/jāti* (Shastri 1988: 97-98):¹⁷ «[...] *sāmānyam iti | tallakṣaṇam tu nityatve saty anekasamavetatvam |*», “[...] ‘The universal’. While its definition is: the property which, being constant, is inherent in many [particulars].” This is formulated in accordance with the definition of Annaṃbhaṭṭa’s *Tarkasaṃgraha* (XVII cent.), «*nityam ekam anekānugataṃ sāmānyam |*» “The universal is constant, one and recurrent in many [particulars]”,¹⁸ which quotes nearly *verbatim* *Saptapadārthī*’s definition of *sāmānya*.¹⁹

In both these definitions we note that *jātisāmānya* must be considered constant (*nitya*), not accidental (*aupādhika*), and naturally innate (*svābhāvika*) in its substrate (*adhikaraṇa*), namely the individual (*vyakti*) who hosts it. Moreover, *jāti* is connected with individuals through the relation of inherence (*samavāya*-

¹⁴ The term *bādhaka* in the compound *jātibādhaka* can be translated as: “blocker, blocking condition, restrictive condition, opposing agent, impediment”. See Phillips (2012: 28, 165) “blocker” defeater, or counter-consideration against taking a property to be a universal, *jāti*, generating “an infinite regress”. Also Dravid (2001: 26-33), Phillips (1997: 60-61; fn. 86-88) and Chakrabarti (1975: 372-379).

¹⁵ *Pramā* is not properly a universal, because if it were considered such it would raise several problems and, *in primis*, would be vitiated by the *jātibādhaka* known as *saṅkara*. See Gaṅgeśa’s *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (1990: 623, where he mentions *jātibādhakas*), Mathuranātha Tarkavāgīśa’s *Rahasya* (1990: 538-571) and the *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī ad Kārikāvalī/Bhāṣāpariccheda* 51. Part of this discussion seems already to begin with Vātsyāyana’s *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya ad* 2.1.36 and Uddyotakara’s *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika ad* 2.2.64; later followed by *Tattvacintāmaṇirahasya* (1990: 210-216, 238-242, 327) and Raghunātha’s *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa* (text 52.4-54.2, Potter 1957: 66-67). See also Jha (1982: 657-660), Potter (1995: 98), Phillips (1997: 143; 2012: 24-30).

¹⁶ Concerning the attribution of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda/Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* to Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma (middle XVI cent.) instead of Viśvanātha, see Bhattacharya (1941: 241-244) and Ganeri (2011: 76, 79-81, 85).

¹⁷ See also the following parts of *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* (Shastri 1988: 98-118) concerned with *sāmānya/jāti*.

¹⁸ See the *Kiraṇāvalī* (1989: 120): *nityam ekam anekavṛtti sāmānyam |*.

¹⁹ *Saptapadārthī* (1934: 50): *sāmānyam nityam ekam anekasamavetatvam || 62 ||*. For other mentions of the word *sāmānya* in the *Saptapadārthī*, see 48b (1934: 40, *sādrśyam upādhivṛpaṇam sāmānyam*); 63 (1934: 51); 100 (1934: 63); 145 (1934: 84) and 161 (1934: 93).

sambandha).²⁰ According to the *Nyāyasūtra* (2.2.68): “The universal is the property which produces [the notion of] identity (*samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ*)”; in other words, *jāti* is that characteristic which permits us to bring together different individuals beneath a unique species-label because it produces a recurrent and unobstructed notion of identity (*anuvṛttipratyaya*).²¹

From the morphological point of view, the morphemes which indicate both, *jāti* and *upādhi*, are abstract nouns (*bhāvavācaka*) formed by adding an abstract suffix (*bhāvapratyaya*), like *tva* and *taL*,²² to words ending with a secondary suffix (*taddhitānta*). In this way, we can generate countless words, i.e.: *ākāśatva*, *pustakatva*, *mārgatva*, *ghaṭatva*, *dravyatva*, *sattā*, *kālatā* and so on. All these words are evidently abstract nouns but this does not mean that they are all to be considered referents of a universal. This is suggested by Vācaspati Miśra’s (950 circa) *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā* (*ad Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.69, Thakur 1996: 540):

prasūta iti prasavaḥ samānabuddher bhinneṣu prasotrī yā jātiḥ sā ’vaśyaṃ samānapratyayaṃ prasūte na punar yā samānapratyayaṃ prasūte sā jātiḥ | pācakādiṣu vyabhicārād iti |

“Produces” so it is a production. The *jāti* is productive (*prasotrī*) of the notion of identity in different [individuals]; what necessarily produces a notion of identity, but not whatever produces the notion of identity is a *jāti*, because this [rule] deviates in properties like “cookness” and other similar.

At this point, let us consider for example the property of “humanity” (*manuṣyātva*), which inheres (*samaveta*) in all humans. Nearly the same can be said for the property of being a cook (*pācakatva* = cookness), which occurs in all cooks. But, while the property *manuṣyātva* is constant and innate in all human beings, the property *pācakatva* is determined by accidental conditions, so it inheres only occasionally – not invariably – in all its particular substrates (the cooks), and is linked to the individual by exogenous reasons (Chakrabarti 1975: 374).²³ Therefore, the word *manuṣyātva* represents a *jāti* but not *pācakatva*, which is an *upādhi*.

²⁰ Kuppuswami Sastri (1998: 18) affirms something, which seems to echo the *Kiraṇāvalī* gloss to the *Tarkasaṃgraha* (2007: 17, see infra fn. 47), and precisely that a genuine *jāti* «is connected with the *vyakti* through the intimate relation known as *samavāya* or inherence. An attribute may be common to several individuals and linked to them either through the direct relation of *svarūpa-sambandha*, the related object itself being looked upon as relation, or through some indirect relation (*paramparā-sambandha*); such an attribute is called *upādhi* and should not be confounded with a *jāti*».

²¹ See *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.2.4 and *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (Bronkhorst, Ramseier 1994: 2) and Śrīdhara’s *Nyāyakandali* (Dvivedin 1984: 11-13); for the analogous concept of “experience of recurrent character” (*anugatapratīti*), see *Kiraṇāvalī* (1989: 123, see also 126) and Phillips (1997: 58).

²² See Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (5.1.119: *tasya bhāvas tvatalau*). There are, in any case, other abstract suffixes such as *śyan* etc. See also *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.59, Potter (1957: 9) and, for a linguistic discussion on the designation of abstract suffixes in Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, see Phillips (1997: 58 and fn. 78, 144-145 and fn. 79).

²³ In the *Kiraṇāvalī* (1989: 119-120) Udayana maintains this distinction between the natural and innate (*svabhāvika*) property (*dharma*) and the adventitious (*āgantuka*) and conditional one.

3. THE SIX *JĀTIBĀDHAKAS*

But how can we distinguish between a universal property, a *jāti*, and a property which is not universal, not a *jāti*? Later authors – without saying so explicitly – suggest a solution: a general property (*sāmānyadharmā*) can be identified as universal when it does not find along its route an opposing agent (*jātibādhaka*) obstructing its being a true *jāti*. On the other hand, it is a conditional property (*upādhi*) when it is vitiated by at least one of the six opposing agents (*jātibādhaka*). Or, more simply, a general property which satisfies the conditions and requirements posed by the definition of *jātisāmānya* should be considered a universal *tout court*. On the other hand, a general property or characteristic which does not satisfy the conditions and requirements posed by the definition of *jātisāmānya* should be considered an *upādhi*, precisely through the use of the *touchstone* represented by the *jātibādhaka*.²⁴

Let us now glance through the six opposing agents (*bādhaka*) of the *jāti*, analysing a stanza of Udayana's *Kiraṇāvalī* (1989: 161)²⁵ quoted also in *Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī* (Shastri 1988: 101-102):

vyakter abhedas tulyatvaṃ saṅkaro 'thānavasthitih |
rūpahānir asaṃbandho jātibādhakasamgrahaḥ ||

“The group of the opposing agents of the universal is [as follows]: oneness of the individual, equivalence [of the individual], [undue] mixing and *regressus ad infinitum*, harm to its own nature and lack of relation.”

In this passage, Udayana lists six impediments capable of preventing a general property from being considered a universal. The opposing agents here presented, together with Praśastapāda's (VI cent.) *Padārthadharmasamgraha*²⁶ which

²⁴ See also the *Saptapadārthī* (1934: 84): “An unopposed general property is a universal, [while] an opposed general property is a conditional property” (*nirbādhakam sāmānyam jātiḥ | sabādhakam sāmānyam upādhiḥ || 145 ||*). Or, in the words of Satkari Mukherjee (1996: xx): «The *upādhi* has got all the incident of a universal (*jāti*) in so far as it functions as a synthesising principle. But the former lacks one or the other of the characteristics of the universal and so stands aloof in a different category. Besides there may be an impediment to its being considered a universal, though it may be a synthesising principle».

²⁵ At the beginning of his analysis of *sāmānyajāti* in the *Kiraṇāvalī* (1989: 121-122) Udayana mentions, and then briefly develops, five of the six *jātibādhakas* (except *tulyatva*) such as “*naikavyāktikam*” [= *vyakter abhedah*], “*jātisaṅkarāpattau*” [= *saṅkaraḥ*], “*anavasthānāt*” [= *anavasthitih*], “*lakṣaṇavyāghātāt*” [= *rūpahānib*] and “*asaṃbandhāt*”. See also *Kiraṇāvalī* (1989: 148-152) and the glosses *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* of Vardhamāna (1989: 148-152ff) and *Kiraṇāvalīrabhasya* of Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa (1981: 79-84).

²⁶ *Padārthadharmasamgraha* (Bronkhorst, Ramseier 1994: 81): «*sāmānyam dvidividham param aparam ca | svaviśayasarvagatam abhinnātmakam anekavṛtti ekadvibakṣuḥ ātmasvarūpānugamaḥ pratyayakāri svarūpābhedenā ādhāreṣu prabandhena vartamānam anuvṛttipratyayakāraṇam |*», «Community [*sic!*] is of two kinds – ‘higher’ and ‘lower’. It pervades over all its objects; has identically the same form (in all cases) inhering in many individuals; it brings about the idea of its own

Udayana is commenting upon, furnish a set of compulsory and sufficient conditions for determining the nature of a *sāmānya* property, whether it is a *jāti* or an *upādhi*. Udayana, although not elaborately, affirms that the conditional properties (*aupādhika*) fail to satisfy one of these testers.²⁷

Entering into their specific structure, the six *jātibādhaka* could synthetically be intended in the following way:²⁸

1) *vyakter abhedah* [*bhedābhāva*] “the oneness of the individual” or “indivisibility of the individual”, that is when there exists only one member of any category, an individual alone. For example, substances (*dravya*) like ether (*ākāśa*), time (*kāla*) and space (*dik*) are not constituted by a multitude of individuals (*vyakti*), but each of them is a unique (*eka*) and pervasive (*vibhu*) substance. Hence the definition of *jāti* as occurring in many individuals is not respected in these kinds of substances. Therefore, when the number of individuals is nothing but one, the properties (*dharma*) occurring in it – respectively *ākāśatva*, *kālatva* or *diktva* – are intended as *upādhi*, because vitiated by the *jātibādhaka* “*vyakter abhedah*”.²⁹

2) [*vyakter*] *tulyatvam* “the sameness/equivalence [of the individual]”: two properties are *tulya* “equivalent, the same” whenever the presence of the first makes that of the second inevitable. Thus, the substrate (*adbhikaraṇa*) of the first property is nothing but the substrate of the second one, and *viceversa*, so only one of these properties will be considered a *jāti* or rather, they will not be seen as two different universals. Therefore, *stricto sensu tulyatva* is not a *jātibādhaka* but more properly a *bādhaka* of the difference between two *jātis* (*jātibheda*).³⁰ For example, if we mention any object or concept, like *pustaka* or *grantha* (book), *ghaṭa* or *kalāśa* (pot), *buddhi* or *jñāna* (cognition), etc., we note that these couplets are formed

form in one, two or many things; and it is the cause or basis of the notion of inclusion, inhering as it does in all its substrates simultaneously.» (Jha 1982: 651). See also Dravid (2001: 60, fn. 83-84).

²⁷ According to Phillips (1997: 58-61) they fail to satisfy in particular the third exam, namely the *saṅkara*.

²⁸ Vardhamāna’s *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* (1989: 161) opens in this way the gloss to Udayana’s stanza: «*jātau bādhakam iva kim ity atrāha | vyakter abhedā iti | abhinnavyaktikānyajātyā saḥānyūnānatiriktavyaktikā ca parasparātyantābhāvasamānādbhikaraṇā cānavasthādīparāhatā ca jātir na bhavātī arthaḥ* |», “What is something like an opposing agent towards a universal. On this issue [Udayana] says: ‘The oneness of the individual’. The meaning is that a universal is not accompanied by another universal whose individual is unique, whose individual is not less and not more, which has a common substrate with the reciprocal constant absence and is not subdued by the infinite regress or other flaws.”

²⁹ Vardhamāna, in the *Kiraṇāvalīprakāśa* (1989: 161) proves the impossibility of considering *ākāśatva* a *jāti* through an inference: «*tathā hy ākāśatvam na jātibh ekavyaktimātravrṭtitvāt | etadghaṭatvavat | anyathā jātilakṣaṇavyāghātāt* |», “In this way: the property of being ether is not a universal, because it occurs only in one individual, like the property ‘this-potness’. Otherwise, there would be a contradiction with the definition of the universal [itself].”

³⁰ See Śāstrī (1980: 323-324, fn. 2) who quotes the *Setu* commentary on *Kiraṇāvalī*: “equivalence is not a universal blocker, but a blocker of the difference between universals” (*tulyatvam ca na jātibādhakam | kintu jātibhedabādhakam*).

by synonyms. As a consequence, the properties inherent in them – respectively *pustakatva/granthatva*, *ghaṭatva/kalāsatva* and *buddhitva/jñānatva* – cannot be viewed as two different universals, because they cover one and the same operating range. This means that wherever *ghaṭatva* occurs, *kalāsatva* also occurs and *viceversa*, because these are equivalent (*tulya = samanīyata*) terms and entities. Thus, they are not two different *jāti*s, but only one of them is a real *jāti*, the other is an *upādhi*. How then can we identify the *jāti* among these properties? One possible answer is: the more commonly as well as widely used primary term, i.e. *ghaṭa*, is conceived as the leading word of the series, in which the occurring property, i.e. *ghaṭatva*, should be considered *jāti*. On the other hand, the other synonymous properties, like *kalāsatva*, are identified as *upādhis*, due to the opposing agent *tulyatva* (Chakrabarti 1975: 375).³¹

3) *saṅkaraḥ* “the intersection, undue mixing, intermixture, medley, cross-section, cross-connection, cross-division, promiscuity, superimposition”: two objects of different nature cannot harmoniously combine with one another, like oil and water, and if they were to mix up, the result would surely be a defect.³² In the context under examination, the undue mixing is that accidental condition where two general properties are sometimes found together and other times not. Or, to say it more clearly, *saṅkara* is a condition where two properties share a few instances, while in others they are separate, so as to determine that they are not to be considered both *jāti*. In other words, «the domain of one generic character cannot cross into the domain of any other generic character. The domain of an imposed property, however, can cross into that of another imposed property» (Tachikawa 1981: 37).

The stock example concerns two properties: *bhūtatva* (“the property of being an element”) and *mūrtatva* (“the property of being the substrate of action”).³³ The

³¹ Again Vardhamāna (1989: 161) glossed *tulyatva* as *anyūnānatiriktavyaktivṛttitva* “the occurrence in an individual which is not less and not more” (see also Udayana’s *Vṛtti* on his own *Nyāyakuṣumañjali*, Upādhyāya, Śāstrī 2002: 187) and tried to establish it through an inference: «*buddhitvaṃ jñānapadapṛavṛttinimittam na jñānatvabhinna-jātiḥ | jñānabhinna-vṛttitve sati sakalajñānavṛttivāt | viśayitvatat |*», “The property of being a cognition, which has the word ‘cognition’ as the ground for its linguistic use (*pṛavṛttinimitta*), is not a universal different from the property of being knowledge, because, not occurring in what is different from knowledge, it occurs in all knowledge instances, like the property of having a content.” In addition, the *Dinakarīya* commentary on *Nyāyasiddhānta-muktāvalī* affirms that *tulyatva* “actually is being as extensive as a universal different from it” (*vastutas tu tulyatvaṃ svabhinna-jāti-samanīyatatvam iti*, Shāstrī 1988: 104).

³² See, for instance, the acceptance of the term *saṅkara* in *Bhagavadgītā*, 1.40-43. We also find the abstract term *saṅkarya*, which depicts the condition resulting from the *saṅkara* flaw.

³³ The term *mūrta*, literally “concrete, having limited dimension” or “active”, is used here according to the second translation (*kriyāśrayatvaṃ mūrtatvaṃ*) although it can be equally intended according to the first acceptance. The *Kiraṇāvalī* on *Tarkasaṃgraha* (2007: 17) accept the first acceptance: «*mūrtatvaṃ apakṛṣṭaparimāṇavattvaṃ kriyāvattvaṃ vā, apakṛṣṭaparimāṇaṃ pṛthivyaptejovāyūnāṃ paramāṇuṣu manasi ceti tāni mūrtāni |*» “The property of being *mūrta* is the property of being endowed with a limited dimension or the property of being endowed with action. The limited dimension occurs in the atoms of earth, water, fire and air as well as in the mind.” See also Ganeri (2011: 212, fn. 15, 16).

property of being an element (*bhūtatva*) occurs in five substances (*dravya*): earth (*ṛṥhivī*), water (*āp*), fire (*tejas*), air (*vāyu*) and ether (*ākāśa*); the property of being a substrate of action (*mūrtatva*) also occurs in five substances: earth, water, fire, air and mind (*manas*). These two properties are found together (*samāveśa*) in four instances (*ṛṥhivī*, *āp*, *tejas*, *vāyu*) while they are separate in the fifth, because *bhūtatva* occurs in ether (*ākāśa*) but not in the mind, whereas *mūrtatva* occurs in the mind but not in ether.³⁴ Therefore, the properties of *bhūtatva* and *mūrtatva* occur together and separately as well, so they are unduly mixed up and, thus, vitiated by *saṅkara*. The result is that they are not accepted as *jāti*, hence both are *upādhis* (Chakrabarti 1975: 374).³⁵

4) *anavasthitiḥ* “the *regressus ad infinitum*”: if we consider that in a *jāti* like *dravyatva* (“substancehood”) occurs another *jāti*, that is *dravyatvatva*, then why not accept that even in the second *jāti* occurs a third *jāti* – *dravyatvatvatva* – and so on incessantly, without any ultimate resting place (*viśrānti*). In order to avoid the *regressus ad infinitum* there is a general rule (*niyama*) resumed as: *na jātau jātir aṅṅikartavyā* “in a universal should not be accepted another universal” (see *Kārikāvalī/Bhāṣāpariccheda* 15). Thus, in a substance (*dravya*) inheres the universal *dravyatva*, but the abstract property occurring in *dravyatva*, i.e. *dravyatvatva*, is not a *jāti* but an *upādhi*. Similarly, the property occurring in *sāmānya* or in *jāti* itself, i.e. *sāmānyatva* and *jātitva*, are both *upādhis* (Chakrabarti 1975: 375-376; Phillips 1997: 60-61). This position is obviously related to the global realism of Udayana, according to whom true universals are to be found in nature, so none of them could be merely a rational product.³⁶

³⁴ See *Dinakarīya* on *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* (Shastri 1988: 104-105): «*bhūtatvaṃ vihāya manasi vartamānasya mūrtatvaṃ vihāya gagane vartamānasya bhūtatvasya ca ṛṥhivyādicatuṣṭaye sattvāt* | ».

³⁵ The most keen debate regarding the *jātibadhakas* focuses on the *saṅkarya*. In fact Navyas, such as Vardhamāna, do not accept it (1989: 161): «*niṣkramaṇatvapraveśanatve na jāti parasparātyantābhāvasamānādhikaraṇatve sati parasparasamānādhikaraṇatvāt | bhūtatvamūrtatvavat* | », “The property of going out and the property of entering are not universals because, while having a common substrate with the mutual constant absence, they [also] have a reciprocal common substrate [with another universal (*jātyantareṇa*, see Staal (1961: 125)), like elementness and the property of being endowed with action.” (see also *Kiraṇāvalī* 1989: 180, «*na mitho vyabhicāriti niṣkramaṇapraveśanādaḥ jātisāṅkaraṇapattau*»). Mathurānātha in his *Kiraṇāvalīrahasya* contrasted Vardhamāna’s idea because even though *niṣkramaṇatva* and *praveśanatva* are two *parasparasamānādhikaraṇa* properties, they are not *parasparātyantābhāvasamānādhikaraṇa*. In fact, there is no contradiction whatsoever in accepting that the same thing can go out (*niṣkramaṇa*) from one place and simultaneously enter (*praveśana*) in another (Śāstri 1980: 324-326). The *Dinakarīya* gives this definition (Shastri 1988: 104-105): «*saṅkaras ca parasparātyantābhāvasamānādhikaraṇayor ekatra samāveśaḥ bhūtatvāder jātitve bādhaḥ [...]*», «The *saṅkara* is the coming together in one place of two properties which possess common-locusness of mutual relational absence, and it is an opposing agent as regards being a universal of *bhūtatva* etc.» (Staal 1961: 125). See also the debate on the acceptance of *saṅkara* between Udayana and the Navyas, such as Vardhamāna and Raghunātha, presented in Dravid (2001: 24-27) and summarized at the end of this paper (infra 3.1). See also Tachikawa (1981: 50 fn. 43) and Staal (1961: 126).

³⁶ Vardhamāna offers a hypothetical reason (*tarka*) in order to prove it impossible to accept a *jāti*

5) *rūpabhāniḥ* [= *svarūpabhāni*] “the harm to its own nature”:³⁷ if on considering a certain property a universal we would cause harm to the very nature of the individual, which is the substrate of that property, then that property should not be considered a *jāti*. For example, the property “particularity” (*viśeṣatva*) or “ultimate particularity” (*antyaviśeṣatva*) inheres in the particular (*viśeṣa*), which in the Vaiśeṣika and Navya Nyāya is listed as an independent category (*svatantrapadārtha*). An ultimate particular (*antyaviśeṣa*) acts like an individualizer, a distinguisher, useful – for example – for distinguishing and individualizing the atoms (*paramāṇu*) from one another. In this case, therefore, the occurrence of a real universal in *viśeṣa* would block the particularization operated by the *viśeṣa* itself; moreover, the operation of a universal, which generalizes, would block the particularizing action of the *viśeṣa*.

We should keep in mind that in every eternal substance (*nityadravya*)³⁸ occurs a certain particular (*viśeṣa*), so the particulars are limitless (*ananta*).³⁹ Since eternal substances are limitless, particulars occurring in them are limitless as well. But, when we have two earthly atoms (*prthivīparamāṇu*), how do we distinguish between them? Although they are identical in many aspects, why are they mutually different? The differentiating and particularizing function is satisfied by the *viśeṣa* because it allows a distinction between two apparently identical eternal substances. The particulars render reciprocally different (*prthak*) the individuals (*vyakti*) in which they are located (*ādhārahūta*), namely, eternal substances. Moreover, they have an innate *quid pluris* which – by itself (*svataḥ*) – permits them to self-differentiate themselves from other kinds of qualifiers (*viśeṣaṇa*). As a consequence, they do not need any further differentiating qualification. Hence, the *viśeṣa* performs two jobs: a) it differentiates the qualified subjects (*viśeṣya*) in which it occurs; b) it auto-differentiates itself from others. This is the reason why it is said to be self-differentiating (*svato vyāvartaka*) or self-differentiated (*svato vyāvṛtta*, Sastri 1998: 26; see also *Kiraṇāvalī* 1989: 129-130).

If we were to consider *viśeṣatva* a universal, then this property would differentiate the individual (*vyakti* = *viśeṣa*) in which it inheres, as well as itself, rendering *viśeṣa* useless as an independent category. Therefore, its own specificity

as *sāmānyatva* (1989: 161-162): «*sāmānyam yadi dravyakarmabhinnam jātimat syāt guṇaḥ syād iti sāmānyarūpavyavasthaivāvasthā* |», “If a generic attribute were different from substance and action, that is provided with a universal, then it would prove to be a quality: the condition will certainly be in an unsettlement concerning the nature of the generic attribute.” See also Uddyotakara’s *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika ad 2.2.64* (Thakur 1997: 302-305).

³⁷ According to elder (*prācīna*) Naiyāyikas the word *rūpa* means “definition” (*lakṣaṇa*), so the compound *rūpabhāni* signifies “the harm to its definition”. On the other hand the Navyas read the word *rūpa* in the sense of *svarūpa* “intrinsic nature” (Śāstri 327-327 :1980).

³⁸ These are the atomic forms (*paramāṇu*) of the four elements – earth, water, fire and air –, ether, self, time, space and mind.

³⁹ *Tarkasamgraha* (2007: 18): «*nityadravavyāvṛttayo viśeṣās tu anantā eva* |»; *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.2.6 and *Padārthadharmasamgraha* (Bronkhorst, Ramseier 1994: 84-85), *Tarkasamgraha* (2007: 168-169) and Sastri (1998: 24-28).

would definitely cease to exist and the survival of the entire category would be in danger: its own nature (*rūpa* = *svarūpa*) would suffer harm (*hāni*). This is why *viśeṣatva* must be considered an *upādhi* but not a genuine universal (Chakrabarti 1975: 374-375, 376-377; Phillips 1997: 60).⁴⁰

6) *asambandhaḥ* “lack of relation”: actually, this particular type of *jātibādhaka* is taken into consideration only by a few Naiyāyikas. The problem can be summarized in this way: inherence (*samavāya*) is different in two related things (*sambandhin*), which are connected through that specific relation. In other words, there are as many inferences as there are relata (*sambandhin*). The universal (*jāti*) resides in the individual (*vyakti*) – its substrate – through the inherence relation (*samavāyasambandha*). If we were to admit the existence of another *jāti* called *samavāyatva* in the *samavāya*, it should occur therein by means of the inherence relation. According to the followers of the Vaiśeṣika, the elder Naiyāyikas and part of the modern ones (*navya*), *samavāya* is only one, while other Navyas – like Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (1475-1550, Potter 1957: 3; Ingalls 1988: 9-20) – accept many *samavāyas* (Ganeri 2011: 150). Here a question arises: how is it possible to establish a relation between *samavāyatva* and *samavāya* if not through inherence itself? Were *samavāya* only one, *samavāyatva* might occur only in that individual *samavāya*, but its being a universal (*jāti*) would be blocked by the first *jātibādhaka* “*vyakter abhedah*”. On the other hand, if we were to accept many inferences in all those *samavāyas*, the presence of the property *samavāyatva* should be postulated. Is this property a genuine universal? Not at all, because if we were to consider *jāti* the property *samavāyatva* occurring in all *samavāyas*, then the only possible relation between these *samavāyas* and the *samavāyatva* would be inherence (*samavāyasambandha*), but this would unavoidably lead to an infinite regress (*anavasthā*). For example, let us formulate the hypothesis of 100 *samavāyas* wherein *samavāyatva* would occur by means of *samavāya*. If in the first stage there are 100 *samavāyas*, in the second we must admit additional 100 *samavāyas* connecting the first 100 *samavāyas* with *samavāyatva*: now the *samavāyas* are 200. But in these new 100 *samavāyas* must also inhere *samavāyatva* through inherence, so we have again 100 *samavāyas*, and so on. Eventually, by accepting

⁴⁰ Vardhamāna suggests another hypothetical reason (1989: 161-162): «*viśeṣo yadi dravya-karmānyatve sati jātimān syāt gūṇaḥ syāt, tathā ca vyāvṛttidhīhetur na syāt* |», “If a particular, being other than substance and action, were provided with a universal, then it would prove to be a quality; so, it will no more be the cause of the cognition of differentiation.” Chakrabarti (:1975 375-374) distinguishes between a fourth restrictive condition that is «no universal can be admitted where the admission would result in violation of the essential nature of members» and gives the example of the *viśeṣas*, which I connect with *rūpabhāni*. The restrictive condition mentioned by Chakrabarti corresponds to the *jātibādhaka* called *asambandha*. Nevertheless, a few lines on, Chakrabarti (1975: 376-377) adds a seventh restrictive condition that is «no universal can be admitted where the relation of ‘inseparable inherence’ (*samavāya*) between the putative universal and its members could not be admitted to be possible [...]». This, again, corresponds to the *jātibādhaka asambandha*. For further information see Dvivedin (1984: 13) and *Dinakarīya* on *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* (Shastri 1988: 105-106).

inherence as inherent between *samavāya* and *samavāyatva* the result will be a *regressus ad infinitum* (*anavasthā*).⁴¹ As a consequence, if between individual and universal there can only be an inherence relation and that very relation cannot take place (*asambandha*) without provoking a *regressus ad infinitum*, then the *samavāyatva* is definitely an *upādhi*.⁴²

To summarize, a genuine *jāti* inheres in *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karman*, not elsewhere. It is an innate and not accidental recurrent property and, whenever it is not such, it proves to be affected by one of the six *jātibādhakas* and is consequently called *upādhi*. Moreover, while the first and the third of the *jātibādhakas* block a general property from being considered a universal (Ingalls 1988: 42), the second nullifies the distinction – purely lexical in nature – between two terms indicating a general property. The last three *jātibādhakas* prevent an entity from being considered the substrate of a genuine universal, keeping the capability of being a substrate restricted to *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karman* (Dravid 2001: 24).

3.1. THE DEBATE ON *SAṆKARA*

As regards five of the *jātibādhakas*, old and modern Naiyāyikas agree perfectly. The major problem arises with the third, *saṅkara*. For instance, Dinakara Bhaṭṭa (end XVII beginning XVIII cent.) in the *Dinakariya* (Shastri 1988: 105), a gloss on *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*, points out that there is no proof for maintaining that two universals cannot be partially coexistent and, at the same time, partially separate or, in other words, partially overlapping. If on conceiving both as universals no patent absurdity arises, there is no point in accepting *saṅkara*.⁴³

⁴¹ See also *Dinakariya* (Shastri 1988: 107). Very similar is the critique moved by Śaṅkara against the concept of *samavāya* in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* ad 2.2.13. Sometimes we find another stock example for the *asambandha*, concerning “absenceness” (*abhāvatva*), which despite occurring in all absences, is not a *jāti* but an *upādhi* because it is too difficult to recognize «the relation of inherence as a link serving to make *abhāva* the *substratum* of any attribute or the attribute of any *substratum*» (Sastri 38-35 :1998). On *abhāvatva* see also Dravid (2001: 24).

⁴² Vardhamāna, too, concludes his gloss on the *jātibādhakas* in this way (1989: 162): «*samavāyo yadi prāptitve sati samavāyavān syāt saṃyogah syāt | na ca prāptivād ātmasamavāyitvaṃ sādhyam sādhanāvachbinnasādhyavyāpakasya saṃyogasyopādhitvād iti | paramate samavāyanānātvaṃ abhyupetyoktam | asmākaṃ vyakter abheda eva tatrāpi bādhaka iti kramenāpādanam iti bhāvaḥ* ||», “If the inherence, being a relation (*prāpti* = *sambandha*, Śāstrī 1980: 328), were to be provided with inherence, then it would be a contact. But, the property of being related with the self through inherence is not the *probandum*, due to [its] being a relation, because the contact, which pervades the *probandum* limited by the *probans*, represents [here] an accidental condition. This is being maintained according to another point of view, which has accepted the multiplicity of inherences. According to us, even there there is the oneness of the individual. Thus, in the due order, this is the final result. This is the idea.”

⁴³ In the *Introduction* of Satkari Mukherjee to Svāmī Madhavānanda’s edition and translation (1940) of the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* with the *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* we find this threefold division of *jāti* (1996: xxi-xxii): «We can distinguish three types of attributes in so far as their mutual

Udayana, viewed here as the champion of the *prācīnas*, in the *Vṛtti* to his *Nyāyak-
usumañjali* writes (Upādhyāya, Śāstrī 2002: 187-188):

*evam vidhirūpayor vyāvṛttirūpayor vā jātyor virodhe sati na samāveśah, samāviṣṭayoś ca
parāparabhāvānīyamah, anyūnānatiriktavṛttijātidvayakalpanāyām pramāṇābhāvāt |*

“Thus, when a contradiction between two universals occurs, be their form inclusive or exclusive, there is not inclusion; and, among the included, the rule of the higher (*para*) and lower (*apara*) should govern. In fact, there is no proof for accepting two universals as occurring in what is not less and not more.”

Udayana accepts that *sañkara* cannot be found in nature, because universals are systematically divided into higher (*para*) and lower (*apara*). Although higher universals include lower ones – like earthiness (*prthvīva*) includes potness (*ghaṭatva*), they are mutually exclusive. If nature were to allow that mutually exclusive classes coincide, then there would be no reason for keeping the division in classes. This is why those properties, which are affected by *sañkara*, cannot be *jātis* but are rather *upādhis*.

The Navyas do not accept the opinion of Udayana. In fact, Vardhamāna’s *Prakāśa* (Upādhyāya, Śāstrī 2002: 188-189) replies that if we accept the *jāti-bādhaka sañkara*, then several of the already established universals – potness (*ghaṭatva*) goldness (*suvarṇatva*), etc. – will become *upādhis*, because they are affected by it.⁴⁴ Also Raghunātha’s *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa* (25.4-26.1, Potter 1957: 38-39) states that *sañkara* cannot occur between *bhūtatva* and *mūrtatva* because they are the same universal (*abhinna-jāti*).⁴⁵ Besides the debate excepting on *sañkara* there is in any case substantial agreement among the post-Udayana authors.

Thus we can plausibly affirm that the restrictions in the computation of genuine universals generate the *upādhi*-properties. An *upādhi* therefore seems to assume the role of a failed universal, a “quasi universal” because it has fallen into the trap of one among the six *jātibādhakas*.⁴⁶ Although many other texts should

relationship varies. Firstly, attributes which are mutually exclusive and never found to coincide, e.g. cowhood and horsehood. Secondly, between two one is found to have independent incidence while the other is not, e.g. jarhood and substancehood. Thirdly, some attributes which are partially exclusive and partially coincident, e.g. the attribute of being an element (*bhūtatva*) and of having a limited dimension (*mūrtatva*). The first and the second types are regarded as universals. The third type of attributes is subject to controversy [...]». See also Dravid (2001: 25).

⁴⁴ The polemic is quite lengthy. See Upādhyāya, Śāstrī (192-188 :2002) and, for a more thorough overview, Dravid (2011: 24-27).

⁴⁵ If there were any *jātibādhakas*, that would be *tulyatva*. See also *Dinakariya* (Shastri 1988: 105) and Śāstrī (1980: 326).

⁴⁶ It is possible to formulate an analogy with the pseudo-*probans* (*hetvābhāsa*): just as a flaw of the *probans* (*hetudoṣa*) prevents a *probans* (*hetu*) from being a true *probans* (*saddhetu*) rendering it a *hetvābhāsa*, likewise a flaw of the universal (*jātidōṣa*), namely a *jātibādhaka*, prevents a property (*dharmā*) from being a universal (*jāti*), rendering it a pseudo-universal (*jātyābhāsa*) or, in other

be examined, this hypothesis is *in primis* supported by the most eloquent lack of a true definition of *upādhi* till a late period. This attitude determines that the proper nature of the *upādhi* is being apprehended merely by a counterfactual modality.

The issue could be summarized in the words of Satkari Mukherjee (1996: xxiii):

When an impediment is present the synthesizing attribute is called ‘*upādhi*’. *Upādhi* again admits of twofold division according to whether it is susceptible of analysis or not. Thus etherhood (*ākāśatva*) is a *upādhi*. But if etherhood can be equated with the character of being the inherent cause of sound (*śabda-samavāyi-kāraṇatā*), which is the definition of ether, it will be called an analyzable (*sakhaṇḍa*) *upādhi*. But the concept of adjectivehood and substantiveness, etc. are not analyzable into simple terms and hence they are called *akhaṇḍa* (unanalyzable) *upādhi*. The latter felt as determinations in reals are not further determined.⁴⁷

4. CONCLUSION

Probably provoked by the keen objections of Buddhist epistemologists⁴⁸ Udayana, and subsequently the later Navya Naiyāyikas, realized that, although – ontologically speaking – universals recur, this experience of recurrence is not in itself sufficient for establishing that they are true universals. If a *jātibādhaka* is present, a property is not a universal but a conditional property, even though it recurs.⁴⁹

I would like to conclude this short analysis with a working hypothesis. As far as I can say at present, it seems appropriate to identify the different phases in the historical development of the *jāti-upādhi* relationship, roughly dividing it into four periods:

words, a conditional property (*upādhi*). See also Poddar (2013: 25-26).

⁴⁷ In the *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa* (49.2-4) Raghunātha explicitly defines an un-analyzable *upādhi* or “surplus property” (*akhaṇḍopādhis tu samavetabhinnanīyadharmātmako gaganatvādīḥ*), “While the un-analyzable *upādhi* has the nature of a eternal property different from what inheres [namely *jāti*]”. An unanalyzable *upādhi* is not entirely mind-imposed -maybe in its precise contours, or maybe it is a thoroughly objective property- but in any case it is recognizable by others, behaving mostly like a universal. See *Kiraṇāvalī* on the *Tārkaśaṃgraha* (2007: 17), where the *akhaṇḍopādhi* is recognized through recurrence so is the *jāti* (Potter 1957: 62). Regarding the *akhaṇḍopādhi*, and its being related with the *locus* by the self-linking relation (*svarūpasambandha*) but not by inherence relation (*samavāyasambandha*) as happens with the *jāti*, Sastrī (1998: 19-20) points out: «The Naiyāyikas recognise certain generic attributes called *akhaṇḍopādhis*, which are not *jātis* but similar to them in all respects except that the relation of the former to their abodes is self-link (*svarūpasambandha*) – the related thing itself constituting its own relation – and that it is not inherence (*samavāya*) as in the case of *jāti*.» See Dravid (2012: 27-29) and Phillips (1997: 142-146).

⁴⁸ For example, in *Nyāyamañjarī*, Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (Śukla 1998: 277-279) replies to Dharmakīrti on *apoha*: postulating a not-cow (*ago*) presupposes the cognition of the cow (Phillips 1997: 58 and fn. 75).

⁴⁹ See *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttika ad 2.2.64* (Thakur 1997: 304): «*na punaḥ sarvo ’nuvṛttipratyayaḥ sāmānyād eva bhavati* |», “But again, not every recurrent cognition comes just from the common property [...]”.

1) The first period coincides with the root *sūtras* of the Vaiśeṣika (1.2.3)⁵⁰ and Nyāya (2.2.68), where the *jāti-sāmānya* problem is more properly connected with the ontological-linguistic relationship with the particular (*viśeṣa*) or the individual (*vyakti*). During this period the two terms – *jāti* and *sāmānya* – are not perceived as distinct, neither is the term *upādhi* in the sense of “quasi-universal” mentioned, nor is its relation with *jāti* taken into consideration.

2) The second period begins with the *Nyāyabhāṣya*, continues through Vācaspati Mīśra and ends with Udayana. During this period, although the terms *jāti-sāmānya* still do not identify different concepts, there are some progressive mentions of the word *upādhi*, coloured with a negative (*abhāvātmake*) patina with respect to the universal *tout-court*. Once the touchstone of the *jātibādhakas* has been introduced, the *upādhi* is shown in fact as a failed universal.

3) A third period, from the post Udayana passing through Śivāditya and Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, till the second phase of the Navya Nyāya with Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, is when we can precisely identify, nominate and discuss the *upādhi*; these conditional properties are then divided into various types, such as those that are complex and analysable (*sakhaṇḍa*) and those that are simple or un-analysable (*akhaṇḍa*), underlining the negative connotation already portrayed by Udayana and Śivāditya.

4) The final period sees the emergence of even more *navīna* Naiyāyikas after Raghunātha, passing through Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa (XVII cent., ca. 1600-1675 Ingalls 1988: 20), Jagadīśa Tarkālaṃkāra (XVII cent., 1620 Phillips 1997: 142) and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya (XVII cent.; 1660 Phillips 1997: 142), till the beginning of the XIX century, when – although apparently trivial – a definition of *upādhi* is finally formulated. For example, the gloss *Siddhāntacandrodaya* on the *Tarkasaṃgraha* written by Kṛṣṇadhūrjaṭi Dīkṣita’s (XVIII cent.) affirms (Śarmā 2002: 15):

yadyapi dharmamātra upādhir ity ucyate tathāpi jātibinnadharmamātram upādhiḥ |

“Although it is said that the conditional property is a simple property, nonetheless this conditional property is a mere property different from the universal.”⁵¹

This same definition recurs in other philosophical views fully influenced by Navya’s lexical technicalities and methodology. We find for instance that same defini-

⁵⁰ «*sāmānyam viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam |*», “The universal and the particular: they depend on cognition”. This means that the classification of a property as universal or as particular depends on the point of view assumed while observing them. See Sastri (1998: 24-26).

⁵¹ See also the Śrīvallabhācārya’s *Kiraṇāvalī* on *Tarkasaṃgraha* (2007: 17): «*upādhitvam samavetabhinadharmatvam |*», “To be a conditional property is to be a property different from what is inherent”.

tion in Śivadatta's *Arthadīpikā* (Śāstrī 1992: 33),⁵² a gloss to the Advaita Vedānta primer *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*: «*jātibhinnasāmānyadharmatvam upādhitvam* |» “To be a conditional property is to be a general property different from universal.”⁵³

Therefore, even though as a matter of fact any *dharma* can be called *upādhi*, nonetheless the *upādhi* is specifically a *dharma* different from *jāti*.

This counterfactual tendency, almost apophatic in nature (*nīṣedhamukha*), manifests by exclusion (*pariśeṣāt*) the real nature of the *upādhi*: a common or general property which is prevented from being a *jāti* by a series of opposing or blocking agents (*jātibādhaka*), whose definition is “the general property different from the universal”.

Despite some divergences concerning the third *jātibādhaka* between Udayana and the following Navyas, the first clearer formulation of the difference between *jāti* and *upādhi* is to be attributed to the *ācārya*⁵⁴ Udayana. Hence, once again he seems to be the real initiator and forerunner of the Navya way of thinking (Wada 2004: 442-450) in a counterfactual way, which we find *in nuce* in the passages from *Kiraṇāvalī*. In fact, although this could be perceived as banal, the attitude which I have defined as “negative” (*abhāvātmaka*) is ultimately “counter-positive” (*pratiyogitvena/pratiyogividhā, vyudāsaniyatvena*) and as a consequence typically Navya Naiyāyika, having originated in the period of Udayana and then having continuously developed with the affirmation of the analytical methodology rotating around the hyper-technical use of the term “counter-positive” (*pratiyogin*).⁵⁵

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary sources

Annaṃbhaṭṭa, *Tarkasaṃgrahaḥ svopajñakṛtadīpikāgovardhanakṛtanyāyabodhinī, śrīkṛṣṇadhūrjaṭidīkṣitakṛtasiddhāntacandrodayacandrajasimhākṛtapadakṛtya-ajñatakṛtapratibimbaraṅgadesīkakṛtalaghubodhinījagannāthaśāstrikrāntanirukti-*

⁵² Śivadatta is the son of Dhanapati Sūri (second half of the XVIII – first half of the XIX cent.), author of the *Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā* gloss on Śaṅkara's *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* where he criticizes Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Gūḍhārthadīpikā*, mainly for his departures from Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Gītā*.

⁵³ See also Amaradāsa's *Maṇiprabhā* gloss on the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (2000: 77), which presents a counterfactual definition of *jāti* – differentiating it from the *upādhi* – within the boundaries of a *probans* (*sādhyā*) and a *probandum* (*hetu*) of an inference: «*ghaṭādikaṃ jātiḥ upādhibhinnasāmānyadharmatvāt sattāvad ity anumānam* [...]».

⁵⁴ For the well-known title “*ācārya*” given to Udayana by the following Nyāya tradition see Chemparathy (1972: 25 e fn. 25).

⁵⁵ This, of course, is invariably connected with the term “base, ground, *locus*, substrate, subjunct” (*anuyogin*). Ingalls (1988: 44, 55) translates “subjunct”; Matilal (1968: 31-33, 34-44) “subjunct of a relation”; Pellegrini (2015) “*locus*, sostrato relazionale, sostrato della negazione”.

- meruśāstrikṛtavākyaavṛttidhūṇḍharājaśāstrikṛtaviralāsahitajyotsnāhindīvyākhyasamalamkaraḥ*, ed. by Śrīnivāsa Śarmā, Vārāṇasī, Bhāratīya Vidyā Saṁsthāna, 2002.
- Annaṁbhaṭṭa, *Tarkasaṁgrahaḥ nyāyabodhini-padaḥkṛtya-dīpikā-kiraṇāvalīvyākhyopetaḥ*, ed. by Śrīkṛṣṇavallabhācārya, Vārāṇasī, Caukhambā Vidyābhavana, 2007 [III ed.].
- Udayanācārya, *Kiraṇāvalī (hindībhāṣāvyākhyānasamalaṅkṛta)*, ed. Gaurīnātha Śāstrī, Vārāṇasī, Saṁpūrṇānanda Saṁskṛta Viśvavidyālaya, 1980.
- Udayanācārya, *Kiraṇāvalī by Udayanācārya with the commentary of Vardhamānopādhyāya*, ed. by Siva Chandra Sārvabhouma, fasc. I-III, Calcutta, The Asiatic Society, 1989 [I ed. 1911].
- Udayanācārya, *Śrīmadudayanācāryapraṇītaḥ nyāyakusumāñjalīḥ (vyākhyācatuṣṭayopetaḥ saṭippanaḥ) śrīmadvaradarājapraṇītayā 'bodhinyā' mahopādhyāyaśrīvardhamānopādhyāyapraṇītena 'prakāśena' nāiyāyikaśīromaṇīśrīmeghaḥhakkurapraṇītayā 'prakāśikayā' (jaladena) mahopādhyāyaśrīrucidattopādhyāyapraṇītena 'makarandena' sarvatantrasvatantṛśrīdharmadatta-(bacchājḥā)praṇītayā ṭīppaṇyā ca samullasitaḥ*, ed. by P.P. Upādhyāya and D.R. Śāstrī, Vārāṇasī, Caukhambā Saṁskṛta Series Office, 2002 [I ed. 1956].
- Udayanācārya, *Atmatattvavivekaḥ, Nyāyaparīśiṣṭam, Lakṣaṇamālā*, in Kīśoranātha Jhā (ed.), *Śrīudayanagranthāvalīḥ, prathamō bhāgaḥ*, ed. Kīśoranātha Jhā, Kolhāpur, Śrīvallabhavidyāpīṭha Śrīviṭṭhaleśaprabhucaraṇa Ā. Ho. Trust, 2008.
- Udayanācārya, *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, in Kīśoranātha Jhā (ed.) *Śrīudayanagranthāvalīḥ, pañcamō bhāgaḥ*, Kolhāpur, Śrīvallabhavidyāpīṭha Śrīviṭṭhaleśaprabhucaraṇa Ā. Ho. Trust, 2011.
- Uddyotakara, *Nyāyabhāṣyavārttikam*, ed. by Anantalal Thakur, Delhi, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997.
- Śrīmadbhagavadgītā Śāṅkarabhāṣya Hindī anuvāda sahita, Anuvādaka Śrī Harikṛṣṇadaś Goyandaka, Gorakhpur, Gītā Press, 2001 [XXI ed.].
- Kaṇāda, *Vaiśeṣikadarśane śrīmanmaharṣīpraśastadevācāryaviracitaṁ praśastapāda-bhāṣyam, 'prakāśikā' hindīvyākhyāvibhūṣitaṁ*, Bhāṣyavyākhyākāra Dūṇḍirāja Śāstrī, Vaiśeṣikasūtravyākhyākāra Śrīnārāyaṇa Mīśra, Vārāṇasī, Caukhambā Saṁskṛta Saṁsthāna, 2002.
- GaṅgeśaUpādhyāya, *Tattvacintāmaṇaupratyakṣakhaṇḍam, śrīmathurānāthatarakavāgīśakṛtavākhyayā tathaiiva śrīmatpaṇḍitajayadevakṛtavākhyayā ca saṅgrhītoddharaṇasahitaṁ, prathamō bhāgaḥ*, Śrīkāmākhyānāthatarakavāgīśena parīśodhitam, Dillī, Caukhambā Saṁskṛta Pratiṣṭhāna, 1990 [I ed. Calcutta 1888-1901].
- Gautama-Vātsyāyana, *Savātsyāyanabhāṣyam gautamīyam nyāyadarśanam*, ed. by Anantalal Thakur, Delhi, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1997.
- Dharmarājadhvarīndra, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā Samaṇiprabhāśikhāmaṇisahitā*, ed. by Pārasanātha Dvivedī and Dadana Upādhyāya, Vārāṇasī, Saṁpūrṇānanda Saṁskṛta Viśvavidyālaya, 2000.
- Dharmarājadhvarīndra, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā śivadattakṛtā arthadīpikā ṭīkāvibhūṣitā, Saṭippanīśampādakaḥ Śrītryambakarāma Śāstrī, Bhāṣānūvādakaḥ Svāmī Pra-*

- jñānabhikṣuḥ, Vārāṇasī, Caukhambha Saṃskṛta Series Office, 1992 [I ed. 1927].
- Pāṇini, *The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini*, ed. and trans. into English by Śrīśa Chandra Vasu, 2 vols., Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1997 [I ed. Allahabad 1891].
- Prāśastapāda, *The Prāśastapādabhāṣya with Commentary Nyāyakandali of Shridhara*, ed. by Vindhyaesvari Prasad Dvivedin, Delhi, Sri Satguru Publications, 1984 [I ed. Banaras 1895].
- Prāśastapāda, *Word Index to the Prāśastapādabhāṣya*, ed. by Bronkhorst Johannes and Ramseier Yves, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1994.
- Bhaṭṭa Jayanta, *Nyāyamañjarī (Gautamasūtratātparyavivṛtiḥ)*, ed. by Sūrya-nārāyaṇa Śukla, Vārāṇasī, Caukhambā Saṃskṛta Saṃshāna, 1998 [I ed. 1936].
- Bhaṭṭācārya Viśvanāthapañcānana, *Kārikāvalī muktāvalisahitā sā ca prabhāmañ-jūṣādīnakarīrāmarudriganīgārāmīti vyākhyāpañcakasamanvitā*, ed. C.Ś.R. Śāstrī, Vārāṇasī, Caukhambā Saṃskṛta Pratiṣṭhāna, 1988 [I ed. Madras 1923].
- Mathurānāthatarakavāgīśa, *Kiraṇāvalīrahasyam*, ed. by Gaurīnātha Śāstrī, Vārāṇasī, Saṃpūrṇānanda Saṃskṛta Viśvavidyālaya, 1981.
- Mīśra Vācaspati, *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā*, ed. by Anantalal Thakur, Delhi, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 1996.
- Rāghunātha, *The Padārthattvanirūpaṇam of Rāghunātha Śīromaṇi*, ed. and tr. by Karl H. Potter, Cambridge-Massachusetts, Harvard Yenching Institute-Harvard University Press, 1957.
- Śivāditya, *Saptapadārthī tīkātrayopetā*, ed. by A.M. Tarkatirtha and N.C. Vedantatirtha, Calcutta, Metropolitan Printing & Publishing House, 1934.

Secondary sources

- Amma, K.V. (1985) *Udayana and His Philosophy*, Delhi, Nag Publishers.
- Apte, V.S. (1957) *Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, part 1 (a-ka), Pune, Prasad Prakashan.
- Bhattacharya, D.C. (1941) "Who wrote the *Bhāṣāpariccheda*?", *Indian Historical Quarterly*, vol. 17, pp. 241-244.
- Chakrabarti, K. (1975) "The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theory of Universals", *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 3.3-4, pp. 363-382.
- Chemparathy, G. (1972) *An Indian Rational Theology. Introduction to Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali*, Vienna, Publications of the De Nobili Research Library.
- Dravid, R.R. (2001) [I ed. 1972] *The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass.
- Ganeri, J. (2011) *The Lost Age of Reason. Philosophy in Early Modern India 1450-1700*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- Gangopadhyay, M.K. (1971) "The concept of upādhi in Nyāya Logic", *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, vol. 1.1, pp. 146-166.
- Goekoop, C. (1967) *The Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Tattvacintāmaṇi*, Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Company.
- Ingalls, D.H.H. (1988) [I ed. Cambridge Mass. 1951] *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass.

- Jha, G.N. (1982) [I ed. Allahabad 1915] *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha of Praśastapāda, with the Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara*, Varanasi-Delhi, Chaukhamba Orientalia.
- Matilal, B.K. (1968) *The Navya-Nyāya Doctrine of Negation. The Semantic and Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-nyāya Philosophy*, Cambridge-Massachusetts, Harvard University Press.
- Mukherjee, S. (1996). See Swami, Madhavananda (trans.). (1996).
- Phillips, H.S. (1997) [I ed. Chicago 1996] *Classical Indian Metaphysics*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass.
- Phillips, H.S. (2002) *Gaṅgeśa on the upādhi. The "Inferential Undercutting Condition"*, Introduction, Translation and Explanation by S.H. Phillips and N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya, New Delhi, Indian Council for Philosophical Research.
- Phillips, H.S. (2012) *Epistemology in Classical India. The Knowledge Sources of the Nyāya School*, New York-London, Routledge.
- Pellegrini, G. (2015) "Assenza più acuta presenza. Sul concetto di abhāva come trattato nelle introduzioni medievali al Navyanyāya", in L.V. Tarca, L. Marcato (eds.), *Forme della negazione. Un percorso interdisciplinare tra Oriente e Occidente*, Milano, Mimesis, pp. 70-84.
- Poddar, Sulekha. (2013). *The Nature of Universal in Indian Philosophy*, Kolkata, Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar.
- Potter (1957). See: Rāghunātha, *The Padārthātattvanirūpaṇam of Rāghunātha Śīromaṇi*.
- Potter, K.H. (1995) [I Indian ed. 1977, I ed. Princeton 1977] *Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. II, General Editor K.H. Potter, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass.
- Sastri, S.K.S. (1998) [I ed. 1932] *A Primer of Indian Logic*, Chennai, The Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute.
- Śāstrī (1980). See: Udayanācārya, 1980.
- Shastri (1988). See: Bhaṭṭācārya Viśvanāthapañcānana, 1988.
- Staal, F. (1961) "Theory of Definition in Indian Logic", *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. 81.2, pp. 122-126.
- Swami, Madhavananda (trans.). (1996) [I ed. 1940] *Bhāṣāpariccheda with Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, Calcutta-Pithorgarh, Advaita Ashrama.
- Tachikawa, M. (1981) *The Structure of the World in Udayana's Realism. A study of the Lakṣaṇāvalī and the Kiraṇāvalī*, Dordrecht-Boston-London, D. Reidel Publishing Company.
- Upādhyāya, Śāstrī (2002). See: Udayanācārya, 2002.
- Wada, T. (2004) "The Origin of Navya-Nyāya and its Place". In Shoun Hino, Toshihiro Wada (eds.), *Three Mountains and Seven Rivers. Prof. Musashi Tachikawa's Felicitation Volume*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, pp. 439-462.