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After the first volume on *Monisms and Pluralisms in the History of Political Thought*, the present work aims at further broadening our reflection on the concepts of monism and pluralism beyond Isaiah Berlin's popular dichotomy, while being conscious of how powerfully they penetrated into our language and society. With this purpose the authors of the essays here collected addressed a series of social and political models having monist and/or pluralist connotation, while showing how — in historical terms — the ideal *connection* between pluralism-liberty and monism-lack of it, which is generally taken for granted, becomes more nuanced and problematic.

In this sense, the present work wants to show how just the History of social and political models offers us a series of *diversified pluralisms* and *diversified monisms*. A kind of achievement which might be useful in our time, characterized by a sort of attitude towards easy generalizations.

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
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Monisms and Pluralisms in the History of Political and Social Models

Indice

Monisms and pluralisms in the history of Political and Social Models
Sara Lagi and Andrea Catanzaro

1. Starting from the beginning:
Isaiah Berlin's concept of monism and pluralism

In our first book on "Monisms and Pluralisms in the History of Political Thought" (Catanzaro-Lagi: 2016) we aimed at problematizing the concepts of monism and pluralism through the perspective of the History of Political thought, while being conscious of how deeply they penetrated into our language. By discussing a series of political theories with a focus on historical context we tried to show the existence of "diversified monisms" and "diversified pluralisms". In other terms, we sought to prove how monism and pluralism (as a term and as a concept) entail a variety of political-philosophical implications and therefore how difficult an overgeneralized definition of both can be. The present book starts exactly from this observation with the objective to further develop it through some (for us interesting) examples of political and social models. Just because we want again to critically reflect on the political meaning(s) of monism and pluralism it is relevant for us to re-focus on the thinker who contributed the most

to elaborate the philosophical and political contraposition between the two concepts: Isaiah Berlin.

In 1958 the already internationally recognized scholar Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) was invited to deliver an inaugural lecture (Prolusion) at Oxford University after accepting one year earlier the Chair of Social and Political Thought in the same University. The title of his lecture – which was published in 1969 as an autonomous writing (Berlin: 1969)[1] – was *Two Concepts of Liberty* and very soon it became a major topic for discussion within the international intellectual environment because it delineated the problem of liberty through the lens of two – in Berlin's mind – distinct concepts: *monism and pluralism*.[2]

On the one hand, Berlin tended to identify a positive liberty and a negative kind of liberty and on the other, he conceptually related the first to monism and the latter to pluralism. More precisely, positive liberty was involved in the answer to the question:

> *what or who is the source of control or interference that can determine someone to do, or be, this rather than that?" whereas the negative liberty was involved in the answer to the question: what is the area within which the subject [...] is or should be left to do or be he is able to do or be, without interference by other persons? (Berlin 1969: 122).*

From these questions, Berlin elaborated a reflection in terms of the History of ideas[3] leading him to conceptually relate positive liberty to the principle of "self-determination" and negative liberty to that of "being free from external interference" (Berlin 1969: 123).

If negative liberty classically implied for Berlin the right for individuals to enjoy a sphere of private liberty which no one and nothing could limit or abuse, positive liberty was identified by him with the concept of "governing oneself", i.e. "self-determination"(Berlin 1969: 122 ss). In other words, in Berlin's view, negative liberty posed the problem (philosophical and political) of the limits of power, whereas positive liberty shifted the fo-

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[1] We are referring to one of the most popular Berlin's work entitled Four Essays on Liberty.

[2] This first section of our Introduction is based in part on a series of reflections developed in (Lagi 2016: 139-153). We used the online version of Berlin's work, dating back to 1969, which is now available online at http://spot.colorado.edu.

[3] At Oxford Berlin had initially contacts with logical positivists such as Ayer who left a considerable impression on him, chiefly as far logical positivists' critique against methaphisical thought and particularly against Hegel was concerned. But soon, Berlin took distance from them to embrace a new kind of study, which was considered quite marginal within the Oxonien environment, i.e. the History of Ideas. It is likely that he approached this new kind of study through the philosopher R. G. Collingwood, whose classes Berlin attended during the Trinity Term in 1931 and who was the only scholar at that time to openly recall to the History of Ideas (Ignatieff 1998: 56)

cus on the source of power and the problem of legitimising it in terms of "self-determination" (human and political). More precisely, Berlin thought that, within the History of Ideas, the concept of "governing oneself" had been gradually assimilated to that of "rational self-determination" which fundamentally contained, in his opinion, another kind of conceptual identification of huge relevance, i.e. the idea that "the only true method of attaining freedom […] is by the use of critical reason, the understanding of what is necessary and what is contingent" (Berlin 1969: 144). For Berlin, the ideal, ethical and political consequences of applying this concept pf liberty to human reality could (and, in his opinion, it have actually been) immense:

> *For, If I am rational, I cannot deny that what is right for me must, for the same reason, be right for others who are rational like me. A rational (or free) state would be a state governed by such laws as all rational men would freely accept; that is to say, such laws as they would themselves have enacted had they been asked what, as rational beings, they demanded; hence the frontiers would be such as all rational men would consider to be the right frontiers for rational beings (Berlin 1969: 145).*

From this perspective, which connected "being free" with "being rational" and which, according to Berlin, characterized in depth the so-called positive liberty, once found out the rational and therefore correct way of being free and living free, the path to a full "self-determination" was reached:

> *All truths could be discovered by any rational principles and demonstrated so clearly that all other rational men could not but accept them; […] On this assumption, the problem of political liberty was soluble by establishing a just order that would give to each man all freedom to which a rational being was entitled (Berlin 1969: 145).*

This kind of view, underpinning the positive concept of liberty, posed a chief problem (philosophical and political) for Berlin. Once identified – he observed – the (supposed) true and correct form of carrying out the principle of "self-determination", i.e. the "just order" to make it real, what would happen to all those who could disagree just with that "order" and its representatives? Their disagree and their "being recalcitrant" would not be simply considered as an expression of their individual opinions and beliefs but as something more dangerous and potentially destructive, as the refusal of a system which was rational and therefore the only one capable of making people truly free; they would become a serious threat to a state of things considered intrinsically and objectively just, because of its rationality (Berlin 1969: 145-146):

> *Freedom is self-mastery, the elimination of obstacles to my will, whatever these obstacles may be […] But how am I to treat recalcitrant human beings? I must, if I can, impose, my will on them too; "mould" them to my patterns. […] Will this not mean that I am free and I alone am free, while they are slaves? They will be so if my plan had nothing to do with their wishes […] but if my plan is fully rational, it will allow the full the full development of their "true" natures, the realisation of their capacities for rational decisions (Berlin: 146).*

It is clear how in Berlin's view the positive concept of liberty, if carried out, would lead to the aftermath of political systems in which paradoxically someone could be "forced" even with the use of violence to be "free" in the name of a plan, an ideology, or a revolutionary thought supposed to be rational and just. Following Berlin's reasoning, once found the (rational) solution to the problem of how to achieve "self-determination", all those principles, values, plans or simply opinions diverging and conflicting with it had to be eliminated (Berlin 1969: 146 ss).

What Berlin stressed a lot in this part of his Prolusion was just the fact that the concept of positive liberty – differently from that of negative liberty – implied the idea – not to say certainty – that objectively true (since rational) and therefore objectively valid solutions to human, ethical and political problems and questions, including that about how to fully "govern oneself" – could be attained. He defined this kind of *forma mentis* "monism" as opposed to that of "pluralism" (Berlin 1969: 167 ss).

In other words, in Berlin's view, positive and negative liberty were underpinned by two particular visions, *Weltanschauungen* – respectively – monism and pluralism. From his Prolusion of 1958 on, both monism and pluralism have been often associated with his person and intellectual work. Whereas pluralism – according to Berlin – was that kind of philosophical, ethical, political vision recognizing the complexity (and plurality) of life in terms of values, goals, ideas, aspirations, monism – as we have already stressed – referred to the opposite concept, resulting in a vision which seemed to reduce human life in all its aspects to a single model, a single idea or principle (theoretical, political, ethical), supposed to be the quintessential of truth (Berlin 1969: 167-172).

On the basis of our previous observations, the ideal connection between pluralism and negative liberty on the one hand and monism and positive liberty on the other clearly takes shape. Negative liberty meant to Berlin "being free form interference" and this implied – in his perspective – the recognition of the individual as bearer of a sphere of liberty and fundamental rights within which one can decide to pursue specific goals, embrace values, support ideas and principles suited to one's own way of life, within which one has to deal with different values and ends, all of ultimate relevance:

> *The world that we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute, the realisation of some of which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others. Indeed, it is because this their situation that men place such immense value upon the freedom to choose; for if they had assurance that in some perfect state, realisable by men on earth, no end pursued by them would ever be in conflict, the necessity and agony of choice would disappear, and with it the central importance of the freedom to choose" (Berlin 1969: 168).*

As we can assume from the aforementioned quote, the concept of negative liberty contains, according to Berlin, a pluralist *Weltanschauung* recognizing "individual freedom" and "freedom of choice" because accepting the existence of more than one single end, more than one single value, more than one single specific – and supposed as universally valid – idea of how the world works or how it should work. Instead, the recognition of the extreme complexity and plurality of reality (human, philosophical, ethical, political) is exactly what – in Berlin's opinion – lacks to monism (Berlin 1969: 168 ss).

As previously stated, Berlin thought that positive liberty – with its principle of liberty as "self-determination" – inevitably led to assimilating the concept of liberty with that of power and therefore potentially legitimising any form of coercion and abuse – of that individual sphere of liberty otherwise characterizing the concept of negative liberty and pluralism – in the name of "self-determination". Once a Leader, a Party or any Institution claimed to be able to carry out on earth a perfect condition of "self determination" for everyone, liberty and submission, according to Berlin's reasoning, came paradoxically to coincide and this was nothing but a perverse form of slavery (Berlin 1969: 152-154). To this, he opposed pluralism and therefore the concept of negative liberty:

> *Pluralism, with the measure of "negative" liberty that it entails seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the great disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of "positive" self-mastery but classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind. It is truer, because it does, at least, recognise the fact that human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivarly with one another. […] It is more humane because it does not (as the system-builders do) deprive men, in the name of some remote, or incoherent, ideal, of much that they have found to be indispensable to their life as unpredictably self-transforming human beings (Berlin 1969: 171).*

There is an extensive academic literature – chiefly of philosophical connotation – on Berlin's idea of monism and pluralism, on the interconnection between monism-positive liberty and pluralism-negative liberty and chiefly on

value-pluralism.[4] Prominent scholars, such as Peter Gray and George Crowder, have for a long time reflected, for example, on the interplay in Berlin's work between liberalism and value pluralism.[5]

From the perspective of the History of Political Thought, Berlin's dichotomy between monism and pluralism reflected in part the particular way he had internalized and interpreted, in terms of the History of Ideas, a century-long tradition of philosophical and political thought. Spinoza, Kant, Rousseau, Schelling and Fichte represented to him – among many other thinkers – some of the founding and spiritual fathers of the concept of monism and positive liberty, whereas Constant, Mill, Tocqueville, Burke (and many other) those of pluralism and negative liberty.[6] Kant had been the first to make a basic distinction – for Berlin one of the turning points in the History of Ideas – between "True and False Myself" i.e. between "Rational and Irrational Myself", resulting in a particular way of conceptualizing liberty as the "ability of True Myself" to govern over the "False Myself" (Berlin 1969: 148-152). Some years earlier than Kant, Rousseau had already developed the political theory of the *Contract Social* in which "political body" could "not hurt" or coerce anyone because it was "built on the equality of sacrifice of all its members" (Berlin 1969: 148). For Berlin, both Kant and Rousseau shared one basic assumption, that "the rational ends of our true natures must coincide, or be made coincide, however violently or poor, […] [because] freedom is not freedom to do what is irrational, or stupid, or wrong" (Berlin 1969: 148). A kind of assumption which was, for Berlin, fully and coherently monist.

The two philosophers of the Enlightenment were not the only to have contributed with their work to the shaping of a certain monist way of thinking liberty. During the Romantic age, according to Berlin, another major turning point took place: the "True Myself", especially (although not only) through thinkers such as Schelling and Fichte, came to be conceptually identified with the "creative Will" of the Subject, capable of creating, transforming, changing life (and human beings' life) at any cost (Berlin 1969: 148-152); this subject could be an individual, a Party, a political regime but the result, for Berlin, was inevitably that:

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[4] Just to give some bibliographical references: (Baum-Nichols: 2013), (Crowder: 2004), (Crowder-Hardy: 2006), (Cherniss: 2013), (Dubnov: 2012), (Galstone: 2002), (Gray: 2013), (Galipeau: 1994), (Ignatieff: 1998),(Jahanbegloo: 1992), (Kelley: 1986), (Lukes: 1994), (Hausheer: 1979), (Ricciardi: 2011). In Berlin's intellectual trajectory, the Prolusion of 1958 was a relevant turning point because from then on he devoted more and more attention to the problem of pluralism and value pluralism. See (Gray: 2013).

[5] (Crowder: 2002); (Crowder: 2004); (Gray: 2013). A very good bibliography of the works published in support and against Berlin's dichotomy between positive and negative liberty is included in (Harris: 2004).

[6] Textual references to these thinkers are disseminated throughout his Prolusion. In particular see: (Berlin 1969: 152 ss; 160-166).

humanity is the raw material upon which I impose my creative will; even though men suffer and die in the process, they are lifted to the height to which thy could never have risen without my coercive – but creative – violation of their lives. This is the argument used by every dictator (Berlin 1969: 148).

The concept of Creative Will and that of "the rational govern of oneself" contained – according to Berlin's analysis – a strongly monist vision. On the opposite side of the barricade, Berlin mentioned thinkers such as Constant,[7] Mill, Tocqueville, the representatives of the 19th Liberal tradition, whose main merit, in his opinion, had been to realize that being free was not only and could not be univocally identified with the problem of finding and carrying out an allegedly "just (and rational) order" (Berlin 1969: 163-165). In other terms, for Berlin, Liberal thinkers had realized that any political system (even a democratic one) could hurt its citizens (for example through the "tyranny of majority"), unless two important conditions were granted: no power can be considered absolute – which meant also, according to Berlin, that no political principle was so noble and high to justify violence, abuses and oppression – and there is a sphere of personal freedom which should be considered as intangible; a sphere made up by rights, principles and rules which should never "be broken" (Berlin 1969: 163 ss).

it is such rules as these that are broken when a man is declared guilty without a trial, or punished under a retroactive law; when children are ordered to denounce their parents, […] when men are tortured or murdered, or minorities massacred […] Such acts, even if they are made legal by the sovereign cause horror even in these days; and this springs from the moral recognition of the moral validity of some absolute barriers […] The freedom of society […], in this sense of freedom, is measured by the strength of these barriers (Berlin: 166).

In these pages, Berlin delineated the contrast between positive liberty-monism, on the one hand, and negative liberty-pluralism in a very strong and vivid way. Each of the two, as we have tried to highlight, seemed to reflect two – in Berlin's mind – different lines of thought and two different visions of the world. At the same time, we can comprehend how Berlin's dichotomy between negative and positive liberty as well as that between pluralism and monism were in debt towards part of Liberal tradition.[8]

It is likewise clear how Berlin's vision and critique of monism and his definition of positive liberty had also a strong reference to the particular historical and political background, in which he lived. Berlin had experienced, although

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[7] Berlin's positive and negative liberty seemed to rechoe Constant's liberty of ancients and moderns. See (Cherniss: 2013).
[8] For a complete analysis of Liberalism in the History of Political Thought see: (Bedeschi: 2015).

not in first person, the totalitarian age and after the end of the second world war he saw the international system redesigned according two big areas of influence: the Western and Eastern "camp".[9]

Part of scholarly literature flourished around Berlin's works (chiefly around those published during the late 40s and the Prolusion of 1958), such as *Generalissimo Stalin and the Art of Government* (1952), *The Hedgehog and the Fox* (1953) and *Historical Inevitability* (1954), has stressed the profound influence exercised by the Cold war political and ideological dynamics on Berlin's political philosophy. More precisely, Terry Hardin situated Berlin within the so-called *Cold War Liberalism*. By this term, Hardin identified first of all "a frame of mind", in which there was "no room for the theory of history or foundational truths adavanced by ideological cold warriors like Samuel Hungtington or Francis Fukuyama. It was epistemological skeptical, pluralist, and committed to a version of constitutional government that could ensure not only negative freedom but also provide some kind of social minimum, which its proponents saw as a condition for a stable civil association" (Hardin 2015: 1).

The same interpretation is shared by Ian Werner Mueller who observed in a recently published article how "Berlin, Aron and Popper all considered themselves engaged in an anti-Marxist war of ideas. Even when they spoke out against totalitarianism it was clear that Stalinism had been the critical template for their models of totalitarianism"(Mueller 2009?: 45?).

When Berlin condemned in the aforementioned passage the "system-builders" depriving men in the name of some remote ideal" and sacrificing human being to "the Altar of Ideals", he seemed to think about all totalitarian regimes, but specifically those of Communist inspiration, which he strongly opposed for all his life.[10]

If we relate in terms of the History of Political Thought Berlin's definition of pluralism and monism to the Twentieth century historical and political context we can grasp two relevant elements: first, his reflection on monism became in *Two Concepts of Liberty* (and not only)[11] a way to critically confront

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[9] See in particular: (O'Sullivan: 1999).

[10] Berlin was a proudly anti-Soviet and anti-Stalinist for all his life. This is not also testified by his diplomatic activity on behalf of the British Diplomatic Service in Washington and New York, where he met prominent political and intellectual figures such John Schlesinger, George Kennan, Max Ascoli, Hamilton Fish Armstrong and many others, all sharing the same anti-Soviet attitude. It is instead to stress that in Berlin's work his anti-Soviet position never coincided with Russophobia. He was in fact a great admirer of the century-long Russian cultural tradition. He himself was born in Riga in 1909 and the very first language he learned before moving with his parents to England was Russian. Also, it is not to forget that one of his "points of references" and most beloved artists was the Russian Alexander Herzen, the father of Russian populism, whose thought would have been extremely influential – as Berlin himself stated – in the shaping of his idea of pluralism in opposition to monism. See: (Kelley 1986).

[11] The other major work in which he delineats the intellectual roots of monism as the ideological

the ultimate philosophical, ethical and political sense of totalitarianism as the incarnation and aftermath of a monist vision in its most tragic consequences; second, by defining pluralism in contrast to monism Berlin seemed to connect all together complexity of reality, plurality of values and ends, freedom to chose and negative liberty. In other words, in his celebrated Prolusion of 1958 monism ended up acquiring a negative (philosophical, ethical and political) connotation whereas pluralism a positive one.

The present work is a collection of thirteen essays whose authors, despite the diversity of historical periods and political thinkers that they have taken into consideration, started all from bearing in mind Berlin's popular definition of monism and pluralism, with the objective to understand in what sense and whether – from the perspective of the History of Social and Political models – these two concepts entail a more articulated and varied range of meanings and implications.

2. Beyond Isaiah Berlin: monisms and pluralisms in the History of Political and Social Models

The starting point of our work on *Monisms and Pluralisms in the History of Political and Social Models* is exactly Isaiah Berlin's reflection on the meaning of monism and pluralism, previously outlined in relation to the concept of negative and positive liberty, but our objective – as stated previously – was basically to try problematizing it. An attempt which is based on the consciousness that Berlin's definition of monism and pluralism reflected, as we sought to show, his particular philosophical and political sensitivity of liberal connotation and his personal way of interpreting (and confronting) the totalitarian experience.

First of all, like in our first work on monisms and pluralisms in the history of political thought, we were deeply steadfast in not approaching the topic of our work from a mere theoretical perspective but from the historical one: it was easy enough to think of relating it to the idea of political and social mod-

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heart of totalitarianism was Historical Inevitabiltity (1954). Here, Berlin discusses about determinist philosophies, identifying differet typologies but all sharing, in his opnion, the common convinction that reality (in social, political, economic or moral terms) can be explained trough a single, universally valid principle or Law which allow us to understand how reality works and towards where it is going, which allow us to make predictions and realize what our place in the world is. According to Berlin, most of determinst conceptions as they had taken shape throughout the History of Ideas, could be seen in part as strongly influenced by a certain part of the Enlightenment and Rationalist tradition of thought (Berlin 1954: 19-25).

els as it was sketched out by Salvo Mastellone (Mastellone: 1983; 1993; 2011) and developed by scholars coming from different Italian Universities (Carini: 1990; Comparato: 1989; 1993; Campos Boralevi-Quaglioni: 2002): i.e. the idea that over centuries specific political and social systems were considered as "examples" to follow, from which drawing inspiration, in order to reform and improve one's social and political reality or – instead – how new social and political systems were imagined and thus proposed as models, in other words as "examples", to be carried out, often in frontal opposition to an existing reality considered as negative, unjust.

In this collection of essays, the authors have addressed different thinkers confronting the problem of social and political models in the History of Political thought and each of these models has been investigated in relation to the problem of monism and pluralism. Consequently, it becomes necessary for us to introduce how in this work we approached Berlin's celebrated and popular dichotomy.

Generally speaking, monism and pluralism as terms and concepts can not be confined within Berlin's work and thought: both have been and continue to be discussed and debated in Sociology, Political Science, Law not to talk about Philosophy, although in each of these disciplines monism and pluralism have acquired particular implications and posed likewise particular intellectual challenges which seem, in many aspects, to diverge from those delineated by Berlin.

In the realm of Sociology, for example, pluralism is used to explain and define the relationships among smaller groups preserving their own cultural identities within a larger societal context (Hannerz: 1998). Also, there is an extensive number of sociological studies focused on religious pluralism which seems to characterize liberal democracies and the challenge which it is posing to the traditional way of conceiving the relationship between authority and religion, on the one hand, and individual consciousness and religion on the other. In Italy, the sociologist Luca Diotallevi, for example, has in fact devoted his attention in a series of writings to what he thinks is the changing relationship in the current Italian and European society among religious pluralism, modernity and secularization (Diotallevi: 2015; Pace-Giordan: 2014). While remaining within the realm of Sociology, we could conversely mention the so-called "sociological monism" which was, for example, theorized and supported by the sociologist, anthropologist and historian of religions Emile Durkheim, according to whom the relationships between individuals and society had to be conceived as those existing between man and God, i.e. between man and a monist superior entity. More precisely, in Durkheim's monist perspective, individuals received their values and behavioural codes, while internalizing them, from one and only the State, defined as the "politically and legally organized Nation" (Perelman 2005: 267-268).

In the case of Political Science, the concept of pluralism acquires even a different meaning: British Twentieth century political scientists such as, for example, Frederic Maitland and Harold Laski, stated that in liberal and democratic systems power should be dispersed among different groups, i.e. a plurality of organizations, groups, communities, with the purpose to combat the concentration of power into the hands of a single elite (Pasquino 2009).[12]

At the same time, in legal terms, we can observe that pluralism is sometimes related to the idea that within a territory marked by national boundaries there might be "more than one or legal system". More precisely, this kind of concept has represented a major topic of discussion for those scholars involved in analysing, for example, the complex relationship within colonized countries between indigenous legal orders and the "plurality of legal orders" introduced by European colonizers (Davis: 2012; Merry 1988: 869-879).

Moving to Philosophy, the term monism was used for the first time by the German Jusnaturalistic Philosopher Christian Wolff (1679-1754) who referred to a metaphisical vision bringing back all beings to a unique material or spiritual principle: pluralism, in his view, indicated exactly the opposite.[13] According, instead, to Raimon Panikkar, who has devoted his life to studying the problems of multiculturalism and inter-religious dialogue, in the present world pluralism has further changed – from a philosophical perspective – into "the true question about the human co-existence on the earth". In this sense, he thinks that nowadays the concept of pluralism is characterized by a strong "existential" implication (Panikkar 1995: 33-43).

Being conscious of the plurality of meanings and connotations which monism and pluralism have taken on, according to the areas of studies taken into account, now we want to focus on the aspects of Berlin's dichotomy between monism and pluralism which have pushed us to pose ourselves a series of questions. We wondered whether and to what extent Berlin's way of defining monism (in negative terms) and pluralism (in positive terms) could fit into the History of Political Thought and more precisely into the History of Political and Social Models: in other words, monism and pluralism, as they were conceptualized by Berlin in the late 50s and therefore during the Cold War, can be considered a good key of interpretation to be employed within the realm of the History of Political and Social Models? And, in relation to these questions, we posed further ones: in the History of Political and Social Models, does monism mean one and only a view of reality trying to find one, final universally valid model or theory which, politically speaking, ends up signifying the

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[12] See also: the voice: "pluralism" in Encyclopedia Britannica available at www.britannica.com

[13] Berlin's definition of monism and pluralism itself has an undoubted philosophical connotation in the sense that – as we can read in in *Two Concepts of Liberty* – *both concepts* seem to refer in first instance to a certain way of conceiving and perceiving reality.

triumph of despotic and intolerant ideologies and regimes? Does pluralism mean one and only a view of reality recognizing plurality of ends and values and therefore that freedom of choice which, in Berlin's view, should characterize a truly liberal, evolved and tolerant kind of society and political systems? Don't we risk – if we confine ourselves to taking into account Berlin's definition – to loose part of the complexity of both concepts?

At the same time, like in our first book *Monisms and Pluralisms in the History of Political Thought* we wanted to avoid transforming our work in an exercise of mere "erudition". If, in fact, we move to present reality, we will notice how the words and concepts of monism and pluralism have powerfully consolidated over time, penetrating into our language through mass media, scholarly works, magazines etc. This collection of essays is indeed based on the consciousness of how important and relevant both terms and concepts are in the complex historical and political contexts in which we are living. While being aware of this and of the diversity of meanings and implications that monism and pluralism have in relation to the particular intellectual perspective used to analyse and discuss them, we wanted to give a personal contribution from our scholarly perspective to the ongoing discussion about these two concepts. In this sense, we sought to reflect on monism and pluralism focusing on their "concrete" dimension, i.e. in relation to specific historical and political problems, figures and projects and more precisely through the lens of the History of Political and Social models.

In other terms, in order to address the aforementioned questions, we did a precise and conscious methodological choice, i.e. we moved from a strictly theoretical level of analysis to the historical one where the concept of monism and pluralism become worth analysing from the perspective of the History of Political and Social models because of their impact on people and their life (social, political, moral). More precisely, the essays here collected delineate different social and political models – from the Antiquity to the 21st century – belonging to different historical frameworks, reflecting different political, social and philosophical views, responding to different, concrete problems and even to times of profound political and moral crisis.

Generally speaking, the essays can be divided into two main "groups" or "directions": 1. those posing the problem of the relationship between the rulers and the ruled people in terms of internal safety (social and political); 2. those posing the same problem in terms of freedom, although – as we can see – interesting lines of interconnections between the two groups do exist and are inevitable. It is not indeed our intention to cut the essays in two radically divergent groups; rather, we simply want to focus on what we think are the basic thematic lines characterizing them. On the basis of our research, we can also notice how the issue of internal safety tends to characterize those

social and political models having a substantially monist-oriented connota-
tion whereas freedom tends to characterize those social and political models
showing a substantially pluralist-oriented connotation. In this sense, chiefly
the connection between pluralism and freedom might echoe popular Berlin's
definition of pluralism.

On the opposite, we think that this connection – although intriguing – is
not so much consistent and that the analysis developed by the authors of
the book allows to grasp how more nuanced the concepts of monism and
pluralism become when related to the concrete historical dimension. With his
definition establishing a direct relation between pluralism and negative liberty,
Berlin defended the primacy of a liberal idea of freedom and he opposed
it, during the 50s and the Cold war age, to totalitarian ideologies and more
precisely to a precise and well-defined political and social system, i.e. Soviet
Russia.

In our work, the connection between freedom and pluralism situates – in-
stead – within political theories and more precisely political and social models
which, in most cases, are far form being labelled as traditionally liberal and yet
all defending and promoting the idea of social, political and value pluralism.
Moreover, if it is true, according to the analysis developed in this work, that
those theories addressing the problem of internal safety are characterized by
a monist component, this does not necessary imply that they aim at rejecting
any form of freedom or even destroying human dignity.

The interrelation between monism and despotic thought is true, for ex-
ample, only for very few political thinkers and socio-political models here
portrayed. In this sense, through our work, we sought to show two elements
particularly relevant to us, because, in our opinion, capable of problematizing
Berlin's definition of monism and pluralism: the "taken-for-granted" Berlin's
dichotomy between pluralism as that philosophical, political, moral, view con-
sidered intrinsically positive, good, acceptable and noble on the one hand, and
monism considered as that philosophical, political and moral, view intrinsical-
ly negative and dangerous, on the other hand, emerges from the essays here
collected as extremely more nuanced, articulated and therefore less clear-cut.
This does not depend only on the diversity of thinkers and the political and
social visions taken into consideration, but also on the fact we moved within
the historical dimension, because in each of the essay collected, the differ-
ent political and social designs, theories, models and proposals discussed have
been related to challenges, problems, inquiries and crisis historically defined
and determined.

By reading the essays here collected, covering a wide range of authors and
socio-political models: from Plutarch to Jacques Basnage, from David Mitrany
to Francis Wright, from Aldo Capitini to Noam Chomsky, passing through

Ernest Duvergier de Hauranne, Luigi Sturzo and many others – all analysed and discussed with a focus to the historical and concrete dimension of their political reflections and proposals – we can notice how Berlin's definition of monism and pluralism show several limits. As previously observed, in many of the social and political models here proposed the concept of monism, i.e. the need of finding a theory, a model, a principle capable of explaining and positively reforming politics and society, seems in fact not be in total and open conflict with the value of liberty in the broadest sense of term. At the same time, in some of the intellectual figures delineated by the authors of the essays, we can identify a way of conceiving pluralism far from Berlin's liberal sensitivity.

That is the reason why, like for our first book *Monisms and Pluralisms in the History of Political Thought*, we opted for entitling our work *monisms and pluralisms* in the History of Political and Social Models. That "s" is put to stress how – when moving from a purely theoretical level to a more historical-political and social-political one – designating all-embracing and extremely general definitions in order to read and explain social and political reality is very difficult and problematic. In this sense, there is a continuity between our first book and the present one. The former and the latter share the same objective, i.e. to reflect through an historical perspective on the political implications of "diversified monisms" and "diversified pluralisms".

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Chapter One
Central monism and suburban pluralism: Plutarch and Dio of Prusa between needs of the *principatus* and claims coming from local communities
Andrea Catanzaro

How might be possible to create a relationship between a plurality of local entities and an absolute central power? How can be possible to establish connections between the variety of provincial cultures and the ruler's? How should non-Roman statesmen and intellectuals interact with the Roman dominant system?

Two remarkable Hellenic authors had to answer these questions at the end of the first century A.D., though for different reasons. Plutarch and Dio of Prusa[1] tried to explain in some of their political works how they interpreted the role of statesmen or intellectuals in contexts where the existence of a strong central and monistic power needed to relate with a plurality of local communities which had to be governed.

The issue of the interconnections between the centre and the outskirts of the Roman Empire in the first century A.D. is a significant hallmark in the political thought of these two authors. During their lives, they were deeply involved with politics both at the low and at the highest level; they had to

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[1] On the political, social and cultural contexts of these authors, cf. Whitmarsh (2001), Swain (2000), Id. (1996); Desideri (2015: 293-325); Id. (1978); Von Arnim (1898); see also Stadter, Van Der Stockt (2002), De La Vega (1998: 1015-1058); Aalders (1982).

manage local problems, but also to keep themselves in touch with the most important figures of the central government.

In order to analyse their ideas about this topic, three works seem to be particularly worth stressing: Plutarchean *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* and *Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum*[2], and the *Third Discourse on Kingship* by Dio[3]. The respective proposals of these authors as sketched out in these works differ from each other, but also have some common elements. Furthermore they both represent attempts aimed at facing the same political problem[4].

If we try to summarize the most remarkable positions on this issue in that period from a theoretical perspective, we might imagine the existence of two polarised extremes: the former might be labelled as a 'supervised pluralism', the latter as a 'pluralism depending on a supervised élite'. Nonetheless, as it will be shown, they are and remain just oversimplified, though useful labels. Due to this, in spite of their utility, they are unsuitable to exhaustively describe the positions of these and other authors from an historical perspective. Differences in the respective cultural backgrounds, lives and degrees of involvement in political life, made each of them develop autonomous and unique proposals. However, although Plutarch's and Dio's proposals remain detached, something is merged and a clear-cut distinction between them – based on the theoretical models previously sketched out – cannot indisputably be found in the works that will be take into account in this essay. Plutarch, for example, seems to bear in mind the 'supervised pluralism' in *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* and the 'pluralism depending on a supervised élite' in *Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum*.

Anyway, since the proposals were conceived in the same political context and in a rather similar cultural one, it allows us to analyse them in a comparative perspective and appreciate different, but, in some extent, also similar proposals aimed at fixing a thorny issue of the state of being contemporary[5].

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[2] On these Plutarchean works from the perspective of the theme of the relations between Greece and Rome, cf. Swain (1996: 162 ff.); particularly on the *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*, cf. ivi, p. 162: «Political Advice is an essay on the civic political life of a Greek politician under Roman rule. It is perhaps the most important single expression of Greek elite views of living with Rome in our period, certainly the most detailed. Plutarch was well placed to speak on the subject. He knew important Roman and Greek politicians and was sufficiently experienced (by his own testimony) in local and internal politics. The work was written late in his life when his fame as philosopher and a writer had made him someone worth listening to»; see also Whitmarsh (2001: 184-186). On the relations between Dio and Rome, cf. S. Swain (1996: 206-241); see also Desideri (1978).
[3] On the Dionean *Discourses on Kingship*, cf. particularly Desideri (1978: 283-318); Swain (1996: 192-196); Whitmarsh (2001: 183-190 and 325-327); Gangloff (2009: 3-38); Catanzaro (2012).
[4] Cf. Desideri (2015: 320).
[5] Cf. Salmeri (2002: 55-56): «In Asia Minor Rome was represented not only by the governors but also by the notables of the Greek cities. Building on the structures of the Hellenistic kingdoms,

Plutarch's first position effectively appears to be summarised in a metaphor presented in a passage of *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* where the political activity in a city subjected to an external domination is compared to a drama on the stage. The philosopher writes:

εὐσταλεστέραν δεῖ τὴν χλαμύδα ποιεῖν, καὶ βλέπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατηγίου πρὸς τὸ βῆμα, καὶ τῷ στεφάνῳ μὴ πολὺ φρονεῖν μηδὲ πιστεύειν, ὁρῶντα τοὺς καλτίους ἐπάνω τῆς κεφαλῆς· ἀλλὰ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς ὑποκριτάς, πάθος μὲν ἴδιον καὶ ἦθος καὶ ἀξίωμα τῷ ἀγῶνι προστιθέντας, τοῦ δ᾿ ὑποβολέως ἀκούοντας καὶ μὴ παρεκβαίνοντας τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῆς διδομένης ἐξουσίας ὑπὸ τῶν κρατούντων.

You should arrange your cloak more carefully and from the office of the generals keep your eyes upon the orators' platform, and not have great pride or confidence in your crown, since you see the boots of Roman soldiers just above your head. No, you should imitate the actors, who, while putting into the performance their own passion, character, and reputation, yet listen to the prompter and do not go beyond the degree of liberty in rhythms and metres permitted by those in authority over them[6].

The context is clear: local rulers are only allowed to move within very limited boundaries. Inside them, they have a bit of autonomy, but they cannot go beyond them. The *ypoboléus* (the prompter) plays the real key-role: though he is out of public sight and hearing, actors on stage can see and hear him and are expected to observe his orders[7].

There is a sort of framework established *a priori*: the metaphorical references to rhythms and metres well describe a situation where individual choices are allowed to arise from a predetermined pattern[8]. It appears as a restrained pluralism, where room for manoeuvre is very restricted. The monism of the *principatus* can grant something autonomous to local rulers, but only within a

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Rome maintained the poleis within a wide-reaching framework under a unified administration, which enabled them to shake off some of the isolationist tendencies typical of the classical polis. To some extent the ground was prepared for the growth of a united Hellenic consciousness, at least at the cultural level. At the same time, however, given the considerable political responsibility they were entrusted with, the notables of Asia Minor found their ties with their native cities strengthening, and with them to desire to spend the rest of their lives in their homeland, following a pattern unparalleled in the western provinces».

[6] Plut., *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*, 813 E-F, in *Plutarch's Moralia* (1960: 236-237); henceforth, both the Greek excerpts and their English translations coming from this Plutarchean essay and from the *Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum*, are quoted in accordance with this edition.

[7] Cf. Aalders (1982: 54-55); ivi p. 37: «However much Plutarch was conscious of the reality of the Roman Empire and however much he unreservedly accepted this reality, his culture and his ideas were Greek and his political models and ideals were rooted in the Greek world and in the old Greek tradition. His personal interests were primarily directed towards the self-governing Greek polis. Whenever Plutarch speaks about state and statecraft, the image of such a polis is foremost in his eyes, even when he deals with Roman history».

[8] Roskam (2002: 175-189).

given score. That is why I previously used the label of 'supervised pluralism' in order to theoretically classified this aspect of the Plutarchean idea concerning this political situation as it appears explained in *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*.

If we take into account who is the addressee of this work and what he is going to do, these words sound even more significant.

The philosopher is writing a sort of handbook concerning politics – particularly dealing with political activity – with a view to allowing his disciple Menemacus – who is about to enter the public arena – to be oriented inside it. So, Plutarch has no interests in describing an ideal or hypothetical situation, but he needs to be extremely exact in showing his disciple what kind of career he might have in the near future. The Greek territories are not free lands; as a result Menemacus cannot expect to be completely autonomous in his local political activities and will always have to obey the commands coming from the Romans, the real holders of power. Just prior to introducing the metaphor of the play, Plutarch had specified:

ἀρχόμενος ἄρχεις, ὑποτεταγμένης πόλεως ἀνθυπάτοις, ἐπιτρόποις Καίσαρος.	You who rule are a subject, ruling a State controlled by proconsuls, the agents of Caesar[9].

The philosopher is also particularly careful in showing his disciple the potentially dangerous consequences of a lack of obedience to Rome. Through his words, the monist essence of the Roman system, the threatening presence of the foreign ruler, the force of its army – even if only in the form of a prospective threat – are clearly explained through the development of the theatrical metaphor and by mentioning an historical event.

ἡ γὰρ ἔκπτωσις οὐ φέρει συριγμὸν οὐδὲ χλευασμὸν οὐδὲ κλωγμόν, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς μὲν ἐπέβη δεινὸς κολαστὴς πέλεκυς αὐχένος τομεύς, ὡς τοῖς περὶ Παρδάλαν τὸν ὑμέτερον ἐκλαθομένοις τῶν ὅρων.	For to fail in one's part in public life brings not mere hissing or catcalls or stamping of feet, but many have experienced The dread chastiser, axe that cleaves the neck as did your countryman Pardalas and his followers when they forgot their proper limitation[10].

An *ékptosis* (fail) in observance of the conquerors' will have very dangerous consequences both for the governor and for the ruled people. Menemacus will have to always call to mind that the relation with the Roman central government is a relation between a ruler and a subject, though there actually is a little space for autonomy. In spite of this reading of the contemporary situa-

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[9] Plut., *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*, 813 E (1960: 236-237); cf. Swain (1996: 166).
[10] Plut., *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*, 813 F (1960: 236-237); concerning the line quoted by Plutarch, it is specified (ivi, p. 237) that it comes «from an unknown play».

tion and its value as a whole in *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*, rather surprisingly Plutarch affirms that, since this space anyway exists, a local ruler has to learn to effectively move within it.

The art of politics is not dead because of the external domination; people of the provinces need leaders very skilled at ensuring them internal safety, order and good administration. All these political targets require that a statesman becomes capable of using the granted autonomy wisely, but fully. If he did not act in this way, also that little space of freedom would be lost. Plutarch writes:

ποιοῦντα μέντοι καὶ παρέχοντα τοῖς κρατοῦσιν εὐπειθῆ τὴν πατρίδα δεῖ μὴ προσεκταπεινοῦν, μηδὲ τοῦ σκέλους δεδεμένου προσυποβάλλειν καὶ τὸν τράχηλον, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι, καὶ μικρὰ καὶ μείζω φέροντες ἐπὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἐξονειδίζουσι τὴν δουλείαν, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὅλως τὴν πολιτείαν ἀναιροῦσι, καταπλῆγα καὶ περιδεᾶ καὶ πάντων ἄκυρον ποιοῦντες.

However, the statesman, while making his native State readily obedient to its sovereigns, must not further humble it; nor, when the leg has been fettered, go on and subject the neck to the yoke, as some do who, by referring everything, great or small, to the sovereigns, bring the reproach of slavery upon their country, or rather wholly destroy its constitutional government, making it dazed, timid, and powerless in everything[11].

The words speak for themselves: Plutarch uses the noun *eghemón* (sovereign[12]) in order to denote the holder of power and it clearly describes the nature of the political system where the disciple has to live.

Nonetheless, the philosopher warns Menemacus against the risk of lacking in autonomy, since it could change the subordination to a complete *doulèia* (slavery[13]). Undoubtedly he is writing about a monistic regime, but he cannot avoid recognising that it has also a component of pluralism, though minimal, which is worth being protected and maintained[14].

The issue of internal safety is an archetypal case of those situations where this balance between autonomy and subordination is essential. It has two particular significances in Plutarch's ideas: the former, as obvious, deals with the internal peace needed, to allow people to live together, the latter with something deeply linked to the problem of the monism-pluralism question.

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[11] Plut., *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*, 814 E- F (1960: 242-243); cf. Aalders (1982: 55).

[12] On the significances of *eghemón*, cf. Liddell, Scott (1996: 763).

[13] On the significances of *doulèia*, cf. Liddell, Scott (1996: 446).

[14] S. Swain (1996: 161-162): «As has been remarked, it is well known that [...] [Plutarch] was highly sympathetic with Romans. But he also had a strong racial and cultural identity as a Greek. If he believed that Roman government was good for the world in theory, there is no cause for us to find it odd that he was resistant to it in practice. Appreciation of Rome's benefits does not automatically entail total acceptance of her rule. If there is contradiction, it represents the compromise and negotiation we must expect from someone living under a foreign power».

He discourages Menemacus from avoiding using the power allowed by the conqueror if it becomes indispensable in maintaining internal order. It must be a priority of the local statesmen, because of the potentially dangerous consequences coming from a lack of its usage. Internal disorders and clear ineptitude of the local statesmen in avoiding them can cause an intervention by the real ruler, that is, in Plutarch's ideas, a situation that Menemacus will always have to forestall[15]. He explains the problem by using again a metaphor:

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἰατροὶ τῶν νοσημάτων ὅσα μὴ δύνανται παντάπασιν ἀνελεῖν ἔξω τρέπουσιν εἰς τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν τοῦ σώματος· ὁ δὲ πολιτικός, ἂν μὴ δύνηται τὴν πόλιν ἀπράγμονα παντελῶς διαφυλάττειν, ἐν αὐτῇ γε πειράσεται τὸ ταρασσόμενον αὐτῆς καὶ στασιάζον ἀποκρύπτων ἰᾶσθαι καὶ διοικεῖν, ὡς ἂν ἥκιστα τῶν ἐκτὸς ἰατρῶν καὶ φαρμάκων δέοιτο.	For when physicians cannot entirely eradicate diseases, they turn them outwards to the surface of the body; but the statesman, if he cannot kept the State entirely free from troubles, will at any rate try to cure and control whatever disturbs it and causes sedition, keeping it meanwhile hidden with the State, so that it may have as little need as possible of physicians and medicine drawn from outside[16].

It sounds clear enough who is the real holder of power. Plutarch does not cast doubts on the monistic nature of the *principatus* of which he seems to be rather scared. Accordingly, the little autonomy allowed within this regime that I labelled 'supervised pluralism' represents a piece of liberty worth defending by whatever means, in order to avoid its complete loss[17]. Due to this, a local community cannot afford to let its divisions prevail; accordingly a local ruler has to work harshly with a view to preventing this occurrence.

However, though the comparison between internal disorders and diseases fits well, Plutarch stresses that the actions of a physician and those of a statesman are different, though similar. Despite both of them wanting to heal, a ruler who is not completely free has to take care of the community effectively but silently, in order to avoid making the disease visible from the outside and having the problem definitively fixed by someone else. The risk is stressed again a few paragraphs later:

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[15] Cf. Aalders (1982: 55).

[16] Plut., *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*, 815 B-C (1960: 244-245).

[17] Cf. Salmeri (2000: 75-76): «What mattered most to Plutarch was that the Greek world should retain that degree of autonomy it still enjoyed under the emperors, and cope with its own problems 'unaided' […] For him as for Dio, the use of force was always to be shunned, and the intervention of the Roman authorities avoided, grave though the tension might be; the discontent of the urban- populations was not to be countered by drastic solutions; if politicians showed a certain flexibility, on the principle of give and take, they could not afford to call for concord and order».

αί δὲ δι᾽ ὅλων ἀναταραχθεῖσαι πόλεις κομιδῇ διεφθάρησαν, ἂν μή τινος ἀνάγκης ἔξωθεν τυχοῦσαι καὶ κολάσεως ὑπὸ κακῶν βίᾳ σωφρονήσωσιν.

But States which have fallen into complete disorder are utterly ruined unless they meet with some external necessity and chastisement and are thus forcibly compelled by their misfortunes to be reasonable[18].

Plutarch's suggestion to Menemacus consists of a warning about the balance between internal and external pluralisms: the good statesman, as his target, must have the will not to allow internal pluralism to balloon to the extent it becomes a threat for that autonomy – or degree of pluralism – allowed by Rome.

In Plutarch's ideas, the *philía* is the means able to attune central monism with that quantum of pluralism, which allows both the central and local administrations to work well. Menemacus will have to weave together relations with men capable of assuring his land that it will be both protected by external enemies and allowed to maintain a *minimum* of autonomous administration. We read in *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*:

οὐ μόνον δὲ δεῖ παρέχειν αὑτόν τε καὶ τὴν πατρίδα πρὸς τοὺς ἡγεμόνας ἀναίτιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φίλον ἔχειν ἀεί τινα τῶν ἄνω δυνατωτάτων, ὥσπερ ἕρμα τῆς πολιτείας βέβαιον· αὐτοὶ γάρ εἰσι Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς τὰς πολιτικὰς σπουδὰς προθυμότατοι τοῖς φίλοις· καὶ καρπὸν ἐκ φιλίας ἡγεμονικῆς λαμβάνοντας, οἷον ἔλαβε Πολύβιος καὶ Παναίτιος τῇ Σκιπίωνος εὐνοίᾳ πρὸς αὐτοὺς μεγάλα τὰς πατρίδας ὠφελήσαντες, εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν δημοσίαν ἐξενέγκασθαι καλόν.

And not only should the statesman show himself and his native State blameless towards our rulers, but he should also have always a friend among the men of high station who have the greatest power as a firm bulwark, so to speak, of his administration; for the Romans themselves are most eager to promote the political interests of their friends; and it is a fine thing also, when we gain advantage from the friendship of great men, to turn it to the welfare of our community, as Polybius and Panaetius, through Scipio's goodwill towards them, conferred great benefits upon their native States[19].

As a result, it does not seem to be unusual to find a similar statement in the opening lines of a Plutarchean work whose title is, significantly, *Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum*.

The essay, clearly devoted to explaining why a wise man should have good links with the most powerful statesmen, allows us to appreciate Plutarch's thought about the question:

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[18] Plut., *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*, 824 A-B, (1960: 288-289).
[19] Plut., *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*, 814 C-D (1960: 239-241); cf. S. Swain (1996: 168-169).

Σωρκανὸν ἐγκολπίσασθαι καὶ φιλίαν τιμᾶν καὶ μετιέναι καὶ προσδέχεσθαι καὶ γεωργεῖν, πολλοῖς μὲν ἰδίᾳ πολλοῖς δὲ καὶ δημοσίᾳ χρήσιμον καὶ ἔγκαρπον γενησομένην, φιλοκάλων ἐστὶ καὶ πολιτικῶν καὶ φιλανθρώπων οὐχ ὡς ἔνιοι νομίζουσι φιλοδόξων· ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὐναντίον, φιλόδοξός ἐστι καὶ ψοφοδεὴς ὁ φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος ἀκοῦσαι λιπαρὴς τῶν ἐν ἐξουσίᾳ καὶ θεραπευτικός.

In clasping Sorcanus to our bosom, in prizing, pursuing, welcoming, and cultivating his friendship – a friendship which will prove useful and fruitful to many in private and to many in public life – you are acting like a man who loves what is noble, who is public-spirited and is a friend of mankind, not, as some people say, like one who is merely ambitious for himself. No, on the contrary, the man who is ambitious for himself and afraid of every whisper is just the one who avoids and fears being called a persistent and servile attendant on those in power[20].

Since there are clear differences between this work and the previous one – the former is devoted to a man who wants to become a politician, the latter to some-one that has the opportunity to be a counsellor of a ruler (or of *the* ruler, that is, the *princeps*) – the theme of the relations between central and local governments is present anyway. Plutarch is very careful in stressing the prospective advantages for the provinces deriving from good links between eminent wise men coming from these lands and all those who are in charge in Rome, particularly the *princeps*.

This reading slightly modifies the aforementioned model: in this work Plutarch seems to move from the theoretical idea of 'supervised pluralism' shown to his disciple Menemacus in *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* to another model that fits better with the second label I have previously sketched out, that is, 'pluralism depending on a supervised élite'. Obviously, it principally depends on the different natures and addressees of this work. The *philía*, and no more a cautious handling of internal questions, becomes the means that allows local communities to maintain their scarce autonomous pluralism.

Dio of Prusa seems to be more attracted than Plutarch by this means. He particularly stresses this aspect in his *Third Discourse on Kingship* through high-lighting how, for intellectuals coming from the outskirts of the Empire, a di-rect relation with the most eminent Roman statesmen, particularly the prince, an inclusion in his inner circle, and the prospect of becoming his counsellor are opportunities of career. They are also a means that might allow these in-tellectuals to take care of their respective homelands[21].

Dio examines and stresses the question from the perspective of effective-ness: he suggests that the *princeps* has to make the most of relations with the eminent representatives of the provinces, particularly the Hellenic ones[22], with a view to getting his voice listened to, his will respected and his commands obeyed also at the borders of the Empire.

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[20] Plut., *Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum*, 776 A-B (1960: 28-29).
[21] Cf., for example, Stadter, Van Der Stockt (2002).
[22] Cf., for example, Salmeri (2000: 86-87).

The central monism needs to be made plural in its executive and opera-
tional dimension, in order to effectively reach his targets: without a systematic
use of proxies, an enormous political system – such as the Roman Empire –
cannot run and, accordingly, survive in the long term.

The *principatus*, a young institution whose stabilization was still *in itinere*
during the first century A.D., cannot avoid finding effective means capable of
assuring cooperation by the local communities and Dio tries to present the *philía*
as a possible solution to this problem[23]. It is conceived by the orator as some-
thing wider than simple friendship. A. M. Milazzo well clarifies that it cannot be
effectively translated by the Latin word *amicitia*, but by a series of other terms
– *moderatio*, *comitas*, *levitas animi*, *civilitas*, *humanitas* – that only taken into account
as a whole are capable of conveying the complete meaning of the Dionean idea
of *philía*[24]. The scholar writes that, through this concept, Dio wants to provide
«not only a series of ideals concerning government addressed to the king, but
also to show Trajan himself and the senatorial-equestrian class how intellectuals
and collaborators (primarily the Greek ones) conceive not the charismatic but
the humanist role of the common *autokrator*» (Milazzo 2007: 56-57)[25].

Section 87 of *Third Discourse on Kingship*, in explaining this concept, allows
us to appreciate something worth highlighting in an analysis devoted to the
topic of monism-pluralism dichotomy. The orator writes:

μόνος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς πρὸς οὐδὲν οὐδὲ τῶν
ἰδίων ἱκανός ἐστι· τοῖς δὲ βασιλεῦσιν ὅσῳ
πλείω τε καὶ μείζω πράττειν ἀνάγκη,
πλειόνων δεῖ καὶ τῶν συνεργούντων
καὶ μετ᾽ εὐνοίας πλείονος. ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὰ
μέγιστα καὶ σπουδαιότατα τῶν πραγμάτων
ἢ πιστεύειν ἑτέροις ἢ προϊεσθαι.

For no one, of and by himself, is sufficient for a
single one of even his own needs; and the more and
greater the responsibilities of a king are, the greater
is the number of co-workers that he needs, and
the greater the loyalty required of them, since he is
forced to entrust his greatest and most important
interests to others or else to abandon them[26].

The key-role is played by the joined usage of the adjectives *mónos* (alone[27]) and
ikanós (sufficient[28]): monism, as absolute concept, cannot exist even in private
life. Human beings are naturally unable to be completely self-sufficient and,
accordingly, need to get out from a monist condition and move to a more
plural one.

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[23] Cf. Milazzo (2007: 51-107).
[24] Ivi, pp. 56-57 and p. 77.
[25] The English translation is mine.
[26] Dio Chrysost., *Third Discourse on Kingship*, 87 (1971: 144-145); henceforth, both the Greek ex-
cerpts and their English translations coming from this Dionean essay, are quoted in accordance
with this edition.
[27] On the significances of *mónos*, cf. Liddell, Scott (1996: 1145)
[28] On the significances of *ikanós*, cf. Liddell, R. Scott (1996: 825).

That being stated, how can the Roman *princeps* think he is able to effectively handle the Empire without sharing part of his absolute power with some selected *friends*? He cannot avoid looking for *synergói* (*co-workers*) capable of allowing him to manage the State with a view to making the most of his government. As Milazzo stresses: «This theory of regal friendship is an attempt of humanizing the Roman *dominatus* through joining the public and private spheres and making the *princeps* be not a god, but only a *primus inter amicos*» (Milazzo 2007: 82)[29].

Dio, like Plutarch, uses a metaphor coming from the medical sphere in order to highlight the significance of friendship:

καὶ μὴν τά γε ὠφέλιμα φάρμακα τοῖς μὲν νοσοῦσιν ὠφέλιμα, τοῖς δὲ ὑγιαίνουσι περιττά. φιλίας δὲ καὶ τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσιν ἀεὶ σφόδρα δεῖ καὶ τοῖς νοσοῦσιν· ἥ συμφυλάττει μὲν πλοῦτον, ἐπαρκεῖ δὲ πενίᾳ, λαμπρύνει μὲν δόξαν, μαυροῖ δὲ ἀδοξίαν.

Again, salutary drugs are salutary to the sick, but of no use to the well. Of friendship, however, men stand ever in the greatest need, whether in health or in sickness: it helps to defend wealth and relieves poverty; it adds luster to fame and dims the glare of infamy[30].

Whereas the Plutarchean doctor has to use his medicine – the scant pluralism allowed by Rome – in order to avoid that the *monist doctor* uses his drastic cure, the Dionean concept of *philía* is a sort of a double remedy: it acts to make both the monistic and the pluralist elements of the Empire get better at the same time. It assures wise political advice and protection to the *princeps*, but also that provinces are safe and well governed. The utility of this means is well explained some paragraphs later:

διὰ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν μόλις ὁρᾶν ἔστι τὰ ἐμποδῶν, διὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς πέρασι θεᾶσθαι. καὶ διὰ μὲν τῶν ὤτων οὐκ ἄν τις ἀκούσαι ἢ τῶν σφόδρα ἐγγύθεν, διὰ δὲ τῶν εὐνοούντων οὐδενὸς τῶν ἀναγκαίων ὅπουδήποτε ἀνήκοός ἐστι. καὶ τῇ μὲν γλώττῃ μόνοις τοῖς παροῦσι σημαίνει, καὶ ταῖς χερσίν, εἰ καὶ σφόδρα εἴη καρτερός, οὐκ ἂν ἐργάσαιτοπλεῖον ἔργον ἢ δύ᾿ ἀνδρῶν· διὰ δὲ τῶν φίλων δύναται καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις διαλέγεσθαι καὶ πάντων ἔργων ἐφικνεῖσθαι· οἱ γὰρ εὐνοοῦντες πάντα ἐκείνῳ συμφέροντα καὶ λέγουσι καὶ δρῶσι. τὸ δὲ δὴ πάντων παραδοξότατον, ἕνα γὰρ ὄντα ἐγχωρεῖ, ὅστις πολύφιλος, πολλὰ μὲν ἐν ταὐτῷ χρόνῳ πράττειν,περὶ πολλῶν δὲ ἅμα

With his eyes he may barely see what lies before his feet; but through his friends he may behold even that which is at the ends of the earth. With his ears he can hear nothing save that which is very near; but through those who wish him well he is without tidings of nothing of importance anywhere. With his tongue he communicates only with those who are in his presence, and with his hands, were he never so strong, he can not do the work of more than two men; but through his friends he can hold converse with all the world and accomplish every undertaking, since those who wish him well saying and doing everything that is in his interest. The most surprising thing of all, however, is that he who is rich is friends is able, although but one.

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[29] The English translation is mine; cf. Desideri (1978: 302-303).
[30] Dio Chrysost., *Third Discourse on Kingship*, 100 (1971: 148-149).

βουλεύεσθαι, πολλὰ δὲ ὁρᾶν, πολλὰ δὲ ἀκούειν, ἐν πολλοῖς δὲ ἅμα εἶναι τόποις, ὃ καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς χαλεπόν, ὡς μηδαμοῦ μηδὲν ἔρημον ἀπολείπεσθαι τῆς ἐκείνου προνοίας.

man, to do a multiplicity of things at the same time, to deliberate about many matters simultaneously, to see many things, to hear many things, and to be in many places at once – a thing difficult even for the gods – with the result that there is nothing remaining anywhere that is bereft of his solicitude[31]

As previously highlighted, effectiveness seems to be the unit of measure, the hallmark of the Dionean thought on this theme, the means capable of assuring him a prominent role both in Rome and in his homeland.

Roman monism is real monism – the power of *princeps* is and remains absolute – but the *philía* increases the opportunity that it can efficiently operate also at a local level. Echoes of Xenophon's *Cyropedia* and Aristotle's *Politics* are clear[31]; rather interestingly it is the same model that Plutarch presents to Menemacus in *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* as a very effective means to manage political power. He explains it through a famous metaphor:

ἀλλ᾽ ὡς οἱ κυβερνῆται τὰ μὲν ταῖς χερσὶ δι᾽ αὑτῶν πράττουσι, τὰ δ᾽ ὀργάνοις ἑτέροις δι᾽ ἑτέρων ἄπωθεν καθήμενοι περιάγουσι καὶ στρέφουσι, χρῶνται δὲ καὶ ναύταις καὶ πρῳρεῦσι καὶ κελευσταῖς, καὶ τούτων ἐνίους ἀνακαλούμενοι πολλάκις εἰς πρύμναν ἐγχειρίζουσι τὸ πηδάλιον. οὕτω τῷ πολιτικῷ προσήκει παραχωρεῖν μὲν ἑτέροις ἄρχειν καὶ προσκαλεῖσθαι πρὸς τὸ βῆμα μετ᾽ εὐμενείας καὶ φιλανθρωπίας, κινεῖν δὲ μὴ πάντα τὰ τῆς πόλεως τοῖς αὑτοῦ λόγοις καὶ ψηφίσμασιν ἢ πράξεσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχοντα πιστοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας ἕκαστον ἑκάστῃ χρείᾳ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον προσαρμόττειν.

But just as pilots do some things with their with their own hands but perform other duties by means of different instruments operated by different agents, thus giving a turn or a twist to the instruments while they sit apart, and they make use of sailors, look-out men, and boatswains, some of whom they often call to the stern and entrust with the tiller, just so it is fitting that the statesman should yield office to others and should invite them to the orators' platform in a gracious and kindly manner, and he should not try to administer all the affairs of the State by his own speeches, decrees, and actions, but should have good, trustworthy men and employ each of them for each particular service according to his fitness[33].

Because of the different addressees of these works, the main distinction seems to be in the sphere of application: Plutarch appeared to consider that this model was suitable to internal contexts, Dio would like to see it applied to the imperial one. The selection of the leading class is crucial for both authors like as the trust between the man in charge and his co-operators; however Plutarch is here thinking of the provincial communities, Dio to the Empire as a whole.

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[31] Xenoph., *Cyropedia*, VIII, 2; Arist., *Politics*, III, 1281b.
[32] Plut, *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae*, 812 C-D, (1960: 228-231).
[33] Dio Chrysost., *Third Discourse on Kingship*, 105-107 (1971: 150-153).

To sum up: as shown above, solutions for attuning the needs of the imperial government with those concerning the local communities have differences and similarities in Plutarch's and Dio's political ideas as they explain in the works taken into account in this essay.

The labels sketched out in the opening lines are maybe useful to understand theoretical archetypes of possible solutions, but are not tailored enough to fully clarify the historical positions of these authors during all the years of their respective political careers. Surely Plutarch seems to be more interested in local politics than Dio, though – as the case of *Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum* well explains – he appears completely aware about the context as a whole.

However, despite the differences, the *philía* seems to be a crucial aspect for both of them; it is a sort of means capable of making the monism milder by merging it with elements – very often minimal – of pluralism. In the analysed works we can see two ways to conceive the *philía*, but it appears significant enough that, in spite of the differences, both Plutarch and Dio think that it is a means to reach the ambitious target of the common good – no matter whether it is at local or central level.

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THE MILLET: AN INTERMEDIATE BODY
OF THE OTTOMAN RELIGIOUS AND LEGAL PLURALISM
Federico Donelli

Even if there still is a wide debate about the nature and the definition of the empire, most scholars agree that every empire consists of something called a 'core' and something called a 'periphery'. Furthermore, most of them agree that both 'core' and 'periphery' are situated in geographically bounded spaces inhabited by culturally differentiated elites and populations. The Ottoman Empire (1302-1923) was one of the most important and long-lived traditional empire of European history. Like others (Habsburg and Romanov) it was characterized by the vastness of the territory and by the ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity. The Ottomans successfully maintained the imperial rule over a vast domain for many centuries thanks to their intrinsic flexibility and ability to integrate diverse populations through pragmatic and tolerant policies. To do that, the Ottomans created new institutions as intermediate bodies, between the core and the peripheries culturally and geographically conceived. Among these the institution of millet represents an original example of a vertical integration model as well as an innovative instrument involved in the management of interethnic relations. The term millet, originally used to refer both to one of the religions and the religious community itself, has been used to account for the administrative and legal status of the large numbers of non-Muslim under the Ottomans between the 15th and the 20th century.

This chapter conceives the 'core-periphery' relationship as the tension between a monistic idea of power (Imperial and Islamic universalism) and a pluralistic reality characterized by religious and ethnic diversity. The chapter is divided

into three sections. The first section offers the basic view of the empire as a complex socio-political structure marked by a polyethnic and multi-religious society, drawing inside the core-periphery (monism-pluralism) structure. The second section deals with the Ottoman Empire as a pristine example of Muslim state (Caliphate) where religion was subordinate to the state and it was a major criterion for defining different groups. Finally, in the last part, the chapter concludes with an analysis of the institution of millet as vertical integration model (hub-and-spoke) able to manage religious and ethnic diversity.

2.1 Theoretical and analytic framework: the core-periphery structure of the empire

The empire as a socio-political phenomenon is particularly complex and extensive, thus making it difficult to draw conclusions about the type of social and political institution it represents. In the course of the 20th century, the empire as a state form had a "bad" reputation, and it was inexorably associated with expansionism, conquest, imperialism, arbitrariness and tyranny. Since the late 1980s, the growing challenges linked to the process of globalization – i.e. transnationalism, multiculturalism, interfaith coexistence, clash of civilizations etc. – have paved the way to a renewed interest for the imperial experiences. The new millennium saw a burst of innovative researches on the history of the traditional or typical empires, prompting a whole revaluation of their socio-political structure. Nowadays, if the future of the nation-state appears uncertain, the idea of empire is seen under a more favorable light as the imperial mentality is associated with the concept of tolerance and with the pragmatic management of ethnic and national heterogeneity.

According to the editors of the *Dictionary of Human Geography*, empire is commonly understood in its classic sense as «*an extensive territory and polity, encompassing diverse lands and peoples, that is ruled, more or less directly and effectively, by a single person*» (Gregory et al., 2011:189-190). This definition allows the editors to assert that there have been over 70 empires in history. Precisely, several theoretical proposals have been formulated in international studies of empire regarding the categorizations to classify historical empires, such as continental and overseas empire, predatory and developmental empire, and scattered and territorially contiguous empire (Hopkins 1999).

Even though literature classifies the empires in several categories, this study evaluates only one of them: the traditional empires. Traditional or typ-

ical empires were a good example of multi-ethnic state, where the sovereign authority was grounded on the principle of the subject's' loyalty, and not to the state or a form of its legitimacy. Currently, there is a wide literature about the traditional empires, and there have been many definition of them as socio-political institution (Eisenstadt 1963; Doyle 1986; Tilly 1997; Lieven 2000; Motyl 2001; Suny and Martin, 2001). Among the many definitions, this work agrees with Barkey's one, who described an empire as:

> *a large composite and differentiated polity linked to a central power by a variety of direct and indirect relations, where the core exercises political control through hierarchical and quasi-monopolistic relations over groups ethnically and religious different from itself (Barkey 2008:9).*

Historically, until the 20th century, building an empire was the most prevalent and effective way of uniting a variety of peoples and extensive territories under a single rule. It was the only way of establishing and maintaining political order in the face of cultural, ethnic, social heterogeneity. It is not surprising that this inclusive institutional entity collapsed concurrently with the emergence of the nation-state idea. Indeed, an empire was characterized by a large composite polity connected to a central power by indirect role; its life span usually had two distinct though frequently overlapping phases: an initial, relatively brief phase, characterized by military conquest and a subsequent, extended phase, known as 'system maintenance' where the main focus insists on stability. In order to remain dominant, imperial states had to find a way to handle diversity – diversity management[1] – of their polyethnic societies. Perhaps the major challenge of empire was the establishment of coherent and lasting rule over this vast array of peoples (Greene, 2005). The empires maintained control over multi-religious and multiethnic diversity through a variety of policies, from toleration of diversity and its gradual incorporation, to forced conversion and assimilation (Barkey, 2008).

The study of this chapter conceives the empire as a premodern sociopolitical form defined through the social conflict between various elites, and the balance established among the center, or core, and the different peripheries: the so-called core-periphery structure. The core carries out some military and fiscal control in each segment of its imperial domain, but tolerates the two major elements of indirect role: retention or establishment of particular, dis-

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[1] Nowadays, the social and cultural composition of societies is becoming increasingly diverse. This diversity has turned policy-makers attention to the management of cultural differences, which is usually known as diversity management. The diversity management defined an organization's culture and systems to ensure that all people are given the opportunity to contribute to the common goals of the organization Hon and Bruner (2000).

tinct compacts for the government of each segment; and exercise of power through intermediaries who enjoy considerable autonomy within their own domains in return for the delivery of compliance, tribute and military collaboration with the center (Tilly 1997). Motyl (1999) points out that when we refer to empires we should keep in mind that they are not so much "states" as "systems". According to him, «these systems are substantially supported by the operation of a sovereign structure, that of core-periphery» (Motyl 1999:124). The core-periphery structure reflected an hub-and-spoke network, where each spoke was attached to the center but was less directly related to the others. More specifically, Galtung (1971) noted that the center performs the work of exclusive political mediator for the periphery and as a result excludes the possibility of interaction between peripheries. According to him, there are four rules defining core-periphery interaction structure in an empire:

1. Interaction between center and periphery is vertical;
2. Interaction between periphery and periphery is missing;
3. Multilateral interaction involving all three is missing;
4. Interaction with the outside world is monopolized by the center, with two implications:
   A. Periphery interaction with other centers is missing;
   B. Center as well as periphery interaction with periphery nations belonging to other center nations is missing (Gultung, 1971:89-90).

As Barkey (2008) underlined, the fact that imperial relations were vertically integrated, and that peripheral entities communicated mainly with the center and with one another only through the center, provided centers with added control over the various peripheral entities.

In summary, the success of empire was based on the resolution of two conflicting ideas: segmentation and integration. Even if the basic definitional aspect of empire that has been used time and again is 'divide and rule', this work assumes the 'hub-and-spoke metaphor' instead. The structure of core-periphery relations maintains both the provision of goods and services to the center and makes peripheral elites dependent on the center. Peripheral entities were forced to communicate only with the center rather than with one another. However, to rule over vast territories and to ensure their military and administrative presence, imperial states negotiated and willingly relinquished some degree of autonomy. For this reason, empires reproduced themselves in peripheral hubs that display an internal hierarchy analogous to that of the center. The main argument of this chapter is that the core-periphery relationship constituted a key element of imperial political structure, useful to manage diversity, harmonizing a pluralistic reality thanks to an intermediate body (millet) conceived as a monistic institution.

2.2 The Ottoman context an example
of multi-religious and multiethnic empire

The Ottoman Empire, founded at the end of the 13th century and collapsed in the first quarter of the 20th century, was one of the longest-lived empires history ever recorded. The conquest of Constantinople by Mehmet the Conqueror in 1453 was an important step in becoming a world scale empire. By this conquest, the Ottoman sultan inherited the long-lived Roman rule and acquired several titles, including "Caesar" (*Rum Kayseri*), with the feeling of dominating the whole world. The new kingdom reached from Vienna in the West to Basra in the East, and from Russia in the North to the Indian Ocean in the South. At the height of its power in the 16th century, it comprised an area of about 19.9 million km^2, though much of it was under indirect control of the central government. Most important, in these immense territories, the Ottomans ruled over many nations, communities and religious groups (Kafadar 1994; Faroqhi 1995; Anscombe 2014).

The establishment of Ottoman administration across new domains took different forms and different times in different places. According to Cleveland (2013) the Ottomans' success was due to their official recognition that the diversity of the territories over which they ruled required the adoption of flexible administrative practices that could accommodate the needs of different religions and different cultures. The Ottomans integrated peripheries into the central state, while also maintaining their distinct identities, and keeping them separate from other local elites (Bragg 2014). Rather than imposing a clean break with the past, the Ottomans tended to preserve pre-existing arrangements (Finkel 2005). They negotiated between the contradictory yet also complementary, visions and organizational forms of urban and rural, Muslim and non-Muslim, Sunni Muslim, Shiites and Sufi sects, but they also created a hybrid civilization that means a civilization that contains elements of different traditions that are brought together by institutional bricolage (Stark and Bruszt 1998).

In all empires, rulers claim the right to be in power, and the population accepts this claim. Thus, one of the most sensitive issues was about power legitimacy of the empire. For centuries the Ottomans were a strong imperial polity that claimed Islam as their main source of legitimacy. This claim remained a potent source of Islamic unity and strength outwards, but within the empire, Islam played a more constrained role (Barkey 2014). In the Ottoman Empire the loyalty to the dynasty had no ethnic or religious nature since the Ottomans had built a dynastic legitimation that accepted and promoted only the descendants of Osman's family as the legitimate heirs to the throne (Finkel 2005). In

fact, legitimacy was not based on Islam, but on the notion of normative order. This was imagined and maintained by the Ottomans following the concept of a 'well-ordered society' or 'world order' (*nizam-I alem*). The well-ordered society was the rationale of the state's attitude also toward religious and ethnic diversity. Furthermore, the *nizam-I alem* was a vital plank in the ideological platform on which the legitimacy of the ruling house rested (Zilfi 2010). For these reasons, despite loyalty and devotion to the religious world of Orthodox Sunni Islam, Ottoman society for centuries remained free of large-scale religious conflict (Kuru and Stepan 2012).

The main pillar of the state-society relations was the concept of justice (*adalet*), that was conceived primarily in terms of protective relations between the sultan and his subjects. This because, according to the concept of *adalet*, the subjects would be induced to work hard and produce more if they were satisfied with their conditions of life (Karpat 2002). Thus, in order to protect the world order, the sultan had a duty to provide justice to all its subjects, Muslim or non-Muslim, treating everyone, regardless of their ethnic or religious standing, as equals.

At the early stage of the nascent empire, the polyethnic society was divided into two segments regardless of ethnicity or religious affiliation: the rulers (*askerî*), military or administrative class, performed some public function as the delegates of the sultan and was thereby officially exempted from all taxation; and the ruled class (*reâyâ*), literally the 'flock', who pursued productive activities and therefore paid taxes (Shaw 1976; Itzkowitz 2008). The latter consisted of three categories: the peasants, city dwellers and nomads. The *reâyâ* were further set apart from the *askerî* class by sumptuary laws that regulated their dress and prevented them from riding horses or carrying swords (Quataert 1997). It should be emphasized that in the Ottoman Empire there never was dominant ethnic group or ethnic elite.

The Ottomans established an Islamic empire (Ottoman Caliphate) after the conquest of the Arab lands in the early 16th century, and the Sultan also became the leader (Caliph) of the Sunni Islamic community. However, within the Ottoman Empire the relationship between religion and state had peculiar features. In the Ottoman Empire, although Islam was understood as the religion of the state, it was subordinate to the *raison d'état*. This characteristic differentiates the Ottomans from their Arab predecessors, Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates. In other words, religion functioned as an institution of the state (Barkey 2008). Islam in the Ottoman Empire represented chiefly a world view, a set of ideas, institutions, and practices that actors believed, interpreted, and lived their lives according to. As Clifford Geertz (1968: 98) argued, religions are «frames of perception, symbolic screens through which experience is interpreted and they are guides for action, blueprints for conduct».

The Ottomans created a strong Islamic religious identity, yet taming it through state-dominated and state-guided administrative structure. Islam was not institutionally dominant because the Ottoman state nurtured and maintained a particular separation between religion as an institution and religion as a system of meanings and relations (Kuru and Stepan 2012). Religion as an institution would help administer the empire. Religion as a system of beliefs would provide the tools for every day practice (Mardin 1969). Thus, in the Ottoman Empire religion was mostly functional to the needs of the state and contributed to the segmented integration of groups into the state, by making religious institutions compliant to its interests.

Broadly, religion not only became the leading element of identity but it also represented the mechanism of integration as well as the main principle of horizontal cleavage among subjects (Muslim and non-Muslim). In the Ottoman domains religious identity determined a person's legal and political status (Karpat 2002). Although the Ottoman Empire was predominantly Muslim, it allowed non-Muslims to practice their religion and conduct their community affairs provided that they would exhibit loyalty to the Ottoman rulers and pay their taxes. Since the expansion period (1300-1500) the Ottomans accepted diversity, and pursued policies of accommodation known as *istimalet* (Lowry 2003). This attitude towards non-Muslim groups contributed meaningfully to the developement of a form of religious tolerance that contrasted to the so-called persecuting society of the medieval West (Moore 1990). As Rodrigue (2013) suggested, Ottomans understood difference and accepted it as such, showing no effort to transform difference into sameness.

Most scholars considered Ottoman toleration[2] borrowed from an Islam body of thought and practice that recognized non-Muslim subjects as second-class status. Indeed, according to the Koran the "Peoples of the Book" (Christians and Jews), also referred to as *dhimmi* (protected), could not be forced to convert to Islam with violence, and they were given the rights to live within an Islamic state and to practice their own religion, paying the *cizye* (special tax of protection), and maintaining some administrative and legal functions (Emon 2012). Certainly, Islam provided the legal framework for the state's acknowledgment of other religious groups. However, toleration as developed by Ottomans, had a little to do with ideals or with culture of toleration. The Ottomans attitude to religious diversity was actually a pragmatic way to qualify and maintain the differences within the empire, to organize the different communities, to establish peace and order, and to ensure the loyalty of these communities (Barkey 2008). Precisely, in terms of diversity management practices, the Ottoman government utilized a pragmatic, non-ideological style

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[2] This work assumes toleration as the absence of persecution of a people but not their complete acceptance into society as full and welcomed members or communities.

of rule and granted broad autonomy to diverse groups in order to maintain public order and prevent internal violence (Levy 2000). The Islamic set of guidelines for Muslim-non-Muslim relations facilitated the integration of the non-Muslim communities, but crucial was the convergence of other elements such as the openness of the Ottoman leaders to the 'other' and the relatively weaker Islamic identification of the rulers that allowed a unique experience of permissiveness and forbearance. This attitude was the outcome of the historic Ottoman path or 'path dependence' marked by the assimilation of customs and practices by various civilization including Seljuk, Mongols and Byzantium (Lowry 2003). The ancient tribal practices (*yāsā*), Seljuk filter of Islam, Mongols customs (*'örf*) and Byzantine administrative system had several effects on the Ottomans diversity management policies, especially in the early period. Thus, toleration emerged as the negotiated outcome of intergroup relations and was maintained in the first three centuries of Ottoman rule, both from the top down by the state and from the bottom up by communities where each shared an interest in the maintenance of intercommunal peace and order.

The set of regulations and practices shaping the relation of the Ottoman Empire's ruling class with its non-Muslim subjects is commonly referred to as the millet system (Braude, Lewis 1980)[3]. The word millet, literally means 'nation', was used to define religious groups who were subjects of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, all through Ottoman history, the term millet was used to refer to minorities and the term "minority" was never applied until Lausanne Treaty in 1923 (Atabay et al. 2008). The Ottomans allowed the "religions of the Book" to be organized in communities: the Orthodox Christians or Rums, the Armenians and the Jews (Ercan 2000). The Ottomans dispensed justice fairly, treating *dhimmi* as separate, unequal, and protected (Yetişgin 2007). According to the millet system, which is the primary mechanism to manage the internal affairs, minorities enjoyed wide latitude of religious and cultural freedom, as well as administrative, fiscal and legal autonomy (Atabay et al. 2008). There were two fundamental obligations for millet's members: paying taxes and sustaining public order (Ortayli 2004). State taxes were collectively assessed by the local Ottoman authorities to the local community as a whole, but the amount was generally set through negotiations between the community leadership and the local authorities (Levy 2000).

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[3] The modern historiography shows that the use of term millet is quite recent and concerns mainly the 19th century. The term is not reduced in the beginning of the Ottoman period, in the 14th and 15th centuries. So the use of the term millet as a nation and religious community is not that old in the Ottoman history. The term has for this reason been labelled as an 'historical fetish' plaguing the historiography of the last hundred years. The terms that they mean a religious community are the terms *takin*, *cemaat* and *tâ'ife*. The term millet was almost non-existent at the duration of the 15th and 16th centuries while in the 17th century it is used in order to describe a religious community. The term that is used more often by the Ottoman administration is the term *tâ'ife*, who is replaced finally in the beginning of the 19th century Braude, Lewis (1980).

2.3 The Ottoman institution of millet

During the 16th century the Ottoman Empire witnessed the foundation of its political and social institutions that were to last until modern times. In order to his power to be effective, the Ottomans attempted to control their population as much as possible through the centralization of government. This attitude led them to develop and support strong hierarchical administrative structures for the different communities (Levy 2000). The government (core) shared control on peripheries with a variety of intermediate organizations and with local elites, religious and local governing bodies, and numerous other privileged institutions, creating an 'hub-and-spoke' structure. Ottoman core-peripheral structure was not direct between state and individual subjects, rather, intermediate bodies, networks, and elites mediated the relationship. The main organizational unit of the Ottoman Empire was the community. Religious communities, local administrative community units, and guilds as economic communities represented the means through which Ottomans administered and controlled society (Barkey 2008).

The Empire's domains linked three continents encompassing an array of cultures, languages, peoples and various social and political structures. Diversity in the Ottoman Empire was due to many different factors like ethnicity (Arabs, Kurds, Laz, Tcherkess, Greeks, Albanians), language (Arabic, Kurdish, Turkish, Greek, Bulgarian, Armenian, Albanian, Serbian), and religion (Orthodox, Gregorian, Jewish, Catholic). However, a major criterion for defining different groups in the Ottoman Empire was religion (Mardin 1977; Anscombe 2014). In a society segmented along religious lines, a special place among the intermediate bodies was of the non-Muslim confessional communities known as nation (*millet*). The religious community (*millet*) progressively acquired institutional status and were recognized by the Ottoman state as a mechanism of social and political control.

The Ottoman state organized and administered a system of religious and communal rule as a version of indirect rule known as the millet system (Greene 2005). The millet system was to some extent an improved version of Islamic *dhimmi* system for pragmatic reasons (Cleveland 2013). At the early years of the Empire, there were four main religious groups, namely the Muslims, the Orthodox Christians, the Gregorian Armenians and the Jews. Communities had their own organizational structures, a dominant church hierarchy, and their leaders were coopted as intermediaries and peacekeepers between state/core (hub) and community/periphery (spoke). Three non-Muslim millets were organized around their dominant religious institutions, with the understanding that religious institutions would define and delimit collective life. All non-Mus-

lims subjects had to be part of a millet in order to be considered as citizens of the Ottoman Empire (Braude and Lewis 1980).

The millet system was a vehicle for administrative purposes (Hovannisian 1997; Göçek 2005). In this system, all minorities freely engaged in their daily activities and their own economic, educational, cultural, social and religious affairs. The millet institution was a quasi autonomous unit which performed functions in legislative, judicial, fiscal, religious and charitable affairs and were responsible for educating their members. Inside them, community's members enjoyed the same liberty and rights as Muslims. Privacy of residence, liberty of religion and thought, liberty of education, right to have access to public utilities and employment right were all recognized to non-Muslims, provided that they belonged to a millet. They were free to establish and maintain their houses of worship, own educational institutions, own welfare institutions and own community courts. They were also permitted to collect their own internal taxes (Ursinus 1993).

The three main non-Muslims groups were incorporated and administrated differently, but the main similarity was the establishment in each case of intermediaries who managed relations for the state, reproducing hub-and-spoke structure. The Greek Orthodox millet was recognized in 1454, the Armenian in 1461 while the Jewish millet remained without a declared definite status for a while though it was unofficially recognized around the same time as the other two (McCarthy 1973; Ben-Naeh 2008).

The top of ecclesiastical hierarchy of non-Muslim communities become the institution of indirect rule par excellence within the Ottoman hub-and-spoke structure. Each millet was headed by its own religious dignitary: Ecumenical Patriarch in the case of the Greek Orthodox, a Catholicos in the case of Armenian community, and a Chief Rabbi in the case of the Jews. The millets had freedom in electing their religious leaders but the elected leaders were approved by the Sultan. Through the sultan's decree of investiture (*berat*) the leader of each millet was in charge as a public servant with the title of *millet başi*. The millet başi, a high ranking paşa entitled to three horse tails (*tuğs*), was accountable to the Sultan for the loyalty of his community and was the chief interlocutor of the Sublime Port (Kenanoğlu 2004). In other words, the millet başi recognized as Ottoman official, was held responsible for any act of rebellion committed by millet members against the state.

These mediators were expected to maintain inter-religious and inter-ethnic peace. Moreover, community leaders, alongside the central state, were interested in preserving the status quo as well as communities boundaries. These intermediaries were controlled by the state, and often were unappreciated by their religious communities. Moreover, although the clerics might have had a leader position in the millet hierarchy, this was always tempered by the local

notables' and laity' s economic and political power. This balance reflected the one that could be found within Muslim community between the *ulama* class and the province notables (*ayan*). The potential power of the confessional leaders was diminished by the Ottoman acceptance of millet secular leadership acting to balance ecclesiastical concerns (Karpat 2002).

The millet system was a socio-cultural and communitarian form of organization which was based primarily on sectarian identity, and only secondarily on linguistic and ethnic features (Karpat 1980). Nonetheless, each millet had its own internal complexity of competing leaders and institutions which reflected different ethnic groups. For example, the Greek Orthodox millet, the biggest one, included Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Romanians, Vlachos, Bosnians and the inhabitants of southern Albania. Since the Ottoman government gave little or no consideration to millet ethnic or religious differences, the local church and village communities took over as the strongholds of cultural identity and linguistic continuity (Hupchick 1993). As Karpat (1980: 147) summarized, the millet system allowed individual communities to retain their local ethnic and linguistic distinctiveness, and thus produced a system of "*simultaneously, religious universality and local parochialism*". Relative segregation as well as the freedom to give an education in their own schools allowed each group to preserve its own language, customs and culture, observe its festivals and holidays and in general live in accordance with the rhythm of its own calendar and traditions (Levy 2000).

Even though the imperial pattern of vertical integration (hub-and-spoke) was reproduced in religious administration and boundaries were maintained by each side, relations among communities flourished in the everyday interactions (Goffman 1994: 135-158). Contacts of each community with other groups led to considerable acculturation and borrowing, which affected language and every other aspect of culture and daily life (Levy 2000). This because where religion and key institutional policies clearly demarcated boundaries between Muslims and non-Muslims, other institutions, such as markets (*bazaar*), neighborhoods (*mahalle*) and everyday practices, made possible the flow from one community to others (Barkey 2008). The presence of safe boundaries among communities and the tolerant and impartial attitude of the Ottoman state favored a long period of peaceful interreligious and interethnic cohabitation, known as *Pax-Ottomanica* (Aydin 2010). Especially, the classical period in Ottoman history has been expressed as Ottoman Peace due to this diverse peaceful coexistence (Ercan 2000).

In addition to a long peaceful cohabitation, one of the main privileges of millet was the high level of social cooperation; each millet's member shared a common life without being assimilated by a larger community or culture (Yetişgin 2007). The boundaries between the different communities were

definite but fluid, and there were public spaces where the entire population, Muslims and non-Muslims, freely mixed, could create an intercultural environment. In this particular environment, intercommunity relations facilitated the rise of multilingualism, which contributed to the general Ottoman cultural synthesis.

Non-Muslim communities were subject to their own ethnoreligious groups in the field of private law, and in public law they were subject to state law. Even if the millets had their own community courts, the problems between Muslims and non-Muslims were subject to Islamic law and the state authorities, namely kadı, judged them. Yet, within the Ottoman context state law was plural because both religious law (Şeriat/Sharī'a) and secular or ordinary law (*kânûn*) were in force. The Şeriat provided the principle of public law, and covered matters of personal behaviour and status in the Muslim millet in the same way that members of Christian and Jewish millets were subject to their own religious codes (Heyd 1973; Sonyel 1993). This picture shows how the millet system was not only a structure which guaranteed religious pluralism, but also a model of legal pluralism. The different sources of law were exercised by the religious and administrative authorities of the empire and were welded together or separated out of local necessity (Gerber 1999). Moreover, Islam's blueprint for ruling non-Muslims communities allowed the communities to maintain their own religious tribunals with jurisdiction over personal law (Ross 2013). As Richard Ross (2013) elegantly shows, legal pluralism in the Ottoman Empire was linked with the special relationship established between state and religion, with the latter subordinate to the first; the fact that religious law never dominated as a single source of law was important for Ottoman state and society.

The historiographical interest and debate about the millet system is still very heated. According to Braude and Lewis (1980) the millet system was not an empire wide system that was regulating the communities of the non-Muslim subjects of the empire during the 15th and 16th centuries beyond the capital, but this happened only when the Tanzimat reforms took place. Ursinus (1993), on the other hand, refers to millet to define a religious community during the pre-modernization era of the empire, and the term was used by Ottomans in order to describe the religious non-Muslim communities that were living in the ottoman state. The sure thing is that the Ottoman pluralism, religious and legal, as well as Ottomans ability in managing diversity contributed in the end to strengthen the stability of the Empire.

2.4 Conclusion

The millet system functioned well until the European concepts of nationalism and ethnicity filtered into the Ottoman Empire, in the second half of the 19th century. During the long 1800s several changes took place which altered the land tenure system, the social arrangement, the communal organization, and ultimately the social structure and leadership of the millets. Until then, the millet contributed to the preservation of a separate identity and, eventually, to the generation of a nationalist consciousness distinct from that of Ottoman Muslims. This trend was facilitated by reform programs promoted by the Ottoman government, known as *Tanzimat* (Reorganization). The equality of all Ottoman nationals was the leading policy of the reforms. The Ottoman administration tried to instill a sense of common identity and significance of patriotism in the population: the Ottoman identity (*Osmanlılık*). With the statement of equality of all the subjects of the empire, the Muslims felt they lost the essential superiority they possessed regarding the non-Muslims (Davison, 1990). Meanwhile, non-Muslims were susceptible to the ideas of equality and nationalism emanating from the French Revolution.

As Levy (2000) accurately emphasized the Ottoman millet system was not an original Ottoman innovation, but it had its origins in earlier Middle Eastern states, both Muslim (Umayyad, Abbasid) and non-Muslim (Persian, Byzantine). The Ottoman contribution was mainly to regulate and institutionalize it, pay greater attention to its proper operation, and bring it down from medieval times to the 20th century. The Ottoman flexible and pragmatic approach to diversity was institutionalized into millet, displaying a mosaic pattern, in which non-Muslims enjoyed a partial autonomy (Davison, 1980). The Ottoman Empire was able to establish mainly a plural organization, which had assisted them to gain the benefits of diversity.

As the evaluations of this chapter suggest, the Ottoman organization was mainly plural in its nature, as the diverse religious communities could preserve their style of living as well as becoming part of the Ottoman population. In other words, the Ottoman diverse management could be consider an experience where a hierarchical institution conceived under unifying principle of religious identity, how was the millet, guaranteed for several years a pluralistic reality.

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Political pluralism and the unity of humankind: the image of the *respublica magna* in Alberico Gentili's reflection
Davide Suin

Alberico Gentili[1] (1552-1608)'s political doctrine develops in an historical context marked by bitter tensions. In his multiform work, the author gives us a viewpoint open to the different contributions offered by late-Sixteenth Century Europe's theoretical and institutional changes.

The Reformation had undermined the ethical and religious monism on which every theoretical construction of political order in *Respublica christiana* was based: the religious conflicts that tore apart Europe in the second half of the XVI century were also caused by the discovery of the plurality of values and principles founding ethical order and political laws.

In his *Mémoire sur la pacification des troubles* (1561) Étienne de La Boétie (1530-1563) had expressed this opinion:

> *Ogni male proviene dalla differenza religiosa, che è proceduta così avanti, che uno stesso popolo, soggetto a uno stesso potere, si trova ora scisso chiaramente in due parti: non solo sono differenti le opinioni, ma esistono ormai diverse chiese e diversi capi, opposte obbedienze, un diverso ordine, una diversa disciplina della religione; in breve, a causa di ciò esistono due Stati diversi, l'uno all'altro contrapposti (Quaglioni 2004: 73).*

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[1] Gentili, born in San Ginesio in 1552, graduated in law in Perugia (1572). He abandoned Italy in 1579 to reach England in 1580 where he became a brilliant academic jurist and lawyer. Biographical notes are in Molen van der (1937); Panizza (1981); De Benedictis (1999a: 245-251); Ragoni (2000).

Religious foundation of power is no more an instrument of obedience and political submission; it becomes cause of the disintegration of political and social order. State existence as a unitary and monist entity seems to be compromised.

New horizons were opening to a critical reflection on the faint foundations of reality. Gentili is witness to a phenomenon of crisis in European conscience: the dissolution of old socio-political relationships was combined with a veiled relativism in the individual conscience. The same Gentili adopts a relativistic approach to the issue of religion and of the relationship between the religious and political spheres. He reads reality with skeptical rationalism and distrusts the possibility of reaching a complete knowledge about Truth and God: this is why religious differences and peaceful interreligious and inter-confessional coexistence should be guaranteed.

Even if on the religious side Gentili accepts pluralism by means of toleration – because «quelli che sono posseduti dall'umano errore e, pur mossi dal desiderio del bene, non seguono una buona religione, non vanno per questo contro il diritto naturale» and so they should be tolerated (Gentili A. 2008: 60) – on the political side Gentili is a firm defender of State monism. Unity and cohesion, threatened by religious divisions, must be guarded in the State: theological and religious differences should be solved, or at least lessened by this common belonging to the monist body of the State.

Sovereign States were replacing the Medieval universal empire, the modern system of States was developing as a pluralist community: uneven on both political and religious sides.

On the political side, Gentili's approach is strongly inspired by relativism, especially regarding study of the forms of government (Panizza 2002: 59-213). He elects effectiveness in the exercise of power as the only criterion to evaluate politics: a power is sovereign when effective and continuous (Suin 2015: 431-448). This idea leads Gentili to recognize the plurality of the centers of power and legitimize the countless manifestations of sovereignty.

The author, by abandoning the traditional interpretative categories of political experience (in particular the classic distinction between good and evil forms of government), assumes a position near to relativism. Gentili raises the principle of *supremitas* – a power *superiorem non recognoscens* – to the only measure of evaluation of political legitimacy and affirms the equal value and dignity of the different constitutions: there are no good or degenerate forms of government.

Gentili's reflection is expression of a common tendency in late-Sixteenth cultural climate: politics was conceived as a theory of obedience to power, it was reduced to the problem of effectiveness of power and to the force of the sovereign authority: this is the only guarantee of peace and order.

This approach explains the absence, in Gentili's theory, of a systematic reflection on the forms of government: Gentili does not single out the best constitution. In *De iure belli* (1598) the Italian jurist, evoking Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592)'s reflection[2], argues: «Come ogni animale ha il suo verso, così ciascuno Stato ha la sua forma di governo: ad alcuni si adatta la democrazia, ad altri l'oligarchia, ad altri ancora il governo di uno solo» (Gentili A. 2008: 493).

Realistically Gentili, neglecting the traditional binomial *princeps-tyrannus*, reduces the category of tyranny to a merely ethical side supporting the absolutist tendencies of Modern monarchies.

Bodin and Machiavelli had strongly contributed to the diffusion of an image of sovereignty as *potestas absoluta*: a power, which consists of the derogation of laws and, *pro salute reipublicae*, to moral principles too (Quaglioni 1992; Id. 2004). A new image of sovereignty was asserting itself in political doctrine while the category of tyranny was gradually being eroded by modern civil jurists.

Alberico Gentili plays a central role in this process. He refutes the clear distinction between good prince and tyrant: they enjoy same rights because «uterque dominus est» and «uterque tenet principatum» (Gentili A. 1585: 53). Often, Gentili affirms in *De armis Romanis* (1599), «creditur principatus, quae saeva dominatio est» (Gentili A. 2011: 114).

Sometimes tyranny, argues Gentili in *De iure belli*, appears to be the best solution to save power and to ensure the safety of the State: «Si dice anche che la tirannide può essere una buona cosa per uno stato lacerato, perché c'è bisogno di qualcuno che vi porti la pace: il tiranno allora è come un principe» (Gentili A. 2008: 493).

The category of tyranny *ex parte exercitii* is demolished: like a good prince, the tyrant should be considered legitimate for being sovereign and owner of an effective and unbroken power. Subjects can't rebel to the prince, not even to the *princeps malus*: they must «obbedire al sommo magistrato» (Gentili A. 2008: 74) and, if ruled cruelly, they have as only possibility the escape or the intervention of a foreign sovereign (Gentili A. 2008: 75, 108-114).

In *De armis Romanis*, political treatise in which the author focuses on Roman imperialism, Gentili moves to Brutus, the murderer of Caesar, this objection: «Obsistere potueris invadenti principatum: factum principem tollere non potuisti» (Gentili A. 2011: 38).

Resistance to authority, if not explicitly allowed – as happens in the German Empire where the Emperor is not sovereign (Bodin 1988: 391-392) –, is unlawful.

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[2] Montaigne in his *Essays* (1588) had affirmed: «E certo tutte quelle descrizioni di governi, immaginate per arte, si trovano ridicole e inadatte ad esser messe in pratica. Quelle grandi e lunghe discussioni sulla miglior forma di società e sulle regole più utili per tenerci uniti, sono discussioni convenienti soltanto all'esercizio del nostro spirito […] e non hanno alcuna vita fuori di lì» (1970: 1273).

In *Regales disputationes* (1605), conclusion of a reflection mostly aimed at the legitimation of European monarchies' absolutist tendencies, Gentili – by referring to Roman law and Scriptural tradition – observes that tyrannized subjects can only hope in God's justice: solely God can remove evil rulers from power (Gentili A. 1605: 99-132). Anyway, Gentili's absolutist position in *Regales disputationes* should not be read as the election of absolute monarchy to the rank of the best constitution.

Prudently, the Italian jurist recognizes absolute and centralized monarchy as the only answer to political and institutional instability: a strong monarchy could guarantee the endurance of peace and security in England.

The absolutist solution offered in *Regales disputationes* is inspired by Iustus Lipsius' political reflection[3], in particular the three conclusive books of his *Politicorum libri sex* (1589): emblem (together with the successful *De Constantia*, 1584[4]) of late-renaissance neo-stoicism[5]. With the Flemish humanist Gentili shared, beyond the pragmatic approach to the question of relation between politics and ethics[6], the concept of absolute monarchy as a bastion against the crisis of political community and as an efficient answer to the threats of civil and religious conflicts[7]. This concept, in Lipsius' theory, was combined with the affirmation of subjection to authority as an ethical value.

In *De iure belli* Gentili refutes Lipsius' theory on religious policy (Gentili A. 2008: 63, 66-67) – the Flemish humanist treated this question principally in the Book IV of *Politicorum libri sex* and in *De una religione adversus Dialogistam liber* – and the ambiguous definition of war offered by Lipsius in Book V of the same work where, Gentili affirms, the humanist «attribuisce dignità di guerra

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[3] The Flemish humanist is constantly quoted in Gentili's works. Lipsius, editor of several modern publications of Tacitus' works (1574, 1576, 1581, 1585, 1588, 1589, 1600, 1607) and commentaries to the Latin author, is yet mentioned in Gentili's *De legationibus* (1585). We have a reference to Lipsius' commentary to Tacitus' *Annales* (1581) in Gentili A. (1585:27).

[4] The work was translated in English in 1604.

[5] The fortunate *Politicorum sive civilis doctrinae libri sex* appears in English translation in 1594. Also Guillaume du Vaur's *La Philosophie Morale des Stoiques* (1585) had great significance in the diffusion of Stoic tradition, the work was printed in English in 1598: *The Moral Philosophie of the Stoicks*. The interest for stoic tradition is testified by the important editions of Seneca promoted by Erasmo, Lipsius (1605) and Marc-Antoine Muret (1585). On Lipsius' edition of Seneca and his introduction to the Latin author (*Manuductio in Stoicam Philosophiam*, 1604) see Isnardi Parente (2008: 169-186).

[6] Lipsius' pragmatism is evident in the election of precautionary prudence to first virtue of the Prince. By referring to this virtue, the author formulates the expression *prudentia mixta*, a faded reference to Renaissance virtue of prudence as art of behaviour and technique of mediation between ethics and utility: prudence permits the composition of the irreconcilable conflict between praxis and moral laws. See Provvidera (2012).

[7] These themes are central in Lipsius' doctrine, as we can infer from the reading of his copious correspondence in the years 1584-1589.

anche alla violenza di privati cittadini e di predoni» and «non fa alcun cenno alla giustizia» (Gentili A. 2008: 17).

However the importance of Lipsius in Gentili's formation is undeniable: Gentili accepts and reworks Lipsius' idea of *prudentia mixta* and the study of the Flemish philologist conveyed him the political value of Tacitus' works.

In the dedication, addressed to the *Ordinibus Bataviae*, of Lipsius' commentary to *Annales* (1581) the Latin author is seen as master of political prudence: Tacitus had read recurring events in human history and *similitudo temporum* as sources of descriptive principles for political action (Lipsius 1581). In a note in Book IV of *Politicorum libri sex* Lipsius had expressed this opinion: «Tacito sembra essere autore oscuro tuttavia ammetto che la sua scrittura è penetrante e acuta. Raccomando la sua lettura ai consiglieri dei principi come guida per la loro azione politica e per la loro prudenza» (Provvidera 2012: 200).

Prudence, aimed at peace and stability of the State (the highest form of utility and the aim of politics), is for Lipsius and Gentili the principal virtue of a politician.

Tacitus, edited by Filippo Beroaldo il Giovane[8], Beathus Rhenanus and Iustus Lipsius, was a recurring source in the late-Sixteenth political debate (Barcia 2003: 43-58). Giovanni Botero in the premised dedication to *Ragion di Stato* (1589) had observed that «nelle corti di re e principi grandi, or di qua or di là dai monti» he had heard talking about Reason of State and «in cotal materia citare ora Nicolò Machiavelli ora Cornelio Tacito» (Baldini, Battista 1997: 398).

It has been observed that Tacitus' works, in particular *Annales* and *Historiae*, have been plagiarized in order to support the most various doctrinal positions: Tacitus was recalled by republican authors as by absolutist ones. Iustus Lipsius had realized the double potentiality of Tacitus' historical treaties: in his over-quoted commentary to Tacitus the Flemish humanist had caught the anti-monarchical implications in Tacitus' depiction of Tiberius, while in *Politicorum libri sex* the Latin author was quoted to corroborate absolutism and subjection to authority.

Giuseppe Toffanin, in his classic work consecrated to the study of modern Tacitism, has widely investigated Tacitus' reception in late-Sixteenth political debate: his partition of Tacitism into three macro-currents is surely fascinating but equally inadequate to explain the use of Tacitus in political literature and Gentili's position (Toffanin 1972).

Gentili's reflection is mostly extraneous to ideological confrontation between anti-monarchical and absolutist authors. Gentili's intention is not to single out

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[8] Beroaldo, in his dedicatory letter premised to the *editio princeps* of Tacitus (1515), had underlined the political interest of Tacitus' writings. In relation to Tacitus' works the editor had affirmed: «summe utilem cum privatis hominibus tum vero etiam principibus et imperatoribus»; the quotation is in Valeri (2011: 257).

the best form of government or an ideal theoretical model, he aims to describe the reality of power and searches for a mediation between politics and ethics.

Tacitus is not quoted in order to support republican or monarchical political values, from the Latin author's works Gentili extracts *exempla* of political prudence: Tacitus is master of political realism, he is a forerunner of Machiavelli's.

Guicciardini observed that Tacitus «insegna a' tiranni e modi di fondare la tirannide» and «a chi vive sotto a' tiranni il modo di vivere e governarsi prudentemente» (Guicciardini 1994: 10): in Gentili these are not the only teachings of Tacitus', Tacitus has revealed *arcana* of politics and the iron-clad reason of a power seen as secrecy and deceit.

In one letter, collected in the second book of the work *Lectionum et epistolarum quae ad ius civile pertinent* (1583-1584), Gentili refers to Tacitus by defining *arcana imperii* as «rationes, et consilia, quae dum maxime inducunt, firmant[q]ue tyrannidem, hanc protinus, maximeque tegunt» (Gentili A. 1583-1584: 117)[9]. *Arcana imperii* are instruments, intrigues and stratagems which hide *dominatio*, tyranny: Gentili asserts the coincidence of the two terms *dominatio* and *tyrannis* in Latin culture (Gentili A. 1583-1584: 117).

As Gentili affirmed in the conclusion of the letter, in Latin political language *dominatio* and *tyrannis* were synonyms: both are expressions of *imperium* (Gentili A. 1583-1584: 117).

Ancient and modern history offer several illustrious examples of tyrannical rulers and, as Gentili clarifies in the third book of *De legationibus*, Machiavelli has uncovered the *arcana* of power to oppressed peoples[10]. However tyrannized subjects (as Gentili diffusely asserts in the third disputation of the treatise *Regales disputationes*) cannot oppose any form of active resistance to sovereign authority. Violent resistance to the sovereign, as well as being illegitimate (because the ruler is responsible for his actions only to God), damages the political community: rebellion and the overthrow of government cause instability in the State and conduce to death and ruin[11].

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[9] Scipione Gentili, Alberico's brother, would offer a more detailed definition of *arcana imperii* in his *Oratio de Lege Regia, de Imperio Principis* (1600) where he gives a definition inspired to the most recent developments in the debate on Reason of State: «Arcana […] imperii non Principem & Imperatorem solum respicere, sed ipsius Reipublicae in universum salutem, tranquillitatem, atque amplitudinem, immo formam administrationis, intelligo. Quae formae quum multae sint atque variae, etiam arcana imperii cuiusque varia esse oportet. Graeci sofismata vocant, de quibus in Politic. Aristoteles libr. IV cap. VII exponit»; Gentili S. (1766: 285). Scipione Gentili, who undertook a brilliant academic career in Germany (De Benedictis 1999b: 268-272), was probably influenced by Arnold Clapmarius (1574-1604)'s doctrine (the two scholars probably met in Altdorf) and by Scipione Ammirato's distinction between good and evil reason of State. One distinction which was widespread in German political debate; Stolleis (1998: 31-68).

[10] Machiavelli didn't aim «tyrannum instruere, sed arcanis eius palam factis ipsum miseris populis nudum et conspicuum exhibere»; Gentili A. (1585: 109).

[11] By quoting Tacitus and the esteemed Gerolamo Cardano (author of the *Encomium Neronis*)

At the end of his third disputation Gentili further confirms his own thesis on the illegitimacy of resistance to authority by quoting the dialogue X of the book XIX of Scipione Ammirato's *Discorsi sopra Cornelio Tacito* (1594). On this matter the humanist had affirmed:

> *Cosi possiam dire noi, si trovano de i Principi scelerati […] ma infelicissimi quelli, i quali ardiranno di manometter la persona reale. […] se natione alcuna è al mondo, la qual habbia minore scusa di ribellarsi, o di congiurar contro il suo principe, questa è la Christiana, ammaestrata a non ricusare d'ubbidire al suo giusto e legittimo signore; ma quando quello pur reo, e malvagio fosse, vuol, che in ogni modo gli si presti ubbidienza, tollerando patientemente l'asprezza della sua servitù. Poi che tale habbiamo a credere, che sia la volontà di Dio, nella cui mano sono i cuori de i re (Ammirato 1607: 498-499).*

Passive submission to the ruler's will and stoical subjection to the supreme authority are essential conditions to aim to the highest utility: State stability and safety.

Anyway in Gentili, the achievement of these values does not mean the denial of the universal principles of natural law on which relations among sovereign States are funded. These natural and moral laws constitute *ius gentium*, a right «di cui usano le genti umane, un diritto che la ragione naturale costituì fra tutti gli uomini e che è custodito in modo perfettamente uguale presso tutti i popoli» (Gentili A. 2008: 10).

Gentili identifies universal moral and rational laws as foundations of human coexistence: these laws, being innate to human reason, are valid both in the internal field (that of relations between rulers and subjects) and external field of relations among States:

> *Non sono adatti ai principi quei precetti dei libri di Giustiniano, «vivere onestamente», «non ledere altrui», «dare a ciascuno il suo», «proteggere i figli», «respingere l'ingiuria», «sentirsi affratellati con l'umanità intiera», «mantenere i commerci», e gli altri di questo genere, e quelli che da questi derivano e che sono sparsi quasi dappertutto in quei libri? (Gentili A. 2008: 25).*

Even if on the side of international relations, the violation of natural laws is a valid cause of war (because it is legitimate moving a war to reply to the violation of a right), on the internal side the natural laws' force is far from being guaranteed: their violation doesn't legitimize subjects' resistance by means of force.

Gentili observes that the Roman Empire's condition during Nero's administration was much better than in the turbulent years that followed his death; Gentili A. (1605: 103).

To this contradiction Gentili answers by originally elaborating the teachings of stoic cosmopolitanism, a doctrine which he approached by reading Seneca and Cicero. Cicero in *De Officiis* (one of the most quoted works in Gentili's treatises) evokes the primary social connection which naturally binds all men: one universal dimension of sociality constituted on the rational nature of men (Scuccimarra 2009: 30-50).

Seneca would underline the universal value of natural and rational principles of justice innate to men, he would affirm the defense of those principles as a duty of solidarity to every member of the immense human community: the *respublica magna* (Seneca *De providentia*, 5, 4). In one famous passage in *Epistolae morales* (95, 33), by Gentili quoted in *De iure belli*, Seneca had asserted:

> *Teniamo sempre questo verso nel cuore e sulle labbra: sono un uomo, e non giudico a me estraneo nulla di ciò che è umano. Mettiamo tutto in comune: siamo nati per una vita in comune. La nostra società è molto simile a una volta di pietre: cadrebbe, se le pietre non si sostenessero reciprocamente, ed è proprio questo che le sorregge (Seneca Epistulae morales, 95, 33).*

Gentili is an important voice in the modern revival of the paradigm of *societas hominum* and its universalistic ethic. He sees, in the natural membership of every rational creature to the human community, the source of binding moral obligations to men: the ideal of an ethical and juridical community of humankind which gathers together all nations, despite their different cultures and religions.

In *De iure belli* there are many references to the philosophical and literary tradition of classical cosmopolitanism. The first book of the work starts with a reference to Seneca's image of *magna respublica*, the stoic *societas hominum*[12]: «Questa filosofia della guerra concerne la grande comunità politica, l'universo orbe della terra e il genere umano tutto» (Gentili A. 2008: 3).

In the chapters of the first book of *De iure belli*, dedicated to the illustration of the just causes of war, the constructive value of Gentili's confrontation with the conceptual constellation of classical cosmopolitanism is clear. Gentili, by dealing with some fundamental theoretical matters (for example the question of the war legitimacy), manifests being in debt with Cicero's idea of a natural kin of human beings.

In the chapter XV (*De honesta defensione*) Gentili illustrates the category of wars moved for an honest cause: these are defined as a kind of just, defensive war waged *in gratiam aliorum*. Honest wars are not conduced to repel a threat or to satisfy a personal utility but to aid people unlawfully attacked by an enemy or cruelly subjugated (Gentili A. 2008: 97-114, 175-184).

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[12] On this image see Scuccimarra (2006: 239-281).

To legitimize this particular kind of military intervention Gentili recalls, beyond the Aristotelian idea of the natural sociability of men and the Christian imperative of charity, the Stoic concept of the unity of human kind (image which inspired also the authors of *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos* (1579), treatise probably introduced in England by intellectuals near to the Huguenot Philippe Duplessis-Mornay)[13]: «noi siamo le membra di quell'unico, grande corpo che è il mondo» (Gentili A. 2008: 97), «se l'uomo è un animale sociale generato alla comunità, non può non guardare al mondo che come a una sola dimora» (Gentili A. 2008: 98)[14].

The honest defense is based on the «fondamento di quei vincoli di parentela, amore e benevolenza che la natura ha costituito tra gli uomini» (Gentili A. 2008: 97). Gentili confirms this political theory by recalling, as well as Cicero and Seneca, Lactantius, Philo of Alexandria, Tertullian: a real compendium of classical cosmopolitanism.

In *De iure belli* Gentili underlines that men are bound to help each other for natural and moral reasons because «da legge di natura ci costringe alla carità universale» (Gentili A. 2008: 98)[15]: these principles, inserted in the context of development of *ius naturae et gentium*, become the foundations of the theoretical framework where the regulation of relations among sovereign States develops:

> *occorre che le armi siano pubbliche da entrambe le parti e che, da entrambe le parti, siano i principi a fare la guerra. […] La guerra è stata introdotta per quella necessita che è dovuta al fatto che fra principi sovrani o popoli liberi non possono esservi dispute nel foro, se non previo accordo delle parti, perché essi non hanno né giudice né superiore. […] Sulla terra il principe non ha giudice, o altrimenti non è un principe quello al di sopra del quale c'è un altro che occupa il primo posto (Gentili A. 2008: 21)[16].*

What – Gentili affirms – Plato had observed relatively to private people should be associated to sovereign States (Gentili 2008: 99): «da condotta che deve tenere un privato cittadino nello stato è la medesima che deve tenere il pubblico

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[13] By referring to the Stoic tradition Gentili affirms: «Gli Stoici pensavano che tutto il mondo fosse una sola città, e che tutti gli uomini fossero il suo popolo, e immaginavano i suoi cittadini come un solo armento che brucava in un pascolo comune»; (2008: 97). The authors of *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos* had aimed: «Del resto gli stessi pagani ci potrebbero insegnare ciò che la società umana e la natura comune richiede da noi in questo caso. Dice infatti Cicerone che tutti gli uomini hanno una stessa natura umana e la natura prescrive e ordina che un uomo desideri e procuri il bene dell'altro […]»; Testoni Binetti (1994: 186).

[14] This consideration is extracted from Seneca's *De beneficiis*.

[15] The quotation is extracted by Ambrogio's *De officiis*.

[16] In Regales *disputationes* Gentili would affirmed: «Ille est huic absolute supremus, qui nihil supra se, nisi Deum agnoscit: nec cuiquam reddere rationem, nisi Deo, habet. […] Et hoc igitur supremitatis est, ut nihil supra se, umquam cernat principatus, neque hominem, neque legem»; (1605: 9). Yet in *De legationibus* the Italian jurist utilizes the adjective «supremus», he defines the sovereign princes as *supremi* (1585: 7).

cittadino in questo pubblico e universale stato del mondo, che riguarda i sovrani ed i popoli sovrani» (Gentili A. 2008: 99-100)[17]. These solidarity bonds legitimize foreign princes' intervention to protect tyrannized subjects. Even if on the theoretical side this solution appears to be a mediation between the sovereign power's objectives and the binding principles of justice inherent to human reason, on the practical side of historical experience Gentili's proposal is an extraordinary ideological instrument to support English foreign policy in the last decades of XVI century.

Gentili was near to the circles of militant Protestantism, in particular to Philip Sidney and to the Earl of Essex who were champions of a strongly aggressive anti-Hapsburg foreign policy. The Flemish rebellion against Hapsburg has a strategic significance in England's political agenda and Gentili, not at random, becomes the defender of English intervention to support the Low Countries: in Gentili's works this action is conveniently associated to the image of the honest defense.

The great heritage of classical stoicism gives Gentili the inspiration to build, on the rising States' common belonging to *respublica magna*, the doctrine of *ius belli* and *ius gentium*. However Gentili's political theory, despite the surprising modernity of some conclusions, is anchored in a classical and Christian vision of the order of the Universe: Gentili's reflection is not so innovative. The Italian jurist frames European relations with the ethnic-cultural Alterity in a system that goes beyond the limits of the asymmetrical confrontation between Christians and Pagans or Civilized and Barbarian peoples, but he maintains an Eurocentric approach regarding the question of relations between Europeans and Indians or, equally, between Christians and Ottomans.

Gentili, taking part in the current debate on the conquering and submission of the New World, refutes the classic reasons of colonial legitimation but all the same he justifies European intervention and agrees with «d'opinione di chi definisce giusta la causa degli Spagnoli nella loro guerra agli Indi», because they – Gentili observes – «intrattenevano commerci carnali contrari al diritto divino, perfino con animali, e mangiavano carni umane, di uomini uccisi a questo scopo» (Gentili A. 2008: 176). These actions are «peccati contro la natura stessa del genere umano, e pertanto ben noti a tutti, salvo forse agli animali bruti, e ai bruti umani» (Gentili A. 2008: 176).

The imposition by force of a natural law conceived in the European conscience shows the contradictions and inconsistencies of Gentili's image of *respublica magna*, the ambiguity of a culture not yet completely detached from the Christian and Medieval tradition.

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[17] This quotation is extracted by Baldo degli Ubaldi's *Consilia*.

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Jacques Basnage's reinterpretation of Cunaeus theocracy: a monistic description of a political model
Iolanda Richichi

4.1 The literature of Refuge

In 1685, Luigi XIV emanated the Fontainebleau's edict in which he revoked the cult's liberties without persecution from the state obtained by Huguenots in 1598 with Nantes' edict. The 'Revocation of Nantes' edict caused an exodus of Huguenots from France and the exacerbation of the theological tensions and the political divergences that had characterized the French Protestantism for a long time.

In this scenario, Protestants, Lutherans or Calvinist, which constituted a persecuted minority in France, weren't united against the King's choices. Instead, every confession was subject to painful intestine struggles for the determination of some meaningless point of dogma. These theological disputes produced a grateful literature. These works were divided in ideological-political terms but also geographic ones: a «géographie théologique» as François Laplanche called its (Laplanche 1986: 5). The relevance of this literature was highlighted by the contemporary historiography, that reserved to these works more attention, by starting from the studies of Laplanche to the most recent Laursen, Mckenna and Hubert Bost (Laursen 1995; Mckenna, Häseler 1999; Bost 2001).

It is possible to describe the dynamics to the Protestant Churches in France as divided in two academies, which belong to two different ways to consider

the faith: in the one hand we find the communities of the North represented by the academy of Saumur and on the other hand the Churches to South of the Loira, represented by the academy of Sedan.

At the beginning of the XVII century, the academy of Saumur was considered the most important and productive institute related to humanistic studies. While the academy of Sedan was the «vraie citadelle de l'orthodoxie dogmatique» as claimed by Pierre-Daniel Bourchenin (Bourchenin 1996²: 428). The last one academy was composed by the radical part of French Protestantism and defined by a rigorous and orthodox Calvinism that was connected with the prophetism and the millenaristic expectations. The differences between the two academies didn't concern exclusively dogmatic matters but also politic ones. The salmurianism movement was inspired by republican feelings and sustained by the aristocracy and by the high middle class. While Sedan's academy was defined by monarchic tendencies and it supported the House of Orange.

Despite the absence of unity, the Huguenots exiles produced an important 'literature of dissent' focused on historical, theological and political points of view. These works constitued the 'Refuge's literature'[1] and the authors were identified by the historiography as 'second generation of exiles'. The political and intellectual debate produced by this literature, inspired many works during the Enlightenment about the religious toleration.

4.2 Respublica Hebraeorum literature

The Jewish myth was an important topic used by the 'second generation of exiles'. The first reason concerns the use of the same *topoi* of the first Huguenots generation[2] essays. After St. Bartholomew's massacre, many works were focused on the people's right of revolt to a king which didn't allow the cult's liberty. Among these works the most important were the *Francogallia* of François Hotman (1573), *Du droit des magistrats* of Théodore de Bèze (1574) and the *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos* (1579). In these texts, we can find a series of *exempla* drawn by the ancient Testament and a biblical language that was used by the authors to explain their points of view.

The second reason is the connection between the literature of *Refuge* with *Respublica Hebraeorum* literature.

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[1] This name comes from the reformed Churches constituted by the exiles out of France.
[2] The first generation of exiles was composed by the Huguenots escaped from Saint Bartholomew's massacre in the night of 23-24 August 1572.

From the 1570s to the 1670s many political thinkers transformed biblical 'exempla sacra' of Old Testament into an organic political model, the *Respublica Hebraeorum*. In the political debates of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in northern Europe, many specific treatises employed the biblical texts to find legitimation for either monarchy, democracy, or aristocracy, such as Bonaventure Bertram's *De Politia Judaica, tam civili quam ecclesiastica* (1574), Carlo Sigonio's *De Republica Hebraeorum* (1582), Althusius's *Politica methodice digesta* (1603). All of them discussed and referred to the biblical polity as a model. Although the secularization is one of the key issues considered by historians analyzing the modern era, Christopher Ligota, Lea Campos Boralevi, Diego Quaglioni, Vittorio Conti's studies about this topic showed the political nature of this debate over the biblical polity, though using terms and themes traditionally belonged to theology (Ligota 1992; Conti 1997; Campos, Quaglioni 2002; Nelson 2010).

In *De Republica Emendanda* associated to Grotius (1605) and Petrus Cunaeus's *De Republica Hebraeorum* (1612) this model was identified as a theocracy. In particular, the description of Cunaeus theocracy started with the studies of the IV book of *Antiquitates Iudaicae* of Josephus Flavius, in which the Hellenistic historian described the first constitution of ancient Israel as a theocracy. In his *Contra Apionem*, Josephus explained that Aristotle's classification of the forms of government was not adequate to define Israel's institutions. He thus coined the term 'Theocratia', meaning 'Government by God', which entailed a special combination of politics, ethics, and religion (Campos 2011: 115).

In the modern age, the works of Josephus had a great diffusion and his description of theocracy was elaborated with the aim to recognize into Jewish's theocracy a new and different model. Cunaeus described the Jewish theocracy as a positive and normative model that would be able to employ to political reformation of actual Dutch republic.

At the beginning of Eighteenth century, works concerning *Respublica Hebraeorum* had a great diffusion in Europe but the theocratic model described in this literature was analysed in radically different way.

4.3 The Jewish history

In this analysis, we take into account an interesting interpretation of theocracy presented by a thinker of Refuge's literature, Jacques Basnage.

Basnage was a Huguenot Minister, chef of the reformed Church of Rouen in 1676, historian, theologian and French diplomat. After the revocation of

Nantes edict, he escaped from France and emigrated in Holland. Here, in the 1704, he published the *Histoire et the religion des Juifs, depuis Jésus-Christ jusqu'à present*.[3] At Seventeeth century, this work, which consisted of 29 volumes, was considered the principal source to study the political, religious or cultural history of the Hebrews.

Basnage's analysis presented different approach to study the Jewish history. He distinguished the Jewish people in 'ancient', that lived before the destruction of Jerusalem Temple, and 'modern'. According to the Christian interpretation, the destruction of Temple was a consequence of divine punishment for the missed recognition of the Messiah. The 'modern' Hebrews was guilty of this misunderstanding and they were punished for this during the centuries. Furthermore, Basnage considered also historical reasons, connected to the problematic relationships among the Iudaea province and the Roman Empire. For Basnage, the theologians recognised just the primary reason (divine punishment), whereas the historians identified the secondary and rational causes (political interests). In this distinction, Basnage located the line between theology and history.

At Seventeenth century, after the circulation of new chronology, the European intelligentsia raised up some doubts about the ancient history. The Bible's content became the subject of scholarly scrutiny. The assessment allowed to shift the Jewish's history in the chronological axis of the formation of civilization. These studies proved that the Jewish's history was less ancient than they had previously believed (Richichi 2016: 30-31).

Basnage described 'ancient' Jewish people as not particularly 'smart' compared with other people, for example the Egyptian:

> *le peuple juif n'avoit rien qui le distinguât du reste des Nations. Occupé à labourer la Terre, & à nourrir des Troupeaux, il avoit peu de disposition pour les Arts & pour les Sciences. Les Egyptiens, sous l'Esclavage desquels ce Peuple gémissoit, étoient spirituels, savans, habiles, & faisoient remonter leur Origine au delà du Déluge. S'ils avoient tiré de la Phenicie une partie de leur connoissance, on ne peut contester qu'ils ne l'eussent portée infiniment plus loin que leurs Maîtres (Basnage 1716, vol. I: 1-2).*

However, for Basnage the history of the ancient Hebrews definitively maintained a central role, because they were the people chosen by God, the people that God «avoit adopté».

The God's intervention was the origin of all the historical events and the 'ancient' Jewish history was considered exceptional due to the God's choice.

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[3] The text was printed in different editions among which, the most complete, was that revised and correct in 1716, *Histoire des Juifs depuis Jésus-Christ jusqu'à présent: pour servir de continuation à the histoire de Joseph*.

Furthermore, even if it was God to determinate the 'ancient' Hebrews identification as 'elected people', it was his choice also to drive the 'modern' Hebrews to be considered as marginalized people.

Gerald Cerny and Myriam Yardeni's studies have brought Basnage's thought to the centre of historiography's debate, showing the importance of Basnage's works for the French philosopher at Eighteenth century. However, their studies didn't analyse the political aspects of Basnage's thought and, in particular, his attention toward *Respublica Hebraeorum* literature (Cerny 1987; Yardeni 2000).

Basnage had a great interest for this literature. He presented the *Histoire des Juifs* as a continuation of the work of Josephus:

> *Nous n'avons aucun dessein d'entrer en comparaison avec cet Historien, dont le Génie & Les Lumieres étoient fort différentes du nôtre. […] Notre Ouvrage s'étend particulièrement depuis la Ruine de Jérusalem, où il a fini. Il peut donc être regardé comme un Suite du sien. (Basnage 1716, vol. I: 19-20).*

The *Histoire des Juifs* started where Josephus interrupted his work. Basnage knew very well Josephus's works and also the authors that used them in the modern age.

A few years before the publication of the Histoire des Juifs, Basnage analysed De Republica Hebraeorum of Petrus Cunaeus, using the French translation realized by Hugues-Guillaume Goree in 1705. Finally, he realised two volumes of notes, *Antiquités judaïques, ou remarques critiques sur the République des Hébreux* (1713): «Il est peu important qu'on regarde ce Livre comme un Commentaire, ou qu'on lui prête une autre forme, pourvû qu'on y trouve quelques remarques capables d'instruire» (Basnage 1713: IX).

Basnage recognized the relevance of Cunaeus' work. Nevertheless, his intent was to show the mistakes and wrong interpretations of Cunaeus' description concerning government of ancient Israel and the history of the religious cult. In the *Antiquités judaïques*, it's possible to find out important critics and confutations of Cunaeus' work, but also of the other authors of *Respublica Hebraeorum* literature like Sigonio, Spencer, Spinoza.

In the Preface, Basnage showed a great interest toward the description of the *Respublica Hebraeorum* as a positive and normative political model that would be able to employ to political reformation of actual Dutch republic. Nevertheless, he didn't accept completely Cunaeus' interpretation: «on me condamnera peut-être plus rigoureusement, parce que je ne suis pas toûjours aveuglement Cuneus» (*ibid.*).

4.4 The theocracy's description

The Basnage's work consisted into two volumes and distinguished the historical and political analysis of ancient Israel from the study of cult and its degeneration.

In this paper, we analyse only the first volume in which he contests the wrong interpretation about the government of ancient Israel. We consider two topics: the theocracy description and its degeneration, the role of the Kings and the importance given by Basnage to the monarchic power.

For Cunaeus, theocracy was a 'God's government', based on the best laws, the divine ones, which provided for a collective ethos and assured social harmony. For Basnage, the constitution of ancient Israel had God as only true king, so, like Cunaeus work, in the *Antiquités judaïques* the government was described as theocracy:

> *Ce Gouvernement étoit donc une Théocratie, car Dieu en étoit le veritable Roi, puis qu'il choisissoit lui-même ses Officiers, & qu'en les choisissant il les révêtoit d'un pouvoir surnaturel pour soûtenir son nom par des Miracles éclatans (ivi: 8).*

On the other hand, Basnage didn't accept the Cunaeus' representation of mosaic revelation. Cunaeus described Moses as a legislator that had created a sacred and perfect republic. Instead, Basnage didn't describe Moses like a great legislator, but only like a «Juge subalterne». Basnage presented him like a «Lieutenant» of God and described God like the only true King of Israel:

> *il ne dépendoit pas de Moyse de choisir la forme du Governement qu'il vouloit donner au Peuple qui marchoit sous sa conduite, car Dieu la lui avoit dictée, & ce n'étoit pas l'effet d'une Providence générale par laquelle on attribuë tout à Dieu, mais par une Institution divine & particuliere qu'il forma la République des Hébreux & en devint lui même le Roi: Moyse ne faisoit que la fonction de Ministre du Dieu vivant, & il apportoit ses ordres au Peuple (ibid.).*

The Jewish theocracy, described in the seventeenth-century like a pluralistic political model, became in Basnage's work a monistic model, in which the absolute power was assigned not to the laws but to God. The extraordinary social power of theocracy, showed by Cunaeus through the presence of agrarian law, was denied.

The Agrarian Laws or 'lex Agraria Hebraeorum' was the Jubilee Laws, prescribed in Leviticus. The Jubilee laws permitted that every fifty years the land – originally divided by Joshua among the Tribes – should be given back to its

original owners and it permitted also the remission of debts and emancipation of slaves. In this way, according to Cunaues, it was possible to limiter politic and economic inequalities and promoter social stability. Besides following Josephus in stating the greatest antiquity of Moses's laws, Cunaeus argued that the *Respublica Hebraeorum* was better than all other commonwealths in the past, because it was the only one which adopted an effective agrarian law (Campos 2011: 115). This law, for Cunaues, was established by Moses, who

> *as it became a wise Man, not only to order things at present, but for the future ages too, brought in a certain Law providing that the wealth of some might not tend to the oppression of the rest [. . .]. This was the Agrarian Law [lex agraria]; a Law whereby all possessors of Land were kept from transferring the full right and dominion of it unto any other person, by sale or other contract whatsoever: For, both they that on constraint of poverty had sold their Land, had a right granted them to redeem it at any time; and they that did not redeem it, received it freely again, by 20 this Law, at the solemn feast of Jubily (Cunaeus 1653: 51).*

According to Basnage, the periodical restitution of land to original owners was caused by religious reasons connected to the necessity 'to do not mix' the different native families.

Basnage denied the social and political reasons of agrarian laws adopted by Cunaeus. For him, the Jubilee laws didn't guarantee the stability of the ancient Israel government. It was the supernatural power of God to assured it:

> *ainsi quoi que Moyse voulût sans doute conserver la simplicité dans le Peuple d'Israël, je croi pourtant que la Loi Agraria pour la restitution des terres tendoit plûtôt à empêcher que les Tribus & les Familles ne se confondissent, parce que la distinction en étoit absolument nécessaire pour la connoissance du Messie, dont la nativité étoit encore éloignée d'un grand nombre de siécles (Basnage 1713: 23).*

In the *Antiquités judaïques*, theocracy was no more described as a normative political model. It was the form of government of a people who belonged to ancient history, but it wasn't analysable like the other political forms, because it was divine. Basnage denied also the possibility to employ this model to political reformation of actual Dutch republic:

> *ainsi je ne vois pas pourquoi on les appelle [le souvrain Sacrificateur] des Monarques, ni comment on peut disputer, si la forme du gouvernement étoit Aristocratique ou Democratique, car ce gouvernement étoit extraordinarie, & ne peut être comparé avec aucun autre, Dieu étoit le chef de la Nation, & les Juges les exécuteurs miraculeux de ses ordres (ivi: 71).*

The Jewish theocracy was still considered a sacred and singular political model. However, according to Basnage, it was the God's intervention to safeguard the stability of ancient Israel. So, the Jewish people lost their privilege at the moment in which they decided to have a human king. The political reasons about the decline of Jewish theocracy were founded in this choice.

For Basnage, the sacred texs content was clear:

> *Dieu se plaint de ce que son peuple l'a rejetté, voilà le peché; & quelle est cette rejection? Elle consiste en ce que les Juifs prenoient un Roi, & secouoient la Theocratie, ou le Gouvernement sous lequel ils avoient vécu en prosperité si long-temps (ivi: 123).*

Despite all interpretations, it was obvious that: «Dieu se sentoit picqué de se qu'on renonçoit à sa Theocratie, & qu'in rejettoit le Gouvernement de Samuel divinement ispiré, pour se faire un Roi».

The theocracy degeneration didn't depend by the action of the priestly caste, as sustained by Cunaeus and Spinoza. The decline of the ancient Israel was the result of the choice to have a monarchy, that left the Jewish people without the divine protection:

> *le peuple juif pechoit par un temerité criminelle en se soulevant contre l'ordre et la volonté de Dieu qui leur étoit connuë, & en preferant le gouvernement des Rois à celui des Juges qu'il avoit établis (ivi: 134).*

Although the connection between Basnage's works and *Respublica Hebraeorum* literature has been proved, Basnage's interpretation of theocracy is very different compared to Cunaeus' work. The theocracy, described in the seventeenth century like the pluralistic political model, became into Basnage's work a monistic model, in which the absolute power was concentrated into God's hands.

Finally, for Basnage, the peculiarity and the sacredness of the Jewish history guaranteed its uniqueness during the time. However, in the Eighteenth century the theocracy represented only a model of the antiquity: it wasn't possible to compare it to the others political models and it couldn't be employed to political reformation of actual constitutions for its divine nature.

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Counter-revolutionary thought and the contradictions of modernity: Bonald's sanctification of Oneness and its deconstruction

Giorgio Barberis

The starting point of this overview of monism and pluralism will be to examine one of the authors to which I have dedicated much of my research; namely, Louis de Bonald, the French thinker who lived from 1754 to 1840. One of the leading figures in the development of political theory and counter-revolutionary political action, he was the sworn enemy of the philosophers of the Enlightenment and a harsh critic of modernity[1].

A staunch conservative, or rather a reactionary, Bonald is one of the chief exponents of what Carlo Galli chose to call an «intellectual constellation» (Galli 1981) to describe the group that included other authors such as Joseph De Maistre, early Lamennais, Carl Ludwig von Haller and Juan Maria Donoso Cortés. All of noble origin and all «militant Catholics», these counter-revolutionaries were united by a form of radical antagonism towards the spirit of 18th century Enlightenment, which they saw as «a century of criminal worth-

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[1] Louis de Bonald, Viscount of Rouerge is a much cited but little studied author, especially in Italy. He was the subject of my doctoral thesis, subsequently published as a book entitled *Louis de Bonald. Potere e ordine tra sovversione e Provvidenza*, published by Morcelliana in 2007. A new, revised edition of the book was translated and published in France in 2016 by Desclée de Brouwer, under the title *Louis de Bonald. Ordre et pouvoir entre subversion et providence*.

lessness» that had jeopardized the stability of an eternal and transcendental order. What we might refer to as a "pluralistic" society founded on the idea of popular sovereignty, they defined as "unruly anarchy" that jeopardized the very existence of a hierarchically organized, single and indivisible power derived directly from God.

Although Bonald's works do not make for easy reading, I believe that there are certain aspects of great interest that provide insight into understanding our own times. While some consider that his prolix and repetitive style cannot compare with other great writers of the counter revolution[2], such as De Maistre, he does, however, remain faithful to his principles. Indeed, in spite of the excessively redundant, systematic, dry and paternalistic nature of his prose, it is this methodical and coherent style that makes Bonald one of the most emblematic writers of the revolutionary period. His untiring efforts to provide critical reflections on the contradictions of the modern age make him stand out as a theoretician who, in my view, was well placed to dialogue with the contemporary reality from which, on an initial reading of his works, he seemed to be far removed.

It may therefore be useful now to re-read the pages of *Théorie du pouvoir politique et réligieux* (the first and arguably the most important of Bonald's works, written in exile in 1796 and confiscated on the orders of the Directory) or *Législation primitive* (produced in 1802 after his return to his hometown of Millau), and give a broad outline of his theories, which are not only easily recognizable but provide a perfect conceptual base for counter-revolutionary thought, with some measure of originality.

So what are these ideas and theories?

First and foremost, the Holy Alliance between the Monarchy and the Church. The underlying premise is the existence of a natural and fundamental law of society, in respect of Divine Will embodied in the Decalogue, which is the exclusive point of reference for both religious and political society. Therefore, if society needs fundamental principles and postulates on which to base a legal system, it is Mosaic Law that must be invoked, and certainly not the artificial abstract laws contained in the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the symbol of revolutionary constructivist fervor.

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[2] In the preface to his lengthy Thèse entitled *Bonald. Les concepts et l'histoire*, Gérard Gengembre (a well-recognised authority on the works of Bonald) writes that «la lecture des œuvres publiées, ajoutée à celle des nombreux inédits, tient plus de l'ascèse que du divertissement». He also makes the point that Bonald consciously chose to employ the same language used by his political opponents, i.e. the philosophes with whom he was in constant conflict. It was a battle of words, in which he obsessively regurgitated particularly incisive modes of expression, tenaciously seeking new turns of phrase that would best convey the basic concepts of his thinking. Gengembre adds, perhaps somewhat ungraciously, that it was a battle «qui explique les répétitions ad nauseam et la rapide lassitude d'un lecteur qui s'inflige une telle nourriture indigeste».

Reality has its ontological basis in God; ideas, knowledge and language itself derive from Him. The theory of the divine origin of language, set down in his early work *Recherches philosophiques sur les premiers objets des connoissances morales,* is both innovative and interesting; however, rather than looking at metaphysical aspects, I wish to focus here on Bonald's political reflections.

For Bonald, there exists a transcendental legal order, a divine providence present in all things. This natural and eternal order propagates an organic and hierarchical model of society that is characterized by a state religion, a sovereign power and by a fixed social structure [«*There have never been* – he writes – *societies without Gods, nor nations without leaders; there have never been Gods without priests, nor leaders without soldiers*»]. Above all else stands a single and unchallengeable authority, whose legitimacy is founded on and linked to the unknowable, the Transcendental. All attempts at subversion will fail, and it is unthinkable that any different form of human society might exist.

Bonald affirms that the very existence of this order implies that there must be a natural scientific order to society, formed by the natural and necessary relations between members of a community. Indeed, he sets himself the ambitious task of elaborating a comprehensive social theory, which to some extent presages the later notions developed by the positivists, in particular by the social philosopher Auguste Comte[3]. One of the ideas they had in common was the belief in the close relationship between the study of society as an exact science and devising plans for its reorganization. Other prominent ideas included working out a clear definition of an organic society, in which all sectors demonstrate reciprocal solidarity and find harmony within the social group and the need for a shared belief system underpinning a strong moral base and shared spiritual principles that ensure social order. The fundamental difference between Bonald and the Positivists was that the latter considered there to be two separate models of organic society: the medieval theological order, which after the critical age of Reform and Revolution could no longer be restored, and the new model of an *industrial* society, which marked a turning point in the historical evolution of mankind. This was something the counter

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[3] Bonald was one of the first to see the need to undertake scientific studies of social structures, which would provide the bases for good moral and political governance. To cite the title of his essay on the Viscount, Robert Spaemann, disciple of Joachim Ritter and one of the leading contemporary German philosophers, believed that sociology had its roots *aus dem Geist der Restauration* (Spaemann 1998). And as Léon Brunschvicg and Jean Lacroix had also observed, the theoretical premises of sociology are to be found in the works of Bonald. Spaemann affirms that Bonald was the first to understand the evolving relationship between politics and modernity and to identify its theoretical foundations, which put succinctly, incorporate and ascribe all philosophical notions and the very idea of God into their respective social functions. In short, in the works of Bonald, metaphysics and theologies can be assimilated into a new theory of society and the laws necessary to ensure its conservation.

revolutionaries obviously refuted. Indeed, just as other theoreticians of the Restoration did, Bonald always fervently defended the traditional model of a healthy and cohesive society, in particular agricultural societies where the spirit of solidarity and brotherhood stand up against the wayward obsession with greed of an embryonic capitalist system that was already showing signs of heartless doggedness in the pursuit of profit through trade and commerce. He found this abhorrent.

Bonald points out that three-part structures are to be found in all societies (a clear connection with the Holy Trinity); that is to say all social structures are composed of three distinct "social entities" (with well-defined roles and functions). The essential tripartite division is: power, the ministers and the subjects, though names change according to different social contexts: father, mother and children in domestic society; God, priests and the congregation in religious society; the king, nobility and the people in public or political society. Power rules and regulates; ministers apply the law and control; the people obey.

As Bonald sees it, there is an indivisible link between political and religious society, between the combined establishment and development of one with the other; the convergence of Catholicism and the monarchy is a union of absolute perfection. In *Théorie du pouvoir* he writes: «In Christian Europe, there are four different forms of government, all of whom espouse religions based on essentially similar founding principles and all of whom share analogous external features» (Bonald 1982: xiv, 301). These four separate typologies of *government* are: 1) Monarchy, with the King, the nobles and the assembly of the Estates General, all of whom carry out their assigned social function in natural harmony, in the same way as the Pope, the clergy and the religious councils do in the Catholic church; 2) Aristocratic hereditary regimes, allied with pure Lutheranism, who accept social distinctions but not the unity of power; 3) democratic governments which, like religious organizations spawned by the Calvinist, Puritan and Presbyterian movements, recognize the separate and distinct power of each, but do not consent to the principle of social hereditary; 4) hybrid governments, such as in Britain, which blended elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy together with an Anglican church that combined elements of Catholicism, Lutheranism, and Calvinism. But there is yet another category to consider, and one which Bonald frequently refers to in order to expose its radical negation of and threat to the natural order of society: he was alluding to the demonic dyad of anarchism and atheism, the corollary of every revolutionary government and the inevitable consequence of any revolt against established authority[4]. I will return to this point in the concluding part of this essay.

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[4] The typology suggested by Juan Maria Donoso Cortés in his *Ensayo sobre el catolicismo, el liberalismo y el socialismo* also recognizes the close link between religious and political order (or disorder). However, it differs partially in that absolute monarchy coincides with theism, Constitutional

As regards corrupt societies, Bonald is particularly adamant about one fact: no social system can survive and thrive if individuals are granted absolute liberty, or are allowed to disavow the principles shared by society as a whole, in complete contempt of legitimate authority and with no respect for social hierarchies and roles. When this does occur, the seed of deterioration is already planted and will quickly and inevitably lead to the complete destruction of society; this will provide the space for the restoration of fundamental principles. Besides, «men cannot impede the continual and inevitable progression of things» (Bonald 1982: xiv, 344). All rebellions, particularly when provoked by those entrusted to enforce law and order, will result in confusion and disorder, which can never last for long.

Real personal freedom consists, then, in being true to one's own nature and following the path of one's own ultimate destiny, which will always coincide with the collective goal of constructing and conserving society. Man is nothing outside the context of the community to which he belongs, and the more that community adheres to solid Christian and monarchist ideals, the freer man will be, and the more willing will he be to respect unquestioningly the necessary relations that evolve and derive from the very nature of things (i.e. from Divine will) and the more unlikely he will be to challenge authority, hierarchies and order. «A free society must be independent, but man can only find true freedom in being dependent»[5] (Bonald 1982: xiv, 405). Thus, man has no freedom to choose between good and evil, since *real* freedom can only be fully achieved through performing good, and not through exercising free will, which entails making a choice that negates freedom itself. God can neither do or want evil, but is at the same time *absolutely* free. Now, it is religion that provides the best means to guarantee freedom because it conquers and controls human passions, places faith above reason and free will, and systematically regulates social life, preventing and repressing immorality and disorder with the force of its truths and the promise of either reward or eternal damnation.

Society's natural and perfect eternal order is assured by the French Catholic monarchy, except when called into question by the ill-fated errors - individualism, subjectivism and rationalism - of Reform and 'Enlightenment', culminating in the ruinous effects of the 1789 revolution. Bonald lived through the revolutionary upheavals personally, something which would radically influence his ideas and thought. Although a transitory phase (because order would eventually be restored - «*Les troubles ont toujours affermi le pouvoir*»), revolutionary fervor produced a monstrous and hellish state, with atheism as its religion

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liberalism with Deism, democracy with Pantheism and atheism with nascent socialist doctrines, whose chief exponent was Proudhon and whose only transcendental equivalent was Satan.
[5] This is the basis of authoritative traditionalism, of which Bonald was undoubtedly one of the chief exponents.

and anarchy its new principle of government. The zeal of the revolutionaries ultimately backfired: freedom created more prisons, equality generated acute and excessive divisions, fraternity bred sharp differences and progress brought about only conflict and killing.

A staunch defender of what he considered the real moral foundations of society, one of the basic tenets of Bonald's thought is a blind fear of any form of dissent. The harsh counter-attack of the anti-revolutionaries (despite the fact that the Revolution itself was in many ways an act of Providence) nurtured a total obsession against the enemy, both in its tangible forms (Reform and the ideas of the Enlightenment, Rousseau and Montesquieu, Voltaire and Condorcet) as well as in the "stigmatized" notion of the subversive, the atheist, the anarchist, the Protestant, the liberal rationalist and even the bourgeois trader.

An additional integral part of Bonald's thinking was the ideological battle against the dogmas of unrestricted freedom of press and unlimited tolerance of others' opinions so strongly defended by the *philosophes*. He opined that this encouraged the spread of revulsion against authority and a hatred of religion; allowing for all opinions to be given voice, he said, was tantamount to showing scorn and indifference to all truths.

A last consideration on Bonald's thinking regards his questionable view of history, somewhat blemished by his radically negative anthropological beliefs, in stark contrast to his faith in a Providential design that will lead to a state of ultimate and definitive perfection. As the guardian of the monistic belief in the indivisibility of Oneness, it is Divine Providence that determines history. So how do we explain revolutions and the increasing proliferation of rebellions? Does social disorder always presage a new order, or have the repeated examples of brutal reprisals throughout history always led to catastrophic results for humanity? What heralds the end of history: perfection or dissolution? Is the ontological divide between the created and the creator destined to disappear, or is failure the fate of humanity? And how do we reconcile the "evil" in man with the kingdom of God? Is the 'mediation' of Christ enough? Such questions have yet to be answered.

In my view, Bonald offers us a prime example of the tension between realistic pessimism and eschatological expectations, between the optimism of faith and the finality of catastrophe. Bonald's own existential and personal experiences are varied and contrasting. His education and early involvement in politics followed a fairly linear path, until interrupted by the chaos unleashed by the revolution and his harsh years in exile. On his return from exile, he lived through the ambivalent, confusing period of Napoleonic rule, followed by the interlude of the glorious restoration of the monarchy and the rise of ultra-right wing militant movement. Among the many awards bestowed on

him, Bonald was nominated member of the Académie Française in 1816 and received the peerage of France in 1823. When the Orléanist faction took control following the revolution of 1830, Bonald saw it as «an impetuous rush towards plurality», once again highlighting his continual wavering between his historical angst and theological convictions, between political disillusionment and his theoretical coherence.

Despite the undeniable inherent contradictions in Bonaldian thought, I believe that this stands out as one of his strengths. To quote Marcuse, Bonald is not only «the most grandiose example of an apology for and defence of a social order under threat» (Marcuse 1970: 87-104), but with his ambitious efforts to work out a comprehensive theory of society and to solve the contradictions wrought by modernity[6], he is of great interest as a subject of study that can help shed light on the aforementioned contradictions in order to conceive a radical political alternative to the conflicting forces of conservation and progress, unity and plurality, order and liberty. To my understanding, the strongest and most solid form of liberty can only emerge by means of the deconstruction of 'order' and the metaphysical foundations on which it claims to rest.

Continuing our journey through Bonald's philosophical reflections, on the one hand we have a well-ordered, organic, hierarchical society that has reached a peak of perfection, a radical monism governed by divine, transcendental providence that also governs every aspect of social life; on the other hand is the threat that plurality poses to this order, which should be thwarted at all costs.

To illustrate this clash, I could cite any number of passages in Bonald's writings, since, as mentioned previously, we are talking here about one of the key tenets of Bonald's thinking.

However, I would like to focus here on a piece Bonald dedicates to the subject of divorce, a question of perennial interest to the French philosopher, in his theoretical deliberations addressing its effect on community life. It was Bonald who was the architect of the repeal law of 1816 that remained in force until 1884. The text in question is entitled *Du divorce considéré au XIX* siècle relativement à l'état domestique et à l'état public de la société*, written in the same period as *Législation primitive*; first published 1801, there followed numerous subsequent editions.

On the subject of *domestic* life – the heart of social life, the nuclear family – Bonald contends that it can only be established through marriage, a free

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[6] Any list of contemporary society's inherent and unfathomable contradictions that the counter-revolutionaries did much to highlight should certainly include its failure to control chronic political instability, manifested both in the domination of various forms of political extremism (e.g. the totalitarian threat) as well as the spread of social apathy and nihilism, or selfish indifference and shallow individualism.

and voluntary act that sanctions the joining together of a man and a woman, legitimized by the church and given legal recognition by the state. The bond of marriage is indissoluble: a married couple, «inwardly joined together by the religious sacrament, a bond given outward legal recognition by the state, forfeit their individuality and no longer possess an individual will (that could induce separation) to rebel against social obligations, which exist and serve to unite people. All arguments against divorce can be summarized concisely thus: once a marriage has been celebrated, the couple as individuals cease to exist (divorce presupposes the contrary); marriage is an inseparable bond [*et erunt duo in carne unâ*»; cf. Gn 2,24; Mt 19,5s.; Ef 5,31].

The particular aim of the text I chose to examine here is to demonstrate that the dissolution of a marriage bond, plainly contrary to the will of God, is therefore perilous and extremely harmful to *social* order, to the very stability of the State. Hence, as stated, any upsetting of the natural order of things, particular if instigated by a state legislator, will lead to instability. Indeed, divorce is always an intolerable threat, because it not only jeopardizes the welfare of children and encourages dissolute and corrupt behavior, but in many cases it causes disruption and conflict in families, undermines paternal authority, creates disorder and instability, but most of all it contravenes the divine spirit. Therefore, it is by far more desirable that certain individuals endure suffering because unable to fulfill their often irrational, illusory and unwarranted aspirations, and that some unhappily married man must accept the consequences of an unworkable marriage, with the possibility in extreme cases of a dignified separation of two people and their material goods (but without dissolving the bond), rather than endanger the stability of society as a whole (Bonald 1982: v, 207-208).

In its various guises, divorce may only be tolerated in backward societies, which are usually highly unstable. Many societies in Asia accept and continue to allow polygamy; the Jewish religion authorizes a husband to repudiate his wife; the Greeks, one of history's most arbitrarily corrupt peoples, introduced divorce at all levels of society, giving both spouses the possibility of dissolving their marriage bond. Christianity, though, assures the sanctity of marriage through divine law, and this for Bonald is further confirmation of how Christianity ensures that plurality and chaos give way to ultimate stability and order and the universal recognition of the principle of unity. In this regard, the words of Bonald are of an exemplary simplicity and clarity:

Monotheism in religion, monogamy in the family, monarchy in government, will gradually remove the threat of polytheism, polygamy, polycracy or government by the people (Bonald, 1982: v, 167).

This is the clearest example of Bonald's sanctification of *Oneness*, or his obsession with the unchallenged and unchallengeable concept of oneness or singleness, referred to by the Greeks with the generic term μόνος, a strand that runs through all of the author's philosophical reflections: *mono*-theism, *mon*-archy and *mono*-gamy are the three constituent parts necessary to obtain universal order; it is a situation of order that can never be overturned, and will always absorb and rebuff any revolt or subversive actions, however violent they might be.

Quite simply, it is plurality that poses the greatest threat to unity. Poly-theism, poly-gamy, poly-cracy have caused a return to confusion and backwardness, tragically triggered by revolution and reform. This rift risks compromising everything, since it evokes the radical antithesis to the monism of the natural society: atheism, as the rejection of all religion; anarchy, as the repudiation of all government and power; and a situation that cannot even be defined, created by an insular, untenable and flawed society, devoid of social relations, where a sense of collectivity cannot exist.

Bonald is convinced of the absolute coherency of his arguments. Society has an absolute ontological and axiological claim on all individuals, who depend on it to obtain the knowledge and awareness of rules essential to adhere to in every aspect of their lives. Derived directly from God, it is the legitimate power assigned to those who govern that creates and makes a *people*. If such a pre-ordained structure did not exist, society would be nothing more than a disaggregate, lawless group of people in constant conflict[7]. Using an apt visual metaphor, Maistre writes: «Take the Queen bee away from a swarm of bees and you will still have as many bees as you like, but the hive will be gone» (Maistre 1995: 50).

Bonald firmly believes that the absence of power, literally 'anarchy', is an absolute evil that will cause the radical disintegration of all things. In his work *Essai analytique sur les lois naturelles de l'ordre social*, he defines human dignity itself as the very power human beings have to control themselves. If man possessed the just balance of reason and passion, of strengths and weaknesses, he would have no need for religion, for government or any kind of authority, nor any form of social organization, if the latter implies a social structure necessary to repress and control destructive tendencies[8]. Faithful to his brand of 'realist' orthodoxy, the Viscount asserts that a world without government would be

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[7] In *Considérations sur la France*, Joseph de Maistre writes: «Le peuple est toujours enfant, fou, absent» (Maistre 1979: i, 46).

[8] «Let it not be said that just as men bring their innate emotions and passions to society, that they also bring reason and goodness; if they were blessed with rational thought, able to offset their instinctive, irrational behavior, and a strength of mind able to override their weaknesses, there would be no need for religion, governments, not even for a *public sphere* in society» (Bonald 1982: i, 54-55).

simply absurd. Instead of entertaining vain visions of a utopian, ideal society, it would be far more useful to ponder the basic unchanging nature of human beings and their intrinsic limitations: «We will never discover within us another *man* different to ourselves, nor can we expect such a hypothesis to be viable» (Bonald 1982: I, 60-61). Maistre believed that if left to his own devices, man becomes too evil to be free. Carl Schmitt started with this very assumption to make his strong argument describing how the radical opposition to anarchism's positive anthropology has its roots in the writings of Maistre and Bonald (Schmitt 1934)[9].

Let us attempt to draw some conclusions from Bonald's reasoning. The differences in the models of society outlined here are of considerable interest, regardless of the criteria adopted to judge them. On the one hand, there is the strength and perfection of monism, blemished, though, by its unnatural disregard for the complexity of reality. A contrived simplification whose foundations collapse in the face of increasing plurality. On the other hand lie the challenges and dangers of an almost unfathomable model of society, i.e. beliefs in the ideals of absolute liberty that counter-revolutionary monism rejects entirely, although it cannot erase its force and attraction (because the idea of a society without government is by no means absurd).

In effect, no perfect symmetry exists between all parts of the triad. The structure is most solid in the first triad (monotheism, monarchy and monogamy) and also the second (polytheism, polycracy and polygamy). The third and last of the trinities, characterized by Greek negative prefix *alfa*, has an inherent contradiction: anarchy, the second element, is not coherent with, or rather is the antithesis of the third, i.e. the absence of societal bonds. This is not a negation but a proposal for an alternative model of society, set within a different ontological plain. It doesn't entail precipitating into an abyss, but is a change of paradigm leading to new horizons and new lands, as yet unexplored.

Using Bonald as a starting point, we can arrive at the idea of a world where all members of a society are free and equal.

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[9] C. Schmitt, *Politische Theologie, Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität*. The reference is to the fourth chapter in particular, dedicated to the philosophy of the counter-revolutionary State. The works of Maistre and Bonald contain a number of ideas that would later be revisited by other philosophers, for example in the clash between reactionary and libertarian thinking, exemplified by the divergent and opposing ideas of Juan Maria Donoso Cortés and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.

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Nashoba: turning an ideal into a concrete reality

Federica Falchi

The community of Nashoba[1] in the state of Tennessee was founded in the year 1825 in area of land that once belonged to the Chiskasaw Indians. The idea and inspiration of the woman who founded it was to create a community for ex-slaves, provide them with both an education and the opportunity to learn a trade that would enable them to pay their own way after emancipation and to make a living for themselves outside the community itself.

The founder and inspirational force behind this experiment that took place at a time when the anti-slavery movement was gaining strength[2], was Frances Wright[3], the Scottish thinker and intellectual born in Dundee in 1795. Wright came from a well-to-do radical family, though having lost both parents at a young age, she was brought up by relatives and friends of her father. The many hours spent in her father's libraries and the period spent in Glasgow with her uncle James Mylne[4] were a great influence on her education. Mylne held the chair in moral philosophy at the university in Glasgow, considered to

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[1] The community was given the name Nashoba, which meant 'wolf' in the language of the native Americans, because the land on which it was built was near the River Wolf. On Nashoba, see among others: Wright (1821); Parks (1932: 75-86); Elliott (1939: 141-157); Emerson (1947: 291-315); Pease (1960: 99-109); Lane (1972); Kolmerten (1973); Wright F. and C. (1975: 221-251; 429-46); Egerton (1977); Kissel (1993); Sampson (2000: 290-303); Bederman (2005: 438-59).
[2] Gould (2003); Kish Sklar and Stewart (2007); Clapp and Roy Jeffrey (2011).
[3] On Frances Wright: Wright (1844); Waterman (1924); Lane (1972); Stiller (1972); Perkins and Wolfson (1972 [19391]); Morris (1984); Kissel (1993); Rendall (2006, 145-159); Picchetto (2007: 284-294).
[4] See Coley (2015).

be the home of Scottish Enlightenment, given that the previous occupants of the chair included such illustrious names as Francis Hutcheson, Adam Smith and Thomas Reid[5].

Although she could not benefit directly from the influence of her father, who died when she was a small child, she did so indirectly through reading books in his libraries and by dialoguing with his friends, who like him were great admirers of Thomas Paine[6], and of the principles and precepts of the American and French revolutions. More significantly though, they were exponents of the Scottish Enlightenment movement, who believed that an understanding of political, economic and social contexts was the key to understanding human behavior and the development of ideas[7].

Having read Botta's 'A history of the American war of independence'(1809) she became fascinated with America, so much so that in 1821, still very young, she and her sister Camilla sailed to America to discover for herself what she thought was a utopian land that gave refuge to the poor and the persecuted from any country or culture in the world.

On her return from the United States, Wright published a collection of letters she had sent to Robina Craig Millar[8] in a volume entitled *Views of society and manners in America,* in which she alternates between detailed descriptions of the founding principles and institutions of America and accounts of the places visited and the people she met. The book drew the attention of a number of influential British thinkers, first and foremost Jeremy Bentham, but also

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[5] On the Scottish Enlightenment period: Trevor-Roper (1967); Venturi (1970); Restaino (1974); Phillipson (1981: 19-40); Jones (1989); Devine (1989); Hook and Sher (1995); Sher (2010); Rubboli (2010: 229-242); Geuna (2003: 49-86).

[6] James Wright belonged to a family of merchants and traders who were involved in radical politics. A fervent admirer of the French and American revolutions and committed to spreading their ideals, he was put under close surveillance by the government after he published a cheaply-priced edition of Paine's The Rights of man in 1794. See among others: Wright (1844).

[7] Exponents of the Scottish enlightenment were greatly concerned «above all, in the social behaviour of mankind». The pioneer was Hutchenson, who emphasized the fact that the mind of every human being was guided by «a common or moral sense that was innate, instinctive and fundamentally virtuous and benevolent», though it «was (he believed), directed differently at different times under different social pressures. It follows therefore that, in order to know man and the development of his ideas, we must know about society and the different forms of society within which man operates and by which his thinking is determined. So, insensibly, the study of man merges in the study of his social context, and the pupils of Hutchenson, from being moral philosophers, concerned with the problem of virtue, became social historians, concerned with the problem of virtue, became social historians, concerned with the problem of progress» Trevor-Roper (1960: 1640).

[8] Robina Craig Millar was the daughter-in-law of John Millar, a leading exponent of the Scottish enlightenment. She too, enamoured with the United States, married and settled there with her husband. See among others: Morris (1984); Rendall (2006).

James and John Stuart Mill and General la Fayette[9], who was to become her trusted friend and mentor.

The two most striking features of the new American world as Wright describes them in her writing are liberty and equality, upheld by equal civil and political rights, which together form the core foundation of a new republican model made possible by the favourable historical circumstances and the particular social and political conditions that promoted the creation of shared values. It was these conditions that fostered not only a sense of belonging and inclusion but also helped create the environment conducive to the flourishing of republican civic virtues. Furthermore, representation by universal suffrage promoted syncretism between elected representatives and the demands for liberty and equality advanced by the various sectors of society represented.

Although her enthusiasm for the United States clearly shows through in many passages of her book, she does not balk from identifying imperfections in an albeit advanced model of society for the time. Wright points to two main flaws in the model that need to be rectified, namely, the inferior status of women and the scourge of slavery. While some progress had been made with the former thanks to the increase and spread of female education, she felt the question of slavery was so painful and appalling that she could not bring herself to visit the southern states. These two iniquities so undermined the widespread application of the principles of liberty and equality because they disavowed the plurality of voices in society, i.e. the opportunity for all members of society to have their needs and interests fully represented.

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[9] Wright met La Fayette thanks to Bentham's introduction, and it was the latter who insisted she should make his acquaintance. They both had a great admiration for America and immediately formed a close friendship; indeed Wright and her sister spent much of their time in France as guests in the General's houses. It was thanks to La Fayette that she was able to frequent French intellectual circles and after seeing the publication of the French version of the *Views* published in 1822, she returned to America to undertake a celebratory tour to which the hero of two revolutions had been invited. The close relationship between the two provoked a certain amount of jealousy among the relations and admirers of the General and some insinuated that theirs was not a father-daughter type relationship, as they declared it was, but a great deal closer. Whatever the reality of their relationship, her friendship with the General enabled her to meet and dialogue with some of the most important intellectual and political figures in America, notably Thomas Jefferson, and to make known her own intellectual standing in a country that would soon become her adoptive home. On the relationship between Wright and La Fayette see among others: Waterman (1924); Morris (1984); Pichetto (2007).

6.1 Slavery

Wright's strong conviction that humanity's progress would only come about through the full realization of liberty and in particular equality, led her to concentrate her mental energy, and subsequently her physical reserves and financial means, on the question of slavery. Her qualities as a political philosopher are evident in her attitude and approach to considering a problem not only from a theoretical viewpoint but also from the standpoint of seeking concrete solutions. This was a personal mission that took more urgent form after her return from the United States, but especially during her second journey to America in the company of General Lafayette in 1824.

In *Views of society and manners in America,* Wright had already written extensively on the subject of slavery, stressing the horror and repugnance she felt for a phenomenon she defined as «the most atrocious of all the sins that deface the annals of modern history» *(Wright 1821: 62).*

In deference to her 'Enlightened' education, as a result of which the influence of the Scottish philosophers and also Montesquieu were quite apparent, Wright's historical analysis of the introduction of slavery into the New world underlines how it was not so much a need seized upon by the colonists than an imposition from the motherland. Indeed, in some states, such as Pennsylvania, where the Quaker[10], community was well represented, there was staunch opposition to slavery.

Wright makes a further interesting observation on the correlation between the establishment of a state religion with its entrenched ecclesiastical hierarchies and the broad acceptance of slavery. The proposition she advances is that the establishment of one preeminent, official religion and the privileges attached to it, makes the violation of the principle of equality for all people more readily acceptable. This does not occur in places where a plurality of religions exist: «in those provinces where the home authority was insufficient to establish one privileged church, this traffic was held in odium from its very commencement» *(Ivi: 63).*

A further interesting and striking aspect that Wright notes, drawing clearly on the ideas of Montesquieu (who was also a vociferous opponent of slavery), is the correlation between climate and enslavement of other human beings. She discerns that in the South there is a notably greater inclination to accept slavery simply because the whites found it more arduous to work in adverse climatic conditions.

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[10] See among others: Jackson (2009); Brycchan (2012).

> *The low and marshy lands stretching along the coasts and great rivers of the south, tainting the warm atmosphere, and generating diseases fatal to a white population, held out too alluring a temptation for the employment of the African, to whose constitution the climate was less fatal, for the offers of the trader to be resisted by the young settlers (ivi: 64).*

While denouncing the presence of massive numbers of slaves in the southern states, Wright (who remained almost exclusively in the north) was quick to note the different behavior of Americans compared to Europeans in regard to slavery. In fact, although it certainly cannot be said the colonists were not guilty of perpetrating the horrors associated with slavery, they were in the forefront of the movement to abolish the slave trade routes and were pioneers in granting freedom to slaves in individual states as well as at the Federal level:

> *The history of African slavery is at once the disgrace and honor of America; the disgrace she shares in common with the whole civilized world — the honor is all her own. Surrounded by every temptation which could seduce her to the crime, at first courted and then awed into compliance, she openly reprobated it when all the nations of the earth were silent, and dared, even in her weak infancy, to brave the anger of a powerful empire in behalf of the wretched […] More than a dozen years before the abolition of the trade by the British parliament, it was abolished in America by act of Congress. There is surely something to admire --- something grand, as well as beautiful, in the effect of liberty on the human heart. This Congress was composed, in great part, of representatives from slave-holding states, themselves slave-holders (ivi: 64-65).*

The reasons often given, notes Wright, to the delay in bringing slavery to an end in the South were the large numbers involved and the aforementioned climatic conditions, which had made the economies of the southern states dependent on black labour. She was also aware of the fact that the total abolition of the infamous practice would still require several more years and that it would be necessary to raise full awareness of the injustice of slavery before real equality could be achieved.

Wright understood that if the black population were not first brought out, through education, of their objective conditions of poverty and ignorance, emancipation would do little to eliminate slavery. The chief obstacle lay in their cultural backwardness, not biological differences. Indeed, the state of Virginia made the interesting proposal «to educate the whole black population at the public expense» *(ivi: 69).*

A similar proposal was presented to Congress by one Mr Meigs, a representative from New York state. Wright thought that his idea was neither

visionary nor impractical, especially if it were to obtain the backing of southern slave owners. Wright believed that emancipation could only be achieved gradually because:

> To give liberty to a slave before he understands its value, is, perhaps, rather to impose a penalty than to bestow a blessing; but it is not clear to me that the southern planters are duly exerting themselves to prepare the way for that change in the condition of their black population which they profess to think not only desirable but inevitable (ivi: 518).

The widespread belief was that the black population was not ready for freedom and would need help and guidance to deal with their new status. Wright firmly believed that it was up to the government to provide them with a basic level of education and a profession that would allow them to provide for themselves or they would risk falling into the poverty trap: «To their untutored minds, the gift of freedom is only a release from labour. Poor, ignorant, and lazy, it is impossible that they should not soon be vicious» *(ivi: 520).*

Among the written documents that attest to Wrights increasing interest in the emancipation of black slaves and the reasons why she chose to take up the battle so passionately, are the letters she exchanged with the Garnett sisters[11]. What emerges in many of these letters is her strong connection and sense of belonging to America, so much so that she would soon take US citizenship, driven by the desire to contribute to improving the country[12]. The Scottish thinker was in fact convinced that, unlike in Great Britain, conditions in America were more favourable to leading the country on a firm path towards true progress, liberty and equality, putting these ideals genuinely into practice. Americans had managed, opined Wright, to achieve a higher level of civic virtue and to forge sentiments of connection between individuals, a *sine qua non* for the unity and prosperity of a community.

The criticism that Wright levies against the home country of Great Britain is the existence of a gulf between the proclamation of ideals and their actual

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[11] Julia and Harriet Garnett were the daughters of John Garnett, belonging to a family of merchants from Bristol, and Mary Gordon. John Garnett was disillusioned with the situation in England and decided to move the whole family to the United States. Frances Wright and her sister Camilla stayed with the Garnetts in 1819 and 1820 and formed a strong bond of friendship with Julia and Harriet Garnett, documented by the numerous letters they exchanged over a number of years. See Payne-Gaposchkin C. (1975a-b: 221-251; 429-461).

[12] «if you then continue in America, I shall seek you there, & follow the bent of my heart in becoming ‹the› /a/ citizen of the only country to wch I acknowledge an attachment. To this I think my two English friends secretly look forward. They have always known my aversion from England, from its climate, its government, its society, & the recollection wch make all these doubly offensive to me. Do not think me madly prejudiced against this island, I know it contains much of good & something yet of happiness, but vice & misery are heavier in the scale». *Letter of Frances Wright to Garnett sisters*, October 1820 (?), (ivi: 223).

application. While acknowledging the evident imperfections in American society, she saw the widespread poverty and the tangible lack of liberty in the motherland as intolerable: «England had once public spirit, she had dignity, she had, at certain degree, freedom, - where is all this now?». Not only had certain basic principles made little or no progress, but social regression had led to the further impoverishment of the lower classes and had induced a number of middle class Britons to take up residency in America. While the introduction of universal suffrage in America had produced social cohesion, a sense of belonging, public spiritedness and impartial patriotism, Wright detects that in Britain such virtues had been swept aside by «The long submission to an unjust government» (Payne-Gaposchkin C. 1975a: 224)[13] which had led to permanent conflict between classes. With more than a hint of acrimony, she notes that the only measures taken by the wealthy classes to help the poor were little more than underhand expedients aimed at maintaining distances between classes rather than seeking concrete solutions to address inequality and suffering.

And it is in the light of such considerations, as she confides to her friend Harriet, that the evil system of slavery still existing in the southern states of America has become a pain intolerable to bear:

> *see liberty/mocked & outraged/ & that by a race of free men, who while they have their name in their mouths, ay and energy in their souls, grasp the chain of oppression in their hands, denying to the wretched sons of Africa that holy birthright wch they themselves declare man holds of God. When my thoughts turn to America the crying sin of her slavery weights upon my heart (ibid.)*

For someone who was an avid supporter of republicanism, seen as the only political system able to offer all citizens liberty and equality and to promote civic virtue in the classical sense of the term, the existence of slavery in over half of the American states was a shameful indictment. However, the fact that slavery had been abolished in some states where it had formerly existed was promising for the future.

Following the publication of *Views of society and manners in America,* Wright was contacted by Jeremy Bentham with whom she formed a relationship that would be described as one between master and novice (Morris 1984).

Therefore, she was certainly familiar with the principles of utilitarianism, as is evident in some of the reflections she makes in her letters to the Garnett sisters. Starting with the assumption that evil prevails over good in human beings, she is nevertheless convinced that although people are capable of selfless actions, they are rarely motivated by pure altruism: «his own good must been

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[13] *Letter of Frances Wright to Garnett sisters*, October 1820 (?).

connected, or must seem to be connected, with that of those he befriends»
(Payne-Gaposchkin C. 1975a: 225)[14]. As Wright further explains, citing exam-
ples of her own acts of pure generosity, such considerations do not concern
individuals but regard man in general. A key point in her argument is the idea
that regardless of whether or not people's intentions are self-motivated, ben-
efits to society will ensue.

> *But man ever finds sooner or later, in every nation & every clime that only wch is just
> & right & virtuous is lastingly for his advantage. Nations as well as individuals are
> gradually forced to see the truth of the proverb that honesty is the best ‹proverb›/policy/
> (ibid.).*

She harboured little doubt that slavery did nothing but degrade and impover-
ish human society.

6.2 On Utility and Justice

The time spent in the company of Bentham and other intellectuals who
formed part of that circle gave her the opportunity to discuss and continue
to reflect on topics and themes that had impassioned her from an early age.
One such subject was the notion of happiness, which Wright examined in one
of her early writings on Epicurus (*A Few Days in Athens 1822)*, but she was
also animated by issues such as the reform of the criminal justice system, the
emancipation of woman and of course slavery[15].
    Bentham did not fail to note the affinity that her enquiring mind had with
such wide ranging questions, so encouraged her to join British and Interna-
tional radical circles, and indeed persuaded her to go to France and meet his
friend Lafayette, thanks to whom she began participating in debates on as-
pects of democracy and republicanism in both Europe and America.
    In 1824, together with her sister Camilla, Frances Wright left for America
in the company of the General, where in the space of a few months she met
a number of leading American intellectuals and political figures. It was on this
same journey that she visited the southern states, which gave her the occasion
to further examine the issue of slavery and advance possible means for bring-
ing it to an end.

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[14] *Ibidem.*
[15] See Campos Boralevi (1984); Rosen (2005).

Among the more prestigious figures that she met was the elderly Thomas Jefferson. Although fascinated by her project and charmed by her personality, he could not commit to becoming involved in it due to his advanced age:

> *At the age of eighty-two, with one foot in the grave, and the other uplifted to follow it, I do not permit myself to take part in any new enterprises, even for bettering the condition of man, not even in the great one which is the subject of your letter, and which has been through life that of my greatest anxieties. […] I leave its accomplishment as the work of another generation. And I am cheered when I see that on which it is devolved, taking it up with so much good will, and such minds engaged in its encouragement. The abolition of the evil is not impossible; it ought never therefore to be despaired of. Every plan should be adopted, every experiment tried, which may do something towards the ultimate object. That which you propose is well worthy of trial. It has succeeded with certain portions of our white brethren, under the care of a Rapp and an Owen; and why may it not succeed with the man of color? ‹https://seaofliberty.org/explore/jefferson-frances-wright-quote-2/255› (25/09/2016).*

Unlike those who called for immediate abolition, Wright advocated a program of gradual abolition because it was essential to take into account the social, political and economic aspects peculiar to the south in particular, where the system of slavery had brought about a structurally different society compared to the north. Firstly, this was because the economy was founded on the work of huge numbers of slaves, and secondly, because the at times severe climatic conditions made it difficult for the whites to adapt. One of the consequences of the conditions of poverty and ignorance in which the slaves were kept was that they were unable to emerge from the yoke of subjugation which, together with entrenched convictions of them being an inferior race, made it difficult for them to become independent. Wright believed it imperative that there must be a phase of transition in which they should be provided with an education, at the expense of the state.

> *She had distinguished, at an early age, that human enfranchisement-which is but another name for civilization- is, in its beginnings, a slow, gradual, and complex operation; and that, to ensure its certain advancement, it must be made to move forward simultaneously in the soul of the internal man, and in the external influences which surround him (Wright 1844: 23).*

She steadfastly believed then, that in order to reconcile the emancipation of the black population with the material interests of the nation, to the reciprocal advantage of ex-slaves and the plantation owners, the former should be guided through «a real moral, intellectual, and industrial apprenticeship» (ivi: 27-28).

> *Neither the red savage nor the negro slave can be converted into America citizens, by acts of legislation; and this not because the one is black, nor the other red, but because the one is a savage, and the other a slave (ivi: 27).*

Despite her repulsion for slavery, she understood that the demands of slave owners had also to be heard; some of them with whom she had engaged in dialogue claimed to support emancipation, provided that they would receive financial compensation for expenses incurred in finding a new workforce.

> *I found several intelligent planters of Louisa & Mississippi decidedly agreed with me in opinion / that these states together with Georgia & Florida / must & will at no great distance of time be filled with a colored population. The only population by the way suited to the soil & climate […] Before the fearful crisis it is highly important that a portion of that people be prepared for liberty; they may then be the means of civilizing the ignorant mass (Payne-Gaposchkin C. 1975a: 240)[16].*

One major problem, though, which she realized would be arduous to overcome, was the total aversion expressed even by the more educated luminaries (including Jefferson) to the possibility of blacks mixing with whites. As Wright noted, this mixing of races had already occurred and would thus continue to be inevitable. In order to avoid resentment and confusion between legitimate and illegitimate heirs, it would be essential to guarantee parity of legal status for all:

> *the fact is also that amalgamation is taking place slowly but surely under the present system […] When men acquire the blood & color of their masters without acquiring their protection / or their privileges/ they sooner ‹feel› / conceive / resentment / & ambition./ So it was in St domingo – So it has been in Louisa ‹& in› where some years since a freightful insurrection was ‹effected› headed by a young mulatto who had been outraged in the most brutal / manner / by his half brother, the white & legitimate son of the master (ivi).*

In her efforts to find a concrete solution to the problem of slavery, Wright decided to visit the south and to familiarize herself with all the laws governing the management and the labour of slaves. She determined to speak with both abolitionists and plantation owners, convinced as she was of the profound effect of the social environment and the need to study it closely before attempting to tackle any issues or hypothesizing on effective solutions.

Her arrival in New Orleans was a traumatic one.

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[16] *Letter of Frances Wright to Julia Garnett*, 8 June 1825.

Slavery I expected to find here in all its horrors, and truly in all its horrors it is found […] For every man's hand is against the hapless slave & every law of man's creation […] In proportion as you travel south the features of slavery grow harsher, until they find their ne plus ultra in New Orleans (Payne-Gaposchkin C. 1975a: 233)[17].

6.3 The difficulty of transforming ideals into reality

Wright received numerous proclamations of esteem and verbal support for her project of setting up her community, coming from various quarters such as some plantations owners in Kentucky, in Tennessee and from the governor of New York De Witt Clinton etc., Nonetheless, she only managed to collect small sums. Refusing to give up, she decided to use her own financial resources.

She began her search for land somewhere in the south, possibly in the least racist of the slave states, Tennessee. On the advice of Lafayette, she turned to General Jackson, who helped organize the purchase at an extra low price of a piece of territory that had once belonged to the Chickasaw Indians. And so it was her that Wright established the community of Nashoba, to which she brought six men and four women, one of whom was pregnant and already had five children. There were sixtheen in all.

Her visits to New Harmony[18] in Indiana would be invaluable in ensuring the efficient structural planning of her community project. Wright wrote to her friend Julia Garnett describing how she was able to observe the techniques imported by the original German owners and a miraculously efficient system of "united labor" sponsored by Owen, far more productive than the traditional individualistic system.

Various modes of procedure have during this season occurred to me, but it was not until I had visited for the second time the settlement of Harmonie in Indiana, considered attentively the practice of its original German proprietors, together with the system now commenced by Mr Owen that I distinctly conceived the only scheme wch I believe capable of being rendered general & consequently efficient in its effects (Payne-Gaposchkin C. 1975a: 239)[19].

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[17] *Letter of Frances Wright to Julia Garnett*, 12 April 1825.
[18] On New Harmony see also Owen (1927); Leopold (1940); Owen (1979); Pollard (1992).
[19] *Letter of Frances Wright to Julia Garnett*, 8 June 1825.

Her admirations for Owen and his project continued to mature over the following months and her letters mention this increasing esteem: «I must speak another time of Mr. Owen. He is working miracles & promises fair to revolutionize a 2ᵈ time the North as I pray we may do the South» (ivi: 247).

Clearly, her visits to New Harmony and her discovery of Owen's cooperativist theories were instrumental in devising her plan. Equally important though, was her meeting the Haitian Jonathas Granville, a man of mixed race who had been a soldier in the French army. Having moved back to Haiti, he was given the task by the president of the island to oversee the transportation of freed black slaves from North America to Haiti, where they would be given land to be paid for by the fruits of their labour. Fanny Wright had long considered the expediency of taking black ex-slaves out of America because she feared that the strong aversion of whites towards any mixing of the two races would confound the progress towards equal rights for all Americans.

> *The prejudice whether absurd or the contrary against a mixture of the two colors is so deeply rooted in the American mind that emancipation without expatriation (if indeed the word be applicable) seems impossible. ‹at least› In time indeed it wd in spite of prejudice take place - but how many years of suffering & what a time of evils including probably a servile war must ensue before that amalgamation cd ‹take effect› / be effected./ The apprehension of this amalgamation will I think operate as not the least powerful incentive towards active measures (Payne-Gaposchkin C. 1975a: 230)[20].*

Despite careful planning that involved the setting up of a school, building canteens and shared housing, creating farms for rearing animals and cultivating various kinds of basic foodstuffs, the community struggled to become productive due to the lack of experience not only of the workers but also the organizers themselves, first and foremost Frances Wright. Moreover, the land itself was not generating revenue. The few funds that had been collected were insufficient for the purchase of reserve stocks and seeds, but were also inadequate for daily provisions of food. Further and far more serious problems would arise. The area around Nashoba was in fact a malarial zone; the sisters became ill repeatedly with yellow fever and another disease similar to malaria. Frances herself fell gravely ill for several days, almost dying, and never fully recovered her former health. In order to recover, she went first to New Harmony, where she formed a stronger friendship with Robert Dale Owen[21], the

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[20] *Letter of Frances Wright to Julia Garnett*, 12 November 1824.
[21] For a number of years, Robert Dale Owen and Wright shared common hopes, dreams and plans. Having originally met him in New Harmony, she got him involved in the Nashoba project, and they came to Europe together. On her return to Britain following the failure of the Nashoba experiment, she and Owen became publishers of the «New Harmony Gazzette»,

eldest son of 'Mr.' Owen. Robert had also taken up the cause against slavery, their shared convictions resulting in them travelling back to Europe together.

Before leaving for Europe, Wright took the decision to transform Nashoba into a municipal area where everyone would have the same rights, both men and women, and where white and black children would grow together. She also assigned an equal portion of property and equal share of future profits to all her friends who had lent their support in creating and administrating the community.

In Fanny Wright's absence, however, a man called James Richardson, one of the owners of Nashoba, decided to write a detailed account of life in Nashoba and to publish it in the anti-slavery journal *The genius of universal emancipation*. Richardson had clearly neglected to consider the possible critical reaction that his article would incite. Indeed, seemingly unaware that his descriptions of life at Nashoba would offend common morals and inflame fears and entrenched prejudices, he gave a straightforward description of how black and white children were educated together, and how parents were kept distant from their children to avoid them being a negative influence. He stressed that the slaves were treated with respect, but if they neglected their duties they would be admonished and punished using traditional methods of correction. Sexual relations outside marriage, even between people of different color, were permitted provided that they were consensual. Richardson then went on to reveal that he himself had a relationship with a black woman. The journal's editor, Benjamin Lundy, was so shocked and outraged, in particular at the idea of white and black children attending the same school and the revelations about sexual promiscuity, that he referred to Nashoba as «one great brothel, disgraceful to its institutors, and most reprehensible, as a public example, in the vicinity» (Morris 1984: 143).

When called upon to explain himself, he only made things worse by publicly declaring that he was an atheist and by railing against what he saw as stupid taboos. Lundy expected Frances Wright to make a stand condemning Richardson's revelations, but she did not explicitly do so. Instead, in an article entitled *Explanatory Notes* (Wright 1828: 124-125) that she wrote for the «New Harmony Gazzette» on 30 January 1828, while not making clear her disapproval of what Richardson had written, she also reaffirmed the principles that she saw as important to not only defend, but to apply in practice. These were liberty in all aspects of life and equality, the only way to ensure the happiness of man and the community as a whole. Besides, asserted Wright, she found herself in the only country in the world that had declared: «all men 'born free and equal'»

subsequently called the Free Enquirer. Their friendship weakened over time, especially after Wright's marriage to D'Arusmont, who accused Robert Dale of cheating his wife. On Robert Dale Owen see among others Leopold (1940).

and had «conquered the political freedom and equality of its citizens – with the lamentable exception, indeed, of its citizens of color». It was for this very reason that that she insisted all citizens should have «equal advantages, equal means of improvement and of enjoyment» (ivi: 124). In addition, America was also a country that enjoyed political freedom, though unfortunately not moral freedom, without which freedom of speech and action were undermined. It was thus necessary to acquire true freedom in all its forms, including moral, because only then would it be possible «To free ourselves of thrones, aristocracies and hierarchies, of sects and armies, and all the arrayed panoply of organized despotism» (*ibid.*).

Richardson and Wright's articles triggered the progressive demise and eventual failure of the Nashoba experiment, tarnished by a moral condemnation that also damaged its founder, guilty as she was of taking a stand, albeit not explicitly, against the traditional institution of marriage, as well as against state religion and white supremacy. Over the centuries, the entrenched common popular belief was that women were both mentally and morally weak. Frances Wright's proven intellectual ability meant that she could not be easily attacked from a cultural viewpoint, but was open to attack from the moral crusaders who pointed to her evident lack of moral propriety. She was an independent woman whose ability to make use of freedom of thought and expression, and whose active participation in intellectual circles set her apart from most other women of her time[22] Therefore, it was not difficult for her critics to distort and make believe that her demands for freedom and equality were a threat to natural order in all quarters of society. It should be remembered that despite paying lip service to egalitarian ideals, the American people continued to believe that a woman's place was in the home.

The Nashoba experiment was officially considered to have ended in 1830, when she located and rented a ship to bring the members of the Nashoba community to Haiti, where they could live free of prejudices and oppressive laws.

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[22] Dale Spender draws comparisons between the lives of Wright and Wollstonecraft, who the Scottish writer much admired and looked up to. Like Wright, she had been ostracized by conformist establishment society, who frowned upon a woman enjoying so much freedom «One woman who did continue in Mary Wollstnecraft's disagreeable tradition, who flaunted just about every precept laid down for desiderable and decorous behavior in women […] she and her name became associated with a number of outrageous activities» in Spender (1988: 160). Spender's text also cites Lane, who described how Wright's public figure was desecrated «because her aims appeared so outrageous to her contemporaries that they were in a hurry to forget her?» due to her unconventional lifestyle and her interests Lane (1972: 1).

6.4 Conclusion

Despite the end of the Nashoba community experiment, which with hindsight was destined to fail, it gave Wright the opportunity to make her own personal contribution, with both words and actions, to America's unstoppable path towards progress. It had also enabled her to elaborate her ideas on the two cardinal concepts of republicanism, liberty and equality, without which no state could function well and guarantee the happiness of its citizens as active members of a community. In other words, only these two fundamental attributes could ensure social, political and economic stability. Moreover, if the three questions of social equality, slavery and women's rights were not fully addressed, no progress would be possible. She wrote:

> *It is much to have declared men free and equal, but it shall be more when they have been rendered so; when means shall be sought and found, and employed to develop all the intellectual and physical powers of all human beings, without regard to sex or condition, class, race, nation or color; and when men shall learn to view each other as members of one great family, with equal claims to enjoyment and equal capacities for labor and instruction, admitting always the sole differences arising out of the varieties exhibited in individual organization (Wright 1828: 124).*

Her rediscovery in the United States of the importance of civic virtue, tangibly apparent in the active participation of citizens, was thanks in large part to her reading of European philosophers such as the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, but also Montesquieu from whom she had learned accurate methods of research and analysis. Having initially become impassioned by the question of slavery through reading the works of Thomas Paine, author of *African Slavery in America*[23], and those of Montesquieu and Botta, it was by studying the writings of Epicurus and Bentham that she determined the path she must follow: work tirelessly for the advancement of knowledge and human happiness because she believed: «*men are virtuous, in proportion as they are happy, and happy in proportion as they are free*» (*ibid.*).

Owen's cooperativist system had the double merit of attempting to eliminate competition and promoting education for all as a means to achieving equality among all individuals and secondly of advocating absolute though not arbitrary or unregulated liberty.

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[23] Published in the «Pennsylvania Journal» and the «Weekly Advertiser» on the 8th March 1775, it was a strong condemnation of the horrors of slavery; Paine would subsequently be involved in the foundation of America's first anti-slavery association, set up in Philadelphia on April 14th 1775.

Wright's personal dedication, her physical, emotional and financial commitment is great testimony to her sincere love of humanity and its progress that she so strongly believed in. Mary Shelley, author of Frankenstein and daughter of her much esteemed friend Mary Wollstonecraft paid homage to Wright's noble soul:

a woman, young rich & independent, quits the civilization of England for a life of hardship in the forests of America that by so doing she may contribute to the happiness of her species [...] Such a tale cannot fail to inspire the deepest interest & the most ardent admiration. You do honour to our species & what perhaps is dearer to me, to the feminine part of it (Wollstonecraft Shelley 1995: 180)[24].

As Wright wrote, Nashoba had been created

not in a spirit of hostility to the practice of the world, but with a strong moral conviction of the superior truth and beauty of that consecrated by the legal act of the founder. By a reference to that act, it will be seen that the principles on which the institution is based are those of human liberty and equality without exceptions or limitations, -- and its more especial object, the protection and the regeneration of the race of color, universally oppressed and despised in a country self-denominated free (Wright 1828: 125).

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[24] Letter of Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley to Frances Wright, 12 September 1827.

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Chapter Seven

THE AMERICAN JOURNEY OF ERNEST DUVERGIER DE HAURANNE: FRANCE AND UNITED STATES COMPARED (1864-1865)

Claudia Giurintano

7.1 THE LAND OF FRENZY AND WELL-BEING

The main theme of the days of study held in Cagliari on *Pluralism and monism in political and social patterns of the modern and contemporary age* has been declined in these pages through the comparison made by Ernest Duvergier de Hauranne (1843-1877)[1] between the personal government of Napoleon III and

[1] Son of journalist and politician Prosper (1798-1881), initiator of the campaign of banquets, Louis, Prosper, Ernest Duvergier de Hauranne contracted during the trip to America a lung injury that would later be the cause of his untimely death at the age of just thirty-four. Collaborator of the «Revue des Deux Mondes», after the travel notes, from 1866 to 1870, he published some articles on the French political debate, but also on the evolution of American politics. During the Franco-Prussian War he was captain of the Garde nationale mobile, the military corps employed primarily in opposition to the Prussian forces. Wounded in Beaune-la-Rolande, for his bravery he received the Légion d'Honneur. After the Second French Empire he leaned in favour of the Republic. Since July 2, 1871 to March 7, 1876 he sat on the benches of the centre-left at the National Assembly. On February 20, 1876 he was elected to the Chamber of Deputies always siding in the centre-left. A role, the latter, which he held until a few days before his death on August 19, 1877. During his term in office, he intervened in many discussions by voting against the resignation of Thiers on May 24, 1873, against the confidence in the Broglie

the United States of America in the last period of the Civil war.

When still a boy, Duvergier had learned from the conversation he had with Alexis de Tocqueville, and especially from the reading of *Démocratie en Amérique*, the functioning of the political institutions of a country that is «unique in the world» which, as Tocqueville wrote, had «drawn the most profit» from the "powerful means" of association; a link between democracy and associations, which offered the young French journalist, thirty years on from the "first" *Démocratie*, the possibility to compare once again France, this time being the France of the Second Empire, with a markedly pluralistic model of social reality, not without defects, but in which free association was presented as «a condition which avoids the extremes of the individualistic closing in private life and statism»[2]. Pluralism as a multiplicity of ideas, opinions, as well as a way of organizing a State where power is not fully centralized, but is rather exercised through local organizations and social groups.

Faced with a political and institutional reality that seemed like the authoritarian degeneration of the Second Republic, Duvergier decides to embark on his trip to America.

June 2, 1864 he began his journey from Liverpool to New York. In eight months of permanence he travelled throughout the United States and Canada[3], approaching Cuba and the Antilles in March of the following year.

He is a twenty-one year young man who, in the wake of the great French intellectuals of the generations that had preceded him, from Chateaubriand to Tocqueville, wants to know the New World and be an eyewitness of the Civil War that has challenged the American political institutions.

He decides to write a travel diary in an attempt to arouse the reader's interest for those events, but perhaps also to fully understand the feelings that Chateaubriand had cleverly set in his *Voyage en Amérique*, describing the dream of the traveller as «une sorte de plénitude de cœur et de vide de tête, qui vous laisse jouir en repos de votre existence» (Chateaubriand 1827: 96), with a mixture of peace of mind and anxiety.

That American route will be documented in the letters and notes published in 1866 in two full-bodied tomes under the title *Huit mois en Amérique* (1864-

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government, against the seven-year period, against the laws on mayors. He voted in favour of the constitutional laws of 1875. See Robert and Cougny <http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr>. See footnote 1 by Le Guillou and Roger-Taillade in Montalembert (2009: 457).

[2] Gomarasca (2006: 8723). (Free translation by the author of the present paper).

[3] From June 16, 1864 to February 12, 1865 the journey of Duvergier winds from Newfoundland to New York, from Philadelphia to Washington, from Maryland to Saratoga, from Trenton to Canada, up to the Great Lakes, from Chicago to the High Mississippi, from Saint Louis to Kentucky, from Cincinnati to Pennsylvania, before heading up towards Boston, Montreal and Toronto.

1865), and published in the «Revue des Deux Mondes»[4], from 15 August 1865 to 1 April 1866, in twelve «excellent» articles, as Charles de Montalembert, the Catholic liberal, wrote in his *Journal intime* (Montalembert 2009: 457).

In the *avant-propos*, imagining perhaps to address a reader too demanding and full of expectations, Duvergier defines his works as ephemeral, not a criticism, nor an apology for democracy, but a tale about the «naive» emotions of a French liberal who lacking a sufficient preparation had fallen into American society with the illusion of being able to find the imagined perfection, the «Platonically» loved freedom and ignoring, in fact, the practice of free institutions.

He had arrived in the US when the cause of the American union appeared severely impaired and had resumed his return journey when the victory of the Northern States was almost certain. He had been able to witness «aux inquiétudes, aux défaillances, aux fluctuations variées de l'opinion publique» (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, I: II).

Both the Democratic and Federative institutions were enable to resist «the violent shock» of war by showing all their solidity as well as their flexibility and their ability to cope with situations of serious crisis. The American people, often depicted as «anarchique, intéressé, ingouvernable, ramené, disait-on, à la barbarie par l'excès de l'égoïsme et de l'indépendance individuelle» (ivi: IV), had been able to manifest both order and discipline, as well as patriotism and perseverance.

Duvergier provided his readers with the «simple impressions», the «familiar» details of the serious contemporary events he was witnessing. The narration of the facts, by his own statement, would not follow a «logical and artificial order». These were personal and daily accounts:

J'ai pensé – it can be read from the first pages of his diary – que les impressions les plus simples, les détails les plus familiers empruntaient de l'importance à la gravité même des événements contemporains. Je n'ai pas voulu imposer un ordre logique et artificiel à des récits tout personnels, écrits au jour le jour, et sans aucune arrière-pensée de publicité. J'ai cru qu'il valait mieux livrer au lecteur mes impressions de chaque jour, les péripéties, les contradictions même de ma pensée, et le faire assister pour ainsi dire à la formation de mon jugement, que de lui donner une conclusion dogmatique qui n'eût montré qu'une des faces de la vérité (ivi: V).

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[4] Founded in July 1829 by Prosper Mauroy and Pierre de Ségur-Dupeyron, in 1831 it was bought back by Auguste Auffray and began being directed by François Buloz. The «Revue des Deux Mondes», *journal de voyages, de l'administration et de moeurs chez le differents peuple du globe,* expressed through such name its interest for the two "Worlds": Europe and America <http://www.revuedesdeuxmondes.fr/qui-sommes-nous/>.

Describing in detail the American character as it had appeared to him in the eight months of travel, Duvergier never claimed to add new features to an «already overburdened profile» of elements, but instead wanted to mitigate «the grotesque» shades with which it was covered by imagination - or as he stated – by the «charlatanism of European caricaturists» (*ibid.*). And among those who went to America with prejudices and stereotypes, he included himself.

He had arrived in the new continent with an exaggerated consideration for the American freedom, and he returned with «an almost childish fear of his costumes». Literature had contributed to this idealization by painting the American custom as fairy-tales to attract the attention of the European public. Stereotypes that had competed to represent the American like a ridiculous and intractable being, as a kind of civilized wild.

Duvergier just presented a true, sometimes hard, judgement on the American people yet without boasting or flattering the French. On the contrary, he intended avoiding to propose an explicit comparison between the two political systems, because it would have been dangerous and certainly not glorious for France. But, if you asked indulgence for France, it was necessary, however, to respect the legitimate pride of a free nation, «notre ainée en bien des choses, notre cadette en quelques autres» (ivi: XI), whose greatness could not be denied.

The first impact with the American reality had requested from the outset a twist in the preconceived idea of freedom. Upon his arrival in New York, Duvergier had experienced red tape, the "tyranny" of searches and of the seizure of some personal items. But America had immediately appeared as the land of frenzy, of tireless activity, of the excesses of wealth that had ended up perhaps weakening the intelligence and sense of beauty, and leaving the monopoly to the «utilitarian positivism».

A Tocqueville scholar, Duvergier shared his rational love for democracy, but also his aristocratic instinct, enough to paraphrase the well-known note *Mon instinct, mes opinions*[5] by the author of *Démocratie en Amérique*, writing the following words on September 7, 1864: «Plus j'avance dans le pays de la démocratie, plus je mes sens aristocrate à mon insu» (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, I: 238).

In his American journey Tocqueville had witnessed the contradictions between extreme freedom and slavery, the inconsistencies of those who love so

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[5] «Experience has proved to me that in almost all men, certainly in me, it always comes back to basic instincts, and one does well only what conforms to one's own instincts. Therefore, let's honestly look for where *my basic instincts and my serious principles* may be. I have a taste of the mind for Democratic Institutions, but I am an aristocrat by instinct, that is, I contempt and fear the crowd. I love passionately freedom, the rule of law, the respect for the rights, but not democracy. This is the depth of the soul». Tocqueville (1994: 12-13). (Free translation by the author of the present paper).

much equality, but think it is natural, as he had denounced, «to hold by side and under their feet» millions of individuals in an «eternal and irremediable servitude!» (*The irreplaceable role of the State*, Tocqueville 1994: 339). The American society was now trying to resolve such contradictions with a civil war that in Duvergier's opinion was the emblem of the antagonism between two rival societies, North and South, on one side the murmur of the city, industry and human activity, on the other side the loneliness, the fatal immobility due to the ambition of the Southerners who had tied slavery to the land ownership (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, I: 86).

7.2. The "secret" of American freedom: the organization of political parties

Since the crossing, Duvergier had had the opportunity to converse on American political issues, on the presidential elections that would re-elect Republican Abraham Lincoln, and to hear comments on the guilt of the South (ivi: 8). He had heard the thesis and the antithesis, the opinion of both the northerner and southerner, the opinion of the Republican - defender of the union, willing to bend the rights of the Member states to the federal domain, - and of the democratic[6], partisan of autonomy to the bitter end and of the absolute independence of the individual Member States (Duvergier de Hauranne 1868c, note 1).

The presidential election campaign - described by Duvergier as a sort of interregnum and of apparent disorder, of suspension of authority, of war between the parties - had revealed to him the power wielded by popular vote.

The American spirit had, in fact, proved capable of ensuring law and order even immediately after the election campaign:

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[6] The Southern States placed their purported right to secede under the aegis of the democratic doctrine. The Northern ones defended the union and consequently they supported the Republicans. The Republican party was internally divided into moderates, who declared themselves as respectful of a limited independence of the States, and radicals, concerned with the abolition of slavery and the simple maintenance of the Federal Union, enough to want to impose on the absolute equality of the races on all States in both North and South. The civil war had fragmented the Democrats, who were divided on the proclamation of the emancipation drafted by Lincoln and presented, on the one hand, the War Democrats joining the Republicans who were lined up in support of the president, and on the other hand the Peace Democrats, close to the Southerners, supporters of peace and for this ridiculed by Republicans with the name Copperhead which became synonymous with traitor. See Auman (2014: 51). See also Weber (2011: 33-47).

Voila - commented Duvergier on November 8, 1864 – le grand mérite de la démocratie américaine et l'utilité de cette insouciance même du juste qui étonne des esprits accoutumés à voir partout la valeur absolue des choses. Les Américains sont des hommes pratiques qui savent accepter sagement les faits accomplis et irrévocables (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, II: 21).

Once the elections were over everything was silent and the signal of that threat of insurrection or of the state of general anarchy was immediately contradicted by the strength of American democracy: «tumultueuse, qui semblait prête à se déchirer, - noted Duvergier - éprouve elle même le besoin de s'imposer la discipline et d'imprimer un caractère de stabilité solennelle à la constitution des pouvoirs nouveaux» (ivi: 23). Such protection, «tutelary genius» of democracy, resided in his opinion in the organization of political parties (*ibid.*).

This was the «secret» of American freedom:

Ces conventions improvisés – he wrote – qui s'organisent au nom du peuple pour désigner les candidats et fixer la politique des partis sont obéies avec un ensemble qui prouve l'intelligence politique du pays (ibid.).

The organization of political parties conveyed the habit to deliberate and act jointly, to give priority to the collective interest on self-interest, to teach moderation (Duvergier de Hauranne 1868b).

Duvergier was aware that to the eyes of a European, the organization of political parties in America could present itself as a State within a State, but still it had allowed the regular exercise of democratic freedoms. Four years of civil war would have crippled any nation, it would put into question the inviolable right of association. America, however, had offered a great lesson. Representative institutions, accompanied by all the necessary freedom, were the sign of the civilization of the peoples, the object of their legitimate ambition, «the natural condition of all civilized nations» (Duvergier de Hauranne 1868a).

Faced with this representation of the American model, and with the freedom of fact as well as the experience and contribution of social progress, France, according Duvergier, had preferred the sterile abstraction of universal suffrage without limits, pure theory[7].

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[7] Duvergier de Hauranne (1866, II: 413). On the issue of political representation, Duvergier defines as «seductive systems», proper to the ideal sciences and to pure justice, the proposals of the *Single transferable Vote* of Thomas Hare and John Stuart Mill's multiple votes. In this regard, he writes: «Nous ne devons jamais perdre de vue les grandes idées de justice qui dominent les institutions libre et qui sont l'âme de nos droits; mais il ne faut pas oublier qu'en politique, comme en morale, ce sont les œuvres qui sauvent encore plus que la foi». Duvergier de Hauranne (1868a). The author believes that the electoral law should not be «left at the mercy» of the pas-

The French political system outlined by Duvergier is an autocratic model that only in appearance, «officially», maintains universal suffrage as a democratic element, as well as public freedoms, but prohibits the national will to express itself[8]. The author minimizes the liberal openings of Napoleon III, inaugurated by the decree of November 24, 1860[9], so as to grasp more its «authoritarian twists» than its authentic liberal evolution[10].

His nation would have to choose, then, between «the reassuring agitation of representative government» and «the frightening silence of personal government»; to choose between the safety of a liberal system in which the country discussed publicly and the instability of a despotic regime that would lead to new and «more terrible» revolutions, in which everything depended on the whims and the «fantasy of one single man» (Duvergier de Hauranne 1869: 9)[11].

What strikes the young French journalist is that in America every local issue, even private ones, ends up being reconnected to a major national issue. The same presidential elections implied the appointment of the Lieutenant-Governor, of the representative of the first district, and had consequences on the choice of a policeman or of a simple street sweeper.

Each party had its own organized government and an "army" of underlings ready to «invade» the little jobs sector: «Tous les quatre ans, – commented Duvergier – l'administration entière est menacée. Si le président change, elle change aussi de la cave au grenier, partout du moins où le nouveau pouvoir a obtenu la majorité» (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, II: 25).

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sions of an ignorant crowd; the citizen, in his view, can make his voice heard in different ways than «jeter un morceau de papier dans une urne ou même de prononcer à haute voix le nom du candidat qu'il choisit». Duvergier (1868b).

[8] (Ellul 1976, III: 385). Today, the judgement on Napoléon le Petit, according to the well-known epithet by Victor Hugo, was revised from an historiographical perspective thus allowing a reconstruction of the Second Empire which highlights the social, economic and industrial progress sponsored by Napoleon III from 1848 to 1870. For an in-depth investigation, see the biographies of Girard (1986), Séguin (1991), Milza (2004), Cardini (2010). Milza in particular judges, among other things, the Second Empire as a step in the democratization process of France, a period that «a familiarisé les Français avec le vote» Milza (2004: 646).

[9] Saitta (1975: 748-749). The decree of November 24 had returned to the Senate and the Legislative Body, «the right to address in response to the Crown's speech» and had given back the Legislature the right to amendment. *Ibid.*: 730.

[10] Ellul (1976, III: 385, 393). Still in 1869, on the eve of the elections, in the brochure *Le gouvernement personnel* while denouncing that the official candidates would lean on the «personal protection of the prince», Duvergier writes: «Les élection que nous allons faire décideront de l'existence même et des fondements du gouvernement représentatif. Elles mettent en présence deux principes absolument opposés. Tandis que l'opposition invoque le principe libéral et réclame l'exercice sérieux des institutions représentatives, le gouvernement s'appuie en revanche sur le *principe d'autorité*, c'est-à-dire sur le droit qu'il prétend avoir d'exercer sur la nation une sorte de tutelle, et de la diriger dans le choix de ses mandataires». Duvergier de Hauranne (1869: 4).

[11] Free translation by the author of the present paper.

Therefore, in American democracy the organization of parties formed and maintained the national line. And although the federal constitution would leave spaces of autonomy to the Member states, the political organization was a unifying force created by the sharing of ideas and obedience to the same political address.

American democracy could have found itself weak and helpless in front of an unforeseen danger, it could have lost the material resources that an absolute power, maybe, would have been able to exploit better, but its moral "spring" would not have failed, since its strength is not derived from the administration or the army, but from the very heart of the nation, from the roots of the major political parties, basic elements of the pluralist theory (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, I: 27).

7.3 Against the domain of centralization

In Duvergier's opinion, the administrative unit would lead to a progressive centralization that would be fatal for freedom. The solution, the remedy, was to be identified in a wider local division (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866: II: 124).

In his famous pages of *Démocratie en Amérique*, Tocqueville had already properly differentiated political centralization from administrative centralization typical of France at that time.

If the interests shared by all parties of the nation, «the formation of the general laws and relations with foreign countries» fall within the political centralization, the concentration and direction of special or local interests instead concern the administrative centralization:

> *I cannot conceive - wrote Tocqueville - that a nation can live and prosper without a powerful centralization of government. But I am of opinion that in centralized administration is fit only to enervate the nations in which it exist, by incessantly diminishing their local spirit (Tocqueville, 1984: 64; 1991: 110)[12].*

Based on the American experience, Tocqueville had attributed to the judiciary the role of corrective for the tyranny of the majority, an autonomous power, able to bring back the majority within its limits. Duvergier shared this analysis so as to give the judiciary the task of safeguarding the institutions, a conserva-

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[12] Free translation by the author of the present paper.

tive and liberal role that maintained the balance of powers and the hierarchy of powers, thus giving powerful guarantees to the freedoms of the individual.

In France, where the centralized structure was dominating, all the laws emanated from the same power, disguised under different names. The laws formed a single, homogeneous set, and although there were some general principles in the French constitution, they appeared as mere outward trappings. The principles of the 1789 revolution were present as a decoration, as an ornament; in the application, the law of detail had taken over the general law.

The situation that Duvergier caught in America was instead very different. Here the Constitution of the United States is the real supreme law which dominates all laws. The judiciary intervenes every day in public affairs. And when a citizen believes he has been injured in his right, he denounces not the government, but the official who represents it and has been made responsible by the law.

In France, the construction of the administrative machinery was impersonal and indivisible, cloaked with the inviolability of the official. In America instead every officer knew he had to account for abuses committed in the ordinary courts. The judiciary was the real controller, the real counterweight essential to democracies, while in France it was a great administrative machine, governed as a regiment. Here, as Duvergier denounced, the voice of the citizen remained isolated before the guilty official and the claim for the enforcement of the law remained a dead letter. In America, the ministers were agents of the president, but the responsibility of all officials in front of the common justice advantageously replaced the accountability of government leaders in front of the assembly (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, II: 111-112).

The press, thanks to the American freedom, was the indispensable intermediary, the tool without which the parties could not have formed, the opinions could not have been expressed and spread throughout the country. It divulged, but did not taught anything, and thanks to the freedom it enjoyed, was less damaging than a docile and gagged press (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, I: 342).

The American administrative decentralization had therefore allowed each location to have its particular laws, and each institution its regulations. An example was offered by free education, the revolutionary innovation that existed in America for two centuries, established in the colonies by the Puritans from which «ce vaste et admirable système d'éducation populaire» originated (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, II: 88).

Duvergier had watched, amazed, the presence of schools of all kinds: state, municipal, private. Americans were aware of the excellence of their system of public education, "keystone" of the republican institutions. They understood how foolish it was to put political power in the hands of an ignorant mass and had invested in the training of citizens.

In Europe, and particularly in France, free education appeared as the expression of political economy aimed at creating strictly identical services. A reform that would have been labeled in a simplistic way as an expression of socialist doctrine. Duvergier warned to look at the results and not the doctrine; an abstract calculation of the ideas was of no importance when the general welfare, the morality, the freedom of an entire people could be reached. It was not just to accept a syllogism or an equation, but to agree with a practical experience that America taught.

Free education was a basic need of every true democracy. French administrative centralism was a too heavy machine, too complicated, and free education would be prohibitively expensive for a State responsible for ensuring the right and the obligation to free education. It was necessary, first, to emancipate the communes.

With its representative institutions, accompanied by all the necessary freedom, America, instead, offered a great lesson in civilization of peoples.

The American habit of *self-government* had been able to survive any ordeal. The war, the defeat of the secessionist government had failed to strangle the independence and the legal order (Duvergier de Hauranne, 1866 II: 88: 490). In less than a year, in fact, the whole South had returned under the legal authority and in the pacific exercise of its freedoms: «Voila le spectacle unique et admirable que la démocratie américaine vient de donner au monde» (ivi: 491).

But the great merit of American democracy was also its extraordinary ability to train men and citizens, to practice the institutions and not only in an apparent form. The possibility to enter the White House, to freely shake hands with the President, was not just a ridiculous formality: it was the sign of the democratic union between the government and the governed; the possibility to «honour» power not under the image of a soldier in uniform or of a prince with royal coat, but in the form of a simple man of the people, of an older worker as Jackson, of a woodcutter like Lincoln, or of a young tailor as Johnson[13]. These men of democracy were formed modestly in the daily

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[13] In 1868 Johnson was subjected to *impeachment* for suspected abuses of power against the Congress which was in favour of a punitive policy against the Southern States. The failure to achieve the 2/3 majority required by the Constitution, by one vote, enabled him to reject the first impeachment of the executive in American history. Duvergier had the opportunity to deal widespread with this matter in an article published on the «Revue des Deux Mondes», *L'élection présidentielle aux États-Unis, Le général Grant et les partis en Amérique,* 1868. The destitution of the president of the United States by an Assembly was a «curious spectacle» which turned «le premier personnage de l'état» in the «plus minime des fonctionnaires». And he wrote: «Accoutumés que nous sommes à des pratiques toutes différentes, nous serions certainement moins étonnés si c'était le pouvoir exécutif qui s'avisât de congédier les chambres et de gouverner le pays sans elles. Tel est pourtant le seul moyen qu'ait inventé la constitution américaine pour trancher les disputes du président et du congrès; mais on conçoit que cette arme formidable ne pouvait pas être d'un usage quotidien» (Duvergier de Hauranne, 1867).

exercise of their political rights; they owed their fortune just to the free choice of their fellow citizens. No one could ever scold their humble origin, nor the lack of theoretical knowledge; no prejudice had banned the conquest of the highest summits of the American administration. Tocqueville had beautifully described it as «the equality of conditions», as the possibility for each single individual to rise in society without finding moral barriers, jealousies of divisions between classes which continued instead to exist in Europe as legacies of the *Ancien Régime* (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, II: 494).

American democracy did not know these vices of French society and its administrative centralization. The words "aristocratic" and "proletarian" were unknown and equality was not a barren appearance imposed by the fear of a democracy shaken by social fears.

America was the only modern country where, in the strict and figurative sense, the man had a space in front of him; the only country where the man had no need to live as a parasite on other people's wealth. The property was respected because it was accessible to all, and the citizen was generous because «[he pushed] forward without looking at what he [was leaving] behind» (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, I: 434).

In his usual use of metaphorical images, Duvergier likened a centralized country like France to a man who ends up atrophying his limbs because despite having two legs he prefers to tie them together and replace them with crutches. In a state so organized, rest and silence become then the only desire and need of the people. The lower classes become accustomed to passive obedience or to anarchy, to the contempt of legal rights and freedom. Tocqueville, «le génie sagace», had appropriately defined this society in «ineffaçables» terms as "revolutionary", but not democratic.[14]

Duvergier exemplified the confrontation between the two political models, between the American and French institutions of his time with the following words:

Quand je compare les habitudes si larges des Américains à nos mœurs défiantes et chicanières, il me semble voir d'un coté un coureur hardi qui s'allège pour atteindre plus vite le but désiré, de l'autre un flâneur qui s'arrête pour ramasser tous les cailloux de la route. L'un est affairé, taciturne, tendu vers son unique pensée: s'il ne vous renverse au passage, il vous repoussera brusquement de son chemin; l'autre est sans contredit plus aimable, et tous ces petits cailloux inutiles qu'il aime à ramasser sont les plaisirs et les ornements de la vie (Duvergier de Hauranne 1866, I: 434).

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[14] Tocqueville (1991: 676-678); Duvergier (1866, II: 496). According to Duvergier, in France the aristocratic sentiment hard to destroy, but publicly concealed behind the «politesse», prevailed on the love for equality. An ability to camouflage that concerned the most wicked acts much to write: «trop de gens chez nous sont habiles à commettre des crimes avec des gants blancs, et sans qu'il leur reste aux mains une goutte du sang versé». Duvergier de Hauranne (1866, I: 237).

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Between Nationalism and Internationalism: Luigi Sturzo's Regionalism

Carlo Morganti

Luigi Sturzo (Caltagirone 1875, November 26th – Roma 1959, August 8th) was a Sicilian priest and politician. He is well known as the founder of the Italian People's Party (PPI), which he founded in 1919. «Priest, poet, philosopher, political scientist, statesman, one of Italy's great glories, Don Luigi Sturzo, after his high calling of priest, the vocation closest to his heart and the one that he put above all others, preferred to think of himself as a sociologist, in the European sense of being a student of society» (Lograsso 1964: 192)[1]. Soon he turned into a famous social scientist with an in depth knowledge of the Italian society, particularly in its historical making process (Gargano 1999: 10)[2].

Among his various writings, we can not therefore forget those dedicated to the idea of society, e.g. *Inner Laws of Society: A New Sociology* written in 1935 and published in 1944 (Sturzo 1944a), or those numerous articles which Sturzo

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[1] About Sturzo see also Malgeri (1993); Fanello Marcucci (2004). About his political thought: De Rosa (1973); Campanini – Antonetti (1979); Guccione (1987); Guccione (1988); De Rosa (1990); De Rosa (2001); Guccione (2004).

[2] See Gargano (1999: 10): «Sicilian by birth but, following his ordination, soon mixing in the ecclesiastic circles of Rome, Luigi Sturzo was a witness to the constitution of the Italian nation-state, living through his country's transition from kingdom to republic. He experienced the difficulties of government at local level and also observed the terrible events of the two world wars, events which rendered the question of a world government a pressing issue both in Italy and in Europe (where the dreadful experiences of Nazi-fascism and Bolshevism had made democracy and freedom the only legitimate way forward)».

wrote during his exile from Italy (see e.g. Sturzo 1949b) – Sturzo was forced to emigrate to England in 1924; he lived in London till 1940, when the Second World War and the Nazi bombings on the British capital led him to move to the USA, to New York, where he stayed just for a few months because of the very cold climate, and then to Jacksonville, in Florida – e.g. *Italy and Fascism*, published in 1926 (Sturzo 1926a), *The international community and the right of war*, published in 1929 (Sturzo 1929a), *Nationalism and internationalism*, published in 1946 (Sturzo 1946) and containing some articles and letters written for American newspapers and scientific reviews. *La regione nella nazione*, published in 1949 (Sturzo 1949a) is an emblematic text of Sturzo's regionalism.

Regionalism – based on a particular attention that the Sicilian priest tributes to regions, local government and local communities – mirrors Sturzo's pluralistic vision of the Italian society and characterizes his political thought. He learned to pay attention, as a statesman and Mayor of Caltagirone, to people's practical necessities, and as a Sicilian, towards the ideas of legislative autonomy and self-government for those regions of Southern Italy which felt abandoned by the post-unity liberal Governments.

However, Sturzo's regionalism is to be set in a larger context and analyzed as it were not an isolated aspect of his political thought, but a fundamental part of his political vision which entwines nationalism and internationalism, attention to traditions and local elements and larger social, cultural and political contexts – in a society where the individuals are opening to the other human beings, the States to other States until creating that «inter-nazione» which is, for Sturzo, the real aim of a christian-oriented human society.

8.1 First framework: Nationalism and Nation

We start from the first point: nationalism. More precise information is required. Sturzo grows up and studies between the end of the XIX century and the beginning of the XX – in those years bourgeois ideals of development and progress of civilization and sciences characterize, in Sturzo's vision, Italy and Europe, but they lead peoples and States not to that progress towards which they are aiming, but to the great disaster of the First World War. After the war, the world seems to be informed by nationalistic ideals and visions – from the idea of nation, the political thought moved towards the idea of nationalism, but it is often difficult to distinguish the former from the latter; nationalism has moreover good aspects: self-determination of nations, minorities respect

etc.; but it has also bad aspects: ideas of hierarchy among peoples and nations, domination, indifference to other peoples' destiny.

Thus, it is necessary to determine the real meaning of the term nationalism in Sturzo's thought. In his vision, in fact, the idea of nationalism, as well as many other political, economic and social phenomena, e.g. socialism, communism, liberalism, belongs to a particular category of political concepts he defines as «ismi» – from the terminations of these words – involving not only new words to indicate ancient and lofty concepts – nation, liberty, society, community – but also a new and different sense. And the idea of nationalism, in this respect, makes no exception. It involves, in a sharp meaning of the term, an idea of the nation being a political and ethic *primum*, at the same time origin and aim of a community, he strictly condemns. So nationalism ranks, in Sturzo's theory, at the same level of the other «ismi». However, Sturzo argues that the term nationalism is often used in other less fanatical meanings, so that it can appear acceptable and even deserving – i.e. as love of one's country, as an affectionate sentiment that entwines the individuals and their birthplaces.

Even Pope Pius XI in his encyclical *Ubi Arcano Dei* (1922, December 23rd) distinguishes among a right nationalism (giusto nazionalismo) and an exaggerated nationalism (nazionalismo esagerato); he approves the former, but condemns the latter as an anti-christian idea.

To summarize, according to Sturzo's political vision, it is always important to understand the real meaning of the words we use in order to avoid mistakes and misunderstandings, for it is not simple to seize the exact connection between a word – and especially a new word – and its real meaning or, to use Sturzo's words: «cogliere l'intrinseco nesso tra la parola ed il significato [so that] si va per approssimazione verso i significati che prevalgono in un dato ambiente e in un dato momento» (Sturzo 1946: 5).

Then, we can not forget that Sturzo writes some articles, especially during the First World War, by using tones we can consider – apparently – nationalistic, but he has not let up in front of any nationalistic temptation. In them, we can simply find Sturzo's will to be on the young Italian soldiers' side, those young soldiers who have been compelled by the wartime circumstances to fight in an apparently never ending trench war.

Nevertheless, that of *Nation* – and not that of nationalism – is, in Sturzo's view, a really acceptable concept, referring to a particular form of the human society. A society that Sturzo sees as a result of the individual: society is a «multiple, simultaneous and continuative projection of individuals» (Sturzo 1944a: 18), he writes at the beginning of *Inner Laws of Society: A New Sociology* – the individual being therefore the starting point of his own political analysis. The individual or, better, the individuals, with all their personalities, specificities, pluralities. And of course with all their natural processes of association.

Sturzo argues that everything that is human is also associative: «nulla esiste dell'attività umana che pur essendo originariamente individuale non abbia va-lore associativo; nulla fra gli uomini può entrare in essere che non richiami una qualche forma di associazione» (Sturzo 1944a: 6).

Sturzo admits however that it is often complicated for the individuals themselves to understand their own natural associative tendencies, for they are used to consider classical social forms – family, State, class, nation – as they were independent social structures, while every merely individual act is at the same time associative, it contains an inter-individual relation and is aiming to goals which are both individual and collective.

So Sturzo gives a great importance to these social structures, both Nation and State, which he considers a natural consequence of a continuous human process and within which he develops all his analysis[3].

Hence, by shifting from an individual perspective to an individual and col-lective one, the natural associative process, characterizing the creation of na-tions and States. It represents a peculiar feature of Sturzo's political analysis. So a natural associative life of the individuals constitutes a key concept in order to move, then, towards the idea of international community as intended by Sturzo.

8.2 Second framework: the international community

If a society is created by organized relations among individuals and the indi-vidual has natural tendencies to an associative life, so does also a community, a nation – whose natural tendencies have, *mutatis mutandis*, the same goal of the individual – when it joins other nations and communities, with different cul-tures and traditions, aiming to the creation of a real international community or, by using Sturzo's words, an «inter-nazione»[4].

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[3] Sturzo writes that: «Human reality is process [not a "progress" but, instead, a "process"] We say process, that is, succession, and not progress, nor evolution, because all human activity is individual, even if developing, as it does, collectively or by groups. Every individual activity is, above all, experience, experiment, the reduction of the experience of others into our own, re-ally personal". For Sturzo, then, "in associated life there are contemporaneously developments, arrest, renewals, involutions, all the stages that experience implies. Hence, there is not always progress, never a real regression, but in a relative sense both progress and regression, that is, experimentation and achievement» Sturzo (1944a: 18).

[4] See for example Sturzo 1944b: «Today there is only one alternative: either a League of Nations with its own juridical and political powers, with its own international police, and a

Sturzo thinks in fact that modern nations have been created by a union of local level units – cities, counties and provinces – within a larger mark, e.g. kingdoms, states, nations. And this unity has been difficult, due to the contemporary presence in this process of local rights and traditions and larger national aims. However, as this unit of cities and counties has been completed, especially during the modern age, it can be then possible also a unit of States and Nations within the even larger international community framework. Near the end of *Nationalism and Internationalism* Sturzo writes: «We are going toward an international life in spite of our mistakes and failings» (Sturzo 1946). He finds the roots of this idea in the Christian theme of human equality before God and in the religious duty to love one's neighbour in a manner that transcends the traditional boundaries of the ancient world. Thus the social values of the pre-Christian world are inverted, and human *personality* assumes the mantle previously held by the social and ethnic bonds of that era.

Sturzo is really persuaded by the fact that Nations and States can reach a pacific international community, he is a great supporter of the League of Nations, as well as, even if a bit more frustrated, of the Organization of the United Nations. And he can be remembered also for his commitment for a European unity[5].

The international community is, in other words, the natural political framework within which nations and peoples can find its own historical realization.

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contribution of armaments from every state: or an imperialistic supremacy (to give it its true name) of great powers which take on the responsibility of world order and direct protection, or protection by means of spheres of influence, of other states. None of the spectrum of possibilities we can think up between these two poles will be able to make either one or the other system prevail. We are in favour of a League of Nations with all the necessary powers to create a new order in the world», cit. in Martini (1988).

[5] «In the more general context of his commitment to world democracy, his support for the post World War II movement towards European unification can, in this regard, also be considered significant, giving substance to some of the assertions he made during the period of his exile from Italy. If we consider that the process of European integration actually originated (if we leave aside the general aspirations of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europa committee and the work and goodwill of Briand and Stresemann in the interwar years) from the meeting and shared feelings of three men, Adenauer, Schuman and De Gasperi, all members of Christian Democratic parties, then the intellectual oeuvre of the Sicilian priest who, for many years had represented the driving force and energy behind a new approach to politics which combined an elevated, ethical sense of duty with an admirable determination to establish new political orders, emerges as particularly significant» Gargano (1999).

8.3 Sturzo's Regionalism

We have to consider that Sturzo' s analysis, although not in favour of national-istic tendencies, develops almost completely within a national framework, i.e. the nation is the political and cultural context within which we have to insert Sturzo's reflections.

A nation, we can also say, that is open to larger forms of community but in continuity with its own traditions and its own culture, as if this continuity, for a nation, were a guarantee of its own existence in history.

In this framework, composed by nations and international community, even regions are pointed out. The young Sturzo's support for an autonomist view of relations between national government and local communities soon becomes evident and, it might be said, accompanies him throughout his life. He gives special emphasis to regions, which are a «geographic, ethnographic, economic and historical fact» nobody can ever deny. According to Sturzo's political theory, Italian regions, whose personality is individual and multiple at the same time, multiple or plural – to use a more proper term – have acquired these characters since at least the Middle Ages. History itself con-tributed to improve their will of freedom and independence – Italy has been the land of conquest since the end of the Roman Empire. A freedom that is like the air, indispensable to live, without which individual life is destined to death.

Politically speaking, this freedom expresses not only a strong critic against centralizing statism of the Italian liberal post-unity governments or a condem-nation of all attempts against regional autonomy during the Fascist era, but also a great support to the idea of regional autonomy itself – autonomy that Sturzo sees both bureaucratic and institutional. And this autonomy reflects then the plural character of Sturzo's idea of society.

He considers himself not a separatist, but a federalist, whose federalism aims to build this autonomy – from an economic and governmental point of view – for regions, not apart from, but within a national frame. To this end, it is necessary to work to implement individuals' and society's freedoms[6].

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[6] Sturzo considers in fact the Italian unification as a fundamentally positive process and repeatedly expresses aversion to any separatist design that arose in Italy after the World War II, especially by his famous speech on New York Radio: Autonomia sì, separatismo no, see for example Guccione (1994). Maybe we can find in Sturzo's words a bit of confusion between the term autonomism and the term federalism he usually uses, but «While there can be no doubt that the Sicilian priest never really considered promoting the cause of independence for the island, it is however quite probable that his indiscriminate use of two conflicting terms: decentralization and federalism, can be attributed to his need to seem not to oppose the regime of the unitary state that emerged from Porta Pia and not to place too much emphasis on questions of form (institutional issues) rather

A debate about regional autonomy in Italy grows between the end of the XIX century and the beginning of the XX: among favourable and opposing opinions, Sturzo points out the silence of many liberal Mps, culpably reluctant, in his opinion, to take side in favour of regional autonomy. On July 12th, 1903, in *Pro e Contro il Mezzogiorno*, he writes:

> *This is the real issue: we are regionalists […] a new Monroe doctrine, Sicily for the Sicilians, is the only basis on which to build a true Sicilian political movement […] which, bearing the banner of administrative and financial autonomy, and characterised by its opposition to central government, would win the support of all the other parties [and then he added] the proud Sicilians of yesteryear know that this is a land that was not born to serve — and yet through the cowardice of its sons, serve is what it has nearly always had to do* (Sturzo 1903).

However, just two years earlier, declaring: «I am in favour of the unity of the Italian state, but unashamedly federalist» (Sturzo 1901b), he had written that the remedy for Italy's ills (meaning, above all, the uneven fiscal burdens in different parts of the kingdom): «would be a *carefully weighted* regional and administrative decentralisation and a *federalisation* of the various regions, leaving intact the unity of the existing order» (Sturzo 1901a).

We have, in this respect, always to remember that these Sturzo's words are worth for any region in Italy and not for Sicily alone, for his «Southernism» aims to a general autonomy of local units and not to create in the South of Italy a new Sicilian State federated within a new federal Italian State, his declared federalism aiming more to a form of regional autonomism than to a real juridical federalism.

Problems correlated to the economic difference between an industrial northern Italy and an agricultural South are in those years treated also by Francesco Saverio Nitti in his book *Nord e Sud*, published in 1900 (Nitti 1900), and then in *Napoli e la questione meridionale*, printed in 1903 (Nitti 1903). In the former the future Prime Minister observes the economic and fiscal differences among North and South, that he considers to penalize the southern yet economically disadvantaged territories; in the latter he treats the old problem of the institutional and economic integration of the ancient Kingdom of Naple in the new Italian post-unity State.

This debate stops, understandably, with the First World War. It begins again after the war, but it is conditioned by new problems raised as a consequence of the deep economic crisis affecting Italy in the years 1919-1920 as well as by the seizure of power by political parties which are against every form of decentralization – especially after 1922, with the fascist Government.

than of content (the urgent problems of the peasant classes)» Gargano (1999).

Sturzo remains resolute in supporting his own ideas of regional autonomy – particularly, he fights for a legislative as well as administrative autonomy of regions within the national framework of the Kingdom – even against different opinions of many members of his Party.

On 18th January 1919, in Rome, in fact, Sturzo founds the Italian People's Party by issuing his appeal to «all men who are strong and free». And in the party's program, sixth item, we can read that the party will sustain regional bodies' freedom and autonomy, municipalities' administrative importance, a reform of bureaucracy[7]. This represents a great novelty in the field of Italian parties' programs. It's the first time that an Italian party recognizes local autonomy importance within the constitutional framework – e.g. before, just republicans and socialists supported regional autonomy, but more against, respectively, the monarchy and the liberal governments, than for a real conviction.

However, notwithstanding this – and despite the bond among regional, national and international perspectives, that is the real novelty – public opinion and newspapers showed they were indifferent, more interested in Catholics organized in a political party after the papal abrogation of the *non expedit* than in the contents of their political program – although the Italian People's Party is not a religious party, even if christian-oriented.

Regionalism is supported in those years also by the National Association of the Italian Communes (ANCI) – it was created in 1901 and Sturzo was councillor and vice-president till 1924 – and by the Association of the Italian Provinces, with a strong fight, in Sturzo's opinion, against bureaucratic centralization and against central Government interferences in regional political life.

Concerning this, Sturzo, in *Riforme statali e indirizzi politici* (Sturzo 1923), which he publishes in 1923, carries out his courageous policy about the reform of the state, by implementing his fight for introducing decentralization and, electorally speaking, a proportional electoral system.

However, these proposals – which make the Italian People's Party a relevant political actor and, with the socialists, the second Italian mass party – have no grip over the liberal electorate, which still constituted the majority of voters.

To the electoral body, in fact, the Italian People's Party seems to be an advanced democratic party, in some cases like the Socialist Party, not able to resolve the Italian citizens' practical problems. To many conservative voters, then, it seemed a revolutionary party, while Sturzo wanted a party that were

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[7] «Libertà e autonomia degli enti pubblici locali. Riconoscimento delle funzioni proprie del comune, della provincia e della regione in relazione alle tradizioni della nazione e alle necessità di sviluppo della vita locale. Riforma della burocrazia. Largo decentramento amministrativo ottenuto anche a mezzo della collaborazione degli enti industriali, agricoli e del capitale e del lavoro».

not anti-system, but deeply rooted into the Statute framework, even if aiming to freedom and democracy.

It is not an anti-liberal party – if we consider the adjective liberal as referred to the idea of citizens and State' s freedom and not to the liberal political theory. It is however really liberal in the sense of sustaining a freedom able to bring economic, cultural and political progress – we can qualify the People's Party activities as anti-liberal just by referring them to the electoral fight against the liberal political forces in the Parliament. And the region is the antidote to centralizing statism, not to the State.

In fact we have to remember that some years ago Gianfranco Miglio yet pointed out that Sturzo's political vision – by not setting the region against the State and on the contrary by entwining the former to the latter – was not against but in favour of the liberal State: a «battaglia politica non già contro lo Stato liberale, ma per lo Stato liberale, anzi, per uno stato veramente liberale, quale l'esperienza italiana non gli aveva consentito di conoscere» (Miglio 1963; Rotelli 1970).

One can not fail to appreciate in Sturzo's political view its character of pragmatism. In this respect we have in fact to remember Sturzo's ability to combine great visions of the future with the statesman pragmatism, the former typical of the Latin peoples, the latter of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, Britons and Americans, with which he stayed during his exile and for which he demonstrates a great admiration.

Concerning this, Piero Gobetti, in his *La rivoluzione liberale* (Gobetti 2008 [1924]), in some pages he dedicates to Sturzo, points out two characters of Sturzo's figure: political messianism and methodological concreteness [messianismo politico e concretismo metodologico] that he thinks Sturzo had acquired by Gaetano Salvemini's thought (Gobetti 2008 [1924]; Salvadori 1973).

In all these praises, there is also the awareness that Sturzo must be considered belonging to the field of freedom and democracy – that are ideals in the name of which he suffered 22 years of exile and refused any possible autoritarian or totalitarian alternative. He was an out and out democrat, convinced that, to avoid present problems of Italy, it would never must to embrace any of such forms of regimes, neither Fascism, nor Communism. And it matters even more after the end of the Second World War (Grottanelli de' Santi 2006:4)[8]

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[8] «At the end of the war, with the new republican constitution (1948), the atmosphere of renewal favoured decentralization. The idea was to bring government and administration closer to the citizen. Decentralization, together with individual liberty and a return to a parliamentary form of government, were seen as a means of creating a democratic system. A particularly strong drive towards decentralization was evinced in those regions which had suffered most from centralization in the past and by large islands of Sicily and Sardinia. It is worth remembering here that don Sturzo, one of the most important founding fathers of our constitution, was

8.4 CONCLUSIONS

To conclude, for analyzing Sturzo's regionalism, it is important not to consider just the single aspects of his political view. Ettore Rotelli's important studies on Sturzo's autonomist thought (Rotelli 1970; Rotelli 1973) have been completed in the past decades by those of Gabriele De Rosa (see e.g. De Rosa 1990), Eugenio Guccione (Guccione 1994; Guccione 2004), Nicola Antonetti (Campanini-Antonetti 1979). And all of them have considered single aspects of Sturzo's thought as they were not isolated points, but as they were parts of a unique analysis of a plural and multilevel society.

My personal judgment in this short essay is that Sturzo's regionalism can not be considered as an important analysis of regional politics, as it were just oriented to institutional, administrative and governmental aspects of regions. And Sturzo can not be considered simply a supporter of the creation of a new level in Italian governmental structure, i.e. the Regions.

Furthermore, I don't think that all the activity of the Sicilian priest could be reduced to a mere «Southernism», that would be more separatistic than patriotic.

Sturzo's regionalism is on the contrary the obvious and practical consequence, politically speaking, of his plural view of the society – that is always, we have to remember, a «multiple, simultaneous and continuative projection of individuals» –, of a pluralism that characterizes the society – or, better, societies – and its political institutions.

There is neither aversion nor competition among the State and the Regions in Sturzo's theory, for they mirror the plural nature of a complex society. And an individual stays in front of a nation exactly as well as a region stay in front of a State and a State in front of the international community of the States. Sturzo's theory is here easy to understand, less easy to turn into practice.

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not just Sicilian, but extremely Sicilian and a great champion of its special autonomy that is to say endowed with more effective powers than those granted to other regions […] furthermore, the two big Italian political parties – Christian democracy and the Left (Communist and Socialist parties together) – were in favour of strong regional decentralization as they both hoped to obtain dominant positions at least in some regions even if their respective parties did not win the national elections».

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REDUCTIO AD UNUM.
THE NEWSPEAK OF OCEANIA,
A LITERARY PARAMETER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
CONCEPT OF TOTALITARIANISM
Giorgio Scichilone

George Orwell published *Nineteen Eighty-Four* in 1949[1]. *The Origins of Totalitari-anism* appeared in 1951, and another fundamental work on totalitarianism, that of Carl Joachim Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, was published in New York in 1956.

As the title reveals, the Jewish philosopher tries to investigate on the genesis of the phenomenon, and explains the origin of totalitarianism as the synthesis of different elements that had taken shape in Europe during the nineteenth century: anti-Semitism, imperialism, colonialism and racism. The last chapter of the book is devoted to totalitarianism. Proceeding by analysing the histori-cal-cultural, sociological and ideological components, Arendt notes that at the turn of the century a new kind of nationalism had raised, founded on the alli-ance between the capital and the crowd. Populism, demagoguery, xenophobia, hatred of Jews were all its essential ingredients. That modern anti-Semitism, which was not religious but racial, did not seek to eliminate the Jewish other-ness through assimilation; it wanted rather to make it the catalyst of nationalist hatred. Imperialism conceived the non-European world as a huge pool of col-

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[1] About Orwell see A. Arciero, *George Orwell. Contro il totalitarismo e per un Socialismo democratico*, FrancoAngeli, Milano, 2005.

onizable lands, open to the expansion of capital and to the conquest of "living space" for the Western powers. In the mid-nineteenth century the division of the world was justified thanks to an ideology that hierarchized humanity in lower and higher classes (Arendt followed its development especially taking into consideration the work of Gobineau), based on an approach that the European racism had to reinterpret later in a biological perspective and that Nazism would radicalise to the extreme. Reconciling extermination and bureaucracy, Arendt took over the British formula of «administrative massacres»; colonialism was an irreplaceable laboratory for the genocides of the twentieth century. In Asia and Africa, it had started, by means of its armies and its colonial administration, to achieve a «civilizing mission» the corollary of which was, in many cases, massacre seen as a legitimate policy towards the "inferior races". Nazism would only apply such policy within Europe.

According to Arendt, the novelty of totalitarianism was the creation of an unprecedented social institution: the concentration camp, which became the hermeneutic figure of that new form of domination. In Arendt's book the concentration camp is presented as the culminating point in the discussion. Here Arendt examines the two levers of the totalitarian regime, propaganda and terror:

> Propaganda is indeed part and parcel of "psychological warfare"; but terror is more. Terror continues to be used by totalitarian regimes even when its psychological aims are achieved: its real horror is that it reigns over a completely subdued population. Where the rule of terror is brought to perfection, as in concentration camps, propaganda disappears entirely; it was even expressly prohibited in Nazi Germany. Propaganda, in other words, is one, and possibly the most important, instrument of totalitarianism for dealing with the nontotalitarian world; terror, on the contrary, is the very essence of its form of government. Its existence depends as little on psychological or other subjective factors as the existence of laws in a constitutionally governed country depends upon the number of people who transgress them (Arendt 1958: 344).

In my humble opinion, I found an unsurpassed explanation of this representation of totalitarianism in a page of Primo Levi's *Se questo è un uomo*, written between the years 1945-1947. The image is taken from the first sequences narrated by the protagonist, who sees the gradual slide towards hell. Here we are still in the station of Carpi, where the German soldiers line up a group of unarmed and 'docile' men.

> With the absurd precision to which we later had to accustom ourselves, the Germans held the roll-call. At the end the officer asked - Wieviel Stück?. The corporal saluted smartly and replied that the «pieces» were six hundred and fifty, and that everything

was in order; they then loaded us on the coaches and took us to the station of Carpi. Here the train and escort for the journey was waiting for us. Here we received the first blows: and it was so new and senseless that we felt no pain, neither in the body nor in the soul. Only a deep astonishment: how can one hit a man without anger? (Levi 1989: 20)[2].

Hannah Arendt's book, written almost simultaneously with the novel of Levi, would speak, like the passage quoted above, of massacres which did not take any care in differentiating between 'guilty' and 'innocent'. But it was Primo Levi who signified first how the essence of totalitarianism, of the concentration camp that becomes the metaphor of the society controlled by a totalitarian regime, is the arbitrary use of violence. The degeneration of the theory of the state carried out by Max Weber according to which the state is «an entity that claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force» is significant also for the historical and intellectual context in which the German scholar explores these themes. The failure of the Weimar Constitution, the heir of nineteenth-century liberal tradition inaugurated in Forty-eight, plastically marks the transition between these two conceptions of power. The dictatorships that rose in Europe after the First World War claim the monopoly of power depriving and emptying the forms, procedures and institutions of liberal legitimacy. To the point that the raison d'être of such a regime is that the monopoly of force is conditional upon the cancellation of the legitimacy produced by constitutionalism. Namely, the lack of (Liberal) legitimacy is essential for the use of force in the totalitarian state. At that point the monopoly becomes devastating, because it is arbitrary and irresponsible.

    People are not punished because of the violation of a rule, the "pieces" – as the complacent soldiers even call them - are in order and do not give any trouble to the keepers of order. People are beaten randomly just without any reason at all: it is this that creates anxiety, not the certainty of the law, but the certainty that there is no rule or law one can stick to in order to escape from the retaliation of power. No one should be safe in a condition in which the Leviathan has the full force and uses it arbitrarily against anyone. Fear, as Montesquieu had taught, is the principle of despotism. Exactly the opposite of the republic, which in order to "work" requires virtuous citizens. This radical opposition between the two forms of power, which fits into the groove of the republican tradition, reproduces in some way, as it will be seen, the decisive confrontation of political theory at the dawn of modern constitutionalism, when the controversy between Hobbes and Harrington saw the clash between the principles of fear and virtues as the basis of legitimacy of political obligation.

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[2] Translation is mine.

Yet, turning back to the contemporary tyranny analysed by the Jewish philosopher, there's more to say. The leap would not be complete if not accompanied by the ideological element as the foundation of the new totalitarian dictatorship. In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, despite the fleeting mention of Montesquieu as a theorist of despotism and its reference to fear as its principle of action[3], the new tripartite division of the forms of power he introduced in *De l'esprit des lois* is however crucial because it allows Arendt to clarify, if not to formulate, her decisive move away from the Montesquieian *fear* to the totalitarian *terror*, and to combine the latter with ideology. The page containing this reasoning is vital.

It is still for Montesquieu the supreme proof for the badness of tyranny that only tyrannies are liable to be destroyed from within, to decline by themselves, whereas all other governments are destroyed through exterior circumstances. Therefore what the definition of governments always needed was what Montesquieu called a "principle of action" which, different in each form of government, would inspire government and citizens alike in their public activity and serve as a criterion, beyond the merely negative yardstick of lawfulness, for judging all action in public affairs. Such guiding principles and criteria of action are, according to Montesquieu, honor in a monarchy, virtue in a republic and fear in a tyranny.

In a perfect totalitarian government, where all men have become One Man, where all action aims at the acceleration of the movement of nature or history, where every single act is the execution of a death sentence which Nature or History has already pronounced, that is, under conditions where terror can be completely relied upon to keep the movement in constant motion, no principle of action separate from its essence would be needed at all. Yet as long as totalitarian rule has not conquered the earth and with the iron band of terror made each single man a part of one mankind, terror in its double function as essence of government and principle, not of action, but of motion, cannot be fully realized. Just as lawfulness in constitutional government is insufficient to inspire and guide men's actions, so terror in totalitarian government is not sufficient to inspire and guide human behavior.

While under present conditions totalitarian domination still shares with other forms of government the need for a guide for the behavior of its citizens in public affairs, it does not need and could not even use a principle of action strictly speaking, since it will eliminate precisely the capacity of man

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[3] In The *Origins of Totalitarianism* this is the only true quote to Montesquieu (the other three are even more marginal), which is surprising, given that it is clear the dependence of the theoretical construction of the category of totalitarianism developed by Arendt from Montesquieu's one to despotism. In this regard, reference is made to two works by Casadei, (2002, II: 625-673) and Id. (2005, II: 805-838).

to act. Under conditions of total terror not even fear can any longer serve as an advisor of how to behave, because terror chooses its victims without reference to individual actions or thoughts, exclusively in accordance with the objective necessity of the natural or historical process. Under totalitarian conditions, fear probably is more widespread than ever before; but fear has lost its practical usefulness when actions guided by it can no longer help to avoid the dangers man fears. The same is true for sympathy or support of the regime; for total terror not only selects its victims according to objective standards; it chooses its executioners with as complete a disregard as possible for the candidate's conviction and sympathies. The consistent elimination of conviction as a motive for action has become a matter of record since the great purges in Soviet Russia and the satellite countries. The aim of totalitarian education has never been to instill convictions but to destroy the capacity to form any. The introduction of purely objective criteria into the selective system of the SS troops was Himmler's great organizational invention; he selected the candidates from photographs according to purely racial criteria. Nature itself decided, not only who was to be eliminated, but also who was to be trained as an executioner.

No guiding principle of behavior, taken itself from the realm of human action, such as virtue, honor, fear, is necessary or can be useful to set into motion a body politic which no longer uses terror as a means of intimidation, but whose essence is terror. In its stead, it has introduced an entirely new principle into public affairs that dispenses with human will to action altogether and appeals to the craving need for some insight into the law of movement according to which the terror functions and upon which, therefore, all private destinies depend.

The inhabitants of a totalitarian country are thrown into and caught in the process of nature or history for the sake of accelerating its movement; as such, they can only be executioners or victims of its inherent law. The process may decide that those who today eliminate races and individuals or the members of dying classes and decadent peoples are tomorrow those who must be sacrificed. What totalitarian rule needs to guide the behavior of its subjects is a preparation to fit each of them equally well for the role of executioner and the role of victim. This two-sided preparation, the substitute for a principle of action, is the ideology (Arendt 1958: 461-462).

What allows to innovate the Montesquieuian category of despotism is therefore the combination of terror and ideology, a pair that makes unreleased what will be called *totalitarianism* at the dawn of Italian fascism, a regime in the history of the forms of power so new that it makes the traditional term *dictatorship*, which contains in itself and in its millennial use even a positive sense, unusable. To break such a lexical ambiguity, given Mussolini's resort to

the myth of Rome on the one hand, where the institution of the dictatorship was a Constitutional exception provided for the salvation of the state; and on the other hand due to the latest Risorgimento tradition, which in the myth of Garibaldi, "Dictator" of the unification process in the name of the Savoy dynasty, were expedients to attempt gaining a cultural and political legitimacy, anti-fascist intellectuals coined a new term which could give account of the radical newness of the regime that turned systematic violence and pervasive propaganda an unprecedented and terrifying kind of dictatorship[4]. On these historic premises of the neologism, not taken into account by Arendt, is based the interpretation of Nazism and Stalinism in *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.

The one study, which along with Arendt's book would impose both the term and concept of totalitarianism in the investigation of the social sciences is the work, mentioned previously, by Friedrich and Brzezinski, which formalized a vision of totalitarianism as an immovable and immutable regime, capable of self-reproduction, yet not of transformation. The two scholars pointed out the elements, both interrelated and inseparable, of totalitarian regimes, as part of a scheme that will make school for many years in the Anglo-Saxon world: the ideology, extended over all spheres of society; the single party, organized hierarchically and directed by a dictator; terror, put in place by a secret police; monopoly of media (radio, press, cinema etc.); monopoly of violence in its various forms; finally, the centralized planning of economy.

I will not deal with the criticism these books, so decisive in the study of the concept of *Totalitarianism,* have aroused. But as in the case of Primo Levi, I like to move on the parallel slope of literature to gain other useful perspectives excluded by the categories of political science in the strict sense. If already in the testimony of Primo Levi, with the dry language of that narrative, there was condensed a substantial portion of the totalitarian paradigm, in my opinion Orwell provides another unique parameter on the characteristics of the nature of the totalitarian regime. Maybe not enough to be acknowledged by political science nor by political philosophy.

The first passage I quote from *1984* is a dialogue between Winston, the protagonist, and Syme, his colleague at the Ministry of Truth who is working on the new edition of the Newspeak Dictionary:

> *Don't you see that the whole aim of Newspeak is to narrow the range of thought? In the end we shall make thoughtcrime literally impossible, because there will be no words in which to express it. Every concept that can ever be needed, will be expressed by exactly one word, with its meaning rigidly defined and all its subsidiary meanings rubbed out and forgotten. Already, in the Eleventh Edition, we're not far from that point. But the*

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[4] I beg to defer to Scichilone (2014: 247-264), as well as to my definition of Totalitarianism, contained in Enciclopedia Filosofica (2006: 11707-11711).

process will still be continuing long after you and I are dead. Every year fewer and fewer words, and the range of consciousness always a little smaller. Even now, of course, there's no reason or excuse for committing thoughtcrime. It's merely a question of self-discipline, reality-control. But in the end there won't be any need even for that. The Revolution will be complete when the language is perfect. Newspeak is Ingsoc and Ingsoc is Newspeak,' he added with a sort of mystical satisfaction. 'Has it ever occurred to you, Winston, that by the year 2050, at the very latest, not a single human being will be alive who could understand such a conversation as we are having now? (Orwell 1949: 26).

Of course this is a literary hyperbole. But this intuition that the narrative register grants the intellectual, reveals a prodigious reflection on the essence of totalitarianism that historiographical tools and social and political science could not and would not be able to provide for a broader and therefore complete reflection on the phenomenon of totalitarianism, that project historically attempted in the twentieth century to create a new society by shaping a new man. A single individual conceived as an active part of a mechanism through which he himself alienates his conscience and, as appropriately suggested by Orwell, even his own memory. It is worth to point out that the literary freedom of the writer allows him to build fictional images that eventually amaze due to the after-taste adhering with reality and that help to identify essential aspects of the nature of the phenomenon and of the actual mechanisms of the regime, although they were not brought to reality as 'narrated' by the writer. Of course none of the existing totalitarian regimes has ever invented a newspeak[5]. But the control of opinions and of thought, of public language, culture, education and of school, was the most stubborn obsession of all regimes which based its raison d'être on a consensus manipulated and drugged by the indoctrination of each and every subject, through a widespread and overwhelming propaganda fuelled by terror. It is to show all this that Orwell, with a shock similar to the metamorphosis of Kafka who opens his novel with the staggering protagonism of a monster now given for granted, speaks to us from the beginning of a new language built by the regime to replace the traditional language. It is an essential passage that must be analysed.

Newspeak, indeed, differed from most all other languages in that its vocabulary grew smaller instead of larger every year. Each reduction was a gain, since the smaller the

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[5] The use of language in politics is one of the central themes in Orwell's thought and deserves more thorough attention. The author of 1984 devoted a constant reflection to it and simultaneously to the composition of the novel he published an essay Politics and the English Language (1946) in which he states that language «is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind». Of all the vast literature aroused by what Orwell wrote on the relationship between language and politics is worth remembering at least Chomsky (2004).

area of choice, the smaller the temptation to take thought. Ultimately it was hoped to make articulate speech issue from the larynx without involving the higher brain centres at all. This aim was frankly admitted in the Newspeak word duckspeak, meaning 'to quack like a duck'(Orwell 1949: 153).

This is the Newspeak of Oceania, the country in which Big Brother rules. The dystopian description of the totalitarian regime in *1984* is well known and I will not dwell on this. The allegorical meanings, beginning with the name of the protagonist, Winston Smith, as a figure of Churchill, would deserve adequate reflections that I have to sacrifice here. But concerning Oceania, which in the vision of Orwell is the Atlantic West, from England to America to Australia, and whose capital is London, I hazard the idea that this is a further reversal than the obvious and evident one. Of course the roll-over could not deliver a more radical suggestion than by turning the home of constitutionalism in the state where Big Brother dominates: the *reductio ad unum* of pluralism is the disconcerting epilogue to a story in reverse; from the English revolutions, from which came the rule of law, to a utopian future in which the law does not exist any more:

A Party member lives from birth to death under the eye of the Thought Police. Even when he is alone he can never be sure that he is alone. Wherever he may be, asleep or awake, working or resting, in his bath or in bed, he can be inspected without warning and without knowing that he is being inspected. Nothing that he does is indifferent. His friendships, his relaxations, his behaviour towards his wife and children, the expression of his face when he is alone, the words he mutters in sleep, even the characteristic movements of his body, are all jealously scrutinized. Not only any actual misdemeanour, but any eccentricity, however small, any change of habits, any nervous mannerism that could possibly be the symptom of an inner struggle, is certain to be detected. He has no freedom of choice in any direction whatever. On the other hand his actions are not regulated by law or by any clearly formulated code of behaviour. In Oceania there is no law. Thoughts and actions which, when detected, mean certain death are not formally forbidden, and the endless purges, arrests, tortures, imprisonments, and vaporizations are not inflicted as punishment for crimes which have actually been committed, but are merely the wiping-out of persons who might perhaps commit a crime at some time in the future (Orwell 1949: 104).

Therefore Oceania – this is my idea – is not only the overthrowing of England, but also of Oceana: Orwell's dystopia is the overturning of James Harrington's utopia. The Republican English writer of the seventeenth century had overthrown the England of his time by turning it into a republic and calling it Oceana. Orwell overturns the constitutional monarchy of his age (who defeated Hitler) by turning it into a totalitarianism and calling it *Oceania.*

Orwell's Oceania is the opposite of Harrington's Oceana. But the emphasis I put into this interpretation is due to the fact that Harrington is the proud opponent of the idea proposed by Hobbes on the substantial lack of difference between the freedom enjoyed by the citizens who live in Lucca, where the inscription LIBERTAS dominates the city towers, and those living in Constantinople, in hand to a sultan. It is evidently the contrast between the rule of law and arbitrariness[6]. But in their dispute both Hobbes and Harrington are acknowledging a topos at the dawn of European politics and intellectual tradition: the opposition between East and West, inflected in terms of freedom and despotism, polis and empire, civilization and barbarism. Even in this case I can not dwell on the fact that it is Hobbes who cancelled (instrumentally) the traditional dichotomy to equalize the oriental despotism with the constitutional political forms. And it was Harrington who insisted on the fact that in the absence of the law freedom is lost. The 'Republican' genealogy of this concept of freedom is easily traced in classical culture: «Freedom (...) does not consist in having a good master, but in having none at all»[7]. Yet it is interesting that a similar opposition is based on the word. And how the distinction between polis and empire, freedom and despotism, civilization and barbarism has the word as discriminant element, without which, in fact, there is no agora, discussion, public deliberation, in other words politics. Who does not have the word is devoid of all this. Man without word is not a political animal[8]. He is not a man. And it is natural, right, legitimate he is governed by a master, just like an animal. Who does not have the word lacks politics, that is humanity. In other words, he is a barbarian. For the Greeks, the term *barbarian* means exactly this: to be devoid of speech, to babble in a gibberish way.

My final interpretation is that with his Newspeak George Orwell, by reducing totalitarian language to a word only to decrease the rational faculties of discernment, of choice, of freedom of the single individuals up to the point of conceiving duckspeak, this expression through sounds from the larynx disconnected with the brain, to prevent men simply to think; all this brings the dystopia projected into the future back to the origin of political thought. Blasting, as Hobbes did, the dichotomy between East and West, since the new Constantinople is an unexpected London, Orwell reproposes together with Harrington the age-old idea that without the word there can be no politics, and without freedom men are reduced to "pieces", as Primo Levi has tragically witnessed.

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[6] On this point, also in this case, the literature is so vast that it is impossible to mention it all; however, I shall hint at Quentin Skinner's studies, which are now canonical, from (Skinner 1988) to (Skinner 2008: 211-213), and at least Parkin (2007: 177-185) and Scott (2004: 151-169).
[7] Cicero M.T., De re publica, II, 23: «Libertas (...) non in eo est ut iusto utamur domino, sed ut nullo».
[8] See what Hannah Arendt wrote in (Arendt 1958).

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A new form of democracy: Aldo Capitini's open society and "omnicracy"
Nicoletta Stradaioli

Aldo Capitini (1899-1968) was an atypical intellectual in the Italian cultural and political panorama of his time: pacifist and convinced activist (his was the idea for the peace march from Perugia to Assisi), he perceived, long before others, the need to reconsider democracy in order to transform it with a new form of political and social organization. Challenging the society of his time and criticizing its inadequacies and its ills, the Umbrian intellectual theorized and put into practice new forms of citizenship with the aim of arriving at a different way of administrating power. The transformation he had in mind would modify not only power relationships, but also the methods of managing power – including institutional power, even when representative. This was necessary in order to achieve a broad-based and capillary political space able to reconcile the single and the community: an open society, in flux, «in which [there would be] freedom, attention to each citizen, space for his growth and development, and which [would embrace], at least as a principle, all mankind» (Capitini 1950: 108, 267)[1].

Capitini's thesis concerning the issue of democracy is developed around the idea of 'openness'. Such a thesis is achieved politically through a society that includes everyone, in a new society and social organization focused on all citizens and all people, in which they participate actively in civic life. This political model is opposed to a 'closed society' which the philosopher recognizes in the institutional structures of his time, whether political, economical

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[1] Translation of cited texts from Capitini works is by the author.

or ecclesiastical: in such structures the individual is constrained, becoming indifferent and selfish toward one's neighbors.

The debate on open society and its theoretical forms has been interest to a large number of authors, such as Henri Bergson and Karl Popper, to name a few, among whom Capitini not only occupies an important place but is also one of the first to have furnished a fully-rounded concept of the characteristics such society should possess[2]. The idea of openness propounded by the Perugian intellectual intended to modify the relationship between State and citizen, between State and society, and – critical of the 'closed' logic of the State-individual dichotomy – set forth an original concept of pluralism to be achieved in the harmonious integration between governing bodies-individual-society-economic structures, that is, between the public and private aspects of life[3]. Having said that, I have no intention to scrutinize the complexity of Capitini's entire thought, but rather to reflect on some traits of his political project, focusing on forms of development of a plural and collective edification of the State and of politics[4]. In this context, this paper represents a first step in a study currently underway.

Throughout his life, Capitini was constantly engaged in the project to renew democratic society. It was a path that can be broken down chronologically into four phases:

1. the period of training at Pisa's Scuola Normale Superiore: the 1930s and the early 1940s witness the founding of Capitini's political theory, marked by antifascism and his liberalsocialist experience;
2. the period after World War II, during which the political paradigm is refined, culminating in the first experiences of grass-roots democracy;
3. the 1950s represent an important turning point: if nationally the struggle between fascism and antifascism appears to have been overcome, on the international level the Cold War looms ahead. This new historical-political context causes Capitini to further develop his political theory, which now concentrates on the theme of 'open revolution' and 'nonviolent revolution';
4. the 1960s, finally, are particularly intense and creative: the Umbrian philosopher's thought turns to the transformation of political and social life through forms of democracy which are decentralized and direct.

[2] See Capitini (1950: 108-112, 264-265, 267), Bergson (1959), Popper (1977). Moreover, see De Sanctis (1993: 230-231).
[3] Here we can note, with some differences, how close Capitini's position is to that of Gobetti, for whom the State not only should take individuals into its sphere of action but also has the obligation actively to promote citizen participation through civic education. See: Gobetti (1960); Gobetti (2008); Capitini (1968); Polito (1994: 179-183).
[4] With regard to Capitini's political writings see: Capitini (2016).

This progression highlights the evolution of Capitini's political design, i.e.: a) the historical, theoretical and political components underlying certain choices made by the Perugian thinker; b) the experimentation with new models of participation.

1. The context in which Capitini lived was fraught with anguish and tragedy: they were years of harsh ideological clashes and preparation for war, in which irreconcilable positions opposed each other and so invariably demanded that every citizen take a stand. Capitini's political reform had its beginning, in fact, in a concrete opposition to the totalitarian monism of the Fascist dictatorship – an opposition which, according to Capitini, had to begin with the individual, with his «intimate self», in order to be a concrete struggle against every form of intolerance and exclusion. For young people to overcome their attachment to fascism and to Mussolini, they had to experience an inner 'conversion', a 'fervor' of a different kind, which the intellectual identified as an appeal to the inner self, which is also a religious appeal (De Sanctis 1993: 230-233). The religion alluded to by the Umbrian philosopher, however, has absolutely no theistic references, much less metaphysical ones, but refers to man (Parodi 2012: 416-417): human beings must be at the center of a political change regarding the development of the human person, his qualities, his freedom. Man, in fact, is the «moral center of decision, responsibility and freedom» (Capitini 1942: 35).

In Capitini's vision, the search for a new form of social and political life as an alternative to Fascist monism was therefore, first of all, a religious openness which would translate into a firm commitment in the political field. Keeping in mind that religious openness and political openness are inextricably linked, and concentrating on the political logic of Capitini's open society, we see that the individual and political transformation which the philosopher wished to effect was, in the first instance, to take a position against the Fascist dictatorship, against the authoritarian collectivism on the Soviet model, and against capitalism[5]. These are three facets of the same trait: fascism, Soviet collectivism and capitalism all level human life, they all deprive it of any 'interior growth', they all are obstacles to freedom which annul the human person. If in fascism Capitini could not accept the nationalism, the colonial imperialism, the absolutist bureaucratic centralization, the police power, the exaltation of violence, the conservatism, the corporate State and the egoistic omnipotence of man, in Soviet collectivism he rejected the centralized control of the economy which translated into a bureaucratic plethora (Capitini 1960: 36-37): a

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[5] Capitini's political-democratic idea was nurtured by his idea of ethical-religious reform. This paper cannot examine the religious aspects which greatly affected Capitini's change of perspective on the political world.

totalitarian solution which no longer distinguished between public and pri-
vate, between political and economic. In Capitini's view, however, capitalist
organization of society was scarcely different, reducing human beings to mer-
chandise, to instruments in the hands of those in possession of capital, to be
exploited according to the needs of industry.

The distancing of the philosopher from such totalitarian visions – that is
from systems in which the unrestricted development of human conscience
and its free affirmation is forbidden – found its expression in a specific politi-
cal alternative which took the name of *liberalsocialism* (Capitini 1990: 104-109).
The characteristics of liberalsocialism were defined by its very opposition to
monocratic fascism or totalitarianism: «a decentralized socialism with a dem-
ocratic structure» which is «conscious of the limits of politics», which does
not make «the majority coincide with the totality», which does not impose «the
dominance of a sole party, a sole idea, a sole interpretation of it and a sole
leader»; which opposes the «arms race» and the «theory that the end justifies
the means» (Capitini 1950: 102; Polito 1994: 175). Capitini, working together
with Guido Calogero, developed the bases for the liberalsocialist experiment[6];
in this paper it is not possible to examine in depth either the two thinkers'
political project nor their different theoretical positions, but it does attempt
to highlight how Capitini's idea for joining liberalism and socialism was the
defining element in his political perspective, and with it the contrast between
a monistic closure and a pluralistic openness of reality.

For Capitini, liberalsocialism is essentially a method of political renewal
that should result in a truly democratic condition of society. In this sense,
Capitini's liberalsocialist political engagement is a reinterpretation of the doc-
trinaire traditions of liberalism and socialism, to move beyond «liberalistic lib-
eralism» and «statalistic socialism» on the one hand, and «the revolution of
rights» and the «collectivistic revolution» on the other (Polito 1994: 172-175;
Capitini 1950: 11, 91-92). The Umbrian philosopher does not develop a uni-
fied ideological-doctrinaire perspective halfway between liberalism and social-
ism, but instead believes that a synthesis is possible between liberal principles
(private sphere) and socialist principles (public sphere), aiming to go beyond
both in order to found a society in which one class does not exploit the other
and which guarantees, within the limits of economic means, all political and
private freedoms of the individual. The concept is a harmonious (open) soci-

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[6] Between 1936 and 1937, Capitini created, with Calogero, the liberalsocialist movement; in
1940 they issued *Il Manifesto del liberalsocialismo*, which enjoyed a wide underground circulation.
Before long, however, the differences between the two founders of liberalsocialism emerged:
Calogero's legalistic approach and Capitini's ethical-religious/social-religious one. Concerning
liberalsocialism in general and specifically as conceived by Capitini and Calogero, see: Cologero
(1945); Capitini (1950: 73-90); Capitini (1966); Bagnoli (1997); Nacci (2010); Capitini-Calogero
(2009); De Sanctis (2005).

ety, opposed both to abstract individualism and abstract socialism, which can define the rights of the individual in terms of common good and those of the community in terms of individual well-being (Bobbio 1994: 51). The goal is to reconcile the greatest individual freedom with the greatest social solidarity. On the political plane that means reconsidering the relationship between freedom and authority, between freedom and social justice, in order to broaden individual and collective freedom. It is a matter of achieving a «social freedom» which can resist self-interest, individualism, egoism and collectivism and instead promote social cohesion, solidarity, altruism, equality and reciprocal understanding (Capitini 1990: 122-123). Thus conceived, freedom becomes an ethical-existential choice which results in forms of socialization and political participation inclined to change the democratic order of society[7].

2. After World War II, Capitini put his liberalsocialist principles into practice, with experiences of shared involvement in democratic processes to grant people a larger role as citizens. But for Capitini the liberalsocialist project, in order to maintain its peculiar connotations (i.e. not to lose its 'openness' and its role as critic of the *status quo*), could not take the form of party organization. The liberalsocialism he had in mind was an ethical-religious movement aimed at a profound renewal, both social and moral. The party, therefore, with its «exclusive program», with its extreme tactics, with its bare formulas could not be the natural locus for expression of social transformation aiming to subvert «every rigidity and conservatism» (Capitini 1950: 94, 92, 19)[8]. It represented a concept of power to be overcome: true participation of citizens in discussion and decisions regarding common problems – that is in political life – did not necessarily have to take place through the mediation of organized groups. Capitini, therefore, countered the party with his idea of the «movement» and within the movement he favored the «center» (a space for discussion) which would «not align itself with other parties but keep itself open to all initiatives, not impose dogmas but discuss problems, not recognize membership privileges nor the power of politicos» (Bobbio 1969: 14).

The first concrete application of this political formula took place in July 1944, in a Perugia recently liberated from fascism (20 June 1944): Capitini created the first CSO – Center for Social Orientation – as a place for open public discussion. For the first time since the 1920s it was possible to exercise

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[7] Freedom is a fundamental principle in Capitini's liberalsocialist political theory. Close behind is nonviolence, another element distinguishing Capitini's position from Calogero's.

[8] In 1943, the liberalsocialist movement merged with the Action Party (Partito d'Azione), for its part formed by a merger among "Giustizia e Libertà", republican groups and other similar democratic movements. Capitini opposed the transformation of the movement into a party, and promptly expressed his dissent in the first national convention, held in Florence in September 1943.

the right of assembly and take part in democratic and grass-roots activities[9]. «The Centers are free assemblies where all can take part and speak […] about administrative matters both local and national, as well as social, political, ideological, cultural, technical and religious matters» (Capitini 1950: 238). Inspired by the participation of political and administrative authorities as well as by intellectuals, the Centers for Social Orientation aimed to arouse interest in a constructive debate on local and national problems and international events. Although they had no power to deliberate, «they consider the issues, they propose solutions […] requirements and needs are dealt with as they arise» – with the result that there was no lack of suggestions for specific measures to be adopted (Capitini 1950: 239). Moreover, examining administrative problems and observing the technical side of local and national governing bodies, the Centers also filled a role of democratic supervision to promote transparency in the practice of power itself. Everyone, therefore, could take part in these meetings (in which women also participated in large numbers) which tried to give a political orientation and education to the Italian people (Capitini 1950: 239-241). Here Capitini was – as defined by Calogero – a «political educator» who ascribed importance to training the whole individual (Calogero 1945: 112-122). Harking back to the spirit of Giuseppe Mazzini, the CSOs educated Italians to be a «live, authentic, pure populace» on the one hand, and, on the other, to form a «democratic solidarity», a «collective spirit» (Capitini 1950: 240). In the immediate post-war era following the Fascist dictatorship, Italians, in Capitini's view, needed to be informed and educated to «discover community» (Capitini 1950: 245). The CSO was therefore «a school to oversee and develop democracy» and to carry out «open research» to promote 'democratic literacy' in citizens (Capitini 1950: 252, 241). The issues dealt with by the CSO were administrative, cultural, political and social; «not only was there a course in English […], a long course on political economy, and a course on the history of social doctrines, but also […] conversations and discussions […] on the spiritual situation in America, on the *kolkhoz*, on historical materialism, on Albania and the Balkans, on freedom, on the cultural problems of young people, on joy in work […], on decentralized socialism, on the Italian agrarian problem, on the way to vote, etc.». Such courses also examined «the programs of the Italian political parties […]. The purpose was not only to expound on

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[9] In the city of Perugia, this first CSO was followed by eight more neighborhood Centers for Social Orientation. Moreover, early in the 1950s, the CSOs were flanked by a number of CROs – Centers for Religious Orientation. For Capitini the CROs represented a sort of new church, open to all and never exclusionist, which attracted students, workers, office employees, and disciples not only from Perugia. The CROs carried on a program of free discussions and reflections on religious themes, in the perspective of personal and social renewal that could take place outside and beyond mainstream religious institutions. See: Foppa Pedretti (2005: 74-75) and Capitini (1992: 10).

the single programs, but to examine the forces, the interests and the mentality behind those programs (Capitini 1950: 250-251). The Centers represented an early instrument of renewal in preparation for open and direct democracy; this was to be carried out by engaging the masses, educating them through the practice of a «collective way of thinking» – which did not, however, eliminate differences and contrasts. In Capitini's view, it was precisely the plurality of opinions that was central, to be followed by a process of comparing difficult choices: this pluralistic basis was essential to grow practically and achieve self-government and a new democracy (Capitini 1950: 260).

In order to reform (and renew) politics, the CSO also represented a first attempt at self-government of citizens: encouraging participation and political growth, it was the cornerstone for creating decentralized systems that would give value to local assemblies, associations, and civic organizations. In the campaign for administrative elections of 1946, the CSO in Perugia in fact proposed:

> *That the new city administration give a stable and organic force to these assemblies. In addition to the City Council, with powers of deliberation, a number of CSOs should be created corresponding to each neighborhood and each outlying hamlet, for periodic meetings, […] in which administrative problems of each area can be examined, proposals and criticisms can be made, in the presence of a city councilor charged with referring back to the City Council. The city administration for its part could entrust the regional and local CSOs with examining measures and giving their opinion, as well as carrying out duties such as local supervision, public order, price control, nomination of personnel, creation of circulating libraries with books and newspapers. […] The management of each CSO (with a secretary to transmit the minutes to the Municipal secretary) could be elected by the citizens every six months. […] This initiative would create the new extended Municipality. Whereas the municipality of the 1920s did not grant a voice to many classes of citizens or to women, this municipality as conceived in Perugia […], will be a municipality in which all inhabitants take part and are present, to overcome the excessive separation between those who administer and those who are administered, between civil servants and the public, between the city and the countryside (Capitini 1950: 244-245).*

The innovative element which Capitini wished to highlight was a decentralized system through which the individual could be an active member of his immediate surroundings. Intermediate groups would help temper the vertical structure of power. The dual dimension of State-individual was refuted, both in its collectivist version, in which the State is «all» and the individual «null», and in the liberal version, in which the individual is «maximum» and the State is «minimum». Through organs of self-government (both political and eco-

nomic) it would be possible to affect politics from within and below, resulting in its continual transformation. Capitini expressed himself thus:

> *The ideal is for everyone to participate in community life, each person bringing a full and continual contribution; it is therefore to be hoped, and to be studied, how agricultural concerns – for instance – and socialized industries may be based on the 'advice' of all individual participants; this will happen of necessity, according to the various competencies. Such self-government requires the participation of everyone, in the culture and dignity of their conscience (Capitini 1950: 78).*

The ultimate goal was to have the interests of the governed and the governing coincide, to have productive and regulative activities with a common aim, to result in a new collectivism that was democratic rather than authoritarian, capable of eliminating the class of inept politicos. (Capitini. 1950: 258-262.).

3. The result was that in this constant opening of the political dimension, Capitini rejected any institutional 'closure', that is, all the rigid structures blocking a free dissemination of power. This commitment to freshen and to break up fossilized institutions closed into themselves required constant revolutionary actions: «a total revolution, outspoken and open» to achieve «a society for all» (Capitini 1956: 5, 14). In the 1950s the content of Capitini's political inquiry turned toward forms of political opposition which further enriched the body of his thought. The open revolution was also a method of «awakening» civil society, improving social political structures from the bottom up through nonviolent struggle. For the philosopher the central point was that the «total transformation of power and of the economy» had to be based specifically on nonviolent methods, since political revolutions of the past allowing «the destruction of adversaries, the Reign of Terror», had demonstrated the extent to which the new world they aspired to create was, in the end, similar to the old (Capitini 1956: 46, 14). Capitini's revolution, aimed at changing social, economic, political (and moral) structures, began with association (the «center» in his terminology), with debate and verbal confrontation, and proceeded with a series of acts such as protest, noncollaboration, sacrifice[10]. It was a revolution in the sense that it was anti-authoritarian, anticapitalistic, and anti-bureaucratic, and it had as its objective a) a State «in the service of all citizens» in which

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[10] In this period, Capitini made numerous references to Danilo Dolci's nonviolent struggle. In the 1950s, Dolci (1924-1997), like Capitini an educator and an activist in the cause of nonviolence, carried out a number of actions aimed at highlighting social concerns and raising consciousness, as well as concrete gestures to help the weakest and most needy. See the exchange of correspondence between the two: Capitini-Dolci (2008) and Capitini (1958). For a bio-bibliography on Dolci see: Spagnoletti (1975); Barone (2004).

power would be «decentralized and monitored in the citizens' meetings, under their control»; and b) an economy «at the service of all citizens» leading to an economic order in which property was collective (Capitini 1956: 46-48)[11].

4. Nonetheless, the 'revolutionary' Capitini did not wish to bring down the existing democratic system, but rather try to reinforce it by spreading forms of self-government while fine-tuning the mechanism of participation. In the 1960s this project was carried out with the idea of «omnicracy», or power to all[12]. It was necessary to affirm a) a freedom that could be reconciled with socialization and b) an application of freedom resulting in both individual well-being and common good. That involved a political and social unity able to withstand any thrust toward self-interest, and – as Capitini repeated:

> *a vast network of grass-roots organizations, local advisory bodies, family-school committees, social centers […], internal commissions, school councils and university committees, training centers for nonviolent activism, local commissions to oversee all forms of assistance and benefits, and development of assemblies to train all citizens, especially young people so they do not feel isolated or manipulated from above (Capitini 1969: 82).*

The political order was to be built «from the bottom up»; on the one hand that meant a broadening of popular participation in political and social issues and in the decision-making process; on the other hand it involved «power to all». The latter was effected in the assembly and in the strengthening of public opinion, defending the rights of free expression, information and control.

Omnicratic power was therefore founded on assembly and on public opinion as bases for a direct democracy not to be understood as «permanent administration by the anonymous public mass which tramples […] on the rights of minorities», but as the multiplication of permanent assemblies and the spreading of self-government at the local level (Capitini 1969: 83, 95, 99). In this way the parliamentary system could be integrated and to all effects improved; the assemblies dealt with certain problems, studying them and proposing solutions; while the local government made possible administration and supervision of the organs of power on the part of the citizens, thanks also to direct experience with the problems and the persons involved.

From this point of view, the epistolary exchange between Capitini and Norberto Bobbio is especially significant, since what emerges is a difference in viewpoint concerning the real possibility for direct democracy (or power of all

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[11] The idea of open and nonviolent revolution calls to mind the great theme of pacifism which occupies such a large part of Capitini's thought.
[12] For a detail analysis of Capitini's concept of «omnicracy» see: Polito (1998: 125-143).

citizens) to correct the flaws of the parliamentary representative system. For Bobbio, direct democracy must not be confused with the mere broadening of public participation in decision-making, because «if this broadening occurs only through a multiplication of the elective organs, the democracy remains representative – perhaps more representative, but not, simply for that reason, a direct democracy» (Capitini-Bobbio 2012: 119). Referring to Capitini's ideas, Bobbio admitted that «[his] position is different, and far more consistent» (Capitini-Bobbio 2012: 119). According to Bobbio, the Perugian intellectual was in fact speaking of «direct democracy in the sense of power to all through discussions and decision-making by small groups», but this system, however laudable, would present major problems in practice, since it was applicable in small cities like Perugia but impossible to carry out «in industrial cities like Turin» (Capitini-Bobbio 2012: 119). Moreover, «without a certain amount of indoctrination or propaganda or, worse yet, manipulation, it is not possible to reach solutions […] reflecting at least the majority».

Bobbio emphasized the importance of pedagogical instruments such as debate and discussion at grass-roots level, but «the purpose of this discussion and education should to be understand general problems», whereas he feared that it would «encourage the tendency of each person to place his own particular interests at the forefront». For the philosopher of law, «the danger of direct democracy is particular interests, fragmentation to an extreme degree»: with the exception of choices which have no middle ground, such as the choice between war and peace, it was impossible to reach an effective political synthesis (Capitini-Bobbio: 2012: 119-120).

How did Capitini answer? He understood his friend's reservations; he well knew that an assembly could run aground on inconclusive shoals and be the instrument for an ideological violence lacking even basic rules to guarantee full democratic functioning. Nonetheless, in order to change a system that was closed, hierarchical and technocratic it was necessary to proceed by degrees, «creatively, making additions little by little», because «parliamentary democracy as the sole instrument is not acceptable» (Capitini-Bobbio 2012: 121). Of course State administration was a complex matter requiring technical knowledge and decisions, but Capitini's overall concept was «not only to overcome and exercise State power», but to have «instruments outside the State», grass-roots instruments of society to give a voice to citizens' political weight. He wrote:

> the point at which I was a follower of Rousseau long before reading him was the distinction between the sovereign, which for me is everyone, and the executors who are unable to make independent decisions and are at times simply temporary (Capitini-Bobbio 2012: 122)[13].

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[13] Rousseau appears to be one of Capitini's great 'teachers'. The Perugian philosopher is at-

The distinction between sovereign power and executive power did not satisfy Bobbio:

> *I realize the good reasons of those who speak, as you do, of the need for power to all, but at the same time I realize that a power is all the more rational when it is based on clear knowledge of the problems to resolve. A power is not rational simply because it is held by everyone. It is not rational even presuming that all those who hold it are reasonable. It is not enough to be reasonable; it is necessary also to know how things actually are, in order not to ask for impossible and contradictory solutions. Rousseau had not yet become aware of industrial society. The first person to do so, Saint-Simon, anticipated technocracy. Today the political problem is far more in the terms in which Saint-Simon posed it than in the terms in which Rousseau resolved it. The fact that it is not enough to have a government of scientists and industrialists, as the former [Saint-Simon] foresaw, does not means that we can go back to the latter [Rousseau] (Capitini-Bobbio 2012: 124-125).*

These, therefore, were the differences (and the similarities) of the two positions. In conclusion, one must ask to what extent the political project posited by Capitini was workable. The Perugian thinker's intuitions were profound and his commitment was total. Bobbio captured the originality of his friend who had a great vision that, however, was extremely difficult to convert into a functioning political institutional model (Bobbio 2011: 23-55). Maybe it is more appropriate to speak of a method (a pedagogic political method) to put into practice new forms of citizenship with the aim of arriving at a different way of administrating power. As a matter of fact, Capitini attempted a discussion, composed of numerous thematic *nuclei*, on the need for a new power structure, on «the passage of power from the hands of the few who today hold it to the hands of the many who today do not» (Capitini 1969: 154). The goal was an open society, whose political dimension would be grounded in socialism and be built up from the base, strengthening and broadening political participation. This took the form of organizations of direct democracy which were to claim larger and larger pieces of decision-making power, through the free and nonviolent exchange of opinions. This omnicratic reform aimed at creating a new man through a political and social pedagogy, criticizing old ideologies, dissolving old myths and provoking a new awareness for human possibilities.

Looking beyond Fascist monism and contrary to the existing societies which were all more or less closed, Capitini had in mind a dynamic political or-

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tracted by Rousseau's ethical-philosophical idea of political order as 'good life' and 'common good', corresponding to the nature of man. Moreover, it is a concept which gives value to direct participation by the individual in political life and makes it a condition for moral excellence and rationality.

der, in continual flux, perennially ready to be challenged, a system that would not repeat itself, its own past, its own traditions, its own habits. It was a democratic method allowing politics a free rein, with purity of intention, with dialogues, with maximum participation, with mutual respect for different points of view. The peculiar character of this 'open' method, aiming to go beyond the passive and marginal role of citizens in the governance of power, was its pluralism – identified as anti-institutional, anti-party, but also (and above all) as «center», open to the contribution and the involvement of all, and capable of creating a unifying dialogue to reconcile differences and convert them into fertile ground for debate. The Fascist dictatorship had fallen; yet, conscious of the risk of underestimating the danger of new authoritarian forms of government, and committed to emerging from a crisis that had affected economics, moral values and social solidarity, Capitini propounded «a work by the people», able to sustain continual examination and continually to challenge its own premises (Bozzi 1982: 121).

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The Functionalism of David Mitrany: the *Monistic-Technocratic* Perspective and the Basis for Peace

Stefano Parodi

The functional theory stated by David Mitrany - Professor of Economics at the London School of Economics - is rather interesting for those scholars who, following Isaiah Berlin's thesis, are willing to approach studies about *monism* and *pluralism*. In that theory (Mitrany 1943; Parodi 2013) the pluralistic and monistic concepts about the international organization are actually both present. In a recent paper I have dealt with this peculiar aspect, underlining the double level found in Mitrany's theory:

> To better understand this concept, it might be very useful to resort to the distinction made by Isaiah Berlin between "monism" and "pluralism". In fact, seemingly, the international organization suggested by Mitrany is characterized by a "pluralism" which could be defined "total", since the functional method does not envisage (at least basically) any hierarchical and coordinative structure. The international Authorities represent, according to Mitrany's approach, some independent "islands", which can freely be transformed depending on needs, activities to be carried out and problems to be solved.
> However, analyzing Mitrany's functionalist proposal we will have to face a "unidimensional" approach, characterized by a sort of "exclusive thought": if the political dimension is the "evil", the main cause of wars, the "technical" dimension is the kingdom of the "good", of the lack of conflicts and of power struggles. And that

is founded on the belief that following only the criteria of competence and efficiency represents the only way to build a world without rivalry and conflicts (Parodi 2016: 115).

In this paper I am going to deal with what might be called the «dark side» (Parodi 2016: 114) of the international organization model proposed by Mitrany: it is represented by the 'monistic-technocratic' perspective rooted in Mitrany's own theory. First of all, to better define the concept of monism, it is useful to remember what Marco Ferrari writes[1]:

Monocracy in its despotic, oligarchical majority or totalitarian forms, in which the government of the "one" gets organized each time, is the political expression of monism, a religious, moral and philosophical ideal, whose critique is one of the recurring themes in Berlin's work. The most persuasive reasoning lies in the conclusion of the Two Concepts, meaningfully titled "the one and the many", a proposition S. Lukes considers the keystone of his thought [...]. "Metaphysical chimera" present in the whole western thought, "from Plato to the latest followers of Hegel and Marx", monism is described as the "belief that somewhere in the past or in the future, in the divine revelation or in the mind of a single thinker, in the solemn declarations of history or of science or in the simple heart of a good and honest man, there is a final solution" where "all the positive values men have always believed in", freedom, equality, justice, brotherhood, order "must in the end be compatible and maybe imply each other". The conflict among values makes a complete human realization impossible: accepting the choice, the compromise and the settlement implies the renunciation of "equally absolute needs" and it leads into believing that any means is legitimate in order to attain this "total harmony" (Ferrari 2001: 117; Parodi 2016: 115, 116).

Starting from this statement, in order to focus on the 'dark side' of Mitrany's theory, it is essential to 'enter' his mind and understand his way of thinking. He is not a politician, but an economist, a technician who uses his own expertise to point out the road to follow, the solution to implement. In this perspective Lionel Robbins's point of view is quite enlightening. In fact, as we are reminded by Giuseppe Casale and Giulio Gianelli, Robbins

claims the impossibility of pinpointing the scientific criteria of choice among the different kinds of governmental intervention. He states that the economy is "neutral towards the ends", meaning it is not able to provide with scientific assessments about them, since they imply different kinds of judgment (moral, political etc.).
This concept of economics as a "positive science", free from value judgment, implies that the economist's task is not to indicate the aims the society proposes each time by adopting measures of economical politics.

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[1] In this paper I personally translated all the Italian quotations.

> *Their "professional" task is to show the best way, from the scientific point of view, to reach certain aims proposed by others (for example the politicians) and not to choose among those aims (Casale, Gianelli 1993: 291; Parodi 2016: 114).*

Those are the guidelines Mitrany follows when he strives to find a solution to the problem of war and to secure a condition of permanent peace for the whole world. As a result, Mitrany's theoretical processing is organized in two phases: the analysis of the given situation, that is to say, the analysis of the international system (and of the international politics) and the proposal of a solution which, in this case, is represented by a model of international organization.

It is important to notice that in this first phase, the one about analysis, Mitrany, though harshly criticizing the state-centric structure of the international system and its politics[2], deemed the main cause of selfishness and therefore of conflicts, never takes on a position suggesting his belonging to any ideology. Not even when he is taking down or is trying to take the federalists' thesis apart, does he lose the detachment of the technician who analyzes and objectively judges while he is thoroughly arguing his observations.

In order to understand his way of thinking, we must, thus, envisage a technician with a goal to reach: permanent peace. In this perspective, the model of international organization proposed by Mitrany is only a suitable tool to reach that goal. At the core of Mitrany's theoretical thinking there is, in fact, the concept of the 'practical basis for peace' (Mitrany 1943; 1975: 123-132): this concept corresponds to the need of founding peace not only on solid basis, but also on realistically achievable ones. This is another important aspect of Mitrany's functionalist theory, where he often harshly criticizes the 'violence' performed by ideologies against social and economical realities (Mitrany 1951).

Examining now in detail the structure of his functionalist theory, it must be stated that the starting point is the charge against the state-centric structure of the international system: this 'charge' turns into the proposal of overcoming the central role of the States in managing economical and social issues at international level. At this very point, Mitrany, the 'technician', wipes out the distinction – so dear to the federalists (Malandrino 1998; Terranova 2003) – between national States and federations, while carrying out a rigorous analysis of international relations and, above all, of international politics. Mitrany, in fact, regards the world not divided into States and federations, but into separated political-territorial Unities, endowed with absolute sovereignty and almost 'physiologically' fitted to implement a policy of power or supremacy. And that is why international politics turns into the place of rivalries, of selfishness and of potential conflicts. Federations, as well

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[2] Intended as dimension of the politics.

as national States, can also wage war[3], they can carry on politics of power: why, Mitrany wonders, should we consider the birth of federations a guarantee for peace? Only a world federation, unattainable, according to Mitrany, could eliminate the risk of resorting to war. In my opinion, that shows the ability of the 'technician' to be, first of all, an observer of 'what is' and not of 'what should or could be'.

In those terms, a second element of Mitrany's theory is worthy of notice: his mistrust in the politicians' likelihood of being really willing to work together and, therefore, of a peaceful coexistence. It must be said that Mitrany's 'mistrust' is not only concerned with politicians, or with people who hold authoritative positions, in general, but also with 'mankind', thus evoking a sort of 'anthropological pessimism'. It is not by chance, in fact, that the model of international organization – conceived by Mitrany and based on what could be defined the 'common interest'- represents mainly a 'net' or somehow, even, a 'cage' in which the States have to accept a severe reduction of their own sovereignty[4]. In other words, this new model is 'suitable' and thus it is successful with the States and, essentially, with the inhabitants of the various countries. Going back to Adam Smith's teaching, we can better understand the real meaning: the individuals act pushed mainly by the search for their own advantage, they are hardly pushed by high principles:

Smith claims that human acting is determined by six impulses: selfishness, desire for peace, sense of ownership, habit of working, tendency for taking one thing for another, "sympathy" (= social consensus). Pushed by them, men – who are the best judges of their own interests – act in a way to realize the maximum of collective utility unawares. "It is not from the generosity of the butcher, of the baker or of the brewer [...] that we can hope to get our lunch, but from their evaluation of their own interests. Each individual strives as much as possible to use his capital in support of the national productive activity, and to direct then that activity in such a way that its product can get its maximum value, each individual necessarily works to make the annual income of the society as high as possible. Actually he does not usually mean to pursue the public interest nor is he aware of the extent in which he is pursuing it… when he directs his activity in such a way that his product is as high as possible, he only aims to his own advantage and he is led by an invisible hand [...], in this as in many other cases, to pursue an aim that does not form part of his intentions…Pursuing his interest, he himself pursues the interest of the society in a way more efficient than he intended to pursue it" (Casale, Gianelli 1993: 135; Parodi 2016: 117, 118).

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[3] We could also witness wars among federations.
[4] In a theoretical way the States could suffer an almost total loss of their sovereignty, with regard to social-economical questions and, obviously, within the international field.

From this point of view, Mitrany is certainly not far from Adam Smith's positions.

As a consequence, the functionalist approach aims to take the new form of international organization away from the good will, the disinterested desire for peace and the improbable sense of justice of the individuals[5].

Even in this case we find ourselves in front of conclusions (and theorizations) based on an analysis of international relations and maybe of human reality. Such analysis is pursued in a rigorous and interdisciplinary way, including economics, political science, sociology, history and anthropology, perhaps even beyond Mitrany's own intentions.

What has been argued so far allows us to face the core of the question: the indisputable presence of a form of 'technocratic monism' in Mitrany's theory does not come out of a technocratic vision, of the adherence to a mainly anti-democratic theoretic model, but it is simply the result of a critical thinking, of a theoretical journey aiming at solving a problem. In other words, the technocratic perspective is the only way to build a world where the international relations are marked by a joint effort and not by rivalry: a world where permanent peace rules. Any element of negativity is absent from Mitrany's approach: a technocratic system is not seen as a danger for democracy anymore. Such an essential question is still open nowadays: on this point it is of great interest the study of Antonio La Spina and Giandomenico Majone about the regulative Authorities which, within the States, are comparable to the international independent Authorities pictured by Mitrany. The authors, challenging the anti-democratic thesis of the Authorities write:

> Such institutions may appear non-democratic to some people because they are politically irresponsible and "not representative". […] At least there could be two reasons in the perspective of the democratic legitimation of such authorities.
> In the first place, it is not always true that in democracy all the decisions must be espoused by those people provided with electoral mandate, "punishable" through non-re-election (as it is assumed in a badly conceived "sovereignty of the elector"). It is instead possible, and it happens everywhere more frequently than we think, that certain decisions on certain subjects are delegated. If the authorization is transparent and devised in an appropriate way, there will still be the possibility to check and punish the decision maker, in different ways from the non-reelection.
> In the second place, it is fairly plausible that a rational citizen in a democratic state (the above mentioned "sovereign") if choosing under a "veil of ignorance" about the future institutional set-up and the future majorities of government, would like certain sectors

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[5] In Mitrany, as it has already been said, a marked dosis of 'anthropological pessimism' is noticeable.

(for example the monetary policy) to be appointed to people having some subjective requisites and working within a certain institutional design, free from political party post-mandate interferences (La Spina, Majone 2000: 8).

In these terms, Mitrany's monistic-technocratic perspective is actually the only possibility when we want to diminish the weight of the States, and their policies in the international economical and social questions.

The fact that each single part of Mitrany's functionalist theory must be considered the result of a real scientific research is even more evident when we take into consideration one of the 'properties' of the functionalist model which Mitrany is very fond of: the endless adaptability, the elasticity. It is a central aspect in Mitrany's thought and it is characterized by the ability to provide the constantly going on changes in the international system with swift and appropriate answers. The Authorities imagined by Mitrany arise in order to carry out a specific function and they are somehow generated by that very same function. At the root of that need for 'elasticity' and 'automatism'[6] there is, in my opinion, a really definite awareness: it is not possible to foresee future events and so it is useless and, sometimes, harmful to plan or even worse, to pretend that the future (the reality) matches our theories.

Mitrany stresses this point so much as to include it in his criticism of the federalists' positions, which 'foresee', thanks to the federalist way, a future of peace and stability. He is also aware of living in the «age of masses», that Tiziana Carena and Francesco Ingravalle set as:

Whilst the collective (behaviorally homogeneous groups) prevails, the higher is the incidence of case, and case means the opposite of thoughtful and rational behavior. The crowds love or hate; the higher the predictability of their behavior, the higher the possibility for a clever demagogue to use them (as the experiences of mass dictatorships have shown); even Freud […] noticed the abyss which separated the logic of individual acting from crowds, masses acting. The age of masses is the age of higher predictability of collective behavior. And, thanks to the media, it is also the age of an easier making of the collective behavior. On the other hand, each age has had its own media: each age has had its own rate of "predictability" (Carena, Ingravalle 2012: 27; Parodi 2014: 37, 38).

The two authors base their argument on the concept of 'event', that is to say,

the most obvious thing, the most common, the most ordinary: every event is characterized […] by the "coming out" (in "technical" words: "phenomenizing oneself") of something that once was not there, or it was there, but it looked different from its present aspect. It is usually the retrospective reflection that draws the event: quite often while

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[6] The States have a role only at the moment of the founding act of the functional institutions.

facing unpleasant or painful facts we think back, sometimes with nostalgia, to the moment when they could still not have happened, maybe thanks to our intervention; but our corrective intervention should have implied the prediction of that very unpleasant and/or painful fact which later happened (Carena, Ingravalle 2012: 13; Parodi 2014: 48).

The problem of the event and of the possibility of predicting the event moves then from a personal to a political level:

In what limits is such prediction possible? If this is the fundamental question in the history of an individual, it is also the fundamental question in the history of the community: what politician does not look back with regret on missed historical opportunities, on choices that turned out disastrous, on illusions that proved "fatal" for their country?" (Carena, Ingravalle 2012: 13; Parodi 2014: 49).

In my opinion, all of this is present in Mitrany's thought and it contributes to increase his mistrust towards politics, always seen as the field of selfishness, of low instincts and, as a consequence, of conflict. Criticizing the solutions proposed by the federalists, Mitrany underlines, in an unequivocal way, the risks inherent in the 'manoeuvrability' of the masses. We should not forget that he brings to an end his functionalist theory during the years of the Second World War, that is to say, the years when the damages caused by the totalitarian regimes propaganda were tragically manifest. However, it would be a mistake to believe that Mitrany's concerns deal only with non-democratic regimes: in democratic countries the 'mass' can also be manipulated. The question is, ultimately, about the stability, about the elimination of the danger that a given 'political structure' (for instance a federation) is radically misrepresented or even destroyed by traumatic political upheavals or simply by the results of the electoral competitions. According to Mitrany, and this is one of his main criticisms to the federalists, the permanence of a State inside a federation can be challenged anytime because of the rising of a new political leadership. If we want to have at our disposal a reliable 'tool' for peace, it is thus necessary to resort to a model that guarantees a continuity in time and it is not hostage of the changes in the international political scenery and of the changes in each single State and it is also not dependent on the masses mood. How can we, thus, reconcile the stability[7] with the inevitable changes that are integral part of history? Obviously, a crystallization of a particular political-institutional set-up (international in this case) is not even thinkable. At this point Mitrany comes up with what could be defined the 'dynamic stability' and that concept holds a central place in Mitrany's functionalist model of an international organization. The dynamic stability is the result of the inner ability of an organization based

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[7] It is a question of permanent stability.

on the functional method of constantly adjusting its own course, of adapting day by day to the reality of the moment. Virtually, there are some mechanisms inside each functional institution which click automatically, without long decisional procedures. We are definitely beyond the mere 'depoliticization of the decisions': we are in the field of almost automatic decisions founded on evaluations and, thus, on the 'technicians' competence.

Once again it is not possible to separate Mitrany's proposal from the problem to be solved. The problem, in this case, is embodied by the unpredictability of the events and, notably, by the unpredictability of the individuals' behavior[8]. Though, being such unpredictability, as we have seen earlier, according to a logic inherent to crowds' actions (and thoughts) absolutely predictable, for Mitrany it becomes a 'datum' to analyze and use in the elaboration of his theoretical model.

At this point, we can claim that Mitrany's way of thinking must be considered 'functionalist' and, as a consequence, his theory is the result of a functional kind of journey. In other words, in his thought the functional procedure changes into a mental scheme, into an interpretative key suitable to understand the reality surrounding us.

So we are back to the 'dark side' of Mitrany's theory and to the origins of the monistic-technocratic perspective easily recognizable in a model of international organization which, while excluding the political dimension from the decision making process, poses a concrete problem for democracy, above all in our present time characterized by an increasing wave of anti-politics. This theme is also deeply debated at scientific level. For example, the trust in the technicians and the mistrust in politicians comes out clearly in the analysis of Antonio La Spina and Giandomenico Majone, who consider the Authorities present in each State as

> *the abandon of a State model seen as a direct manager, a goods distributor, a social engineer in favor of the idea of a Regulator State. Its strategic tools are the regulative authorities: institutions that are independent from the political class and the electoral cycle and are provided with a specific mandate and with incisive powers, which are provided for by law, only about distinctly limited issues. These authorities are composed by people who were chosen because of their high technical knowledge and their impartiality (La Spina, Majone 2000: 7; Parodi 2016: 109).*

The independence from the political power is seen as a positive condition, a basis for a fair and efficient management: as a consequence, a technocratic system proves to be essentially acceptable. Therefore, there is a contrast between technocracy and politics. Hence it is useful to quote what Michela Nacci writes:

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[8] The term «individuals» stands for both the politicians and the masses.

Technocracy deems politics irrational: the skills it requests are certainly different from the rational choice, from the same economical rationality. But the typical rationality of politics must take into account non-rational factors which are at the same time absolutely crucial such as beliefs, emotions, general opinions.
Technocracy would like to do without ideologies, values, abstractness, recourse to general concepts such as the common good, mediation, negotiation, the class of professional politicians: these are probably requests which politics can comply only with effacing itself. […] In the technocratic question the expertise, the knowledge takes place only on one side: the side of technique, whatever it means, of the technicians, whoever they are. […] Technocracy is an ideology in itself and as such it must be dealt with and discussed (Nacci 2005: 273, 274; Parodi 2016: 116).

As matters stand, the concept of 'independence from political power' - directly linked to the overcoming of the political dimension, that is the 'voluntaristic' dimension – represents one of the core elements in the building of Mitrany's international organizational model. If we consider, for example, the process of European integration, a concrete case of (partial) implementation of Mitrany's functionalist theory, we realize the importance of the contrast between the sphere of automatism, typical of the functional procedure, and the sphere of the political decision-making process. Corrado Malandrino, in fact, reminds us that Walter Hallstein

calculated the speed of the unification process in the Sixties […] and he compared it to a "three-phase rocket", which expressed three separate, complementary and ensuing forms of integration: customs union, economical union, political union. A metaphor sticking an irrepressible mechanic stroke to Hallstein's idea of the European integration. Even though, later on, the president of the European Commission was aware of the constant need for a voluntaristic element, for a discussion and for political decisions to make it actually move forward (Malandrino 2005: 11).

As a matter of fact, the two spheres can be considered complementary, 'different phases of the same rocket':

Anyway, since today the two first phases have mostly carried out their task, bringing Europe to an almost final degree of social-economical integration and they have already left the main carrier, we should be in the middle of the section of space the third phase must complete, the political union. The most difficult, the most tormented, full of problems no functionalist automatism could solve (Malandrino 2005: 11, 12).

This absolutely acceptable observation by Malandrino takes us back to the political dimension, to the role politics must have and to an unavoidable ques-

tion: is the political journey the only open way? As we have previously seen, Mitrany's answer is negative and that gives us the starting point for a short final consideration about the genesis of the elaboration of a theory that can also be defined 'internationalistic-technocratic'.

As I have tried to point out in this paper, Mitrany gets to a technocratic solution only after a deep and thorough analysis of the international politics. Such a solution is based on a principle of feasibility and on the possibility of overcoming any ideological element. As a consequence, the model of international organization proposed by Mitrany represents some sort of landing in the harbor of practicalness, of reliability. In other words, it is not the result of the search about what is right or preferable, but of the search about what is possible and feasible in a certain historical, political, economical and social context. The sense of 'coldness' we feel when we deal with Mitrany's functionalist theory[9] comes probably out of lack of ideal surges commonly founded on high principles and irremissible values. However, a 'technician' works on facts and avoids what belongs to the dimension of the illusion, or even the dream. That is why I have tried to 'enter' Mitrany's mind, to picture a kind of functionalist way of thinking. Unfortunately, along this path I have constantly run into the same question Mitrany must have asked himself very frequently during the building process of his international organizational model: is a political journey to peace (and integration) feasible? In front of the severe crisis the European Union is going through, I personally can not refrain from asking myself the same question, for which I have no answer. Or I might dread it.

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[9] It is probably the same sense of 'coldness' felt by the European Union citizens when facing those community institutions they regard as some sort of bureaucratic-technocratic monster.

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Chapter Twelve

Democratic pluralism and capitalist monism
Gianfranco Ragona

Translation from the original Italian by Angelina I. Zontine

12.1 Pluralism and democracy

For both common sense and specialist studies, pluralism is considered con-
stituent of democratic systems, as it allows us to recognize the "multiplicity"
and "variety of actors and opinions that contribute to public life" (Belligni
2010:363)[1] and legitimize the different structures of interest, such as the set
of political parties, trade unions, associations, etc. that formulate civil society's
political demands, directing them to the decision-making sphere, the parlia-
ment in first instance. According to Noberto Bobbio's eloquent definition,
pluralism's main aim is to construct "a society consisting of various groups of
power, potentially even in conflict with one another, whose function is to limit,
control, contrast and, to some extent, eliminate the central role of the domi-
nant power that is historically identified with the State" (Bobbio 1990:789). As
the Turinese philosopher noted, to this end the theory of pluralism becomes
autonomous in relation to both classical liberal and democratic theories. The
former seek to define the sphere of interference power exercises in the lives
of citizens and, in particular by means of a vertical division of power, to limit
the State's tendency to colonize ever-increasing spaces of civil society. On the

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[1] Translations of sources not published in English are by the author.

other hand, democratic theories share the idea that power can be limited by the law and, above all, by citizens' participation in decision-making processes.

The emergence of the concept of pluralism, however, precedes the establishment of Western democracies: in fact, its origins can be found in the debates regarding "intermediate bodies", representative of the Modern Age, that put forward the idea that collective decisions could favourably count on the contribution of subjects other than the sovereign. Hence, the tie between democracy and pluralism appears somewhat problematic, so much so that it has been challenged over time, especially by pure democracy theorists such as Rousseau. It was precisely this renowned thinker who rejected the idea that intermediate bodies could benefit the formation of general will and public good, fearing the fragmentation of interests and opinions and, ultimately, judging pluralism not a resource but a pathology of communal living.

Later, the promoters of liberal democracy viewed pluralism with confidence, placing it as a protective shield between the social body and possible resurgences of despotism, abuse or tyranny, even of the majority as Tocqueville would say. Finally, during the 20th century academic political science purposefully raised pluralism to the status of democracy's core element, inaugurating the widely used term "polyarchy" to define pluralist democratic regimes.

The paradigm of 20th century democratic pluralism displays specific characteristics. Firstly, «in all pluralist democracies (or polyarchies) the allocation of political goods is the result of interactions between [...] private actors and governmental agencies» (Belligni 2010: 366); secondly, a pluralist democracy goes beyond the State, and the State's role is equal to that of any other actor involved. It has also been noted that «rarely has the State-government, in this metamorphosis of sovereignty, behaved as an organic body, tending ever more to fragmentation into apparatuses and powers that operate not as organic units of a hierarchy but as autonomous subjects, at times competing or conflicting, other times in *partnership*, according to an internal pluralism that is not only structural and functional but also decisional» (*ibid.*). Lastly and most importantly, democratic power is pluralist both when concerning leadership – legitimized by elections, through which the deception of the *government*'s general will acts – and the agreement guaranteed by the system as a whole, that is, at the level of so-called *governance* where manifold protagonists act through negotiations and compromises (see Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Arienzo 2013). In other words, electoral legitimacy is supplemented by the system's legitimacy, which basically distinguishes the notion of "democratic pluralism"; in any case, at present this notion seems to be undergoing a deep crisis:

Many empirical studies have documented how the construction of the pluralist decision tends to generate new exclusions by privileging high demanders over disorganized citi-

zens, giving advantage to specific groups of interest over those of public interest, and, within them, to shareholders as opposed to stakeholders, or to the top-tier oligarchy as opposed to rank and file members (Belligni 2010:369-370).

Given the contemporary democracy crises – an evident fact, as shown by the vast literature on the topic (Mastropaolo 2012) – and the different hypotheses of reform targeting democratic systems, pluralism in general remains an untouchable element, as if it were surrounded by a sacred aura; attempts to redefine its concepts and practices notwithstanding, as the work of French intellectual Pierre Rosanvallon demonstrates.

12.2 Attending to democracy, or rather the crisis of democratic legitimacy

The achievement of universal suffrage in European political culture simultaneously transformed political parties into representative brokerage organs between state institutions and society, posing challenges to the political system – of which they are a part, however – organizing consensus and social life. The parties represented the organs of pluralism, and today's crisis in electoral participation seems to mirror their difficulties. The crisis can also be related to the fact that the object the parties represented has also become ambiguous: social classes, or the class sectors into which society was divided, not only citizens *sans phrase*. Today, the voting population's task is to select its governors; a minute after the elections, having removed the sovereign's robes, the population transforms itself into the cluster of the governed while the political focus dislocates to higher levels, giving rise to perverse effects in democratic life: disillusionment, disappointment, contempt, mistrust and silent protest. Some years ago, Colin Crouch observed that:

> *Politicians in many countries are becoming alarmed at growing voter apathy and declining membership in parties. This is the interesting paradox of the political class. It wants as much as possible to exclude the mass citizens from becoming actively involved in probing its secrets, organizing oppositional activities, disturbing the tight control exercised by the politico-business ellipse. But it desperately wants us to offer passive support; it dreads the possibility that we might lose interest in activities, fail to vote for it, give no money to its parties, ignore it (Crouch 2004: 112).*

According to David Van Reybrouck, author of the provocative text *Against Elections*, «the Democratic Fatigue Syndrome that is now emerging everywhere is a perfectly understandable consequence of the beatification of the electoral-representative system» (Van Reybrouck, 2016: 105), which in reality is not a democratic instrument at all but exactly the opposite; following in the tracks of Bernard Manin's study (Manin 1997), Van Reybrouck argues that it endorses the divide between those who govern and those who obey.

Rosanvallon suggests with a realistic – or resigned – perspective that we not seek to bridge this divide in extremis but rather acknowledge the distance: «Rather than attempt to carry over the bond of identification from the electoral to the governmental sphere, it is better to recognize the functional necessity of distance in the latter and to give this new relationship its own specifically democratic form» (Rosanvallon 2011: 220). In this perspective he introduces the concept of «*democracy of appropriation*» in an attempt to rethink pluralism in an original way.

The democracy of appropriation is founded on certain pillars. Namely, on activism and society's engagement, thus the critiquing of power, its decisions and conduct and, lastly, on control, correction or pressure. This is what he has defined in a previous, highly-impactful text as «counter-democracy» (Rosanvallon 2006). Furthermore, the democracy of appropriation is based on the development of two other important elements of democratic life: *authorities* and courts of justice (constitutional, administrative, etc.). Generally, he speaks of non-elective institutions, which in his eyes may represent «a new democratic horizon» (Rosanvallon 2011: 221).

In this article I focus on the former, as in the author's perspective they seem to be able to grant protection to the polyphonic character of contemporary democracies. In effect, independent authorities reduce «the scope of administrative-executive power» (Rosanvallon 2011: 75), meaning that they circumscribe the powers of the governors by limiting and therefore recognizing it, leaving the field open to the rich and varied intervention of civil society. The aim is to stem or contrast both power abuses and the privatization of general interests that many blame on the parties even though such privatization is common practice within the institutions as well. These authorities give democracy a legitimacy of impartiality, that is, a systemic legitimacy based on independence from governmental power, on the autonomy from the electoral period, namely from the partisan clashes, and on the technical rationality of prominent figures when facing the plural and vital struggle of the people in its various expressions[2].

Rosanvallon's argument is fuelled by from the consideration that there is no democracy without the shaping of a society in which everyone can fully find

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[2] Concerning the controversial concept of "people", see Pazè (2011); Badiou *et al.* (2013).

their place, without a collective identity and the writing of common history. The author asserts however that, within a pluralist society where «electoral legitimacy rests on popular recognition» (Rosanvallon 2011: 97), the concept of "the people" should be replaced by that of "generality", a positive and active social dimension that includes all citizens. This terminological and conceptual adjustment is important given that the legitimacy of impartiality is based on the concept of "negative generality", not in the sense that everybody has a role or that they all have rights, but that «*nobody* should benefit from a privilege or advantage» (Rosanvallon 2011: 97). In fact, although in today's democratic systems it is not possible for every individual to be positively included, or rather, it is not possible to unite and constitute a "general interest" with increasingly vague outlines, it is nonetheless important that nobody be excluded. In other words, if all particular interests do not constitute the general interest, at least a limit to the success of the particular must be set. This is the purpose of impartial institutions, to prevent the overbearing victory of particular interests – the cancer of democracies – and thereby safeguard pluralism

However, a problem arises in view of the fact that we do not live in a laboratory and it is not possible to conduct experiments in neutral contexts. Democratic societies are also capitalist societies and, even if capitalism may originate from different models (see Burroni 2016 and Crouch 2013), it is not pluralist in its essence. Quite the opposite: accumulation, its operating principle, is monist, an absolute principle on which society's welfare or crisis depends, resonating in the life of citizens and impacting their possibility to participate, control, decide and understand, reflecting the governors' conduct, behaviour and integrity, and affecting the trustees of independent authorities.

12.3 Capitalism and democracy, or rather: either democracy or capitalism

To try and make sense of the current crises of democratic systems, an original point of view is offered by the political scientist Wolfgang Streeck who sets out from the almost *naïve* but nonetheless accurate assertion that the fundamental structure of Western democracies is anchored to a capitalist economic order and that a thorough and articulated theory of capitalism is necessary to analyse this kind of society. This perspective ipso facto calls into question all the approaches that distinguish the political field from the economic one in a factitious manner, or that surreptitiously put forward ancient theories

regarding the autonomy of one or the other. Streeck writes: «Following what happened from 2008 onwards, it is not possible to understand politics and political institutions without considering their relation with the market and economic interests, as well as with class structures and the conflicts that have developed within them» (Streeck 2013: 17)[3].

In this perspective, the present crises of neoliberal democracies mirror the crisis of "democratic capitalism" that emerged during the post-war interval and started its decline during the Seventies, following the period known as the "Glorious Thirty": thus it is not just a "simple" financial crisis, nor a crisis of traditional democratic legitimacy, as Rosanvallon seems to believe, but a problem deriving directly from the fundamental tension between capitalism and democracy[4]. Then again, Streeck highlights, giving particular emphasis to historical processes, that «what is instructive for the social sciences is not the conditions themselves, but rather the processes, or the conditions in relation to the processes […]. All that is social happens and develops over time, becoming ever more similar to itself in and with time. What stands in front of us can be understood only if we know how it was yesterday and identify what path it has followed in the meanwhile» (Streeck 2013: 12-13).

The roots of the crisis of civilization that we are currently witnessing are anchored in the contradiction between «a kind of economy governed by the capitalist imperatives of exploitation and growth» (Streeck 2013: 12) and democratic life. On one hand, then, the absolute of accumulation is evidently monist, on the other, democratic relativism is the principle of pluralism:

> *Retrospectively, the history of the crises of late capitalism, starting from the Seventies, appears to be the development of the eternal and fundamental tension between capitalism and democracy, leading to the gradual dissolution of the marriage that was imposed on them during the aftermath of World War II (Streeck 2013: 25).*

Streeck's argument unfolds in keeping with a clear and convincing framework, recalling the objections on the compatibility between capitalism and democracy raised by neo-Marxism between the Seventies and Eighties: think of Paul Sweezy and Paul Baran's text, *Monopoly Capital* (Baran and Sweezy 1966), in which crisis represents not an exception but the normal state of the capitalist system or, for instance, Paul Mattick's text, *Marx and Keynes* (Mattick 1969), which argues that mixed economy, characteristic of the "Glorious Thirties", was destined for crisis due to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall; and lastly, the more recent insights of Alain Bihr (Bihr 1991), who cast a critical glance

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[3] Translations of Streeck 2013 are by the author.
[4] For a wider discussion on the topic, refer to the monographic dossier of the journal «Teoria Politica», 2014.

on the end of the Keynesian social pact between capital and labour within the context of post-war liberal democracy. In effect, the growth of the golden age could not have been without end, and only its growth, that is, the negotiated division of productivity gains between socially and politically legitimate actors in a pluralistic context, acted as an instrument for guaranteeing civil peace.

Streeck believes that «the history of capitalism during the Seventies, including the continuous succession of economic crises in that period, is the history of the leak of capital from the social regulation in which it was constrained after 1945» (Streeck 2013: 39). However, the fundamental tension between capitalism and democracy manifested itself without directly precipitating towards its extreme consequences, and that occurred because of a strategy based on a wise use of money, that «was employed to defuse potentially destabilizing social conflicts, first thanks to inflation, and then through public debt and expansion of private credit markets, and eventually - today - with the purchase of State and bank debts on behalf of the central banks» (Streeck 2013:15-16).

During this phase, capitalism began to flood the economies with money, creating an illusion of success and trust in future well-being, buying time, neutralizing conflicts and thereby giving way to the conditions of a real "secession" from democracy. In Europe, the crisis of state budgets translated into the erosion of a peculiar and consolidated model of social State, the guarantee deriving from the "pact" that had operated for a period of around three decades to enable imperfect forms of democracy to coexist with a mode of production whose operating principle is obviously problematic:

> *The three methods, adopted one after the other to create, thanks to money, the illusion of growth and well-being - inflation, public and private debt - all functioned for a limited amount of time. But once adopted, each method needed to be abandoned, as it interfered with the process of accumulation rather than sustaining it (Streeck 2013: 65).*

Naturally, a rational justification for this strategy is necessary; thus the debt crisis is traced from the dominant economic doctrine to democracy's inefficiencies and excesses (see Crosiet *et al.* 1975) following an argumentative strategy based on the concept of "common resource" and "common good", which are argued to be always and necessarily badly administered by the public and, by contrast, valorised by the market, i.e. the enterprise, recovering an old idea at the base of the original accumulation of capital that began with the appropriation of medieval collective property.

This is an ideological operation that allows us to set aside the decisive historical phenomenon represented by the eclipse of the compromise between capitalism and democracy, with the establishment of so-called neo-liberalism

and the simultaneous estrangement of the masses that reveals itself through increasing rates of electoral abstention. The consequent paradox is that the apathy of the democratic citizen always grants new strength to capitalism itself. In short:

> *Today democracy is at an advanced phase, in that democracy, as we know it, is about to become sterile and altered into a redistributive mass democracy, in other words it is about to be reduced to a combination of state of law and mere public entertainment. This process of de-democratization of capitalism through the de-economization of democracy has further advanced [...] following the crisis in 2008 (Streeck 2013: 25).*

Along these lines, Streeck reconstructs how the breach of the social pact from the middle of the Seventies led to the transition from the fiscal State – the one that drew its resources from a generally progressive imposition during the Glorious Thirties, with capital agreeing to contribute to the social State – to the debtor State, which instead needs to borrow money to guarantee the same benefits and subsequently support the privatization of welfare and social security services:

> *And so the substitution of the citizens' social rights won during the post-war period with the privatization and commodification ran parallel to the emergence of a new form of democracy that Crouch defines as "post-democracy" in which political participation is redefined as entertainment and unfastened from political, especially politico-economic, decision making (Streeck 2013: 95).*

Thus the action of the State is financed by debt, following the interest of those who own the financial wealth. Additionally, with all due respect to democratic, reformist and progressive utopia that attribute the State a neutral role in the conflict between those who own and those who do not, those who draw their income from capital:

> *have all the interest that the State not only leaves the money available to them as owners, but that it takes it back as credit, preserves it on their behalf, paying the interest for what has been burrowed instead of confiscated, and lastly that gives them the possibility to hand it down to the next generation so as to keep it in the family, at which point estate taxes will have become insignificant. And so the State, as a debtor State, contributes persistently to the perpetuation of the social stratification and inequality that derives from it. At the same time it subordinates itself and its activity to the control of its creditors, represented in the form of "markets". This control is exercised alongside the democratic control of citizens, maybe overlapping or eliminating it as is happening at the moment (Streeck 2013: 99-100).*

The de-democratization of capitalism, or the triumph of capitalism over de-mocracy, of a monist economic system over a pluralist and open one such as yesterday's mixed economy, translates into the freeing of capitalist accumu-lation from politics and the possible remedies that it might have introduced.

Here we get a glimpse of the Berlinian figure of the "hedgehog" (Berlin 1953), a metaphorical subject that traces everything back to one, universal principle capable of making sense and giving direction to life and history: for capital, this principle is the maximization of the profitability of investment. And if this principle collides with the democratic one of social justice – an object constantly debated and negotiated between different positions and in-terests, and thus in itself the fruit of a pluralistic process of definition and redefinition – then what needs to be reconfigured is democracy. This is true also in view of the fact that the rational alternative, «a democracy without capitalism, or without capitalism as we know it» (Streeck 2013: 200), has yet to be defined.

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THE PROBLEM OF TRUE MONISM
AND FAKE PLURALISM IN NOAM CHOMSKY'S
POLITICAL THOUGHT
Sara Lagi

13.1 INTRODUCING NOAM CHOMSKY:
LIBERTARIAN SOCIALIST AND ANARCHIST

Recognized as an internationally prominent linguist, father of Transforma-
tional Generative Grammar, Professor emeritus of Linguistics at M.I.T.,
Noam Chomsky was born in Philadelphia in 1928 into a Jewish Russian fam-
ily. He is considered a militant and anarchist intellectual, who has, over time,
become a point of reference for no-global and radical movements (Barsky
1997; Kinna 2012: 133-134)[1].

Although he has always rejected the idea of an interconnection between
his linguistic theory and his political ideals, it is Marcus Raskin who reminds
us that Chomsky's scientific interests in linguistics should be taken seriously
into account when analyzing his political thought. Chomsky's linguistic theory,

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[1] In bio and bibliographical terms, a good and reliable research tool for investigating Chomsky's
work is the official web-site: www.chomsky.info

which was systematically elaborated for the first time in his Ph.d. Dissertation entitled *Syntactic Structures* (1955), is based on the idea that the intelligibility of a language is not so much determined by peculiar rules which vary according to the language being considered, as by a deeper structure, a «universal grammar» (Chomsky: 1957; Smith a 2005: 21 f). Raskin thinks that Chomsky's theory on generative transformational grammar and his political view share the common principle of «universality»:

> one side of the Chomsky strip is innateness which presents humanity with the gift of language and therefore of communication. Follow that strip of universality, you will note that there is imprinted on the strip a capacity that allows for rationality and moral action that can catalyze humanity's benign social purpose (Raskin 2014: 9).

In other terms – according to Raskin – as a linguist, Chomsky theorizes a «universal grammar», as a political militant and thinker he writes and discusses about a universal entity, i.e. mankind who tries to find and carry out a better and just form of society. Raskin's interpretation is – in my opinion – acceptable not only because it catches the ultimate intellectual affinity between the two 'souls' of Chomsky's work, but also because it allows us to better grasp another remarkable aspect: from Chomsky's viewpoint, the creation and consolidation of a just society requires a totally renewed way of communication, an alternative way of delivering information to the people, which should not be conditioned and determined by those with economic and political power, i.e. «the élite domination» (Chomsky 1988). From Chomsky's perspective, an active role in delivering truth instead of manipulated information should be played by intellectuals who therefore should be independent from power. Intellectuals' responsibility should be to «speak the truth and expose lies». It is exactly the idea – clearly inspired by the Enlightenment tradition – Chomsky elaborates in his first relevant work on political theory, published in 1967, entitled *American Power and the New Mandarins*[2], in which the intellectual is called to speak the truth for those without power against the privileged (Chomsky 1967).

In all of his writings Chomsky uses different terms to describe and indicate the existence of small groups detaining any form of centralized, unaccountable, undemocratic power (economic, political, social): «prosperous few», «the minority of the opulent», «the privileged élite», «the privileged minority», «aristocrats», «masters of mankind»[3], «established power». Objectively, Chomsky does not provide a fully satisfactory and precise definition of the terms above mentioned; in my opinion, he tends to use them as synonyms. Even if, scien-

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[2] This book made Chomsky popular as a representative of the American libertarian Left, involved at that time in a harsh opposition to the Vietnam war.
[3] Chomsky derives this term from Adam Smith's *The Wealth of the Nations* (1776).

tifically speaking, Chomsky fails to delineate them in a more substantial way, we can see that all of them are related to a core political issue to him: what he thinks is the gap between the minority holding the power and the majority cut off from it.

Chomsky refers to the concept and word of pluralism (social, media and political) but never openly to those of monism and political or social models. Yet, I will seek to show how, from Chomsky's work, a discourse emerges not only on pluralism but also on what I call true monism and how this discourse fundamentally includes Chomsky's opposition to the American political and economic model. Such a model, in his opinion, unjustly depicts and represents the U.S. as a Nation of economic, civil, political freedom and plurality, a land of pluralism (social, economic, political, media), while concealing, in his view, the «élite domination» over the people. The latter, which as we are going to see takes different shapes, is what I define true monism. I decided to use the adjectives "true" and "fake" in order to better stress Chomsky's opposition to the «élite domination» and to a state of things (social, economic, political) that – as I am going to argue – is, in his opinion, only seemingly free and pluralist. With the purpose to comprehend in what sense Chomsky develops a discourse on fake pluralism and true monism, it is necessary for me to sketch out his ideological and political profile.

Chomsky has been defined as libertarian, a supporter of anarcho-syndacalism or simply an anarchist, engaged in the frontal critique of an élite monopolizing both wealth and means of communication, and therefore capable, in his opinion, of influencing the content of information (Edgley 2015: 45 f; Call 2002: 10; Ragona 2013: 118-120; Smith-Allot 2016: 186 f). Regardless of these many 'labels', it is relevant – in my opinion – to make Chomsky himself speak about his political and ideal identity, because I think that his self-perception turns out to be useful and important in developing our thesis. Chomsky states about himself:

> *I was attracted to anarchism as a young teenager, as soon as I began to think about the world beyond a pretty narrow range, and haven't seen much reason to revise those early attitudes since. I think it only makes sense to seek out and identify structures of authority, hierarchy, and domination in every aspect of life, and to challenge them; unless a justification for them can be given, they are illegitimate, and should be dismantled, to increase the scope of human freedom. That includes political power, ownership and management, relations among men and women, parents and children, our control over the fate of future generations (the basic moral imperative behind the environmental movement, in my view), and much else. Naturally this means a challenge to the huge institutions of coercion and control: the state, the unaccountable private tyrannies that control most of the domestic and international economy, and so on (Chomsky 1995).*

Generally speaking, if we look at his vast intellectual production we can observe that he has always defined himself as a libertarian socialist and anarchist (Otero 1982: 245 f; Peck 1987: 22). One of the major points of reference for delineating Chomsky's political ideals and identity is his *Notes on Anarchism*[4], an essay originally written as introduction to the English edition of the French anarchic intellectual Daniel Guerin's *Anarchism: from Theory to Practice* (1968) and afterwards republished in 1970 in the «New York Review of Books». Most of the concepts, ideas, principles elaborated in the Notes would be entirely or partially re-proposed by Chomsky in all of his further books from *Manufacturing Consent. The political economy of the mass media* (1988) to the recent *Power Systems* (2013). In his *Notes on Anarchism* Chomsky seems to be driven by one chief purpose: explaining what he means by libertarian socialism, anarchism and anarchic spirit. There is a core idea underpinning the whole essay: Chomsky uses the term anarchism and libertarian socialism as perfectly synonymous. To understand the reason behind this, it is necessary to take into account that he traces a sort of filrouge connecting part of liberal tradition to socialism and anarchism. He does so by mentioning and discussing a series of characters who played a relevant role in his intellectual formation. First of all, he recalls Bakunin and in particular a self-portrait of the Russian anarchist, who said he was a «fanatic lover of liberty, the unique condition under which intelligence, dignity and human happiness can develop and grow». These words represent to Chomsky the «leading idea within the anarchist tradition» (Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 121).

The truly interesting aspect to us is to observe how Chomsky relates just this «leading idea» to the Enlightenment, to the philosophical and political tradition embodied by Rousseau, Kant and above all to Wilhelm Von Humboldt. The latter, who set on one of the most important intellectual highlights of liberalism (Gray: 19952), has always been a thinker particularly significant in Chomsky's eyes and frequently quoted by him (Chomsky 2005 [1970]: 121-122). It was Von Humboldt (1767-1835) who – as we read in *Notes on Anarchism* – was able to tie up the critique of State's interference with humanist principles and values, in a coherent. Von Humboldt is in fact the main character of another of Chomsky's major works dating back to 1970: *Knowledge and Freedom* (Chomsky b: 2005 [1970]). Here Chomsky recognizes two great merits in Von Humboldt, who actually was also a pioneer of general linguis-

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[4] Obviously this is not the only work where Chomsky defines himself as libertarian socialist and anarchist. Important references are also included in Peck (1987: p. 22 f), where Chomsky also explains why he has been focusing primarily on European Anarchists rather than American ones: «the American anarchist tradition at least the more articulated part of it, is composed of writers in an individualist tradition who are thinking about […] What attracts me about anarchism personally are the tendencies in it that try to come to grasp with the problems of dealing with complex organized industrial societies within a framework of free institutions and structures. And the American anarchists rarely dealt with these questions».

tics. The first is the condemnation and refusal of an unlimited State power – as this key-principle was elaborated in Von Humboldt's *The Limits of State Action* (1792) – and the second is the emphasis on the concept of *Bildung*, the idea that the man should express and fully develop all his potentials and skills (Chomsky b 2005 [1970]: 108).

In Von Humboldt Chomsky sees a defender and representative of «libertarian values» who was able to harmonize political theory with a particular vision of human nature. In doing so, it seems to me that Chomsky is not illuminating us only about his idea of Von Humboldt's intellectual legacy but also about his own most intimate beliefs. In *Language and Freedom* Von Humboldt is portrayed as that thinker who saw in unlimited power into the hands of the State, one of the major obstacles to the development of human intellect, diversity, dignity, freedom, plurality. By emphasizing, for example, Von Humboldt's belief in man «as a fundamentally spontaneous and creative, self-perfective being», whose development and intellectual enrichment can be reached through an education capable of stimulating «self-fullfillment», Chomsky is providing us an insight to his own idea of education and the relationship existing, in his opinion, between the latter, freedom and social progress (Rai a 1995: 1-18; Rai b 2005: 232-239).

It is just in this sense that we can better comprehend the reason why Chomsky highlights a major affinity between Von Humboldt's idea of education and that professed by another thinker truly relevant to his formation, John Dewey (1859-1952). Chomsky has always praised the American social philosopher's model of education aiming at a truly democratic society of «anti-dogmatic» minds and citizens (Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 119-120).. Yet, if we limited ourselves to considering these aspects, we would have a partial view of Chomsky's intellectual formation. In *Notes on Anarchism* Chomsky sees in Von Humboldt's ideals – as well as those professed by Rousseau and by Kant – a humanist and libertarian message which after the degeneration of classical liberal principles «perverted into an ideology to sustain the emerging social order» was inherited by libertarian socialism. The latter – Chomsky states – should be considered «as the libertarian wing of socialism» because it «is properly to be regarded as the inheritor of the liberal ideals of the Enlightenment» (Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 122)[5].

In his portrayal of anarchism as the meeting point of liberalism and socialism Chomsky is far from being original. He openly recalls to the work of

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[5] In his interpretation of liberalism, «perverted» by the logic of capitalism, market-system etc. Chomsky seems to forget (or simply not to know) that historically speaking, from the mid 19th century, the liberal tradition of political thought encountered and embraced the democratic principles and progressively reformed itself – chiefly from the late 19th century – in a more pro-social reforms direction: a good example for that might be T.H. Green's work.

another major intellectual point of reference to him: the anarcho-syndacalist Rudolf Rocker (1873-1958) and his *Anarcho syndacalism* published for the first time in 1938. If it is true, according to Chomsky, that libertarian ideals are an integrative part of anarchism, it is also true for him that in its socialist connotation anarchism opposes the «private ownership of the means of production and the wage slavery»[6] in favor of a new form of society where – here Chomsky is quoting from Marx – «labor […] will become the highest want in life» (Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 122-124). In *Notes on Anarchism*, Chomsky openly refers to Marx and particularly to the connection established by the latter between «the detailed worker of today reduced to a mere fragment of a man» and the existing «capitalist relations of production» (Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 123-124).

Generally speaking, Chomsky's work is characterized by several references to Marx' political and economic thought – interestingly the main references are to Marx as author of *La Commune de Paris* – even if – as Chomsky himself states – his own political work substantially reflects «a little engagement with classical marxist tradition» (Chomsky 1995). Instead, much more frequent and detailed are his references to Rosa Luxemburg, Anton Pannekok, Paul Mattick, Herman Gorter, Rudolf Rocker. After criticizing the «capitalist relations of production» and the «specialization of labor», all «degrading human beings» Chomsky concludes that «a consistent anarchist, then, should be a socialist, but a socialist of particular sort» (Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 125). He emphasizes how the anarchist opposes the system which reduces man to an instrument for fulfilling specific goals established by economic and political authority, in support of a new kind of society where «individuals' purposes» – a term he openly derives from Von Humboldt – can be carried out. The reference to Von Humboldt proves and again testifies the relevance of this thinker to Chomsky's eyes but it should not make us forget that in Chomsky's view the fulfillment of «individuals' purposes» must be pursued and enhanced according to a perspective of cooperation, solidarity and creation of free workers' associations. In my opinion it is precisely in these principles (solidarity, cooperation, free workers' associations) that Chomsky identifies what makes the anarchist «a socialist of particular sort». More specifically, in supporting the implementation of «free associations of free producers» Chomsky declares to draw inspiration again from Rudolf Rocker (Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 124). Chomsky's recall to anarcho-syndacalism has a huge implication in grasping the meaning of his political and ideal identity better: if it is true – as he states – that anarchists refuse any form of «alienation», and «specialized labor», it is also true for him that they strongly support the «appropriation of capital by the whole body of workers». Chomsky heavily insists on the fact that the

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[6] Chomsky is quoting from Marx' *Capital*.

appropriation must be «direct» rather than a process led and controlled by an élite of politicians acting «in the name of the proletariat» (Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 125).

In this sense, it is worth quoting a passage from Chomsky's *Preface* to the English edition of Rocker's *Anarcho syndacalism*, vividly highlighting how this book and his author influenced Chomsky's political identity and thought:

> *In Rocker's [...] conception, people must take their lives and their work into their own hands. Only through their own struggle for liberation will ordinary people come to comprehend their true nature, suppressed and distorted within institutional structures designed to assure obedience and subordination. Only in this way will people develop more humane ethical standards, "a new sense of right", "the consciousness of their strength and their importance as a social factor in the life of their time" and of their capacity to realize the strivings of their "inmost nature". Such direct engagement in the work of social reconstruction is a prerequisite for coming to perceive this "inmost nature" and is the indispensable foundation upon which it can flourish (Chomsky 1989 a: VII).*

It is evident how Chomsky is profoundly critical – as libertarian socialist and anarchist – towards any form of «State-socialism», and «bureaucratic centralism», denounced, for example, by Bakunin. In that light, we can also better understand and situate Chomsky's frequent references to Rosa Luxemburg's critique of the Bolshevik tendency towards the primacy of bureaucracy, i.e. the absolute power and control concentrated in the hands of the Bolshevik Central Committee (Chomsky c 2005 [1969]: 41). Chomsky identifies the same critical and anti-centralist perspective in the British Communist William Paul – author of *State, Its Origins and Functions* (1917) – who, in his opinion, stresses how so-called State-socialism has hindered true democracy. Its implementation will always be negatively influenced and «limited» as long as – Chomsky states – «the industrial system is controlled by any form of autocratic elite» (Chomsky a 2005 [1970]: 128).

His insistence on those thinkers criticizing «red bureaucracy», State-socialism, bureaucratic control – all considered as forms of despotism – is clearly finalized to stress what he thinks is the fundamentally libertarian and humanist content of anarchism. This aspect of Chomsky's political reflection represents an important premise to his critique of «élite domination» and any form of power concentration in the contemporary U.S. political, economic and social system.

To Chomsky – libertarian socialist and anarchist – the creation of a true democracy implies a totally new form of social organization, which would allow the full development of human potentials by overcoming traditional power systems. By reading Chomsky' works, we can observe how he has sub-

stantially remained loyal to his political ideals emerging, for example, from his *Notes on Anarchism*. A majority of the beliefs, ideas and ideals discussed so far are included in the writings I am going to analyze. Here he denounces what he thinks are the obstacles on the road to a true democracy and to a just society of fully developed individuals. Two of these obstacles are, in my opinion, what I called at the beginning of my paper true monism and fake pluralism.

13.2 CHOMSKY AS POLITICAL THINKER: TRUE MONISM AND FAKE PLURALISM

The thesis I am going to propose and develop, basically consists of two elements: firstly that in Chomsky's work a political and economic American model can be identified. In his *Storia del pensiero politico europeo*, Salvo Mastellone recognized three different meanings and types of political model: 1) those elaborated and designed on the basis of a specific, existing and functioning political system («modelli politici funzionanti») with the general purpose to use that model as an example to follow and imitate; those based on a past political system («modelli politici storici») and those created on the basis of a utopian project («modelli politici utopici») (Mastellone 1993: 9).

Part of the first definition fits into Chomsky's work: in my opinion, Chomsky's political reflection – although not explicitly – identifies an American political and economic model which, in his opinion, emphasizes a series of merits and positive aspects supposed as belonging to the U.S., i.e. free market, pluralism (social, economic, political, media), solid democratic institutions, which actually – in his opinion – do not correspond to reality. I think, as I am going to show in the following pages, that the problem of true monism and fake pluralism in Chomsky's political work can be situated ideally within the discrepancy he establishes between what he thinks is the true American political and economic system and the American political and economic model spread in and out of the national borders. Both severely criticized by him. Having said that, the point for me is to seek to answer the following questions: *How and to what extent can we talk about the problem of true monism and fake pluralism in Chomsky's political thought?, And why is it relevant to discuss about it?*

I think that the problem of true monism as well as of fake pluralism, interconnected with Chomsky's critical attitude towards the American political and economic model, develops and articulates on three specific macro-levels of reflection: 1. the critique of the American free market system; 2. the in depth critique of American mass communication system; 3. the reflection on what

Chomsky defines as the gradual impairment of American democratic institutions and life. In his *The Prosperous Few and the Restless Many* (1993), Chomsky poses the problem of free market principles in the U.S. In his view, there is an evident but unmentioned gap characterizing the American economic system: that between the rhetoric of a true free market, free competition among different subjects all sharing equal opportunities, economic pluralism – all elements praised by the official American political and economic model – and the reality of a growing predominance (economic and even political) of multinationals that – in his view – has been fostered by the U.S. government itself by means of special protectionist measures (Chomsky 1993). I think that exactly this contrast emerging from Chomsky's work of 1993, can be read as between fake pluralism and true monism. Not only in his book of 1993 but in all of his writings we can observe that Chomsky is as much in favor of a clearer and more effective governmental role in promoting good public education and social insurance[7] as he is against government support to the interests of the «prosperous few»: i.e. the multinationals and their managers, by subsidizing specific industrial fields often, according to Chomsky, closely linked with the Pentagon:

> *Internationally, the Pentagon was an intervention force, but domestically it was a method by which the government could coordinate the private economy, provide welfare to major corporations, subsidize them, arrange the flow of taxpayer money to research and development, provide a state guaranteed market for excess production, target advanced industries for development, etc. Just about every successful and flourishing aspect of the US economy has relied on this kind of government involvement (Chomsky 1993: 346)..*

Chomsky emphasizes how this kind of government involvement has turned into a great opportunity for the «prosperous few» to increase their wealth:

> *So you could say that one alternative to the free market system is the one we already have, because we often don't rely on the market where powerful interests would be damaged. Our actual economic policy is a mixture of protectionist, interventionist, free market and liberal measures. And it's directed primarily to the needs of those who implement social policy, who are mostly the wealthy and the powerful (Chomsky 1993: 346).*

In this sense, the U.S. government involvement would show how the true American economic system is – according to Chomsky – far from being based on a coherent free market mechanism:

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[7] See for example: Chomsky (1969).

For example, the US has always had an active state industrial policy, just like every other industrial country. It's been understood that a system of private enterprise can survive only if there is extensive government intervention. It's needed to regulate disorderly markets and protect private capital from the destructive effects of the market system, and to organize a public subsidy for targeting advanced sectors of industry, etc (Chomsky 1993: 346).

In Chomsky's critical analysis the American economic system emerges as being characterized by what I would define as a truly monist logic covered up by the supposedly pluralist free market principles. His reflection on the power of multinationals should be correctly situated within the context of a general critique of neo-liberal policies, which represent the backbone of current globalization (Ritzer-Dean: 2015). The latter, in Chomsky's opinion, contributed to extend «the Third World model to industrial countries» which means the growing gap between «prosperous few and the restless many». It is just the prosperous élite who – in his view – has found a major point of reference and support in the main International Governance institutions such as MIF, Nafta, G-7, and even the EU Bank which, according to Chomsky, «answer basically to the transnational corporations, international banks, etc. All these structures raise decision making to the executive level, leaving what's called a "democratic deficit" – parliaments and populations with less influence» (Chomsky 1993: 347).

The international institutions above mentioned should correspond to a logic of pluralism (pluralism of voices, interests, international actors), whereas they conversely embody and exercise what we could define a monist kind of economic and political power. Monist because, in Chomsky's view, these institutions concentrate in their hands a huge amount of power in contrast with the interests of the many (Chomsky 1993: 344). In the U.S as well as on a global scale Chomsky denounces thus the existence of that «autocratic elite» he opposed in his *Notes on Anarchism*.

His critique of multinationals' power and that of international governance bodies can be related to the second macro-level of Chomsky's reflection. His repeated critical statements on how profoundly distorted the American free market system is and on the role played by government intervention seem to imply, according to Chomsky that, the American political and economic model, as it as been designed and promoted inside and outside the U.S, is based on a fake form of pluralism hiding a true state of monism. This might be, in my opinion, one of the keys to interpreting Chomsky's attack on the U.S media system which he defines a refined and sophisticated mechanism whose purpose is to indoctrinate people and change citizens into consumers, convincing them that a government of the people or for the people cannot and must not

exist (Chomsky: 2013 a [2011]). To this end, in my opinion, Chomsky's focus on the U.S. mass media communication system directly connects the second level of our reflection to the third one concerning the impairment and weakening of American democratic life.

In Chomsky's view, the process of indoctrination has taken place through what he defines as a «propaganda model» based on a systematic manipulation of language and people's critical ability and skills. He elaborates the connection between media-indoctrination and power in one of his most important works, where he also employs his knowledge and understanding of linguistics, *Manufacturing consent* (1988) (Chomsky-Hermann: 1988)[8].

Starting from the idea that «mass media serve as a system of communication […] in order to integrate (the populace) into the institutional structure of the larger society and to fullfil this role requires a systematic propaganda» (Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 61), Chomsky states that such propaganda serves to strengthen the «élite domination», while weakening democracy. More precisely, he thinks that the «propaganda model» set up in the U.S. has distorted and altered democratic principles because, while pretending to support and nurture a state of freedom and pluralism, it would be actually based on a precise strategy (economic and political). I would define this monist because its main purpose would be, in Chomsky's view, to preserve the power in the hands of a very small group of people. Hence, according to Chomsky's interpretation, the U.S. media system can be considered an integrative part of the true American political model. In other terms, a contrast seems to take shape in Chomsky's pages: on the one hand, a mass communication and media system supposedly pluralist, open, free, articulated, far from any form of censorship, as depicted by the official American political model, on the other a mass communication and media system monopolized and controlled by a small élite of power. A contrast, in my opinion, between fake pluralism and true monism. In *Manufacturing Consent*, it becomes of great relevance for Chomsky to understand and explain how concretely the «propaganda model» works. In doing so he identifies five special «filters», by means of which the «elite domination» reinforces and imposes itself on the people, neutralizing dissent (Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 62-63).

It is Chomsky to stress how ancient and deep the roots of the propaganda model are. With regard to this aspect, he relates the failure of many British late 19th century working class newspapers to «various taxes designed to drive out radical media by raising the costs» (Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 63)[9]. A strategy

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[8] Chomsky wrote the book in collaboration with Edward S. Hermann (1925-): Professor Emeritus of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania and media analyst.

[9] Chomsky and Hermann refer to *Power without Responsibility* (1981) by J. Curran and J. Seaton as one of their major sources for the history of the British news media from the Eighteenth

created and implemented by the «autocratic élite» whose major purpose was to strengthen its social, political and economic control over the people («élite domination»).

Yet, the use of State intervention to eliminate specific targets, such as radical media, proved to be unsuccessful. That was the reason why it was replaced by a market-oriented kind of media resulting in the «industrialization of the press» which – as Chomsky states – means that over time the media has needed a growing amount of financial investments and only those receiving them have been able to survive. This situation shows, according to Chomsky, the ever-closer connection between two realms that should be independent from each other: the media, on the one hand, and the «corporate power», on the other. As for this aspect, Chomsky identifies a third subject playing, in his opinion, a major role in the media industry, i.e. the government. All media companies require «government licenses and franchises» and they can obtain them as long as they are able to foster and promote their ties with the government, through a lobbying strategy. These ties in Chomsky's view, are also functional to media corporations, which would use their relations with government actors to influence a series of key-aspects for their business: «interest rates, labor policies, business taxes, enforcement or non-enforcement of anti-trust laws». But just this complex and multi-level interdependence, depicted as an integrative component of the U.S. media system and that of the major Western countries, has contributed, in Chomsky's opinion, to erode any form of true media pluralism. In doing so it has hindered ever-more, any form of dissent and critical skills, dealing a serious blow to American democratic life (Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 73-74).

To Chomsky, another aspect – corresponding to the second «filter» of his «propaganda model» – should be carefully taken into account: the massive role played by «the advertising license». Parallel to the aftermath of big media corporations, the number of media companies whose publishing success is largely determined by their ability to attract ads has increased, resulting in an increasingly inevitable «marginalization» of those newspapers, Tv, radio etc. whose survival is actually based on the «revenue from sales». According to Chomsky's analysis, the strong (economic) influence exercised by advertising is another means by which the «élite domination», imposes, preserves and strengthens its interests and in doing so it impacts people's mentality and attitude by fostering a kind of business-oriented media system rather than «cultural-critical programming» (Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 74-78).

Besides the prominent role played by media corporations and ads in shaping the media world, Chomsky identifies a third element (the «third filter») which, in his opinion, works on an even more subtle and complex level, i.e.

century to the present (Chomsky-Hermann 1988).

the problem of «sourcing the media». So far, Chomsky has explained what he thinks are two major (negative) forces drastically limiting and distorting true media and information pluralism by means of an essentially economic and financial strategy, which punishes marginal and often dissident newspapers, TV, radio. However, in Chomsky's opinion, the first two identified «filters» would be nothing without the ability of finding the 'right' and 'proper' sources of information:

> *the media need a steady, reliable flow of raw material of news. […] they cannot – Chomsky writes – afford to have reporters and cameras at all places where important stories may break. Economics dictates that they concentrate their resources where important rumors and leaks abound and where regular press conferences are held (Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 79).*

The 'where' to which Chomsky is referring is a group of places and locations that we might define representative and highly symbolic of the «élite domination», i.e. «The White House, the Pentagon, the State Department» along with «business corporations», whose chief point of strength – Chomsky states – is their ability to grant a regular flow of news (Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 78-79). If the first three «filters» deal with a market-oriented strategy, the remaining two («flak and the enforces»; «anticommunism as a control mechanism») are more openly driven by ideological factors. With «flak» Chomsky refers to «negative responses to a media statement or program. It may take the form of letters, telegrams, phone calls, petitions, lawsuits, speeches and bills before Congress and other modes of complaint, threat, punitive action» (Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 86). According to Chomsky, the fourth «filter» corresponds thus to a deliberate, direct, intentional, open attempt to drastically discourage and even eliminate that media programming perceived as dangerous by the «established power». The last of the five filters has been recently updated by Chomsky. When *Manufacturing consent* was published for the first time, the Cold War did still exist and therefore he identified in «the ideology of anti-communism» a vital and strategically relevant target for the U.S. (Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 86-89). In the new edition of the book (2001) following to the end of bi-polarism, «anti-communism» was replaced by «anti-terrorism» and the War on Terror as one of the major current social control mechanisms (Chomsky-Hermann: 2001)[10].

In the light of this reflection, Chomsky states that, through a series of special and well-working «filters», the «autocratic élite» has not just been able (in the U.S. and outside) to become the main source of information but also – or even mainly – the subject manufacturing what people must and must not

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[10] As for the updating of the propaganda model theory, see also: Chomsky-Hermann (2008).

know, while using this huge power to protect its own interests (Chomsky-Hermann 1988: 79 f)[11].

It seems to me that in *Manufacturing consent* the élite monopolizing economic and political power creates an actual state of true monism (in terms of media system and not only) covered and hidden by fake pluralism. As I have tried to show, Chomsky insists greatly on how the people are manipulated and indoctrinated by the «media-industry». It is the indoctrination created through the «propaganda model» and more precisely through the above-mentioned «filters» that, in his opinion, has increasingly weakened democratic sovereignty and the principle that the people rule. To this end, «the manufacture of consent is the antithesis of democracy» because, in Chomsky's view, it generates from the «attempts at the control and manipulation of democratic politics» (Wilkin 1997: 4; Catanzaro 2013: 194 f).

When the dominating few use their material power to condition, lead and determine information, the space of democratic freedom is severely harmed: according to Chomsky, the weaker the principle of democratic sovereignty is, the stronger the «domination élite» is. In his perspective, this kind of mechanism has reached such a refined, subtle and complex form that the people themselves, who are the main target, paradoxically change into an integral part of it: he stresses how the people internalize it, without being conscious of it. The conclusions he draws are pessimistic the most perverse outcome of the situation he delineates in *Manufacturing Consent* is *Consent without Consent*. This is the title of another popular work of Chomsky's, relevant for me in order to elaborate my thesis. *Consent without Consent* was originally published in 1996, during the primary season for the American presidential elections. Chomsky identifies what he thinks is one of the most striking aspects of that season: «money and publicity were present in abundance, but not voters or much difference in outcome» (Chomsky 1996: 417). Yet, his primary interest is not so much to focus on 1996 primary season as to reflect on the state of American democracy. Recalling one of his intellectual points of reference, David Hume, according to whom «the governors have nothing to support them but opinion», Chomsky introduces the concept of «consent without consent».

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[11] The topic of manufacturing consent is a long-term problem in Chomsky's intellectual production; a problem he has largely discussed either in many of his public speeches. In 2013, he held a speech at the East Stroudsborough University in Pennsylvania, where he addressed the issue of «global warming and common good», while referring to how, in his opinion, almost any kind of information, including that about global warming would be heavily conditioned and distorted. In particular, he criticized the recently enforced Environmental Literacy Improvement Act, whose major objective would be to promote environmental education in American schools, and supported by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), which is financed, as Chomsky states, by «lobbying organizations of the fossil fuels». See: Chomsky (2013 b). As for the manufacture of consent see also: Chomsky (1989 a).

Not only, in my opinion, is this one of the chief components underpinning both true monism and fake pluralism, but it also allows us to deepen and better grasp his idea of democracy, and more precisely, what Chomsky thinks democracy is. Like in most of his writings, Chomsky uses many specific and detailed examples to elaborate his critique. Firstly, he refers to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals which «denied an appeal by workers who lost their job when Ohio plants were moved to states with cheaper labor» by noting «States and counties in the U.S. compete with each other for companies contemplating re-location» (Chomsky 1996: 429). According to the Court, the labor laws could neither «discourage such relocations, nor bar closing unionized plants in favor of an nonunion plant in another part of the country or in a foreign country as contemplated by the NAFTA» (Chomsky 1996: 429-430). Chomsky relates the judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals to that on Allen vs Die-bold Inc.,[12] dating back to 1994 and noting that:

> *Congress and the Courts have made the judgment that […] our capitalistic system, Darwinian though it may be, will not discourage companies from locating on the basis of their own calculations of factors relating to efficiency and competitiveness. The rules of marketplace govern. By so reflecting commercial interests, the institutions of government serve – according to current legal and economic theory – the long-term best interests as a whole. That is the basic social policy the country has opted to follow (Chomsky 1996: 429).*

Chomsky provides further examples with a more specifically political nature. On the basis of *United States and World Court U.S Department State Bureau of Public Affairs* of 1985, he mentions, for example, the U.S government decision in 1980 to withdraw «its compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court» as a response to the fact that a growing number of U.N. Member states were no longer aligned with the American leadership and began to openly oppose U.S. international conduct (Chomsky 1996: 428). More precisely – as Chomsky stresses – one of the most important international questions regarded the American interventions in Nicaragua, condemned by the World Court as «il-legal». Chomsky interprets these events as a means to the preservation and empowerment of what he calls «traditional structure of power» (Chomsky 1996: 428). This «structure» can take a variety of different shapes: it might be embodied by the U.S government which, thanks to its military, economic and political power, can withdraw from World Court jurisdiction, or by the U.S. Courts whose judgments, according to Chomsky, are actually against workers although they seem to be justified on the basis of a (fake, to him) respect for

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[12] The case concerned the employer's decision to replace «two unionized Ohio manufacturing plants with the two new non-unions plants in Virginia and South Carolina». www.justa.com

pluralism of interests and demands (companies, workers, commercial interests). The point is that, in his opinion, in both cases we are dealing with decisions justified and supported in the name of national interest or, specifically like in the case of the Ohio workers, in the name of a market-oriented economy, which actually – as Chomsky states – seems to be applied only to lower classes or, like in the case of Allen vs Diebner, in the name of a social policy considered good and just for the whole society. To Chomsky all this becomes excellent proof of how relevant, even vital economic and political decisions actually reflect the «élite domination» based on alleged understanding of what is objectively right and wrong for the people, for those who have no power, i.e. through a practice that Chomsky defines the undemocratic «consent without consent». (Chomsky 1996: 428-429).

To Chomsky, the issue of «consent without consent» is a long-term American problem that he traces back to a substantial and persistent fear of the people, perceived as threat to the élite. An historically relevant example for that comes, in his opinion, from the thought, work and political engagement of one of the American Funding Fathers, James Madison. Despite his frequent references to the Constitutional values and the principle of freedom, Madison's primary objective – in Chomsky's opinion – was to serve the «opulent minority» with property rights and whose interests were identified with «the common good». Showing his sensitivity for linguistic matters, Chomsky criticizes Madison's defense of «rights of property» by observing that technically «[this] formulation is misleading. There are no rights of property, only rights to property, which are rights of persons standing alongside other rights (to freedom, to speech etc.)». In the use of «rights of property» instead of «rights to property» Chomsky identifies what he thinks was Madison's true, final purpose, i.e.: «provide special and additional guarantees for the rights of one class of persons, property owners, thus protecting the minority of the opulent against the majority» (Chomsky 1996: 432). It is in this sense that, according to Chomsky, we should interpret Madison's emphasis on the importance of providing political rights on the basis of property rights and economic wealth. In his *Consent without Consent* Chomsky is decisive: he sees the backbone of the entire true American economic and political system in Madison's defense of private property rights. Yet, according to Chomsky, a relevant gap does exist between Madison and the current American ruling class. He reminds how to Madison, the country had to be ruled by men who had to be not only wealthy and economically independent but also wise, well educated, capable of defending public interests and ready to sacrifice their own for the good of the nation (Chomsky 1996: 432-433). In contrast to this view, the contemporary American political and economic system is depicted by Chomsky as ruled by «huge, uncountable private tyrannies». Chomsky's comment is harsh:

they largely dominate, have gained substantial control over the domestic and international economy as well as the informational and doctrinal systems, bringing to mind another Madison's concern: "that a popular Government, without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy, or perhaps both (Chomsky 1996: 433).

In Chomsky's view, the post-Madisonian America has gradually turned into the cradle of what I would define a true monism, whose development and aftermath seem to be connected, in his analysis, with the centralization of economic power as well as of media and information systems into the hands of the few. It is not by chance that in *Consent without Consent* Chomsky refers to Jefferson and Tocqueville sharing, in his view, the same concern for the establishing of a new form of tyranny in the U.S., led by an «opulent minority»:

Thomas Jefferson, who warned of the rise of a "single and splendid government of an aristocracy, founded on banking institutions and moneyed corporations" which would enable the few to "riding and ruling over the plundered ploughman and beggared yeomanry", destroying democracy and restoring a form of absolutism if given free rein […] Or Alexis de Tocqueville, who like Jefferson and Adam Smith, regarded equality of condition as an important feature of a free and just society. He saw the dangers of a "permanent inequality of conditions" and an end to democracy if "the manufacturing aristocracy which is growing up under our eyes", "one of the harshest that has ever existed in the world", should escape its confines. (Chomsky 1996: 420).

Most of Chomsky's critical reflections on his country, which we have tried to read and interpret in terms of true monism and fake pluralism, have been stimulated and inspired not only by his own political and ideal beliefs but more concretely by concrete historical events and changes: the Vietnam war, the Free Speech Movement, the birth of the U.S as global power, the outbreak of international tensions due to Islamic terrorism and 9/11, global warming and last but not least the massive financial crisis of 2008-2009. The latter, in particular, was seen by Chomsky as an opportunity to revitalize and re boost American civil society, making positive forces emerge. Chomsky's focus on the recent American economic breakdown shows how we can identify another major issue in his thought, that is, true pluralism as opposed to the fake one and true monism.

It seems to me that in Chomsky's thought true pluralism is linked to the principle of popular sovereignty, solidarity, cooperation, i.e. ideals that, as we read in *Notes on Anarchism*, Chomsky traces back to libertarian socialism and anarchic tradition. Looking at American society, he identifies a series of forces and groups whose major merit – in his opinion – is to make these principles

circulate again. To his eyes, the best example for that is the birth of the Occupy Wall Street movement, established as reaction to 2008-2009 financial crisis. Chomsky has devoted great attention to it in recent years as witnessed in the book *Occupy* in 2012 and in many lectures and interviews he has held on this topic across the U.S (Smith-Allott 2016: 307 f)[13]. Chomsky's interpretation of the Occupy movement becomes comprehensible if we take into account all we have discussed about his political thought so far. Behind his analysis of the Occupy activism there is again a critique substantially similar to that of the *Prosperous few and the Restless Many*. In the movement, he sees a force capable of regaining public attention to the problem of rising economic inequality:

> one of the really remarkable and almost spectacular successes of the Occupy movement - Chomsky states – is that it has simply changed the entire framework of discussions of many years. There were things that were sort of known, but in the margins, hidden, which are now right up in front of – such as the imagery of the 99% and the 1%; and the dramatic facts of sharply rising inequality over the past 30 years, with wealth being concentrated in actually small fraction of 1% of the population (Chomsky: 2012).

Although Chomsky thinks that the movement has to tackle with many different challenges on many different fronts, he is also convinced – as libertarian socialist and anarchist – that it should capitalize what he considers as its major point of strength, i.e. its ability to:

> create communities – real functioning communities of mutual support, democratic interchange, care for one another, and so on. This is highly significant, especially in a society like ours in which people tend to be very isolated and neighborhoods are broken down, community structures have broken down, people are some kind alone (Chomsky: 2012).

Chomsky's suggestions about concretely what the movement should do and what methods it should employ to spread are objectively too general and not fully satisfactory in strategic terms but what is really relevant to me is how his comments can be read in the light of the contrast between fake and true pluralism. In fact, the «real achievement» of the movement is, according to Chomsky, the creation of «bonds» and «associations» being formed by people

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[13] Occupy collects a series of Chomsky's writings, public speeches and intersections with the Occupy Movement: 1. the lecture he gave at Occupy Boston in 2011; 2. an interview about the meaning of Occupy; 3. a conference call with militants of the Occupy Movement; 4. the speech on Occupying Foreign Policy at the University of Maryland; 6. a tribute to his friend and co-agitator Howard Zinn (1922-2010), historian, author of *A People's History of the United States* (1980), political activist for the civil rights movement and militant against the war in Vietnam.

and which «should be brought into the wider community» (Chomsky: 2012). In his public speech at the Boston Occupy Movement (October 2011) he particularly emphasizes the relevance and the revolutionary potential of the movement in terms of creating associating structures, «cooperative communities» (Chomsky: 2011). In doing so he directly relates to the ideals expressed, for example, in his *Notes on Anarchism* when he opposed the truly anarchic and libertarian spirit to any form of centralism.

To the fake pluralist American political and economic model, Chomsky seems to oppose the truly pluralist component of the Occupy movement (as a new political and social model), just because the latter has been able – in his opinion – to create a network of groups and associations working horizontally rather than vertically, i.e. democratically, giving voice to a variety of ideas, proposals, adopting principles of solidarity and direct participation to public life. Regardless of the progressive marginalization of the Occupy Movement, it is relevant to me to stress Chomsky's interpretation of it: he sees in it an attempt to carry out true democracy. This is particularly clear if we take into account his lecture at Columbia University (December 2013). On that occasion Chomsky defined the idea of *Common Good* (Chomsky: 1998), as the search for finding «social arrangements that are conducive to people's rights and welfare, and to fulfilling their just aspirations» (Chomsky: 2014).

In his opinion, these «social arrangements» can be set up within a truly democratic system which he defines using the words of Rudolf Rocker: «an alliance of free groups of men and women based on cooperative labor and a planned administration of things in the interest of the community». It seems to me that, in part, it is through Rocker's words Chomsky sees the Occupy Movement and relates to it. Chomsky's political thought is based on the trust that a true libertarian, just, democratic society can be established only from the bottom-up. In this sense, we can identify a direct link to the ideals and beliefs professed in his *Notes on Anarchism*. From his critical analysis of the media system as well as from his open support to the Occupy movement, his idea of pluralism (true and fake) and monism (true) takes shape. In my opinion, in his work, true pluralism is where people come together with their ideas, potentials, variety of aspirations and search for a just society, a true democracy and regaining the public sphere in the name of a shared political and social project, whereas monism (true) and pluralism (fake) are where a small group of the privileged concentrate all the power in their hands, to the detriment of the people and therefore democratic principles, imposing their view and interests from top to bottom.

Yet, regardless of the righteousness (or lack thereof) of Chomsky's critical reflection (Collier-Horowitz: 2004), Chomsky seems in fact to outline an American political and economic model in which fake pluralism becomes

functional to the preservation of a power he considers profoundly monist, i.e. vertically based and controlled by a «prosperous few» with the purpose to cut off and neutralize the majority: 1% vs 99% (Chomsky: 2012); in other terms, a profoundly undemocratic system to his eyes.

Fake pluralism becomes – and is depicted by him – as the 'mask' of true monism and true pluralism turns into one of the chief 'antidotes' against the first two. An antidote in favor of what he thinks should be a well-functioning democracy, i.e. a social and political reality based on freedom and solidarity, on people's ability to associate, give voice to their ideas and demands.

Chomsky's political vision – regardless of its objective legitimacy or lack of it – contributes, in my opinion, to showing how problematic and complex finding a univocal, one-sided meaning of pluralism and monism can be. This especially if we address both – as all the authors of the essays here collected have done – in relation to the political thought of single and specific authors who inevitably bring their own intellectual formation, specific historical-political influences and sensitivity into their work. In this context a question arises again: *what monism and what pluralism in the history of political and social models?*

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INDEX

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Saggi e ricerche

Matteo Verda, *Politica estera e sicurezza energetica*
Francesco Poropat, *The Balkan Democratic Puzzle*
Lorenzo Trucco, *Il trust*
Candidate and Leader Selection, *Forza Doria*
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Antonella Seddone e Marco Valbruzzi (a cura di), *Le primarie da vicino*
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Matteo Verda, *Azerbaijan. An introduction to the country*
Carlo Pala e Stefano Rombi, *Fallire per vincere?*
Laura Canale, Paolo Franzosi, et. al, *Contro L'Europa*
Giovanni Nacci, *Open Source Intelligence Abstraction Layer*
Luisa Faldini (a cura di), *Dal Mediterraneo al Baltico*
Lisa Lanzone, *Il MoVimento 5 Stelle*
Gianfranco Pasquino e Marco Valbruzzi, *A Changing Republic*
Valentina Usala (a cura di), *(s)legàmi*
Giulia Sandri e Antonella Seddone (a cura di), *The Primary Game*
Danilo Lazzaro, *Nuove sostanze psicotrope*
Marino De Luca e Stefano Rombi (a cura di), *Selezionare i presidenti*
Federico Fornaro, *Fuga dalle urne*
Andrea Catanzaro e Sara Lagi (a cura di), *Monisms and Pluralisms in the History of Political Thought*
Fabio Sozzi, *Teoria e tecniche della ricerca politica con SPSS*
Gianfranco Pasquino, *No positivo*
Federico Fornaro, *Elettori ed eletti*
Marco Valigi, *Sicurezza ed energia nel Caspio*
Flavio Chiapponi, *Democrazia, populismo, leadership: il MoVimento 5 Stelle*
Olivier Razemon *Il potere dei pedali*
Carlotta Scozzari *Banche in sofferenza*
Jeff Halper *La guerra contro il popolo*