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... And What about the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*'s *paribhāṣātva*? Some hypotheses on the use of *paribhāṣās* in later Advaita Vedānta

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Abstract: This contribution re-analyses some standpoints of the notion of *paribhāṣā* through the looking glass of later Advaita Vedānta. The article is limited to single text, namely Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra's (17th–XVIIIth century) *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*. This text does not present the peculiarities of earlier *paribhāṣās*, hence the title *paribhāṣā* somehow assumes a sense closer to “Elucidation” or “Manual”. Nevertheless, placing *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* within a wider historical and philosophical milieu, an attempt is made to investigate the reasons why Dharmarāja willingly chooses such an evocative title, which is solidly rooted on a technical background. Further, the paper proposes some hypothesis and case-studies concerning Dharmarāja's understanding of *paribhāṣā*.

Keywords: Advaita Vedānta, *paribhāṣā*, Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Navya Nyāya

1 Introduction

In the previous chapters several facets of the concept of *paribhāṣā* have been discussed. I would like to re-analyze some points under the magnifying glass of later Advaita Vedānta. I shall limit my analysis to a single text, namely the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, attempting to insert it within the cultural and textual milieu in which it was written. The *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* does not present the same peculiarities as those of earlier *paribhāṣās*, hence the title *paribhāṣā* somehow comes closer to assuming the guise of an “Elucidation” or “Manual” (see Freschi). Nevertheless, we should try to investigate why the author wittingly chooses such an evocative title, which has a solid technical background.

There are several questions which require an answer: is the term *paribhāṣā* used rigidly to indicate an interpretative rule, a meta-rule or limitative rule, or

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could its purport be extended to other contexts? How do the generally accepted definitions and functions of *paribhāṣā* apply to the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*? On what kind of structural and conceptual foundations is it based? How does the title *paribhāṣā* apply to it? Does the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* present a single level of interpretation of the term *paribhāṣā* or does it represent a confluence of several meanings of that term?

In the following pages I shall introduce and contextualize the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, so as to suggest some hypotheses concerning the use of the term *paribhāṣā* as a title often applied to particular kinds of primers. I suspect that the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* presents and develops many of the meanings of the term *paribhāṣā* that come from other disciplines, adapting them to the historical and philosophical specificity of early modern Advaita Vedānta.

In order to provide some answers, I shall *in primis* place the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*'s author – Dharmarāja Adhvarin – in a precise geographical area and in a specific historical period. This is useful in order to present the cultural landscape of the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* on a broader scale. In fact, the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* should be situated within a definite textual milieu, not only in the Advaita tradition, but more broadly within the textual panorama of the numerous analogous primers written when the school of New Logic was spreading throughout India. In order to fully understand the real extent of the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*'s influence, I believe it is essential to indicate briefly the texts to which it is indebted as well as those with which it is in contrast. Only once the framework in which the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* developed has been determined, will I be able to fully penetrate and communicate its *paribhāṣā*-nature (*paribhāṣātva*), with the merging of the multiple semantic nuances of the term developed by other disciplines across the centuries. Then, in order to show concretely the multiple level of the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā*'s *paribhāṣātva*, I shall present some case studies selected from throughout the text. I am convinced that what we see in the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* is a re-semanticization of a (primarily grammatical) technical term which, due to the lack (until later in time) of a formal definition of the word *paribhāṣā* and to its multiple functions as well, conforms to the specific context and discipline in which it is newly displayed, thus assuming therein a definite shape.

2 Dharmarāja Adhvarīndra

In the Kevalādvaita Vedānta milieu the *paribhāṣā* label was applied only to the *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* (hereafter VP), a very late text written by Dharmarāja

Adhvarin o Adhvarīndra (hereafter DR), who lived between the second half of the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries.

In the VP, DR first salutes his master's master Nṛsiṃha (Nṛsiṃhāśrama, sixteenth century)¹ as well as his *guru* Veṅkaṭanātha,² both of whom lived in Tamilnāḍu.³ In the verses that follow DR informs readers of his textual production: he is the author of the *Tarkacūḍamaṇi*, a gloss on Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*⁴ and also of the *Nyāyaratna*, a commentary on Śāśadhāra's *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* (twelfth century).⁵ Both these specifications highlight DR's great familiarity with Navya Nyāya. He is also the author of the *Padayojanikā* commentary on Padmapāda's *Pañcapādikā* (ninth century), and with this remark he hints at his own philosophical stance within Advaita Vedānta.⁶ The last verse

1 For some information on Nṛsiṃhāśrama, see Sastri-Sastri (1959: 47–48). Nṛsiṃhāśrama wrote several works on Advaita philosophy: the *Advaitadīpikā*, the *Tattvaviveka*, the *Tattvavivekadīpana*, the *Bhedadikkāra*, etc. Among his most influential pupils are Nārāyaṇa Āśrama, Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa, Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita and Veṅkaṭanātha, DR's teacher.

2 From the scarce information we have, it seems that at least two Advaitins called Veṅkaṭanātha lived during the same period. The Veṅkaṭanātha who was DR's teacher remains almost unknown. As for the other Veṅkaṭanātha, we know that he wrote a sub-commentary on the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, namely the *Brahmānandagīri*, and one on the *Bhagavadgītā*. In the *Gītā*'s gloss he criticizes Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Guḍhārthadīpikā*. We can probably consider this Veṅkaṭanātha nearly Madhusūdana's older contemporary (Sitamahalakshmi 2003: 276–280).

3 VP (2000: 1): *yadantevāsipañcāsyair nirastā bhedavāraṇāḥ | taṃ praṇaumi nṛsiṃhākhyam yatindraṃ paramaṃ gurum || 2 || śrīmadveṅkaṭanāthākhyān velāṅguḍinivāsinaḥ | jagadgurūn ahaṃ vande sarvatantrapravartakān || 3 ||* “I bow down to him, called Nṛsiṃha, lord of wandering ascetics, the great master, whose pupils like lions have conquered the elephants of difference (2). I revere the master of the universe, called the glorious Veṅkaṭanātha, who resides at Velāṅguḍi, the promulgator of all disciplines (3)”.

4 VP (2000: 1): *yena cintāmaṇau ṭikā daśaṭikāvibhaṅginī | tarkacūḍmaṇir nāma vidvanmanoramā || 4 ||* “He who has compiled a gloss on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, named the *Tarkacūḍamaṇi*, which annihilates ten [earlier] glosses, fascinating for the learned”. Notwithstanding these words, the *Tarkacūḍamaṇi* is more precisely a commentary on Rucidatta Miśra's *Prakāśa* (mid-fifteenth century), a commentary on the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

5 The Śāśadhāra's *Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* is an important precursor of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Śāśadhāra acts as a connecting author between Udayana (eleventh century), the supposed initiator of Navya Nyāya, and Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya (thirteenth–fourteenth century), Navya Nyāya organizer (Matilal 1977: 102–103).

6 Padmapāda is the silent initiator of the “theory of reflection” (*pratibimbavāda*). After Prakāśātman Yati's *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* (eleventh–twelfth century), the school was named *vivarāṇaprasthāna*. The VP says (Mādhavananda 1997: 3; Sastri 1971: 2): *ṭikā śāśadharasyāpi bālavrutpattidāyini | padayojanayā pañcapādikā vyākṛtā tathā || 5 ||* “moreover [he has written] a gloss on Śāśadhāra, which warrants the understanding of beginners, and has also commented upon the *Pañcapādikā* with the *Padayojanā*.” This verse is absent from the VP (2000), VP/AD (1984) and VP (1983).

displays VP's subsidiary purpose (*avantāra prayojana*): to introduce and instruct in Advaita doctrine those who are ignorant or slow-witted (*manda*).⁷ All these elements are useful in sketching some important features connected with VP's peculiar *paribhāṣā*.

3 Towards the *paribhāṣā*-framework of the VP

3.1 Other *paribhāṣā*-treatises

During the philosophical history of pre-modern India there are some texts written by the Advaitins' opponents which are stylistically connected with the VP and seem to debate with it and pursue similar objectives. All of them are somehow related to a peculiar re-semanticization of the word *paribhāṣā* (or *bhāṣā*) which occurred during those centuries. We can attempt to trace a relative chronology of these works.

It is likely that DR was socially close to the author of the *Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā* (hereafter MP), Kṛṣṇa Yajvan (or Dikṣita), as both were members of the Yajvan family based in Tamil Nadu. But we know very little about Kṛṣṇa Yajvan⁸: some scholars believe he lived between 1700 and 1760⁹ and therefore situate the *Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā* slightly later than the VP. The *Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā* represents the only explicit *paribhāṣā*-text within Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, exactly like the VP within Advaita Vedānta.¹⁰

Geographically close to the VP is Śivāgrayogin's *Śaivaparibhāṣā* (hereafter ŚP), which could also be considered a possible source or textual model for the VP (as for the *Yatīndramata-dīpikā* as well),¹¹ but while DR makes extensive use

7 VP (2000: 15): *tena bodhāya mandānām vedāntārthāvalambinī | dharmarājādharvāndreṇa paribhāṣā vitanyate || 5(6) ||* “For the comprehension of the slow-witted [students] that Dharmarājādharvāndra has composed the ‘Elucidation’ grounded on the meaning of Vedānta [= Upaniṣads]”.

8 Mādhavānanda 1987: xii; Bhattacharya 1998: 16.

9 Śāstrī 1992: 187–188.

10 Regarding Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, more than the *Mīmāṃsā Paribhāṣā*, I believe Laugākṣi Bhāskara's *Arthasaṃgraha* (sixteenth–seventeenth century) and, even more thoroughly Āpadeva's *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* (mid-seventeenth century) to be closer to the VP in terms of language, style, purposes and readers.

11 In the preface of the Madras edition and translation of the ŚP, Balasubramanian writes (1982: iii): “The *Śaiva-paribhāṣā*, which is a valuable manual on Śaiva Siddhānta, is comparable to Dharmarāja's *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* of the Advaita school and Śrīnivāsa's *Yatīndramata-dīpikā* of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school.” (Soni 1989: 53–54 n. 102).

of the New Logic techniques, Śivāgrayogin does not. Śivāgrayogin (sixteenth century) wrote the ŚP as a synthetic compendium of all doctrines and concepts of Śaiva Siddhānta.¹² It is divided into five sections (*pariccheda*): the first is dedicated to epistemology¹³ while the other four touch on ontological and cosmological matters.

Viśiṣṭādvaita's reply to the VP is Śrīnivāsa Dāsa's *Yatīndramatadīpikā* (hereafter YMD), which is called by the author himself the *Śārīrakaparibhāṣā*. Śrīnivāsa Dāsa's father, Svāmī Puṣkariṇī Govindācārya, lived in Tirupati and was a pupil of Mahācārya. According to Ādidevānanda, Mahācārya was a friend of Appaya Dikṣita (1520–1592).¹⁴ Mahācārya lived in the second half of the sixteenth century and consequently, Śrīnivāsa Dāsa can be situated between the late seventeenth and the beginning of the eighteenth century, thus a contemporary of DR, who lived in the same land. The YMD should be considered to be slightly later than the VP, because Śrīnivāsa is aware of the VP and quotes it in fact in a *pūrvapakṣa*.¹⁵ The YMD is divided into nine “descents” (*avatāra*): the first three deal with Viśiṣṭādvaita epistemology, while the other six are dedicated to ontology.

I have mentioned that DR also demonstrated a remarkable knowledge of Nyāya. At this point, a work worth mentioning is Keśava Miśra's (between the twelfth and thirteenth centuries) *Tarkabhāṣā*. A striking feature is that several manuscripts of Keśava Miśra's work report in the beginning as well as in the colophons: *Tarkaparibhāṣā*.¹⁶ Therefore, bearing in mind this successful title and also the period when Keśava Miśra lived, it seems possible to recognize a certain kind of influence of the *Tarkabhāṣā*-model on the title and choices of DR.¹⁷

12 Soni 1989: 39.

13 In the ŚP the terminology, the problems analyzed and the definitions proposed are closer to Prācīna Nyāya than to Navya Nyāya. For example, the structure follows the scheme of 16 categories (*padārtha*) of the early Nyāya and on several other issues – *pseudo-probans* (*hetvābhāsa*) etc. – utilizes that same lexicon. Moreover, it can easily be seen that ŚP's style is close to *Tarkabhāṣā*'s.

14 Ādidevānanda 1949: xxviii–xxx.

15 In a *pūrvapakṣa* the YMD (Ādidevānanda 1949: xxix n. 3, 19–20) seems to quote two passages from the VP (2000: 61–62, 102–103): the first is placed at the opening of the chapter on direct perception (YMD 1949: 19) while the second concerns the inclusion of certain kinds of verbal knowledge within the scope of the knowledge born out of direct perception (YMD 1949: 19–20).

16 Bhandarkar 1979: xix–xvi; Kunjuni-Raja 1974: 116–117.

17 Like the ŚP, Keśava Miśra's *Tarkabhāṣā*, too, was written in a period of transition from the old to the new Nyāya. For example, it preserves the sixteen categories of the old Nyāya. This text has at least two namesakes: a predecessor from the Buddhist milieu, namely Mokṣākara Gupta's *Tarkabhāṣā* (or the *Bauddhatarkabhāṣā*, between 1050–1202, Kajiyama 1988: 1) and a successor among the Jainas, namely Yašovijaya Gaṇi's *Tarkabhāṣā* (or the *Jainatarkabhāṣā*, seventeenth century).

During a decidedly Navya Nyāya period, Viśvanātha Pañcānana Bhaṭṭācārya wrote the *Bhāṣāpariccheda/Kārikāvalī*. This text describes synthetically the seven categories (*padārtha*) of Navya Nyāya and is accompanied by the *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* (hereafter NSM), a considerably more extensive self-commentary.¹⁸ Viśvanātha lived in the first half of the seventeenth century (1630)¹⁹ and was quite probably an older contemporary of DR. The complex *Bhāṣāpariccheda-Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* soon became one of the more studied introductory textbooks on Navya Nyāya. It could therefore be assumed that DR knew it or might have been at least specifically acquainted with that type of textual production if not with the NSM itself. In fact, although not so much so as to identify a clear indebtedness, the VP often seems to reply to some critics of Advaita included in the NSM.²⁰

It is obvious that the VP is much more closely related to the above-mentioned texts than to the earlier *śrauta* or *vaiyākaraṇa paribhāṣās*' formulations. In fact, the VP is temporally very distant from those formalizations, and its purpose is basically pedagogical and descriptive. However, I shall suggest some points for reflection and discuss them accordingly.

3.2 Earlier Advaita textual-models of the VP

It should be pointed out that in 1942, S.N. Dasgupta claimed that the VP was just a simple manual of Vivaraṇa inspiration, greatly indebted to Rāmādvaya's *Vedānta Kaumudī* (fourteenth century).²¹ Apart from Rāmādvaya's text, I personally think that DR was somehow ideally influenced by the concept underlying another Advaita text: Prakāśātman Yati's *Śārīrakanyāyaśaṃgraha*. Adopting the Vivaraṇa perspective, in the *Śārīrakanyāyaśaṃgraha* Prakāśātman synthetically explains the entire *Brahmasūtra* (hereafter BS), dividing it into sections and subject-matters

18 In the second opening stanza Viśvanātha states that he wrote the NSM more analytically than the *Bhāṣāpariccheda*, overwhelmed by compassion for Rājīva, a slow-witted pupil (NSM 1988: 7). In addition, it must be pointed out that according to some scholars the *Bhāṣāpariccheda/Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* was not written by Viśvanātha but by Kṛṣṇadāsa Sārvabhauma (mid sixteenth century). See Bhattacharya (1941: 241–244) and Ganeri (2011: 76, 79–81, 85). This would reverse the indebtedness: the VP would be indebted to the *Bhāṣāpariccheda/Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*.

19 Matilal 1977: 110.

20 K. Potter (1988: 92) maintains that the VP is very similar to the *Tarkasaṃgraha* (TrS). On the contrary, I believe that the distance between the TrS and the VP is significant; hence I would suggest considering the NSM or the *Tarkasaṃgrahadīpikā* as the Naiyāyika counterparts of the VP.

21 Dasgupta 1997: iii. For some additional information on the alleged indebtedness of the VP to the *Vedānta Kaumudī*, see Pellegrini 2016a.

(*adhikaraṇa*). Even though the structure of the VP is quite different from that of the *Śārīrakanyāyasaṃgraha*, nonetheless the basic intent of both texts appears similar. In fact, the effort made to collect BS's teachings and arrange them in a simpler and more organized manner – obviously according to the *Vivaraṇa* point of view – nearly recalls the opening declaration of late *paribhāṣā*-texts.²² In addition to Prakāśātman's *Śārīrakanyāyasaṃgraha*, we have another text that could also be possible connection between an earlier generation of Advaita proto-*paribhāṣās* and their later textual instances. This is the *Vaiyāsikanyāyamālā*, a work attributed alternatively to Bhārati Tirtha, to Mādhavācārya or to Vidyāraṇya (all belonging to the fourteenth century). The text is a *Vivaraṇa*-oriented metrical compendium focusing entirely on the interpretative rules (*nyāya*) presented in the BS and the BSBh, strictly following their internal subdivisions. The *Vaiyāsikanyāyamālā* was preceded by a twin compendium dealing with the *nyāyas* in Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, composed by Mādhavācārya, namely the *Jaiminīyanyāyamālā*. The text, closely adherent to Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, was glossed by Mādhavācārya himself, with the *Jaiminīyanyāyamālāvīstara*. However, later on I will briefly return to *nyāyas* or *laukikanyāyas* as interpretative rules, analogies or maxims based on situations and examples taken from daily life (see Chierichetti, Candotti-Pontillo and Freschi, this volume).

To return to our principal subject, from the last opening verse of the VP we become aware of its intent: to teach Advaita Vedānta to those who are slow-witted or never had any connection with Advaita. Although this remark seems negligible, it conceals a pivotal historical as well as philosophical point.

4 Historical and philosophical context

4.1 Pre-modern philosophical India

Before entering into this subject matter, I shall focus briefly on DR's historical-philosophical period.²³

²² *Mutatis mutandis*, the purpose of this text somehow reminds me of Maṇḍana Miśra's *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇikā* and Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāyasūcinibandha*. In addition, let me mention that, as rightly pointed out by Parimal Patil (2013: 95–98), the manualistic tendency most likely began within the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, from Vācaspati on, through Jayantabhaṭṭa, Bhāsarvajña, and Udayana's "ground breaking" treatises, becoming then, in the pre-modern period, a *must* for several authors.

²³ For a more in-depth description, see Bronkhorst-Diaconescu-Kulkarni 2013, Ganeri 2011 and Pellegrini 2015: 279–282.

The Dvaita Vedānta school is of paramount importance for the philosophical development of the period included between the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Madhvācārya (1238–1317) systematizes it and focuses his attention primarily on a contemporary critic of Advaita.²⁴ Following Madhva, the Dvaita school includes two other great philosophers, namely Jaya Tirtha²⁵ and his principal pupil Vyāsa Tirtha.²⁶ The significant development of the *vaiṣṇava*-Vedānta is due to the fact that they were the first to adopt the style and methodology of the new-born *navya* logic.

It is a fact that between the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century, in the Mithilā region a new extremely rigorous philosophical style, based on the merging together of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, was standardized. This tendency, named Navya Nyāya (“New Logic”), developed an ultra-technical meta-language, which in the course of two centuries became the common idiom not only for philosophical treatises but also for grammatical, poetical and legal ones. Although this stylistic transformation is already traceable in Udayana (eleventh century), the standardization became evident with Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya’s (1325) *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.²⁷ In order to provide common grounds for discussion, the adoption of this new linguistic technology soon became the necessary requirement for all debaters at least until the eighteenth century.

From a recent article, it emerges that in its earlier phase of formation – from Gaṅgeśa to Pakṣadhara (*alias* Jayadeva Miśra, late fifteenth century) – Navya Nyāya was jealously kept within Mithilā’s borders, where the local *paṇḍitas* prevented any manuscripts from leaving the city.²⁸ Nevertheless, it later spread throughout India, following perhaps two main channels: the school founded at Navadvīpa by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi (fifteenth century) and the Hindū kingdom of Vijayanagara. Vyāsa Tirtha was the royal preceptor of the Tuḷuva dynasty (1505–1570). During that period he wrote his *magnum opus*, the *Nyāyāmṛta*, in a very sophisticated *navya* style, signalling an already advanced degree of assimilation of that style by the Dvaita Vedānta school.²⁹

During a slightly later period, its real shining *star* rose in the Advaita firmament – Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, probably a much older contemporary of DR.

24 Sharma 1981: 77–79.

25 For Jaya Tirtha’s date, works and philosophical positions, see B.N.K. Sharma (1981: 245).

26 For Vyāsa Tirtha or Vyāsa Rāya, see Sharma (1981: 286) and Pellegrini (2015: 280–281).

27 Matilal 1977: 105.

28 Bronkhorst-Diaconescu-Kulkarni 2013: 73–75.

29 It is not clear how Vyāsa Tirtha became proficient in Navya Nyāya, at that time unknown in South-India. According to Bronkhorst-Diaconescu-Kulkarni (2013: 78–79, see also Sharma 1981: 291–296) Vyāsa Tirtha might have been taught by Pakṣadhara Miśra, the teacher of Rucidatta Miśra, commented upon by DR.

Meanwhile, Appaya's *Siddhāntaleśasamgraha* (a kind of totally Advaita philosophical doxography) inaugurated a new season of harmony within Advaita Vedānta: an internal tendency to overcome old differences and barriers. This kind of synthesis is visible mainly in the continuous effort to find some points of contact between Advaita's two most important rival positions: the *vivaraṇaprassthāna* and the *bhāmatiprassthāna*. Even while remaining faithful to their views, authors of this period looked at other schools with a less deconstructive attitude, seeking to harmonize previous doctrines with new developments based on the adoption of the *navya* style adapted to Advaita tenets. All these elements favored fresh hermeneutical interpretations, opening new philosophical developments and clearing the way for what we can reasonably call Navya Vedānta.

DR's VP is a typical textual example, gathering within itself all the inspirations of such a lively cultural period because it is written at the apex of the use of *navya* style in other *śāstras*.

Hence, going back to the final opening stanza of the VP, its readers are a specific category of Vedānta beginners (*manda*) who have already acquired a significant background in disciplines like Navya Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā *in primis*: these are *mandas* of their own time.³⁰ The stanza implicitly announces that whoever should study and understand the VP would develop an enviable introductory insight into the whole Advaita *darśana*, which might allow him to easily catch any hints and references to the earlier textual heritage.³¹ It should be borne in mind that even today, the VP is studied in the traditional brāhmaṇical *cursus studiorum* to introduce pupils already advanced in other disciplines to Advaita epistemology. This is due to the peculiar structure and language of the VP, remarkably precise and capable of endowing the pupils with all those tools needed to read more advanced texts. This might be one of the reasons for placing the VP as a type of *paribhāṣā* text within such a late context.

30 In this case the word *manda* corresponds to the term *bāla* “child, kid, little boy”, utilized in other pre-modern texts. Reading it with Candrajasiṃha's *Padakṛtya* to the TrS (2007: 2): *bāleti atrā 'dhītavyākaraṇakāvyaakoṣā 'nadhītanīyāśāstro bālah* “*bāla*: here, child is someone who has already studied grammar, poetry, lexicons, but has not studied the discipline of logic”. There are also the words of the initial and final *maṅgalacaraṇa* of Varadarāja's *Laghusiddhāntakaumudī* (sixteenth–seventeenth century, hereafter LSK 2001: 1), respectively *pāṇinīyapraveśāya* “for introducing to Pāṇini's [grammatical] school” and (LSK 2001: 480) *śāstrāntare praviṣṭānām bālānām copakārikā | kṛtā varadarājena laghusiddhāntakaumudī ||* “Varadarāja has composed the ‘Lunar ray of the shortened doctrine’, which is beneficial for the beginners already introduced to other disciplines.”

31 See the first lines of Vyādi's *paribhāṣā* text: *atra hi jñātaparibhāṣaḥ svayaṃ śāstram pratipādayituṃ samartho bhavati | sa tāvat sukhaṃ jñātaparibhāṣo bhavati* (Wujastyk vol. 1 1993: 1) “Because he who has got to know the *paribhāṣās* becomes capable of teaching the discipline himself. Indeed, he gets to know the *paribhāṣās* easily.” (Wujastyk vol. 2 1993: 1).

4.2 The VP within Advaita Vedānta

Now, that the VP has been placed within a wider historical perspective, it should also be situated specifically within the Advaita tradition.

Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* (hereafter BS and BSBh) was glossed several times. Out of these, three principal theories crystallized across the centuries: the “appearance theory” (*ābhāsavāda*) of Sureśvara (eighth century), the school of the “limitation theory” (*avacchedavāda*) initiated by Vācaspati Miśra's *Bhāmātī* (ninth century) and the school of the “reflection theory” (*pratibimbavāda*) derived from Prakāśātman Yati's *Vivaraṇa* (eleventh–twelfth century). Roughly, following the twelfth century, Sureśvara's *ābhāsavāda* completely merged into the *pratibimbavāda*, limiting the Advaitins' internal contrast to two schools: the *vivaraṇaprasthāna* and the *bhāmātīprasthāna*.³²

By the time of DR, internal divisions had become attenuated and had moved towards harmonization. Notwithstanding this tendency, the substantial differences remained unaltered. Although DR incarnates the synthetic spirit of the epoch, he definitely is a *vivaraṇa* author, even if he does not refrain from expressing his own convictions.

Hereafter I propose two tables.³³ The first highlights a few differences between the *vivaraṇaprasthāna* and the *bhāmātīprasthāna*:

vivaraṇaprasthāna	bhāmātīprasthāna
The reflection on <i>brahman</i> (<i>brahmicāra</i>) is due to the listening-injunction (<i>śravaṇavidhi</i>). ³⁴	The reflection on <i>brahman</i> is due to the study-injunction (<i>adhyayanavidhi</i>). ³⁵
The execution of the act enjoined by the Veda is done to reach knowledge (<i>vidyā</i>).	The execution of the act enjoined by the Veda is done to reach desire of knowledge (<i>vividīṣā</i>).
Mind is not a sensorial faculty.	Mind is the sixth sensorial faculty.

(continued)

³² Pellegrini 2015: 298.

³³ See the introduction to the edition and Hindī translation of the VP (1984: 37–38) by Gajānana Śāstrī Musalagāṃkara as well as the scheme proposed by Bina Gupta (1995: 102–103).

³⁴ The reference concerns the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (2.4.5, 2.5.6): *ātmā vā re draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nidhidhyāsitavyaḥ*. For the *Vivaraṇa* school this is a restrictive injunction (*niyamavidhi*).

³⁵ The reference is to the Vedic passage: *svādhyāyo 'dhyetavyaḥ* (*Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa* 11.5.7.2 and *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* 2.15).

(continued)

vivaraṇaprasthāna	bhāmatīprasthāna
In the process consisting of listening (<i>śravaṇa</i>), reflection (<i>manana</i>) and meditation (<i>nididhyāsana</i>), listening is the primary object of the injunction (<i>vidheya</i>), while reflection and meditation are subsidiary (<i>aṅga</i>).	In the process consisting of listening, reflection and meditation, listening is not the primary object of the injunction but, with reflection, is subsidiary to meditation.
The individual self is the reflection (<i>pratibimba</i>) of consciousness (<i>caitanya</i>).	The individual self is consciousness limited by the internal organ (<i>antaḥkaraṇācaccinna</i>).
Pure consciousness (<i>śuddhacaitanya</i>) is the <i>locus</i> of ignorance (<i>ajñānāśrayatā</i>).	The individual self is the <i>locus</i> of ignorance.
Ignorance is one.	Ignorance is multiple.
The content of the last mental modification (<i>caramavṛttiviśaya</i>) is unconditioned <i>brahman</i> .	The content of the last mental modification is conditioned (<i>upahita</i>) <i>brahman</i> .
The purpose (<i>prayojana</i>) of the study-injunction is to understand single syllables and words (<i>akṣaragrahaṇa</i>) which compose it.	The purpose (<i>prayojana</i>) of the study-injunction is to understand the entire meaning (<i>arthajñāna</i>) of the sentence.
The objects derived out of gross elements (<i>bhautika</i>) are produced through the process of “quintuplication” (<i>pañcīkaraṇa</i>). ³⁶	The objects derived out of gross elements are produced through the process of “triplication” (<i>trivṛtkaraṇa</i>). ³⁷
Similarity (<i>sādṛśya</i>) is not considered among the causes of the superimposition (<i>adhyāsa</i>).	Similarity is considered among the causes of the superimposition.
Verbal testimony (<i>śabda</i>) bestows immediate knowledge (<i>aparokṣa</i>).	Verbal testimony bestows mediate knowledge (<i>parokṣa</i>).
Oneiric manifestations (<i>svāpnaprapañca</i>) are modifications (<i>pariṇāma</i>) of ignorance.	Oneiric manifestations are modifications of the internal organ.

The second table concerns the philosophical divergences between the *vivaraṇaprasthāna* and DR:

³⁶ For a brief survey on the well-known doctrine of the *pañcīkaraṇa* see the VP (2000: 382–395), the VS (Sadānanda 2004: 6–7) and Śaṅkara’s BSBh *ad* 2.4.22.

³⁷ The triplication process (*trivṛtkaraṇa*) is analogous to the *pañcīkaraṇa* and literarily concerns the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.3.3. The unique difference between these two processes lies in the exclusion of ether (*ākāśa*) and air (*vāyu*) in the *trivṛtkaraṇa*. See the VP (2000: 382–395), the BSBh *ad* 2.4.30, the VS (Sadānanda 2004: 4–7) and the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.1.1.

vivaraṇaprasthāna	dharmarājamata
Valid knowledge is a cognition whose content has not been previously cognized and not subsequently sublated (<i>abādhita</i>).	Valid knowledge (<i>pramā</i>) is a cognition whose content has not been previously cognized (<i>anadhigata</i>).
Recollection (<i>smṛti</i>) in not valid knowledge.	Recollection is valid knowledge.
Individual self is consciousness reflected on ignorance (<i>ajñānapratibimbitacaitanya</i>).	Individual self is consciousness limited by the internal organ (<i>antaḥkaraṇāvachchinnacaitanya</i>). ³⁸
The internal organ has two functions/ modalities: <i>buddhi</i> and <i>manas</i> .	The internal organ has four functions/ modalities: <i>buddhi ahaṃkāra</i> , <i>manas</i> and <i>citta</i> .
Similarity (<i>sādṛśya</i>) is not considered among the causes of superimposition (<i>adhyāsa</i>).	Similarity is considered among the causes of superimposition. ³⁹
The existence and persistence of illusory superimpositions is an effect of radical ignorance (<i>mūlājñāna</i>).	The existence and persistence of illusory superimpositions is an effect of derivative/ relative ignorance (<i>tūlājñāna</i>). ⁴⁰
In the superimposition of the red colour of the china rose on the crystal, that red ⁴¹ is illusory (<i>prātibhāsika</i>) and undeterminable (<i>anirvacanīya</i>).	In the superimposition of the red colour of the china rose on the crystal, that red is empirically real (<i>satya</i>).
The knowledge of invariable concomitance (<i>vyāptijñāna</i>) is not a cause (<i>kāraṇa/hetu</i>) of the inferential knowledge (<i>anumiti</i>).	The knowledge of invariable concomitance is a cause of the inferential knowledge.
The knowledge of the speaker's intention (<i>tātparyajñāna</i>) is not counted among the causes of verbal knowledge.	The knowledge of the speaker's intention is one among the causes of verbal knowledge.
Cognition of absence (<i>abhāvajñāna</i>) does not have the nature of direct perception (<i>pratyakṣatā</i>).	Cognition of absence has the nature of direct perception.

³⁸ On this issue DR follows Vācaspati. See the VP (2000: 62, 114).

³⁹ Again DR, even though he also accepts the position of *vivaraṇa*, follows the *bhāmatīprasthāna* (VP 2000: 150–152).

⁴⁰ The *avacchedavāda* subdivides ignorance into two categories: the primordial radical ignorance (*mūlājñāna*) related to *brahman* itself, and the derivate or relative ignorance (*tūlājñāna*) connected to each cognitive error and to any effects of radical ignorance. The word *tūla* indicates the hull and the fruit of the cotton plant, which conveys the idea of subordination of *tūlājñāna* to *mūlājñāna*.

⁴¹ The reference is to the well-known example of the transparent (*svaccha*) crystal gem (*sphaṭikamaṇi*) placed in front of a red china rose (*japākusuma*). Due to this proximity the qualities of one – namely the redness (*lauhitya*) of the flower – are wrongly superimposed (*adhyasta*) on the other, the transparency of the crystal.

5 What is the nature of VP's *paribhāṣātva*?

Analyzing pre-modern Advaita philosophical production and specifically, Madhusūdana's works, some recurrences can be noted. For example, wherever Madhusūdana quotes *sūtras* from the MS or the BS, he often closes them with *iti nyāyāt, iti nyāyasiddhaḥ* or similar expressions.⁴² Conversely, in many chapters of the *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* (hereafter GAD) gloss on the *Bhagavadgītā* (hereafter BG), Madhusūdana himself discusses problems related to the *Yogasūtra* and the (so-called) *Vyāsabhāṣya* extensively, quoting from them profusely. On that occasion, while reproducing *verbatim* several aphorisms he never uses the word *nyāya* or its derivatives.⁴³

Another interesting specificity or better, tendency (but not an invariable rule!⁴⁴), is that those *sūtras* quoted with an *iti nyāyaḥ* closure often present the typical argumentative and nominalized śāstric construction: the grammatical subject in the genitive and the property attributed to it usually expressed by an abstract term in the ablative of cause (*hetupañcamī*) and sometimes in the instrumental case (*hetuṭṭriyā*). This kind of synthetic expression has a systematizing function typical of late *nyāyas* and *paribhāṣās*. These considerations are supported by Staal, according to whom the problem concerns the *bhāṣya*-style with its peculiar argumentative expression, which substitutes earlier meta-linguistic formulations with nominalized sentences expressed through abstract words in the ablative case (*-tvāt/-tāyāḥ*).⁴⁵ This is also witnessed by the use and purport of a few of Pāṇini's aphorisms (A 1.2.53–57, which are nevertheless of uncertain attribution).⁴⁶ Staal remarks:

⁴² See specifically Madhusūdana's GAD *ad* BG 3.33–35 (2005: 198, 201), 4.5–6 (2005: 215–219), 4.11 (2005: 223), 4.18–19 (2005: 229–231), 4.27 (2005: 241), 4.33 (2005: 252), 4.37 (2005: 255), etc. Even so, the entire 3rd, 4th and 6th chapters of the GAD *ad* BG present several instances of these uses. See also the ŚP (1982: 314).

⁴³ In those contexts, Madhusūdana simply uses expressions like *iti sūtram, sūtritām, sūtrayati, saṃkṣepasūtram ... iti, sūtrayāmāsa*, etc., or *ity āha bhagavān patañjaliḥ, tathā ca bhagavān patañjaliḥ*. Among the many examples are: GAD *ad* BG 4.27–29 and GAD *ad* BG 5.22.

⁴⁴ Because there are also several references to BS's aphorisms quoted with the closure *iti sūtrāt* or other similar ones. One example is GAD *ad* BG 4.37.

⁴⁵ Staal 1975 and 1995: 79–80.

⁴⁶ Staal (1975: 337) affirms that these syntactical constructions are very frequent in *bhāṣya* literature after Patañjali. He refers to Paranjape's book published in Paris "*Le Vārtika de Kātyāyana. Une étude du style, du vocabolaire et des postulats philosophiques*" (1922: 55, which I was unable to consult, see References in Candotti-Pontillo, this volume). In addition, Staal (1975: 337) also quotes an article by Thieme (1931) "*Grammatik und Sprache, ein Problem der altindische Sprachwissenschaft*", *Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik*, n. 8 (pp. 23–32) which analyzes the same phenomenon in *Prātiśākhya*s (specifically the *Vājasaneyi Prātiśākhya* 1.1–5).

Since all quoted forms function as nouns, quotations can easily be replaced by nominalized forms which are nouns... The replacement of quotations by nominalization is a distinguishing mark of later scholarly Sanskrit (BSBh 1.1.2). Thus, the metalinguistic features of the earlier phases of Indian culture are finally incorporated in the nominalized expressions which characterize Indian thought in its later developments. These expressions constitute a rich language which is to some extent artificial and may even be described as partly formalized.⁴⁷

These statements recall Prakāśātman's *Śārīrakanyāyasaṃgraha* mentioned above, which I have considered to be the hypothetical antecedent of the VP.

5.1 Connecting the VP with earlier *paribhāṣās*

At this point it should be repeated that the structure and expressive models of the VP are, however, quite distant from Śrautasūtras and grammatical texts. Nevertheless, it may be possible to identify a subtle connecting-thread. I believe in fact that there is a two-way relationship: on one hand, between Śrautasūtra, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and *vyākaraṇa*, while on the other, between *vyākaraṇa*, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta. Furthermore, as pointed out by Pelissero (see *supra*), an interpretative rule has various uses and applications, from the general to the selective and restricted. In order to put the VP in a wider textual perspective, the considerations presented thus far should now be applied to the VP.

In the VP we find discussions which may throw some light on entire sections of Advaita philosophy. A similar intent is evident even in the *Vedāntasāra* (hereafter VS), the *Siddhāntabindu* and several other Advaita *textbooks* meant for the sake of students, which effectively re-use earlier Advaita doctrines in conformity with the peculiar trend of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Non-dualists of that period wrote their treatises by cataloguing variants and tendencies and attempted new explanations within the limits of their philosophical positions.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, the only text within Advaita Vedānta called *paribhāṣā* is DR's. But what are the striking features of its character of being a *paribhāṣā* (*paribhāṣātva*)? It is significant that even today every traditional Vedānta student must study the VP.⁴⁹ This proves that the VP is of transversal

⁴⁷ Staal 1975: 337–338.

⁴⁸ See Minkowski 2011: 212. For example, Appaya Dikṣita writes a fourfold commentary on the BS, collecting different points of view: dualism, qualified non-dualism, Śaivasiddhānta and non-dualism. Although faithful to non-dualism, Madhusūdana too sees *brahman* in Kṛṣṇa's marvelous qualities.

⁴⁹ Today the study of Sadānanda's *Vedāntasāra* is compulsory for brahmanical students. The VS is a systematization similar to the VP, more general and less technical, which highlights however some recurrent issues treated by Advaita texts, but never strictly epistemological ones.

importance not only within the perspective of the Advaitin proponent (*uttarapakṣin*) but also within that of the opponents' schools (*pūrvapakṣin*).

We have seen how concealed within the word *paribhāṣā* is a technical semantic field and a meaning closely related to “definitions” of technical terms and/or “definitions” expressed in technical terms. The Advaitins' oral tradition glosses the word *paribhāṣā* directly simplifying the reading of Jinendrabuddhi's *Nyāsa* (KV *ad* A 2.1.1: *parito vyāpṛtāṃ bhāṣāṃ paribhāṣāṃ pracakṣate*): *parito bhāṣate yā, sā paribhāṣā* “What speaks all-around is a *paribhāṣā*.”⁵⁰ There is as well a third option, already quoted, according to which a *paribhāṣā* “creates a restriction where there is no restriction” (*aniyame niyamakāriṇī*).⁵¹

These derivations (*nirvacana*) generate slightly different orientations. If we look at the first case (= *parito bhāṣā*), it is similar to Patañjali's statement (M *ad* A 1.1.49: *kaścid ekadeśasthaḥ sarvaśāstram abhijvalayati yathā pradīpaḥ sarvaṃ veśmābhijvalayati*, see § Editor's overview),⁵² which illustrates the revealing and indicative function of a *paribhāṣā*. In fact, within the VP a *paribhāṣā* is sometimes used as a clue to recall some longer discussions developed in other texts, which – in the VP – are abbreviated so that the beginners can understand them. The second case, closer to the notion of *pariṣkāra*,⁵³ shows a relationship with definition-devices (*lakṣaṇa*) profusely displayed across the VP as a refined definition (*pariṣkṛtalakṣaṇa*).⁵⁴ The third option presupposes a need for organization and clarity. Accordingly, the word *paribhāṣā* could be intended as “systematization” or “settlement” (*vyavasthā*). In this case its purport seems to me closer to the interpretative role represented by *nyāyas* or *laukikanyāyas*. These are maxims and analogies typical of the Indian cultural milieu, which suggest certain solutions through the observation of empirical-daily life. Even so, the line of demarcation between these elements is extremely feeble.

⁵⁰ See KV, Jayāditya-Vāmana 1985 vol. 1: 71. We could also simplify as: *parito bhāṣā iti paribhāṣā* “an all-round statement is a *paribhāṣā*”. Moreover, playing with the prefix (*upa-sarga*), oral tradition interprets the word as: *pariṣkṛtā bhāṣā, vacanam iti paribhāṣā, pariṣkāra ity arthaḥ* “[it is said] *paribhāṣā* a refined expression, a [perfected] statement”.

⁵¹ Jhalakīkar 1978: 480.

⁵² Since it is roughly identical to M *ad* A 2.1.1 but more synthetic, I only quote the passage of M *ad* A 1.1.49. See Candotti-Pontillo, this volume.

⁵³ See also Chakravarti 1980: 27.

⁵⁴ See Staal 1961: 122–124.

First of all, there is a systematizing meta-rule (considered also a *nyāya*), deriving from Vātsyāyana's commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra* (1.1.3),⁵⁵ which crosses transversally all *śāstras*, i. e. *lakṣaṇapramāṇābhyām hi vastusiddhiḥ* "Through the definition and the means of knowledge there is indeed the establishment of an entity". Several discussions within the VP are clarifications of certain Advaita positions, usually developed out of a definition. In fact, following the rule quoted above, the VP is concerned primarily with definitions (*lakṣaṇa*), their application (*samanvaya*) and the verification of their validity (*lakṣaṇaparīkṣā*).

I agree substantially with Fritz Staal's (1975) hypothesis concerning meta-linguistic formulations of the *bhāṣya* style. More than this, along with definitions *tout court* (which I see as peculiar *paribhāṣās* or formulations leading to *paribhāṣās*) there are all-around meta-rules that assist us in interpreting earlier textual passages. I have therefore identified three reasons for re-semantizing the word *paribhāṣā* and calling *paribhāṣās* texts as late as the VP:

- (1) the VP is an "anthological" handbook with the aim of introducing Advaita to students already well-trained in other disciplines. This kind of systematizing attempt provides several answers and elucidations to questions raised across the centuries.
- (2) The VP's *quid pluris* consists in its adoption and adaptation of *navya* style to the *epistemological* tenets of later Advaita Vedānta.
- (3) The VP incarnates a precise teaching and hermeneutical *iter* pervasive in the Advaita tradition of the pre-modern period and already present in Madhusūdana's works.

I have formulated this hypothesis after examining several texts of pre-modern Advaita. For example, both Madhusūdana and DR, despite some differences, treat and develop analogous issues.⁵⁶

The VP finely collects and connects what was scattered! DR attempts to bring together several doctrines previously spread out over an enormous textual heritage, and to systematize them according to a markedly epistemological taste. In fact, prior to the VP we do not have any well-structured manual on Advaita epistemology. In this sense the entire VP is on one hand a general settlement (*vyavasthā*) and on the other, a specification or, better, a restrictive rule (*niyama*). Also specifically present within the VP is the meaning of the word

⁵⁵ Pellegrini 2011: 442.

⁵⁶ More than others, Madhusūdana's *Siddhāntabindu* and *Vedāntakalpalatikā* happen to be very similar to the VP in terms of style, language, doctrines and target, even though the VP's intent is explicitly pedagogical. See Pellegrini 2015 (297).

paribhāṣā as *lakṣaṇa* and *nyāya*, rendering the VP a general meta-text useful as a hermeneutical key for the entire Advaita *śāstra*.

Karl Potter (1988) analyzes the VP attempting to understand its innovations and utility. He finds them in the VP's "systematic reconstruction" of typical Advaita doctrines: DR's primer is a well-ordered and structured exposition. Potter adds a few remarks about why DR's exposition is organized specifically in terms of definitions (he counts 84) chained together, derived from key-technical "primitive terms". He states:

What makes Dharmarāja's definitions unusual is that they are interconnected with each other so that all of them can be generated from a small base of primitive notions.⁵⁷

In the VP, Potter identifies five characteristics of philosophical exposition, mainly connected with the philosophy of science: internal coherence, sufficient clarity and precision, adherence to the proposed aim – I add as well adherence to historical period and place – accuracy and internal economy.⁵⁸ Potter's analysis corresponds quite closely to those criteria of systematization I identify in the VP: (1) the need to organize opinions scattered throughout Advaita texts; (2) a translation into Navya Nyāya language of Advaita epistemological tenets and their re-elaboration consistent with the historical and philosophical moment.

These criteria of systematization move on various hermeneutical levels and can be seen as basic characteristics of the complex nature of a *paribhāṣā* and/or of a system of *paribhāṣās*. For this reason, *paribhāṣās*, at least as intended in the VP, are synthetic formulas and penetrating interpretative tools useful in re-reading, clarifying and reworking problematic passages, as well as agile meta-linguistic tricks capable of moving beyond their specific textual position in order

⁵⁷ Potter 1988: 92–93.

⁵⁸ Potter 1988: 95. Basing his analysis on Nelson Goodman (quoted in Potter as Goodman, Nelson (1951). *The Structure of Appearance*. Cambridge-Mass.: Harvard University Press), Potter (1988: 94–96) identifies the conception of a philosophical system as a "translation manual or scheme the input into which is a set of ordinary language statements and the output from which consists of translations of some of these together with clarification of the others" (1988: 94). This translation, far from being the rendering of one language in another, indicated a translation of certain concepts from a natural language to a formal, more precise and technical one. Potter himself further clarifies: "Yet the point of the translation is not, of course, to reproduce the deficiencies ... inherent in the sentences to be translated. The translations in the manual must be in a 'clarified' version of the language, one in which both the syntax and the semantics of the translation sentences are carefully controlled so as the best to achieve satisfaction of the criteria mentioned. Goodman argues cogently that what this conception of the philosopher's task suggests is the « construction of a *system of definitions* »." (1988: 96).

to disambiguate, regulate, generalize and systematize a situation wherever the *śāstra* requires it (see Conclusions).

It could be maintained that Madhusūdana's introductory works constitute an initial attempt at systematizing Advaita. Nevertheless, he is more careful of defending Advaita and of disputing the positions of adversaries: Madhusūdana replies rather than presenting. Wherever he presents something, his exposition is not systematized through preparatory steps, taking into account readers' needs. On the contrary, DR adheres to the requirements of Advaitin-beginners. Therefore, apart from his personal positions, there are definitions and systematization useful in the whole *śāstra*, certainly close to *vivaraṇaprasthāna* but also careful of the harmonizing period within Advaita.

6 *Paribhāṣās* in the VP: Some “case studies”

The VP is divided into eight “sections” (*pariccheda*). Following a brief introduction, the first of six epistemological *paricchedas* begins, each dedicated to one of the six means of knowledge accepted by Advaita Vedānta⁵⁹ in accordance with Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā⁶⁰: direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), authoritative testimony (*āgama*), presumption (*arthāpatti*) and non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*). The seventh section, namely the *viśayapariccheda*, is dedicated to Advaita ontology, while the last one – the *prayojanapariccheda* – deals with liberation. The order of presentation of the issues is the same as in the ŚP and the YMD.

Up until the present the VP has been studied rather extensively. In addition to Arthur Venis's translation (1882–1885), Mādhavānanda's (April 1942)⁶¹ and Suryanarayana Sastri's (May 1942),⁶² despite minor difficulties,

⁵⁹ In its early period Advaita Vedānta is reluctant to deal with epistemology *tout court*. However, *pramāṇas* are used in order to better comprehend the nature of both, *ātman* and the entities different from *ātman* (Mayeda 1968–1969: 221–223). It is not clear how many and which means of knowledge were accepted by Śaṅkara. However, we can count three of them: *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *śabda* (Mayeda 1968–1969: 223–224). Prakāśātman habitually refers to four *pramāṇas*: *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *arthāpatti* and *śabda* (Dasgupta 1991: 105–106), even though we also find references to *anupalabdhi*. Madhusūdana and then DR clearly indicate six *pramāṇas*.

⁶⁰ In oral teaching there is a well-known maxim traditionally attributed to Citsukha *vyavahāre tu bhāṭṭanayaḥ*. In the Advaita system whatever concerns empirical existence – including epistemological issues – is treated according to the Kumārila Bhāṭṭa's view of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā.

⁶¹ See Madhavananda 1997.

⁶² See Sastri 1971.

are quite useful. Furthermore, three other texts analyze three different sections: Bina Gupta (1995) works on the *pratyakṣapariṣheda*, Fernand Brunner (1987)⁶³ on the *anumānapariṣheda* and Purushottama Bilimoria (2008) on the *āgamapariṣheda*. Two monographs follow *in toto* the argumentative structure of the VP: Datta (1997) very closely and Satprakashananda (2001) more generally. A great deal of information is scattered throughout secondary sources, and we find several editions and translations into various Indian vernacular languages. Nonetheless, apart from Potter's article (1988), to date no other scholar has investigated why DR calls his work *paribhāṣā*.

Mention should be made of a contemporary Sanskrit text: Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī's *Viśuddhavedāntaparibhāṣā*.⁶⁴ This booklet is strictly based on Śaṅkara's commentaries on the *prasthānatrayī* and is aimed at instructing students of classical Advaita in the technical terms and interpretative tools used by Śaṅkara. According to Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī, the main interpretative principle (*nyāya*) of the entire Advaita tradition is *adhyāropāpavādābhyām niṣprapañcaṃ prapañcyate* "what is free from distinctions becomes differentiated through superimposition and [subsequent] negation".⁶⁵ This pan-Advaita maxim lies on the doctrine of superimposition (*adhyāsa*), which represents the very axiological foundation of Advaita.⁶⁶

In the following section I shall select and discuss some insightful "case studies" which are helpful in investigating why the VP can be called *paribhāṣā*.

⁶³ Brunner 1987: 92–119.

⁶⁴ Sarasvatī 1969.

⁶⁵ See the BGBh (*ad* 13.13) with the gloss of Ānandagiri, and the *Brahmasiddhi* (hereafter BSi, Mīśra 1937: 26), where this *nyāya* is attributed to Sundara Paṇḍya, a predecessor of Śaṅkara.

⁶⁶ For some considerations on *paribhāṣās*, see also Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī's introduction to the text (1969: 9–10). Therein he writes that a meta-rule is a clue, a sign, a verbal convention, which, once understood, although placed in a certain position in the text becomes useful to comprehending the entire meaning of that text. In Vedānta, as in other disciplines, there are several technical as well as illustrative terms, through which a secure understanding of the treatise is achieved: *viditam evaitad vācakamahodayānām yat sarvam api śāstraṃ svasvicitapāribhāṣikapadavākyanyāyādisaṃketaviśeṣānanurudhaiva svasvābhidheyaṃ vastu pratipādayitum pravartata iti | paribhāṣā nāma paṭhitaikadeśasthaḥ san svabuddhijananadvārā sarvaśāstrārthajñānopakārakaḥ padādisaṃketaḥ | vedāntaśāstre 'pitarāśāstreṣv iva pāribhāṣikapadādīni tatra tatra cakāsanti yair vijñātarair eva śāstrārthabodho nirvicikīrṣaṃ jāyeta nānyatheti jijñāsubhir avāśyaṃ tadvijñānaṃ saṃpādayitavyam |*

6.1 Pratyakṣapariccheda

The chapter in VP dedicated to direct perception (*pratyakṣapariccheda*) is one of the more detailed, where the Navya Nyāya style is massively present. Let us examine some instances of “hypothetical” *paribhāṣās* which appear there.

For example, immediately after the definition of valid cognition (*pramā*) and its examination (*parīkṣā*), DR continues his logical *iter* listing the instruments (*karāṇa*) which allow *pramā* to be achieved. Before entering into the technicalities, I shall recall however some Advaita doctrinal presuppositions.

Referring to the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* (3.14.1: *sarvaṃ khalv idaṃ brahma* “Everything is indeed *brahman*”) Advaitins claim that whatever exists is *brahman*, pure consciousness (*śuddhacaitanya*). According to the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (2.1.1) *brahman* is truth (*satya*), knowledge (*jñāna*) and infinitude (*ananta*). The Advaitins’ final aim is the direct realization (*sākṣātkāra*) of this absolute principle. While in the absolute realm there is only one supreme reality (*pāramārthikasattā*), by contrast the empirical world (*vyāvahārika*) is subject to multiple limiting conditions. These conditions are represented by the epistemological triad, namely the knowable object (*prameya*), the knowing subject (*pramātṛ*) and the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The individual self is the knowing subject (*pramātṛ*) in every state of consciousness⁶⁷ during which, through certain means of knowledge, he experiences objects and accordingly develops cognitions (*jñāna/dhī/buddhi*), which can be valid (*pramīti/pramā*) or erroneous (*apramā*).⁶⁸ If everything is *brahman* (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 3.14.1) the elements of the epistemological triads must also be such. How then does the infinite supreme self (*paramātman*) become imprisoned in the *status* of *pramātṛ*?

It should be pointed out that every cognition arises out of a rigorous process during which a knowing subject cognizes an entity through a particular cognitive mode. The instrument for attaining the valid knowledge (*pramā*) of an object is called *pramāṇa* (*pramākaraṇaṃ pramāṇam*).⁶⁹ The VP also suggests a definition of *pramā*: *pramātvam anadhigatābādhitārthaviṣayakajñānatvam* “Being a

⁶⁷ Of course the typical cognitive situation described here represents more likely the individual self (*jīva*) during the awakening condition (*jāgrtāvasthā*), when he is technically defined *viśva*.

⁶⁸ It should be noted that in the VP there is a complete correspondence between the definitions of *pramātṛ* and *jīva*, respectively *antaḥkaraṇāvacchinnaçaitanyaṃ pramātṛçaitanyaṃ* “consciousness of the knowing subject is the consciousness limited by the internal organ” (VP 2000: 62) and *jīvo nāmāntaḥkaraṇāvacchinnaçaitanyaṃ* “the individual self is the consciousness limited by the internal organ” (VP 2000: 114).

⁶⁹ VP 2000: 22.

valid knowledge is to be a knowledge whose content is an object not previously cognized and not [subsequently] sublated".⁷⁰ The following passage is then inserted:

*pratyakṣapramāyāḥ karaṇaṃ pratyakṣapramāṇam | pratyakṣapramā
cātra caitanyam eva* “yat sāksād aparokṣād brahma” iti śruteḥ |
‘aparokṣād’ ity asya aparokṣam ity arthaḥ |

The instrument for a perceptual valid knowledge is the means of knowledge [consisting] in direct perception. **Here** [= in Advaita Vedānta] **valid knowledge is consciousness alone**, as [stated] by the śruti: “What is direct and immediate is *brahman*” (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.4.1). The purport of [the Vedic ablative] *aparokṣāt* of this [passage] is [the neuter nominative] *aparokṣam*.⁷¹

Here DR quotes the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (3.4.1): only *brahman* is always immediately present and directly perceivable. As a matter of fact, vedāntic speculation constantly feels to adhere to śruti’s statements, attempting to establish them logically. According to this point of view, the light of self-luminous (*svapṛakāśa*) *brahman* manifests on the entire universe. This light penetrates every cognitive operation, which is the expression of pure consciousness (*caitanya*) reflected on a transparent (*svaccha*) psychic surface characterized by certain functions and modifications (*vṛtti*).

We distinguish between two kinds of knowledge: the pure and perfect one, which is the absolute itself (*svarūpajñāna*), and the empirical one, which is mediated by the cognitive act and manifested by mental modifications (*vṛttijñāna*).⁷² This statement prompts an objection (*pūrvapakṣa*): if beginningless

70 VP 2000: 22–23; Potter 1988: 106. Within this definition, the term *anadhigata* (“not cognized [previously]”) rules out any content of the recollection (*smṛtivyāvṛtta*). The word *abādhitā* (“not [subsequently] sublated”) avoids the exceeding extension (*avyāpti*) of the definition into erroneous cognition (*bhramajñāna*), which is sublatale. In this first definition, recollection (*smṛti*) is excluded from *pramā* context because of its mediate nature. In fact, recollection is *saṃskāramātrajanyaṃ jñānam* “a cognition born out of the residual impressions alone” (TrS 2007: 61). These impressions are gathered in the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) as a consequence of a previous direct experience (*pūrvānubhava*) and therefore do not share the same character of novelty which valid knowledge must have. See also Datta 1997 (18–21) and Pellegrini (2016a). The second definition might express the personal view of the author of the VP.

71 Gupta 1995: 137–140. In the part 6 of this article the bold is used to highlight the *paribhāṣās*.

72 Pellegrini 2009: 73–74. I translate the word *vṛtti* as “mental modification” or “modification of the internal organ” according to the definition of the VP (2000: 63). See also the VP (2000: 48–49) which quotes *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 1.5.3 to explain how *vṛtti* (= *dhi*) is a property of the internal organ. See also *indriyajanyaṃ jñānaṃ cāntaḥkaraṇarttiḥ* (VP 2000: 415).

consciousness is the only direct knowledge, how can we speak of means for generating it?

nanu caitanyam anādi tat katham cakṣurādes tatkarāṇatvena pramāṇatvam iti | ucyate – caitanyasyānāditve 'pi tadabhivyañjakāntaḥkaraṇavṛttir indriyasamnikarṣādīnā jāyata iti vṛttiviśiṣṭam caitanyam ādimad ity ucyate jñānāvachchedakatvāc ca vṛttau jñānatvopacārah | tad uktaṁ vivaraṇe 'antaḥkaraṇavṛttau jñānatvopacārād' iti |

[Objection:] But if consciousness is without origin, then how is it possible to affirm that sight and other faculties are valid means of knowledge because they are instruments for [generating] it [= *caitanya* as *pramā*]? [Reply:] It should be replied that although consciousness is without origin, the modification of the internal organ revealing it arises out of the sense contact. For this reason, it is said that consciousness qualified by the mental modification has an origin, because it is capable of limiting [pure] consciousness. Thus, **an implied use of [the word] knowledge is made as far as mental modification is concerned.** This is said in *Vivaraṇa*⁷³: “... since there is an implied use of the word knowledge in [connection with] the modification of the internal organ.”⁷⁴

The entire passage can be considered a settlement in order to suggest a preliminary reply to a recurrent doubt. The structure implied here goes beyond the simple passage because it also involves the *pūrvapakṣa* and the lapidary formulation of the argumentative expression: a nominalized causal sentence with an abstract term in the ablative (*jñānāvachchedakatvāt vṛttau jñānatvopacārah*).

Real knowledge is only *caitanya*, *brahman* itself; hence the literal meaning of *pramā* can only be *brahman*. Nonetheless, since the modification of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*) has the capacity of delimiting and determining (*avachchedaka*) the domain of knowledge, the capacity of being called “knowledge” is transmitted to it by secondary implication (*upacāra*).

Let us return to the principal question: if everything is pure, undivided consciousness, then also the cognitive triad – *pramāṇa*, *prameya* and *pramātr* – should be undivided and consequently, nothing can be perceived. This would render inexplicable the process of direct perception, which is grounded on difference (*bheda*). Hence, something limiting the indivisibility of *caitanya* must be postulated.

⁷³ The passage is found with a minor difference in the *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* (hereafter PP/PPV, Padmapādācārya 1992: 132): *antaḥkaraṇapariṇāme jñānatvopacārāt*.

⁷⁴ VP 2000: 46–49 and Gupta 1995: 140–146.

The Advaitins' reply begins with the following considerations: knowledge as *ṛtti* is by its very nature extremely changeable, since it is shaped in accordance with cognized objects (*vastutantra*).⁷⁵ Supreme consciousness, although unlimited and undivided, in the cognitive process reflects itself on various surface-modes, thus happening to appear limited (*avacchinna*) by multiple limitations, determinations and qualifications (*avacchedaka*).⁷⁶ In the VP this triad is expressed as follows: *pramāṭr* becomes *antaḥkaraṇāvachinnacaitanya* "consciousness limited by the internal organ", *pramāṇa* becomes *antaḥkaraṇavṛttyavacchinnacaitanya* "consciousness limited by the modification of the internal organ", while *viśaya* (or *prameya*) is *viśayāvachinnacaitanya* "consciousness limited by the object".⁷⁷

The empirical cognition born out of the *ṛtti* (*ṛttijñāna*) is a kind of knowledge and as such, shares the luminous nature of the consciousness itself. However, in order to fulfil its manifesting function in the empirical realm, it needs the mediation of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*).⁷⁸ The *antaḥkaraṇa* is an adventitious condition or limiting superimposition (*upādhi*) which – illusorily – renders *caitanya* conditioned (*upahita*) or limited (*avacchinna*). For example, the ether (*ākāśa*) contained in a jar X is not different from the ether contained in a jar Y, because both are pervasive and undivided. Therefore, a limiting condition (*upādhi*) represented by these two jars has as a result that an unlimited entity like ether appears limited (*upādheya*) and consequently, multiple, diversified and endowed with parts: the *upādheya* appears divided and confined due to the diversification of *upādhis*.

In order to show a more accurate perceptual process, DR introduces a causal constituent (*prayojaka/tantra*) different from the contact of the senses with their

⁷⁵ See BSBh 2.1.2, 2.1.11 and also BGBh 2.16.

⁷⁶ A limiting agent or determiner (*avacchedaka*) delimits the function or the field of an entity, rendering it limited or determined (*avacchinna*), namely different from another entity. There are three kinds of *avacchedaka*: (1) *viśeṣaṇa*, the qualifier or determinant; (2) *upādhi*, the limiting superimposition or adventitious condition and (3) *upalakṣaṇa*, the indicator. The VP (2000: 115–116) explains further: *viśeṣaṇaṃ ca kāryānavyāvartakam | upādhiś ca kāryānavayī vyāvartako vartamānaś ca* "While the determinant differentiates and is connected with the effect; the adventitious condition is not connected with the effect but differentiates and is present".

⁷⁷ VP 2000: 61–62. See also Potter 1988: 107

⁷⁸ Concerning the nature of *antaḥkaraṇa*, it is not simple to deduce a general theory from Śaṅkara's writings. However, we already find the four functions of *antaḥkaraṇa* (BSBh 2.3.6) as well as their nomenclature, namely *manas*, *buddhi*, *vijñāna* or *ahaṅkāra* and *citta* (BSBh 2.3.32, 2.4.6). See corresponding passages in the VP (2000: 97–98). DR refutes also mind sensorial nature (*indriyatva*): see the VP (2000: 55–57), Mayeda (1968–1969: 225–228), Bilimoria (1980b: 36–37), Datta (1997: 40–61) and Gupta (1995: 154–156).

objects⁷⁹ maintained by Naiyāyikas. DR defines perception as not-difference (*abheda*) of the three kinds of conditioned *caitanya*.⁸⁰ To be more precise, the process described by the VP has two distinct cognitive phases: determination of the capacity of being perceived (= perceptuality) of the cognition itself (*jñānagatapratyakṣatva*) and determination of the capacity of being perceived of the object (*viśayagatapratyakṣatva*).⁸¹ Of these, the causal constituent (*prayojaka*) of the perceptuality of the cognition (*jñānagatapratyakṣatva*) is the not-difference (*abheda*) of three modes of consciousness.⁸² The modification of the internal organ goes out through sensory canals, joins the object and pervades it, taking its form (*viśayādyākārapariṇāma*). The modification of the internal organ then eliminates the veil of ignorance which covered (*āvaraṇabhāṅga*) the object.⁸³ In this process, the internal organ cannot be distinguished from its modification. Yet, upon exiting the *vṛtti*, “consciousness limited by the mental modification” (*vṛttyavacchinnacaitanya*) and “consciousness limited by the internal organ” (*antaḥkaraṇāvachchinnacaitanya*) are already unified. Once these two join together

⁷⁹ Naiyāyikas’ theory of perception is summarized by the definition of the TrS (2007: 78): *indriyārthasamnikarṣajanyaṃ jñānaṃ pratyakṣam* “Direct perception is the knowledge generated by the contact of senses with [their] objects.”

⁸⁰ VP (2000: 101): *na hīndriyajanyatvaṃ pratyakṣatve tantram dūṣitatvāt | kintu yogyavartamānaviśyakatve sati pramāṇacaitanyasya viśayacaitanyābhinnatvam ity uktam |*.

⁸¹ Bilimoria 1980b: 35–36.

⁸² According to Advaita Vedānta cognition, as mental modification – *antaḥkaraṇavṛttyavacchinnacaitanya* – as well as its content (*viśaya*) both have a perceptual character. During this process, the first perception is produced once the object is grasped and when there is such a statement as “This is a jar”, so the cognition itself is perceived. At this point, the content of this cognition – the jar – is also perceived. The core of the discussion reveals an attack on the Nyāya theory of perception. Naiyāyikas think that the first perception of an object “This is a jar” (*ayaṃ ghaṭaḥ*) is *vyavasāya* and the following cognition is “apperception” (*anuvyavasāya*), whose content is the knowledge of the object: “I know the jar” (*ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmi*). Advaitins disagree with this position. The pervasive consciousness simultaneously abides in the object, in the *antaḥkaraṇa* and in the *vṛtti*. It grasps everything at first. Actually, within *caitanya* there is no differentiation (*bheda*) or part (*avayava*), but it seems threefold when *upādhis* are superimposed on it. When the non-difference (*abheda*) between *pramāṇacaitanya* and *viśayacaitanya* takes place, we have direct perception of the cognition (*jñānapratyakṣa*): we know not only the object but also to know that object (*jñāto ghaṭaḥ, ghaṭajñānavān ahaṃ*).

⁸³ This is a reference to the function of the *vṛtti*. According to the theory of the “unique individual self” (*ekajīvavāda*) we must postulate the existence of the *vṛtti* because this modification of the internal organ eliminates the veil of ignorance which covered the object. Thus, the individual self is “*caitanya* conditioned [= limited] by ignorance” (*sā cāntaḥkaraṇavṛttir āvaraṇābhībhavarthyety ekaṃ matam | tathā hi avidyopahitacaitanyasya jīvatvapakṣe ...*). The other point of view presented in the VP (2000: 416–418) – probably borrowed from the *Vedānta Kaumudī* – maintains that *vṛtti* operates a connection between *pramāṭṛ* and *prameya*.

with the “consciousness limited by the object” (*prameyācaccinnacaitanya*), then direct perception takes place.⁸⁴

The VP contains the refined definition (*pariṣkāra*) of perception: *yogyavartamānaviṣayatve sati pramāṇacaitanyasya viṣayacaitanyābhinnatvam* “[Perceptuality of knowledge is] the unification of the consciousness of the object with the consciousness of the means of knowledge, its object worthy of being directly perceived and present [in that precise moment].”⁸⁵ The VP exemplifies this perceptual process of unification of the three aspects of *caitanya* as follows:

*tatra yathā taḍāgodakaṃ chidrān nirgatya kulyātmanā kedārān praviśya tadvad eva catuṣkoṇādyākāraṃ bhavati, tathā taijasam antaḥkaraṇam api cakṣurādīdvārā nirgatya ghaṭādiviṣayadeśaṃ gatvā ghaṭādiviṣayākāreṇa pariṇamate, **sa eva pariṇāmo vṛttir** ity ucyate |*

About this, for example, once having gone out from an opening and having penetrated the field through irrigation ditches, the water of a basin takes a quadrangular shape [=corresponding to the form of the fields themselves]. Similarly, once it has gone out through [sensory] canals of sight and others and, once it has reached the place of the object, a jar or whatever, the luminous internal organ also patterns itself after the shape of the object, be it a jar or whatever. This very modification is called *vṛtti*.⁸⁶

A few lines earlier, I mentioned perceptuality of the object (*viṣayagatapratyakṣatva*). Remaining faithful to the undivided nature of *caitanya* DR also offers the definition of *viṣayagatapratyakṣatva*: *ghaṭāder viṣayasya pratyakṣatvaṃ pramātrabhinnatvam* “Perceptuality of the object, like a jar or whatever, is non-difference from the perceiving subject”.⁸⁷

*pramātrabhedo nāma na tāvad aikyaṃ kintu **pramāṭṛsattātiriktasattākātvaḥbhāvaḥ** | tathā ca ghāṭādeḥ svāvaccinnacaitanyādhyastatayā viṣayacaitanyasattaiva ghaṭādisattā **adhiṣṭhānasattātiriktatayā āropitasattāyā anaṅgikārāt** | viṣayacaitanyaṃ ca pūrvoktaprakāreṇa pramāṭṛcaitanyaṃ eveti **pramāṭṛcaitanyaiva ghaṭādyadhiṣṭānatayā pramāṭṛsattaiva***

⁸⁴ Mayeda 1968–1969: 228–229; Bilimoria 1980b: 38–39 and Potter 1988: 107–108.

⁸⁵ VP 2000: 101. The debate, which precedes this refined definition (*pariṣkāra*), is articulated in many interesting points (VP 2000: 61, 64–66). For the complete discussion, see the VP (2000: 82) and Gupta (1995: 167–200).

⁸⁶ VP 2000: 63.

⁸⁷ VP 2000: 85–86. Potter 1988: 108; Gupta 1995: 201–207.

ghaṭādisattā nānyeti siddham ghaṭāder aparokṣatvam |

Therefore, non-difference from the knowing subject is not the identity [with it], but the **absence of a [degree of] reality apart from the existence of the knowing subject**. Thus, since the jar and other objects are superimposed on the consciousness limited by themselves, the existence of the jar, etc. is nothing but the reality of the consciousness of the object. In fact, **a superimposed object existing independently from its own substratum is not accepted**. Conversely, in the previously-mentioned way, the consciousness of the object is nothing but the consciousness of the knowing subject; *ergo*, **since the substratum of the jar and other [objects] is just the consciousness of the knowing subject, the existence of the knowing subject is not different from the existence of the jar and other [objects]**. Thus, the direct perceptuality of the jar and other [objects] becomes established.

In these lines the existence of the perceived entity depends solely upon the perceiving subject, which is the reflection of *caitanya* on the internal organ. Here, the empirical nature of the external object is not denied, but it is strongly claimed that in order to cognize an object the attentive presence of the knowing subject is fundamental. In addition to this “psychological” attitude, DR poses a doctrinal tenet. Everything – be it physical, psychic or causal (see below 5.5)– is superimposed on the self; furthermore, accepting that a superimposed object can exist independently from its own substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) is absolutely untenable.⁸⁸

According to this reconstruction, in these passages two examples of mutually connected *paribhāṣās* are recognizable. The first (*adhiṣṭhānasattātirikatāyā āropitasattāyā anaṃgikārāt*) is a nominalized structure, which in Advaita serves to regulate such a perception. In fact, here the systematizing function and the hermeneutical regulation are traceable. The pan-Advaitin use is evident: everything is superimposed on a substratum which does not take part in that same superimposition, but its reality allows a temporary existence of that superimposed projection. The second *paribhāṣā* (*pramāṭṛcaitanyaiva ghaṭādyadhiṣṭānatayā pramāṭṛsattaiva ghaṭādisattā nānyā*) is a weaker offshoot of the first one. It is used to contextualize and consequently, to conclude, the previous discussion, underlining the more general range of the first.

⁸⁸ Bina Gupta (1995: 128–129) explains the difference between *adhiṣṭhāna* and *ādhāra* while discussing *adhyāsa* according to Sarvajñātman’s *Samkṣepa Śārīraka* (1.31–36).

In another passage, DR himself seems to use the word *paribhāṣā* with the meaning of definition.⁸⁹ The discussion concerns the Advaitins' refutation of Naiyāyikas' understanding of universal property (*jāti*) and conditional property (*upādhi*)⁹⁰: *jātitvopādhitvaparibhāṣāyāḥ sakalapramāṇāgocaratayā 'prāmāṇikatvāt* “because, since the definition (*paribhāṣā*) of the property of being a universal property and that of being a conditional property are not the content of any means of knowledge, [both] are not authoritative”.⁹¹

Another remarkable *vyavasthā*, useful for Advaita understanding of the theories of error (*khyātivāda*), is when DR formulates a differentiation between a real modification (*pariṇāma*) and an apparent transformation (*vivarta*)⁹²:

pariṇāmo nāma upādānasamasattākakāryāpattiḥ | vivarto nāma upādānaviśamasattākakāryāpattiḥ | prātibhāsikarajataṃ cāvidyāpekṣayā pariṇāma iti caitanyāpekṣayā vivarta iti cocyate | avidyāpariṇāmarūpaṃ ca tad rajataṃ avidyādhiṣṭhāne idamavacchinnacaitanya vartate, asman-mate sarvasyāpi kāryasya svopādānāvidyādhiṣṭhānāsritatvaniyamāt |
Real modification is the arousal of an effect of the same [degree of] reality as its material cause; apparent transformation is the arousal of an effect of a different [degree of] reality from its material cause. The apparent silver is said to be a real transformation with respect to ignorance and an apparent transformation with respect to consciousness. Moreover, that silver, which is an aspect of the real transformation of ignorance, appears on the consciousness limited by “that” (*idam*),⁹³ which is the substratum of ignorance [related to “that” in fact, according to our point of view, **as a rule every effect actually lies on the substratum of ignorance which constitutes its material cause.**]⁹⁴

89 VP 2000: 75–76.

90 Pellegrini 2016b.

91 Gupta 1995: 191–194. DR leaves it to the readers' śāstric background to reconstruct the refutation of the definition of *upādhi*, while he is quite precise about *jāti*. Here DR seems to reply to NSM's definition (1988: 97–98): *nityatve sati anekasamavetatvaṃ jātitvam* “to be a universal character is to be inherent in innumerable entities [= particulars] while being qualified by eternity”. Advaitins obviously cannot accept something that is eternal (*nitya*) other than *brahman*; consequently, they do not even accept the relation of inherence (*samavāyasaṃbandha*) considered eternal by Logicians. See also the BSBh 2.2.13–17.

92 VP 2000: 155–156.

93 For the meaning of *idamavacchinnacaitanya* within the *khyātivāda* and, specifically, in the *anirvacanīyakhyaṭi*, see Pellegrini 2009: 78–79.

94 Gupta 1995: 261–262.

In these passages DR defines *pariṇāma* and *vivarta*.⁹⁵ He applies them to the classical example of the silver (*rajata*) mistaken for the nacre (*śukti*) and maintains that this instance is a real transformation of the ignorance localized (*āśrita*) on its own substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*), that is consciousness. Here consciousness is not in its pure state but limited by the nacre, whose cognition is partially given as the substratum on which the illusion of silver is projected. That illusion is concretized in the judgement “That is silver” (*idaṃ rajatam*), where “*idam*” represents the object lying before (*purovarti*) the victim of the perceptual error (*vibhrama*). Furthermore, in order to exist, ignorance needs a *locus* (*āśraya*) and a content (*viśaya*). Here its content is nacre and its *locus* is consciousness limited by nacre, that nacre which lies before and is perceived just partially through the word “that” (*idam*). In the end, DR claims for this statement a regulating *status* (*niyama*) throughout the whole Advaita *śāstra* (*asmanmate*): *sarvasyāpi kāryasya svopādānāvidyādhiṣṭhānāśritatvaniyamāt*.

According to Advaita Vedānta, every entity is substantially different from *brahman* and essentially identical to it. The difference between these two *milieux* can be expressed in many ways. Here it is understood that everything different from *brahman* is a transient effect (*kārya*) because it has an origin as well as an end (BG 2.27). In its aspect endowed with qualities (*saguṇa*), *brahman* is the cause of causes (BSBh *ad* BS 1.1.2). Every effect is grounded in a material cause (*upādāna*), which constitutes its solid body. This explains the first segment: *asmanmate sarvasyāpi kāryasya*.

DR establishes a synthetic rule in order to comprehend the notions of *vivarta* and *pariṇāma*. For Advaita Vedānta the empirical world (*vyāvahārika*) and the illusory domain (*prātibhāsika*)⁹⁶ are an apparent transformation (*vivarta*) of the unchangeable *brahman* and a real transformation (*pariṇāma*) of ignorance (*avidyā/māyā*). Saying that the world is a *vivarta* of *brahman* means that the absolute reality of *brahman* is different (*viśama*) from the reality of the empirical universe.

Conversely, like the world, ignorance has an empirical *status* – or at most an apparent one – and therefore has a reality (*sattā*) equal (*sama*) to that of its own effect. Hence, the world is an effect of both – *avidyā* and *brahman*. In these two ways of presenting the effect, only the ontological *status* of that

⁹⁵ VS (Sadānanda 2004: 2–3, 8–9) refers to these two notions in this way: *satattvato 'nyathāprathā vikāra ity udāhṛtaḥ | atattvato 'nyathāprathā vivarta ity udāhṛta iti |* “A real modification (*vikāra = pariṇāma*) has been defined as the effective mutation [of the material cause]; [and] an apparent transformation (*vivarta*) has been defined as the illusory mutation [of the material cause].”

⁹⁶ On the three ontological levels of reality, see Pellegrini (2009: 79–81).

presentation changes. The world is a *pariṇāma* type of effect when it shares the same nature with its material cause, namely ignorance. In fact, ignorance is the material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of the real transformation, namely the empirical universe. On the other hand, *brahman* is the material cause of that same effect, seen as apparent transformation (*vivartopādāna*). Thus the second part of the restricting rule (*niyama*) is explained: *svopādānāvīdyā-*, where *sva-* means “one effect or another” (*tattatkārya*).

To explain the last section of the *paribhāṣā: -adhiṣṭhānāśritatva-*, we must remember that in Advaita Vedānta ignorance is eventually false (*mithyā*), so it needs a real and immutable substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*) on which to be placed (*āśrita*). This is *brahman*, the material cause of the apparent transformation (*vivarta*) of the empirical universe.

This *paribhāṣā* exhibits a nominalized structure with a noun in the genitive accompanied by a causal ablative of an abstract term. Here the abstract term does not occupy the final position of the compound, because the last word is *niyama-* (in the ablative), which underlies the restrictive and regulative character of the entire statement.

Reading this accommodation as a whole, we find that *brahman* is the unchanging substratum of everything. On *brahman* lies *avidyā* which, in turn, is directly responsible for every other empirical effect. Therefore, *brahman* is only involved in the creative process because it is the substratum on which lies *avidyā* which, since it is its true *authoress*, shares its own nature with any worldly effect whatsoever. Conversely, the text again remarks that finally, everything is based on consciousness, whose absolute reality (*sat*) lends and allows other entities a certain degree of reality, be it empirical or illusory.

This *paribhāṣā* can be taken into consideration on several occasions. For instance, in the field of the theory of error, where the effect of *avidyā* – located on consciousness for *vivaraṇa* – is as illusory as the silver superimposed on the nacre or, in the phenomenal domain, where the effect of *avidyā* is not just a perceptual error but the empirical world itself.⁹⁷

⁹⁷ Potter (1988: 105–106) briefly indicates another interesting point of the VP (2000: 182), namely the difference between *nivṛtti* and *bādha*: *kāryavināśo hi dvividhaḥ | kaścīd upādānena saha kaścīd tu vidyamāne evopādāne | ādya bādhaḥ, dvitīyas tu nivṛttiḥ* | “Destruction of an effect is indeed twofold: some [effects are destroyed] together with their material cause, while other [effects are destroyed] when their material cause indeed persists: the first is a cessation while the second is a withdrawal.” For a somewhat similar lexical choice, see PP/PPV, Padmapādācārya 1992: 108.

6.2 Anumānapariccheda

In every epistemological treatise, after perception we find inference (*anumāna*). The VP repeats this scheme.⁹⁸ I shall present here just a single instance of what I consider a *paribhāṣā*.

The discussion focuses on how many types of invariable concomitance can generate corresponding inferences.⁹⁹ DR's premise is that the Advaitins do not accept Naiyāyikas' threefold inferential classification: jointly positive and negative (*anvayavyatireki*), purely positive (*kevalānvayi*) and purely negative (*kevalavyatireki*).¹⁰⁰ This classification is based on the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), which can be positive (*anvayavyāpti*)¹⁰¹ or negative (*vyatirekavyāpti*).¹⁰² According to the Naiyāyikas, the *anvayavyatireki* type of inference has both kinds of invariable concomitance, the positive as well as the negative. The judgement “mountain has fire because it is smoky” is based on two premises: 1. wherever there is smoke there is fire, just as in a kitchen (= *anvaya*), and 2. wherever there is not fire there is not even smoke, just as in a lake (= *vyatireka*).¹⁰³ Bearing this in mind, DR replies:

tac cānumānam anvayirūpam ekam eva, na tu kevalānvayi | sarvasyāpi dharmasyāsmanmate brahmaniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogitvena atyantābhāvāpratiyogisādhyakatvarūpakevalānvayitvasyā 'siddheḥ |

... and that inference is only one, of the positive type, but not purely positive. In fact, according to our point of view, **since every attribute is endowed with the property of counter-positiveness of a constant absence occurring in brahman, then the property of being purely positive – whose nature is possessing a probandum which is not the counter-positive of any constant absence whatsoever – cannot be established.**¹⁰⁴

98 Satprakashananda 2001: 142–143.

99 Brunner 1987: 106–108; Mādhavānanda 1997: 73–75; VP, Dharmarājadhvarindra 1984: 55–56.

100 TrS 2007: 105.

101 Where the *probans* (*hetu*) is positively connected with the *probandum* (*sādhyā*) and the invariable concomitance is determined by the observation of the co-existence of two present objects: “wherever there is the pervaded, there is the pervasor” (*yatra yatra vyāpyaḥ tatra tatra vyāpakaḥ*).

102 The *probans* (*hetu*) is negatively connected with the *probandum* (*sādhyā*), and the invariable concomitance is determined by the observation of the co-existence of two absent objects and is presented in reverse with respect to the *anvayavyāpti*: “wherever there is the absence of the pervasor, there is the absence of the pervaded” (*yatra yatra vyāpakābhāvaḥ tatra tatra vyāpyābhāvaḥ*).

103 TrS 2007: 101.

104 Satprakashananda 2001: 150–152. Endowed with this property are *kevalānvayin* entities (*padārtha*), translated as “unnegatable term, universal” by Ingalls (1988: 61–62, 113–115) or “universally present” by Matilal (1968: 80).

DR accepts only the positive type of inference, which is different from the purely positive (*kevalānvayi*) as well.¹⁰⁵ The *kevalānvayi* inference is based only on the positive invariable concomitance (*anvayamātravyāptika*): “wherever there is the *probans*, there is the *probandum*” (*yatra yatra hetus tatra tatra sādhyam*). The Naiyāyikas maintain the existence of universally present properties (*kevalānvayi*) such as “knowability” (*jñeyatva/prameyatva*), “nominability” (*abhidheyatva/vācyaatva*), etc. Technically speaking, these properties cannot ever be the counter-positive (*apratyogin*) of their own constant absence (*atyantābhāva*). The purely positive inference does not have a negative instance (*vipakṣa: niścitasādhyābhāvavān vipakṣaḥ* “the negative instance surely possesses the absence of the *probandum*”), that is to say that in the universe there is no *locus* whatsoever where the above-mentioned properties do not reside.¹⁰⁶ On the contrary, the purely negative inference (*kevalavyatireki*) is based on the negative invariable concomitance (*vyatirekamātravyāptika*) “wherever there is not the *probandum*, there is not even the *probans*” (*yatra sādhyam nāsti tatra hetur api nāsti*) and does not have any positive instance (*sapakṣa: niścitasādhyavān sapakṣaḥ* “the positive instance surely possesses the *probandum*”).¹⁰⁷

The analysis of *atyantābhāvāpratyogisādhyakatvarūpa-* should be conducted as follows. It is impossible to establish an entity only through an unproven thesis (*pratiññāmātrā*): we need evidence (*pramāṇa*)! If Advaitins do not accept the threefold kind of inference, they must ground their refutation on solid bases. For this reason, DR displays the problem of the untenability of *kevalānvayitva* property and, as a consequence, the impossibility of an inference whose *probandum* (*sādhyā*) is such a universally present property, which is not the counter-positive (*a-pratyogin*) of a constant absence. An inference with such a *probandum* is unacceptable for Advaitins because it openly contradicts the passage “Here there is not anything [= nothing] manifold” (*neha nānāsti kiṃcana, Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad 4.4.19; Kaṭha Upaniṣad 2.10*). Following the text: in *brahman* (*iha*) there is the constant absence (*atyantābhāva*) of all entities; *ergo*, Advaita Vedānta considers every entity the counter-positive of a constant absence occurring in *brahman*. In fact, in *brahman* there are no attributes/properties such as “nominability”

105 DR does not accept purely negative inference (*kevalavyatireki*) either, because he does not admit any invariable concomitance grounded on absence (*vyatireka*). In fact, the Advaitins consider *vyatireka* an example of presumption (*arthāpatti*). For them, non-acceptance of the *vyatireki* type of inference also determines the impossibility of the mixed type of inference, the *anvayavyatireki* (VP 2000: 223–228).

106 TrS 2007: 109.

107 TrS 2007: 108.

(*abhidheyatva*), “knowability” (*prameyatva*), etc., because it is beyond the range of senses, words and mind (*avānmanasagocara*, see the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2.4.1). Hence *brahman*, which cannot be expressed through words, is not endowed with a property such as “nominability” (*abhidheyatva*); or, since it is not an object to be known through any means of knowledge, it is not even endowed with “knowability” (*prameyatva*). As a consequence, properties called by Naiyāyikas *kevalānvayi* do not occur in *brahman*, ergo, they are the counter-positives (*pratiyogin*) of their own constant absence in *brahman*, certainly not the non-counter-positives (*a-pratiyogin*) of their own constant absence.¹⁰⁸ Hence, if no *kevalānvayi* property exists how can the cogency of an inference whose *probandum* is constituted by such a property be maintained?¹⁰⁹ In fact, such an inference would be flawed by the “unestablishment of the qualification” (*viśeṣaṇāsiddhi = sādhyāsiddhi*).

The *paribhāṣā* here discussed presents the usual structure and is of course applicable in all similar circumstances.

6.3 Āgamapāriccheda

Next¹¹⁰ there is *āgamapāriccheda*, where the basic principles of the Advaita philosophy of language are dealt with. Bilimoria’s already-mentioned and widely-debated¹¹¹ volume has highlighted the intricacies of the subject, presenting the controversies between Nyāya, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, Vyākaraṇa and Advaita.¹¹² DR fills the entire section with several definitions and consequent discussions. Hereafter, in order to avoid another lengthy analysis, I shall limit myself to a passage, which shows the structure of the later philosophical *paribhāṣās*, where what is exhibited is a character jointly meta-linguistic, regulating and slightly hermeneutical.

108 I follow Śivadatta’s *Arthadīpikā* gloss on the VP/AD (1983: 117).

109 We experience a constant absence (*antyañbhāva*) through its counter-positive (*pratiyogin*) by means of a sentence such as “There is no jar” (*ghaṭo nāsti*). For Logicians this kind of absence is without beginning or end, therefore constant because connected with three times (*traikālikasaṃbandhāvaccchinnaṃpratiyogitākābhāvaḥ* “an absence whose counter-positiveness is limited by a relation with the threefold time”, TrS 2007: 171). Thus, if this kind of absence pervades all time, its counter-positive (*pratiyogin*) is not, was not and will not ever be.

110 In DR’s very short presentation of *upamāna* in the VP (2000: 245–257) there are no clear examples of meta-linguistic style, interpretative rules or well-structured systematizations. DR simply defines *upamāna* and briefly discusses and justifies its definition.

111 See Bronkhorst (1993: 103–105), Phillips (1995: 273–279) and again Bronkhorst (1998: 5–14).

112 Bilimoria 2008 [I ed. 1988].

Once he has presented the generalities of verbal testimony (*āgamapramāṇa*)¹¹³ and the four causes¹¹⁴ of verbal knowledge (*śābdabodha*), DR introduces a discussion on the powers and functions of the word capable of conveying meanings:

padārthaś ca dvidvidhaḥ – śakyo lakṣyaś ceti | tatra śaktir nāma padānām artheṣu mukhyā vṛttiḥ | yathā ghaṭapadasya pṛthubudhnodarādyākṛtiviśiṣṭe vastuviśeṣe vṛttiḥ | sā ca śaktiḥ padārthāntaram, siddhānte kāraṇeṣu kāryānukūlaśaktimātrasya padārthāntaratvāt | sā ca tattatpada-janyapadārthajñānarūpakāryānumeyā | tādrśaśaktiviśayatvaṅ śakyatvam |

The meaning of the morphemes is of two types: literal and implied. About this, the literal potency (*śakti*) is the primary function of words towards [their] meanings. For example, the primary function of the word “jar” occurs in a particular object characterized by the shape of a large and bulging belly, etc. Such a potency is an independent category! **In fact, in [our] doctrine the mere effect-generating-potency is a separate category [included] among causes.** This [potency], inferable by the effects,¹¹⁵ takes the form of the knowledge of the meaning of the terms which has arisen from one word or another. The property of being the primary meaning is to be the referent of such a potency.¹¹⁶

Hidden in this brief passage is a *pāribhāṣika* phrase: *siddhānte kāraṇeṣu kāryānukūlaśaktimātrasya padāntaratvāt*.

The underlying debate here concerns the opposing positions of Nyāyā and Pūrva Mīmāṃsā, mainly of the Prābhākara school. The bone of contention concerns *śakti*: is it a separate and independent category (*padārthāntara*) or not? Here the word *śakti* does not mean only “power, potency” but “causal efficacy” and “potential meaning”. On these issues, the Advaitins accept the Mīmāṃsakas’ empirical point of view (see *infra* fn. 60) according to which *śakti* is a separate category.

113 VP 2000: 259.

114 See the VP (2000: 261) and Bilimoria (1980a: 393–399; 2008: 31–51).

115 Mīmāṃsakas seem to agree with Grammarians (*vaiyākaraṇa*) when they affirm that it is not even possible to postulate the idea of a grammatical case (*kāraṇa*) without recognizing a *śakti*. The word “activity” (*vyāpāra*), as used by Vaiyākaraṇas, has the same purport as *śakti*: both are known by their results. In the M (*ad* A 1.3.1, Patañjali 1985–2002: 254) Patañjali has the same idea about action (*kriyā*): *kriyā nāmeyam atyantāparidrṣṭā ... sāsāu anumānagamyā* “What is called action is totally invisible ... that is knowable through inference ...”

116 VP 2000: 287–288.

The school of Nyāya, the old and the new, does not accept *śakti* as an independent category (*padārtha*) as the Mīmāṃsakas do. According to the Logicians it is not necessary to postulate a new category like *śakti*, when the same function is satisfied by the essential nature (*svabhāva*) of an entity. For example, the Logician Haridāsa Bhaṭṭācārya, while glossing Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjali* ([hereafter NK] 1.5–7) understands *śakti* as causality (*kāraṇatva*).¹¹⁷ At first Haridāsa presents the Mīmāṃsakas' position, saying that *śakti* is an independent category of multiple nature, different in different objects: eternal in eternal entities and non-eternal in non-eternal entities.¹¹⁸ Mīmāṃsakas maintain that the cause of a phenomenon is something that necessarily has a potency (*śakti*): for instance, a piece of clay has the potency of generating a jar. Only when an entity is endowed with that potency can it be completely considered an agent (*kāraka*) or a cause (*kāraṇa*). The Mīmāṃsakas try to establish their theory by furnishing valid evidence. Since potency is beyond the range of the senses (*atīndriya*) it is cognized through the process of presumption (*arthāpatti*). This process can be exemplified by assuming that fire has the power to burn (*dāhikā śakti*), otherwise the relation between fire and its burning potency cannot be explained (*anyathānupapatti*).¹¹⁹

Naiyāyikas vehemently oppose the inclusion of *śakti* as a distinct category. They point out that *śakti* is nothing but the essential nature (*svabhāva*) of an entity, which is a property inseparable from and inherent to the entity itself. For example, the potency to burn is not different from the fire itself. In fact, a fire without its heat, which is its intrinsic nature, cannot be imagined.

This discussion is implicit in the *pāribhāṣika* phrase just quoted. Along the lines of the *paribhāṣās* already described, it prompts me to recall that *paribhāṣās* could also be seen as conventions (*saṃketa*) or somehow synthetic revealers or

¹¹⁷ Miśra 1997: 23–32. Naiyāyikas do not completely refuse the notion of *śakti*, but they prefer to speak about *kāraṇatva* – the property of being a cause or causality – charging it with *śakti*'s peculiarities. This property is the potency (*śakti*) through which an entity becomes the cause of certain effects. Although not acknowledging that *śakti* has an independent position, in the NK (1.13, Upādhyāya-Śāstrī 2002: 150) Udayana does not completely refute it, identifying it with *kāraṇatva*: *atha śaktiniṣedhe kiṃ pramāṇam? na kiñcit | tat kim asty eva? bādhaṃ, nahi no darśane śaktipadārtha eva nāsti | ko 'sau tarhi? kāraṇatvam* “[Objection:]: Now, what is the proof for refuting *śakti*? [Reply:]: There is none! [Objection:]: Then what's this [refutation] for? [Reply:]: Well, it is not that from our point of view there is not a category [called] *śakti*. [Objection:]: So, what is that? [Reply:]: [That is] the property of being a causality.”

¹¹⁸ *Haridāsivṛtti ad NK 1.6* (Miśra 1997: 26–27): *śaktiś ca padārthāntaram prativyakti nānā, anitye 'nityā nityaiva sā śaktir anitye bhāvahetuḥ* “Potency is an independent category, multiple in every individual, non-eternal in what is not eternal and eternal in what is eternal. In what is not eternal this potency is born out of a positive cause.”

¹¹⁹ Chakravarti 1940: 34–40.

indicators of certain traces of wider debates held somewhere else in the discipline. Often, through a few words utilized in the usual style, these indicators seem to carry out the task of referring the reader to a more cogent philosophical position concerning the issue under examination.¹²⁰

6.4 Anupalabdhipariccheda

I shall now go directly to the section of non-apprehension (*anupalabdhipariccheda*),¹²¹ where there are several examples of *paribhāṣā*, even though I shall analyze only one of them with the usual structure, thus helping us to interpret and answer various questions concerning the fourfold absence.¹²²

An interesting passage occurs in the discussion on the absence subsequent to destruction (*dhvaṃsābhāva*), which is simply the destruction of an entity when that entity has withdrawn into its material cause: like a jar, once destroyed by a mace, re-enters its immediate cause or ground (*adhikaraṇa*), namely the half part (*kapāla*).¹²³ Once its immediate ground is destroyed, the previous *dhvaṃsābhāva* is destroyed,¹²⁴ too, and the half part returns as the clay out of which the jar was made.¹²⁵ In an open polemic with the Naiyāyikas, DR adds that it cannot be accepted that the destruction of the destruction of the jar (*ghaṭadhvaṃsadhvaṃsa*) will bring the same jar back to life. This is untenable because the destruction of a destruction of a jar is simply a destruction, whose counter-positive is the destroyed object, i. e. the jar.¹²⁶ If we were to accept the Logicians' position, then when a jar – whose nature is of the destruction of its antecedent absence – is destroyed, we would have to face the undesired event of the re-emergence of the antecedent absence already destroyed. Enclosing it in a somehow *parenthetic* clause-phrase (*na ca ... vācyam*), DR reports one of the

120 Devasthali 1985: 1 n. 1.

121 See the VP (2000: 344).

122 See the VP (2000: 344).

123 The *kapāla* is a wet lump of clay not yet baked and similar to half a skullcap. Once joined with the other half, it gives shape to the jar to be baked. These two *kapālas* are the jar's immediate material causes.

124 For Naiyāyikas the *dhvaṃsābhāva* has a beginning (*sādi*) but has no end (*ananta*), because destruction cannot be destroyed (TrS 2007: 170).

125 Without mentioning other intermediate stages, here I am simplifying the process leading a jar back to its clay condition.

126 VP (2000: 353): *tatraiva ghaṭasya mudgarapātānantaram yo 'bhāvaḥ sa dhvaṃsābhāvaḥ | dhvaṃsasyāpi svādhikaraṇakālanāṣe nāṣa eva | na ca ghaṭonmajjanāpattiḥ ghaṭadhvaṃsadhvaṃsasyāpi ghaṭapratyogikadhvaṃsatvāt |*. I follow Śivadatta's AD interpretation (1983: 215).

Naiyāyikas' replies where they maintain that it is not possible to accept the destruction of destruction when the substratum of that destruction is eternal. Regarding this the Logicians ask the Advaitins to elaborate their position. That is: if they think that the destruction of a certain entity/effect is also destructible, then they must explain whether all destructions are ephemeral or only a few of them. For instance, if the destruction of an eternal substance (*nityadravya*) takes place – be it time (*kāla*), space (*dik*) or consciousness (*caitanya*) – it cannot be considered ephemeral, because according to the Naiyāyikas whatever resides on an eternal substratum is also eternal. If the Advaitins were to be bound to revise their position regarding a single destruction related to an eternal substance and thus consider it eternal, then why not reconsider all destructions eternal, even those taking place on other substrata?¹²⁷

The Advaitins refute the Naiyāyikas' position. First of all, it cannot be maintained that the substratum of the destruction of a jar is time or space because all philosophers accept *kapāla* as the material cause of the jar and, consequently, as the substratum of the destruction of that jar.

Later on, the Advaitins try to accept for a while the position of the Logicians. They admit temporarily that a substratum of destruction might be something eternal. Nevertheless, they question the Logicians according to Advaita tenets: is such an eternal substratum of destruction different (*bhinna*) from *brahman-caitanya* or is it *brahman-caitanya*? They refute both these options:

tādṛśādhikaraṇaṃ yadi caitanyavyatiriktaṃ tadā tasya nityatvam asiddham, brahmavyatiriktasya sarvasya brahmajñānanirvartyatāyā vaksyamānatvāt | yadi ca dhvaṃsādhikaraṇaṃ caitanyaṃ tadā 'siddhiḥ, āropitapratīyogikapradhvaṃsasyādhiṣṭhāne pratīyamānasyādhikaraṇamātratvāt | tad uktam – adhiṣṭhānāvāśeṣo hi nāśaḥ kalpitavastunaḥ – iti | evaṃ śūktirūpyavināśo 'pīdamavacchinna-caitanyam eva |

If such a substratum is different from consciousness then its eternality is not proven, **because we will affirm¹²⁸ that whatever is different from brahman is sublated by the knowledge of brahman.** If, on the other hand, the substratum is consciousness itself, then [in this case also] there is an incongruence **because a destruction, whose counter-positive is a**

¹²⁷ VP (2000: 354–355): *na caivam api yatra dhvaṃsādhikaraṇaṃ nityaṃ tatra kathaṃ dhvaṃsanāśa iti vācyaṃ*. Here again I follow the reading of the AD.

¹²⁸ This sentence, too, has the structure and characteristics of an organizing *paribhāṣā*, perhaps just within the boundaries of the VP, since it refers to another section of the text, namely the *prayojanapariccheda*.

superimposed entity [= an erroneous perception] **and which is perceptible on [its own] substratum, is nothing but the mere substratum itself.** In fact, it has been said: “The destruction of a superimposed entity is but the reduction to [its] substratum.” [*R̥bhu Gītā* 2.55]. Thus, the destruction of silver on the nacre is also indeed consciousness limited by “that” (*idam*).¹²⁹

Here there is a typical *paribhāṣā* of the VP: *āropitapratiyogikapradhvamsasyādhiṣṭhāne pratīyamānasyādhikaraṇamātratvāt*. It has two levels of interpretation: one concerning the empirical world and the other concerning illusions. On the first level, the sentence points out that the destruction of an entity is nothing but the mere substratum of that entity. The second level states the same thing while applying the structure to perceptual errors and illusory entities cognized on a certain *locus*. Destruction of their cognition simply means perception of the substratum on which illusion is projected (*adhiṣṭhānasākṣātkāra*). Hence, jointly applying these levels of interpretation, the *paribhāṣā* seems to say that consciousness is the unchanging substratum of the empirical and of the apparent world as well. Destruction of the world is nothing but the perception of its substratum, that is *brahman*.¹³⁰

6.5 Viṣayaparicheda

The *viṣayaparicheda* is one of the VP's larger sections, where DR shifts his attention from epistemology to ontology and cosmology.¹³¹ Within this and in the last *paricheda*, the nature of the VP, jointly introductory and anthological, allows the treatment of several positions internal to Advaita Vedānta.

DR divides dissolution (*pralaya*) into four types, one of which is daily dissolution, namely deep sleep (*suṣupti*). His treatment of deep sleep is extremely innovative.¹³² Deep sleep represents the withdrawal within their own cause of all empirical effects – namely the awakening condition (*jāgrtāvasthā*) –

¹²⁹ VP 2000: 355–356.

¹³⁰ For instance, this *paribhāṣā* could also be applied to the opening debate of the *Advaitasiddhī's* second definition of falsity (Pellegrini 2011: 445–446).

¹³¹ In this section the object of Advaita Vedānta is dealt with, taking from the conditioned (*sopādhika*) and unconditioned (*nirupādhika*) forms of *brahman*, to the primary (*śakya*) and implied (*lakṣya*) meanings of the word *tat* (“that” = *brahman*) in the *mahāvākya* “You are That” (*tat tvam asi, Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.8.7 ff.) and of the word *tvam* (“you” = the individual self).

¹³² These are the four *pralayas*: daily (*nitya*), natural (*prākṛtika*), occasional (*naimittika*) and total (*ātyantika*). See the VP (2000: 395).

together with the psychic ones – namely the dream condition (*svapnāvasthā*). DR explains that merits and demerits merge entirely into the causal condition (*kāraṇāvasthā*) and subsist therein in a latent state. That is why on awakening, the individual regains the memory of his preceding experiences and sensations.¹³³

At this point a problem arises: during deep sleep, for the sleeping individual every entity – be it physical or psychic – is reabsorbed into the causal ignorance, and everything ceases being manifest.¹³⁴ In Advaita physiology deep sleep corresponds to the sheet made of beatitude (*ānandamayakośa*) and to the causal body (*kāraṇaśarīra*). Out of this state, with the addition of accidents, all constituents of the individual self (*jīva*) are produced. The psychic, or better the subtle, body – namely the dream condition – merges into the causal body, that is the deep sleep condition. The subtle body is made up of three sheets: the sheet made of vital breaths (*prāṇamayakośa*), the sheet made of mind (*manomayakośa*) and the sheet made of intellect (*vijñānamayakośa*). During deep sleep the sheet made of mind and that made of intellect cease their activity and are reabsorbed within their cause, namely the *ānandamayakośa*. On the contrary, the sheet made of vital breaths, namely five *prāṇas*, remains awake and active, otherwise death of the physical body would occur. At this point a problem arises: how is only a partial merging of the subtle body into its cause possible?¹³⁵ The feeling is that during deep sleep, the internal organ – once it has entered into the subtle channels called *hitā* – leaves the subtle body under the control of the breaths¹³⁶:

na ca suṣuptāv antaḥkaraṇasya vināśena tadadhīnaprāṇādikriyānupapattiḥ, vastutaḥ śvāsādyabhāve 'pi tadupalabdheḥ puruṣāntaravibhramamātratvāt, suṣuptaśarīropalaṃbhavat | na caivaṃ suptasya paretādaviśeṣaḥ, suptasya hi liṅgaśarīraṃ saṃskārātmanātraiva vartate paretasya tu lokāntara iti vailakṣaṇyāt | yad vā antaḥkaraṇasya dve śaktī jñānaśaktiḥ kriyāśaktiś ceti | tatra jñānaśaktiviśiṣṭāntaḥkaraṇasya suṣuptau vināśo, na kriyāśaktiviśiṣṭasyeti prāṇādyavasthānam aviruddham |

It should not even be claimed that since during deep sleep the internal

¹³³ See the VP (2000: 395–396).

¹³⁴ See *Kaivalya Upāniṣad* 1.13.

¹³⁵ See also Śaṅkara's commentaries *ad Praśna Upāniṣad* 4.3–4 and BSBh *ad* 1.3.8.

¹³⁶ According to the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upāniṣad* (2.1.17–20) there are seventy-two thousand *hitā* canals. They are subtle canals departing from the heart and reaching the pineal gland (*puritat*); within these canals *prāṇa* moves while the individual is deeply asleep.

organ is nullified, [then] the activity of the *prāṇa* and other [vital breaths] which depend on it [= the internal organ] is not possible. The reason is indeed that also while the breath is absent [its] perception is [due] merely to the perceptual delusion of another person [who observes the sleeping man], just as what happens with the perception of [his own] body by the sleeping man [himself]. Neither [can it be said] that there is no difference between a sleeping man and a deceased one, because there is indeed a distinction: [while] the subtle body of the sleeping man remains in that precise place (*atraiva* [= the gross body]) in the form of a residual impression, [the subtle body] of a dead man goes to the next world. Otherwise, **[it should be postulated that] two potencies of the internal organ exist: the knowledge-potency and the action-potency. In that case, during deep sleep, there is the suspension of the internal organ characterized by the knowledge-potency, not that characterized by the action-potency.** *Ergo*, it is not contradictory [to hold] the persistence of *prāṇa* and other [vital breaths also during deep sleep].

Here DR furnishes two explanations for this phenomenon. The first is not philosophically cogent, but the second one shows a consistent effort to solve the inconsistency: the sleeping man is not conscious of his breaths, whose movement continues spontaneously. In this passage I perceive a meta-regulating nuance because this discussion could be used as a demonstration and settlement also in earlier texts, wherever the objector has proposed a similar doubt.

6.6 Prayojanapariccheda

The last section of the VP deals with the purpose of Advaita and is called *prayojanapariccheda*. DR indicates two purposes: the primary (*mukhya*) and the secondary (*gauṇa*). Obviously, the primary purpose is the attainment of bliss and the removal of any sufferings. The secondary one is the identification and consequent pursuit of all those means through which the primary purpose becomes achievable.¹³⁷ In the *mukhyaprayojana* as well there are two levels: relative (*sātiśaya*) and absolute (*niratiśaya*). The relative level concerns the specific pleasures and tiny delights, whereas the absolute deals with the achievement of *brahman* itself, the supreme beatitude (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 3.9.28, 4.3.32; *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 3.6).

¹³⁷ VP 2000: 435–437.

One of the *paribhāṣās* identified in this *pariccheda* briefly deals with the nature of liberation (*mokṣa*).¹³⁸ Besides the quotations, this formula shows its *pāribhāṣika* structure with a pair of nearly aphoristic expressions:

sa ca jñānaikasādhyah “*tam eva veditvā ’ti mṛtyum eti, nānyaḥ panthā vidyate ’yanāya*” *iti śruteḥ*, **ajñānanivṛtteḥ jñānaikasādhyatvanīyamāc ca | tac ca jñānaḥ brahmātmaikyagocaram** “*abhayaḥ vai janaka prāpto ’si*”, “*tadātmānam evāved ahaḥ brahmāsmi*” *iti śruteḥ |*

And that one [= liberation] is attainable only through knowledge, as [assumed] by the textual passage “Only after having known That, he overcomes death: there is no other way for reaching there.” [*Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 3.8]. **In fact, as a rule, the cessation of ignorance is attainable only through knowledge, and that knowledge has as its content the identity of brahman with the self**, as [witnessed] by *śruti* “Have you indeed attained absence of fear, oh Janaka!” [*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 4.2.4], “Then he knew only the self: ‘I am brahman!’” [*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* 1.4.10].¹³⁹

Here we find three synthetic formulations of the same nature. While the first one *jñānaikasādhyah* is a plain statement, the second one expresses in the usual *pāribhāṣika* style the same concept in an assertive way (*ajñānanivṛtteḥ jñānaikasādhyatvanīyamāt*), underscoring the fact that liberation is attainable only through knowledge and that this knowledge is nothing but total cessation of ignorance. According to Advaita Vedānta this is an inviolable rule (*niyama*), which somehow restricts and cuts off the possibility of attaining liberation also by other means. Besides this *paribhāṣā*, we have an elucidation about the nature of knowledge, which is capable of destroying ignorance and leading to liberation. This is the highest axiom of Advaita: *mokṣa* is the direct experience (*sākṣātkāra*) of the identity of the individual self with the absolute (*jñānaḥ brahmātmaikyagocaram*).

Towards the end of the section¹⁴⁰ DR discusses the nature of action (*karman*) and its results. As often happens in Advaita texts, the examination is undertaken after an objection. Here there is a problem: how to explain in the condition of living liberation the arousal of ripe results of actions previously taken (*prārabdhakarman*). In the usual way, DR replies by quoting some sentences from *śruti* (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6.14.2) and *smṛti* (*Bṛhannāradya Purāṇa* 29.76).

138 See the VP (2000: 436–437).

139 VP 2000: 442.

140 VP 2000: 467.

He interprets those passages stating that through liberating knowledge two types of action are removed along with their results: the action which is taking place (*kriyamānakarman*) and the accumulated one which has not yet begun to bestow its results (*saṃcitakarman*). On the other hand, the *prārabdhakarman* still persists, because it is consumed simply by enjoying its results.¹⁴¹

The *pūrvapakṣin* refutes these clarifications stating that if knowledge of *brahman* destroys ignorance, how is it possible that a result of ignorance such as *prārabdhakarman* still lasts even if its cause is demolished? This determines the deviation (*vyabhicāra*) from a rule accepted by everyone, in conformity with the interpretative maxim *nimittābhāve naimittikasyāpy abhāvaḥ* “when there is not the cause there is not even effect”¹⁴²:

*nanu brahmajñānān mūlājñānanivṛttau tatkāryaprārabdhakarmano 'pi
nivṛtteḥ kathaṃ jñānināṃ dehadhāraṇam upapadyate iti cet | na,
apratibaddhajñānasyaivājñānanivartakatayā prārabdhakarmarūpa-
pratibandhakadaśāyām ajñānanivṛtter anaṅgikārāt |*

[Objection:] But, if with the knowledge of *brahman* radical ignorance withdraws, then the cessation of that action that is already giving its results, which is the effect of that [=ignorance] should also occur. [Therefore,] how to explain the persistence of the body of the sages? [Reply:] It is not like that! In fact, since only an unbounded knowledge can dispel ignorance, the cessation of ignorance when a hindrance as the action which is already bestowing its results is [still] present cannot be accepted.

Here, too, we are facing the usual structure of the formulation, but this time it is a specification and a settlement of precise doctrine. Only a complete, incontrovertible and unbounded knowledge can uproot ignorance. On the other hand, *prārabdhakarman* is completely consumed only through the direct fruition of its results. This represents the obstacle which prevents liberating knowledge from immediately causing the fall of the body along with any other effects of *avidyā*. This is the difference between living liberation (*jīvanmukti*) and the incorporeal liberation (*videhamukti*), achievable after death once the effects of *prārabdhakarman* are eventually annihilated. This discussion is a reminder that every Advaita author must agree that even in living liberation, the presence of a

141 VP 2000: 466.

142 This *nyāya* is included in Ṭhakuradatta Śarma's compendium *Bhuvaneśalaukikanyāyasaḥasrī* (1989: 188–189). The same rule is otherwise expressed as *nimittāpaye naimittikāpayah*. See also *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.2.1 and 1.4.2 (*kāraṇābhāvāt kāryābhāvaḥ*). See Candotti-Pontillo, this volume.

trifle of ignorance (*avidyāleśa*) must be postulated. This trifle is nothing but *prārabdhakarman*, which contrasts the instant downfall of the body (*sadyadehapāta*).

7 Conclusions

Throughout these pages the issue of why we find text titles such as *Vedānta Paribhāṣā* in the later period has been raised. As a consequence, I have tried to highlight some of the features which led DR to choose the title *paribhāṣā* for his text, inserting it in a precise textual context. The *pāribhāṣika* nature of the VP obviously differs considerably from the formalizations of the original *paribhāṣā*, supposedly traceable in the Śrautasūtras and extensively developed by Vyākaraṇa and then used as *nyāyas* by the ritualistic Mīmāṃsā.

We should in fact bear in mind that for a long period, it was primarily the Vyākaraṇa which contributed to specifying the *paribhāṣā corpus*. In my opinion, across the centuries this tendency encouraged new philosophical endeavors, especially when the New Logic arose and became widespread. From the thirteenth to the eighteenth century we see a flourishing of texts called *paribhāṣā* (or *bhāṣā*), even though their style is different from the extremely concise one of the original *paribhāṣās*. It seems that due to the diffusion of the ultra-technical terminology and methodology of Navya Nyāya, the characteristics of the old *paribhāṣās* flowed into the new stylistic rules. We are facing on one side, a de-technicalization of a technical term and on the other, a specification of a non-technical use of the same term. This might have caused a requalification and diffusion of the well-known term *paribhāṣā* as a title for didactic treatises. Furthermore, the word also assumes a new kind of formalization and a peculiar purport analogous to a “technical definition” expressed in the *navya* style. This involves an entire philosophical debate, which beginning with a definition passes through a complex discussion and reaches a doctrinal settlement and a consequent final refined definition (*pariṣkāra*).

As far as the VP is concerned, the above-mentioned is certainly the essential factor on which the founding concept of the text subtends together with its internal structure. Although the VP displays some peculiarities, when comparing it with other *paribhāṣā*-texts of the same period we can see various analogies: its basic idea, the structure, the style, the terminology, the contents and, of course, its target.

The VP can be defined *paribhāṣā* in a very broad sense of the term because some typical tendencies of the classical *paribhāṣā* literature are traceable in it. Simultaneously, its *paribhāṣika* formalization is not specified as in the *paribhāṣās* of other disciplines.

In fact, I believe that in the VP's case, the essential factor of its *paribhāṣātva* is a concomitant cluster of characteristics. Of course I understand that the viewpoint I am presenting could be adapted to any philosophical writing of DR's period. However, I reaffirm that what makes the VP a *paribhāṣā* is a combination of concauses. The VP's primary purpose is clarity and precision for beginners, along with the application of this intent to the philosophical requirements of the period.

It can be stated that the VP is not as concise as the original *paribhāṣās*. Around VP's period (apart perhaps from grammarians such as Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa, who were closer to the ancient *paribhāṣā* tradition),¹⁴³ the structure of *paribhāṣā*-texts changes. In new *paribhāṣās* the title conveys several characteristics: at one and the same time they are introductory textbooks, full-fledged philosophical treatises and elucidations.

What I can now conclude is that in the VP, and in analogous texts, the word *paribhāṣā* is taken to mean “discussing around/beyond, talking/elucidating by taking the whole system into consideration”, which further suggests the meaning “re-arranging an older system by taking the principles that were mentioned or implicit in that system but were not given the role of building blocks”. With this way of recasting a system a different but complimentary understanding of it or its literature emerges, so that what were underpinnings come to the surface and offer an updated introduction to it.

These thoughts prompt me to consider that in the VP there are various levels of application of the notion of *paribhāṣā* and a consequent difficulty in translating the term univocally. The VP is a *paribhāṣā* in the most general sense as well as in a more specific one. The entire text is an ample *paribhāṣā* (“manual of elucidation”) because it is useful in reinterpreting and reformulating already consolidated doctrines using new and renovated philosophical instruments. Moreover, in the VP there are stylistic and linguistic expressions which are repeated in different contexts, which can be considered single *paribhāṣās*. The terminological, methodological and doctrinal innovations of the period bring with them a new textual elasticity, which reverberates in each context and with which the VP is fully involved. In order to justify the title, we must investigate its recurring schemes as phenomena repeated also in corresponding texts.

143 Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa (end of the 17th – beginning of the 18th century) was likely a younger contemporary of DR. He wrote several important works, among which is the “Mañjūṣā-trilogy”. The shorter text of this trilogy, which was meant for peculiar beginners, is the *Paramalaghumañjūṣā*. Within the grammatical tradition (in addition to Kuṇḍa Bhaṭṭa's *Padārthadīpikā*) this text occupies the same place as the VP within the Advaita tradition and the *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* within the *Mīmāṃsā* tradition (Ruegg 1959: 5–6). See also Ganeri (2011: 98–101).

DR initiates every discussion with a definition, continues with its examination, moves towards a systematization to arrive at an application of the context under examination in a broader panorama. It seems likely that this *iter* helped to apply definitions correctly. This might be the reason why, in order to create his vision of *paribhāṣā*, DR uses definitions as its main structural and stylistic tool. Therefore, the entire VP is a *paribhāṣā* in a larger sense. Furthermore, in addition to definitions (*lakṣaṇa*) of technical terms, the VP also includes interpretative maxims (*nyāya*), regulations and restrictions (*niyama*) and reasoning (*yukti*) capable of re-organizing and settling (*vyavasthā*). Moreover, a complete demonstration of a concept can be a *paribhāṣā*, applicable throughout the entire *śāstra*. Equally, within the VP, a *paribhāṣā* can also be seen as a peculiar revealing marker or conventional indication: through a few words in nominalized style the reader becomes capable of situating a debate within a broader philosophical panorama.

These formulations can be formalized as causal sentences, recurring nominalized structures expressed with the grammatical subject in the genitive plus the ablative (sometimes the instrumental) of an abstract term. This is one of the characteristics which cause this renovated tool to resemble the style of ancient philosophical works. However, we must extricate ourselves from simple definitions and argumentative expressions: although some passages match the above-mentioned characteristics, they are common uses of the śāstric language. In fact, even though it is true that since most expressions are formulated in the Navya Nyāya style, it could be considered a meta-linguistic system, nevertheless the specific settlements and regulations I have referred to have a certain echo that goes beyond their textual placement. Furthermore, when these structures are presented within a *śāstra* as hermeneutic keys, they are often placed after a discussion studded with doubts, objections and replies. When DR ends the discussion with a *paribhāṣā*, he wants that answer to acquire a wider echo and to solve similar situations throughout the entire *śāstra*.

It is likely that the sphere in which *paribhāṣās* are used determines different translations of the term: meta-rule, general rule, hermeneutic rule, interpretative maxim, definition, restriction, regulation, settlement or systematization, elucidation, beginner-textbook and also convention and indication. In the textual context treated here, a *paribhāṣā* appears to be a fluid element, capable of acquiring several shapes and semantic nuances or suited to being adjusted to different contents, while remaining remotely faithful to an original *cliché*. This vast range of hints transforms itself fluidly according to the circumstances: when a *paribhāṣā* is wider and more general it is utilised as a hermeneutic key for all similar circumstances, and when it is more precise and focused it is used to regulate and restrict the context in which it is placed.

One more point should be noted. In the traditional *cursus studiorum* of the Kevalādvaitins, the VP is taught as the first text in order to have the student acquire a significant overview of the entire *śāstra*. The importance of the VP is not limited to Advaita. As a matter of fact, other schools of Vedānta – and other *darśanas* as well – should study the VP as an anthological compendium gathering together many arguments scattered throughout Advaita literature, such as those of Prakāśātman and Citsukha, as well as those of Appaya, Nṛsiṃha and Madhusūdana.

To conclude then, the specific *pāribhāṣika* model of the VP reinforces my conviction that, from a certain period on, together with Navya Naiyāyikas, Navya Vaiyākaraṇas, Navya Alaṃkārikas and Navya Mīmāṃsakas we can reasonably speak (apart of course from the political nuances of the eighteenth century) of Navya Vedāntin and even more precisely, of Navya Advaitin.

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