CROSS-
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Proceedings of the
13TH WORLD CONGRESS
of the International Association
for Semiotic Studies (IASS/AIS)

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INTRODUCTION

The 13th World Congress of Semiotics of the International Association for Semiotic Studies (IASS-AIS) took place in Kaunas, Lithuania, from the 26th to the 30th of June 2017. It was hosted by the International Semiotics Institute (ISI), within the premises of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Arts and Humanities at Kaunas University of Technology (KTU). Along with IASS-AIS, ISI and KTU, the chief organizers of the event, the congress enjoyed the cooperation of Baltic Conference Partners, the A. J. Greimas Centre of Semiotics and Literary Theory and the Nordic Association for Semiotic Studies (NASS).

The most important scientific event for the international semiotic community, the congress has been organized since 1974 (in Milan), and it has been hosted in years by Italy (twice), Austria, Spain (twice), US, Mexico, Germany, France, Finland, China and Bulgaria. This was the first edition to take place in Lithuania or in the whole Baltic region. As ISI, we have been of course very proud of this, but most of all we have seen this event as an opportunity to expand the semiotic map, and add another significant pin to it. Among other things, this was the second time that ISI organized a World Congress, the 2007 edition having taken place in Finland, in Helsinki and Imatra, where ISI had its home before it moved to Kaunas in 2014.

Along with the congress as such, and the related activities pertaining to the functioning of IASS-AIS, we were also very happy to host important events like the 10th Conference of the Nordic Association for Semiotic Studies (NASS), the 13th Symposium on Semiotics and Translation SemTra 2017, and, in cooperation with the Greimas Centre, the celebrations of the 100th anniversary of Algirdas Julius Greimas, one of the crucial theoreticians of the whole discipline, and the most important Lithuanian semiotician.

Thanks to the commitment of all the parties involved, the response to the call for papers has been great, and very much in line with the last few editions of the congress, where ca. 500 participants from all over the world joined the event. This edition had nearly 50 countries represented, from every continent of the world. Of all the participants, a bit less than 100 are represented in these selected proceedings, with a variety of topics that covers most, if not all, the thematic areas touched during the various sessions. The theme chosen for this 13th edition of

the congress was "CROSS-INTER-MULTI-TRANS-". The idea was to employ semiotic scholarship to face the challenges and the opportunities in today's world in terms of "relations". Regardless of modes, times and places, indeed, the keywords of nowadays all imply the importance to establish/nurture/understand/reinforce relations: CROSSculturality, INTERfacing, MULTImedia, TRANSgender, CROSSover, INTERspecies, MULTIethnic, TRANSdisciplinary… Via these keywords we describe social changes as well as explain technological innovations, we implement our research paradigms as well as hope for a better world. Due to its very epistemological identity, semiotics seems to be naturally-inclined to be in the frontline of such discussions. This is why the mascot we chose for the event was a platypus, the "Cross-Inter-Multi-Trans" species by definition. You will see this cute monotreme popping up in all the celebrative posters we created for the congress, and that you will see reproduced in this volume.

While the modern academic world, with its seemingly-unstoppable process of "corporatization" of its activities and interests, seems to devote less and less attention to publications like proceedings (i.e., the infamous "points" assigned to dissemination work), we remain convinced of the importance of books like this, not only for their intrinsic scholarly insightfulness, but for the value they bear of witnessing the large assembly of hundreds of members of the same academic community, qualifying by all means for the title of "historical event" within the field in question. Edition after edition, the World Congress of Semiotics has retained its identity and integrity, going hand in hand with the development of semiotics as a whole.

In conclusion, a foreword would not be a foreword without its fair share of acknowledgments. First and foremost, in the specific of this volume, I am thankful to Audronė Daubarienė, Simona Stano and Ulrika Varankaitė for their invaluable editing work. In the midst of various important traditions that the congress has been carrying out throughout the years, there was one I was quite happy to break: the idea that, as scientific director of the congress, my name had to appear basically everywhere as "the main one" – regardless of how much (or how real) an effort I had put in any given activity. This congress was a team performance. The three editors of this volume, all parts of ISI staff, have played crucial roles in it: they deserve adequate credit.

And not just them: I wish to express my sincere gratitude to the colleagues of all the associations and institutions involved, with a particular mention for Paul Cobley and Kristian Bankov, President and General Secretary of IASS-AIS, and my friends and colleagues at ISI, especially the two general secretaries of the congress, Aušra Berkmanienė and Audronė Daubarienė herself. My gratitude goes also to the colleagues and the volunteers at KTU, who helped in various ways, and to other colleagues, outside KTU (and in most cases outside Lithuania too) who offered additional and precious assistance: impossible to name them all, but – my friends – you know who you are. Thank you.

By welcoming you to the 13th World Congress of Semiotics, we have welcomed you to a celebration of interactions, contaminations and relations (and vegan food, as you certainly remember: I hope you have forgiven us, by now). With these selected proceedings, we hope to give the readers a fair idea of what that celebration meant in terms of research and scholarship.

Dario Martinelli

10TH CONFERENCE OF THE NORDIC ASSOCIATION OF SEMIOTIC STUDIES

DESIGNING SCANDINAVIA: A CULTURAL SEMIOTICS APPROACH TO DIALOGIC IMAGE-MAKING

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Abstract

Evaluation of other cultures is a strong force, not only in cultural dialogue but, consequently, in a culture's formation of itself. Cultures are formed in encounters that include domination, conflict, and dismissal as much as appreciation and smooth exchange. In this paper, the construction of cultural identity is discussed, in relation to a Scandinavian Theme Park proposal that was made in cooperation between American consultants and a local Swedish design team. The image production in this design proposal shows that "Scandinavia" appears as a dialogic construction that adopts mainly ready-made cultural identities, or cultural *clichés* as it were. Scandinavian (or Nordic) culture is represented in the visualised proposals by stereotypes such as Vikings, trolls, or element from old Nordic mythology. American (or rather USA-based) values are rather indicated in the project by the way the economic calculus was made, as well as by the choice and style of images in the project, both aspects being strongly influenced by the way Disney parks had been physically realised as amusement areas with attractions building up a world of its own. In a semiotic account of this architectural decision-making, models of culture are here discussed, where the tripartition of culture into Ego culture, Alter culture and Alius culture (Lotman 1990; Sonesson 2000; Cabak Redei 2007) can be seen as a basic abstracted backdrop to what we mean by cultural difference. It is here suggested that this general tripartition, in order to account for the uneven reciprocity that shapes it, could benefit from input from post-colonial studies, and the terms of "mimicry" (Bhabha 1984) and "subalterity" (Spivak 1988), i.e. additions from studies in the particular type of cultural relationships where dominance, or the reciprocal balancing of dominance relations, is fundamental. In a graphic, diagrammatic, representation and devel-

opment of these thoughts on culture formation, it is here suggested that grouped exclusion (as pacts between two "equal" parties kept together at the cost of a third "neglected" party) as well as uneven reciprocity (as pacts between two cultures in situational, but not mutually equal need of each other) is well suited to cast light on the mechanisms of cultural interchange. This means that not only is otherness, curiosity and neglect acknowledged, but also mimetic behaviour and lack of voice, as strong forces in cultural interchange. Such an intercultural approach, based on semiotic capabilities, supports here an analysis of what is sacrificed and what is kept, when images of cultures are created, hence when cultures are formed.

1. Cultural encounters and cultural affairs

Seminal post-colonial views on cultural encounters, such as those of Bhabha (1984) and Spivak (1988), foregrounded what could be called uneven reciprocities of culture, showing how mutual dependence may constitute cultural relationships, and the tactics needed to keep this common world, this situated culture, together. To (pretend to) do as the other — as in mimicry — or to not (be able to) perform the will of the other — as in subalterity — are two facets of cultural formation. Post-colonial situations are often seen as being a matter between two parties, colonizer and colonized, but as was clear already in Spivak's (1988) seminal text on subalterity, the cultural contract was actually tripartite, consisting of: a colonizing tradition, a local tradition, and the voiceless victim of tradition-making. Also the branches, such as Sonesson's (2000) and Cabak Redei's (2007), of cultural semiotics that continued Lotman's (1990) idea of a culture that incorporates other cultures into its sphere, have worked with a tripartite relationship as a basis: an Ego-culture turns with a friendly, even admiring eye to an Alter-culture, at the same time as disregarding Alius-cultures being not even worthy of consideration. Both these theoretical traditions, one grounded in analyses of geo-political difference, one aiming to structure meaning-making in general terms, have taken notions such as reciprocity, appreciation and disregard as the main driving forces in how one culture is perceived by another.

When it comes to architecture and design, the empirical matter of this text, reciprocal forces and cultural influences are usually present in the daily apparatus of dialogue, sketches and image-production that supports the envisioning of new environments, but they are seldom analysed in architectural theory as important in themselves, perhaps because they do not describe the result, they are rather mechanisms in the processes behind the effectuation of new houses, new cities or new facilities for human action. Sometimes, however, the production of "culture" is the explicit objective in design, such as in the case addressed in this paper, where a proposed Scandinavian Theme Park, envisioned as located in Malmö close to the bridge to Copenhagen, will cast light specifically on the production of cultural otherness. The theme park vision here addressed was produced and sketched collaboratively between Swedish planning authorities and globally working American design consultants, starting in 2002. The park idea existed as a projective possibility, discussed for more than ten years, but the project was eventually dropped as in 2013, officially due to lack of managerial interest. The preliminary proposals and sketches of attractions reveal that American (or rather USA based) culture is conveyed through a promise of robust amusement design, while Scandinavian culture is represented by images of Vikings and other stereotypes (Figures 1-3). The images serve here to ask what it means to visually construct a culture. The cultural construct in this case was as a joint venture between a Swedish group of visionaries and the American design consultants BRC Imagination Arts and ERA (Economic Research Associates).

As we shall see, the images produced in this cross-cultural dialogue cast light on more than one type of visual production of "otherness", thus implying that otherness is both a multiple entity, and a necessary part of cultural interchange.

Figure 1. "Viking" theme park attraction (Image: Eksploria Edutainment).

Figure 2. "Gods and Heroes" theme park attraction (Image: Eksploria Edutainment).

Figure 3. "Scandinavia Map" theme park attraction (Image: Eksploria Edutainment).

The promotion images convey a set of attractions within the designated area, a density that reminds us of modernist theme parks with a promising, initially seemingly never-ending amount of attractions, but at the same time they give a generic impression, conveying a kind of "placial emptiness". Emptiness of everyday life is the normal case, and for representational reasons essentially so, in architectural proposals, but in this case it is also partly due to the lack of "real" life in the images. Placial emptiness, or "non-place" was for a long time part of anthropologists' way of regarding the "social facts" (Durkheim 1895) of modern places, or rather, a way to label the unsufficient diversity of social facts traditionally defining a place (Relph 1976; Augé 1995). Such emptiness, it can be argued, is actually partly a "false" disciplinary production of emptiness, created by anthropologists sceptical to new places such as airports, shopping malls or themed places. With "falsity", I mean here a quite longstanding view (Relph 1976; Augé 1995) that seem to forget that as soon as new architecture is established there are also new activities established that start to anchor the place meaningfully (Sandin 2012; Lazzari 2012). The theme park proposal in Malmö was however truly impaired by a non-place anxiousness, in the sense that it conveys an over-scrupulous urge to engage people. However, this urging is done through obsolete traditional means of attraction, within a limited physical location, hence the effect is reverse from the intended one. The visual rendering could therefore be said to convey a kind of reverse anthropological emptiness (empty despite architectural and population density). The emptiness present in these images is due to the pictorial elimination of activities other than the obligatory ones that are traditionally given as amusement park activities.

David Kolb (2008) points to the fact that every themed place has to be consciously and continuously put forth as such, thereby suggesting an anchoring in a lived reality beyond — or behind — the theme itself. There is, according to Kolb, always a reality acting to produce the theme, a reality virtually lacking in design renderings. The general habit in architectural visualisation — of reducing away "unnecessary" stuff for the sake of keeping visionary focus — risks however, if we trust people's ability to judge images, to become unbeneficial for the project because the content may be perceived as too typified, too ignorant of the lived world.

2. Designing cultural encounters

The fact that images appeared in the proposal representing an already existing theme park-oriented style of BRC's was completely in line with the clichés of ERA's preliminary list of preliminary sub-themes and attractions: "Scandinavian Kingdom; Viking World; Five Worlds/Holy Wood; Human Factor/Fantastic Factory; World of the Car; Film/TV Studio Tour; Music/Music; Other Attractions (Sky Tower, UN Plaza, Sculpture Park, World Train, International River)" (ERA 2002). Both the images and the list of themes seem to emanate from the success of mid 20th century animation technologies originally made in relation to the Disney film industry. The images of this project were however not made by the sole hand of the design consultant BRC, but were produced in a dialogue between the American firm and the Swedish group of entrepreneurs, visionaries and politicians. Thus, a common cultural construction was made for the purpose of selling a concept about a region to an extended regional audience. But what about the local population? Was it heard?

The amusement stereotypes were here not a result of ignorance, but were actually desired, conceptualised as the "familiar" and "well-known" qualities aimed at catching the interest of an audience and, in the first instance possible financiers (ERA 2002). On the whole, these depictions, like visions in general, are not images made to present as true as possible a culture, not even as true as possible a representation of the actual future amusement environment, but they are ultimately made simply to sell amusement. They are, just as most visionary architectural imagery, and every depiction of an apartment for sale, made to arouse a certain desire as part of the place rendered.

But the campaign in Malmö also had an objective to find examples with a typically Scandinavian figuration, and in accordance with the presumed commercial end objective, they went for a well-known, even clichéd, cultural figuration, instead of for instance a slightly less known, or completely unknown heritage — which could have been another point of departure. Theoretical attempts at describing culture and cultural traits are several, and they virtually go hand in hand with how disciplines within the humanities, and to some extent the social sciences, form themselves as disciplines. The languages, the literature and the art works of a culture are often thought of as what define cultures. Explicit theorisation on what constitutes cultures, and how they work and build themselves, as found in anthropology, organisation theory, or biology, depends more on who, or what, it is that form a certain common interest, or set of rules, that defines the culture of a population. While several of these disciplines regard their subject as a "positive" one, in the sense that the matter studied simply defines, or reflects, the culture surrounding it, late modern theorisation on cultures, including post-colonial studies and cultural semiotics, has been more concerned with seeing those traits as conditioned by relations between *different* cultures. They have been more occupied with how cultural difference and cultural exchange can be modelled, giving some explanation to how appreciation, conflict, and dismissal not only appears in politics, in regional controversy and in cultural history, but how such affective and value-based mutual regard of one another, is the actual decisive force of culture.

3. Mimicry, subalterity and cultural dependence

The basic figures of thought in early post-colonial theory concerned how essentially differing cultures (colonizer and colonized) are involved in mutual but uneven sharing of interests, and how silently accepted agreements or silenced voices (Spivak 1988) regulates a daily living together. Forced (and sometimes fake) reciprocity as well as simulated likeness between members of differing cultures can be seen as hiding patterns of dominance in their relationship (Bhabha 1984), but such mimicry also makes joint cultures get along on a daily basis, thus avoiding completely disrupting conflict (or even cultural death). Even if these figures of thought emanates from severe living conditions and cruel upholding of cultural roles, the will here lend themselves to cast some light on our case of specifically architectural co-production of cultural image making.

Mutual dependency is a decisive force in cultures' definition of themselves (Bhabha 1984). Mimicry, or the tendency to imitate cultural behaviour and artefacts, can on the one hand be seen as a desired will from a dominant culture, enacted to eliminate unproductive difference towards the dominated culture. On the other hand, mimicry can also be a (counter-)strategy from a dominated culture to align to a certain degree with a dominating culture. Mimicry — seen this way — is "at once [an act of] resemblance and menace" (Bhabha 1984). Mimicry, or the tendency to imitate the other's behaviour, values and taste, is not as a straightforward communicational tool, but always works by retaining a certain difference. Elimination of difference is — for both parts — essentially a semblance, since difference in such mutual situations is the very fundament for co-existence. It is a matter of almost same, but not really (Bhabha 1988).

Mimicry, as a tactic to reach an advantage, or to survive, is possible only if you have the position to be part of the deal. Some groups in societies, and as here, in design dialogue, are not even heard. And the subaltern – those who are not only other but moreover do not have opportunity to speak their voice (Spivak 1984), are in the contemporary land use and planning business a category that is actualised when the designs are not aimed for the real users to take part in, but only concerns them as stereotyped economical figures invented to fit the ideas developed between the two main business interests. In our case the subaltern are the abstract and demographically defined visitors talked of in the interest of city branding and entertainment design.

In the Scandinavian Theme Park case subalterity was not only an effect of factual lack of user participation, but a subaltern category was also actively created already in the initial descriptions, formulated by ERA, when they — ironically in what they regard as an educational effort — try to induce their preferred feelings and response into the wills of potential users, announcing in public what the visitor wants. This kind of inducement is an intervention completely different from the kind of "subject-engagement" Spivak (2012) seeks in political-aesthetic activity.

4. Otherness in semiotic modelling of culture

Branches of cultural semiotics that see culture as a matter of exchange of values and information (Lotman 1990; Sonesson 2000) often take evaluation of another culture as a starting point, viewing appreciation as well as disregard for the other as main driving forces in how culture is perceived, modelled and construed. Reciprocity is a fundamental feature of the notion of "semiosphere", launched as a concept earlier by Jurij Lotman (1971; 1976; 1990) with the aim of capturing a perceiving culture's exchange of meaning and substance with familiar cultures (inside the sphere) or unfamiliar cultures (outside of it). The idea of a semiosphere (containing known languages, behaviour, concepts and values) helps us understand what happens when the borders between cultures are violated and partially dismantled. Lotman (1990) also launched the idea that it is in the act of circulating a cultural product to other cultures, or extra-cultures, and getting it in return, that we see our own cultural act again in a new light. Lotman called this process auto-communication, or activation of an I-I channel. This type of circular communication, if we look at it from different angles, actually contains several types of otherness, or "extra-quality". We could name four of them as: (i) the quality of circulation into other media that reflects the message ("extra" in the sense an outside quality); (ii) unforeseen secondary communicational effects ("extra" as a surplus quality); (iii) advanced communication with high-evaluated recipients ("extra" as having a prominence quality); and (iv) understanding that certain impossibilities are present in communication ("extra" as an unreachability quality) (Figure 4).

Hence, following this model, we have in circulation of cultural matter "extra-quality" ap-

Figure 4. Various aspects of "Extra-quality" in cultural dialogue, in a diagrammatic interpretation of Lotman's concepts of "auto-communication" and "semiosphere". Black arrows symbolize the circulation of a cultural product (or "text" in Lotman's terminology).

pearing as outsideness, surplus, prominence and unreachability. This multiplicity fits well with design thinking, and with the idea in design thinking of a reflective practitioner. Nevertheless, this kind of multiplicity is forgotten in design cases where specific ideas are too confined from the start, and where a mono-idea is therefore put forth.

In the line of thought that follows Lotman (1990), the act of getting to know an unknown culture is a matter of bringing it into the semiosphere of the well-known culture. This branch of cultural semiotics builds partly on the dichotomies of known-unknown, and liked-detested, i.e. dichotomies that in many cases are too simple to make real sense.In semiotic theory this model has therefore been refined, either through modalizing cultural complexity into "degrees of semiotization" (Posner 2004), or by problematizing the notion of "other" by introducing the double character of "alter" (neighbouring) and "alius" (unknown) cultures, standing in radically different positions to the "ego" culture (Sonesson 2000; 2014; Cabak-Redei 2007). These interpretations and extensions of Lotman's model take into account cases where the "foreign" culture is appreciated/understood but also ignored/depreciated. In the case of design, and as here in a theme park project that deals explicitly with the design of a (Scandinavian) "culture", these semiotic theories introduce the idea that cultural constructs have to include varying modes of cultivation, such as when a growing knowledge about the construed culture is the case. This kind of semiotic thinking is a way of making more transparent how incorporation and rejection appear in cultural dialogue.

Each cultural encounter, and each realised mutual cultural modelling also has temporal features. When one culture approaches another, different aspects and qualities may be approached simultaneously, in a synchronic process, and other aspects need successive encounters, a diachronic process, to slowly make something become familiar. We can look closer into this familiarisation by applying some thought from Peirce.

In the processes of cultural reciprocity here accounted for, Peirce's basic constituents of representation can be seen as activated: iconicity (resemblance) appear as an instant recognition of something; indexicality (proximity) works to incorporate our impressions of the other culture into our known world; and symbolicity (habit) is activated when we find the common ground against which we can articulate a new cultural construct (Ståhl & Sandin 2011). These three representational faculties are, in line with contemporary interpretations of Peirce (Sonesson 2013; Colapietro 1989) always present in human exchange of meaning, to a varying degree, and importantly, in varying order. In meaning making — or semiotic — processes in general we assume, in line with Peirce, that the three main forms for representation: icon, index and symbol, appear on the one hand simultaneously (synchronically) and on the other, in a way where they need each other to mature (diachronically). If we apply these Peircean figures of thought into the landscape of cultural semiotics, it is not a far fetched hypothesis that synchronic assimilation is more prevalent when Ego assimilates Alter, whereas diachronic processes would be more likely to appear when Alius is sceptically regarded from the point of view of Ego. Even if both types of temporal processes are part of both types of cultural exchange, we may assume that when a foreign culture is approached it is more often done in successive steps. The first impressions and recognitions of sounds and forms are followed by intuitive connections to other things, only to be followed in their turn by a more reflected symbolical understanding of what it was that was recognized in the first place. We have in other words, when we meet a foreign culture, a sequence much aligned with how Peirce imagined how impressions mature into full signs (Ståhl & Sandin 2011). Cultures we already regard as familiar, are generally approached with a larger immediate reliance on, and understanding of, the impressions, links and habits that we meet, whereas the foreign cultures will likely need a more substantial measure of trial and interpretational effort. The latter is also more likely to lead to neglect or misunderstanding, since for instance language

and habits are different. If we accept this basic difference between approaches towards known and unknown parties in cultural interaction, we get a description of cultural semiosis where the *Ego* culture establishes a temporally, conducted difference between an *Alter* culture and an *Alius* culture (Figure 5).

Figure 5. A model of the separations that an Ego culture makes between an Alter culture and an Alius culture, including how these two types of "otherness" are constructed temporally, and containing three types of representational (Peircean) principles. This model extends on semiotic divisions previously made by Sonesson (2000) and Cabak Redei (2007).

This semiosic difference appears as a temporal factor simply because the representational stages need each other to mature, and this is done differently in approaches towards known and unknown cultures respectively.

5. Conclusion

Cultural constructions including the repressive forces of cultural encounters, here rendered through both post-colonial theory and semiotic accounts, can apart from being vital parts of cultural modelling in general, also assist reflection on actual constructs, or as here designs, of cultural artefacts. In the case of the theme park proposal here accounted for, but also in the general case of cultural production, the modelling of culture, as argued in this text, could introduce thoughts of diversity as a vital part of the resulting cultural "product". A semiotic view that emphasises temporality and the stages of conceptualisation needed in recognition of each other's culture has a possibility to model what happens in human encounters as these go on. We have seen here that the formation of joint constructs of culture contains mimicry — mutual imitation of manners, tastes and procedures — that assists the progress of projects. These mimetic processes are general mechanisms in the making of culture, as it goes on. In line with such a process-oriented view we have also seen here, in reflection of cultural encounters and co-cultural production, that cultural analysis gains from making temporality an explicit part. This was done here by reflecting on the one hand on the multiple "extra" effects that may be generated by auto-communicative acts, i.e. acts where the return of a concept alters the self-view

of the sending culture. We have also seen that both successive and simultaneous building up of semiotic meaning can add new aspects to what it means to approach and understand another culture. Reciprocal constructs of culture are silently present in the image-production that supports the envisioning of new environments in general. Not only in the here rendered case where the production of "culture" is an explicit architectural task and the actual objective of the design, but in any co-operated image-making, reflections on the multiple forces in cultural reciprocity is needed in order to make cultural production trustworthy. And not only in the case here addressed, with explicit visualisation of the forming of cultural futures, but in any situation where there are two or more agents that have an interest related to identity (of for instance commercial, political or projective type), a common view is often wished for, and often presented as such, but in reality seldom truly common, or negotiated on equal terms.

A more reflected recognition of the reciprocal alterity that appears whenever cultural exchange is at hand, has here been argued to inform semiotic modelling in general, but also planning procedures as they form societies. A modelling of culture based in reciprocal alterity makes it possible to encompass more representational aspects, and thus portray cultural encounters more accurately. Such a perspective should also stand a chance to respond to a more diverse account of voices in the daily practice of planning and design. This latter practical aspect does not mean, of course, that spatial negotiation and architectural design should be schematized, or that it necessarily has to follow certain dialogical procedures, just that there are in fact models at hand, based on analysis of dialogue in cultural encounters, that may serve as enlightening and supporting resources.

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ENCYCLOPEDIA AND SEMIOSPHERE

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Abstract

This paper aims at drawing a link between Echian and Lotmanian semiotic theories and, in particular, between the concepts of encyclopedia and of semiosphere. These two concepts have been indicated as akin, but, we argue, there are some key differences.

1. Eco and Lotman

Italy has been one of the most receptive countries to the innovations brought to semiotics by the Tartu-Moskow Semiotic School and, especially, by the works of J. M. Lotman and B. Uspenskij. There are several Lotmanian semioticians in Italy and many works of the Tartu-Moskow School have been available in Italian since the Sixties. This led to an intense, and often productive, dialogue among the major semiotic schools in Italy, namely French-tradition semiotics, and in particular the works of A. Greimas and the Italian branch of interpretative semiotics, established by the works of Umberto Eco.

I would like, here, to focus especially on the latter, which promoted an early dialogue with what, at the time, was known as "Soviet semiotics". Umberto Eco himself, along with translator Remo Faccani, has been the editor of one of the very first Italian book dedicated to "Soviet structuralism": *I sistemi di segni e lo strutturalismo sovietico* published by Bompiani in 1969, containing articles by Ivanov, Revzin, B. Uspenskij, Toporov, Lekomcheva, Lotman and many others.

In particular, Umberto Eco's interest in Lotman's works has been consistent all along his life. It is not a case that Eco wrote the introduction to *the Universe of the Mind* in 1990 where he praises Lotman's ability of going beyond structuralism:

> Lotman has managed to fuse the structural method (which takes a synchronic approach, that is, the description of a culture system at a given moment in time) with his vocation as historian* a historian interested in explaining how a culture is formed and how different culture systems, distant from one another in time, can be compared (Eco in Lotman 2009: xi).

Eco, in fact, integrated in his theories several concepts both from Lotman and from other Tartu-Moscow scholars. In *A theory of semiotics* (1976) and then in *Semiotics and philosophy of language* (1986) he mentions both Juri Lotman and Boris Uspenskij several times. In particular, he commits to the idea of an articulation between *primary* and *secondary* modelling systems, and he borrows some concepts from Lotman's and Uspenskij's works on the typology of cultures — namely the distinction between grammar-oriented and text-oriented cultures, that he renames hyper-codified and ipo-codified cultures. These few lines should be enough to demonstrate the level of intellectual exchange that existed between the two semioticians and their respective schools.

In this paper, then, I wish to propose an overview on the similarities and differences between two of the more popular concepts from the two semioticians, respectively: Lotman's idea of the semiosphere and Eco's semantic system based on an encyclopedic model. The research question arises because the two concepts have often been mentioned as akin, if not indicated as being basically the same thing. These claims, however, are generally done *en passant* and certainly require more investigation.

2. Differences and similarities

Let us start, then, from the semiosphere, probably the most popular theory from Juri Lotman. The semiosphere was initially theorized by Lotman as the semiotic analogous of Vernadsky's *biosphere* and defined as "the semiotic space necessary for the existence and functioning of languages, not the sum total of different languages; in a sense the semiosphere has a prior existence and is in constant interaction with languages" (Lotman 1990: 123-124).

His first conceptualisation outlines an omni-comprehensive semiosphere, which encompasses all texts, languages and modelling systems of human kind — outside of it there can be neither communication nor language. Lotman, however, abandons quickly the universalistic version of the theory of the semiosphere and uses this term to indicate a smaller object:

> At the same time, throughout the whole space of semiosis, from social jargon and age-group slang to fashion, there is also a constant renewal of codes. So any one language turns out to be immersed in a semiotic space and it can only function by interaction with that space. The unit of semiosis, the smallest functioning mechanism, is not the separate language but the whole semiotic space of the culture in question. This is the space we term the semiosphere (Lotman 1990: 124-125).

Here, the term is used to refer to the semiotic space *of a single culture*, built around a central natural language. From this point of view, there are several semiospheres separated by boundaries. We have thus a passage from "the" semiosphere to "a" semiosphere. This double articulation should not be seen as contradictory: it is based on the fractal structure of culture. For this reason, Lotman also employs the term "sub-semiospheres" to refer to the semiosphere of a single language or even of a single text. These smaller semiotic systems share the same structure, feature and dynamics with the larger semiosphere encompassing them.

It is probably also because of this duality that Lotman often uses metaphors in order to hold his readers figure what he means. Interestingly enough, Eco quotes a rather long definition of the semiosphere in his introduction to *The Universe of the Mind*, taking it from the book itself and presenting it as its favourite take on the topic: the metaphor of the museum.

> Imagine a museum hall where exhibits from different periods are on display, along with inscriptions in known and unknown languages, and instructions for decoding them; there are also the explanations composed by the museum staff, plans for tours and rules for the behaviour of the visitors. Imagine also in this

hall tour-leaders and visitors and imagine all this as a single mechanism (which in a certain sense it is). This is an image of the semiosphere. Then we have to remember that all elements of the *semiosphere are in dynamic, not static, correlations whose terms are constantly changing. We notice this specially at traditional moments which have come down to us from the past (definition by Lotman quoted by Eco in Lotman 1990: 126-127).

He probably liked very much this quote as he will mention this entire paragraph again in his book *From the tree to the labyrinth* (2014), several years later. Nevertheless, Eco proposes also another metaphor, this time his own, and describes the semiosphere as a forest:

> If we put together many branches and great quantity of leaves, we still cannot understand the forest. But if we know how to walk through the forest of culture with our eyes open, confidently following the numerous paths which criss-cross it, not only shall we be able to understand better the vastness and complexity of the forest, but we shall also be able to discover the nature of the leaves and branches of every single tree. This book gives an indication of both the vastness and the allure of the forest and helps us to understand the form and the colour of the leaves and branches through which the forest lives (in Lotman 1990: xiii).The picturesque idea of a walk in a forest as a representation of interpretation is, of course, the same that we can find in his 1994 book *Six walks in the fictional woods. Tout se tient.*

If the semiosphere was born from a parallelism with biology, Eco's idea of "encyclopedia" arose as a criticism to the semantic models organised as trees, that he refers to as "dictionaries" (see Eco 1976, 1986, and especially 2014). The main fallacy of these models, he argues, is the idea that there can be a set of "primitives": a series of meaning-bearing unities that determine the meaning of all other signs. However, either the primitives cannot be interpreted, and therefore it would be impossible to explain the meaning of a term, or they can and *must* be interpreted, and thus cannot be limited in number. Following the second possibility, then, the structure of the semantic model cannot be a dictionary, but it becomes that of an *encyclopedia.*

The encyclopedia is a rather Peircean concept, as it is founded on the idea of unlimited semiosis: every semantic unity is only explained by other semantic unities, without ever arriving to a "source" of meaning, but continuing in an endless process. As interpretants are always interpretable, there is no bidimensional tree that can represent the global semantic structure of a culture. This representation, described by Eco (1976) as the "Model Q", is only a semiotic postulate, a regulative idea that takes the format of a multidimensional network. In other words, then, the encyclopedia is used to indicate the architecture of human knowledge and, by extension, the ensemble of all human knowledge altogether.

This formulation led several scholars to see the encyclopedia as rather akin to Lotman's semiosphere, so much that in 2014 it will be Eco himself, in a footnote of *From the tree to the labyrinth,* that will deal with the similarity of the two concepts:

> It has been suggested that the concept of a semiotic encyclopedia corresponds to Lotman's idea of the semiosphere (...). In point of fact Lotman's semiosphere would appear on the one hand to be still vaster than a Maximal Encyclopedia because it also contains the private and idiosyncratic notions of the individual visitors; on the other hand, it is, so to speak, regulated by someone (the organizers) and therefore appears rather to be the territory of a culture that has set up rules to distinguish a Median Encyclopedia from the Specialized Encyclopedias (Eco 2014: 73, note 39).

Eco mentions here two dimensions where the encyclopedia and the semiosphere differ: their extension and their structure. Lotman dedicates quite several pages to the structure of the semiosphere. He describes it as having a centre and a periphery, which are characterised by an inner dynamism and a series of hierarchies and, most importantly, he insists on the importance of the borders between different semiospheres (seen as permeable spaces of translation).

On the other hand, Eco's encyclopedia has a *rhizomatic* structure, that of a labyrinth were every point is united to every other point by countless possible paths. Rhizomes, however, don't have centres and neither do encyclopedias, at least according to D'Alambert (in Eco 2014: 83). If the labyrinthine nature *per se* wouldn't be too problematic for a parallelism with the semiosphere (Lotman insists in its criss-crossing nature), the centre is indeed one of the core elements of Lotman theory and cannot be disregarded without losing epistemological soundness. Nevertheless, Eco appears to recuperate the idea of a "centre" when he speaks of *median* and *specialised* encyclopedias:

> Median Encyclopedia (shared in the present case by both the naturalist and the common native speaker) and on the other an unmanageable plethora of Specialized Encyclopedias, the complete collection of which would constitute the unattainable Maximal Encyclopedia. Accordingly, we could imagine the states (or strata) of what Putnam has called the social division of linguistic labor by hypothesizing a kind of solar system (the Maximal Encyclopedia) in which a great many Specialized Encyclopedias describe orbits of varying circumferences around a central nucleus (the Median Encyclopedia), but at the center of that nucleus we must also imagine a swarm of Individual Encyclopedias representing in sundry and unforeseeable ways the encyclopedic notions of each individual (Eco 2014: 72).

We are clearly facing an opposition which is rather similar to that of Lotman's centre and periphery, only fixed in a sort of astrophysical immobility. This lack of dialogue between encyclopedias, which could be problematic, is however only apparent: despite the metaphor used by Eco in this case, his understanding of the encyclopedia is that of an absolutely dynamic and diachronically complex structure.

As for the extension, Eco claims that the semiosphere appears to be larger than the Maximal Encyclopedia because it includes the "visitors" — i.e. the human beings that are part of a said culture. Eco describes the Maximal Encyclopedia as an encyclopedia that:

> Is not content with merely recording what "is true" (...). It records instead everything that has been claimed in a social context, not only what has been accepted as true, but also what has been accepted as imaginary. It exists as a regulating principle: yet this regulating idea, which cannot constitute the starting point for a publishable project because it has no organizable form, serves to identify portions of encyclopedias that can be activated, insofar as they serve to construct provisional hierarchies or manageable networks, with a view to interpreting and explaining the interpretability of certain segments of discourse (2014: 72).

This description seems to account of the two ideas of semiosphere implicitly present in Lotman's work. On the one hand for the "universal" semiosphere — the one that Lotman theorizes as similar to Vernadsky biosphere and encompassing the whole world — and on the other hand the cultural semiospheres — those endowed with internal hierarchies and borders between them and that are typically related to a single culture.

The difference, then, seems to be limited to the presence of the so called "visitors of the museum": the inhabitants of the semiosphere that are excluded from the encyclopedia. The presence or absence of these "visitors", however, may be symptomatic of a far greater difference between the two models.

Eco's encyclopedia, being a semantic model, has no presence in the physical world. It can be mirrored by a text, or by a practice, but its dimension is purely abstract and deals only with interpretation. The semiosphere too has a semantic dimension, but it is deeply rooted in its material manifestations: the texts and the anthropic organisation of space. In other words, going back to the metaphor of the forest that Eco used to describe the semiosphere, we can say that

while Lotman, with the semiosphere, describes the forest itself, including the people that walk in it, Eco's encyclopedia deals with the infinite paths that one can walk through the "*forêt de symboles*" (as Baudeaire would call it) that can be travelled through like a rhizomatic labyrinth.

3. Conclusions

We can conclude, therefore, that while simply equating these two models would be a mistake, the similarities of the two models are not fortuitous: they are the result of a sort of parallel evolution of the description of two different aspects of the same semiotic phenomenon. The integration of these two models, then, might be desirable.

For example, if Lotman describes in detail the movements and dynamics of texts and modelling systems inside the semiosphere, he recognises that the inhabitants of the semiosphere have a ubiquitous presence in it: "In the mind of modern man there mingles Newtonian, Einsteinian (and even post-Einsteinian) ideas with deeply mythological images as well as persistent habits of seeing the world in its everyday sense" (1990: 203). Eco's encyclopedia, therefore, offers a model — the rhizomatic one — that explains this ubiquity and describes how individuals move through the semiosphere.

On the other hand, we can claim that the hierarchies and dynamics of the semiosphere apply also to the encyclopedia. This might not be particularly interesting if we deal with collective encyclopedias, but may be rather intriguing if we think about the *individual* ones. This would allow us to outline a sort of semiotic of individual knowledge that sees the latter isomorphic with the semiosphere. Every individual, therefore, would have its personal "centre" and its "periphery", and, of course, would be separated by other people by intellectual borders.

These two examples, that need still further development, are nevertheless telling, as they show us the possible benefits of integrating these two theories.

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INDEX AS GATEKEEPER TOWARD DIALOGIC REASONING: PEIRCE AND BEYOND

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Abstract

This inquiry capitalizes on the relational character of Peirce's index. Its evolution from object finder in the physical world, to enhancer of communication between minds, to modal/perspectival coordinator is examined. Its relational character organizes events into episodes, and obviates perspectival alterations in dialogic reasoning. This shift demonstrates Peirce's last word regarding Index: a sign intrinsically dialogic, whose interpretants increase levels of consciousness, and advance communicational interaction by commanding self/others to believe/act in novel ways.

Its power to coordinate specific, vivid images provides index with the means to suggest novel propositions, assertions, and arguments. Peirce memorializes this relational role by characterizing index as Pheme, and as Dicisign (1904: 8.334-9; 1906: MS295: 26; 1908: EP2:489-90). Ultimately, index integrates the logical with the phenomenological and the empirical with the semiotic – when it deploys relational operators to trace event templates and to predict participant's perspectives. As such, interpreters restructure thought and action and recommend sound courses of action for diverse event participants.

1. Introduction

This account provides Peirce's ultimate perspective regarding the function of index, initially serving as "zoom" agent to orient attention of interlocuters to physical objects in the here and now, later orienting them to the logicality of propositions and assertions, and finally becoming a modal operator to facilitate habit-change (cf. West 2016). From these three functions, four operations of index are posited: attention securing, integrating individuals with the continuum, expressing propositions and assertions, and serving as modal operator.

When Index acquires Dicisign status (with the emergence of linguistic forms of pointing) the element of Thirdness begins its energizing work (cf. West in press). At this stage, Index

graduates from "asserting nothing," to asserting logical meanings. The Pheme constitutes Index's transition from command to Dicisign, having a more subjunctive effect. Peirce demonstrates that Index can bring assertions before others' minds via imperatives, interrogatives, or declaratives. The Pheme operates primarily as an imperative; and the representamen can constitute: a gesture, a word, or a fact of culture/nature. But, Index's graduation to Dicisign, raises it to the status of implied argument, in that beyond its attentional and compulsive powers, Index can recommend alternative assertions, thereby altering others' reactions, and habits of mind.

2. Early attributes of index:

Peirce introduces Index as a sign promulgating attention to simple propositions, implicit in gestural performatives (cf. West in press). At this point in Peirce's development of it, Index does not possess any assertory power – in fact, it "asserts nothing" but "takes hold of our eyes" and rivets them to "a particular object of sense" (1885: 3.361). Here Peirce showcases the imperative nature of Index in forcing sign users to focus on a particular subject of discourse. As such, its purpose is not primarily to indicate, as many semioticians claim, but to orient sign interpreters to the conditions/contingencies critical to the sign event – coordinating its pulse, temporally, spatially, and participatorily.

Indicating alone does not characterize the unique attributes of Index; In fact, "indicating" is often used synonymously with "signifying," which is the work of all signs; otherwise signs would fall short of a triadic character, lacking the component of Thirdness. Rather, index's unique function is to direct emotionally and cognitively, supplying orientational qualities. It ultimately coordinates spatial and temporal features of experienced and future events for speaker and listener. To have an orienting effect index must "mesmerize" the event participants, imposing both physical and psychological force -- limiting the subject of discourse and facilitating sign interpretation. [1] Index "takes hold of our eyes," (1885: 3.361), and directs will, action, and thought, in order that speaker and listener have a "common place to stand" (1908: MS 614).

Peirce emphasizes this attention-securing purpose of Index at earlier stages in his treatment of it, because of the primacy of Secondness within his semiotic. Nonetheless, Peirce was still short of realizing that, even in the natural world, Thirdness operates in producing potential Secondnesses as forms of pregenerative Thirdness (cf. Deely 2015: 780 and West under review), or in suggesting alternative (future) states of mind. In 1885 when Peirce characterizes index as imperative, an agent of force in the here and now, he prefigures the infusion into Index of increasingly more logical Interpretants: "it [Index] forcibly directs them [our eyes] to a particular object, and there it stops…" (3.361). As imperative, Index induces an effect upon sign receivers, compelling them to notice the relevance of particular Dynamical Objects, and to ascribe new habits of action to those objects. This operation constitutes an elementary form of Thirdness – in raising to another's consciousness the unique attributes of Dynamical Objects, which otherwise might have been obscured. Consequently, Index together with the dynamical object insinuate themselves upon the awareness, to the degree that the mind of the sign receiver has little choice but to notice (with some scrutiny) additional qualities intrinsic to the object.

In 1897 Peirce extends the pool of representamen which can compel attention -- from purely gestural to linguistic (without including facts of nature and the like), but objects still must be present concurrently with sign production. Like gestures, he grants the same power to words (demonstrative pronouns), providing them with imperative status -- the means to force atten-

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1 "One of these kinds [of sign] is the *index*, which like a pointing finger exercises a real physiological *force* over the attention, like the power of a mesmerizer, and directs it to a particular object of sense. One such index at least must enter into every proposition, its function being to designate the subject of discourse." (1885: 8.41).

tion to objects in Secondness. Like gestures, words constitute Indices if they refer to present Objects – having the effect of changing the sign receiver's focus: "… an Indexical word… has force to direct the attention of the listener to some haecceity common to the experience of speaker and listener" (3.460). In extending the representamen of Index to words, Peirce ascribes imperative status to symbols, endowing words with the power to impel attention. In attributing to words the force to alter another's topic of discourse, Peirce transfers to single word utterances a deictic function -- to individuate in the stream of Secondness/"haecceity." In short, with the advent of words as pointers, Index acquires a symbolic character; and the influence of the Dynamical Object continues to exert a primary force even when words serve as pointers, despite their benefit to disambiguate when accompanied by indexical gestures. In attributing to words indexical and hence propositional status, Peirce allows the Term, a single word (representing a static event) to imply an entire proposition. Still the word substantially depends upon gestural Indices to disambiguate the intended object, and to hasten well-formed interpretations for other sign users.

Peirce continues to follow this rationale in 1905 (8.335) as follows: "I define an Index as a sign determined by its dynamic object by virtue of being in a real relation to it". A word, together with a gesture more clearly serves an indexical function – both individuate the same Dynamical Object. The indexes together validate shifts in discourse topics; but, the word has an additional function, to identify the object as a member of a class. It does so by implying similarity relations with like objects – those bearing the same name (cf. West 2013: chapter 2).

3. Index as individual:

Peirce's second characteristic of Index (as individual) resolves the seeming contradiction in adhering to momentary existence while giving great weight to the continuum. He likewise introduces Index as assertion. In Secondness, Index showcases coherence among all of the members instantiated within the continuum, superseding the single contribution of particular dynamical objects in specific places and at fixed times (cf. West 2015). This coherence of Dynamical Objects to the continuum forms the foundation for building event structures, such that the function of diverse objects in diverse contexts provenates the operation of Thirdness - it foundationalizes the triad's future instantiations. At the same time, Index is afforded an assertory power. The relations which Index as individual implies constitute the foundation to forge would-be effects of objects upon one another. This may involve altering the placement, orientation, and use of these objects, hence foreshadowing the dynamic character of event templates. The perceived object relations make possible the generation of novel assertions – conjectures as to who is impinging upon what and what kind of events might ultimately transpire, e.g., agentive giving and receiving, or experiencing an unexpected state of being. In making these relation-based suggestions, the individual nature of Index is welded into the continuum – it examines which propositions must be modified based upon composite experience, to establish which propositions speakers/listeners will assert. To this end, Index brings together event frames (cf. West 2014), integrating spatial and temporal components to appreciate time and space travel, the event's episodic complexion. Index traces event shape by highlighting event features: beginnings, middles, and conclusions/destinations. This translates into assertion-making when directed motion suggests which participants are necessary to carry out the event.

Peirce elaborates upon Index's unique means to signify moving events, without resorting to spoon-fed resemblance/culturally agreed upon meanings. He constructs the case that no other sign can synthesize particular Seconds with individual features of Secondness (present, past, future) to form assertions. Hence, the unique effects of Index operate: to obviate physical and logical relations, and to make relevant the individual to the continuum. Index does this by

coordinating the stuff of different Secondnesses – orienting sign users to relevant spatial and temporal axes. Peirce illustrates this in the following passage:

> Indices may be distinguished from other signs, or representations, by three characteristic marks: first, that they have no significant resemblance to their objects; second, hat they refer to individuals, single units, single collections of units, or single continua; third, that they direct the attention to their objects by blind compulsion. …Psychologically, the action of indices depends upon association by contiguity, and not upon association by resemblance or upon intellectual operations (1901: 2.305).

Here the attribution of contiguity to Index is plain; it serves as relations enhancer, uniting the momentary existence of individuals with the whole of the continuum. Recognition of relations in contiguity operates when Index regulates the association of sign to place and time of an Object's appearance, because it monitors potential changes in the where and when of Objects' instantiation.

In the previous passage, Peirce still requires that Index (gesture, word) be employed concurrently with a present object, but he extends the dynamical object to mental constructs, e.g., images in the mind –allowing temporal distance between the Dynamical Object and Index. This represents a significant semiotic transition. Index can now have as its Object, something mental (an image), which permits sign-object attenuation. This attenuation strengthens the sign, and lays the groundwork for incorporation of time-travel necessary to shape the episodic character of moving events (cf. West 2014). It likewise shepherds the increased influence of the Immediate Object – attributing to the object in question the means to link in the mind similar Dynamical Objects and their meanings/effects.

When Index progresses in semiosis with more elaborated Immediate Objects and Logical Interpretants (illustrated by attenuated uses), it acquires iconic qualities —affording a more informational interpretant: "An Index or Seme … is a Representamen whose Representative character consists in its being an individual Second. If the Secondness is an existential relation, the Index is genuine. If the Secondness is a reference, the Index is degenerate. A genuine Index and Its Object must be existent individuals (whether things or facts), and its immediate Interpretant must be of the same character. But since every individual must have characters, it follows that a genuine Index may contain a Firstness, and so an Icon, as a constituent part of it. Any individual is a degenerate Index of its own characters. Examples of Indices are the hand of a clock, and the veering of a weathercock. Subindices or hyposemes are signs which are rendered such principally by an actual connection with their objects. Thus, a proper, [a] personal, demonstrative, or relative pronoun, or a letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a real connection with its object, but none of these is an Index, since it is not an individual" (1903: EP2:274). Personal, demonstrative, and relative pronouns are indices only when they refer to present objects for the first time, because it is then, and then, only that their principle function is to individuate; in subsequent applications to the same Objects, they are not indices since an association has already been established with that object and a particular interpretant housing iconic or symbolic meanings. In the latter cases, the object has already been singled out from the pool of potential referents (cf. West 2013 chapter 7). In short, in making prominent Index's role as "zoom agent" and tracker of discourse topics, emphasizing momentary shifts, Peirce disqualifies certain Legisigns from having Indexical status. Such is determined by the presence of a Legisign and a Logical Interpretant.

This status is assumed when the classificatory meaning of pronouns/proper names becomes primary. They cannot qualify as Indices, because their designative power is muted by compari-

son based knowledge already present in the Immediate Object. Thus, on the first occasion of use, pronouns/proper names can qualify as Index, since their designative meaning or "zoom" effect is primary; but, once the subject of discourse has been established, these linguistic pointers elicit stored memories, and hence function similarly to common nouns (cf. West 2013 chapter 7). Consequently, when these linguistic pointers serve an indexical function, they can imply assertions; but, when they bring with them classificatory meanings, assertions are inherently built into the interpretant.

4. Index as assertion:

Beyond its attentional function (designating physical objects in relatively undifferentiated space), Index can intimate assertions. In momentarily shifting to any object of focus, or passively attending to the same object as the agent, it is not resigned to "asserting nothing." As assertion, Index recommends that the interlocutor consider the viability of a claim which the speaker relies upon. "Let us distinguish between the proposition and the assertion of the proposition. We will grant, if you please, that the proposition itself merely represents an image with a label or pointer attached to it. But to assert that proposition is to make oneself responsible for it, without any definite forfeit…" (c.1902-1903: 5.543). The receiver is now not merely required to focus on a subject and predicate (a proposition), but must actively consider whether the statement of the agent has logical merit. In fact, the message to the receiver is that some merit operates in the speaker's assertion; otherwise he would not have staked his reputation upon it.

Nonetheless, before making oneself "responsible" for the assertion, Index must first identify the subject of discourse. This process entails making icons definite by sharpening their boundaries, such that their identity and application are defined uniquely (cf. 1898: MS 485). Absent this sharpening, little information of an iconic or symbolic character would be contained within the interpretant; and nothing would be asserted. In other words, without the definiteness of icons which Index affords, assertions could not materialize, because the subject and the predicate of the discourse would be insufficiently defined to generate a reliable claim. When Index makes explicit an icon and carries within it information, as in the Dicisign, it does, in fact, assert. It is in the Dicisign that Peirce most clearly showcases the assertory character of Index. Recognition of Definite Icons are obviated via Index because it establishes and traces peripheries of objects or scenes. It orchestrates this by highlighting the shape of an object's image on the retina, or by monitoring the direction of events in memory. In this way, Index illustrates event contours, revealing the semantic and syntactic complexion of action schemas. In sharpening icons and in tracing their relations to one another, Index makes explicit the underlying propositions; and the assertive power of the claims is enhanced: "Every assertion represents an illative transformation of an index into an icon to be satisfactory" (1898: MS 485: Alt. 2). Here, Index supplies definiteness and uniqueness to icons, defining the subject of discourse. It is not the pictorial quality which index enhances that qualifies the icon as definite, rather coherence/contiguity – binding elements of the shape. This sharpening of identity further establishes how the topic of discourse pertains to the proposed predicate.

Accordingly, definite Icons (discrete subjects of discourse) materialize when Index highlights shapes of objects and event complexions (icons) by establishing discrete structural identity within figure-ground relations, both within static depictions, as well as for dynamic event relations. Peirce further affirms the need for Index to clarify the icon before acquiring its assertory power in his 1904 *Kaina Stoichea*: "It is remarkable that while neither a pure icon or a pure index can assert anything, an index which forces something to be an icon, as a weathercock does, or which forces us to regard it as an icon, as the legend under the portrait does, does make an

assertion, and forms a proposition" (EP 2:307).   In "forcing something to be an icon," Index acquires assertory status; it compels attention not so much on the present object under scrutiny, but on comparisons with other, previously experienced likenesses. In "forcing us to regard [X] as an icon" possessing informational qualities (EP 2: 275), Index asserts something, and attains Dicisign status (cf. EP 2: 172; Stjernfelt 2014, 2015). In the Dicisign, Index directs interpreters to access already stored like experiences to include in the interpretant.

To further clarify, Peirce's notion of "assertion" in contradistinction to "proposition" involves a real commitment to the veracity of an ontological issue; as such, the existence of an informational Index (possible via the presence of an icon) within a Dicisign is paramount. In fact, without forcing the recognition of icons (as do Dicisigns), propositions would lack the means to become claims to submit to another, since the subject of discourse would not be sufficiently defined. [2] The Dicisign, then represents Peirce's elevation of Index from Pheme or commander of attention to a proposition, to submitter of claims to another mind. To reach muster as assertion, Index must state a claim sufficient to qualify as an argument, with the potential to garner another's "full belief, …[or] willingness to act upon the proposition in vital crises" (1898: EP2: 33). "Full belief" is tantamount to settled belief, to the extent that acting upon it to remedy an exigent consequence qualifies the claim as viable. In other words, to own the assumption affirmatively is equivocal to asserting it; one must be committed to its truth value and effects. To do so, interpreters must submit the claim (via Index as implied argument) to make relevant already stored like experiences, and to ensure that claims do not contravene one another.

5. Index as modal operator

When Index expresses anticipatory assertions equivocal to the status of arguments (when it qualifies as a Dicisign), it becomes a prime modal operator. It suggests new states of affairs, and directs complexions of mind and affect accordingly. It does so by submitting future states of affairs packaged in assertions to other minds. These assertions can take the form of: imperatives, interrogatives or indicatives. Accordingly, as imperative, interrogative, or as simple statements of fact, the Dicisign possesses the potency to change other's modes of consciousness by submitting (rather than compelling) alternative ways to conceive of relations among objects and actors of events. These submissions (packaged in mature Indexes) promote serious consideration of possible event relations, because Indexes as implied arguments reflect the degree of speaker's commitment to a claim, which strengthens (for receivers) the merit of the assertions contained within the argument.

In short, Index experienced a lengthy ontogeny: from Pheme, to Dicisign as assertion, to Dicisign as implied argument. Peirce's new taxonomy, especially his substitution of "Delome" for argument, demonstrates Index's potency as submitter of assertions: "The second member of the triplet, the "Pheme," embraces all capital propositions; but not only capital propositions, but also capital interrogations and commands, whether they be uttered in words or signaled by flags, or trumpeted, or whether they be facts of nature like an earthquake (saying "Get out of here!") or the black vomit in yellow fever (with other symptoms of disease, which virtually declare, or are supposed to declare, some state of health to exist). Such a sign intends or has the air of intending to force some idea (in an interrogation), or some action (in a command), or some belief (in an assertion), upon the interpreter of it, just as if it were the direct and unmodified effect of that which it represents" (1906: MS 295:26).   In its capacity as Pheme, Index directs others' thought

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2   Dicisigns have a double function-one of likeness, the other of direction-contiguity: "…a dicisign is a sign which is understood to represent its object in respect to actual existence…" (1903: EP 2: 292).

germinations and ultimately their assertions through forcing an idea before their mind -- requesting consideration of the plausibility of a future event, or explicitly expressing the novel assertion in an argument.

The introduction of "seme" permits Terms to imply more than subjects of discourse, while "Pheme" for Proposition demonstrates more than an application of a predicate; and later the Dicisign made possible Index's role as implied argument (cf. Bellucci 2014: 539-540; and West in press). The Pheme supersedes propositional status, approaching an assertory character, when it forces others to consider the veracity of its claims. But, when Peirce folds "Pheme" into the Dicisign, he recognizes the full use of Index as conveyer of information to be submitted for consideration by other minds. As Phemes, ideas become interrogations; actions become commands; and beliefs rise to the level of assertions.

Nonetheless, Index's influence does not stop at its command-like character; it is expanded to house the complexion of the Delome, in which the Dicisign permits Terms and Propositions to imply arguments. To do this, Peirce was required to "widen the use of Term and Proposition (alluded to previously):

> A familiar logical triplet is Term, Proposition, Argument. In order to make this a division of all signs, the first two members have to be much widened. [—] As the third member of the triplet, I sometimes use the word Delome […], though *Argument* would answer well enough. It is a Sign which has the Form of tending to act upon the Interpreter through his own self-control, representing a process of change in thoughts or signs, as if to induce this change in the Interpreter (1906: 4.538).

Peirce later continues to affirm that Index constitutes an agent to submit arguments. To this end, he extends Index's Dynamic Interpretant: "According to my present view, a sign may appeal to its dynamic interpretant in three ways: 1st, an argument only may be *submitted* to its interpretant, as something the reasonableness of which will be acknowledged. 2nd, an argument or dicent may be *urged* upon the interpretant by an act of insistence. 3rd, argument or dicent may be, and a rheme can only be, presented to the interpretant for *contemplation*" (1905: 8.338).

6. Conclusion

Within a twenty-year interval, Index underwent revolutionary alterations, from "zoom agent," locating objects in Secondness, to a logical travel guide for apprehending episodes. Peirce's introduction of "Delome" integrates Logical Interpretants into Index, furnishing their ultimate episodic character. Index as Delome directly expresses an assertion, while as Seme and Pheme, it asserts implicitly. This latter form demonstrates Index's potency to suggest invisible sign-object relations -- to imply new meanings for other minds. The lack of explicit mention of conclusions turns out to be an advantage; it beckons the interpreter to utilize his own inferential powers to determine meaning relations. Reliance upon interpreter's competence to infer conclusions from the flow of Index-Object relations, demonstrates Index's influence to fashion new habits of action/thought. Index draws an invisible line to event players, intimating their unique contributions to the episode at large. This flow or directional "pull" of meanings from stark physical contexts is bolstered by attention to iconic qualities, which Peirce ultimately integrates into the Dicisign (1909: EP 2: 496). In the Dicisign, Index becomes "zoom agent" not merely for the self in physical contexts, but to enhance logical relations for interlocutors. They are compelled to arrive at conclusions utilizing the diagrammatic character of Index which highlights definite icons. In short, Index's ultimate role is to compel interpreters to rely upon nonsymbolic devices to discern triadic relations.

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AN INTER-CROSS UNIVERSUM INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN OSIPOVICH JAKOBSON'S SLAVIC POETRY STUDIES

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Abstract

This paper introduces a special analysis of language through biographical acknowledgement as begun by the important the Russian Slavist and well-known language theoretician, Roman Osipovich Jakobson. It will show how his personal engagement as a scholar highly emphasized studies of world languages. His research of the comparative Slavic language reflected the most profound and stimulated statements about the history of poetry that until recently has remained relatively unknown. Through a deep and personal study of the language of (Slavic) poetry he overcame the language borders created by different nations. His career presents an argument for the definition of his linguistic creativity, similar to poetical works. Thus, this article is only the first step to the introduction of the personal poetics of Roman Jakobson.

1. Biographical and linguistic notes

When Roman Osipovich Jakobson (1896-1982) began his affiliation with linguistic research at the beginning of his career as a linguistic scholar, the young Russian intellectual and student of Slavic studies was also a very delicate poet. Between 1908 and 1910, he wrote down and published poems with the following titles that all reflected his interest in word games and semantic features: An Epigram, A Castle in the Clouds, A Fantasia, An Apartment of a Solid Man, and An Imitation of Maxim Gorki. Later, in 1913, in a letter to the poet and Russian futurist, Alexey Kruchenyh, Roman Jakobson explained his poetical attitude. He specified that his lyrics should not be interpreted as samoizvitoe slovo 'poetry that is not self-satisfactory'. Additionally, he reiterated that he felt uncomfortable within the laconic style and consequently in arhythmical po-

etry (Jakobson 2011). Certainly, it seems that already in terms of that self-expression, Jakobson expressed the normative of poetical language that should never be treated as a non-complex universe, but should be understood as the highly sophisticated atmosphere of unpredictable relations between the signans and signum (in signatum). Moreover, Jakobson articulated the value of the rhythm in poetry that could connect lyric with personality. Later, in his study The Kernel of Comparative Slavic Literature, he defined the foundation that could function as a properly grounded base for comparative studies of the Slavic languages: "If in the Slavic languages diverge as to the relation between word accent and word boundary, and between word accent and vocalic quantity, these divergences are particularly revealing, for they can be analyzed and interpreted against background of numerous fundamental likenesses which continue to unify the Slavic tongues" (Jakobson 1985). In other words, it was in the similarity of sound expressions in different Slavic languages and the resulting aesthetic criteria that he found as an argument for the investigation of the internal similarity for certain groups of Slavic languages. The latter led to Jakobson's important notes on Slavic rhyme that, according to him, "clearly illustrates how essential the similarity of Slavic linguistic material is for the formal devices utilized in the poetry of diverse Slavic people" (Jakobson 1985: 7).

In his lecture in Moscow in 1966 (after many years of living through double emigration, particularly in the USA, where he was engaged in linguistics of the literary form), Roman Jakobson, who at that time took an active part in the 9th International Congress of Psychologists, highlighted that it is important not only to analyze the relationship and interrelation between the signifier and the signified, but that it is also most fruitful (and creative!) to interpret the correlation between the signs of form and meaning. In his (previously mentioned) unique definition of his own poetry, Jakobson also expressed another specific element of his personal attachment to the poetry saying that his poems are "the expressions of the heart that suffers" (Jakobson 2011: 228). Within this, he expressed the basis of a message that should be highly emotional and tending toward the person on the other part of communication.

It has to be mentioned that, in 1911, Jakobson pioneered the first linguistic research concerning the language of the poem of Vassilij K. Trediakovski, a Russian poet of the 18th century, whom Jakobson profiled with the statistical analysis of his poetical language. At that time, he also personally met Vladimir Majakovski at the funeral of the Russian painter, Valentin Serov. By the year 1912, Jakobson had already translated Stéphane Mallarmé's poem, *Unedentelle s'abbolite*, (a commission kindly requested by the Italian author of the manifesto of Futurism, Marinetti) and because of Mallarmé's words that the poet attributed the journal's language to the bourgeois (Jakobson 1987: 287). In 1913, Jakobson also met a surrealist painter named Kazimir Malevich and the poet, Velimir Hlebnikhov, both of whom vitally built up his attitude towards the visual and acoustic concepts of modern art and poetry. It was Hlebnikhov's poetry in particular that was, for the rest of Jakobson's life, one of his favorite forms of contemplation on the poetical effects of Russian creativity in the Avant-garde period predominantly due to the poet's link to old Russian oral (folk) tradition, namely, that it was with a poet's perfect and congenial ability to mimetically re-create or hear the archaic voices that he managed to save them in his poetry as a memoir of old songs in the human mind. Not accidently, but rather more coincidently, Jakobson, in a cited letter to Kruchenyh, declared that a linguist must be aware of the magic of invocations (citing the example of the Greek gnostic) which, in a previously cited lecture, he had stressed as the most complex correlations of ethnolinguistic studies (Jakobson 2009: 207). Only later, after the Russian Revolution in 1917, such experimentation with the language of reality by means of encoding it with the non-canonical (Apokrypha) and non-traditional formulas stepped into the path of Russian modernism (Aptekman 2003: 477). At that time, Roman Jakobson also acknowl-

edged Albert Einstein's relativity theory. He continued to publish his poetry under the pseudonym 'Roman Ialiagrov', some of which were entitled *The Farewell of the Words, How Many Fragments I Sip Away* and were published in the journal *The Thought of the Pupil*, edited by the Lazarev Institute for Eastern Languages (Jakobson was a part of its editorial board). During the following year (1914), he wrote a letter to Hlebnikhov about experiments in the language of poetry. In his poetry, Jakobson also found a reflection of the previous tradition of Russian poets who willingly formed their verse based on spoken language (Jakobson 1987: 287–288).

When Jakobson entered Moscow University, he struck up a friendship with an ethno-linguist, P. G. Bogatyrev, who later became a one of the first Russian theoreticians of semiotics. When the Russian linguist Filip F. Fortunatov died, Roman Jakobson found a paper by a Russian linguist (of Polish origin), Nikolai Krushevski, among his manuscripts on the basis of which Jakobson built his famous theory about metaphorical and metonymical thought in the perception of artistic and poetic language. At that time, he was 19 years old. In 1915, he had his first public lecture about the language of Tredjakovski, though this was only to be completely published for the first time a half-century later. In that lecture, he first stated some of his crucially important goals concerning Russian folk verse. Moreover, he was awarded for his research of the language of the Russian heroic epic poem called *byline*. In the same year, Jakobson organized the first meetings of the Russian linguistic circle, over which he presided until the year 1920. At that time, he started to study the writings of Helmut Husserl and to read the linguistic studies of dialectics and of the folkloristic approach. In 1916, the famous OPOJAZ (The Association of the Research of the Language of Poetry) was founded by Roman Jakobson, Evgenij Polivanov, Viktor Skhlovski, Boris Ejkhenbaum and Osip Brik (Jakobson 2011: 229). Among Russian artists at that time, a dichotomy was formed in intellectual thought that produced archaists and innovators, and Jakobson took a semi-place in between them. Indeed, among them Jakobson was the only one who started to investigate Slavic languages from the diachronic perspective and also research languages that were originally not similar to his native Russian language. However, only within these studies did he manage to solve issues in Russian verse that were among the most problematic of the linguistic studies.

In 1920, Jakobson emigrated to Czecho-Slovakia, specifically, to Prague. In 1921, he published a study about modern Russian poetry in Prague, particularly about the poetry of Hlebnikhov. He managed to pass over the limitations of his native language through the active organization of the Prague linguistic circle in 1926 and, finally, in 1930, with a PhD thesis entitled Über Ver*bs au der serbokroatischen Volksepen* ('The Poetics of Old Slavonic Serbo-Croatian Verse') thanks to which he gained the title of Doctor of Philosophy at the German University of Prague (Jakobson 2011: 234). Although he received a critical but friendly review for his linguistic comparative study of the poetry of A. S. Pushkin and V. Hlebnikhov by Nikolai S. Trubetzkoy, Jakobson was also the first scholar who was able to connect the verse of Pushkin's problematic cycle entitled *The Songs of Western Slavs* with the structure of Russian verse from the satire *A Second Chorus to the False Sun* by the 18th century Russian poet, Sumarokov, on which Trubetzkoy based his argumentation of the study of Pushkin's verse system in 1937 (Trubetzkoy 1963: 66). In 1928, Jakobson and Jurij Tynyjanov published a famous manifesto in *Novyj LEF* in which they represented an intellectual power in new cultural conditions, but also a connection between Russian and European humanities (Levchenko 2003: 518). In 1931, Jakobson wrote an important article as a reaction to the suicide of V. Majakovski of which Osip Emilevich Mandelshtam spoke "with biblical words" (Jakobson 2011: 235).

On the basis of further investigation of biographical facts, Jakobson also took into very serious consideration the fact that Charles Sanders Peirce had, already in 1868, illustrated his definition with an example of medieval logic. Obviously, Roman Jakobson understood the Slavic Middle ages as more than a dynamic source of the permanence and universal significance of

spiritual values. Moreover, his interpretations reflected how he was truly inspired by the content of old Slavonic poetical material. That is why N. Trubetzkoy's findings in 1937 were among the most important findings of poetical fragments in old Slavonic prose for him, as they further stimulated Jakobson's investigations into Old Church Slavonic. It was not an accident that on October 17, 1938, Roman Jakobson accepted Orthodox confession in the old Orthodox-Catholic church of St. Magdalene's in Prague. All of the aforementioned items resulted in detailed studies of the oldest patterns of Slavonic poetry such as *Saint Constantine's Prologue to the Gospels* (1942) as well as the paper *The Slavic Response to Byzantine Poetry* and Jakobson's studies dedicated to the Czech gothic historical verse. Jakobson continued most of these studies and developed them after his emigration to the USA. It was there that he also published *Condensed Survey of Slavic Languages* in 1955 in which Jakobson marked that, generally, word order in different Slavic languages is still based on the same principles as those of Protoslavic; thus, there is one basic pattern and a set of set deviations each of which possesses distinct semantic or stylistic value (Jakobson 1955: 21). His affective research of the oldest Slavic literary forms as historical evidence for the common language impression of poetic forms continued especially in the case of Jakobson's argumentations of the original language of the first Russian folk epic, *The Tale of Igor's Campaign*. It was to the grammatical equivalences between the languages, artistically understood as constitutive devices of the single sequence in the language progress, that Jakobson dedicated his most courageous studies of the verse. According to him, Slavic poetry must be seen through the investigation of the "general Slavic phenomena such as the strong autonomy of word units, their sharp delimination and their clear-cut opposition to word groups, or the accentuation, division, and intonation of the sentence, are fundamental prerequisites for including the metrical patterns of diverse Slavic languages within the common framework of comparative Slavic metrics" (Jakobson 1985: 6–7).

More than that, it seems that Jakobson verbalized the cultural memorial evidence of the common and metrical rules of human sense for rhymes and rhythm, particularly in the case of his research into the Slavic and Slavonic language features. In a very precise study of the two oldest forms of Slavonic verses presented at the International Congress of Slavists in Sofia in 1963, Jakobson analyzed the two oldest patterns of Slavic poetical effects on a phonetic level, which is the most problematic aspect of Slavic studies, especially in the case of the prehistory of Slavic languages (Protoslavic) regarding the appropriate localization of Slavonic linguistic features. In the paper entitled *A Phonetic Approach to the Structure and Evolution of the Common Slavic Prosodic Pattern*, from Common Slavic (before its gradual dissolution), Jakobson detected two prosodic features (*long-short* and *acute-grave*) and consequently defined Western as Serbo-Slovenian and Eastern as Bulgarian-Russian types among which, in the former, the long-short opposition survived while the tonic was lost. In the Eastern type, the final establishment of the prosodic opposition *stressed-unstressed* eliminated the long-short difference. However, in his conclusion of this paper in Russian, Jakobson called for radicalism in the selection of methodological approaches in linguistic material to be the basis for Slavic studies (Jakobson 1963: 22). He clearly denied the so-called phonetic rules siting them as fictional, and expressed the fact that the scholar must be cautious when dealing with dangerous grammatical analogies in the field of historical research. Moreover, he claimed that only historical analyses could answer questions of the internal evolution of language forms (the structural connections between new forms). Indeed, because Jakobson believed that "true continuity unites the present not only with the past but also, and most importantly, with the future," as Stephen Rudy said of him (Rudy 1985: XXII), he was also capable of excluding redundant Slavic linguistic material.

It could be said that Roman Jakobson developed his significant Slavic contrastive poetics based not only on his inter- and cross-medieval studies, but also on his interesting observations

about the poetic effect in contemporary poetry, in which he was able to detect the peculiarities of Slavic poetry with a strengthened, self-preserving sense of endurance. The latter stated values of important permanence and universal significance. Jakobson's interpretations of the language of Slavic poetry gained such a level that he was also competent enough to interpret the poetry of a Slovenian poet, Oton Župančič, in a study that Jakobson introduced with the statement that poetical speech lacks its primary effect in every translation by Louise Tesnière (Jakobson 1981: 577). As a result, Jakobson also found, only in the relationship of the poetry, a suitable place for the moment of the translation and the defining of collective memory.[1] However, in a single poem entitled *The Death Bride*, Jakobson was able to recognize the folk and historical features of Župančič's verse that crucially built up the poetical impact of the poet. In other words, Roman Jakobson, in his studies of Slavonic and Slavic poetry, managed to notice such sublime and eloquent poetical effects that were only known to and recognized by native speakers.

2. The science of poetical language

The reason we argue the thesis that Roman Jakobson's definition of poetic function is too narrow to cover the cognitive and emotive aspects of the message connecting the actants (the addresser and the addressee), as Peet Lepik stated when referring to his study of magic forms of culture (Lepik 2008: 105-106), can be found within Jakobson's biography, which speaks of his deeply personal affiliation with his linguistic studies. The biographical circumstances that followed Jakobson's first definition of his own poetry in 1913 were highly emotional. They also confirmed the fact that when discovering the magical signs of poetical language (as early as 1915), having also been introduced to Einstein via his theory functioning as the basis for cognitive contemplation, Jakobson was aware of the language of science. In his first definition of the poetry that touched him, he declared that the language of poetry should be understood as open to all interpretation and consequently to multi-semantic valuation. More than that, Jakobson declared that C. S. Peirce was right when he announced that, even in the case of homonyms, there is no evidence of a firm and stable connection between the *sign* and the *signum* (although every word has a one single meaning - significatio). By such direct, but also historical discourse, Jakobson did not exclude the second person, but only the third as a non-direct go-between. Reasonably, Jakobson as the scholar took the responsibility of the researcher and acted at the same time as the interpreter as well as the mediator. As a highly wakeful investigator, he presented the animate actant in the dialogue between the addresser and the addressee. In his previously mentioned lecture in Moscow in 1966, he also noted that one has to pay attention not only to the context, but must also examine the further and deeper fields of personal language by additionally taking into consideration the psychological perspective of the interpreter himself. Again, Jakobson referred to Peirce who, in the communication process, stressed the intrapersonal aspect followed by *internal dialogue*. The latter was found in the important semiotic recognition of the literal structures of a drama (or a drama in a novel), found, for example, in Shakespeare's *Hamlet* defined by Jurij M. Lotman as the *text within a text* (Lotman 1981; Zajc 2015: 60). Furthermore, Jakobson was convinced that an internal dialogue between different phases of ego was a cardinal factor in the network of language, which serves as one's connection with the self's past and future. Therefore, when the scholar (i.e. researcher) takes the place of the mediator, there is no need for a third person. In this role, he was finally able to directly understand the language of poetry as a permanent entry into historical language that activates the oldest human cultural memory (archetypes) and which simultaneously opens up to the sign system's transitional varieties (as Lotman's collective intellect). However, the scholar

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1   That could be seen in Lotman's model of culture in which knowledge is maintained and transferred through time while the actualization of codified information as well as new information is guaranteed (Lotman 1992: 200; Andrews, Maksimova 2008: 264).

should be fully involved (with his emotions and sufferings) in the process of the semiotic discovery of hybrid forms and syncretic formations of idiomorphic systems, which are indirectly related to language (gesticulation, body language, social impact) (Jakobson 1970: 31). By taking an active part in research communication that regarded science as the social universe and, vice versa, communication as the most magical moment of the cultural event that one could imagine, Jakobson realized an entirely aware model of linguistic scholarship. Within such an attitude, Jakobson also managed to improve his own interpretative problem of the immanent and non-immanent interpretation of a literary work that resulted in the poetic text being seen as very autonomous, but not as entirely immanent.

Although, because of his communication model, Jakobson is mostly frequent understood as the creator of sociolinguistics (Torop 2008: 254); more truthfully, with his Slavic studies, he defined the highly introspective investigation of the language that should be an introduction to more specified intrapersonal communication. Consequently, he allowed for the most complex immanent aspect in his work in the treatise of the linguistic level of the literary work and content by which he finally gained the ideal objective valuation of the quality of the literary piece and the critical notes on authors' style. Nevertheless, Jakobson's goal was not an objectiveness, but rather a detailed and profound reading of the poetical material from the linguistic point of view. He introduced the ability of non-reversed analysis of the language of poetry that only permits freedom within one's native language and between languages. It seems that, as a scholar, Jakobson was open to the many other aspects of the science of languages that originate within the limits of national language, but he preferred research that was profiled and immersed and that usually tended towards a direct relationship between the scholar and the topic of his investigation.

However, Jakobson remained an orthodox, but non-nationally oriented linguist who confessed the overwhelming limitations of the national Slavic languages through constant scholarly contributions and the consistent, monophonic answering of the most difficult questions in the history of the Slavonic languages. In this aspect, he was a faithful pupil of his teacher N. Trubetzkoy who warned about harmful cultural egocentrism, especially in terms of Slavic languages, and proceeded the scholar's rejection of the Eurocentric view of Slavic history (cf. Rudy 1985: XII). In any case, Jakobson's linguistics research into the language of poetry (not only Slavic) resulted in his work being understood as poetical and dubbed the *Poetics of the Roman Jakobson* (Ivanov 1987: 22).

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SIGN-THEORETIC APPROACH TOWARDS EXPLANATION OF MENTAL IMAGERY

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Abstract

The nature of mental imagery is one of the most controversial issues in cognitive sciences. Contrary to the traditional representational theories, which view images as either propositional or pictorial representations, I propose to account for mental imagery using semiotic approach, i.e. in terms of signs and signifying relations. This article reviews two alternative sign-theoretic accounts developed by C.S. Peirce and F. Saussure and analyses what kind of sign theory serves better to explain mental imagery. Brief analysis showed that Peirce's semiotics is better suited to account for the diverse nature of mental images. In particular, I will argue that Peirce's sign theory fulfils four main conditions of a comprehensive explanation of mental imagery. Namely, it accommodates:

a. heterogeneous and manifold properties of mental imagery;
b. image's co-relation with the object (intentionality);
c. image's dependence on the subject, who produced an image and his individual traits;
d. image's dependence on the context, where the image was produced.

In sum, a sign-theoretic approach towards the explanation of mental imagery, based on Peirce's universal semiotic, could suggest, I believe, a new perspective on the complex nature of mental imagery.

1. Introduction

Since cognitive revolution in 1950-60s, the question about the nature of mental imagery (MI)

became one of the most debated ones in cognitive sciences. Traditionally, two representational theories were proposed – (quasi-)pictorial and propositional – to answer this question. According to the (quasi-)pictorial theory, mental images are picture-like representations in the mind (Kosslyn 1980, 1994; Finke, Pinker and Farah 1989). Proponents of propositional theory, on the opposite, claim that mental imagery constitutes verbal representations or language-like descriptions (Pylyshyn 1981, 2002, 2003; Fodor 1975). However, representationalism towards the explanation of MI encounters serious problems, such as: different results of replicated experiments (Pylyshyn 2002; Slezak 1991; Chambers and Reisberg 1985; Rock, Wheeler and Tudor 1989); multiple interpretations of empirical evidence (Anderson 1978; Pylyshyn 2002; Ganis 2013); and manifold properties of mental imagery, e.g. motor, tactile, auditory properties (Lacey and Lawson 2013; Keller 2012; Pascual-Leone et al. 1995; Richardson 1995; Schimdt et al. 2014). In sum, existent empirical data showed that MI cannot be comprehensively accommodated nor by (quasi-)pictorial, neither by propositional accounts.

An alternative way to answer the problematic question about the nature of mental images is to say that MI is a sign system[1]. Indeed, there are several reasons to consider semiotic theory as one of the possible solutions towards proper explanation of MI. Just as a sign a mental image is intentional, i.e. stands for some object that it represents. Next, it also has some ground element or representamen, i.e. something that represents. Similar to a sign, a mental image has a meaning comprehended by the subject. Shortly, it seems that MI shares similar structure and properties with a sign. Thus, semiotic theory might shed some light on the complex nature of MI.

However, what kind of sign theory serves better to explain MI and what conditions a comprehensive semiotic account of MI should satisfy? This article gives a brief overview of the two alternative sign-theoretic accounts developed by Charles Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure and suggests that Peirce's sign theory is better suited to account for diverse nature of mental images. In particular, I will argue that a sign-theoretic account of Peirce fulfils four main conditions of a comprehensive explanation of MI, namely it accommodates:

a. heterogeneous and manifold properties of MI;
b. bimage's co-relation with the object (intentionality);
c. image's dependence on the subject, who produced an image and his individual traits;
d. image's dependence on the context, where the image was produced.

In order to show that, I will begin with the analysis of Peirce's sign-theoretic account in Section 1. Then, I will proceed with the description of semiotic theory developed by Saussure in Section 2. Finally, in Section 3 I will analyse both semiotic theories as applied to explain MI. I will try to show that Peirce's sign theory constitutes a more complex and elaborated account compared to its alternative, it satisfies four conditions of explanation of MI and thus suits better to account for the latter.

2. Peirce's sign theory

Peirce's theory of signs or semiotic is a unique account of signification, reference and meaning, distinctive among others for its "breadth and complexity" (Atkin 2017: 1). Central tenets of Peirce's sign theory are the philosophical origin of his account, pansemiotic view of the universe, phenomenology, Peirce's triadic definition of sign and classification of signs.

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1   For detailed justification of why mental imagery can be legitimately seen as a sign system see Issajeva 2015a,b.

To begin with, Peirce's theory of signs has philosophical background. His work was strongly influenced by philosophy of Aristotle, Kant's theory of knowledge and Locke's theory of ideas. In particular, the very term 'semeiotic' was borrowed from Locke, who used it to name a new 'doctrine of signs' (Short 2007: 2). Following its philosophical origins, Peirce's semiotic theory aims at solving general and universal problems of knowledge and being, i.e. those questions that are philosophical by nature. In this vein, Nöth rightly noticed that "Peirce's semiotics aims at epistemological and even metaphysical universality" (Nöth 1995: 39).

Philosophical origin, epistemological and metaphysical universality of Peirce's semiotic give rise to his pansemiotic view of reality. Peirce claims that man, cognition and reality can be interpreted in terms of signs: "The entire universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" (Peirce 1994, CP 5.448). In particular, Peirce claims that human cognition, our thoughts and the man himself are semiotic by nature. He clearly states, "man is a sign" (Peirce 1994, CP 5.314; Peirce 1998, EP 1:54) and "we think only in signs" (Peirce 1994, CP 2.302). Based on this view, a whole human life is interpreted as a historical sequence of signs. Thus, semiotics for Peirce is a universal science. It is the science that equally explains cosmological processes, physical events, mental and cognitive states and makes rigid conclusions about them using the method of logic. In his letter to Lady Welby on December 23, 1908, Peirce writes: "It has never been in my power to study anything […] except as a study of semeiotic" (Peirce 1977: 85), thus clearly stating that whatever discipline is under investigation, it will eventually lead us to the study of semiotics. This universality of the scope of Peirce's sign-theoretic account makes his Semiotic distinctive among other theories and sets the stage for his triadic definition of sign and sign typology.

Next essential trait of Peirce's semiotics is his system of categories. Peirce singled out three main categories, based on which he developed a complex phenomenology of human cognition. Three categories are firstness, secondness and thirdness. "Firstness is the mode of being which consists in its subject's being positively such as it is regardless of aught else" (Peirce 1994, CP 1.25). Firstness is the category of unreflected feeling, mere potentiality, and possibility of that, which is immediately given (Peirce 1994, CP 5.66-68; CP 1.531). Secondness involves the relation of the first to the second (Peirce 1994, CP 1.530). This is the category of reaction and action, facticity, reality and experience in time and space (Nöth 1995: 41). "Category the Second is the Idea of that which is such as it is as being Second to some First, regardless of anything else […] That is to say, it is *Reaction* as an element of the Phenomenon" (Peirce 1994, CP 5.66). Finally, thirdness is a category of mediation; it brings second into relation to a third. "Had there been any process intervening between the causal act and the effect, this would have been a medial, or third, element. *Thirdness*, in the sense of the category, is the same as mediation" (Peirce 1994, CP 1.328). Following Peirce, all the phenomena that we experience, feel, live through, react upon can be analyzed in terms of firstness as the category of feeling, secondness as the category of reaction and thirdness as the category of mediation. Peirce's sign theory can be properly understood only in the context of this system of categories.

In general, Peirce's pansemiotic view of reality, philosophical traditions and system of categories comprise the unique context of his sign-theoretic account. So what is a sign, according to Peirce? Following his triadic system of categories, Peirce, claims that sign has triadic structure and consists of three main relata or three basic elements – a signifying-vehicle or representamen, an object and an interpretant – and is characterized by dynamic, context-dependent semiotic relations between them. All together, they – a set of sign-elements and semiotic relations – constitute an interconnected network that works together

as a whole and constitutes a sign. "A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign. That sign which it creates I call the *interpretant* of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*" (Peirce 1994, CP 2.228). Schematically the structure of a sign could be depicted in the following way:

Figure 1. Peirce's structure of a sign.

This definition uncovers two main aspects of a sign*:*

1. Peirce views sign as consisting of three relata – a signifying vehicle or representamen (as Peirce sometimes calls it), an object which the sign stands for, and an interpretant as the meaning of the relation between signifying vehicle and its object;

2. He defines sign through its participation in semiotic or signifying process (i.e. semiosis).

According to Peirce, the sign, its structure and nature is about the semiotic relations between its three elements. Thus, Peirce's sign theory has a distinct relational and functional character (Nöth 1995: 42). It is the relations between sign-elements, i.e. semiosis that defines the nature and function of a sign. By 'semiosis' Peirce means "an action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of *three* subjects, such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs" (Peirce 1998, EP 2:411). Strictly speaking, semiosis is the subject of Peirce's semiotic study and analysis.

According to Peirce's semiotics, relations between elements of the sign are dynamic and context-dependent. Dynamics of signifying relations means that they continuously develop and change their characteristics dependent on various factors. As Floyd Merrell (2001) puts it: "sings simply cannot stand still" (Merrell 2001: 37). Context-dependence corresponds to the changes in the environment that influence both the relations and characteristics of the sign elements significantly (Peirce 1994, CP 2.265). Thus, Peirce's theory accounts for sign in terms of three sign relata and dynamic, context-dependent relations between them.

Based on three universal categories and triadic structure of a sign Peirce elaborated a comprehensive typology of signs, which became the significant part of his sign theory. According to Peirce, each of the three sign elements – sign-vehicle, object and interpretant - is divisible on three sub-types.

> signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its object consists in the sign's

having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that object, or in its relation to an interpretant; thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility or a sign of fact or as a sign of reason (Peirce 1994, CP 2.243).

Peirce calls the first of the three thrichotomic divisions – Qualisigns, Sinsigns and Legisigns (Peirce 1994, CP 2.244), the second – Icons, Indexes and Symbols (Peirce 1994, CP 2.247), and finally the third division – Rhemes, Dicisigns and Arguments (Peirce 1994, CP 2.250). Thus, if we analyse each of the three sign elements and their features, then we can get ten various classes of signs. Later Peirce postulated sixty-six classes of signs. A comprehensive analysis of classes of signs was one of the Peirce's main interests of study.

To sum up, Peirce's semiotic has distinct features. First, it has philosophical origin. Second, Peirce's sign theory aims at epistemological and metaphysical universality that gives rise to his pansemiotic view of reality. Next, an essential feature of Peirce's semiotic is his phenomenology and three universal categories – firstness, secondness and thirdness. Finally, Peirce gives a triadic structure of a sign and elaborates a detailed classification of signs. All together, these elements comprise the core of Peirce's sign-theoretic account.

3. Saussure's semiology

An alternative sign theory, elaborated independently by Ferdinand de Saussure, is the so-called 'semiology'. In contrast to Peirce's semiotic, Saussure's sign theory has linguistic heritage. As being the father of modern linguistics and precursor of structuralism, Saussure embedded his semiology in linguistic studies. His primary focus of interest is, thus, on linguistic signs, such as words: "Saussure focused on the linguistic sign and he 'phonocentrically' privileged the spoken word" (Chandler 2007: 16). For Saussure, the spoken, acoustic words comprised a primary sign system, whereas the written words were seen as "a separate, secondary, dependent" sign system (ibid.).

Focusing on linguistic signs, Saussure defined a sign as being composed of a 'signifier' and a 'signified' (Chandler 2007: 14). The signifier is the form of the sign. Saussure defined the signifier as a 'sound pattern', i.e. hearer's auditory impression of a sound or '*image acoustique*' (ibid.). The signified is the concept, to which the signifier refers. It is more abstract and general element of a sign.

> A linguistic sign is not a link between a thing and a name, but between a concept [signified] and a sound pattern [signifier]. The sound pattern is not actually a sound; for a sound is something physical. A sound pattern is the hearer's psychological impression of a sound, as given to him by the evidence of his senses. […] The sound pattern may thus be distinguished from the other element associated with it in a linguistic sign. This other element is generally of a more abstract kind: the concept (Saussure 1983: 66).

The relationship between the signifier and the signified is called signification. A sign, according to Saussure, is then the whole that results from inter-connection between signifier and signified (Chandler 2007: 14-16). Schematically the Saussurean model of a sign can be depicted as follows:

Noteworthy that in contrast to Peirce's sign theory, Saussure suggests a dyadic structure of a sign. A sign consists of two elements – signifier and signified. Saussure compares bilateral structure of linguistic sign with the two sides of a sheet of paper: "Thought is the front and the sound is the back; one cannot cut the front without cutting the back at the same time" (Saussure 1916/1969: 113). This simile of diadicity of the sign clearly shows that two elements

of a sign are inseperable from each other and together constitute a "two-sided psychological entity" or a sign (ibid., p. 66). Along the lines, Chandler rightly notes that Saussurean sign

Figure 2. Saussure's structure of a sign

must have both elements to count as a sign: "A sign is a recognizable combination of a signifier with a particular signified" (Chandler 2007: 16). In the same vein, Short states that according to Saussure "sign is a two-part entity, consisting of a material signifier (*signifant*) coupled with a signification (*signifie*)" (Short 2007: 17). Thus, contrary to Peirce, he does not elaborate the third element of a sign – an interpretant – a meaningful reaction of one's mind towards the process of signification.

The latter circumstance yields further the lack of phenomenological explanation of signification in Saussurean semiology. Despite the fact that for Saussure both 'signifier' and 'signified' are purely psychological, 'non-material' entities (Chandler 2007: 14-15; Nöth 1995: 60), he does not develop a comprehensive account of the mind to explain them. Quite on the contrary, his explanation of what is going on between 'signifier' and 'signified' remains vague (Short 2007: 18). In particular, Saussure admits the notion of intentionality of thought and language, but fails to give clear explanation of how thought and language manage to be about the world. Along the lines, Short states that Saussure makes the intentionality of speech dependent on intentionality of mind, but still fails to account for the latter (Short 2007: 18).

Next, Saussurean semiology employs different to Peirce's structure and notion of the sign. Peirce sees a sign as being essentially a part of the world, which "is perfused with signs" (Peirce 1994, CP 5.448). As being such a sign is context-dependent, i.e. continuously develops dependent on the changes in the environment in which a sign is produced and used. Shortly, Peirce's sign interacts with the world. In contrast, Saussure claims that sign is independent of the world, its relation to the world is arbitrary (Saussure 1983: 131). Saussure did not deny the existence of world independent of language. But his semiology establishes a relative autonomy of the language from reality, which it stands for. Thus, Saussure embraced the mentalistic conception of a sign (Nöth 1995: 60). Such notion of 'arbitrariness' of a sign supports the structuralist idea that language constructs the world, rather than reflects it. In the same vein, Charles Ogden and Ivor Richards (1923) criticized Saussure for "neglecting entirely the things for which signs stand" (Ogden and Richards 1923: 8). This makes semiological account of a sign independent of any extralinguistic influences.

The arbitrariness of a sign implies also the closed structure of the sign. If a sign and its elements – signifier and signified – are independent of the external world, then they are completely determined by intralinguistic system. Hence, Saussure's semiology operates totally

inside the sign system, i.e. inside the relations between signified and signifier, and thus is closed to any other influences and changes. In comparison, Peirce's semiotic presupposes dynamicity of relations between its sign elements. Peirce's sign is opened to the world, since it is indispensable part of the latter. Saussurean sign is not the part of the world as such, rather it arbitrarily structures formless mass of reality, i.e. constructs the world. Here is the place for Saussurean linguistic structuralism, which constitutes the background for his semiology. In the same vein, Sturrock rightly noticed "since we come to know the world through whatever language we have been born into the midst of, it is legitimate to argue that our language determines reality, rather reality our language (Sturrock 1986: 79). Thus, Saussurean semiology constitutes a structuralist theory of sign rather than a phenomenological-cosmological one as was proposed by Peirce.

All this yields to the relative narrowness of Saussurean theory of signs. Indeed, Saussure clearly deals just with linguistic signs, abstracted from their particular uses, natural signs and the users' responses to them (Short 2007: 19). In contrast, Peirce aims at universal explanation of reality in terms of signs, and hence investigates various classes of signs; grounds of signification; as well as thoughts, feelings and actions as responses to signs. Such difference in applicability of sign theory in Peirce and Saussure appears to be one of the reasons that caused semiotics to be favoured over semiology (ibid.).

To sum up, Saussurean theory of signs differs significantly from that of Peirce. Firstly, it has linguistic origin and focuses on investigation of linguistic signs. Secondly, Saussure defines a sign as a purely mentalistic dyadic structure comprised of signifier and signified and relation between them. Finally, the scope of Saussure's semiology is also different. He abstracted the sign from reality and focused on the structural analysis inside the sign system of language. As a result, the phenomenological explanation, intentionality of a sign, grounds of signification, as well as its pragmatic uses remain either undeveloped or vague.

4. Sign-theoretic account towards the explanation of mental imagery

So, where does the previous discussion lead us? The main question of this paper is what version of sign theory can better explain the complex nature of MI? In other words, which sign-theoretic account, if any, can fulfil main four conditions to explain comprehensively mental imagery?

Firstly, heterogeneous and manifold properties of MI can be easily accommodated by Peirce's semiotics. Various grounds of signification allow applying his semiotic to natural signs, images, linguistic signs etc. The detailed classification of signs suggests an explanation of manifold sign properties. The context-dependence, flexibility and dynamics of Peirce's conception of sign allow to comprehensive explanation of the process of signification, signifying relations and factors that influence the latter. All this yields that Peirce's sign theory can give a proper explanation of heterogeneous properties of MI.

In contrast, Saussurean semiology encounters serious difficulties with explanation of divergent properties of MI. The major focus of his semiotic investigation is a linguistic sign. However, not all images contain verbal properties. Other manifold properties of mental images remain unattended by Saussure's semiology. Thus, he fails to account for wide diversity of imagery properties. He also fails to discern among different grounds for signification, putting arbitrary relation as the only signification ground. In addition, Saussurean account abstracts the concept of sign from their particular uses, natural signs and the users' responses to them. All this makes his account hardly applicable to investigate heterogeneous nature of MI.

Secondly, image's co-relation with the object (intentionality) was sufficiently investigated by Peirce. He developed an interesting phenomenological account that underlay his sign theory

and suggested a comprehensive explanation of how signs can be about the world and what relations there are between internal signs and external objects. Contrary to Peirce, Saussure remained ignorant to the problem of intentionality. Although, he admitted that signs are somehow connected to the world, Saussure fails to properly account for the latter.

Next, image's dependence on the subject, who produced an image and his individual traits, is clearly manifested in Peirce's sign-theoretic account. The triadic structure of a sign proposed by Peirce includes an interpretant element, i.e. a subject's cognitive response to the sign. According to Peirce, feelings, emotions, thoughts, memories and even actions – all can count as an interpretant, i.e. as internal part of a sign. Thus, he clearly incorporates a subject inside his sign system. To compare, Saussure quite differently abstracts the sign from its particular uses as well as from area of individual influences. Saussurean model of sign is dyadic and lacks an element that would represent subjective differences inside the sign system. On the contrary, Saussure tries to abstract the sign from all subjective elements and analyse the sign intralinguistically.

Finally, the explanation of image's dependence on the context, where the image was produced, can also be given by Peirce's semiotic. His sign-theoretic account embraces the context-dependence of a sign. The latter corresponds to the changes in the environment that significantly influence both relations and characteristics of a sign (Peirce 1994, CP 2.265). Peirce's semiotic takes into account different influences and contextual changes and adapts them inside the sign system. In contrast, Saussurean semiology neglects contextual/circumstantial changes as being influential upon sign system. His sign theory tries to analyse the signification process and the sign structure outside of any changes in context.

To sum up, it occurs that Peirce's theory of signs can give a better and more profound explanation of MI compared to that developed by Saussure. In particular, Peirce's semiotic satisfies all four criteria of comprehensive theory of mental imagery. It explains:

a. heterogeneous and manifold properties of MI;

b. image's co-relation with the object (intentionality);

c. image's dependence on the subject, who produced an image and his individual traits;

d. image's dependence on the context, where the image was produced.

In contrast, the alternative sign theory developed by Saussure is dedicated to the investigation of linguistic sign, lacks the universality and breadth inherent to Peirce's semiotic and thus can hardly explain all characteristics of mental imagery.

5. Conclusion

To conclude, this article suggests a sign-theoretic approach to explain the problematic nature of mental imagery and analyses what kind of sign theory serves better to explain MI. Based on the divergent empirical data four main conditions of a comprehensive account of MI were singled out:

a) heterogeneous and manifold properties of MI;

b) image's co-relation with the object (intentionality); c) image's dependence on the subject, who produced an image and his individual traits; d) image's dependence on the context, where the image was produced. Thus, a full-scale explanation of mental imagery should accommodate these characteristics of MI.

Two alternative sign-theoretic accounts developed by Charles Peirce and Ferdinand de Saussure were analysed in order to check whether any of these accounts can satisfy all four conditions and thus suggest a comprehensive explanation of MI. The above-stated analysis has shown that Peirce's semiotic is better suited to account for diverse nature of mental images compared to its alternative and that is for the following reasons:

1. Peirce developed a more profound, detailed and wide-scaled theory of signs. His semiotic has philosophical origin and aims to solve general metaphysical and epistemological questions;

2. Peirce's semiotic is universal (pansemiotic), it accounts for the (external) reality and explains the co-relation between object and the sign;

3. Peirce's sign theory includes subject inside the semiosis. It accounts for subjective differences, influences and reactions, i.e. his semiotic is phenomenological as well;

4. Peirce elaborated a detailed and flexible account of sign and semiosis. Peirce's triadic definition of sign and sophisticated classification of signs can give a full-fledged interpretation and thorough analysis of any sign.

Based on these characteristics, it appears that Peirce's sign theory fulfils four main conditions of a comprehensive explanation of MI and can be legitimately applied to explain the latter. Whether studies about MI can benefit from the sign-theoretic approach and semiotic methods of investigation is the issue for further research. So far, it seems that the complex nature of mental images needs another perspective. In addition, perhaps Peirce's detailed and universal semiotic could suggest a new look on a very old problem of the nature of mental imagery inside human mind.

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THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF GREIMAS

FROM THE SESSION "GREIMASIAN SEMIOTICS AND CURRENT AFFAIRS

DES EXERCICES PRATIQUES AU SERVICE DE LA THEORIE : LE MAUPASSANT DE GREIMAS

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Abstract

L'article expliquera d'abord les raisons qui ont poussé Greimas à procéder à des exercices pratiques en analysant *Deux Amis* de Maupassant. Il précisera ensuite les procédés de Greimas concernant le séquencement du texte, enfin, insistera sur les effets produits par ces exercices pratiques sur la théorie alors existante : confirmations et corrections de celle-ci concernant le schéma narratif, théorisation novatrice de la dimension cognitive autonome, démonstration de l'appartenance de Maupassant au symbolisme et non pas au réalisme.

1. Introduction

C'est entre 1972 et 1975 que Greimas, constatant ce qu'il appelle une « crise de croissance » (Greimas 1976 : 8) de la sémiotique, procède à l'analyse de *Deux amis* de Maupassant, livre publié en 1976 sous le titre *Maupassant, La sémiotique du texte : exercices pratiques* et, enfin, — soit vingt cinq ans après que cette traduction avait été projetée — traduit en lituanien grâce à Saulius Žukas et Kęstutis Nastopka. Mais pourquoi revenir à un texte publié il y a une quarantaine d'années, vous demanderez vous ? La raison en est simple. En effet, le but affiché des « exercices pratiques » de Greimas est de servir à la fois d'exemple et de leçon aux apprentis sémioticiens en train de construire la théorie (Greimas 1976 : 9-10).

2. Les symptômes d'une crise de croissance de la sémiotique

Qu'est-ce donc que Greimas appelle les symptômes de la crise de croissance en question ? Premièrement, la projection sur divers textes littéraires du schéma proppien dont il constate que la

vertu heuristique s'épuise, ce qui ne sert ni à augmenter les connaissances des organisations narratives, ni à rendre compte de la spécificité des textes étudiés. Deuxièmement, le choix de textes modernes et hautement élaborés qui conduisent souvent à n'émettre autre chose que des points de vue sur le texte, ce qui n'a rien de sémiotique. Troisièmement, la fascination provoquée par la richesse de certains textes et parallèlement l'impuissance d'en rendre compte qui conduit à une forme de démission, en arguant qu'il faut construire une grammaire pour chaque texte ou que chaque texte est susceptible d'une infinité de lectures, ce qui pour Greimas est « une belle excuse de se dispenser de toute lecture, toujours, fastidieuse » (Greimas 1976 : 9). Bref, Greimas constate que l'outillage méthodologique dont dispose alors la sémiotique ne correspond pas encore aux exigences de l'analyse de textes littéraires complexes. Or, cette inadéquation entre les moyens et les besoins ne permet, selon lui, ni d'incriminer l'outillage, ni de discriminer des textes soi-disant réfractaires à l'analyse (Greimas 1976 : 9).

3. Comment procéder pour construire la théorie

Greimas indique que la sémiotique littéraire, en sa qualité de théorie scientifique doit toujours se confronter aux textes, et ce à travers une analyse minutieuse qui tienne compte de tous les aspects et niveaux de ceux-ci et en partant de textes relativement simples pour aller progressivement vers des textes de plus en plus complexes au lieu de sauter, comme se fut alors souvent le cas dans le séminaire, du conte populaire à des romans fort complexes. Seule, une telle analyse minutieuse permet, selon lui, de confirmer la validité de la théorie d'ores et déjà existante et de procéder, le cas échéant, à la généralisation de celle-ci. Et, seule, une telle analyse est susceptible de conduire à une correction et à un élargissement de la théorie, si le texte analysé infirme ou complexifie telle ou telle partie de celle-ci, voire comporte des éléments textuels pas encore pris en compte par elle.

4. Des exercices pratiques en guise de leçon

Il s'agira donc pour nous, à partir de quelques exemples pertinents, de démontrer les résultats de ces deux fonctions des « exercices pratiques » de Greimas, la confirmation de la validité de la théorie déjà existante, d'une part, et la correction et l'élargissement de celle-ci, de l'autre.

4.1. De l'utilité du découpage en séquence

Commençons par attirer l'attention sur la minutie avec laquelle Greimas découpe le texte en séquences, puis multiplie les critères de segmentation : sont à prendre en compte les critères spatio-temporels, les disjonctions d'ordre logique (Greimas 1976 : 19), les récurrences textuelles (Greimas 1976 : 68), l'opposition entre description et commentaire (Greimas 1976 : 135), entre discours continu et dialogue (Greimas 1976 : 136), le comportement des acteurs discursifs, les apparitions et les disparitions d'acteurs (Greimas 1976 : 67), le passage du faire cognitif au faire pragmatique qui le suit (Greimas 1976 : 120), enfin, l'intercalation, terme que Greimas préfère à celui d' « enchâssement » (Greimas 1976 : 40) et qu'il définit comme « une procédure formelle d'organisation discursive permettant, sous la forme simulée d'un rejet de contenus hors du texte, d'intégrer ceux-ci plus intimement dans un discours unique et cohérent » (Greimas 1976 : 42), et ce par des procédures de disjonction temporelle et spatiale et des mécanismes de débrayage et d'embrayage. Ces procédures de segmentation permettent de voir plus clair dans l'organisation discursive du texte, de repérer des récurrences même très éloignées les unes des autres et de faciliter ainsi la reconnaissance de la paradigmatisation du récit qui invite, le cas échéant, à des rétro-lectures (Greimas 1976 : 224) et permet l'identification des anaphores et des cataphores (Greimas 1976 : 50). Greimas attire en outre l'attention sur le fait que « la multiplication

des critères de la segmentation fait apparaître […] la non-concordance terme à terme entre les séquences textuelles et les syntagmes narratifs » (Greimas 1976 : 69).

Il souligne également l'importance et les significations des jeux proxémiques, à savoir l'utilisation des mouvements, attitudes et gestes du corps humain qui, en tant que signifiants, rendent compte des relations interactorielles, tout en soulignant qu'une théorie à ce sujet reste à élaborer (Greimas 1976 : 221).

4.2. La complexification du schéma narratif

A l'époque, le schéma narratif que Propp avait élaboré à partir du conte merveilleux russe (Propp 1970) — schéma que Greimas avait développé — existait déjà. L'analyse de *Deux Amis* confirmera du reste dans ses grandes lignes la validité de ce schéma pour le conte littéraire, tout en obligeant à le complexifier. En effet, contrairement à ce qui se passe dans le conte populaire où le conteur, le destinateur et le sujet-destinataire partagent un seul et même système de valeurs, dans le conte de Maupassant on assiste au dédoublement de ce destinateur, l'un individuel, l'autre social, destinateurs qui s'avèrent en outre axiologiquement incompatibles. Greimas note que ce dédoublement des destinateurs fait éclater le schéma spatial élaboré par Propp et Meletinski (1970) qui opposait un espace familier à un espace étranger, puisque, pour le sujet « deux amis » il existe deux espaces familiers — le bord de l'eau et Paris — l'un commun au sujet et au destinateur individuel, l'autre commun au sujet et au destinateur social (Greimas 1976 : 97) . Ce dédoublement du destinateur entraîne en outre l'instauration de deux types de contrats : au contrat injonctif qui prévaut dans les contes populaires où c'est le destinateur qui prescrit et/ou interdit un programme, vient ici s'ajouter un contrat permissif où c'est le sujet qui prend l'initiative et s'adresse au destinateur social pour lui demander de l'autoriser à réaliser le programme qui lui a été inspiré par le destinateur individuel, demande que le destinateur social est susceptible d'accepter ou de refuser (Greimas 1976 : 91-99).

Toujours dans le cadre de l'instauration du contrat entre le sujet et le destinateur, Greimas détecte l'existence de ce qu'il appelle « les décepteurs ». Il démontre que le rôle actantiel des ces décepteurs est important, mais ajoute que la typologie de ce genre d'acteurs reste à faire, tout en proposant des pistes : le décepteur est défini comme un syncrétisme de rôles actantiels en même temps qu'un acteur figuratif, investi d'un ensemble de contenus axiologiques de caractère figuratif. L'une des caractéristiques du décepteur est sa préférence pour des investissements articulés en termes complexes qui lui permettent d'assumer un rôle thématique, destiné à manifester, au niveau du paraître, l'être d'un autre acteur pour lequel il veut se faire passer et d'instaurer ainsi l'espace de l'illusion. Et c'est au sémioticien qui analyse le texte qu'il appartient de découvrir l'acteur pour lequel le décepteur désire se faire passer (Greimas 1976 : 85-89).

Enfin, deux autres complexifications du schéma narratif sont à signaler. Dans la première partie du récit, à savoir le programme « pêche », les épreuves qualifiantes, bien qu'occupant conformément au schéma proppien l'espace para-topique, se déroulent non pas sur l'isotopie de la « pêche », mais sur celle de la « guerre », qui occupera la seconde partie du récit : en effet, lors de la première de ces épreuves, pour ne citer qu'elle, il s'agit pour le sujet de vaincre la peur que lui inspire une éventuelle rencontre avec l'anti-sujet, victoire qui se déroule sur la dimension cognitive et volitive et non pas pragmatique et dotera le sujet du pouvoir-faire qui lui permettra de surmonter les épreuves auxquelles il aura à faire face plus tard lors de sa confrontation avec l'anti-sujet (Greimas 1976 : 111-114). Autre complexification : l'absence de l'épreuve décisive lors de la réalisation du programme « pêche ». Certes, les deux amis se trouvent, lors de leur « pêche miraculeuse », conjoints à l'objet de valeur « poissons », mais cette conjonction n'est pas une

épreuve, car l'anti-sujet est encore absent. La conjonction avec l'objet de valeur quêté est donc un don, en l'occurrence du non-anti-destinateur « eau ». Parallèlement, les poissons, une fois attrapés, sont remis dans le filet de pêche, puis dans l'eau. On n'a donc pas à faire à une épreuve principale, mais à un don et un contre-don, soit à « une forme de communication participative entre le sujet et son destinateur » (Greimas, 1976 : 126-127), qui dote le premier d'une joie qui frise l'extase mystique.

Je viens de dire que le conte de Maupassant s'articule en deux récits successifs — le premier se déroulant sur l'isotopie de la « pêche », le second sur celle de la « guerre ». Or, l'analyse de Greimas démontre, malgré l'occultation du programme narratif du sujet « deux amis » dans le second récit et malgré l'absence somatique de l'anti-sujet « prussien » dans le premier, « l'existence d'isotopies plus profondes permettant de réunir les deux récits en programmes unifiés, recouvrant pour chacun des sujets l'ensemble du texte » (Greimas 1976 : 264).

4.3. De l'importance de la dimension cognitive autonome

Autre leçon à tirer de l'analyse de Greimas : l'importance à accorder à la dimension cognitive autonome du discours qui se superpose à la dimension pragmatique (Greimas 1976 : 161). Greimas démontre ainsi qu'il existe deux types de faire cognitifs : le faire persuasif et le faire interprétatif qui relèvent de la catégorie modale de la véridiction. Dans ce cadre, il précise que le faire persuasif vise à l'établissement d'un contrat fiduciaire, « comprenant, en tant que contrepartie, l'adhésion de l'interlocuteur », autrement dit « la confiance […] ou, tout simplement, le croire-vrai que l'énonciataire accorde au statut du discours énoncé » (Greimas 1976 : 197-198. Il s'agit là d'une forme particulière du contrat fiduciaire que Greimas désigne comme contrat énonciatif ou contrat de véridiction puisqu'il « porte alors sur le discours énoncé en tant qu'objet de savoir, valorisé du fait de la modalisation » (Greimas 1976 : 198). Si le faire persuasif se double en outre d'une proposition d'échange et si cet échange se produit sur le plan pragmatique, on aurait en plus à faire à un contrat énoncif (Greimas 1976 : 198).

Cette attention portée à la dimension cognitive permet à Greimas de reconstruire le faire cognitif de l'officier prussien qui assume à la fois le rôle actantiel de l'anti-sujet et de l'anti-destinateur social. En voyant les deux pêcheurs, voici comment se présente ce faire cognitif de l'officier : il veut pénétrer dans Paris ; pour ce faire il lui faut comme adjuvant un mot d'ordre, les pêcheurs doivent en avoir un ; pour l'obtenir il lui faudra donc les accuser d'espionnage et les menacer de mort et, si cela ne suffit pas, leur proposer en échange et en guise de tentation la grâce, enfin, pour ce faire, il faut d'abord qu'il les fasse prisonniers. Et Greimas de conclure que tout programme se construit, comme ici, depuis la fin vers le début, en y insérant au fur et à mesure des sous-programmes censés permettre sa réalisation. Or, le lecteur, quant à lui, en prend, au contraire, connaissance du début à la fin. En effet, dans le récit nous avons d'abord la capture, puis l'accusation d'espionnage et la menace de mort, enfin, la tentation.

Le programme de l'officier échoue, puisqu'il n'obtient pas le mot d'ordre, étant donné le silence que lui opposent les deux amis, silence à partir duquel Greimas reconstitue de la même manière le faire interprétatif et le nouveau programme des deux amis. Dans ses « Remarques finales », il conclut que « la reconnaissance de cette nouvelle dimension » — à savoir la dimension cognitive — « dont, pour l'instant, on voit mal la configuration d'ensemble n'est qu'une ouverture vers de nouveaux champs d'exploration » (Greimas 1976 : 265). Et que « s'il est encore trop tôt pour parler d'une éventuelle typologie des discours non figuratifs, il n'est que plus important d'enregistrer la présence de la dimension cognitive dans les discours narratifs de caractère figuratif » (Greimas 1976 : 265-266).

4.4. L'attention à porter à la structure de l'énonciation

Vient s'y ajouter la volonté de Greimas d'élucider certaines phases du fonctionnement de la structure de l'énonciation dont il affirme qu'elle est fondamentale pour la théorie du discours, mais dont il juge que la connaissance est alors très rudimentaire et dont il théorisera le fonctionnement dans *Du Sens II* (Greimas 1983). C'est ainsi qu'il tente, entre autres, à partir de l'énoncé constatif « ils étaient bien seuls » — qui intervient au moment où les deux amis, ayant rejoint le bord de l'eau, croient en l'absence de l'anti-sujet — de préciser les opérations complexes en jeu dans ce qui s'apparente au « discours indirect libre », tout en précisant avec modestie qu'il ne prétend pas les avoir mises à jour dans leur totalité. Il s'agit selon Greimas de trois opérations : premièrement d'un débrayage énonciatif, à savoir la projection, par l'énonciateur hors de lui et dans le discours énoncé, de la structure même de l'énonciation ; deuxièmement d'un embrayage cognitif qui consiste pour le sujet de l'énonciation, après avoir reconnu dans la construction qu'il vient d'effectuer, la dimension cognitive du discours, à suspendre la production de l'énoncé prévu et de le prendre à sa charge ; enfin, « de l'utilisation du débrayage énoncif implicitant qui, sous la forme de l'énoncé constatif 'ils étaient bien seuls' réussit à occulter le parcours génératif antérieur et à retirer fictivement la délégation de l'énonciation confiée d'abord à un sujet de l'énoncé » (Greimas 1976 : 122-123).

4.5. Maupassant symboliste et non pas réaliste

Venons-en à l'analyse par Greimas du martyre des deux amis. Les corps de ceux-ci forment, à la suite de la fusillade, la figure de la croix en même temps que les bouillons de sang qui s'échappent de la poitrine de l'un d'eux rappellent la figure de Jésus crucifié. Mais à la différence du martyre de Jésus, ce martyre humain se dresse face à un ciel qu'il nie : en effet, l'un des deux amis, « tombé sur le nez », tourne le dos au ciel, tandis que l'autre se retrouve le « visage au ciel ». Le ciel que toutes les représentations dans le texte font considérer comme un lieu vide assume, par ailleurs, au niveau axiologique le rôle actantiel du non-destinateur des deux amis tant et si bien que leur position — dos et face a ciel — en même temps que les bouillons de sang qui sont, eux, des hyponymes du soleil, destinateur axiologique des deux amis, signifient à la fois l'affrontement du non-destinateur et le rejet des valeurs qu'il représente (Greimas 1976 : 236-238). Et Greimas de commenter qu'il s'agit là « d'une procédure curieuse qui consiste à exploiter des représentations chrétiennes socio-lectales afin de dénier, de manière idéolectale, d'autres représentations chrétiennes », à savoir de la production d'un mythe anti- et para-chrétien. A la suite de l'apparition, vers la fin du récit, de cette nouvelle isotopie figurative où l'image de la croix semble faire fonction de connecteur d'isotopies, Greimas va procéder à une rétro-lecture pour voir, s'il est possible de détecter des éléments permettant l'élargissement de cette isotopie à l'ensemble du texte et en trouve un nombre non-négligeable, comme par exemple et pour n'en citer que deux : dans la seconde partie du récit, le silence des deux amis face à l'officier prussien qui rappelle celui de Jésus lors de son procès face à Ponce Pilate, et, dans la première partie, l'isotopie générale choisie par Maupassant qui fait assumer aux deux amis le rôle de pêcheurs, ce qui renvoie à la première communauté des disciples de Jésus, elle aussi, formée de pêcheurs (Greimas 1976 : 238-239). Greimas conclura pour finir que « la lecture proposée par l'énonciateur est donc à la fois profondément chrétienne et sacrilège » (1976 : 261), ce qui l'amène à affirmer que l'œuvre de Maupassant ne relève pas du réalisme, mais du symbolisme.

Certes, un certain nombre d'éléments du récit renvoient implicitement à la débâcle de l'armée française face aux Prussiens à Sedan le 2 septembre 1870, à la chute du Second Empire et à la proclamation de la Troisième République, suivies du siège de Paris qui dura cinq mois du 18 septembre 1870 au 29 janvier 1871. Rappelons que Paris est « bloqué », que c'est en janvier que

les deux amis décident de partir à la pêche, qu'ils ont besoin d'un laissez-passer pour sortir de Paris et qu'ils finissent par être fusillés par les Prussiens qui encerclent la capitale — éléments qui pourraient être interprétés en termes de réalisme. Et cependant, tout le long de son analyse, Greimas montre l'inanité d'une telle lecture, à la fois sur le fond et sur la forme, et attire l'attention sur le caractère symbolique de l'écriture de Maupassant. Il démontre que la guerre est présentée dès le début comme un mal absolu et universel, si bien que l'ancrage historique du texte demeure implicite. Il signale un peu plus tard, sur le plan de la forme, un passage composé de quatre phrases ayant chacun un sujet phrastique différent, tout comme la strophe d'un poème symboliste (Greimas 1976 : 22). Il note, à propos de la joie qui saisit les deux amis lors de leur pêche miraculeuse et qui transforme le sujet en objet conjoint avec le destinateur, sujet de cette saisie, que l'écriture de Maupassant ressemble à celle d'un mystique et que, par conséquent, Maupassant en est un (Greimas 1976 : 131). Enfin, il précise, à propos de la mort des deux amis que « l'exploration du plan figuratif et notamment des figures somatiques pour leur faire signifier les activités noologiques est l'un des traits qui caractérisent le symbolisme du 19ème siècle » (Greimas 1976 : 237).

5. Conclusion

On peut, bien sûr, ne pas être d'accord avec certains résultats de l'analyse de Greimas, mais nous espérons avoir montré que ces *exercices pratiques* non seulement ont une incontestable valeur didactique, mais encore qu'elles ont à l'époque considérablement enrichi la théorie sémiotique et souligné les lacunes à combler. Je ne peux donc qu'encourager tous les apprentis sémioticiens à lire attentivement ce livre de Greimas.

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GREIMAS AND THE SEMIOTIC TRIANGLE OF HISTORY

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Abstract

Algirdas Julien Greimas's position in twentieth-century linguistic theory of history deserves of its own right an ample monograph. This paper intends to be a first approach. I will employ my heuristic model called Semiotic Triangle of History (Fernández 2012: vi-xxv), whose vertices are the past, the thought that historians elaborate about it, and the narrative in which they write their conclusions. Within this framework, we analyze Greimas's view on history, and his place in French structural "Cliosemiotics" (a shorthand for "semiotic study of historical knowledge").[1]

1. Past, thought, writing

Remains of the past (documents and monuments) are decoded as *signs* of past actuality. Thought then proceeds to a synthesis of these pieces of knowledge. In a further step, by means of symbolization, knowledge is converted into writing, the stable discourse of historians about events. This linguistic product, eventually, enters in a representative or referential relationship as to the whole object of inquiry. This First Triangle (Fig. 1) has been the semiotic presupposition of most historiographical methodologies since Herodotus. However, contemporary philosophy cannot justify it.

Every present, as a result of past events, is, semiotically, a Peircean index or trace of the past (Peirce 1998: 4-10). As we cannot identify indices without some previous knowledge of their links to regularities of the world, it becomes clear that we have no direct access to the past, but only to its signs as identified by our present conceptions. Thus, the signification process in historiography does not really jump from past reality to present thought: it rather goes *from present initial signs to further elaborate signs*.

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1   All quotations in English from original French texts are my own translations.

Figure 1. First Semiotic Triangle of History

In ontological terms, we posit a homologous past projected from our idea of a present; such a past is the regulative idea of a historical world that we have not fully discovered yet. As to the transit from thought to writing, their separation is also impossible. The very form of historical thought consists of its development through a discourse. All historical thinking is historical writing. Finally, it sounds strange to say that the historical narrative represents a historical past, once we realize that this past is in part a linguistic construction.

Instead of signification, symbolisation, and representation, we now reach three correlate notions of a Second Triangle (Fig. 2): *dialogical configuration, ideal identity*, and *poiesis*. French structuralism played a leading role in this transformation of the theory of historical knowledge.

Figure 2. Second Semiotic Triangle of History

2. Greimas's Cliosemiotics

2.1. System and event

Cliosemiotics entered the French theory of historiography through three major streams: Phenomenology, Structuralism and, in the professional self-understanding, neo-Positivism. Thus, its founding references were Edmund Husserl, Ferdinand de Saussure, and Émile Durkheim.

Greimas's line, hegemonic from mid-1960s to mid-1980s, sprung from Saussure's paradigm. In an early article, he contended that structural linguistics was a "general epistemology for human sciences". But conciliation of structural and historical linguistics could only be achieved in the historical dimension. Even though "the living speech is supported (…) by the already instituted language", it is "at the same time the source of every new creation, every historical progress"; linguistic change is to be found in this "to-and-fro dialectic between speech and language" (Greimas 1956).

Greimas's next general considerations on history appeared in *Annales*, the leading journal of France's sociological new history (Greimas 1958). He warned that the mere exploitation by historians of lexicographic analysis did not really imply a methodological rapprochement. Although the emergence of a synthetic history (*histoire synthétisante*) against a history of events (*histoire événementielle*) had driven to a "totalitarian" (*totalitaire*) scope and a priority of the synchronic interpretation over the diachronic one, this was just a methodological preference, but not, as in Saussurean linguistics, a methodological necessity. Johan Huizinga's picture of the late Middle Ages, for example, had been, albeit synchronic and structural, guided by subjective choices of the contents deemed more representative. On the contrary, Saussurean linguistics provided an overall sociological attitude, taking language, a symbolic system, as "the place where history happens" ("*la langue, en tant que système symbolique, est ce lieu où se passe l'histoire*"). Instead of the typical, we encounter mentality systems. The linguistic bid to history was to achieve a wholesale "new objectivism, no longer atomistic, but totalitarian" (Greimas 1958: 112).

In 1966, Greimas published a major work: *Structural semantics*. We must highlight there: (1) the "actantial" model of myths: subject-object, aide-opponent, sender-receiver; (2) the mediating role of narrative between: structure and behaviour; permanence and history; society and individual. In the first case, Greimas took as an example the Marxist ideological version of history. Man is the subject; society without classes, the object; the universal process of history is the sender; humankind, the receiver; the working class is the aide; and the bourgeois class is the opponent (Greimas 1966a: 181). In the second case, dissecting Russian folktales, Greimas postulates the immanent coexistence of two different models of organization: the constitutional (*modèle constitutionnel*), which presents contradictory, inevitable, and unpleasant axiological poles; and the transformational (*modèle transformationnel*), which offers an ideological solution to the showdown (Greimas 1966a: 212-213). All this favored a semiotic criticism of historiography.

In Jean-Paul Sartre's journal *Les Temps Modernes*, Greimas tried also to extrapolate structural linguistics to an anthropological view including the temporal dimension. Saussure's *language/speech* pair established a relationship between system and history: the structure, "indifferent towards time, was able to produce, in its manifestation, sequences of significations at the same time eventful (événementielles) and temporal (*temporelles*); it was generatrix of historical events" (Greimas 1966b: 816). However, since syntax takes the sentence as unity, it cannot articulate the whole speech. The discourse is not the articulation of successive structures, but the redundancy of just one hierarchical structure, the sentence (énoncé). Furthermore, from the viewpoint of the receiver,

> all grabbing of signification has as an effect the transformation of histories into permanencies: be the question about the sense of a lifetime, or about the sense of a history (or of History), the questioning, that is, the fact of placing oneself before a linguistic manifestation in the attitude of the receiver of messages, has the consequence of presenting historical algorithms as states, that is, as static structures (Greimas1966b: 816).

Greimas considered that this "fundamental signification" of a history (story, tale, myth) was ever reduced to a simple homological articulation. Time and space were means of the manifestation of meaning, but meaning was neither temporal nor spatial itself (Greimas1966b: 817).

The key is the opposition between systemic capabilities and restrictive uses: "Just as the atomic structure is easily conceived as a combinatory whose partial actualization the manifested universe is, the semantic structure, imagined after a similar model, remains open and receives its closure from history" (Greimas 1966b: 823). Thus, history is a redundancy and a brake, rather than a motor. It is closure, not overture.

The next question is "the transformation of structures". Here the passage from the philosophy of history to the science of history has to pay the same price as linguistics had paid earlier: abandonment of general concepts, development of "description models". Structural transformation is a metalinguistic topic that can only be mastered once the scholar has been able to extract, from usages, the underlying structures, in a typological understanding. Lévi-Strauss's research on myths was the paradigm (Greimas 1966b: 826).

2.2. Narrative structures

In "For a sociology of common sense", Greimas laid down the basis for the interpretation of the present as a *connotative* access to past structures. Connotation is a second layer of meaning attached to every semiotic object. The appearance of society and man is expressed through two great connotative taxonomies, one articulating the linguistic community in classes and subclasses (social or geographical, for example), and the other establishing a typology of individuals. Connotation is the result of an inferential code based upon recurrences (Greimas 1970: 101); it generates "an external semiotic space", where we encounter all kinds of linguistic signs constituting cultural objects, "from words connoted as heavy-sensed or endowed with power, and the proverbs that express eternal truths, to the events that become historical out of simple narrative structures". Also, a qualitative distinction is made between "simple" and "historical" contents: "simple" means handed down by tradition; "historical" already involves a judgment of pertinence, a selection. Historians normally employ their ethnocentric semiotics of connotation (Greimas 1970: 102).

In "Elements for a narrative grammar", Greimas pointed to the combination of a deep or fundamental grammar, and a hollow or "surface grammar". The main feature of the fundamental grammar is that the story, in its deepest level, is a syntax that manipulates classificatory forms, previously inter-defined. Between these forms, there are relationships of union or separation. The syntactic operations are oriented and, therefore, predictable or calculable. The operations are ordered in series, composed of segments or operational units (Greimas 1970: 166). This grammar is essentially conceptual in its semantic articulation. It can bring about stories manifested in a figurative form (where human actors perform tasks, endure challenges…). But Greimas thinks it is necessary still an intermediate level, anthropomorphic but not figurative: the surface grammar.

Greimas distinguishes three types of narrative statements: descriptive (deeds), modal (wishes, powers, knowledge), and translative (transference of a valuable object). He identifies the "performance", of a polemical nature, as the basic narrative unit composed of a sequence of three narrative statements. In turn, a series of performances creates the story, through an ordered path that can be understood by means of *logical presuppositions*. Every story is an anthropomorphized complex sequence that expresses conceptual abstract relationships of junction and disjunction in the deep structure.

Was it also the structure of historical knowledge? A major analysis came as a contribution to a German metahistorical conference (Koselleck and Stempel 1973: 139-143; Greimas 1976: 161-174). Greimas opposes a "fundamental" or deep history (*histoire fondamentale*) to an event-made surface history (*histoire événementielle*). As a first step, he distinguishes between, on the

one hand, a "fundamental dimension" (*dimension fondamentale*) made of taxonomic organizations and structural transformations in social phenomena, and, on the other hand, the "historical appearing" or "surface dimension" (*paraître historique*), the place of manifestation of historicity through an infinity of micro-events not available for systematic or complete description.

Out of this multiplicity of micro-facts, the historian extracts, in a selection guided by principles of significance, those invested with the dignity of "historical events" (événements historiques); these events are later enchained together in a "series of events" integrated in the historian's discourse. Therefore, selectivity is a mediation between deep history and surface history. There are two conceptualizations of the fundamental dimension. One of them opposes structures to events, "as different modes of semiotic existence", and establishes the structural level as deeper than that of events. The other one sees the fundamental dimension as a "puff pastry" (*pâte feuilletée*) of autonomous and stackable levels, being some among them more fundamental than others; thus, in ascendant order: economic, social, and cultural structures. Then, there are three possible ways of understanding the relationship between fundamental and event-made history:

1. Only the upper layer of the set of structures touches and influences the événementelle dimension.

2. Each structural layer would be in independent and direct connection to the *niveau événementiel*. But then the level of events would have to be divided into as many surface types as structural levels.

3. A historical event (or sequence) is in simultaneous relationship to several structural layers.

Greimas equals scientific history to structural history, but without an ontological commitment. He regretted that history was still written, despite Marxism and Annales, much in the same way as in older times, without "homogeneous and comparable descriptions of the different structural levels of societies" (Greimas 1976: 165). The Marxist achronic model, for sure, had raised the problem of the relationship between the constructed pattern and its diverse historical realizations. Greimas endorsed the view that different models of states and levels converge for bringing about the historical event; the area of human freedom lays in the margins of (in)compatibility between models. Historical events become meaningful just through their insertion into wide networks of compatibilities and incompatibilities.

Thus, deep structures obey to a sort of "grammar of history", whose taxonomic element they constitute; this grammar has "restriction rules" (limits to the possibility of manifestation), and "organization rules" for setting up syntagmatic sequences capable of being inscribed in the historical discourse. While Marxism and Annals permit to guess what the fundamental structures of history would look like, that is not the case of the event-made history. For Greimas, historiographical traditions had tended "to confuse history and historicity, and to consider the inscription of events within space-time coordinates as attributing them the status of historical events, and the procedures for inscription as the criterion of the scientific doing of the historian" (Greimas 1976: 168). But space and time can only be circumstances of the historical event, not its definition.

How, then, are we to establish the historical fact, that is, the "historical referent" (*référent historique*)? While the positivistic tradition takes the historical fact as a denotation of reality, the situation is not so simple. The historical manifestation is never present before the historian, so the historian builds no description, but some "hypothetic construction" (*construction hypothétique*) projected into the past as if it were a "reality". History cannot be written without linguistic mediation. Its true referents are texts, which stand for the "real" sequences of events that are reconstructed through a "referential projection". On the one hand, written sources are already the elaboration in natural languages of "somatic programs"; on the other hand, objects and monuments play the same role as the extra-linguistic context in discursive analysis. Now, we

may take two alternative paths: (1) to consider the ways of writing history as diverse syntagmatic forms that deserve "a typology of historiographical narrative structures"; or (2) to consider the historical discourse as a scientific one, in permanent construction and in search of an operative language of its own, departing from the natural language that gave a first access to the object. Greimas defines the historical discourse as a set of utterances describing "facts" and forming chains of succession according to rules. All such statements will correspond to the basic form "someone does something" or, in formula, *F faire (S⇒O)*. Thus, statements descriptive of "being" are not historical; and if we restrict S, we might exclude natural history as well (Greimas 1976: 169-170).

What about collective subjects? Greimas examines two different instances. "The Renault factories" are a figurative subject which works as a subject in the whole syntagmatic chain that tells the story of car production; however, a crowd (*foule*) taking on La Bastille in the French Revolution is a complex subject integrated by individual subjective programs and, finally, it is representative of classes of the French people. Its significance comes from its taxonomic value. It emerges, then, the possibility of a "historical syntax".

Though, we should begin by rejecting the naïve positivism that "pretends to describe a reality already made and previously organized". The situation is the opposite: reality is *prima facie* "the effect of a lexematic categorization of the world, subjected to cultural relativism". And such a syntax would not work if it did not keep a constant reference between the two levels, fundamental and event-made: "Indeed, the true goal of the event-made history is its constitution as a historical discourse that can manipulate the canonical historical utterances aided by a discursive syntax capable of satisfying the scientific criteria" (Greimas 1976: 173).

Some features of narrative are misleading. Isolated statements on singular facts create the "illusion of reality"; a sequence of unrelated statements gives the impression of absurdism; and two factual statements in sequence tend to be read as being the former a cause of the latter. And if we take those chains as determined by intentions following a logic of decisions, we shall be assigning to history "an ideological voluntarist coloration". Greimas preferred the *a posteriori* teleology that biology shows:

> From this perspective, the meaning of history would not be read but after the facts, and historical discourse will be, indeed, a reconstruction of history, thus authenticating the historian's true approach, which has ever been, since the moment of his enunciation, the penetration backwards into the depths of history. A historical syntax searching for the establishment of chains of statements, beginning by the results and not by the starting points of historical programs, would have at its disposition the logic of presuppositions capable of founding the relationships constituting sequences of historical utterances, even if the historian conserved, for his didactic discourses, the chronological order of exposition (Greimas 1976: 173-174).

Anyway, Greimas began to believe that history was one of the fundamental disciplines in semiotics, because "history as a science does not seem possible unless it aims at describing not events, but their sense" (Greimas 1973: 152).

2.3. Inner referent

Greimas dealt more radically with history in his analysis of the scientific discourse in social sciences (Greimas 1976: 7-42). He asked to take science not as a system, but a process, a "scientific doing" that expresses itself through the discourses it produces. The subject of this discourse is a virtual position, the "speaking subject" (*sujet parlant*). It performs a twofold activity: taxonomic selection, syntagmatic-hypotactic handling. Taxonomy is not enough for discriminating

the concept of scientific discourse: its purpose is to tell the truth about reality. This "telling-the-truth" makes it a "veridiction discourse". The truthfulness of an assertion of existence is always modalized by the knowledge of the speaking subject. When he says "this is so and so", he means "I *know* that this is so and so". The truth-value of the utterance is founded upon previous wisdom, in turn based on inner convictions or empirical tests. There is always an anaphorical relationship to other discourses.

This way, Greimas postulates an "inner referent" (*référent interne*): the discursive layer that tells the truth (*vérédictoire*) appeals to this background plan that becomes its support. Despite its implicit character, it always appears as a referential discourse, founder of the "veridiction" discourse (Greimas 1976: 26). This idea that a scientific discourse, for making valid assertions, has to build its own inner referent came as a shock for positivistic thinkers. But Greimas took as example the naissance of philology and its branching out in linguistics and history. Philology was born as a "science of the referent": it established the text and, with it, the reality. The historical discourse puts its contents as representations of the non-linguistic referent in the past. A prolongation of the philological discourse in the stage of source criticism, history is even more ambitious: "the reconstruction, with the help of the linguistic referent created by the philological discourse, of the extralinguistic referent—the historical reality". Therefore, it introduces two novelties: temporality is substituted for achronicity, pretending that the present meaning of a text has a past meaning; and reifying this present meaning through its identification with the external referent of discourse. There are both a "temporal illusion" and a "referential illusion" (Greimas 1976: 29).

So, history must submit to the same conditions as the other social sciences. Every science builds for itself "simulacra" that stand for reality. *The historical simulacrum is the true referent of the historical discourse.* A positivistic realism would dispense history from constructing its own taxonomy. But if historians limit themselves to the lexematic coverture that the studied society has given to itself, they would be unable to account for the synchronic diversity or the diachronic transformations. Only "structural comparatism" could provide a scientific taxonomy for history (Greimas 1976: 30).

The problem arose again when Greimas and Joseph Courtès contended that the expansion of cognitive dimensions in narrative discourses reflects a transition between figurative and abstract discourses. Among the latter, they distinguished three groups:

> -*interpretative discourse*, such as literary criticism, history as an interpretation of series of events, exegesis, art criticism (painting, music, architecture), and so on;
> -*persuasive discourse*, such as pedagogical, political, advertising, etc.;
> -*scientific discourse*, which overlaps with both persuasive discourse (with the subtle game of demonstration) and interpretative discourse (exploiting previous discourses considered as referential discourses), with true knowledge as its project and goal (Greimas & Courtès 1976: 445).

They posited here two kinds of historical discourses: the interpretative and the scientific. Structuralism was unable to overcome this epistemic dualism.

Greimas and Courtès (1979: 159-160) also promoted, along with the "generative trajectory" (*parcours génératif*) as a model for articulating signification through semio-narrative, discursive, and textual structures, the so called "canonical narrative scheme", made of four stages of actions: manipulation, competence, performance, sanction (1979: 244-247). These structures could have been applied to historical stories, not as a proof of the fictional or "mythical" character of history, but, on the contrary, as showing that myths and folktales are already based upon everyday narrative structures.

3. Greimas's place in French Cliosemiotics

Greimas never took pains in analyzing real historical texts, nor offered a simple unified model for historiographical analysis, unlike Roland Barthes (1984: 163-177). While providing new tools for criticism of historiography, Greimas fell short of explaining how the Second Triangle works. His "inner referent" is rather complex and was not further elaborated: it points to the three vertices of the Semiotic Triangle, as referent-source, referent-explanatory model, and referent-ontological projection.

Greimas is akin to Lévi-Strauss (1962: 140-141) in believing that historical narratives are semantic modelizations. His understanding of stories is also akin to the analysis of action trajectories in Tzvetan Todorov (1966) and Claude Bremond (1966), and of utterance levels in Émile Benveniste (1966: 237-250) and Gérard Genette (2007: 13-20). Benveniste and Todorov provided Greimas with strong arguments for refusing "history" as a process apart from its linguistic foundations. Genette blurred the difference between history and story. Like Lévi-Strauss, Greimas saw the threshold of scientificity in the contribution of anthropological structures to historical discourses. On the other hand, he would have admitted, with Barthes (1968: 27), that, as an interplay of independent structures, *l'Histoire est elle aussi une écriture*.

Which were greimas's solutions to the semiotic triangle?

As to the connection past-thought, he suggested scales of signification (natural, connotative, deep structures). He also translated this progression into historiographical styles: traditional history, structural subjectivism, new objectivism. As to the link between thought and writing, greimas understood text as a structurally "generated" event with semantic and syntactic levels going from depth to surface and discourse. Underlying the narrative, there is a whole conceptual infrastructure. Finally, writing and past are understood as the re-elaboration of inner referents of historical discourse.

What was left unresolved by greimas's approach?

Above all, the correspondence between narrative logic and logic proper is mostly unclear. It is not apparent how successive generative layers fulfil the logical needs of an argumentative process. The "generative trajectory" does not seem wholly compatible with the duality "veridictive-referential". Besides, greimas never managed to explain how an event can create a structure. Constitutive events are not just expressions of the structure they destroy; they act on behalf of the structure that will become the new normal. Greimas suggested for language an innate tendency to disequilibrium, but this idea would never undergo a full elaboration. Dualism was not superseded. And, while presuppositional logic produces necessary causes, historians more often seek the logic of the sufficient ones (wright 1971: 50-55, 135-139).

The Husserlian stream eventually performed its own linguistic turn and became postmodernism and hermeneutics of history. Jacques Derrida (1967: 42-43) established writing as the condition of history. Michel Foucault (1971) asserted the historicity of discourses and the discursive constitution of historical conscience, thus reshuffling semiotically the Nietzschean outlook. Michel de Certeau (1975: 119) interpreted historical writing as a mix of logic and storytelling with Freudian underground. Paul Ricoeur (2000: 302-367) recognized the presence of writing in every stage of historical method: archive, explanation/understanding, representation. All these phenomenological developments would have been almost unthinkable without the huge influence of Greimas on the theory of human sciences since 1966. On the contrary, the inner link connecting structuralism and neo-Positivism was abandoned about 1990, when neither of the two could deliver on their great promises. Yet Greimas's Cliosemiotics is still a must in the adequate understanding of how historical science works.

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INTERACTION SPACES: SEMIOTICS AND URBAN PERIPHERIES

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Abstract

This article is framed in the scope of the semiotics of space, examining the urban periphery and its public space practices (Greimas 1976, Hammad 2003). It is based on a collaboration with an interdisciplinary team of sociologist-architects, anthropologists and urban planners involved in a project for the upgrading of the largest Western-European public housing neighbourhood (about 28.000 inhabitants), located on the outskirts of the city of Rome. The neighbourhood was built between 1983 and 1985, and it is composed of a series of twenty 14-floor towers and about ten other linear buildings of 4-5 floors and of varying in length (up to 1 km). With nearly 28,000 inhabitants, the neighbourhood has a population comparable to that of a small Italian town. Conceived as a "modest" utopian city (i.e. as part of a utopian quantitative program of social housing) meant to introduce order in the Roman periphery (mainly composed by irregular habitation), the neighbourhood quickly deteriorated and it now constitutes one of the areas with the highest crime rate in the city, as well as with most social, economic, and political problems.

1. Practices of empty spaces: semiotics as a method for analysing the use of space by inhabitants

The urban planners, who expected to use the inhabitant's practices as the foundation for their project of transforming the area's public spaces, found themselves in difficulty, as this neighbourhood is a paradoxically empty one. The vast open spaces that characterise it are, in fact, very sparsely used, if at all, by its inhabitants. According to them, a sense of *denial of the public space* was evident: in addition to the lack of people in both existing squares, they had noted that, in some of the buildings, the façades "were lived" as behind-the-scenes-parts, whereas the concentration of people, such as the healing/fixing and recovery interventions of the public/collective space and gardens, introduced by the inhabitants themselves, were located in building areas mainly detached from the streets (Fig. 1).

Figure 1. Typical example of one of the main roads of the district

Based on this intuitive observation, I started an ethno-semiotic study (Marsciani 2007) of the neighbourhood's two squares — conducted during a failed re-qualification attempt, in the 1990s — in an attempt of understanding how the meanings were reconfigured through the living of everyday practices in those spaces. I started focusing on the two squares of the district, Largo Mengaroni, and the second, unnamed, both located in the south and the north-western parts of the district. The under-utilisation of the squares was immediately evident.

Figure 2. Mengaroni square.

Largo Mengaroni (Fig. 2) in its 300m is inhabited by 7637 people (the data are provided by the Italian national statistics institute, ISTAT); however, in its internal premises, about 20 people may meet in a given hour, often the same ones, and almost never in groups. The way in which passers-by use that space seems to be significant: they are generally focused in individual paths that cut through the square without stopping in it, a use independent to the adjacent car parks.

The same under-utilisation is noticed in the unnamed constructed square, in the northern area of the neighbourhood: there are over 3500 people living within a 300 meters' radius approximately and yet, never more than 20-30 people are present in the open area at any given hour. In this case, one could also note that:

1. The paths/trails were always aligned to the square's perimeter;
2. There were no significant processes of group gatherings;
3. The crossing was hurried/fast;
4. The gaze of the passers-by was always directed outwards.

One could also notice that the inhabitants of each of the two squares were oblivious to the existence of the other.

In both cases one could notice the absence of people acted as a border in itself, deterring others from approaching, and multiplying the effect of "emptying" the public space. Therefore, it was not possible to understand the use of public space, considering those two squares.

Where would people meet then? The only point of concentration found related to the commercial organisation of the district: a strange hybrid space, facing the square, where the paths of passers-by intersected, formed by a portion of a sidewalk where there were some shops, a lawn, and the exits of two low-budget supermarkets. It is located just in front of the empty square of Largo Mengaroni, and also, if it is not a planned and organised public space, it seems to be the only grouping place of the area. The practices of the public space were re-located in spaces other than those planned and equipped originally.

2. The meaning of the public space: from physical space to interactions

How to define public space in such conditions? I think it is not applicable to choose between practices and physical spaces, as the city is always an "agglomeration of men and things" (Greimas 1976), but it is necessary to introduce another language, i.e. verbal language.

According to the dictionaries (e.g. the Italian dictionary Garzanti 1987 and the online Treccani Dictionary) something can qualify as public if it "concerns the entire community" or "falls within the state interest" or "it is everyone's, and done in front of everyone" (my translation). Similarly, a public place is defined as a place which "everyone can attend". This definition refers to an isotopy of totality and assumes the referral to a universal subject (in the Greimasian metalanguage, an actant sender that guarantees its value): the State.

Nonetheless, that does not tell us anything about how the totality of people is articulated inside it: is it a mass, a crowd, a set of groups, or rather a collection of individuals? The definition of public as a noun is from this point of view more interesting: "the people, the mass of the population" (for example a garden/green space open to the public). This definition indicates a change: from an isotopy of totality/entirety, one shifts to the image of a group of people, a group of an indefinite number, but united by something in common, such as "the whole of all who read the newspaper". Therefore, such can be understood as a new type of "togetherness": always a totality, but open, under constant construction (a potential totality, as in the opposition between *omnis* and *totus* in the Latin language).

The online Treccani Dictionary also provides other elements for consideration. The adjective "public" is defined as "the people, the total complex of an indefinite number of persons", and a place open to the public is "a place to which anyone can have access" (my translation). Such definitions confirm the isotopy of totality but add an element, namely the fact that the

members of the aforementioned totality have to share a characteristic in common: the right to access a certain place. Such implies that, as actants, they have the same competence to act. Therefore, a public space would not be subject to the architectural or urban typologies: any place where an indefinite number of people can meet and be considered (and consider reciprocally) as equals — at least to a certain extent. From a semiotic point of view, this implies shifting from spaces to actors and their interactions. What happens if we consider the practices of public space from the point of view of interactions?

2.1. Interaction spaces in the district?

What spaces belonging to such typologies were present in the neighbourhood? In addition to the above-mentioned meeting point, I wondered if other spaces linked to the economic, political, military and religious isotopies existed — all of which are identified as main social "frames" by Dumezil (1968) and Benveniste (1969).

The first interesting piece of information was a "shift" of religious sites towards the internal part of the neighbourhood, also predominantly controlled by crime, where the members of a religious community took over two abandoned premises, where they would conduct activities with mentally impaired people, and recondition a garden. Both political spaces and paths were absent: the seats/offices of unions and associations were in closed spaces that were not related to the public space of the neighbourhood (i.e. there were no demonstrations, open-air gatherings, celebrations, etc.).

The previously mentioned actions of public space maintenance were carried out everywhere in the area, both by individual citizens and self-organised committees and, through their efforts, a lack of consistency was made visible. And yet, from the political point of view, the large number of maintenance actions made them interesting. It was the case of minor interventions, scattered (not at all coordinated among them) of a fixing and recovery nature, of places developed by citizen committees or individual inhabitants.

When the articulation of places is considered from the perspective of a military isotopy, it became immediately evident that, at least in some parts, the role of military control of the neighbourhood was not performed by the police but, rather, by the criminal organisations. After a few weeks of observations, in fact, I started to notice the squares were being observed, as well as the presence of drug-related crime, with a systematic control system of the territory consisting of fixed stations and observation points, communicating with each other through a whistling-and-yelling code which was widespread around the area. I also noticed that the degradation and the absence of people observed in the squares continued inside the buildings, meaning the use of space was limited to the private space of individual habitation. The deterioration could be observed in all the spaces which represent the access points to individual apartments and in all further general collective areas: the entrances of the buildings, landings, stairs, cellars.

In all these spaces, there were visible traces of drug-dealing and use (e.g. syringes, blood) and, occasionally, one could come across drug addicts. It was in those passage spaces that the crime actors (such as drug dealers) were positioned: invisible, yet present.

The uninhabited spaces became, thus, spaces of uncertainty, in which it would be impossible to establish what the boundaries were, what actors cross them, and at what times of the day. It was, in fact, a sort of "criminal privatisation" of the space, through the occupation of abandoned collective places, the control of the squares, and the traffic of drugs in some of the apartments inside the buildings. Although neglected in design, those transition areas are vital spaces and paths: if one fears to cross them, the house becomes a place from which one cannot get out. Fur-

thermore, if the meaning of a building changes in such manner, becoming linked to activities which make it inhabitable (Eco 1968), then the house itself is transformed into a kind of prison or a place in which the actants' modal competencies are reduced.

In these spaces, the crime was appropriately adapted, with its actions marking a transition from a strategy of programming, in which the district project was initially based; to a regime of risk, following Eric Landowski's (2005) use of the term.

3. Semiotic models for interactions: actor, actants, and modalities

Based on these elements, I used the generative path of the meaning elaborated by Greimas (2007, entry "generative path") to structure a semantic articulation starting from observable practices. The path, nonetheless, starts at the most superficial levels, and not from the deep, abstract semantic structures (Marsciani 1997). In such manner, it is possible to identify two axes, along which the thematic figures of the "rehabilitation" vs "degradation" of space would be placed, which allowed to refine the analysis including the intricacies of two networks of actors (two collective actors) which, for the sake of unpretentiousness, we shall call "citizens" (*political/religious isotopy*) vs "crime" (*economic/military isotopy*).

The modes of action of the two collective actors could be articulated through the very elements that Greimas defined as discursive syntax (i.e. articulation of space, actors and time). By comparing the modalities of action, interaction, and intervention in the places, it could be noted how we were dealing with very differently structured collective actors. Crime operated through privatisation of space: it acted through the control and closure of the space, obtained through by positioning of particular actors (sentinels) in fixed and visible positions (seen as actors who wanted to observe and be observed). From the point of view of time, its objective was to order spaces in a way they remain the same, despite the passing of time. Finally, when examining the relations between actors, crime acted as a collective, syntagmatic, hierarchical actor (Greimas and Landowski 1976), whose elements can be interchanged because they all follow a single narrative program — namely, the drug dealing.

The other collective actor, called "citizens", acted in the opposite way: they operated in the in-between spaces with a reduced size, temporarily removed from criminal control (for instance, through collective cleaning of interior areas of the buildings, gardening, closing of access to cellars and to the entrances); from the point of view of time, they were taking advantage of opportunities (mainly, the temporary lacking of criminal control), and their mode of interaction showed a reduction of the difference between the different actors (a form of denying the hierarchy). What is interesting is that their work didn't aim at closing the restored spaces but, rather, aimed at their returning to a common, non-predefined use (even though, in fact, the same spaces were sometimes destroyed). It was a process of collectivising the space, as opposed to the privatisation enacted by crime.

Even from the point of view of the relationship between the actors in these two networks, there were important differences. On the one hand, crime acted as a highly hierarchical collective actor, whereas, on the one other hand, citizens behaved as a collective actor where the difference between actors was deliberately reduced: the citizen committees were not entirely coordinated, no one was therefore fully aware of the actions of others, and thus no one decided for all. And yet, the uneven actions of this network of actors, in which nobody thoroughly knew the actions of others, produced an overall effect of order.

To understand the meaning of these interventions, thus, it was necessary to ignore the reference level of the spatial practices identified: whoever is performing those activities, is not "only"

creating a garden or a flowerbed, but counteracting, in advance, with another actor, which is an interaction practice of a strategic nature. In fact, those were practices and communication actions aimed at marking their presence in the territory and disrupting the other collective actor, in the process of preventive obstruction of the antagonist's action. In the words of one of the inhabitants, who told me about the upgrading of the entrance to his building, to which he had contributed: "that's how we cut them [the drug dealers] off".

Considered as actants, these networks of actors were qualified as follows: on the one hand, crime as an appointed manipulator, according to the threat that operated through the modalities of obligation; the citizens, on the one other hand, took on the attentive role of the competent subject, who works with the will and the feeling. In fact, the citizens aimed at space-making which allowed others to feel they were the same, by reducing the difference between actors. From this point of view, we could argue that the common spaces — neither public nor private/individual, but produced by the citizens — are the real "public spaces", because they allow an indefinite number of people to feel at the same level. Hence, a neighbourhood re-qualification project could start by creating pathways in large and small empty spaces, both inside or outside the buildings.

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NARRATIVE COHERENCE: INTERACTION BETWEEN VERBAL AND VISUAL IN GAME OF THRONES

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Abstract

One of the most successful television series of the last decade has been *Game of Thrones*, an adaptation of George R. R. Martin's novel sequence *A Song of Ice and Fire.* Because the books are still being written while the television series is being produced, it presents an interesting opportunity to examine the interaction and contamination between the written and the visual versions of the story and the effects of serialisation on narrative structure. According to A. J. Greimas, both the syntactic and the semantic structures of a text can be understood as a series of transformations from an abstract deep level to a textual surface level. If the link between the surface textual structure and the underlying semantic structure is lacking, or cannot be perceived by the reader, the result is a feeling that the text is incoherent. This is also true of the syntactic dimension. An endless series of narrative 'events' or episodes that does not appear to lead to any significant change in the narrative, or confer any clear direction on it, results in a growing frustration, a feeling that the text isnot 'going' anywhere. The need for continuity between surface textual structure and underlying syntactic-semantic structure will be demonstrated by looking at the narrative and thematic structure of both Martin's novels and their television adaptation.

This paper has its beginnings in my taste for science fiction and fantasy. I like to read science fiction and fantasy literature, and I like to watch films of this kind. However, I like some books or films more than others. This does not seem to depend on the story as such, but on *how* it is told.

A story can be told in many ways, and the way in which it is told has a great deal to do with the enjoyment of its readers or its audience. So in this paper, I want to take a closer look at what it is, in how a story is written or filmed, that affects our enjoyment of it. I will be examining both the syntax of the story (the narrative structure as such) and its semantics, or what could loosely be called its fictional universe.

It was Louis Hjelmslev (1961 [1943]: 109) who first pointed out that "in practice, language is a semiotic into which all other semiotics could be translated – both all the other languages and the other possible semiotic structures." In other words, a message in any semiotic system can be expressed in natural language. Actually, that statement should be modified: a message in any semiotic system can be translated into natural language, but it may well be less effective, less attractive, and a lot more extensive if it has to be expressed in words.[1]

It is also, of course, possible to "translate" or "trans-code" a verbal text into a visual one. There is a whole theoretical field, adaptation theory, about the questions raised by the adaptation of a written narrative to a visual medium, usually cinema. This is not just a matter of substituting visual images for verbal description. Linda Hutcheon, in particular, argues convincingly that successful adaptation from one medium to another involves complete "remediations", that "translations in the form of intersemiotic transpositions" from one sign system to another involve "a recoding into a new set of conventions as well as signs" (Hutcheon 2006: 16).

However, visual media also have specific qualities that verbal texts do not share. Both graphic images and cinema, unlike verbal texts, have to specify the visual physical environment of the narrative. This can be an advantage, but it is also a constraint. A writer can choose *not* to describe the room where an action takes place, can decide not to give details of the landscape through which the characters move, can avoid indicating what clothes they are wearing and even to some extent what their physical characteristics are. The cinematographer has no choice: the characters of the story have to be represented by physical actors, and the physical environment has to be specified, because it is part of the photographic frame.

The job of creating the fictional environment in verbal texts is done mostly by description (in the wide sense of all the qualities attributed by the text to settings and characters). In cinema, description corresponds to depiction: the fictional world is created by what the director decides to put into the frame. An image, like a verbal description, creates meaning by activating the semantic values given to what it depicts by a particular culture or society.

Whether we are dealing with verbal language or visual media, however, the functions of this process in a text remain largely the same.

The primary function of description is probably to create the illusion of reality, the *effet du réel*. It should be obvious that this effect is indeed an illusion. It is entirely possible to give a very realistic description of something that does not and indeed *cannot* exist. This is the standard technique used by writers of fantasy and science fiction to create for the reader that feeling of reality which is necessary for our enjoyment of the story. In fact, the more completely the writer develops this aspect of the fantasy world, the more willing we are to suspend our disbelief and be carried along by the narrative.

However, interpreting description only in terms of the creation of a "reality effect" is not enough. Description, like action, has to be anchored in the structure of the narrative.

According to Greimasian narrative theory, the structure of a text can be modelled as a series of transformations from an abstract, deep level to a textual surface level. The deep level involves basic semantic choices (values) and their potential logical development (the "semiotic square"). The intermediate level is the level of narrative, where narrative roles (actants) are organised and the value structure of the story is put in place. At the surface or discursive level, actantial roles are matched with characters (actors), the action is situated in time and space, and values are developed into themes (thematisation) which can be given further verbal form in a process which Greimas calls figurativisation.

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1   Anne Hénault makes a similar statement (Hénault 1983: 180-90). Umberto Eco argues for a more complex position in his discussion of the relationship between verbal and non-verbal semiotic systems (Eco 1976: 172-174; for the full discussion, see Eco 1976: 172-217).

Figurativisation is the process by which the fictional world of the text is created and elaborated. In the case of verbal texts, this is done largely through descriptions. In the case of film, it is done through settings, costumes, acting, photography, and all the things that collaborate to create the visual universe of the work.

This is what Greimas calls the "generative process" or model that governs the production of narrative texts.[2] In inverse, it is also a model of interpretation. Reading a story or watching a film, we encounter the semantic isotopies of the figurative, descriptive language (verbal or visual) of the surface level of narrative discourse, with its characters, settings, actions and episodes. We interpret this surface by working our way downward, through the isotopies of the figurative language and the narrative themes to the basic semantic antitheses which the story sets in motion.

If the link between the surface structure and the underlying semantic structure cannot be perceived by the reader, the result is a feeling that the text is incoherent.

This is even more obvious in the case of the syntactic dimension. An endless series of narrative "events" or episodes that does not appear to lead to any significant change in the narrative, or confer any clear direction on it, results in a growing frustration, a feeling that the text is not "going" anywhere.

This necessary relationship between discursive surface structure and underlying syntactic-semantic structure can be demonstrated by looking at the figurativisation in the books of the series *A Song of Ice and Fire* by George R. R. Martin and their very successful audiovisual adaptation as the television serial *Game of Thrones*.

Game of Thrones is part of a relatively recent development in television production, the so-called "quality" television drama serial. These serials, most of which are produced for the American subscription television network HBO, are characterised by so-called "signifiers of quality": high production values (enormous amounts of money go into the filming of each episode), a large cast of characters, well-known actors, cinematic filming techniques giving the serial a recognizable "visual style" (Mittell 2004: 25),and above all, complex narrative structures, with multiple, overlapping plot lines and lengthy narrative arcs.[3] Martin's books appear to have been written from the beginning with this format in mind.

The books are overflowing with episodes and characters. There are so many characters that Martin provides a list of them in an appendix at the end of each volume. In the first book, this appendix comprises 18 pages. In the next book, it has grown to 34 pages. In Book III, it covers 50 pages, in Book IV 68 and in Book V 60. It has also acquired several subdivisions. In the first book, only the members of the principal noble houses are given. By the time the story reaches volume 7 (the second volume of Book V), the appendix has been divided into six separate sections, devoted to The Kings and their Courts, Other Houses Great and Small, The Sworn Brothers of the Night's Watch, The Wildlings or the Free Folk, a section called Beyond the Wall, and a new section on Essos beyond the Narrow Sea, including subdivisions for Braavos, Old Volantis, Slaver's Bay, The Queen Across the Water, and the Sellswords of the Free Companies. Even considering that Martin is famous for casually killing off his characters, clearly the narrative has grown enormously in the telling.[4]

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2   The same model can also account for the production of non-narrative texts, but this is a subject which does not concern the present paper.

3   Virtually all discussions of quality television drama series agree on the central importance of high production values and complex story lines; cf. McCabe and Akass (2007), Edgerton and Rose (2005), Thompson and Mittell (2013), Logan (2016). For the term "signifiers of quality", see Cardwell (2007: 29) and Pearson (2007: 255). A special thanks to Betty Kaklamanidou for her generous help with television bibliography.

4   There is a fascinating animated graphic depicting the explosive growth in the number of characters in Martin's books at www. jeromecukier.net/projects/agot/events.html.

Martin's acknowledgements at the end of each volume also make it clear that he is increasingly having trouble controlling the different strands of his narrative. He has promised his readers that *A Song of Ice and Fire* will comprise a total of seven books, but while the second volume of Book V was published in 2011, Book VI has not yet appeared, and Martin's fans are complaining loudly about his procrastination in various internet fan-sites and blogs.

Television audiences, like readers, want a proper ending to the story.

Many television serials never reach closure, as networks simply decide not to renew the show for the next season and leave the story hanging (Newcomb 2005: 31). Many scholars have pointed out the problems of managing complex narratives in such a way that they can be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, and some have argued that the serial format as such is inimical to closure (e.g. Seiter and Wilson 2005, O'Sullivan 2013; see the discussion in Logan 2016).

Nevertheless, the writers of *Game of Thrones* have promised to complete the serial and bring some sense of closure to the narrative.[5] Since Martin has not completed the books of *A Song of Ice and Fire*, for the last two seasons the writers of *Game of Thrones*[6] have been relying on a plot outline supplied by him.

However, even though the television serial has drastically simplified the story, eliminating many secondary characters and dropping whole sequences of episodes, it still has to cover a huge multiplicity of interlacing storylines.

This multiplication of storylines affects what we usually think of as "character development". A character in a text is created both syntactically, through the successive actantial roles they occupy in the narrative (in other words, through their actions in the story), and semantically, through the qualities ascribed to them by the text (from descriptions of what they look like to the feelings and thoughts they are described as having). This is a cumulative process: if character A is described as having blond hair in the first chapter, he should still have blond hair 700 pages later, unless he has explicitly changed the colour of his hair in one of the intervening episodes. More importantly, the actions he performs in chapter one of the narrative, and the motives ascribed to him there remain part of his "character" throughout the story.

The multiplication of episodes that results from serialisation, because it involves the same characters in many different situations, means that characters easily accumulate contradictory attributes, which leads to inconsistencies in characterisation. In *Game of Thrones*, for example, Sir Jaime Lannister in the first episode casually throws a child out a window to protect his incestuous love affair with his sister. By the time the narrative reaches Book V, Sir Jaime has become a chivalrous knight and a diplomatic leader of armies. Readers (or viewers of the television serial), if they have not simply forgotten what the same character did in Book I, will have to find some way of interpreting this change in order to maintain the coherence of the text. We can say that the character has "matured", though it is not clear from the story how the maturing of Sir Jaime Lannister has come about. Alternatively, we can say that the characterisation is incoherent.

A similar problem can be observed in the case of descriptions. Martin's books are full of descriptions of all kinds, often very sensual. A sword is "alive with moonlight, translucent, a shard of crystal so thin that it seemed almost to vanish when seen edge-on" (Bk I, p. 8). Cloth is "so smooth that it seemed to run through her fingers like water" (p. 25). Night air is chilly on bare

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5   Martin's fans still reacted with outrage when Emily Dreyfuss suggested that he did not need to write the last two books, as the television series would finish the story for him (see readers' comments on Dreyfuss 2017). One reader pointed out that there were many plot lines in the books that are not included in the television serial, and these require to be brought to a close.
6   Writing for a television drama series is a collaborative effort. The principal writers of *Game of Thrones* are presently David Benioff and D. B. Weiss; Martin wrote one episode for each of the first four seasons and comments on other scripts as co-executive producer ("Game of Thrones," *Wikipedia*).

skin (p. 103), wine is "cool fire" as it trickles down your throat (p. 120), unwashed men have "a sour smell" (p. 114), and blood feels "like warm rain" as it sprays across your face (p. 127). The descriptions continue to be vivid and sensual throughout the series. In Book V, a hall rings with "Yunkish laughter, Yunkish songs, Yunkish prayers. Dancers danced; musicians played queer tunes with bells and squeaks and bladders; singers sang ancient love songs.... The air was redolent with the scent of saffron, cinnamon, cloves, pepper and other costly spices" (Bk V, vol 2, p. 145).

Martin's device of "skin-changing", where some of his characters temporarily share the consciousness of animals, also gives him opportunities for vivid descriptions of smell and sound: "Where before there had been silence, now he heard: wind in the trees, Hodor breathing, the elk pawing at the ground in search of fodder. Familiar scents filled his nostrils: wet leaves and dead grass, the rotten carcass of a squirrel decaying in the brush, the sour stink of man-sweat, the musty odour of the elk" (Bk. 5, vol 1, pp. 73-74). The section where Arya Stark becomes blind involves 14 pages of narrative (Bk V, vol 2, pp. 66-79) based entirely on sound, touch, smell and taste: "the rough feel of the crust beneath her fingers, the slickness of the oil, the sting of the hot pepper" (Bk V, vol 2, p. 67).

In a cinematic medium, visual and auditory sensations can be presented directly to the viewer, but smell, taste and touch cannot. Instead, in the television serial, the depth of the "reality effect" carried by the descriptions in the books is achieved largely by the high production values, with their attention to details of setting, costumes and photography that create the visual style of the show. *Game of Thrones* has a clearly recognizable visual "universe", a mixture of luxurious costumes and palace interiors contrasted with dark, grubby, "medieval" scenes of war and violence, persuading us that its fantasy world has a kind of virtual "reality". In fact, black dominates the visual style of the show to an astonishing degree.

Visual style is essential to the viewer experience. A cinematic environment that is not faithful to the visual style that has been established for the show will interfere with viewers' "suspension of disbelief" and prevent their participation in the fictional world.[7]

Thus, there is no doubt that the fictional world of Westeros is vividly brought to life, both in Martin's books and in the television serial. But just as the welter of characters and episodes eventually makes the reader or viewer lose track of the storyline, so the wealth of descriptions in the novels and the visual richness of the television serial ultimately become self-defeating. There seems to be no clear direction to them.

The crucial link between deep semantic structure and discursive surface structure are the *themes* of a text.[8]

Martin's books have a huge amount of figurative material that could potentially be united into themes, but until he brings the narrative to a conclusion, we do not know which thematic strands, among all the figurative discourses, will turn out to be significant and above all, how they are supposed to interconnect.

Obviously, central to the whole series is the political theme of the struggle for power.[9] This is the theme that both Martin and the television writers must bring to a satisfactory conclusion if the story is to have any coherence at all. It branches off into several subordinate themes: issues of legitimacy and governance, loyalty to lord or to family, what constitutes chivalrous conduct, even the relationship of religion and the state.

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7   For a similar conclusion concerning film adaptation of video games, see Katsaridou (2017).

8   Elliott Logan (2016) has in fact proposed theme as an interpretive strategy for coping with the narrative complexity of another contemporary HBO television drama series, Breaking Bad.

9   This is identified as a central theme even in the Wikipedia article about *Game of Thrones*.

A second set of themes, which the narrative originally seemed to promise us, is the story of the Stark family. There is not much left of the Stark family by now, but clearly, the narrative will have to do something with the members who are still alive. A closely related question concerns the parentage of the supposedly illegitimate Jon Snow, which will have to be answered now that he has returned from the dead (the attempt to kill off Jon Snow may have failed due to general outrage on the part of Martin's fan base).[10]

We can more or less guess how the writers will manage to connect the fate of the Stark family with the resolution of the theme of power. But the Stark family is also related to the theme of "winter is coming", and to the walking dead who will presumably appear together with winter.

Then there are the skin-changing abilities of Bran Stark. This theme has been carefully developed throughout the narrative and presumably has to lead to something significant. Part of it are the direwolves (at last count, there were still three direwolves alive).

There is one theme around which we might group both many of the powerful descriptions in the books and the visual style of the television serial, a theme that forms the basis for much of their feeling of realism. Martin has a particular fondness for extreme, naturalistic, sensual descriptions – stink, dirt, decay, burning flesh, festering wounds, rotting corpses, etc. This element could perhaps be organised under a heading like "the horrors of war", but it seems to be equally frequent in peacetime, so perhaps we are meant to understand it as the horrid nature of life in general.

This is a very brief and incomplete account of some of the major themes that Martin has set in motion. At the end of the seven substantial volumes published so far, it is not at all clear how the themes relate to each other or to the numerous strands of the narrative.

The television serial has tightened the narrative structure by drastically reducing both the number of episodes and the number of characters. However, the basic problem remains. Thematic coherence has improved only marginally.

In fact, the feeling of incoherence and inconsistency in characterisation, which is largely the effect of the soap-opera narrative structure, encourages the reader to interpret this inconsistency as a theme in itself, a theme that could perhaps be summed up as "the unreliability of human relations". It is interesting to note that many readers and viewers interpret this inconsistency as a form of realism: since people in the real world are not consistent, the inconsistency of characterisation which tends to be inherent in the serial format is a sign that the story is realistic. In other words, readers have noticed that this feature of the narrative cannot be understood on the level of the story itself, and instead interpret it on a meta-fictional level as a kind of comment by the author on the nature of storytelling. This is very similar to the mechanism by which we interpret non-figurative art: a painting by Mondrian can be understood as a statement that art does not need to be pictorial.

The feeling of incoherence is probably also at least partly responsible for the impressive amount of internet activity generated by *Game of Thrones*, and the enthusiastic speculations on what will happen next. Indeed, one could argue that this condition of "undecidability" opens up the fictional world of Westeros to creative audience participation in the manner of postmodern fiction writers such as Julio Cortázar or Alain Robbe-Grillet. There is certainly a huge amount of audience participation (more or less creative), but most of it seems in fact to be focused precisely on issues of coherence and consistency, and the demand for an ending.

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10   Characters who die and come to life again are one of the many narrative tricks that the drama serials have adopted from the older soap operas; see Seiter and Wilson (2005), De Kosnik (2013), Thorburn (2008). But the interaction between television serials and their fans, which has been revolutionised by the internet, and how the networks are trying to manage it, is a fascinating and complex topic that is only beginning to be studied; see Lotz (2007), Scott (2013).

Of course, from the point of view of the author and his publisher, as well as all those involved in the production of the television serial, this is an ideal situation. With such passionate audience expectations, they could go on for years producing new episodes (as they may very well be doing[11]).

However, the risk is that readers, and viewers, will eventually tire of being constantly frustrated in their attempts to make sense of the story – and ultimately, decide that it is simply boring.

One television scholar, Sarah Cardwell (2007) makes an interesting distinction between what she calls "quality television" and "good television". We recognize "quality" television by the "signifiers of quality" already mentioned: high production values, large cast, good actors, naturalistic performances, visual style, complex narrative structure. However, for a serial to be "good" television, it also – in addition – has to "be coherent at the level of stylistic integrity. In good television, there is a high level of synthesis and cohesion between stylistic choices and the programme's 'meanings'" (30). In other words, the visual and textual "signifiers of quality" have to be integrated with the meaning of the story, creating a coherent whole. It remains to be seen whether the HBO production team will be able to create a coherent whole.

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11   Martin has already published three volumes of prequels, and HBO is developing four possible spinoffs, in addition to the already existing video games, podcasts, interviews, aftershow, companion books, record albums and concert tour of the music soundtrack.

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LA NARRATIVITE GREIMASSIENNE COMME ELEMENT DE STRUCTURATION DU SENS DANS LE CROISEMENT DU FOOTBALL ET LA PUBLICITE AU STADE

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Abstract

Considérée comme principe d'organisation du discours (Greimas et Courtés 1979), la *narrativité greimassienne* semble garder ce statut au-delà des types d'objets sur lesquels elle a été testée à l'origine, par exemple, le système d'oppositions dans les *figures-signes*. Notre étude, consacrée aux *pratiques* du football et de la publicité telles qu'elles se réalisent et se croisent au stade, montre que la *narrativité*, en lien avec le *système tensif*, organise aussi le parcours du sens dans cette interaction. Elle instaure tout un système de hiérarchisation des valeurs à travers une stratégie d'exposition des grandeurs.

1. Introduction

La syntaxe narrative développée par Greimas ([1966] 1986), avec des éléments comme : schémas narratif (schéma de l'épreuve, schéma de quête…), les transformations narratives, etc., semble sous-tendre tout un modèle de structuration du sens ayant cours au stade dans la situation du croisement du football et la publicité. Ce modèle repose sur la mise en place de deux sujets d'énonciation : un informateur et un observateur, dont l'interaction se déroule à l'intérieur d'un processus d'ajustement (Bertin 2007, Landowski 2007) des espaces : espaces du football et espace de la publicité (le panneau). Dans le présent article, nous décrivons ce phénomène. Nous proposons d'abord quelques données observées sur terrain qui manifestent le procès en question (section 1), puis nous fournissons un modèle explicatif de ces configurations qui épingle les outils du modèle narratif de Greimas (section 2). L'exposé s'achève sur une conclusion qui en résume les propos.

2. Les données du terrain

Nous présentons ces données relevées en deux moments caractéristiques du stade de football: stade en l'absence d'une partie du football et stade en présence d'une partie du football.

2.1. Stade en l'absence d'une partie de football : ajustement statique

Figure 1. Stade de Sclessin, Liège (source: Stades.ch).

La Figure 1 montre un stade de football en l'absence d'une partie du football. Ce stade de Sclessin à Liège (Belgique) offre la possibilité de voir l'interaction entre le football et la publicité. Nous appliquons une grille de description spécifique qui tient compte de la hiérarchie des niveaux de pertinence du plan de l'expression (cf. Fontanille 2008) pour décrire les éléments de cette figure. De ce fait, nous faisons correspondre le stade au niveau de pertinence *objet*[1]. Nous lui assignons la valeur *n+2*. La séquentialité du jeu du football[2][3] (qui se déroule sur une surface plane) d'une part et la surface des panneaux publicitaires (qui organise des éléments figuratifs, notamment), de l'autre, représentent, elles, le niveau de *texte*. Nous leur assignons la valeur n+*1* (Groupe μ, 1992). Les expressions figuratives du football (les joueurs, etc.,) et celles de la publicité (des éléments eidétiques, topologiques et chromatiques) reçoivent la valeur *n* et, en fin, aux parties des figures, c'est-à-dire des aspects dits transitoires (cf. Töpffer cité par Gombrich 1996 : 287-8) qui sont des traits permanents qui servent à l'identification des figures, nous assignons la valeur *n-1*. Nous pouvons ainsi décrire les éléments de la Figure 1 de la manière suivante (Tableau 1):

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1   *Objet* ici est entendu dans le sens des niveaux de pertinence du plan de l'expression tel que formulé par J. Fontanille : *Figure-signes*, *textes-énoncés*, *objets*, *scènes pratiques*, *stratégies*, *formes de vie*. Dans une étude, à paraitre (le croisement sémiotique du football et la publicité : éléments d'une grammaire générale), nous saisissons le stade, avec toutes ses composantes : l'aire de jeu, les gradins, les vestiaires…, tout le bâtiment qui détermine notamment sa morphologie et son identité extérieure comme *objet* dès lors qu'il présente bien une fonctionnalité spécifique : c'est l'endroit où l'on joue au football, laquelle en manifeste l'usage spécialisé (cf. définition d'objet fournie par Fontanille 2008 : 23). Il en est de même pour notre saisie du *texte-énoncé* que nous faisons correspondre au jeu qui se déroule sur terrain du football et à la surface du panneau publicitaire, dès lors que dans la situation du stade, ces ensembles signifiants y sont intégrés.

2   Les séquences de but, de passe, de remise en jeu, etc.

3   Nous ne considérons pas encore la présence du jeu du football (séquences sur l'aire de jeu, qui est absente sur l'image).

a) Pour le Football

Niveau *Objet* n +2	*Texte-énoncé* n+1	*Figures* N	*Parties des figures* n-1
Stade en tant que lieu d'énonciation	Absent	Aire de jeu	Tapis vert + plus marquages blancs au sol
			Peint en rouge (couleur du Standard de Liège)

Tableau 1. Description des éléments du football de la Figure 1.

b) Pour la Publicité

Niveau *Objet* n +2	*Texte-énoncé* n+1	*Figures* N	*Parties des figures* n-1
Stade en tant que lieu d'énonciation	Panneaux alignés en quatre rangées (zone autour de l'aire de jeu et les balcons (frontons) des étages).	Figures linguistiques et plastiques	Couleurs des caractères et des fonds des panneaux (rouge, blanche, bleue, etc.)

Tableau 2. Description des éléments de la publicité de la Figure 1.

Comme on peut le voir, la Figure 1 propose tout un modèle de structuration des panneaux publicitaires. En effet, nous avons des panneaux localisés dans la zone entourant l'aire de jeu et dans trois frontons (balcons) du stade qui proposent, à travers leurs tailles, notamment une hiérarchisation verticale qui va, dans l'ordre des grandeurs décroissant, de bas vers le haut. Ces dimensions fournissent entre autres les conditions d'inscription des objets panneaux au stade. Nous rappelons ici qu'un stade de football est souvent construit sous la forme d'entonnoir : les cercles concentriques en fonction desquels sont placés les sièges des spectateurs s'éloignent du centre de manière horizontale (éloignement latéral) et verticale (de bas vers le haut). Ce modèle propose une stratification des spectateurs selon leurs situations de siège et ce, en rapport avec leurs champs visuels : dans un stade construit avec les étages, comme celui de Sclessin, l'observateur du rez-de-chaussée fait face à un panneau de grande dimension, celui du premier étage à un panneau de dimension moyenne, celui du deuxième étage à un panneau de dimension faible. Nous pouvons saisir cette configuration dans une structure tensive. On considérera, par exemple, comme valence intensive la *distance à l'objet* et valence extensive la *dimension du panneau.*

Schéma 1. Structure tensive opérée à partir de la Figure 1.

La corrélation produite par cette structure est inverse : plus l'objet à observer est grand, plus la distance qui sépare l'observateur à l'objet semble faible. Mais, ce n'est pas tout. Cette structuration n'est qu'une vue partielle du procès du sens qui se déroule au stade. Voyons le deuxième moment, celui de la présence d'une partie du football au stade.

Figure 1. Stade de Sclessin, Liège (source : Pro League).

2.2. Stade en présence d'une partie du football : ajustement dynamique

Nous retrouvons (Figure 2) le même stade de Sclessin, cette fois en présence d'une partie du football. Les unités présentes sont les suivantes :

a) Pour le Football

Niveau *Objet* *n +2*	*Texte-énoncé* *n+1*	*Figures* *N*	*Parties des figures* *n-1*
Stade en tant que lieu d'énonciation	Jeu (séquence de but marqué par l'équipe du Standard de Liège)	Joueurs	Standard de Liège (habillée en rouge et blanc) Equipe visiteuse, Charleroi, (habillé en bleu et blanc)
		Aire de jeu	Tapis vert + marquages blancs au sol
		Spectateurs	Spectateurs de Standard de Liège, habillés en rouge

Tableau 3. Description des éléments du football de la Figure 2.

b) Pour la Publicité

Niveau *Objet* *n +2*	*Texte-énoncé* *n+1*	*Figures* *N*	*Parties des figures* *n-1*
Stade en tant que lieu d'énonciation	Deux lignes de panneaux placées dans la zone entourant l'aire de jeu (une en retrait et l'autre, ayant des panneaux isolés, placée à l'avant plan)	Figures linguistiques et plastiques	Les noms des marques ainsi que les couleurs qui accompagnent es caractères et le fond des panneaux (rouge, orange, verte, blanche, bleue…

Tableau 4. Description des éléments du football de la Figure 2.

La Figure 2 présente deux espaces énoncés : la partie du football et les panneaux publicitaires. La partie du football découpée par l'image montre un but marqué par le club du Standard de Liège. Il s'agit d'une séquence qui se déroule dans la surface de réparation. Les panneaux publicitaires se présentent en deux rangées : une constituée de panneau électronique occupe la zone qui entoure l'aire de jeu (ce panneau couvre toute la zone entourant l'aire de jeu de l'ensemble du terrain). L'autre rangée des panneaux est constituée des panneaux manuels isolés, placés à l'avant-plan et principalement dans la zone de la surface de réparation. (Ils ne couvrent pas l'ensemble du terrain).

Ces panneaux (manuels isolés) proposent un autre type de hiérarchie : la hiérarchisation horizontale, manifestée par le fait que sur un même plan horizontal, des panneaux publicitaires sont placés les uns derrière les autres, créant ainsi une hiérarchie de valeurs visuelles : les panneaux placés à l'avant-plan peuvent être mieux vus (perçus) que ceux placés à l'arrière-plan. On voit qu'en plus de l'*effet de distance à l'objet*, relevé dans le premier cas, également présent ici par le fait que les panneaux placés à l'avant-plan bénéficient d'une distance d'observation faible par rapport à ceux placés à l'arrière-plan, on remarque un autre effet, celui de la *concentration* des panneaux à un même lieu. Cette configuration à mettre à l'actif stratégique de l'informateur s'appuie entre autres sur la modalité de *ne pas faire ne pas savoir*. Ce qui explique cette configuration particulière des panneaux à cet endroit est sans doute l'attention accrue que ce lieu mobilise potentiellement au cours du jeu (nous l'expliquons dans la seconde section). De ce fait, cette concentration pose la grandeur espace comme un référent de discrimination : l'espace situé derrière les buts présente une valeur narrative et visuelle supérieure à d'autres espaces. Nous traduisons cette configuration sur le plan tensif de la manière suivante :

Schéma 2. Structure tensive opérée à partir de la Figure 2.

La corrélation est converse : ce sont des zones à forte concentration des panneaux qui font mobiliser l'attention. Le procès peut aussi se laisser saisir par des oppositions qu'il instaure. De ce point de vue, si nous posons l'*exposition* du panneau comme l'enjeu principal de cette configuration, nous pouvons reconnaître, en plus de l'exposition, trois autres pôles sur lesquels s'articule l'effet du sens dans une telle dynamique de modalisation cognitive de l'espace (Fontanille 1989) : l'*inaccessibilité*, l'*accessibilité* et l'*obstruction*, formés à partir de la combinaison des modalités de l'informateur (le *faire savoir*) et de l'observateur (le *pouvoir faire -pouvoir observer-*). Le schéma tensif proposé ci-dessus montre les régimes sur lesquels s'articule le sens dans la figure 2 : il y a une opposition entre exposition et inaccessibilité et entre accessibilité et obstruction.

Schéma 3. Articulation des oppositions. Adaptée de Fontanille 1989.

Il y a ici un régime d'accessibilité qui permet au panneau d'être exposé (les panneaux vus ou perçus) et un régime d'obstruction qui rend les panneaux inaccessibles (les panneaux ou parties des panneaux non vus ou non perçus, c'est-à-dire obstrués par ceux ou celles qui sont visibles).

3. La narrativité comme élément de structuration du sens

La configuration du sens présentée dans les deux modèles ci-dessus s'appuie sur un fait important : la séquentialité qui se déroule sur le terrain du football. En effet, le jeu du football qui se déroule sur le terrain exploite deux sujets collectifs (les équipes) engagés dans une épreuve (confrontation). Il traduit une situation narrative caractérisée par la quête d'objets (Greimas 1973), lesquels sont disputés entre les sujets : par exemple l'objet victoire, dont l'acquisition passe notamment par le contrôle de l'objet ballon qui, de ce fait, devient aussi objet de dispute. Chaque sujet collectif développe un programme de domination/défense qui s'affronte à celui de l'autre. Les rapports sujet(s)-objet(s) qui contribuent à la formalisation de ce procès se traduisent particulièrement sur le terrain par des opérations de transformation (changements d'état) des sujets vis-à-vis de l'objet. Celles-ci se réalisent par des régimes de conjonction (acquisition) et des disjonctions (perte) d'objets, créant ainsi des séquences narratives du football. Par exemple, la séquence de passe ou de tir qui transforme l'état d'un sujet conjoint à l'objet ballon en celui de sujet disjoint à l'objet ballon (libération du ballon auquel on était conjoint)[4] ; celle de la réception de la passe ou de la réception du tir qui transforme l'état d'un sujet disjoint à l'objet ballon en celui de sujet conjoint à l'objet ballon (acquisition du ballon dont on était disjoint), etc. (Il existe quantité de séquences comme ça, celle de l'interception de la passe, de remise en jeu, de faute, de but, etc., qui, toutes, se réalisent sur base de transformation des états). Il se trouve que ces transformations qui se déroulent sur la surface du terrain, et en fonction du temps (90 min[5] du temps réglementaire du match) modalisent les indices spatio-temporels en instaurant, par exemple, tout un système de hiérarchisation spatiale ou temporelle : une passe ou un tir qui s'exécute en plein centre du terrain, n'a pas la même valeur qu'une passe ou un tir qui se déroule dans la surface de réparation (ici, elle ou il mobilise plus d'attention) ; de même un but qui rentre aux derniers moments du match dans une partie dont le score était jusque-là de parité n'a pas les mêmes effets qu'un but qui rentre dès les premiers instants du match. Cette modalisation spatiale structure l'interaction du football et la publicité au stade : les panneaux publicitaires

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4   On retrouvera toute une taxinomie de ces transformations dans Bassilua 2016.
5   Cette durée peut varier selon des situations, par exemple dans le cas des prolongations.

sont ainsi concentrés au niveau de la surface de réparation pour bénéficier de la grande attention que suscitent les opérations narratives du jeu qui se déroulent dans cette zone. Leurs régimes d'accessibilité et d'exposition se réalisent au moyen des modalités de l'observateur de *pouvoir observer* (les panneaux sont bien placés au stade), d'une part et de *ne pas pouvoir ne pas observer* (le fait que les panneaux soient placés sur son champ visuel le plus important). C'est donc en suivant le déroulement du jeu à travers les déplacements du ballon, que l'observateur voit les panneaux[6]. La même logique s'applique sur les panneaux publicitaires (de grande dimension, par rapport à ceux des étages) placés autour de la surface du jeu et dont la distance visuelle est faible vis-à-vis des sujets. Ces panneaux construisent également leurs régimes d'accessibilité et d'exposition en combinant leurs coordonnés spatiaux avec les données des séquences narratives qui se déroulent le long des lignes de touche et de buts : une séquence de passe qui se déroule le long d'une ligne de touche fait en même temps voir le panneau placé à côté.

4. Conclusion

L'étude proposée ci-dessus montre que la syntaxe narrative développée par Greimas, loin de se cantonner sur le récit, peut expliquer la construction du sens dans des situations aussi variées comme celle de l'interaction entre discours, entre systèmes, entre procès, etc. Le croisement du football et la publicité qui s'opère au stade, en tant que système et procès, demeure une de ces situations qui montrent la manière dont la séquentialité narrative formulée par Greimas permet de structurer le sens dans la rencontre de deux configurations discursives, celle du football et celle de la publicité.

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6   Ceci s'opère sur tous les espaces du terrain, mais il est plus accru dans la zone de surface de réparation.

SQUARE DREAMING OR, FOUR WAYS OF TRIADIC SIGN-NESS ON TWO SEMIOTIC SQUARES

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Abstract

I would like to express sincere gratitude to my supervisor Silvi Salupere. Semiosis produces signs, which enable the generation of meaning by way of signification which in turn is based on an underlying signifying process consisting of the semiotic and the symbolic. Signification designates a doing or a state provided they are in a "relation of reciprocal presupposition that defines the constituted sign" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 299). In general terms, semiosis is the meaning generated by the pragmatic relations of syntactic and semantic elements of syntagmatic and paradigmatic units represented in the form of a sign.

Often semiosis is treated either as a process of thought or as a function in the systems of nature or culture. It is only the outcomes of semiosis – meanings – that become known to the interpretant in an infinite series. Though excluded at first, it may be noted that as a term semiosis is "synonymous with semiotic function" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 285). By exclusion and theorizing over semiosis, I intend to dissect a sign into four dimensions of potential existence and each of which it will be shown to have its peculiar semiosic modes and conditions for signness with regard to the anthroposemiotic awake. Human as we are, this article deals primarily with four dimensions of consciousness and semioses therein by exemplifying their origins.

1. Sign-ness and the four-dimensional triadic sign

Before discussing semiosis, it pays to acquaint ourselves with its produce – sign. Sign as such must have the potentiality to be a sign, i.e. the elements enabling the sign's meaning to be generated are presupposed entities that exist before the sign itself. Therefore, semiosis as sign-function will be excluded to reach into the four elementary spaces of existence known to us that afford semiosis. In order to do so, I adopt Piatigorsky's (1974) view in that semiotics should – instead of sign-system or sign – concentrate on the concept of *sign–ness*.

But sign-ness is not the PRIMARY (or ELEMENTARY) concept of semiotics since it is the   abstraction of a particular QUALITY, namely, to formulate it in the most general terms, the abstraction of THE QUALITY OF BEING A SIGN, or, in a more expanded formulation, of SOMETHING'S QUALITY OF BEING A SIGN OF SOMETHING FOR SOMEONE IN SOME PLACE. The semantic aspect of the problem is expressed in the words 'to be a sign of something', the pragmatic by 'to be a sign for someone', the communicative by 'to be a sign somewhere'. (The syntactic aspect is not expressed here, since the concept 'sign system' is not being considered.) (Piatigorsky 1974: 185).

We recall that intra- and interspecific boundaries along with the boundaries of more abstract and/or concrete semiotic spaces cannot be experientially transgressed, penetrated into and comprehended in their totality by another. With regard to the meaning(s) afforded by a given sign, it depends on the semiotic subject's modalities and competence as well as its relations to the sign, which "are of a *radically different eidetic type* in the logical and the semiotic universes" (Petitot [1985] 2004: 210). Sign-ness in human *Umwelten* is not necessarily identical sign-ness in nature or other semiotic spaces and vice versa, which allows the presumption that for one sign there must be different dimensions of semiosis.

The triadic sign is an elementary structure consisting of and embedded in a network of relations in which relation alone institutes properties that "serve as determinations for objects and render them knowable" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 314). Relation as a non-definable concept is the establishment "of relations and of relational networks which ground objects and semiotic universes" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 262). Sign-ness is what affords the elementary structure of signification to become "a concept uniting the minimal conditions for the apprehension and/or the production of signification" as well as "a model containing the minimal definition of any language (or, more generally, of any semiotic system) and of any semiotic unit" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 314).

On the level of fundamental semantics, it may be argued that the minimal requirement for any meaning to become is the presupposed existence of signs constituted upon sign-ness as semiotic entity existing "prior to the analysis which will recognize therein a discrete unit" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 102).

The unit sign consists of three entities, operationally treated here as elements[1] – *representamen* (R), *object* (O) and *interpretant* (I). In theory, all signs consist of these constituent elements and function in a similar manner. Sign(s) as the unit before analysis forms a class which – tri-structurally speaking – are recognized as identical to each other in order to be declared variants of one and the same class; these units, when considered as a class, are "constructed semiotic beings and therefore no longer belong to the objective semiotic system […] but to the descriptive metalanguage" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 356). The elements constituting the unit sign forming a class can be treated as prerequisite for the elementary structure of signification based on a simple relation between at least two terms that eventually "can be formulated as semantic categories and can be articulated on the semiotic square (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 275). Alternatively, the categories of all conceivable objects (O) and interpretants (I) as elements of the class sign which, with representamen (R) form a unit that enables the elementary structure of signification and by extension semiosis by way of a signifying process.

It may be noted that Piatigorsky's definition of sign-ness echoes Peirce's definition of sign: "[A] sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity" (CP 2.228[2]). Signs make their way so that "the interpretant is nothing but an-

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1   "Generally speaking, the term element designates a constitutive part of a unit which can be broken down" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 98).
2   PEIRCE, Charles S. 1931–1958. Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [Hartshorne, Charles; Weiss, Paul; Burks, Arthur W. (eds.). In-text references are to CP, followed by volume and paragraph numbers.].

other representation to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its interpretation again" (CP 1.339). The infamous infinite series of interpretants is halted by way of ontologizing the semiotic square and however unorthodox, the triadic sign is projected onto it.

Due to the nature of the semiotic square, the term opposition is used as "an operational concept which designates the existence of any relation between two entities, sufficient to allow them to be considered together" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 220). Adding the four basic dimensions of existence – awake (A), asleep/dream (Z)[3], nature (N) and culture (C) – sign-ness acquires four differing relations.

The diagram in figure 1. is an adaptation of the semiotic square as presented by Greimas and Courtés (1982: 308–311). However, the semiotic square remains a first generation square regardless that the positioning of the dimensions is visually similar to the second generation of terms as in the original. Albeit omnipresent in consciousness, the dimensions belong to different semantic and overall semiotic categories. In the diagram, representamen (R), or sign-ness is placed in the middle because:

i) no beings have interaction with anything without it being (an interpretation of) a representation, i.e. a sign, and;

ii) by extension – due to our intersectional consciousness – this argument also applies to nature and culture.[3]

Figure 1. Square of dimensions.

Relations of (R) as projected onto the semiotic square representing triadic sign-ness in four dimensions. In which:

⟷	: Relation of contrariety	**R**: Representamen	
		O: Object	
↑	: Relation of complementarity	**I**: Interpretant	
		N: Nature	
⤢⤡	: Relation of contradiction	**C**: Culture	
		A: Awake	
⟨⋯⟩	: Relation of simple presupposition	**Z**: Asleep/Dream	
⇅	: Relation of reciprocal presupposition		

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3   There are two reasons why the term dream is marked with (Z). Firstly, it is presumed that in a dream anything can be and secondly, it is visually customary to use (Z) to point out that someone is sleeping – the minimal requirement for dreaming proper.

On the axis of contraries, object (O) and interpretant (I) are in opposition. To avoid confusion, it must be noted that this opposition, albeit not a categorical one like left *vs.* right or up *vs.* down is nevertheless a relation between two presupposed entities treated as elements that is sufficient to allow them to be considered together as semantic categories which can be articulated on the semiotic square; in the diagram, representamen (R) is what binds the four-dimensional sign-ness together iconically whereas the predominance of other elements in semioses fluctuates according to dimension. In essence, the context is that of traditional object-subject-relation; I stand behind the interpreting "I" whereas (R) is what mediates and enables signification and brings (O) and (I) of sign-ness together in a signifying process.

In a triadic sign, both object (O) and interpretant (I) are presupposed and "can be present concomitantly […] they are said to enter into a relation of reciprocal presupposition or which comes to the same thing, a relation of contrariety" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 309). Were it possible to distinguish a single semiosis in actuality, the interpretant is never the object yet the presence or absence of one presupposes that of the other.

Our acknowledged being as afforded by consciousness by way of signs is depicted on the axis of contraries, where the triad representamen (R), object (O) and interpretant (I) make their way in semiosis in our awake (A) minds. The quadruple "R–O–I–A" may then be said to be our basic dimension of acknowledged being, the existential whereabouts and semiotic elements by which I know "I" am when awake.

On the positive deixis, in addition to representamen (R), there is an object (O) but no interpretant (Ī) – the semiotic dimension of the positive deixis is that of nature (N). Because "no animal ever plays the role of an observer, one may assert that they never enter into relationships with neutral objects" (Uexküll 1982: 28) and so, abstract endowment of meaning therein is diminished; there is less possibility for arbitrary interpretations of objects in nature. It is only in the anthroposemiotic where "the neutral object is transformed into a meaning-carrier, the meaning of which is imprinted upon it by a subject" (Uexküll 1982: 28) proper. Allowing this, it may be said that the quadruple "R–O–Ī–N" forms the semiotic dimension of beasts and organic matter, including our bodies.

On the negative deixis, representamen (R) holds a diminished object (Ō) – interpretation (I) is predominant in culture (C) which, due to its material build-up or structure cannot be said to be conscious of its physical self through senses to receive information via or of objects but only their representations interpreted. "The history of culture is reflected as an evolution of interpreting culture – on one side by its contemporary auditorium, on the other by next generations, including the scientific tradition of interpretation" (Lotman 1999: 39 [Kultuuri ajalugu kangastub evolutsioonina kultuuri tõlgendamises – ühelt poolt tema kaasaegse auditooriumi, teisalt järgmiste põlvkondade, k.a teadusliku tõlgendustraditsiooni poolt.]). Culture interprets itself through representations constituting the semiotic dimension "R–Ō–I–C"; a supra-individual monad.

The axis of subcontraries hosts no object (Ō) nor an interpretant (Ī) but only a representation (R) in and of a physically unreal dimension – dream (Z). Dreaming is "an endogenously mediated perceptual experience occurring physiologically during sleep […] in a format which the dreamer tends to experience as a participant rather than a mere observer" (Blom 2010: 157). The *Traumwelt*[4]is a polylingual semiotic space which is immutable by conscious action[5], the dream "does not immerse us in visual, verbal, musical and other spaces but rather in the space of their

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4   traum + welt; from German traum 'dream'; from German welt 'world'
5   Occasions of lucid dreaming – a dream where one knows s/he is dreaming and can control their behavior and environment to an extent – are excluded here alongside hypnagogic/hypnopompic hallucinations.

coalescence which is analogous to real space" (Lotman 2009: 145). There is no meta-awareness in dreams and hence there cannot be any acts of semiotic recognition allowing for the "separation of significant elements from insignificant ones in surrounding reality" (Lotman 1990: 58). The dream is singular and accordingly, even more so than awake, "the *form of meaning* articulates a substance which *cannot* be empirically observed" (Petitot 2004: 191).

What comes of the relation of simple presupposition between nature (N) and culture (C) is quite obvious – chronologically speaking culture could not have come to be without nature by way of our bodies and minds whereas nature was and still is well off without the presence of culture. The relation of reciprocal presupposition between awake (A) and asleep/dream (Z) as a physiological necessity is also clear. Their possibility of functional concomitance is based on for example the resurgence of dreams to the awake mind at random which may orientate a given musing in a similar fashion as the semiotic and the symbolic organize our everyday and every night existence.

2. Semiotic Symbolic

The relations of sign elements allow for meaning to manifest "in the form of an articulated signification" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 187), a process synonymous with semiosis and functionally collocatable with the signifying process that is founded on the intermingling of the symbolic and the semiotic within and beyond the human. In general, the symbolic "designates language as it is defined by linguistics and its tradition, language in its normative usage" (Ponzio 2010: 250) whereas the semiotic "refers to primary processes and to the pulsions that enter into contradiction with the symbolic" (Ponzio 2010: 250).

Together they found the signifying process or "the ways in which bodily drives and energy are expressed, literally discharged through our use of language, and how our signifying practices shape our subjectivity and experience" (McAfee 2000: 14). The semiotic and the symbolic are inseparable in the signifying process; the symbolic affords the human sign-ness represented as sign(s), the meanings of which are organized according to the semiotic both on the cultural level as well as on the level of the subject, respectively. The symbolic in culture pre-dates the individual subject whereas subjective symbolic is ontogenetically organized in part according to the semiotic *chora*.

In the anthroposemiotic framework, the distinction between the semiotic and symbolic is based on the very beginning of a subject and the relations s/he holds with the world and itself. These relations may be presented as topological spaces that facilitate the world in which things are connected via and in the zones of the fragmented body. "This type of relation makes it possible to specify the *semiotic* as a psychosomatic modality of the signifying process; in other words, not a symbolic modality but one articulating […] a continuum" (Kristeva 1996: 96). The semiotic as part of the signifying process has its origins in the semiotic *chora*, a receptacle of sorts that is based on the rhythms of the body in the wide sense of the word. "The *chora* is not yet a position that represents something for someone (i.e. it is not a sign); nor is it a *position* that represents someone for another position (i.e. it is not yet a signifier either); it is, however, generated in order to attain to this signifying position" (Kristeva 1996: 94).

The (individual) semiotic is chronologically anterior to sign, syntax, denotation and signification, but crosses them synchronically whereas the symbolic subsumes everything that belongs under sign; it labels under itself syntax, signification and denotation – all that is representable to the extent of anthroposemiotic sign-ness. The subject along with all the signifying systems that have been produced by such subjects is always and simultaneously both semiotic and symbolic.

Both are present and each signifying process is always dominated by one of the two tendencies; the subject (or system) is always indebted to both aspects. It is only in theory that such processes and relations may be situated "diachronically within the process of the constitution of the subject precisely because *they function synchronically within the signifying process of the subject himself*, i.e., the subject of *cogitatio*" (Kristeva 1996: 96).

With regard to the *chora*, it may be said that the daily semiotic is diminished during sleep due to lessened proprioceptivity[6] whereas the relational potential of the symbolic is increased creating *Traumwelten* one can only dream of. The dream is a "semiotic mirror and each of us sees in it the reflection of our own language" (Lotman 2009: 144). The symbolic corresponds to "the semantic universe considered as co-extensive with a culture or with a given human being" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 114), which can further be divided into exteroceptive and interoceptive properties[7].

Whilst asleep, the signifying process is less influenced by proprioception of the *chora* or exteroceptive semiotic whereas the (interoceptive) symbolic gains more associational leeway as regards the manifestations of dream-imagery. The fodder for dreams originates in one way or the other from (awake) reality, from both the semiotic – accustomed to order of things – and the symbolic – accustomed to sign-ness. Due to the diminishing of the former, the latter may coalesce in unexpected ways in the signifying process of dreaming and, provided that dreams yield their content and order from reality, the experiencing of reality by a given subject yields in part from dreams which become known only in retrospect when they have already ended and are reminisced awake as signs affording arbitrary/ambivalent meaning – as "signs in their pure form" (Lotman 2009: 143).

3. Modal categories

From the theory of modalities, the concept of "being-able (*to do* or *to be*)" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 23) is adopted as an operational term to clarify the natures of the above semiosic dimensions. Modality is that which modifies the predicate of an utterance[8] whereas modalization is "conceived as the production of a so-called modal utterance, which over-determines a descriptive utterance" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 193).

An infinite process, semiosis can be treated as being that "serves as copula in utterances of state" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 22) and as such, it is simultaneously a doing. The term "being-able (*to do* or *to be*) can be considered as the name of one of the possible predicates of the modal utterance governing a descriptive utterance of doing or of state" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 23). Both possible predicates are elementary modal utterances definable by their respective transitive aims and by this the modal structure of being-able can be considered to have "for its object an utterance of doing: *being-able-to-do*" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 23). Given the continuity of semiosis, it may be endowed only with the modal structure of being-able-to-do, which is also projected onto the semiotic square to bring it into accordance with the above dimensions:

6　"[…] the set of semic categories which denotes the semanticism resulting from the perception which humans have of their own bodies" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 248.)

7　"[…] appeal can be made to a certain psychology of perception, which distinguishes exteroceptive properties, as coming from the exterior world, from interoceptive data which have no correspondence in that world and which are presupposed, on the contrary, by the perception of the former." (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 114).

8　[…] we understand utterance to mean any entity endowed with meaning, belonging either to spoken strings or to written texts, prior to any linguistic or logical analysis" (Greimas, Courtés 1982: 362). Here utterance is adopted so that its definition extends to the abstract category of semiosis as entity.

being-able-to-do
(freedom)

being-able-not-to-do
(independence)

not-being-able-not-to-do
(submission)

not-being-able-to-do
(powerlessness).

Figure 2. Being-able-to-do projected onto the semiotic square (In: Greimas and Courtés 1982: 23).

In light of the above and general knowledge of semiotics, it may be said that what is received of a sign by a subject is its representamen (R). Strictly, (A) and (Z) are two main states of consciousness available to us but as is obvious, people are part nature (N) part culture (C) and thus, however semiosis occurs in either or both, it is applicable to the human and its intellect in consciousness. Allowing this, and by way of a 45° tilt, an extended adaptation of two semiotic squares with terminological supplementation is presented in Figure 3. The two squares are overlaid to complement the elementary functions of semiosis through being-able-to-do; the values of modal categories along with the explicated sign-relations in different dimensions will be shown to define the mode of semiosis in each.

E g e i r o t h e t i c

Freedom

A

Autophuneric

Arisaorist

O

Submission   *N*   *R*   *C*   *Independence*

Ī   *Ō*

Thesisaorist

Z

Sciautomatic

Powerlessness

O n e i r o t h e t i c

Figure 3. Semeioneiron.
45° tilted square on square with dimensions (**N/A/C/Z**), functional principles (**N–Z / C–A**) and elementary mechanisms (**N–A / C–Z**) of semiosis with proposed terminology.

4. Supplementation and adaptation

Axis N–Z on the positive deixis is the functional principle of the natural world as based on non-interpretations of (representations of) objects. It is void of conscious will and semiosis functions on an "as-is" principle. Semioses unstressed by consciousness or volition may be called *thesisaorist*[9].

Axis N–A is where the phenomenal, natural world resides and in which (bio-) semioses happen – within the material object of nature without the possibility of interpreting itself as something else – the elementary semiotic mechanism of which may be called *autophaneric*[10].

In essence, thesisaorist semiosis is an unstressed function that is autophaneric in that as a mechanism it represents objects of itself to itself by itself and in itself, excluding conscious interpretation. From the 45° tilted point of view of being-able-to-do, the functional potential of sign-ness in thesisaorist autophaneric semioses is defined according to the value of modal category *not-being-able-not-to-do*, i.e. semiosis is in a position of *submission* due to lack of free interpretation.

On the negative deixis, axis C–A constitutes the phenomenal cultural world, the functional principle of which is based predominantly on interpretation and semiosis functions on an "is-as" principle. Semiosis stressed by consciousness or volition (ultimately by way of humans) may be called *arsisaorist*[11]. Axis C–Z holds the elementary semiotic mechanism of culture that may be called *sciautomatic*[12] in that culture does not sense but consists of more or less distorted interpretations of something else.

Arsisaorist semiosis is a stressed or guided function that is sciautomatic in that as a mechanism it interprets representations of itself to itself by itself and in itself, excluding objects. From the 45° tilted point of view, the functional potential of sign-ness in arsisaorist sciautomatic semioses is defined according to the value of modal category *being-able-not-to-do*, i.e. semiosis is in a position of *independence* due to lack of objects, which in themselves are not essential to their being.

The dimension of awake (A) along with its constituent parts facilitate conscious thought and acknowledged existence and may be said to be *egeirothetic*[13]. Consciousness in an awake state facilitates the structure "I" and what follows – the world. Strictly speaking, all information from both culture (C) and nature (N) as well as from dream (Z) fall under this semiosic category as objects of knowledge. From the 45° tilted point of view, the functional potential of egeirothetic semiosis is defined according to the value of modal category *being-able-to-do*, i.e. semiosis is in a position of *freedom* due to the presence of sign-ness in totality. All that can be known, can be known to the extent signs can be known.

The dimension of dream (Z) and unconscious thought may be said to be *oneirothetic* due to the absence of "I" or meta-awareness that would enable any semiotic recognition. The dream is not known of beforehand nor during but only in retrospect, hence there cannot be an object nor interpretant in the *Traumwelt*.

Yet, as is known, dreams do serve a purpose in our existence as for example strengthening and/or weakening memory and by this working through the whole "I" and forming it in the process. From the 45° tilted point of view of *being-able-to-do*, the functional potential of sign-ness in oneirothetic semiosis is defined according to the value of modal category *not-being-able-to-*

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9   thesis + *aorist*; from thesis (prosody): an unstressed syllable or part of a metrical foot in Greek or Latin verse; from *aorist* (grammar): relating to or denoting a past tense of a verb (especially in Greek), which does not contain any reference to duration or completion of the action.

10   *auto + phaneros*; from Greek *automatos 'acting of itself'*, from *autos 'self'*; from Greek *phaneros 'visible, manifest'*.

11   *arsis + aorist*; from *arsis* (prosody): a stressed syllable or part of a metrical foot in Greek or Latin verse; from *aorist* (grammar): relating to or denoting a past tense of a verb (especially in Greek), which does not contain any reference to duration or completion of the action.

12   *scia + automatic*; from Greek *skia 'shadow'*; from Greek *automatos 'acting by itself'*.

13   *egeiro + thetic*; from Greek *egeiro 'to waken, to raise up'*; from Greek *thesis 'placing, a proposition'*.

do, i.e. semiosis is in a position of *powerlessness* due to the lack of both object and interpretant, the representations of which are known to us only by memory.

5. Conclusion

Semiosis in each dimension was shown to function according to the values of modal categories that define their states and doings in accordance with the respective sign-relations and sign-ness therein. Culture arose from nature by way of the human consciousness. Our bodies are natural organisms and the structure and function of culture is analogous to the human intellect. The cognitive separation of dream from reality has left us with two experientially indistinguishable spheres of existence. Dreams and the way they come about effect the processes of our awake consciousness and vice versa. Hence, it may be argued that part of our consciousness is based on known/remembered dreams as well as dreaming as such. The known/remembered dream as a semiosic phenomenon was shown to be an autophaneric-arsisaorist state in egeirothetic reality. Dream is the result of dreaming as such which was shown to be a thesisaorist-sciautomatic doing in oneirothetic reality. Both dimensions are effected and in part caused by the other by way of the overlapping of the semiotic and the symbolic both in (awake) signifying processes and (asleep) semiosis, the operation which produces signs.

This implies that what photosynthesis is to plants or what metabolism is to animals; what continuance and unpredictability are to culture, dreams and dreaming are their equivalent to *compos mentis* in human beings. The last trait is derived from consciousness and considering its alleged changes during our phylogenesis along with the fact that we as natural beings are a product of evolution, it may be argued that consciousness as such should not be restricted within the boundaries of human flesh alone.

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FROM THE SESSION "TO ALGIRDAS, TO JULIUS, TO GREIMAS

ON THE MEANING OF NARRATIVE TEXTS. RECONSIDERING GREIMAS' MODEL IN THE LIGHT OF A NEW SOCIO-SEMIOTIC NARRATIVE THEORY

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Abstract

This article aims at showing how the teachings of Greimas about his generative model of the meaning of narrative texts can be reconsidered, in the light of the new socio-semiotic narrative theories. What follows is an attempt to show how Greimas' positions can be better harmonized with the sign theory of Saussure and with the researches of Lévi-Strauss about the social and cultural meaning of myths. Introducing some concepts like the ones of system of values, topic and focus, Perspective and Destination Principle, narrative signifier and signified, some small adjustments to Greimas' model are proposed, trying to show with some examples how they can turn useful to understand and describe the sense of a story and the interpretations a story activates in the eyes of their addressees.

1. How to determine the meaning of a story

What follows is an attempt of showing how some of the many important discoveries Greimas made with his generative model of the sense of narrative texts may be reconsidered in the light of a new *socio-semiotic narrative theory*, to improve our way of determining, describing and understanding the meaning of modern stories. The perspectives that will be followed are the ones of Saussure and Lévi-Strauss, as they are elaborated by Ferraro (2001; 2010; 2012; 2015; 2017, in Ferraro and Santangelo eds.: 69-98) and by who is writing (Santangelo 2013; 2013b, in Ferraro and Santangelo eds.: 73-116 and 165-194; 2017, in Ferraro and Santangelo eds.: 41-68).

The first goal of this article is to show how Greimas' model can be *simplified* and brought closer to the most classical semiotic theories about signification, by recurring to the *sign* con-

cept of Saussure, so that it can be easier to comprehend the way we connect signifiers to their signified when we interpret stories. This can be achieved by eliminating some of the *inhomogeneities* of the famous levels of Greimas' model, for example the one that persists between the functioning of the semio-narrative structures superficial level, with the four steps of its "canonical narration scheme", and the mechanisms of all the other levels, which are instead based on some simpler dual differences. The second goal is instead to demonstrate that, in another sense, Greimas' model should be *more complex*, giving up to the idea that a single opposition between two values is at the basis of a narrative text meaning. The notion of *system of values* will be used to replace it, showing that the significance of a story resides in the way many values are *kept together* and in the *reason why* they must be connected. Finally, the third goal is to wonder how a textual semiotic analysis, conducted with a tool like the Greimas' model - even if with the modifications that have just been mentioned - can aspire to go *beyond* the borders of the text, to say something about the social and cultural meaning of it. Here the idea of the existence of some canonical configurations of stories will be recovered. They will be called *cultural models* and it will be demonstrated they have the shape of Lévi-Strauss' differential mythemic matrixes.

2. Some changes to the Greimas' model

In Figure 1 Greimas' model (Greimas and Courtes [1979] 2007: 142) is compared to the model that will be discussed in the following pages.

Figure 1. Two narrative models in comparison

As it can be noticed, the first assumption is that Greimas' model in its entirety should not be seen, as Greimas seemed to believe (Greimas and Courtes [1979] 2007: 140-143)[1] , as an attempt to describe the functioning of what Hjelmslev (1943) may have called the *content plan* of a story, that is the plan of its *meaning*. On the contrary, only the semio-narrative structures of Greimas' model cover this function, whereas the discursive structures must be considered as a description of the *expression plan* of the story itself, with actors, spaces, times and plastic elements[2] being what Saussure ([1916] 2001: 84-85) may have called the narrative *signifiers*. The idea is that a story is a text made of *signs* (Saussure [1916] 2001: 22) whose significance is strictly con-

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1   But in some parts of his Dictionnaire Greimas seems to change his mind (Greimas and Courtes [1979] 2007: 190-191). Anyway, this is an interpretation of Greimas' theories which is very diffused, as it can be seen for example in Marsciani and Zinna (1991: 32-34).
2   Here we insert the elements of plastic semiotics (Greimas 1984) in the discursive level, even if Greimas does not explicitly do it in his Dictionary, but it is clear that the plastic elements of a story are signifiers connected with the signified of it, as it can be seen in many works about the way of functioning of narrative texts (Corrain and Valenti 1991; Ferraro in Ferraro and Santangelo eds. 2017: 69-98; Lancioni in Ferraro and Santangelo eds. 2017: 129-150).

nected with the Greimas' notion of *value* (Greimas and Courtes [1979] 2007: 375-376), which is represented at the discursive level by some *figures* (Greimas and Courtes [1979] 2007: 122-124) and by some more abstract *plastic components* that refer to it. However, as anticipated, at the basis of a story, even of a very simple one, there are often more than a positive and a negative value. There can be a *system* of many linked values[3], posing the question of whether the notions of *themes* and *semantic thematic investments* (Greimas and Courtes [1979] 2007: 353-354) should really be distinguished and separated by the notion of value. This is the reason why in picture one the word "thematization" is followed by a question mark.

In any case, the signs that constitute the bricks of a story must be syntactically connected, following some combination rules. But these are not the ones of the so called *canonical narration scheme* (Greimas and Courtes [1979] 2007: 214-218), also because this does not prove to be universal (Ferraro 2010: 93-101). There are instead some other rules that establish a relationship between what Ferraro (2012: 168-177) calls a *Perspective principle*, based on the values of the protagonist character, and a *Destination principle*, based instead on the values of the other characters being part of the world the protagonist must deal with. These two principles seem to be more general, as far as every story talks of the relationship between a *self* and the *otherness*, this maybe being the universal topic of every narrative. The way the values connected to the Perspective principle and to the Destination one are linked has to do with something more "canonical"- as Greimas would say - than the narrative structure of a single text. In fact, it derives from some typical modalities of constructing stories which depend on the *cultural models* (Santangelo 2013: 27-53) of a certain social context.

3. A *system of values* to describe the meaning of a story

Let us now try to defend the positions mentioned above. If one reads the newest manuals for screenplay writing, which – from a socio-semiotic point of view – are some of the most interesting researches on present narratives, because they aim at understanding how to construct big stories that are meaningful for a very wide range of people, he finds out that the easiest way to describe how they make sense is to concentrate on their *topic-focus structure* (Bandirali and Terrone 2009: 25-32). The topic is what a story talks about, while the focus is what it affirms, the position it takes on the topic itself. Of course, these concepts are connected, but it is the focus that determines the meaning of a narrative text, being what can differentiate it from another text on the same subject.

Interestingly to Greimasian semioticians, Robert McKee, one of the most famous screenplay manualists, affirms that the focus of a story is "*value + cause*" (McKee 1997: 115). With the word *value* he refers to "the universal qualities of human experience that may shift from positive to negative, or negative to positive, from one moment to the next. For example: alive/dead (positive/negative) is a story value, as are love/hate, freedom/slavery, truth/lie, courage/cowardice" (McKee 1997: 33-34), while with the formula "value + cause" he means the *controlling idea* of a narrative, "a single sentence describing how and why life undergoes change from one condition of existence at the beginning to another at the end" (McKee 1997: 115), something which "identifies the positive or negative charge of the story's critical value at the last act's climax, and […] identifies the chief reason that this value has changed to its final state" (McKee 1997: 115), this reason consisting in the fact that another value has connected with the previous ones, giving birth to a new *system of values* (Santangelo in Ferraro and Santangelo eds. 2013: 77-78). For example, someone could decide to write a story about forming a stable couple (topic) and affirm (focus)

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3 This seems very clear, for example, if one reads the analysis Greimas conducted on Maupassant's Les deux amis (Greimas 1976)

that between being faithful and unfaithful (values), it is better to be unfaithful because it keeps the desire alive (cause). Hence, accordingly to McKee's theories, the meaning of a story depends on the circumstance that in the story structure two different values (being unfaithful and keeping the desire alive, here) are *linked*. This link, which is at the same time, in Hjelmslev's words, paradigmatic (two dual oppositions are connected) and syntagmatic (there is a causal connection between something that happens before and its consequence), is the core point to determine the sense of the narrative[4]. After all, as Lévi-Strauss used to say, in his studies of myths, the meaning of stories resides in their *grammar*, that is in the rules to differentiate and combine their elements.

The notion of "system of values" can easily be inserted in Greimas' model, because Greimas himself distinguishes between *basic values* and *utilitarian ones* (Greimas and Courtes [1979] 2007: 376), affirming they must be connected by some syntagmatic rules (first comes the conjunction between the Subject character and the utilitarian values, *then* he can reach the basic ones) to describe the generation of a narrative text sense. The values of the example mentioned above – keeping the desire alive and being unfaithful – can be seen in such a way. What Greimas does not seem to do – at least in his most theoretical works, like in the *Dictionnaire*, because in his *Maupassant* (Greimas 1976) there are many hints that this should be the result of a complex textual analysis – is to connect them also *paradigmatically*, in a way that could be helpful to describe the structural form of the content plan of a story. This can be done as in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2. The system of values of a simple story.

As it has been anticipated, a story can be conceived as a reflection on the reason why some values must be kept together when it comes to focus on or, in other words, to take a position on some topics. This position has a lot to do with the meaning of the story and it can be portrayed by the system of values at the core of the story itself. This system, like Greimas' semio-narrative structures deep level of narrative texts, has some paradigmatic and some syntagmatic characteristics, both contributing to generate sense. In other words, the notion of "system of values" is useful to describe the story content plan way of functioning, even if it is not its only element, as it will be shown later, reflecting on the features of Greimas' model semio-narrative superficial structures level.

The more a narrative is complex, the more its system of values is *articulated*. As an example, but without the aim to be exhaustive, the one in figure three is at the basis of *Shrek* (USA 2001), the world-famous animation movie about the homonymous shy ogre who would like to be left alone in his swamp because he is convinced that nobody will never like him, but then meets a talking donkey who becomes his friend and a princess who falls in love with him, accepting to turn into an ogress to be his wife. The story faces two main topics – identity and socialization – and its focus on them is that it is better to be natural instead of being artificial, to be beautiful inside than outside, to be different than stereotyped, to be free instead of being compelled, to express one's

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4 Some similar reflections can be found in Marks ([2008] 2008: 58), where the core part of the meaning of a story is described as the relationship between a "theme" (topic) and a "thematic intention" (focus), or in Danciger and Rush (2000: 18-19), who talk about a "dilemma" and a "choice in dilemma". But the clearest way to face this problem of the system of values connected with the topic and with the focus of a story is explained by McKee.

own talents instead of repressing one's own inclinations, to be open instead of having prejudices, to give gratuitous affection instead of buying it, because this takes to be in the company of the few right persons who really love us, while the other way of thinking may lead to be accepted by a wider range of people, but not to be truly appreciated. It could be said that *Shrek* is an articulated *narrative discourse* – the metaphor of the topic/focus structure comes from the tradition of the discourse analysis (Van Dijk 1977) – on identity and socialization, which affirms that if someone wants to live a life in the company of the right few people, instead of living it with many wrong ones[5] , then he must follow and keep together the values on the left side of figure three, while avoiding the wrong values on the right side of it.

Figure 3. The system of values of Shrek.

   As it has been written at the beginning of this article, it is very difficult to say if these values are "deep" or "thematic", in the terms of Greimas. This is the reason why, in the version of Greimas' model portrayed in figure one, the term "thematization" has been written with a question mark. It seems also difficult to say if these values are "basic" or "utilitarian". Of course, the first seven take to the eighth, but in the *Dictionnaire* Greimas writes that for a monkey a banana is a basic value and finding a stick to grasp it is a utilitarian one (Greimas and Courtes [1979] 2007: 376). Now, the values in Figure 3 are of a very different kind than the value represented by the monkey's branch. As far as the distinction between deep and thematic values, basic and utilitarian ones may also lead to think that one of them is more important than the others, to determine a narrative text meaning that must be shared by anyone, perhaps it is better to guess that a story interpretation may focus on one or more of the many values being part of the system that shapes the story content plan, giving birth to the different points of view on how to read the story itself. But this is a hypothesis that should be confirmed with some empirical researches (Santangelo 2017). What is sure is that when watching a movie like *Shrek* the spectators understand that its significance has something to do with the fact that some of the values mentioned above "stay together" in the *vision of the world* its authors want to convey[6].

4. A system of signifiers, their signified and their manifestation

If someone wants to convey the vision of the world affirmed in a system of values about one or more topics, it is of course important to *express* it. As anticipated, this can be done recurring

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5   Something which is like being alone, in the vision of the movie authors, as far as the beginning of the story Shrek lives alone because he accepts the wrong values on the right side of picture three, that are shared by all his neighbours.
6   To deepen the idea that the system of values of a story conveys the vision of the world of its author, see Santangelo (2014).

to the elements that constitute the "discursive level" of Greimas' model (Greimas and Courtes [1979] 2007: 85-89). These elements must be conceived as some *signifiers*, in Saussure's terms, standing for the values being part of the system, that are their *signified*.

Figure 4. The signifiers of a story.

The oppositions and the connections between these signifiers and their components is the same that persists between the values they represent. In Figure 4, there is an example of it. On the left, there are the guests of Shrek and Fiona's (his princess) wedding. It is possible to recognize the wolf of the *Red hat* fairy tale, wearing as the granny he has eaten and substituted, who stands next to Pinocchio, the three little pigs, some witches, a soldier carrying an armour and many other people. All of them are very different, maybe extravagant, but they like being together to celebrate the two protagonists of the story. On the right side of Figure 4, there are instead the citizens of the town of Du Loc, which is ruled by Lord Farquad, the "evil" enemy of Shrek and Fiona, who believes in the wrong values of the narrative. The inhabitants of his reign are portrayed in a carillon, welcoming the foreigners that come to their home place and they look all the same, very stereotyped. A plastic and figurative analysis of these images may reveal that the opposition between the values of being different and being stereotyped corresponds to the opposition between the variety and the repetitiveness of colours, or to the visual conflict between fairy tales looking weird figures – animals, sorceresses, living toys – and good looking "normal" human ones. These are exactly what Saussure means for "signifiers", that is *differential classes*[7] (Ferraro 2012: 24-26) of elements belonging to the expressive plan of a code – in this case the code of the story – that stand for some concepts, their meaning generating in their relationship with these concepts. The material images being part of the movie and being portraited in picture four are instead what Saussure would call "acts of *parole*" of a more general "*langue*" (Saussure [1916] 2001: 23), that is something that belongs to the "manifestation level" of Greimas' model and that is not pertinent to determine the narrative sense[8].

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7   "Variety of colours" vs "repetitiveness of colours" and "fairy tales weird looking figures" vs "good looking normal human figures" are two oppositions between two differential classes of elements. For example, the combinations of colours that can be part of the "variety of colours" class are many, as well as the colours that may be repeated, being part of the class "repetitiveness of colours". The same can be said for the fairy tales characters that can be part of the class "fairy tales weird looking figures" or for the "good looking normal human figures" that may be portrayed as representatives of the latter signifier class.

8   If in the story code is stated that the protagonist of Shrek must be an ugly green ogre – this is the signifier class the main character of the movie belongs to –, then it doesn't matter if he is materially represented with a drawing in a comics, with a computer graphics image in an animation movie or by an actor in a theatrical show, because the meaning of the story remains the same.

Being natural	vs	Being artificial		
Being beautiful inside	vs	Being beautiful outside		
Being different	vs	Being stereotyped		
Being free	vs	Being compelled		
Expressing your talents	vs	Repressing your inclinations		
To be open	vs	Having prejudices		
To give gratuitous affection	vs	To buy affection		
Company of the right few people	vs	Company of many wrong people		

Figure 5. The meaning of the expressive elements of Shrek.

If the system of values that describes the functioning of Greimas' model level of semio-narrative deep structures is well reconstructed, then the meaning of all the elements constituting the discursive level of a story – that is its expressive plan, in the terms of Hjelmslev – can be easily inferred, as it should look clear in Figure 5. Here it is possible to see some images of Shrek that make sense because of their oppositions and of their connections, oppositions and connections that are at the same time horizontal – with other images being part of the expressive plan of the story – and vertical– with the concepts portrayed in picture three, being part of the story content plan (Volli 2000: 39-41). It is easy to notice that these images also form a system, which can be called the story system of signifiers. For example, in the second couple of shots from the top, Shrek, Fiona and their friend, the talking donkey, are represented running happily in the nature, after having done many politically incorrect things, like enjoying themselves crushing with Robin Hood and his gang in the woods, inflating air in the stomach of snakes to use them as flying balloons, yelling at birds to scare them and then eat their eggs. These images are "horizontally" opposed to the ones that portray the inhabitants of Du Loc, who are instead drawn as some apparently polite puppets, concerned with following the rules of political correctness (their master is a judge showing a sheet of paper with the word "rules" written on it), dressing and looking all the same, happily singing in ordered lines. It is clear this opposition on the expressive plan of Shrek gets its meaning by "vertically" connecting to the oppositions on the content plan of the movie, between being natural and being artificial, being different and being stereotyped, being free and being compelled. The same line of reasoning can be followed to understand the meaning of all the other images[9].

5. A new vision of Greimas' semio-narrative structures superficial level

Of course, as far as the elements of the expression plan of a narrative text have the function of sketching the characters of a story, the places and the time in which the story is set, their meaning has also to do with the role all these things have in the narrative[10]. Describing this role is the goal of the Greimas' model semio-narrative structures superficial level (Greimas and Courtes

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9   There can be some more simple images that can be read connecting them to a single value and some more complex ones that must be linked with many of the values being part of the system at the core of the story.

10   Understanding that a character is the good protagonist of a story (the Subject, in the terms of Greimas) and that another one is the bad villain (the Anti-Subject), that the places and times in which they live are good or bad too, maybe having a role in determining their destiny (sometimes they can be their Senders or the Anti-Senders, some other times their Helpers or the Opponents), and understanding the reasons why the narrative structure takes us to interpret them as such is very important to get their meaning.

[1979] 2007: 140-143, 245-246), with the notions of "actants", of the "actants scheme" (Greimas and Courtes [1979] 2007: 17-18) and of the above mentioned "canonical narration scheme[11]".

The actants scheme functioning can be explained with the same logics that has been used in the previous pages for the system of values and for the system of signifiers of a story, as it can be seen in picture six. Here the roles of the Subject, of the Helper and of the Sender can all be connected, firstly one to the other, then to the positive values of the story itself, while the roles of the Anti-Subject, of the Opponent and of the Anti-Sender can be connected again one to the other and then opposed to the former three roles.

Figure 6. The actants scheme and its relationship with all the other levels of Greimas' model[12].

Greimas is right to affirm that the characters, spaces and times being sketched at the discursive level of his model get their meaning also because of their roles in the semio-narrative superficial level. This can be demonstrated with some examples like the ones taken at the note eleven of this article, but also noticing that most of the times their plastic and figurative features depend on their role and on how this role is connected to the system of positive and negative values of the story, as it can be seen in Figure 7, where the evil Lord Farquad and the good Shrek are opposed and at the same time connected to their friends and servants, or to the places where they live. Here one can notice that Shrek is tall and "big", of course, because he is an ogre, but also and maybe especially because of his "big" values that make him the hero of the story[13], that is its Subject, in the terms of Greimas, while Farquad is short because his wrong values make him a "little person", a villain, that is the Anti-Subject. But it is also easy to acknowledge that the small clearing where Shrek lives is such a nice tiny natural place because of the many values Shrek is connected to in the system of values of the story – especially the ones of being natural and free, and of living with the right few persons –, the same clearing being like a Helper to the protagonist of the movie to be as he wants, while the town of Du Loc is such a big tidy place because the majority of people, in the movie and maybe also in our world, think like their king, in fact it is portrayed as an Opponent to Shrek, being closed by high walls and gates that should keep him outside of it.

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11   At this level there is also the modalities theory, but here, due to the small size of this article, this topic will not be treated.

12   Of course, some elements of Picture 6 do not belong to Greimas' tradition, such as the "Anti-Object of Value", while other concepts belonging to it, like for example the one of the Addressee, are not part of this scheme. Due to the limited space of this article, a discussion about this model is avoided and will be carried on in another occasion. Anyway, its overall resemblance to Greimas' model should look clear, like the reason why it is used here.

13   The authors could have chosen other fairy tales characters as the protagonists of the story.

However, as anticipated, Greimas also affirms that the way the characters, spaces and times of a story, due to their narrative roles, are inserted in the structure of the canonical narration scheme, strongly contributes to their meaning. This scheme directly descends from Propp's studies on Russian fairy tales and even if it is more general, it maintains many connections with Propp's "unitary composition scheme" (Propp [1928] 1988: 31-97). The problem of using it to describe the functioning of a story content plan is that it is very different from all the other elements that constitute Greimas' model, not being purely differential – of course there are some differences between the four phases that constitute it, but these phases are not dually opposed such as the values at the deep semio-narrative structures level, as the actants and as the elements of the discursive level – and being based on a chain of moments that is more complex than the passages that, for example, can take a character to shift from sharing a positive value on a semiotic square to share a negative one (A $\rightarrow$ not A $\rightarrow$ B)[14]. Here there are some incongruences, maybe also a certain inelegance in Greimas' model, that can be solved recurring to Ferraro's Perspective and Destination principles.

As it has been written above, in a paradigmatic sense, these two principles are dual and logically opposed such as all the other elements constituting Greimas' model, but they also define the syntactical functioning of stories. As a matter of fact, a story can be conceived as a way to connect a Perspective principle, that is an individual way of seeing things and of giving them a value, and a Destination principle, that is another way of conceiving the world, that may belong to another individual but which is often linked to a whole social context, as if stories were a way of reflecting on how every single person has to deal with the others to be part of a society. In fact, the connection between the Perspective principle and the Destination one has a lot to do with the overall meaning of the narrative. Sometimes it happens that the values of a community become the values of the hero of the story – such as in many of the fairy tales analysed by Propp, where the same hero wants to symbolically marry the daughter of the king –, communicating a sort of a conformist vision of the world, while some other times, for example, the Destination principle of a whole society and of its rulers is in conflict with the Perspective principle of the protagonist, giving birth to some more revolutionary stories. This conflict, such as the way a character comes to share some values, can of course be described syntactically, maybe passing from a narrative phase where the Destination principle and the Perspective one are in junction and then to another phase where they are in opposition, or vice versa, and this has of course to do with the meaning of the story.

Perspective principle	vs	Destination principle
Being natural	vs	Being artificial
Being beautiful inside	vs	Being beautiful outside
Being different	vs	Being stereotyped
Being free	vs	Being compelled
Expressing your talents	vs	Repressing your inclinations
To be open	vs	Having prejudices
To give gratuitous affection	vs	To buy affection
Company of the right few people	vs	Company of many wrong people

Figure 7. Shrek semio-narrative structures superficial level.

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14   See Greimas and Courtes ([1979] 2008: 265-268).

In Figure 7 there is an example of what has just been written. From a paradigmatic point of view, all the good values on the left side of the system the story is based on belong to the Perspective principle of Shrek and of his friends, while all the bad values on the right side belong to Lord Farquad's and to the inhabitants of Du Loc Destination principle. Hence Lord Farquad plays the role of the Anti-Sender, the citizens of his reign are the Opponents, while the ogre is the Subject and the talking donkey, for example, is the Helper. In fact, the Greimas' actants are also linkable to the Destination and to the Perspective principle, as far as the Sender and the Anti-Sender are connected to the Destination principle, while the Subject, the Anti-Subject, the Helper and the Opponent are connected to the Perspective one. But at the beginning of the story the situation is different, because Shrek accepts the Destination principle of Lord Farquad, stipulating with him the most classical of the contracts, that is going to save a princess and taking her back to the king, who sees her as his Value Object. However, during his adventure, the ogre changes his mind, understands that Farquad's values are wrong and that taking the princess to him would mean going against the good values of his own Perspective principle.

6. A socio-semiotic narrative theory

If the overall structure of *Shrek*, as it has been described in the pictures of this article, is compared to the structure of Lévi-Strauss' *mythemic matrixes*, then it is easy to notice their similarities. In fact, Lévi-Strauss, following Saussure's teachings, believes that every myth story is based on an expression plan made of signifiers whose value depends on their position in a *grid* of oppositions and connections with all the other signifiers of the same story, while their meaning depends on their link with the elements of the story content plan, which is again describable with a grid made of oppositions and connections. However, in Lévi-Strauss' perspective, such matrixes are useful to illustrate how a story generates its sense not only because they reproduce its internal structure but, what is more important, because they reproduce some general *cultural models* that give birth to dozens of other stories. These cultural models stand in a relationship with other cultural models which is again *structural*, in the sense that they are connected and opposed in what could be called "the grid of culture" (Santangelo 2017).

If one thinks about the structure of the semio-narrative superficial level of the story of *Shrek* and he compares it, for example, to the one of the fairy tales analysed by Propp, or to the ones of many Walt Disney's classical movies stories, then he finds out that the former is a *transformation* of the latter, always in the terms of Lévi-Strauss (see Ferraro 2001: 197-214). As far as to Lévi-Strauss transformations depend on the shifting of a certain narrative structure from a culture to another, in a socio-semiotic perspective it could be said the semio-narrative structure of the superficial level of *Shrek* is the hint of a huge change in the way of telling stories to our children, because of the cultural changes of the society we live in. Once we used to tell stories on some heroes who shared the values of their communities and succeeded in "marrying the princess", so to become "kings" of their worlds, now we tell stories of people who do not believe in the wrong values of the majority of their fellow citizens and who desire to be left in their own swamp, sharing their little corner with the ones who really love them. If one analyses the narrative structure of many other movies, novels and fairy tales of our age, he can find out that *Shrek* is not an exception, but that it is simply one of the many stories of this kind that circulate in our media system (Santangelo in Ferraro and Santangelo eds. 2012: 191-193).

Figure 8. The meaning of the structure of Shrek semio-narrative superficial level.

Anyway, it is not only the semio-narrative structure of the superficial level of the story of *Shrek* to look familiar in its opposition to other traditional stories. Considering the discussions raised in the field of feminist studies by the character of Fiona[15], who shares Shrek's values marrying him, it is clear she has become a symbol of feminism in the age of our mass consumerist culture, giving birth to argumentations basing on the use of some very similar signifiers to the ones being part of *Shrek* expressive plan and on their connection with some very similar systems of values. This demonstrates that the model presented here as an integration of Greimas' one can be used to conduct socio-semiotic analyses of narrative texts, to say something about the social and cultural meaning of stories. This paves the way to the development of a truly socio-semiotic narrative theory, without going too far from Greimas' teachings.

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15   Here Fiona is compared to the character of other winning "ugly" women, like the protagonist of the TV serial *Ugly Betty*: http://www.repubblica.it/2007/05/sezioni/persone/brutti-vincenti/brutti-vincenti/brutti-vincenti.html.

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RECONSIDERING GREIMAS' NARRATIVE THEORY: DIFFERENCES THAT MAKE A DIFFERENCE

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Abstract

Contemporary semiotics has largely adopted Greimas' ideas of the "narrative program" and the "canonical narrative schema", which emphasise the temporal dimension of narrative texts (conceived as correlations of a "before" and an "after", an initial situation and a final one). By contrast, rather less attention has been paid to the Lithuanian scholar's conception of the narrative as a tension between a "resolved (or posited) content" — i.e. the final "positive" state of things asserted by the text — and an "inverted content" — i.e. the initial thematic situation whose transformation into a contrary or contradictory situation marks the completion of a narrative sequence (Greimas 1966). Rather than focusing on mere temporal successions and cause-effect relations, such a perspective interestingly insists on the logical and expository structures underlying narratives. Building on these premises we will deal with specific cases of narratives focusing on the process of creation and manifestation of "otherness", in order to show how the subjective-individual level (the "perspective logic", Ferraro 2012) relates to the collective-external dimension (the "Sender level"), and to analyse the implications of such dynamics on narrative structures and functioning mechanisms.

1. Introduction: Greimas' narrative theory between "schemas" and "tensions"

Contemporary semiotics has largely adopted Greimas' (1966) ideas of the "narrative program" and the "canonical narrative schema", which emphasise the temporal dimension of narrative texts—conceived as correlations of a "before" and an "after", an initial situation and a final one. By contrast, rather less attention has been paid to the Lithuanian scholar's conception of the nar-

rative as a *tension* between a "resolved (or posited) content" — i.e. the final "positive" state of things asserted by the text — and an "inverted content" — i.e. the initial thematic situation whose transformation into a contrary or contradictory situation marks the completion of a narrative sequence. Rather than focusing on mere temporal successions and cause-effect relations, such a perspective interestingly insists on the logical and expository structures underlying narratives.

Building on these premises, the following paragraphs will deal with specific cases of narratives focusing on the process of creation and manifestation of "alterity", in order to show how the subjective-individual level (i.e. the "Perspective principle" [Ferraro 2012]) relates to the collective-external dimension (i.e. the "Destination — or Sender — level" [Ferraro 2012]), as well as to analyse the implications of such dynamics on narrative structures and functioning mechanisms.

2. Alterity and identity: an indissoluble pair

As Greimas and Courtés ([1979] 1982) state in *Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary*, alterity is "a non-definable concept, which is in opposition to another concept of the same sort, identity: this pair can at least be inter-defined by relations of reciprocal presupposition" (12). After all, the idea that identity is defined by difference is not new: according to Ferdinand de Saussure (1916), the value of a term cannot be positively defined by analysing its content, but only in a negative way, that is, by identifying the relationships it has with the other terms of the system to which it belongs. Claude Lévi-Strauss (1964) then pushed this idea beyond the limits of the Saussurian theory of value, relating it to myths: the value of each mythical element can be defined primarily on the basis of what it is not, or what makes it different from the other elements of its same mythical system. Each element therefore does mean through its own essence, but by difference. Similarly, Jerome S. Bruner, in *Making Stories: Law, Literature, Life* (2003), claims that "Self-making is, after all, our principal means for establishing our uniqueness, and a moment's thought makes plain that we distinguish ourselves with the accounts that others give us of themselves" (66).

3. Sexual alterity and narratives: analysis of four case studies

The following paragraphs will focus on the analysis of texts where the pair identity-alterity is explicitly showed, with specific reference to sexuality. More specifically, we will discuss four Italian movies dealing with homosexuality and gender-based identity cultures: *Le fate ignoranti* (2001), *Viola di mare* (2009), *Mine Vaganti* (2010) and *Diverso da chi?* (2009).

3.1. *Le Fate ignoranti*

Le Fate ignoranti (*His Secret Life*) is a 2001 Italian drama movie directed by Ferzan Özpetek. The movie opens with a scene shot in the rooms of Centrale Montemartini, an exhibition venue full of Roman statues, where Antonia and Massimo pretend not to know each other and simulate a casual encounter introducing the theme of betrayal, which is the main pillar of the entire narrative. Another artwork (i.e. the painting *The Unknown Fair)* then reveals to Antonia her husband's "real" betrayal after his death in an accident. Such an accident will completely change Antonia's life, forcing her to question all the certainties she had before and making her encounter otherness, which is in this case incarnated by Michele and the gay community around him — which is composed of eccentric, nonconventional people, who are very "different" from each other, and above all from the bourgeois society represented by Antonia. So if the first image introducing the woman is her motionless portrait while fixing a statue (metaphorically recalling the immobility in which she lives), the end of the movie rather shows her figure moving through an airport and deciding by herself in which direction is worth moving.

What caused such a change? Surely the inciting incident — i.e. the event that begins the story's problem, thrusting the protagonist into the main action — but especially what followed it, namely the encounter with the so-called "ignorant fairies", which are described by the same director in a poetry:

> "Le fate ignoranti sono quelle che incontriamo e
> non riconosciamo ma che ci cambiano la vita.
> Non sono quelle delle fiabe, perché loro qualche bugia la dicono.
> Sono ignoranti, esplicite, anche pesanti a volte,
> ma non mentono sui sentimenti.
> Le fate ignoranti sono tutti quelli che vivono allo scoperto,
> che vivono i propri sentimenti
> e non hanno paura di manifestarli.
> Sono le persone che parlano senza peli sulla lingua,
> che vivono le proprie contraddizioni e che ignorano le strategie.
> Spesso passano per "ignoranti", perché sembrano cafone
> e invadenti per la loro mancanza di buone maniere,
> ma sono anche molto spesso delle "fate"
> perché capaci di compiere il "miracolo" di travolgerci,
> costringendoci a dare una svolta alla nostra vita"
> (Ozpetek 2011)

> [Ignorant fairies are those we meet and
> we do not recognise, but who are able to change our life.
> They are not fairy tales, because sometimes they lie.
> They are ignorant, explicit, sometimes even heavy,
> But they do not lie about feelings.
> Ignorant fairies are all those who live in plain sight,
> who live their feelings,
> And are not afraid to express them.
> They are those who don't mince their words,
> Who live their own contradictions and ignore strategies.
> Often they look "ignorant" because they can be bad-mannered,
> And intrusive for their lack of good manners,
> But they are also "fairies"
> Because they are capable of doing the "miracle" of overwhelming us,
> Forcing us to a turning point in our lives.]

But if Michele and his gay community are the ignorant fairies forcing Antonia to a turning point, she also ends up changing their life, and making them question about their certainties as regards to love, truth, lies, prejudices, etc. So, the question is: in Greimassian terms, who is in this case the Sender? And who is the Receiver? If at the beginning Antonia seems to be Subject/Receiver and Michele (and the gay community he represents) the Sender (that comes to positively sanction her after an initial refusal by giving her the keys of Michele's apartment), Antonia in turn increasingly emerges as Michele's Sender, as evidenced in some crucial scenes (analysed in Stano 2013).

It is in this sense that Ozpetek's movie questions the Greimassian theory, teaching us that, for each narration, there is no a single plan for the Sender, nor for the Receiver/Subject. On the contrary, identity and alterity are defined precisely by means of constant oscillations between these two plans, or through their combination. This in turn introduces another crucial question:

who is the "Other" in Ozpetek's movie? If at the beginning the most obvious answer would be Michele (that is to say "Miss Mariani", in Antonia's mind, since she seems unable to realise that her husband's lover is a man even when she talks to him face to face), the female character soon becomes herself the "Other" for the community living with Michele, with which she is called to compare herself and to conform. As a result, the topic[1] (cf. Ferraro and Santangelo 2013) of the movie could be describe as follows:

Antonia's home	*vs.*	Michele's terrace
Silence		Thunderous polyphony
Composure		Impetuousness
Seriousness		Playfulness
Pain		Happiness
Short-sightedness		Vision
Conformism		Non-conformism
Appearance		Essence
Rigidity/Immutability		Transformation
Atomised Individual		Collective dimension
Surrender		Courage to follow one's dream
Truth		Lie/Secret

Initially, the movie opposes two apparently antithetical systems: on the one hand, we have Antonia's world, which represents the level of socially shared values and corresponds to the close space of her house, being characterized by silence, composure and seriousness. Such a world is presented as inevitably leading to pain and loneliness. It is the universe of conformism, immutability and surrender. Yet this same world is described as the place of truth. So, we have a positive value strongly contradicting the dysphoric connotation of the previously mentioned values, and also colliding with the appearance and the short-sightedness characterising Antonia's life (which *seems* happy, but in fact *is not*, as we discover after Massimo's death). Likewise, the "ignorant fairies'" world, represented by Michele and the terrace that many times, during the narrative, hosts dinners and parties, represents the realm of those who do not fear to welcome others and to be free (therefore adopting a subjective point of view, that is, a Perspective logic) and, for this reason, are happy; nonetheless, such a world is strongly marked by lies (*seeming but not being*) and secrets (*being but not seeming*). A sort of break or dissonant category, therefore, makes it impossible to opt for one position rather than the other, since they both contain both positive and negative elements. Only in the end such a dissonance or break is "resolved", by making these two dimensions permeating one into the other.

More specifically, the movie seems to opt for *non-breaking* socially shared values: while being able to change her thoughts and behaviours after meeting Michele and friends, Antonia opts for a "conservative" solution, showing us the need of keeping the positive values characterising the first axis of the opposition presented by the topic of the movie (i.e. the level of socially shared values, or Destination level), which are therefore simply moved to and mixed with the others' ones (pertaining to a more subjective or Perspective logic).

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1   I.e. the matter dealt with in a text, which can be articulated into an opposition of values or logics underlying the narrative structure.

3.2. *Viola di mare*

Viola di mare (*Purple Sea*) is a 2009 Italian romance drama movie by Donatella Maiorca. Its title makes reference to the Sicilian name of *Coris Julis Linnaeus*, a hermaphrodite fish that comes into the world female and, after laying the eggs, becomes male. Similarly, Angela, who was born female, changes her sexual identity for love, becoming Angelo. Also in this case, the narrative seems to oppose two different logics:

Public	*vs.*	Private
Collective values		Individual values
Culture		Nature
Men		Women
Power		Impotence
Violence		Tenderness
Conformism		Non-conformism
Refusing the Other		Accepting the Other
Male chauvinism		Egalitarianism
Short-sightedness		Vision
Appearance		Essence
Falsity/Lie/Secret		Truth
Fiction		Spontaneity
Immutability		Transformation
Vice		Virtue
Corruption		Pureness

The public dimension represents in this case socially shared values and a culture based on conformism, violence, power, male chauvinism, immutability, and vice, while the private sphere corresponds to individuality, egalitarianism, non-conformism, truth and virtue. Nonetheless, this same dimension is the kingdom of submission and of the impossibility of rebelling against the public dimension's violence. Angela tries to overcome such an inequality: woman "by nature", she becomes a man "by culture", by forcing her body into male clothes, cutting her hair, and even changing her name. However, the movie shows that culture cannot intervene on the substance of natural reality: Angelo still has the menstruation that characterised Angela's biorhythm, and the society s/he lives in only apparently accepts her change of identity and her union with Sara, never losing an opportunity to manifest their scorn toward them. Moreover, culture shows its limits when the couple decides to have a baby, requiring the intervention of a (naturally-born) man and finally causing Sara's death. The final scene of the movie therefore clarifies the narrative's focus:[2] Angela, now again in a female dress, heads to the church where her wife's funeral is taking place, holding in her arms the infant that her lover left her. The message of the movie is clear: the identity of the Other can only be fully manifested by completely *breaking* the system of values to which alterity is confronted; Angela tries to agree to a compromise with the values typical of the society in which she lives (that is, her Destination level), but culture proves unable to respond

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2   I.e. the "answer" or "resolution" to the oppositions presented by the topic.

to nature's oppositions, leading to a catastrophic solution. Only a complete break, therefore, allows reaching happiness and love, even though the main character discovers it only in the end.

3.3 *Mine vaganti*

Mine vaganti (*Loose Cannons*) is a 2010 Italian comedy movie by Ferzan Özpetek. It develops around the Cantones, a bourgeois family owning a pasta a factory in conservative Southern Italy. One of the two sons of the family, Tommaso, comes back home after his studies in Rome and hopes to take advantage of a family reunion to reveal his homosexuality. During a dinner with some guests, with whom the Cantones are in business, just as Tommaso is about to share his news, his brother Antonio (who knows what he is going to say) interrupts and reveals to everyone that he himself is homosexual. Mr Cantone, the brothers' father, takes the news badly and is hospitalised. Rejecting Antonio, Mr Cantone decides to place Tommaso in charge of the family business. The latter changes his mind about revealing his homosexuality, as he thinks it could kill his father, and accepts his father's decision.

Here (Cantones' hometown)	*vs.*	There (Rome)
Collective Values		Individualism
Culture		Nature
Conformism		Non-conformism
Submission		Freedom
Male chauvinism		Feminism
Homophobia		Accepting the Other
Classism		Egalitarianism
Appearance		Essence
Short-sightedness		Vision
Ignorance		Knowledge
Richness (money)		Richness (spirit)
Sadness		Happiness
Conforming not to damage other people		Pursuing one's own dreams
Loneliness / No real love		Love

The movie therefore shows us that, in a "here" (i.e. the Cantones' hometown in conservative Southern Italy) marked by socially shared values promoting conformism, male chauvinism, homophobia, and classism, it is impossible to express otherness without a destructive effect: if Tommaso accomplished his own intentions, in fact, he would no longer be admitted among his family. It seems therefore better to lie and pretend to conform to such a collective perspective, accepting to express one's own otherness only in a separate "there" (such as Rome, in Tommaso's case). Therefore, in the final scene, when Tommaso calls his family's attention, it is not for revealing his homosexuality, as one could think; even though he *does not adhere* to the socially shared codes of the "here", he opts for a "non-conformist" position, leaving the direction of his family's factory to his sister to go back to Rome, the "there" where he can be the "Other" he wants to be.

3.4. *Diverso da chi?*

Diverso da chi? (*Different from Whom?*) is a 2009 Italian comedy movie directed by Umberto Carteni. Piero is married with Remo, with whom he lives in a north-eastern Italian city. Here he works as a gay activist, and due to a misunderstanding, he finds himself competing for the local elections, together with Adele, an ultra-moderate anti-divorce politician.

Adele	*vs.*	Piero
Collective Values		Individualism
Conformism		Non-conformism
Submission		Freedom
Homophobia		Accepting the Other
Classism		Egalitarianism
Appearance		Essence
Short-sightedness		Vision
Closure		Openness
Sadness		Happiness
Conforming		Pursuing one's own dreams
Loneliness / No real love		Love

While at the beginning it seems that no dialogue is possible between the woman and the man, at a certain point they agree on inverting their roles and principles, which will make themselves fall into confusion: the former, Catholic and unable to think of any loving relationship outside of the family, will have a sexual and loving relationship with a man already engaged, as well as gay (i.e. Piero himself); the latter, acclaimed as the "new man" welcoming diversity and promoting otherness, will refuse his own alterity, trying to deny his love for Adele. The only character able to escape such a confusion is Remo, who, working as a chef and enogastronomic critic, is able, in the kitchen as in everyday life, to appropriately mix the various ingredients he comes into contact with, giving rise to new and balanced combinations. He is, in fact, the one suggesting the initial possibility of encounter between Adele and Piero (and the logics they represent); and also the one accepting any kind of diversity and welcoming otherness.

In this case, therefore, the solution presented in the end seems to be different from the ones described in the analysis of the previous cases: alterity does not rely on being "conservative", nor "revolutionary" or "non-conformist", but rather on oscillating among different positions and logics, and problematizing them. The only character able to do so is — not surprisingly — a "cook", since he continually deals with the passage from Nature — that is, raw ingredients — to Culture — that is, the final dishes, obtained through a clever combination of the former (cf. Lévi-Strauss 1964) —, and so is able to grasp the "nature" of the elements with which he comes into contact, "culturally" amalgamating them according to the specific needs of the moment.

4. Conclusion

Drawing on the above-reported considerations, we can conclude that alterity (or the "identity of the Other") emerges precisely from the relation between the Perspective and the Destination levels, although in a variable way. In fact, the "resolved (or posited) content" — that is, the final "positive" state of things asserted by the text, corresponding to what is generally referred to as *focus* in film studies — does not originate from a simple transformation of an initial thematic

situation (or "inverted content") into a contrary or contradictory situation — as the common Greimassian model assumes — but rather relies on the problematisation of such situations or contents.

Figure 1. The manifestation of alterity between the Destination level and the Perspective logic

If we exclude adhesion between these two levels (since we are dealing with otherness, which by definition inevitably implies a certain detachment from the Destination logic), we have three main positions: *breaking* is the one adopted by the "revolutionary" Angela in *Viola di mare*, who understands that only totally subverting the Destination logic (therefore keeping her female clothes on and at the same time freely expressing her love for Sara) she can manifest her alterity; *non-conformism* is the solution promoted by *Mine vaganti*, which by contrast shows that breaking is not always possible (since it could damage people), and that only by "non-adhering" to the Destination logic the Other can express his/her own identity; finally, *Le fate ignoranti* opts for *non-breaking*, suggesting that sometimes there is no need to go beyond the Destination level, and it is sufficient to promote a sort of osmotic process between it and the Perspective logic (as the "conservative" Antonia does). However, *Diverso da chi?* shows that real and complete alterity (that is, the capability of being even "diverse from the diverse") implies continuously moving within the semiotic square (Fig. 1) showing such solutions, adapting to different situations by making this model dynamic and variable. After all, as Jerome S. Bruner (2004) states, "we constantly construct and reconstruct our selves to meet the needs of the situations we encounter" (4); therefore, only by moving among these various positions and combinations of the Destination and Perspective levels, the process of identity-building can take place, both in texts that deal with otherness and in any other form of narrative through which identity is formed.

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APPROACHES IN SEMIOTIC THEORY

SEMIOTICS IN A MARGINAL ISLAND - 37 YEARS OF SEMIOTICS IN JAPAN AND MYSELF

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Abstract

Japanese Association of Semiotic Studies (JASS) was founded in 1980. At that time, there was a kind of boom of the contemporary thought especially focused on French thinkers like Roland Barthes, Claude Lévi-Strauss and so on in Japan. Thus, during several years, JASS got in the limelight but it soon became rapidly forgotten by the end of the 80s.

At the starting time of this society, there gathered various types of people including linguists, anthropologists, philosophers, critics, architects, artists, film directors, computer scientists and biologists.

In Japan, semiotics has not succeeded to occupy any official departments in universities at last, so JASS has been a space for freelancers and a shelter for those who do not like to be bound by a specific discipline. In Japan as a marginal island of East Asia, semiotic studies have survived as a peripheral and marginal science, but I think that it has been playing a different and important role as a tool to connect different kinds of disciplines, areas and intellects.

I would like to talk here about the 37-year history of the JASS and some of the accomplishments that it brought.

1. The place called Japan

I came from Japan. Is there anyone who has been to Japan in your life? What was the impression of Japan? Looking from the current globalized world, Japan is a member of the international community, but at the same time, it is still keeping many non-Western cultural elements. In addition, most of Japanese culture is incompatible and mostly made by Japanese language. Almost all intellectual communication through books and through the Internet in Japan is done in Japanese. I think that it is difficult for foreigners who do not understand Japanese to understand the whole picture of the Japanese culture easily. That is the present condition. It has smaller population than Russia and China, but there is still about 130 million people, twice the population of Italy.

For example, there are Japanese style and Western style on toilet. Western-style toilets have been introduced since the 1970s, but the Japanese style was mainstream before that. Even now,

this toilet is mainstream in general homes and in old buildings in rural areas. In other words, both the globalized aspect and Japan's unique domestic aspect coexist in Japanese society. Such duality is always hidden in the Japanese society and culture.

Since the opening of country in the Meiji era, Japan has mainly imported Western civilization in the form of translation and transformation. A small group of experts specializing in each region has translated civilizations and cultures of countries such as England, France, Germany and Russia. Moreover, once it is translated, discussions in Japanese develops through it. People who can only understand Japanese language would discuss arguments about French literature and German philosophy and they are absorbed into Japanese culture in a unique way - the modern Japan has been formed in such a way.

How about the situation of philosophy or cultural theories in Japan? There were originally the Confucian culture imported from China and the Buddhist culture entered from India via China, and we have the unique culture such as paintings and sculptures. We also have *kabuki* and *ukiyo-e* as the popular culture that evolved in its own way since the 17th century.

However, apart from that, philosophy and art that came from European civilization since the modern day has been widely accepted. The influence of German philosophy was originally strong, but with the boom of existentialism in the post-war ages, French philosophy has become dominant (of course, American philosophy is the strongest now).

In addition, popularity gathered in the post structuralism philosophy such as Foucault, Deleuze or Derrida. However, there are parts that are somewhat suspicious as to whether these thoughts really are rooted in Japanese society; in short, it seems to be an outward pretention as a western style toilet.

I graduated from the philosophy department of Kyoto University in the 1970s in such an era, but Kyoto University was the base for the import of German philosophy before the war in the flow of Kantian philosophy and Heideggerian philosophy. In such an environment, I studied French philosophy and criticism, and from there I turned via Roman Jakobson to Jan Mukařovsky of the Prague School, Russian Formalist, Yuri Tynyanov, and Mikhail Bakhtin at last. I was much influenced by those theories of Slavic schools. At that time, the term "semiology" or "semiotics" was introduced mainly via Roland Barthes. It was not philosophers but the researchers of French literature that introduced those terms at first. However, philosophers, cultural anthropologists, sociologists, and artists also gained great interest in this new language soon and the Japanese Association of Semiotic Studies was born.

2. History of Japanese Association of Semiotic Studies

The Japanese Association of Semiotic Studies (abbreviation is JASS) was founded in 1980. At that time, there was a sort of boom of contemporary thought; especially a wide range of interests was focused on a certain French people such as Roland Barthes and Claude Lévi-Strauss. For that reason, although Semiotics had been attracting the society in the first half of the 1980s, it became forgotten soon in the late 1980s.

At the beginning of the foundation, people from various fields gathered: linguists, cultural anthropologists, philosophers, critics, architects, artists, film directors, computer scientists, biologists, and so on.

In Japan, there was no instituted place for semiotics in the university course, JASS was a place for freelancers, a place of exchange for people who do not like to be trapped in a narrow discipline. That is still the case, even now.

What I have learned by joining the International Semiotic Conventions many times so far, is that in countries where semiotics is incorporated into the institution of universities and those where semiotics is not incorporated, the type of people interested in semiotics and the environments surrounding them are very different. It is extremely important in academic politics to defend the specialized field of semiotics in Italy, Spain, parts of Latin America, and countries where semiotics are included in university education like Germany and Scandinavia.

In Japan, however, there are few semiotics courses in universities, so there are no official "semioticians". The members of the JASS are members belonging to different academic groups such as philosophy, aesthetics, art history, literary theory, anthropology and sociology. Therefore, JASS is the place for interdisciplinary exchanges. Nobody is going to bring semiotics as a specialized department into the politics of the academic world. In that respect, the situation of Japan is quite different from China and South Korea. Members of JASS love semiotics as a multidisciplinary and free place as much as anything, and we do not think of enlarging it as an institutional academic society. Rather, we only aimed at how we can attract students and young people. Therefore, we have made many innovative attempts that cannot be done by the institutional academic societies.

For example, our academic journal *Semio-topos* has been published as a book for the public sold at the general book store from the first issue. Because the number of JASS members is about 200 to 300, then the publisher does not want to make books only for us. The publishers have been changed four times so far. For that reason, the content is centered on what is attracting non-professional readers in general. So far, popular issues include *Semiotics of Mobile Phones*, *Semiotics of Beautiful Girls*, *Wearing and Removing - Semiotics of Fashion* and so on. In addition to that, the themes such as "photograph", "computer game", "urbanity" and so on are popular. Unfortunately, there are issues that did not sell very well.

We hold a national conference once a year, but we also want to call as many people and students as possible, so we chose the theme that the young people will be interested in as much as possible.

Tomorrow we will organize a round table on pop culture, which includes idol culture and games and animation. Of course, we do not intend to lower the level of our research. Instead, we are hoping to improve the ventilation in the academic politics of the university that is increasingly specialist-dominated institution by introducing the semiotic thought.

The first president of JASS was Shigeo Kawamoto, he was the linguist who introduced Roman Jakobson's works to Japan. We also have Keizaburo Maruyama, a researcher of Saussurian original materials, who has built his own original philosophical thought of life. As the successors, we had Syuntaro Ito who was a science philosopher, Hyakudai Sakamoto who was standing on the Speech Act Theory of Austin and Searle, Hiroshi Kume who is an expert on Paul Ricœur, Joji Mori who introduced Marshall McLuhan and others. My colleague Hiroshi Yoshioka and I also have been the presidents of JASS.

However, the greatest contributor of our association was Professor Masao Yamaguchi (picture 1), a great cultural anthropologist.

Masao also used to be the vice president of the International Association of Semiotic Studies. He passed away in March 2013. He had a close relationship with Umberto Eco, Thomas Sebeok and Paul Bouissac. Since the 1970s and 1980s, he played an active part in international academic societies.

Figure 1. Masao Yamaguchi

The main works of Masao Yamaguchi were two books, *Folklore of Clown* (1975) and *Culture and Ambiguity* (1975). He discussed the importance of the role of clown as a "trickster" to revitalize and actualize culture and in *Culture and Ambiguity*, by using the concept of "center and marginality"; he claimed the importance of marginal existence for revitalizing culture.

Yamaguchi's best achievement, however, is that he himself was an active trickster in the intellectual world. He was interested in various fields and was a person who invaded into various places. The area of his interest was almost everything, such as literature, art, theater, dance, sports and movies. In addition, he appeared in various media includ-

ing television and radio, and traveled all over the world. He launched the magazine *Hermes* with some colleagues, but this represents his own way of living as a trickster. Japan Association of Semiotic Studies always respects such Yamaguchi Masao's way of life as an ideal model and hopes to fulfill a role like Hermes as a god of strategy that makes connections of various areas.

I believe that the role of semiotics and our Association lies in these heterogeneous intellectualss that connect different areas, departments, and intelligence.

3. "Possibility" of Semiotics -- my thought on Semiotics

When I began to be interested in semiotics, I was studying the literary theory of the 20th century. From the so-called structural analysis such as *Les chats de Charles Baudelaire* (1960) written by Jakobson and Lévi-Strauss and *Poétique du récit* (1977) by Roland Barthes, I went back to the Russian formalism as their origin and resource of those works. When I learned such literary theories, I was already aware that in the 1920s the flow beyond the limits of such a static structuralist literary theory existed in Slavic culture.

For example, Yuri Tynyanov was quite conscious of how text interacts with the structure outside the text, and Jan Mukařovsky recognized that the aesthetic value determined by a dynamic interaction between aesthetic norms and aesthetic functions, rather than by reading the fixed structure of text.

Such trend has since been handed down to the "reception aesthetics" of Wolfgang Iser and Hans Robert Jauss of the Konstanz school in Germany, but they simply stressed the readers' active interpretation as an 'act of reading' like Hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer. It will explain the importance of interpretation, but it will not show us what is going on there.

On the other hand, the Russian thinker Mikhail Bakhtin's "theory of dialogue" that the Estonian Tartu School rediscovered explains that the human culture is an entanglement of various heterogeneous language systems that are alive. Following the principles of dynamic dialogue, it brought us a vision that culture itself is moving like a living thing. There is no single language or symbolic system for Bakhtin. Culture is created in dazzling interactive exchanges where various languages collide, merge and fall apart. In the research of François Rabelais, medieval carnival space or Dostoyevsky's interactive novels, Bakhtin showed us a dynamic space of the dazzling field of signification filled with heterogeneity.

On the other hand, Vilem Flusser who moved to Brazil by escaping World War II and returned to Europe after the end of the Cold War, pointed out that human beings created the sign system - code to experience the world, and that the dominant code among the multiple code systems has changed over time in his books *Toward a Philosophy of Photograph* (1984) and *Kommunikologies* (1998). From the era in which the image code in the prehistoric era and to the era when the linear and logical character codes after the Greek civilization dominated was mainstream, and to the era of technically handled image code after the appearance of photography, he explained the cultural history by the theory of "communication studies"(Kommunikologie) that he claimed, and it seems to be consistent with the recent semiotics as well. Flusser (1998) also classified the type of communication into four models discourses and two models of dialogues. Discourse in this case refers to systems in which existing information is stored, accumulated and diffused, and dialogue refers to systems that creates new information.

In modern times where sign process has become infinitely accumulated inside computers as digital information, Flusser pointed out that civilization is moving from linear and logical thought to image and magical thinking. Indeed, in the present time, where mass media that had been dominant faded and digital information flooded, I think that new semiotic thinking is strongly required.

On the other hand, Thomas Albert Sebeok, inspired by Jakob von Uexkull's concept of the *UmWelt* (environment world), thought that the "semiosis" also existed in the animal world other

than human culture, it became the idea of Zoo-Semiotics (Sebeok 1968), furthermore It became to be arranged as a part of Bio-semiotics of Jesper Hoffmeier.

Bio-semiotics extended the semiotic concepts that have been thought to be effective only for human culture, especially toward the process of semiosis of the whole life phenomenon. There is a current tendency of semiotics to grasp the whole world including the natural world as an infinite process of semiosis called "semio-sphere". In other words, we are shifting from an epistemological semiotics that treats the world as a fixed sign system or as "structure" to be interpreted, to an ontological semiotics that treats the world as sign process of semiosis unbounded.

I myself have very little interest in the semiotics as a tool to decipher or read the world. Rather than interpreting human culture as a symbolic structure, I think that there is a huge plurality of heterogeneous sign systems that dynamically interact in this world as in the Bio-semiotics and the zoo-semiotics.

I think that the attitude and the stance to grasp the world as *Physis* of Greeks, that is productive nature; *natura naturnas* like Spinoza or Schelling's philosophy is the most important.

Therefore, I do not think that semiotics is a tool useful for a specific scientific methodology or realistic problem solving. Of course, we know that there are some attempts to make applied semiotics such as advertisement semiotics and marketing semiotics, but we do not think that semiotics is useful for something.

When I joined IASS conference in Dresden in 1999 with Mr. Masao Yamaguchi it was the first time to join, Dr. Roland Posner, the president at that time, asked us to hold the next international conference in Japan. As previously explained, JASS was not an institutional academic society but of freelancers, so I thought that we had better to refuse the proposal. Dr. Posner said, on the other hand, there is Nintendo Company in Japan and they would support our congress and said that it would be nice to hold a convention in Kyoto. Dr. Posner seemed to have already been approaching Nintendo via other Japanese colleagues. I was surprised because I think Nintendo would never provide any financial aid. Of course, I knew that Korean colleagues had a certain relationship with a company like Samsung and that there were such cooperative relationships with companies in other countries. However, I thought that Nintendo had no reasons to support us, and there were no executives in Nintendo who were interested in semiotic studies.

At the general assembly at that time, Lyon and Japan were proposed as candidate sites for the next convention, but South American colleagues expressed a strong opinion against going to such a distant place like Japan. As a consequence, the 2004 Congress was held in Lyon.

Since then, JASS has never accepted invitations of the International Congress and has been domestically playing its part as a free place for freelancers in Japan.

I think Japan is a marginal country in the world. Because we keep communication in Japanese at the center of our lives and we do want to protect that. On the other hand, I also think it is important to speak and write in English as I am doing now. I believe it is important to disseminate the essence of Japanese culture not well known outside the country toward the world.

However, at the same time I think that it is quite difficult for Japan to lead the world's humanities. From now on, it will be increasing for Japanese who are fluent in foreign languages to transmit Japanese culture abroad, or vice versa, foreigners who can speak Japanese very well will translate Japanese texts into foreign languages. However, as usual, all information from all over the world will jump into Japan, but all of them will be finally translated into the Japanese language and inserted into the Japanese domestic context. If the situation with our language does not change, Japan will continue to stand at the margin of the world. However, as Masao Yamaguchi's "center and marginal" theory shows, I think that there is something we can do because we are the marginal existence.

See the website of JASS: http://www.jassweb.jp/.

FROM THE SESSION "CYBERSEMIOTICS"

WHY CYBERSEMIOTIC STAR IS NECESSARY FOR INFORMATION STUDIES

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Abstract

The paper first analyzes why the problem of information is hard to solve. Then it critically reviews two classes of prevailing theories in information studies arguing that they cannot succeed because of the assumptions behind. I turn to Peirce's theories of information dug out by semioticians in recent years. As a contemporary development of Peircean theory, cybersemiotics shows a promising way to explain superficially incompatible aspects of information.

Many scholars who encounter the concept of information in their fields have been aware of the fact that the dominant information-processing paradigm is not enough for studying information. There has been a desire ever since the birth of the paradigm in 1948 that to find a theory of information which would be consistent with the folk theory that covers data, meaning, and usefulness of information. Such a theory has been still out of reach until now.

1. The problem of information

The question of "*what is information?*" is annoying. After almost 70 years, the claim made by Shannon that, "It is hardly to be expected that a single concept of information would satisfactorily account for the numerous possible applications of this general field" (Shannon 1993: 180), is still true. No need to say developing a unified theory of information (UTI).

However, no one would disagree with Wiener's well-known slogan that "Information is information, not matter or energy." (1961: 132) Wiener recognizes that any mechanism that processing information must cost certain energy, no matter computer or brain. In both Shannon and Wiener's way, information is defined as the possibility of a state happening in a set of possible states. An information state is an abstract logical state. Information processing is logical operations. However, information has to be implemented by a physical system. The system has physical states to correspond to logical states. Thus, logical operations are mapped to changes of physical

states of the system. All the physical systems implementing information processing cost energy.

The claim raises problems in two aspects: Ontologically, information is not something physical but has physical consequences; epistemologically, information cannot be explained by physical processes. Here we come to the problem of information in general: what is information? As it is not physical, what is the place of information in nature?

I believe that the problems of information, in general, is an empty problem without being further analyzed into subproblems that are easy to explore. It is fortunate that, first, people have sympathy in the claim that information has its place in nature. The problem is how to understand it. Second, we already have several good formulations and mathematic theories of information, which can be our departure towards a complete theory of information if there is one.

Nowadays, there are several taxonomies of information in general: information at technical, semantic and effectiveness level (Weaver 1949); information as reality, about reality, and for reality (Floridi 2010: 30); syntactic/physical, semantic/referential, pragmatic/normative information (Deacon 2010); or in common sense, measurement/quantity, semantic content/meaning, and value/usefulness/significance, of information; etc. It is clear that there is little doubt on defining information as a trinity. Following, I will adopt Deacon's terms, physical, referential, and normative information, basing on the reason he gives (private communication) to discuss the problems of information with respect to his most recent works on information (2007, 2008, 2012).

As we argued above, information processing as logical operations is instantiated by the changes of physical states in which information embodies. More specifically, patterns, forms, or differences, which we think convey information content, are constituted by the physical properties of the information medium. This is so-called physical information. We cannot distinguish physical information from other phenomenon in nature with respect to its physical embodiment. The hard problem of physical information is that how could these physical patterns, forms, or differences convey something non-physical, namely semantic content. The hard problem connects with the next level of information: referential information.

Without saying anything about referential information, we can even say that those formal theories of information actually are not theories about information. Distinguishing from other phenomenon in nature, information, mind and language/sign have the ability to be about, to represent, or to stand for something else. For information studies, what counterintuitive is that, different from physical properties which are intrinsic to signals (physical information), information content is something extrinsic to its physical carriers. Then, the problem is that, how can physical information refer to something extrinsic to it? What is more mysterious, information content is not physical. How can physical information be about something not physical? These are ontological problems of referential information.

We normally call information content meaning. A bit of physical information, or a signal, always has a particular meaning. As philosophy of language raises, what makes signals to be meaningful? How does a signal acquire its distinctive meaning? What is more, a signal conveys certain information content stably and reliably. How could it possible? These are problems of the genesis of referential information.

There is also the causal problem of referential information. Although referential information is not physical, it has physical consequences. Where does the causal power of referential information come from if we follow the principle of physical causal closure?

Information is not just meaningful but also significant. This is the level of normative information. Information can be correct or incorrect, accurate or inaccurate, useful or useless for a specific receiver. What is unusual for information from language is that it has different significance

for different individuals. Then, the problem of normative information are that, why certain signal with physical and referential information has significance for its interpreters? Why are the significance of same information content different for different interpreters who are under different boundary conditions?

We do not lack good theories for each aspect of information. For the measurement of quantity of physical information, we have several good formal theories being sufficient for engineering purpose. For referential information, we have many theories of reference and meaning in the philosophy of language. For normative information, we also have pragmatics in linguistics. However, it is clear that these theories for different levels of information distribute to different disciplines. Although there are some overlaps between these disciplines on information, these theories are incoherent and full of conflicts. It is too bald to say there exists a definition of information that is proper to all these theories and disciplines.

Nevertheless, there are still many endeavours trying to go beyond the limitation and to search for a UTI that can explain physical, referential and normative information coherently. Because many disciplines involving information are in need of a more developed conception of information. Thus, the potential benefits of UTI are alluring. Although the road ahead is rough, many works aiming to explain information in full sense have been done.

2. Methodologically reductionist and fundamentalist theories

In general, there are three classes of theories in contemporary information studies trying to develop full theories of information: methodologically reductionist, fundamentalist and transdisciplinary theories. Although Shannon has explicitly noted at the very beginning of his paper that his theory aims to solve engineering problem and has nothing to do with semantic information, it was unavoidable that there was a tendency to confuse it with semantic information. A notable argument against the tendency is that it confuses what is conveyed and what provides conveyance, or, meaning and the signal conveying the meaning. (Bar-Hillel 1955)

With the distinction in mind, Carnap and Bar-Hillel (1952) develop a formal theory of semantic information. The theory assumes an ideal language system including all semantic statements. The amount of the statements are finite. The quantity of a semantic statement is measured by the probability of the occurrence of the statement in the language system. Less likely a statement happens in the system, more information it contains. However, the theory implies a paradox called Bar-Hillel-Carnap paradox. (Floridi 2004) According to the theory, we cannot decide the quantity of the information contained in a contradiction is infinite or none. Therefore, Floridi (2004) develops a theory of strongly semantic information based on multiple value logic.

Scholars who want to find a theory explaining what information is dissatisfy with those formal theories. Some scholar, Dretske, for instance, thinks that semantic information is unmeasurable. Given the receiver already knows about the possibility of source, only when the conditional possibility of s being F is 1, can we say that a signal carries the information s is F. Some may argue against that the requirement is too strong to accept. (Collier 2015) Dretske argues that if the conditional possibility is not 1, then the sent and the received message are two different message qualitatively even with a little bit of difference. In other words, whether semantic information is measurable depends on the purpose they aim to afford.

Actually, the assumption behind those formal theories of semantic information are methodologically reductionism. All the theorists are aware of the fact that semantic information is different from the one handled by the mathematical theories. However, semantic content or meaning is abstract and thus has neither spatial nor temporal extension. Therefore, in order to

measure semantic information, it has to be transformed to something measurable methodologically, namely something has extension. While only physical things have extension. Although semantic information cannot be reduced to physical properties, we can construct something having extension like physical ones but not physical with respect to particular criterions, aka some logical system. With the transformation, semantic content is reduced to something having extension methodologically.

Opposite to the methodologically reductionist theories of information, the fundamentalist theories "treats it (information) as an unanalyzed primitive, and brackets its necessary physicality and efficacy from consideration in order to focus on intrinsic attributes." (Deacon 2010: 150) Generally, there are four kinds of theories. The mystical theory, Chalmers (1996), for instance, treats information as a basic property of the universe essentially different from other physical properties. Information is not an *explanandum* but an *explanans*. Some may argue that it does not solve but avoid the problem. The pan-informationalist or digitalist theories (Zuse 1967; Wheeler 1989; Wolframe 2002, Dodig-Crnkovic 2011, to name a few) argue that the universe is computable fundamentally. The position has two weakness: first, they lack specific boundary conditions under which they are workable and thus are empty (Floridi 2011); second, what we want is a theory being able to solve the problem "what is information?" While the answer they give is that "information is computable." Stonier (1997) identifies information as organization being a basic property of the cosmos. Then the term "information" is redundant as it is a synonymy of terms like organization, difference, structure, etc. Wu (2005) names a new subfield of the field of being after reclassifying the field as information and based on which develops a philosophy of information. However, what we want to explain is information in common sense rather than to name something metaphysical as information. (Zhou & Brier 2015)

There is a common and stubborn assumption hiding behind the superficial conflicts between methodologically reductionist and fundamentalist theories. Both classes implicitly treat information as something substantial like physical entities, or singularly present. (Deacon 2010) Like water and airflow in which molecular as substantial entities flow from one place to another, it seems that we talk about the flow of information.

Actually, we should formulate information under the consideration of the whole situation of information transmission. (Weaver 1949) Since the situation comes across almost all levels of the world and the disciplines of natural science are arranged with respect the hierarchy, many scholars think that we should understand information in a transdisciplinary approach. One of the most promising ways in the approach is a conceptual framework developed by Søren Brier.

3. Information in formation: Peirce's theory of information

In recent years, some semioticians rediscovered an exciting fact that Peirce developed theories of information based on his theory of sign. Peirce not only developed a theory of the measurement of information (Nöth 2012) but also one explaining how signs convey information embodying in semiotics. In the latter theory, Peirce shows how meaning emerges in semiosis or sign process.

According to Peirce, semiosis can be defined as a triadic relation between a sign, its object and its interpretant. That is, sign, object and interpretant are the most basic constitutive elements of a semiosis. No one is reducible to another. However, the statuses of those three are not equal. In a semiosis, a sign is determined by its object and determines its interpretant. Put it differently, an object has an effect on one's mind, creating an interpretant, through a sign in semiosis. Obviously, the effect upon a mind is not a causal one. What is conveyed from the object to the mind by the sign in semiosis? Peirce says,

> …a Sign may be defined as a Medium for the communication of a Form. […]. That which is communicated from the Object through the Sign to the Interpretant is a Form; that is to say, it is nothing like an existent, but is a power, is the fact that something would happen under certain conditions (EP 2.544, n.22).

It is the form in an object being conveyed to create an interpretant in one's mind by a sign in semiosis. Integrating both definitions of sign, we can define semiosis as a triadic process of communication of a form from the Object to the Interpretant through Sign mediation. (Queiroz and El-Hani 2007) The account of sign as a medium of the communication of a form explains the order of determination in semiosis, too. Peirce clarifies,

> As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which it is determined, and to its interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the Object, the Sign is passive; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the sign is active, determining the Interpretant without being itself thereby affected (R 739: 2).

As Liszka (2016) argues, the communication of a form in semiosis has three phases: first, the object determines the sigh by its form; second, the sign determines the interpretant in a similar way in which the sign is determined by the object's form; third, the interpretant affects something in the sign agent in a way similar to how the sign relates to the object. Queiroz and El-hani (2007) argues that the communication of a form is information.

Some may still not be satisfied with the theory. First, it does not provide an account of form. If the term form is in the sense of difference, pattern, or data, it just provides an account of physical information. It falls in methodological reductionism. Alternatively, if it is in the sense of Stonier's concept of organization as a basic property of the universe, then it leads to fundamentalism. Second, as I have argued, the theory seems not to solve the problem of how the telic nature of information emerges in semiosis. Without the solution, we cannot distinguish the communication of form from data processing.

Actually, Peirce has solved both problems in his theory. Form is not a singular thing. Although it is substantially embodied in the matter of an object, it can be conveyed to an interpretant by a sign, which is outside the object. (R 739: 3) It is something expressed as a regularity of its organization, or a habit. In his most recent book, Deacon negatively frames the concept of form, regularity, or habit as the concept constraint. (Deacon 2012: chapter 6) He argues that a representation of sameness and diversities is realized through reducing those states, which would have possible implement, by a constraint. Through such formulation, the concept of form can get off from the trap that treating it as mental products.

The telic nature of information, or semiosis, originates from the personal purpose and "all general purposes flow down from it" (De Tienne 2005: 158). However, with the elaboration in semiosis, a form goes beyond the limitation of a personal purpose and acquires an objectively teleological nature in Peircean kind rather than Aristotelian. "Put briefly, … for Peirce every symbol is teleological in the sense that, being preoccupied with its own development into new interpretants …" (De Tienne 2005)

Information as the communication of form is processual. Using De Tienne's term, information is a process constitutes by three dimensions: exformation, transformation and metaformation. The object emanates form for the proximate purpose of attracting attention to it, and for the remote purpose of fueling the semiotic telic engine. This is exformation. Transformation is the process of transmitting the form emanating from the object. "Signing is the art of conveying forms through other forms." (De Tienne 2005) Metaformation is the effect made by the proac-

tive interpretant when influenced by transformation.

As we can see, Peirce's theory of information is neither reductionist nor fundamentalist. The next question is how information manifests at the different levels of the living world and grow into knowledge adapting to different dimensions of the world but is incompatible with each other. This is what cybersemiotics tries to answer.

4. At the center of cybersemiotic star

A riddle cybersemiotics tries to answer is that of how to bridge the gaps between natural, social and human science. Through integrating Luhmann's system theory and Peircean semiotics, especially its contemporary development, biosemiotics, Brier develops a transdisciplinary conceptual framework called cybersemiotics. He believes that gaps between the logical space of nature and of reason can be bridged and thus provides a comprehensive account of information within the framework.

Follows Luhmann, Brier argues that the living world can be modelled as a triple autopoiesis model consisting of three systems: the biological, psychic and socio-communicative system. "Autopoiesis" is a term created by Maturana and Varela (1979) to refer to organizationally closed, self-reproduced and self-identified system. A biological autopoietic system refers to a living system individual which we normally name as a physiological system. However, the description autopoietic system is qualitatively different from the description physiological system in biological science. The former has an agency that is experiential and meaningful while the latter is a subject of natural science from a third-person perspective. A psychic autopoietic system is a description of the living system from first-person perspective. Socio-communicative autopoiesis builds on biological and psychic autopoiesis but is qualitatively different from them. Both biological and psychic autopiesis are silent in the sense that they are still in biological sphere. Through symbolic semiosis, it breaks through the limitation of individual autopoiesis and builds an inter-subjective sphere.

Brier thinks that Luhmann's system theory is not sufficient unless combining with Peircean biosemiotics. What distinguishes those three dimensions of autopoiesis are the ways of communication of form, rather than their organizations or components. With the contribution of biosemiotics, Brier classifies four types of semiosis works in a socio-communicative system: endosemiosis, phenosemiosis, intrasemiosis and thought semiosis.

Endosemiosis refers to the semiosis that occurs within organisms, particularly those semiotic interactions at a purely biological level among cells, tissues, and organs. Phenosemiosis denotes to our inner states like feelings, perceptions, and volitions in their non-conceptual or prelinguistic forms that are not recognized by conceptual consciousness. There are also internal semiotic interactions between the psyche and the body different from endosemiosis. Brier calls it intrasemiosis. Thought semiosis describes semiotic interactions between the psyche and the language system. It not only makes some inner psychic states verbally expressible but also inter-subjective communication possible.

As we can see, these semiosis bridge gaps between different levels of autopoiesis and different autopoiesis at the same level. Endosemiosis happens between biological autopoiesis. They make up a whole organism with the biological autopoiesis. Phenosemiosis seems to function as meta-patterns of endosemiosis. (Brier 2008: 397) Intrasemiosis bridges the biological and psychic autopoiesis. Thought semiosis bridges psychic autopoiesis with socio-communicative autopoiesis. Every semiosis discussed here can be analyzed as exformation-transformation-metaformation process, also known as information. However, sign games displayed at different levels of semiosis are different.

Endosemiosis consists of chemical signals among hormonal systems, signals in nervous systems, including the brain, transmitters in the immune system, etc. We should not confuse chemical signals conveyed in a living system with physical signals in an engineering communication system. The former help establish a second-order autopoietic system within a multicellular organism. The second-order autopoiesis means that every cell in a multicellular organism is itself autopoietic and the endosemiosis happening between them constitutes an autopoietic system again at a new level. It is an autopoiesis that builds on autopoiesis. While the processes signals delivering in latter are just physical processes. Actually, the emergence of autopoiesis at new levels are a distinctive feature of the living world. Based on the stipulation made above, it is convincible that similar sign games happen at the level of intrasemiosis.

Intrasemiosis is more about instinctual movements. Brier believes that there is a level between instinctual movements and reflexes that is necessary for communication to develop as a significant system with its own organizational closure, also known as socio-communicative autopoietic language games. Cognitive coupling, namely an instinctual movement ritualized and acquired a value for a living system, happens at the level through coordination of coordination of behaviour. He calls it languaging which was coined by Maturana and Varela.

Within evolution and life experience in which a human infant grows, sign games at the preliminary levels develop into language games. At this level, it is linguistic symbols that are displayed. Our psyche is perfused with language.

Semiosis at each level creates a distinctive significantion. Endosemiosis creates structural couplings, intrasemiosis creates instinctual signification, together with phenosemiosis, thought semiosis creates conceptual signification. Together, they create individual signification sphere. Within language games, the communication between individuals creates cultural signification sphere.

The model is at the heart of cybersemiotic star. Four branches of knowledge grow from the heart. Each branch explains a dimension of the world: matter/energy, life/living systems, inner life/consciousness and sense/meaning. Respectively, we divide the knowledge into different disciplines classified as natural, social and human sciences. There has been a metaphysical impulsion since the very beginning of science looking for a unified theory that can consistently and coherently cover all the knowledge. However, it seems that these different branches of knowledge are mutually exclusive. This is the Sphinx Riddle of knowledge. Isomorphically, we can construct Sphinx riddle of information as that physical, referential, and normative information are mutually exclusive but constitute information as a whole.

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FROM THE SESSION "HUMANISM AND HUMANISTS WITHOUT BORDERS"

THE SEMIOTIC SPHERE AND ITS DEMARCATION

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Abstract

How we interact with others and the rest of the world is a basic question of intercultural relations in the meaning of crossing the lines and finding new synergies and spaces for positive interactions. The concept of a semiosphere (Lotman 1990) provides a theory of a synchronic semiotic space where interaction takes place between different sign systems and within a continuum of signs. The limits of the semiosphere are the critical point for separation and integration.

The interconnection between cultural spaces has been studied by many authors (Deledalle-Rhodes 1992, Block de Behar 1997). In the positive meaning it is open and seeks multiple channels. Contradictions and opposites add new modes to the interaction process. Recognizing the signs expands our look and the possibility of infinite semiosis (Peirce 1998).

In physical terms, a border forms a division between historically and culturally separate spaces and its meaning becomes simultaneously economic and political. An idea of globalization and of a universe has occupied our minds, which does not mean the vanishing of borders and different signs of demarcation. How do we track these lines of separation in a complex world? How do we interpret the meaning of a "border"? The border as a sign?

1. Introduction

Ten years ago I wrote an article on how the "sphere of Europe" is seen, in an intercultural perspective, mainly from the outside (Myllymäki 2007). The question posed was how we can interact with the rest of the world in the sense of crossing the lines and finding new synergies and spaces for positive interactions. Globalization was providing a new dimension, an opening, a possibility. In today's world, we need to ask if expanding globalization still means keeping the doors open for people and ideas to come closer or whether there are greater distances and barriers that obstruct the way to better harmony between societies and cultures.

How we define the concept of a semiotic sphere and its limits has become more critical, if the surroundings and milieu are more diverse than they seem. The physical border in Europe

and elsewhere is not a symbol as the flows of migrants are increasing. How do we deal with a variable semiotic system and its sphere? Demarcation can be understood as the act of creating a boundary around a place or a thing, setting or marking of boundaries or limits. It also has a connotation of a separation, a distinction. The delineation comes from within and without.

In physical terms, a border forms a *division* between historically and culturally separate spaces, and its meaning is simultaneously economic and political. An idea of globalization and of a universe does not mean the vanishing of borders and different signs of demarcation. I am focusing on the aspect of the border instead of the interconnections. How do we track these lines of separation in a complex world? How do we interpret the meaning of a "border"? To what extent does the border represent a sign?

The *interconnection* between cultural spaces and the various means of interaction and encounter has been studied by many authors (Deledalle-Rhodes 1992, 2000; Block de Behar 2003). In the positive interpretation, it is open and seeks multiple channels. Contradictions and opposites add new ways into the interaction process. Juri Lotman's comprehensive concept of *a semiosphere* (1990) provides a theory of a synchronic semiotic space where interaction takes place between different sign systems and within a continuum of signs. Recognizing the signs allows an extension towards and interaction with other cultures and the Other. The *possibility of infinite semiosis* is inherent in the Peircean semiotic theory.

2. Border as a limit

For Lotman (1990), the limits of the semiosphere are the critical point for separation and integration. The boundaries of the semiosphere are "the hottest spots for semioticizing processes". The notion of "boundary" is ambivalent: it both separates and unites. The boundary belongs to both the frontier cultures, to both contiguous semiospheres. It is a mechanism for translating and the place where 'the external' is transformed into 'the internal'. Even more, it is a filtering membrane so that foreign texts become part of the semiosphere's internal semiotics while retaining their own characteristics (Lotman 1990: 136-137).

In Europe, a "Hotspot approach" has been introduced for the establishment of joint reception centres in frontline EU member states to identify and fingerprint migrants and refugees to facilitate the return of "irregular migrants". Officially-designated Hotspots would have the task of relocating refugees from war zones and filtering out people who have crossed the Mediterranean in search of better economic situations.

We can observe real-life hotspots in the European neighbourhood and the construction of border fences around Ceuta and Melilla starting in the 1990s is an early example. To prevent the human flows of irregular migrants, high walls with barbed wire were erected. A study of irregular forms of human mobility in Europe and its Mediterranean neighbourhood and security measures at the EU's external and internal borders in Calais, the Greek-Turkish border and the island of Lampedusa concludes, however, that there is no way to stop the movement of people. (Kynsilehto 2014: 141-142) Physical concrete walls and other less visible ways to monitor entry at crossing sites is a way of responding. A response, a reaction is always necessary to meet and encounter people coming from elsewhere. The border also becomes a threat but there is always a point of contact – whether one stays or goes back.

The concept of the boundary is central throughout Lotman's theory of the semiosphere. The function of any boundary or filter is "to control, filter and adapt the external into the internal". At the same time the notion of the boundary separating the internal space of the semiosphere from the external is just a rough primary distinction (Lotman 1990: 140,138).

3. Border as a divided area

Gloria Anzaldúa describes life in the border culture (U.S./Mexican) as being in a constant state of transition: "To survive the Borderlands /you must live *sin fronteras*/ be a crossroads" (1999: 216). Its inhabitants are the prohibited and the forbidden. Borders as dividing lines, "a narrow strip along a steep edge", are set up to define the places that are safe and unsafe, to distinguish *us* from *them*. A borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary: "This is my home /this thin edge of barbwire" (Anzaldúa 1999: 25).

In the frontier areas, semiotic processes are intensified because there are constant invasions from outside. The boundary is ambivalent and one of its sides is always turned to the outside (Lotman 1990: 141-142). We can conclude that there is also a two-way flow and penetration across the border. Even if it is not symmetrical, a special border culture becomes its own semiosis, a crossroads with various subsystems. But it functions mainly as a crossroads making links between discrete, autonomous cultural units.

As we take the border as a division, we find dividing lines, binarities and dualisms. We may take a look from the outside or from the inside vis-à-vis those lines. The variables can be opposites and they can be complementary in relation to the idea of a semiotic sphere to filter and adapt the external into the internal.

We may distinguish ambivalent variables when balancing the *outside – inside* binarism:

> *history – unpredictability, definition – indefinition, open – closed, inclusion – exclusion, peace – conflict, collective – individual, hope – fear, tolerance – control, answer – doubt, crossing – retreat, access – rejection, opportunity – challenge, bridge – wall, fiction – reality, new – old, communication – silence*

When we think of divisions, be they physical or imaginary, we are dealing with opposites that are somehow incompatible in character. Still, we can try to identify a point that makes each a rupture and a link, keeping in mind any opportunity for connection and conversion. Being at the border grants us a chance to look at both sides. Being on either side is a closed position where contradictions seem real unless we find a way out.

4. Around the border: possibility of dialogue

Assuming the existence of the borders, we may turn to the realities around the borders circling various subsystems. Again, there are differing perspectives to defining those spaces that facilitate interaction and eventual dialogue. Demenchonok (2014) expands on this: cultures have boundaries or border zones as areas of contact and interaction with other cultures. Leaning on Bakhtin, the life of cultures takes place at the boundaries, an idea that is central to the concept of transculture. Thus, on the transcultural principle, they can transcend their borders. Furthermore, boundaries play a certain constructive role in protecting the uniqueness of each culture and in resisting the homogenizing intrusion of globalization (Demenchonok 2014: 125-127). The idea of transcending borders, however, would need closer scrutiny to be verified or if it is more a utopia in the complex reality in which we live.

Transculture should not be an abstraction. Lois Parkinson Zamora (2006) approaches "transculturation" by referring to the processes by which meanings are produced from the contact of distinct cultural systems over time. Transcultural conceptions of the visual image condition present ways of seeing in Latin America, and these ways of seeing condition contemporary fiction. She studies inordinate relations which "are *not co*-ordinate relations; inordinate points are *not* deployed in ordered relation, as are coordinate points, but in irregular, decentered, asymmetrical relation" (Zamora 2006: xxii). She proposes the metaphor of the inordinate eye as an

alternative to the "gaze" to recognize a reciprocal relation and exchange to encompass inordinate transcultural processes (Zamora 2006: xv, xxi-xxiii). Facing the other culture involves many angles and choices. Looking, seeing is an inevitable element of intercultural approaches as an entrance to comprehension, before other steps are taken.

5. Dualistic reconciliation

Is there a possibility of reconciliation, a chance of mediation instead of conflict? How do we close the diverging gaps that separate, distance and hinder the communication?

> response <–> resistance, proximity <–> remoteness, love <–> violence, stability <–> chaos, humanity <–> hostility, choice <–> no choice

A contact, an exchange is the first step to meaningful communication. If we manage to create dialogue, we may take a step towards interaction and meaningful understanding.

Lotman (1990: 143-144) finds dialogue mechanisms in which the elementary act of thinking is translation and the elementary mechanism of translating is dialogue. There are still conditions for dialogue as it presupposes asymmetry, to be seen in the differences between the semiotic structures (languages) used by the participants in the dialogue. Asymmetry also assumes a degree of invariancy. Another necessary condition is the concern of both participants for the message and their capacity to overcome the inevitably arising semiotic barriers. The need for dialogue, *the dialogic situation,* precedes both real dialogue and even the existence of a language in which to conduct it; the semiosis situation precedes the instruments of semiosis.

Lotman recognizes that the schematically outlined cycle may not be fully realized in the actual process of cultural contact. It demands favourable historical, social and psychological conditions. The process of 'infection' needs certain external conditions to bring it about and it needs to be felt to be necessary and desirable. As with any dialogue, a situation of mutual attraction must *precede* the actual contact (Lotman 1990: 145). Binarism and asymmetry are the laws binding on any real semiotic system. The boundary is the crucial unifying factor for the unity of the semiotic space of the semiosphere, dividing the internal space of the semiosphere from the external, "its *inside* from the *outside*" (Lotman 1990: 124, 130).

Dialogism is present in Bakhtin's philosophy in relation to human communication and relationships. Dialogic relationships form the very foundation of all human activities, from the personal level to the most general level of dialogue among cultures. To Bakhtin, the life of cultures takes place on the boundaries and contact between cultures should be a dialogic encounter. Edward Demenchonok (2014: 85-88) describes this philosophy of dialogism as personalist: it is inseparable from the human persons between whom dialogue takes place. Dialogism is intimately related to the concept of the other and to I-other relationships, to "otherness". Dialogical relationships between I and the other constitute the structure of Being, understood as an "event". Dialogism thus combines diversity and co-existence. The principal borders lie inside the dialogic space. Another key concept in Bakhtin's dialogism is outsideness. It is only in the eyes of another culture that the foreign culture reveals itself fully and profoundly.

Laas poses a further question as to how the semiosphere, as a model for studying semiosis in complex systems, would function when resting on different kinds of dialogical foundations — comparing Peirce, Lotman and Bakhtin. Dialogue is a fundamental ontological feature of the semiosphere: internal relations between the subsystems and external relations with its environment are dialogic. A semiosphere based on Peircean dialogues would be an open system that exchanges information with its environment and co-evolves with it. This has implications for

the semiosphere's binarism as its opposition with the environment is no longer clear-cut, nor is the nature of its boundaries. Translation mechanisms might be graded, vague and susceptible to temporal change. For Peirce, semiosis is a gradual progression toward a complete understanding (Laas 2016: 488-489). Thus we have an open-ended process to facilitate interaction under varying conditions. The level of understanding and the expectation of reaching understanding varies depending on the comprehensiveness of our own perspective on the process of signification.

6. Still a continuum: translation and other means

The border does not exclude the possibility of an indefinite semiosis. We just need to find those *tools and means of dialogue that facilitate our interaction*. In broad terms, translation is necessary even if it is complicated. To Ludwig Wittgenstein, "the limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (1922), but where are those limits? And what is the language? The contact between different semiospheres, a constant exchange, a search for a common language (Lotman 1990: 142) taking place on the frontiers is of paramount importance.

There is no empty space between cultures. The process of interaction continues even if it takes new forms and channels. Where do we track the points and surfaces of contact of a cultural interface? It is not yet an act of understanding the other but it is a condition and an existential situation in which the experience of understanding "the Other" is possible through crossing a line. It is a concrete communicative situation in space and time. From the semiotic viewpoint, it is the gradual convergence that is in focus in the search for the perception of the real nature of the Other's representation.

Even if our interest focuses on the process of convergence and continuum, there are also hints about limits in Peirce's texts. Emerson's verse "Of thine eye I am eyebeam" (The Sphinx, 1841) is used as a quotation in Peirce's explanation about symbols that grow. A symbol produces an endless series of interpretants. But every endless series must logically have a limit (Peirce 1998: 10, 323) By this logic of a limit Peirce means "an object which comes after all the objects of that series, but so that every *other* object which comes after all those objects comes after the limit also" (in Peirce Edition Project 1998: 538-539). "Thus the series of whole numbers is an increasing endless series. Its limit is the denumerable multitude" (in Peirce Edition Project 1998: 539).

7. Identity and alterity: fundamental for understanding

The concern for otherness brings us another, more intimate aspect of being related to others and overcoming our own closeness and self-reflection. Arthur Rimbaud's "Car je est un autre" (Lettre du voyant, 1871) symbolizes the amplitude of choices of how to see and hear the other.

Julia Kristeva deeply analyzes the question of identity and alterity precising more the relationship: "Mon malaise à vivre avec l'autre — mon étrangeté, son étrangeté — repose sur une logique troublée réglant ce faisceau étrange de pulsion et de langage, de nature et de symbole qu'est l'inconscient toujours déjà formé par l'autre" (1988: 269). Her definition "l'étrange est en moi, donc nous sommes tous des étrangers" (Kristeva 1988: 24) constitutes "a semiology of uncanniness". It originates in the Freudian concept "unheimlich" (Friedrich Schelling) joining to the instant where something that is familiar to us becomes foreign and frightening. Here Kristeva (1988: 269-275) brings forward the idea that the sign is not arbitrary but has real importance. So the moment of recognizing the strangeness is an awakening and an opportunity to know more. It can occur at a personal level but we may interpret it in a more universal way in intercultural situations.

The same question about being elsewhere, feeling strangeness is presented by Lisa Block de Behar:

On ne peut voir de loin ni de près autrement qu'au travers d'écrans, de filtres qui rapprochent l'ailleurs et font du proche quelque chose d'étranger: du déjà-vu, du jamais-vu, indécidable. Où est ailleurs? Où n'est-il pas? Qu'est-ce qui est étranger? Qu'est-ce qui ne l'est pas? (1997: 86).

It is a moment of revelation which is relevant for understanding differences and combining the internal and the external. It is the look that determines but we have different ways of looking. Is there an inordinate eye that sees behind the look — and is it me or the Other who is looking? Finding a synthesis of signification with its intersections can make a continuum possible in a way that would transform seeing into being. Crossing the line(s) is the act of determination that always becomes more important than the division.

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FROM THE SESSION "SEMIOTICS AND SEMIOTICS"

ON CONNOTATION AND ASSOCIATION IN THE WORK OF MICHAEL GIBBS (1949–2009)

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Abstract

Connotative semiotics as it is introduced and developed by Louis Hjemslev (1873–1950), became known to a larger audience thanks to Roland Barthes (1915–1980). One of Barthes' admirers was the British-born visual artist and poet Michael Gibbs (1949–2009), who wrote about Barthes and made systematic relations and the concept of connotation central to his literary and visual work. Contrary to most semioticians in the Saussurian tradition, he was not so strongly opposed to the use of psychological concepts, such as "association" and "suggestion". In this essay, Marga van Mechelen argues that his application of "connotation" and "association" is depending on certain factors. In general, when the production of a 'text' as a conscious and orchestrated act is involved, the concept of connotation is used, while considering the position of the receiver, "association" is the more common term. It is the right term to stimulate the individual and personal creation of meaning. In addition, to counterbalance the structuralist and all too defining approach that Gibbs as an artist fears. Indirectly, Gibbs supports the structuralist idea that there is, or should not be a fixed meaning, as well as Barthes' thesis that denotation is not the first meaning, but the last of connotations.

1. Michael Gibbs, poet and performance artist

In early January 1980, I attended for the first time a performance by the British-born visual artist and poet Michael Gibbs (1949–2009) at the de Appel art center in Amsterdam. Gibbs had moved to Amsterdam five years earlier. I knew him personally and we shared not only our involvement in performance art, but also in concrete and visual poetry. What I did not fully realize at that time was that we also had academic interests in common: word and image relations and several semiotic issues. His background was in Fluxus, though he was of a younger generation than the founder of the Fluxus movement George Maciunas, called "Mr. Fluxus" by Gibbs

(Gibbs 1998). In Amsterdam he belonged to an international circle of artists who met each other regularly at the In Out Center gallery, the bookshop Other Books & So, owned by the Mexican artist Ulises Carrión, or at de Appel. Roughly at the same time Gibbs moved to Amsterdam, de Appel opened as a center for performance and situation art (later called installation art) (Van Mechelen 2006). He became a regular visitor, publisher of reviews of the events at de Appel in his magazine *Artzien* and a contributing artist.

In 1980 he did his first performance in de Appel, entitled *The Name of the Game* (1980). What I remember is a slender man, with straight half-length hair and a beard, looking older than he was at that time, who moved through space without paying much attention to the public. He carefully arranged sheets of paper onto a large sheet of glass that lay on three trestles. A little girl, together with Gibbs, piled up bricks onto the sheet of glass. Slides were projected, forty in total, with a single word on each slide and a tape recording that played spoken texts. These were constructed from the same words as those on the slides. The performance was very well orchestrated. Numbers played an important role: the sheets of paper in five rows of seven, the exact number of 60 bricks and 40 slides etc. Still, at the same time "chance" was also a factor. The sheet of glass had to break, but when and how? Not immediately though. The first ten bricks were thrown in the direction of the glass but were not intended to hit it. Much later, I read his notebook. There he writes that to a certain extent he also wanted to prevent the performance from being killed by defining. "Rather, let it be related to, the connotations are what make the work live in the imagination" (Gibbs 1979). Nevertheless, in another note, he reveals his own thoughts, placed between brackets [...]; therein he talks about "virgin pages awaiting the 'imprint'", "fragile inviolability". And when the bricks fell in front of the glass, he sees "the pages tremble in fearful anticipation of violation". At the end of these notes, he formulates a kind of conclusion, the quintessence of the performance, as it were: "the violation effected – the weight of language proves too great for its supporting surface" (Gibbs 1979).

When I began researching the notion of ventriloquism in his work (Van Mechelen 2015), I encountered the word "connotation," not only in notes concerning this performance, but also in numerous places elsewhere in his work. It started with the publication of a collection of his concrete and visual poetry, called *Connotations* (1973). On the back flap he wrote: "I'm concerned with the reduction of language in its structural elements – taking it apart to see how it works. Words don't always mean what they say – their patterns and forms reveal inner processes and events, ambiguous connotations of meaning". In the preceding years, he studied in Exeter at the American Arts Documentation Centre, which had Dr. Mike Weaver as its director; he was the curator of the first international exhibition of concrete and kinetic poetry in Cambridge, in 1964. At this center, Gibbs wrote his thesis "New Structural Methods in the Contemporary Modern Arts". Although *Connotations* contained visual and concrete poetry, his ideas about poetry had already shifted shortly after the travelling exhibition *Sound Texts? Concrete Poetry Visual Texts* (1970–1972). Concrete poetry had become too much of an aesthetic game with the alphabet, while he considered visual poetry as more open to "a socially engaged combination of language and image or object" (De Rook 2016: 177). While he had initially described concrete poetry as "the first truly international poetry movement – a universal form of poetry that cuts across nations and languages – the poetry of the global village" (De Rook 2016: 176), he now downplays it as "an aesthetic play with the alphabet" (De Rook 2016: 177). Considering his later activities, publications and performances, he remained intrigued by the alphabet and the history of the relation between typography and avant-garde art. The artists he mentions when talking enthusiastically about juggling with poetry include Stéphane Mallarmé, Guillaume Apollinaire, Filippo Marinetti, Hugo Ball, Raoul Hausmann, Theo van Doesburg and Kurt Schwitters; they

also remained important in later years. The alphabet is given a special place in several activities in which he tries to ruin the alphabet. It began with a booklet called *Extinction* (1974), which contained a series of photographs in which the letters of the alphabet were set on fire. This booklet accompanied the exposition at the In Out Center in the spring of 1974. In the same year, he made a second trip to the Netherlands, this time not to Amsterdam but to Maastricht, where he did a performance in the garden of the Jan van Eyck Academy of Art, on the invitation of the artist-run space Agora Studio. In Maastricht, he set fire to an alphabet of large letters cut out of polystyrene with a hardboard template, which was doused in gasoline, ignited, and put out with a fire extinguisher (Van Mechelen 2016:192). The following year, in which he settled in Amsterdam, he did another performance with the alphabet as it main subject, called *Bloody Alphabet* (Schraenen 2016). And a year later *These Letters are My Flesh and Blood* (Utrecht,'t Hoogt, 1976). In both performances he wrote the alphabet with blood on his fingers.

2. Influences

Michael Gibbs was an admirer of all the artists that are mentioned above. These were writers and visual artists from different avant-gardes, interested not only in typography but more generally in the signifier of their medium as such. Furthermore, he admired John Cage as the composer who draw attention to the *sound* of language, while the others highlighted the *visual* image of language. However, his interest was not limited to binary relations between two "languages" or media, but rather in bringing together all possible media. We might consider his project in terms of a Mallarméan *Gesamtkunstwerk* (Total Artwork). We remember Mallarmé's *Le Livre* as a form of a book that unites theater, music, poetry etc., which goes against the grain of our linear way of reading and turning pages, one after another; Mallarmé did not manage to finish it before his death. Kees van Gelder, who was asked by Michael Gibbs to contribute to his art magazine *Artzien*, mentions Mallarmé and Gibbs' mutual interests (Van Gelder 1982), stressing that Gibbs had more media at his disposal than Mallarmé ever did. There are many other performances and publications that can be placed in the context of this major project, called by Van Gelder *The Book of Books*. For instance, *The Oracle*, a live video performance from 1980, and *The Absent Words* (1980), which was the most elaborate performance, installation and exhibition of that year. The title is important as it refers to the famous book by Edmond Jabès, *Le livre des questions*, published in 1963 by Gallimard, some parts of which were published in English a couple of years earlier (*The Book of Questions* in 1976 and *The Book of Yukel/Return to the Book* in 1977). In the seventies, Jabès was considered to be the most important French poet since Mallarmé, in particular within the circle of *Tel Quel*. Both Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) and Maurice Blanchot (1907–2003) wrote about him and contributed to the dissemination of his poetry.

There is more to say about these ancestors and the role they played in the life of Gibbs. From today's perspective, we could consider Gibbs' enterprise as a form of artistic research, in which academic and artistic questions are intertwined. During that time, however, as can be derived from the title of his thesis and from the introductory lines in *Connotations* (1973), Gibbs considered his efforts above all as a form of anarchistic academic research. Compared to more traditional academic research in humanities, his approach contained different forms of testing and, anticipating later developments, the acceptance of irrationalities, paradoxes, irreconcilable phenomena or real contradictions., These irrationalities were simultaneously examined with a structuralist or semiotic eye and engagement. Though it might seem a somewhat extreme way of looking at things, it was consistent with the discourse of that time, in particular the intellectual tradition of the French poststructuralism of the late sixties and early seventies. It is the reverse side, if you want to use that phrase, of structuralism that came to dazzle in the writings of the Tel Quel group, in which Michael Gibbs took a special interest.

Instead of working consistently on his larger project, Gibbs often chose an unmethodical approach that reveals itself through giving space to chance, humor, mockery and relativization, as if the achievement of *The Book of Books* (or *Le Livre*) is an idealistic goal in which one should never stop believing, though not presenting it too seriously either. In *The Absent Words* project, these two different ways of looking were both visible. Here, Van Gelder (1982) recognizes the influence of both Jacques Derrida and Roland Barthes (1915–1980). While Derrida formulated the Peircean idea of an unlimited semiosis and endless references in order to argue for the unattainability of a destination, Barthes argued for a recognition of the para-doxa and the acceptance of unpredictability (Van Gelder 1982). This background partly explains why the concept of connotation is so important to Gibbs and why it is accompanied by an adjective like "ambiguous" or by the psychological term "association". Here he touches, probably unintentionally, upon a never-ending topic in semiotics.

3. Semiotic issues

I already mentioned that Gibbs and I shared an interest in word/image relations and semiotic issues, but let us make that more precise now. One of these issues is the notion of connotation and semiotic traditions in the twentieth century in which this notion was introduced, but also the broader context of the elimination of psychological terms from semiotics. An elimination that was not entirely successful (Van Mechelen 2013) and that Gibbs would never have accepted. As we have already noticed, in his performance *The Name of the Game* (1980) Gibbs oscillated between a structural approach and careful way of organizing his materials on the one hand, and a discourse that included not only the notion of connotation, but also a couple of psychological terms on the other. For example, his regular use of words like "suggestion" and more particularly "association". Here he implicitly touches upon an old problem in semiotics, namely the two axes of language, one axis being a class of linguistic elements that can be *associated* because of certain similarities – the paradigm or paradigmatic relations – and the other axis, the syntagm or syntagmatic relations, consisting of a relation of terms, this time not in absentia but in praesentia. As we know, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) still spoke about associations or associative relations, while after Roman Jakobson (1896–1982) paradigmatic became the generally accepted term, applicable to all different kinds of sign systems. Paradigmatic relations operates on both the level of the signifier and the signified. More so than syntagmatic relations, paradigmatic relations put the reader, listener or viewer to work. It requires the act of comparing and contrasting each of the signifiers that are present, with all relevant signifiers that are absent but imaginable. A single choice makes one aware of the significance of making choices as such, and consequently the construction of meaning. It makes no difference if it concerns relations of form, style, genre, medium, images, sound or words. This – condense – characteristic contains elements that are interesting to artists, not only Gibbs. It appeals to the creativity of both the artist as the producer and the observer as the receiver of his work. Likewise, it seems that Gibbs often deliberately zigzags between the categories just mentioned.

The reason why semioticians after Saussure replaced the term association with paradigmatic relation was the psychological nature of the word "association". Obviously replacing just one term was not enough to remove the psychologism from Saussure's approach. The question is however: is this purpose desirable at all? Surely not from Gibbs' perspective, and neither from a psychosemiotic point of view (Van Mechelen 1993). How important was it actually to semiotics? Let us focus very briefly on how Roman Jakobson, Louis Hjelmslev (1873–1950), Roland Barthes, but also Algirdas Greimas (1917–1992) dealt with this issue. It is clear that the first three names made connotation central to their semiotic theory and structuralist analysis (Gar-

za-Cuarón 1991). However, as Garza-Cuarón showed in her book *Connotation and Meaning*, Greimas also contributed to the reflection on "connotation" with his "Semiology of Common Sense". Interestingly, in his (and Joseph Courtés) *Semiotics and Language: An Analytical Dictionary (Advances in Semiotics)* (1979) he first states that the process of connotation is hard to identify, which he explains by referring to Hjelmslev's effort to define a class of connotative semiotics belonging to the type of non-scientific semiotics. Greimas' explanation points to a number of features that are already mentioned above, such as the fact that connotations are connected to both the plane of content and the plane of expression. His conclusion is that semiotic connotations undoubtedly exist. He adds, "Their importance has been clearly shown in the work of R. Barthes" (Greimas and Courtés 1982: 53). For Barthes, whose starting point was also Hjemslev, connotations are associations made by the subject as a text within its own system (Barthes 1970: 14–15). While his main purpose was to approach and understand connotation as correlations that are immanent in the text, Greimas opened the common sense practice of connotations, distinguishing between social and individual connotations. Consequently, by attaching such importance to connotation, the three of them, but I could mention a couple of other scholars too, made not only the separation of connotation and association less distinct, but also the distinction between denotation and connotation less self-evident. That is to say, a distinction between a literal, denotative meaning on the one hand and connotations on the other. Barthes even argued in *S/Z* that denotation is not the first meaning, on the contrary: it is the last of the connotations (Barthes 1970: 16). Still, as we know from every introduction in semiotics, denotation remains the point of departure, also in art history. Erwin Panofsky, for example, in his writings about iconography, stated that denotation is defined by the basic recognition and naming of visual images; that which all viewers generally recognize immediately. This is another interpretation of the idea of common sense. In comparison to this understanding of denotation, or as Panofsky called it "factual meaning," connotation is obviously more dependent on contexts and aspects, such as culture, time, social class etc. Panofsky takes the denotative level for granted, unlike the semioticians after him that I mentioned. The interest in connotation drew Jakobson, Greimas and Barthes away from Saussure and Hjemslev, whose models focused on denotation as well as on *langue* and written language, rather than on *parole*, speech or the use of language.

4. Gibbs' approach to connotation and association

Like many of his contemporaries, Gibbs was interested in Roland Barthes, both the structuralist and the poststructuralist, mainly because of his focus on language and other sign systems as manifestations in the real world. What helped was that both Jakobson and Barthes wrote extensively about other semiotic practices besides language, such as cinema, music and fine arts (Barthes 1977). In his very noteworthy "Graph of photography" (Gibbs [1989] 2016), Gibbs brings together Derrida and Barthes. In the essay, he starts by saying that, "photography did not so much introduce 'new ways of seeing' as institute new ways of describing" (Gibbs [1989] 2016: 46). Photography is not a transparent medium, but a graph, "a trail that leads not to a reality that can be captured, but simply something that 'marks the passage'" (Gibbs [1989] 2016: 50). These last words refer to Barthes, while graph and trace refer to Derrida. Denotation does not make photography transparent; it is only a sign of something that *has been*. Consequently, in discussing Barthes' "The photographic message" (1964), Gibbs' main goal is to demonstrate the lesson of Barthes that the photographic image is a product of human labor and a cultural object suffused with historical meanings. "Their 'graph' is scriptural, a panoply of signs and meanings" (Gibbs [1989] 2016: 50).

What I made clear already is that Gibbs used both the words "association" and "connotation". At first, this seems inadvertently, but after giving the context of the use of these words a second

glance, I noticed that one could discern two positions in which they occur, that of the artist/ producer and that of the viewer or listener. He seems to apply the word "connotation" primarily when it is related to artistic production as a conscious and orchestrated act; then he relies emphatically on structuralism and semiotic theory. As onlookers and listeners, we might be able to recognize these connotations, supported by different primary sources and certain codes, certainly, if we are familiar with his work or otherwise have access to it, however there always remain more diffuse and personal *associations*. In his secondary reflections this is noted, not as a shortcoming but rather as a stimulant to his reader and viewer to create meaning. As I said, he wants his performance not to be too defining and that gives room for everyone's personal associations. For this reason, he thinks codes should not be provided too readily or even not at all. In all the performances of which I am aware, the audience is watching the performance from a distance, and is not actually taking part in it. Nevertheless, the performances give the impression of something like a game, as we are familiar with from Fluxus events. That is to say, a performance with certain rules but also space to apply those rules individually or collectively. Therefore, it feels as if one is indeed involved in the performance. Additionally, here we should point again to the influence of (post)structuralism.

In *Connotations* (1973), he describes his ambivalent position toward a structural approach. He wants to build on structural elements, but at the same time, there is something beyond his control, which we could now identify as the inner processes of association. The Dutch art historian and curator Cees de Boer wrote about a work of Michael Gibbs, called *Ex Libris*, which consists of a large drawing of his own bookcase with all the book titles in alphabetical order (De Boer 2016). He situates this work in the context of other famous fictional libraries. He mentions Michel Foucault and his reference to Jorge Luis Borges in the opening sentence of the preface of *Les mots et les choses* (Foucault 1966). Here, Foucault points to a fictional Chinese list of categories, an encyclopedia in which the animals are divided into nonsensical categories such as "belonging to the Emperor", "drawn with a very fine camelhair brush" and "suckling pigs" (De Boer 2016; Foucault 1966: 7). Borges' Library of Babel was inspirational to many authors, not the least of whom Umberto Eco. In his essay, "SomeVolumesFromTheLibraryOfBabel" (Gibbs [1982] 2016) Gibbs started to write his own historiography of endless galleries of books, which he combines with the historiography of the *Book of Books*, the *Bible* and the *Koran* – two traditions that strangely enough come together in a few Fluxus projects and in his own work. What is interesting in this context is the ambivalent attitude of both Foucault and Gibbs toward categorization and enumeration. There is a continuous play with all the possibilities and even preposterous impossibilities of orderings in the work of Gibbs. A paradigmatic or connotative order supposedly underlies these orderings, but still every individual makes his own story out of it, that can likely go in any direction. Both De Boer and Gibbs draw attention to the similarity between the construction of paradigms in the semiotic sense and a Barthes-like lists of connotations, referring to how a poet starts writing, namely looking for words that have a sound in common or otherwise something on the level of content. De Boer stresses the materiality of words, one of the elements that made artists and writers in the early seventies interested in the circle of Tel Quel and Derrida, besides Barthes and Foucault. Furthermore, he stresses the emphasis on the production of meaning by the receiver, directing the attention to Umberto Eco and his idea of the modern work of art as an open sign. As we know, it is through the *intentio lectoris*, through the interference of the audience, the viewer or reader, that the work of art becomes an open work of art. It is this idea that Gibbs tries to reconcile with his structuralist preoccupations.

Central to my research for a very long time was the relation between semiotics, in particular the Saussurian tradition, and psychosemiotics, mainly the semanalysis of Julia Kristeva (Van

Mechelen 1993 and 2015). In my dissertation I compared, for example, the way Greimasian se-mioticians dealt with the signifying process and the psychosemiotic approach of Kristeva, after first making a comparison between Greimasian semiotics and art history. How do art historians approach the relation of form and meaning and how is this done by semioticians and psycho-semioticians? In fact, I concluded that all these approaches are rooted in nineteenth-century psychological aesthetics with complicated, but still interesting, debates about form and content, and secondly that we should revisit these debates to get a better view on how to approach the signifying process of, for instance, artistic production. This brought me back to the nineteenth-century psychological concept of association and the twentieth-century semiotic concept of paradigmatic relations and connotation. The simple standpoint of semiotics that the concept of association should be eliminated from semiotics and replaced once and for all by paradigmatic and connotation, was something I ultimately did not accept. Primarily because there is a blur-ring line between the two and this blurring line cannot be negated in our analyses of artworks and the way they are perceived. I even wish to argue – and I hope the description of the perfor-mances and writings of Michael Gibbs made this clear – that the oscillation between the two is just one of the more intriguing aspects of artistic production and communication.

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ON SUBSTANCE: FROM LOUIS T. HJELMSLEV TO LUIS J. PRIETO

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Abstract

The notion of substance plays a major role in structural semiology. However, what is to be understood under such notion can be a matter of discussion. The aim of this paper is to show that Prieto's understanding of substance inasmuch drifts apart from Hjelmslev's, can be very useful to throw light upon current topics about semiotics and cognition, as long as for Prieto, semiotics deals with the *raison d'être* of knowledge itself.

Substance, in Prieto's thinking is much more close to a conception of "material reality", or even to the idea of a mind independent reality. This position supposes that substance will have a major role in determining what kind of form one is able to derive from it. This goes against Hjelmslev's claims, in which substance manifests form.

What is a stake in this discussion is whether an object of knowledge imposes its material features upon the cognizing subject, or if it is the cognizing who imposes formal features upon a given cognized substance.

Following Prieto, we will show that cognitive processes, as long as they are regarded as semiosic processes, are always in a tension between the cognized material reality, i.e. substance, and the semiotic structure that determines such knowledge, i.e. form.

1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to show that Luis J. Prieto's notion of substance and the role it plays on a *cognitive act* can throw light on current discussions about the relation between semiosis and cognition. Thus, we will divide the exposition in three parts: first, we will present the notion of substance according to Hjelmslev. This is a necessary step, considering he was a major influence in Prieto's work. Then, we will see to what extent Prieto drifts apart from Hjelmslev by forging his own understanding of the notion of substance. Finally, by examining the way substance relates to cognition in Prieto's theory, we will present some conclusions and prospects for future works.

2. The notion of substance in Hjelmslev

According to Hjelmslev, a sign function is established between the dimensions of *form* of each of the planes of a semiotic structure (Hjelmslev 1954: 171, [1943] 1971: 86-87). It would seem thus that this amounts to substance not playing any significant role in the sign function, for the sign, as far as it is a systemic (functional) unit, remains an *immanent* unit. Nevertheless, it is worth noticing, that in the whole of Hjelmslev's theory, substance is not always disregarded as a completely external factor in semiosis.

Indeed, in *La Stratification du Langage* (1954), Hjelmslev highlights that commutation is the ultimate procedure to determine to which extent substance does play a role in the conformation of a given plane (Hjelmslev 1954: 171). He even claims that a plane is not reducible to "pure form" but it always involves the *selection* of form by substance (Hjelmslev 1954: 172), or to put it in technical terms: a possibility of manifestation (Hjelmslev 1954: 167).

It seems to us that these precisions can be located at an epistemic level of analysis. And thus we would like to suggest that for Hejlmselv, the role of substance in the conformation of a plane is important only in terms of the *analysis* of a given system, not in terms of the ontological properties of such process (*cf.* Hjelmslev 1971:149).

This interpretation seems to be consistent with Hjelmslev's overall orientation. In his *Prolegomena* we read:

> Una teoría, en el sentido que empleamos es por sí misma independiente de toda experiencia. Por sí misma, no dice nada en absoluto acerca de la posibilidad de su aplicación y de su relación con los datos empíricos. No incluye postulado de existencia alguno. Constituye lo que se ha llamado sistema puramente deductivo, en el sentido de que sólo puede usarse para calcular las posibilidades que se siguen de sus premisas (Hjelmslev 1971: 28).

Thus, it seems possible to claim that in Hjelmslev there is no metaphysical, or ontological, commitment to substance as a "real" object. Rather the focus is put into the solely epistemic dimension of substance that results from the analysis of sign systems as strictly a calculus of possibilities (Hjelmslev 1971:29, 149-150). The very definition of form presented in *La Stratification* (1954) seems to support this claim: form is defined as "l'ensemble total, mais exclusif, des marques qui, sélon l'axiomatique choisie, sont constitutive des définitions" (Hjlemslev 1954: 172). Accordingly, substance would encompass the rest of features borne by the object that, even if disregarded, would need to be included in order to give a thorough account of the object in question.

But if substance is defined as the other features that do not count as form, then it becomes evident that form and substance are relative terms. What qualifies as form from one point of view can be regarded as substance under another. In fact, Hjelmslev maintains that in order to pursue a scientific analysis of substance, substance should be intellectually grasped in such a way that it becomes form, even if it is a different kind of form than proper *semiotic form* (Hjelsmslev 1954: 172-174). This relates to the problem of there being a multiplicity of substances that can manifest a given form. For substance according to Hjelmslev, is always the variable in a manifestation, while form is the constant (Hjelsmslev 1971: 150).

It follows that substance is not an absolute term but a relative one. In order to make a distinction between a formed variable and an unformed variable, Hjelmslev calls the unformed variable *matière* 'matter[1]' (Hjelmslev 1954: 174). Moreover, he points out that in order for matter to

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1   This term is also translated as *purport* in English. The couple *matiére* and *sens* is used in French, as well as in Spanish, as *materia* and *sentido*. The Danish word originally used by Hjelmslev was *meningen* (Siertsema 1965: 151).

be knowledgeable it must also be formalized in some degree (as substance, that implies a certain degree of formalization).

But it is this latter concept, the concept of matter what we are interested in. Since this concept seems to point to substance in its ontological dimension, without any kind of epistemic implication (*cf.* Siertsema 1965: 152). Mainly, the claim we want to put forward with this suggestion, is that Hjelmslev's notion of matter coincides with Prieto's use of the term substance. Let us explain this claim.

3. The notion of substance in Prieto: from communication to cognition

In this section, I will try to provide some arguments supporting the statement that Prieto's notion of substance is ontologically rather than epistemically oriented.

On the one hand, Prieto explicitly defines himself as a substantialist, in explicit opposition to Hjelmslev (Prieto 1975: 127), but it is important to notice that he does so while treating the distinction between *langue* and *parole* (Prieto 1975: 77). This distinction is tackled by Prieto by means of conducting an epistemological analysis of structural phonology, that ultimately leads to an ontological, or metaphysical, based model of cognition (Prieto [1975] 1977: 215).

For Prieto, language is an instrument (Prieto 1977: 247), and as such, it always has a teleological dimension. Language is thus a means to a given end, inasmuch the goal of every communicative act is to act upon the listener (Prieto 1977:181, 247). However, if language can be characterized as an instrument, it follows that there are some operations that can be carried out by means of the language in question. To put it in Prieto's own words, a language, inasmuch it is a semiotic structure, entails a principle of pertinence that correlates the semantic dimension of the content plane with a more broad *intercomprehension* system, which ultimately determines the "utility" of language as a tool (Prieto 1975: 108-109). This is what Prieto calls the noetic field of a language, and it is defined as the field of everything which can be said by means of a given language; i.e. the actual *message* (or *sense*) conveyed by a signal or utterance (Prieto 1966:35). The noetic field is distinct from the purely systemic semantic field, i.e. the field of lexical meanings in the content's plane form. Actually, according to Prieto, it is the double articulation between the noetic and semantic fields in the content plane of a language what renders communication possible (Prieto 1977: 239). Roughly speaking, this is Prieto's main formulation: a given utterance would have a specific linguistic meaning; thus it will point to a given class of lexical meanings in the semantic field; this class in its turn will point to another class of *messages* in the noetic field (Prieto 1977: 239).

Hence, in a communicative act, the receiver will cognize the signal uttered by the emitter as pertaining to a given class in the expression plane, that will point to a specific class in the content plane, which presents the aforementioned double articulation between the semantic field and the intercomprehension system, or noetic field. This model of *linguistic* knowledge will be generalized by Prieto for knowledge in general (Prieto 1977: 205-206). There are always two planes that get correlated by relations of *pertinence*, knowing that one object in one plane belongs to one class immediately makes us know that there is another object in a correlated plane that belongs to another specific class.

It is important to notice that Prieto's approach to knowledge is a generalization of what he identifies as the actual work of structural phonology (*cf.* Prieto 1977: 215). This fact has been already pointed out by Krampen (1998:172) and Fadda (2012:34). The interest in this model depends upon the fact that for Prieto, operating with classes (phonemes) is equivalent to operating with concepts. This is the dimension of cognition he is most interested with: concept formation (Prieto 1977: 204). In his later years, Prieto stated that the ultimate goal of semiology was to explain the *raison d'etre* of knowledge *tout court* (Prieto 1991: 9).

Following Prieto then, to cognize something is to recognize it under a certain identity, i.e. to recognize that something as a member of a given class (Prieto 1975:81). In a *cognitive act* the main aim of the subject will be to determine whether the object he is *cognizing* is a member of a class A, or of its complement (i.e. all the other elements in a universe of discourse that do not belong to class A). In *cognizing* an object, then, the subject must be aware of certain features the object bares *in itself*, and by virtue of those features the subject will recognize the object as a member of a specific class. Those features will be *pertinent features*, for they render the object equivalent to all the other objects within the class (Prieto [1986] 1994).

The important point here is that the subject identifies the features in the material (i.e. substantial) dimension of the object. Prieto will state that such features can only be *manifested* and thus recognized as such, in the *aesthesis* of the portion of reality the object constitutes. This *material* dimension of any given object of cognition is what Prieto calls *substance* (Prieto 1975:88).

Accordingly, he says that the identity between two objects is always dependent upon knowledge: "il faudrait dire, non pas que deux objets *sont* identiques entre eux, mais qu'ils *apparaissent* comme tells à la connaissance" (Prieto 1975:83, emphasis in the original). On the contrary, difference is to be found on the objects themselves (Prieto 1985). The main point is that if there is a material feature that gets recognized by a semiotic structure as being a pertinent feature, then it can no longer be ignored in the object as form, and it must have a substantial correlate in the object. For instance, if a language can distinguish between a pair of fricative sounds because of one is cognized as *voiced* phoneme while the other as *voiceless* phoneme, then the phonetically voiced fricative cannot be recognized as the "voiceless fricative" phoneme (*cf.* Prieto 1975: 85 n. 11).

Thus, substance as the material dimension of any given object will play a decisive role in determining the membership of the object to a certain class. But at the same time, the semiotic structure by means of which the subject cognizes the object will determine the pertinence of the features. Hence, following Prieto, in the cognitive act there is a tension between the semiotic structure that models the knowledge and reality in its material dimension, i.e. there is a tension between form and substance.

4. Conclusions and future research

This reading of Prieto's work could offer another point of view in current issues between semiosis and cognition. The difference from Hjelmslev has already been noticed by Badir (2001). Badir notices that Prieto's commitment to the ontological dimension of substance renders Prieto's theory more suitable for a syntactic and semantic description of the "cognitive constructions" (Badir 2001: 12). The main point here being the shift imprinted on the notion of substance made by Prieto. As Badir notes, for Prieto, substance cannot longer be just the "variable in a manifestation"[2].

And indeed, manifestation, as a Hjelmslevian term, seems to be also affected by Prieto's understanding of substance. As long as Prieto talks about the aesthesis of an object as the initial step in a cognitive act, it would seem that he tries to establish sensation, or sense-perception, as the basis for cognitive activity. However, the fact that he talks of the object of cognition as *manifesting* what can become *pertinent features* calls for an additional component within his theory that can explain how these features are actually grasped by the cognizer. Thus, *manifestation* seems to be no more a relational term between form and substance, but rather amounts to the specific sensorial modifications in the cognizer's sense organs (*cf.* Prieto 1975: 88).

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2   Prieto's different understanding of substance would inevitably have a consequence in the axiomatic definition of form within Hjelmslev's formal terminology. Thus, it seems possible to suggest that Prieto's notion of form would also have to be different from the Hjelmslevian notion of form. But this problem, however, is outside of the scope of this paper.

I would like to suggest that Prieto's views on cognition might be further expand with the aid of the semiotic notion of intentionality, as presented by Beuchot (1994), and by Deely (2007) after their analysis of Poinsot's philosophy. This intentional component would aim to explain the mechanisms by means of which the cognizer's cognitive faculties are specified by the object of cognition (resulting in an immediate union between subject and object in the cognitive act). The realist orientation in Prieto already supposes that knowledge arises at the encounter between man and world.

Our argument can be fleshed out like this: Prieto speaks of the pertinent features of the object of cognition as being *manifested* in the *aisthesis* of the object as substance. Manifestation, in Prieto's sense, is related to modifications in the sensory organs, that is to say: the pertinent features of an object will specify the cognitive faculties and would permit the rise of a formal sign, i.e. a concept, in the subject's mind.

The intentional component in Prieto's theory, if provided, would amount to consider the possibility of taking Prieto's cognitive model as a general model of semiosis, and as such, it would need to be articulated with current biosemiotic understanding of semiosis. This would be our main task for future works.

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TRANSFORMATION OF VERBAL SIGNS AS A RESULT OF THE INTERACTIONS OF LANGUAGE SYSTEM[1]

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Abstract

Interlingual contacts foster not only the phenomenon of borrowing verbal signs from a donor language into a host language. This is the first stage of much wider phenomena that is interaction between whole semiotic systems. The transfer of a sign itself from one system to another launches different processes connected with its adaptation in the host system – developing new syntactic structures (adaptation to the grammar rules of the host language), new relations between signs and their designata and new interpretations.

An important role in the adaptation of new verbal signs in host languages plays the pragmatic aspect: e.g., the word *haker* (Eng. hacker) exists in Polish only with negative connotation, although in English it has also neutral meanings.

As a result of interactions between the language systems the very meaning can become a borrowing. The already existing verbal sign in the host language is somewhat 'contaminated' with additional meaning which it did not have so far.

The process of semiosis here is the interaction between language systems that results in new meanings (which are actually new signs). The sign is therefore a reaction (according to S. Petrilli and A. Punzio) to the influence of cultural, social, political, economic, psychological and other factors

1. Introduction

Contacts between different national languages foster not only the phenomenon of borrowing verbal signs[2] from source language (further called SL) into host language (further called HL). This is the first stage of a much wider phenomenon, which is the interaction between whole

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1   Based on the research on terminological borrowings in contemporary Russian language.
2   In this article, a verbal sign is understood a s a sign in the function of a term – a special type of sign with special (professional) meaning.

semiotic systems. The transfer of a sign itself from one system to another launches different processes connected with its adaptation in the host system – developing new syntactic structures (adaptation to the grammar rules of the HL); new relations between signs and their designata and new interpretations of these signs. The greatest change, however, is the major influx of new signs that are terminological borrowings. However, this phenomenon has a complex nature, going significantly beyond the pure linguistics. According to Susan Petrilli and Augusto Punzio, the sign (here I mean also the borrowed ones) is therefore a reaction (Petrilli, Punzio 2002:13) to the influence of cultural, social, political, economic, propaganda, psychological and other factors. Consequently, the research on this phenomenon has a comprehensive character, as it covers not only the strictly linguistic method, but also the analysis of non-linguistic factors. Thus, the main aim of this article is to show that this multifaceted approach – consisting of analyzing both the linguistic and non-linguistic factors influencing the interaction of language systems – creates opportunities to reveal the causes and extent of this issue, as well as a detailed observation of the dynamic character of influx, adaptation and existence of borrowings in the HL.

2. Factors influencing the changes in language systems

Language borrowings, especially terminological, are the result of mechanisms, conditions, factors and other drivers: linguistic, communicative, historical, psychological, social, psychosocial, psycho and sociolinguistic, cultural, economic, political etc. Therefore, the multifaceted approach which assumes the combination of all possible and essential reasons, processes of forming the final versions of new signs in the HL, grammatical and semantic adaptation and transformations – can bring substantial progress in this research. The careful scrutinizing, in particular, all the phenomena in relation to language borrowings may contribute to a better understanding of the global changes in modern national languages.

The non-linguistic reasons of language borrowings (mentioned by Krysin 1996: 146, Fomina 1990:181, Grinev 1993:161) are the following:

- cultural impact of one language on the other,
- oral and written contacts between the countries with different languages,
- increasing interest in learning the definite language and authoritativeness of the SL,
- historically conditioned passion for foreign culture sharing by certain circles.

The linguistic reasons (according to Krysin and Grinev) are the following:

- the lack of the proper equivalent for a new notion in HL,
- the tendency to substitute the world combination with one word,
- the tendency to reduce homonymy and polysemy,
- the necessity to define the meaning of a new concept more precisely,
- impossibility of creating the derivatives from domestic words (like *товарообмен – бартерный*, *управление сбытом – маркетинговый*, *посредник – дилерский*).

The influx of foreign language borrowings into the HL is a major, although not the only reflection of change in the Russian languages for special purposes (further called *technolects*). The research resulted in the conclusion that this leads to further changes having a more profound and diverse character: the complex process of adaptation of foreign language units in the HL on a morphological, syntax and semantic level. Semantic shifts are the result of the adaptation process, intra-lingual translation from one technolect into another or from a technolect into literary language and colloquial speech and vice versa. In the first case, we have to deal with strengthening the cognitive aspect of a literary language and in the second, the appearance of colloquial

units like phrasemes or set phrases in the role of terms.

3. The role of non-linguistic factors in interactions between the language systems

Most of modern languages, which participate in worldwide communication, are constantly being updated to reflect the changes in the modern world. The increased amount of terminology of mostly American English origin is reflected in national languages and is due to the changes in markets and capital resources as well as the development of communication technology. While 200 years ago English was perceived as a language of international trade, nowadays it has also become a language of economy in a wider sense (including economics), as well as the language of aviation (flight control), maritime navigation (in professional and international cooperation) (Ociepka 2002: 38), politics, pop culture, electronics and many others. Taking the above factors into account, the presence of terms of English origin in Russian economic texts causes, to some extent, to 'internationalization' these texts, i.e. it makes them more understandable even for those who do not speak Russian well but are familiar with the professional terminology. Looking through the prism of rationality, the phenomenon of the inflow of English terminological verbal signs into professional texts increases their informative and communicative effectiveness. It also simplifies the activity of mass media considering linguistic diversity as one of the main obstacles to their internationalization (Ociepka 2002: 37).

The influx of new verbal signs into the Russian language is strictly connected to the system transformation in Russia, which began in the second half of the 1980s. This process considerably affected practically all spheres of life in the country, including the language. The lack of native lexical items to name the new concepts and phenomena became a serious problem for many, including politicians (Makosza-Bogdan 1994: 25). With the democratization of political life and democratic elections, Russian politicians referred to advisors (or spin-doctors) of American and Western politicians. In order to encourage citizens to take part in the elections and to overcome their psychological resistance, – a result of the long-term imperative character of governmental system, it was necessary to address voters in a different language, free of ideological overtones. New terms from the sphere of the so-called political marketing and public relations appeared in the Russian language of politics (Makosza-Bogdan 1994: 25), words such as *консенсус, лигитимность, либерализм, люстрация, федерализация, лидер, лобби, коррупция, инновация, индустриальное общество* etc. Mass media – mostly press and television affected the increase of foreign notions and terms in the Russian language.

Some processes and psychological changes taking place in the environment of young people were an important factor and aided the new phenomena and concepts to take root. The language of youth is always an interesting piece of material not only for linguistic research. Branch offices of Western companies were keen to employ young educated people as they were open-minded and easily adopted Western corporate models and standards. For instance, in the 1990s new young managers not only adopted the principles and mechanisms of Western businesses but also the language of corporate business. In the advertising business in particular, these young people were mostly responsible for the particular Russian language of advertising, which thanks to the vast number of terms, most of English origin, has become transnational, which can be illustrated by the following terms: *баннер* (Eng. *banner*), *биллборд* (Eng. *billboard*), *бренд* (Eng. *brand*), *воблер* (Eng. *wobbler*), *креатив* (Eng. *creative*), *лайтпостер* (Eng. *light poster*), *призма-вижн* (Eng. *prismavision*), *сити-формат* (Eng. *cityformat*), *сэндвич-мен* (Eng. *sandwich man*), *хард постер* (Eng. *hard poster*) etc.

Original Russian terms in terminological systems satisfied their semantic function. Moreover, thanks to their domestic origin they not only sounded familiar but also were also understandable to the majority of recipients (Mąkosza-Bogdan 1994: 15). However, in the period

of economic transformation in the 1990s, concepts which had till then been expressed with native familiar-sounding terms were replaced with foreign equivalents; this was because Russians perceived them as obsolete and belonging to the previous economic and political system. New loanwords were considered to better reflect new phenomena in the life of the transforming country. Thus, for example: товарообмен ° бартер (Eng. barter), страхование от потерь ° хеджирование (Eng. hedging), долгосрочное пользование ° лизинг (Eng. leasing), платёжеспособность ° ликвидность (Eng. liquidity), подписка на акции ° андеррайтинг (Eng. underwriting), даритель ° спонсор (Eng. sponsor), управление сбытом ° маркетинг (Eng. marketing), руководитель ° менеджер (Eng. manager), квалификационная оценка ° рейтинг (Eng. rating), посредник ° дилер (Eng. dealer) and others. Since a borrowed verbal sign was more precise in determining concepts (coming from a different reality together with the new phenomenon), it was perceived as more professional and quickly adopted in developing professional circles in Russia. For example, the whole banking system in Russia has changed – as a result, an increasing number of new terminological signs have entered the lexicon of bankers. Among these signs, there are a lot of loan words as well as many calques: дисконт (Eng. discount), овердрафт (Eng. overdraft), овернайт (Eng. overnight), валютный коридор (Eng. currency corridor), мусорные облигации (Eng. junk bonds). In the 1990s it was banks (and bankers), among others, that played a crucial role in introducing new signs of English origin into Russian, which made them a kind of "linguistic window to the market economy" (Bykova 2000: 3). Taking part in the process of the internalization of banking systems involved the adoption of specialized dictionaries and lexicons of banking terms, the majority of which derive from English such as: варрант (Eng. warrant), голосующий траст (Eng. voting trust), дилинг (Eng. dealing), форвард (Eng. forward), рычаговый кредит (Eng. leverage buy-out), андеррайтинг (Eng. underwriting), кредит-скоринг (Eng. credit-scoring) etc.

Psychological factors also need to be considered. The question of users' like or dislike in relation to a language, specifically to its native speakers, is formed under the influence of political, social, ideological, economic and sociological factors, e.g. the adoption of western political mechanisms during the process of transformation in Russia; changes in social sphere, which is connected with adopting principles of liberal economics etc. English was and still is fashionable as is the American lifestyle portrayed in pop culture. Western values and institutions appealed to people from other cultural circles because, in their eyes, they were seen as the bedrock of Western power and wealth (Huntington 2004: 139-140).

In an increasingly inter-linked and globalized world, scientific achievements are quickly adopted throughout the world, thereby technical and scientific progress has had an impact on the development of terminological systems. The crucial element of the technical and scientific revolution is the transfer of information, a process that nowadays has reached an unprecedented level. Due to the increasing pace of life – in most spheres of human activity – the time needed for the creation of a new terminological sign as well as the process of its occurrence into the HL and its adaptation has become ever shorter. Both these factors – the ease of entry of a borrowed term into the HL due to modern channels of communications and the pressure of time – result in the fact that borrowing remains the easiest and the most effective means of sourcing new means of nomination. There is also a third factor; as Philin (1977: 22) points out, nowadays the role of linguists in creating terms is unfortunately marginal because the process of their coining and spreading may sometimes have a spontaneous character, without any scientific (linguistic) approach. Therefore, the job of translators and editors, responsible for the introduction and circulation of new terms, like синдром рассказа сказок (Eng. story telling), головная компания (Eng. headquarter), внутрокружной перевод (Eng. Intra-District Transfer), дистанцирован-

ное финансирование (Eng. arm's length financing) is so important.

The occurrence of English terms representing different fields of science in different languages (including Russian) should come as no surprise. For many years, the United States invested vast sums of money in science and held one of the leading positions. While the countries of the post-Soviet bloc were undergoing transformation and economic crisis in the 1990s, the United States took advantage of the brain drain to recruit scientists from research institutes that were facing decline and lack of funding. Today more emigrants than indigenous Americans work in scientific laboratories in the U.S. (Mary Madeiros Kent 2011). It is not surprising therefore that the vast majority of terms in the Russian language (and sometimes whole terminological systems of advertising, computing, marketing, controlling) are of English origin, including the inventions that these terms define.

Many terms have been incorporated into the Russian language together with the concepts invented by their authors, economists, practitioners and theoreticians. These terms usually occur in texts translated from English or American scientific magazines, which describe new phenomena in Western economies and appear with the name of the author, often in the form of a calque. An example of this which has appeared in the Russian language of economy is *чёрный лебедь* (Eng. *black swan*), together with its notion, from the author Nassim Taleb (2007) in his book *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable*; another term *поиск политической ренты* (Eng. *political rent seeking*) – was coined by Ann Kruger (1974) but the phenomena was mentioned first by Gordon Tullock in 1967; the term *экономика бюрократии* (Eng. *economics of bureaucracy*) was created in the theory of William Arthur Niskanen (1994). In a similar way, many terms from the field of new institutional economics were incorporated into the Russian language. This economic perspective has been developed in the U.S. and nowadays enjoys its heyday, inter alia in Russia, where it has been incorporated into the university curricula and widely published (Stankiewicz 2007: 29). Hence the following examples: *отбор худших* (Eng. *adverse selection*), *обеспечение выполнения прав собственности и контрактов* (Eng. *enforcement*), *моральный риск* (Eng. *moral hazard*), *зависимость от предыдущей траектории развития* (Eng. *path-dependency*), *высшая из функционирующих организаций* (Eng. *supreme going concern*).

The increase in the number of terms of English origin in the role of internationalisms is connected with the appearance of new concepts, objects or phenomena that are similar for many countries. The similarity between words, reflected in the semantic proximity of words and word combinations in modern European languages is based on the development of "international semantics", and as a consequence "the national form of words in many cases reflects international content" (Zhirmunski 1936: 200). The tendency to the internationalization of semantics emerges in the sphere of scientific and technical terminology, which is connected with the progressive integration in different spheres of sciences and technics. The special character of terminology, as a language system expressing special concepts, is because having a 'national' form, is intended to be international in its content, due to the inclusive character of the development principles of science and technology (Volodina 1993:6). A similar tendency can be observed (especially in the last three decades) in the case of economic terminology, which includes more and more internationalisms (which are actually Americanisms) and reflects new phenomena in economic life. As an example, the term *аутсорсинг* (Eng. *outsourcing – outside resource using*) which is in the early stages of adoption into the Russian language.

The unification of terminology makes the reading of specialized texts simpler and results in a more effective and faster exchange of information. The contemporary Russian language belongs to the group of languages that include a large quantity of internationalisms. In 1972, Valery

Akulenko observed (86) that already in the 1930s, the Soviet Union terminology was developing towards internationalization, whereas, at the same time Czechoslovakia tried to find and create domestic equivalents or words based on domestic derivation. The same occurred in Canada – English terminology was replaced by French (Superanskaja et al.1989, 4). The number of terms of foreign origin in the Russian language increased significantly at the turn of the XX and XXI centuries due to changes resulting from political and economic transformation. The Russian language still remains under the influence of the Western European region, with the greatest influence from English and French. The common proto-form in Latin and Greek, connecting internationalisms, allows them to be understood by users of many languages. As a result, a Russian acquainted with the English language can understand, from the context, the meaning of the verb *to transform* (*трансформировать*), *to coordinate* (*координировать*), *to corrupt* (*коррумпировать*), even if they are unaware of the existence of appropriate international English nouns (Akulenko 1972, 35-36).

Two or three decades ago, before the spread of globalization, the difference between borrowings and internationalisms was clearer. Borrowings appear as a result of the contact between two languages, while internationalisms are the result of mutual interference of languages in a much broader perspective, which is reflected in the international coverage of their meaning. Several linguists considered that internationalisms derived from Latin or Greek and were created on words from these two languages; therefore, they are deprived of homeland (Akulenko 1972: 37-38, Budagov 1971: 38). However, from the perspective of the last couple of decades the theory that internationalisms are mostly from words of Greek-Latin origin, has to be verified. Thus, the role of internationalisms (or – according to the terminology introduced by Akulenko – language universals) increasingly fulfill the words of English origin, mainly Americanisms. The majority are units (mainly nouns and their derivatives), which proto-form derive from Greek or Latin. However, most language users will identify them with the English language (in its American version), which is primarily a consequence of non-linguistic factors. Many linguists mentioned the English-American origin of internationalisms, e.g. Leonid Krysin (1998), Margarita Kitajgorodskaja (1996), Halina Rybicka (1976) and others.

4. Linguistic changes as a result of interactions between the language systems

The interaction between language systems, triggered by linguistic and non-linguistic factors, results inter alia in variety of the borrowed forms into the HL[3]. The offered approach considers borrowings to be a much wider phenomenon, not limited to loanwords, which seems much more interesting from the point of view of language functioning and development. Owing to this, it is possible to observe the diversified adaptation mechanisms of the new borrowed units as well as the phenomena accompanying these processes. Therefore, as a result of borrowing the linguistic changes comprise the following units:

- phonetic borrowings – new combinations of sounds which are untypical for the HL, like e.g. *–ейдж* like *блокейдж* (Eng. *blockage*), *–адж* like *бадж* (Eng. *badge*), diphthongs *–ау* like *аутрайт* (Eng. *outright*) or *–ей* like *гринмейл* (Eng. *greenmail*).

- morphological borrowings – morphemes like e.g. suffix *–инг* in words like *дауншифтинг* (Eng. *downshifting*), *баинг* (Eng. *buying*) which becomes productive in the HL word-formation: *костюминг, дачинг, клубинг, отдыхаинг* (slang).

- loanwords – entire verbal units which appear in the HL both in their form and meaning,

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3   Due to the limitations imposed on the size of the article, I have to confine the linguistic changes mainly to semantic loans, actually omitting the problem of phonetical, graphical and morphological adaptation as well as derivational changes in the HL.

e.g. *бизнес* (Eng. business), *аутсайдер* (Eng. outsider), *ноутбук* (Eng. notebook);

• semantic loans – the process of borrowing the semantic meaning from the SL to the already existed word in the HL. It results in broadening the range of its meanings – the already existing verbal sign in the HL (equivalent to the word in the SL) is to a certain extent 'contaminated' with additional meaning, which it didn't have so far. As the examples may serve the stock market terms like *бык* (Eng. *bull*) and *медведь* (Eng. *bear*); the political terms *ястреб* (Eng. *hawk*) and *голубь* (Eng. *dove*), and their derivative adjectives *ястребиная* (*политика, позиция*) (Eng. *hawkish politics*, *position*) and *голубиный* (Eng. *doveish*). Already in existence in the Russian language, the word *банк* (Eng. *bank*) (Witalisz 2007:27) has broadened its meaning and collocability which resulted is new set phrases like *банк данных* (Eng. *databank*), *банк спермы* (Eng. *sperm bank*), *банк крови* (Eng. *blood bank*), *банк-корреспондент* (Eng. *corresponding bank*), *банк-мост* (Eng. *bridge bank*), *банк оболочка* (Eng. *shell-bank*), *банк-спонсор* (Eng. *bank sponsor*), *банк-трейдер* (Eng. *bank-trader*), *банк-эквайер* (Eng. *bank acquirer*).

The adjective *эпический* (Eng. *epic*) exists in Russian with two meanings "of, relating to, or having the characteristics of an epic" (Merriam-Webster) or the bookish meaning "majestically calm", like "speaking with epic tone". Nowadays we can often come across the meaning taken from English "extending beyond the usual or ordinary especially in size or scope" (Merriam-Webster) or extremely large or good (Cambridge dictionary) (e.g. *epic traffic-jams – Сегодня просто эпические пробки в Москве*), which is not considered correct in Russian.

Another example can also be the adjective *драматический* (Eng. *dramatic*): 1. "of or relating to the drama" (Merriam-Webster); 2. suitable to or characteristic of the drama (Merriam-Webster). Because of the influence of English, we can observe an additional meaning, which is not typical for this word in Russian: striking in appearance or effect (e.g. *dramatic grow* – […] *это приведет к драматическому росту цен на услуги связи*) (Merriam-Webster), which is not considered correct in Russian as well.

• word formative calques – the result of translation the structural pattern in SL. They can be: 1) full, like *бритоголовый* (Eng. *skinhead*), *трудоголик* (Eng. *workaholic*), *лизингополучатель* (Eng. *leaseholder*); 2) partial, like *промывание мозгов* (Eng. *brainwash*), *наружка* (Eng. *outdoor*), *постепенцы* (Eng. *gradualists*).

• syntactic or structural calques – especially phrases borrowed from SL by literal translation, like *отмывание денег* (Eng. *money laundering*), *эффект стоптанных башмаков* (Eng. *shoe leather effect*), *ценовое плато* (Eng. *price plateau*). The last term may serve as an example of quite unfortunate copy of the whole structure which sounds awkward in Russian, especially in newspapers headlines: *Цены на жилье в Минске: это дно или плато? Все разговоры о выходе нефти на «новое ценовое плато»*, […]. Now the calque with the element *плато* is also used in the technolect of sport (*тренировочное плато* – Eng. *training plateau*) and medicine (*эффект плато* – Eng. *plateau effect*).

• phrasal calques – translation of idiomatic phrases and set expressions. Some time ago the English phrase: *a skeleton in the cupboard* was translated into Russian as a hidden secret: *семейная тайна*. Now it mostly exists as a calque: *скелет в шкафу*. Similarly, the English phrase *Fat cats*, which was previously translated into Russian as *денежный мешок, толстосум* (*sack with money*), now exists as a calque *жирные коты*.

5. Conclusions

The meaning of a sign reflects the way in which its users perceive this definite element of reality (Witalisz 2007: 29). In order to understand this, the study of linguistic changes in the form of new signs from the perspective of the interaction between language systems contemporary

global phenomena will help to determine the ways in which the borrowings appear in the HL, the reasons for this phenomenon and its consequences as well as the stages of their further functioning in this language.

The interdisciplinary approach to research on borrowings has many supporters among researchers of this language phenomenon. One of the eminent researchers of loanwords in the Russian language, Leonid Krysin, considered that research into the process of language borrowings should be conducted within the context of political, economic, social and cultural conditions – in other words: taking into account non-linguistic factors, on which this process closely depends (Krysin 1968: 9). In turn, according to Uriel Weinreich, a strictly linguistic approach to research into language contacts has to be combined with a non-linguistic approach to research into bilingualism and the phenomena connected with it (Weinreich 1979: 26).

Thus, the principle of considering references, links and applications in the global and civilizational context should be applied in research into special type of signs that are borrowings. It can support the traditional lingual analysis and help to discover the new meanings, new connotations and their roles in different contexts.

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FROM THE SESSION "TO FIRST, TO SECOND, TO THIRD"

SOUNDS, SIGNS AND HEARING: TOWARDS A SEMIOTICS OF THE AUDIBLE FIELD

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Abstract

In what ways the study of sounds and of the audible field allows a reevaluation of questions regarding C. S. Peirce's semiotics and its implications to the philosophy of language? This essay is an attempt to rethink the relationship between the mimetic and the semiotic elements of language through a research on how the process of hearing relates to sounds and meaning. To draw a map of the audible field, one must follow Peirce's triadic logic (Peirce 1975) in a double articulation of Jacques Rancière's three political orders of sensitivity (ethical, poetical and aesthetical; Rancière 2004) with Michel Chion's three ways of hearing (reduced, causal, semantical; Chion 2005). Peirce's three logical categories (firstness, secondness and thirdness) enables numberless triadic combinations between ways of hearing, orders of sensitivity and the signifier's operations. The audible field unfolds itself according to the following partition: a) reduction to the ethical dimension of a strict regulation of its own volume and pitch variations; b) representation according to mimetic criteria of causal attribution of sounds to its supposed sources; c) linearization into a signifying sequence of organized coded sounds. The final result is a semiotic understanding of the audible field as an organized gap between sounds and signs.

1. Introduction: theory of language and audible field

The purpose of this essay is to rethink the relationship between the semiotic and the mimetic elements present in every language through a set of questions raised by the audible field; what do sounds and hearing may tell us about the correlation between language's codification and semantization processes and the different social forms of seeing things and speaking about them?

The traditional duality that has been established between the verbal and the visual fields (or between the order of the images and the order of the words) not only silences the presence of

sounds and the role of hearing in semiotic non-musical processes, but also overlook completely the innumerable possibilities of inter-semiotic translation inherent not only to the verbal discourse's sphere, but also to all kinds of synesthetic phenomena in which words, images and sounds get together in order to provide some sort of (un)codified meaning.

The audible field founds itself fissured into three distinct possibilities of organizing the experience of sounds that are correlated to the three Peircean categories of phenomenological experience: thirdness is correlated to a semantical hearing capable of activating the required *interpretants* for a verbal or musical message auditive decodification; secondness relates to causal hearing inasmuch as sounds can act as traces or indexical marks of the supposed presence of its real or imaginary sources or *objects*, be them visible or not; and firstness correlates to a special mode of hearing in which the listener's attention is reduced to following the free floating amplitude and frequency variations of sounds (its *representamens*) in their random modulation and environmental propagation.

The correspondence between Chion's three modes of hearing and Peirce's three categories shapes semiotics of the audible field that allows for an understanding of the way the generative component of verbal language covers up this field almost entirely through the invocation of semantical hearing. Nonetheless, the audible field presents a high rate of semiotic instability and a synesthetic mimetic potential capable of acquiring unpredictable counter or post-significant properties. When it doesn't find itself completely tied up to orality and verbal meaning, or to the visual field through different synchronic effects, the audible field is the most resilient counter-significant factor of cognitive disruption: a cry is always a condemnation of orality's ability to convey articulated reasonable speech, as well as a dissonance can always be heard as an open stance against musical harmony while noise is often posited as the last desperate possible opposition to a disquieting silence that gaze sometimes upon the visual realm.

Thus, the formulation of a theory of language articulated to the audible field must rely upon a theory of *mimêsis* understood not only as a supplementary element of meaning, but also as a social process that calls for a cultural and political regulation on a supra-semiotic level of analysis. We find the principles of such a theory in the threefold distribution of the sensible conceptualized on Jacques Rancière's *Politics of Aesthetics*. Despite his traditional emphasis in the visual and verbal aspects of the arts and dimensions of language, the audible field can be constantly eavesdropped in Rancière's three modes of distribution of the sensible under the form of a contradiction: unpredictable bodily sounds (moaning, crying, sighing…) are generally considered as noisy destroyers of the rational order brought in by articulated speech through words (and regulated by the arts of oratory and rhetoric), but, when inscribed in a choreographic collective and social order, organized sounds are able to synchronize the citizen's body to the *Polis*' law and offer a political and cultural alternative to theatrical mimicry and its simulacra.

2. Semiotics of the audible field

By criss-crossing Chion's three modes of hearing with Ranciére's three ways of distributing the sensible, we can deepen up and amplify the mapping of the audible field already sketched above through Peirce's semiotics. Applying recursively Rancière's three regimes of distibuting the sensible to Chion's three modes of hearing in a conceptual cross-fade operated by Peirce's three phenomenological categories of existence, we have obtained a semiotic diagram of the fissures of the audible field that can be read either vertically, beginning with the three modes of hearing, or horizontally, through its three distinct audible regimes:

Audible Regimes/ Modes of Hearing	Reduced hearing (1ª) Representamen	Causal hearing (2ª) Object	Semantic hearin (3ª) Interpretant
Ethical Regime of modulation and propagation of sounds (1º).	*Sound Objects*: Variations of frequency, phase and amplitude of sound waves (concrete and electroacoustic music).	*Voice as Object*: *Vocalization, p*honation, intonation (phonoaudiology, psychanalysis).	*Modal music*: Noises, timbres, languages (étiquette, sociology, anthropology).
Poetic-Mimetic Regime of codification and representation of sounds (2º).	*Audio Signals*: Recording, editing and mixing sound tracks (radio, cinema and television).	*Voice as Chant*: Epics, lyrics, dramatics (recitals, poetics).	*Tonal music*: Genre, styles, authors (rythm, melody, harmony).
Aesthetic Regime of dissemination and interpretation of sounds (3º).	*Sound Tracks*: Atmospheres, art installations, sound machines (sound effects and sound design).	*Voice as Speech*: Diction, prosody and accent (linguistics, elocutionary).	*Discourse*: Enunciation, persuasion, interpretation (oratory, rhetoric and hermeneutics).

Table 1: Semio-logics of the audible field.

In the present diagram of the audible field and its fissures, sound and language are articulated around voices, music and a variety of different types of noise that may emanate from a certain ambience – real or imaginary - or not. That is the same threefold conception of the audible field commonly used for any movie sound pre-mixing of its tracks, precisely called by sound mixing engineers as *D, M & E* (Dialogue, Music & Effects). This does not mean that sound for cinema techniques should be necessarily considered as a consolidated new paradigm capable of thinking the audible field in such a satisfactory way that it could eventually replace musical paradigms with all its insufficiencies and anachronisms. It means, rather, that sound movies, as well as the musical avant-garde movements of the 20th century, have not only explored the limits of the audible field in its full Peircean sense, but have also presided over an unprecedented, never heard before process of expansion and dilation of the audible field towards unsuspected aesthetical frontiers; and while sound cinema has built itself around the practice and experience of new possibilities of hearing, the *avant-garde* musical theory provided the knowledge and the concepts, related to this expansion of the audible field, that allows it to be mapped by applying an approach that is simultaneously semiotic and aesthetic.

The most basic layer of reduced hearing is referred to an ethics of modulation and propagation of sounds that encompasses apparently distinct problems and phenomena – from the laws against excessive noise ambience to problems concerning the common right to free public speech. Reduced hearing is the result of a phenomenological reduction of the audible field to its own variations of sound amplitude, frequency and phase, as perceived by a human ear as volume, pitch and placement (spatial localization) information, in a pre-significant layer of sound objects that, considered as pure *quali-signs*, were only uncovered and charted by last century's concrete and electroacoustic musical researches.

Audio signals are sound *representamens* deprived of any codified formal relationship between themselves. As *sin-signs*, they already lead the audible field towards secondness inasmuch as reproduced sounds are always experienced as imaginary doubles indicating a correlated supposed real source or cause. Its particular potential for noise and nuisance (based on its electrical amplification through public speakers) calls for codified practices of modulation, broadcasting and amplified reproduction, and its possible interpretants are the physical properties of a sound considered in itself: frequency and wavelength (*emotive interpretant*), volume sensation

and relative sound intensity (*energetic interpretant*) and its own waveforms analyzed as such (*intelectual interpretant*).

The art of shaping and reshaping sounds through analogic and digital audio signals came to be known in certain cinema circles as *Sound Design*. Although partial and limited, the possibilities of an aestheticized reduced hearing related to the meaningful semiotic functions of Peircean third-ness, are linked to auxiliary signifying roles of high mimetic expressiveness and efficacy played by certain sounds, be them musical or not, in a huge variety of narrative genre and/or staged shows: theatrical plays, movies and animated cartoons tend to offer a wide range of articulated sound effects (from Foley sounds of an almost graphic character to incidental soundtracks, ambiances and sound atmospheres or soundscapes) – that are not organized and presented as an autono-mous code of representation, but as auxiliary *legi-signs* that may be replicated to collaborate with the generation of a meaning mainly conveyed by visual and verbal processes.

Nevertheless, for an expanded semiotics of the audible field, the most important feature com-monly displayed by sound films and sound design techniques is the need to synchronize sound-ing voices to a moving body or lip's image. Far from being only a technical trick or effect, *lip-sync* reveals the central role played by the voice as a privileged object of hearing. Voice is the causal object of human hearing inasmuch as our own physiology of audition demonstrates that our ears were shaped and are sharply tuned in to listen to the whole frequency range or *spectrum* of human voices in the most pitiful acoustic or otherwise perceptive conditions. So, inside and outside cinema, voices are the most important object for the human hearing and not only for cognitive reasons related to Peircean thirdness; and although causal hearing can be related to an infinite number of possible sound objects, its main goal is to relate to a human voice in at least three different ways: iconic, indexical and symbolic.

Voice as an object is linked to pre-significant, ethical questions related to its *iconic* qualities. Its immediate objects refer to the flowing vocal variations (modulation, intonation, vocaliza-tion) studied by phonoaudiology; silence as a sound object can be considered one of its most eloquent audible statements. Its dynamic objects belong to the realm of psychoanalysis and are of course in need of incessant interpretation. "Cries and Whispers" (as in the homonymous In-gmar Bergman movie) can be considered as iconic opposite signs that delineate the borders of this particular field of sound objects.

Voice as chant is the most important sound object regarding the relationship between voice as an object and language. Precisely in-between the mimetic-expressive element of language and a fully codified semiotics, either musical and/or verbal, chant is probably the most universally stable sound object of the audible field, for there is no culture in which the vocal function is not strongly marked by sound indexes related to its timbre and tuning. In the intersection between causal hearing and the possible ways of poetically articulating sounds and voices into language and meaning, the complex phenomenon of orality arises precisely as ethnomusicological lyrics whose immediate object is the singing voice as a synesthetic passage from the audible to the verbal that keeps a strong mimetic-expressive and visual power. Its dynamic objects include the huge variety of lyrical and poetical ways of combining music and speech through verse, and Aristotle's threefold division of the epic, the lyric and the dramatic forms of *mimèsis* is the first intellectual attempt to synthesize their possible *interpretants* into a unified systemic *Poetics*.

Voice as speech is the central object of causal hearing in its third, *symbolic* layer. Its immedi-ate object is language as such, considered as an abstract code, and its dynamic objects are the non-discursive components of speech embedded in the sound materiality of voices. A less se-mantic and more aesthetic mode of hearing a speaking voice does not pay attention to the mean-ing of its discourse and its multiple possible interpretations, but rather focuses on its elocution-

ary, trying to situate, in a socio-cultural level, a given speech through its symbolic, linguistically organized, characteristics: its diction, prosody and accent.

Singing and speaking voices are sound objects that reach the limits of the audible field to intermingle with the visual and verbal fields through language. Metaphors understood as poetic images, for example, are at the core of this process, since they aren't generally pure visual or verbal forms of expression, spreading out mainly through oral (and audible) social resonance. But the audible field is also capable of generating autonomous codes of expression, called in our culture "music". The concept of semantical hearing may thus cope with a semiology of music as well as with a semiology of the verbal languages (or linguistics): understood as "a pure combination of sounds", without any other reference to visual and/or verbal signs, music is an artistic discipline traditionally linked to the influx of a well-established poetic-mimetic regime and under the influence of a highly semantical hearing. The history of music shows how difficult was the process of establishing an autonomous poetics of the audible field, for most of the so-called modal music is still entirely comprised by a specific cultural ethics that provides the audible field its proper forms of expression, generally related to verbally transmitted myths and/or to gesturally (and visually) performed rites. The iconic firstness that primarily informs this kind of music is of course what gives it its ethnic folkloric flavor, while its culturally regulated ethics is what tends to maintain the audible field's strong mimetic sensory qualities in a state of permanent repression. Musical ideas are only Peircean *rhemas* at the first cognitive stage of semantical hearing, still subordinated to a given set of verbal and visual expressions and having its *interpretants* outside the range of the audible field: a certain culture's étiquette and politeness' rules may configure a first set of *emotive interpretants* of a given piece of music: its appropriateness for different social occasions, the type of emotions that cultural convention wants it to supposedly convey, the great or lesser social prestige of a particular style of music in a specific society, etc. A second set of *energetic interpretants* would configure a whole sociology of a specific genre or kind of music, describing as completely as possible its socio-cultural context, depicting its historical development and stating its proper place in the history of music. *Final interpretants* would belong to a general anthropology of music whose main three goals would be to provide a full overview of the history of all types of music, to formulate a general theory of sounds and music (as in Pierre Schaeffer's *Traité des Objets Musicaux*) and to provide a closure to the audible field by demonstrating its final correspondence with the verbal and visual fields.

The obvious impossibility of a such a final interpretant of the audible field demonstrates, *a contrario*, the structural necessity of the fissures and anachronisms between the history of music and the history of literature and of the plastic arts: last creation of the classical 17th century poetic-mimetic régime, tonal music is in the very edge of the aesthetical regime and it is adequately situated, in our diagram, in this intersection. As an autonomous, self-referential system, it offers a representational image of a possible final interpretant of the audible field and, as such, allows for a complete development of pure musical ideas as sound organized propositions or *dici-signs*. There's no doubt that, in pure musical terms, thirdness can be thought of as the triadic relationship between rhythm (1º), melody (2ªª) and harmony (3ªª), and these elements act recursively as music's own internal interpretants, unfolded into its emotive interpretants (rhythms), energetic interpretants (melodies) and intellectual ones (harmonies). Nevertheless, tonal music does not have to be considered, in this diagram, as the final and exclusive interpretant of Peircean's thirdness in the audible field.

Last but not least, semantical hearing's most celebrated cognitive achievement is our ability to follow oral discourse and listen to a given set of *arguments*. This is the most abstract and verbal spellbound layer of the audible field: oratory, rhetorics and hermeneutics are related to

its emotive, energetical and intellectual interpretants. Although highly regulated and controlled in its synesthetic expressive capacity, the mimetic element of language often permeates verbal discourse through numberless correspondences - sensuous and non-sensuous – unforeseen by the code or language in use: homophonies, puns, lapses, cacophonous sounds and undesirable rhymes unveil to us on a daily basis how language, amongst cries, whispers and arguments, resonates and amplifies the ever present fissure that is carved between sounds, signs and hearing.

3. Conclusion: cries, words and whispers

So, what does the diagram of the audible field may tell us about the general relationship between language, sounds and images, as well as about the tension between the mimetic and the semiotic elements in every signifying process? While the first question raises a set of problems related to aesthetics understood as a theory of plastic arts and literary genre, the second one is primarily related to issues regarding the possibility of an epistemological paradigm capable of providing a conceptual synthesis between the theory of language and the theory of knowledge. In the short scope of this article, we will be able only to hint at some preliminary hypotheses concerning these two questions.

For the aesthetical research in general, the main improvement brought by semiotics of the audible field is the conceptual dislocation of the traditional duality between the verbal and the visual fields of expression and its no less traditional description as a pair of complementary opposite (convergent or divergent) poles. Unveiling sounds as the excluded middle of words and images - a theoretical possibility unforeseen by Rancière's aesthetics – allows the crossfading and criss-crossing of all kinds of poetical genre codifications and stylistic models based on a supposed matrixial primacy of the verbal codes over the visual ones (or *vice-versa*) and points towards a better understanding of the synesthetic processes at work in the phenomenon of language from its very start, thus establishing the conceptual foundations for an all-encompassing aesthetical paradigm based on the primacy of mimetic material hybridizations over its subsequent decanting and distillation into poetically codified particular forms of art and expression.

This hypothesis of a semiological primacy of the mimetic element of language over its properly semiotic element can also lead to a complete reshaping of our epistemological prejudices about the relationship between language and thought. This becomes possible because, through the semiotic mapping of the audible field, it gets easier to demonstrate how verbal and musical third-order symbolical codes may arise from the more fluid and sensuous second and first-order signifying articulations already at work when voices and sound objects happen to be heard. The great scientific challenge of finding a conceptual ground to deal with the diachronic problem of the origins and evolution of language as well as with the systemic analysis of its synchronic structures, therefore, can be solved only outside the realm of verbal grammar and structural or transformational linguistics, for its secret lies in kinesthetic and synesthetic layers of intra-semiotic hybridizations that can be historically traced and semiotically described only through a speculative grammar (as in Peirce's semiotics) capable of mapping all possible meaningful articulations between sounds, signs and images.

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THE WEIRD INDEXICALITY OF CLIMATE CHANGE: SIGN INTERPRETATION FROM INSIDE A HYPEROBJECT

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"Has it started yet? How far in are we"?
- Timothy Morton

Abstract

A common example of an indexical sign, a plume of smoke, indexes the physical, proximal existence of fire. The relationship between smoke as a sign and the fire as referent, thus, exemplifies the conventional criteria for indexicality; in contrast, hyperobjects, non-local objects, massively distributed in space and time permeating or encompassing other entities violate these understandings of indexicality and push against the limitations of conventional sign interpretation. With reference to the theories of Charles S. Peirce and the work of Timothy Morton in *Hyperobjects* (2013), and taking climate change as the prime example, this paper explores the difficulties of interpreting hyperobjects when their indices are nonlocal, shifting, and sometimes in direct contradiction. Rhetorical reliance on unidirectional and exclusive indexicality wherein a single plume of smoke points only and unequivocally to the existence of a local fire permits the disavowal of climate change altogether, and serves as the ground for backward and counterproductive climate change policies. If climate change is a fire in need of extinguishing, a re-imagining or reformulation of indexical sign relationships is required to allow for the successful and productive interpretation of its indices and effects. I will explore ways in which indexicality can be made "weird" and expanded to accommodate hyperobjects, entities for which a linear and rigid definition of indexicality permits the conclusion that climate change does not exist.

1. Introduction

Sign interpretation poses one of the greatest obstacles to dealing with climate change, and the problem stems from its status as a *Hyperobject*. Hyperobjects, as coined by Timothy Morton

(2013) in his eponymous book, are non-local objects massively distributed in both space and time, permeating and encompassing other entities. These objects pose an interpretive challenge, as conventional understandings of indexical sign relations—which index presence, and thus ontology—are complicated by hyperobjects' non-local, chronologically/physically extended, and phasing qualities. This paper explores semiotics' possible contribution to the problematic of interpreting climate change indices, bringing Posthuman theory to bear on the science of sign interpretation. I suggest a collective or hyperobjective semiosis, and outline some of the human and non-human coalition required to index climate change. Finally, I compare two examples of climate change indices: one, which leans on the limitations of individual humanity and indexical signs to deny the existence of hyperobjects, and another, which symbolizes a practical collective semiosis of hyperobjects.

2. Peircean indexical signs

Albert Atkin (2005) offers a useful and concise summary of indexicality and recent scholarship on this category of Peircean signs. Indexical signs differ from iconic signs (which have a resemblance-based relation to their object) or symbols (which have a law-like, historical, or arbitrary relation to their object), though the categories almost always overlap to some degree. In order to constitute an indexical sign, there must be some manner of physical connection between the index and its object, which "suggests the presence or existence of the object". And in so doing, indices neither describe nor explain their objects; they "assert nothing" about an object (Atkin 2005: 164), only point to it. As such, the pointing finger is a prime example of an indexical sign: the finger neither describes nor explains the object, only indicates its local, physical existence. Another different example of an index would be that of smoke and fire—the plume of smoke indexes the physical, local presence of a specific conflagration.

Pierce's criteria for indexical signs contains the claim that indices exist independent of, and possess their characteristics irrespective of, any interpreter or imperative to interpret. On a practical level, this criterion allows for indexical signs to include signs not intentionally constructed to signify (Atkin 2005), like unintentional smoke and fire, or the symptoms of disease. But on a surprisingly existential note, this criterion also implies that indexical signs "index" ontology—that they signify by virtue of signaling the actual existence of stuff. There is no smoke without fire: if the index exists, and its connection to its object is proven, then its object exists as well. Pierce also specifies that indices gesture toward a particular and specific ("individual") object. Therefore "if a sign… is an index of many objects, the nature of the index-object relationship means that we treat the collection of objects as an individual." An example would be a hovering helicopter denoting the presence of a traffic jam, not any specific cars within the individual object "traffic jam" (Atkin 2005: 165).

3. Indexicality and climate change

This becomes an interesting problem when the existence of an object's indices is in question. In the case of climate change, studies were commissioned by the U.S. Government into the consequences of CO_2-induced warming as early as the 60s, and scientific consensus as to the deleterious effects of global warming had coalesced by the mid-90s (Oreskes and Conway 2012). Therefore if the indices of climate change exist, and have existed for over 20 years outside of our interpretation of them, why is the existence of climate change still contested to this day, and why does the human collective have such difficulty interpreting its indices?

Indexical sign interpretation is a fundamental of human phenomenological experience; our world itself is composed of indices of presence. Jacob von Uexküll's theory encapsulates this vision of indexicality; an entity's perceived world, or *Umwelt*, is composed of perceptible 'meaning-carrier' objects, which have signification for the individual and constitute the totality of the individual's perceptual world. "Umwelt" is the world as constituted through any single perceiving entity's experience. Any object which has no relevance or significance of the individual constitutes a 'Neutral object' and is excluded from the individual's Umwelt. Uexküll offers examples of 'meaning-carrier' objects which are exclusively local, consisting only of those things which the individual has direct physical or perceptual interaction with, such as rocks, trees, or knives (Uexküll 1982).

Indexical sign interpretation represents the extension of an individual's Umwelt beyond the immediate objects of physical interface. If smoke is perceptible, there exists somewhere a fire which, no matter how remote, may have great significance for the sign's interpreter. Thus my Umwelt consists of those objects of my direct experience, as well as any relevant objects whose existence is indicated to me by indexical signs.

4. Hyperobjects

Semiotics' focus on sign interpretation typically allows semioticians to skirt the issue of ontology, an approach that is perfectly encapsulated by the concept of Umwelt. But Pierce's ontological criterion for indexical signs positions ontology as an unavoidable feature of indexicality, which requires support from a recent strain of ecological philosophy.

Posthumanism is the constellation of disciplines attempting to de-center the human and reduce the anthropocentric nature of western philosophical engagement with the world. One branch of posthumanism, Object-Oriented Ontology, asserts exactly this—that the non-human intrudes so heavily on the human 'foreground' because hyperobjects (and all non-human entities) are autonomous, active agents which exist in their own right. Recent posthuman theory posits a genre of object that disrupts traditional theories of indexicality and worlding. Hyperobjects are objects extended in space and time at a scale nearly unfathomable to humans. They permeate and span vast spatial planes; for example, climate change spans the entire earth, and encompasses human beings, animals, and environments. It is this nonlocal quality that Morton says is indicated by one's inability to "point to" global warming, as it both is and is not in any one place (Morton 2013).

A rising sea level in one Florida town is an index of changing climate, but it is not the only index of climate change; a Californian drought is the antithesis of sea level rise or increased precipitation from hurricanes, and yet in tandem these opposing indices point toward the same object, invisible, yet overlapping and distinct. Hyperobjects such as climate change can be composed by multiple other objects in completely distinct places, and that take opposite and contradicting shapes. For this reason, the task of diagnosing climate change's indices is rife with complications: "this is a crisis that is, by its nature, slow moving and intensely place based. In its early stages, and in between the wrenching disasters, climate is about an early blooming of a particular flower, an unusually thin layer of ice on a lake, the late arrival of a migratory bird" (Klein 2014: 138). Here Naomi Klein describes the weird indexicality of climate change—the disconnect between local, experiential phenomena and the enormous, slow-motion present and future disaster they index. Thus the difficulty of interpreting hyperobjective indices resides in the space between Peirce's concepts of secondness and thirdness, the relationship between the observable real and the knitting of data points into a pattern.

Further complicating the relationship between indices and their respective hyperobjects is their massive chronological extension: 75% of the effects of climate change will manifest in the

next 500 years, meaning that an overwhelming majority of the object in question exists only in the future (Morton 2013). The hyperobject is hidden in space and time, even as it currently enfolds us: consider the soundtrack to the 2010 film *Inception* as a musical analogy for an individual's immersion in hyperobjects. Venturing deeper in levels of reality, rapid-fire human actions take place amid the eerie, stretched trumpet rhythms in Edith Piaf's "*Non, je ne regrette rien,*" transformed into unrecognizable ambient atmospherics by the scalar difference.

5. The psychological problem of hyperobjective perception

What is it like to dwell in the stretched and massive space between trumpet articulations? The epigraph for this paper, taken from Timothy Morton's work of the same name, perfectly encapsulates the interpretive and ecological problem of hyperobjects: "has it started yet? How far in are we?" The question echoes the desperation of interpreting indices from inside an object that can't be seen in its entirety, and expresses the near certainty that the object exists, tempered by the inability to properly perceive its indices and thus its immediate effects, scope, and exact relationship to individual scale. As with the *Inception* soundtrack, it is difficult to determine the nature of the hyperobject, its size, and where one resides within its vast finite chronology.

This scalar problem of indexical perception might be best presented by an American sign: in response to claims that 2014 was the hottest year on record, U.S. Senator Jim Inhofe famously produced an intact snowball on the senate floor as proof that this was not so—in other words, argued that the winter outside the door repudiated climate change. (Bump 2015: n.p.) Though clearly rhetorical, this device is a form of proof—a proper, local, uncomplicated index—that cannot take the stand for climate change. Climate change *cannot* be locally, individually, or entirely indexed, only accepted on faith precisely as a result of the hyperobjective nature of its indices.

See the following methodological example: while I employ the term "Climate Change" to reflect the diverse and conflicting indexicality of hyperobjects, Morton insists on the term "Global Warming". He does so precisely because global warming, the very gradual rise of *average* global temperatures to the current tune of at least 2ºC , is an object that risks being erased or discounted by particularities within it, such as a dip in local temperature in Washington D.C. This example clearly illustrates why we fail to index hyperobjects: their indices are overshadowed by local, perceptible phenomena. Humans are rarely in a position to perceive phenomena like slight statistical changes in local temperature, let alone perceive global averages. The confusing trouble of hyperobjective indices is that, in Morton's ingeniously posthuman phrasing, "we cannot help but fail to see such high-dimensional entities when they are plotted [through direct experience]" (Morton 2013).

6. Climate data and statistical analysis

Climate change and other hyperobjects are indeed available to humans through statistical analysis and aggregated climate data, suggesting a scientific solution to the semiotic problem. Moreover, in their book *Merchants of Doubt*, Naomi Oreskes and Eric Conway (2012) conclude that the key to collectively indexing climate change is for laymen and the media to heed the scientific establishment and peer review process, which can reliably plot global warming. But the scientists and researchers featured in the book failed to realize that their rhetorical opponents formed a *part* of the very object they were observing. A handful of influential, anti-communist scientists spread disinformation on climate change and other post-cold-war public safety issues, and in so doing permitted extractive emissions to increase uninhibited by legislation for another 20 years. A sizeable fraction of the object global climate change consists of the future emissions and

consequences of those emissions directly resulting from these men's actions. So in a crucial way, climate scientists were unable to perceive the entire object they were studying. This anecdote suggests that the issue of hyperobjective semiosis cannot be resolved through statistical and scientific analysis alone.

7. Locality and "sacrifice zones"

As a practical example of locality threatening our perception of hyperobjects, "sacrifice zones" refer to areas of the earth that are permitted to be destroyed in the pursuit of extracting resources demanded under capitalism. For centuries, western nations have offloaded the physical, emotional, and ecological consequences of capitalist consumption on poorer nations, and in so doing maintained a separation from the harmful consequences of their lifestyles (Klein 2014). This stacking of isolated worlds permitted the denial that the nonlocal and the chronologically vast can stick to us, implicate us, and be a piece of us. Sacrifice zones provide the background for the foreground of western neocolonial business-as-usual—for the family vans, the iPads, the rolls of toilet paper. But "like an oil spill… the sacrifice zones created by our collective fossil fuel dependence are creeping and spreading like great shadows over the earth. After two centuries of pretending… We are all in the sacrifice zone now" (Klein 2014: 272). Morton describes this breakdown of foregrounding, of separate worlds, as follows: "hyperobjects are what have brought about the end of the world. Clearly, planet Earth has not exploded. But the concept world is no longer operational, and hyperobjects are what brought about its demise" (Morton 2013: 14). This end of the passive nonhuman background has come about by exposing the inextricability of localities.

8. Umwelt in the age of hyperobjects

The semiotic disruption of passive backgrounding has consequences for the concept of Umwelt. A hyperobject's indices often consist of neutral objects, precisely those objects that are invisible lumps to the Umwelt. For perhaps a majority of people, climate change is now considered a real and present object, and yet the vast majority of its indices continue to constitute neutral objects when considered from the perspective of direct experience. As such, certain highly relevant objects, entities, and signs are systematically omitted from individual phenomenology. The individual, subjective scale—the Umwelt—is perforated and invaded by "neutral" objects taking revenge. Neutral objects—a news article on distant rains, candy wrappers, an awkward conversation about the weather, the lessened presence of bees, snow in June, and all the other scattered and uncanny indices of the hyperobject global climate change—are intruding on our settled world. In this way, hyperobjects are the repudiation of Umwelt. The indices of hyperobjects such as climate change slip into relevance and back out again. These kinds of indices and objects frustrate because they simultaneously are and are not relevant, are and are not present for interpretation.

In *the Natural Contract*, Michel Serres (1995) uses Francisco Goya's painting *Duelo a Garrotazos* to explain the stakes for interpretation of the neutral nonhuman background under conditions of ecological collapse: "Invisible, tacit, reduced to a stage set, [the nonhuman world] is the objective common enemy" of the human rivals (Serres 1995). And while Serres' adversarial metaphor is gleefully anthropomorphic, it makes a necessary point about the consequences of identifying the climate as a "neutral object" or background. A further, Lithuanian artistic example might be the appropriately-titled M.K. Ciurlionis' painting *Finale*. Part of a trio of paintings titled *Sonata Of the Sea*, *Finale* could present the cognitive moment directly following that dramatized in Goya's painting, as the dueling ships come to realize that their vast and placid

stage set has turned against them, and as they finally turn (perhaps even moments too late) to devote attention to—and interpret—the true active nature of their background.

Figure 1. Goya's Duelo a Garrotazos

Figure 2. M.K. Ciurlionis' Finale.

9. Collective semiosis

As regards the interpretation of the indices of global climate change, the failure is a hyperobjective one. Because they are non-local objects, and we are local creatures, the apparatus, which can interpret hyperobjects must be a hyperobject itself: a communal semiosis is required. To use Sebeok's term, the "total perceptual equipment" (Sebeok 1975) for perceiving hyperobjects is most

of humanity. Sign interpretation from "inside" a hyperobject, then, is a mischaracterization—the only hyperobjective semiosis is semiosis by hyperobjects, for hyperobjects. To respond to the threat posed by a hyperobject it must be acknowledged that we are hyperobjective agents and interpreters, and that the object cannot be 'thought' individually. To deny the hyperobjective nature of climate change, to deny that we are inside hyperobjects, or to deny that we (humans, nonhumans, living/nonliving alike) necessarily compose the instrument that can perceive them, is to wait and watch hyperobjects assert themselves, and take revenge on each and every component of the perceptual apparatus. A collective semiosis is required to adequately perceive, interpret, and respond to the threat posed by global climate change.

In *The Natural Contract*, Serres (1995) describes the shape of Europe as a wave, "visible at night from orbit as the biggest galaxy of light on the globe", and claims "the decisive actions are now, massively, those of enormous and dense tectonic plates of humanity" (Serres 1995). I might add that the tectonics of humanity are not those of humanity alone: the lights which index the human hyperobject in Serres' metaphor are infrastructural non-human components of that same object. This "plate" of humanity and nonhumanity serves as the collective sensor for hyperobjects such as climate change.

10. Case study: two American signs

Inhofe's snowball represents a rejection of the collective semiosis this paper advocates: desperately, literally grasping the local as a denial of that which is nonlocal, vast, permeable, and shifting. In contrast, Indigenous North American anti-oil activists recently worked to produce a very different, hyperobjective sign during the course of their fight against oil companies. Members of the Lummi Nation carried a totem pole 1,300 km from Washington State to the Otter Creek Montana home of the Northern Cheyenne, performing ceremonies at each stop on the journey. In so doing they connected the disparate local effects of oil extraction—compromised air and water quality, damage to settler ranchers' and indigenous subsistence alike, and disruption of ancient burial grounds—to the object climate change and to a larger tectonic object that underlies the life that would be threatened (Klein 2014). The Lummi have subsequently extended their symbolic journey as far as Manitoba, Canada, traveling further afield to trace the outline of a hyperobject, recognizing and nurturing historical and geographical connections, and consolidating the scattered indices of the larger object they face and of the object they stand to protect. And in 2016, two years after the publishing of Klein's book, the interpretation and action represented by this vast and communal sign accompanied tangible results; the Lummi nation celebrated the cancelation of a coal export terminal on their land (Tamayo 2016: n.p.).

11. Conclusion

The example of the hyperobjective sign drawn by the Lummi Nation encapsulates the unique stakes and difficulties of theorizing the environment, an endeavor that "is necessarily… an effort to inhabit a difficult space of simultaneous critique and action" (Heise 2016). Moreover, precursor to both critique and action is the process of semiosis or sign interpretation, which thus has consequences for whether successful environmental interventions are identified and carried out. These findings suggest a need for more scholarly enquiry into the ontological implications of semiotic theory, and a need for a semiotics that engages with the unique semiotic challenges of the Anthropocene—problems of scale, chronology, and subjectivity epitomized by the hyperobject climate change.

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13º CONGRESO MUNDIAL DE SEMIÓTICA

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
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CITY, SPACE, ARCHITECTURE

CODES, GRAMMARS, FIGURES: ARCHITECTURE

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Abstract

With a code the designer tries to communicate his own world view, but in a given time, dominant forms are models; they are reproduced, with variations in different spatio-temporal contexts. When conceiving an original project, the designer imagines a network of relations, including virtual, by chaining architectural elements in a new way. Invention is then nothing else than a transformation of existing codes by different operations such as derivation or hybridization of models.

In this presentation, it is so a question of highlighting the economy of forms into architectural codes. We will do that analyzing classical works, in different contexts. But, to deal with the meaning of space as resulting from a project, from a projected modeling as an intention to make sense, this paper address also contemporary forms and processes.

1. Codes and articulations of language

Following works of André Martinet, Luis J. Prieto (1966) proposed to distinguish codes that contain signals which only give notifications, where the signified corresponds to the noetic field, from codes that contain signals giving a significant indication. He then distinguished codes further according to the mechanisms of economy they use, or are governed by, presenting or not presenting the first or second articulation and having a full or partial second articulation. Finally, in the same book, he proposed to distinguish codes containing or not containing mechanisms, which allow the adaptation to circumstances, and application with a certain style.

Because of the double articulation of the language, the human being can express orally infinity of things and emotions by the means of a limited number of sounds and units of meaning. The first articulation set in relation units of language endowed with meaning, words or parts of words; these units are all endowed with a vocal form and a meaning, each one can express something else within a different context.

The first articulation of the language concerns only the function of the language, that is to say it is useful to give an indication. There are some codes that do not present the first articulation (that results of a division in units of expression endowed with meaning), but only the second one, as for example the alphabetical code (the letters do not have any meaning). The second articulation is composed of the *'minima linguistic units'* lacking in meaning allowing the constitution of the words. By the means of certain phonic features, we can obtain a lot of words, every word having a different meaning.

Being a question of words or spaces, the question of the articulation is then fundamental, it is worth for the economy that it brings. It interests us in the constitution of the architectural language where itis directly related to the syntagmatic composition of the meaning units. A work in the artistic creation, as a word in the act of speech, cannot be reduced to the code that has produced it. There are necessarily space and time. Prieto shows that circumstances are indices of space and time that supplement the meaning given by the word in the pragmatic communication. He also shows that in the artistic creation a work of art is an icon of space and time. The manipulation of that icon, like any other act, unveils the implicit; it is registered in a dialectic of being and appearing. It is registered in a space, a dialectic of presence and absence, and in a time, a dialectic of before and after.

1.1. Codes and combinatory

As coordination practice, architecture implements a set of codes, some of which are combinatorial[1]. A combinatorial code provides an economy, with a limited number of terms and rules; it allows conceiving an infinite number of chaining responding to different contexts. The composition of architectural elements (classes of components) follows shape grammar rules and shape style rules. While rules of chaining impose sequences of elements in an architectural composition, associations with others, absent elements, allow in a given place their substitution by others components that are instances coming from the same class of elements or from other classes related by hierarchical inference or by mereological nesting with the first one.

1.2. Codes and catalogs of forms

If, in architectural thought, it is possible recourse to catalogs and assembly of building elements ready to be composed in a project according to assembly rules, some of which are imposed by standards. Architectural creation, when it is effectively architecture, is not limited to this conformation: the normativity of the grammar of composition is deconstructed to be reconstructed by integrating unexpected but possible relationships, virtual, between forms and forces, as well as between statements of state and propositions of transformation.

The architect designs not only with the contemporary forms of human space, but also with the forms inherited from the past and with their process of transmission and reception, their representation, description and narration. He composes with codes that structure human space, not just architectural codes. He questions their prevalence in cultural habitus, their presence in different kinds of memory and their actualization in semiotic practices, rituals, returns and detours

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1   In our researches, we have formalized this kind of codes towards a conception assisted by computational intelligence, parametrizable geometry, logic and computable reasoning (Pellegrino, Jeanneret et al. 2012).

of symbolic forms. Thus, architecture implements a set of codes, several of which are its own, but others do not (Eco 1973). It can therefore proceed by hybridization, decomposition and re-composition of acquired models, dissociation and association of their features to make them the components of new models that it proposes (Pellegrino et al. 2010). In this way, the architectural project, by semiotic interactions and manipulations, integrates models or derives contextual codes.

1.3. Code and generativity

A generativity endowed with a grammar can be found in the passage from "deep" forms to "superficial" forms, in the passage from a "content" that would be universal to an "expression" that would be peculiar in an architectural work. Several researches tried to show that this generativity is to be sought in a formation at several levels of the meaning of the object of architecture; some have sought to grasp it in registers of forms, from tectonic and bioclimatic forms to plastic forms (Levy 2003). It remains to be understood whether this generativity and the grammar which regulates the passages between levels form objects with complementary traits defining themselves at levels of structures that remain included or, on the contrary, if they modify successively and in a loop at each level the set of traits of each object. In one case, the articulation between the planes can remain arbitrary, in the other not, since changes then reverberate from one level to the other, one becoming the "expression" of the "content" of the other.

2. Schemes and design process

Schemes manifest concepts and structure images; even before using a vocabulary and transforming elements of memory, the project thus puts forms into action that allow the architect's intuition to be creative. These forms are first schematic and intuition generalizing, because architectural creation is an intention to unify a world of objects in a project.

			Space Time			
			Scheme of intuition			
	Concept		Presence – Absence Beginning– End		Image	
Induction Abduction			Scheme of action			Assimilation Accommodation
			Movement – Resting Beats -Repetition			
	Sign of form		Scheme of perception		Rule of form	
Paradigmatic			Imprint – trace			Syntagmatic
		Elements	Scheme of composition	Measures		
	Lexicon	Point, line, plan, volume, ..	Course – Position	Regularities, Rythms,...	Syntax	
	Dictionary	Circle, triangle, square, ..		Proportion, Scale, ...	Grammar	
		Module		Frame		

Figure 1. Formalization of the process of architectural design.

This creative process of invention can be used to articulate the architectural composition to a combinatorial form, from geometrical forms to an algebra, and logical forms to a grammar.

3. Algebra vs grammar vs logic

As algebra of shapes, we have the modes of calculation in what Vitruvius defines as basic operations of the project and characteristic of the architectural "proposition". It is not merely the addition or subtraction of forms, with or without entanglement or crossing, nor of simple repetition or serialization (rhythm, eurythmia), or even of multiplication (product, power) or division (proportion), but the true calculation of a combinatorics, of arrangements (taxis) and dispositions (diathesis), of permutations or reversions (symmetry), of associations in tours and detours, allowing to conceive distributions of the parts of projected space into a unified whole.

Algebra	Grammer	Logic
continuities vs discontinuities	juxtapositions vs compositions	resemblances vs differences
number	relation	class

Figure 2. Articulations of architectural shapes.

The process of calculation operates on the discontinuities of forms, the grammar in rule of juxtapositions and permissible compositions and the logic of space classifies them by resemblance and difference. The calculation is not made on static elements, but on the number of discontinuous forms ("primitive" forms of Euclidean geometry, triangles, squares, rectangles, etc.), their placement (displacement, rotation, ...) and their transformation (addition, subtraction, ...)

Figure 3. Geometrical operations.

Figure 4. Algebraic operations.

3.1. Variants and invariants

The variation of a form can be recognized on specific variables, on the order of the calculation logic, classificatory and inferential, as well as on numerical variables, on the order of algebraic, metric and statistical calculation. The algebraic calculation may involve variables of number, position, magnitude. It operates on their:

- Combination, arrangement, ...
- Disposition, permutation, ...
- Measurement, proportion, scale, ...

This being so, we can seek, for a given "language", what are the invariants of the architectural conception; the invariants define a composition scheme that will then be considered as essential, universal in a design universe, whereas the variants will be taken as accidental, depending in particular on the composition in the course of the project and its context. Thus in the composition schemes are rules of imposed measures:

- proportions
- scales
- ...
- symmetries
- rhythms
- …

Figure 5. Composition scheme of Palladian Villas.

These rules relate to the articulations of the project, they are applied between:

- shapes, spaces, boundaries
- shapes, forces, structures
- shapes, structures, openings
- shapes, materials, lights
- shapes, materials, textures.

3.2. Grammar and geometric figures

At a first level of definition, shape grammars regulate the assembly of the elements of a building according to geometrical operations, with invariants and variants allowing the adaptability of the elements with the others in their assembly. At another level, the integration of the various elements in a whole and their organization carry out operations equipped with meaning, such as to support, to cover, to close, to open, to implant,… in a regulated sequence of components such as column, beam, cover, envelope, door, base, …, whose assembly is not only geometrical, nor even physics or esthetics, but answers to uses and shapes, values and schemes.The schemes are prepending, upstream of grammars of form and of the articulation of these grammars with figures and geometrical operations. Geometric figures such as the square, the rectangle, the triangle or the circle …

Figure 6. Geometric figures.

… cannot have architectural meaning if they are not chained in a consecrated phrase:

Figure 7. Architectural chaining.

The meaning comes from this chaining. And the very notion of grammar refers to rules of concatenation (in the verbal language: subject-verb-complement, etc.). For verbal language they are grammatical functions. In architecture, one can associate with any combinationof forms one or the other of the following grammatical functions:

- to cover (protect, isolate, seal, ...)
- to support (in traction, in compression, ...)
- to bind (found, fix, chain, ...)
- to close (wrap, seal, grout, ...)
- to open (drill, connect, orient on, ...)

This gives, for example, the sole gives ground to the base, the base carries the slab, the shaft supports the capital and the capital carries the entablature, the wall surrounds the building, the bay opens the room on the garden, … And we can find for each architecture specific rules of chaining these grammatical functions (and not only architectural elements having a geometric shape, proportions, symmetries, etc.).

3.2.1.   Grammar, prescriptive and generative rules

As far as a shape grammar is concerned, it is a prescriptive as well as a generative grammar that consists in limiting the composition of the project to some of the shapes that a given algebra makes possible, by giving them a figurative foundation, anthropological as well as architectural; which removes from them the more or less superficial side that the calculation and the creative imagination of figural shapes have been able to give them. This grammar imposes not only a selection among the cut-outs and combinations that the calculation of shapes establishes, but also an attribution of value to some of the relations and the characteristics of shapes that result (good form, good proportion,…) rather than to others. The "shape grammars" that architecture can implement use one or more combinatorics, and they dispose, displace and transform "primitive" forms of a geometry, first Euclidean, then algebraic, and articulate it with logic of space defined not only by a semantic classification, but also by a reasoning, inferences (deduction, abduction, induction) that constitute a logic of propositions, a logic that the very process of the project implements.

3.2.2.   Grammar and syntax

The syntax consists precisely in that the discontinuities which delimit the continuous objects of the project, different or similar, do not give rise to a simple juxtaposition of objects but to compositions of set or hierarchical subsets; it does so not only by ordering them in a unifying architectural device, but also by adding elements of transition, jointure and ligature. The grammar rules the remarkable syntagmatic groupings, endowed with meaning (e.g. base, shaft, capital, …, pedestal, column, entablature, …), as it constrains their association and their possible substitution in different places and at different levels of architectural composition, according to construction standards (column * entablature, pole * beam, …) or style (Doric, Ionian, Corinthian, …). Obviously, when there is an invention of new rules, the normative weight of the old is shaken, a new architecture thus asserts itself in opposition; whereas when it comes to imitation or transposition, it is rather old rules that are interpreted in a new way.

3.2.3. Shape grammars and manipulation of tropes, relations between parts and whole

However, if shape grammars are prescriptive, constraining choices, imposing constraints in a computation that can be algorithmic, coupled with creative logics, they are the place of tropical manipulation and persuasive innovation. Playing on analogical derivation, metonymic nesting, and metaphorical displacement, this manipulation produces an anamorphosis, a reduction or an amplification of the meaning. The relations, which are found requalified here, are redefined by operations concerning the relations between parts as well as between the parts and the whole of the composition. They are not only places of discontinuities, of connection and classification, but also of quantification, transport and comparison, in which the singular can be repeated without multiplying, and elsewhere can find itself in the here, the opposite can mean its inverse and the same can be another.

Figure 8. Generation of variants by algebra and shape grammar, by E. P. Jeanneret following F. L. Wright.

Figure 9. Peter Eisenman, Sketches for the House VI, Cornwall, 1972-73.

Figure 10. Generation of a composition scheme with Palladian algebra and grammar by P. Pellegrino.

Figure 11. Transformation grammar by derivation of a composition scheme, by P. Pellegrino following Palladio.

4. Tropes, paradigmatic association and syntagmatic context

Comprising a veritable tropematic, the manipulation of these relationships will seek not only within a syntagmatic context but also outside of this context, in paradigmatic associations of forms that can make sense. The first is to transform the context of the project into a co-text, to

unify it by transforming it into an object of the project. Thus the place becomes an architectural space, the ground an implantation, the light an orientation, …, but also history a reference, and the present an accident.

Whether in space or in time, this transformation, which is a transformation which produces meaning, decomposes and recomposes sets of subsets of parts of the project, substitutes and associates forms between them, puts them in correspondence beyond their presence and returns them to each other as echo.

This association can be defined at several levels of the project process, particularly at the level of the relations between shape and scheme, to project a concept, at that of the relations between form and figure in order to produce a meaning, as at that of the relations between form and forces to ensure an equilibrium, or that of the relations between form and function, in order to permit a use. At each of these levels, the instances corresponding to default values of the architectural codes may thus be recalled and replaced by others providing sufficient qualities for the object to be recognized as an instance of an architectural type conforming to the code of the projected architectural "language".

4.1. Style and context

An architect needs tools to formalize his style. The first tool is constituted of the context. The context will be not only interpreted by the architect in the geometrical form of a diagram, but also manifested into rhetorical figures. The physical data of the context impose constraints; it is for example a question of orientation, of the quality and of the quantity of light in the environment of the building, or also of the temperature.At the starting point, there are desires and needs that have to be satisfied in the respect of the habits and customs of a certain culture. However, without a form that opposes to constraints and gives specific responses, there is no economy possible in the architectural project, no meaning.

A second tool, useful to draw a form, is so constituted of the various geometric variables of the architectural language that, following grammatical composition rules, allows the transition from the form of the container into the form of the content of the project, from the diagram into the plan .

A third tool, useful to the style of the architect, is made of the tropes of the architectural rhetoric. He finds them by transcribing the geometrical language into rhetorical figures. In architecture, rhetorical figures allow to add meaning to a geometric assembling. Certain figures result very directly from geometric operations by which elements are set in stable relations articulating the parts and the whole.

The architect uses these tools notably by recognizing into the context regularities and module, frame and figures that have remarkable proportions and transposes these at the level of the elements composing the content of the set they compose. Thus, he designs a stable architectural composition, that is to say a composition that becomes a common denominator to different projects.

4.2. The classical semiotic order

Regardless of how the context acted on the development of form, Tzonis (1983) described the formal rules of classical architecture. According to him, three formal dimensions enter into any conception of a classical architecture. First, a 'taxis' "conceived as a normative scheme structuring the architectural space into a set of elements", splitting the building into units and sections of composition. Every classic taxis is a tripartite schema that has a starting unit, a central unit, and a final unit (which is the diagram on the right below in which a cross is cut out, the diagram on the left is the most classic expression and simple of a taxis).

Figure 12. Basic taxis. In A. Tzonis et al. 1983, Le clasicisme en architecture, fr. transl. 1985, Dunod, Paris.

From this scheme of the taxis, composed of five elements, a number of operations can introduce variations and complexify a composition at the outset very simple. Taxis of different shapes are then obtained.

| The suppression | The combination | The addition | The substitution |

Figure 13. Examples of operations to realize variations of the basic taxis. In A. Tzonis et al. 1983, Le clasicisme en architecture, fr.transl. 1985, Dunod, Paris.

The second invariant formal dimension in classical language concerns genres; they are conceived as normative schemas governing family relations among the architectural elements that animate the taxis" (Tzonis 1983). Genres (the equivalent of orders) "serve to fill the pre-ordered scheme according to the principle of taxis". They are defined by the proportions on the one hand and by the ornaments on the other hand. In classical architecture, different genres can coexist in the same work. The genres follow each other according to a modulation operation; one goes from one to the other, in a vertical development, according to rules relating to their solidity. "What is common to genres is their division into elements, their formal framework, and their respect for the taxis that articulates and splits all these elements".

In accordance with the principle of tripartition, which governs all aspects of a classical architectural composition, all types include a pedestal, a column and a beam, or a base, a shaft and a capital. Each element is redivided into three to the smallest element. The two main genres are Doric and Ionic, the Corinthian is an order derived from the first. The oldest is the Doric, it is willing to lend a male character because of its robust proportions, while the ionic would be of a feminine nature, with its slender and slim proportions and its decor.

| Tuscan | Doric | Ionic | Corinthian | Composite |

Figure 14. The five orders according to Andrea Palladio. In A. Palladio, 1566, I quattrolibri dell' architettura, transl. from the original 1980, ed. Arthaud, Paris

The module of the intercolumnation is in direct relation with that of the diameter of the column, which is repeated a prescribed number of times. Palladio (1570) writes that "it is necessary to ensure that the intersections, or empty spaces, are in proportion and in correspondence with the columns, because, if we leave too much emptiness between small columns, we make them lose a lot of their appearance, the great quantity of air which is in these spaces diminishing notably their size; likewise, on the contrary, giving too little distance between large columns, this narrowness and lack of space will make them appear swollen and without grace". The size of the intercolumnation thus depends on the orders and refers to the height of the column.

On the left: symmetric equilibrium of the parts.

Figure 15. . Schemes of a case of symmetry and one of asymmetry P. Pellegrino et al. 2012, Modelization of the project and formalization of architectural knowledge, Craal, Geneva.

Finally, the third invariant formal dimension is symmetry; it "represents the normative pattern that governs the relationships between genres in the same building, or between genres and taxis" (Pellegrino et al. 2012). Symmetry is a particular case of the moment of inertia, more precisely the case where the parts are in a perfect equilibrium ratio because each one has an equivalent weight. Thus, in a classical architecture, the way to invest a taxis can only be done in a symmetrical articulation of the parts in the whole.

4.3. Figurative patterns

Figurative patterns are composed as sets of rhetorical tropes. Whether by parallelism or by analogy, by metaphor or by synecdoche, the motif aims to strengthen the through ratios of proportion and relationships of equivalence between components, which at the first glance are different. Figurative patterns may also contribute to the meaning of the work by flouting its coherence, whereupon they bring to the very core of the composition.

Following path of polarities, contrast and oxymoron set face to face, or in opposition, similar or dissimilar combinations. *Abruptio* or *aposiopesis* disaccentuates or interrupts rhythmical motif by linking or merging it with another. Sooner or later, the effect of these tropes in inviting discussion of the coherence of the normal relationships between components invariably strengthens the overall composition of the building. Displacements, elisions, non-accentuations or breaks clash with the norms lie down, but have the reverse effect: the complex sequences of the composition are strengthened by the attention thus drawn to them.

Although oxymoron is a violation of the norm, its application always ends up reinforcing the cohesion of the whole. This is equally true of all the other architectural tropes which disturb a strict order only in appearance; a deeper analysis shows that these figures all aim at reinforcing the coherence of the sequences of classical architecture.

Figure 16. Generation by rotation and adjunction, by E. P. Jeanneret 2007, analyzing Palladian Villas.

Figure 17. Variations of figurative patterns and rhythmical accents in Palladio's villas, responding to different synchronic contexts, Palladio, 1566, I Quattro libri dell' architettura

5. Transposition and transformation grammar - Case study

The Renaissance records the ancient monuments and charts their composition patterns in the design of new buildings. As it has several sources, it is for it to find a synthesis of its different patterns. This is what Alberti undertakes by trying to grasp in each building that he analyzes "what principles he holds, in what parts he consists and delimits himself", an overall reason for his design.Seeking to relate the composition of the particular building to a universal code, Alberti defines in the 15th century, in the *De re aedificatoria* (1485), the rules of classical language and applies them to all works. Codifying the composition, he wants to order it on a global scale according to a mode defined by a combinatory and successive interlocking and a synthesis of clear and distinct forms.

Figure 18. L. B. Alberti 1485, Rotunda Plan, illustrating the De re aedificatoria. Sketching and synthesis of the plan of the Holy Sepulcre in Jerusalem and of the Isola in Hadrian's Villa.

Figure 19. L. B. Alberti 1485, Gallery plan illustrating the De re aedificatoria. By homeomorphism, the same synthesis, with resumption of the octagons of the Baptistery of Florence and the central plan of the San Stefano Rotondotempietto in Roma

Figure 20. Typology of Greek temples, 4th century B. C. Variations of the device of the colonnades around square, rectangular or circular planes.

Figure 21. Pantheon. Roma, 2nd century, transformation by transposition and hybridization, Fragmentation and juxtaposition of consecrated types.

Figure 22. Santa Costanza, Roma, 4th century, transformation by splitting the envelope and inversion - inside and outside - of the position of the colonnade.

Figure 23. San Stefano, Roma, fifth century, transformation by cross-processing of volumes inclusion and inter-section of type.

Figure 24. St. Irene, Constantinople, 4th century, transformation by hybridization of the basilical plane, crossing of centered circular and oriented linear plane.

Figure 25. Hagia Sophia, Constantinople, 6th century transformation by splitting into symmetry, reversal of the Sainte Irene plan and carrying arches on the outside.

Figure 26. Byzantine architecture, Panagia, Crete, 13th century, transformation by imbrication of the circular plane centered into the plane in cross by symmetry on four sides, vertical accentuation.

Figure 27. Antonio da San Gallo he Giovane, San Egi-dio, Cellere (Viterbo) 1520, transformation by trans-position and derivation, balance of masses, horizon-tal vertical, and impression of classic mode natures.

Figure 28. Villa Almerico, Rotonda, Palladio, Vicenza, 1556, transformation by extension and proportionate plan and volumes, measurement by rotation of the geometric mean of the sides, postponement of a base with stairs and classical colonnade in symmetry on four sides.

6. Synthesis

There are therefore several sets of grammars and rules that complement each other, generative and transformational: generative, crossing the various levels of articulation of the codes of the utterance, they govern the decomposition of the project into basic elements and its recomposition according to the same principle to generate a whole with a unifying form; transformational, from a constituted totality, retaining some of the invariants and variants constituting the code that governs it, redefining the dependence or independence of the selected form variables, their crossing and the transformations that may emerge, by derivation or opposition, extension or distortion, catharsis or hybridization.

On these games of generation and transformation, as composition or decomposition and variance or invariance, moving some of the parts of the projected building and their relations to the whole that it forms, rhetorical manipulations can operate to strengthen or reduce their imprinting power. The lines, surfaces and volumes that stand out on the profile of the projected building thus draw figures that have meaning in relation to other buildings taken as references for the project, transposed either synchronously in distinct geographical context, or diachronic at other epoch, tracing thus a virtual semiotics of space and time of architecture.

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CONNECTING SEMIOTICS AND CULTURAL GEOGRAPHY: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERPRETATIONS OF MONUMENTS AND MEMORIALS

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Abstract

Monuments and memorials are built forms with commemorative as well as political functions. They articulate selective historical narratives, focusing attention on events and individuals that are preferred by elites, while obliterating what is uncomfortable for them. Articulating historical narratives, monuments can set cultural and political agendas. Thus, elites design monuments striving to reinforce their political power and to legitimise dominant dynamics of inclusion and exclusion. Nevertheless, individuals differently interpret and use monuments in ways elites might have never envisioned.

This paper claims that advancing the understanding of the connections between semiotics and cultural geography can be useful to explore how the built environment conveys meanings and how these meanings are variously interpreted at societal levels. To do so, this chapter develops a theoretical framework that conceives the interpretations of monuments and memorials as depending on three interplays: a) between the material, symbolic and political dimensions; b) between designers and users; and c) between monuments, the cultural context and the built environment.

These ideas are explored through a comparative analysis of two monuments in Estonia: the Victory Column, a war memorial in Tallinn, and the so-called "Kissing Students", a fountain-sculpture complex in Tartu.

1. Introduction

Contemporary nation states create and often privilege elites. As part of the state, urban planning can be used to serve the needs of national elites (Yiftachel 1998). This is also the case for the

design of monuments and memorials. National elites have more power and resources to erect monuments and thus to present and reproduce their political and cultural meanings in space (Dwyer 2002: 32; Till 2003: 297). Hence, national elites use monuments as tools to legitimate the primacy of their political power and to set their political agendas.

This is particularly evident in transitional societies associated with regime change (Grava 1993: 19-10). In transitional societies, recently formed elites spend significant resources to shape a society's collective meanings and to establish concepts of nation in accordance with current political conditions. In this context, monuments and memorials are often used as tools to shape specific attitudes toward the past and thus to create specific future expectations (Whelan 2002; Tamm 2013; Till 2003). Nevertheless, individuals differently interpret and use monuments in ways elites might have never envisioned.

This paper shows how a connection between analytical frames developed in the field of semiotics and cultural geography could contribute to a better understanding of the multiple interpretations of monuments and memorials in regime change. Section 2 identifies two key limitations of the geographical and the semiotic literature on monuments and memorials. Section 3 proposes a theory to overcome these limitations. Section 4 highlights the rationale to analyse Estonian monuments and memorials as case studies. Section 5 explains the rationale for a multi-method approach using interviews, observations and the investigation of documents. Finally, Section 6 introduces the context for a comparative analysis between two monuments in Estonia.

2. Two limitations of the geographical and the semiotic perspectives on monuments and memorials

Monuments and memorials have attracted a growing interest in geography and semiotics. Since the mid-1980s, cultural geography has conceptualised landscape as a construction to perpetuate social order and power relations (e.g. Cosgrove 1984). Despite using different perspectives, most cultural geographers converge on two assumptions: landscape has power and it can be seen as a text that communicates meanings (Boogart II 2001: 39). These assumptions have been extended to the built environment as the result of human actions on the "primeval" landscape (Duncan 1990).

In this context, a great deal of geographical research has assessed the role of monuments in perpetuating cultural norms, social order and power relations (Wagner-Pacifici and Schwartz 1991; Hershkovitz 1993; Johnson 1995; Peet 1996; Withers 1996; Atkinson and Cosgrove 1998; Osborne 1998; Dwyer 2000; Whelan 2002; Hay et al. 2004; Benton-Short 2006). This research has empirically focused on different built forms and urban areas: monumental buildings, public statues, squares, memorial gardens, civic precincts, war memorials and so on. Moreover, it has concentrated on a vast range of geographical locations and time periods. Despite such variety in empirical analysis, this geographical research has based on two common assumptions: first, monuments play an important role in the definition of a uniform national memory and identity; second, monuments are tools to legitimise and reinforce political power. These assumptions can be seen as interdependent: in practice, the national politics of memory and identity embodied in monuments can legitimise and reinforce political power.

Some cultural geographers have recognised that unexpected practices could challenge the meanings of monuments and memorials as intended by elite (Hershkovitz 1993; Atkinson and Cosgrove 1998). Nevertheless, geographical research has mostly focused on the elite intentions.

While national elites design monuments to convey dominant meanings, their interpretations are never enclosed once and for all. Once erected, monuments become "social property" (Hershkovitz 1993: 397) and thus they "can be used, reworked and reinterpreted in ways that

are different from, or indeed contradictory to, the intentions of those who had them installed"
(Hay et al. 2004: 204). Monuments and memorials embody the agency of generations and assume different functions in different time periods. Monuments legitimising elite power can turn into sites of resistant political practice (Hershkovitz 1993; Whelan 2002; Benton-Short 2006). For example, after the fall of Communism, popular movements suddenly used Communist monuments to demonstrate against the same regime that installed them. In other cases, monuments sacred for an elite become the object of scorn and ridicule (Atkinson and Cosgrove 1998). In less spectacular way, monuments of a bygone era can turn into neutral urban landmarks.

Cultural geographers provided a methodological basis to understand the ways in which monuments could reproduce social order and reinforce political power. Moreover, they have developed tools for unveiling the geographies of power embodied in monuments and memorials. Nevertheless, the geographical approach to monuments has grounded itself on two key limitations:

1. There has been no extended discussion of how the material and symbolic levels of monuments and memorials actually convey political meanings and thus of how they can effectively reinforce political power.

2. Little attention has been paid to how monuments and memorials are interpreted at the societal level.

By inviting questions on readership, semiotics has sought to overcome the restricted focus on the designers' intentions that has characterised the geographical approach. Inspired by the debate around the conflation between memory, history and place (e.g. Nora 1989), semiotics has begun to analyse places of memory as communicative devices to promote selective "discourses on the past" (Violi 2014: 11, my trans.). Discourses on the past always present a "partial vision" focusing attention on selective histories while concealing others (Eco 1976: 289-290). As a consequence, discourses on the past can affect present and future identity as well as the ways in which individuals represent themselves and relate to each other (Violi 2014: 18).

Several semiotic analyses have aimed to explain how monuments and memorials can establish specific understandings of the past addressing the effects a given material representation of memory has had at the societal level (Pezzini 2006; Sozzi 2012; Abousnnouga and Machin 2013). Despite the efforts to focus attention on readerships, the key limitations identified in the geographical perspective persist in the semiotic analysis of monuments and memorials. In fact, semiotics has rarely discussed how the materiality of monuments and memorials actually conveys political messages and thus reinforce political power. Moreover, despite the efforts to focus attention on the readership, semiotic analysis of monuments and memorials has overlooked the interpretations of monuments and memorials at societal levels.

3. A holistic perspective on meaning-making of monuments and memorials

As seen in the section above, the geographical and semiotic perspectives on monuments have grounded themselves on two distinctions: 1) between the material, symbolic and political dimensions and 2) between designers and users. This section aims to overcome these distinctions connecting analytical frames developed in the fields of semiotics and cultural geography. To do so, it develops a theoretical framework that conceives the interpretations of monuments as depending on three interplays: a) between the material, symbolic and political dimensions; b) between designers and users; and c) between monuments, the cultural context and the built environment.

As for a), the material, symbolic and political dimensions of monuments and memorials always function together and influence each other through continuous mediations. These dimensions equally contribute to the creation and development of a better understanding of how

the meanings of monuments and memorials are constructed and negotiated. There is the need for a theory that conceives the material, symbolic and political dimensions as interacting in the interpretation of monuments.

As for the interplay between designers and users, the meanings of monuments and memorials originate at the intersection between the designers' and the users' interpretations. A set of "semiotic resources" is available to designers to entice users along specific interpretations of monuments (Abousnnouga and Machin 2013: 57). Nevertheless, not all users conform to the designers' stated intentions. Unforeseen interpretations and practices thus play a critical role in the meaning-making of monuments. As for textual interpretation (Eco 1990: 50), the interpretation of monuments lays on an intermediate position between the designers' intended meanings and the users' interpretations. Hence, there is the need for a theory that conceives the interpretations of monuments and memorials as originating at the intersection between designers and users.

As for c), monuments and memorials cannot be analysed separately from the cultural context. Culture can mould the designers' and the users' interpretations and even influence actions and interactions within the space of monuments. In turn, monuments convey cultural meanings in space contributing to the shaping and reshaping of culture. Finally, monuments and memorials cannot be analysed separately from their interrelations with the surrounding built environment. As texts reinterpret other texts (Eco 1984: 68), newly erected monuments actively affect the interpretation of the existing built environment. Post-structural geography has used the term "intertextuality" to describe the relations that built forms establish between them (Duncan 1990: 22-23).

The conceptual scheme below symbolically represents the three interplays here identified (fig. 1). The scheme presumes that a relationship is established between the material, symbolic and the political dimensions of monuments and memorials. An arrow links the two rectangles representing the terms "designers" and "users" to visualise their interaction. A polygon visually representing the term "culture" is added at the top of the scheme. The dashed oval including monuments and memorials symbolically represents the built environment.

Figure 1. The theoretical framework conceiving the interplays a) between the material, symbolic and political dimensions; b) between designers and users; and c) between monuments, the cultural context and the built environment

4. Identifying the case study: the multiple interpretations of monuments in Estonia

A case study research strategy is used to develop the theoretical framework identified in the previous section (Yin 2009). The selected case studies analyse the multiple interpretations of two monuments in Estonia: the War of Independence Victory Column in Tallinn (hence, the Victory Column) and the so-called "Kissing Students" in Tartu.

Estonia restored its independence from the Soviet Union on 20 August 1991. Ever since, a cultural reinvention of the post-Soviet built environment has evolved through two distinct but concurrent practices: the redesign of the inherited built environment created by the Soviets and the simultaneous establishment of a new built environment reflecting the needs of post-Soviet culture and society. Cultural reinvention is the process of filling the built environment with specific cultural meanings through practices of redesign, reconstruction, restoration, relocation and removal.

The Estonian EU and NATO memberships in 2004 provided opportunities to gain symbolic capital through the redesign of the built environment and the erection of new monuments and memorials (Ehala 2009: 152). Hence, Estonian elites have taken various initiatives to marginalise Soviet monuments and memorials while establishing new monuments signifying specific future expectations. In Estonia, the marginalisation of Soviet monuments and memorials and the erection of new ones have often sparked broad debates and resulted in civil disorder. For example, the 2007 relocation of a memorial to the Soviet Army in Tallinn – the so-called Bronze Soldier – resulted in two nights of disorders, during which a 20-year-old Russian was killed.

The controversies over monuments and memorials have been so intense that scholars have used the terms "War of Monuments" or similar terms to refer to a series of small-scale conflicts over the interpretations of monuments and memorials starting from the early 2000s (e.g. Pääbo 2008: 5; Smith 2008: 419; Bruggemann and Kasekamp 2008). For this reason, Estonia was selected as a relevant case to address the multiple interpretations of monuments and memorials.

5. The methodological framework for the study of the multiple interpretations of monuments in Estonia

The analysis of the selected monuments and their multiple interpretations is based on data collected during fieldwork in Estonia, between February and October 2015. The data were collected through a multi-method approach using interviews, observations and the investigation of documents.

The investigation of planning documents provided an account of the researched monuments as envisioned by their designers. Documents available in English were collected through visits at archives and libraries.

The analysis of the users' interpretations, actions and interactions was based on primary data collected through interviews and observations. Semi-structured interviews aimed to collect a range of interpretations on the researched monuments. Interview data derived from sixteen interviews with respondents that resided in Estonia their entire life or that had only left Estonia temporarily. Respondents varied in terms of ethnic origins, age, gender, education and profession.

A suitable balance of Estonians and Russophones was guaranteed: eight respondents were Estonians and eight belonged to the Russophone community. The term "Russophones" refers to Russian speakers that are in possession of Estonian citizenship, including ethnic communities that speak Russian as first language and do not define their ethnic identity as "Estonian". After Estonia regained independence, the Russophone community suffered status decline; conversely, Estonians found new economic opportunities and political power (Ehala 2009: 147).

In Estonia, the relations between Estonians and Russophones have not always been peaceful and this antagonism has often resulted in conflicts over the interpretations of memorials.

Participant observations concentrated on the actions and interactions of users who daily cross and use the space of the monuments. Observations were arranged at different times of the day and on different days of the week, including weekends and public holidays. They were carried out during the day and occasionally at night, under range of environmental conditions.

6. Introducing the context for the comparative analysis between the Victory Column and the Kissing Students

The selected case studies analyse the multiple interpretations of the Victory Column (fig. 2) and the Kissing Students (fig. 3). These monuments have different appearance, but both have contributed to create a built environment in accordance with the current political and cultural agendas of the Estonian elites. Besides this, the rationale for comparing these monuments is twofold: first, they show different ways of conveying cultural and political meanings; second, they present different ways in which these national politics are interpreted at societal levels. This section presents and discusses the preliminary findings of the analysed monuments.

Figure 2. The War of Independence Victory Column. Picture taken 5.10.2015.

Figure 3. The Kissing Students. Picture taken 1.6.2015.

6.1. The Victory Column of Tallinn, a memorial to promote an ideological understanding of the past for a select audience

The Victory Column is a large, column-shape memorial erected in Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, in 2009. It commemorates those who served in a war against Soviet Russia and Baltic German forces between 1918 and 1920. The war ended with the first recognition of Estonia as an independent state. For this reason, Estonians refer to this war as the "War of Independence" (in Estonian *Vabadussõda*) and link it with ideals of freedom and sovereignty. The memorial stands in Freedom Square, a large square on the southern edge of Tallinn's Old Town. Freedom Square has been used as an arena where the different regimes that ruled Estonia have tried to assert themselves via architecture, monuments and public rituals (Kalm 2014).

The function of the Victory Column has gone beyond commemoration. The memorial has helped to reflect and sustain the cultural and political agendas of the Estonian Government that took the initiative for erecting it. In particular, it has aimed at putting an end to the controversies over the interpretations of monuments that characterised Estonia from the early 2000s and, in consequence, at turning a new page in the construction of the national memory and identity.

However, the significance the Victory Column has assumed for the Estonian political elite has not been widely recognised at non-elite levels. During interviews, Tallinn citizens expressed disapproval of the material and the symbolic design of the memorial. Its iconography featuring a military decoration has created discontent due to resemblance with totalitarian aesthetics. This military iconography is highly hermetic and not many users knew what it represent - visitors as well as Estonian citizens themselves.

Criticism also regarded the modern-looking design of the Victory Column as inappropriate and disconnected from the adjacent medieval built environment of Tallinn's Old Town. Moreover, respondents expressed discontent also toward its size, too resonating and grandiose to commemorate ideals of freedom.

The Victory Column does not facilitate comfortable interactions. Raised up on an elevated platform, users remain literally at the feet of the memorial. Consistent with this, it is very rare that users climb the staircase to approach the memorial. Observations did not register any commemorative practice around the memorial, if not during the formal commemorations periodically arranged by the Estonian Government and its affiliates. For the rest of the year, the memorial attracts only unexpected practices that are different from those intended by its designers: due to flat ground and sharp curbs, skaters and bikers use the space of the memorial for their tricks during the warmer weather.

6.2 The Kissing Students of Tartu, a fountain-sculpture to promote an everyday narrative for the general public

The so-called "Kissing Students" is a circular fountain with a sculpture featuring two kissing young people under an umbrella. The statue was unveiled in 1998 to improve the appearance of Town Hall Square, the central square of Tartu. The several regimes that ruled Tartu have used the present-day Town Hall Square as the seat of government and venue for public rituals and celebrations of days of national and local importance.

The Kissing Students does not openly express direct political purposes. Avoiding confrontational political messages has been a typical cultural policy of post-Soviet Estonia, which has been largely used in the context of the transition to democracy. In Tartu, the general aim of this policy has been to establish a built environment free from direct political meanings and not directly related to the political storm characterising Estonia throughout the 20th century.

Nevertheless, the Kissing Students as every built form presents specific cultural and political positions. The fountain-sculpture dedicates an important location to a significant part of Tartu's population: the students. Estonian citizens consider Tartu and its students as crucial in creating the ground for the Estonian national awakening and independence (Salupere 2013: 6). Located right in the central square, the fountain-sculpture recognises the significance students have for Tartu, as bearers of an Estonian national consciousness.

The Kissing Students reveals a case in which the interpretations of users match with the designers' stated intentions to a great extent. Design strategies such as easily understandable iconography, life-sized dimensions and continuity with the surrounding built environment facilitate the interaction between the fountain-sculpture and users. The positive attitudes of citizens are symbolic of the general approval of the fountain-sculpture at the societal level: during interviews, the totality of respondents acknowledged and endorsed its everyday narrative; they expressed general approval toward its iconography and its material design.

Altogether, the Kissing Students has been largely assimilated into the everyday itineraries of Tartu citizens. Only occasionally it attracted some practices that are different to the designers' expectations, especially playful practices of young students. The Tartu local authorities have not spent much effort to discourage these practices. Therefore, they have become integrated into the symbolic and material dimensions of the Kissing Students.

7. Conclusions

The preliminary results that emerged from the analyses indicated that elites use monuments and memorials as a form of discourse to construct and spread meanings in space. Designers use complex semiotic strategies to channel users' interpretations, but users interpret monuments and memorials in ways designers may have never intended. The holistic perspective connecting semiotics and cultural geography can be very useful to understand what strategies designers use to design monuments and how these are variously interpreted at societal levels. These findings highlight a number of research directions that will be explored in future papers.

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FROM THE SESSION "SEMIOTICS AND THEORY OF FORMS: TRIBUTE TO MARTIN KRAMPEN"

FORM AS A CATEGORY OF SPATIAL SEMIOTICS

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Abstract

The paper is devoted to some theoretic problems of form as a category of spatial semiotics, where this polysemantic concept gets a special meaning. The concept of form is described here as one of key grammatical category for diverse spatial codes. Its relations to several other concepts of their grammars are considered as essential invariants forming the main subject of a "universal spatial grammar".

Treated in this perspective, *form* characterizes a visible configuration of spatial elements taken in complex of their simultaneous relations selected and correlated with a meaning by the norms of a code. In the same spatial substratum various meaningful forms can be found as units of expression plans created by different spatial codes. A semiotized by a code space gets its own laws of formation and becomes autonomy of one or other type. Morphology can be more or less essential part of the grammar describing a given code and its ways of semiotization of space.

Semantics of spatial forms depends on the code as well. A form can be connected with its meaning as an index, a signal, a conventional sign, a polysemantic symbol or as an iconic model. Diverse semiotic mechanisms act in each of these cases. A content of spatial forms can develop not only on conceptual level, but also on the "infralogical" levels of psyche — perceptual or motoric images. So dynamic images of diverse forces are correlated with spatial forms by architectonic code, the schemes of instrumental acts with tools — by object-functional code, etc.

1. On the category of form

Form is a polysemantic concept. As a philosophic category, it has at least two different meanings. In ancient philosophy it was treated still by Plato and Aristoteles as an ideal scheme, *eidos* opposed to amorphous matter. In the German classical philosophy by G. Hegel "form" was understood as a way of expression opposed to an expressed content. These ways of the treatment were juxtaposed by A. Hildebrand (1893: 20), who distinguished "form of being" (*Daseinsform*) and "form of influence" on a viewer (*Wirkungsform*), considering the last as more important

in spatial arts. The Platonic and Hegelian approaches to category of form were in another way combine by L. Hjelmslev (2006 [1943]), who has defined *sign function* as a connection between *form of expression* and *form of content* opposed to substance of expression and of content.

Such semiotic specification of the concept of form remains essential for the spatial semiotics that researches the significant relations between spatial objects. It continues the initiated by A. Hildebrand and noted by E. Cassirer (1985 [1930]: 93) transition from natural-philosophical research of space "as it *exists*" to cultural-philosophical studies of "that the space *means*" for a human. Not limited by the research of *what* mean the diverse spatial objects, semiotic studies investigate also *how* these objects are connected with their meanings in processes of semiosis, are included in diverse spatial texts and are regulated by specific spatial codes.

Although the concept of form can be used in the spatial semiotics in the general semiotic sense following Hjelmslev (as it is discussed in Tschertov 2003), this concept obtains there a specific sense. Here "form" is revealed as a meaningful configuration of spatial elements taken in their qualitative and quantitative relations, whereby it is recognizable and distinguishable from other forms.

As a *qualitatively definite* configuration, the form is a whole that has parts correlated with each other by a definite way; it is perceptible and conceivable as a system of internal relations between its structured elements able to maintain their internal connections, independent on changes of relations to external spatial objects. Due to this invariability, one the same form can be selected and reproduced in different substances of material objects and ideal images of diverse subjects in the acts of their communication according norms of a spatial code.

Its *quantitative definiteness* depends on proportions of these parts. However, a pure spatial form does not have a definite size, because many objects with different sizes can have the same spatial form. Only an embodied form obtains thereby a magnitude and can be related to a human scale.

As *a meaningful configuration,* a semiotically treated spatial form is always connected with a sense: it either itself represents another object or certain actions of a subject, or it takes a part in such representation as a sense discernible unit. Such obligatory connection of spatial form with meaning distinguishes its semiotic treatment from consideration in many other disciplines, where diverse spatial forms are taken independent on this link. On the contrary, as a category of spatial semiotics, form is always considered in perspective of one or several spatial codes — systems of norms regulating semiotization of space — its structuring and interpreting by definite rules (see Tchertov 1997, 2002).

The spatial form can be included in semiotic systems and communicative acts in two ways. It can be, on the one hand, a represented object and belong to the content plane of a spatial code. On the other hand, it can be one of the means of representation belonging to expression plane of a semiotic system. As an element of the content plane, the spatial form is represented, for example, in the figurative painting, but it is excluded from the content plane in non-figurative art. At the same time, the spatial form always participates anyway as means of the expression plane of spatial codes, and thereby it can be considered as a universal category of spatial semiotics.

2. Relations with other categories of spatial grammar

Considered as one of the key categories of spatial semiotics "form" does not coincide with concepts under the same name neither in geometrical, nor in physical sense. Semiotically interpreted spatial form is a *grammatical category* of various spatial codes.

The constant relations of form as a general category of spatial semiotics with other its categories can be the subject of a "universal grammar" of spatial codes. In its frame, the category

of form enters into relationships to other universals of spatial semiotics: body, place, border, location, semiotized space, etc. Each of these notions belongs to the same group that the category of form considering in system of a spatial grammar. They also are taken in this system as semiotic concepts, but not as the notions of geometry, physics or any other disciplines. The connections between the members of this group are included in a conceptual framework of the spatial grammar and constitute its essential part.

In particular, the *significant body* as one of universal categories of such grammar is a perceptible and recognizable spatial object connected with reproducible schemes of formation and of interpretation according to the norms of a spatial code. Depending on this code, these objects can be related to their meanings due to spatial forms, magnitudes, materials and other features. The spatial form is therefore only one of the factors giving to a body its significance in the plane of content. Nevertheless, it is an essential element of the expression plane at least as a sense distinctive index. Through its form, a body is qualitatively different from some formless mass and from bodies of other forms. The definite form also opens for a subject a possibility to distinguish this body as a separate object of perception and of interpretation. Quantitatively, a significant body has not only the proportions given by the form, but also a definite size, which is absent in a non-embodied form.

Another category of the spatial "universal grammar" is *significant place,* where one or more significant bodies can be located. This category covers several concepts that relate to the category of form differently. Particularly, the category of *entering* represents the point, where relations between spatial objects in an ordinal structure intersect — as, for example, an indication of a metro station at a scheme. The category of *surroundings* represents an area close to the selected center — as, for example, a banner in the field indicates a place of gathering of the fighting squad. Neither entering, nor surroundings have a definite form, even if the indexes pointed on this place such form have.

Unlike them, *locus* is such type of places that is not only correlated with some ordinal sets, or with a picked out point, but also is outlined by certain borders. Thereby, only loci are the places that obtain a spatial form and a meaning dependent on it. In particular, the forms of various areas and rooms in social space acquire diverse meanings: round and oval rooms, arena etc. facilitate the circulation of people to each other, whereas the elongated spaces contribute to the isolation of small groups or individuals.

Differences between the bodies and the relevant loci are not absolute and depend on the viewpoint. A place is something that can be filled with bodies, *where* something else can be placed or moved, whereas the body is *what* is placed or moved there. However, both bodies and loci are shaped and have definite forms, sizes and borders.

Border is therefore also one of universal categories of the spatial grammar and can be defined semiotically as a place, where one spatial object (body or locus) meets with spatial objects having other meanings. Although configuration of the borders can coincide with the form of a body or of a locus, border and form are not identical concepts. The borders are always between some things separated or divided by them, and they are connected with a place, where they are located. On the contrary, the form is a configuration of spatial relations between its parts that does not depend either on its location, or the definite size of things or places, where it is embodied. It can be brought into a substance or extracted from it, but as a scheme of the relations between its own parts spatial form is independent of any substance. A form is substantiated, when it coincides with the boundaries of a particular body or locus. In its turn their borders are formed, when their configuration becomes definite. For example, the form of square is always identic to itself in any substance and magnitude, whereas the square borders, particularly, of one table, always differ from the square borders of any other tables even very similar to them.

The same form can belong to a body and to a place. For example, a door and a doorway can have a common rectangular form and coincide in magnitude. However, their borders are not identical, even if the enveloped body exactly fits into the enveloping one. In a similar way, the borders of a sculpture (a "model") and a plaster "form" cast from it do not coincide, although the process of casting supposes a possibility of preservation and transfer a form from one body to another one. Such preservation is possible, because the same spatial form is common for the convex model and the concave mold taken from it.

The set of places, where significant bodies can be located is the *semiotized space,* if relations between spatial objects in it are subordinated to the norms of a spatial code. Such space is *autonomous* as long as these norms set a special law of its organization. It is also a *separate* space, if it is bounded from other spaces and founds a special environment for the objects that stay or change in it: a special order of their emplacement, a special scale of measurement and an internal connection of states independent on any external events (as, for example, the separate spaces of different chess games). A separate space can be considered as a locus of an embracing space, if it has definite borders and together with them — a definite spatial form (as, for example, a format of a picture or a chessboard).

A common feature for the space and the form is that both of them are composed of spatial relations. However, the spatial form is exactly a configuration of quite definite spatial relations, whereas the space is a set of places, where these relations can be formed by one way or another, and where their diverse configurations can appear. Outside the spatial relationships, space does not exist, but none spatial configuration does not exhaust the space.

3. Semiotic functions of forms in spatial codes

A significant spatial form can have varied semiotic functions in different cases of its interpretation by the norms of diverse codes. It can serve a *signal* to an action of a subject. For example, a barrier is a signal for stopping or change of movement direction according the norms of a *demarcation code*. Its spatial form is also an *index* of a meaning change of spatial area located behind it. Both of them are related to the situation, where the form is presented. Each index points to something that is contiguous to it in space and time as well as each signal is a stimulus of an action or a reaction of a subject to a presented situation. Such joint of indexical and signal functions is a usual situation for many other codes.

Particularly, in the system of *object-functional code* an object's form can have the signal function too, if it not only indicates at the possible instrumental actions with a formed object, but also evokes an impulse to use it as a tool in a presented situation. Both indexical and signal functions of object's form are two side of a case, when it points to a subject some features of a presented situation and causes his reaction to them.

However, the form can serve also a *conventional sign* representing something that leads arbitrarily far out of this situation. The instrumental action represented by the object's form does not need obligatory to be performed to create of a sign connection between this form and an interpreting scheme as its meaning. A repeatedly reproduced and embodied in the collective experience object's form becomes a sign of its instrumental function for a subject, who can recognize and interpret this form according to the established scheme of a purposeful action with the object (cf. Barthes 2000 [1964]: 267). If the mental scheme of instrumental action serves as a designatum (in terms: Morris 1971 [1938]: 19-21) of the object's form, this action itself becomes a denotatum of the same form. If such denotatum can be or not be in diverse cases, the object's form as a sign of the object-functional code has its designatum always independent of real using of the object.

When the form is interpreted with several semiotic systems using together, it can be treated also as a polysemantic *symbol*. The object's form that denotes an instrumental function can connote at the same time some social functions of people using of this object. In the last case, the same form becomes a unit of a *social-symbolic code* connecting it with definite social functions of people acting with these objects. So, a military uniform denoting the direct functions of the clothing connotes at the same time the social role and rank of an individual, who puts it on. The object's form can serve also as mythological, religious or artistic symbol and express the ideas of human on itself, on society or on world structure.

The form of a spatial object can serve also as a *model* of something other, what is similar to it in some relations. Particularly, in mythological mind a vessel, a suit or a building can be interpreted as models of the world structured according the scheme of "world tree". Their axes setting by oppositions "top-bottom", "left-right", "center-periphery", etc. permit to model many non-spatial structural relations (see Toporov 2010).

Some spatial forms can serve as spatial models of time. A god example of the time representation trough the spatial forms are clocks in their diverse historical modes. They not only give diverse ways to measure and to index actual time, but also the difference of their forms (sundial, clepsydra, sandglass or mechanical clocks) can serve by symbols representing diverse periods of historical time and even diverse ways of mythological and Natural-philosophical ideas about it — as, for example, a sand clock can model an image of time by St. Augustin (see Tchertov 2014: 138-148).

4. Ways of reception and comprehension of spatial forms in diverse spatial codes

Each spatial code sets its own norms regulating ways of vision and comprehension of spatial configurations; the differentiation of spatial codes is connected with distinctions among ways of vision and among ways of comprehension.

Vision of the spatial forms can perform on diverse levels of psyche. A form can be fixed in the visual field of a person on the *sensorial level* as a configuration of colored spots and boundaries between them correlated to an internal scheme of subject's body. The form can be reproduced also on the *perceptual level* — as an ideal model of an external object separated from the body of a human and contraposed to it. The form can be represented also on *apperceptual level* of vision already without of outer stimulation — as a scheme of recognizable and imaginable spatial object. Each of these ways of vision can serve as a basis for a plane of expression in various spatial codes.

Particularly, unlike object-functional code, where expression plane is build by perceptual images of recognizable objects, the synesthetic codes have a lower, sensorial, level as a basis of the expression plane (for example, when interpreting visible angular forms through tactile images: "prickly", "rough", etc.). Conversely, the social-symbolic code has as a basis for expression plane more upper, apperceptual level, where a recognition of an object performs.

On the other hand, the spatial forms can be in different ways comprehended by human as by subject, whose activity has diverse modes. Not only logical concepts and verbalized notions can be meanings of spatial forms, but also some elements of "infralogical" (in the terms used by Piaget & Inhelder 1963 [1959]) levels of mental activity — perception or planes of actions. For example, the *perceptographic code* on the basis of the same sensorial level in the plane of expression gives the means to create in plane of content a shifted perception of objects absent on this surface as if they are behind it (see more detailed: Tchertov 2005, 2015).

Together with their comprehension in the cognitive modus of interpretation of visible spatial forms, they can be interpreted in projective and valuative aspects.

Interpreted in the *projective modus* visible spatial forms are included in the dynamic codes that connect these forms with images of moving formed on diverse psychical levels. So, the *architectonic code* ties the spatial forms placed into anthropomorphous space with definite kinesthetic feelings of mechanical forces acting in this space. By means of the architectonic code visible spatial forms can express mechanical forces through the prints of previous impacts, through the indexes of functioning in the present (for example as support or as weight) or through symptoms of possible changes in the future (for example, indexes of stability or instability).

Another level of dynamic interpretation in the projective modus of comprehension is connected with the spatial forms by the means of described above object-functional code. As it said, this code connects the forms of artefacts with such type of meanings that contain schemes of definite instrumental actions elaborated in culture and mastered by individuals.

The spatial forms interpreting in *valuative aspect* can have also an *affective* meanings (cf. the concept of "emotive meaning" by Ogden & Richards 1923). This modus of interpretation is typical for the *mimic code* that connects definite relations between parts of a face in expression plane with diverse emotional conditions in plane of content (as, for example, the different forms of mouth in antique masks of tragedy and comedy). In a similar way on the same signal-indexical level of semiosis, the *haptic code* connects with such affective reactions definite kinds of touches of diverse body parts between different people: kiss, stroking, slap, etc. (see Kreidlin 2002).

Thus, various *ways of vision* combined with diverse *ways of comprehension* give diverse modes of structuring and interpreting of the spatial forms.

5. Morphology, morphogenetics and syntax in spatial codes

It is clear from the said above that diverse spatial codes differently introduce their "semiotic form" in norms of forming and interpreting of spatial configurations. They set own norms of choosing of significant spatial forms in the expression plane and their connections with meanings in plane of content. Thereby, one the same object can be viewed and interpreted by the means of several spatial codes, and diverse parts in it can be differently singled out as carriers of meaning.

For example, a spatial form of a cup can be structured and comprehended by means of different spatial codes. The system of architectonic code gives a possibility visually to single out in it some "carrying" and "carried" parts. The semiotic means of object-functional code make possible its interpretation as a liquid container and a drinking vessel. In the same time, this cup can be interpreted by the semiotic means of social-symbolic code as a prize for awarding of champions. Such a variety of ways to interpret diverse elements of complex spatial construction is typical not only for applied arts or architecture, but for pieces of other kinds of art.

If one the same spatial object can be differently divided by diverse codes, different meaningful units are singled out after each such segmentation. Each of codes gives its own units of meaningful form, and these units can be researched in *morphology* as a special part of its spatial grammar. This part in the grammatical system of spatial codes should contain a doctrine of meaningful form together with its structural and functional features in the expression plane. If applicability of this notion in linguistics is undergo to doubt (Saussure 1977 [1916]: 167-168; Hjelmslev 2006: 51), it can be more appropriate in spatial semiotics, which preserves an object-spatial dualism typical for visual perception of the world, and which differs internal relations between parts of a form and external relations between the whole forms. The wide notion of morphology, referred by J. W. Goethe (1957 [1817]: 104, f.) to various objects of animate nature is applicable to the meaningful spatial forms deliberately created by human.

The forms of artefacts are selected in cultural evolution, just as well organic forms are selected in evolution of the nature. However, unlike of the natural forms, the forms of artefacts are be created by a human as ideas that pass a cultural selection, are deliberately embodied into material objects and assimilated by other people as reproducible schemes. The research of historical changes of these meaningful forms can be a subject of "*morphogenetics*" understood as a part of a "historical grammar" of certain spatial code dealing with diachronic changes of artificial created forms that are by this code regulated.

Although the category of significant spatial form is a universal for diverse codes, each of these codes has its own morphology and definite complex of meaningful forms — morphemes. We shall call *morphemes* the morphologic units of a spatial code, further division of which does not give more any units that have meanings in the system of this code (as, for example, the neck of the vessel). These morphemes can be combined in more complex *morphologic constructions* (as, for example, a whole vessel). So, in the field of the object-functional code one can speak about the morphemes, which combine in different ways with each other in diverse morphological constructions in whole forms of things (cf. Semper 1863: §§ 99-113).

Figure 1. Form-shaping morphemes and their combinations in the object-functional code.

A. 1-5. Morphemes, shaping the forms of vessels (a jug, a teapot, etc.).

B. Expressed articulation and, conversely, the fusion of the morphemes of the jug in different versions of object-functional code.

C. Set of objects forms composed from the morphemes of an object-functional code.

Morphemes and morphologic constructions are units of a semiotic system and parts of spatial texts correlated by it, but not the physical objects. Shards of a broken jug are not morphemes into which its form disintegrates, although its discarded handle can continue to be recognized by the means of object-functional code, if an appropriate scheme is still applicable to it.

As a semiotic unit, form is only a scheme, used for selection of the elements necessary for the sense expression. This scheme can be embodied in the various copies that are identified as far as they reveal common features as, for example, the same letter, cup, table, etc. Therefore, one the same object's form, for example, of a ladle, one can recognize independent on a possibility to use it — as it is in a drawing, from where it cannot be picked up, or in the configuration of seven stars of the constellation Little Bear that even more is not possible for using as a tool of object action.

Together with the morphology, the grammar of spatial codes has also a more or less developed *syntax*, regarded to relations between significant units of expression plane. Unlike morphology, spatial syntax deals with relations between meaningful forms and places — with locations of forms in spatial texts. Particularly, in the same object-functional code the field of syntax includes significant relations between the forms of things as well as their relations to an acting subject. It is also true that the relations of the object code to an acting person become the signs of a social-symbolic code pointing to social function of this person.

The relations between morphology and syntax, as between more or less important parts of the spatial grammar, can be various in different codes. Morphology is a most important part of grammar in the system of the object-functional code. In the system of the social-symbolic code, it shares the importance with syntax. It is less essential in the semiotic system of the architectonic code, and it completely inferiors a place to the syntax in the system of the perceptographic code (see Tchertov 1997, 2005).

Thus, various ways of vision combining with diverse forms of comprehension give multiplity modes of structuring and interpretation of the spatial forms. This diversity increases in art, where many spatial codes are used together, creating heterogeneous spaces with polysemantic forms, and where a semiotization of space can be correlated with a semiotization of time by other semiotic systems.

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PERICEAN INTERPRETATION OF DIGITAL GEOMETRIC ARCHITECTURE

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Abstract

Digital geometric architecture for this paper refers to the architectures designed by mathematical algorism creating systemic formal generation. For example, Greg Lynn's digital architecture—biomorphism architecture or blob architecture—deals with an architectural form image of amoeba and geographical natural landscape. I analyze this current architectural movement by comparing it with a classical architectural form through Peircean semiotic and logic.

Lynn theorizes architecture as homogeneity of differences projecting the smoothness of architectural form. The smoothed surface rules metaphorical oneness and integrity in architecture. Instead, a classical form of architecture has the hierarchy of *taxis*, *genera*, and *symmetry*. This hierarchy is intrinsically ruled by the notion of *tripartition* as opposed to blob architecture. I discuss how such characteristics persisted and transformed into the language of blob architecture.

I approach this analysis by applying Peircean Algebraic Logic (PAL) developed by Robert W. Burch, a Peircean scholar to a topological logic based on Peircean reduction theory. Following PAL, the notion of *hypostatic abstraction* formalizes meaningfulness in architecture with cyclical processes conditioned by all three identity modes (*monadic*, *dyadic*, and *triadic*). In the case of Classical architecture, *monadic* identity originated from scenographic elements, while blob architecture needs *dyadic* identities (e.g. technology, complexity) that are shifted to *monadic*.

1. Introduction

The experimental design theory—a notion of *research by design*—shows a new relationship between both views that of technological and an aesthetic. This new movement affirms parametric design methods and the application of new materiality. The availability of Building Information Modeling (BIM) supports the practical justification of this new architecture. Theoretical justification (Migayrou 2014: 19) derived from Deleuze philosophy that "reference[s] to the non-

standard … assimilated to the epistemology of the differential calculus (in topology) …". This theoretical justification aligns with structuralism, neo-rationalism, and poststructuralism. The movement is called *digital morphogenesis* that we can expect an *informed performance design* in architecture (Oxman and Oxman 2014: 6-7). Greg Lynn's new architectural theory in the 1990s—"the commitment to the curvilinear as a sign of the avant-garde, and the preference for non-orthogonal geometries" (Oxman and Oxman 2014: 7)—is a groundbreaking novelty, although, this trend became purposive through performative architecture and the method of experimental design.

This new formalism is gaining the importance increasing the tectonic aspect of recognition in theory, while the practical aspect of tectonic suits a new design theory—*research by design* applying computer software even more. The continuum of tectonic mode change should be analyzed for semiotic. Through "*hypostatic abstraction*" in Peircean Algebraic Logic (PAL) (Burch 1991), I will discuss the continuum between Lynn's original thoughts and the formalism of tectonic exemplified by Classical architecture.

2. Digital Geometric Architecture

Digital computational architecture's noticeable characteristic is the formal adjacency of surface segments. It was originally developed through philosophical implication of Deleuze and digital technology that creates curvilinear form. Greg Lynn is a primary inventor of this new architecture; now Frederic Migayrou calls as *Non Standard Architecture* (NSA) that uses parametric design with the complexity for assembling materiality (Oxman and Oxman 2014). Migayrou approximates this architecture is "non-Euclidean geometry to a new set of conceptual points more Deleuzean in origin" according to Oxman (2014: 2). The space is formulated by the surface expansions with imaginably unlimited, and not with rationally reduced compartments. The conceptualized space is a whole without boundary but surface. The goal of architecture is now depending on the defined continuation of adjacency which are parametrically ruled connections—new tectonic—and oneness. A theorist of NSA, Frederic Migayrou (2014) explains the development of NSA was via philosophy of ontology and Deleuzian thoughts with mathematical non-standard set theories.

A surface is configured by the local computational rules and syntax while landscape concept expands the rules to global surface, which is a field creates formal meaning. Lynn explains (1999: 29) landscape is "an initial condition of speed and density that is unfolded …". His concept of animate (Lynn 1999: 28-29), ephemeral architecture connects the concept of landscape. Lynn's landscape concept (1999: 30) is controversially static spatiotemporal image, and brings architecture back eternal, while keeping evolvement of perceptive movement. The term *blob* is "a topological surface exhibiting landscape characteristics", "an index of a high degree of information, where information is equated with difference", and "neighboring forces with which it can be either inflected or defuse" (Lynn 1998: 166). The blob shape characterizes smoothness and complexity "measured by the degree of both continuity and difference that are copresent at any moment" (Lynn 1999: 31). Lynn's concept of "animate fields" is associated with "topological surface" which has "a sequence of identical entities located in a series through a gradient space would constitute both a self-similarity and a difference based on the characteristics of the gradients" (Lynn 1999: 32). Gradients must be measured as surfaces not based on point-by-point for Lynn. This is a concept of continuity that dismisses difference between gaps, fragmentation that dominates deconstructivist architecture form. Lynn's architecture was created along with organic processes which "involve non-dialectical relationships between matter and information, form and time, and organization and force" (Lynn 1999: 33) like a landscape—"a ground

that has been inflected by the historical flow of energy and movement across its surface"(Lynn 1999: 35). His *organic form* (amorphous form) derived from the idea of non-dialectical is his universal thought, as Migayrou describes (2014: 30) "form becomes a morphogenetic a priori".

Lynn's organic form is expressed architecture as inorganic and transforms static inorganic to dynamic organic. He aimed to release static geometric form relationship between architectural form and Cartesian mathematic being used from Classical up to Postmodern architecture. Lynn explains the relationship between organic body and inorganic geometry (buildings) should be released from static form. It is described "where the organic is internally consistent, the inorganic is internally discontinuous and capable of multiplicity of unforeseen connections. To disentangle the pact between organic bodies and exact geometric language that underlines architecture's static spatial types is a monumental task" (Lynn 1998: 41). Lynn thinks (2008: 172) Classical architecture, which is a typical static form, likewise: "the definition of Classical architecture in terms of both holism and modularity was a consequence of the dimensional logic of measurement and subdivision by fractional unit". Lynn's philosophy on organic and inorganic established his amorphous architecture. Lynn selected the aspiration to have organic form instead of having fragmentation with deconstructivist proxy signification.

3. Tectonic System for Digital Geometric Architecture

Lynn's blob shape significantly contrasts the traditional tectonic formal system of architecture throughout history. This shape expresses the metaphor of organic architectural form. This is controversial because a blob shape aimed to avoid a specific form selection; now it is specifically organic form. Rather, this avoidance is a selection of norm and standard form, which requires having typologies such as cultural bounded tectonic. Instead, a construction of building needs local typologies for the material fabrication called "file to factory" (Oxman and Oxman 2014). The conflict between Lynn's original intention and the actuality of making a building must be resolved. Therefore, it must be considered to have double-layered dimensions: a conception of amorphous geometry, and a pure formal dimension with production. To project on Peircean semiotic interpretation through PAL, these two layers are used to re-format a blob with non-ideological frame at the *extensional* semantics level in PAL, and an ideological frame at the *intensional semantics* level in PAL. A tectonic aspect requires inevitably ideological frame because of Lynn's fundamental philosophy and primitive matter in architecture. This matter is derived from the principle of tectonic in architecture and leads an alternative clarification of his proposition depart from pure reductionist, expressionist architecture, and deconstructivist architecture.

Lynn's curvilinear takes two series of characteristics for his idea of inflection (Lynn 1999: 33): "a discrete, or repetitive series and a continuous, or interactive series". The repetitive and continuous surface formalize with the *dyadic* relationship in the local perspective. The connections of segmented surfaces are not defined by required specific functionality of an architecture essentially. The pure formal relationship of surface connection and continuity are *dyadic* relation (two-thing relation) for both Lynn's blob and the disjunctive deconstructivist form, even if they are in detail not the same: smooth and disjunctive. They belong to the *dyadic* mode in Peirce at the physical level. The fragmented surfaces are replaced by tectonic adjacency glue with maximum flexibility and a mathematical algorism that defines the parametric rules.

For Peircean semiotic, the question remains about other modes including *monadic* mode (oneness mode) and that of *triadic* (more than three-thing relation mode). Lynn's original intention requires Deleuzian philosophy regarding singularity and repetition constitute Lynn's antithesis of deconstruction as syntactical means to generate local surfaces with curvilinear.

This *monadic* mode can be extended to the conflicting mode and harmonious symbolic mode. The mode of conflict is *dyadic* and materialistic. The mode of symbol is the harmonious triad. The local relationship of surface coincides non-standard calculous with infinitesimal creating a possible conversion from multiplicity to singularity. When a conversion is made, it is *monadic*. Singularity and plurality have an innate connection; they come together as a woven structure scoping a perception of architectural elements.

Tectonic elements require interactions between elements and the abstraction process with a certain reduction. The avoidance of reduction needs deferment which is common to deconstructivist. Lynn's choice is "an alternative concept of abstraction, one that is more generative and evolutionary, involves proliferation, expansion and unfolding. This marks a shift from a modernist notion of abstraction based on form and vision to an abstraction based on process and movement" (1999: 39). Lynn's attempt of abstraction opens new possibility of form generation. I project this abstraction on Peircean *hypostatic abstraction* to probe how digital geometric architecture is related to classical form of architecture.

4. Architecture on Peircean Semiotic

Peircean semiotic is fundamentally *triadic*. My position is that if we did not apply Peirce sufficient enough to a theory of architectural language (Takahashi 2013), we need to recall Peirce's essential *triadic* system and semiotic logic. I take this approach to digital geometric architecture.[1] Peircean notion, *interpretant* creates the recursive structure as a semiotic agent, not as an interpreter. Peirce uses another term *representamen* that is a *sign* and a sign *object*. Peircean *three mode of being* governs: *representamen* which is a *sign*, *sign* to *object* relation, and *sign* to *interpretant* relations. (Peirce 1931) This scheme creates recursive, *hierarchical,* and *heterarchical* relationships of sign-itself and between signs. Peirce described the three modes of *interpretant*: *immediate interpretant* (*firstness*), *dynamic interpretant* (*secondness*), and *final interpretant* (*thirdness*). These three modes of *interpretant* formulate a shifting process in the *mode of being* (Takahashi 2013: 152). Rational architecture follows hierarchical scheme and that of irrational does heterarchical. Hierarchical tectonic elements are exemplified by Classical architecture, while those of heterarchical can be by postmodern architecture and that of deconstructivist. The degree of rationality is on the various contexts. By comparing Classical architecture and digital geometric architecture, I probe the continuum between rationality and irrationality.

The essential characteristics of digital architecture innate *dyadic* mode concerning architectural form's disjunctive/smooth relationship. The notion of adjacency is concerned with the one to one/many relationships as a base system with the hierarchical relationship. Nevertheless, the human brain is not only functioning rational order. Current research on phycology have been discourses the notion of heterarchy and possibly related Peirce (Goldammer et al. 2003). The formal characteristic of blob architecture involves the attraction perceiving feelings of swaying, and swinging mental activity guided by the directional movement as we consume a formal sequence. This directional movement combines the hierarchy and heterarchy stream tracing building surface and materiality. This experience makes an architecture singular and wholistic, while the experience of materiality expresses another aspect and different scopes dynamically. Digital geometric architecture does this multilayered interaction explicitly, and Classical architecture does this implicitly.

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1   My research on postmodern architecture through Peircean *triadic* mode is extended for this research on digital geometric architecture.

5. Architectural Logic Based on Peircean Reduction

A logic of Peirce's language was made through Peircean Algebraic Logic (PAL) in *A Peircean Reduction Thesis* (Burch 1991) by Peircean scholar and logician, Robert W. Burch.[2] Charles Sanders Peirce's *existential graphs* was proved by his developed Peircean Algebraic Logic. Burch's theory was influenced by Peirce's *existential graphs* which is a *diagrammatic mathematics*, and the Burch's theory (1997b: 206) contains "*the first-order predicate logic with identity*". The relations are represented by the notion of *adicity* (stand for), and all relations are possibly reduced to *monadic*, *dyadic*, and *triadic*. The PAL entities are: *terms*, *elements*, *operations*, *arrays*, and others. I apply this logic to a formal system comparison between Classical architectural and digital geometric architecture. I highlight my review of PAL (Takahashi 2013: 148-180) briefly.

The semantics of PAL takes two layers: the level of *extensional* semantics (*Enterpretation*) and that of *intensional* semantics (*Interpretation*). The *extensional* semantics deals with the formal system and the *intensional* semantics is associated with mental activities with Kripke's modal logic, "possible world logic." (Burch 1991: 39) Each layer holds three levels of semantics: (1) *depiction*, (2) *representation*, and (3) *expression*.

Summarizing Burch's (1991: 117-122) Peircean reduction—*hypostatic abstraction*—all relations are reduced to *monadic*, *dyadic*, *triadic* non-degenerated relations. The condition of *hypostatic abstraction* takes recursive way that requires a certain kind of *monadic*, *dyadic*, *triadic* new entities to proceed the abstraction. In other words, these additive entities make abstraction possible. The entities of abstraction (Figure 1) must include primitive term R1, *dyadic* identity (I^2), and *triadic* identity called *teridentity* (I^3) (Burch 1997a). I interpreted R^1 can be a *monadic* identity (I^1) for architectural Identity. The new abstraction is possible through additive new entities because of (n+1) as specified below where n is original term's adicity number. Importantly, Burch emphasizes Peircean *thirdness* involvement for true *teridentity*. The result of *Intensional* Reduction formula follows (Burch 1991: 114):

$$\mathfrak{R} = \iota(R^n) =$$
$$\iota^+[\ \text{QUANT}^1\{\text{HOOKID}^{1,3,5,\ldots,2n+1}[(n+1)\text{PRODUCT}(\mathbf{R}^1, I_1^{\,2}, I_2^{\,2}, \ldots, I_n^{\,2})]\}]$$

where: $\mathfrak{R}$ as Relation, R^n as n-adic term, ι as *Interpretation,* QUANT as operator ,HOOKID as operator, PRODUCT as operator.

Figure 1. Graphical Syntax of Hypostatic Abstraction, Courtesy of Indiana University

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6. Classical Architecture Projected on PAL

Following Vitruvian view Alexander Tzonis and Liane Lefaivre. (Tzonis and Lefaivre 1986) provides the basic syntax of Classical architecture. The formal categorization (1986: 6) has: "(1) *taxis*, which divides architecture works into parts; (2) *genera*, the individual elements that populate the parts as divided by *taxis*; and (3) *symmetry*, the relations between individuation elements". The notion of *taxis* is the framework of architecture like grid systems, and basic rules of space configuration via *tripartition*: although, the system of *tripartition* works for the second categorization *genera* and that of third *symmetry*. The *taxis* can act as a universal guide in the *monadic* mode, which gives us immediate given condition.

At the level of *enterpretation*, the semantics of taxis act depictions and iconic functionality of the formal system of architecture. At the level of *interpretation*, *taxis* are theoretical principles of architectural system within *monadic* mode immediately configuring the mental relations between architecture and human mind through possible world. The *taxis* mean Peircean *immediate interpretant*.

The *genera* associate with typology, and provide the nested subdivision with the aid of *tripartition, genera* can provide the nested subdivisions with hierarchy. The structure of *tripartition* is however, two *dyadic* relations originated from three relations. For example, the relation of A-B-C composes A-B and B-C combination with *dyadic* relation. If we see A-B-C as genuine relation, our perception is upheld with higher hierarchy level of *genera*. The perceiver's scope is between detailed and overall, it provides a totalized unit of figure toward *symmetry* if a perceiver detaches genera from the surrounding elements, which are map. The clarity of figures convinces the relations of representation what a figure stands for such as *order* system—analogical unit due to the characteristics of typology and repetition. At the level of *enterpretation*, *genera* represent the component of articulated architectural formal elements. At the level of *interpretation*, this articulation generates perceivers' image making which is a stage of conception dynamically shifting modes like *dynamic interpretant*. The formal vocabularies are scenographic representation positioned by *tripartition*.

The *symmetry* (Tzonis and Lefaivre 1986: 118) is a relation and balance of architecture. This category is further divided into *rhythm* and *rhetoric*. While *taxis* address a total scheme of architecture and *genera* make a whole orchestration of players of a given components, *symmetry* coordinates the arrangement of their action as the expression of architecture. At *symmetry dyadic* relations are shifted to background and *triadic* relations are foreground. *Rhythm* is a compositional unit that expresses "stress, contrast, and reiteration". (Tzonis and Lefaivre 1986: 118) associated with pattern and clarity of expression by means of the formalization of *genera* such as intercolumniation instead of individual order. Tzonis exemplifies (1986: 153) Andrea Palladio's rhetoric of parallelism (*overt figure*) and embedded effect of *tripartition* (*subtle figure*). The parallelism creates an effect of analogy enhancing formal emphasis at the foreground, while rhetorical use of *tripartition* overlays at the background. The subtle figure includes: (1) interruption of a series, (2) breaking off an element, and (3) the returning to the initial series of element. (Tzonis and Lefaivre 1986: 157) At the level of *enterpretation*, the rhythm creates units of formal arrays initiating mental interaction. At the same level, rhetoric creates simultaneous formal multiplicity generating combined effects of overt and subtle. At the level of *interpretation*, rhythm activates the mind interaction of sensitization, repetition, and contrast. At the same level, rhetoric initiates dynamic mind interaction permuting overly composed figures and subtle perceived figures. This shifting process possibly prompts a new level of abstraction clarifying the meaning of architecture for the aspect of *symmetry*. The dominant level of semantics is expression and relevant to *final interpretant*.

Recalling a *hypostatic abstraction*, the certain set of architectural identities are specified: *monadic* architectural identity, *dyadic* architectural identity, and *triadic* architectural identity. These identities are presupposed corresponding to *monadic* primitive term, *dyadic* identity, and *teridentity*. The process of *hypostatic abstraction* requires these additive identities.

Monadic architectural identity is a principal belief in architectural theory. For Classical architecture, it is the syntax of architectural *tripartition*, which is a main component of *taxis*, and the view of universality and iconicity, originally denoted as *monadic* term R^1 in PAL. Since the PAL system works with recursive way entirely, *monadic* term can be understood as a starting point and the interiority of architecture. For Peirce, this *monadic* foundation is the universal view aligned *immediate interpretant*. This identity initiates formal rules at the *extensional* semantics. For the *intensional* semantics, the identity is scenographic and static cultural symbolism.

Dyadic architectural identity is a representational associated with ornament in a cultural context. This identity characterizes shifting mode like *dynamic interpretant*. Architecture is presupposed as autonomous representation system for Classical architecture at the *extensional* semantic level. Architecture involves mental activities associating with the *intensional* semantics and ornamental scenographic elements. This shifts identities to *monadic* singularity.

Triadic identity is exceptionally relevant to *symmetry* for the *extensional* semantics. The rhetorical treatments engage mental attraction in local and requires the combination of overt figure and subtle figure effect. This is dynamic mental interaction with *secondness* mode. On this scope, *tripartition* articulates the relations in the foreground. In the *intensional* semantics, a mental engagement scope becomes larger; the *triadic* architectural identity gains the higher level of consistence. The specification of scope described aligns with time and space like *final interpretant*.

7. Abstraction of Digital Geometric Architecture

Lynn's philosophy on *abstract machine* (1999: 40) following Foucault is theoretical starting point for his amorphous architecture aligned with curvilinear, non-standard calculus, and Deleuzian singularity. Lynn depicted computer algorism from his corresponding interiority that ameliorates disjunctive formal treatment of deconstruction, and the departure from cultural bounded critical regionalism gaining his free will for amorphous architecture. The *hypostatic abstraction* underlines Lynn's concept of *abstract machine* as his primitive *monadic* source. The following is the set of architectural identities for his abstraction.

Monadic architectural identity is a theoretical shift from *dyadic* identities' fragmentation. Lynn's theoretical foundation is established partially idealism and partially instrumentalism. Foucault's "abstract machine" is a key to understand Lynn's choice of *firstness* mode. The act of abstraction is generative "proto-signifier" which is "diagram." Diagram is a map and conflict for Foucault. (Lynn 1998: 229-230) This is originally *secondness* mode for Peirce. It is turned to the *firstness* detaching from any specific meaning like Lynn's amorphous architecture. This principle is relevant to the experimental design method establishing the theory of amorphous architecture. Therefore, for digital geometric architecture, this theoretical underpinning is singularity. At the *extensional* semantics, *monadic identity* is shifted from *dyadic* formal rules. Then, at the *intensional* semantics, this identity depicts reasons of practicality materializing amorphous idea to architecture.

Lynn's *dyadic* figuration can hardly stay only in the Peircean *secondness* mode. His notion of pluralism requires amelioration of collective disjunction by balancing the thought that creates singularity. His *monadic* identity has theoretically *firstness* and practically *secondness*. Ideology takes the *monadic* mode at overall scope to deduce amorphous architecture while the local level conscious deals with *dyadic* level for the tectonic materiality and syntactical rules, para-

metric design and *research by design*. Lynn described Deleuze's notion, "asignifying concepts" which is "instrumental before it is representational." (Lynn 1999: 39). The role of instrument is *firstness* abstraction and *secondness* index so as representational. In the *intensional* semantics, these two stages are dynamic exchange like a stage of *dynamic interpretant*. For digital geometric architecture, this formal rule is shifted to *firstness* and for *intensional* semantics, Lynn's primitive concept, curvilinear is shifted to *firstness* singularity and to a theory. The parametric materialization is in this identity and enhances design, technology, and production. The mode of *secondness* practicalities dominates the way of tectonic within computerized culture.

Lynn's *triadic* configuration is continuously emerging *hypostatic abstraction* process filling a new set of entities: *monadic* architectural identity, *dyadic* architectural identity, and *triadic* architectural identity. Lynn's *monadic* initiation has been linked to dyadic technicality. For digital geometric architecture, I am concerned with the scope of tectonic. If the scope is local, the tectonic matter dominates technological aesthesis within culture of digital geometric architecture in the *extensional* semantics of PAL. If amorphous mode becomes universal architectural *triadic* identity through intentional semantics of PAL, we need a complete agreement of this architecture. The performance of architecture is one of commonly recognized goals to justify.

8. Conclusion

By shifting to *monadic* identity from *dyadic* identity, the digital geometric architecture becomes theory of architecture. This *monadic* singularity presents a new stage of architecture. I drew the specification of observed architectural identity following the framework of *hypostatic abstraction* and Peircean semiotic. Classical architecture and digital geometric architecture are both scenographic, but differently. This scenographic is between in the *firstness* and *secondness* mode. Classism holds *firstness* while digital geometric is *secondness* primary. However, they are sifted respectfully. Classical architecture's scenographic is *monadic* in *intensional* semantics because of human perception, while that of digital geometric is *extensional* because it is the instrumental abstraction that can facilitate making architecture with parametric means such as technology and complexity. Perception is continuously evolving, and parametric means are the source of forming materializing architecture. To conclude, the continuum of Classical architecture and digital geometric architecture is realized shifting modes with required triadic architectural identities that embrace architecture. Perhaps, it is possible at the point of critical agreement of *teridentity*. The true *teridentity* needs Peircean *thirdness* mode according to Burch (1991: 117) and the probe of Peircean interpretation of digital geometric architecture requires this condition essentially.

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SEMIOTIC ARTICULATIONS BETWEEN LITERATURE AND ARCHITECTURE

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Abstract

Philippe Hamon, in his ground-breaking study Expositions. Literature and Architecture in Nineteenth-Century France, focuses on the ways architecture becomes a privileged model grammar or meta-language for the construction of the 19th century French literary narratives. According to him, architecture functions as a shifter, a metaphorical operator that enables the visual domain of the 'real' to be translated into the semiotic, textual domain of the literary representation. I plan to adopt Hamon's hypothesis and lead it to further, specific directions of research, articulated around three different levels of contemporary architectural problems: 1. The problem of the nature and meaning of space as objects of architectural conception; 2. The problem of context and place in relation to memory and time; and 3. The problem of fiction and narrativity as vectors of the architect's creativity. My aim is to show how literature and its various semiotic articulations and conceptual conjunctions with situations of everyday life and their spatial setting entail a radical shift in the epistemological models of architectural conception. More specifically, I will briefly sketch a new methodology for the conception of architectural space based on the above three levels of problems.

1. Philippe Hamon's hypothesis and the question of space

The semiotic articulations between literature and architecture are complex. Philippe Hamon, in his study titled *Expositions*, investigates this complexity from the viewpoint of literary studies and textual poetics. Hamon focuses on the ways in which architecture becomes a privileged model grammar or meta-language for the construction of nineteenth-century French literary narratives. According to him, architecture functions as a shifter, a mathematical-metaphorical operator that enables the visual domain of the "real" to be translated into the semiotic, textual domain of the literary representation. Through architecture as a common background of experience, as a framing device, writers of fiction are enabled to produce "lexical space" im-

bued with intelligibility, structure and meaning (Hamon 1992: xi-xii, 12-13, 19-22, 24-25).

This process leads Hamon to formulate a basic working hypothesis: "the artifice of literature (an articulated semiotic ensemble that produces meaning) possesses a structural complicity or deep pre-established homology with that very thing whose existence in reality is already artificial: namely the building (an articulated semiotic ensemble that produces space)" (Hamon 1992: 6). What could be the implications of this deep homology or affinity between the built domain of the visible and the written domain of the legible, for architecture as a discipline? Since August Schmarsow (1994: 286-287), we are familiar with the fact that the discipline of architecture creates space. How does literature represent the space produced by architecture? Can architects learn something from this process? These are the first questions I would like to respond to.

These questions acquired urgency since another ground-breaking study: Joseph Frank's *The Idea of Spatial Form*. Trying to override Lessing's assumption that literature deals with time-sequences, whereas the plastic arts are spatial in character, Frank argues that Modernist literature and contemporary literature are "...striving to rival the spatial apprehension of the plastic arts in a moment of time" (Frank 1991: 61). This predominance of spatial form can be attested in the works of Flaubert, Proust, Pound and Joyce. "Space" is therefore an internal, relational logic of some Modernist literary works that organizes their form as a regulative idea (Frank 1991: 9-10, 14-27). The deep pre-established homology between literature and architecture is due to a common, spatial structure: if architecture offers an "inhabitable story" (Hamon 1992: 29) in real space, then literature, through the spatialization of its form, leads to a narrativization of space.

Thus, it is not uncommon to talk about literature's "semantic spaces" (Hamon 1992: 45), its "narrative space" (Pelletier 2012: 64), its "textual space" (Spurr 2005: 29), and its "oneiric" or "paradoxical spaces" (Robbe Grillet and Pérez-Gómez 1996: 250, 258). Let me therefore reformulate my previous questions: if there is a "literary" space, how does it represent "architectural" space and how does it organize itself to produce meaning? Hamon lists five (5) levels of "literary space" that articulate its meaning: (1) the topological, (2) the topographical, (3) the topical, (4) the typographical, and (5) the typological (Hamon 1992: 34-35). I argue that architects should be interested especially in the *topographical level* since it is the level of the signified collective actants, such as places, dwellings and architectural themes, and of movements, rituals and proxemics (Hamon 1992: 34). From the topographical level of literary space, we can infer how literature represents the social space and the staging of everyday life that architecture produces.

However, I would be reluctant to speak about "literary spaces". We should be epistemologically cautious. It is far better to talk about "literary representations of space" or, following David Spurr, "forms of spatial representation" (Spurr 2005: 16). So, the fundamental question would then be this: what *kind of space* does literature represent (or present)? I argue the following three points: (1) Literature does not represent "real space". It is not a picture or a photographic image of the space of reality. It distorts, alters or transcends reality. We could even argue that literature shapes or invents reality, giving order to an amorphous mass of random facts (what Hamon calls a "configuration") (1992: 35). (2) The topographical level of a literary spatial effect or spacing operation rewrites "material space", suspending reality and distanciating from all its details, which abstracts, transfers and transforms it. (3) This set of transformations does not present geometrical space, which is measurable and quantifiable (Spurr 2005: 15) but unveils *intangible qualities* (Weiner 2005: 24) of the space of reality that often transcend immediate sensible data or sensual stimuli.

One specific example of this kind of spatial operations is Italo Calvino's *Invisible Cities*. Apart from the fact of its amazingly complex spatial structure, its strict architectural geography, and its internal mathematical organization (Peponis 1997: 37-53) this literary artefact deals specifi-

cally with the problem invoked by Hamon's hypothesis. I quote Calvino: "the city must never be confused with the words that describe it. And yet between the one and the other there is a connection" (Calvino 1974: 61). As Marco Polo describes fifty-five (55) cities of Kublai Khan's vast empire, a pressing enigma haunts the reader: is he speaking of real or fictional and imaginary places? And how does the narration of reality alter its meaning – through signs, images and the poetic use of language? What is the relation between words and things? Calvino writes, "Signs form a language, but not the one you think you know. I realized I had to free myself from the images which in the past had announced to me the things I sought" (1974: 48).

Narrativity transforms real spaces into image-spaces, dreamscapes (Calvino 1974: 44). Sometimes, naming a reality is more important, and "real", than reality itself: "the city that they speak of has much of what is needed to exist, whereas the city that exists on its site, exists less" (Calvino 1974: 67). Calvino thus states that literature transforms real space into a "zodiac of the mind's phantasms" (1974: 22). The literary vision "does not see things but images of things that mean other things" (Calvino 1974: 13). Literature unveils a latent, emotional space, articulated through signs: "Your gaze scans the streets as if they were written pages" (Calvino 1974: 14). This "emotional space" is constituted by intangible qualities: memories and dreams. Let us call them the "space of memory" (Calvino 1974: 19) and the "space of the imagination". I argue that Hamon's topographical level of the literary representation of space is *imbued* with those types of spaces, forming what Calvino calls a "mental space" (1974: 103).

We could begin formulating an answer to our fundamental question. Literature represents, or rather reveals, a hidden spatial dimension: aspects of "lived space", the space of "experience", which is different from real, material or geometrical space in so far as it is distorted and altered through various intellectual eyeglasses. Thus, if architecture assigns a structure to literature for the staging of the narrative plot, literature offers back a sense of the structure of lived, qualitative and experiential space: what I would like to name, after Edmund Husserl, the *lebenswelt* – that is, the life-world or the space-of-life.

2. Edmund Husserl's *lebenswelt* and the question of place

Let us, then, assume as a working hypothesis that literature, a specific type of discourse, gives us privileged access to the *lebenswelt*, namely to a "space of experience" crystallized through narrative and the creative use of language. An obvious question naturally arises: what is the *lebenswelt*? The ambiguous concept of the *lebenswelt*, translated as "life-world" or "world-of-life", was mainly expounded by Edmund Husserl in his magisterial but unfinished text *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*. Husserl worked on this major project from 1934 until 1937. Its main aim was to expose and elaborate on the hidden precondition of scientific knowledge; a foundation he believed remained unrecognized. Husserl states: "Science is a human spiritual accomplishment which presupposes as its point of departure … the intuitive surrounding world of life, pregiven as existing for all in common" (Husserl 1970a: 121, 111-112). The *lebenswelt* discloses the everyday world as a horizon, a framework and background of our lived experiences that is constituted through forms of meaning (Sinnesgestalten) (Husserl 2002: 152-157, 163-165). This concept reminds us of the idea of a spatiotemporal "environment" (Umgebung), a "surrounding world", as elaborated by Husserl in his lectures on "Thing and Space", in 1907 (Husserl 1997: 1-4; Woodruff Smith 2007: 344).

This family resemblance led Edward Casey to advance certain arguments regarding the spatial dimension of Husserl's *lebenswelt*. In his important study *The Fate of Place*, he shows how, in the early work of Husserl, the human living body (Leib) is entangled with a "system of locations" (Ortssystem) which define a "bodily space" (Leibesraum), a "core world" (Kern-welt).

He then proceeds to almost identify the *lebenswelt* with this *leibesraum* (Casey 1997: 216-220). In other words, the *lebenswelt* would be a continuous system of possible locations of the living body (Casey 1997: 224-228, 437 n.141). I do not agree with Casey's interpretation. If we go back to Husserl's own primary texts, we will find out that the *lebenswelt* does not necessarily coincide either with the scientific world of geometrical extension (Descartes) or with the materiality of a network of possible particular locations of bodies or things.

In 1935 in Vienna, Husserl delivered a revealing lecture titled "Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity". In it, he concedes: "'Surrounding world' is a concept that has its place exclusively in the spiritual sphere. That we live in our particular surrounding world, which is the locus of all our cares and endeavours – this refers to a fact that occurs purely within the spiritual realm. Our surrounding world is a spiritual structure in us and in our historical life" (Husserl 1970b: 272). A life-world is not, therefore, a system of objective locations but a lived experience (Lyotard 1991: 61-64) of this network: a mental configuration, what Husserl names a "meaning-construct" (Sinngebilde) (Husserl 1970a: 113). It is a "subjective-relative a priori" (Husserl 1970a: 140) which constitutes "a world-horizon as a horizon of possible thing-experience" (1970a: 138). Literature discloses such a world-horizon, revealing the *lebenswelt*, since, as Paul Ricoeur writes, it denotes "the reservoir of meaning, the surplus of sense in living experience" (Ricoeur 2002: 592-593).

Then, what would be the particular spatiality of concrete historical and cultural experiences that are so characteristic of the *lebenswelt*? If we carefully examine the various sections in the *Crisis* where Husserl analyses the specific spatial structure of the *lebenswelt*, we will find out that it differentiates into particular "regions", giving birth to subjective "systems of correlations" mapping sectors of the world (Husserl 1970a: 143-147, 161-167). Those systems of correlations offer overlapping *horizon-validities*, which evaluate a given system of locations through the lens of a specific form or way of life (Engelen 2010: 136-149). As an example of this process, I could mention a literary and autobiographical text written around the same period: Walter Benjamin's *Berlin Childhood Around 1900*. Benjamin narrates his past through a collection of fragments, where childhood memories intermingle with real localities of Berlin, accentuating certain spatial characteristics and recombining them into novel constellations of meaning. Memories and phantasms colour urban experience, relating certain spaces with feelings and emotional qualities.

Benjamin writes, "the imagination, once it has cast its veil over a region, likes to ruffle its edges with incomprehensible whims" (2002: 369-371). The experience of Berlin through language, signs and street names unveils a child's perspective of the city: "How much was promised by the name 'Court Hunters' Lane', and how little it held!" (Benjamin 2002: 352). Reality is constantly refracted through dreams, expectations and hopes: the *lebenswelt* of subjective world-horizons rooted in everyday practices and habits. Benjamin notes (2002: 395):

> Just as the lost word that was on the tip of our tongue would have triggered flights of eloquence worthy of Demosthenes, so what is forgotten seems to us laden with all the lived life it promises us. It may be that what makes the forgotten so weighty and so pregnant is nothing but the trace of misplaced habits in which we could no longer find ourselves.

Berlin Childhood Around 1900 is a literary, almost phenomenological, reconstruction of those lost habits, sewn around a qualitative nexus of lived spaces of experience. Organizing those relational spaces into "systems of correlations", with whom Benjamin was familiar from his archival practices, he reveals the Husserlian "life-world". Literature thus offers privileged access to the *lebenswelt* as a cultural world of values (Wertewelt) (Woodruff Smith 2007: 383-387; Carr 1977: 208-211).

I now proceed to the second point of my argument. Since the *lebenswelt* is not a material form of location but the structure of experience that gives meaning to it, I claim that it bears a similarity to the concept of "place" as used in human geography (Cresswell 2004: 11, 19-34) – namely, a *lived space*, a meaningful location. Tim Cresswell writes (2004: 10): "When humans invest meaning in a portion of space and then become attached to it in some way (naming is one such way) it becomes a place". Moreover, Hamon writes (1992: 45): "A place is never truly a place until it has become a named locality (lieu-dit)". Literary discourse, through naming and ascribing meaning to places and things, reveals the *lebenswelt* hidden into spaces and localities. Mari Lending, examining Stendhal's autobiography, proves the place-making role of literature. Stendhal's textual corpus, which is based on his diagrammatic drawings, is a map of existential possibilities, an emotive geography capturing the physiognomy of a place (Lending 2011: 94-103). Architecture could use literature in order to understand the "genius loci", the spirit of a place.

Christian Norberg-Schulz writes, "Being qualitative totalities of a complex nature, places cannot be described by means of analytic, 'scientific' concepts. As a matter of principle, science 'abstracts' from the given to arrive at neutral, 'objective' knowledge. What is lost, however, is the everyday life-world, which ought to be the real concern … of … planners and architects" (Norberg-Schulz 1980: 8). Literature as a humanistic endeavour can therefore capture the elusive "spirit of a place", which is related to the Husserlian *lebenswelt*. I would like to call it the "plot of a place": structures of the *lebenswelt* expressing ways of life. I argue that the architect should read the *lebenswelt* of a place as a text. What would be the consequences for the methodology of architectural design and for the status, virtues and roles of the architect as a creative subject?

3. Paul Ricoeur's *refiguration* and the question of the architect's task

In order to offer some preliminary answers to those two questions, I will now turn to Paul Ricoeur's impressive essay, titled *Architecture et Narrativité*. Ricoeur remoulds Hamon's hypothesis, trying to investigate the pre-established homology between architecture and narrative. He writes, "I would like to propose an analogy, a parallelism between, on the one hand, building, constructing in space, and, on the other hand, narrating, creating a plot in time. … I am wondering if we could not push the analogy further, until a real intersection, an intricacy between the architectural configuration of space and the narrative configuration of time" (Ricoeur 2014: 2; Ricoeur 1996). In order to arrive at this intersection, Ricoeur uses the categories linked to threefold mimesis from his work *Time and Narrative*, transposing them to the architectural plane (Ricoeur 2004: 527 n.2). The transposition makes use of the Heideggerian treatment of another famous triptych: building, dwelling and thinking (Heidegger 1997: 100-109).

The first logical moment of a literary creation is the *prefiguration*, where the narrative function is engaged in the everyday life, in conversation, without detaching itself to produce literary form. Prefiguration is related to the act of dwelling. Then comes a second logical moment, the *configuration*, namely the stage on which time is organized according to a plot and the narrative acquires intelligibility. Ricoeur relates the second stage to the act of building. Finally, in the third step, that of *refiguration*, the literary creation arrives at the disposal of its reader. In the architectural realm, this third logical moment would entail a thoughtful dwelling (Ricoeur 2014: 4-14). Prefiguration is a way of living-together that refers to the *lebenswelt*. Configuration animates the problem of context and intertextuality in architectural creation. Refiguration opens up "the possibility of reading and re-reading our places-of-life from the point of view of our way of dwelling" (Ricoeur 2014: 14).

I would like to argue that Ricoeur's scheme could entail a radical shift in architectural pedagogy. Let us recall the dominant model of architectural creation, which is deeply rooted in

the history of the discipline: first, there is process of conceiving an abstract idea, thinking in terms of a concept, which is then represented through sketches, models and plans. In a later stage, through the mediation of those graphic representations, construction and building begins, where materiality is shaped according to the initial idea. Finally, after the work of construction is over, dwelling begins. However, Ricoeur's scheme leads me to propose another possible alternative: why not merge the final stage (dwelling) into the first (thinking)? If we bring together *refiguration* and *prefiguration* into a single, holistic process of conception, we gain something valuable: the anchoring of abstract thinking in the Husserlian *lebenswelt*.

Thus, architectural ideas would lose their formal, and, often, arbitrary nature. They will relate to place and its spirit. This is where literature comes in. Literary representation, as we have seen, offers a privileged access to the *lebenswelt* of a place, namely to the lived space expressing ways of life. Literature could help architects to mediate between the abstract, mathematical-geometric space of conception and the concrete, experiential environment of the lived body (Ricoeur 2004: 148-150). Ricoeur names this a "third space". I argue that the "third space" can be accessed through literature. Architectural creation then would be more like reading the con-text and "plot" of the place and trying to adjust abstract ideas to concrete situations of life. Dwelling/thinking as reading should come before building. What does "dwelling" mean?

In Christian Norberg-Schulz's work titled *The Concept of Dwelling*, we read that "human existence is qualified by the insoluble unity of life and place" (Norberg-Schulz 1985: 13). Dwelling is related to the *lebenswelt* of a place, as a world of characteristic, meaningful things (Norberg-Schulz 1985: 16). Therefore, dwelling is not only a material condition of shelter but also a belonging to a place through phenomenological horizons of meaningful structures that affect the mind and the senses. In other words, dwelling creates ethos and character. Karsten Harries (1997: 4) writes, "Ethos…names the way human beings exist in the world: their way of dwelling". In order to illustrate how a "personhood of place" (Caicco 2007: 1-18) can influence ethos through dwelling I will turn to Edgar Allan Poe's story titled *The Fall of the House of Usher*.

Poe maps the influence of place on character through the concept of the "atmosphere". He writes, "I had so worked upon my imagination as really to believe that around about the whole mansion and domain there hung an atmosphere peculiar to themselves and their immediate vicinity" (Poe 1994: 1464). The melancholic atmosphere of sorrow surrounding the House is mirrored in the mental idiosyncrasy of its proprietor, Roderick Usher, urging Poe to admit of "the perfect keeping of the character of the premise with the accredited character of the people" (Poe 1994: 1464) who live there. The place, therefore, influences the formation of the ethos and mental conditions of its dwellers. Poe (1994: 1466) observes "an effect which the *physique* of the grey walls and turrets … had, at length, brought about upon the *morale* of [Usher's] existence". I argue that reading the plot of a place signifies a new task for the architect: to decipher the "atmospheres" of dwelling as a decisive ethical factor in the design of space.

Let us therefore recapitulate the arguments thus far in order to conclude. Philippe Hamon's hypothesis about a deep homology between literature and architecture leads to significant semiotic articulations between the two disciplines. Those articulations entail a radical shift in the methodology of spatial design, analysed in the following points:

1. Literature reveals hidden and intangible dimensions of space, as well as more specifically, a space of imagination and a space of memory.

2. Literary representations uncover the Husserlian *lebenswelt*, a lived space with qualitative and spiritual structures.

3. Literature can help architects to map the "systems of correlations" that transform locations,

through the *lebenswelt*, into meaningful places.

4. The architect, therefore, should *read the lebenswelt of a place* before building, thus merging abstract thinking with concrete situations of life, through literary representation.

5. This process of reading the plot of place as a critical dwelling would ultimately reveal the "atmospheres" and the character of a place, and it would navigate architectural creation to contextualize a proposal appropriate to its ethos.

Moreover, architects can learn the following from literature:

6. How to investigate imaginatively possible worlds (Weiner 2005: 25).

7. How to direct dwellers through dramatic sequences of embodied experiences (Pelletier 2012: 62-66).

8. How to reconstruct stories about places that influence the foundation of their atmospheres (Hamon 1992: 29, 46-47).

Finally, literature can help architects to realize that architecture is not a technical discipline that can be treated as an instrument or a commodity, as Dalibor Vesely (2004: 3) argues; it is a complex discourse deeply rooted in the humanities (Vesely 2010: 189-200).

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SEMIOTICS OF SPACE AND THEORY OF FORMS: ARCHITECTURE, FORMS OF MEANING, FORMS OF CREATION

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Abstract

This paper examines the progress of research on forms in interdisciplinary works where semiotics hangs a large share. Several ways of approaching this area of semiotics can be relevant, including by bringing results from other fields of research, provided that these results are "cleared" at the crossing of disciplinary boundaries. In order to propose a synthesis, I would like to submit here a few questions and some reflections which, I hope, will help to situate the field to which I am referring. The questions I am tackling here and the answers I am sketching are obviously incomplete but relate, from my point of view, how, inscribed in the emergence processes of forms that produce meaning in space and time, architecture in its practice produce a space that can be object of the semiotics researches, and, between present spaces and absent objects, forms are invented that can articulate forces and produce meaning. In this way I propose a path to develop a general theory of semiotic forms.

1. Semiotics of space

In general, the semiotics of space is a semiotics of spacing's as shapes of form given to the artificial world in which we live, the semiotics of the processes of production of meanings in that they take shape in the space of human facts. Equipped with a metric, the spatial forms, forms of localization, inclusion and exclusion, intersection and overlap, provide a measure for separation or contact, disjunction or junction, proximity or distance, amplitude and density to the orientation and distribution of the human actions and gestures.

In this sense, space is not merely a scene or a place where the facts of meaning, otherwise determined, manifest themselves. For the semiotics of space, space is not a thing. In the semiotics of space, the relation between form and substance is very different from that of verbal semiotics. The substance is absent and the form refers to this absence; yet, in its absence, this substance

confers on space a proper value. The form of space is first topological, it is then the form which the (open or closed) boundaries of its external neighbourhoods confer upon it. And the limits of these neighbourhoods have a substance; for example, the boundaries of an architectural edifice, those of a wall, a roof, or a slab. As these limits have a form, they impress it not only on their substance, but also on the space they contain, as well as they also impose their cutting on whatever might take place in this space. This form has geometric properties (positions, orientations, axes, dimensions, magnitudes, …), properties that contribute to define and mark the relationships that human practices can have in space. As it is a built space, these boundaries and the form they impart to their substance are thus not univocally determined by relationships of causes and effects, but they can be motivated by intentions or deliberately selected by convention.

2. Semiotics of architectural space

As regards the semiotics of space, that of the architectural space, with the research of the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first century, there are many developments, each of which implements, and questions, the concepts of form and meaning. Particularly there are works which, at different scales, have focused on architecture as a foundation act, the topogenesis and the architecture of the territory, or several works of architectural typology and urban morphology, as well as works on geographical space, on archaeological semiotics, on the morphogenesis of cities and territories, or on the semiotic profiles of urban forms. Around and beyond these works recent contributions develop the researches in the field of semiotics of space, notably researches on grammars of form, virtual reality and schemes of architectural composition, or works on the logics of space and logics of time, as well as researches on architecture and energetic of bodies. Each of these contributions has a conception of the principle of emergence, construction or deconstruction of forms that give meaning in space-time, with an emphasis on one or the other of its articulations. In this perspective, the considerations that follow in this paper are meant first of all to remind how architecture questions itself about the meaning of its project and how it can develop a semiotics of space and time to respond.

2.1. How has architecture interpreted the relations between space and meanings?

In the most ancient treatise from which we have a complete version, Vitruvius (Circa 42 B.C.) explains what the sign is for the architectural theory: "In architecture, as in any other sciences, two things are noticed: that which is signified and that which signifies" (I.3.). Still more precisely, it is a theory based both on a metasemiotic system, in which the thing signified, the thing stated about, is the object of the architectural design, "the building", a tool possessing certain properties for those who use it, and on a connotative representation in which the thing that signifies in the design of the object of architectural project is the demonstration given of its properties by reasoning, supported by science. And these properties, for Vitruvius, are of three register of values: "firmitas, utilitas, venustas" (III.2.).

Thus, what signifies in architecture is not the building per se but the secondary connotative signification which architecture gives of the connection that, in its properties, the edifice may have with things other than itself: certain items and concepts of knowledge. We also learn that architecture "is a science that should be accompanied by a great variety of studies and knowledge, by means of which it judges all works of the other arts that belong to it" (I.1.), to the point where "most cannot comprehend that the understanding and memory of one man should be capable of so much knowledge" (I.12.). All sciences, however, have "a communication and link between them"; "universal science is composed of all these sciences" (I.12.), so that it is enough for the architect to know the "consistencies... between certain things that are common to all the sciences, one of which helps in learning another more easily" (I.15.).

The practice consists in the execution of designs "whereby the matter" of architectural works "is given suitable form" (I.1.). And the theory demonstrates the relevance of the measurement given to this form, "explains and demonstrates the fitness of the proportions of the things it is desired to make" (I.1.), the relevance of the measurements given to the various parts of the edifice planned. The connotative connection between what architectural reasoning signifies and what is signified in the design of the edifice which it builds is thus marked in the building as a "right measurement" of objects "in relation to their use"; architecture is then "constituted" by operations of measurement, ordering, disposition, rhythm, proportion, properties and distribution of the parts of the edifice ("taxis, diathesis, …" (II.1.)). And the theory of architecture is a theory of measurement signified in the edifices it produces. Thus, the "demonstration" of the usefulness of the instrument is given by a measured design that connotes a reasoning.

As instrument endowed with a solidity, a usefulness, and a beauty the building is the semiotic object of a demonstrative meta-discourse explaining intentions that preside to partitions of space whose it is the object and to the articulation of the variable forms of its content and its expression ; this metadiscourse is held on the forms of the proposal of project, it disarticulates and rearticulates its models of reference, to seize its deep semantic and to neutralize its context, as it decomposes and recomposes its in a graphic reasoning by putting them at stake to test its syntactic rules and transform its context in a measured co-text.

Then this teaching, formulated in a first synthetic treatise, is reformulated in successive epochs (Renaissance, Baroque, Classicism, …) by different master of architecture. However, in the twentieth century, several research tracks have been followed since the seventies to try to go beyond this heritage and explore in a new way the production of space, the forms it takes in architecture and their meaning.

The modern movement of the early twentieth century had sought to produce a functional architecture in a wide variety of "organic" or "rational" propositions, aiming at the realization of a singular building for the one, the production of prototypes for the industry for the other. But the production of the post-war building with its serial repetitions and its volumetric simplification has sunk into the semantic reduction, producing an international, industrial architecture, standardized to be functional, which many critics considered monotonous, disembedded and delocalized.

The protagonists of this production themselves had finally challenged the precepts of this modernity to re-interrogate ancient knowledge about the "language" of architecture, and to propose new codes of shaping an architecture that wanted to be "post-modern", codes that would express the contradictions of the conception of the architectural space, its ambiguity and its complexity, as its inscription in a context.

The work of two contemporary architects, among others, can also illustrate the question. For Mario Botta, heritage and architectural creation meet and find an echo in a significant gap; even before taking shape in a new synthesis, as in an articulation between modernity and baroque, urbanity and rurality, …, the meaning of the work is the product of this gap. For Peter Eisenman, it is a matter of escaping from the usages and conceiving without being bound to functions as to metaphysics of utility, the process of architectural design consisting of discarding mental habits, deconstructing consecrated models and to produce an open work, in order to leave free the interpretations which can be made of it.

2.2. What are the attempts of contemporary architecture questioning?

Looking for complexity across the gap or reducing the meaning to a zero degree of architectural writing, attempts by contemporary architects all seek to open up the actual on the vir-

tual, transcending the close relationships established between the partitions of a space in project to find a general form, universal, in the generativity of a process of singular composition.

Faced with the desire to produce standards for the industry which had been the aim of modern architecture of the twentieth century, contemporary architecture questions the very idea of type, in order to find the value of the unique work in a creation process that escapes both standards and constraints of the series. The process of creation intends to reach the path of intuition, and it does so to the detriment of experimentation; it is no longer a matter of accommodating forms to constraints of reality, but of assimilating the real to the frameworks of architectural thought .... It is not to meet the expectations of the recipient of his project that the form is designed by the architect, but to transform his expectations. If the building is conceived so that it is perceived, the architectural conception intends to act on the perception of its object. Rather than reproducing object types to reinforce the project's grasp with memory values recorded in the mental habits of an era, the project draws the unexpected to capture attention and transform expectations.

Many modern architects displayed a functionalism embodied in a theory of evolution. But, paradoxically, it was in a catalogue of so-called "first" forms, of a well-defined geometry, that they drew, while their stated intention was that the "form" follows the "function", adapts as in a Darwinian "context". The theory of Gestalt was even called to justify the choices of form, whereas precisely the theory showed that, in its perception, unstable form inscribed in a dynamic process, the "good form" emerged from a background in equilibrium always hesitant.

The discussion was also to know whether, before the seizure of the parts, as the Gestalt claimed, modern "language" was more than the sum of its parts, a multiplier or an incentive "language", or, on the contrary, less than this sum, reductive code, inhibitor. Since, reproduced by inheritance or imitation, the structure could be understood as a "deep" structure, a system of transforming forces into forms or, on the contrary, as the result of forces otherwise in action independently of the forms they could take on the surface of the shape. The question remained whether the generation of architectural forms followed universal patterns or, on the contrary, was it particular and linked from case to case to local dimensions and constraints of the project? According to the epistemological background to which this generation was described, nativism or empiricism, structuralism or constructivism, the answer could radically diverge.

For nativism, knowledge is innate and the forms our mind gives to reality, inscribed in our biological heritage, if they are not immediately accessible to our consciousness, are only gradually discovered and taken from intuition in this heritage. For empiricism, on the contrary, knowledge comes from the observation and abstraction of material reality, and forms are in this reality and we discover them by analysing the phenomena that can be observed there. Structuralism, in particular semio-linguistics, considers that there are structures immanent in every reality as in any grasp that one can have, especially that language as structure precedes speech, even if only speech can produce modification of codes, and thus that the grasping of shapes depends not only on a prior structure, but also on the practice we have of them — especially when, by learning, we imitate our fellow men. For constructivism, which lies at the interface between these first three backgrounds, it is from the practice we have of reality and from the abstraction reflecting this practice that we derive our knowledge, and the forms are those which we construct in our minds to make possible and control this practice — the structures being only states of equilibrium of the forms constructed in our mind. Generally speaking, depending on the background, either the forms give meaning to a real that they put into form, or they take meaning in a reality from which they derive their form.

In architecture, these different backgrounds can all be implemented in the same project, they do not necessarily oppose each other in contradictory epistemas, as is the case for knowledge

that takes them as surfaces of emergence of a scientific production. Intuition, observation, re-production and construction are all practices at work in the architectural project. As a project object, there remained the question of a link between a projection of the forms of space and time posited as universal (a priori) and their grasping into the relativity of a process dependent on its frame of reference.

2.3. What did architects look for in semiotic competence to answer these questions?

In the nineteenth century, at a time when causal adequacy was the rule, architecture had been constrained by an evolutionism that saw in form the adaptation of an organ to its environment, if not by an absolute determinism, a historicism in which an immutable law imposed its evolution on every form. But, far from accepting to be reduced to conforming to a causal, even historical, adequacy, architecture later sought to escape the yoke which had been dictated to it by the episteme of the century. In its project, it wanted to be free not only to create new objects, but objects that make possible, not absolutely necessary, new visions of the world, as well as instruments that allow new behaviours without imposing them. For this reason, it wanted to reject historicism and turned to structuralism. It then interviewed disciplines such as anthropology, psychology or linguistics.

Linguistics had itself rejected the threads of historicism. It had also sought to re-articulate this cut which in the nineteenth century had led, on one side, to the separate study of sounds, first in phonetic inventories, then in phonological analyses of sounds classes, and on the other side had pursued the study of meaning by formalizing the logic of its elementary semantic components. In the very idea of arbitrariness of the sign, it had found the articulation of two planes of language, that of "expression" and that of "content". The articulation not only of the forms of "expression" and "content", but also of their substances, was posited as an arbitrary relationship defining the units of the spoken language.

Based on the structural definitions of the language of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, verbal semiotics were constructed around an arbitrariness not only of the relation between the form of expression and the form of content, but also of the relation between form and substance, on the two levels of expression and content.

In non-verbal semiotics it may be otherwise, not only because the cut-outs of a plane may be those of another plane, when one of the two planes is the signified of the other, for example when a door signifies a door, when there is iconicity, but also when the cut-outs of a plane can be interpreted as being proportional to the cut-outs of another. In these semiotics, forms can be motivated by the substances they cut, and their relationships depend on them.

For architecture, the question of an "architectural language" raised questions about this articulation. Many then insisted on a limitation of this arbitrariness in the different forms of articulation that can be found in what constitutes a trace or a symptom, a clue or an icon, a signal or a symbol, to seek to grasp what can make the specificity of the architectural forms. However, it has been found that these various forms of articulation can all be identified in the reception of the object of architecture and that none of them alone makes the specificity of the design of the architectural project. As for the conception of this project, it remained to be seen whether the arbitrariness of the choice of form is limited by an economy of "language" such as that found in the correlation between syntagmatic composition and paradigmatic substitutions in texts written from verbal codes.

Others have tried to avoid the excesses of this questioning and have attended to inscribe the conception of architectural forms not in that of the signs of the spoken language but in the

more general one of instruments, made up of tools and utility. In architecture, it was a matter of re-thinking "function" by linking it to a point of view, a relevance and a practice. This approach to the object was a project approach, but only that of one of the currents of thought at work in architecture. Styles and architectural symbols could hardly be reduced to any practical utility, if not to make sense, or to serve an ideology. Some then thought that it was possible to reduce tools and utilities to a level equivalent to the denotative level of the spoken language and to add to this level of meaning production another, equivalent to the connotative level. They declared the intention to distinguish between so-called "first" and "second" functions, appearing as dia-chronic transformations of the meaning of human instruments. The remaining issue was how these transformations occur, and in particular if they follow a process in which proportion and symmetry, with decomposition and recomposition, play a role similar to that in which analogy and agglutination shape the modifications of the spoken language.

But whether they are of the order of the stability of the edifice or of its convenience, the utili-ties which the instruments produced by architecture may have, do not mechanically determine their forms; in particular, if they are taken into account in the design of the project, the efforts that can be assumed by the architectural forms do not completely constrain their contours. Just as the glottis does not allow the voice to make any vocal concatenation, the forces present in the material used in a constructed edifice do not allow any sequence of forms; but if architecture is concerned, it is precisely in that, in their arrangements and devices, the chosen forms allow to oppose as formal forces to the material forces that they have the arbitrariness of choice, and can produce the meaning of the project.

A whole other set of other works has tried to show that the articulation was rather to be sought in a formation at several levels of the meaning of the object of architecture. Some have sought to grasp it in a generativity of architectural forms and registers of forms, from tectonic and bioclimatic forms to plastic forms. It remains to be understood whether this generativity and the grammar which regulates the passages between levels form objects with complementary traits defining themselves at levels of structures that remain included or, on the contrary, if they modify successively and in a loop at each level the set of traits of each object. In one case, the articulation between the planes can remain arbitrary, in the other not, since changes then rever-berate from one level to the other, one becoming the "expression" of the "content" of the other.

Other works have sought this articulation in forms in which the relations between parts of the projected object, interior and exterior, support transports between levels, from container to content as between architectural expression and local impression. In other words, these works have shown that, in architecture, tropes allow a passage between the shapes of the container and the shapes of contents and figures filter, inhibit or accentuate the expression of the content and the impression that one may have. Some of these works have been extended by showing how, in the architectural project, tropes and figures play on models in memory and paradigmatic as-sociations to produce ideas of new forms.

For other authors, in the architectural project the meaning of these forms is not only made of substitutions or paradigmatic associations; it also emerges from successive acts whose se-quences aim at producing an object of value which, projected in the face of prohibitions, notably the prohibition of ownership, can eliminate a lack of space as a lack of meaning. These sequences are syntagmatic linkages that form part of a narrative and it uses a "deep" structure, made up of a logic of forces, oppositions and interactions, developing in a surface structure, producing a logic of positions, places and displacements. The semiotic practices that implement this development are then those actants who seek, by disjunctions and conjunctions, to grasp projected objects in a process where the intention of the project is constrained by modal values; the will then de-

pending on knowledge, duty and power, not only of the one who bears the project, but also of other protagonists, adjuvants, opponents and indifferents.

Certain works, particularly those involved in the practice of town planning, have sought to formulate project scenarios that highlight the distribution of the forces between "actants" and "actés" and the way in which they seize objects by mediating between those who control and those who are controlled by the power of the other. Since the object of value is the projected form, it is supposed to be produced not only by the author of the project, but also by the games of oppositions and interactions between "adjuvants", "opponents" and "indifferents"; to give figure to these interplay, these scenarios use shifters to describe the temporal or spatial devices of the object of the project and to include not only *figural* figures (minimum units in the geometry of the project) but also *figurative* figures (significant units in the sense given to the project, for the classical units supposed to represent its solidity, its convenience, its beauty). The articulation between the plans of semiosis is then understood as the fruit of a process.

In this process, when the relation between the subject and the object is mediated by a third, interpreter, the semiosis passes from a dyadic to a triadic relation. The relation to oneself and the relation to the other are mediated by this interpreter. In a semiotic school of thought in which the quest for meaning goes through a process of interpretation, a series of researches attempted to formalize the logic of the architectural project in this triadic relationship: between the sensitive object, the referent of the project, the signs (indices, icons or symbols) that represent it, and an interpreter, producing an adaptation of the meaning of the project to the interaction between actors of its development. Thus, in architecture as in literature, interpretation would be based on an open work, offering a structure awaiting multiple and successive meanings, according to a textual cooperation of the recipient of the edification.

However, for other authors, the context of the architectural project is not that of the blank page of the sketch sheet, but either a territory made up of exclusions as well as inclusions, overlaps as much as embeddings, in partitions to the centre, bordered by borders, blocked by sacred spaces, separated by imaginary traces as well as by walls, pierced by prohibitions of implantation, highlighted in voids, voids of any edification. Or a territory open to infinity, or in voids constituted in deserts, apotropaic or abandoned in a repetitive obsolescence, interstitial or imposed in centres. Or still a territory marked by cross of foundation, centred by axes and an orientation of the world, polarized by attractors, organized in a geography of otherness where a spatial dynamic and an unequal development impose on the architectural project to be inscribed in a morphogenesis in which it participates in processes of territorialisation, de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation of populations and activities, goods and services, as well as values and habitus. The architectural project would therefore respond to a social logic of space, today a logic of cities, metropolises and megalopolises, which would be at the basis of a logic of representations and centrations of the world.

3. Heritage and fashion

But all this presupposes an over-determination of the architectural project which seems to leave little room for what could be the equivalent in architecture of the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign as well as the free will of its designer. However, as with spoken language, we can distinguish between what is the order of the system of the "language" and what is the system of intercomprehension between contextual protagonists of the project. The forms in which one of the two protagonists, the "projeteur", conceives the project and to which it relates the signified of the drawing which he traces, are not necessarily, absolutely and in all the same as the forms to which the receiver relates what is for him the meaning of the project he receives, especially because these

forms are part of his heritage, his culture, his habits and desires more or less conscious. Thus the edifice produced by the architect is not necessarily received in all his architectural understanding by the inhabitant. It is enough that a level of understanding is that of the correspondence between the designer and the recipient of the project so that at least part of the intention passes in the communication of one to the other.

But here it is too a question of rethinking communication, since in an architectural work the distances between points of view and the discrepancies between encodings can leave open the interpretation and the interaction between the actors of the semiotic process. It is in fact on these shifts that the contemporary media space engages some of its actors and disengages others, and plays its partition in partitioning the world of the deceived spectators between "plugged" and disconnected. Having set the distinction as interaction value as well as value of missing, the fashion system leads its war of the false to the service of those who finance it. Information has become propaganda. In architecture, where the value of the object is not the truth value of a current world, but the fictitious value of an artefact projected into the projection of a possible world, made of weakness as well as power; these shifts are the places of a coveted value that do not say its presence; by shifting, the manipulation consists of naturalizing the meaning of the information, or what is given for its equivalent, the image.

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FROM THE SESSION "TO SEE, TO DESIGN, TO BUILD"

THE DESIGN OF MUSEUMS: A SEMIOTIC APPROACH

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Abstract

The space of museums is designed following criteria according to which artefacts are placed in specific relations among each other. The design of museums aims to give artefacts a specific meaning within space and time. The spatial dimension refers to relations with the present. Time refers to relations with the past (history) and the future (prognostication). The space of museums is organized by someone's will aiming at providing the meanings that are significant for the creator. To some extent, museums can be considered as a *text* in Lotmanian terms (1988a). However, museum is a text in process: this presumes a multiplicity of meanings within the text and the creation of multifaceted relations with other texts (Lotman 1982, 1988b). The unpredictability of the meaning of artefacts becomes predictability through the design of museum spaces, inside and outside. The design and organization of museum's spaces to convey special meaning is ruled by extra-textual rather than inner-textual systemic relations (Lotman 1977b). The order in museum is created to verify and change the relations of artefacts to the outer components (other museums, collections, visitors' interpretations). The aim of museums is not to preserve artefacts but to convey their potential meaning to the outside of the museum. Looking at the design of museum can be useful to classify and predict relations in current artistic environments.

1. Introduction and background of research

In today's Western culture, museums perform several functions: some of these functions are presumed to be more significant and are claimed as central (preservation, education); some others refer to communication processes between museum and spectators (opinion influence, branding, marketing and so on). This paper looks at museum's communication as a phenomenon that describes predictable outcomes of sender-receiver communication processes. As a phenomenon, the space of museums is designed following criteria according to which artefacts are placed in specific relations among each other.

Cultural studies have produced several terms and methodologies to approach art and artistic environments (Bolin 1992). Drawing on this approach, this paper aims to describe the principle

of modern art museums — a particular case of museum phenomena in culture — and then to assess its possible application to the artistic environment.

Modern art museums are specific kinds of museum. According to the Oxford Dictionary (2003, second edition), a "museum" is a conceptual (physical) space or a building whose function is to keep objects considered as "valuable" for a culture and display them. Following this definition, the main functions of museums are: preservation and restoration of the objects, education, analysis of objects and their values in a current society. Several experienced museum curators and art critics defined the function of museums as a target oriented meaning making process (e.g. Gopnik 2007, Bedford 2014). In *Mindful Museums*, Adam Gopnik explains:

> The model of the museum as mausoleum was already on its way out by the end of the 1950s. In its place came the model of the museum as machine. By "machine" I don't mean something mechanical, but something productive. I mean simply that a new idea had emerged of the museum as a place where you went to be transformed in another way — not a place where you went to commune with the past, but a place where you went to learn how to be modern (2007: n.p.).

This idea can explain the specific area of modern art museums and some specific departments and conceptual movements within them (for example, the Research and Learning Department at TATE Liverpool, UK). Modern art museums are created to convey specific meanings, e.g. to make objects to be perceived as artworks or even masterpieces. The space of museums is organized by someone's will aiming at providing the meanings that are significant for the creator.

In relation to modern art, Ward (2014) explained that contemporary art is something rather vogue to notice. Its main task for artists is to guide audiences to art's appreciation and consumption. The "new" practice of art consumption is, in fact, not different from art appreciation. The discussion about consumption brings to inherent functions of modern art museums as marketing and branding which are true practices of preservation and evaluation. Art is a form of product satisfying some needs of consumers, e.g. the need for emotional distress, relaxation and aesthetic satisfaction, or even catharsis. Moreover, the complex relation between art and spectators change the process of art creation itself.

Art is often represented in physical objects or tangible processes created by author(s) in a psychological process reflecting reality. However, nowadays (at least since Andy Warhol) public expectations make author(s) create more art products within less amount of time. This limits the time and quality of creative analysis. It also reduces the time allowed for receiving the messages of arts. That is why museum guides, while explaining artwork, simultaneously become part of the production of art. That leads the spectator to understanding and co-reflecting — in case we consider two types of meeting with art as quality and quantity ones. Museums and collections work on both.

Museum is an artificial space creating value among its artefacts (exhibits) influencing the position of artefacts in social aesthetics and its own axiological relations to other similar spaces (museums, galleries, exhibitions, collections and so on).

2. Research design and theoretical framework

This paper aims to draw parallels between the space of modern art museums, their representation and the influence they have on the artistic value of objects. Furthermore, it aims to highlight connections between museums and the artistic environment. The theoretical framework is based on methodologies developed by Tartu-Moscow Semiotic school, with a focus on text, systemic relations and predictability (Lotman 1977c).

The research design aims at addressing the following questions: (a) How does museum space influence the perception of artefacts? (b) How does museum space make audiences perceive artefacts as artworks? (c) How does museum space make people understand that some artwork is more valuable than others?

Answering this question can be useful to describe how museum space (on case of modern art museums) creates heritage narratives and convey them to spectators by navigating the flow of values in a given society. Modern art museums are fruitful cases for modeling, because they are easy to observe artistic environment, simple and transparent in structure, have a visible order/ structure and give fast visible results.

Therefore, pointing out the terminological aspects, the museum space here discussed is a concept that finds physical ideological equivalent in the idea of modern art museums. The museum space is a concept which can be present physically (building) or virtually (websites, network of websites, culture). The museum space is a way to communicate some message about artefacts (objects) that they are valuable and meaningful, that they are artworks.

In this extent museum can be considered as a *text* in Lotmanian definition. Museum space can be methodologically described as a text. The modeling of museum on the principle of text analysis can enlighten the structural connections among all museum's components and its functions as whole. Therefore, the artefacts can be compared with the smallest part of the text. Several features and functions of text can be enlightened, according to Lotman (1967, 1977, 1982, 1988, 1992): (a) text is expressed — it is fixed in some language/ sign system; (b) text is completed — it narrates some idea; (c) text is structuralized — it has inner organization.

However, museum is a *text* in process: this presumes a multiplicity of meanings within the text and the creation of multifaceted relations with other texts. The spatial dimension refers to relations with the present. Time refers to relations with the past (history) and the future (prognostication). Museum as the text has static and dynamic features. Static features can be considered as a story, in other words "what is text about". Dynamic features can be considered as a plot or narration, in other words "how is text develops for spectator from the beginning to the end". Accordingly, collection (quantity of artefacts) can be compared to the story of museum's text and exhibition (the correspondence between artworks) to its narration.

Museum as a space of contemporary art forms has some shape. Normally the shape of museum's existence corresponds with ideas of curators to convey some specific meaning. In this case, shape can be compared to narration. Narration of the texts presumes several inherent systems it belongs to. Narration is a fruit of some author. The author always gives a *subjective* representation of the reality therefore the representation of reality is subjective and has some policies. The policies are inclusive for some ideas and exclusive for another. The creative approach to the narration and composition makes museum artistic work itself. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the curator is an author who significantly influences final meaning of message visitor receives in museum space. This means that the unpredictability of artefacts' meanings becomes predictability through the design of museum spaces, inside and outside.

The so-called "machine museums" (Gopnik 2007: n.p.) is a term describing museum as a particular mechanism to make the appreciation of artefacts predictable. In other words, they make visitor think what the curator of exhibition wants. This topic was discussed by many researchers: for example, Dodd et al. (2012) undertook a qualitative research on European museums; the author described the strong influence in channelling visitors' opinions and even their will to come (or not) for the exhibition. This phenomenon can be considered as a model of communication. This communication model can be applied in other spheres which built according to museum space and give similar results.

Importantly, the design and organization of museum's spaces to convey special meaning is ruled by extra-textual rather than inner-textual systemic relations (Lotman 1967, 1977a). This can mean that the deep analysis of the features of artefacts cannot give understanding why an artwork in museum is culturally more valuable than others, or, even, what is the difference between museum collection and an exposition of art school. Meanwhile extra-textual systemic relations place the connections with other artefacts, created in past and presented nowadays, by other authors and the author herself. Therefore, extra-textual systemic relations give possibility to create the system (Lotman 1977a) of values in which artefact acquires the features in a system presented or meant to be present. The presented or meant to be presented values can be defined within categories in culture.

In brief, museum space support\influence the following meaning-making processes:

1. Artefact in relation to other artefacts (initial meaning)

2. Artefact in relation to the Museum's structure (meaning within the space)

3. The Museum in relation to other Museums (meaning within the time)

4. The Artefact through the Museum to other Artefacts (cultural meaning)

This can also be expressed in some formulas to simplify the analytical process. In the formulas, A is for "artefact" and M is for "museum space".

$A<=>A1, 2, 3…$
$A<=>M$
$M(A)<=>M1,2…$
$A(M)<=>A1(M1)$

3. Practical application to theoretical framework

To develop the feasibility of the theory presented in the previous sections, this section analyses three examples of modern art museums and their physical or metaphorical spaces. These examples are different in their nature, but function the same way in communication.

The first example relates to closer understanding of art and museum reality: the exposition "From selfie to self-expression" at the Saatchi gallery in London, UK. Saatchi gallery is the most present art gallery in social networks. For almost hundred years of its existence, the art gallery has managed to find and sponsor the authors with significant recognition in social and cultural context (e.g. Daniel Herst's "shark" was sponsored and first time exhibited in Saatchi).

1. $A>A1,2,3…$

The work of Dawn Woolley "The substitute (Holiday)" from Cambridge, UK, stated as winner of "From selfie to self-expression" competition and one of the central artefacts of the exposition.

2. $A>M$

This exhibition has the entire floor and the other solo exhibitions are grouped in thematic relation to support the idea of self-representation.

In the representation within museum space of Saatchi gallery the exposition "From selfie to self-expression" took place partly on the first and second floor of gallery building. The exposition had several parts: selfies of famous people (printed and placed on the walls as it used for classical art representation), artworks of stated (in artistic community) artists (placed on the walls in frames as it meant to be for classical art representation), the collection of printed photos and photo-collages of "selfie" competition (everyone was allowed to send their "artwork" via website of Saatchi gallery, over 14000 participants) and interactive Huawei sponsored screens and interactive panels (allowed to make selfie with some applications or see depiction of oneself).

In the representation within NOW within gallery museum space is drawn the systemic relations between old and new media (printed photo and interactive screen), representation of artefacts (framed static object and dynamic interacting screens), referring to the changes in tendencies of perception in culture/ This point the feature of Saatchi gallery exposition as progressive.

3. M(A)=>M1

In representation within PAST is drawn systemic relations to the all ever displayed in Saatchi gallery artworks, which makes to the same level or value the works presented for "selfies for the competition" and million pounds worth artworks. Saatchi did support and first expose the work of Damien Hirst's "The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living", therefore this is the most significant and influential modern art gallery in UK.

In representation NOW within museum space including other museums of modern art in UK and Western culture: Saatchi invited all the visitors to do pictures of exhibition and tag them with special word, therefore brining museum space of gallery to the Instagram platform and increasing audience covering up to the amount of gallery visitors. Therefore, in extra-textual systemic relations, being more presented virtually, museum space of Saatchi gallery has possibility to establish connections and convey meanings in relation to wider range of museums of modern art as well as possible cultural experiences of visitors and their followers within Instagram's communication platform.

4. A(M)>A1(M1)

The highlight of Selfie to Self-expression exhibition in Saatchi gallery has significant influence on the world culture, now the exhibition reached 113 countries and over 14000 entries. Being well represented via Instagram and Saatchi gallery web-site, the work of Dawn Wooley found wide audience. Many spectators evaluated it within their cultural background. That cause different reactions and will of visitors to follow the unique, Saatchi gallery stated, meaning of the selected Wooley's work over others. The cultural value of this artwork "The substitute (Holiday)" and Dawn Woolley increased together with brand value and marketing prospectively.

4. Conclusions and future perspectives

This paper aimed to describe in semiotic terms the phenomenon of museum and its design. The theoretical framework proved to be useful to classify and predict tendencies in artistic-like environments within Western culture. Looking at the design of museum space reveals the mechanism through which meanings and values are created around artefacts, making an object become an artwork. Audience is involved and ultimately navigated in co-creating the artistic text through social practices: this helps the adaptation of the text into the culture (Torop 1995). Audience often accepts artefact as culturally valuable.

This research can be continued within the idea that museums are not museums of objects, but museums of meanings and philosophy, when meaning is not grounded in any actual form.

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OBJECTS FROM THE FUTURE: A SEMIOTIC APPROACH TO DESIGN FICTION

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Abstract:

Design fiction challenges the meaning of everyday life objects to produce social critique (Dunne 1999). It is based on the creation of *diegetic prototypes*: fictional objects thought to solve real-life problems. The objective is to explore what a future technology might look like, but also to acquire a different look on the present. From a semiotic perspective, we could define the diegetic prototypes as "competences" for a potential subject, creating different possible narrative programs to explore – they are devices used to look into *possible worlds*, similar to ours, but irremediably distinct. Due to their fictive nature, the prototypes are objects with no use value, with the sole purpose of being texts, of representing a virtual set of possibilities, but that will always lay out of reach. Hence, we can consider them as *toys:* objects to be resemantised and which functions are limited to a fictional world. According to Lotman (1978), the indeterminacy of toys is meant to leave a space for interpretation, which allows players to *use* them, instead of interpreting. This paper aims at proposing a semiotic analysis of the concept of "design fiction" and to reconnect it to the broader idea of the modelling ability of playfulness (Lotman 1967).

1. From critical design to design fiction

This paper is a brief overview on a possible semiotic take on "design fiction". In order to explain what design fiction is, we have to situate it in the larger context of critical design, a practice based on the idea that design does not have to reinforce the status quo (which is what is made by affirmative design) but, at the contrary to challenge it. Critical design is rooted in several avant-garde movements active in the 1960s, such as Italian Radical Design. Radical design, which had a very political and experimental nature, consisted in an attempt of modifying modernism with utopian projects that challenged the contemporary idea of good taste. This movement had consequences on several later designers and theorists, such as Daniel Weil (Figure 1) and Ezio Manzini (one of the promoters of "design for social innovation").

Figure 1. "Bag Radio" by Daniel Weil

The idea of critical design, however, was first introduced by Anthony Dunne in his book *Hertzian Tales* (1999: XV), where he claims that:

> The primary purpose of this book is to set the scene for relocating the electronic product beyond a culture of relentless innovation for its own sake, based simply on what is technologically possible and semiologically consumable, to a broader context of critical thinking about its aesthetic role in everyday life.

The basic idea, therefore, is that design can – and should – have functions other than simply imagining basic solutions: it can be the basis for a wider reflection about our society and about its possible alternatives. The idea of critical design was rather successful and gave birth to several other currents, such as speculative design, which is more abstract-oriented, critical play (see Mary Flanagan 2009), which focuses on digital gameplay as a way to trigger critical thinking, and critical making (Ratto 2008), which unites material crafting to critical design.

Design fiction, in particular, is a form of speculative design – and sometimes of critical making – with a particular focus on the future. The concept was theorised by sci-fi writer Bruce Sterling in his 2005 book *Shaping Things*. The book deals with how design influenced his fiction writing and, vice versa, what fiction has to offer to design thinking.

> Design fiction reads a great deal like science fiction; in fact, it would never occur to a normal reader to separate the two. The core distinction is that design fiction makes more sense on the page than science fiction does. Science fiction wants to invoke the grandeur and credibility of science for its own hand-waving hocus-pocus, but design fiction can be more practical, more hands-on. It sacrifices some sense of the miraculous, but it moves much closer to the glowing heat of technosocial conflict Sterling (2005: 30).

In practice, design fiction activities are based on the creation of fictional objects or *diegetic prototypes* (Kirby 2010): thought to solve real-life problems in a more or less realistic future. Their objective, then, is to explore what a future technology might look like, but also to acquire a different look on the present and at its moral dilemmas.

The use of an object in order to think critically about the future has two main strengths. The first one is that it makes it easier to focus on change than I would be through a more generic approach. While trying to imagine how the societies of the future might be like can be overly dispersive, a single object, and the practices related to it, will be sharper and more coherent. The second strength is that the object, thanks to its fictional nature, eases the suspension of disbelief that is necessary to imagine a future different from what we might expect (Ferri 2016).

Practices of design fiction, even if not always called with this name, are nowadays rather common. One of the most notable examples can be the series of "Microsoft productivity future vision" several clips that, even if they are not promoting any specific Microsoft product, explore possible future technologies and therefore propose the specific vision of the future by Microsoft.

2. A case study: The Thing from the Future

To see in detail how design fiction works, let us approach a case study: *The Thing from the Future*. Despite the fact it is labelled as a game *The Thing from the Future* is in fact a design deck used to spur bottom-up design fiction. It was created by the Situation Lab, based in Toronto and formed by Stuart Candy and Jeff Watson. The cards are used to create a prompt that gives some instructions for the creation of an object that then will be imagined and prototyped by the players.

In order to create this prompt a card of each of the four types is needed. There are green cards indicating a temporal arch, i.e. in what kind of future the object will be used, utopic, dystopic, close, far etc.; blue cards indicating a terrain, i.e. a context, place or topic area; red cards indicating the general shape of the object; and purple cards indicating the emotions that the thing from the future might evoke in an observer from the present (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. prompt formed with "The Thing from The Future" cards.

Starting from a set of four cards, the players have to invent, for example, an object that is used one thousand years from now, in a world in continuing economic and technological growth that has something to do with reproduction, is shaped like a candy and that a today's viewer can find confusing. One possibility, proposed and prototyped in a workshop of the situation lab along many others, would be the *Insta-preg* – pregnancy pills that allow women swallowing them to be impregnated with a child with the characteristics of their choice (Figure 3).

Figure 3. "Insta-preg" pills: a diegetic object created by the Situation Lab.

It is self-evident that this object is the product of an action of critical design: a diegetic prototype. It focuses on a future scenario – which can be positive or negative – and put its possible outcomes in front of today viewers, so to make them question their values and wonder. Are these possible outcomes desirable or not? If yes, what should we do in order to proceed in that direction? If they are not desirable, what should we do to avoid them?

3. A semiotic approach to Design Fiction

Ferri (2016) proposes one of the first semiotic approaches to design fiction, and in particular to its relationships with playful practices. Ferri does not provide a semiotic analysis of the practice, but he rather calls for a dialogue between semiotics, speculative design and pervasive games, which, in his opinion, is highly desirable in order to improve the efficiency of critical design.

What I will attempt to, in this last paragraph, is to analyse the semiotic workings of design fiction, and, in this way, to deconstruct it. This should allow us, on the one hand, to understand better, what this design practice entails and how it works and, on the other hand, to underline what are the features that make it effective.

Let us start with the diegetic prototypes. From a greimasian narrative perspective, we can define them as "competences". They allow the subjects using them to perform actions that, without them, would be impossible. For example, the *Insta-Preg* pills (fictionally) allow a woman to become pregnant without the need of anything (or anybody) else. These competences open, for their potential subjects, different possible narrative programs to explore: the objects might be used or not, exploited in several ways or in different contexts and so on. The *Insta-preg* pills, continuing with this example, can be used to generate different types of children, but also to impregnate someone against their will. We can imagine that these pills might be very expensive, and therefore available only to rich elites, or, at the contrary, that they might be easily found in every supermarket, and so on. In this way, a series of possibilities arises around the object, forcing us to reconstruct an increasingly larger context. The several narrative programs that spring from the diegetic prototype, therefore, are a primary way of building and exploring what Eco

(1979) calls a "possible world", that will be in some measure similar to ours, but at the same time irremediably distinct. The object, then, becomes the starting point for the construction of a specific image of the future.

We must not forget, however, that despite its critical aims, this practice, as the name says, deals with fiction. Possible worlds are fictional by definition, no matter how much realistic and similar to ours they may be. In fact, every projection of the future that we make *is* a fictional possible world. As we cannot know for certain what tomorrow holds for us, what we do is imagine a fictional world that is believable enough that there is at least some possibilities for it to become reality.

The diegetic prototypes themselves are fictional too: they are objects with no use value, they obviously do not work (the *Insta-preg* pills are empty), they merely represent what future objects could be like. From a textual perspective, then, the purpose of diegetic prototypes is that of representing something that does not exist and to confer to it, thanks to textual strategies, a set of virtual possibilities that are however denied to the object itself.

There is, in fact, a word to define exactly this sort of objects: they are *toys* – objects to be resemantised and whose functions are limited to a fictional world. Due to their purposes, we could call them "critical toys". This definition, however, has several entails in regard with the idea of what design fiction is. According to Lotman (1978), the indeterminacy of toys is meant to leave a space for the players' interpretation. If a toy is too detailed, it is not a toy any more, but a statue. Toys are *incomplete texts*. The critical aspect of design fiction, therefore, is not exhausted with the creation of the object, on the contrary: these objects are a trigger for critical thinking to be carried out by its viewers. The latter will also explore narrative programs and build possible words using the diegetic prototype as a starting point. In this way, the critical purposes of the objects are fulfilled by multiple subjects multiplying their efficacy.

In conclusion, if the term "design fiction" underlines the importance of design thinking in the creation of objects that can be used for reflecting on the future, it would be a mistake to see it as a mere form of *autocommunication* that terminates with the realisation of the diegetic prototype. On the contrary, the toy-nature of the latter makes it the centre of an action of abstract critical play that involves several subjects, the viewers, and forces them to wonder about the future.

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CULTURAL HERITAGES

FROM THE SESSION "PERFORMATIVITY/ ICONICITY"

RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS IN THE OLD ENGLISH TRADITION[1]

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Abstract

The paper highlights the issues of acceptance of Occidental Christianity by Anglo-Saxons and as a result it caused the change of their religious worldview. So, the author indicates that the transfer of information, which excludes pagan connotations, has an influence on the choice of the word "cross" in the Anglo-Saxon Christian culture. However, the belief in pagan deities was not damaged under the influence of evangelization, and the reference to widely revered god *Woden* indicates it. The article also shows that the Old English bestiary, unlike the other bestiaries, does not represent a vast description of various living and nonliving creatures, but it retains the main message of the Physiologist - a description of the kind of living / non-living creature from the point of view of Christian morality.

1. The principles of the Old English bestiary

To date, there are more than 150 bestiaries in literature, distinguishable by territorial features, which are based on distinctive mythological stories. Bestiaries are a set of articles describing one or another kind of animal in the sense of moral lessons. Thus, in Christian bestiaries, animals can be conditionally referred to the divine creation and, naturally, to diabolical origin. Proceeding from such a traditional division of the world into a good and evil beginning, the meaning of the bestiary consists in a strict delineation of the characteristic acts of God and the Devil through allegorical fictional stories.

The Greek treatise *The Physiologus*, relating to the II - III centuries, is the basis for the following bestiaries. The pages of this Alexandrian treatise tell of various mythical and real animals, birds, and also about magic stones. The popularity of this treatise contributed to its translation into the Latin language by the IV-V centuries, then to the IX-X *The Physiologus* became widely known in Western Europe (Dines 2007:37). Consequently, such renown of the treatise is due

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precisely to its translation into Latin. Thus, an unknown author translated a fragment of this translation into Old English, which came to our days as a part of the anthology of Anglo-Saxon poetry of the 10th century, *The Exeter Book*. This translation includes the following three poems (or, as it is also considered, this is one poem consisting of three parts): *The Panther*, personifying Christ, *The Whale*, represented as the image of the Devil, and *The Partridge* (Jones 2012:14). Researchers tend to think that this instructive poem is related, as a rule, to the period from the end of the IX century and the middle or the end of the 10th century, therefore, this bestiary is rightfully considered the earliest version of *The Physiologus* in England (Rossi-Reder 1999:462). Thus the Old English bestiary, unlike the other bestiaries, does not represent a vast description of various living and non-living beings, but it retains the main message of *The Physiologus* - a description of the kind of living / non-living creature from the point of view of Christian morality. In the first part of this poetic text Christ is represented in the form of a panther, the second part sheds light on the image of the Devil described as a whale, and, as in the third part, sinners and their future fate are mentioned. The choice of these living creatures by the unknown poet was not accidental, because they represent the inhabitants of the three elements created by God: the earth (panther), water (whale), air (bird). The three parts of one poem symbolize the death of Christ in the salvation of people and His resurrection. So, in *The Panther* it is symbolically told about the death of Christ, His descent into Hell and resurrection from the dead. *The Whale* tells about the souls of sinners who fall into Hell. The final part, *The Partridge*, describes the day of the Last Judgment, when souls of sinners and the righteous people will appear before God (Rossi-Reder 1999:467). As the Bible says, "And she shall bring forth a son, and thou shalt call his name JESUS: for he shall save his people from their sins" (Matthew 1:21). Therefore, the God-man Jesus is Christ, the Savior bringing with him a new, corrected state of the whole world being, He is the intermediary between Heaven and Earth.

1.1. Pagan's world view

It is worthwhile to turn to the Christianization of the island of Great Britain, as this will shed light on the further representation of the image of Jesus Christ in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. In the first half of the 7th century on the island of Britain, namely the kingdom of the Angles Northumbria, through the Irish missionaries (the Church in Ireland was approved already in the 5th century), Christianity and, as a consequence, the Latin alphabet and Latin literature penetrated. Undoubtedly, the preaching of the new faith did not proceed favorably for the Anglo-Saxons, who were accustomed to praying to their gods, because it was rather a psychological breakdown due to the rejection of the usual past worldview. Anglo-Saxons represented the world as *Miðgarðr* and Útgarðar. Let us turn to their understanding of the center of the world *(The Old Germanic midjan-gardaz* literally "the middle fenced place"), so, Yu. S. Stepanov notes, referring to his follower S. G. Proskurin, that the center of the world of the ancient Germans is marked as the mythical tree *Yggdrasill* in the North German (Norse), as the mythology pillar *Irminsul* in the Germanic paganism of the Saxon people, as the highest mountain *Asgardr* (where Æsir (the gods) live) in Norse mythology. S.G. Proskurin notes the German word *midjan-gardaz* with the meaning of *the middle world* (which literally reads through S. G. Proskurin as "center, middle of the world"), as correlating more with a horizontal view of the world, where the middle part (Miðgarðr) contrasts with others frightening worlds, the abode of gods and demons (Útgarðar) (Stepanov, 2004 (a) :93) (see: (Proskurin 1990).

1.1.1. The most revered gods in pagandom

The most revered gods for the Germans were *Odin* (the supreme god) and his sons *Týr* (the god of military prowess) and *Thor* (the god of thunder and storm). It is noteworthy that at one time

Jacob Grimm noted (1844-1854) that Christ was perceived in the early stages of Christianization as the ancient German god of storms, thunder and fertility - Thor, and his equipment was the hammer *Mjölnir*. In this case, the hammer imitates the cross. After Christianization words with the meaning of *tree-cross* referring to the pagan picture of the world view were replaced by neutral borrowing *cross*, which didn't have any pagan connotations. At the moment, three sources of borrowing the word *cross* are being discussed: 1. "crux" (Latin word); 2. "cros" (Norman word, previously borrowed from Latin, "crux"); 3. "cros" (the Irish word, which entered the vocabulary of the English language thanks to the Irish missionaries) (Crystal 2004:31). The information transfer factor, excluding pagan connotations, influenced the choice of the word "cross" in English Christian culture.

As for one of the most revered Æsir, who was Odin, I note that the Germans had a tendency to erect ancestors' names to that supreme god, even after the process of Christianity. Thus, they tended to show that Odin was the progenitor of their people. Here is a fragment of the excerpt from The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, dated by A.D. 855; it is a list of names, rising to Odin, Adam and to Christ:

> "<...> On se Ęþelwulf wæs Ecgbrehting, Ecgbryht Ealhmunding, Ealhmund Eafing, Eafa Eopping, Eoppa Ingilding; Ingild wæs Ines broþur Westseaxna cyninges, þæs þe eft ferde to Sancte Petre 7 þær eft his feorh gesealde; 7 hie wæron Cenredes suna, Cenred wæs Ceolwalding, Ceolwald Cuþaing, Cuþa Cuþwining, CuþwineCeaulining, Ceawlin Cynricing, Cynric Cerdicing, Cerdic Elesing, Elesa Esling, Esla Giwising, Giwis Wiging, Wig Freawining, Freawine Friþogaring, Friþogar Bronding, Brond Bęldæging, Bęldæg Wodening , Woden Friþowalding, Friþuwald Freawining, Frealaf Friþuwulfing, Friþuwulf Finning, Fin Godwulfing, Godwulf Geating, Geat Tętwaing, Tętwa Beawing, Beaw Sceldwaing, Sceldwea Heremoding, Heremod Itermoning, Itermon Hraþraing, se wæs geboren in þære earce: Noe, Lamach, Matusalem, Enoh, Iaered, Maleel, Camon, Enos, Sed, Adam primus homo et pater noster est Christus, Amen <...>" (The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: An Electronic Edition (Vol 5) literary edition).

Consequently, the belief in the pagan gods was not completely eroded under the influence of missionary activity. This, by the way, is evidenced by the excerpts from, in which the name of the supreme god of the Anglo-Saxons is interspersed, for example, excerpts from The Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, which are dated by 449, 552, 597, 626 years. (See this in more details: Proskurina 2013).

2. The image of Jesus Christ

Throughout the history of Christianity, the image of Jesus Christ was represented in different ways; it is possible that such a different image of God is associated with a euphemism, i.e. do not use Lord's name vainly. S.G. Proskurin notes that early Christians portrayed Him in the form of fish, because this image was the closest to the creators of The New Testament in the ancient Greek language, and also to the earlier translation of The Septuagint, because it was correlated as an anagram or as a shortened record, acrostic about Jesus Christ in ancient Greek with the word ΙΧΘΥΣ (fish) (Proskurin 2013:175-176). The crucifixion started to be used as a cult object approximately since the 5th century. Before the appearance of the Romanesque style (the 11th – 12th centuries), the cross was considered as a symbol of resurrection, and not as a sign of the suffering of Jesus. Then, until the middle of the 12th century, Christ was portrayed as triumphant, with an absolutely calm expression. However, after the 12th century in His appearance features of the sufferer began to be traced, and by the middle of the 14th century such features finally fixed for the next centuries. Namely from this period the image of Jesus Christ appears as a man who is tormented by suffering (Proskurin, Tsentner 2014:51-52). Consequently, the replacement of one image of Christ by another is an evolutionary semiotic series. In such series Yu S. Stepanov groups cultural objects (things) which are connected by metamorphic relations – the later replaces the earlier one by performing its function or (and sometimes simultaneously with the

function) adopting its form. Naturally, the "thing" in the literal sense of the word is not a concept, it, as already indicated, embodies the concept, and serves as its sign, which gives grounds to call such series as evolutionary-semiotic series. In the literal sense, it is precisely the concepts that evolve: representations of people about what the corresponding thing should be, and the intentions of those who produce this thing (plans, designs) (Stepanov 2004 (b): 11). Let us imagine schematically evolutionary-semiotic series of the most famous images of Jesus Christ during the first mention of the anagram of Christ by the first Christians to the 14ᵗʰ century: the word ΙΧΘΥΣ (fish) → Thor (with the hammer Mjölnir) the rebirth of Christ from the dead → Jesus as a panther → Christ triumphant → Jesus Christ as the sufferer. Mircea Eliade defines the image of Jesus Christ in the tradition: telling the world about the deity of Jesus Christ, the first Christians implied His historicism. That did not mean that Jesus was not regarded as a person of history, but above all it was stressed that He was the Son of God, the universal Savior who granted redemption not only to the human race, but to all Nature. Moreover, His ascension to heaven and His communion with the divine glory (Eliade 2010:167) transcendently overcome the historical authenticity of the person of Jesus.

2.1. The image of Jesus Christ in the Old English bestiary

Returning to the Old English poem, it is worthwhile once again to pay attention to the figure of Christ, allegorically presented in the image of a panther. Here it is said that the all-merciful Christ, who loves all living beings, except the Devil, descended into hell and on the third day rose again. The story reference to the three days (nights) is rather interesting, it is about the panther who spends this time in a dream (see lines 35 to 54), and then describes its awakening, so this description is a symbolic narrative of the death of Christ and His resurrection. This little moralizing narrative of the works of the Lord God follows at the very end of the poem, thereby drawing a parallel between the images of Christ and the panther (hereinafter the original text is presented in Jones 2012).

35. Symle, fylle fægen, þonne fōddor þigeð,
æfter þām gereordum ræste sēceð,
dȳgle stōwe under dūnscrafum;
ðǣr se þēo[d]wiga þrēonihta fæc
swifeð on swe[o]fote, slǣpe gebiesga[d].
40. Þonne ellenrōf ūp āstondeð, þrymme
gewelga[d], on þone þriddan dæg,
snēome of slǣpe. Swēghlēoþor cymeð,
wōþa wynsumast, þurh þæs wildres mūð;
æfter þære stefne stenc ūt cymeð
45. of þām wongstede— wynsumra stēam,
swēttra and swīþra, swæcca gehwylcum,
wyrta blōstmum and wudublēdum,
eallum æþelīcra eorþan frætw[um].
Þonne of ceastrum and cynestōlum
50. and of burgsalum beornþrēat monig
farað foldwegum folca þrȳþum;
ēoredcystum, ofestum gefȳsde,
dareðlācende —dēor [s]wā some—
æfter þære stefne on þone stenc farað.

35. When it partakes of food, after that meal, happy from feasting, it always seeks out as a resting spot places hidden deep in caves among the mountains; there the people's champion, overcome by sleep, dozes in a slumber for the space of three nights. 40. Then on third day, the boldly courageous creature rises up swiftly from the sleep, adorned with majesty. A melodious noise, most delightful of sounds, comes from the mouth of the untamed creature. Following that voice, an aroma issues from the place, a breath more delightful, more sweet and potent than every fragrance, tan the flowering herbs or blossoms on the trees, more refined than all the treasures of earth. 49. Then, out of cities and royal households, and out of fortified halls, many a host in throngs of people, chosen companies, warriors journey the paths of earth, troops driven with haste; animals likewise travel toward the aroma in the wake of that voice.

However, throughout the first part of the poem, there are repeatedly held subject references to Jesus Christ.

15. Sē is ǣ[g]hwām frēond, duguða ēstig, būtan dracan ānum; þām hē in ealle tīd andwrāð leofaþ, þurh yfla gehwylc þe hē geæfnan mæg.	15. The animal is a friend to everyone, gracious in its favors exept to the serpent alone, against which it lives perpetually in a state of hostility, on account of every evil that it [the serpent] can do.

While describing the panther's skin (see line 21), the author refers the reader to the biblical story about Joseph and his colorful clothes, thereby drawing a parallel between his garment and the shiny animal skin: þætte *Iōsēphes tunece* (that Joseph's tunic). Joseph's identification with Christ is a common occurrence in Anglo-Saxon moral and educational works; therefore, comparing the panther with Joseph, the unknown author also strengthens the parallel between the panther and Christ (Rossi-Reder 1999: 468). Consequently, the sacred image of the animal in the first part of the Old English poem appears as a certain image, which narrates about the life and death of the Lord God.

2.2. The image of the Devil and sinners in the Old English bestiary

Let us turn to the rest of the poem – *The Whale and The Partridge*, describing the image of the Devil and sinners. Academician Yu. S. Stepanov notes the following: if the imp, the word and the concept connect us to the deep layers of the national Slavic culture, then the Devil and Satan as cultural concepts include us in the culture of Europe (Stepanov 2004 (a):886).

The Devil, represented in the form of a whale in the second part of the poem, now and then inclines people, who have departed from the commandments of the Lord, to sin. The poem includes (as such apostates) navigators who swallowed by the large whale jaws, which symbolize hell.

It is interesting to note the parallel between eating panther and whale. As we remember from the previous context, the panther eats his meal calmly and gracefully, but the whale endowed with a brutal appetite, continuously absorbs the souls of unhappy sinners. Again, as in the first part of the poem, a scent that attracts seafarers is described, but in this case sinners cannot distinguish the true smell which is emanating from the panther from what the whale produces. Thus, contrasted in the poem are the deeds of Christ and the Devil, their eternal opposition.

51.Þonne hine on holme hunger bysgað, and þone āglǣcan ǣtes lysteþ, ðonne se mereweard mūð ontȳneð, wīde weleras; cymeð wynsum stenc 55. of his innoþe, þætte ōþre þurh þone, sǣfisca cynn, beswicen weorðaþ. Swimmað sundhwate þǣr se swēta stenc ūt gewīt[e]ð. Hī þǣr in farað, unware weorude, oþþæt se wīda ceafl 60. gefylled bið; þonne fǣringa ymbe þā herehūþe hlemmeð tōgædre grimme gōman. Swā biþ gumena gehwām se þe oftost his unwærlīce, on þās lǣnan tīd, līf biscēawað: 65. lǣteð hine beswīcan þurh swētne stenc, lēasne willan, þæt hē biþ leahtrum fāh wið Wuldorcyning.	51. When hunger oppresses it at sea and the awful creature wants something to eat, the guardian of the ocean then opens its mouth, its lips wide; a pleasant fragrance issues from its insides, so that other kinds of fish in the sea are beguiled by it, swim confidently toward the source of the sweet smell. 58. In a heedless company, they enter in there until the wide maw is filled up; then suddenly the cruel jaws slam shut around the spoils. So it is for every man who too often regards with insufficient care his life in this fleeting age, who allows himself to be beguiled by sweet aroma, an illusory pleasure, so that he becomes guilty of sins against the king of glory.

In the final, third part of the poem *The Partridge* tells that any sinner can be forgiven if he turns to the Lord God.

5. In swā hwylce tiid swā gē mid trēowe tō mē
on hyge hweorfað, and gē hellfirena
sweartra geswīcað, swā ic symle tō ēow
mid siblufan sōna gecyrre
þurh milde mōd; gē bēoð mē siþþan
10. torhte, tīrēadge, talade and rīmde,
beorhte gebrōþor on bearna stǣl.

5. In whatever time you turn to me in your mind, by means of faith, and give up dark, hellish acts of sin, so will I immediately turn toward you in gentle disposition, with familial love. After that, to me you will be numbered
9. and reckoned as resplendent and gloriously blessed, radiant brethren in my children's place.

Therefore, in the above-mentioned parts of the Old English poem, the eternal question of the righteous life of the sinful person is raised: "how should one live so as not to go to hell"? What is the concept of sin? Let us turn to the dictionary of Russian culture written by Yu. S. Stepanov. The concept, by definition of Academician Stepanov, is not only conceived, but is also experienced; it is the main cell of culture in the mental world of a person. The concept is a subject of emotions, sympathies and antipathies (Stepanov 2004 (a): 43). Consequently, ideas, reflections, experiences, etc. of a sinner about sins and the degree of his (her) own sinfulness is the concept of sin. Certainly, that the comprehension, acceptance and atonement of sin by a person depends on the depth of his religious enlightenment.

3. The concept of sin in the Anglo-Saxon world view

The Old English lexeme *synn* "sin", according to the etymological dictionary (Holthausen, 1974: 340), is interpreted as follows: *synn* – sin, wine; crime, injustice; insult, feud; English *sin*, Old Frisian *sende*, Old Saxon *sundae*, Old High German *suntea*, Norse *synd*, refers to Old Saxon and Old High German *sunnea* –hindrance, need, Norse *syn* – negation, Latin *sons* –guilty.

The concept of sin in the Anglo-Saxon picture of the world, with the adoption of Christianity, is directly reflected in the lexemes of the language. Based on *A Concise Anglo-Saxon Dictionary* and *An Anglo-Saxon dictionary*, (Baker, 2007)), I give the main 35 nouns that denote the concept of SIN. In this article, only nouns are considered, this is due to my research interest in the field of various denominations of sin (the names of sinful deeds and the names of signs defining sinners were deliberately excluded from the study, as this will serve as material for the following works).

So, with the process of adoption of Western Christianity, at least 35 nouns reflect the concept of sin in the Old English language. Let us present an illustrative example of the lexeme *morþdæd* – murder, deadly sin, crime (Old English contexts are represented by *An Anglo-Saxon dictionary*, based on the manuscript collections of the late Joseph Bosworth).

"Hé gewenede swá hine sylfne tó heora synlícum þeáwum and tó márum morǽdǽdum mid ðam mánfullum flocce. . . Swá férde se cniht on his fraceþum dǽdum and on morǽdǽdum micclum gestrangod on orwénnysse his ágenre hǽle, Ælfc. T. Grn. 17, 18-24" (He reconciled with them, with sinners, with their mortal sins and with that evil society. Then this young man was plunged into his misdeeds and mortal sin, but he triumphed over despair and his fortune).

"Wearþ ðes þeódscype swýðe forsyngod. . . Þurh morǽdǽda and þurh mándǽda, Wulfst. 163, 21" (The value of this penance is that the sinner ... with its help is cleansed of both mortal sin and crime).

Consequently, the concept "sin" directly varies from the depth of religious knowledge, from the adoption of Gospel wisdom, regardless of the social status of the sinner.

1	ægylt	sin, offence, a breach or violation of the law, a trespass fault
2	bealudæd	evil, deed sin
3	culpa	fault, sin
4	déaþfiren	deadly sin
5	deáþscyld	crime worthy of death a death-fault capital crime
6	eftforgiefnes	remission, forgiveness of sin
7	eofot	crime, sin, guilt
8	fácen - (facnes/-)	deceit, fraud, treachery, sin, evil, crime, blemish, fault
9	fácendæd	sin, crime
10	firen	Transgression, sin, crime, outrage, violence, torment, suffering
11	firenleahter	great sin
12	firensynn	great sin
13	firenweorc	evil, deed sin
14	frumscyld	original sin
15	godscyld	sin against God impiety
16	gylting	sin
17	heáfodleahter	a capital offence, mortal sin
18	heáhsynn	deadly sinn crime
19	heáfodgylt	a capital crime deadly sin
20	níðsynn	grievous sin
21	morðor	deed of violence, murder, homicide, manslaughter, mortal sin, crime, injury, punishment, torment, misery
22	morþdæd	murder, deadly sin, crime
23	synbend	bond of sin
24	synbót	penance amends for sin
25	synbryne	burning ardor of sin, sinful passion
26	synbyrðen	burden of sin
27	syndæd	a sinful deed sin, wicked act
28	synleahter	stain of sin, a sinful fault sin
29	synléaw	injury caused by sin, sinful injury
30	synn	sin, guilt, crime
31	synnlust	desire to sin, sinful desire or pleasure lust
32	synrúst	canker of sin, the foulness of sin
33	synwracu	the punishment for sin
34	synwund	wound of sin, a wound inflicted by sin
35	wróht	blame, reproach, accusation, slander, fault, crime, sin, injustice, strife, enmity, anger, contention, dispute, hurt, injury, calamity, misery

Table 1. The concept SIN in the Anglo-Saxon worldview.

Conclusion

The religious scheme of the individual, represented in bestiary, is distinctive: pages of allegorical stories tell of various mythical and real animals, birds, and also about magic stones. In the Old English bestiary, however, the scheme of the individuality is viewed through the prism of real living beings personifying Jesus Christ (panther), the Devil (serpent, whale), and the souls of sinners (fish). Let us note that the image of Christ is the most individual. Thus, the description of the panther is presented in more detail; its image in the Old English tradition appears more perfect. The description of the semiotic classification of the images of Christ, the Devil and sinners is possible due to the modified *The Porphyrian tree*, proposed by Yu. S. Stepanov. *The Porphyrian tree* is a classification of the natural world, which indicates an increase in the degree of the individuality of the object, as the number of the heading increases (1-2.1-2.2.1) (Proskurin 2013: 45).

Thus, Yu. S. Stepanov formulated the following semantics statement which is fundamental for linguistics: the genus-species classification principle (whatever it is) is an abstraction of the relations of the genus and species in living nature. The larger the group number, the greater the degree of the individual it sets (and requires) in the language for the names it includes (Stepanov 1981:76).

Figure 1. Semiologic taxonomy of nouns (Stepanov, 1981).

So, the animals personifying the Devil and sinners are poor signs, or a weak degree of the individuality, because their body parts are little opposed to each other, i.e. in the text of the Old English bestiary there is no detailed description of their appearance, activity and abilities. While the image of the Son of God appears in the text as a maximally rich sign, which includes both the description and appearance, and the activity and abilities of the panther. Therefore, the image of Jesus Christ is vividly contrasted with the depiction of the Devil, which is a consequence of the developed Christian tradition of the Old English period.

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FROM THE SESSION "RECONCEPTUALIZING CULTURAL HERITAGE IN THE SEMIOSPHERE"

FEMALE PORTRAIT IN POLISH PAINTING 1897-1956. HERITAGE AS CONTEXT FOR INTERPRETATION

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Abstract

The article considers the way in which visual texts are interpreted firstly against the pragmatic background called broadly *heritage* and secondly, according to the rules of *the rhetoric of the image*, the idea forwarded by Roland Barthes (1964/1977) but well-grounded in theoretical considerations of art historians (Panofsky, Gombrich, Porębski). The author describes a corpus of twelve paintings created between 1897 and 1956 by outstanding Polish artists related to the Cracovian milieu, all united by the common theme of *womanhood*. She analyses the import of the local cultural, social and religious contexts (the component parts of the Polish national heritage) on the "reading" of those pictorial texts.

In what concerns the rhetoric of the image, the author utilizes her own three-layered model of interpretation, close in spirit to Barthesian taxonomy, and which consists of: a) literal, b) figurative and c) allegorical level. Extending Giambattista Vico's tropological circle (1744), she postulates ten *master tropes* of artistic imagination that shape both verbal and visual texts (metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, irony, simile, antithesis, catachresis, euphemia, hyperbole and suppression), treating them as *stylistic universals* operative on the level of figuration (cf. Chrzanowska-Kluczewska 2013, 2017). The appearance of new ways of representing reality (e.g. Cubism-Formism or Expressionism juxtaposed with Impressionism or Symbolism) can be likened to Lotmanian *explosions* in the *semiosphere*. Heritage must be perceived as a dynamic phenomenon, a cluster of ideas evolving in time and helping in *recontextualization* of previously produced texts of culture.

1. Heritage and the interpretation of visual texts – late 19th and 20th-century Polish female portraiture

Womanhood in the mostly urban (predominantly Cracovian) setting, as seen through the eyes of outstanding Polish painters, representatives of various artistic currents – from the late 19th-century Impressionism and Art Nouveau symbolism, through Cubism, Expressionism-Colourism

to post-World War II Social Realism – can be analysed from several perspectives. My considerations intend to focus mostly on the issue to what extent the concept of *heritage* – as widely and often uncritically accepted historical and cultural setting (cf. Lowenthal 1996/1998) –   imparts the meaning to those portraits.

Assuming the portraits to be described below were *decontextualized*, in the sense of being deprived of the background knowledge of the Polish and specifically Cracovian-centred cultural tradition, the Polish national identity and collective memory, would they still be readable and fully meaningful as texts? Heritage is understood here as the way of *contextualizing* pictorial texts and *recontextualizing* them again, especially within the Lotmanian border zones, where *explosions*, i.e. novelties are bound to happen (Lotman 1992/2009). Heritage in itself is also a dynamic concept, evolving in time and crucially dependent on the historical, political and social circumstances. As a pragmatic notion it is closely related to the artists' and viewers' encyclopaedic knowledge of the surrounding reality, their ideological stance, social awareness and aesthetic sensibility.

2. *Paratext* in the interpretation of paintings

A subsidiary subject, closely related to the problem of how to "read" visual texts of the fine arts is a semiotic influence of the *titles* given to the pictures on their interpretation, an issue related to the constitution of *museum discourse*. The titles fulfil two opposing functions: on the one hand, they help the viewer to understand the content of the visual representation, on the other they often impose interpretation on the receiver. It is worth remembering that the titles rarely come from the painters themselves but are creations of museum curators, art merchants, collectors and even poets (this, for instance, was the case of Blaise Cendrars inventing titles to some works by his friend Marc Chagall). We should be aware of a potentially persuasive, if not straightforwardly manipulative, function of the verbal paratext that accompanies pictorial texts and often participates in shaping their rhetorical potential.

3. Multilayered reading of paintings

A well-known hierarchy of readings of the visuals was postulated by Roland Barthes ([1964] 1977: 52-68) in his essay "The third meaning". The following three levels of interpretation were distinguished:

1. *the informational level* ("the first semiotics"), which roughly corresponds to what in art history is traditionally referred to as the *iconographic level*;

2. *the symbolic level* ("the second semiotics", including symbols as well as allegorical readings, if any), which corresponds roughly to the *iconological level* of art historians;

3. *the third meaning/the obtuse meaning* ("the third semiotics") – a supplementary reading, highly connotative and subjective, difficult to voice, extending "outside culture, knowledge, information" (Barthes 1977: 55), erratic and carnivalesque in nature; a set of intangible impressions, probably even difficult to voice.

Similarly, in Chrzanowska-Kluczewska (2012), I postulate to stylistically analyse works of figurative painting on three levels of representation, in the spirit of several debates held by art historians but extending their widely accepted subdivision of the painterly work into the *iconographic* (*basic, primary, denotational*) *level* and the *iconological* (*secondary, connotative*) *level* (after Panofsky [1939]1964; Gombrich 1996; Porębski [1980] 2009). The levels I distinguish are as follows:

4. *literal* – iconographic (where *symbols* can appear);

5. *figurative* – iconological (inclusive of major tropes such as *metaphor, metonymy, synecdo-*

che, irony, etc., cf. Section 4);

6. *allegorical* – iconological (where particularizing and generalizing allegories can be additionally distinguished).

Hence, I have slightly reorganized Barthesian taxonomy, mostly in what concerns the position of symbols. Barthes believed them to be present on the second level of interpretation yet our taxonomy allows for their appearance already within "the first semiotics". Taken together, symbols, tropes and allegories ("connotators") constitute what Barthes (1977: 32-51) called *the rhetoric of the image.*

4. Figuration in painted texts – *master tropes* of artistic language and vision

In line with the ideas of the 18th-century Neapolitan philosopher Giambattista Vico ([1744] 1984), brought to the contemporary attention of literary critics and linguists involved in discourse studies by Kenneth Burke ([1945] 1962) and Hayden White ([1978]1985, 1999), in my monograph devoted to figuration in verbal artistic texts (Chrzanowska-Kluczewska 2013), as well as in the paper that proposes to extrapolate those figures onto pictorial texts (Chrzanowska-Kluczewska 2017), I have put forward the following list of *master tropes* for consideration:

1. *Metaphor* – the figure of subjective comparison, of similarity and dissimilarity alike;

2. *Metonymy* – the figure of objective association, of the relationship between entities called *contiguity* (physical and abstract), as when we mention the author instead of his/her work or the place instead of an event;

3. *Synecdoche* – the trope of particularization, of mentioning a *pars pro toto*, or the singular for the plural, the figure of *salience* (often classified as a subtype of metonymy but which in my opinion deserves a separate treatment, like in Vico's tropological circle);

4. *Irony* – the figure of hidden negation, relativism, scepticism, criticism and ridicule (present conspicuously in satire and grotesque).

Although at this point the great tropological tetrad of Vico ends, I argue that we should expand it by adding the following, in all likelihood, universal figures:

5. *Simile* – the figure of overt comparison based on similitude, closely related to metaphor, in which it is often present in a covert way;

6. *Antithesis* – the generally recognized trope of opposition, antinomy and contrast;

7. *Catachresis* – the generalized figure of semantic abuse and logical transgression, exemplified by oxymoron and paradox, among others;

8. *Euphemia* – the generalized trope of understatement, of toning-down and lessening unpleasant effects instead of a direct, straightforward representation of things;

9. *Hyperbole* – the generalized figure of exaggeration and overstatement, the opposite of euphemia;

10. *Suppression* – the generalized figure of omission, passing over, silence.

All these great figures of artistic conceptualization and expression appear as obvious candidates for *tropological universals*, applicable in the creation and interpretation of texts produced in various perceptual *modalities*. The analysis of the paintings presented in Section 5 will be carried out according to the above-mentioned taxonomy.

5. Cracovian female portraits – a figurative interpretation and the Polish national and cultural heritage between 1897 and 1956

Our analysis will be conducted as ekphrastic descriptions of the selected corpus of outstanding artworks, mostly on show in the collections of the National Museum in Kraków, spanning three

decades and illustrating a dynamically evolving attitude of artists towards the representation of women. The first work marks the end of *la belle époque* (1897) while the last one exemplifies the principles of Social Realism (1956). In between, the historical upheavals of two World Wars and the resulting changes within the Polish society, together with constantly evolving cultural and aesthetic values, formed a rich backcloth for the artistic visions. All those events imposed on the painters and viewers the need to constantly change the "writing" and "reading" of the female portraits, respectively. Let us look closer at these artworks as *semiotic witnesses* of the fluctuating reality which gave birth to them.

Józef Pankiewicz (1866-1940), "Little girl in a red dress" (1897). One of the most beloved icons of Polish portraiture, it is an instance of Impressionistic literality (hence consisting solely of the iconographic level). In the most popular reproduction it shows a beautiful young girl, with blonde hair and dark eyes, in an elegant dress of intense red. She appears in almost half-figure, facing the viewer, against a plain beige background. Although the title is purely descriptive and refers literally to the painting's content, this way of showing the girl is *synecdochic* as the original composition depicts her in three-quarters, leaning against a chair and holding a purse. In this case the cutting off of a part of the picture and reproducing only the upper part of the figure may be claimed to be manipulative and as such a good instance of the "rhetoric of the image" that foregrounds only the girl's torso.

Alfons Karpiński (1875-1961), "Model Jane" (1908). This portrait of a young woman, seated in a chair and showing off a lush white dress with light blue stripes, a huge black hat and a ginger scarf is only seemingly an instance of literality. The woman's body has disappeared entirely under the dress and this foregrounding of clothing becomes a *reifying metaphor* (on the 2nd, figurative level of interpretation), with only the model's face and a tiny part of her arm betraying her to be a human being made of flesh. The title possesses a clearly evaluative function, pointing to the sitter's occupation, which early in the 20th century was still thought to be socially dubious. The appositive description "model" can possibly trigger some obtuse speculations as to her relationship to the painter.

Alfons Karpiński "Jane with a Japanese doll" (1909). This time the proper name "Jane" does not need an additional modification. The social position of the young brunette becomes obvious. Seated in a wicker hair, in a white lingerie contrasting with the black stockings and black shoes, showing her bare arms and partly uncovered breasts and thighs, she cannot be anybody else but a model, placed in an intimate setting. The woman is depicted in profile; in one hand she holds a small Japanese doll dressed in red, in the other what looks like the head of a white flower (rose?). The symbolization of the eponymous toy becomes obvious only if we know that at the turn of the 19th century the Polish artistic milieu underwent a period of intense fascination with Japanese art and culture, and especially with wood engravings by such famous artists as Hiroshige, Hokusai or Utamaro. This fashion was dubbed "Japonism", a part of the Polish and especially Cracovian artistic heritage, with the Japanese doll signalling this inter-cultural allusion.

Jacek Malczewski (1854-1929), "Spring" (1909, private collection). Contemporaneous with Karpiński's renditions of Jane, this painting by the famous Symbolist Malczewski the father, featuring a handsome red-haired woman in half-figure, almost naked (as her breasts show through a green muslin dress), has to be interpreted in a totally different manner. The single-world title is of tremendous help in interpretation. Although the landscape in the background is absolutely realistic, showing the suburbs of Kraków, with the river Vistula meandering across the plains and the Tatra Mountains, still covered in snow, looming in the distance (1st level of interpretation, with contextual information as part of the natural heritage), the woman depicted, smiling mysteriously, belongs to "the second semiotics". She is Spring personified, holding a bird (sparrow?) in her right hand. Both the bird and the colour green of her dress (likewise of the trees and meadows in the background) stand symbolically for the new life. This particular way of

making the seasons of the year anthropomorphic boasts a long tradition in European painting. With it, we enter the space of "the third semiotics", the realm of allegory that treats the four seasons of the year as reflections of "the four ages" in the human life. As only a thin line separates metaphor from allegory, the crossing from the figurative into the allegorical level is often hardly discernible, although allegory as a *metatrope* is usually concerned with very general and widely recognized topoi.

Vlastimil Hoffman (1881-1970), "Concert" (1910, Fig. 1). Hoffman, a half-Czech and half-Polish by origin, active in Krakow and later in Szklarska Poręba, was known for his religious symbolism and folk allusions. The painting shows a peasant woman dressed in a traditional sheepskin coat, seated in the middle of a wintry meadow and holding a small boy on her knees. She is flanked by two teenage girls, wrapped in winter coats, scarves and hats. The strange atmosphere of this scene is heightened by the fact that, despite cold, the woman wears only a light pink dress under the fur, and is bare-footed. Consequently, we feel obliged to read this painting within "the second semiotics". Backed by a particularly strong Roman Catholic heritage of the Polish nation, this composition imposes on us a religious reading – it is no less than the Peasant Mary with Child and the two angels, constituting at the same time a metaphor of motherhood, a pervasive motif in 19th and early 20th-century Polish art. The fascination with folklore, peasant customs and values, displayed by several Polish artists at the turn of the 19th century, constitutes another important ingredient of our artistic heritage. The title is important for two reasons. Firstly, it draws our attention to the fact that the small boy is playing a shepherd's flute. Secondly, it refers us to another well-known composition by Hoffman titled "Spring", portraying a young satyr playing a similar instrument. Yet, this *intratextual allusion* to another painterly "text" by the same artist undermines the first Christian reading assigned to the picture. Under the close scrutiny, the boy on his mother's lap, wearing a strange red headgear, resembles a young satyr more than the Christ Child. The obtuse antithetical implications setting the Christian tradition against less obvious pagan mythological allusions imbue this work with the feeling of the uncanny.

Figure 1. Vlastimil Hoffman, Concert (1910), The National Museum in Krakow.

Zbigniew Pronaszko (1885-1958), "A Formist nude" (1917). This is one of the outstanding instances of Cubism (called Formism in its Polish version) that shows a nude frontally emerging from amidst the curtains. Cubism in its early strongly geometrized version called "analytical" presented human beings and objects fragmented into various figures and shapes and arranged in a contiguous manner, hence – from the tropological viewpoint – it was classified as an instance of *visual metonymy* (cf. Jakobson 1956). With time, the emergence of the "synthesizing" Cubism, with Pronaszko's work being an exemplar of this change, marks a transition from metonymy to

synecdoche, understood as "the trope of reconstruction around some salient feature(s); the figure of particularization that leads, subsequently, to generalization" (Chrzanowska-Kluczewska 2017: 78). In fact, the woman's massive thighs capture our attention as the focal point of this geometrical rendition of the human body. What may not be transparent to the viewer is the artist's attempt to recreate the woman's movement towards the viewer, heightened also by the rhythm of the curtains' folds, multiplied and overlapping. This kinetic composition has been executed in a sophisticated palette of greys and broken pinks. The onset of Cubism marks what Lotman (2009) referred to as an explosion in the semiosphere, happening within the stylistic border zone in which the traditional portraiture of feminine beauty was suddenly giving place to the representation of female carnality in what certainly was a shocking experience to the museumgoers in the year 1917. Such eruptions in the semiosphere always mark sharp turns in the aesthetic tastes of the interpreters. Yet, from the perspective of the 21st-century viewer this portrait does not come as offensive anymore.

Irena Weissowa "Aneri" (1888-1981), "The interior" (1921, private collection). Contemporaneous with Pronaszko's experimental painting, this composition by the only lady painter represented by our corpus marks the adherence to a traditional way of depicting elegant women in their, usually bourgeois, homes. This slightly Impressionistic rendering shows a lady in a white summer dress and a straw hat sitting at a round table in the living room. The blue of the walls combines with the whites of the lady's clothing and the table cloth, as well as the browns of the furniture. The walls are adorned with colourful pictures but what definitely catches our attention is a bouquet of lush flowers in a black vase that decorates the table. Seemingly a very literal rendition, this composition contains a paradox – the female figure, although depicted in the foreground, has undergone *backgrounding* by means of the title, which points to a widely practised subgenre of painting called *interior* and simultaneously obliterates the presence of a living person in the room. From here only one step takes us to "the second semiotics" – on the figurative level we are faced with a *reifying metaphor* – a woman shown as an artefact, on a par with other props of the scenery such as pictures, pieces of furniture and flowers.

Zbigniew Pronaszko, "Nude in an interior" (1922, Fig. 2). By one year later than Aneri's "Interior", this composition by Pronaszko, were it not for a dramatically different way of recreating reality, plays on the identical theme of a woman taking rest at home. Pronaszko's nude, seen only from the back, is shown asleep on a sofa. The room's window opens out onto a townscape, a street with rows of low houses, all bathed in warm summer yellows and oranges. The interior, in which we can see two dark green armchairs and a tiny round table, possesses a somewhat theatrical arrangement owing to the curtains that frame the window. It is an instance of fully developed synthesizing Cubism, in which the female body has regained its natural smooth shape, with the fragmentation reduced to the play of the furniture's shadows. The central perspective runs dynamically towards the window, which stands out conspicuously from the background, also owing to an intensely red vase with orange flowers placed on the sill. This work is a deft combination of such subgenres as *a nude*, *an interior*, *a still life* and *a townscape*. We can wonder whether this composition, apart from its literality, possesses any symbolic reading. Even if the symbolization itself remains unclear, "the second semiotics" may be claimed to include a *dehumanizing metaphor* of the reposing nude, merging delicately into the furniture set. *Visual intertextuality*, however, is undeniable. The European artistic tradition boasts a number of exquisite nudes shown from the back, to mention only "The great odalisque" by Jean-Auguste Ingres or "Bella above Vitebsk" by Chagall. However, a closer *hypotext* for Pronaszko's rendition of a naked woman may be "Venus" by Diego Velázquez, though the woman shown by that Old Master is not asleep but reclining; what is more, we can see her face in the mirror. Visual intertextuality clearly instantiates the situation in which the viewers can produce in their minds obtuse associations with other pictorial texts, all depending on their

general aesthetic education and the competence in recognizing appropriate texts of culture. The local heritage may be insufficient in forming such connotative readings. What is required is a re-course to a *broadened heritage*, in this case the circle of European art in general.

Figure 2. Zbigniew Pronaszko, Nude in an interior (1922), The National Museum in Krakow.

Zygmunt Waliszewski (1897-1936), "In the box" (1922). Waliszewski, a good representative of expressionistic Colourism, has opted for a theatre scene, presenting to us three personages, most probably parents with a young marriageable daughter or else two ladies accompanying a gentleman. As the very name indicates, for colourists it was colour and not the theme that served as the basic means of expression. This kind of art, ahistorical and apolitical, building an equivalent of life and nature through the play with colour, surface and space, would rarely de-pend on any strictly national heritage. Waliszewski shows to us three standing figures, in which deformation is a matter of degree. The rhetoric of the image should be applied directly to the col-ours used and "read" them as highly symbolic. The ugly black-haired woman in the foreground is dressed in black but holds a bouquet of red flowers in her hands, the elegant gentleman is antithetically dressed in white, yet his gloves are black. The young lady behind has the pinkish-yellowish skin and black hair with a kind of red covering; she wears a pink dress and holds what looks like a pink fan. According to traditional European *colour symbolism*, red stands for love and passion, black for the evil and demoniac things (and, consequently, makes the elder woman look ominous), white denotes elegance and purity, pink female elegance, bodily attractiveness, joyfulness and youth, while yellow has been traditionally associated with jealousy. Despite the disclaimers about the unimportance of the content for the colourists, on the figurative level this work is an undeniable instance of *irony*, realized through a grotesque deformation and obtusely meant as a piece of social satire.

Józef Mehoffer (1869-1946), "Rose of Sharon – a portrait of Z. Minderowa" (1923). Parallel to Cubism and Expressionism, the traditional portraiture of wealthy ladies flourished in Kra-kow in the 1920s. The title contains a clear intertextual allusion to the Old Testament "Song of

Songs", pointing to the Jewishness of the beauty portrayed. A young black-haired woman, clad in a black evening dress with a trail, with bare arms and part of her back uncovered, is seated in an armchair. A lush wallpaper in the background features a drapery covered with vegetal motifs and peacocks (possibly symbolical) perched on garden vases. The colour black, contrary to Waliszewski's painting, stands here for elegance and so does the white rose the sitter holds in her hand. The rose is not only a clue for the symbolic biblical reference but also triggers a tropological interpretation: the lady *synecdochically* represents the charm of all Jewish women. The Jewish population was an important part of the Polish society before the Holocaust, forming an important ingredient of our pre-Second World War social and cultural heritage.

Andrzej Wróblewski (1927-1957), "Child with the killed mother" (1949). A wide temporal gap separates Mehoffer's creation from Wróblewski's work, produced only four years after the horrors of the Second World War had ceased, the memories of which became an obsession with a very talented young painter. The composition is in many respects unusual: it shows a boy wearing colourful summer clothes turned away from the viewer and embracing a large standing figure of his mother, in a summer dress of intense blue. Her head has been cut off by an unusual framing and her flesh is pale white. Wróblewski utilizes here a double symbolization: the colour blue has been traditionally associated with depression, sadness and melancholy, to wit only the blue period in Pablo Picasso's oeuvre. For Wróblewski, the colour blue has acquired a much stronger significance – it is a connotation of death and so is the "decapitation" of the mother. Visual rhetoric plays also on the *antithesis* between the whiteness of the mother's corpse and the lively yellow-orange of the -boy's skin. Although Wróblewski uses mostly flat modality, the woman's figure throws a black shade on the white wall behind it.

Andrzej Wróblewski (1927-1957), "Chairification I" (1956). The last composition, realised apparently according to the tenets of Social Realism, which Wróblewski espoused only to soon reject them, is shocking in its ugliness. A pregnant woman is seated frontally in a chair while the second chair beside her is empty. The literal reading would be banal – in all likelihood, it is a woman queuing up to consult a doctor. Yet the neological title makes a forceful hint at the rhetoric of this image. The woman, with her eyes closed, looks unhappy and resigned – her waiting becomes a metaphor of hopelessness, of a dreary post-war existence in the socialist Poland. The title implies a *reifying metaphor* as well – the woman is slowly becoming a chair herself. The empty chair constitutes an *antithesis* to her own situation – it is already deserted or has not been occupied yet. The figure of *suppression* is also present – silence looms over this sad scene and the emptiness of the second chair signals some omission. "The third semiotics" opens up the space for a higher reading – this work appears to be an allegory of the human condition in general, of the fate of all people always waiting in line for their destiny, and – ultimately – death.

Fifty-nine years elapsed between the first and the last painting in our Cracovian collection. Two World Wars, the Holocaust, the onset of socialism/communism, which happened within this period, upturned the social and political order in Europe and Poland. The Polish and Cracovian artistic heritage faithfully reflected the atmosphere of the passing days, from the image of a beautiful girl dressed in red, in the portrait commissioned by her loving parents, to an unattractive and melancholy woman caught in a glimpse of the painter's visual memory.

6. Conclusions

"History, tradition, memory, myth, and memoir variously join us with what has passed, with forebears, with our own earlier selves" (Lowenthal 1998: 3). These component parts of heritage, all semiotic systems by themselves, form a backdrop for the corpus of twelve important artworks by the well-known Polish 19th and 20th-century painters. The reading of those pictorial texts is regulated by "the rhetoric of the image", which is a complex multilayered process that starts at the level of literality, moves on to the stage of troping and ends with pictorial allegory (in the

manner parallel to the interpretation of verbal artistic texts). The passage from one artistic trend to another can be seen as Lotmanian "conflict of signs" that leads to a functional renewal of sign subsystems. The introduction of structural and semantic novelties to the semiosphere need not be limited to verbal texts only. I have extrapolated this notion onto our analysis of nonverbal texts (to wit the appearance of cubism as a bold visual experiment).

The better we understand the semiotic import of the heritage to which the painters had access, the easier it becomes for us to "read" a painterly text according to the *intentio auctoris*. However, if parts of the heritage have been lost or become obscure with time, a handy mechanism of recontextualization will always be ready to assist us in interpreting artistic texts according to a new, reshaped rhetoric.

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PROGRESSIVE NEW YORK AND BELLE EPOQUE BUCHAREST. A FEW GROUNDS FOR COMPARING TWO CITIES

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Abstract

The paper attempts a semiotic description of, and comparison between, New York City and Bucharest at the end of the nineteenth century. Although there was hardly any contact between the two cities at the time and they differed in point of urban civilization tradition and direction of urban development (verticality for New York City and horizontality for Bucharest), the analysis demonstrates that these two relatively new cities were fairly similar as regards their ethnic structure, rate of construction, introduction of urban facilities (running water, sewers, tramways, electric lighting, telephones and cinema). All these factors led to a redefinition of urban facilities in both cites and show them to have been pretty different in appearance but quite compatible in essence. A few case studies are analyzed to this effect. They are meant to indicate that, at the turn of the century, the appearance of the two cities changed significantly, while newcomers altered the urban configuration and massively contributed to each city's modernization and modernity.

1. Introduction

The Progressive Era of American cities in general, and of New York City in particular, expands from the 1880s to the 1920s, while the *Belle Epoque* of European cities, in general, i.e. of Bucharest, in particular, roughly expands from the 1880s to the outbreak of World War I. This is the interval taken into account in the research outlined here[1].

This investigation tries to see "how to understand [a] fragment in relation to the totality of the city, [as] no interpretation can apply to the city as a whole" (Harvey 2000: 18). Various fragments of the two cities will therefore be compared with a view to finding differences and similarities.

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1   Some of the data presented in this paper are excerpted from Neț (2016).

2. Arguments against a parallel

At first sight, the two cities seem to have had very little in common, and a comparison between them appears as far-fetched. Around 1900 New York City was already a well-known metropolis, an icon of the United States, of the Western hemisphere, of the American way of life and speedy development. How could it possibly compare with Bucharest, a city lost in the Balkans, as a number of people still viewed it? A few objective data remind us of the huge differences between the two cities. Five of the most salient such differences are outlined below.

In 1865, at the conclusion of the Civil War, New York City had a long-lasting urban civilization; it had been first implemented by the Dutch administration, then by the British one and eventually by the American one. By the same time, i.e. in 1866[2], Bucharest was just beginning to adopt a European kind of urban civilization. Its age-long experience of Ottoman domination had left rather deep traces on its urban structure; from mid-nineteenth century onwards, the administration of Bucharest endeavoured to modernize the city structure and infrastructure according to European models.

The height of buildings in the two cities was one of the most obvious differences between New York City and Bucharest. Around 1900 the first sky-scrapers had already appeared in the American metropolis: Park Row Building dates from 1899, the Flatiron was built in 1902, and the Woolworth Building was dedicated in 1913. The architecture in Bucharest, on the contrary, developed on a horizontal line. According to the census in 1900 (cf. Parusi 2007: 474), most buildings, i.e. 26,296, had only one level, there were 9,132 two-story buildings, 2,058 three-story buildings, 340 three-story buildings and only 57 higher buildings.

Yet another important, and immediately visible, difference between the two cities lay in street alignment. New York was a perfectly ordered city; most of its streets and avenues had been traced forever by the Commission Plan in 1811.The streets in Bucharest had been always tortuous. The first partial street alignment had been attempted in 1806, under the rule of Prince Alexander Ypsilantis[3]. The second street alignment dates from 1888; it was still incomplete. At the end of the century, many streets in Romania's capital city were still tortuous, even downtown.

Another major difference between the two cities around 1900 lies in the existence of the subway – or its non-existence. The subway in New York City was one of the first in the world; it was dedicated in 1904. The first project to build a subway in Bucharest dates from the 1930s, but the actual subway was built only in the late 1970s and dedicated in 1979.

Last but not least, almost no contact existed between the two cities in the 1865-1914 era.

3. Arguments in favour of a parallel

In spite of all the above-mentioned differences, an analogy does exist between New York City and Bucharest, such as they were around 1900. A parallel is quite possible between the two cities. A few grounds in this respect are listed below.

3.1. Position, age, lifestyles

First of all, it should be kept in mind that, with due respect to proportions, once you talk(ed) about a city, you talk(ed) about all cities. Because, during the second half of the nineteenth century, a new kind of city was devised, a new kind of urban civilization emerged in Europe and the United States. Modern identities are essentially *urban* ones, and they were framed in the nineteenth century. This applies both to New York City and to Bucharest.

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2   The year 1866 marks the beginning of the reign of Carol I, first ruling prince (1866-1881), then king of Romania (1881-1914).
3   Alexander Ypsilantis (1725-1805) was ruling Prince in Wallachia (1775-1782 and 1796-1797).

As regards urban progress and lifestyles, each city represented a country. New York City was the acknowledged economic and financial capital of the United States, universally called "the American metropolis", Bucharest was the capital city — and the most developed city — of Romania.

In terms of age, both cities were relatively new ones: New York City was founded in 1609 and Bucharest was first mentioned in a document one and a half century before, i.e. in 1459.

A new era had started in both cities — and countries — some two decades before: the year 1865 marked the end of the American Civil War, while 1866 is the inaugural year of the reign of Carol I.

All along the nineteenth century, and actually up to the *inter bellum* era, for all cities of some importance, Paris was the model. This model was followed by New York City and it was also followed by Bucharest. Most guidebooks of the time dubbed New York "a second Paris". E.C. Prescott's guidebook expands upon the comparison by specifying that New York was "second only to London and Paris in wealth and refinement" (Prescott 1874: 7). As for Bucharest, from mid-nineteenth century onwards, it was called both "a city lying at the gates of the Orient" and "a little Paris" (*Guide-Manuel* 1879: 17). To give only one example in this respect, a guidebook from 1906 mentions "such titles which Bucharest first from strangers has acquired, as *the little Paris, the city of joy,* etc." (*Călăusa…* 1906: 5).

3.2. Language

Another similarity between the two cities concerns language and it is established at a deeper level. The official language in New York City, as all over the United States, was, obviously, English. But not all inhabitants spoke it fluently; on the contrary, most of the recent immigrants (viz. one third of the population in the city, see below) used a poor vocabulary and even poorer grammar. English was the language of a "higher" culture, to which many recent immigrants referred, but which quite a lot of them did not master at all. In Bucharest, the official language was, of course, Romanian. But the "upper" classes and even the members of the middle class spoke French fluently. French was the *lingua franca* all over Europe, taught in grammar schools and high schools and appropriated, in various degrees, by those people who claimed to have a certain cultural background. As far as language was concerned, the resemblance between New York City and Bucharest lay in the fact that a wide segment of the population in both cities spoke fluently, and were at ease in, the language of a different culture: the language of the British Empire in the case of New Yorkers, and French in the case of Bucharesters.

3.3. Population

The next similarity is also less obvious at first sight, being established at a deeper level. It concerns the population, viz. the ethnic structure of the two cities. The census of 1898 showed the population of Greater New York to be of almost 3,5 million inhabitants[4], over one third of which were recent immigrants: Germans, Irish, Italians, Austrians and others. According to the census of 1900, Bucharest counted almost 300,000 inhabitants[5], out of which 186,623 were ethnic Romanians, 43,308 were Jews, 38,660 came from the Austro-Hungarian Empire[6] and 13,530 belonged to various other ethnic groups. This means that only 66.16 p.c. of the population of Bucharest consisted of ethnic Romanians, while 33.84 p.c. were non-natives. Consequently, although the population in New York City was some twelve times the population in Bucharest, the same percentage of aliens were encouraged to come and settle down in both cities, though for different reasons in each case. More specifically, in New York most immigrants were needed

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4   More specifically: 3,487,202 inhabitants.
5   Actually, there were 287,233 inhabitants.
6   This percentage also included the Romanians from Transylvania, which until 1918 was part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

as unqualified labour force, whereas the city of Bucharest needed foreign *specialists,* who were called to develop the country and the city.

3.4. Compatible destinies

It is also a fact that many specialists who settled down in both cities had compatible destinies; this is yet another reason for comparing New York City and Bucharest. As an example, let us have a look at the lives of Joseph Pulitzer and Frédéric Damé.

Joseph Pulitzer was born in 1847 on the present-day territory of Hungary. In 1858, his family immigrated to the United States. At the age of 20, Joseph Pulitzer got US citizenship and started studying law. A year later, he joined the bar, but his impetuous temperament and his poor English prevented him from practicing law. It was also in 1868 that he started working as a reporter for *Westliche Post,* and two years later he became editor-in-chief and co-owner of this publication. Pulitzer was a member of the American Philosophical Society, and frequented a German language bookstore, where he often talked to Joseph Keppler and Thomas Davidson. He was a member of the Republican Party, and in 1870 was elected to the House of Representatives (before reaching the age stipulated by the statutes and after having lived for only two years in Jefferson City, which he was to represent). Then Pulitzer settled in New York City, and in 1883 he bought *The New York World,* which he saved from bankruptcy by orienting it towards sentimental stories and scandal. Joseph Pulitzer was often attacked by rival publications like the *New York Sun* and the *New York Journal.* Theodore Roosevelt and John Pierpont Morgan sued him for calumny, but the trials never came to court. Joseph Pulitzer died several times a millionaire, onboard his yacht, on the way to his residence in Georgia, in 1911. In his will, he left 2 million dollars to Columbia University, in order to fund a School of Journalism. This project was accomplished in 1934. However, Pulitzer's worldwide posthumous fame is mainly due to the literary prize he established, first bestowed in 1917.

Frédéric Damé was born in 1850 in the small town of Tonnerre (France), and graduated from the famous Saint Louis high school in Paris. From his early years, he published articles in newspapers like *Le Figaro, Le Gaullois, L'Evénement illustré,* as well as in journals such as *La revue populaire* and *La Cloche.* During the French-German war, Damé edited the journal *L'Invasion,* and after the Commune in Paris he was Thiers' secretary, and published *La Renaissance.* In 1872, FrédéricDamé settled down in Bucharest. Shortly afterwards, he took up Romanian citizenship, and started a career as a journalist by publishing very successful articles in the *Journal de Bucarest* edited by Ulysse de Marsillac. A year later, in 1873, Frédéric Damé founded *La Roumanie,* the first big-format newspaper in Romania. At the same time, in Paris, he founded the monthly journal *La Roumanie contemporaine.* Damé also published articles in C.A. Rosetti's *Românul,* as well as in *L'Indépendance roumaine* and *L'Orient.* FrédéricDamé was not only a journalist. He also functioned as a teacher of French at high schools in Craiova and Bucharest. He was a playwright; his play *Le rêve de Dochia* was successfully produced and presented in 1877.But posterity remembers Frédéric Damé for two really remarkable achievements, namely two of the French language dictionaries in Romania (Damé 1900), and his monumental monograph *Bucaresten 1906,* in many respects still valid, though unfortunately unfinished, which came out a year after his death. Frédéric Damé died in 1906.

3.5. Facilities for the middle class

The next relevant issue for a comparison between the two cities concerns the facilities for the middle class. They were a clear sign of modernity and were implemented not only in New York City and Bucharest but in all European and American cities of some importance. New materials (cubic tiles, macadam, asphalt) were used for street paving, sidewalks were built, electric light-

ing was installed outdoors, running water and sewers were installed indoors, public transportation (e.g. tramways) was introduced within cities, the telephone, i.e. the new communication means, began being installed (first for business reasons, then for private use, too), listening to the phonograph was a pastime, while phonograph records were a means of preserving famous voices and speeches, the cinema was a favourite amusement, especially with the (lower) middle class. Owing to the development of all these urban facilities, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, cities were re-invented everywhere in the world. This was the chance of Bucharest. The city could thus skip a few stages of development and try to be on a par with more modern, Western European cities.

As an illustration, let us cast a bird's eye view on the introduction of telephones in the two cities. The telephone was invented in 1875 and patented in 1876. As early as 1877 the first Bell telephone was sold in New York City (cf. Trager 2003: 184). A year later, the Metropolitan Telephone and Telegraph Company was founded in the American metropolis. It had 271 subscribers. It was also in 1878 that the first telephone book was published in New York City. In 1880, the American metropolis virtually counted one telephone for 430 subscribers. Long-distance telephony (between New York City and Chicago) was opened in 1892 (cf. Trager 2003: 232). In 1906, as many as 264,364 telephones were in function in New York City, i.e. about two and a half times more than in London (cf. Trager 2003: 301).

Telephony in Bucharest had much timider beginnings. In 1877, the small enterprise of Engel & Tierich began experimenting with "the new device called telephone or speaking telegraph" (Parusi 2007: 338). Telephones were introduced in Bucharest in 1882, five years later than in New York City: a private line connected Socec bookstore to the Socec printing shop (cf. Parusi 2007: 359). The first Government connection was established only two years later: the Home Office was connected to the Post and Telegraph Corporation (cf. Olteanu 1992: 284). A telephone exchange was built in 1886; it had 5 operating numbers but the capacity to increase the number of subscribers. The beginnings of the telephone system in Bucharest were modest and slow. However, in 1890 a telephone network began being built and a year later it already had 300 subscribers. The average rate was thus of one telephone per 677 inhabitants. But the number of subscribers increased to 700 in 1898, and in 1900 the average rate was of one telephone per 410 subscribers. Long-distance telephone service began in 1893 and in 1894 it was open to the public (cf. Parusi 2007: 397). The first telephone book was also issued in 1894. It listed 31 institutions and 2 private subscribers. In 1906, 3,000 telephone connections could be established in Bucharest, but the telephone book listed only 1,600 actual subscribers.

A few conclusions can be drawn from this brief survey. At the turn of the century, the number of people who could virtually use the same telephone device in Bucharest was almost double as compared to New York City. In this respect, Bucharest was two decades behind New York City. In actual fact, the gap between the two cities was much narrower than that, if several other factors are taken into consideration, including the fact that the American metropolis was the city where the first telephone devices for public use were produced. It is also important that in 1900 New York City was an industrial and commercial power, and the telephone was adopted mostly for business reasons. None of these remarks apply to Bucharest, where both industry and trade were rather weak, and the telephone was basically used in administration. It is also well known that, when this invention was introduced in (continental) Europe, people were rather reticent and suspicious about it. The families who did choose to have a telephone installed in their homes kept it in the entrance hall and mainly used it for placing orders with various suppliers and it was mostly servants who answered the phone (cf. Weber 1986: 76). This state-of-the-art continued until as late as the 1930s and 40s. Agatha Christie's novels give several examples in this respect.

It is also a fact that spaces between houses in Bucharest were fairly large; this made the installation of a telephone network far from profitable. Nevertheless, the introduction of long-distance telephony began almost simultaneously in Bucharest and in New York City. Thus, all things considered, as far as the beginnings of the telephone system were concerned, Bucharest was fairly compatible with New York City.

4. Conclusions

This paper has given a few reasons why a parallel between New York City and Bucharest at the turn of the nineteenth century is by no means far-fetched. About 1900, to speak about one (European or American) city meant to speak about all cities of some importance, as the same phenomena took place everywhere. Bucharest made the best use of the chance offered by urbanization, so that, by the turn of the century, a lot of the gaps which had separated it from modern European and American cities beginning of this era were considerably narrowed before the outbreak of World War I.

Notwithstanding, a number of objective brakes prevented the complete urbanization of Bucharest. The city's (and country's) geo-political position was perhaps the most relevant one[7]. Another hindrance to complete modernization was the relatively small number of inhabitants, which made urbanization a rather unprofitable business. Most of the population lived in individual houses, separated by big courtyards and gardens, and most streets were crooked; it was therefore technically difficult and costly to install running water, sewers and telephones everywhere. Nevertheless, as already shown, although the modernization of Bucharest was still incomplete, a parallel, and even a comparison, between *Belle Epoque* Bucharest and *Progressive* New York is still possible and rewarding.

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7   Romania's independence from the Ottoman Empire was declared in 1877 and conquered in 1878. The Principality of Romania became a Kingdom in 1881.

THE SAMI WORLDVIEW THROUGH SHAMAN DRUMS AS INTANGIBLE CULTURAL MANIFESTATION AND COMMUNICATION

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Abstract

In Sami world, all life has dualism on the spiritual and physical levels, thus this animistic, polytheistic view influenced the Sami tradition towards harmony with nature and the necessity for the shaman. As a healer, the shaman carries multiple codes, expressing their meanings verbally, musically, artistically, and in dance. He is informed to his culture and acts with trust on behalf of the community. His mediations with the spirits including the dead ancestor require a drum, where shamanistic symbolic motifs represent the Sami cosmology and life, categorised by the way they are depicted. It has a segmented pattern in three levels: the upper represents gods; the middle of humans; the bottom of the paradise underworld where the ancestors lived. Among many symbolic motifs in the drum, a drum motif is occasionally found, raising its specific role. Is it a musical instrument for a shaman? A communicative tool for invoking/warning off spirits by the shaman? Hidden cultural manifestation of Sami activity? My paper discusses the drum motif in relation to its neighbouring motifs (gods, humans, animals, etc.) and positions with semiotic considerations. This result can shed light on intangible values of shaman drums, to underline a cultural significance in Sami heritage.

Introduction

In the Sami world, all life has dualism on the spiritual and physical levels, and the animistic, polytheistic view has influenced the Sami tradition towards harmony with nature and the need for a shaman. As a healer, a shaman carries multiple codes and expresses their meanings, verbally, musically, artistically, and in dance. Accordingly, he is informed by his culture and acts with trust on behalf of the community. His mediations with the spirits in nature and the dead ancestors require a drum.

Two types of the drum are based on their physical construction, but the common symbolic signs reveal the Sami cosmology in a segmented pattern of three levels – (1) the upper level represents gods (2) the middle - of humans, and (3) the lower of the paradise underworld, where the ancestors lived. Although many signs of the surviving 71 drums are difficult to read their full meaning due to the eradication by the Church in the 18th century, the constant appearance of gods, humans, and animals suggest their central roles in the Sami cosmology. And semiotic interpretations of these symbolic signs can generate the drum as an intangible cultural manifestation.

For example, a drum sign imprinted on a physical drum raises a question about its specific role: (1) Does the sign represent a musical instrument for a shaman? (2) Is it a shaman's communication tool for invoking spirits or warning off? (3) Is it a hidden cultural manifestation of the Sami activity? My paper investigates the 29 physical drums, on which a sign of a drum shows. It aims at interpreting their semiotic positions and meanings and hopes that the result can shed light on new intangible values of the shaman drum as well as its cultural significance of Sami heritage.

1. Sami shamanism and shaman

The Sami shamanism is a traditional belief and practices of communication with the spirit world. The world is occupied by invisible spirits of supernatural powers, which defend all living ones and places in nature. They possess magical powers and protect animals, plants and other places in nature. All life has a duality between the spiritual and physical levels. And the spiritual world, where the dead ancestors continue to live, embraces the wholeness and perfection in opposition to the material world.

Figure 1. On Idolatrous among the people of the Arctic region (Source: Olaus Magnus- "History of the Nordic Peoples" 1555).

For a success of hunting and fishing, people turned to the counsellors such as the sun god, the invisible spirits of rocks, cliffs, lakes, the migratory routes, and even entire mountains, making a cult of them. The cult was a symbol of the divine spirit and was believed to look after flora and fauna. And people offered individually or collectively at the beginning of the hunting and fishing seasons (Figure 1). The residential tent or nearby places were the commonest places for people to pray to the divine, and many sacred places were built in the locations, where people hunted and fished. The most popular animal of sacrifice was a reindeer, while the bear hunting was a religious festivity. Above all, a shaman is needed to cooperate with natural forces for the people's survival without damages to nature and living stocks.

Figure 2. A shaman with his rune drum (Source: Kund Leem 1767).

Originally, shamans (Figure 2) refer to the traditional healers of Turkic-Mongol areas of Siberia and Mongolia. With direct contacts with the spirit worlds through the journey, they acquired knowledge and power by traversing the axis mundi and brought them back. Besides a guidance of souls, shamans cured people, led a sacrifice ceremony, preserved the traditional stories and songs, and predicted fortune-telling. As a doctor-prophet-officiator at major sacrifices, a shaman (*noaidi* in Sami) was the central figure of the Sami society.

Illness was caused by a disorder of the balance between the two souls or the two realms of reality. The shaman, in a spirit form, transferred to the other side, in order to restore harmony. He learned the types of offering to gods for healing the illness. Sometimes, Sami ancestors, who protected their descendants and reindeer herds, caused troubles. Accordingly, the shaman's travels in and out of the spirit world were assisted by the drum as a bridge between the physical and spiritual worlds.

2. Ritual drums

A strong tradition with a drum has been kept in the Sami spiritual rituals. Its oldest identifying reference is the late 12th century's *Historia Norvegiae*, where it was described as a small vessel. In *The History of Lapland* (1674), Johannes Schefferus included a chapter of the Laplander's magical ceremonies and symbols.

The drum has a segmented pattern of three levels: the upper (gods), the middle (humans) and the lower (the paradise underworld). It was used for (1) the guidance of the daily life, (2) knowledge of the future, (3) curing sickness, and (4) offering for the gods. An indicator (*arpa*), a ring or a triangular shape of a bone was put on the membrane of the drum, sometimes with small rings. And the paintings on the membrane were chewing bark from the alder which resembled blood. Made with a careful concern, one drum could have 150 symbolic signs.

Figure 3. Shaman's beating a drum and his trance (Source: Rheen 1671)

In some places, every family had a drum. A famous shaman owned several drums and powerful helping spirits. By beating the drum faster, he began his soul journey to the spiritual world, and when he entered into a trance, he fell down on the ground, putting his drum on the back (Figure 3). He met his helping spirits and changed himself into a spirit or a breath of wind or a reindeer. Upon his return to the world, he could interpret how the indicator moved and positioned on his drum.

Reformation arrived in the Scandinavian countries in the 16th century, and the Sami people had to convert to Christianity. Eventually, the Church authorities ordered persecutions to the shaman and his drum, and ritual practices were condemned to be a devil and witchcraft including the ancestor worship. Laws were written prohibiting the shaman and worshipping. At the beginning of the 18th century, the drum was common in major households; at present, only 71 drums have survived after the Church's eradication of drums.

> For the Sami, the drums represented their threatened culture, the resistance against the Christian claim to exclusiveness, and a striving to preserve traditional values – i.e. 'the good' that had to be saved. For the Church authorities, on the other hand, the drums symbolized the explicit nucleus of the elusive Sami 'paganism' – i.e. 'the evil' that had to be annihilated (Ahlbäck and Bergman 1901).

3. Symbolic signs and their roles

For the Sami people, familiar signs of the drum represent an intangible aspect of their world, because symbolic meanings of signs enable them to approach a more transcendent aspect of the reality. Among invisible spirits, *Rota*, the death god, is the most powerful due to his kingdom in the underworld. In order to ride his land, *Rota* demands a sacrificial horse, which appears in the majority of the southern drums (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Left-Rota, right-Akkas (Source: Manker 1950).

Veraldenolmmái is the god of vegetation-fertility and a fortune for the reindeer. The violent thunder god *Horagalles* controls the weather with a double hammer or an axe-hammer. *Bieggaolmmái*, the wind god, makes good and bad weather, while the hunting and forest god *Leaibeolmmái* rules over animals and helps hunters. Goddess *Máttaráhkká* and her three daughters *Akkas* are crucial to conception, birth, and a child's growth. As a circle or a rhombus with four rays, *Beive*, the merciful sun has a central position in the Sami life and protects the reindeer.

Figure 5 presents examples of Frame and Bowl drums. **Frame Drum 1:** 1 *Beive* - sun god & reindeer offering; 2 *Leaibeolmmái* - hunting god; *Horagalles* – thunder god; Hunter or *Leaibeolmmái*; Elk; 6 *Bieggaolmmái* – wind god; 7-9 *Ailekesolmak* – churchman; 10 Prediction place; 11 Boat offering; 12 Mirrored boat?; 13 Reindeer; 14 Gand – troll's shot; 15 Beaver barrage; 16 Elk & bear; 17 *Leaibeolmmái* – Rain & snow?; 18 Wild reindeer; 19 Weather & forest; 20 Wild reindeer; 21 Forest, a game between elk & bear, or *Saivo* – underworld?; 22-23 Forest's council;

24 Goat; 25 Christianised village with a goat; 26 Church; 27-28 Church & people; 29 Death with a coffin; 30-32 *Rota* or horse rider; 33 *Jabmeaimo* – world of the death, or a dead man, or *Rota* or his wife?; 35 Servants of *Jabmeaimo*; 36 probably grave; 37 probably *Sáráhkká* – women, birth goddess; 38 *Uksáhkká* – mother/child goddess, *Juoksáhkká* - boy's goddess; 39 Child; 40 Reindeer herd; 41 Fish netting & boat; 42 Residence with four tents; 43 Njalla – meat shed; 44 Squirrel forest. **Bowl Drum 71:** 1 *Bieggaolmmái*; 2 *Horagalles*; 3 Reindeer; 4 *Beive*; 5 Radjen-pardne - the Radien son; 6 Radienattje/*Veraldenolmmái* - the Radien father; 7 Sacrifice place or church?; 8 Radjenakka - the Radien mother; 9 *Máttaráhkká* - protection goddess; 10 *Sáráhkká*; 11-13 *Ailekomak*; 14 Moon; 15-16 *Leaibeolmmái*?, Churchman?; 17 Sacrifice place or church?; 18 *Veraldenolmmái* - vegetation/fertility god?; 19 *Uksáhkká*; 20 *Rota* - death and illness god; 21-22 Demon?; 23 Hell's strainer?; 24 Demon's chain? Drum; 25 *Jabmeaimo*, *Saivo* - underworld.

Figure 5. Frame Drum 1 & Bowl Drum 71 (Source: re-worked by the author after Manker 1950).

4. Cognitive semiotics and its interpretation

Cognitive semiotics can be described as "an emerging interdisciplinary matrix of disciplines and methods, focused on the multifaceted phenomenon of meaning" (www. cognitivesemiotics. com). For example, in rock art studies, four approaches can be pursued, although Clottes (1995) claims that there has been a combination of three main approaches from the past 100 years, shifting emphasis on different periods.

(1) In studies of the French and Spanish Palaeolithic rock art, the first approach deals with a diverse species of the animal's size, gender and the techniques chosen for the description. (2) The evaluation of its archaeological context helps chronology and people's actions. Rock art images, which people had seen on their visits, were sometimes drawn on portable artefacts for their best interpretation. (3) Finding ethnographic analogies between traditional societies, which created rock art, establish more precise information. (4) An alternative approach is based on particular ethnographic insights and general insights for neurophysiology.

In this regard, shamanistic interpretation expresses peoples' seeing in a changed state of their consciousness. When an object receives cultural importance, it becomes more pervasive in thought, featuring in their hallucinations. Rock art is an attempt to commemorate the shamanic visions. Therefore, Mulk & Bayliss-Smith (2006) maintain that semiotics is an integrating way

of the four approaches. As the science of signs, semiotics allows us with a holistic approach to analysing image contents and symbolic meanings in a wider context. However, it needs insights from historical ethnology and from studies of other societies which can serve as analogues.

In establishing a framework for exploring the encoded messages in rock art, Peircian semiotics is applied. For example, an iconic similarity is between the boat in rock art and knar type of sailing boat, used on the drums as indices and symbols as well. Any language of words or images should be expressed by three kinds of the sign ("icon", "index", "symbol") for an effective medium of communication.

Preucel & Bauer (2001) recommend the Peircian model in dealing with material culture, because most artefacts have variable cultures with multiple meanings. Archaeologists should investigate the interpretative potentialities of all possible relations between an object and a sign. The Sami drum is the case.

> An index…a sign directly related in the act to what it signifies. If a hunter in pursuit of a lion sees a certain kind of footprint in the sand this is an index to the passage of his game… An icon is a sign that represents its object by resembling it. We might regard the statue of a lion as iconic by virtue of it having its form and proportions determined by those of the animal. A symbol…a sign determined by its object only in the sense that it will be so interpreted on allocation dependent on habit, convention or agreement, or natural disposition of the interpreter. Following our example, a lion is a symbol of bravery by convention (Firth 1973:61).

5. The position of a sign

As a composition of different signs, rock art was made in artist's mind at a specific time in pursuit of aesthetic, religious and/or narrative purpose. In the case of the Sami drum, symbolic signs can generate extra meanings from local settings. If we want to know the correlation between a shaman and his drum in the context of time, the position of a sign and its relations to other signs are helpful. Lewis-Williams (1981) suggests four possibilities in rock art: (1) activity groups (2) juxtaposition (3) superposition, and (4) conflation.

(1) As an activity group, the position of various signs will tell a story. In other words, signs from a set of iconic representations of a real scene are a scale model of an actual event. (2) With juxtaposition, the artist is using signs as icons, and juxtaposed signs are a powerful way for a symbolic statement. When representations of different things from nature or human activities are put together, a different meaning is conveyed. (3) Superposition makes a statement of the relationship between two contrasted icons, creating symbolic meanings by a connection. (4) For conflation, the iconic form of representation virtually disappears. It combines an element of one icon with that of another, suggesting an analogy between them.

For example, a sign on the Sami Drum 44 combines a person standing on top of a reindeer, signifying the thunder god *Horagalles*. However, a stylistic conflation becomes a pure symbolic sign, losing its original meaning due to the abstraction. Therefore, a competent shaman in symbolism can only decode the sign on behalf of his people, reminding its source as a conflation of iconic signs.

6. Relationships between shaman, drum, and shaman+drum

Among the surviving 71 drums, a sign of shaman or drum or shaman+drum (Figure 6) is found on the 29 drums. In this paper, representative samples are assessed for semiotic interpretation.

Figure 6. Drum motif in variety (Source: Manker 1950).

Figure 7. Frame Drum 3.

Frame Drum 3 (Figure 7) is probably originated from Åsele Lappmark in Sweden and has been preserved at the National History Museum in Stockholm. Its form is egg-shaped, oval and asymmetric, with dimensions of 46 x 32 x 7-7.5 cm. The drum frame is made of pinewood. Near the centre, we can see a circular sign, interpreted as a drum or a tyre (protecting the shaman). In the middle of the right side, two signs of a shaman are seen. The upper sign shows a shaman (or a god) on the way to the paradise underworld, where Sami ancestors inhabit (icon: *Saivo*, symbol: the underworld). The lower sign could be a shaman himself (icon: *Jabmeaimo*, symbol: the land of the death). In general, *Saivo* and *Jabmeaimo* are closely related, thus it makes hard to differentiate them from each other. Nevertheless, the role of the shaman is obvious. He tries to bring a dead soul back from *Saivo* and *Jabmeaimo* through negotiation, confrontation, threatening and stealing. About the relationship between the shaman and the drum, their rather distant positions could suggest simply an activity group. Semiotic interpretation makes the drum play a central role in the spiritual underworld.

Drum owner, shaman

Shaman's drum

Figure 8. Frame Drum 10.

The origin of Frame Drum 10 (Figure 8) is unknown, probably South Sami in Sweden. It has been preserved at the National Museum of Ethnology in Leipzig. The drum is egg-shaped and oval with dimensions of 47 x 27.3 x 5.8-6.5 cm and is made of pinewood. In the middle of the lower part, we can see the two neighbouring signs (a drum and a shaman) in their upside-down gestures and detail in the depiction. It testifies the free reading of the drum in any direction as well as the artistic freedom of a sign making. Moreover, the positions recall their roles in the underworld, although the gods of *Saivo* and *Jabmeaimo* depicted on the right side of the drum. Regarding their relation to different gods and a reindeer herd at the lower part, the drum and the shaman could mediate to harmonise the Sami nature and life. They are juxtaposed with two icons.

Flanged Frame Drum 43 (Figure 9) originated from Kemi Lappmark in Finland has been preserved at the National History Museum in Stockholm. The drum form is ecliptic, oval, symmetric and vertical. It is 85 x 53 x 11-11-5 cm in dimension and is made of pinewood. Interestingly, the drum has almost a double size of other drums and a different way of depicting signs. All gods and humans are personalised, instead of typical geometrical expressions. With a segmented pattern of the three worlds, two shamans in the middle and the lower part are the human world and the underworld respectively. From the second left in the middle, a shaman holds a drum, and his hands and feet are fully opened, suggesting the act of entering into a trance. The figures adjacent to the shaman represent different gods, thus the shaman intends to invoke the gods' help for his people. On the left, lower part, there is a shaman with a drum confronting with a sickness for fear of a death. It can be also interpreted as a shaman fighting against the magic. As mentioned earlier, the Church's eradication of Sami drums has left a mystery. Shaman signs (icons) and their juxtaposed positions can raise further semiotic interpretations.

Shaman with
a drum

Shaman with a drum,
sickness between death?
Shaman fighting against a
magic.

Figure 9. Flanged Frame Drum 43.

Shaman a
drum owner?

Shaman to the
underworld or
Jabmealmo, a
dead person on
the road?

Figure 10. Frame Drum 64.

Preserved at the National History Museum in Stockholm, the origin of Bowl Drum 64 (Figure 10) as Lule Lappmark in Sweden is questioned. It has an egg-shaped form, oval, vertical with the ground and sidewall vaulted. With dimensions of 40 x 26.8 x 9.8 cm, the drum is made of pinewood. In general, the bowl type selects specific signs and excludes occasionally the *Rota* god. Here, a shaman, probably a drum owner, is standing on the far left of the drum. He is surrounded by tents, forest gods and an animal, explaining his belongings in the Sami society. The other shaman is located at the middle of the lower part. He is visiting *Saivo* or *Jabmeaimo*, because his head points to a squared cemetery with crosses. Or it can be a dead person on the road. Of shaman signs (icons), two different symbolic meanings and two activity groups are interpreted.

N	S	D	S+D	SF	N	S	D	S+D	SF
F3	2	1		S	F7	1	1		=
F8	2	2		=	F10			1+1	S+D
F11	1	1		=	F13	1		1+1	=
F17			1+1	=	F18	1	1		=
F19	1	3		D	F21		1		D
F22	1		1+1	=	F24		1		D
F25	2	2		=	F26	1	1		=
F27	3	1		S	F28		1		D
F30	1	1		=	F31	1		1+1	=
F33		1		D	F37	1	1		=
F38	1	1		=	F40	2	1		S
Fl43	1		1+1	=	Fl44	2		1+1	S
B 45	1		1+1	=	B51			1+1	S+D
B54		1		D	B64	2			S
B67			2+2	S+D	Sum	20D with 28S	18D with 22 D	10D with 11S+11 D	D6, S5, S+D3

Table 1. The appearance of shaman, drum, shaman+drum on the 29 drums (Source: the author).

N(number), S(shaman), D(drum), S+D(shaman+drum), SF(superior frequency), F(frame drum), Fl(flanged frame drum), B(bowl drum)

The table above shows the location of the shaman, drum, and shaman+drum signs on the 29 drums. There are 28 shaman signs on 20 physical drums; 22 drum signs on 18 physical drums: 11 shaman+drum signs on 10 physical drums. Of their frequent use, 6 drums, 5 shamans, and 3 shaman+drum are in a row, indicating the drum sign to be the first in dominance. Except for 9 drums (10, 17, 21, 24, 28, 33, 51, 54, 64), all have two signs and suggest the closeness between the shaman and the drum, particularly on 10 drums (10, 13, 17, 22, 31 43, 44, 45, 51, 67). Interestingly, two pairs of the shaman+drum on Bowl Drum 67 can raise a question whether this can be a character of the further northern area.

At any rate, 29 drums of the 71 surviving drums do not fully guarantee the absoluteness of the drum, shaman, shaman+drum signs on a drum. It is an intangible, traditional asset among the actual painters (mostly shamans) who decode these signs in their cognitive minds. Every painter has his own expression, manifesting the Sami's individual yet collective identity.

Conclusion

The 71 preserved drums at present are a crucial source of studying the Sami culture and religion, and the assessed 29 drums represent a strong closeness of the Sami belief and their tradition, although their semiotic interpretation awaits more challenges.

> The surface of the drum…is a Sami Weltanschauung of a tripartite universe. It consists of the upper realm of the heavenly deities, the middle or human realm, and the lower realm or the upside-down world. They are connected with a pillar having the sun as its centre, surrounded by gods, people, animals, and other symbols in a symmetric configuration towards the centre. The location of the figures and the whole structure of the drum with its oval form seem to indicate a cyclic view of life (Pentikäinen 1984, cited by Hoppal 2007).

The symbolic drum signs provide a powerful communication between shamans, gods, and peoples in Sami world, regardless of their positions and interpretations. Moreover, the Sami drum has fused the traditional and the modern worlds, manifesting Sami as an intangible cultural heritage. It is no wonder why a drum, a powerful evidence of the Sami religion, had to be eradicated by the Church.

Common signs of various layout designs are due to the painters' free minds and adoptions of other designs to their drums, creating similarities with local variations. However, the overall design shows universal human aspects of a mental map. Anyone can design a drum with favourite signs and depict activities, persons, important things, and concepts. Although Sami culture has to absorb and to incorporate modern influences and conveniences into their lifestyles, the old traditions remain. In the imagery of the newly made drums, their symbolic signs are a reminder of the past to the present. In this regard, the 71 drums testify the contemporary Sami culture through generations.

In short, the Sami drum bridges gaps between the old and the modern worlds. It still functions as a way to view the world in a holistic manner - a symbol of hope for the Sami future. Semiotic interpretations have enhanced the Sami worldview through shaman drums as intangible cultural manifestation and communication.

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SELECTIVE TRANSFER OF IDEOLOGICAL CONTENT OF PLACES OF WORSHIP IN INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION. CASE STUDY BASED ON SILESIA

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show changes in the ways of adaptation of communal symbolism, which over the centuries bound the Silesian Lowland with the ideological goals of its inhabitants. The practice of assigning various symbolic meanings to the same place will be presented after analyzing the source documentation and publications devoted to such selected places. Examples of such practice can be found in Silesia, the geographical land located in the basin of the upper and middle Odra river, where two mountains — Ślęża located on the western side and St. Anne Mountain on the eastern side — served as places for pagan worship. In Christian times monasteries were built in both of these places, however only one monastery remained to this day. In German times both mountains served as a place of secular worship. The main goal of the paper is to to characterize this process in periods of political transformation in the 20ᵗʰ century. In the case of St. Anne Mountain an attempt will be made to determine the causes of contemporary coexistence of religious and secular symbolism.

1. Introduction

Semiotics focused on poetry includes the category of icons. According to Grzegorz Grochowski, "[t]he most traditional, somewhat old-fashioned approach, identifies iconic images with the ability to create visual images that stimulate the recipient's sensitivity" (2006: 47). Therefore, if a word is to correspond to a picture, then the question arises whether the ideological meaning of the particular image may change over time. Considering such assumption as probable an attempt was made to investigate such change based on the symbolism attributed to the two moun-

tains: Ślęża (718 m.a.s.l.) and St. Anne Mountain (408 m.a.s.l.). Both mountains are located in the Silesian Lowland along the middle course of the Odra river. The culmination of the terrain grows out of a flat, lowland environment. The shape of the mountains was associated with their volcanic origin (Majewski 1923: 30). However, in case of Ślęża the claim has not been confirmed scientifically. Both mountains are 152 kilometers apart. Nowadays, this distance can be reached within 13 hours on foot and in about 2 and a half hours when traveling by car. On sunny days, one can see the top of the mountain from the top of the other.

2. The first acts of worship

In the pagan times both of these mountains were places of worship. Stone artifacts which were found on Ślęża (Zieliński 1889: 135) indicate that in pagan times the mountain became a place of worship (Słupecki 1992) (Fig. 1).

Figure 1. Pagan bear from the Ślęża mountain (owned by: Wojciech Fabisiak Muzeum Ślężańskie <muzeum@sobotka.pl>)

However, no such evidence was found on St. Anne's Mountain. The pagan roots of this place derive from folk stories about the dragon's nest as well as the names assigned to the mountain. The other names included: Chełm or Chełmska Mountain, which referred to the appearance of the mountain and St. George (*Georgiberg*) (Reisch 1910-206: 36). In the Christian hagiography St. George was a hero who fought against the dragon, which symbolized paganism (Kowalenko 1970: 305). Therefore, the name of this saint symbolized his beliefs, which were assigned to the mountain.

In Christianity both mountains were adopted for religious purposes. In the 12th century, an Augustinian canonical monastery was established on Ślęża (Tymieniecki 1935: 131; Zieliński 1889: 135). On St. Anne Mountain a chapel was built. In the 17th century Franciscans, who fled from the invasion of the Swedes (Reisch: 1910-2006) established a monastery there. After 39 years they left the place due to the pagan rebellion. They finally settled in Wroclaw, the capital of

the duchy (Zieliński 1889: 135), located about 34 kilometers away from St. Anne Mountain. The Franciscans from St. Anne's Mountain have been living there until today. They left the monastery only once as a result of anti-Catholic persecution.

Apart from these rare periods of absence, the monks of St. Francis became guardians of the St. Anna Samotrzecia's cult [Virigin and Child with Saint Anne]. The wooden figure of St. Anna Samotrzecia from the 15th century was worshiped in a nearby church. Originally, this church was dedicated to St. George, the patron of farmers and knights but over time his intercession was limited by the religious influence of St. Anne, mother of Mary, grandmother of Jesus, protoplast of Catholic religion. Along with the growing worship of St. Anne, the patron of the local church also changed. Periodic pilgrimages to the place, where the figure of St. Anne was kept became one of the worshipping forms. The figure depicted the religious mission of the biblical Anne: on the shoulders of the main figure rested two other figures, the bigger represented Mary, and the smaller — Jesus (Fig. 2).

Figure 2. The figure of St. Anna Samotrzecia from St. Anne's Mountain located in the Opole Voivodship. From the collection of Jozafat R. Gohly.

On the slopes of the mountain, where the church with a statue of St. Anna Samotrzecia was located, a Calvary route was established. The route was to resemble the way that Jesus walked from Pilate's palace to the crucifixion on the Mount of Olives in Jerusalem.

The opportunity to follow the footsteps of the Crucified, attracted many visitors, who at the same time could visit the church with the statue of St. Anna Samotrzecia. The importance of the pilgrimage tradition in the place of depositing the figure of Jesus' grandmother was reflected in the name of the mountain and the nearby village. They were both named as St. Anne Mountain (since the 18th century) (Reisch 1910-206: 38). In the case of the Ślęża Mountain a similar process did not develop, even though the Catholic church also influenced this place (Zieliński 1889: 135). The nearby town was named Sobotka, after the name of tribal Slavic rituals, occurring during the ceremonies related to the summer solstice (the 24th June), when the inhabitants gathered around the fires, augured and floated wreaths of flowers down the rivers (Bielowski 1834: 215).

3. State symbolism

In the 19ᵗʰ century, both mountains became an example of replacing religious symbols with the secular ones. In 1810, under the rule of Prussia, St. Anne's monastery was secularized and dissolute. The place of pilgrimage was deserted (Reisch 1910-206: 168). 49 years later the monks returned there, but after 16 years new state restrictions forced them to leave the monastery again. It was during the Kulturkampf times. After 12 years Franciscans returned to their monastery on the St. Anne Mountain and re-established earlier pastoral activities for the Polish-German and German-speaking population (Kurowski 1997: 19).

In the case of Ślęża every year since 1813, the meetings of German students from Wroclaw were held for 101 years. The meetings were organized to commemorate the extinction of the anti-Polish *Freikorps* (volunteer corps) from the nearby village (Rogów Sobieski) (Kolbuszewski 2016). In 1837 a tourist hostel was built near the St. Anne's Mountain top. 15 years later the development of the tourist movement led to the launch of a new tourist facility and another one at the beginning of the 20ᵗʰ century. The practice of the meetings in Ślęża ended after the outbreak of the First World War (Kolbuszewski 2016). After the First World War the tourist traffic was more interested in the heathen artifacts than in the Catholic symbolism.

After the First World War and the demarcation of the German-Polish border St. Anne Mountain represented the new symbolism. In May 1921 due to its strategic location over the lowland the St. Anne Mountain became the site of the biggest battle of the III Silesian uprising. *Freikorps'* troops and Polish insurgents of Silesia were fighting (Sobota 1998: 31-67). Since than the religious symbolism of St. Anna was added a secular cult of memory about the participants of the armed struggle for the motherland. This idea was promoted both by the Germans and the Poles. In the 1920s, a project to change the name of the village from Annaberg (German name of St. Anne's Mountain) to Ahnenberg ("Mountain of the Forefathers"), however, it was not successful (Nijakowski 2001: 96). At the end of the 1930s, the *Freikorps* was built to replace the symbolism of the pilgrimage place with the new values (Struve 2016: 214) (Fig. 3).

Figure 3. The Mausoleum of German soldiers killed in the First World War built on St. Anne Mountain in the 1930s. From the collection of Piotr Smykała.

At the foot stone of St. Anne Mountain an amphitheater was built (Fig. 4), where Nazi celebrations were organized. Every year in March the "Memorial Day of Heroes" was celebrated. The aim of the celebrations was not to commemorate the nameless German soldiers killed in World War I, but to heroize them (Orlowski 2003: 208). The symbolism of St. Anne Mountain was used instrumentally. These ceremonies took place near the Franciscan monastery, mimicking the significance of religious pilgrimages (Ogiolda 2014).

On the other hand, part of the population, which was repressed by German authorities and their fellow citizens in 1922 and later for fostering Polish national aspirations, after immigration to the Second Polish Republic decided to build a "substitutive" temple for the cult of St. Anne in the diocese of Katowice (Olszar 2005: 245).

In 1936 those who remained in Germany founded the "Polish House" at the foot of St. Anne Mountain. The House was located based on the sense of identity of Poles living in Germany with a place to which their ancestors made pilgrimages for over three centuries. The "Polish House" became a place where Polish organizations gathered around the Polish Association in Germany (Musialik 2005: 236). During World War II, this building was transformed into the headquarters of the Nazi labor camp for Jews, transiently Soviet captives. In 1941 the Franciscans were deported from the monastery, and their headquarters were initially transformed into a military haven, and then settled by the Volksdeutsch settlers from Bessarabia and Bucovina (Polanko 2013: 119-153). In 1945 Franciscans returned to their monastery (Polanko 2013: 160) when Silesia was already in the hands of the Polish administration, dependent on Soviet power. The *Freikorps* mausoleum was blown up and replaced the Monument of the Silesian Uprisings which consists of four connected fifteen meter pylons (pillars) covered with scenes referring to Polish fights for Silesia. Every year on May 3rd the outbreak of the III Silesian Uprising was commemorated at the foot of the monument (Fig. 4).

Figure 4. The monument of the Silesian Uprisings on St. Anne Mountain. From the collection of Piotr Smykała.

For 37 years the religious symbolism of St. Anne Mountain had no major significance. The visit of the Pope John Paul II (21st June 1983) was used to reclaim its religious importance.

4. Public and social adaptation of symbols

In the 1990s, celebrations commemorating the Silesian uprisings were used as an opportunity to manifest nationalist attitudes by the NRC (National Radical Camp). This led to the relocation of other major state events. At the same time, the rank of Polish-secular symbolism of St. Anne Mountain declined. Even the Museum of the Silesian Uprisings established in1969 in the interwar building of the Polish House was also threatened. It was due to the increased authority of the German-speaking population, which considered Silesian uprisings as the intervention of a foreign state — Poland — in the internal affairs of the German state. For the Poles, the Silesian uprisings symbolize independence struggles. The German minority, which emerged after 1989, returned to symbolism related to the pre-war German religious tradition. Polish celebrations in this place are considered by the minority as the political instrumentation of the Catholic pilgrimage site (Czolk 2017: 96).

In the 21st century diocesan authorities of the Catholic Church transformed pilgrimages to St. Anne Mountain into pilgrimages of national and ethnic minorities (the Germans and the Romanies). In addition to the usual pilgrimages, new forms of religious meetings have been developed, such as the Youth Festival (since 1996).

At the turn of 20th and 21st centuries, the importance of natural landscape and cultural values of St. Anne Mountain increased. In 1988, the Landscape Park was established, and in 2014 the National Geopark of St. Anne Mountain (Fig. 5).

Figure 5. The logo of National Geopark of St. Anne Mountain.

In December 2016 the Holy Mountain was selected for the national stage of voting on the Internet sites for the European Heritage Label in 2017. In the visual symbolism the pilgrimage site does not symbolize the statue and the profile of the Franciscan monastery. However, the symbols of Mount Saint Anne in regional promotion or economic marketing were not as significant as in the case of Ślęża. The name of Ślęża was adopted not only by the landscape park created in 1988 (Ślęża Landscape Park) (Fig. 6).

Figure 6. The logo of Ślęża Landscape Park.

The name of the Ślęża mountain is found in many other economic ventures: on the hotel sign "Ślęża" (Ślęża Pension), in the name of enterprise of urban economy (Ślęża Department of Municipal and Residential Management) and in the name of sports club (Ślęża Ciepłowody).

In comparison, the terms referring to the St. Anne Mountain in marketing promotion are used less frequently. This is most likely due to the complexity of the name, which consists of three words. Using these words as a company name would make it difficult to memorize this multi-word name. In 2011 an attempt was made to overcome this inconvenience in identifying with the place of origin by using the word *Annaberg* — the German name for St. Anne Mountain. This happened in the case of transport companies Annaberg Kran, Ltd and Trans Annaberg. However, this way of using the name of the town when identifying the company may be misleading because a place with the same name exists in the Federal Republic of Germany. In this case residents also use the name of the town to identify their businesses.

5. Conclusion

In the past both St. Anne Mountain and Ślęża became symbols. Their ideological symbolism was determined by representatives of the dominant religious or political authorities. However, there is no evidence that the mountains were bound by the same ideological symbolism at the same time. In the case of Ślęża, the original pagan symbols were preserved, despite the subsequent changes of religious denominations, cultures and economic and political formation. St. Anne Mountain has reached a similar status as a symbol of the local Catholic Church in the Upper Silesia. The St. Anne Mountain's influence was limited by 180 years of ongoing attempts to develop secular ideology. Religious symbols were eliminated by both German (feudal, democratic and Nazi) and Polish (communist) governments.

Both mountains have become an example of appropriating and instrumentalizing their symbolism by dominating ideologies. The differences in this process may arise from three factors. The first factor is related to the intensity of religious practices developed in both of these places. Although Roman Catholic church functioned both on Ślęża and on St. Anne Mountain, only the St. Anne Mountain's sanctuary gained the supra-local character. The second factor is a national variety of Catholics visiting both places. In the case of St. Anne Mountain, the pilgrimages of both Polish and German visitors doubled the number of occasions for the manifestation of national differences. In the case of Ślęża this type of dichotomy did not occur as the inhabitants were homogeneous nationally. The Germans organized national manifestations but they were secular.

The third factor refers to compulsory migration movements, particularly intense after the Second World War. When settling in new places, immigrants either sought for or built substitute temples. The Polish immigrants from the Eastern Borderlands of the Second Polish Republic did not take over the German symbolism associated with the Ślęża Mountain, unlike it happened in the case of St. Anne Mountain's inhabitants, who worshiped St. Anne, the grandmother of Jesus. Thus belonging to the same confessional circle, they assimilated the cult of Anna Samotrzecia as an element of "homeliness" in a culturally alien place inhabited due to the forced immigration.

From the 19th century to the 1980s the separation of state power from religious values created another force aiming at taking over the symbolic importance of the well-recognized place of pilgrimage. These actions were taken independently of the nationality or political views represented by the authorities.

In the 21st century, the symbolism of these places still exists in the space of faith and historical memory. In addition, references to both mountains can be found in the logos of economic projects developed by local authorities, which are supported by the EU's funds. The reference to

the one-word association (Ślęża) seems to be easier. Perhaps that is also why St. Anne's Mountain is sometimes reduced to personal identification of St. Anne, for example, St. Anne Land.

The original symbolism of both places was restored and renewed at the turn of the 20th and 21st century after the democratic revolution in Poland. The return to pagan symbolism was observed on Ślęża and to religious and national symbolism (both Polish and German) on St. Anne Mountain.

In the 21st century symbols of both mountains are included into local and regional marketing undertakings as well as the names of private enterprises. To a lesser extent, this practice was carried out in the case of Mount St. Anna, probably because of its three-word name. As indicated, Polish name is often replaced by its German equivalent.

For centuries, the symbolism of these two mountains have evolved not only transcendentally but also more usefully, utilitarianly.

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FROM THE SESSION "(THE) ROLE OF SEMIOTICS IN THE ANIMATION OF CULTURAL HERITAGES"

LE DISCOURS SEMIOTIQUE ARABE

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Abstract

L'évidence projetée dans cette recherche est celle de la méthode sémiotique et son engagement avec le texte littéraire, mais également de la manière dont les critiques Arabes l'ont apposée à leurs travaux et la place qu'occupe cette approche parmi les autres dans le discours critique Arabe. L'objectif de cet essai est donc de jeter la lumière sur les approches sémiotiques mises en œuvre par les chercheurs dans le monde Arabe.

1. Introduction

L'évidence projetée dans cette recherche est celle de la méthode sémiotique et de son engagement avec le texte littéraire, mais également de la manière dont les critiques arabes l'ont apposée à leurs travaux et la place qu'occupe cette approche parmi les autres dans le discours critique arabe.

Les résidus séculaires de la critique arabe sont encore actuels dans les esprits de nombreux critiques arabes, qui marchent encore sur le sillon de leurs prédécesseurs. Cependant, cette vision obsolète tend à se dissiper. En effet, si nous considérons de près l'univers de la critique arabe, qui s'étend de la fin du deuxième millénaire au début du troisième, nous constatons qu'une nouvelle génération de chercheurs et de critiques s'est ouverte aux méthodes analytiques et critiques modernes, conduites par l'approche sémiotique.

A travers des lectures constantes et assidues d'œuvres littéraires créatives, les chercheurs ont franchi le niveau du regard personnel pour souscrire à une vision objective. La lecture qu'ils font de la littérature se retrouve ainsi élargie et matérialisée, passant de simples impressions personnelles inconsistantes à des réflexions objectives.

Le discours sémiotique arabe se particularise par une volonté de dépasser l'application didactique de la méthode sémiotique et des concepts qui lui sont liés, avec cette volonté consciente de trouver des réponses aux questions que pose le texte littéraire arabe.

Pour tenter de délimiter les questions que soulève le discours sémiotique dans les pays arabes, nous pouvons les dénombrer en ces points :

- L'ampleur de l'influence qu'a exercé la culture critique occidentale sur le discours critique arabe.

- Le degré de l'impact de la méthode sémiotique sur les chercheurs à travers le long processus de son évolution.

- Les difficultés qui ont imprégné le glissement des concepts critiques sémiotiques vers le discours critique arabe.

- Si les chercheurs se sont bornés à instrumentaliser la méthode sémiotique ou ont investi d'autres approches.

L'objectif de cet essai est donc de jeter la lumière sur les approches sémiotiques mises en œuvre par les chercheurs, qu'on appelle les modernistes, qui ont puisé leur pratique critique dans les méthodes analytiques occidentales.

Les réponses à ces questions ne seront pas livrées en un seul jet, la première halte qui nous interpelle étant le degré de l'impact exercé sur le discours arabe par son analogue occidental.

2. L'influence de la critique occidentale sur le discours critique arabe

De manière générale, la migration du savoir d'une société vers une autre est l'une des plus pertinentes manifestations de l'anthropologie, dans ses formes ancienne et contemporaine. La vie intellectuelle s'abreuvant même, au sein des nations, de cette migration qui peut constituer une condition intrinsèque à l'implantation d'une activité intellectuelle singulière. Cette transmission est tributaire du degré d'admission de l'idée dans son nouveau foyer et de la manière de la manier.

L'importation de la pensée du continent européen et de l'Occident en général a constitué l'un des pivots de la problématique culturelle posée au pôle intellectuel arabe depuis le 19ème siècle, qui a vu soulever plusieurs questions sur la nature de la relation qui doit nous lier à l'Occident et les questions de la modernisation ou de la modernité. Concrètement, maints chercheurs ont recouru à l'importation massive de concepts et de théories de l'Occident, n'y voyant finalement aucune indisposition à acquiescer ses dispositifs et sa technologie avancée. Toutefois, cette adhésion s'est murée dans une tension née des multiples difficultés qui ont accompagné le passage des concepts critiques d'une réalité culturelle productrice de savoir vers une réalité consommatrice de ce savoir et ne détenant aucun outil pour le développer.

Le projet critique a connu son éclosion dans le macrocosme arabe à la fin du 19ème siècle, à l'issue d'une prise de conscience du développement atteint par la critique occidentale et d'une velléité d'en tirer profit en important ses théories et ses concepts. A l'aube du 20ème siècle, la critique s'est affectée à une somme de missions tangentes au discours littéraire, telles que les études historiques, les biographies, l'étude de textes patrimoniaux et à d'autres supports, s'appuyant sur la méthodologie historique telle que préconisée par Taha Hussein dès les prémices du 20ème siècle.

Cependant, le mouvement moderniste a affecté la pensée et la vie littéraire avec l'émergence de critiques littéraires spécialistes à partir de la deuxième moitié du 20ème siècle, ayant un impact incontesté sur la mutation qualitative qu'a connu le discours critique arabe. On laisse deviner du coup que la vague de critiques arabes déferlant des universités occidentales s'est ouvert aux méthodes de critique moderne, leur permettant d'approcher la littérature à partir d'angles de vue différents des pratiques dominantes. Ainsi imprégnée, la scène de la critique littéraire a subi la prépondérance des méthodes modernes de critique, parmi lesquelles on peut évoquer la sociocritique, la psychocritique, le structuralisme, la poétique, la critique génétique, la stylistique, la critique sémiologique, la déconstruction, etc.

La critique arabe moderne a accédé à ces méthodes et à ces théories par le canal de la Nouvelle critique, jusqu'aux années 1970, grâce aux travaux de traduction et à la production par la

suite. Quelques œuvres fondamentales de la critique occidentale ont été traduites vers la langue arabe, à l'instar de *The Armed vision* de Stanley Hayman (1955), *Principles of literary criticism* de I. A. Richards (1962), *Essays in criticism* de Mathew Arnold (1965) et *Critical approaches to literature* de David Daiches (1956), et d'autres.

Les méthodes liées au structuralisme et aux approches postérieures se sont déployées à grandes ailes dans les années 1980, marquées par les chercheurs issus des universités françaises et ses instituts implantés dans les pays du Maghreb et en Orient, notamment au Maroc, en Tunisie, en Algérie, au Liban, en Syrie, puis en Egypte. « Ils appelaient à un genre de nouvelle critique qui a adopté de nouveaux fondements analogues au modèle occidental, porteurs de la nécessité de rapprocher le texte littéraire en tant que texture linguistique et d'aborder le discours littéraire en tant que discours autarcique et indépendant des autres espaces » (Miri Mahmoud 2007 : 90).

Un flot de mutations s'est opéré dans le monde arabe au cours de la deuxième moitié du 20ème siècle, exhortant le chercheur arabe à reconsidérer une multitude d'axiomes auxquels il adhérait. Cette modernité à laquelle aspiraient quelques chercheurs modernistes arabes a été accueillie par certains théoriciens arabes avec des quolibets (Hamouda Abdelaziz 1988 : 130) car la conception arabe de la modernité a été cachetée de fascination pour ces théories venues de l'Occident, en même temps qu'une difficulté à cerner les différentes méthodes importées, que ce soit dans leurs portées cognitives ou philosophiques. Néanmoins, ces modernistes ont eu la primauté de « sauver l'honneur des Arabes », pour paraphraser Louis Awad lors d'une rencontre intellectuelle (Hamouda Abdelaziz 1988 : 130).

C'est dans cette optique et ces conditions que s'est timidement manifestée la sémiotique au champ des recherches littéraires arabes en tant que nouvelle méthode qui idéalise le texte sans tenir compte des attributs socioculturels.

3. L'émergence de la sémiotique dans le monde arabe

La théorie sémiotique est apparue aux chercheurs comme un nouvel espace cognitif encyclopédique, à l'instar de la philosophie et de l'histoire, connues depuis l'aube des temps. Partant, le concept de signe s'est révélé comme une clé qui ouvre les portes du savoir vers tous les domaines de recherche et d'investigation, en raison de ce qu'il recèle comme pouvoir de description, d'interprétation et d'abstraction, et d'outils de compréhension et d'analyse. Et en raison de la vocation de la sémiologie à être une science générale des signes qui englobe une diversité de branches et de spécialités, dont la sphère littéraire en particulier, les chercheurs l'ont prise d'assaut, de sorte que les contours de la sémiotique littéraire notamment se sont graduellement précisés dans les études littéraires arabes. Si les académiciens émérites sont plus modérés et moins exaltés dans leur connivence avec cette méthode qui incarne la modernité à leurs yeux, la génération d'étudiants et de nouveaux gradués des universités se sont laissé allécher par la modernité, allant jusqu'à investir ses moindres exploits méthodologiques, qu'ils ont instrumentalisé dans leurs études et leurs analyses.

Or, cette méthode ne s'est pas frayé son chemin avec aisance dans la culture arabe, ankylosée par des constantes et des convictions au point où il est devenu chimérique pour beaucoup de critiques et de chercheurs de renoncer à une réserve de coutumes esthétiques léguées par le passé.

Certes, la greffe de cette théorie dans le tissu du discours critique arabe, avec ses concepts, sa terminologie et son arsenal méthodologique multiple, n'a pas échappé aux crocs de la résistance locale. En effet, l'émergence de la sémiotique dans l'horizon culturel arabe a été accompagnée de conjonctures inhérentes à cette émergence, telles que la cognition tardive, la traduction tantôt juste et tantôt erronée, l'adoption de certains concepts et le rejet d'autres. De telles incidences

entravent n'importe quelle théorie lors de sa migration d'un contexte culturel vers un autre, de sorte que la théorie intruse se voit renoncer à beaucoup de ses assises fondamentales afin qu'elle puisse épouser la culture hôte. D'autres entraves à la théorie se sont manifestées dans la nature même de la pensée arabe. Cette dernière reste récalcitrante à la modernité, de la même manière que le discours critique arabe n'a pu se défaire du fardeau de calquer le passé et de le ressasser. Un constat flagrant malgré l'audace de certains néo-critiques qui ont ouvert les bras à la culture occidentale pour lui emprunter ses théories et ses approches contemporaines. De cette perspective, le discours critique arabe ne cesse de couver son identité culturelle en clonant son héritage ancien sous divers alibis, tels que la sauvegarde du patrimoine et de l'identité culturelle.

Les malaises qui frappent la critique arabe sont donc à foison. En tête, figure ce que Mohamed Al-Rabii a dénommé « le dilemme de l'illettrisme culturel chez les Arabes » (Al-Rabii Mohamed 1981 : 198), et qui est à même de faire avorter tout effort critique, outre l'obsession de sauvegarder l'identité contre l'expropriation identitaire et le spectre de l'invasion culturelle. Le discours critique arabe demeure ainsi un réservoir pour la culture critique arabe ancienne, au moment où la modernité se dresse comme le mouvement par le quel on se libère des legs antérieurs et on marche à la rencontre de l'avenir en opérant une rupture avec le passé. Elle est fondamentalement et avant tout chose un programme intellectuel libérateur et une riposte « à ceux qui considèrent la modernité comme une hérésie » (Fadl Salah 1995 : 14).

Depuis l'apparition des méthodes critiques occidentales modernes, les questions critiques sont demeurées fondamentalement les mêmes, avec une probable variation dans l'aspect qui n'a pas touché à leur essence, malgré que les adeptes de ces méthodes - dont l'approche sémiotique - les aient présentées sous des couverts historiques et culturels différents. Dans ce climat, beaucoup de chercheurs et de critiques étaient conditionnés par une conscience critique héritée, croulant sous le poids des discours politique et religieux. Leurs discours sont alors tombés dans la similarité au niveau de la prestation, malgré les turbulences qui ont secoué les pays arabes, sans pour autant ébranler trop de convictions et de constantes. Cependant, face aux enjeux de la nouvelle ère, le discours critique arabe s'est confronté au nécessaire développement de ses outils et la mise à niveau de ses compétences, mais non sans difficultés.

4. Les difficultés rencontrées

Parmi les embuches qui ont paré au parcours de la sémiotique dans le monde arabe, on peut revenir sur la question du maniement de la terminologie, qui a engendré des désordres lexicaux dans notre champ de critique. Il arrive, en effet, souvent que la compréhension erronée ou le maniement inadéquat aboutisse à une altération de la théorie et du texte. La majorité des disciples de la sémiotique littéraire se comportent avec l'appareil conceptuel de cette méthode en tant qu'ensemble de termes liés à des fragments textuels particuliers, autrement dit une simple description structurelle du texte définissable à travers une terminologie qui vient porter secours à l'analyste dans l'identification des unités et des composantes textuelles, en évitant de creuser dans la genèse scientifique de cette théorie, se contentant de résumés qui expliquent des termes isolés qui ne peuvent enrichir un texte .

Le maniement terminologique de cette théorie sans en saisir la généalogie scientifique et son arrière-plan cognitif sert entre les mains du chercheur de simple outil qui n'apporte rien à notre intellection du texte et n'engendre aucune accumulation de connaissances susceptibles de développer les procédés de notre interaction avec ce texte.

En outre, le chercheur trébuche sur la définition terminologique. En effet, il se retrouve souvent prisonnier d'une traduction unique de plusieurs termes ou sur plusieurs traductions cor-

respondant au même terme. A entendre par là que la traduction d'un terme peut varier d'un chercheur à un autre et d'un traducteur à un autre en dépit de l'appartenance du terme traduit à une seule référence dans son origine occidentale. Cette pluralité a débouché sur une véritable ambigüité dans la signification des termes dans plusieurs œuvres critiques traduites vers la langue arabe ; et cet aspect reflète un pan de la difficulté de convenir d'une signification, cultivant ainsi une crise qui s'est abattue sur la critique, due à « l'incapacité des critiques à parvenir à assigner un sens aux termes et à les fixer » (Al-Manii Hassan 1969 : 8).

L'affectation d'une signification aux concepts est imposée par la nature même du terme qui appartient au vaste champ des sciences humaines, dans lequel les concepts, contrairement à ceux appartenant à la sphère des sciences exactes, ne peuvent revêtir la valeur absolue quelque soit notre évaluation de leur disposition à la généralisation et de leur autonomie théorique (Laroui 1987 : 75).

Cette difficulté découle foncièrement des chercheurs qui n'ont pas assimilé que le terme ne puisse être perceptible que par sa position à l'intérieur d'une représentation théorique qui lui octroie une légitimité d'existence et de fonction. La migration du terme vers la langue cible ne peut pas se résumer à l'attribution d'un équivalent arabe à un énoncé étranger. Le terme est une unité de la langue qui va au-delà de ses portées verbales et lexicales pour encadrer des représentations intellectuelles.

On pourrait considérer la problématique de la terminologie et de sa traduction comme un obstacle réel sur le chemin de n'importe quel chercheur qui travaille sur la théorie sémiotique dans le discours sémiologique arabe, un obstacle qui d'ailleurs ne peut être surmonté que si les chercheurs accordent leurs diapasons sur les sens à attribuer à la terminologie que leur propose la théorie sémiotique, sans doute en les épurant et en unifiant l'usage par l'élaboration d'un lexique compilateur de toute la terminologie de cette théorie, une démarche qui fait actuellement défaut aux chercheurs arabes. Il n'est pas exclu de rencontrer dans le même pays plusieurs lexiques élaborés par plusieurs chercheurs sur les mêmes lexies. Une confusion qui laisse les étudiants perplexes quant au choix des termes les plus proches de la structure-source, les plus appropriés et les plus aptes à rendre le sens.

Parallèlement, la sémiotique s'est figée dans le monde arabe sur une sorte d'intrication et de contexture entre les représentations, les théories et les différentes approches. Ceci confère à son image une ambigüité dans l'esprit de certains chercheurs qui manquent de pratique. Il est inéluctable donc d'introduire une figuration palpable et systématique de la sémiotique en proposant une perception organisée, notamment depuis qu'elle s'est élargie jusqu'à contenir diverses sciences et champs de savoir, au point où il devient difficile de distinguer la sphère sémiotique du reste. Subséquemment, on assiste à une dispersion qui a brouillé l'imaginaire des chercheurs et à la propagation d'un amas de paralogismes inhérents à ce sujet. Notons donc l'obligation de procéder à des recherches et à des études pour sonder les spécificités de cette science et isoler ses unités et ses éléments.

Il serait utile de rappeler les efforts entrepris par des chercheurs arabes dans ce domaine. Certains ont défriché le terrain en proposant une définition de la sémiologie et de ses orientations, tandis que d'autres ont rendu accessible des théories et des représentations de la sémiotique littéraire. Et en dépit d'une dissemblance dans l'expression de leurs travaux, ils ont convergé vers la désuétude des anciennes méthodes et la nécessité de les reconsidérer à la lumière des sciences modernes.

5. La prépondérance de l'école de Paris

Les critiques ont considéré — avec beaucoup de retenue — la sémiotique narrative telle appliquée par l'école de Paris, au roman et au récit en générale. L'un des premiers a avoir apporté sa

contribution est le Marocain Mohammed Nadif, qui a traduit l'œuvre de Bernard Toussaint définissant cette science, intitulée « Qu'est-ce que la Sémiologie » (Toussaint Bernard 1978) : « C'est la science définie par De Saussure, qui étudie la vie du signe au sein de la vie sociale » (Nadif Mohammed 1994 : 5). Le chercheur a, en effet, pointé du doigt les   tumultes que traverse la sémiologie durant le siècle en cours et les contributions des chercheurs qui ont fastueusement enrichi l'édifice théorique de la sémiologie moderne.

L'intérêt que portent les chercheurs et les critiques à la sémiotique narrative s'est exprimé à travers sa terminologie et ses concepts qui ont reconsidéré un grand nombre d'axiomes et de préjugés qui ont prévalu dans les années 1970 et 1980, dans ce sens qu'elle a approfondi notre compréhension des textes et des mécanismes qui se cachent derrière leur production d'une part, et contribué à créer une accumulation dans la pratique de la critique, d'autre part.

Il apparait néanmoins, en examinant les travaux publiés par les chercheurs en sémiotique dans plusieurs pays arabes l'existence d'une déficience flagrante. Ces publications sont en effet en majeure partie des traductions d'articles ou de chapitres de livres, lorsqu'elles ne sont pas des répliques laconiques à des théories ou des sommes de théories. Malgré l'importance de ces publications et leur valeur didactique, elles demeurent déficitaires et parfois trompeuses, car dissociées de leur embryon épistémologique et de leur environnement de gestation. De son côté, le sémiologue marocain Saïd Ben Kerad déclare : « Il est rare qu'on tombe sur un exposé exhaustif et intégral pour une seule théorie incluant ses frontières de cognitives et son prolongement dans d'autres champs » (1994 : 54).

Dans la même perspective, A. J. Greimas a captivé l'intérêt des chercheurs et des académiciens (étudiants et enseignants) dans le monde arabe, en raison de la globalité de sa théorie dans la représentation et dans l'analyse, et de sa capacité aussi bien à absorber divers éléments appartenant à d'autres théories narratives qu'à adopter d'autres discours autres que le discours narratif. Le Marocain Saïd Ben Kerad a consacré plus d'une publication à Greimas et à sa théorie.

Sa prédilection pour la théorie de Greimas a été motivée par un ensemble de facteurs :

1. La problématique du sens que pose sa théorie. L'objectif de toute analyse étant de traquer le sens et de l'apprivoiser avant de le restituer aux éléments qui l'ont engendré.

2. La globalité dans la conception imaginative et dans l'analyse. La théorie de Greimas a cette capacité de dialoguer avec des éléments cognitifs qui appartiennent à des domaines impliquant des dissimilitudes et à dresser des passerelles vers des théories avec qui elle partage un thème d'étude unique.

3. Une autre singularité de cette théorie est sa disposition à adopter, théoriquement et dans la pratique, des discours autres que le discours narratif. L'intérêt de Greimas ne porte pas sur la nature narrative d'un texte mais sur la narrativité (Ben Kerrad Saïd : 7-8).

Les empreintes de la théorie sémiotique sur la critique du texte se sont dévoilées dans le cadre de l'héritage narratif et de sa critique. Les chercheurs ont travaillé sur un ancien corpus, s'appuyant sur les derniers travaux des structuralistes et des sémiologues qui ont développé l'héritage de Vladimir Propp, probablement en raison de la nature folklorique de l'ancien texte, qui allège la tâche du chercheur dans la pratique, surtout que l'analyse structurelle — chez Propp notamment — s'est construite sur la base du corpus du « conte populaire » qui offre une facilité dans l'exercice. La théorie sémiotique elle-même n'a pas décliné une pureté et une authenticité pour tous les chercheurs, vu que la nouvelle critique s'est enchevêtrée à des méthodes classiques, retardant son application sur le roman et le récit. L'antériorité de la critique de l'héritage par rapport à la critique du roman et du récit a été attribuée par Abdellah Abou Hif (Abou Hif Abdellah 2000 : 350) à deux arguments :

1. Le souci de sauvegarder l'identité.

2. L'essor de la narratologie à partir des travaux des formalistes russes, notamment de V. Propp, qui a déployé des tentacules dans la plupart des nouvelles orientations adoptées dans la critique occidentale par les structuralistes et leurs successeurs, qui ont été influencés par ses travaux et ont développé son héritage.

La critique de l'héritage populaire a eu une primauté par rapport à la critique du patrimoine littéraire narratif, car les premières méthodes appliquées sont celles de Propp, qui a travaillé sur la narration folklorique avant d'élargir son optique à d'autres genres narratifs tels que le récit, le roman, etc.

Les formes de la critique de l'héritage narratif ont dévoilé une disparité allant de la lecture à l'analyse, à la théorisation, sans tenir compte de la prépondérance des lectures critiques étayées sur l'analyse structurelle de la narration et tirant avantage en même temps de la critique sémiotique qui examine la signification dans sa portée relationnelle et la grille de ses concepts (Abou Hif Abdellah 2000 : 320).

Abdelhamid Bourayou est l'un des chercheurs arabes précurseurs qui ont concouru à l'enrichissement de l'œuvre algérienne d'expression arabe. Il est l'un des pionniers dans la transposition des méthodes modernes sur le conte populaire algérien (Bourayou Abdelhamid 1986), par souci de dépasser ces méthodes qui se sont attelées à l'objectif ou à l'objet du texte sans s'arrêter sur sa trame structurelle et ses significations. Dans les années 1980, ce chercheur a entrepris une expérience laborieuse et périlleuse, en raison de la primeur des études littéraires modernes dans le monde arabe et qui accomplissaient leurs premiers pas en toute timidité ; ce qui l'a promptement interpellé sur la question de l'usage terminologique. Cette première expérience s'est pourvue d'attributs didactiques et d'une rigueur méthodologique souvent inaccessible à d'autres chercheurs qui ne respectent pas la dialectique du texte et ne considèrent pas le corps étudié comme une finalité en soi mais comme un terrain d'application et une invitation à démontrer la recevabilité d'une théorie, car « l'adoption d'une théorie pour approcher un phénomène donné ne constitue pas un simple souci technique réductible à l'acquisition d'un ensemble d'outils procéduraux naïfs, mais un choix cognitif et idéologique » (Ben Kerad 2003 : 6).

Son étude « Les contes fantastiques du Maghreb », parue en 1992, offrait une plus large harmonie dans sa critique de l'héritage populaire oral, partant des travaux formalistes de Propp, de l'anthropologie structurelle de Strauss, des travaux de Greimas et des études ethno-littéraires de Josef Courtes. Le chercheur justifie cette lecture composée de plusieurs méthodes par « la position du conte fantastique entre la légende et la littérature, rattaché d'une part à la pensée mythologique car enfanté par la légende, et représente d'autre part l'environnement culturel qui a permis le glissement des composants légendaires du discours idéologique vers le discours culturel aux outils esthétiques et artistiques à visée divertissante, outre sa représentation symbolique de *la* logique du groupe et de sa vision de l'univers » (Bourayou Abdelhamid 1992 :123).

Ces efforts et cet intérêt demeurent fructueux dans la mesure où ils interviennent pour opérer une rupture cognitive avec l'imitation dans la critique littéraire arabe, avec pour résultat une accumulation analytique qui ne fédère pas les chercheurs autour d'une méthodologie explicite et n'aboutit pas à une méthode critique unique et rigoureuse. Il devient récursif que des chercheurs nous proposent des lectures qui reproduisent plus ou moins les données des méthodes critiques occidentales modernes, en partant généralement de la méthode structurelle pour arriver à d'autres méthodes qui lui sont adjacentes ou corollaires, telles que la sociologie de la littérature, la sémiotique, la poétique, la déconstruction ou la critique thématique, etc.

C'est l'emprunt à des origines intellectuelles hétérogènes et la formulation d'une représen-

tation conciliatrice dans le domaine de la pensée qui a distingué le discours critique arabe, car « face à la diversité des théories, des méthodes et des concepts affluant de l'Occident, le critique arabe se retrouve en position de sélecteur qui s'abreuve à plusieurs sources, pour répondre aux besoins que lui dicte sa conjoncture sociale. Il peut même émaner de concepts dérivés de deux orientations qui divergent dans leurs assises théoriques sans méditation ni perception des erreurs méthodologiques qui en découlent » (Azerouil Fatma-Zahra 1989 : 193.)

La critique marocaine Fatma-Zahra Azerouil l'attribue au fait que la critique souffre dans le monde arabe d'une crise de production théorique et se cantonne dans la consommation des théories, des méthodes et des concepts, sans se référer à des assises culturelles, économiques, politiques et sociales qui l'habilitent à une lecture féconde des modèles de critique occidentale.

6. Conclusion

Le discours sémiotique arabe est pertinemment afférent à la problématique culturelle générale prévalant dans le monde arabe. D'un point de vue personnel, nous considérerons quelques remarques qui ont découlé de cette étude, avec pour ambition de permettre au chercheur de concevoir dans son imaginaire une représentation du discours critique arabe de manière générale et du discours sémiotique de manière plus ciblée, dans leur interaction avec le cadre culturel général:

1. Le discours critique arabe est dominé par les nouvelles orientations liées au structuralisme et à ses prolongements, parallèlement à l'affaiblissement des autres orientations en rapport avec les sciences humaines, telles que la psychocritique et la sociocritique.

2. Les modernistes arabes ont été subjugués par les théories modernes affluant de l'Occident, mais sont restés dubitatifs et incapables de composer avec ces études et d'en capter les objectifs et la fonction critique elle-même, sous l'emprise de la terminologie critique traduite, rapportée, souvent dénaturée, qu'ils ont imposée à la critique arabe.

3. La finalité de la critique littéraire arabe moderne dans son abord avec les nouvelles théories est d'avancer des réponses aux questions de l'identité, car si l'intérêt qu'elle porte à l'héritage narratif dans toute son étendue géographique traduit une préoccupation, ce serait à l'évidence celle de préserver cet héritage afin de mettre en valeur les spécificités du Moi nationaliste dans la littérature et dans la critique.

4. L'exercice critique de la théorie sémiotique s'est étalé dans son volet pratique, là où la théorisation s'est bornée dans les perspectives de la définition et de la traduction. Il n'est donc pas étonnant que la production arabe manque cruellement de livres consacrés à la théorie pure.

5. Le lecteur se confronte au même titre que le chercheur à la difficulté de se diriger vers une terminologie sémiotique définie, car les chercheurs et les critiques diffèrent dans leur assimilation de cette nouvelle orientation, en raison de l'hégémonie de la traduction et de l'arabisation dans la théorie critique sur la production et l'étymologie.

6. La prépondérance de la sémiologie narrative sur le discours sémiotique arabe n'est plus à démontrer. Les chercheurs, notamment Maghrébins (Algérie, Tunisie, Maroc), ont jeté leur dévolu sur l'école parisienne en se déployant pour la traduction et la mise en valeur de ses travaux et ses ténors, en raison de l'emprise exercée par la langue française sur le panorama culturel maghrébin en général.

7. Les chercheurs et les critiques se sont rarement imposé une méthode critique unique ou prédéfinie. Il nous semble qu'aucun critique n'a adopté une orientation ou une autre dans sa globalité.

8. Les théories de souche occidentale ont donné lieu à la libération de la critique littéraire

arabe de sa captivité passéiste. Cependant, on déplore que certaines pratiques se cantonnent dans les applications mécaniques, l'imitation et la reproduction, qui ne rend aucun service au discours critique arabe. La léthargie qui a engourdi la culture arabe a agi comme un puissant inhibiteur d'une nouvelle production conceptuelle susceptible de contribuer à générer un élan prometteur de développement et de modernité.

9. La question de prospecter une méthode critique reste nébuleuse et instable, car les chercheurs arabes peinent à dépasser le seuil de l'assimilation des méthodes critiques occidentales qui, par ailleurs, ont proliféré et se sont propagé durant les trois dernières décennies, rendant pénible le simple fait de se mettre à jour, à défaut d'aller au-delà d l'assimilation pour arriver à la production.

10. Le déblayage des voies de la critique arabe et du discours sémiotique arabe en particulier ne se borne pas à des efforts individuels ou collectifs, mais interpelle les institutions et les organismes qui travaillent sur la traduction organisée. De leur côté, les universités arabes ont une pierre à apporter dans l'ancrage de quelques méthodes modernes et leur ajustement conceptuel. Le concours des conditions de la recherche scientifique organisée sont des facteurs incontournables pour parvenir à dépasser la consommation des concepts importés pour les investir profitablement.

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DISCOVERING THE ABANDONED AND THE LIVING: A MATERIAL-SEMIOTIC READING OF TEXTILE MILLS IN AHMEDABAD

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Abstract

The abandoned mills — a commonplace phenomenon in recent times of drastically changing economic landscape — have often been alluded to as "material excess of ruins", thus hinging historicity as a function of materiality. Heritage policies and practices, largely anthropocentric in disposition, overlook the agency that might be accorded to the material itself in prolonging its own sustenance and survival. This paper draws upon post-humanism to challenge signifier-signified binary in heritage narratives that distances heritage from an ecological manifesto. It further articulates a relevance of the Donna Haraway's material-semiotic, insisting on unifying meaning with matter in formulating a holistic definition for heritage value, thereby incorporating the role of redundancy and vacancy in heritage discourse. Building on Haraway's rejection of binaries and segregations, this paper proposes a study of tactical micronarratives that emerge during, and in the aftermath of, abandonment of textile mills in urban centers — case example of Ahmedabad, India, treating them as a transect of probable interventions.

This paper views the abandoned mills as "thingness at work". In their materiality, and "looking old", the mills are endowed with a cultural value. As it has been said, "the scars of time" are the signs of life. The paper also takes Georg Simmel's view that ruins were interesting and appealing because they represented the vitality of opposing forces: construction and destruction; spirit and nature.

1. Challenges in treating post-industrial landscape of Ahmedabad as heritage

Industrial space, more specifically industrial heritage, presents a tactile and layered spatiality that represents a continuous cycle of recovery and renewal. It offers a stage for re-enactment that allows the uncertainty of the ruin to persist alongside a contemporary use. It reclaims its own agency to be used, to be lived in, and to be an exhibit of itself. Thus, urban ruins are sites embodying hybridized, interwoven narratives of politics, economics, past, present, wealth, waste, and human, machine — all the while eroding their established taxonomic dualities.

This paper proposes a study of micronarratives that emerged during, and in the aftermath of, abandonment of textile mills in urban centers — case example of Ahmedabad, India. The abandoned mills in Ahmedabad are part of the Heritage discourse which seeks to either preserve the fabric for sake of nostalgia or tear it down for the sake of economic agenda. This paper draws upon post-humanism to challenge signifier-signified binary in heritage narratives — involving material wealth — as a deterrent to heritage becoming integral to an ecological manifesto. It further articulates a relevance of feminist-scientist Donna Haraway's material-semiotics, insisting on unifying meaning with matter — which itself is fragmentary, and heterogeneous — in formulating a holistic definition of heritage value, thereby incorporating the role of redundancy and vacancy in heritage discourse.

Post-industrial landscape of Ahmedabad continues to host the ruins of textile mills, some in refurbished conditions that house new entrepreneurial narratives. But undoubtedly, amidst the rubble, the dust, and the new voices are distinct signs of continuity. The mills continue to be referred to as "once textile mills". This is evidence enough to indicate a semiotics of the workforce and the machinery that was once its strong identity. Relationship of pride and ownership between a built space and humans is a given, but the material semiotics of the old mills is an unexplored subject matter in research on the built environment. In this exploration, we call for recognition of the relationship between the materiality and the ecology of the post-industrial ruins.

There is a sublime aesthetics about the ruins of the textile mills that brings together a unity of humans and nature. A ruin has a uniqueness that comes from the people that made that which is being ruined. In the case of the Ahmedabad textile mills, it was a unique history of the people of Gujarat, who created a "Manchester of the east" with their skills as textile entrepreneurs. The first mill was established in 1861, and by 1939 there were 77 mills in the city. The history of textile mills in India is said to be one of the best in Mumbai and Ahmedabad, due to the business acumen of these communities, unmatched in any other part of the country. The mill owners turned the tables on the colonizers by exporting textiles and cotton yarns. And this incredible history continues to ruminate in the material remnants of the textile ruins. The construction aesthetics, form, structure, design and aesthetics, even in its half-alive status, gives insights of the past, which could very well be the lessons for the future.

A ruin — Florence Hetzler (1988) says — is a new category of being and has maturation time. Cycles of maturation time turn a ruin into something other than what it was, with a new signification and a significance, and with a future that is to be compared with its past. The narratives in this research, try to elbow into the maturation time and to understand how the mills today are semiotically different from what they were before they became ruins. In documenting these processes of reclaiming abandoned mills, the paper acknowledges those sites as facilitating and embodying tactical narratives. This paper thus views the abandoned mills as "thingness at work". In its materiality, in its "looking old", the mills are endowed with a cultural value as it has been said, "the scars of time" are the signs of life. The paper also takes recourse to Georg Simmel who asserted that ruins were interesting and appealing because they represented the

vitality of opposing forces: construction and destruction; spirit and nature. Here was the source of fascination in things that showed the look of age: "sensing these contradictions within ourselves, we notice the salient beauty of the object in its passage through time" (Simmel 1959: 259).

Hetzler says "time writes the future of a ruin" (1988). After a phenomenal success in the early years of its enterprise, due to changing economy, mills started to slowly shut down and by 1996, almost all mills had been locked down in Ahmedabad and Mumbai. Thus began the cycle of maturation into ruins. The first cycle was evident in the narratives of mill-workers who describe their journey from a denial of unemployment, to a recovery of a new job — be it peddling ice on a hand cart or watching guard at a business house, or cutting and polishing diamonds. At the same time, the abandoned sites have hosted an occasional art installation, a visit by heritage scholars, a scheme for adaptive re-use for urban regeneration of economy, or a well-intentioned plan for revival of mill culture. In this witnessing to a multitude of transect of probable interventions the abandoned mills assume an interface on which the diversity of the contemporary world gets represented. These vacant spaces become a retainer of informal voices that charge the place with heterogeneous meanings.

To explain this further, the paper borrows heavily from the experiences earned and stories discovered during the course of an architectural workshop led by Sonal Mithal — *Tactics of Bricolage: reclaiming micronarratives in the urban ruins of abandoned mills* (2017). The objective of the workshop was to assemble new spatial meanings from found objects of abandoned mills by bricolage — piece-by-piece building a micronarrative of contemporary voices so as to propose a design which rewrites the materiality and spatiality of the mills. The workshop addressed three concerns: firstly, treating appropriation as a tactic to resolve present day redundancy in industrial landscapes; secondly, to reduce social disparity by improving livability; and thirdly, redefine preservation by foregrounding materiality. The proposals in the workshop designated new meanings to this waste: sculpture, playground, board game, and so forth.

2. Closing down the mills: the cycles of maturation into ruins

The total land area occupied by the closed mills is 3.34 square kilometers. Due to complex use change procedures and because of claims of banks and workers the land is lying vacant since mid-1980s (prior to which there were 85 textile mills in the city). Of the 53 closed mills National Textile Corporation (NTC) owns five, Gujarat State Textile Corporation (GSTC) owns fourteen, and the rest are privately owned. Three of the privately owned closed mills have already been developed into multiplexes and commercial complexes. Mills owned by NTC have been demolished and their machinery sold out, making land available for development. NTC had sought a land use change from industrial to commercial and residential use and was awaiting state approval. Meanwhile, it had demolished the mills and sold the machinery. NTC plans to sell the land as soon as it gets the land use change sanctioned. Same is the case with GSTC owned mills. Fourteen mills on private land are under dispute. These mills were constructed on rented land. After demolition of these mills original owners as well as factory owners lay claim (Patel 2004). However, according to the Ahmedabad City Development Plan 2021 by the Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority, 218 ha land of 38 closed mills is to be used for institution, education and affordable housing.

The rampant demolition of closed mills in present day Ahmedabad demonstrates how incapable we are of leaving things alone. What is evident in the narrative of closed mills is the urgency to assign it a function-based value — mostly fulfilling a commercial purpose — not necessarily an economic one. Thus the question that demands attention is: what if the industrial ruin is left to persist not despite, but because of its uselessness?

Journalist and scholar Amrita Shah describes these sites of abandoned mills as having the "look of a war zone, with piles of rubble lying all around; [...] overgrown with wild foliage and resembl[ing] a forest in the making" (2011: 48). It is a disjunctive product with the intrusion of nature. The conjunction of real time, with the slow meandering start to the day, the basking cows and the flying dust, the rusty gates, and shutters, the corroded metal, and the fungus infested stone frescos, the sounds of cycles, and scooters fill the space with a sense of an alternative world, devoid of urgency, and urban rush. Yet there is a relationship with the urban. As we approached each of these ruins, we realized that the approach itself was significant. Some of the approaches were broad, dusty roads, lined with closed shutters and neatly parked scooters and carts, almost bursting to tell its history of a bustling work space. Walking under what were once busy tunnel spaces between the mills, bats flying through and smell of human waste, it opens out to a view of the crumbling structure of the mills. A sense of awe and worship of the performative value of the mills develops naturally. There is a sense of peace which is different from devastation by nature, as Simmel (1959) says. Devastation is nature led and does not have the ruin time to mature into a ruin.

Here, we present four distinct case examples: Rajnagar Mill (NTC mill), Pickers Mill (disputed property), Printing Mill (reorganized old mill), and Raipur Mill Estate (redeveloped industrial area).

A. Rajnagar Mill

Rajnagar Mill was established in 1925, shut down in 2002 and was nationalized in 2007 and is currently run by the National Textile Corporation. Part of the land has been renewed and now houses a fully functioning cotton manufacturing unit installed with state of art machinery. The old part which is five minutes walking distance across the railway line is sealed and not accessible to anybody. The old machinery from this premise is sold off, its employees either absorbed at the new site or given an exit with reasonable financial aid. The new unit was set up as a green field project at an investment of 1500 million INR (23 million USD) comprising imported looms and other machinery. In 2013, the old mill compound hosted a Cotton Exchange exhibit, an exhibition of art installations by 13 artists. These art installations ranged from textile compositions, ceramics to photography and represented the erstwhile glorious era of textile industry in Ahmedabad. However, that exhibition received academic criticism. For example, cultural and international studies scholar Dia Da Costa (2015: 76) argues that this exhibition mobilized sentiments of nostalgia and hope but erased violence and inequality. She further argues that art was mobilized to obscure disposition and exploitation in the name of urban revitalization and heritage production — to deploy sentimental capitalism. This criticism caused the mill owners to completely shut the premises to any further interests of exhibitions or dialogues.

B. Printing Mill

Printing Mill is an erstwhile textile mill possibly constructed in the late 1800s or early 1900s as evident from its cast iron columns and jack arches. Almost all the textile machinery is gone and instead a notebook printing unit is functioning on the ground floor. On the upper level an informal sorting of waste from textile industries is carried out by women. These women are paid on an hourly basis. This is an example which tells a story of the informal and undocumented waste recycling services of the Indian textile industry. Almost everything produced in textile factories — from broken threads to discarded pieces of woven cloth — is recycled, and contributes to the economic logic of the overall textile industry.

This example embodies Haraway's argument of transition from traditionalist family/market/ factory hierarchy to the new networks of women in the integrated circuit. In this argument she rejects the emphasis on the daily responsibility of real women to build unities. At the paper mill women create collations based on affinity which comes as a result of "otherness, difference, specificity" (2016). Women who are no longer physically strong enough to be capable of pulling carts under harsh sun have come together to work in this factory sorting out waste material from textile mills. The waste material is recycled to make cheap ropes, doormats and sometimes cheap clothing. The factory itself houses bundles of cotton and synthetic yarn, lying carelessly knotted with shreds of cloth — awaiting to be sorted and shipped off to serve a better purpose. The once cleanly designed jack-arch vaulted roofs and cast iron columns regimentally demarcating machinery space, is now an indiscernible shed. It is an informal storage of material that takes an unclear form and vehemently hides the structure, all the while itself taking the shape that the space accords.

To quote Haraway, "to be feminized means to be made extremely vulnerable; able to disassembled, reassembled, exploited as a reserved labor force; subjected to time arrangements on and off the paid job that make mockery of a limited workday; leading an existence that always borders on being obscene, and out of place" (2016: 23). This could describe the factory as well as the workers working in it. At the same time, it describes the waste from textile factories being recycled here.

Heritage studies scholar Torgeir Bangstad accords a semiotic, spatial, social vacancy to the gap between the original function and the present idleness of industrial ruins. That vacancy is extant because there "the economic rules of productive space do not apply, or are suspended momentarily. We struggle to make sense of this place because it cannot be tied to the normal rhythm of work" (Bangstad 2014: 102). This is clear in the following example of Raipur Mill Estate.

C. Raipur Mill Estate

The Raipur Mill Estate currently holds Self Employed Women's Association (SEWA) trade facilitation centre and several small scale manufacturing units. This estate was sold off in the 1980s to developers who reconfigured the place into smaller industrial units that are now privately owned or rented for small-scale industrial activities. These units are quite varied in their products and hence processes, yet they are all housed in similar built form. These manufacturing units vary from manufacturing plastic bags, ice cream cones, or plastic water bottles to spare parts for power looms.

Haraway (2016: 28) argues that we are living through a movement from an organic, industrial society to a polymorphous, information system — from all work to all play. In that argument the world order created by industrial capitalism is giving way to an emergent system where the duality of nature and culture function more like fields of difference and the hierarchy of family/ market/factory have taken the form of integrated circuits. The reassembly of Raipur Mill and the co-existence of people as organic beings alongside the vegetation and the decay exemplify an erstwhile duality having morphed into one whole indistinguishable materiality. It is not just a void, but the place expresses the social processes of organizing objects, structural systems and people. Meanings are created at the interface of decay and the emergence of new organized practices, bringing together post-industrial urbanity and nature. Meaning implied here is that there exist enough material conditions in the precinct to make urban space habitable.

D. Pickers Mill

Pickers Mill is a ruinous precinct of an erstwhile textile picker factory. In fact, one of the rooms today houses a huge pile of unused pickers — possibly the only evidence suggesting the origi-

nal intent of the place. When the mill closed, the workers were promised twenty percent of the land for housing but that did not happen. At the same time, a vacant piece of land, in the heart of the city is of immense real estate value. Hence, the workers found a way to ensure their stake in the land — that has been by ensuring a hostile environment which keeps people away.

The number of discarded playing cards, and plastic cups — apparently being used to consume alcohol in an otherwise prohibitionist state — are testimony to the gambling, drinking activities that go on here. One may dismiss that as anti-social activities in an abandoned site, but it is much more that. It is a well strategized tool to guard one's right to property. The land is privately owned at the moment. The legitimate owner has to be escorted by security personnel because they feel threatened by the workers who live in the informal settlements in the neighborhood, as well by two other parties who lay claim to the site.

Meaning implied here is that the place that is owned for a future to convert to real estate, a place which can contain seemingly hostile activities to ensure one's own right to the place and keep property sharks away, the materiality of the ruin personifying those meanings of ambiguity and hostility — broken walls, falling ceilings, strewn cards, dead animals, vegetation and trees having taken roots in the walls, glass-less north lights against corroded trusses. A visibility and yet a lingering hostile invisibility that comes from lack of accessibility.

3. What makes industrial landscape a material-semiotic canvas?

Taking the example of the Pickers factory the re-users (the informal occupiers) organized the effects of what they were destabilizing — the social environment of the place. One of the workshop participants — Andrea[1] — read the relationship between the ruined structure and the fluidity of water as provoking a clash of meanings. Their proposal to heal the space through water reinforces that provocation — "not only water symbolizes the cleaning process but also serves a basis for mundane activities such as washing, shower, et al." (Leitmannova 2017). The proposal sought to use the ruins — material remains — in the space to accord its own healing.

For Laura[2], entering Pickers Mill meant breaking an invisible barrier, and stepping in a hostile place. The path to follow was not clear, and the ground as unstable as the broken walls and roofs. One does not know where to go, neither where to step in. To remove the clutter meant to remove the cards, bricks, decaying animals to reveal the organic and decaying corroded steel trusses, holes in brick walls — incrementally arranging them to make way for new activities such as sitting, jumping, talking, or simply lingering. In taking cognizance of the light and shadow appearing because of broken north lights and trusses, the designer makes way for people's movements. In acknowledging the broken walls and large holes as signs of violence, the designer allows for playful transition spaces. What once meant a sign of violence is now turned on its head to become a sign of inclusive play.

4. Material-semiotic reading and its implication on an ecological approach to urbanity

Ecology of the ruinous site — manifested in vegetation growing out of broken walls, or corroding steel, or people finding ways to sustain — demands a redefinition of revitalization that incorporates this hint of life in the otherwise derelict place. Haraway's rejection of binaries supports a multiplicity of meanings that emerge, because the ruins and waste — redundancy and

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1   Andrea Leitmannova, Participant, *Tactics of Bricolage: reclaiming micronarratives in the urban ruins of abandoned mills*, Archiprix International 2017.
2   Laura Camargo, Participant, *Tactics of Bricolage: reclaiming micronarratives in the urban ruins of abandoned mills*, Archiprix International 2017.

uselessness — escape the confinements of norms surrounding their previous value or function. In this liberation, designers, preservationists, and users alike can relate to them in "imaginative, sensual, conjectural and playful fashion [because it is…] precisely their fragmentary nature and lack of fixed meaning that renders industrial ruins more profoundly meaningful" (Edensor 2005: 123). The micronarratives described above embody a critique on the current tendency to assign sites of industrial ruin to the category of waste, and manifest the new kinds of space that these industrial ruins produce — space full of meanings and activities that challenge the dominant discourse on post-industrial urbanity.

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PARADIGMATIC, SYNTAGMATIC AND SYNTACTICAL INVARIANCES IN THE SEMIOSPHERE: SOCIOHISTORICAL VS. STRUCTURAL APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF CULTURAL HERITAGE

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Abstract

Cultural identity is forged by the recognition of certain patterns of reiteration, thus conferring to the dynamics of the ever-changing semiosphere a dialectical or even contradictory character. The permanence of certain patterns throughout time is normally associated with the constancy of paradigmatic elements. But certain syntagms present also a remarkable stability, appearing under the form of verbal expressions, gestural formulas, harmonic cadences, and culinary combinations. Another level of stability appears when a syntactic perspective allows to recognize invariances at a deeper level of textual organization. But if a historical background might justify certain structural and functional similarities, the parallelism between some present manifestations of Brazilian folklore and culture and aspects of ancient Egyptian mythology present a more challenging question: could there be a deeper syntactic level of invariance that might reproduce not only elements but also their functions and relations in chronologically distant, maybe even independent cultural environments? Adolf Bastian, who postulated the principle of psychic unity of mankind, defined the concept of *Elementargedanken* as a set of invariances shared by different cultures that do not have necessarily any direct or even indirect contact with respect to one another, and *Völkergedanken* as their manifestation in different societies, that would be influenced by the social and historical constraints related to that time and space. The present article proposes that the abstract structures and deeper levels of invariance of the *Elementargedanken* would constitute a generative path corresponding to different manifestations of the concrete *Völkergedanken* — like a same basic narrative path being put into discourse in different manners. This paper on Semiotics of Cultural Heritage will apply that perspective to the analysis of a few contemporary cultural manifestations in Brazil surprisingly similar to some ancient rituals to Isis described in classical antiquity.

1. Introduction

Cultural identity is forged by the recognition of certain patterns of reiteration, conferring to the dynamics of the ever-changing semiosphere a dialectical, sometimes even contradictory character. The permanence of certain identitary patterns throughout time is normally associated with the stability of paradigmatic elements — the huge presence of syncopated melodies in Brazilian popular music for example can be easily tracked back to the late 18th century. But certain syntagms present also a remarkable steadiness, appearing under the form of verbal expressions, gestural formulas, harmonic cadences and culinary classical combinations — like Brazilian *arroz-com-feijão* (i.e. rice and beans, a national dish) or the English *fish-and-chips*.

A far less obvious level of stability appears when a syntactic perspective allows to recognize invariances in a deeper level of textual organization. A comparison between the Brazilian and North-African cuisines can contribute by showing the structural similarities between the Moroccan *couscous* and the Brazilian *farinha* — dishes in the one hand made of different ingredients, but on the other hand produced with similar techniques and presenting very close nutritional and cultural functions. If a case like that can defensibly be explained considering the common debt of Brazilian and Moroccan cultures with respect to the 800 years in which the Iberian Peninsula and North Africa were part of the *Al Andalus* civilization, other examples may require more sophisticated justifications. This can be the case for instance of some intriguing analogies between a few manifestations of Brazilian folklore and certain aspects of ancient Egyptian mythology, as we will further analyse in the present article.

Such analogies bring about a rather interesting question as far as semiotics is concerned: should such a permanence be approached supposing historical and/or cultural continuity, or would be there a deeper syntactic level of invariance in the semiosphere that once triggered might reproduce not only elements but also their original functions and relations in chronologically distant cultural environments? The present paper intends to discuss the problematic aspects of this last hypothesis by means of some examples relating a few manifestations of Brazilian folklore and culture to surprisingly similar ancient rituals described in classical antiquity.

2. *Elementargedanken* and *Völkergedanken*: invariants and variants in cultural syntagmatic structures

Traveling all over the world for about 30 years, the 19th century anthropologist Adolf Bastian observed what he described as a "monotonous sub-stratum of elementary ideas" (Bastian 2005a: 171) that could be recognized in the most varied cultures even if drastically separated in geographical and chronological terms. Analogies were not confined to the similarity of myths appearing in cultures strikingly distant in space and time — they went further to the sameness of technical solutions developed independently in the most varied contexts. Identifying, collecting and analysing such "elementary ideas" — *Elementargedanken* in the German original — would be one of the missions of ethnology, so that anthropologists might rediscover "those initial idea-complexes, those thought-seeds or *logoi spermatikoi* which encapsulate the inherent potential for the growth of man's mind" (Bastian 2005a: 171). The *Elementargedanken* would so correspond to some invariances shared by different cultures that do not have necessarily any direct or even indirect contact with respect to one another:

> The world over we will find a monotonous sub-stratum of identical *elementary ideas*, identical in spite of local variations. These few *elementary ideas* exist in all natural savage conditions and also under the artificial veneer of every civilization; they are indeed those seminal ideas from which civilizations have grown (Bastian 2005a: 175).

Bastian affirms that his *Elementargedanken* would not be directly observable, being "always materialized in the form of unique patterns of thought, or *Völkergedanken*, reflecting the inter- action of peoples with their environments, as well as their contacts with other groups" (Penny and Buzzi 2003: 95). *Elementargedanken* thus "constantly recur and are open to constant rear- rangement by and in each culture", tending to appear in each society, "albeit veiled in historically and geographically inspired clothing as *folk ideas*" (Penny and Buzzi 2003: 95). So, the abstract structures and deeper levels of invariance of the *Elementargedanken* would constitute a genera- tive path corresponding to different manifestations of the concrete *Völkergedanken* - like a same basic narrative path being put into discourse in different manners. Each one of this "manners" would correspond to a specific set of natural and/or cultural conditions, being therefore unique- and thus conciliating in anthropological terms the idealism of a generalist approach with the pragmatism of an empirical perspective.

Despite such contributions, translations from Bastian's work are not at all abundant - partly because of the ostracism that some German scholars experienced after World War II. Nonethe- less, his concept of *Elementargedanken* was later to be championed by many scientists - and by no means restricted to the area of anthropology. Thus, when a few decades after Bastian's death we read that the same symbolic patterns of ancient civilizations "can be found in the ritu- als or myths of small tribal societies still existing, unchanged for centuries, on the outskirts of civilization" (Henderson 1964: Part 2, paragraph 1), we have no longer in our hands a work on ethnology, but Carl Gustav Jung's *Man and his symbols* (Henderson 1964: Part 2, paragraph 1). Bastian's work was instrumental for two of the main concepts developed by Jung: his *archetypes*- quite close in many aspects to the *Elementargedanken* - and the *collective unconscious* - not far from the *psychic unity of mankind* that he postulated considering it as a necessity in face of the physical unity of the species (Bastian 2005b: 179-185). A succinct definition of the *collective unconscious* presents it as "that part of the psyche which retains and transmits the common psychological inheritance of mankind" (Henderson 1964: Part 2, paragraph 6). Henderson ex- emplifies its usage and that of the archetypes:

> Christ's crucifixion on Good Friday seems at first sight to belong to the same pattern of fertility symbolism that one finds in the rituals of such 'saviors' as Osiris, Tammuz, Orpheus, and Balder. They, too, were killed, and were reborn. They belonged, in fact, to cyclic religions in which the death and rebirth of the god-king was an eternally recurring myth (Henderson 1964: Part 2, paragraph 12).

Thus, Bastian's postulate of a psychic unity of mankind would imply the existence of a *collective unconscious* shared by all human beings, that would manifest itself by means of isolated or enchained symbols composing structures Jung called *archetypes.*

Examining Henderson's example under the perspective of French semiotics, there would be a common narrative path shared by the five myths quoted above - a path that would correspond, in the discursive level, to the themes of *birth*, *death* and *rebirth*. Moreover, an actor *débrayage* in the discursive level would be associated to the figure of the *god-king*. Some important differ- ences become evident regarding the narrative structures associated in the discursive level to the themes of *death* and *rebirth* in each myth. Although the five protagonists experience death - or, in more technical terms: a disjunction with life -, the invariance of this disjunction allows two variants in terms of narrative syntax: *privation* when the subject is deprived from his object by another subject; or *renounce*, when the disjunction has the same subject both as addresser and operator. Christ would have been crucified by Roman soldiers, but only because he would have consciously resigned to the possibility of offering any resistance so that he might thus save man-

kind - therefore, a case of *renounce.* Quite different from Osiris' death, carefully planned by his brother Seth, who with a ruse convinces him to lie inside an ornamented coffin that he immediately locks and throws into the Nile - here, neatly a case of *privation.* Tammuz was chosen by his former wife Inanna/Ishtar to replace her in the kingdom of the dead - another case of *privation.* Orpheus goes to the underworld voluntarily to rescue his late wife Euridice - again a *renounce.* Finally, Balder is the victim of a ruse from Loki, that convinces Balder's blind brother Höðr to launch an arrow poisoned with mistletoes, the only substance that might successfully kill the hero - therefore, once more a *privation*, resulting in Table 1.

DEATH		Performed by:		
	Christ	Roman soldiers (with consent)	S1 = S2	Renounce
	Osiris	Seth	S1 ≠ S2	Privation
	Tammuz	Inanna/Ishtar	S1 ≠ S2	Privation
	Orpheus	Goes to the Underworld voluntarily	S1 = S2	Renounce
	Balder	his blind brother Höðr, deceived by Loki	S1 ≠ S2	Privation

Table 1. Variances in the narrative program of the death of the heroes cited by Henderson.

On the other hand, the five myths would share the following invariants in semiotic terms:

FUNDAMENTAL LEVEL	Fundamental syntax		Life	Death
NARRATIVE LEVEL	Narrative syntax	Death		Disjunction with Life
	(Narrative programs)	Rebirth	Restored conjunction with Life	
DISCURSIVE LEVEL	Discursive semantics	Figures	god-king	
		Themes	birth	death
			resurrection	
	Discursive syntax	actors	god-king	
		space	world	underworld
		time	temporal syntagm (a logical imperative in this case)	

Table 2. Invariances in the structure of Henderson's myths.

Table 2 suggests that the *Elementargedanken* that emerge in the *Völkergedanken* expressed by those five myths would have in common a generative path including certain elements belonging to each one of the signification levels. Thus, the fundamental opposition between *Life* and *Death* would be related respectively in the narrative level to operations of *conjunction* and *disjunction* with the object that corresponds in the discursive level to the theme of *life*. That value would be represented by a certain actor, the *god-king*, that would follow a temporal syntagm joining sequentially *life, death* and *resurrection. Death* would correspond to the negative values of the system, and an operation of *débrayage* would set it spatially into the *underworld*, from which the *god-king* would ultimately emerge returning to the space of life, the *world*.

Table 1 exposes the differences between the programs of *renounce* in Christ's and Orpheus narratives, and *privation* in the others. The contrast in the attitude of those two characters —

Christ resisting up to the end to use his powers to free him from his utmost suffering, whereas Orpheus causes his own sorrow out of his incontinence - results in a quite different modal configuration in each case. Although both Christ and Orpheus *knew* what would happen, Christ *did-not-want-but-should* perform his sacrifice, ultimately expressing the *strength* of his *resignation* to his fate, while Orpheus *should-not-but-did-want* to look a last time upon the underworld, expressing his *weakness* through his *incontinence* and *curiosity*. Osiris, Tammuz and Balder *did-not-know* what was going to happen, ending up trapped - the first by his brother Seth; the second, by his former wife Inanna; the last, by Loki - in all cases, with the *realization* of the performative program of the *anti-subject S2* resulting in the *privation* of their *life*. Therefore, the narrative semantics dimension presents important differences in the myths, from the *glory* in Christ's resurrection to the *sorrow* that made Orpheus refrain from the love of any other woman until the end of his days (although the Ovidian version of his legend depicts this attitude rather as a shift in his preferences from women towards young men).

So, having part of the generative path in common still leaves room to significant differences among the various myths analysed here. The varied versions correspond to contrastive *Völkgedanken*, counterpoising to their invariants variances not only in the discursive level, but also in the narrative one - and both in syntax and semantics. On the other hand, the similarities in the discursive level are present both in semantics (covering figures as much as themes) and in syntax, and not only in isolated paradigmatic elements but also in syntagms (like the sequence *birth-death-resurrection*). These latter ones are not random: their elements exert syntactic functions, here understood according to the Hjelmslevian approach of *dependence* between or among elements (Hjelmslev 2003: 147). Thus, if the narrative subject corresponds in the discursive level to the *god-king*, his attributes are the condition for his competence to the main performance of the myth, the *resurrection*, which in its turn presupposes another performance - his *death*. Therefore, the stories share not only superficial paradigmatic elements, but also syntagms and syntactic functions, which make clear that the *Elementargedanken* should not be thought of as the coincidence of singular isolated terms, but rather of whole structures of signification of varied complexity.

3. The cult to Isis in Apuleius' *The Golden Ass* and Brazilian rituals to Yemoja as related *Völkergedanken*

On February 2nd, 2004, the Brazilian newspaper *Jornal do Brasil* published a story about the recent New Year's Eve in Copacabana beach:

> Whoever tried to reach the sea, being it in order to jump the traditional seven waves, or to throw offers to Yemoja, or simply to dive into the waters for the first time in the New Year, would have to face the camping tents, religious rituals and even full suppers served on the sands of the most popular beach in that time of the year (Jornal do Brasil 2004: A14).

Yemoja is the deity associated with the sea in many religions of African origin spread mainly in the Americas and in Africa. The usage of the jumping of seven waves at midnight in New Year's Eve is part of her rituals in Brazil, better detailed in another article published in the *Correio da Manhã* on January 1st, 1971:

> People belonging to all social classes bought yesterday their offers to Yemoja. From the Minister of the Court of Auditors to the impoverished ones living in the outskirts of the big cities, faith costs money [...] The complete kit with all the items of the religious offer (a small boat with an icon, ribbons, soap, flowers, a trowel,

perfume, a mirror, palms and a brush) cannot be found for less than 150 cruzeiros [the equivalent at the present date to about €388] The owner of the Casa Xavante exhibited on his balcony the small boat that he would launch into the sea at midnight. Cost: 200 cruzeiros [c. €518]. It could range from a simple board costing 5 cruzeiros [c.€13] until exquisite 150 cruzeiros [c.€388] yacht miniatures. Those more zealous spread incense in their houses (Cr$1,50 the package) [c. €3,88], where they also leave their 7 days candles (Cr$4 each) [c. €10,47] (*Papel picado...* 1971: 10).

Such enthusiasm to practice an African-Brazilian religious ritual contrasts with the fact that Brazil remains the largest Catholic country in the world, with more than 123 million believers encompassing 64.6% of its population (IBGE 2010: 91). Over 22% more - about 42 million - are Christians of other confessions; and finally only 0.3% - roughly 570.000 - people declare to be followers of African-Brazilian religions. Considering that, as the story in *Correio da Manhã* leaves clear, such a ritual can involve costs, the momentary engagement of so many Brazilians in Yemoja's cult might be considered as eccentric as if, with a far superior 0.8% of Muslims in their population, the United States would present a remarkable adhesion to Ramadan - or the United Kingdom to the Pessach celebrated by the 0.4% of its Jewish citizens. If cultural resistance to assuming to belong to an African religion in Brazil can indeed take its toll on the meager numbers mentioned above, even so the sudden overwhelming adherence to one of its rituals in a mostly Christian country challenges socio-demographic explanations. That popularity would be easier to understand had that tradition been continuously documented since the Colonial times - nevertheless, it is definitely not the case. A research in Brazilian newspapers discloses the popularity of that so-called "tradition" after the late 1960s - before that, references disappear altogether. This absence even in the works of Brazilian 19th century folklorists represents considerable evidence that the apparently ancient ritual might be surprisingly recent. But in case it became popular only in the last few decades, why is it perceived as an archaism? The following paragraph may shed light to this question:

> I found good hope and sovereign remedy, though it were very late, to be delivered of all my misery, by invocation and prayer to the excellent beauty of this powerful goddess. Wherefore shaking off my drowsy sleep I arose with a joyful face, and moved by a great affection to purify myself, I plunged my head seven times into the water of the sea; which number of seven is convenable and agreeable to holy and divine things, as the worthy and sage philosopher Pythagoras hath declared. Then, very lively and joyfully, though with a weeping countenance, I made this oration to the puissant goddess [Apuleius 2015: Book XI, 1st paragraph].

The description above might be easily mistaken by a contemporary Brazilian for that of a zealous believer in Copacabana celebrating New Year's Eve. After that prayer, "a venerable face" appeared to the protagonist, who, "little by little", "seemed to see the whole figure" of a female body, "bright and mounting out of the sea" standing before him (Apuleius 2015: Book XI, paragraph 3). The goddess enlists the many names she receives: "Mother of Gods" among the Phrygian, Venus to the Cyprians, Proserpine to the Sicilians, Ceres, Juno, and eventually remarks that "the Egyptians, which are excellent in all kinds of ancient doctrine, and by their proper ceremonies accustom to worship me, do call me by my true name, Queen Isis" (Apuleius 2015: Book XI, paragraph 4). A portrait of the goddess follows that passage:

> First, she had a great abundance of hair, flowing and curling, dispersed and scattered about her divine neck; on the crown of her head she bare many garlands interlaced with flowers, and in the middle of her forehead was a plain circlet in fashion of a mirror, or rather resembling the moon by the light it gave forth; and this was borne up on either side by serpents that seemed to rise from the furrows of the earth, and above it were blades of corn set out. Her vestment was of finest linen yielding diverse colors, somewhere white and shi-

ning, somewhere yellow like the crocus flower, somewhere rosy red, somewhere flaming; and (which troubled my sight and spirit sore) her cloak was utterly dark and obscure covered with shining black, and being wrapped round her from under her left arm to her right shoulder in manner of a shield, part of it fell down, pleated in most subtle fashion, to the skirts of her garment so that the welts appeared comely (Apuleius 2015: Book I, paragraph 3).

Many of the elements associated by Apuleius to Isis' image are also part of the standard representations of Yemoja in the Brazilian imagery - particularly in the way they appear in *umbanda*, an African-Brazilian religion that, contrarily to the more genuinely African *candomblé*, presents a clear mixture of African, European and Native-Brazilian heritages. Another familiar scene appears in the following excerpt:

The day which shall come after this night is dedicate to my service by an eternal religion; my priests and ministers do accustom, after the wintry and stormy tempests of the sea be ceased and the billows of his waves are still, to offer in my name a new ship, as a first-fruit of their navigation; and for this must thou wait, and not profane or despise the sacrifice in any wise (Apuleius 2015: Book I, paragraph 4).

The ship "was filled up with large gifts and prosperous devotions", and "the women attired in white vestments" to accompany it - quite a few of them "with lamps, torches, and other lights, doing honour to her that was born from the celestial stars".

The inventory above results in a list of approximately sixteen elements shared between the scene described by Apuleius and the rituals to Yemoja at New Year's Eve. If such a number renders difficult to disregard such similarities, even more compelling is the fact that not only isolated paradigmatic elements appear likewise in those two contexts: also syntagms that encompass from figures in the discursive level to narrative programs occur equally in both - and often with similar functions.

There are three narrative programs of different natures to emphasize. The first one, the *seven immersions*, corresponds to a performance of acquisition of competence to qualify the subject to the next step: the *prayer* - a manipulation in which S2 will seduce S1 with his prayer in order to be granted her divine help. The third program is a performance in which the discursive roles formerly corresponding to the addresser and addressee are inverted, and the deity makes the believer perform the ritual of the *launching of the ship*. The relations of dependence and/or correspondence between categories of different plans imply Hjelmslev's definition of *functions*, allowing us therefore to recognize paradigmatic, syntagmatic and syntaxic similarities in the two cases analysed here.

In the discursive level, the seven immersions and the launching of the ship imply a *débrayage* that defines the *seashore* as the space in which takes place the meeting between the discursive actors corresponding to S1 and S2, the *believer* and the *female deity*. Some figures are associated to the former with implicit performances: the dressing of *white vestments*, the usage of *candles* and finally the *fireworks*, an extended version of the isotopy that enumerates "candles, torches, and other lights". A first attribute of the *female deity* is being *the deity of many names*- a rather familiar theme to Brazilians used to address Yemoja as Iemanjá, Janaína, Rainha do Mar [queen of the sea], Nossa Senhora da Conceição [Our Lady of the Conception] or Nossa Senhora dos Navegantes [Our Lady of Navigators], among other names and titles. Surprisingly, so many identities in classical antiquity as in the present converge to a same description: *abundant* and *curly hair*, *scattered about her divine neck*; a *garland* and a *heavenly body* (the moon in Apuleius's text; a star in Brazilian Yemoja) *shining* on her forehead, and finally a *dark cloak* covering her garments - black in *The Golden Ass*, blue in Brazilian imagery. Figures like the *sea-*

shore, the *sea*, the *heavenly body* and the *garlands* in the one hand, in opposition to the human made *ship* or the *candle lighting* on the other hand help to characterize the fundamental level syntax as the classical dichotomy *Nature* (to the former inventory) *vs. Culture* (to the latter).

The variances observed here perfectly suit Bastian's conception that *Elementargedanken* require adaptations in order to be expressed as *Völkergedanken*, like the function of a "dark cover" in the *black/blue* cloaks or the *moon/star* variants of the "shining heavenly body" in the goddess's diadem. More interestingly, the temporal *débrayage* of the *opening of a new season* bifurcates into the dawn of the *navigation season* in the second century book and in the New Year's Eve nowadays.

A table summarizing this discussion results in:

FUNDAMENTAL LEVEL	Fundamental syntax		Culture	Nature
NARRATIVE LEVEL	Narrative syntax	Seven immersions		acquisition of competence to the conjunction with Nature
	(Narrative programs)	Praying	manipulation by seduction (positive attributes of the addressee)	
		Launching of the ship		performance (required by the addresser)
DISCURSIVE LEVEL	Discursive semantics	Figures	white vestments	
			usage of candles	
			other lights (fireworks)	
		Themes	devotion	deity with many names
	Discursive syntax	actors	believer	female deity
		space		seashore
		time	"new season"	

Table 3. Invariances between Apuleius's description and the Yemoja New Year's ritual in Brazil.

4. Final considerations

The idea that the striking similarities between contemporary Yemoja's rituals and 2nd century Isis' cult might be caused by historical heritage would be hardly defendable. The Christian and Muslim civilizations that succeeded the cultures that embraced Isis' cult have endeavoured to erase as much as possible any traits of the goddess' worship. Even assuming that the devotion to the Virgin Mary as the mother of Christ would have much to owe in terms of imagery to that of Isis as the mother of Horus, as constantly suggested by Egyptologists like Sir Wallis Budge (Budge 1911: 30, 1969: xvi), had Isis rituals survived by diffusion in Brazil by means of Marian devoutness, 1) they would certainly have survived with equal detail in many other countries; 2) such a feast would by no means have passed unnoticed by local writers and travel diaries that have registered Brazilian life throughout half a millennium. The alternative of survival through the North African legacy - Apuleius was born and spent most of his lifetime in Algeria - would again clash with the hostility against anything that might resemble pagan in certain periods of the Al Andalus era, like under the almoravids or, even more intensely, under the almohads. A final possibility would be to consider a sub-Saharan connection that might have syncretized Isis' rituals with those dedicated to Yemoja and taken to Brazil with the African slaves. Even though the ancient Egyptian religion can by no means be understood if not through its relations to its African peers and the deep structural similarities among them (Budge 1911: 7), once more had Brazil inherited those rituals and they should n have been described in other countries and ages.

Assuming Yemoja and Isis rituals to be *Völkergedanken* corresponding to same *Elementargedanke* and thus sharing a common semiotic and generative structure is not bound to be a conclusion, but rather the point of departure for further investigation. Interesting questions arise with respect to the reason why certain archetypal myths suddenly emerge - like in the case discussed in this article -, and why they may vanish. Historical continuity and compliance with different *Völkergedanken* can explain, for example, why the Middle Age Iberian celebrations of the war between Muslims and Christians still survive in Brazil - for, if Islam has never rivalled Christendom in the New World, local and African pagan beliefs certainly did, and thus the quarrel between "faithful" and "unfaithful" represents an invariant that is still an issue to this day. Bastian observed all over the world the "monotonous" repetition of local solutions to universal problems, like the case of the bow-and-arrow When previously disappeared myths come back, would they correspond to local answers that the psychic unity of mankind would impose in face of a certain set of social and historical circumstances? Or would their return, maybe in a more Jungian approach, correspond to psychic needs of the collective unconscious? These are some of the questions that remain open, and that we intend to discuss in future publications.

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REPLICA AND INVENTION: A NEW LECTURE OF MODES OF SIGN PRODUCTION REGARDING THE ROMANIAN TRADITIONAL BLOUSE, IA

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1. Introduction

In this paper, we propose a semiotic investigation of cultural practices and communication processes woven in recent years, around the Romanian traditional blouse, *ia*, from the perspective of theory of sign production (Eco 1979). Practically, we continue the series of articles dedicated to our traditional blouse, *ia*. In a previous article (Corduneanu and Drăgan 2016) we treated the Romanian traditional blouse as a multi-dimensional semiotic object with a complex semiotic structure (Sonneson 1992: 190). It is no news that clothes are regarded as complex semiotic systems (Bogatyrev [1937] 1971; Barthes [1967] 1990; Enninger 1984; Danesi 2004; Todorović et al. 2014). For example, according to Peter Corrigan (2008), the semiotic system of clothes can be studied at two levels. Clothing as a *phenomenon* – endowed with certain semantic markers (which generate the mechanism of interpretation) – and clothing as an *object* – endowed with certain syntactic, material, perceptible markers (as surrogate markers that contribute to the construction of the mechanism of interpretation). The first dimension recreates structural aspects, working, for instance, as markers of social class. The second dimension refers rather to relational aspects, to the manner in which social relations are structured in the field to which the object belongs.

We illustrate this double articulation of the semiotic system of clothes through a project recently developed in Romania. Through the project *Ia-Aidoma* 'Ia-Alike', a few dozens of such old blouses, preserved in great museums of the world, were recreated and brought to the present time through replicas called *aidoma* 'alike'. We present and examine this semiotic phenomenon

par excellence, put into practice by the community *Embroidered Signs in Action*.

In the first part of the article, we present the *Ia-Aidoma* project, a project that aims to restore the meaningful ties between past and present, the balance between tradition and innovation in an exemplary and unique manner. In the next section, we examine a few aspects of the methods for the sign productions in the creation of an *aidoma* replica. Section 4 provides a case study, the creative solutions used in the process of creating an *aidoma* replica in the South-western part of Romania. The last section presents conclusions.

2. *Ia-Aidoma* project. Between tradition and innovation

We recalled earlier the fact that the authors involved in this semiotic experience are members of the community *Embroidered Signs in Action*. This group is the first and the biggest digital sewing bee in Romania that promotes the sewing techniques of our traditional blouse. Presently, over 20,000 women are part of this group constituted on Facebook, in March 2014. In a recent article (Drăgan 2016), we have explored the way in which virtual communities have replaced old sewing bees (p. 38). We showed there how the experience of modern living, in a networked society, could happily meet the traditional experience of the community. The lanes of the global village, which are now the connections enabled by social networks, can be a place to meet and to experience life as a group.

This context generated the idea for the *Ia-Aidoma* project, essentially a project of heritage recovery. Firstly, the principle requires intense labour in the recovery of the object itself (the model-blouse). We are actually talking about an effort to identify and choose the original model from a set of objects (Eco 1979: 151). The process required individual, detailed studying of the blouses in the area approached, throughout the period provided by the project. Each participant has individually chosen the starting model for the construction of an *aidoma* replica. We will therefore provide the detailed selection criteria for a certain model.

Usually, original models, dating back to the end of the 19th century, beginning of the 20th century, are not displayed to the public within permanent exhibits. They are kept either in collections or deposits of various international museums – The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York City, Textile Museum of Canada, The Ethnographic Museum of Geneva, Textile Museum of Lyon, Horniman Museum of Great Britain, The Russian Ethnography Museum of St. Petersburg –, or in private collections. According to Victor Ieronim Stoichiţă ([2006] 2011), the experience of the object displayed at a Museum is, "the consequence of triumph of the *image* over the *object* in 'the work of art'" (5). The prohibition "Do not touch!" establishes the visual experience and the "sole and legitimate means of access to the work" (Stoichiţă 2011: 5). How can this type of visual experience, of pure contemplation be transgressed? What other means of "linking Art and Life" (Stoichiţă 2011: 5) can there be found in order to bring model-blouses closer to the public to become a communication experience? The solution proposed by the participants was the creation of replica *aidoma* 'alike'. A replica that may be worn and admired.

From semiotic point of view, manufacturing and wearing your own *ia* it is a kind of *signifying practice*, a concrete *process of meaning production* (Kristeva, 1980: 251). The object-blouse (the model) goes beyond the realm of contemplation and into the realm of communication. The creation of an *aidoma* replica allows the object to be communicated in different ways, other than the visual experience. The strictly visual experience proposed by the Museum or Collection is replaced by the idea of a communication event and interaction (Marcus 1989: 33).

These replicas were called *aidoma*. This is a word describing an object that wakes up the same emotion, impression, mood, but not intended to be simple replicas, or identical.

In Romanian, the semantic markers associated with the word "aidoma" suggest a high similarity with the object. We understand this similitude in the sense of Umberto Eco (1979), as

"a matter of cultural convention", even more so since the original models discussed imply a "previously culturalized content" (Eco 1979: 204). As we will see thenceforth, the model-blouses possess certain *qualisign elements*, whose *rules of production* are scantly accessible and which render the creation of an identical copy, of a *duplicate* (Eco 1979: 182), almost impossible. Such elements, among others, allow the participants to carry out various creative acts.

Secondly, we are dealing with a project that aims to recover the intangible heritage. The effort of recovering, updating and transmitting archaic methods for producing signs regarding the traditional Romanian blouse starts with the accurate selection of the most suitable materials, the tailoring of the cut, the definition of the composition and finally, of the sewing and embroidering practices and techniques.

A significant challenge was to restructure the models based on photographs, some of them being in black and white, dating back to the 20th century. Then, in order to create the blouses, the challenge was to resolve the equation of a balanced composition: adapting the model depending on fabric and fibres, finding the ideal sewing pitch, determining the cadence and classifying the models, so as to generate the correct proportions. Another effort was to observe the chromatic of materials used in the past: arnica, silk, wool, gold and silver thread, fine silver coated copper braid, golden butterflies.

Each *aidoma* replica is based on an original model. As shown before, the participants were required to consider various compromise procedures between the object (original model) and method, to create an object modelling process. According to Solomon Marcus (2011), any modelling act "is based on an invention act" (155). Moreover, "a model cannot be obtained by mere observation, induction or generalization; it must be envisioned. Therefore, the attempt of modelling begins with a hypothesis, a promise that is converted into a model only on occasion" (Marcus 2011: 155).

The more the historical background is considered, the more complex the effort proved to be. As recalled earlier, the model-blouses at the base of the construction of exact replicas dates back to the end of the 19th century, beginning of the 20th century. During such time, information concerning the sewing techniques and practices for the traditional Romanian blouse were passed on by oral tradition, within the family, usually on a maternal line. They were cultural experiences where the social exchange of signs was facilitated by the recognition and cultivation of certain *overcoded rules* (Eco 1979: 134).

Later on, the communist period generated a rupture in the natural rhythm of the lives of members of the society. Although oral tradition has lost its force, such knowledge continued to be passed on in this way and, more sporadically, within the shops of folk art schools. The ethnographic studies and folk art notebooks published during the communist period feature scant theoretical references assessing this aspect. This explains why certain pieces of knowledge regarding the rules governing the compositional elements of the traditional blouse have been lost or have become difficult to access.

At present, the participants were challenged with recreating the original model "in the absence of previously established reliable rules" (Eco 1979: 202). Practically, they produce replicas *aidoma* through *acts of undercoding* (Eco 1979: 138). They have to proceed from "non-existent codes to potential codes" (Eco 1979: 136).

Via the *Ia-Aidoma* project, the authors restore the connection between archaic and contemporary, between tradition and innovation in an authentic manner. The communities of women who preserve the craft of sewing our traditional blouse try to restore the old significance connections of the systems of ancient signs in our traditional culture.

3. Concerning the methods for producing signs in the creation of an *aidoma* replica

In the effort of creating an exact replica, we have seen the participants experimenting with different manners of producing signs. Below, we examine a few structural particularities occurring in the construction of an exact replica, the criteria that have determined the choosing of the model blouse, as well as the general conditions for creating an *aidoma* replica.

3.1. Structural aspects

In the structure of the traditional Romanian costume, the traditional blouse, *ia*, is one of the main costume pieces. The *ia* blouse distinguished the status and the personality of its owner.

According to Marcel Danesi (2004), clothes in general are the main way to assert one's identity, of "*presenting persona*" (178). They can be regarded as signs coding semantic markers relevant for the wearer's personality, social status or character traits (Danesi 2004). From ancient times, clothes propose an appearance, a story that I tell others about myself (Danesi 2004: 182), thus triggering the mechanism of interpretation. Wearing your own *ia* is like wearing a passport, valid not only for this world but also for what's beyond it – it is a shirt for both body and soul. Wearing it for a social gathering, be it a religious festival or the traditional dance on Sundays, made it easy for people to know your exact place of birth, social and marital status but also your personality and virtues and they could decide, at a glance, if it was worthy to approach you in any way. Because the eyes of the people from the past could 'scan' your *ia* and get the message. It is one of the reasons why such a great importance is set on the structural particularities for creating our traditional blouse.

3.1.1. The tailoring system (the cut)

In terms of the topological structure of the traditional blouse, the cut is the main element underlying the construction of an *ia*. On the cut, the *ia* blouse redefined the wearers silhouette. The fabric (cloth) was used in a very efficient and optimized manner, based on well-established criteria. On the one hand, we have functional criteria, basically – obtaining a thermal and functional comfort -, and on the other hand, we have social hierarchy criteria, i.e. the recognition of a certain social status. For example, the excess fabric used for the tailoring of an *ia* blouse expressed a high status of the wearer. The cut is the creative solution to the environmental conditions and man's activities.

In addition, the cut is critical for the ornamental composition elements. Composition does not aim to contradict anatomy, but rather to turn it into an advantage. Composition is translated by great splashes of colour, visible from afar, created by embroidery, in vivid colours. They mark certain areas of the body, such as the wrists and/or limbs. They highlight the edges of the blouse, the length of the arm, etc. Sometimes, even by not taking into account the chromatic, composition also highlights ages.

3.1.2. Decorative composition. Compositional elements (ornamental fields and motifs)

The ornament is also a defining feature of the region, occupation, age and social status, meaning that there are certain limitations in the sewing techniques necessary to illustrate a certain ornamental motif.

An ideal ornamental motif, drawn on paper, seems universally applicable. The difficulties occur, however, when such must be illustrated on certain fabric formulas (cloth) or with certain threads for sewing. This is when regional particularities come into play: a thicker cloth, imposed by weather conditions, the lack of natural dyes for the colouring, the lack of fine threads for the embroidery. These are added to the social and material limitations. Certain types of fabric and

sewing threads were not accessible to everyone, which determined the limitation of this type of motif. The finer the cloth, the finer embroidery threads may be. Thus, a centimetre fits several sewing points. As a result, on a set area of cloth, the authors have two options. The first allows fitting a greater number of repeats within a simple motif on such area. The second option allows sewing a more complex, enriched motif for an equal number of repeats from the basis of a simple ornamental motif called *core.* Both imply certain types and forms of creativity from the authors. For example, the first option tends to the creation of an algorithm procedure. It is more related to elements of the sewing technique and to the optimum distribution of a simple model on a certain area. On the other hand, the second option tends to "stray from the rules and algorithms, by creating unique motifs" (Marcus 2011: 122). In both cases we are faced with an act of fine invention, characterized by a certain *manner* of working which makes the solution selected by a means of cultural creativity (Marcus 2011: 122).

Therefore, the motifs and the way they are organized on the fabric acquire a creative dimension, they are not mere replicas or "replicable *stylizations* with intertwined *pseudo-combinational units and programmed stimuli*" (Eco 1979: 259). They become thus an invitation to reading and (re)interpreting the language of embroidered signs. From this point of view, this kind of concrete process of meaning production is a "world of possibilities" (Marcus 2011: 163).

3.1.3. Qualisign elements

Thanks to its density, expressed in the number of threads per centimetre, cloth determines the scale for representing *izvoadele* 'ornamental motif the patterns', implicitly the number of repeats fitting into the corresponding piece of cloth. Some women have sought to use old cloth, manually weaved from hand-processed natural fibres. This type of cloth features natural irregularities that contribute to the general authentic appearance.

However, industrial cloth was made available and used by the vast majority of the people who took part in this project. This type of cloth provides the advantage of a regular structure that supports the efforts of applying an even, organized sewing pattern. Particularly, people preferred the "nature" cloth, not subjected to chemical whitening treatments during the production process. The cloth was tailor-made to be used in the creation of traditional blouses. As a result, the density formula of the cloth used featured a high degree of similarity with the original.

All such aforementioned factors have defined the aesthetic styles and criteria specific to the respective villages, subareas, areas and regions, going beyond the administrative borders. Therefore, we cannot talk about a national style, but rather about local versions thereof.

3.2. Criteria for choosing the object (model-blouse) and the conditions for creating an *aidoma* replica

Most women who have been enlisted for this project wanted to duplicate a blouse from their birth region. Models coming from the areas where their grandparents were born have become the foremost criterion in justifying their choice. For 42% of participants, this is the main reason for choosing a model. The blouse they are to sew and wear thus becomes a testimonial. It serves as a means of declaring their appurtenance to a certain region. It is the primordial step in expressing who they are. Their character and customs will be consonant with the education received, as well as with the practice within their region of origin.

A great number of participants (39%) stated that they did not know, could not define the criterion for choosing a model. They argued that, in fact, the model is the one choosing them, alluring them and all they do is bring that action to fruition.

Only 10% choose according to *pattern* or *izvod* (ornamental motif), acknowledging that they

can adapt it to any region and any sewing technique, through a suitable composition. They chose to be creators from the very beginning, in an undertaken, conscious and responsible commitment. A low percentage (2%) choose to sew an *izvod* only because it has never been sewn before, preferring to differentiate themselves through the *izvod*, regardless of actually harnessing it within a composition. The arguments for the other participants, up to 100%, is based on the familiarity and ease of the sewing techniques identified in the model-blouse, arguing that "it has been sewn before, it is easy to sew", etc.

Moreover, most women choose the *ia* blouse and embroidery as a therapy or as a means for restoring emotional affinities, to rediscover themselves or to find a hobby. As a result, they will take comfort from sewing according to a model, using aesthetic criteria that have already been defined and verified. They will only intervene on the model if forced to do so by the materials used, only to adapt the model to their silhouette.

However, the *Ia-Aidoma* project is aimed at those who have managed to retain their objectiveness and managed to intercede with the model for subjective reasons. The participants have strayed or made changes only to the extent to which the materials available forced them to adjust the proportions or number of repeats. For the very reason provided by the subject of the project, namely to restore the object via a faithful replica, not just by the recovery of knowledge, practices and techniques for reacting a traditional blouse.

Therefore, in order to create replicas as faithful to the original as possible, several conditions must be fulfilled, aiming to: *recover the izvod* (it must be visible and easily decipherable), *use identical work materials and identical work practices*. When of these three factors are not met, the other two are required to even out the process.

Beyond the chromatic harmony, perhaps the easiest to replicate, is the compositional harmony. This is a subservient of the cut and the element associating a blouse with the regional specifics. As a whole, setting aside colour, the eyes rapidly manage to read and to fit the composition within a time and space pattern. Only upon close inspection, can the eyes effectively assess the ornamental motif (*izvod*) and may observe the small details. At the first level of reading, the *aidoma ia* blouses have managed to fulfil their objective. Seen from afar, they leave the impression of being old or identical to old *ia* blouses in museums or private collections. Yet by displaying them next to old photographs or photographs of the originals, the *aidoma ia* blouses have appeared to the public as new, slightly different creations.

This project has determined the public to study them closely, for the very reason that the eye, being intrigued, sought to discover such small differences. In turn, such slight abatements have represented the creative response of the authors to the conditioning imposed by the materials available.

4. Case study. Creative solutions in the construction of an *aidoma* replica

The *aidoma* replica discussed was created based on a black and white photograph where the blouse is not fully displayed. It required great effort to visualize the cut based on the particularities of the area where the model-blouse originated. Considering that, the ornamental motif (*izvod*) on the broad shoulder sleeve was frequently used in the respective area, the cut of the other blouses sharing the ornamental motif on the shoulder was observed. Ornamental motif is the most important element in the composition of a blouse.

All these blouses had a cut specific to the Southwestern part of Romania, from the Mehedinți area. It implies a tailoring system with a broader sleeve than the normal model, from one and a half times the width of cloth. This half (1/2) width was inserted at the armpit, in order to widen

Figure 1. Embroidered smock (the model-blouse) from the Mehedinți area, situated in the historical provinces of Oltenia and Banat, from the end of the 19th century (Oprescu 1922: 86).

the sleeve more than necessary, to indicate the high status by using excess fabric. Usually, the joinery between the basic cloth sheet used for the sleeve and the excess sheet, small sewing is used, peppered here and there into a rhythm, intentionally placed to underline the joinery solution, in order to highlight this type of cut, ensuring its visibility without a semblance of a doubt. These small splashes of embroidery taking part in the joinery solution are not visible in the photograph of the original blouse (model). They were taken as a part (reference) from the embroidery *izvod* of the sleeve.

To the same extent, the embroidery on the chest was reinvented to replace the lack of clarity of the ornamental motif in the photograph. We are faced with an act of invention, understood as a "code-making" (Eco 1979: 250). New solutions were required in the effort to recreate the original *izvod*, "new coding possibility" (Eco 1979: 272). The starting point of this reinterpretation was the observance of the principle of solid and gap ratio established by the embroidery. This is subordinate to the solid-gap ratio used on the sleeve, which in turn is subordinate to the one on the shoulder. The embroidery on the shoulder must be denser, because, within the composition, the shoulders must be covered in splashes of colour, marked as being important and defining for a silhouette. If the ratio between the embroidery and white spots on the shoulders reaches 75% - 80%, the ratio for the sleeve must be around 50%.

The embroidery on the sleeve is created "on the board", meaning the ornamental motif (*izvod*) patterns are very small, interconnected via a network of small lines. This entire network (called table or board) will be fitted into a rectangle which, more often than not, will be narrower than the embroidery on the shoulders, when a horizontal band called curl is applied to the upper side of the sleeve (regardless of its functional curling role or its lingering on the sleeve simply as a decorative element). If the sleeves are tailored with a separate broad shoulder sleeve, this is highlighted by the embroidery, the composition being used to underline the cut. In such a situation, the shoulder features a more compact embroidery and the differentiation from the rest of the

Figure 1. Aidoma replica created and carried by Ioana Corduneanu, founder of the community Embroidered Signs and initiator of Ia-Aidoma project (personal archive). This embroidered smock, created according to the model of the Mehedinți smock, was presented at the opening of the Ia-Aidoma Exhibition at the Romanian Peasant's National Museum, on December 3, 2016.

sleeve is done by this horizontal embroidery band, created by a special technique, called încreț 'smocking'. Under this band, the sleeve embroidery worked "on the board" is less dense than the one on the shoulder. If the sleeves are tailed from a single cut, the network of ornamental motifs (the board) covers the entire sleeve. It is discontinued by neither the cut, and implicitly, nor by the horizontal band called curl.

Although a simplified *izvod* was used for the chest, compared to the one in the photograph, the replica-blouse achieved its objective of being considered an *aidoma*. The basic assessment criteria discussed in section 3.2 have been met. The tailoring system specific for the area (Mehedinți), chromatic, *izvod* patterns on the sleeve used at the same scale as the ones in the original model, have determined, via a correct number of repeats, the correct composition of the sleeve. The discussions here were mostly focused on the sleeve, because it is the tailoring element that features the most zonal or regional particularities. In addition, in many situations, blouse chests were often covered with other heavier costume pieces, such as the *ilic* 'doublet', *vesta* 'vest' or *bundița* 'sleeveless jacket'.

5. Conclusion

In this article, we present and examine a cultural project recently developed in Romania, from the perspective of theory of sign production (Eco 1976). Through this project, called *Ia-Aidoma* 'Ia-Alike' and put into practice by the community *Embroidered Signs in Action*, a few dozens of such old blouses, preserved in great museums of the world, were recreated and brought to the present time through replicas called *aidoma* 'alike'.

We have shown that the process of reconstructing the original model (model blouse) via an exact replica is an extremely complex process. Such an effort inevitably implies various means and acts of cultural creativity from the authors. It is also a way of understanding the complexity of the problems and meanings coded in a particular area of culture, namely in folklore and in our ancient traditions (Culianu, 2009). This project continues the configuration of a semio-

sphere around this cultural object, the Romanian blouse *ia*, as we explained in previous articles (Corduneanu and Drăgan 2016).

In a recent book, Dario Martinelli (2016) tried to capture, on the one hand, the difficulty of building and communicating a cultural project, and, on the other hand, to emphasize the need to recover the "social relevance" (2016: vii) of such significant practices. Through this type of cultural projects we trying to make a small contribution "to promote humanistic practices at their best" (Martinelli 2016: vi). Therefore, the paper highlights this aspect of such significant practices and contributes to the development of the semiotic culture.

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AGAINST POST-MEDIALITY. SEMIOTIC AND AESTHETIC REFLECTIONS FOR A MORE COMPLEX VISION OF THE MEDIA SYSTEM

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Abstract

In order to explain the many changes the media system is going through, some scholars propose to start thinking that we live in the *post-media condition*. A good way to schematize their vision of things is in the words of Eugeni (2015: 27-28): "The media are everywhere. We ourselves are the media. And this is the reason why the media don't exist anymore". What they point out is that today it does not make sense to distinguish between a medium and another, as we used to do in the field of media studies. However, many authors of modern manuals for the creation of trans-media, cross-media or inter-media communication projects, whose increasing diffusion and importance is one of the main reasons why the changes of the media system are becoming so visible, still underline that even if they aim at creating involving and very immersive experiences, they do not forget that every single medium of their *media mix* is different from the other and that it must be used with a specific function. It is very important to give their addressees the possibility to deal with the complex communicative architectures they produce. Given these opposite ways of thinking to nowadays media, this article aims at defining the theory of the post-media condition, reflecting on the advantages and on the disadvantages of using it and then at proposing another metaphor, the one of *complexity*, to understand what the media system is becoming today, without abandoning the idea that there is still a difference between a medium and another.

1. Is it still possible to distinguish a medium from another?

Due to digitalization and to the progressive evolution of cross-media, inter-media and trans-media communication strategies by the most important content producers and distributors all over the world, a new debate is rising about *the post-media condition*, which comes from the field of aesthetics (Krauss 1999), lies on Jenkins' theories about *convergence* (Jenkins 2006) and in

Italy is mainly carried on by the works of two scholars: Eugeni (2015) and Arcagni (2016). More or less, the idea is that it is no more possible to distinguish a medium from another, because the same contents run into different platforms and are used in too many different — or in other cases, as it will be shown, in some too much similar — ways. For example, it is difficult to say if a video which was first published on YouTube and then, due to its huge success in terms of visualizations and sharing, is broadcasted with no changes on TV, raising the same interest and buzz, is indeed a web video or a television one. In such a case, the supporters of the post-media condition theory say that following the old way of thinking one should wonder if, by broadcasting this content, television remains itself or, on the contrary, if by displaying it, YouTube becomes like a sort of a traditional television. But in their opinion this discussion upon the differences of the media in the media system is starting to look pointless and, what is more important from a semiotic point of view, *meaningless*.

However, if one reads the manuals for trans-media content producers (Bernardo 2011; Phillips 2012; Giovagnoli 2013), he discovers that professionals underline that different media must have different functions in their projects, because they believe their users/recipients/audiences - whatever they may be called — have different ideas and expectations about what they look for when they think about, for example, watching a movie at the cinema or a television programme at home. Maybe the problem is that the media system, and consequently the definition of what a medium is, is becoming more *complex*. It is true that technologies, devices and interfaces which in the past ages of communication were much easier to be distinguished, now are starting to look interchangeable. But this is giving more importance to the languages, formats and social usage practices that define the media in the mind of people. These are hybridizing and changing as well, but anyway, if one looks at how the most popular cross-media, inter-media and trans-media projects are built, it still seems possible to make a distinction between a medium and another. This is indeed what makes these kinds of projects *meaningful*, as far as they look like a clever way to mix, for example, television and the world wide web, cinema and the videogames, etc. Hence in the following part of this article, it will be sustained that we do not find ourselves in a post-media condition but in a *complex media* one.

2. The terms of the debate

For the supporters of the post-media condition theory, due to *digitalization* and to the phenomenon of the transformation of computer into a *meta-medium*, that is an instrument to produce, distribute and display any other media content, the old mechanical and electronic media have gone through a sort of a *remediation* (Bolter and Grusin 1999), which have led them to share some common qualities with the new digital ones. Quoting these features from some of the books and articles dedicated to the evolution of all media in the digital age (Arvidsson and Delfanti 2013: 14-18; Ferraro 2014: 41-64; Arcagni 2016: 3-35), they can be summarized by the following key words: non specialization[1], multiple distribution[2], mobility[3], personalization, convergence[4], hybridization of languages and of usage practices, modularity and non linearity of contents, interactivity, hyper-textuality, presence of forms of undelimited textuality[5], necessity of recurring to meta-texts as instruments to gather different and dispersed contents, transformation into actual and not only virtual social spaces.

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1   This means that any media today can perform many functions which once belonged to different media.
2   Many media have become multi-channel, multi-platform and multi-timing, and their contents are distributed via the narrowcasting method.
3   Here the keyword is multi-placing, as many media can be used everywhere.
4   Once again, the complex meaning of this word refers to what Jenkins ([2006] 2007: XXXVII) writes about it.
5   Like in trans-media storytelling projects.

Moreover, talking about the characteristics of the digital media, Eugeni (2015: 26-28) underlines that the whole media system has moved towards the *separation of the text from the dispositif* — something he defines, using a French word that recalls Foucault's theories, as the media technology together with the social rules that determine the way media technologies are used-, *the separation of the* dispositif *from its typical context*, and the fact that *things and people are becoming media*. As an example of the first phenomenon he talks about movies, which nowadays can be watched at cinemas, but also at home, in a train on a PC or in a bus on a tablet. To give an idea of the second trend, Eugeni refers to the video walls, which take cinema into public and open spaces where people do other things rather than watching the movie that is displayed on the screen. To illustrate what he means for the third observation he talks of the *internet of things* and of *augmented reality*, which are based on the production of data out of the way we employ or interpret the objects that surround us, or even out of our bodies, so that we can use and take profit of this information, often by sharing it. Driving his conclusions, Eugeni writes that "the more the media become pervasive, the more their *dispositif* loses a clear identity and disappears [...] The media are everywhere. We ourselves are the media. And this is the reason why the media don't exist anymore" (Eugeni 2015: 27-28)[6].

Eugeni's theories that take the distance from the clearer distinctions which could be done between different media in their first mechanical era and then in the following electronic one, when for example the *dispositif* of cinema could easily be differentiated from the one of television, and both of them, together with their contents, were clearly separated by all the other spaces and activities of everyday life, are based on the consideration that if media are, as Bourdon writes, "technique + organization + content + audience" (Bourdon [2000] 2001: 7), all these elements have changed in the digital era, so that we can't talk about media themselves in the same way we have always done. This is the reason why Arcagni, the other main scholar who, as it has been written, has raised the debate about the post-media condition in Italy, especially focussing on the audio-visual digital media, affirms that if we want to understand what audiovisual digital media are today:

> it is very hard to recur to the interpretative categories we used for cinema or television […] in my book I have used a wider multi-disciplinary approach, keeping together media studies, film studies, sociology, internet studies, computer studies, design, architecture, game studies. I've had to do it because we are in front of an audiovisual world which has become fluid and impalpable (Arcagni 2016: VIII - IX)[7].

Between all the many examples he takes, Arcagni considers Vice and Nucleus Medical Media. The first one is a worldwide famous video journalism platform which produces video-reportages made by free-lance journalists with their light technical equipment, that can be distributed and displayed indifferently on the internet — maybe on YouTube or on a newspaper website —, on television, on an application for tablets and mobile phones, on a big screen at cinemas, etc. Hence Arcagni wonders how such a kind of audiovisual products should be classified, whether as TV programmes, web documentaries or anything else. A similar question may be posed for the second of Arcagni's examples, which refers to a YouTube channel created by an American centre for medical imaging that posts on the internet some computer graphics videos of births, surgical operations, development of illnesses and of their cures, seen in the perspective of the inner parts of the human body. These products have become so famous, clicked and seen all over the world that they usually reach and surpass the audience of a typical thematic television

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6   The translation is mine.
7   The translation is mine.

channel. Thus, they raise some doubts about the difference between the contents of two media that once seemed so clearly distinguishable. As far as some similar observations can be done for the Machinima videos, for the videos of people playing videogames on YouTube and for many other cases, Arcagni simply notices that their contents, their languages, the way they are used in the *dispositifs* that display them, give birth to *something new* which mixes the cards and goes far beyond our old idea of the electronic media and of their different identities.

3. Advantages and disadvantages of "thinking post-medial"

If one thinks that the media do not exist anymore, or at least that they do not exist as we have always known them, he can explain some interesting phenomena of our everyday life. Eugeni (2015: 32-48) talks for example of the *naturalization of the media* as the end of the distinction between mediated and authentic experiences, culture and nature, "reality" and "fiction". As a semiotician, he analyses some texts that talk about this topic. He compares some Philip Dick's novels to James Cameron's *Avatar* (2010). In fact, in the first ones there is the idea that media give birth to an artificial experience of the world, mediated indeed by a screen, by the page of a newspaper or by any other interface. Moreover, these interfaces are based on the presence of another important mediator, that is *the language* which is used to produce the discourses they make visible. All these things work as filters that prevent people from living immediate experiences of what surrounds them, so that many distopias can be told about regimes that alienate entire populations, lie to them and imprison them into fake visions of reality. But in Eugeni's opinion these are stories of an old age, of the old media era. On the contrary, *Avatar* talks of a technology that permits men and women to enter the bodies of aliens and to communicate to other aliens in a direct and natural way, as if their communication tools were transparent, not even existing. Moreover, aliens themselves possess a wire which is part of their body and that they can connect to animals, trees and plants, once again to directly communicate with them, without even the need of sharing a language. To Eugeni, this is a metaphor of the way we use our digital media today, as far as they are everywhere, being part of our environment, becoming intertwined with our bodies; we don't recur to them as *filters* between us and the world, but as instruments to *augment* our experience of the world itself.

Another metaphor of the contemporary digital media age is, to Eugeni (2015: 49-63), the affirmation of the visual technique of the *first person shot* far beyond the field of videogames[8]. The first person shot represents *subjectivity* as something in motion, interactive, inter-defined with the objects and with the space it explores, so that it looks very different from the "stillness" or from the "otherness" — in the sense that it was built and posed by someone else, with no possibility for the recipient to actively deal with it — of the point of view offered by the media of the past, especially by classic cinema and television. To Eugeni, nowadays the relevance of the first person shot, as a way to install people into the world of media products, shows some analogies with the *changes in the rules of socialization* through the usage of media themselves, in a time that has seen the passage from an individual conceived as a *couch potato*, that is a passive spectator of mass communication, to a more active and self aware person, giving birth to theories such as the ones of the *individual in the net* (Rainie and Wellman 2012), of *mass self communication* (Castells 2009), of the *connected audiences* (Arvidsson and Giordano 2013), etc.. As a matter of fact, today people consciously recur to media contents to build their social identity and to stay together. To explain what he means, Eugeni quotes the famous TV series *Lost* (2004-2010) and *The Lost experience*, an Arg connected to the television programme which consists in joining the

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8   Now this technique is also used in movies, like for example in Hardcore! (Naishuller 2016), and in other audiovisual products.

forces of spectators, their information, their personal capacity to solve riddles and other tests, with the aim of collectively understanding what was going on in the world of the series itself. Even the metaphor of the story told in *Lost* looks very meaningful, in this sense, as it is about the exploration of a mysterious island by a group of survivors of a flight crash who, with their "first person shot" into the woods and into the mysteries of that place, must find a way to know each other and to give value to each other's capacities to discover how to return to their previous lives. In other words, thanks to such a popular TV programme and to its trans-media interactive communication strategies, the spectators can connect, promote themselves, socialize in small or big nets of other people, transforming what was once lived as a solitary and passive media experience, clearly separated from everyday real life, into something different, at the same time subjectively and collectively relevant.

As it looks clear, Eugeni's theories are very interesting. However, as a matter of fact, we still go to the cinema, watch television, listen to the radio, read a book or a newspaper, accepting that they are media and so that they mediate our experience of the world. When we think about *Lost*, we know it mainly is a TV show and we expect it to be such a product, while when we decide to live *The Lost experience* we are aware we are going to play an Arg. The same can be said about *Avatar*, that with no shadow of a doubt in our mind is a movie we like to watch on the big Dolby surround 3D screens of cinemas, even if we know we can download it and display it on a tablet or on a PC. And obviously we can easily distinguish *Avatar* from the videogame that has been produced to exploit its franchise on another medium. It seems that even if the theory of the post-media condition can help us to see some new trends of nowadays communication and of our culture, on the other side it prevents us to catch a glimpse of what remains of the "*old media*" in the contemporary media system and especially of which role the old media play to make us understand the meaning of what we perceive as the "*new ones*".

As far as in semiotics the meaning of anything lies in the *differential relationship* it maintains with the other elements of the system it is part of, it does not sound good to delete every diversity, as Eugeni seems to do. He is surely right to say we have gone beyond a certain past idea of the media, but even in the same examples he takes to support his position it is easy to see that it makes sense to watch a movie at the cinema or a serial on TV and *then* to take part to a transmedia storytelling experience. Without knowing that millions of people all over the world watch every week an episode of *Lost* on TV, thinking that at the end they will catch the sense of all the mysteries they have been told, maybe it would not be meaningful to participate to an Arg to give one's own contribution to find and share some hints and their interpretation while the show is on air and *before* it is over. Without seeing in the movie a human character who enters the body of an alien and then explores a small part of the marvels of the planet Pandora, sharing the culture and the destiny of its inhabitants against the greed of human invaders, maybe the player of the videogame that comes from *Avatar* would be less motivated to play at it, using a *dispositif* — the one of his videogame machine — which for sure offers a less spectacular experience, but gives him the possibility to continue the exploration of that world and the battle to defend it[9].

Hence if we want to recur to the terms of Eugeni we should say that *the media still exist*. Talking about a post-media condition looks too simplistic, because it means to give up identifying the role of every single medium in the digital era. The media have actually become more complex than in the past, so maybe it is better, as it has been written before, to talk about a "complex media condition". The meaning of the media experiences we live today depends on a *redefinition*

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9   To say the truth, Avatar. The game gives the player also the possibility of fighting for the human armies against the aliens, but Frank Rose ([2010] 2013: 43-54) criticizes this decision as it proves that game designers haven't understood the reason why people find the world of Avatar as a meaningful one: because it is based on a story of defence of ecological values and of the beauties of a marvellous natural world which is worth to be seen and explored.

of the differential relationships that occur between all the media, the "old" and the "new" ones. It is true that the media are changing, that they are everywhere and that we ourselves are the media. But this simply means that they involve us into communicative experiences that look more and more complex than in the past and as Arcagni suggests, in the passage mentioned above, it is necessary to find out new analysis categories to understand them.

4. Remediation, not death: the dynamics of beyond/behind

One of the new analysis categories that have just been mentioned could be called *the dynamics of beyond/behind*. As Bolter and Grusin have noticed, most of the times a new medium is invented to make human communication more *immediate* (Bolter and Grusin [1999] 2002: 27-43), so to reproduce our experience of the world more directly and to make it sharable in an easier way. This means to go *beyond* what once could be shared using the old media, especially in an *aesthetic* sense, as the new medium seems to better reproduce our way to perceive the things we want to communicate. This is what makes the previous media look "old" and, what counts more here, "*hyper-mediated*" (Bolter and Grusin [1999] 2002: 44-55), as they suddenly prove to be constructed, explicitly descending from the usage of a "language" by the individual who expresses through them, whose subjective glance in choosing how to show and how to describe the world becomes apparent. With its immediacy, the new medium demonstrates that the old ones were just media, in the sense that the latter only seemed to give direct access to people's vision of things, but that "access" was filtered actually by the old media *dispositif* and language, to use Eugeni's words. This is what happened, for example, when photography came and made a certain way of painting look old and hyper-mediated, as from that moment on a "realistic" painted portrait or a landscape, that once were used to "objectively" describe what they showed, have automatically proved to be the subjective artwork of a painter. Something similar happened when cinema appeared and, adding the movement first, and later the live sound and speech registered on stage, looked more immediate than a certain kind of photography. Or again this occurred when television was invented and looked more immediate than the radio, etc. Now virtual reality promises to be more immediate than any other previous audiovisual media.

But as Bolter and Grusin notice, most of the times a new medium does not kill the old ones. It simply pushes them to *remediate* itself. Now, there can be many dynamics of remediation. One of them has already been described in the second paragraph of this article, and it is the one that today leads someone to talk about the post-media condition: it consists in trying to reproduce some features of the new medium, hybridizing with them, with the aim of experimenting to reach more immediacy. For example, Ferraro (in Volli eds. 2002: 344-375) writes that when web cams appeared and through the internet gave people the possibility of watching live factual videos of what was happening around the world, autonomously choosing their own "palimpsest" and without the mediation of anyone, television, which had always been seen as the most immediate audiovisual media, suddenly understood it had a competitor. That was the reason why *Big Brother* was invented, the worldwide famous TV format which recurred to still video cameras put in the rooms of a house as if they were web cams and gave its audience the possibility of personally deciding which one to watch, either through the web site of the programme — something that, in Eugeni's perspective, could have allowed someone to talk about post-media even at that time — or through the "mosaic" channel of a satellite television company, which simply reproduced the multi-windows aesthetics of an internet website, being actually a television channel and hence giving people the option of doing, with the television *dispositif*, some of the things they may have done through the web.

There is however another way of remediating which may less recall the experimental activity of the *avant-guards*[10], but that is also very recurrent when a new medium appears: the individuals who operate through the old media understand that the new one is by the nature of its *dispositif* more immediate, so they take advantage of the sudden "revelation" of the hyper-mediated nature of their "old" way of communicating, to explore what there is *behind* the immediacy of the newcomer. This is again what happened to painting after the invention of photography, when for example the impressionists abandoned the naturalistic techniques to portray people and landscapes and moved towards the representation of what a photograph will never be able to directly show: our inner way of seeing and perceiving the world. Impressionist painters often took photographs of the subjects they wanted to picture but then they worked to explicitly display their own presence, their language, the diaphragm of their art, to show that if the new medium had succeeded in going beyond the representation of the world their old medium was capable of, the latter was still useful to represent something, but something of another nature. Something that cannot be immediately captured and communicated without the mediation of an entire "old" *dispositif* and of the language used to craft its contents, both obviously employed as metaphors to indirectly reveal another kind of truth.

This dynamics of beyond/behind can be anyway less complicated. For example, at the beginning the *Big Brother* format contemplated the usage of a web site and of a mosaic satellite TV channel to enhance television, so to give it the possibility of reaching the immediacy and the interactivity of a web cam on the internet, but in that mechanism a very important place still belonged to the old way of crafting a TV programme. As a matter of fact, even if people were given the tools to see 24 hours per day what was going on in front of the video cameras, personally choosing what to watch without any imposition by a troupe or by a programme director, that simply proved to be impossible. Neither a spectator who had dared to try and watch *Big Brother* all day long could aspire to directly see everything, because he should have paid attention to what was going on in front of every video camera at the same time. Consequently, to have a clear vision of the meaning of what he was capable to see, he needed someone to tell him the story of it. In other words, he needed someone to show him what was *behind* those images. And to fulfil that necessity there was the "old" television, a good traditional TV programme that, like a documentary, was able to cut the most important sequences of the facts happened in front of the video cameras and to make a meaningful montage of them.

5. Inter-medial, trans-medial projects and old media as meta-media to frame a world

Big Brother is considered as one the most famous examples of inter-medial TV programmes (Santangelo 2012: 33-34), which anticipated a trend that today is very visible in the whole media system. It consists in using different platforms, *dispositifs*, languages and contents to expand a *franchise* (Jenkins [2006] 2007: 81-29, 348), so that it can reach its audience every time, everywhere and to every device (Scaglioni and Sfardini 2008: 21-31). But instead of just displaying the same contents on different media, as it usually happens with cross-media strategies, *Big Brother* has been projected to give every medium which is part of its format design a *specific function*. The live video cameras on the web and on the mosaic satellite channel permit people to watch 24 hours per day what happens in every single room of the house where the programme is shot. The 30 minutes daily strip on the broadcasting classic television channel must tell a story about the most important facts that everybody must know to understand the meaning of what is going

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10   Many observers, and between them Ferraro, have claimed that the first edition of Big Brother has been a remarkable avant-guard experiment on TV.

on. The 3 hours weekly talk show must give the audience and some experts the possibility of discussing and of judging the stories that have birth in the house. The paper review must show the behind the scenes. The web site must give the basic information to know the protagonists and to recap what happened in the last days, as far as the programme goes on for months. None of the instruments that have just been mentioned are experimental, in the sense that they remind typical TV programmes, reviews and web sites: the whole project is complex, but its parts are very simple an easy to be understood. This communication strategy is typical of nowadays inter-medial products[11]. It aims at creating some franchises that give people the possibility of living an overall *new media experience*, but they lean on old media to *frame* it, so to be able to give a clear vision of what is going on in the entire "*world*" of the project itself, any time one wants to know it, from any place and from any device. It is as if the old media were a sort of *meta media*, that is tools to have a more comprehensive glance on the complex mechanisms of the franchise.

Now the most recent evolutions of the media system see trans-media storytelling as the new frontier of what has just been discussed. What is innovative, if compared to inter-medial strategies, is that now the worlds created by the franchise have birth thanks to stories that evolve from a medium to another, in the sense that a part of them is told on a web site, another on a book, another on a movie, on a videogame, etc., and all the pieces must fit like in a puzzle, to show some connections and an overall meaning. Even if trans-media is not the fruit of a technological evolution, in the sense that no new technology has been invented to surpass in immediacy the old media, it shows the main characteristic of remediation, in the sense that its objective is to give people the sensation of finding themselves into the world of their favourite trans-media project, often by engaging them in Alternate Reality Games, meet-ups or in other situations in which fictional worlds overflow in the real one. But even in these cases, the old media, used and perceived as hyper-mediated tools, if compared to the overall feeling of being immersed in a very involving media experience, are projected as meta-media, having the function of framing all the information that is needed to understand what is going on, to move and to coordinate with other people participating to the same "thing".

As anticipated at the beginning of this article, the manuals for trans-media storytelling are full of technical words that simply say what has just been written. Giovagnoli (2013: 100-104) recommends for example to build, with the old media, "referrals" and "omnivorous communicative systems" called "touch points" to help people know where they are in the story and to help them recover all the information they need to go on. Moreover, these manuals talk about a *specialization* of the media they recur to, operating some precise choices about "the main and the secondary storytelling platforms" (Giovagnoli 2013: 23-24), that are again old media. For example, in the world famous *The truth about Marika* (SVT 2007), a TV drama series was transmitted on the national Swedish television channel SVT about a disappeared woman, to take the problem of disappearing people in Sweden to the attention of the public opinion. After the first episode, a talk show followed, to discuss of that topic and a woman called to say publicly that Marika was not a fictional character, but a friend of hers and that she was investigating to find her. She said she a had a blog and a website to carry on with her investigation and she asked the help of everybody. The newspapers hence wrote of the case, the radios treated it too and al the Nation mobilized to find Marika, looking everywhere for hints. A sort of a treasure hunting took place, coordinated by SVT, where the "touch point" was the website of Marika's friend who called the TV talk show, the "omnivorous communicative system" was the talk show itself, which collected and framed all the information people started to accumulate. The "main storytelling

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11   Today almost every radio has its web TV or its TV channel, the most important national newspapers communicate through a web site, a YouTube channel, maybe a TV channel, some comics publishers have their own cinema production house, etc.

platform" was television that, as a meta media, directed all the operations, revealing at the end that everything was just a game projected to teach citizens that joining their forces the problem of disappeared persons in Sweden can be fought.

6. Conclusions

One can think that projects like *The Truth about Marika* are new media experiences that with their interactive and immersive design push the media system towards remediation. This may be true, but it is very clear that in its game design *The Truth about Marika* simply uses old media in their most typical ways. Broadcasting mass television was needed to give the franchise the widest visibility and to be sure to trigger a viral mechanism that would have taken the news about the contents of the programme everywhere in the information sphere (newspapers, TV news, blogs, etc.). The TV drama and the talk show that were transmitted weekly were needed to make the story clear to everybody and to give a rhythm to the game, so that people were committed to solve the riddles, to find some hints, to join their forces in time for the next episode. This management of the time of the game through the timetables of a television palimpsest was also intended to create an active community, because if the audience had seen the TV drama or the talk show many months later than the rest of the Nation, as it happens for example on Netflix or on many on demand television platforms, the game wouldn't have worked, as all the "referrals" and the storytelling platforms would have been full of spoilers from the players who had already finished the game.

The Truth about Marika, like many other trans-media storytelling or inter-media communication projects is therefore a very complex new media experience, but its interest is in the way it mixes old media in a clever way, inventing something different from what we were used to see with old media themselves. After all, Morin (Morin and Le Moigne 1999: 58-97) writes that one of the characteristics of complexity is the holistic principle that the entire is more than the sum of its parts and that what is complex has some *emerging* features that are not possessed by its smaller components. We can hence consider the communication strategies that the defenders of the theory of the post-media condition study as something truly new, but maybe we don't have to forget that — quoting Eugeni again — even if in such new projects the media are very pervasive, they are everywhere and we ourselves are media, this doesn't mean that media don't exist anymore, but simply that we use them in a very refined and aware way, to reach some communicative goals that once we could only dream of.

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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE – LIVING THE BRAND STORY OR BEING EXCLUDED FROM THE STORY

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Abstract

Artificial intelligence (AI) is already adopted by companies with the intent to improve the customer's experience with the brand, e.g. Amazon, Google, Facebook, etc. In just a few years, it is highly likely that individuals will use various AI-enabled smart devices on a daily basis. Its applications are almost limitless but its main purpose in terms of marketing is to enhance the customers' experience by offering them solutions, which save them time, money, effort, etc. On the one hand, this could improve the customer's life but on the other, there are some emerging threats. By satisfying the needs of the customers before they even arise, the companies exclude them from the decision-making process. Will this make customers more satisfied or will it set limits to their experience and exploration of new things? One of the valuable resources for brands is to use the semiotic approach to analyze customers' behavior and needs. Computational semiotics could help marketers to understand the creation of meanings, the world modeling and behavior generation of customers in the virtual space in order to use this knowledge in the application of AI. This will help companies not just to create smart objects but also to involve the target audience in a process of customer-brand interaction.

1. Introduction

The predictions are that in 2022 there will be around 29 billion connected devices, of which 18 billion will be related to the Internet of Things (IoT). In 2018, mobile phones are expected to be surpassed in numbers by IoT devices, which include connected cars, machines, wearables and other consumer electronics (Ericsson Mobility Report, 2017). The companies implement artificial intelligence (AI) in the products to make them not only connected but also smarter – to be adjustable to the customers' preferences in order to be able to help them with their everyday

decisions. They give them information about their physical condition in real time, they advise them how many steps to make every day or which road to take in order to avoid the congestion, they remind them what their appointments are or what they needs to buy, etc. On the one hand, this sounds very convenient and just as another logical step of the technological development but it changes radically the way customers take the decision to buy, interact with brands and consume the products. There is a chance that in the near future marketers will have to build relationships with the smart machines rather than with customers themselves. The aims of this article are to present some of the possible effects of the marketing in the artificial intelligence age and the impact on the customer's behavior and to suggest a semiotic approach of overcoming some of the possible negative effects.

2. Definitions and predictions

John McCarthy introduced the term artificial intelligence in 1955 and defined it as the science and engineering of making intelligent machines (Peart, 2017). The expectations related to the artificial intelligence's development back then were not too ambitious. The scientists were focused on creating machines that think and could perform simple logical functions. 61 years later, there is a great variety of artificial intelligence definitions. In his book, *Artificial Intelligence* Richard Urwin defines it as a "tool constructed to aid or substitute for human thought. It is a computer program, whether standing alone in a data center or a PC or embodied in a device such as a robot, which plays the outward signs of being intelligent – those signs being the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills in order to act with reason in its environment" (Urwin 2016:5). It is an example how with the technological development the expectations have changed and nowadays it is assumed that AI will be able to perform more complex tasks – to have the knowledge and skills to act with reason and even to substitute human thought. In 2016, IBM conducted a Cognitive Advantage study in which over 600 cognitive decision makers participated worldwide. It reveals that nearly six in ten early adopters see AI as a must have to remain competitive within the next few years because it is expected that half of all customers will interact with cognitive technology on a regular basis. Eighty-five per cent of the respondents say that the Internet of Things (IoT) will play an important role in their cognitive initiatives within 2 years (IBM, 2016).

3. Artificial intelligence and customer relationship marketing

3.1. Marketing application of AI

There are many different applications of AI in the product development and the communication with customers and their number is constantly increasing. In the first place, companies implement artificial intelligence in the products to make them not only connected but also smarter. They ultimate goal is to create customized products which are able to adjust to the customer's preferences. For example, Nest thermostat programs itself adjusting to the typical behavior patterns of its users. AI plays an essential role in the development of the Internet of Things. The combination of both makes it possible not only to create connected devices but also to have devices, which add value to customer's life. Moreover, AI helps the companies to manage Big Data. All the connected devices provide a great amount of valuable data and insights but it needs to be analyzed. AI systems overcome the great challenge to review and understand all this information and to find patterns that can be learned from. They give meaning to the large volumes of digital data by providing predictions and recommendations.

One of the most common uses of AI is the recommendation tool. For example, companies like Amazon, YouTube and Netflix use it to suggest products, songs or movies, etc. to the customers based on what they have learned about them – their previous behavior, their profile, etc. Another popular use of AI are the wearables – smart devices, which keep track of the customer's health, condition and give advices how to improve it. Some companies, like Tesla for example, are using AI to create a collaborative learning system. They are working on producing self-driving cars, which are connected, and when one car learns something about driving, the others adopt it too. There are also intelligent applications such as Siri, Alexa and Google Home that understand a number of voice commands, for example ,to find certain information online, to play a song, or order a pizza. Probably in the recent years with the conversational AI apps, the customer will be able to control almost any device by giving voice commands to the personal virtual assistants. Another popular topic, related to the use of AI, is the implementation of bots in the customer relationship management – companies use a software, which is designed to automate some actions, such as various customer service requests. For example, the famous outdoor brand North Face's has developed a bot, which is trying to recreate the experience of shopping in a store with an assistant. It asks where and when the customer will be using the jacket, then analyzes the weather forecast and other relevant data and recommends the best jacket for the customer. This results in higher customer engagement and improved experience with the brand. The implementation of chatbots is becoming a trend in Facebook Messenger. Since Messenger became an open platform last year over 34,000 bots have been developed. The main reason is that AI enables computers to process natural language and exchange information with customers in an automated conversation. This gives the brands the opportunity to be available in the absolute instant that a potential customer connects with the company (Duhig, 2017). Facebook is also using AI for deeper understanding of the images and their context. Google uses in its algorithm learning artificial intelligence system called *RankBrain* that analyzes the search query and makes an assumption about its meaning so it can be answered in real time without prior human research. One of the most interesting examples comes from Amazon. The company is investing in the development of a service called *predictive delivery* – it sends the customer products based on his purchasing behavior before he even orders them.

3.2. AI customers

Currently connected and smart devices are part of the lifestyle of people who are young, well educated, tech-savvy, and open minded, concerned about their health and the environment. They want to have full control, to be smarter, better and more efficient. These customers want an added value and are looking for brands who are similar to them – innovative and creative. That is why an increasing number of companies focus on their digital marketing strategy and change the way they interact with customers (Ericsson Mobility Report, 2016). For example, Hyundai has launched its Genesis Intelligent Assistant smartphone app, which combines data from the vehicle, the owner's smartphone and the internet with multiple layers of intelligence in order to enhance the customer experience by sending notifications and recommendations. The app estimates appropriate departure time analyzing the traffic, is sends reminders for upcoming meetings, it also allows the owner to remotely control the temperature inside the car, and it searches for nearby gas stations and has many other features.

3.3. AI development

Increasing the brand value and improving the customer's experience are becoming the main goals of the companies. For example, IBM declares that the company goes even beyond artificial

intelligence with its Watson products. It believes that in the next five years, every important decision, whether it is business or personal, will be made with the assistance of AI. This is the vision of the IBM president and CEO Ginni Rometty. For example, the sports cloth company *Under Armour* has used Watson to create an app that serves as a personal trainer to the customer (Bort, 2016). In a press release about the new product IBM states: "A 32-year-old woman who is training for a 5 km race could use the app to create a personalized training and meal plan based on her size, goals, lifestyle. The app could map routes near her home/office, taking into account the weather and time of day. It can watch what she eats and offer suggestions on how to change her diet to improve performance" (Gaudin, 2016). Artificial intelligence becomes increasingly popular for business goals because companies see it as an opportunity to be more efficient, to interact better with the customer and to deliver an improved product/service.

4. Possible disadvantages

As more and more devices become part of customers' lives by making recommendations and participating in every step of the customers' journey there is a possibility that marketing and the interaction with the customers will change significantly. Dr. Susanne Hupfer, a researcher and consultant, predicts that in the near future, people are likely to allow the digital brain to enhance their decision-making. In the more distant future, "we may even trust the digital brain to take certain actions upon our behalf" (Hupfer, 2016). She uses the term collective digital brain to illustrate how the human brain will transform because of the dependence on AI-powered smart devices.

The possible disadvantages for the companies are related to the fact that as more and more devices become part of customers' lives, there is a possibility that brands will end up marketing to them. For many years now, marketers have been focusing on building relationships with the customers in order to turn them into loyal brand ambassadors. But if companies keep working on creating devices which help the customer or even make the purchase decision for him, are brands going to build an emotional bond with the machine? Maybe this prediction is too bold but there is already a significant change in the customers' behavior and expectations. They want to be delivered targeted and relevant information as fast as possible as there is an overflow of data. The customers highly appreciate the convenience of leaving some everyday tasks to the virtual personal assistant, such as ordering food, shopping, arranging appointments, checking the weather or traffic, etc. A survey revealed that one of the main reasons for owning a connected car is the convenience and the feeling of "making my life easier" (Ericsson Mobility Report, 2016). Relevance is the currency of the digital economy, so it is no longer just enough to deliver personalized customer experiences – those experiences need to be smarter, faster and in the right context. AI makes this new personalized experience possible by recognizing behavior patterns, recommending the best options, predicting outcomes and becoming smarter about the customer (Afshar, 2016). In brief, customers are looking for relevant and simple information, fast and convenient service and are willing to rely on connected and smart devices to help them. In this way, customers believe that they will have more time and energy to focus on more important tasks and projects. However, if individuals leave all the small cognitive tasks to the AI what will be the impact on their behavioral and mental capabilities?

The fact that AI predicts the customer's needs and tries to satisfy them before they even emerge will have a great impact on the existing purchasing path. The active role of smart devices in the process of decision-making could eliminate the impulse buying and limit the customer to his previous purchase behavior missing out potentially interesting brands. Marketers will have to find a way to influence the algorithm that analyzes price, relevance, previous purchases, recommendations, user's data, etc. This will change the marketing focus from building rela-

tionships and personal communication to providing highly targeted and reasonable data. Task automation will leave many unpopular brands in an unfavorable position as the chance to get recognized by the smart device will be limited. For example, a smart refrigerator is expected to monitor its content and order the groceries or drinks which are about to finish. It orders the brands which the customer is already using making it harder for new brands to reach its owner. When researchers refer to intelligence of smart devices, they use the word to describe the process of analyzing data to act in a rational way – following rules and predefined structures. Many brand stories are not rational, they appeal to the emotions of the customers in order to make a connection with them and make them not only buy the product but feel happy about it. Smart devices, on the other hand, do not take into account if the owner of the company has quit his job to start his business with no money and has fought hard for his success, the machine analyzes if the Zappos' shoes match the needs of its owner.

There are possible disadvantages for the customers too. They are expected to live in the so-called filter bubble where AI will limit their choice to what it thinks that is the most appropriate. Practically the customer will be excluded from the brand story and the decision making process. Maybe the most important thing is that AI will probably have an impact on people's cognitive capabilities. Marshall McLuhan believes that media transforms the cognitive and behavioral models of individuals thus changing whole civilizations (McLuhan, 1994). If customers leave more and more tasks and decisions to the smart devices, this could result in the inability or frustration to take an everyday decision. For example, what to eat for dinner, where to go on a vacation or what gift to buy for a friend. This hypothesis will be supported or denied with time but we are already experiencing some changes. The writer Nicholas Carr believes that the Internet has changed our mental habits. In his book *The Shallows* Carr states that our brains change in response to our experience and the technologies we use to process and share information can reroute our neural pathways. The Internet in this sense is related to skimming rather than deep reading, making sense of small bits of information instead of concentrating on long texts. He believes that this way we are losing the ability to contemplate and reflect (Carr 2010). Similarly, AI could have an impact on the human brains in the long term making them dependent on the smart devices. AI offers almost unlimited possibilities to enhance the customer experience and deliver improved and highly customized products and services. The main threat is that this process will go too far and the customer will be excluded from the buying process leaving the decisions and the communication with the brands to the smart devices.

5. The semiotic approach as a solution

One way of overcoming the challenges is changing the marketing perspective. Companies should focus on engaging and involving the customer and not making it easier for him to skip the process and ask the smart device to take the decision for him. The smart machines provide a great amount of customer data, which can be used not just to offer recommendations to the customer based on his profile and previous behavior but using the knowledge to engage him in the communication and process of decision-making. Marketers should deliver meaning to the customers. The field of AI could benefit from the use of semiotic approach by focusing on the meaning making process of customers and their use of signs to construct reality. A quantitative survey of more than 10 000 marketers from 92 countries, conducted by Harvard Business Review, reveals that brands are distinguished by their ability to integrate data on what consumers are doing with knowledge of why they are doing it, which gives new insights about consumers' needs and how to best meet them. This way companies are not only focusing on what the customers are doing, when and how but are looking for the true reasons behind their actions. The brands, which suc-

ceed in developing relationships with their customers, provide not only functional benefits, but also emotional and social benefits, which enhance the value of their products by creating customer experiences (Arons, 2014). In brief, there are two possible approaches for the companies. To offer ready-made solutions to limited minds or to understand the obvious limitations of the human mind and to present it possible methods for evaluation to generate solutions.

The second one is the method used by Clarisse de Souza and her research method – the Semiotic Engineering. At first, it was presented as a semiotic approach to user interface design but with time it evolved into a theory on human-computer interaction (HCI). In brief, it studies the principles, materials, processes, effects and possibilities for producing meaningful interactive computer system discourse. The main principles of semiotic engineering are that HCI is a computer-mediated communication between designers (producers of the message) and users and that computer systems should focus on the communication tools of the system and not only on the user's needs (de Souza, 2005). The main idea that could be the core of the AI development is that there should be metacommunication between designers (brands) and customers. In this process, the producers of the signs communicate their meaning potential to the users and give them interactive tools to respond. First, the designer studies the users, their activities, and their environment and then expresses, in the form of computer technology, his views about how the users, their activities and environment may or must change in order to meet their goals. Then the users interpret the message by interacting with the system and respond to the message. Thus, communication is seen more as a collaboration between designers and users and interpretation is seen as a continuous process (semiosis).

In this process, the designer of the message should take into account the culture of the customers and the social group, to which they belong. This idea is opposed to the mainstream interface unification related to the challenge of creating products, which meet the needs and expectations of people with different cultural and social backgrounds. Clarisse de Souza defines five cultural viewpoint metaphors – a conceptual design tool that can be used by brands when creating cross-cultural product design (de Souza et al., 2009). The designers can use them when creating the user interface:

- the domestic traveler: the user's culture is dominate;

- observer at a distance – the designer uses interface elements which represent cultural practices from the customer's culture;

- guided tour visitor: the design provides contrast between two cultures. The customer's culture is dominant and serves as a reference;

- foreigner with translator: the content is the same for all customers, only translation of the words is provided;

- foreigner without translator: the culture of others is offered as it is (ibid).

By focusing on the culture of the individual and his way of creating and interpreting meanings, the AI-enabled devices could be designed to meet his needs and involve him in a metacommunication with the brand, which will enhance the customer's experience and will inspire a process of relationship building.

6. Conclusion

Most brands and customers are experiencing the digital transformation related to deep behavior, mental and social changes. The smart devices and artificial intelligence are becoming an extension of the human body and its capabilities. This controversial trend has its advantages and disadvantages, which have a great impact on the brand development and customer experi-

ence. The semiotic approach could be used to actively involve the customer instead of offer the convenience of leaving the marketing communication and purchasing decision to the smart devices. It could help marketers analyze how meanings are generated, negotiated and transformed in order to engage the customer in an active sign exchange and thus improve his experience.

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FINITE SEMIOTICS: A NEW THEORETICAL BASIS FOR THE INFORMATION AGE

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Abstract

This paper argues that the arrival of the information age and its "attention economy" compels a new theoretical stance for semiotics: that semiosis is a function of the finiteness of human cognition and the allocation of that resource by the intermediating world. On this basis, and proceeding from only basic ontological commitments regarding cognition, a model is sketched that offers novel definitions of sign, semiosis, and semiotics, and develops two new analytical constructs: the semiosic field and semioformation. The new theoretical standpoint is illustrated with two related examples. Firstly, a finite semiotic examination of metacognition, exemplified by "memory", is used to reveal a contradiction in the direction of its supposed recovery of thought and the occasion of its recovery. Secondly, such "recovery functions" are shown to be a central mechanism exploited by technology to restructure cognition and categories of the real. Their further study is proposed as an important area for semiotics.

1. Introduction

This paper introduces and illustrates a new approach to semiotics based on the finiteness of cognition called *finite semiotics*, which is detailed in two articles to appear in *Semiotica* (Shackell In press-a, In press-b).

The paper is organised into three sections. In the first section, the marginalisation of semiotics from the innovation and evaluation of information technology is explored. This lack of engagement is traced to how technologists perceive the notion of the sign, which to them does not provide a quantum for computational applications.

The second section provides a primer in finite semiotics, which seeks to bridge this gap by grounding the sign in the finiteness of cognition. It introduces the theory's ontological commitments and the constructs built upon them.

The third section provides two illustrative applications of the new theory. Firstly, the notion of metacognition is deconstructed to reveal an important paradox. Secondly, the ability of technologies like Facebook to mutate patterns of semiosis is modelled using finite semiotics.

2. Semiotics and technology

The semiotic forces driving technology and the information revolution are reflected in the questions haunting its innovators and consumers. A few of these, for example, are:

- What will be the next big thing? (The next Google, Facebook, or Uber?)

- How do I avoid losing out without missing out on social media? (In common parlance, FOLO, Fear Of Losing Out, versus FOMO, Fear Of Missing Out)

- Should robots be given legal rights?

- Can democratic processes now be manipulated by technological monopolies such as Facebook and Google?

Much incisive and relevant work has been done in semiotics on the effects of technology. Semiotic analysis is no stranger to memes, viral videos, website design, or the mechanics of social networking: for example, Shifman (2014), Frobenius and Harper (2015), Marino (2015), and Leong (2016). There has been a general failure, however, of semiotics to engage with the actual process of technological innovation or evaluation. Some very specialised branches of semiotics such as organisational semiotics (Stamper 1973; Liu 2001) and semiotic human-computer interaction engineering (De Souza 2005) do impinge, but with very specific domain focus and uneven popularity. In comparison to the broad historical and sociological strokes of semioticians such as Barthes, Foucault, and Eco, there has been little attempt to model the questions driving technology as systemic, nor to inform the creation of new competing "semiotic" technologies. In the words of Nadin (2011: 153): "If it [semiotics] ever shows up on the radar, it is rather a blip than a foundation of computer science – contrary to what many semioticians have claimed or hoped is the case."

2.1. Motivation for a new theory: a closer engagement of semiotics with technology

The situation described above is surprising. In the early 1990s semiotics was enjoying a heyday with a popular ascendency lead by Eco's theoretical and fictional oeuvre. It even counted enough adherents to qualify it as a combatant in the "science wars" (e.g. Ross 1996). At the same time, the World Wide Web was beginning its own ascendency until, by around 1996, it was clear that something remarkable was taking place in patterns of semiosis. A gold rush has ensued in which human computer interaction has been normalised to the point of becoming an obligation. Libraries, art galleries, and museums are now virtual presences in homes, and every realm of commercial and social life has undergone "disruption". Universities now cater for digital natives with online courses; employers attract workers with fringe benefits such as free iPhones on unlimited data plans. Yet, in the technological world – the world of technological innovation – semiotics has been the word on virtually no one's lips. A Google search for "Silicon Valley semiotics" is all that is required to confirm this moribund state of affairs. (The masochistic might also contrast the number of job openings in the technology sector calling for semiotics expertise with those calling for cognitive science expertise.)

How could semiotics have been marginalised during what has essentially been a semiotic revolution? Semiotics is anything but a surface level discipline. It is capable of more than retrospective comment. Yet this would seem to have been the *status quo* in regard to technology.

To better understand this eventuality, it is necessary to address a fundamental disconnect that still endures between semiotics and technology: the sign as a quantum.

2.2. The sign is not attractive as a quantum for technologists

In his introduction to semiotics, Chandler predicts that, when told that semiotics is the study of signs, most people will ask, "What do you mean by a sign?" (Chandler 2017: 1). Chandler is quite rightly pessimistic that any answer will be well received. This is doubly true when addressed to technologists. To be told that signs are everywhere and that we all obey sign codes is not seen as much use. In short, to the innovator the notion of signs seems vaguely descriptive but, upon reflection, functionally useless.

2.3. A different question

How do we go about unlocking the vast potential of semiotics in relation to technological design? The answer is not to reject the tradition of the sign as the basis of semiotics: much analysis demands impressionistic sign identification as a starting point. However, to facilitate a reengagement with the questions of the information age, it is opportune to re-examine the sign.

This can begin simply by asking a different question. Instead of the qualitative question "What is a sign?" let us ask the quantitative question "How many signs are there?". For example, let us ask a provocative riddle such as the following: In all the data storage on earth (2.5 exabytes is a nominal estimate), how many signs are there?

Suddenly, we have a question of interest to both semiotics and technology.

2.4. The common basis of the ideas of Barthes, Foucault, and Baudrillard

Three influential ideas in semiotics are: that we live in a system of mythologies (Barthes [1957] 1972); that genealogies of thought lead to closed and limited epistemes (Foucault [1966] 2002); and that technological reproduction and simulation give rise to new "hyperrealities" (Baudrillard [1981] 1994). Each of these ideas already has its own well-travelled applicability to information age outcomes. None, however, has translated into much direct influence on which technologies are produced or how technologies are evaluated – mainly because they do not provide a methodology appealing to technologists.

One central problem is that identifying signs is no longer an easy task. To baptise something as a sign was once quite practical and defensible: signs were relatively sparse and stable; agreement about them was well supported by social structures and, more crucially perhaps, a crypto-prescriptive academic establishment. Today, however, stimuli are propagated with such dynamism and at such saturation levels that any agreement about any particular sign must be fleeting. Social structures today, in fact, are only in evidence by the mechanism of being in flux: their identification immediately motivates the entry and exit of followers and disrupters. Meanings are more codified by *likes*, *upvotes* and *wikis* than by media-beset politicians, prestigious university dictionaries or industrially-invested publishers.

We will find no direct answer to our question about the number of signs in digital data from the pre-internet works of Barthes, Foucault and Baudrillard. But as always from works of great insight and scope, we can glean a hint. Their seminal ideas all imply that signs operate upon a *finite* substrate. For Barthes, each of us may live out multiple mythologies, but it is our subset relative to others that defines us. For Foucault the limitations of thought in any age derive from the limitations of the passing age. For Baudrillard, the real cannot be separated from the amount of thought it consumes. In each case, it is patterns in this finite *cognitive* substrate that create

what we experience as signs and meaning. In the era of Barthes, Foucault and Baudrillard this inference was perhaps obvious and trivial. In fact, it is still largely considered so today despite the need for "multitasking" and the considerable effort devoted to the study of "cognitive load". Semiotics, however, has the opportunity to make of this misunderstood and underestimated *ontological* fact a deeper basis for itself and for the "attention economy" built upon it. For from the simple premise "cognition is finite" we can deduce that "signs are finite" and so establish a finite basis for semiotics.

So how many signs are there in all stored data? One answer must be: as many as the finiteness of thought allows.

2.5. Two benefits of a finite semiotics

A treatment of the sign as finite is urgent and relevant for an obvious reason: the level of semiosis currently being stimulated by technology represents an acceleration, compression and distortion of finite thought to absurd limits. Myriad technological externalities are in evidence with barely a vocabulary to describe them, much less a theoretical framework to compensate for them. Some, such as the side-effects of Facebook, are existentially tragic (Kross et al. 2013); others, like climate change inaction, are potentially apocalyptic (Hulme 2009).

A second benefit in pursuing the finiteness of cognition as the quantum basis of semiotics is theoretical precision. It can bring new clarity to general semiotic theory due to the minimal ontological commitments required. Making these commitments explicit allows us to define constructs such as semiosis and the sign transparently and build grounded and justified methodologies.

3. Finite semiotics: a primer

As discussed above, the very useful concept of the sign is nonetheless very difficult to define. In analysis, the sign is something organic, arising naturally from focused, purposive reading. However, this inferential, impressionistic method, which works so effectively in certain domains of the humanities, is a limitation that has alienated semiotics from the realm of technological development. Moreover, the information age has revealed that the process of sign identification itself is highly fluid. We should not, therefore, begin with a declarative definition of the sign but with an examination of the first principles from which a tenable definition might arise. To this end, the section below sketches the ontological commitments of finite semiotics (presented more fully in Shackell [In press-a]).

3.1. Ontological commitments of finite semiotics

The most basic of premises is that the world changes. This can be represented formally as in Figure 1.


Figure 1. Formal representation of how the world moves from one state to another (Shackell In press-a).

Each of us, of course, is a part of this changing world. We are aware of our membership because it is the primary function of our thought to divide or *discretise* the world into separate objects: and so, as a first move, we assert a discrete identity or self. It does not matter whether we assert our identity implicitly or explicitly: it is a performative contradiction to deny that we exist (for we have conceded our existence as the asker), or to deny that we think (for we must think the denial). Hence, we can locate ourselves as discretising agents within the changing world as in Figure 2.


Figure 2. Discretising human agents as sub-states of the universal state (Shackell In press-a).

The imperative to discretise gives rise to the continuity of the world becoming for us a reduced, finite system of objects – something already explored in relation to consumerism, for example, by Baudrillard ([1968] 2005). Any attempt to interrogate this process of discretisation leads to a new discrete object commonly labelled thought. Hence for any agent, any interrogation of existence will insist it is a series of thoughts or cognitive states as in Figure 3.

Figure 3. The consciousness of an agent as a series of identified cognitive states (Shackell In press-a).

3.2. Semiosis and semiotics

In the context of the simple ontology above, *semiosis* can be defined as the process by which thought moves from one cognitive state to another. This is illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4. The consciousness of an agent as a series of identified cognitive states with semiosis being the movement between those states.

Semiotics, then, is the study of how, why, when and at what rate this occurs. If one reflects on semiotics as a whole, this is not inconsistent with it as an endeavour and is discernible as a background over its modern history.

3.3. Semiotic valency

The effect of semiosis on the cognition of other agents (through action of the body as part of the world by speaking, for example) can be called its valency. The asymmetric, reticular effects of valency on semiosis come to equilibrium over time. This leads to the stability of sign systems such as language. It is important to note, however, that not all valency derives from semiosis. Our environment introduces stochastic elements (weather, for example) around which the system of

valencies has long adapted. The continuous process of valency and semiosis seeking equilibrium is labelled in finite semiotics with the term *semioformation*.

3.4. The semiosic field

The above definition of semiosis, applied at the population level, allows us to construct the semiosic field which is simply a formal model of global cognition highlighting the relativity of the cognition of any one agent. A basic representation is offered in Figure 5.

Figure 5. The semiosic field of all agents.

If the semiosic field seems like an intractably ambitious construct, consider that if values for cognition were asserted, such a model could easily be run as a simulation on contemporary computers. (Even just seven gigabytes of memory, for example, would store approximately one byte of data per agent.) Moreover, there are in fact many similar partial maps of cognition in use – political polls, marketing surveys, behavioural analyses, and web site metrics, for example. It is not commonly recognised, however, that these maps are partial maps of a complete theoretical territory: a fact that perhaps retards their understanding and usefulness, especially in regard to observer effects.

3.5. Equivalence of the semiosic and epistemological fields

An important corollary of finite semiotics is that due to the dependence of knowledge on thought (for what is never thought cannot be knowledge), the semiosic field is coextensive with epistemological space. This is seen as a possible source of relativistic effects in examination of the field by any single agent. The closed system created by this equivalence is consistent with Foucault's concept of the *episteme* (Foucault 2002) in which each identification of knowledge is indistinguishable from knowledge itself.

The ambiguity of knowledge and semiosis meets in the concept of the sign, which we may now finally come to reframe. The sign is simply a special type of *identification* prevalent in the semiosic field. Semiosis is inevitable; the sign is optional. Signs are recovered *by* semiosis *from* semiosis for specific purposes. Hence, an observer paradox pertains when identifying signs: semiosis involves cognition moving from one state to another in which signs are motivational forces (the Stop sign we see when driving, for example, causes cognition to tend towards the ac-

tion of stopping). However, it is only by semiosis that we are able to identify signs. The sign then is an artefact derived from a certain persistent discipline of interrogation of cognition and its observable effects: namely, formal and folk semiotics.

3.6. Summary of the postulates of finite semiotics

The formal foundations for the theory of finite semiotics can be summarised as:

1. Cognition being finite, each agent (human being) is, or is not, having a thought at any moment.

2. As cognition is finite there is a sequence to cognition.

3. he sequence of cognition bears a relation to the world. For example, hot weather often accompanies thoughts of drinking water.

4. The movement from one cognitive state to another we can label semiosis. The study of how this movement occurs we can label semiotics.

5. The effect of semiosis on the cognition of other agents (through action of the body as part of the world, for example) can be called its valency.

4. Illustrative Applications

4.1. Analysis of metacognition: memory or "recall"

A theoretical concept very much in use – either explicitly or implicitly – in practically every intellectual endeavour is memory or "recall". Without an assurance that the past is static, real and available, knowledge would seem impossible. The essence of recall is that some thought we have had in the past can, at will, be replayed, recaptured, resumed or otherwise interfaced to present thought. In these terms (and in contrast to some other more assumptive usages in psychology, for example), we can categorise recall as a type of metacognition: thought about previous thought.

Finite semiotics allows us to model metacognition with some clarity. An illustration is provided in Figure 6. When I remember my childhood dachshund Fido, my cognition (seemingly under my volition) reaches back to bear some relation to previous cognitive states. I would not maintain that my recall of Fido is precise or is an exact replay of thoughts I had in the past, but overall the thoughts I have now relate by some function (however complex) to the thoughts I had in the past. These functions can be labelled as "recovery functions", and it is by some recovery function, for example, that I recall that Fido's muzzle was light brown, that he liked lamp chops and so on. The direction of any recall is retrograde: we can only recall what has happened in the past.


Figure 6. An example of metacognition in terms of finite semiotics. Present cognitive states relate in some way to past cognitive states (adapted from Shackell [In press-b]).

4.1.1. The path dependence of thought

Consider the causal chain involved in memory. If I had never had a dachshund called Fido, would I be able to recall Fido? This seems a ridiculous notion. Obviously, due to the finiteness of cognition, we only recall things that we have had thoughts about in the past, otherwise they would have never entered cognition to be available for recall. I do not seriously recall a purple unicorn I had as a five-year-old because I never had such a pet. There is therefore a dependency between thoughts in the past and thoughts in the present: if we never thought of something in the past, it will never be recalled as "a memory" to determine our thoughts in the present. This can be generalised as path dependence in thought: what we think now shapes the conditions of possibility for what we can think in the future. (Such a notion is in fact the rationale for learning and education.) In terms of the example of remembering Fido, this path dependence can be represented as in Figure 7.

Figure 7. The path dependence of cognition. If I had never thought of Fido, I would not think about him now. The occurrence of X and Y occur due to the prior occurrence of A, B and C.

4.1.2. The paradox of recovery functions

If metacognition involves integration of past cognition into present cognition, how is this to be reconciled with past cognition leading to the act of metacognition itself? As shown in Figure 8, the directions of causality are contradictory.

Figure 8. The contradictory directions of metacognition and path dependency of thought (adapted from Shackell [In press-b]).

It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve deeper into this paradox, or to expand examination of it into the multiple agent case (which we can call trans-metacognition). Both the thought recovery paradox and trans-metacognition are explored more fully in Shackell (In press-b). The pertinent fact for present purposes is that finite semiotics has been useful in modelling and uncovering a paradox in the notion of metacognition.

4.2. An application to technology: reality as consumption of thought

In the above example, finite semiotics is used to problematise one commonly held belief about cognition. Finite semiotics is similarly useful in the analysis of the effects of technology, especially where these effects impact the category of the real. To better understand how technology evolves and distorts reality, let us refer once again, as a starting point, to the principle that cognition is finite.

4.2.1. Reality as consumption of thought

Baudrillard offered the concept of *hyperreality* to describe changes in modern society impacting what is considered real. He defined hyperreality as "the generation by models of a real without origin or reality" (Baudrillard 1994: 1). Finite semiotics can offer a rationale for hyperreality: reality for any individual over some interval cannot be distinguished from what that individual thinks over that period. If we are immersed in the virtual world of a video game during an hour, that is our reality for that hour. We can expand this theoretical notion as far as required. An individual's total reality must consist of the full set of thoughts over their lifetime; globally it must consist of all peoples' thoughts over all their lifetimes. Just as for knowledge, no reality can lie outside what is thought. Our notions of what lie beyond reality are but structural elements of reality itself.

As Baudrillard claimed, the tendency of technology is to introduce homogenous artefacts (reproductions) into our local environment where they affect our cognition through our sensoria. Not only do these artefacts have an immediate effect on our reality as we watch television, interact with apps on mobile phones and watch YouTube videos on our notebook computers, but, due to their ubiquity, they become the common objects occupying our cognition far beyond the time spent focussed on them. Hence they lead to a progressive restructuring of thought with new realities implied by the thought they consume.

Let us take Facebook as an example. Devotees spend time with Facebook's affordances, often prompted by a stream of event-driven alerts to do so. Over time, Facebook begins to alter their cognition by skewing their choice of activities. They gravitate to activities that will look cool in a "selfie" posted to Facebook, for example. This in turn alters how they conduct themselves at relevant activities (interrogating a concert venue for the best selfie locations, for example), which brings a new range of exposures, feedback and semioformation. These subtle evolutions have their own cascading effects as new stimuli are encountered, new agent commonalities are forged, new affordances are added to Facebook, and so on. Such mechanisms are not highly individuated or complex, but have become, by virtue of technology, accelerated and coordinated. They are now highly valent, serving to establish new equilibria of cognitive allocation, often closely reflecting underlying economic patterns. A regulatory tax on Facebook, for example, would likely alter cognition on a massive scale.


Figure 9. Finite semiotic modelling of structuration of cognition due to Facebook engagement.

Figure 9 illustrates the scenario discussed above. The semiosis regarding concerts and selfies accrues economic benefit to concert promoters, mobile phone manufacturers and other agents as well as Facebook. Facebook thus assumes a power-reality position of being able to evolve the reality of its users for the benefit of commercial customers. The economic good traded is effectively the reality of its users.

4.2.2. The extinguishment of interrogations of reality

In response to the above, one might object that technology merely aids us in dealing with an objective reality that we always remain aware of. This would suppose that at any point in our dealings with technology we can ask ourselves the question "Is this real?" and satisfy ourselves with an answer. But "What is real?" is a recovery function to which the metacognition paradox discussed above applies. To interrogate what is real, we must have already been lead (as always via the path-dependence of thought) to that interrogation. Hence, the absence of an interrogation is the only necessary condition for an instance of "reality". With such a mechanism in effect there can never be any stabilisation of what is real, for it is always vulnerable to mutation of the circumstances in which such interrogation takes place. If objects persist in our environments for substantial periods of time, interrogations about their reality tend to be extinguished from the semiosic field.

An example is the *Pokémon GO* craze of 2016 (Niantic Incorporated 2016). Many players would no doubt claim to have always kept the *Pokémon GO* characters in the category of the "imaginary". This may have been true initially, but by the time they were fully engaged and standing at crowded *PokéStops*, how many were still asking if the character Bulbasaur was real?

As Baudrillard suggests, the equivalence of the focus of our attention and reality leads, via the modulations of technology, to rapid shifts in what is considered real. Undoubtedly this is a phenomenon that has always applied to the evolution of human thought: a mechanism of environmental adaptation. But technology, with its powerful ability to reproduce objects and make them ubiquitous – in other words to modulate our environment – saturates and structures the semiosic field with unprecedented speed and tendentiousness. Intergenerationally this is plain to see. Consider how "real" social media is for most grandparents compared to how "real" it is for the average teenager.

5. Conclusion

This paper introduced a new perspective on semiotics that seeks to reinvigorate its links to technology. The tradition of the sign holds an invaluable contribution to the discourses emerging in the information age. Engagement in this area, however, requires an evolution in our conception of the sign to account for the speed and agility with which technology is shaping semiosis.

The germinal notion of the new theory – that cognition is finite – may seem an unlikely epiphany. But if one begins to refer to it in the face of semiotic dilemmas – particularly those raised by technology – a new sensitivity becomes possible: not only to what semiosis and the sign mean now, but more importantly, what role a discipline devoted to their study must play in the world to come.

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FROM THE SESSION "SEMIOTICS OF MULTIMODAL DIGITAL TEXTS"

MULTIMODALITY AS A NEW LITERACY: LANGUAGE LEARNING IN THE AGE OF MULTIMODAL SEMIOTICS

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Abstract

Both researchers and practitioners deduce that there is a need for a revision and reconceptualization of what constitutes the concept of 'being literate' in the 21st century. It is evident that nowadays literacy is no longer confined to the reading and writing of plain handwritten or typed text. The comprehension and production of a variety of multimodal texts – instant messages, social media posts, blogs, vlogs, etc. – become an inevitable, daily communication practice.

How does the theory of language learning reflect the multimodal literacy and assess its opportunities and limitations in the language classroom? How can language teachers use multimodal text in their practice? How are on-screen texts able to support the development of different language skills?

This current study examines the concept of multimodality, its role in digital communication practices, and some arguments of using multimodal texts in a Russian as a foreign language classroom.

1. Multimodal texts: introduction and background

Although the linguistic research in multimodality was begun in the 1990s (O'Toole 1994; Kress and van Leeuwen 1996), nowadays the phenomenon of multimodal and multi-semiotic texts remains underexplored, and the very term is subjected to varying interpretations.

In their introduction to a *Special Issue of Semiotica*, T. Stivers and J. Sidnell examined the multimodal nature of human communication and indicated that "face-to-face social interaction is necessarily multimodal" (Stivers and Sidnell 2005: 6). A handful of academic papers have discussed the phenomenon of multimodality in connection with face-to-face communication or video recording of a spoken interaction (Baldry and Thibault 2001; Taylor 2004, etc.). In Russian

linguistics, it is also more usual to use term "multimodality" to describe the complex of spoken and nonverbal communication (Kibrik 2010).

Another area of research, which started with Kress and van Leeuwen's paper *Reading Images* (1996), focuses on the multimodal nature of texts, for example, newspaper or magazine articles, advertisements, etc. Multimodal texts are concerned with a variety of sensory modes and semiotic resources that do not necessarily even include the verbal mode, working in a synchronized way to construct meaning. Such semiotic resources may include: written language, visual images, different fonts, colours, spatial organisation of a text (for printed texts), spoken and written language, sound effects, music, static or dynamic images, fonts and special organisation (for digital texts). Later in the next paragraph, we will discuss the peculiarities of digital texts in detail.

The relationships between different modes can vary. For example, written language can be dominant, while other signs, for instance, visuals, can repeat and support it. Also, different semiotic resources can represent complementary aspects of a message, so that it is impossible to decode the whole meaning of the message without considering all the modes. The message delivered by a multimodal text can even be inconsistent, when different modes convey contrasting meanings, for example, in an ironical context (pic.1).

Figure 1. Inconsistent digital communication: enthusiastic text is combined by a gif with a crying woman.

2. Multimodality of the modern digital communication

The majority of communicative practices of modern people are carried out in digital spaces, in online environments, which are multimodal by their nature. Woods and Hastings (2009) mentioned that nowadays an average consumer of media is bombarded with hundreds of thousand words, most of which are accompanied by different kinds of visuals. Digital genres, such as social media posts and comments, tweets and longreads, blogs and vlogs, emails and instant messages, etc. are mostly hybrid and consist of different types of signs. The most obvious and widespread example of multimodal texts in digital communication is a printed text combined with iconic symbols called the "emoji". Picture 2 shows how emojis can complement "traditional" texts – the Russian classical poetry; picture 3 demonstrates the ability of emojis to construct a meaningful text by themselves (this resembles ancient pictographic writing systems).

Figure 2. Mobile game by Azamas: some words in A. Pushkin's poem are replaced by emoji icons.

Figure 3. Emojis are able to replace the verbal text.

The possibilities provided by modern media allow enhancing the meaning of the text by using multimodal effects. An exemplary case is a longread about the tragic accident in Karelia, Russia, when 14 children from a summer camp drowned in a lake during a storm (Chesnokov 2016). The article is accompanied not just by illustrations, but by an animated background with sound, which represents a calm (and horrifying, due to the article content) water surface. The language mode is dominant in this case, as the main message of the article is concentrated in the printed text, so that it can be understood without consideration of other resources. The role of aural and visual modes is to underline the essence of the story, to create an appropriate atmosphere and to enhance the emotional mood of the article.

Another hybrid digital genre is a very popular internet phenomenon called the "meme". Generally, memes can take different forms, such as a word or a phrase, a hashtag, a gif, a video, etc., but the most common type is an image accompanied by a text. Such kind of memes are usually derived from a weird, funny or peculiar in any other way memorable picture or freeze-frame, which has begun to be shared in social media and to be associated with a specific situation or concept. A good example in the Russian context is a meme Ждун (Zhdun, which literally means 'a person who always waits' and in English is known as "Snorp", originally named "Homunculus Loxodontus"), a funny creature by the Dutch sculptor Margriet van Breevoort. It was intended to capture the emotion of a hospital waiting room, while in Russian internet culture it became to represent the patience and naivety of Russian mentality (pic. 4).

Figure 4. Zhdun as an experienced PC user. [I clicked on something and everything disappeared].

Internet memes can illustrate how different modes of a multimodal text are able to complement each other. For example, one of the most popular memes with the character by R. Downy Jr. consists of visual and verbal parts (pic.5). A verbal part by itself is an ungrammatical construction, an incomplete sentence, but in conjunction with the visual part, it makes sense.

Figure 5. Meme: when a text and a picture are a unitary whole.

3. New literacies in the language classroom

In the digital media age, when the screen became the dominant medium of information delivery and communication, the idea of "new literacies" is derived from the thesis that in modern life, people consume and produce mostly multimodal texts, from private posts in Facebook or Instagram to business presentations. "'The world narrated' is a different world to 'the world depicted and displayed'", G. Kress argued in his book *Literacy in the New Media Age* (Kress 2003: 2). Nevertheless, in traditional school-based literacies, linguistic modes of communication are privileged over the other modes, and this applies to the language classroom, both for L1 (native language speakers) and L2 (second and foreign language speakers) learners.

It is fair to say that some of the national educational standards have already included the concept of a multimodal text: for instance, it is integrated into the new National Curriculum for England and the Australian Curriculum. Meanwhile, the Russian educational system is more conservative, so multimodal literacy, as well as related notions, are not mentioned in the official documents.

In this paper, we would like to discuss some of the arguments for the wider implementation of multimodal texts into language learning and teaching practice.

The first one is that, as mentioned above, the literacy in the digital age requires new competences; therefore it is logical to teach students to create and decode those kinds of texts we are surrounded in our daily and professional life. Research shows that reading multimodal texts, especially in a digital format, demands other skills than reading written or printed texts: visuals attract attention more successfully than the language part; digital readers are more likely to skim very quickly through the text, focusing only on images and headings, but they struggle to read a text carefully and thoughtfully (Ziming Liu 2012; Rosen et al. 2013; Daniel, Woody 2013). This causes problems with the recall, when readers are not able to remember and retell what they have read about (Mangen 2010). Students and teachers should be aware of these peculiarities when reading and producing such kinds of digital texts.

The other argument is that multimodal texts can support language learning very effectively in terms of creating authentic tasks for language learners. Walker A. and White G. (2013) indicate that images and videos meet students' expectations and, even more importantly, can bring "real life" into the classroom: for example, creating a Tripadvisor post about an excursion is more authentic than writing an essay on the same topic, telling a story in Instagram or Snapchat is more authentic than writing a "one-day-in-my-life" essay. Moreover, such kind of tasks makes students be more responsible for their results, because their work can be viewed and commented by not only a teacher, but also by their classmates or even the users from outside.

When a typical A1 level text about the weather is designed as a Facebook post, it meets the requirements of the communicative approach to create authentic environments for learning a language (pic. 6).

Figure 6. Classical A1 text about the weather looking like social media post

In the case of foreign language teaching, it is important to remember that online space is often the first place where a learner meets the authentic, not-from-textbook, language, as well as the native speakers of the target language.

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SEMIOTICS OF ANIMATED IMAGES AS A NEW WAY TO PRESENT GRAMMAR SEMANTICS

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Abstract

The paper deals with the analysis of semiotics of animated images as a modern way to present grammar phenomena. In semantization of new lexico-grammatical material using animated images coupled with a text can enhance the effectiveness of training. Traditionally, the text has taken the central position in the field of pedagogics. However, multimodal nature of the digital space affected the text so that now it often operates in close concurrence with the visual semiotic units. Moreover, the combination of animated images and verbal text is becoming more widespread. The application in the teaching of foreign languages, particularly in teaching Russian as a foreign language can significantly increase opportunities for linguistic education.

Animated images allow verbalizing most visually a certain lexico-grammatical material that as a rule has abstract meaning complicated to comprehend. One of the most difficult parts of Russian grammar is the system of verbs of motion. Since they denote different ways of motion, their lexico-grammatical meanings are closely related to the visual component. In this case, animated images help to illustrate in dynamics the meaning of every new language unit, as well as specific lexico-grammatical characteristics that complicate learning of the language material. Thus, they aid to clearly distinguish between unidirectional and multidirectional verbs of motion (идти / ходить 'to go') and between transitive and intransitive ones (идти 'to go' / нести 'to carry'), explain the features of denotation of motion (идти 'to go on foot', ехать 'to go by vehicle') and when dealing with prefixal verbs of motion to refine various meanings of a certain polysemantic prefix (зашёл в магазин 'went to the shop', зашёл за угол дома 'went around the corner of the house') and show that they can have different antonyms depending on the denoted situation (принести 'to bring' – унести 'to carry away', принести 'to bring something from' – отнести).

1. Introduction

Because of its multifunctionality text always remained the key instrument of pedagogics. However, as informational technologies develop, the world around us changed noticeably that could not but affect the text. Firstly, a text was obviously incorporated into the digital space and has become an integral part of a display, which now accompanies us almost every second, therefore it is possible to talk about new display form of test existence (Kostomarov 2014: 54–55). Secondly, the digital text has included visual and sometimes audiovisual elements, now "все чаще мультимодальные знаковые композиции вытесняют привычные, в большинстве своем исключительно письменные тексты" [multimodal signed compositions more often dislodge habitual, mostly solely written texts] (Kress 2016: 79). So we can argue that the text, as a unity of interrelated verbal signs, has changed significantly and nowadays is characterized by the feature which is called multimodality. Functioning of the text in close concurrence with the image undoubtedly increases opportunities for linguistic education, particularly for teaching Russian as a foreign language. As Gunter Kress rightly points out, "понятие может быть объяснено уже не 'словами', а изображением" [a concept can be already explained not by 'words', but by image] (Kress 2016: 79). Nevertheless, text supplemented with static image has been used for different purposes for centuries. These are well-known illustrations in books, which help us to imagine what we read, this is advertisement. Today, thanks to evolving technology and the availability of the digital space, the combination of animated images and verbal text is becoming more widespread. The combination allows us to illustrate a certain statement in dynamics, and therefore achieve maximal visibility in demonstrating and semantization of new lexical and grammatical material.

2. The challenges of teaching Russian as a foreign language

Grammatical meanings of language units are often abstract and complicated to be verbalized. Moreover, in students' mother tongue one or another lexico-grammatical group can be realized completely differently rather than in target language. As our empirical experience shows, such situation is most typical for the learning process because native speakers of the languages that are not closely related for Russian like English, Chinese, Spanish, Italian, Arabic usually constitute the main contingent of students.

The class of verbs of motion is one of the most difficult parts of the Russian grammar. They represent the special separate group, which has some grammatical and semantic peculiarities, that complicates its acquisition by foreign students. Our research is devoted to the analysis of semiotics of animated images as a modern way to present grammar phenomena, namely, to present Russian verbs of motion and meanings which are peculiar to them in order to increase the productivity of acquisition of the part of the Russian grammatical system.

3. The system of verbs of motion in the Russian language

There are 14 pairs of original verbs of motion without prefixes in the Russian language: идти – ходить 'to go, to walk', ехать – ездить 'to go, to ride, to drive', бежать – бегать 'to run', лететь – летать 'to fly', плыть – плавать 'to swim', лезть – лазать 'to climb', ползти – ползать 'to crawl', брести – бродить 'to wander', вести – водить 'to lead', везти – возить 'to carry (by vehicle)', нести – носить 'to carry', тащить – таскать 'to drag', гнать – гонять 'to chase, to drive' (Yudina 2009: 511). The first nine pairs of them are intransitive, the last five pairs are transitive and therefore they require a direct object in form of accusative case. It is no coincidence that the verbs are represented in pairs since such way of representing can help to reflect the specificity of the lexico-semantic group. The main distinction between them is that some of them mean motion in one direction and are unidirectional (идти 'to go on foot', ехать 'to go by vehicle'),

and on the contrary, other ones are multidirectional as they mean differently directed, repeated motion. Furthermore, each pair means a certain way of motion. The four of them correspond to the English verb *to go,* but the difference is that идти and ходить mean motion on foot, whereas ехать and ездить mean motion by transport. The same distinction is characteristic of the transitive verbs нести – носить 'to carry' и везти – возить 'to carry by vehicle'. All verbs of motion without prefixes mean process and are imperfective verbs. Because of prefixation, the unidirectional verbs form the prefixed perfective verbs of motion (прийти 'to come', приехать 'to come, to arrive') and multidirectional verbs form the prefixed imperfective verbs of motion (приходить 'to come', приезжать 'to come, to arrive'). Meanwhile, prefixes do not have the only grammatical meaning of imperfective or perfective aspect, some of them can realize different meanings depending on the context.

4. The current ways of verbs of motion semantization in teaching Russian as a foreign language

In the textbooks and special manuals of Russian as a foreign language usually different schemes and tables with examples are used. They may be supplemented by illustrations that represent moving people, or arrows which show direction of motion, that is combination of verbal and visual component (Antonova et al. 2013: 129–130, 140–141, 167–168; Bogomolov and Petanova 2008: 6-7, 11; Chernyshov 2009: 151, 174-175, Chernyshov and Chernyshova 2009: 49; Esmantova 2012: 94, 132, 210; Khavronina and Shirochenskaya 2016: 225, 231, 235; Skvortsova 2003: 6-14, 59). Nevertheless, as practice shows, the static images do not contribute to better understanding and acquisition of this part of Russian grammar by foreign students. Indeed, it is very difficult to learn verbs of motion without motion.

The use of animated images permits to simplify both the process of explanation and the perception of the grammatical phenomenon functioning features by students. Unfortunately, the modern technology does not yet allow us to use animated images in printed textbooks, but through the use of appropriate technical equipment, we can involve in studying process digital texts very easily or combine oral explanation, examples and animation, which allows to show the idea contained in a certain language unit very clearly, whereas in comparison with application of solely verbal means – "использование сочетаний модусов предоставляет более полный набор средств для передачи смысла" [usage of modes combinations provide more complete set of tools for transmission of meaning] (Kress 2016: 86).

5. The ways of usage animated images in teaching Russian as a foreign language

The following options for usage of animated images are possible. Firstly, the animation should be applied when it is necessary to present and verbalize new lexico-grammatical material. In this case, a short text is complemented with a visible animated image illustrating the way of motion. For example, if we talk about the distinction between verbs идти 'to go on foot' and ехать 'to go by vehicle' it is possible to use short text like Мы в городе. Мы на улице. Кто это? Это Андрей. Он идёт. Что это? Это машина. Машина едет 'We are in the town. We are on the street. Who is he? This is Andrew. He is going. What is this? This is a car. The car is going', that is accompanied by the animated image, which is showing a person walking in the street and a moving car. Other ways of motion can be represented similarly: Это дельфин. Дельфин плывёт. 'This is a dolphin. The dolphin is swimming' / Это птица. Птица летит. 'This is a bird. The bird is flying' / Это спортсмен. Спортсмен бежит 'This is a sportsman. The sportsman is running', where every verbal example is accompanied by an appropriate animated image. The transitive verbs of motion which require an obligatory direct object that is an object whose motion is caused can be submitted likewise. For instance, in interpreting of the verbs нести 'to carry', везти 'to carry by vehicle' we can use animated images that show very clearly the distinction between these verbs, so students see that in the first case a subject moves an object with his

hands (a person is walking along the road and carrying a book in his hand; a person is walking and carrying his child in his arms), while another animated image should contain a mean of transport (it can be a moving car with the word "Milk" on it – Машина везёт молоко 'The car is carrying milk'; a person is on the train who shows souvenirs – Человек едет домой из Китая и везет друзьям сувениры 'The man is going home from China and bringing souvenirs for his friends').

Then students may be offered the tasks aimed at the testing of acquisition of lexical material itself, where students may be offered to replace an animated image with an appropriate word, to match a sentence and an animation, or to choose a correct answer, using a given animated image.

Secondly, animated images help to distinguish between concepts of unidirectional and multidirectional motion. This is especially important, because foreigners, as a rule, do not feel this crucial difference thereby potential mistakes like *Студент сейчас ходит в институт while correct – Студент сейчас идёт в институт 'A student is going to the institute' are possible. In this case in explaining we should use animated images illustrating motion in one direction and motion in different directions (a person who is going from door to window / a person who first goes from door to window and then goes back – here it is better to repeat the motion three or four times). The more special case like regular motion that is realized by the verbs of the second group (ходить) can be represented with animated image that shows a person who constantly makes the same motion, where regularity would be emphasized by date (a student goes to the institute: the motion repeats for three or four times, every next time in the corner we see a calendar that shows the next date like Monday, the 2nd of October, Tuesday, the 3rd of October and etc.). The semantization of bidirectional motion (to there and back; a visit to the place) can be complemented by animated image that shows a person who goes to one direction and reaches a certain place (from home to pharmacy), then he is present there for some time (he buys medicine, for instance) and comes back (he comes home).

Finally, animated images help to facilitate remembering of meanings peculiar to prefixes, including cases when prefix is polysemantic or when prefixed verbs according to the denoted situation get different antonyms (принести 'to bring' – унести 'to carry away', принести 'to bring something out' – отнести 'to take something off'). For example, the prefix за- means, firstly, additional motion on the main way from point A to point B, secondly, motion directed behind an object. In explanation, we can delineate these meanings using verbal examples in combination with animated images. The first one would represent a person who goes from one location to another and additionally goes somewhere else on his main way (a person goes home from the institute and goes to shop on his way home – По пути домой он зашёл в магазин 'He went to the shop on the way home'). The second one shows a mowing subject that makes the movement that is directed behind the frontal side of an object (Машина заезжает за угол дома 'The car goes around the corner of the house'). Animation also can help to represent cases when prefixed verbs of motion form different antonymous pairs. The above examples принести 'to bring' – унести 'to carry away', принести 'to bring something from' – отнести to take something to' can be presented and explained using the set of two animated images. In the first one a person comes into the room and bring something, for example, a bouquet of flowers, with him, then he goes away and takes away any other subject, for instance, a book. In the second one, we watch the following situation. A person shows us a broken thing, such as watch, and carries it in for repair (У него сломались часы. Он отнёс часы в ремонт 'His watch has broken. He took it to repair'), then we see that he again goes to repair workshop, takes his watch and come home with his watch (Он ходил в ремонт. Он принёс часы из ремонта 'He went to repair workshop. He brought his watch from repair').

6. Prospect for the implementation an animated images card index

Under appropriate technical capabilities, individual card index of special animated images can be created in a two-dimensional format by graphic artists. Implementation of the card index

as an illustrative content can be carried out within the framework of developing educational portal. Furthermore, the Internet as a huge digital resource allows us to choose necessary animated images which meet our requirements and serve the needs and the tastes of students. For example, the animated images with animals can be very popular among students due to evoking pleasant feelings as well as positive educational effect. Apart from that, the modern video editing programs allow us to mount short animated images on the same topic. For instance, we can create animations based on a feature film or cartoon. Animated images based on the cartoons will be especially relevant in the classroom of primary and secondary school-age children.

7. Conclusion

In our opinion, usage of animated images helps to create bright associations in studying of new grammar material, that contributes to its better understanding and acquisition and allows students to interpret relevant verbal signs correctly in the future. In the practice of teaching foreign languages, animated images may be used both during the class work (in the context of presentation of new material, under the testing or individually during the implementation of tasks using appropriate devices) and the independent work, as well as in distance learning, in e-learning courses and mobile applications both in theoretical and practical aspects.

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BEING IN THE WORLD AND BEING FOR THE WORLD IN THE EXISTENTIAL MODELS OF REALITY

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Abstract

Departing from existential universes of animals (*Umwelt*) and humans (*Lebenswelt* and *Dasein*), this paper confronts a number of views on the subjective experience, or modelling systems of reality, developed in the philosophy of nature and culture. The first part examines how the semantic relationships of non-human and human organisms to their environments are outlined in phenomenology as a study of individual experience from a subject-oriented perspective. Respectively, animals are admitted to have meaningful relations with actual things through an outward extension of their body, but they are stated to lack a direct access to the things in themselves and to their various forms of being, because they cannot transcend the imprisonment of their surroundings. In the second part exposing the mundane background of semiotic phenomenology, the existence modes of animal and human subjects are considered in terms of being-in-the-world as immanence and being-for-the-world as transcendence. Immanent subjects are seen as existing in their environments, and transcendent subjects as being able to go beyond their life-world. Reassuming by positively marked or unmarked interpretations of existence and life in the semiotic universes of humans and animals, the author arrives at a conclusion that the extension of the study on reality and world might enrich the framework of existential-transcendental phenomenology if the human organisms' relations to the world they dwell in were considered from the viewpoint of their becoming in the world and the becoming of the world as a result of their interactions.

1. Subjective universes of animals and humans as semiotic spheres

In the first part of this paper, the terms *Umwelt* introduced by Jakob von Uexküll and *Lebenswelt* put into the use by Edmund Husserl are interpreted with regard to animal and human environments basing on their applications and interpretation in existential phenomenology, philosophy of biology, and biological semiotics (for details see Wąsik 2001).

1.1. The phenomenology of the animal world in the light of biosemiotics

The term *Umwelt* denoting the 'surrounding world' derives its connotation from Jakob von Uexküll who has investigated how living organisms perceive their environment and how this perception determines their behavior. Pertaining to the subjective world, this term was coined by Uexküll in his *Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere* early in 1909. As Kalevi Kull remarked, "in his article of 1907 he still uses the term 'Milieu', as different from 'Außenwelt'" (1999: 390; cf. Uexküll 1907). Soon afterwards, Uexküll's framework was enriched with a new term *Umweltröhre*(*n*), 'environmental pipe(s)', introduced in *Theoretical Biology* (1926 [1920]; cf. 1928 /1920/). Moreover, in the 2nd edition of *Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere* (1921 /1909/), a complementary term *Funktionskreis* was added, rendered as "functional circle" or "functional cycle". Metaphorically modelled as a "soap bubble", *Umwelt* was referred to a particular environment of an animal that acts in a "functional circle" of, e.g., medium, food, enemy or sex (cf. Uexküll 1982 [1940]: 59-60, especially 71), and *Umweltröhren* appeared to show a sequence of environmental circles that an individual organism had to pass in a stroll of its life understood as a journey through invisible worlds according to Jakob von Uexküll and Georg Kriszat (1992 /1957/[1934]) and Jakob von Uexküll (1936).

Having studied the behavior of organisms entering into relationships with their environments, Uexküll (1982: 27-31) noticed that animals at all levels, endowed with the property of the so-called "ego-quality" — from unicellulars to hominids — are capable of discerning meanings from environmental indicators.

1.2. Interpreting the mundane phenomenology in terms of sign-behavior

Another kind of subjective universe was proposed by Edmund Husserl under the label of *Lebenswelt* describing the pre-given world in which humans live. The spherical dimension of human surroundings is visible in Husserl's definition provided during his lectures, held at Prague in 1935 and Vienna in 1936, edited for the first time 1954 and translated into English in 1970, as *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*:

> In whatever way we may be conscious of the world as universal horizon, as coherent universe of existing objects, we, each "I-the-man" and all of us together, belong to the world as living with one another in the world; and the world is our world, valid for our consciousness as existing precisely through this "living together" (Husserl 1970 [1954]: 108).

In his description of *Lebenswelt*, Husserl adheres to a dualistic division between empirical and rational facts. This separation of sensible from the intelligible generates the conception of one life-world which encompasses two distinct worlds, of nature and of mind/psyche (Husserl 1970: 60).

What is significant, Husserl links the use of world to the appearance of a special subject-oriented psychology combining empiricism with rationalism to generate "a psychophysical anthropology in the rationalistic spirit" (Husserl 1970: 62). A phenomenological concept of world in Husserl's interpretation should not only overcome the hitherto kept opposition between empiricism and rationalism but also have the extent to include at the same time the spiritual world, the ideals world and the life-world.

Thus, Husserl's life-world conception demands a more authentic understanding of subjectivity and objectivity, as far as to live is always to live-in-certainty-of-the-world. Walking life is being awake to the world, being constantly and directly conscious of the world and oneself as living in the world, actually experiencing and actually effecting the ontic certainty of the world. But there exist a fundamental difference between the way individuals are conscious of the world and

the way they are conscious of things or objects, though together the two make up an inseparable unity (cf. Husserl 1970: 142-143).

It was, however, significantly earlier, in his manuscript of 1890 "Zur Logik der Zeichen (Semiotik)", when Husserl (1970 /1890/) gave some thoughts to the origins of sign behavior, summarized in four statements: firstly, that all animals react to phenomena as signs of relevant objects or situations; secondly, that when they are able to grasp causal or regular connections between some parts of situations they usually chose these as signs of the whole; thirdly, that when communication occurs with the use of signs then it must be preceded by sign consciousness and, finally, that at further evolutionary steps the users of signs must be aware of regular effects of their intended use(s).

1.3. The reality of everyday life as an intersubjective world

Discussing Husserl's *Lebenswelt*, one should add that the term "life-world", used in mundane phenomenology as the translation from the German original, was abandoned by social constructivists, Peter Ludwig Berger (1929-2017) and Thomas Luckmann (1927-2016), in favor of the term "the reality of everyday life" (cf. Berger & Luckmann 1966: 23). Nevertheless, the term *structures of life-world* was continued in the work of Alfred Schütz (1899-1959), an Austrian philosopher and sociologist, first in the English and then German editions, by Thomas Luckmann (cf. Schütz & Luckmann 1973 [1975]).

Following the belief of Berger and Luckmann (1966: 23):

> The reality of everyday life further presents itself to me as an intersubjective world, a world that I share with others. This intersubjectivity sharply differentiates everyday life from other realities of which I am conscious. I am alone in the world of my dreams, but I know that the world of everyday life is a real to others as it is to myself. Indeed, I cannot exist in everyday life without continually interacting and communicating with others.

Subsequent to social constructivists, the society is the creator of knowledge, although an individual human being, as organism, experiences, *de facto*, the reality while receiving various kinds of information from the environment.

1.4. *Animal Symbolicum* on the evolutional scale of communication systems

While reading Husserl's ideas pertaining to the awareness of signs, Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) took stand to mutual relationships between sensuous bearer of meaning and the meaning itself in several places of his earlier works. However, he had created his phenomenology of symbolic forms under the influence of his contemporary friend and scientific colleague, Jakob von Uexküll. Entering into the epistemology of biology, Cassirer poses, in his summarizing book *An Essay on Man*, published in America, a question: "Is it possible to make use of the scheme proposed by Uexküll for a description and characterization of the *human world*?". And he answers it consecutively: "Obviously this world forms no exception to those biological rules that govern the life of all the organisms. Yet, in the human world we find a new characteristic which appears to be the distinctive mark of human life … a third link which we may describe as the *symbolic system*" (see Cassirer 1962 /1944/: 24). As he expounds there:

> [M]an lives in a symbolic universe. … Instead of dealing with the things themselves man is in a sense constantly conversing with himself. He has so enveloped himself in linguistic forms, in artistic images, in mythical symbols or religious rites that he cannot see or know anything except by the interpretation of this artificial medium. … He lives rather in the midst of imaginary emotions, in hopes and fears, in illusions and disillusions, in his fantasies and dreams (Cassirer 1962: 24).

Cassirer argued that animal behavior includes only signals but not symbols. Even when practical imagination and intelligence is attributed to an animal, it is only man who has power over of "a symbolic imagination and intelligence" (Cassirer 1962: 33).

1.5. On three levels of modelling the mundane reality in the semiotics of nature and culture

The background of Cassirer's concept of symbolic forms was noticed by Thomas A. Sebeok in his paper "From Vico to Cassirer to Langer" (cf. 1994 [1992]) placing him between the historiosophical thought of Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) and the philosophy of Susanne Langer (1895-1985), pertaining to mentalist symbolism in language and art. Worth mentioning is the rapport between Vico and Juri Lotman (1922-1993), discussed in Tuuli Raudla's article "Vico and Lotman: poetic meaning creation and primary modelling" (2008).

In conformity with Uexküll's and Cassirer's separation of animal and human universes based on a semiotic opposition between the signs of nature and the symbols of culture while being opposed to the distinction of primary and secondary modelling systems authored by Lotman, Sebeok postulated to distinguish three levels of the modelling of reality, answering a question (posed at the Semiotic Society of America Meeting in 1987): "In what sense is language a 'primary modelling system'?" (cf. Sebeok 1988).

In his theses on "The place of art among other modelling systems", Lotman ([2011 [1967]: 250) describes a model as "an analogue of an object of perception that substitutes for it in the process of perception", as far as: "Modelling activity is human activity in creating models" (Lotman 2011: 250). Accordingly, "A modelling system is a structure of elements and rules of their combination, existing in a state of fixed analogy to the whole sphere of the object of perception, cognition, or organization. For this reason, a modelling system may be treated as a language" (Lotman 2011: 250).

While taking stand to Lotman's position, Sebeok puts forward his modelling system theory based on the discrimination between non-verbal communication and verbal systems. At the same time, he mentions that it is very likely that the *Homo habilis* had the capability of language without any verbal expression claiming that: "Solely in the genus *Homo* have verbal signs emerged. To put it in another way, only hominids possess two mutually sustaining repertoires of signs, the zoosemiotic non-verbal, plus, superimposed, the anthroposemiotic verbal" (Sebeok 1988: 55). According to Sebeok, what the Russo-Estonian semioticians call "primary" — i.e., the anthroposemiotic verbal — is "phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically secondary to the nonverbal; and, therefore, what they call 'secondary' is actually a further, tertiary augmentation of the former" (1988: 55).

In his studies on the semiotic self under the title *A sign is just a sign*, Sebeok (cf. 1991 /1979/; and 1991) postulates three modelling systems of reality. Accordingly, the primary modelling system (PMS) of reality is found on the level of animals that act through effectors and receptors. The secondary model system (SMS) involves, the reality of everyday life construed by the use of verbal means of signification and communication, which occur as such only in the realm of human organisms. The tertiary modelling system (TMS is characterized as encompassing the whole sphere of language and culture and civilization where the representations of extrasemiotic reality are artificially created by humans only.

Describing the triadic relationship between "developmental" stages of an individual organism, Thomas Sebeok and Marcel Danesi have maintained that (1) PMS is "the system that predisposes the human infant to engage in sense-based forms of modelling"; (2) SMS is "the system that subsequently impels the child to engage in extensional and indexical forms of modelling";

and (3) TMS is "the system that allows the maturing child to engage in highly abstract (symbol-based) forms of modelling" (Sebeok & Danesi 2000: 10).

2. Interpreting the being modes of human subjects in terms of existential semiotics

The second part of this article is devoted to a search for the roots of existential semiotics characterized by the category of *Dasein*, which is central to the mundane phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. It begins with rethinking the layouts of human-centered semiotics developed by Eero Tarasti in the light of philosophers who pay attention to "existence" as a dwelling in the real world and "transcendence" as going beyond the concrete reality and starting a trans-mundane journey to other realties through the acts of subjective sign-and-meaning-creation (semioses), in his subsequent works published in the last decades, two of which namely, (1) "What is existential semiotics? From theory to application" (Tarasti 2009) and (2) *Sein und Schein. Explorations in existential semiotics* (Tarasti 2015) which appear to be most advanced for a detailed consideration.

2.1. The worldhood of the world through the vantage point of *Dasein* as being-in-the world

The existential relationship of the human subject to the world in which he lives, should be exposed on the basis of Heidegger's works: *Being and Time* (1962 [1927]), "On the essence of ground" (1998 [1929]), and *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* (1995 [1983]). As Heidegger notes in 1929, *Sein und Zeit* constitutes the second of three different approaches to the problem of the world (see Heidegger 1995 [1983]: 176-177).

The first approach in "On the essence of ground" ["Vom Wesen des Grundes"] (1998 [1929]), deals with the historical development of the word and concept of world. The second approach, in *Time and Being* [*Sein und Zeit*] (1926-1927), addresses "the phenomenon of world by interpreting the way in which we at first and for the most part move about in our everyday world" (see Heidegger 1995: 177). And the third one, in turn, discussed in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* (1929-1930), 1995 [1983] rests on a "comparative examination" of man, animals, plants and stones (see Heidegger 1995: 177).

What makes *Being and time* distinctive is its emphasis on the world as not a concept but as a phenomenon. A phenomenon describes something that "shows itself" something that becomes "manifest" and "shows itself in itself" (see Heidegger 1962 [1927]: 28-29). Thus, the world as a phenomenon shoulds give us the world itself. For Heidegger, however, the manifestation of the world in "our everyday life" reveals "the phenomenon of the world as a problem".

This problem which arises in *Being and time* Heidegger approaches in *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics*, is the world from the vantage point of *Dasein*, and we therefore find dealings "that which is so close and intelligible to us in our everyday dealings is actually and fundamentally remote and unintelligible to us" (Heidegger 1995: 177).

What Heidegger addresses in his third approach are thus the three concepts, namely world, finitude, and solitude, which form a unity. Therefore, the discussion of animality must be contextualized as belonging to this larger analysis of metaphysics and the essence of man. Without a doubt, Heidegger's famous tripartite thesis constitutes an attempt to understand the essence of "the other beings which, like man, are also part of the world", with regard to their relationship to and difference from the "having world" that marks man: "[1.] the stone (material object) is wordless; [2.] the animal is poor in world; [3.] man is world-forming" (see Heidegger 1995: 177).

2.2. Philosophical positions of existential semiotics

The foundations for a human-centered paradigm of existential semiotics were laid by Tarasti at the 9th Congress of the IASS/AIS, Helsinki-Imatra, 11-17 June 2007 (cf. 2009). To understand

the contribution of Tarasti (2015) to the semiotic-existential interpretation of transcendental forms of human subjects who cross the boundaries of their life-world by means of signs and sign-processing activities, one should especially attend to the relationship and the difference between the understanding of existentialism in the works of Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980).

However, the sources and direction of reasoning of the former, Heidegger, and the latter, Sartre, were completely unrelated (cf. 1990/1960/ [1936-1937] and 1956 [1943]). The way of Heidegger was leading from the forerunners of existentialism, Søren Kierkegaard (1941[1846]) and Karl Jaspers (1962 [1946/1913/]), and that of Sartre from the speculative philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1941 [1846]) and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1910 [1807] or 1977 [1952 /1807/). Therefore, Tarasti (2009, 2015) proposed to go back to Hegel, the first philosopher who characterized his approach to reality as phenomenology alluding to Kant, but who, unlike Kant, expressed his conviction that phenomena constitute a sufficient basis for a universal science of being.

Having departed from the study of human experience consciously realized by the senses (or lived through) from a subjective or first person point of view, Tarasti focused on rethinking the semiotics in the light of philosophers who paid attention to the such notions as "subject", "existence", "transcendence", and "value". These selected concepts were placed on the background of such categories of existential phenomenology as *Umwelt*, *Lebenswelt* and *Dasein*.

The primary point in Tarasti's (2009, 2015) inquiry constituted Hegel's categories of *An-sich-sein* 'being-in-itself' and *Für-sich-sein* 'being-for-itself' distinguished in his phenomenology or mind/spirit (1910 [1807] or 1977 [1952 /1807/). These categories were confronted with the philosophy of Kierkegaard (1941[1846]) who spoke about an individual as an observer of him- or herself or the observed one.

Sartre, an attentive reader of Hegel (1977 /1910/ [1952 /1807/]) and Kierkegaard (1941[1846]) simultaneously, referred to Hegelian concepts using the French terms, *être-en-soi* and *être-pour-soi*. For Sartre (1956 [1943]), the being as such becomes aware of itself through an act of negation, and when becoming an observer of itself, it shifts its interest into the position of being for itself. Having noticed a lack in its reality, the being begins with the first act of transcendence as far as it strives to fulfil what it lacks.

2.3. Individual and social being forms of human body in the semiotic phenomenology

In his studies on Hegel's phenomenology (cf. 1977 /1910/ [1952/1807/]), Tarasti (2009, 2015) was influenced by Jacques Fontanille's corporeal semiotics (2004: 22-23), Hegelian categories *An-sich-sein* and *Für-sich-sein*, were further extended in Tarasti's existential semiotics (2009: 1761-1763; 2015: 22-24) through *An-mir-sein* and *Für-mich-sein* (*être-en-moi* 'being-in-myself' and *être-pour-moi* 'being-for-myself').

In his appropriation of Hegelian categories, Fontanille (2004), presented a distinction between individual and social being forms of human body (*soma*) in an entirely new phenomenological sense (*séma*). While proposing to detach the body experienced inside of their organism as a flesh, which forms the center of all physiological and semiotic processes, from the body observed outside of their organism, which shapes their uniqueness and behavioral characteristics, he introduced a distinction between *Moi* and *Soi* as two categories referring to the same acting individual. As he assumed, the *Soi* is that part of ourselves, which me, *Moi*, projects out of itself to create itself in its activity. Likewise, the *Moi* is that part of ourselves to which the *Soi* refers when establishing itself. In Tarasti's interpretation: "The *Moi* provides the *Soi* with impulse and resistance whereby it can become something. In turn, the *Soi* furnishes the *Moi* with the reflex-

ivity that it needs to stay within its limits when it changes. The *Moi* resists and forces the *Soi* to meet its own alterity" (cf. Tarasti 2009: 1761). These labels, *Moi* and *Soi* connote the existential and social aspects of the subject or, rather, the individual and communitarian sides of the whole self as an investigative object of neosemiotics.

2.4. Human subjects in existential acts of self-awareness

After considering Hegel's (1910 [1807] or 1977 [1952 /1807/), Heidegger's (1962 [1927], 1995 [1983]), Sartre's (1990 /1960/[1936-1937] & 1956 [1943]) along with Fontanille's (2004) scaffolds as they have influenced Tarasti in his elaboration of a semiotic model of the corporeal and mental, individual and social existence modes of human subjects in the real world and transcendence from it into other realities, it is worth enumerating the four modality acts of their self-awareness, reconstituted in a cohesive description (cf. Tarasti 2009: 1766; or 2015: 25):

1. Being-in-myself – *An-mir-sein – être-en-moi* in which an individual is willing to appreciate his/her/its existential bodily self-worth;

2. Being-for-myself – *Für-mich-sein – être-pour-moi* in which the individual can reflect upon him-/her-/it-self while transcending to the position of an "observer";

3. Being-in-itself – *An-sich-sein – être-en-soi*, in turn, in which an individual transcends to probable chances that he/she/it must either actualize or not actualize in society;

4. Being-for-itself – *Für-sich-sein – être-pour-soi* in which an individual refers to an actual role he knows how to perform in the existential world of society.

3. Life and existence as conscious being-in-the-world, being-for-the world and becoming-of-the-world

Summarizing similarities and differences between existential modes of (non-)human subjects in terms of their being in the world as immanence and being for the world as transcendence, one can say that immanent subjects are assumed to exist in or with their environments and transcendent subjects as being able to exceed the universe of their (human) life. A significant dissimilarity between animals and humans, is noticeable in the meaning of 'life' and 'existence' in terms of conscious awareness of being alive and taking stand to the existence in the surrounding and existing for the surrounding.

Important is the statement that all organisms cohabit (dwell in) the same world. One might therefore be entitled to assume that considering thus the organisms' relations to the world they cohabit, it is the matter of their becoming in the world and, subsequently, the becoming of the world as a result of these relations.

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LA CRISE DU SENS ET DE LA COMPREHENSION DES DISCOURS MYSTIQUES. UN NOUVEAU PHENOMENE DANS LE MONDE CONTEMPORAIN

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Abstract

Dans cet article, nous allons analyser les particularités discursives et énonciatives du discours des mystiques et des soufis persans. Nous voulons montrer qu'il y a de modèles différents de l'énonciation chez ses derniers : la danse Samâ, la poésie et des versets labiaux. Dans toutes ces énonciations, c'est toujours la question de la transcendance, un *Soi* qui se met en scène. En effet, leurs discours montrent un dépassement de soi qui atteint à un *Soi transcendantal* et qui entraîne un débordement du sens. Des valeurs individuelles, ils atteignent aux valeurs ontologiques.

L'objectif de cette recherche est de montrer que pour comprendre les discours mystiques, il faut considérer l'ancien système de valeurs des mystiques et des soufis pour qui la connaissance de soi est celle du *Soi* surhumain et infini qui est le seul Réel même. Ce système de valeurs est en contradiction avec le système nouveau dans le monde d'aujourd'hui. C'est pourquoi le sens est en crise et d'une certaine manière incomplète. C'est la constante « affirmation de l'Un » qui aboutit à l'« extinction » de l'illusion existentielle dans la « réalisation de l'Essence (suprême) ».

1. Introduction

Le monde moderne remet en question les idées de la transcendance et d'un Etre suprême. Les systèmes des valeurs changent ainsi naturellement. Avec ce changement de système de valeurs, comment pourrait-on comprendre les textes des mystiques ?

Il est bien évident que dans les discours des mystiques, c'est toujours la question de la transcendance, des valeurs et de l'éthique. Dans tous ces modèles de l'énonciation que ce soit avec le corps et par le langage non-verbal comme la danse mystique ou par le langage littéraire, il y a un

Soi qu'ils essaient de mettre en scène. C'est la mise en pratique du « croire sans voir » qui atteint son point culminant dans la concentration permanente d'un *soi-ipse* sur le principe surintelligible. Ce qui compte pour ces sortes du discours, c'est la dimension mystique, un sous-ensemble de la dimension cognitive, qui contribue au sens qui reste incomplet et toujours dans le voile pour les gens ordinaires. Tout cela mène à une sorte de philosophie l'Unité de l'existence abordée et expliquée par Ibn Arabî.

Pour expliquer le sens de ces textes, nous profitons de l'argument de Jacques Fontanille selon lequel les valeurs pratiques prennent forme dans l'organisation du cours d'action. Nous devons nous référer également à la sémiotique des cultures. C'est une sémiotique-objet à part entière, une macro-sémiotique constituée d'un plan de l'expression et d'un plan du contenu, des codes et des règles systématiques. « La contribution des pratiques à la formation et à l'évolution des cultures tient à leur propension à produire des valeurs, notamment éthiques et esthétiques, par le moyen des processus d'accommodation, et donc sur l'axe syntagmatique » (Fontanille 2008 : 293).

Comme le note très bien Fontanille, la production des formes culturelles avait déjà été étudiée par Denis Bertrand sous la forme de la praxis énonciative. En effet l'énonciation n'est pas seulement un appareil formel ou un simulacre projeté dans l'énoncé, cette praxis est une réalité linguistique et culturelle qui est actualisée et réalisée par une performance discursive. L'énonciation est un lieu de traditions et d'innovations, un lieu d'usages et de créations rhétoriques. C'est une sorte de la dynamique linguistique.

Le système de valeurs proposé par les mystiques est plutôt centré sur dépassement par un Idéal ou un autre. Manque de sens résulte non de l'absence du sens mais du débordement du sens vers l'idéalité et l'altérité. C'est un élargissement de la sphère du *Moi*, En effet les discours reconstruisent les systèmes de valeurs autour d'une altérité, la transcendance de l'Autre. C'est une question existentielle. Nous devons ajouter également que la question éthique se pose à propos d'un homme engagé dans l'action pratique dès que cette action a des effets qui dépassent son opérateur, son acte et son objectif et qui concernent l'Idéal, l'Autre et une utilité généralisable.

Après cette petite introduction, il faut étudier l'histoire du soufisme et du mysticisme, ensuite nous allons parler de trois modèles de l'énonciation pour notre analyse.

2. L'historique et la philosophie « Unité de l'existence »[1]

La vision mystique est l'ensemble des consciences qui se crée pour l'être humain dans le monde avec tous les phénomènes, toutes les choses et prennent du sens sans recourir à l'observation directe, au raisonnement, c'est la compréhension sans intermédiaire. La vision mystique est une connaissance illuminative et intuitive. Et celui qui comprend intuitivement est un mystique. Cette vision est une sorte de sagesse et elle n'est pas basée sur les cinq sens. Les mystiques aspirent à enlever les voiles et de trouver le secret de ce monde.

Dans cette voie, ce qui compte est d'abord l'illumination, ensuite la croyance à l'Unicité, et finalement la notion du temps qui n'a pas assez de sens. « Le résultat de cette intuition est de voir jusqu'au plus profond des choses. Pour les scientifiques, c'est la partie droite du cerveau qui contribue à l'intuition et à la connaissance de la totalité » (Farshad 1989 : 82). Pour les mystiques, la Réalité est à l'intérieur de nous. La connaissance mystique ne suit pas la logique d'Aristote, mais suit une sorte de l'expérience qui va d'un niveau à un autre. La tradition mystique existait depuis toujours dans le monde entier, mais il y a certaines cultures qui le développent davantage avec leur propre point de vue. Chine, Inde et l'Iran ont créé un grand système culturel qui

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1   La philosophie de Vahdate Vojud, Etre suprême a mandé Son ipséité par Lui-même de Lui-même vers Lui-même, sans aucun intermédiaire ou causalité (extérieure) que Lui-même.

s'appelle le mysticisme de l'Orient. Le mysticisme en Iran est inspiré des idées de Mithraïsme du culte zoroastrien. En effet, c'est l'Iran Antique qui a inspiré l'Inde. Avant l'arrivée de l'Islam en Iran, le culte zoroastrien, le culte « mani » ont créé un mysticisme.

Dans le système oriental, la vision et la connaissance intuitive sont plus importantes que le raisonnement. Ils essaient d'atteindre un hyper-savoir. Une sorte d'inspiration. Pour cela ils n'ont pas besoin des 5 sens. A côté du mysticisme, il y a un courant de pensée qui est une secte religieuse, c'est le soufisme. D'après un philosophe iranien, Shafii Kadkani, le mysticisme a un regard esthétique sur la religion, le soufisme et le mysticisme sont tellement liés qu'on ne peut les séparer parfois. On peut dire que le soufisme est à la fois la religion et le mysticisme.

Le mysticisme pense plutôt à une éthique, une sorte de morale qui n'a pas de racine dans la religion et les prescriptions mais s'inspire de différentes religions. C'est une nouvelle éthique qui commence par Rabee Adviye (713-801), nommée Martyre de l'amour divin, Hossein Mansour Halladj (858-922), Bayazid Bastami (848-874), Abol-Hassan Kharaghani (963-1033), et plus tard Shamsoddin Mohammad Hafiz (1315-1390) étaient des mystiques. Il y a aussi des mystiques et gnostiques qui sont des idées philosophiques, Shahaboddin Sohrevardi (1154-1191) très célèbre pour sa philosophie de l'Illumination et il y a aussi Eynol Gozât Hamedani (1098-1131) qui a des lettres et des idées philosophiques. Ils pensent à une Unité dans le monde, et non pas à la Pluralité, c'est le culte de l'intérieur.

Ajoutons encore que l'histoire du soufisme remonte au IIème siècle (de l'Hégire, VIIIème de l'ère chrétienne), les adeptes de cette secte étaient les gens qui préféraient être ascètes et les modèles de l'énonciation chez eux étaient très variés, trois modèles d'énonciation pour exprimer leur point de vue et leur état d'âme qui sont très distinctives : la danse *Samâ*, la poésie pleine de métaphores, de sens figuré et les expressions propres à ces gens et la prose poétique avec des versets labiaux « *Shâth* » . Et parfois chez un seul soufi, nous pouvons voir différents modèles de l'énonciation : par exemple chez Faridodin Attar (1145-1221) et Jalol Din Mohammad Rûmi (1207-1273). Pour les soufis, ce qui était important, était d'abord la religion « *Shar* », ensuite la voie « *Tarigat* » et enfin la Vérité. Il y a deux écoles importantes pour le soufisme : école de Xorâsân et l'école d'Ibn Arabi. La première est basée sur l'humanisme et la présence dans la société et la deuxième est plutôt isolement et l'ascèse. Et Rûmî et Attar font partie plutôt de la première.

Le soufisme n'inspire que la transcendance de l'âme. Essentiellement dans la pratique de l'ascèse et de la vertu, il s'accomplit de proche en proche dans des structures plus élaborées introduisant des notions comme l'anéantissement (*Fana*), l'union (*ittahâd*), et la liaison (*ittisâl*) entre autres, si bien qu'il atteint le point culminant de son évolution au IXème siècle. On peut dire aussi : « C'est une philosophie de la vie et son but est de présenter à l'être humain une voie concrète lui permettant d'atteindre une conscience plus haute et de pouvoir comprendre, grâce à cette conscience élevée, sa relation avec l'Etre suprême » (Ali Shah 1998 : 9).

La base essentielle de la pensée de ces poètes soufis est l'Unité de l'Existence (*wahdat-e-wudjud*): l'esprit humain est séparé de son origine par l'individualité de son être provisoire, aussi éprouve-t-il la nostalgie du retour à sa source et de l'union avec elle.

Pour les soufis, l'homme doit trouver la joie mais une joie spirituelle et celui qui désire obtenir la joie de l'union avec le divin doit tout d'abord percevoir intuitivement l'unicité de l'Existence, non avec les yeux du corps, mais avec l'œil du cœur. Dans la voie d'une telle recherche, ce qui importe, ce ne sont pas que les règles et les rituels religieux, mais aussi la connaissance mystique (*'irfân*) et les moyens de l'acquérir, tels que la vision, le dévoilement, l'illumination et l'intuition.

Nous devons dire que leur but est l'abolition du sentiment du « moi ». Cette abolition détermine la conscience de la présence d'un « Soi transcendantal ». On a appelé cette conscience,

l'intuition du divin. Les soufis et les mystiques persans appellent cette conscience, illumination. C'est la négation complète de la volonté, la modalité de Vouloir. D'ailleurs, la disparition de la pensée logique est automatique, puisque sans une passivité intégrale et sans une négation complète de la volonté (on doit nier la modalité de vouloir) il n'y a pas d'illumination. Le moi cède la place à non-moi. Par contre, la pensée discursive met en relief la dualité du sujet pensant et de l'objet pensé. L'objet pensé est comme un jouet sous la pression de la variation des opérations intellectuelles; tandis que dans l'illumination, la personne pensante est obnubilée ou plutôt victime devant l'infusion ineffable de l'immanence de Dieu.

Ajoutons encore les propos d'un autre philosophe très important et un grand soufi du IXème siècle Ghazalî, dans *Les Prodiges du Cœur*, définit les quatre modes par lesquels la connaissance parvient au cœur:

> La connaissance « naturelle » relève de l'expérience sensible; elle est possédée par tous. La connaissance acquise par l'« effort » et la « recherche réflexive » ; propre aux « savants de l'extérieur ». La connaissance obtenue par « inspiration », surgissant dans le cœur, sans que l'on appréhende toujours la réalité de sa provenance ; c'est celle des soufis. La connaissance obtenue par « révélation », impliquant la vision de l'Ange qui la transmet au cœur ; c'est celle des prophètes (Chauvin 2001 : 53-54).

Et chez eux, le style devient lui-même sens et acquiert une nécessité qui fait du texte un architexte. Ils sont plongés dans une extase par le récit de ses visions. L'objet de la vision et de la connaissance, c'est l'au-delà, un être transcendantal. Ainsi peut-on voir un rapport entre leur discours et leur vision, un rapport entre le texte et l'expérience visionnaire. La vision se mue immédiatement en discours comme si celui-ci absorbait le visible dans sa textualité et le transmutait en parole. Déjà chez Rûmî, l'énonciateur c'est l'esprit: si le cœur est le lieu de la vision, c'est l'esprit qui est le vecteur du discours. Le discours se fait entendre en devenant visible. La révélation de la majesté est affirmation de l'unicité, d'une telle unité que le mystique n'est rien d'autre que cet être transcendantal dans sa solitude. Il découvre que la véritable distance qui existe entre les créatures et Dieu est celle de la connaissance et non celle de l'étendue.

L'image de l'au-delà apparaît comme un pur stéréotype. Ce qui est important, c'est que toute immanence n'a en effet de réalité que par la transcendance qui l'excède et la suscite. Leur discours semble renvoyer à un vide à la fois sémiotique et ontologique. C'est le vide interne, le silence interne de l'énonciateur qui rend possible le discours, mais il est acquis et révélé par l'expérience du visionnaire. C'est le vide de l'anéantissement volontaire de l'énonciateur dans la transcendance. Il est temps maintenant d'analyser trois modèles de l'énonciation.

3. La Poésie

La poésie est le premier modèle de l'énonciation chez les soufis. La forme devient différente. Chez Attar, de plusieurs sujets on arrive à un seul, de la pluralité, on arrive à une sorte de singularité de l'existence. Chez Rumi, les différents actants apparaissent et ils arrivent tous enfin à la connaissance. Ce qui compte c'est la dimension cognitive du discours. Chez Rumi et d'autres poètes, nous voyons que la dimension cognitive du discours est important, si un seul sujet est cognitif d'autres aussi arrivent à cette connaissance. Déjà il y a une polyphonie énonciative qui compte. Chez certains poètes (Hallâj, Araghi, Hafiz) parler à la première personne renvoie à une expérience particulière. Ils s'objectivisent dans le discours. C'est à partir de « Je » que non seulement le spectateur et mais l'auditeur peuvent se constituer. Par exemple chez Hallaj, l'instance projetée est le « Je » : « J'accours à toi, j'accours à toi, ô mon secret et mon salut, J'accours à toi, j'accours à toi, ô mon but et mon idéal, Je t'appelle, ou plutôt tu m'appelles à toi » (Ruspolli 2005 : 114).

Dans ces vers, nous constatons que Hallâj pose les repères du cadre énonciatif du discours à partir du « je » pivot central et de la visée réglant le rapport des personnes verbales. Je signifie en effet la coexistence de l'expression et de l'impression, une sorte de synthèse des fonctions. Par ce signe nous avons aussi la mise en présence d'un Autre qui est « Tu ». Je qui devient débrayé Tu.

Le Moi, érigé en instance suprême du sens, commande le filtre essentiel de l'univers du discours de Hallâj. Sujet sensible et passionnel, parfois sujet passif qui éprouve l'amour et la passion, autant d'effets de sens qui sont de l'ordre de pâtir. Un embrayage énoncif et énonciatif qui devient double c'est le dédoublement de l'instance embrayée nous avons affaire à une organisation subjective de l'énonciation.

En effet le sujet passionnel est repérable dans un « Je » qui est régi en sujet pragmatique qui cherche à se connaître, à se voir. Il est pris aussi en charge par le faire cognitif d'un observateur qui est lui-même.

Il s'agit donc d'un actant « Moi » et la perception de son identité est en grande partie proprioceptive. La dialectique du Moi (instance de devenir) et du Toi (Instance de référence) est exprimée par une sorte de passion. Pour cela, il a besoin aussi d'un savoir qui est inscrite dans un système axiologique de la connaissance de soi.

4. Les versets labiaux

Après avoir parlé de la poésie, parlons de certaines proses poétiques dans lesquels il y a un débordement du sens. D'abord disons que pour les soufis, ce qui compte c'est le cœur et non pas le raisonnement et la Raison. Quand on dit le cœur, ce n'est pas seulement le muscle de chair et de sang mais on doit le prendre au sens figuré, où l'emporte son rôle intellectuel. La nature intellectuelle du cœur ne saurait nous conduire vers un Soi et nous fournit sa connaissance tant qu'il n'est pas illuminé par la grâce divine. Quand le cœur est purgé des péchés et des pensées mauvaises, il brille comme un miroir et reflète la connaissance d'un Être. Cette lumière dirige le croyant et le détourne de l'égarement. En effet l'Univers est un miroir qui reflète l'Être transcendantal et le cœur de l'homme est un miroir qui reflète l'univers et toutes les qualités se reflètent. Dans ce cœur, on voit : l'extinction des passions et des désirs et la concentration est la contemplation des attributs divins.

La connaissance est une connaissance dotée de concepts intellectuels. Dans l'extase, les soufis et les mystiques perdent leur activité sensori-motrice. C'est l'activité spirituelle qui compte. Ils arrivent à *wajd*, la prééminence à l'ouïe et c'est plutôt l'audition de la parole d'un Soi transcendantal. Pour eux, le cœur est l'organe de la connaissance, l'esprit, l'organe de l'amour divin et c'est l'âme qui contemple la beauté transcendantale.

Parmi les versets labiaux, deux sont très célèbres : « Je suis le Vrai Divin » (Hallâj), ou bien; « Gloire à moi; que ma certitude est grande! » (Ba Yazîd al-Bistâmi). Ils sont arrivés à un degré sublime et que son être intime est l'être intime d'un Soi transcendantal, sans aucune transformation d'attributs ou transsubstantiation d'être intime. Et il voit qu'il n'y a ni âme ni existence sauf la Sienne.

Les mystiques disent, « ce n'est pas toi, mais Lui ; Lui et non toi; qu'Il n'entre pas dans toi et tu n'entres pas dans Lui ; qu'Il ne sort pas de toi et que tu ne sors pas de Lui. Tu n'existes absolument pas et que tu n'existeras jamais ni par toi-même ni par Lui, dans Lui ou avec Lui. Tu es Lui et Lui est toi. Sans aucune dépendance ou causalité » (Chauvin 2001 : 29-30).

Au temps d'écriture, l'énonciateur est le sujet, au temps de l'expérience est le non-sujet malgré le pronom « je », il est soumis à un pouvoir transcendant. Ce débordement du sens n'est pas à cause du manque, parce qu'il dépasse le sens par le biais d'un Autre transcendant (un Idéal), c'est

la sphère de moi qui s'élargit, «on agit de telle manière que l'âme et le corps disent la même chose, c'est la réflexivité de la conscience » (Chauvin 2001 : 32).

5. *Samâ'* et concert spirituel

Défini comme une danse mystique des Derviches tournants, *Samâ'* constitue une chorale, ou plus précisément un concert spirituel ou « danse cosmique » où l'on voit que ces derviches font ensemble des danses spécifiques au son de la flûte de roseau (*nay*) et du tanbur (une sorte de luth). C'est un état (*hâl*) spontané qui transporte le soufi dans le ravissement (*wadjd*). Les derviches ou « les disciples tournent autour du maître, en même temps que sur eux-mêmes. Ce qui évoque la giration des planètes autour du soleil, aussi bien que celle des âmes en quête du 'Soi' » (Chauvin 2001 : 73).

Ajoutons qu'il y a un lien indissociable de l'Amour et de la Mort qui se manifeste dans le costume des « derviches tourneurs »: la coiffe de feutre symbolise la pierre tombale, la robe blanche, le linceul; le manteau noir, le tombeau, présage d'une renaissance à l'Esprit.

Il convient de souligner que ce mot désigne l' « audition », en concert, de poésie, musique ou chant ; c'est une « écoute » et un « entendement ». *Samâ'* a en effet pour fonction —dans le contexte du soufisme — de faciliter l'actualisation et l'accroissement des potentialités spirituelles des participants. Il s'agit d'une expérience sacrée, à la fois personnelle et communielle. Bien plus qu'un phénomène culturel maniant à merveille l'affectivité et les sentiments, il provoque l'émergence d'« états » de conscience (*hâl*); il dévoile l'Être, ou la Conscience elle-même, suivant les prédispositions et la part de grâces de chacun. « Quand l'audition spirituelle frappe les oreilles, elle éveille ce qui était caché au fond des êtres » (Kalâbâdhi 1981 : 184).

Nous devons ajouter que *Samâ'* existait avant l'islam. C'était une poésie chantée, solidement ancrée dans la culture arabe antéislamique, et s'adaptait fort bien à la musique instrumentale (*daf*, tambour sur cadre; *nay*, flûte de roseau; *rebâb*, sorte de violon carré à six angles; vieille *kamântche*, ...), lorsque la civilisation islamique s'étendit aux aires aryano-persane et indienne. On attribue à Dhûl-Nûn Misrî, le soufi iraquien, d'avoir répandu cette pratique, « à une époque, souligne Jean During, où précisément l'art musical était en train d'atteindre son apogée à la cour de Bagdad » (1998 : 140). A la fin du même siècle, Junayd, le grand maître bagdadien, d'origine persane, donnera ses lettres de noblesse au *samâ'* : « La Miséricorde de Dieu descend sur le soufi quand il mange par nécessité; quand il parle, par devoir, et quand il auditionne (samâ') dans l'extase » (cité par Chauvin 2001 : 111-112).

Sémiotiquement parlant, nous devons dire que le *samâ'* est une attitude globalement « passive ». L'énonciation d'un Nom apparaît comme une trace symbolique de la Création, et l'invocateur re-naît et co-naît en vérité, puisque le Nom d'un être transcendantal est parfaitement plein de la Présence d'un Soi. Celle-ci « devient opérante dans la mesure où le Nom prend possession du mental de celui qui l'invoque. [...] L'union au Nom divin devient l'Union à Dieu même » (Burckhardt 1977 : 81). Cela favorise la réceptivité du cœur à l'égard des influences spirituelles. C'est la relation entre l'ouïe et la danse.

Ajoutons encore que cette danse nous met en présence d'une sémio-sphère dans laquelle de la pluralité du corps, on arrive à une fusion menant à une transcendance. Nous savons très bien, comme le note Fontanille dans son œuvre *Corps et sens* (2011), que le corps a fait un retour explicite en sémiotique dans les années quatre-vingt, avec les thématiques passionnelles, avec l'esthésie et l'ancrage de la sémiose dans l'expérience sensible. Chez Jean-Claude Coquet, « le corps est d'abord le siège de l'expérience sensible et de la relation avec le monde en tant que phénomène, dans la mesure où cette expérience peut se prolonger dans des pratiques signifiantes et/ou dans des expériences esthétiques » (Fontanille 2011 : 1).

Durant cette danse, nous sommes en présence des sujets épistémologiques dotés d'un corps, qui perçoivent des contenus signifiants et qui projettent les valeurs. Mais le corps n'est pas en référence à une expérience sensible du monde phénoménal mais une expérience intelligible d'un monde transcendantal et des pratiques de l'esprit. Le corps ici n'est pas substance du contenu (sémiotique) mais une forme du contenu, forme sémiotique de l'actant énonciatif, et substance n'est pas concevable facilement. Il n'est pas seulement un actant mais un acteur. C'est une instance énonçante par excellence qui exprime son état de conscience (*hâl*). Dans ce corps qui a la chair, il y a aussi l'âme que Fontanille appelle le corps propre : « Le corps propre serait donc porteur de l'identité en construction et en devenir, et il obéirait quant à lui à une force directrice » (2011 : 13).

Le corps est l'énonciateur, c'est le Moi de l'individu. S'il y a plusieurs corps, c'est-à-dire que le Moi que Fontanille, à la suite de Paul Ricœur, appelle « le point de repère des coordonnées du discours, et de tous les calculs de rétention et de protension, à la fois référence déictique, centre sensori-moteur, et pure sensibilité » (Fontanille 2011 : 13), va vers l'autre, le Soi. Le soi se construit par répétition, par recouvrement et confirmation de l'identité de l'actant par similitude (le *soi-idem*) mais aussi avec l'altérité (le *soi-ipse*). Durant cette danse, plusieurs corps sont en train de construire un « Soi » vers l'autre transcendantal, ce sont les « Moi » qui se déplacent et ils doivent obéir aux règles générales de ce que Fontanille appelle la « figuralité » : « la morphologie et la syntaxe figurales reposent principalement sur les différents états et les différentes étapes des interactions entre la matière et l'énergie » (2011 : 14).

Pour les musulmans, l'âme (*nafs*) a plusieurs degrés. Il n'y a pas un seul degré pour l'âme: l'âme animale, soumise aux sens ; l'âme instigatrice du mal, l'âme qui blâme, consciente de sa corruption, et qui souhaite y porter remède; l'âme guérie, qui a réintégré l'Esprit[2].

Les soufis considèrent le désir de la chair et de l'âme charnelle comme ce qui voile l'être transcendantal. « Celui qui connaît son âme, connaît la nature totalement illusoire des désirs qui la préoccupent. Connaissant ce qui est sans racines autres qu'imaginaires, ce qui est limité, périssable, éphémère, il connaît ce qui est éternel. Connaissant le serviteur, il connaît le Seigneur. Jonayd caractérisera ainsi l'*union* avec Dieu comme un *renoncement au désir* » (Chauvin 2001 : 83).

Comme dit Burckhardt, il faut donc que « les puissances de l'âme ne se laissent point déterminer par des impulsions de l'extérieur, mais qu'elles répondent à l'activité spirituelle, centrée sur le cœur » (1977 : 25). En effet, *in divinis*, à l'activité principielle de l'Esprit, répond la parfaite passivité de l'Âme universelle. C'est pourquoi nous avons parlé de la passivité chez le soufi. Il convient donc d'apprendre à fermer le cœur, volontiers versatile, aux sollicitations imaginatives de toute provenance, jusqu'à le rendre réceptif au seul être transcendantal. Par cette philosophe, nous devons dire que le monde des mystiques n'a pas seulement deux dimensions, il a un espace profond avec plusieurs versants : le monde du sensible, le monde intelligible, encore le monde exotérique et le monde ésotérique, *Alfikr* (La raison) doit être avec le *Zikr* (Prière), le monde spirituel. A part le monde physique, il y a le monde de l'imagination, le monde de la Raison et le monde de l'amour. En effet, l'âme est intermédiaire entre le corps et l'esprit. Par rapport à la triplicité constitutive de l'homme, le domaine « terrestre » correspond au « corps » (*sôma*). L'« âme » (*psyché*) reflète l'« Escabeau » (le monde de la royauté de l'Être suprême) et l'« intellect » (*nous*) représente « le passage vers les mystères de l'incréé et du Soi ».

Les derviches avancent alors lentement, et font trois fois le tour de la piste. Ces trois tours symbolisent les trois étapes qui rapprochent de Dieu : la voie de la science, celle qui mène à

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2   « Les degrés de l'âme font l'objet de divers classements. Jîlânî en retient sept, auxquels il associe autant de 'couleurs': l'âme animale, bleue ; la consciente, jaune, l'inspirée, rouge; la convaincue, blanche; la satisfaite, verte ; la bienheureuse, noire ; la parfaite, incolore » (Chauvin 2001 : 99).

la vision, et enfin celle qui conduit à l'union. Dans la danse *Samâ*, viennent à la fin les derniers saluts et l'évocation de Dieu: *Hû* (Lui). C'est vers Lui seul qu'est montée cette adoration.

Alors c'est en tant que moyen de connaissance illuminative que se justifie le concert spirituel : la musique et éveil de l'âme, elle la fait se souvenir d'une partie oubliée.

Nous voyons que pour la sémiotique du *samâ'*, il ne faut pas seulement parler de l'expérience corporelle, bien que le corps soit placé au cœur de la production du sens. Il faut parler d'un « champ sémiotique », c'est le terme de Fontanille, qui est « un domaine spatio-temporel que l'instance d'énonciation se donne en prenant position » (2011 : 57). En montrant le corps en mouvement, les derviches offrent un monde spirituel. Par le déplacement d'un corps réel, ils rappellent en même temps un monde virtuel (supra-sensible).

Disons encre que l'instance d'énonciation circonscrit ce qui relève du monde de Soi, et plus précisément de la présence à un *Soi transcendantal*, dans cet état d'extase, c'est la pure présence d'un *non-Moi* à un *Soi transcendantal*. Ils vont vers l'autre, l'altérité. Un Autre transcendantal qui est accepté comme *propre*. Les gestes de leurs mains montrent une sorte de *proprioceptivité*. C'est l'union entre ce monde et l'autre monde. Durant cette extase, nous ne devons pas parler du monde sensible, ils sont dans un état où ils ne voient rien, ils n'entendent rien. C'est un champ entièrement débrayé par rapport au système sensoriel. Ce débrayage est contrôlé par une vision, qui est une sorte de méditation. Ils entrent en contact avec un monde transcendantal. Et ils essaient de s'unir avec l'Etre suprême. C'est l'unification de la multiplicité.

6. Conclusion

Avec cette étude, nous avons montré qu'il existe trois modèles d'énonciation chez les soufis et les mystiques. Ces modèles sont en rapport avec leur philosophie, l'unité de l'existence et le soufisme qui considère la singularité et l'Être unique dans la pluralité. Tout cela est difficile à comprendre dans le monde actuel où on attend un raisonnement empirique et scientifique, et on doit accepter la crise du sens. La révélation de cet Être est l'affirmation de l'unicité, d'une telle unité que le mystique n'est rien d'autre que cet être transcendantal dans sa solitude. Ils découvrent que la véritable distance qui existe entre les créatures et cet Être est celle de la connaissance qu'ils doivent acquérir intuitivement. L'homme incarne, dans son être, deux aspects différents : l'esprit, son côté divin, et le corps son côté ténébreux et matériel, éphémère et limité. Lors de l'énonciation, nous voyons que la plupart du temps, il y a une pluralité, non seulement des actants mais si on analyse profondément leur poésie, une pluralité spatio-temporelle où apparaît la transcendance, comme un non-lieu et non-temps, impliquant une sorte de saisie *supra-sensible*. Et parfois un dédoublement de l'Etre, qui montre un lien réflexif. Pour comprendre leur texte, il faut définir une autre dimension, un sous-ensemble de la dimension cognitive : dimension mystique qui est propre à la poésie persane et qui est liée à l'Unité de l'existence.

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IN THE SEMIOTIC NETWORK: SIGNS, SUBJECTS, OBJECTS AND ALL IN BETWEEN

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Abstract

Signs themselves are no longer the only object of semioticians' interest. Semiotics is no longer able to focus solely on langue structures and discourse. Following this way of thinking, I discuss the case of complex relations between signs, objects and subjects within the so-called semiotic network. By "semiotic network" I mean a sophisticated idea, founded on the combination of two contemporary theories: Bruno Latour's object-oriented philosophy and Eero Tarasti's existential semiotics. Such an idea requires, of course, some references to classic theories like Charles S. Peirce and Algirdas-Julien Greimas' semiotics that are also mentioned in my paper. There are some crucial notions common to all these theories, like dynamics, processuality and transition. Bringing these concepts mentioned above all together would only succeed when considering the crossing axes, rather than a strange mixed hybrid. They differ in as much as they are similar, but I am convinced that the points where all these theories converge are really worth studying and discussing.

1. Instead of introduction. Intuitions and ideas

The above juxtaposition of the distinct theoretical concepts, which grew from completely different philosophical sources, may seem quite risky therefore, to be on the safe side, I would like to emphasize that the assumptions I will present here have the character of an "intuitive-report", and they are, so to speak, work in progress. But I would not like to discourage anyone from reading this text at the beginning so let me remark that I trust, as a counterpoint at least, my observations will turn out interesting. My intuitions are as follows: in certain aspects and considering certain reservations the concept of semiotics presented by Charles S. Peirce (1955), relational ontology proposed by Bruno Latour (Latour 1993, Harman 2009) and the existential semiotics advocated by Eero Tarasti (2000, 2005) are to a certain extent parallel and analogous. Suffice it to say that they include overlapping groups of similar notions, such as: object, relations, transition and translation, network, flux or motion. In my essay, I would like to outline these parallels

and indicate these elements, which make it impossible to bring all of the three above-mentioned concepts to one common denominator. However, we should point out that the lack of such a common denominator is not a gloomy or negative perspective. It is merely an observation of the distinct character of these various concepts despite their structural similarities. This however, does not exclude their comparison that can be quite promising.

2. Charles S. Peirce – sign and its object

Let us begin with a short outline of Peirce's observations, which are the most important for my text. First, his concept should be indisputably considered referential, i.e. the one that takes into account a relation of sign to extra-semantic reality. Let us observe that this proposal is founded on the ground of Peirce's philosophical idea, i.e. on the ground of pragmatism, and that is why it has a strong epistemological and cognitive bias. According to this author, a full sign was the one consisting of three elements: a sign itself (representamen), an object and an interpretant:

> A sign, or *representamen*, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign I call the *interpretant* of the first sign. The sign stands for something, its *object*. It stands for that object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have sometimes called the *ground* of the representamen (Peirce 1955: 99).

The following Triad is a basic category of Peirce's (1955) thought: the First (the sign, representamen), is in a true relationship to the Second (the object) and determines the Third (interpretant). Such a process does not occur out of the Triad relationship. Let us remember also one of the three divisions of signs distinguished by Peirce – it will be important for our considerations when I try to juxtapose the project proposed by Peirce with the concept proposed by Tarasti (2000, 2015). The above-mentioned division was conducted on the basis of the criterion which allows to establish whether "the sign in itself is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law" (Peirce 1955: 101). According to this division, the semiotician distinguishes the three following categories: *Qualisign*, *Sinsign* and *Legisign*. The first means "a quality which is a Sign" must be embodied in order to become a sign. Albeit the embodiment does not have anything to do with the character of the sign as such. The second, *Sinsign*, is "an actual existent thing or event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns". The third category, according to the discussed trichotomy, is *Legisign* – "a law that is a Sign". While it should be remembered that the law is usually established by a human being. The second trichotomy proposed by Peirce is probably the best known of them, i.e. the division into icons, indexes and symbols. Let us remind a description of only the first of these types of signs: "An *Icon* is a sign which refers to the Object that it denotes merely by virtue of characters of its own, and which it possesses, just the same, whether any such Object actually exists or not" (Peirce 1955: 102). It will be important when confronting the semiotics proposed by Peirce with the concept of existential signs outlined by Tarasti.

Here we can briefly mention the distinction made by Peirce between a dynamic and direct object, in other words a real object and an object shown by signs. The former is an object, which exists independently of a sign, which is a thing in itself, before it becomes the Second in the Triad. The latter, i.e. a direct object, is a semantic representation of the thing in itself and consequently it only partly "shows" this thing. "Immediate object of the sign – Peirce writes –

does triadically produce the intendent, or proper, effect of the sign strictly by means of another mental sign" (Peirce 1955: 275). Tarasti reminds that in the Peirce's model of sign construction "the object of representation is already a 'semiotic' entity, but behind it looms the 'dynamic object', which is a real entity" (Tarasti 2015: 59). He adds that the only problem is how "the dynamic object can produce a direct object. Does this take place as a kind of casual relation, as organic development, or as transformation?" (Tarasti 2015: 60). These solutions lead the author to the conclusion that Peircean semiotics does not "go down" to the level of reality, it is immanent and stays at the level of phenomena. Can it then be convergent with existential semiotics?

3. Bruno Latour – actants and objects

Let us begin this part of our ponderings in a somewhat subversive way. Eero Tarasti in his book *Sein und Schein. Explorations in existential semiotics* (2015), which is an update and extension of his previous book *Existential Semiotics* (2000) not even once refers to the concepts of Bruno Latour ((Latour 1993, Harman 2009)). We will not find the name of this author in any indexes in these books. Even this fact can be a certain indication that my ponderings are going in the wrong direction. Nevertheless, let us take the risk and continue our considerations in this very direction following the hypotheses initially put forward. After all, there is a chance that this study will not lead us astray in terms of semiotic considerations.

In the book issued in 2009 by Graham Harman *Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics*, the author faces a difficult task: "This book is the first to consider Bruno Latour as a key figure in metaphysics […]. Latour has long been prominent in the fields of sociology and anthropology, yet the philosophical basis of his work remains little unknown" (Harman 2009: 5). What is interesting, Harman focuses in his study of the Latour's ideas on the early period of his scientific research, as he discusses his metaphysics in 1984–1999. The project known as "flat ontology" is provocatively described by Harman as "one of the most powerful of our times". What should be understood by this name? Latour, who emphasized relations between actants avoided a priori imposed hierarchies and orders of entities so he somehow "flattened" the inequalities between them. Therefore, one can speak about Latour a metaphysician or Latour a sociologist. Thus, it cannot be denied that the flat ontology and the theory of an actor-network are closely interlinked. Latour, contrary to most of representatives of other philosophical concepts, does not try to equal the world to another distinguished sphere of reality, on the contrary, he maintained that "everything will be absolutely concrete, all objects and all modes of dealing with objects will now be on the same footing" (Harman 2009: 13).

Not to summarize unnecessarily the whole book by Harman, let us just present after him four central ideas of Latour's metaphysics. Firstly, "the world is made up of *actors* or *actants* (which I will also call 'objects') […] all entities are on exactly the same footing". It is useful to add a remark on temporality, which will turn out crucial when we juxtapose Latour's concept with the semiotic proposal put forward by Tarasti: "All features belong to the actor itself: a force utterly deployed in the world at any given moment, entirely characterized by its full set of features". It is important to notice the great emphasis placed by Latour to temporality, momentality and concreteness: the value of an actant is determined by its current position, current relationships that he in a given moment enters into, not an inherent quality given once and for all. Latour's actant is here surprisingly convergent with the existential sign proposed by Tarasti and different from Peircean concept of sign itself. The second axiom of Latour's metaphysics is a rule of irreduction, i.e. "no object is inherently reducible or irreducible to any other". Thirdly, "the means of linking one thing with another is *translation*", each layer of reality is a mediator, which is never neutral, but always adding something from itself while translating one item into another. Let

us emphasize here that the notion of translation is another key notion for comparing Latour's relational metaphysics with existential semiotics by Tarasti. Finally the forth thing, "actants are not stronger or weaker by virtue of some inherent strength or weakness harbored all along in their private essence. [...] an object is neither a substance nor an essence, but an actor trying to adjust or inflict its forces" (Harman 2009: 14-15). All these metaphysical axioms as Harman assumes stem from one deeper principle: absolute concretness: each actant is simply what it is, so it is essentially concrete, and it gains its real being in a specific time and place without having it inherently in its single self. An actant is always individual. Thus, here we have the outlined project of flat ontology resulting from metaphysical axioms. Latour a philosopher wants to tell us mainly that "the world is a stage filled with actors; philosophy is object-oriented philosophy". (Harman 2009: 16).

Since this term has been already mentioned we should define more precisely how it should be understood. What we have in mind here are the trends of contemporary humanities that are ontically oriented, hence object-oriented philosophy and object-oriented ontology. Both these trends assume a retreat from (post) Kantian epistemology, which has been dubbed the Copernican Revolution, and thereby a retreat from the so-called philosophies of access which define the access of the cognizing mind to the cognized world. Referring to the assumptions of metaphysical realism, contemporary researchers proposed a concept that they called speculative realism. Speculative realism somehow changes the optics of observation by emphasizing ontic categories at the expense of epistemological ones and giving priority to the notion of an object in relation to a subject. Here we come across the first insurmountable obstacle, the first significant difference between the project proposed by Latour and the concept put forward by Tarasti.

Let us change the perspective for a moment and reconstruct Latour's project emphasizing its threads, which are either inspired by Greimas or shaped similarly to semiotic findings. We will find such threads primarily in his theory of actor-network. This theory is characterized by translation and focusing on dynamics and relationality, thus it rejects a perspective of philosophical essentialism. The notions of translation and relationality should be emphasized as those, which are constitutive for our further ponderings. Krzysztof Arbiszewski, in his preface to the Polish edition of Latour's book: *Reassembling the Social – An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory* writes that the author is inspired by works of Greimas and perceives all studied objects through dynamic relations into which he enters with other objects, and mostly he uses the "actant" category treated relationally as proposed by Greimas. An actor (actant) in ANT is someone/something that acts (Arbiszewski 2010: XIII).

Two notions, namely, mediator and intermediary introduced by Latour may turn out interesting for semiotic considerations. In *Reassembling the Social…* he fathers creating active connections upon mediators, whereas passive ones upon intermediaries; translations created by mediators are uncertain and not predestined, whereas connections between intermediaries are stable, an intermediary does not bring any surprises. Latour metaphorically writes about zig-zag[1] transgressions from humans and objects, and specifies that it is not about elevation of an object in the subject-object relation, as there is no relation between nature and culture, between what is material and what is social. Actually, this distinction is artificial and mistaken.

 In the important for our ponderings work by Latour entitled *We have never been modern,* the author accuses semiotics (generally understood) of excessive concentration on the discourse itself, at the expense of what that discourse may refer to and its users. In other words, Latour accuses semiotics of underestimating of objects, which constitute the whole network of media-

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1 Interesting similarity to Tarasti's "Z model" (see below).

tions. Semiotics gave the discourse more autonomy; it concentrated on one of the mediators, i.e. language. However, Latour also notices assets of semiotic philosophies, as he calls them, stating that they developed a reflection on mediators and saved them from deep waters of referential dualism. Referring to semiotic dictionary of Greimas and Courtès he claims that:

> "the greatness of these philosophies was that they developed, protected from the dual tyranny of referents and speaking subjects, the concepts that give the mediators their dignity - mediators that are no longer simple intermediaries or simple vehicles conveying meaning from Nature to Speakers, or vice versa. Texts and language make meaning; they even produce references internal to discourse and to the speakers installed within discourse (Latour 1993: 63). "

Everything that is important occurs in-between, between these sides, thanks to mediation, translation and networks.

4. Eero Tarasti – transcendence and subjects

Tarasti when introducing his concept of semiotics, on the pages of his first book dedicated to the mentioned issues (*Existential semiotics*, 2000) announces that eponymous "existential semiotics studies the ways in which signs are fixated into objective entities". Such semiotics must rely on hermeneutic and phenomenological background. Tarasti sees semiotics "in transition, shift, rupture, and flux, something that is 'becoming' rather than 'being'". The author sketches "a new philosophical basis for semiotic inquiry" (Tarasti 2000: Preface): as this proposal is inspired by e.g. Hegel, Heidegger and Sartre, he calls it "existential semiotics". However, this is not a simple return to the earlier phase. It is about the ways of reasoning. Fields of study distinguished by Tarasti are extremely significant for our considerations: processes, temporality, signs in flux, pre-signs ("signs in the states before fixation into a sign"). The author notices that by focusing on dynamics, change, shaping and creating, semiotics has a chance to pursue cognitively satisfying continuation.

It is very important for our ponderings to notice an issue which constitutes one of those fields in which the concepts presented here will overlap, i.e. that Tarasti refers also to the notion of event and adds that reality consists of "energy fields". He writes that "energetically negative or positive events are connected and strengthen each other". When we remember relational metaphysics by Bruno Latour (Harman 2009) some analogies become apparent[2]. In the second book, written fifteen years later, Tarasti at the beginning remarks that he will be only interested in "philosophical reflections on what could be called 'ontologico-transcendental' issues of existential semiotics" (Tarasti 2015: v). He indicates the so-called Paris school of semiotics, created by Greimas, as the roots of this idea. However, it is particularly important for us that the founder of existential semiotics, which is a new paradigm within the discipline, adds that semiotics might as well be Greimassian, Lotmanian or Peircean, so not necessarily limited to neo-structural one. Establishing his concept on the notion of *Dasein* Tarasti introduces oppositions necessary to its description, such as external / internal, inner / outer, objective / subjective. It should be mentioned that in his book *Sein und Schein* (2015) the author adds another category to the previous ones of Being and Doing, namely the category of Appearing. It will address the new issues of representation including appearing and simulation. Hence, it is a field, which to a certain extent belongs to ontological semiotics, where the key role is played by *Dasein*, modalities, values and *Moi / Soi* distinction. The last notion will allow Tarasti to transform the classical semiotic square proposed by Greimas into "Z-model". In other words Tarasti, updating his project moves

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2 It should be added that in this context Tarasti invokes the concept proposed by Yuri Lotman and remarks that on the level of culture it might be an analogous way to capture reality as consisting of "fluxes", where presence is as significant fact as absence.

on from static figure in the shape founded by Greimas, i.e. to the dynamic "Z" model ("Zemic model") and studies its "inner (emic) notions" (Tarasti 2015: 27).

Remaining for a while at the fundamental issues, we should observe that Tarasti describes Kant as a German speculative philosopher. However, it is necessary to bear in mind that this notion relates to other theoretical assumptions than the one used by contemporary speculative realists. The Finnish semiotician considers the concept proposed by Kant as one of the sources of his own concept of neosemiotics (as he refers to existential semiotics), while speculative realists constructed their project on a distinctive opposition to Kant's ideas. Hence, the argument that philosophical sources of existential semiotics and relational ontology are incompatible is justified.

Coming back to the findings regarding the notion of *pre-sign*, let us quote the author who explains this issue: "the most interesting, existential moment of signs is in the moment before or after them, since the life of signs does not stop, of course, with their fixation into objects. In any case, if there are existential signs, they are always in a state of becoming" (2000: 7). Tarasti refers here to Peirce's classification of signs into legisign, sinsign and qualisign discussed above. So let us repeat after Tarasti: terms which characterize signs on the ground of existential semiotics are "the continuous becoming", "flux", and "streaming of signs". What is interesting, as if basing on the classification proposed by Peirce, Tarasti in the work *Existential Semiotics* distinguishes six types of signs: 1/ *pre-signs* ("in the process of forming and shaping themselves"), 2/ *trans-signs* ("signs in transcendence"), 3/ *act-signs* (signs which are "actualized in the world of *Dasein*"), 4/ *endo-* and *exo-signs* ("signs in the dialectics of presence/absence"), 5/ *internal/external signs*, 6/ *as-if-signs* ("signs that should be read *as if* they were true") (Tarasti 2000: 19). In his concept of transitional signs Tarasti refers to Peirce's distinction into dynamic and immediate objects and three types of signs which regarding their objective reference are divided into icons, indexes and symbols, and he states that "Yet the essential thing is what happens in between, that is, during the shift form *Dasein* 1 to *Dasein* 2" (Tarasti 2000: 24). However, it should be added that in his book from 2015 the Finnish semiotician observes that "signs are viewed as transiting back and forth between *Dasein* – Being-There, our world with its subjects and objects – and transcendence. Completely new sign categories emerge in the tension between reality, as Dasein, and whatever lies beyond it. […] We have to make a new list of categories in the side in the side of that once done by Peirce" (Tarasti, 2015: 4). The author includes in these categories the following signs: trans-signs, endo-signs and exo-signs, quasi-signs (as-if-signs) and pheno- and geno-signs. This classification established anew seems to refer to the one proposed by Peirce, albeit naturally it is different.

Further, the author of *Existential semiotics* points out that "signs always appear in connection with a certain situation" and that "the sign emerges from its union with the structure". These two closely related statements are in my opinion convergent with other two approaches very different from one another: with the semiology proposed by Ferdinand de Saussure (1983) and the ontic philosophy by Bruno Latour. As the former maintained that a sign gains its value solely by the position that it occupies in the sign system, so it does not have any inherent value but gains it by a given (hence somewhat temporal) location in a particular arrangement of the system. On the other hand, Latour, (when we remind the previous findings, being fully aware that this is not a semiotic project in any way but a philosophical and sociological one, however certain structure of reasoning seems to be analogous) remarks that an actant either gains or loses its significance and value due to the currently occupied place in the network or even more due to its ability or inability to maintain relations with the network. As Tarasti writes: "In some cases, signs get all their power from their situations" (2000: 7) and further "their significance grows from the situation in which they appear" (2000: 8) and these statements only confirm my belief

that certain analogies with Latour's project are unambiguously clear. Existential semiotics in Tarasti's approach is not a field based on stability. Situations are always concrete, changeable and the sign is not "in focus", only in dialogue, and the interpretation is possible only "in a certain moment". Nevertheless, these issues should be nuanced as in his later work Tarasti places his concept of values in opposition to the ideas proposed by de Saussure. According to the Swiss (Saussure 1983), the value of a sign stems from its position in the system, whereas according to the Finn values "are transcendental but become signs via the activities of the subject" (Tarasti 2015: 10). Hence, the agential force of the subject seems the necessary condition here.

The key category for existential semiotics should be introduced here, namely the category of a subject. And here simultaneously a certain turn in my argumentation occurs, namely, the first significant opposition appears which does not allow us to bring the concepts proposed by Tarasti and Latour to a common denominator. Shortly speaking: existential semiotics is subject-oriented, whereas relational metaphysics proposed by Latour is object-oriented. This distinction is quite restrictive and made on the basis of the theses derived from *Existential semiotics* albeit it has to be mitigated by the statement from *Sein und Schein*, i.e. that *Dasein* is a "collective entity, which consists of subjects and objects, of Others" (Tarasti 2015: 9). However, in the early stage of designing the new paradigm Tarasti seemed to marginalize the importance of an object and wrote, "The phenomena of an existential semiotic nature open themselves to a subject only through his/her presence. […] The interpretation is only possible by being inside the world of *Dasein* – but at the same time transcending it" (Tarasti 2000: 10-11). "Who puts signs in motion?" – asks Tarasti and asnwers: "the transcending subject, of course, in his act of existing" (Tarasti 2000: 12). The sign which is in motion in the permanent state of "becoming" not "being", the sign which floats, creates unstable and dynamic semiotic system is also interesting for me here. However, motivation for sign movement can be varied. In the case of ontic philosophies it will be the activity of intermediaries and mediators, in the case of existential semiotics dissatisfaction of the subject.

Concentrating on the subject, Tarasti remarks that in his concept the meaning is born in dialogue, during the "journey made by the subject", hence it is closely connected with existence, with *Dasein*. This is certainly a quality which distances the project of existential semiotics from the theory developed by Latour. However, what unites these two approaches is understanding of signs, "signs come into continuous motion; – writes Tarasti – they are no longer fixed, ready-made objects, but are free to take shape in many completely new ways. […] On this view, what is interesting in semiotics, are the states that both *precede* and *follow* the formation of signs" (2000: 19). In the book, updating the project Tarasti emphasizes that signs have their "perishable, temporal, spatial, and actorial part" (Tarasti 2015: 17). It does not have to be added perhaps that the last of the above-mentioned features brings neosemiotics closer to Latour's concept.

Summing up this part of my text let us observe that in relation to the primary version of the project of existential semiotics, in the updated version Tarasti introduces the following modifications: he pays more attention to the category of object, he attributes "actorial" features to signs, among others, he introduces "Z-model" as a new reference to Greimas' square and emphasizes that neosemiotics designed in this way is realistic not nominalistic in its essence. He also shows that within one paradigm one can easily combine two seemingly incompatible orientations of semiotics, namely the structuralist approach and Peircean approach. One can easily repeat after the founder of neosemiotics that it is based on the structuralist model that becomes Peircean triad[3].

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3 As E. Tarasti put it during the discussion after his presentation at 13th IASS-AIS World Congress of Semiotics Cross-Inter-Multi-Trans- Kaunas University, 26-30 June 2017.

5. Instead of conclusion. Disparities and convergences

Let us begin with the differences between the three approaches discussed here with particular emphasis on the relations between Peirce and Tarasti's concepts on the one hand, and Latour's on the other. The first and most obvious difference is that Peirce and Tarasti's approaches are of semiotic character, whereas Latour, albeit (as sometimes Tarasti) he refers to Greimas' notion of actant, does not represent semiotic orientation at all. However, on the ground of his relational metaphysics and flat ontology Latour develops concepts, which are parallel and analogous to the selected findings of Tarasti.

The next, more subtle, but still equally significant discrepancy concerns establishing the center of the ponderings by the presented authors. The core of existential semiotics is the figure of subject. Existential semiotics is "a journey made by a subject". Whereas under Latour's approach what makes the network of relations move is the "journey made by an object". Shortly speaking, we may state that if Latour's philosophy is "object-oriented", then – *per analogiam* – Tarasti's existential semiotics will be "subject-oriented".

Time for convergences. Existential semiotics has a temporal dimension; it is characterized by being in the process, coming to being, instability, processuality, flux, and dynamics. Are not the same terms used to characterize the project proposed by Latour and partly by Peirce, although in a different context? When we remind ourselves processuality and continuity of a sign, two superior theses proposed by Peirce, one might find only the confirmation of the intuitions presented here. Similarly *pre-signs* and *act-signs* by Tarasti can be juxtaposed with *iconic* and *quali-signs* by Peirce. Greimas, to whom Latour referred, became also an important author for Tarasti who invoked the figure of semiotic square – in the later stage of the project development it was transformed into "zemic model".

I am aware that Latour's proposal, as well as those of other ontic philosophers, will not support existential semiotics, even for a simple reason that the former are object oriented and the latter emphasizes the subjects. However, obvious parallels and analogies between the discussed approaches cannot be denied. I think that if existential semioticians and ontic philosophers looked in the mirror, they would recognize probably familiar faces rather than strange images.

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MODELING THE MULTIPLE SELF IN TRANSDISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATIVE APPROACHES

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Abstract

This paper focuses on multiaspectuality of human self and its modeling with respect to inherent and relational properties determined by its existence modes. The subject matter of the following study constitutes a typology of the definitional models of the self that exist in language and culture. Exposed are here three levels of reality, on which the self as a person and subject operates, namely intra-level, inter-level and trans-level. The intra-level is dependent upon experiential knowledge, the inter-level is limited by contents of collective interactions, and the trans-level is achievable in intrapersonal communication when the subjective self exceeds the boundaries of its sensorial experience through pure reasoning and imagining.

Special attention is paid to aspectual conceptualizations of self, its constituents and aspects in functional characteristics that result from environmental factors. Regarding the many-sided approach to the self, a distinction must be observed between multi- or-pluri-, inter- and trans-disciplinary perspectives. Multi- or pluri-disciplinarity consists in studying the object which belongs to the one and the same discipline through a variety of disciplines at the same time, and interdisciplinarity involves the transfer of methods specific to a discipline into another one. Transdisciplinarity, in turn, demands going beyond and above any disciplinary boundaries to create a holistic view of all features of investigated reality (cf. Nicolescu 2002 [1996]).

1. The human self as a sign of multiple experiences of the individual

The notion of human self refers to man as a creature endowed with a consciousness of being conscious. Encompassing both his mind and body, his self is his thinking that reflects and determines his experience, knowledge, and behavior. The notion in question allows approaching human consciousness in terms of mental representations of human feelings and actions. It implies the uniqueness of particular human beings, capable and aware of both enjoyment

and suffering and also intrinsically concerned for themselves. Hence, the self as a sign of individual personhood and subjectivity, with its body and mind, might be studied in relation to the world and the other(s) under the heading of living semiotics according to Susan Petrilli (2013).

As to the origin and functions of human self as a set of perceptions of the individual about him/herself, its development is set off by the rise of boundaries between self and non-self — i.e., by the emergence of personal identity of the individual in his/her childhood, when he/she begins to distinguish him/herself from the environment — and proceeds gradually in effect of its contacts with others. Each human individual has his/her many selves that are contingent on situation and time, exactly upon his/her distinct past experiences, present involvements and imaginations of the future. Multiple dimensions of self allow it to control its behavior, exactly the messages it sends about itself interpreted in terms of visible signs of the individual. The self, including both naming and valuing, being in change, manifesting itself in different behaviors, cannot be fully known, neither by itself nor by others.

2. Modeling the self in philosophical deliberations and empirical studies

Extensive knowledge about selfhood as the sense of individuality, encompassing both the faculty of human mind and product of socialization, comes from the philosophy of mind, phenomenology, developmental and cognitive psychology, psychiatry, developmental and evolutionary biology, neurology and neuroscience, artificial intelligence, computing and robotics, etc. Researchers in these investigative domains deal with modeling the multifaceted nature of human self with respect to its bodily and mental activities, to enrich the understanding of mechanisms of perception, awareness, and reasoning of the individual staying in temporal contacts and long-lasting relationships with other individuals.

The human self as an object of cognition is inaccessible to direct observation, and its essence can be grasped only through inference or speculation. Hence, particular attention deserves modeling as an explanatory method. Similarly to researchers who develop scientific theories as sets of propositions being exhaustive and logically interconnected or conceptual-methodological scaffolds as sets of assumptions, principles and premises which demonstrate the characteristic features of their investigative objects, scholars who deal with self-consciousness also create models of self for the purpose of increasing systematic knowledge about the domains of their study. According to Roland Posner (2003: 2345-2346), theories, as output of research, are used as models to explain, predict and change the properties of specific objects, when they function as sets of propositions approved as reliable approximations to the complex subject matter, even when they are not always and everywhere valid. Models, being useful for setting up new research goals, mostly serve as a starting point for a prospective further research.

The applicability of the models of self exposing the exceptionality of the human individual as a communicator, consists in the explanation how the communicative behavior of human individuals is regulated by psychosomatic and environmental conditionings. Being the result of the creative imagination of their authors, these models outline the characteristics of human mental operations as objects of cognition, the contents and structure of which are not available to researchers directly. The models of self make mental facts open to analyses, systematization, and confrontation with observable facts of real life situations.

To realize how the human self manifests itself in language and culture, it is necessary — while drawing on Yuri M. Lotman's (1977 [1974]) and Thomas A. Sebeok's (1988) terminology — to model it. However, both scholars conceived the term *modeling system* somewhat differently. For Lotman, language — specified as a set of verbal texts — is the primary modeling system,

which helps to understand the texts of culture forming thus the secondary modeling system in the world of humans. In a complementary view, for Sebeok, language is only the secondary modeling system, which functions above the primary modeling system, consisting of indexical symptoms and appealing signal, as communication codes of the semiotic self. The human self is able to communicate about culture through verbal and nonverbal signs, considered as a tertiary modeling system, including language as a social system of signification and understanding.

3. Aspects and constituents of the self

A survey of selected models of human self gives a picture of the internal organization of self-awareness of the human individual as an intrapersonal, interpersonal/intersubjective communicator, and a transcendental being. As it is the self who possesses the ability to experience itself as an object among other objects, it has two existential aspects, the knower and the known. This distinction, motivated by the fact that thinking processes of individuals are, as William James (cf., *inter alia*, 2001 [1892]: 43-83) argued, internal conversations in which their selves as subjects response to their selves as objects. Hence, the pure ego (the subject of thought, the *I*, unifying its own past and present thoughts) is juxtaposed to the empirical self (the self as an object of thought, the *Me*, and the self objectively known).

Breaking with the traditional definition of the human being as a rational animal, with reference to Alfred Korzybski's work *Science and Sanity* (1994 [1933]: 369-561), J. Samuel Bois' (1972 [1966]: 18-23; cf. also DeVito (1976: 63-79) speaks in favor of approaching man as a single, but complex and integrated organism the behavior of which, with four aspects, such as thinking/speaking, feeling, self-moving and electrochemical activities, consists of continuous transactions with his space-and-time environment. Exactly, the human self (i.e., man) is — in Bois' depiction an environmentally conditioned semantic reactor engaging in communicative activities. As one might state, after Bois, the self as the whole organism of the individual, with both the momentum of its accumulated past and the drawing power of its anticipated future, situated in the environment, reacts, at a particular moment, semantically and comprehensively. Its semantic reactions express the values that it holds dear and maintain the ego-image that it has of itself. They are indivisible into any constituents and inseparable from each other while verbal and nonverbal messages constitute only their aspects.

Ways of specifying information about self coming from the environment have been distinguished by Ulric Neisser in his article "Five kinds of self-knowledge" (1988). Neisser presents different sources of the selves, each establishing their different aspects. In particular, the self generally growths due to: (1) the perception of oneself with respect to the physical environment, called as the ecological self; (2) the awareness of being a person engaged in a particular human interchange here and now, called as the interpersonal self; (3) the awareness of the own past experiences based primarily on personal memories and anticipations of the individual, called as the extended self; (4) the awareness that the own experiences are not directly shared with other people, called a the private self; and (5) the self-concept, that is, a concept of oneself as a particular person in a familiar world which originates in social life, called respectively as the conceptual self. As one might simply state, each individual derives knowledge about him- or herself from the multitude of his/her experiences which leads to the formation of essential constituents of his/her self.

4. Characterizing the self with regard to its intra-, inter- and trans-levels

The distinction between levels at which the self operates is helpful in explaining its symbolic capacities in relation to intersubjectivity, that is, the ability to assume the inclinations of com-

munication participants to share the same common-sense meanings. This implies that human individuals construct these meanings in communicative interactions/transactions. It is assumed that they are able to and actually resort to these meanings as to conceptual resources, while interpreting the signs in social situations and cultural contexts. The intra-, inter- and trans-levels of self might be characterized as follows.

Firstly, the intra-level of self includes perception and internal processing of data that come from perception. This level implies intra-organismic communication, that is, electro-chemical, self-moving, feeling and thinking activities; nevertheless, it could not exist without the inter- and trans-levels of self. The intra-level of self is, in the first instance, the experiential self, the first person felt experience of being across periods of time. But its development requires certain mental capacities, especially memory. It relates to experiential consciousness, to drives and needs of the individual and his/her emotionally organized feeling states. Accordingly, it also includes the internal self-consciousness system, when the private self appears as an internal narrator, commentator, or interpreter of what is going on. It is able to verbally narrate and/or to make sense of what and why something is happening. And it functions in consistency with or against attitudes, beliefs and values it includes. The self, essentially confined to the functioning of the nervous system of the individual, lives, at its intra-level, thanks to images coming from direct perception, and it discloses itself, or manifests itself, in part through one-directional, non-intentional and non-reciprocal symptoms, that may become signs for the observers.

Being aware that the whole self of the individual gradually matures throughout his/her life, one must divide the known part of it, i.e., the empirical self, or the self as an object or a person — in conformity with James' view (2001 [1892]: 43-83) — into three parts, such as the material self, social self, and spiritual self. According to James, the self includes (1) all the material items in the immediate environment of the individual, his/her body, parts of it, clothes, homes and other possessions, works of his/her hands and minds, (2) ways in which the individual presents him/herself to others, as well as (3) mental faculties and dispositions of the individual which become an object to his/her thoughts at a particular moment.

To all these contents of the empirical life, arranged by James into a tripartite structure, one should also add the psychological scripts, named as the life scripts, which constitute the intra-level of the individual oriented toward him/herself. As a key notion covering all mental contents of the individual comprising the whole course of his/her life. the concept of the psychological script, according to which he or she makes important decisions, has been developed by Eric Berne (1964) and Thomas Harris (1969) and subsequently extended by Berne (1975 [1972]), the inventors of transactional analysis, one of the therapy methods employed in interpersonal communications to stimulate changes of attitudes in intersubjective relationships. The psychological scripts (examined by Berne 1975 [1972], *inter alia*, 25-26, 244-364), including cultural and family scripts, as private scenarios of what could eventually happen in the lives of individuals, are equal to dramatic scripts in which the co-occurrence of certain characters and roles, scenes, dialogues, and plots is projected. Yet, as argued, they are not fully realized by individuals who follow them.

On the basis of the model of intrapersonal awareness, called the Johari window — after the first-name initials of their creators Joseph Luft and Harrington Ingham — popularized by Luft (1969 [1963]: 11-20), one can realize how information, attitudes, feelings, desires, motivations, ideas of communicating individuals have been conceptualized into open, hidden, blind or unknown selves, realized to different degrees in the course of mutual interaction. Respectively, in the authors' descriptions, the self may: (1) know itself, being at the same time known by others; (2) know itself but keep this knowledge to itself, not revealing it to others; (3) be ignorant of significant and/or insignificant information about itself which other people know about it (e.g.,

about some its habits, faults or virtues, personality traits, psychological strategies governing his or her behavior, past experiences, etc.); or (4) be unaware of some facts about itself of which also other people are unaware but do infer from different sources. What is to be deduced, the constituents of intrapersonal awareness are not loose, unrelated to each other, but intermingle with each other, influence each other, and evolve over time. In the case of different individuals, the open, hidden, blind or unknown selves as parts of their entire selves may vary in respect of size, depending on time and situation.

Contents and structures of human selves change with the passage of their life when they adjust themselves as communicators to specific situations in which they participate. As a matter of fact, validity of models which represent psychological mechanisms that direct the adaptive behavior of humans, can be verified as theoretical constructs on the basis of facts coming from both introspection and observation.

The known (i.e., personal, or empirical) self, defined in terms of intrapersonal communication variables, such as knowledge, beliefs or opinions and prejudices, attitudes and values, of which the individual is conscious to different degrees, develops, according, *inter alia*, to Larry L. Barker (1977: 126-128), due to his/her experiences in society. At the same time, as has already been stated by James (2001 [1892]: 18-83, especially 49-51), the originator of empirical studies of self-consciousness and self-awareness, all constituents of the self, which arouse its subjective feelings and emotions, trigger its personal actions. Searching for self-evaluating aspects of self at its intra-level leads to the detection of psychic mechanisms of self-seeking, self-estimation and self-preservation, particularly accentuated by James (2001 [1892]: 51-62) as well as ego states and life positions, described by Berne (cf. respectively, *inter alia*, 1964: 23-27; 1975 [1972]: 90-95).

Anyhow, the human self is a malleable, instable mental structure performing threefold functions, the cognitive, affective and conative ones. For psychologists, especially Hazel Markus and Elissa Wurf (1987: 315) and Tory E. Higgins (1987), the self-awareness of the individual depends on the functioning of his/her cognitive-affective-conative system which consists of three domains, such as the actual self, governed by the cognitive system, as well as the ought self and the ideal self, being respectively governed by the affective system and the conative system; the latter two direct yet again the actual self. So, the self — who organizes its experiential data being relevant for the maintenance of self-esteem and the optimization of balance between pleasure and pain during his/her life — is responsible for coordinating his/her behavior which can be habitual, probable, or unpredictable.

Moreover, the intra-level of self-study creates also the attribution that individuals may think of themselves similarly to how they believe in how other persons view and evaluate them, as has already been noticed by Charles Horton Cooley (1902), the creator of the concept of the looking-glass self. Cooley has appreciated the importance of psychological processes, called as reflected appraisal processes. The self-image of the individual develops, according to Cooley (1902: 151-153), just in effect of these processes, in three stages, exactly: (1) when the individual imagines how he/she appears to be in the eyes of another person; (2) when the individual imagines how he/she is evaluated by this person; and, finally, (3) when the individual feels good or bad depending on the imagined judgments of another person. In consequence, the internally oriented feelings of the individual do not result from pure reflections but from opinions which he or she imputes to other persons.

The tendencies of individuals toward self-evaluation through social comparison are the object of modeling in the theories on motivation for changing behavior. In particular, the cognitive dissonance theory, put forward by Leon Festinger (1957: 3, 260-266) and the self-discrepancy theory proposed by Higgins (1957) deal with the inconsistency of feelings experienced by hu-

mans, who, being in a psychologically uncomfortable situation, may be strongly inclined to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance, in other words, an internal emotional consistency. Since it is important to human individuals to establish the inner harmony, a kind of congruity among their knowledge and opinions as well as attitudes and values they cherish, individuals are apt to change their behavior, initiate communication and/or control its content, change cognition, especially selectively acquire new information.

Secondly, by way of illustrating aspects of self as a participant of communicational exchanges - visually represented, nevertheless, through communication models and discussed, for example, by DeVito (1979: 20-26) — one must concentrate on its activities of sending and receiving messages in concrete social situations. Hence, it is right to speak about the inter-level of self, considering the collective nature of interpersonal and intersubjective communication in which the self of the individual manifests itself in concrete acts that he/she performs and in the spoken and written texts, being the products of their communicative activities.

The inter-level of self is thus its communication with others. Focusing on it, one can identify the patterns of interpersonal interactions which are usually established, and through which stimuli coming to the organism from the environment are processed. The individual self is recognizable as a person and its personality is detectible, as Bois (1972 [1966]: 274) put it, whenever it sees, hears, walks, speaks, writes in a manner it has acquired. Another matter is, according to Bois, that patterns of interaction oftentimes emerge due to early conditioning or conscious training; sometimes they permeate in body tissues of the individual at the electrochemical level, sometimes they are emotional and sometimes intellectual habits. In the case of each individual, alternations from one mental state to another are expressed not only in his/her appearance, facial expressions, body gestures, postures etc. but in words and other symbols of interpersonal communication; they communicate information about themselves through storytelling. What is observable in communication are interpersonal interactions, neither thinking activities as psychological states nor social networks.

Thirdly, the subjective self is able to achieve its trans-level when it exceeds the boundaries of sensorial experience in intrapersonal communication, particularly in pure reasoning and through imagination. At this level, the human self exists in language and culture; hence, it is also possible to define the relation between mind (consciousness) and reality.

At this point, one has to allude to transcendental idealism as a position (different from realism and idealism) represented by Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), who, focusing on the mental subject of cognition, emphasized the role of both critical reflection and the point of view in looking at the world. The issue of the metaphysics of the subject, raised in the context of transcendental philosophy or transcendental idealism, amounts, as has been shown by David Carr (1999: 49-64), to considerations whether there exist two distinct egos, such as the empirical subject and the transcendental subject, as one might also say, the real and the merely phenomenal subject, or only one with its two aspects. At any rate, the subject, who thinks, perceives and acts, is somebody, who in doing so relates to a natural and social world of meanings. As can be argued, *inter alia*, in keeping with Carr, the implicit distinction between empirical subject and transcendental subject implies that subjectivity of self has two aspects, namely, being an object in the world and being a subject for the world, but any of them can be neither underestimated nor set above the other. Even though there is perhaps no reason to distinguish between the two egos, each subject as such is related to the world both in non-intentional ways, because as a person (body), the self, situated in space relates to other persons (bodies) in objective space, and/or through its experiences, thoughts, and ideas as its properties. In this second case, the question arises how do these ideas relate to the objects and the world they are about. No less intriguing issues concern, among the other things, the role of

the body in shaping mental representations, the immediate experience as a source of knowledge of the individual, his or her self-consciousness and the notion of transcendence as the possibility to go beyond his/her experience, and/or capacities of grasping, intentionality, intuition, etc. It is why concentrating on human selves in their natural and social reality, one has rather to focus on individual and social means of signification and communication, having, at the same time in view that, emerging in human minds, they always have a subjective character.

For theoreticians and practitioners of postmodern semiotic studies and representatives of other disciplines interested in man in his social-cultural and personal conditioning, the trans-level of self, to which there is only an indirect access thanks to the behavior of the individual and its products, is essential. Therefore, it would be appropriate to refer to the investigative framework postulated by Eero Tarasti originally in his book *Existential Semiotics* (2000). As to human selves as signifying/communicating subjects, the following properties are to be ascribed to them, in keeping with Tarasti's model: (1) corporeality that implies bodily conditioned experiencing of reality; (2) subjectivity of feelings and emotions, connected with the capacity for modal thinking; (3) the ability to engage in signifying social activities; and (4) the ability to think in terms of not only individual, but also supra-individual values and social norms. Thus, even though communication and understanding begin on the somatic level, that is, cognitive/communicative acts of humans are at first influenced by their corporeality, they interact with one another as observed persons and mentality, but can understand each other as inferred subjects.

Thinking of the self in terms of self-knowledge, one must refer to the notion of transduction, introduced by Lawrence W. Barsalou (1999) for the tasks of behavioral sciences. Similarly to all knowledge, characterized by Paula M. Niedenthal et al. (2005: 35-38) in terms of amodal data structure, it must be then approached from biological and experiential perspectives. The self is in such a case an outcome of transducing modality-specific states that arise in (1) perception, (2) action and proprioception, the recognition of intra-organismic stimuli, and (3) introspection, the reflection upon the own mental states, as emotions, evaluations, motivations, ways of reasoning, memories, etc. into data structures that are amodal. Specific experiences of the individual activate his/her modality-specific states, the multiplicity of which is the source of division within self.

5. Conclusion

Accordingly, there is a need for transdisciplinarity in the study of both the human self and its semiotic manifestations, especially as the complex and multidimensional nature of human consciousness is not reducible to parts, or components, but translatable into terms of human existence. Human individuals as assumed mental subjects establish and apprehend intentional meanings, being observable objects to themselves in the context of others, seeking for values, making choices, taking responsibilities, developing their creativeness, etc. Most important semiotic extensions of human mind are texts where the multitude of which the self can be conscious to a certain degree finds reflection.

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MOZART'S PERSONAL STYLE AND PERIODIZATION: PERFORMANCE, CULTURE, AND TEMPORAL DISTANCE

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Abstract

The paper explores how we experience Mozart's personal musical style? For this purpose a model for expressing representations of historical/cultural features in music is put forward. Mechanisms of representation, such as simultanization or spherization, are used together with music analysis to form an interpretation of contemporary experience. From these premises the paper questions the adequacy of historical periodization and asks if analysis of representation could provide a firmer basis for a contemporary experience of Mozart's personal style. This conjecture is further supported by an accompanying analysis of culturally conditioned dialogue relations in Mozart's piano concertos KV 456 and 482.

1. Introduction

Present paper attempts to delineate a view of Mozart's personal style. This is seen, however, not primarily as a music internal matter, but as depending on music's representational properties, especially how a sense of the contemporary arises out of historical references. Two piano concertos' 1st movements, KV 456 and 482, are presented as examples of how outer stylistic and historical features are projected inside a concerto movement. This brings the need to examine the question of periodization of the late classical style and to juxtapose it with the concept of representation. This also opens a view of how Mozart in a highly personal way uses extra musical factors to form his personal stylistic language.

When historical allusions are used, the concept of contemporaneity is evoked to bring forth and integrate a sense of stylistic integrity. Two analytical examples that are presented here do not suffice to give a comprehensive picture of Mozart's personal style. It however points to the direction where the answers could be found after more detailed and extensive analytical work.

2. Sense of the contemporary and the personal style

Musical style period needs to be experienced as more or less contemporary. It is essential that a style as such is experienced as belonging to the now moment in a broad sense. How can this be achieved, then? We are making a distinction between different styles partly based on the way they make use of their surrounding styles.

A personal style is something that is experienced in the present moment. It illuminates how Mozart appears to us. In being able to recognize the difference between not yet and no more a certain style is paradoxically able to invoke this quality in all style periods. There is a peculiar type of representation taking place here. The sense of the contemporary within a period is transformed to the contemporariness of the present moment. This must be, then, something universally recognizable. Otherwise we could not be able to have access to the otherness of a historical period. Historical presence serves to gain a universal being. There is the ability of art to cite, to make relevant again any moment from the past, to re-evoke that which it had declared dead (Agamben 2009: 50). It is this combination of temporal significations that gains a universal status and is able to deliver the message of the work regardless of the time where reception takes place. In this way an individual starts to elaborate on previously non-existent matters because there is a space available to do this.

2.1. Reinterpreting music analysis

Can the above theoretical picture be illuminated through music analysis? In the concertos KV 456 and 482 certain compositional solutions are truly novel and ahead of their time. Most central of these is the way in which there is an emerging interaction between S1 and R1. In KV 482 bb-minor theme comes up in a location where in the history of concerto form a corresponding theme has never appeared before. Historically this detaches the secondary theme from the conventional type of contemporary in a temporal sense. Here it is the *Moi* that is detached in bar 128 (Example 2) since in comparison to the first ritornello R1 the individual is highlighted and in a tragic vein torn apart from the frame of reference provided by first ritornello that is much more part of the conventional contemporary in Enlightenment music. This is a virtual representation of a future style. This is compatible with the idea of a supra-zemic level as a conveyor of performance knowledge since here representations are virtual by nature.

2.2. Types of representation

Tarasti (2015: 67-69) makes a distinction between different types of representation. Can one find those types in how the social has been represented in concerto discourse? Different kinds of historical detachments and disjunctions can be discerned in the way configurations of modalities come up in relations between the first ritornello and the first solo. These mechanisms can then be related to how a sense of the contemporary arises in musical performance. In terms of music analysis we are dealing with the *Soi*, and in terms of concerto form it is the ritornello that is in focus. Basically, we need to see how materials from different historical distances are positioned with respect to each other and how various anachronisms and disjunctions might work toward the formation of the contemporary. This kind of representation is then experienced in a unique way at the present i.e. contemporary moment. Is this the kind of formal quality that is experienced as universal but that is embedded in deep context?

Can the above be used even as partial criteria of periodization? In a sense this implies the relative nature of stylistic categorization when the trademark of contemporary has become the sense of the work being detached from history not the ahistorical nature of the image of the

work. How does all of the above relate to periodization? One could easily see that Mozart in his late style is on the verge of early romanticism. In his sense this would form an essential part of his personal style. The paper asks, however, if this is sufficient as a stylistic marker?

3. Periodization and conceptual change

The approach of this section is built on a twofold theoretical development. On the one hand, we are constructing an approach based on dialogue internal to the discourse and see how this can be put in a historical perspective and producing a relation of representation. Here Mozart's piano concertos (cf. Rosen 1997; Keefe 2001) serve as paradigm case, although other repertoire could be included. On the other hand, principles of periodization and the problem of change from one stylistic period to another one is addressed with traditional tools of historiographical periodization and then this approach is integrated with the first mentioned theoretical tools. The goal is to present a renewed view of late classical style and its historical embeddedness and to show how it affects Mozart's personal style.

We are basing our approach on the general idea that at some point stylistic qualities, which partly originate outside of work at supra-zemic level, become internalized within musical works i.e. *Soi* enters the Moi. It is to be expected that this will put stylistic characteristics into sharper focus and will possibly alter familiar divisions. This awakens the question of a work's relation or embeddedness in its context, which can be seen as a problem of representation. The research questions if a new conceptual regiment is entered in romanticism and to what extent and in which ways does this relate to late classicism?

3.1. Mechanisms of stylistic representation

When there are stylistic features in a corpus, such as piano concertos, a part of which belongs to a former style and another part to the upcoming style, how or on what grounds should stylistic consequences be judged? This is closely related to the way in which concepts or clusters of concepts change and new concepts emerge. Customarily one has approached this phenomenon in terms of periodization. Yet, alternative mechanisms for representation between work and world can be discerned (Tarasti 2015: 69). They include possibilities such as simultanization, spherization, temporalization, fragmentation or *Wiederspiegelung,* etc. How do these mechanisms then depict a sense of dialogue, which has been our main source of concern? Although only one facet of the problem of representation a concrete example is the conversational culture in Enlightenment and how it is represented in the art of the time on both individual and social levels.

We may ask which of the available mechanisms suits the Enlightenment and which might best fit in with the present world. There is always a tension between these perspectives. In this way it may become possible to trace the route that our experience discovers through historical musical styles. The remaining research task of the present project is how to reconcile the above mechanisms of representation with Enlightenment art and its relation to early romanticism, and to see how this changes our present understanding of late classical style and contributes to Mozart's personal style.

When we have already established the relation of the work to cultural practice of Enlightenment, we can now examine how this relation changes in the changeover from classical style to romanticism. This relation may possess stylistically noteworthy clues with regard to stylistic identities. From this base one can widen the approach to interpretations of the work as it exists today, or those various interpretations that can be thought to be implicit in it. In this sense, it is not only a question of musical features per se, but it concerns the way that an artwork is po-

sitioned with respect to the outer reality. Existential moments are born here. They exist both in music and the outer world and in fact they are an outcome of an interaction between the two.

3.2. Re-signification of late classical style

What we are putting weight on in our model is how we conceive of a work's relation to various facets of representation of reality such as how the work represents our own reality, how a cultural practice is represented in the work, how previous cultural practices are represented in contemporary reality? What are, then, the differences to traditional periodization? Whereas stylistic features in conventional periodization are mostly based on musical features, in the present framework it is the Moi as a criterion behind the style that remains invariant. What is changed in these ways of representation, when romantic features are emerging? It is the Moi that changes only when romanticism proper is entered. The Moi prescribes what is endogenized and what is not. Many questions arise. Does conversational culture change when romanticism starts to emerge? Do romantic features cause in some way a widening of distance between work and reality? Does the romantic imagination cause a loosening of representational relations that in Enlightenment was a tighter fit or does it possibly result in a change in their objects? Most importantly, when these romantic features come up in an environment basically belonging to classical style, how does this affect representational relations and consequently the related stylistic prescription?

This leads us to the question about Enlightenment conversational culture and its relation to artistic expression. It is widely acknowledged that Enlightenment highly valued conversational culture (Hanning 1989). Yet, the crucial question is how this culture talks to us today while manners of conversation today are certainly different, and communication has become increasingly fluid? Obviously, a sense of conversation can be represented in a musical work. How do, then, different modes of being function toward representing this cultural phenomenon?

The above discussion, it is conjectured, amounts to a reinterpretation of boundaries of late classical style. On the one hand, we need to consider how a work relates to its own time and its cultural and stylistic arrangements. On the other hand, one should consider what the properties are that remain relevant from the perspective of our own time. In other words, what is being carried over to the realm of contemporary performance practice?

As mentioned, what the more exact relation between the work and reality is, is a question of representation (Tarasti 2015), which can be expressed through mechanisms of representation or possibly also in terms of rhetoric (Greenblatt 1988). It could in fact be argued that for an existential moment to arise both these levels and their mutual relations need to be considered either in the form of negation or affirmation. In these instances, the work and outer reality become one in a metaphorical, experiential sense. It is the existential experience that finds a way to reconcile them. To generate an inner experience (internalized and represented *Soi* and *Moi*) we need here the outer world (outer *Soi* and *Moi*), the latter of which can be seen partly to exist in transcendence at supra-zemic level (Tarasti 2000, 2015). Basically, this recognizes the centrality of both the aesthetically positive experiences and the tragic ones as well. It is the relation of representation that is the driving force and initiator of changes and that is conceived in different terms at different style periods.

4. Cultural signification and representation in KV 456 and 482

There is no absolute force from the outside in classical style that makes things work in a certain way. Rather there is a spontaneous order that arises from within the musical discourse that then results in a peculiar manner or arrangement and order between the individual and society and

the respective modalities. In this sense there is compatibility also with the Enlightenment concept of sociability that implies a sense of spontaneous order that arises within society (Kors 2005).

NMA V/15/5: KV 456/01

NMA V/15/5: KV 456/01

Internationale Stiftung Mozarteum, Online Publications (2006)

Example 1. Piano concerto KV 456, 1st movement, bars 105-117.

4.1. Analysis of KV 456

4.1.1. Interaction between musical work and cultural practice in KV 456

The inner dialogue characterizes the conversational procedures of this concerto movement. A feature at the end of R1 is picked up by S1 and it is commented through the procedure of vary-

ing it in different ways in S1. In this sense there is a dialogue going on inside the S1 as well, but one whose origins nevertheless are in the formal section R1. This is a joint appearance of rhetorical figures of iteration (repetition of the proposition before drawing our formal conclusion, Cicero), incrementum (a kind of amplification which by steps of comparison scores every degree till it come on the top, Hoskins) and distribution (our statement may be distributed into parts, Cicero) (Sonnino 1968). The overall effect is one of distribution and enhanced significance. In terms of modalities this is shown as modality of must, combined with light buffo character that does not really move anywhere, therefore its seemingly harmless insignificance.

In terms of relation to society there arises a metonymic relation to the plural changes in various social and individual actant roles that are a consequence of changing relation between public and private sphere. It is suggested that these are reflected in Mozart's music. In terms of linguistic theory this is a question of not-at-issue, which is in the course of the movement transformed into a more meaningful and diversified role.

A side issue in bars 61-76 (not-at-issue) is taken and turned into something that can be considered the main target of elaboration, understood as a conversational reaction in S1 not development as such. Basically, this is a question of a motive consisting of repetition. In itself the figure does not have a clear form functional role, but in R1 it is turned into a cadential closing function (cf. Caplin 1998). It could even be said that in S1 there is a dialogue among the motive itself, a closed dialogue, which seems to imply that although he/she is on stage now the respective actor is not really in interaction with the rest of society. An upward 8th and a downward 5th motive is added to the repetition motive at bars 105-117 (Example 1). Through this transformation the repetition motive moves closer to the modality 'might'. Its buffo character is also strengthened. In a temporal sense it becomes more forward directed. This is the conversational content of R1-S1 relation. As a whole, the concerto seems to convey a sense of isolated forward moving patches and as a result a feeling of competition between these and more conventional discursive material such as main and subsidiary themes. Corresponding phenomenon of embracing a not important looking feature as a central target of attention happens to varying extent in other concertos as well. In Mozart the main theme rarely turns out to be a main theme except in the sense that it appears in the location that is conventionally reserved for the main theme. From a conversational point of view, we suggest that this is the case in Mozart's concertos. Perhaps it is these not-at-issue passages that are most capable to convey the meaning and changes in meaning of modalities in conversation and for this reason Mozart relies on them.

4.1.2. Representations of the contemporary in KV 456

Metaphorically this may signify the increasing possibility for entry to the public sphere of representatives of previously minor or so far marginalized and in this sense insignificant groups. This could be taken as a reflection of societal changes in the Enlightenment. A new significance is given to them in this part of concerto discourse. There is energy pouring into the society from the music and in this sense also a grounding for dialogue between the performer and audience has been provided. In this sense an artwork could be a reaction to the power relations in societal practices. At least it can be said that there are traces of historical knowledge that support this kind of interpretation. There seems to be various kinds of human characters that are raised to the front stage from the back through corresponding procedures.

Mozart is clearly playing with different temporal layers to overcome the sense of conventional contemporary. In KV 456 he evokes the abundance of rhetorical flourishing that one discovers in baroque style, closely resembling the kind of baroque sequences that are occasionally to be found in development sections of classical concertos. Here it is placed in the first solo to emphasize the agency of the individual, the *Moi*. This is a remarkable achievement for exam-

ple in comparison to a buffo character in bars 61-66 in an almost atemporal and inert passage where the society is clearly on hold Mozart brings along an entirely new topic and turns it into a baroque-like sequence (bars 105-117) which is in highly unconventional position in the exposition. There are many aspects in this procedure that are something that is not yet, but also aspects that express the not any more in a stylistic sense. It is this kind of construction of the contemporary that as representation it is possible to understand and gain an understanding of the present moment as well. It is this tension within the contemporary that can be sensed regardless of what the present moment in history is. This would seem to hold even though the experience is bound to be of a different kind. In the above sense there is a universal component involved in this historicizing process. Here we have the historical traces represented as a result of simultanization. Different historical moments are superimposed into simultaneous presence in the work of art.

NMA V/15/6: KV 482/01

Example 2. Piano concerto KV 482, 1st movement, bars 128-139.

4.2. Analysis of KV 482

4.2.1. Musical level in KV 482: Solo and ritornello as contemporary agency

The bb-minor theme in bars 128-139 (Example 2) is the only theme that can be measured against the main theme complex (bars 1-13) in rigor and majestic character. Most importantly as a modal mixture it is a negation (¬) to the major mode or predominantly buffo world of

R1. This is a transcendental act of negation, which initiates a dialogue between R1 and S1. The individual stands against the world view represented by orchestral ritornello R1. In this sense there is a negation between the world views as well, where R1 stands for the "old world" (ancient regime) whereas S1 is a representation of novel, more progressive features of the Enlightenment and where things start to evolve around the individual. Thus, the two world views coexist in the Mozart concerto 1st movement. It is symptomatic and a possible sign of reconciliation that bb-minor theme does not appear again in the recapitulation, but the other two themes do. Perhaps it has fulfilled its destiny and may disappear in due course.

It is now interesting to ask how this kind of signifying strategy might be related to matters of musical performance. This can be accessed through the theory of modalities and temporal references that can be derived from modalities together with relevant contextual features. It is from interaction between modalities that a sense of dialogue based on temporality arises. This in its turn is expressive of the contemporary that is conveyed through the possibly contradicting or anachronistic historicities of the piece. As a Sturm und Drang topic the theme paves the way to romanticism, the forthcoming period. In KV 482 perhaps the most striking feature is the sudden shift to bb-minor half way through solo exposition with this Sturm und Drang topic. Without previous appearances in the movement and an energetic upward movement together with strong modality of 'must$_{Moi}$' the complex produces a strong forward directed temporal reference – perhaps the highest degree of modality in the whole movement. This is further enhanced in the latter part of the thematic complex although the reference is reversed into a backward one through several repetitions of the cadential gesture. This gives further credibility for the idea that within one phrase there tends to be two modalities combined with a historical reference within an alien historical context.

4.2.2. Representation of culture in KV 482

When the entry them launches the solo exposition, it remains somehow indifferent in terms of modality because of overly simplified harmony, as though the actor did not have a clear volition. This is Singende Stil with a slight touch of buffo topic. When the basically same theme, although without the Galant features, arrives after the Sturm und Drang episode the underlying harmony enforces a more complex modality on it. The tonality is ambivalent, the theme does not seem to be able to decide between Eb-major (the previous tonality) and Bb-major (the forthcoming tonality, structural dominant). There is uneasiness about the Buffo character that was so eminent in R1. The actor does not seem to be certain of its identity and /or its manner of development. This can be seen as being largely due to alternating backward and forward directed temporal reference.

How does one find parallels to 18th century conversation? Conversational culture of the time should first be studied as such. Here we are entering the realm of cultural signification and the related cultural profile of the movement. At last instance we should also figure out how these forms of conversation are understood from today's perspective and how anachronistic features contribute to the experience of the contemporary. In KV 482 this is also a result of simultanization, but now there is also a sense of spherization in that the modes are arranged around the *Moi* or me as is evident in first solo where in bb-minor theme the individual takes a central position in relation to which other interpretation in the movement is done.

5. Summarizing the argument

We have located mechanisms of representation through which influences from historically distant periods are brought together to create a sense of the present experience. Our examples present two different cases of how the outer is projected inside a musical work. These can be

taken as instantiations of Mozart's personal style and how this style relates to stylistic and historical circumstances of its own period and how it might be experienced today. In KV 456 this is a matter of representing stylistic features of Baroque period in highly unconventional location in concerto form, while KV 482 presents Sturm und Drang features again in an unconventional location that are usually associated with development sections. Both cases deliver a sense of dialogue that emerges between R1 and S1 and that through historical categories results in a contemporary experience of musical discourse.

We may now ask, what is the relation between historical periodization and history seen through change in representation? Could it be that the whole concept of a period is getting redundant and that we should more readily trust on composer's personal stylistic profile that is born of analysis of representation?

6. Conclusion

In this way it has been shown already that an art work is not only a document of 18th century culture, but an imaginative combination of various even temporally distant elements that together are able to create a sense of the contemporary. How these elements are ordered can be depicted via mechanisms of representation such as spherization, simultanization, localization or temporalization or a combination of these. They convey a sense of how a representation relates to the represented and how it is given a contemporary way of being. Along with the mechanism of representation the way the dialogue works appears to be subject to historical change. This manner of representation holds the key to understanding Mozart's personal style. In this way a step has been taken toward delineation of Mozart's personal style especially based on how Mozart's *Moi* may be seen to transform influences of the outer world into unique artistic creations.

Stylistic references that are either "not yet" or "not anymore" build up a network of representations of Mozart's personal style and convey the message of the music to our contemporary listener and performer. A specific type of dialogue emerges out of these disjunctions and juxtapositions of the historically impregnated references.

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URBAN SEMIOCRISES RESEMANTISING CITIES: BOUNDARIES, PRACTICES AND PLAYFULNESS

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Abstract

Urban areas are undergoing a semiocrisis, triggered by a change of episteme in our culture (Tarasti 2015). If globalisation already blurred identities, reshaped neighbourhoods and outsourced industrial production far from the European cities (Cross & Moore 2001), today cities are facing a new mutation. Internet and ICT are eroding the everyday-life meaning of space, as they move on-line many tasks that used to require physical movement — the spaces of the city are, hence, partially de-semiotised and available to assume new meanings. As for all semiocrisis, the first reaction has been to resort to old values, reinforcing separations based on census (gentrification) and on origins (banlieues, Londonistans). However, the space of the city, relieved of the burden of ordinary-life functions, is also available to different semiotic domains, such as playfulness. This paper aims at investigating how the ludicisation of our culture (Bonefant & Genvo 2014) influences our ways of reading and writing the city. Playful practices such as flash-mobs, parkour and memetic street art will be engaged in order to shed some light on how the modelling system of play seems to offer a valid solution to today's urban semiocrisis.

1. What are semiocrises?

This paper aims at applying the concept of semiocrisis to the contemporary urban environment in order to enrich the semiotic tools for a framework for urban gamification (already initiated in Thibault 2016).

The concept of "semiocrisis" is part of the wider theory of existential semiotics, developed in the last years by Prof. Eero Tarasti and well showcased in the book *Sein und Schein* (2015). Semiocriss are due to a deep change of epistemes in a culture (Tarasti 2015: 142). In other words, while the immanent structures of social life have changed or are changing, its visible and observable signs did not, and therefore they do not correspond to it any more.

Semiocrises, I quote:

> Can be to some extent anticipated but, *when* they take place exactly speaking, no one can tell. The conceptual orientations of a culture's deep level also move as slowly as continental plateaus. A semiocrisis emerges when these epistemic levels start to move. This becomes manifest when the prevalent discourse in a society does no longer correspond to the epistemic reality (Tarasti 2015: 142).

And again, in a semiocrisis:

> Signs have lost their isotopies, their connections to their true meanings. (…) It is as if under the surface of the everyday reality there would loom a kind of sociokinetic energy field, which can combine things in unexpected manners. Just these changes in such a socio-energetic level are recognized as semiocrisis (Tarasti 2015: 143).

In these moments, then, a crisis is happening between the social signs and their meaning, a culturally-motivated "misworking" of semiosis. It is a gradual change, extremely slow, but when it reaches a breaking point it leaves the citizens in a structureless situation, completely exposed to the change. This, according to Tarasti, can have two consequences: either individuals become aware of themselves as existing subjects or, more commonly, they try to reject the lack of meaning opened by the semiocrisis, generally resorting to old or mythological values. The efforts to return to a previous stage, however, are doomed to fail, but they are not consequenceless, as it is well shown by the contemporary revival of nationalism in face of globalisation. Nevertheless, semiocrises can also be productive, as in a leap from nothingness to creation of a new meaning, a new semiotic identity may arise (2015: 144).

2. Urban semiotics

In order to approach *urban* semiocrises we have first to make some considerations on how we make sense of the city spaces — how we interpret them and how we "write them".

In 1980 Michel de Certeau in his *L'invention du quotidien* proposed to consider the city as a textual form. This parallelism — metaphorically already implicit in the expression "urban fabric" — leads de Certeau to consider the cities as a real text, actualised (and transformed) by the practices of interaction and crossing of their inhabitants. The journey of the latter through the urban space, then, is nothing but an *enunciation* by which the individuals take possession of the cities and transform them by introducing their own subjectivity. The city, thus, is a text anything but fixed: it is the result of practices of enunciation that, at the same time, actualise and deeply modify the urban spaces. The metaphor of urban space as a text was later retrieved by semiotics as an important research direction. In one of the founding works of urban semiotics, Ugo Volli writes:

> From the semiotic point of view, an expressive reality that is renewed and continually redefines itself such as the city, is defined a discourse: a signifying practice which, however, at all times projected behind itself a text. The city is alive, it changes materially and in the meaning that it projects; but in every time it is stable and legible as a book (Volli (2005: 1 [my translation]).

The city, then, is not "really" a text, but rather works as a text — as a text it can be read, but also approached, analysed and understood (Volli 2008). The city, just like a text, is both an organic whole — that can be understood and labelled as a unique thing — and characterized by an irreducible structural heterogeneity — a city encompasses numerous texts smaller scale (neighbourhoods, streets, buildings, signs, street furniture, graffiti ...). All these smaller texts

are interconnected by their simultaneous presence within the city, which then becomes a web of meaningful elements connected to each other (Volli 2005). This is obviously an unstable and uncertain mingling, whose metamorphoses follow different times and rhythms, from the slow construction of new neighbourhoods to the quick work of street-writers and the ephemeral presence of advertising posters.

Urban spaces, then, are complex semiotic engines, were many layers of meaning coexist and sometimes clash. Our urban semiotic competence regulates our ability of living and moving through a city, guiding our interpretations. Nevertheless, this competence can never be definitive, as the continuous changes of meaning of the city require flexibility and adaptation.

In this frame, an urban semiocrisis is a *desemiotising* force that is able to impair our urban competence, as it questions the meaning that we are used to attributing to public spaces.

3. The urban semiocrisis

The general semiocrisis related to globalisation has strong effects also on cities. Through migrations, globalisation blurs identities and reshapes neighbourhoods rewriting the urban text on different dimensions, adding new layers of meaning to those already existing and, sometimes, erasing almost completely other layers (Cross & Moore 2001). Moreover, the outsourcing of industrial production far from the European cities left behind itself a series of *terrain vagues*, that cities are still trying with patience to refunctionalise and re-insert into the urban fabric.

As for all semiocrisis, the first reaction to this change of paradigm, has been to resort to old values. The cities have been reshaped then according to census — is what we call "gentrification" — of ethnicity — the rhetoric "Londonistans" —or both — like in Paris' *banlieues.*

Nevertheless, while this crisis is far from solved, another one, potentially much more revolutionary, is also starting to show its effects. I'm thinking about the Internet and ICT revolution, whose impact is increasingly reshaping our lives. Among the many effects of this revolution, one has a direct impact on the everyday-life meaning of space. Today, many tasks that used to require physical movement require only an internet connection. We do not need to go to the post office for sending documents, nor to go to the bank for managing our account. Many certificates can be obtained online, without queueing in public offices, and working from home becomes more and more common. Netflix is a good substitute for Blockbusters and, in a certain measure, for Cinema; Amazon is replacing bookshops. The spaces of the city, then, are partially desemiotised: their traditional meanings and their isotopies are fading, as the use value of spaces is slowly disappearing.

4. Playing with the city: a possible solution?

The spaces of the city, now partially relieved of the burden of their ordinary-life functions, are however available to assume new meanings, to be resemantised. As signifiers orphaned of their signified, they become easily exploitable for the creation of new signs, and therefore for incorporating new meaning inside the city. There are, in fact, several operations of this kind and, interestingly enough, they often feature a pronounced playful nature. Let's see a few examples.

Flash-mobs, nowadays, are perhaps one of the most widespread practices of urban play. Often located in the city streets, in train stations or subways, flash mobs involve the sudden creation of a crowd of people making an unusual performance characterised by a playful nature. These performances invade the space of traditional events (protest marches, sit-ins, fairs) and often replace them as ways of aiming at the same objectives (Turco 2012). There are flash mobs of political protest, others that promote moments of sociability (e.g. the *dinners in white*), or

purely recreational (zombie walks) or promotional. During flash mobs the spaces of the city are transformed in improvised stages for shows that involve masking, playful carnivalesque traits, and surreal spectacles. We face, then, a semiotic device acting on the border between everyday reality and play. Viewers of a flash mob become players without their knowledge: the communicative effectiveness of this practice is based on their interpretative disorientation, their temporary inability to distinguish between play and real life.

Urban games, on the other hand, are full-fledged games that take place in city environments, encouraging participants to move freely in public spaces, to socialize and interact with passersby and to favour exploration, experimentation and the creative use of urban spaces. These games are mostly, but not necessarily, played in the squares and streets of the city, but can also take place on public transportation, libraries, shops, restaurants and universities. A special kind of urban games, typically digital, uses GPS devices and smartphones to transform the players' position in space in data exploitable for in-game purposes. *Locations based games*, as they are called, are games where the player has to move through the real space of the city in order to win or to progress in the digital game. These games frequently make use of augmented reality, or using a computer (usually a smartphone) to enrich the perception that the player has of the urban environment. These games are not limited to the resemantise the urban text, but they also write on it, adding digital textualities that will overlap intermittently to semiotic buzz that already characterizes the city. In some cases, these are purely recreational games — as the famous Pokémon *Go* (Niantic, 2016), while others may be gamified apps that spur the players to make physical activities (Nike+) — what they have in common is the attempt to give a value to the spatial dimension by replacing the traditional meaning with a playful one. In this way, if the growing digital media evolution always requires less to move by necessity, these games offer a new reason for crossing urban spaces whose incentive are no longer functional, but playful.

We could, of course, make many other examples, such as parkour (see Leone: 2009), or game-inspired street-art (Fig. 1).


Figure 1. A graffiti from street-artist Invader.

Urban gamification, therefore, attempt to harness the ability of play to bestow city-authorship to the common citizen. With no need of actually modifying the city, the players/citizens can act on their own urban competence to re-interpret the city according to new logics, and therefore to fill desemiotised urban spaces with new meaning.

Play's efficacy to this task it is probably not innate, but it is probably rooted in another change of paradigm: the so-called *ludicisation of culture* (Bonefant & Genvo 2014). This is a cultural shift that sees play become one of the most efficient universalistic metaphors in our culture. In other words, play and games are rapidly moving towards the centre of our semiosphere, and therefore they become more and more able to offer new meaning to our society, de facto also offering resources to replace what is desemantised by the ICT revolution.

Approaching this topic in the frame of existential semiotics, in conclusion, allows us to see how play seems to offer an alternative to a reactionary response to urban semiocrises. Instead of painfully recurring to old stereotypes and models to keep the city spaces under control and in the hopeless attempt to stop the semiocrisis, playfulness offers a way of investing the city of new meanings, particularly effective to foster a re-appropriation of the public spaces by the citizens.

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