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# Riding the Populist Wave

Metaphors of Populism and Anti-Populism in the *Daily Mail* and *The Guardian*<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

*This paper addresses the construction of the concepts of populism and anti-populism and their metaphorical realisations in British news discourse, and specifically in the Daily Mail and The Guardian, in 2016, a crucial year for populist politics. The analysis of two corpora made of articles from the two newspapers is based on the methodology offered by Corpus Linguistics and Corpus Approach to Critical Metaphor Analysis. The metaphors of populism emerging from the analysis highlight a substantially standardised use of the metaphor POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT, both for populists and anti-populists, but with diverging evaluations. The authors argue that metaphors play a key role in orienting the public perception of populism based on shared modes of understanding social and political life.*

**Keywords:** *anti-populism, metaphors, media, news, populism*

Towards the end of his final speech at the European Parliament on 29 January 2020, just two days before the UK officially left the EU, Nigel Farage celebrated the outcome of the Brexit referendum and quipped about the political backdrop against which Brexit was taking place: “[t]here is a historic battle going on now across the West—in Europe, America and elsewhere. It is globalism against populism. And you may loathe populism, but I’ll tell you a funny thing—it’s becoming very popular” (Peck 2020). By playing with the common root of

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<sup>1</sup> This paper has been conceived and written jointly by the three authors. The individual contributions of the authors are identified as follows: Massimiliano Demata is the author of Sections 2, 3, 4 and 6; Michelangelo Conoscenti has written Section 5 and made the two corpora used in this paper machine-readable; Massimiliano Demata and Yannis Stavrakakis have jointly written the Introduction and Section 1. Section 7 has been written jointly by the three authors.

“populism” and “popular” in opposition to “globalism,” Farage was praising his own success story of a well-implemented populist agenda. The implicit assumption is that the frequent appellation of “populist” which Farage and other leaders and parties abroad had been attributed by rival politicians and media was disparaging, as populism is “loathed” by those who oppose it. Indeed, especially within the European context (because, arguably, global comparison and historical contextualization reveal a much more diverse and ambivalent picture), the “populist” *topos* has slowly come to operate as an almost undisputed ‘common place,’ as an index suggesting some kind of imminent danger and as a warning signal indicating the threat coming from a grave political pathology.

In effect, Farage’s words reflect the highly conflictual nature of populism as a set of political ideals and practices as well as the diverging meanings of the term *populism* as it is *de facto* negotiated in discourse, becoming itself a focus of ideological struggle. In today’s political and media culture, populism acquires either a positive or a negative connotation (mostly the latter, as we have seen, given the sedimentation of a pejorative meaning over time). This raises questions on the contested meaning of populism in the public domain, and how it is shaped by media and political discourses as well as by the public at large, sometimes producing the ‘common place’ meaning often taken for granted in today’s Europe. Indeed, while populism has been thoroughly studied in political science, less attention has been paid to “vernacular” populism (Bale, Van Kassel and Taggart 2011, 112; Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2016, 18; Hamo, Kampf and Weiss-Yanim 2018, 1), that is, to the non-scholarly use of then term, and specifically to how metaphors contribute to shaping the meaning and the public perception of populism.

This paper addresses the issue of how populism is conceptualised in news media, and specifically of how metaphors contribute to the evaluation of populism in its “vernacular” use in two leading British newspapers, *The Guardian* and the *Daily Mail*. Two corpora have been compiled, one for each newspaper, collecting all the articles where *populis\** appears. The year chosen for the two corpora is 2016, which was, as claimed by the *Wall Street Journal*, “the Year Populism Went Mainstream” (Glaston 2016). The two corpora will be analysed with two research questions in mind:

1. What is the meaning (or meanings) of populism emerging from its “vernacular” use?
2. How is the meaning of populism shaped by metaphors?

The paper opens with a theoretical discussion of populism and antipopulism, which emphasises the need to trace these oppositional ‘markers’ in discourse. This is followed by a review of how news media have addressed populism. The two corpora are then analysed in their main lexical features and the most frequent metaphors used to define populism. The main hypothesis is that metaphors used to address populism are not just a key element in its evaluation, but also contribute to (and derive from) a conceptualization of society based on a sociocognitive and discursive construction of the social space in terms of physical space. In this sense, metaphors play a key role in orienting the public perception of populism on the basis of shared modes of understanding social and political life.

### **1. Populism and anti-populism**

There are many interpretations of populism, and its true meaning still seems to be elusive: populism has been seen as an ideology, a soft ideology, a thin ideology, a discourse, a strategy, an organisational pattern or a style (for a comprehensive presentation of different orientations on the topic, see Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2017). The one issue that most scholars seem to intuitively agree on is that populism mainly consists in the elaboration of an antagonistic political space dominated by the struggle between the elite and the people. This social, cultural, and political chasm is used by the populists in order to justify their claims to power: they present themselves as the true voice of ‘the people’ as opposed to ‘traditional’ politicians and the economic and institutional establishment, who embody ‘the elite.’ How can we refine such an intuition in order to produce a set of operational criteria for the differential identification of populism? Interestingly enough, populism has recently been defined on the basis of a dichotomic identity in ideological and discursive terms: populism is constructed in opposition to what has been called anti-populism, i.e. all those parties and leaders who are competing with the populists.

This is important because, obviously, populism cannot be studied in isolation from the broader social and political stakes framing its emergence. In this sense, the populist/anti-populist divide is at the basis of two diverging ideas of how democracy should work, and scholars have attempted to account for the nature of this divide. This is also important for analytical reasons because the meaning of populism is usually created by those who oppose and often demonize it. As a result, in certain contexts, the pejorative signification has all but eliminated all the others (Stavrakakis 2017a). In that sense, a rigorous linguistic and political study of populism must also be a rigorous study of anti-populism. In discourse analysis, this becomes, in addition, a methodological priority to the extent that, very often, the discursive material

directly accessible to the analyst is predominantly anti-populist. If being a ‘populist’ is rather rarely chosen by politician as an acceptable self-description, then the ‘populist’ designation has to be the creation of an anti-populist opponent or the analyst herself. It is also important to note that the division is not limited within the political sub-system but permeates the socio-cultural field.

Beyond the ideological differences between different populist movements and parties, Ostiguy defines populism and anti-populism in terms of opposition between the “low” and the “high” (Ostiguy 2017). In particular, he looks at the populism/anti-populism division in sociocultural and sociopolitical terms: the “low” is associated with the populist tendency to personalism and coarseness, in direct opposition to the “high,” often represented by the traditional parties, which claim to support institutions, legal procedures and proper manners (Moffitt 2018: 7). From a perspective more anchored to discourse rather than style, Stavrakakis has argued that the populism/anti-populism dichotomy has gradually emerged as the most characteristic feature of political discourse in Europe, to the extent that “the axis between populism and anti-populism emerges as the dominant cleavage, and ideological rupture that organises the political meaning of our current predicament, orienting the discursive production of various political actors in Greece, southern Europe and beyond” (Stavrakakis 2014, 505). This development has been facilitated by the crisis of representation that marked the administration of the 2008 world financial crisis. Especially since, within Europe, this administration, in terms of actual policies, was largely conditioned by European and Eurozone institutions, the populism/anti-populism divide has largely coincided with the anti-European/pro-European rift. Most European populist parties are nationalist or at least anti-EU and compete against pro-EU parties, with the result that sometimes “Europe and populism are viewed as the two extremes of a radical antithesis” (Stavrakakis 2014, 510)—although one should also take into account ideological orientations that are simultaneously pro-EU and anti-EU. Indeed, the eurosceptic dimension is particularly evident in the United Kingdom: the outcome of the Brexit referendum of 2016 was a victory of the (partly) populist Leave campaign, which appealed to anti-immigration feelings and was a political offspring of decades of Euroscepticism fed by conservative politicians and most tabloid press (Kneuer 2018).

At the same time, registering the importance of anti-populism from a discursive perspective is also important on epistemological and ethical grounds. Scholarship on populism has rarely been neutral on the populist/anti-populist divide. The pejorative meaning of populism has a long tradition in scholarship and has become naturalised in discourse, constituting a ‘common

place' in debates about populism (Stavrakakis 2017a, 4-5; 2018, 34). Furthermore, anti-populism is "the default position for the academy" (Moffitt 2018, 5), given that most political scientists who study populism also consider it as a political practice dangerous to democracy with supposedly authoritarian leanings (Moffitt 2016, 134-142) and usually identify it with the far right (Stavrakakis 2018, 35). This rather euro-centric perspective often ignores the historical complexity and the comparative variance of populism(s) around the globe and betrays a certain bias in favour of elitist models of democracy and away from any concept of popular sovereignty and popular participation in decision-making processes. In some cases, it can also be an indication of poor, unreflective scholarship: "The study of populism is instructive about the consequences of condescension, *arrogance*, and *ignorance* on the part of elites and intellectuals" (Vann Woodward 1981, 32, emphasis added).

Following Ostiguy's and Stavrakakis's distinction between populism and anti-populism, if a leader or a party is accused of being populist, this is usually done pejoratively and is produced discursively mainly by those political actors who claim to oppose populism. However, the pejorative nature of the term is so well embedded in political, media, and academic culture that for a long time it has rarely been used with an alternative, more positive meaning. Indeed, in their survey of the British press published in 2011, Bale, Van Kassel and Taggart noticed how *populism* had become a term of insult by whoever used it. While the term could be attached to a wide variety of policies, *populist* could be used by either the conservative or the progressive press to attack their opponents. Yet, the growing success of populist leaders and parties since Bale, Van Kassel and Taggart's paper was published raises questions as to how the meaning of populism is constructed and regarded in the public domain. This calls for the development of new hypotheses on the often paradoxical interaction between politics, academia and the media; for example, on account of their undifferentiated anti-populist default positioning, very often the media and academia are perceived as parts of the establishment and, as a result, their denunciation of populism actually helps the forces denounced as populist to present themselves as the only real threats to 'the system,' irrespective of their ideological/class location.

Hence, a rigorous discursive analysis of the meaning(s) with which the word *populism* is invested within the populism/anti-populism nexus requires the development of formal, reflexive criteria for the identification of populism, something requiring an awareness of the historical and geographical-cultural background. For example, it is instructive how the progressive, egalitarian populist tradition in the US (going back to the *People's Party* of the

1890s, a precursor of Roosevelt's New Deal) conditions the positive definition employed even by mainstream politicians like Obama:

Speaking at a press conference alongside the president of Mexico and the prime minister of Canada, President Barack Obama offered a strong implicit rebuke to Donald Trump, saying, "I'm not prepared to concede the notion that some of the rhetoric that's been popping up is populist." [...] Instead, Obama said that he is the true populist. "I care about workers being able to have a collective voice in the workplace and get their fair share of the pie," he said. "I want to make sure that kids get a decent education." (Yglesias 2016)

Given the aforementioned complexities, one of the most common limitations of contemporary populism research is the lack of a rigorous and operational working definition allowing us to encompass signifying fluctuations. This is rather paradoxical to the extent that a variety of research orientations today—ideational, discursive, etc.—seem to tentatively agree on a set of shared common (minimal) criteria designating populism "as a formal discursive articulation dividing society into two relatively homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the people versus the elite" (Andreadis and Ruth-Lovell 2017, 112). This recent rendering of the ideational definition operates in a more or less similar wavelength with a discursive perspective drawing on the so-called Essex School. For the latter, populism presupposes

a dichotomic discourse in which 'the people' are juxtaposed to 'the elite' along the lines of a down/up antagonism in which 'the people' is discursively constructed as a large powerless group through opposition to 'the elite' conceived as a small and illegitimately powerful group. Populist politics thus claim to represent 'the people' against an 'elite' that frustrates their legitimate demands, and present these demands as expressions of the will of 'the people' (De Cleen and Stavrakakis 2017, 310).

Here, the difference from the original (full) ideational definition is largely a difference of emphasis. In Mudde's oft-quoted definition, populism is presented as "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people" (Mudde 2004, 543). Let us set aside the obvious epistemological distance between the two perspectives; their emphasis on 'discourse' or 'ideology' respectively, their different views on whether populists perceive 'the people' (and the 'elite') as always already 'homogeneous' or just involved in some strategic, performative operation of collective identification and (relative) unification, on stressing the democratic or undemocratic potential of populism(s), and on the necessity or superfluousness of additional criteria (like moralization, for example, which seems to operate, within ideational

approaches, as the supplement that ties them to a liberal, predominantly anti-populist tradition). What then emerges is a set of two minimal criteria: (1) “people-centrism” and (2) “anti-elitism” (Stavrakakis 2017b, 528). Together they constitute the common backbone on which these two salient perspectives seem to agree (other orientations in populism research, like the late work of Margaret Canovan, are also compatible with this designation). This is the minimal, formal definition that will be employed in this paper.

## 2. News media and populism

The populism versus anti-populism divide is fed by news media, which are often “stakeholders” in this divide: left-of-centre media (e.g. CNN and the *New York Times* in the USA, *The Guardian* and the *Independent* in the UK) mainly support anti-populist parties (and occasionally publish editorials by populism scholars), while conservative media (e.g. Fox News in the USA or most British popular press) have a populist outlook on the major political issues. All news media contribute to the development of a non-scholarly, “vernacular” (Bale, Van Kassel and Taggart 2011, 112; Rovira Kaltwasser et al. 2016, 18; Hamo et al. 2018, 1) populism which partly overlaps with its academic use: as seen in Section 1, the term populism is used mainly negatively in academia (i.e. populism is a danger and is connected to xenophobia or racism), and newspapers use this pejorative meaning as a rhetorical weapon to discredit their enemies. In this sense, as emerging from Hamo, Kampf and Weiss-Yanim’s analysis of populism in Israel, political and news discourses often use populism as a “keyword” and a metadiscursive, “positioning resource” (2018, 4), characterised by “the moral-evaluative undertones of its motivational layer of meaning and its overwhelmingly pejorative sense” (2018, 7), which contributes to defining the speaker’s attitude towards the social reality s/he describes. Bale, Van Kassel and Taggart (2011) notice how, while the label ‘populist’ can be attached to very different political actors and policies, the overall usage of populism in British newspapers is pejorative. Similarly, in Greek newspapers, populism is used again negatively and is linked either with *Syriza*, Greece’s left-wing populist party, or with right-wing populist movements from abroad (Nikisianis et al. 2018).

The *Daily Mail* and *The Guardian* have been chosen for analysis in this paper because of both their popularity (and therefore their influential role in shaping and spreading vernacular uses of populism) and their supposedly diverging evaluation of populist politics. The *Daily Mail*, “Britain’s most influential newspaper” (Henderson et al. 2016, 187), is a ‘popular paper,’ with a strong focus on entertainment, while *The Guardian* is a quality paper and its primary function is informative (Jucker 1992, 47). The two newspapers may also be distinguished on

the basis of their belonging to two distinct categories used to classify newspapers, i.e. “popular” vs “elite” (Conboy 2007, 10), a distinction which echoes the key categorization (people vs elite) commonly used as the basis of populism. A further difference may be seen in the language used by the two newspapers, with the *Daily Mail* showing the typical “emotionally charged” language of tabloids or popular papers, while *The Guardian* strives to use a “neutral language,” appealing to “the cognitive part of ourselves” (Kitis and Milapedes 1997, 562).

The differences between the two newspapers extend to politics. The *Daily Mail* has always supported anti-Liberal policies, famously campaigning against immigration and abortion laws, and its content, language, and style certainly caters for, using Ostiguy’s term, a “low” audience. It campaigned for Leave in the name of nationalism and nativism, attacking at the same time the EU and rejecting multiculturalism and globalization (Martinson 2016). *The Guardian* has a mainly left-of-centre attitude and endorsed Remain along with the *Daily Mirror* and the *Financial Times* (Levy et al. 2016, 4, 10). These deep ideological differences are also mirrored by the attitudes towards Brexit of their respective readerships, with *The Guardian* readers largely supporting Remain, while most *Daily Mail* readers were in favour of Brexit (Taylor 2019). The year 2016 was chosen for analysis because of two key populist events, i.e. the Leave victory at the Brexit referendum on June and the election of Donald Trump as the President of the United States of America in November. If the huge rise of worldwide Google searches for *populism* in 2016 tell us anything about the popularity of the term (Mudde 2018), then it is possible to argue that in that year populism became a key signifier in the public sphere.

### 3. Methodology

The analysis of the metaphors of populism and anti-populism in this paper will employ the methodology and tools of Corpus Linguistics, and in particular, considering the goal of the research, the Corpus Approach to Critical Metaphor Analysis proposed by Charteris-Black (2004). In order to trace the metaphorical constructions of populism, the analysis has been carried out on *populis\** as a search-word, with the (\*) working as a wild card in order to gather all the samples in the corpora which contain *populism*, *populist*, and *populists*, occurring both as head-nouns and in the pre- and post-modifying positions. This allowed us to cover the whole spectrum of lexical realisations of the concept of populism.

A corpus-based approach to discourse is very useful when handling large amounts of data: discourse has a cumulative effect, whereby meanings are determined by how language is used

and by “working through the repetition of particular ways of handling causality and agency, particular ways of positioning the reader and so forth” (Fairclough 2001, 45). Through the analysis of certain recurrent collocations of a certain lexical item, it is possible to measure its discourse prosody. Discourse prosody emerges from the interplay of the lexical item(s) with other words suggesting a certain discourse. Its analysis gives us information about the evaluation that the speaker or writer is giving of that item (Baker 2006, 87-88; Partington, Duguid and Taylor 2013, 58-60).

The theoretical framework proposed by Charteris-Black in his *Corpus Approach to Critical Metaphor Analysis* explains metaphors on the basis of the (often unconscious) use that we make of them and of their effect on us (Charteris-Black 2005, 2), and the analysis of collocations will enable critical insights into the expressive connotations of metaphors. Metaphors play “a central role in the construction of social and political reality” (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 159) because of their evocative power: they are used in the evaluation of a discourse topic, and the repetition of the words related to these domains can make a metaphor a distinctive part of a specific discourse.

Section 5 will be devoted to the quantitative and qualitative analysis of *populis\** in the two corpora: the collocations and the clusters of *populis\**, as well as its discourse prosody, will be identified. In Section 6, the results of both the analysis in Section 5 and a preliminary search in a sample of texts from both corpora will lead to the identification of “candidate metaphors” (Charteris-Black 2004, 35). This will be followed by metaphor interpretation, that is, the identification of conceptual metaphors, whereby the ones that have been identified are discussed to highlight the kind of relationship they share with the cognitive and pragmatic factors determining them. Finally, and as part of the Discussion and Conclusions of this paper, through the evidence provided by the two corpora, metaphor explanation will be followed by the identification of the ideological and rhetorical motivations of metaphors and “the social agency that is involved in their production and their social role in persuasion” (Charteris-Black 2004, 39).

#### **4. The two corpora**

The two corpora analysed in this paper (Table 1), collected through *LexisNexis* (2019), consist of the articles published in 2016 in the *Daily Mail* (henceforth DMC) and *The Guardian* (henceforth GC) in which *populis\** occurred.

<b>Source</b>	<b><i>Daily Mail</i></b>	<b><i>Guardian</i></b>
Articles	525	1102
N tokens (running words) in text	715.646	1.456.321
tokens used for word list	705.017	1.439.680
types (distinct words)	25.486	43.158

**Tab. 1:** Quantitative description of the DMC and the GC

The disproportion in the size between the two corpora is due to the fact that *The Guardian* is a paper addressing mainly political news, and its use of *populis\** is wider than that in the *Daily Mail*, a popular newspaper in which political items are less central. The two corpora include non-political articles, on subjects such as sport and celebrity culture, in which *populis\** has been quoted. The use of Wordsmith Tools (Scott 2016) has made research into the two corpora easier as it has been possible to trace and measure the most important features of the terms under exam and their discursive environment.

## 5. Quantitative and qualitative analysis of the corpora

In Section 1, it has been argued that the meaning of populism is constructed in opposition to anti-populism and, crucially for analytical reason, it is done so by anti-populists themselves. On the basis of what has been outlined in Section 2, the hypothesis is that a pro-populist newspaper (the *Daily Mail*) and an anti-populist one (*The Guardian*) may have different discourse prosodies and evaluations of populism, on the basis of similar repertoire of tropes associated with populism (and built by anti-populists). In this section, the quantitative analysis will outline the key differences between the two corpora, and its results will indicate the differences in the discourse prosody of *populis\** between populist discourse and anti-populist discourse. In this sense, it is expected that polarised evaluations of populism are generated by specific narratives that can be rendered in ‘simple’ conceptual metaphors, i.e. POPULISM IS GOOD, or POPULISM IS BAD, according to one’s own political bias.

Overall, *populis\** appears 820 times in the DMC and 1689 times in the GC. The ratio of 1.56 occurrences per article in the DMC is slightly higher than that of the GC (1.53), but substantially confirms a similar level of discursive attention to the issue and narrative coherence. Namely, if *populis\** is addressed, both the newspapers treat it with an informative and cognitive weight that is fundamentally the same, regardless of their political attitude.

The Z-score analysis of *populism* reveals very different patterns, as indicated in Tab. 2 and Tab. 3.<sup>2</sup>

N	Word	Z	Total
9	NATIONALISM	27,51	12
11	PLUTOCRATS	26,47	2
13	ISOLATIONIST	24,03	5
14	RISE	23,89	21
17	WING	19,69	18

N	Word	Z	Total
2	CRASS	50,72	14
3	RIGHTWING	38,23	41
7	RISE	23,83	30
8	IGNOBLE	21,35	2
10	NATIONALISM	18,94	12
15	CRUDEST	18,52	1

**Tab. 2:** Z-score for *populism* in the DMC

**Tab. 3:** Z-score for *populism* in the GC

The comparison between the Z-score for *populism* in the DMC and GC seem to point to rather different discourse prosodies. Three of the top six scores in the GC (*crass*, *ignoble*, *crudest*) have a negative connotation and may show the hostile attitude of *The Guardian* towards populism. These terms do not appear among the top six scores of the DM and can therefore be considered a distinctive discursive feature of GC. *Nationalism* appears in both Z-scores, but in ranks higher in the DMC than in the GC.

The Z-scores highlight an important term, *rise*, which has a very similar Z-score in both the DMC and the GC and ranks very highly (14th in the DMC and 7th in the GC). The use of *rise* might imply a possible constituent of a conceptual metaphor, a hypothesis that will be explored and discussed in Section 6. The Z-scores for *populist* reinforces what has been discussed so far, as well as the pervasive presence of *rise*.

Cluster	N DMC
RISE OF	12
COUNTER RISING	6
DRIFT TOWARD	6
ECONOMIC	5
RIGHTWING	3
NEW	2
ANTI-IMMIGRANT	1

**Tab. 4:** Clusters for populism in the DMC

Cluster	N GC
RIGHTWING	37
CRASS	13
RISE OF	10
NEW	7
CONSERVATIVE	7
AUTHORITARIAN	7
HARD-RIGHT	5
ANTI-IMMIGRANT	5

**Tab. 5:** Clusters for *populism* in the GC

<sup>2</sup> The Z-score collocation index has been adopted because it has proven to be the most reliable since it considers not only the 5L-5R-word horizon, but the whole universe represented by the corpus itself with a specific total sampling. This is the most important element, since in this study the dispersion of several concepts is realized by means of conceptual metaphors.

Despite specific different preferences in denominating the adjective, the newspapers show a tendency to refer to the *populist movements* rather than *parties*, thus following the way these often name themselves.

N	Word	Z	Total
2	MOVEMENTS	43,72	28
3	WING	34,67	53
4	TONES	28,05	8
7	PARTIES	24,59	36
8	RIGHT	23,03	74
11	WAVE	21,85	17
13	ISLAMOPHOBIC	21,42	7
15	MOVEMENT	20,24	28
16	EUROSCEPTIC	19,93	18
24	RISE	18,96	29
27	SURGE	17,79	13
31	UPRISINGS	16,62	3
33	ANTI	16,13	35
34	RHETORIC	16,08	14
35	UPRISING	15,86	5
36	RIDE	15,80	9
43	INSURGENTS	15,71	2

**Tab. 6:** Z-score for *populist* in the DMC

N	Word	Z	Total
2	RIGHTWING	40,81	72
3	MOVEMENTS	33	34
4	PARTIES	27,18	65
6	NATIONALIST	25,37	28
7	RIGHT	24,63	107
9	RISE	23,24	49
13	WAVE	19,31	18
14	UPRISING	19	9
16	FORCES	18,58	26
18	APPEAL	17,41	25
19	NATIONALISM	16,07	17
29	MOVEMENT	15,9	39
30	ANTI	15,31	47
32	POLITICIAN	14,54	22
36	EUROSCEPTIC	13,48	13
48	DEMAGOGUES	11,64	6
49	ANGER	11,62	15

**Tab. 7:** Z-score for *populist* in the GC

Three important elements emerge from the Z-score of *populist*. The first element has to do with the denomination of populists. In both corpora, *populist* ‘attracts’ both *movement(s)* and *parties* as frequent collocations, indicating a similar level of communication between the populists and the anti-populist media, but it does so in different measures: in both the DMC and the GC, *movement(s)* is more frequent than *parties*, and this may be an indication that, at the vernacular level, populists are categorised more often as outsiders than as a *party*, a more traditional and institutional political denomination. In fact, *movement* and *movements* score higher in the DMC than in the GC, and this indicates a higher attention to them in the right-wing press. *Movement* implies militant, often grassroots, and certainly non-conventional and extra-institutional political activities. Many collocations in both corpora refer to “the populist Five Star Movement,” and in all cases *movement(s)* are denoted by their status as outsiders, variously referring to both right-wing (Donald Trump, *Pegida*, *AfD*, *UKIP*) and left-wing (Bernie Sanders, Jeremy Corbyn) populist actors and movements/parties.

Text 1. *Populist movement(s)* in the DMC.

- (1) *All these populist movements*, whether staged or accidental, will erode the majesty that the royal family need and must retain to survive
- (2) Ukip isn't really about Europe and immigration—*it's a populist movement*.
- (3) with opinion polls already predicting a surge in support for *the populist anti-immigration movement AfD*.
- (4) you can ride the anger through *these populist movements*
- (5) They have all the energy and unpredictability of a *populist movement*,
- (6) The billionaire Republican contender, who has whipped up *a populist grassroots movement* among largely white male voters

Text 2. *Populist movement(s)* in the GC

- (7) Initially a small protest group, it grew into *an amorphous right-wing populist movement*
- (8) no one can understand Corbyn, Sanders or *a host of other populist movements*
- (9) This is a blow not just for the former indigenous activist and his Movement to Socialism (Mas) coalition, but for *the wider progressive populist movement* in the region
- (10) Trump has emerged at the head of the pack by building *a populist movement of discontented blue collar voters*
- (11) What are the problems in the Netherlands that help build *these rightwing populist movements?*

Second, when looking at items related to political discourse in the Z-score charts, the GC is often linked to *populist* as *right-wing* and *nationalist*, something that the DM does not do very frequently. In terms of discourse prosody, this is in line with a tenet of anti-populism, i.e. the fact that populism is automatically identified as a right-wing and nationalist political entity. The presence of *demagogues* ranking high in the GC also suggests a negative evaluation of populists. On the other hand, in both the DMC and the GC *Eurosceptic* ranks highly, while *Islamophobic* appears only in the DMC. Given the completely different bias towards the EU of the two newspapers, it is quite clear that the *Daily Mail* interprets the Eurosceptic nature of populist movements quite positively, while *The Guardian* gives a negative evaluation to Euroscepticism.

Lastly, *populist* is semantically linked to a number of elements that convey the idea of an uprising movement towards the top/high end. *Waves, rise, ride, uprising, uprisings, and surge* (the last two only in the DMC) are mostly natural phenomena and all suggest an upward

movement. As already highlighted in the above discussion of the Z-score and clusters of *populism* (Tables 4 and 5), this may also indicate the possible presence of metaphors. These elements indicating (mainly upward) movement allow the identification of candidate metaphors as indicated by Charteris-Black. Furthermore, they show that the discussion on *populis\** is so complex that the newspapers prefer to avoid a ‘taxonomic’ definition of it, as discussed in Section 1, and resort to a simplification that is coded into more manageable conceptual metaphors.

## 6. Metaphors of populism

The data emerging from the analysis in Section 5 emphasise the presence of *rise* as a key lexical element related to *populis\** in the two corpora. The association of *rise* and *populism* indicates the presence of a linguistic realization of a metaphor, and specifically one with a physical basis indicating an upward movement, i.e. POPULISM IS GOING UP or, more specifically, POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT. This is an orientational metaphor, that is, a metaphor in which a concept is given a physical orientation (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 14-21). POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT can be viewed as an application of the general conceptual metaphor of MORE IS UP, a primary metaphor (Grady 1997) whereby increase or expansion of some quality or object is metaphorised as physically going up. In politics, this spatial metaphor is usually attributed to individuals or groups who become more successful or powerful—together with its opposite, LESS IS DOWN, for example in expressions such as ‘the rise and fall’—and is very common in defining emerging, often revolutionary, political or social movements, especially as consequences of actual or likely changes in power relations. Furthermore, as seen in Section 5, a term frequently connected to populists is *movement*, and its original meaning may also resonate with the metaphor POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT: the term *movement* is used in the corpus in its more recent meaning as political association or “course of acts and endeavours by a body of persons toward some specific end,” (Etymonline 2020), but its etymology is linked to the Latin *movere*, to move, and later to the French *movement*, “change of position; passage from place to place” (Etymonline 2020). Even in its more recent meaning, the expression (*populist*) *movement* may recall a lack of stability in the established (fixed) order and its connotation, unlike *party*, is certainly linked to non-establishment politics.

The physical basis of POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT is expressed by the fact that the birth and success of parties and leaders commonly identified as populist is seen as some kind of change in physical status by going upward. The metaphor is well represented in both corpora

and this is an indication of the fact that the success of populism was reported extensively by both newspapers as an epochal political phenomenon. *Rise* and *populism* appear in various combinations expressing the metaphor POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT (e.g. *rising populism*, *the rise in/of populism/populists*, *populism is on the rise*) 21 times in DMC and 24 times in the GC.

Text 3: examples of corpus lines for *ris\** and *populism* in the DMC.

- (12) The *rapid rise of political and social populism* and accelerating global migration are causes of concern
- (13) Asked in August about *the rise of right-wing populism* around the world, Steinmeier targeted those who 'make politics with fear.'
- (14) The BBC now uses it to describe everything it doesn't like, from Nigel Farage to *the rise of populism*.

Text 4: examples of corpus lines for *ris\** and *populism* in the GC.

- (15) nationalistic and authoritarian *populism is on the rise*.
- (16) to examine both the EU referendum and the general *rise* of right-wing *populism*
- (17) I think [elites] are worried about the *rising populism*
- (18) Petrified by the *rise of the populists* they try to neuter them

Looking at the context of the above quotations, *rise/rises/rising* and *populism* co-occur along with other negative terms or expressions: in the DMC the rise of populism is a *cause of concern* and is attributed to those who *make politics with fear*, while in the GC populism appears along with *authoritarian*, *worried* and *petrified*. Clearly, then, the metaphorical association of populism with the upward movement implied in *rise* carries with it a generally negative evaluation in terms of discourse prosody. However, while the presence of *rise of populis\** is quite pervasive in both corpora, in the DMC all of its 21 occurrences are quotations or paraphrases from politicians and other celebrities who are hostile to populism, and not once does the metaphor appear in the direct words of the *Daily Mail's* journalists. Thus, the lexical realisation of the POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT in *rise/rises/rising* and *populism* expresses the negative evaluation of populism coming from those who oppose it, and not from the *Daily Mail* itself.

The metaphorical use of *rise* is not limited to *populism* as a noun. Nouns such as *parties*, *extremism*, *sentiment*, *forces*, *politics* and *rhetoric* are often premodified by the adjective *populist* and are also expressed in metaphorical terms as upward movement through the use of *rise*.

Text 5: corpus lines for *ris\* of populist + noun* in the DMC.

- (19) Far-right leader Marine Le Pen could WIN France's presidential elections due to *the rise of populist politics* and the success of Trump
- (20) in a reference to the predicted *rise of Italy's populist Five-Star opposition movement*
- (21) Instead his leadership and liberal modernisation project was knocked off course first by a financial crisis, then by *the rise of a populist force* on his right flank

Text 6: corpus lines for *ris\* of populist + noun* in the GC.

- (22) Heir to throne talks of 'disturbing echoes' and *rise of populist extremism*
- (23) *The rise of populist, anti-establishment parties and figures*
- (24) something Britain can ill afford given *the rise in populist identity politics*

The discourse prosody of the lines quoted above from the GC expresses a negative evaluation of populism: *populist extremism* connects with *disturbing echoes*, and *populist parties and figures* with *anti-establishment*, while *the rise of populist identity politics* is in the context of something Britain can ill afford. In the DMC, only example (21) may imply a negative judgement of populism ('liberal modernisation project was knocked off course' by the rise of populism), while the two other uses refer to the possible victories of populist leaders and movements in France and Italy without any clear evaluative orientation. The nouns linked to *ris\** and *populis\** may be classified according to two main semantic fields: politics and feelings (Tab. 8).

<b>Politics</b>	<b>DMC</b>	<b>GC</b>
EXTREMISM	0	6
FIGURE(S)	0	1
FIVE-STAR MOVEMENT	0	2
FORCE(S)	1	2
GROUP(S)	6	5
INTOLERANCE	0	1
MOVEMENT(S)	6	5
NATIONALISM	0	1
PARTY(IES)	3	16
PHENOMENON	1	0
POLITICS	2	4
REVOLTS	0	1
RHETORIC	0	1
RIGHT	1	6
TENDENCIES	0	1
TRUMP	0	1

Feelings	DMC	GC
FEAR	0	1
MOOD	0	2
RESENTMENT	0	1
SENTIMENT	1	1

**Tab. 8:** Classification of lexical items modified by *populis\** in connection with MOVEMENT as a source domain

The much larger use of *rise of populist party/ies* in the GC compared to the DCM indicates that *The Guardian* highlights the increasing (and threatening) success of populists more than the *Daily Mail* by using the MORE IS UP aspect of the POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT metaphor. Furthermore, the GC constantly associates this metaphor to parties of the far or extreme right as well as to populist parties and indicates their success in various nations.

Text 7: examples of metaphors for *rise* and *party/parties* in the GC.

- (25) aided *the rise of the rightwing party Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD)
- (26) *A new rightwing populist party is on the rise*
- (27) As Europe grapples with *the rise of anti-immigration parties*
- (28) liken the political mood in Austria to that before *the rise of the Nazi party*
- (29) the Cronulla riots and *the rise of the Tea Party*
- (30) *the rise of Farage's party* was fed by deep problems
- (31) *The rise of populist, anti-establishment parties* and figures

The collocation of *rise* with *the Nazi Party*, *the Tea Party* and *rightwing party* communicates a negative evaluation, given the mainly liberal readership of *The Guardian*.

The discussion of the Z-score of *populist* in Section 5 highlights the importance of two more lexical items associated with populism, *wave* and *tide*, which may be singled out as possible candidates for metaphors. *Wave* and *tide* denote massive (and potentially dangerous) movements of water, suggesting the metaphor POPULISM IS A NATURAL PHENOMENON. Given the nature of its lexical realisations, this metaphor may be considered a subset of the more general metaphor of POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT. POPULISM IS A NATURAL PHENOMENON is an ontological metaphor, that is, a metaphor in which abstract entities or concepts, such as emotions or ideas, are turned into tangible objects observable in reality (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 25-26). Populist wave occurs six times in the DMC and five times in the GC.

Text 8: corpus lines of *populist wave* in the DMC.

- (32) fiercely anti-migrant Prime Minister Viktor Orban *rides a populist wave* across the bloc
- (33) Donald Trump hopes *to ride the same populist wave* to victory in the US
- (34) Labour leader wants *to embrace an anti-establishment populist wave* in politics
- (35) Neither likely November rivals really square with 2016's *populist wave*
- (36) The likely November rivals' personal portfolios don't exactly square with *the populist wave* defining 2016
- (37) The One Nation leader, *who rode her own populist wave* back to Canberra in the July federal election

Text 9: Corpus lines of *populist wave* in the GC.

- (38) EU referendum: *the next big populist wave could sweep* Britain out of Europe
- (39) not just Trump but *many of the populist movements now making waves* around the world
- (40) Sanders is hoping *to capture the same populist wave* that carried Zephyr Teachout's
- (41) “There is a real risk of *a populist wave* leading to safeguards being watered down or jettisoned”
- (42) Trump's economic view is far from neoliberal, but it *rides a populist wave*

*Populist* is connected to *tide* only twice in the DMC, and eight times in the GC.

Text 10: corpus lines of *populist tide* in the DMC.

- (43) And Twenty20 can carry it along on *a tide of new populism*
- (44) ‘A *rising tide of populism* threatens to undermine what has long been one of the world's most prosperous regions’

Text 11: corpus lines of *populist tide* in the GC.

- (45) a scarlet letter in a year when *a populist, anti-establishment tide swept* US politics
- (46) Bannon was appointed this week by Trump *to help channel the populist tide* that drove him to the top of the Republican ticket
- (47) Facing *a rising populist tide* led by Sanders on the left
- (48) In 2016, the *tide of rightwing populism* has seemed unstoppable
- (49) many of those deemed to be dissenting from *the tide of rightwing populism* have experienced the same
- (50) *The tides of populism* and nationalism currently *sweeping* many developed countries

- (51) when Germany would find itself facing *a rising tide of populism* in the context of the refugee crisis
- (52) where parties of the right will be looking to *surf the populist tide that carried Trump to his win*

The GC corpus contains one example of an even more destructive natural phenomenon.

Text 12: corpus line of *populist tsunami* in the GC.

- (53) unless there is *a tsunami of populism sweeping over the nation*

Natural phenomena such as waves, tides and tsunamis communicate destructive and uncontrollable effects (they *rise*, are *unstoppable*, and *sweep* the places they encounter), and both populist leaders and populism are somehow blended with them and become one with their force, as populists *surf* or *ride* them. The close association of populism with such natural phenomena may also be seen in the use of *populist* as a premodifier of other concepts related to *wave*. *Populist* premodifies nouns expressing metaphors of natural phenomena quantified as *wave* six times in the DMC and three times in the GC, which is quite remarkable, given the imbalance in the size of the two corpora:

Text 13: corpus lines of *populist\** as a premodifier of nouns indicating metaphors of natural phenomena in the DMC.

- (54) Donald Trump has stunned America and the world, *riding a wave of populist resentment* to defeat Hillary Clinton
- (55) Expect *a wave of populist uprisings* across the world against liberal elites
- (56) The former Prime Minister complained that Labour was turning into a 'party of protest' as he voiced *fears about a wave of populist politics* in Western democracies.
- (57) The former reality TV star rode to victory on *a wave of populist resentment*
- (58) There is growing concern in France that *the same wave of populist, anti-globalisation anger* that carried Trump to the White House
- (59) Trump has ridden *a wave of populist anger* with Washington

Text 14: corpus lines of *populist\** as a premodifier in metaphors of natural phenomena in the GC.

- (60) On the Republican side, that *wave of populist outrage* has fueled Donald Trump's campaign
- (61) the current *wave of populist insurgents* are all in the fear business

(62) The current *wave of populist politics*, mostly nationalistic and xenophobic

*Populist* premodifies nouns denoting strong emotional states in connection with *wave* six times in the DMC (*anger* and *resentment* twice, *outrage*, *uprisings*), and only once in the GC (*wave of populist outrage*). Again, in terms of discourse prosody, a negative evaluation of this metaphorical construct is expressed by anti-populist actors only once in the DMC, in Tony Blair's reported quotation in (56), and more widely in the GC, where again *populist* has a negative prosody through its connection with *fear business* and *mostly nationalistic and xenophobic*.

*Tide* is also used very frequently in metaphors in which the target domain indicates violent emotions, such as *rage* or *anger*:

Text 15: corpus lines of *tide* as part of the NATURAL PHENOMENA metaphors in the DMC.

- (63) Anyone who is so complacent as to excuse the Cameron list so easily is ignoring *the rising tide of public disillusionment* with our political institutions.
- (64) Like some Western equivalent of the Arab Spring, *a tide of anti-elitist resentment* has shaken the capitals of the world's richest countries.
- (65) So rather than stand Canute-like against *the rising alt-right tide*, the bearded one plans to surf it.
- (66) The *rising tide of public anger* makes it increasingly harder for the chancellor
- (67) The *tide of anti-establishment feeling* could also reach Italy today
- (68) The *tide of discontent* could yet reach Italy today
- (69) The *tide of disenchantment* which is flowing away from the mainstream parties in Spain, Italy, France

The above metaphors of natural phenomena in which *tide* appears are not linked to *populist*, but the lexical items which realise them are the same as those used in metaphors involving *populist* and *wave/tide*: emotions (*discontent*, *disillusionment*, *disenchantment*, *resentment*), populist politics (*anti-elitist movement*) or both (*anti-establishment feeling*).

Another term which suggests an upward movement or flood is *surge*, which, like *ride* and *wave*, also scores highly in the Z-score of *populis\**. It appears as part of metaphors involving *populis\** 13 times in the DMC and 7 times in the GC.

Text 16: corpus lines with *surge* and *populis\** in the DMC

- (70) for a *populist surge of working-class people* on either side of the Atlantic

- (71) Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi became the latest victim of *the populist surge against Brussels*.
- (72) *The surge of populist politics* of the Right

Text 17: corpus lines with *surge* and *populis\** in the GC

- (73) as *the populist surge spreads* and accepted norms are discarded
- (74) defending Rust Belt swing states that once looked vulnerable to *Trump's populist surge*

The above analysis shows that, while the metaphors of POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT and POPULISM IS A NATURAL PHENOMENON draw on different source domains, they do share a common semantic terrain. Whether it is something *rising*, a *wave* or a *tide*, or whether *populist* premodifies other signifiers expressing the same source domain of natural phenomena, the notion of populism is always linked to metaphors expressing some movement upward (waves or tides may be seen as going ‘up’), a movement which implies a change in physical state described in dramatic fashion. Indeed, the use of metaphors connected to upward movement is not limited to populism but extends to concepts or emotions somehow connected to it, either through the premodifier *populist*, or by sharing the semantic field of emotions. Indeed, populism has always been related to the strong emotions such as hate and anger attributed to disenfranchised people. This relationship is made evident through certain commonly shared metaphors, which generate some kind of semantic alignment between populism, the strong emotions connected to it, and (mainly right-wing) leaders and movements.

The metaphor POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT may imply different evaluations: the populist *Daily Mail* uses the physical basis of POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT to define populism as something good or at least neutral, while the discourse prosody of the same metaphors in *The Guardian* or in those politicians opposing populism quoted in the DMC suggests a negative evaluation of populism by anti-populists. The spatial metaphors at the basis of our culture posit that the physical basis of certain metaphors suggests positive values, as in MORE IS UP and GOOD IS UP. However, as explained by Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 22-23), for certain subcultures and groups MORE IS UP may prevail on GOOD IS UP, which may then be turned into BAD IS UP. This is the case of certain representations of the wave/tide metaphors, which may denote natural phenomena difficult to control: they are often linked to negative feelings in the political space and emphasise the threat or violence coming from certain social groups or phenomena. For example, they are very common in politics and media as part of domains

evaluated negatively, such as immigration in racist discourses. These metaphors have often been used to characterize people arriving (or threatening to arrive) in Europe or the USA, such as migrants, asylum seekers or refugees, who are seen as a threat to the social order and are evaluated negatively (Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 59-60; Semino 2008, 118-23; Musolff 2015, 45-46).

## 7. Discussion and conclusion

The antagonistic political space opened up by the struggle between populism and anti-populism as discussed in Section 1 results into diverging discursive articulations of “vernacular” populism: the discourse prosody of *populis*\* in the two corpora discussed in Section 3 communicates different evaluations of populism, with certain marked lexical options in *The Guardian* that communicate a distinctly hostile attitude to populism, as in the collocations *rightwing populism* and *crass populism*. The pejorative meaning of populism, which has become naturalised and embedded in both populist and anti-populist discourse, is somehow amplified by *The Guardian*, while the *Daily Mail* links populism to Euroscepticism and Islamophobia, which certainly do not communicate a negative evaluation among its readers. A key aspect in the populism/anti-populism divide between the two newspapers is their use of the same set of metaphors, POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT. In confirmation of the hegemony played by the anti-populists in setting up discursive elements and strategies across the board, the populist *Daily Mail* uses the same (anti-populist) metaphor as *The Guardian*, thus reflecting the fact that the discursive realisations of populism usually created by those who oppose it, are also used by those who support it. The metaphor reflects the pejorative evaluation which is usually attached to entities described as ‘moving up.’ However, in the DMC this pejorative evaluation is decisively toned down and does not generally carry the negative discourse prosody which appears so frequently in the GC. On the other hand, the *Daily Mail* shows a preference for such metaphors in connection with strong and ‘low’ emotions much more often than *The Guardian*. This is in line with the kind of readership addressed by the *Daily Mail* and indicates the preference of the newspaper for the typical populist ‘style,’ as defined by Moffitt (2016).

Metaphorical constructs of populism are crucial in the way populism is codified and *understood* in discourse. The metaphors of populism analysed in the two corpora discussed here have proved that the concept of populism is made visible in discourse by representing it on the basis of orientational as well as material conceptualisations. Indeed, the orientational nature of POPULISM IS (UPWARD) MOVEMENT may be seen as deriving from (and further

contributing to) a wider metaphorical scenario of society in vertical terms. Populism is traced in discourse through the use of well-trodden metaphors according to which politics and society are given a vertical dimension. The discursive realisations of populism in vertical terms (as ‘rising’) is part of the mapping of populism in terms of a conceptual metaphor which allows (or *makes*) us see society and politics in hierarchical terms. The conceptual aspects related to the ontological metaphor of POPULISM IS A NATURAL PHENOMENON, with tides or waves which also rise, strengthen the general perception and representation of populism as a threat to the established (vertical) order. Thus, the populist hostility to the elite can be metaphorised and ‘seen’ as a movement upward within the social structure from below, a ‘below’ embodied by the people, whose anger and social aspirations threaten the socially ‘high’ locations of the elite. Indeed, some theoretical constructs of populism seem to follow the same conceptual metaphor: both Ostiguy’s concept of populism as defined by a struggle between ‘high’ and ‘low’—in social, political and moral terms—and De Cleen and Stavrakakis’s codification of populism, mentioned in Section 1, along a vertical axis which intersects with the horizontal axis of nationalism follow the same spatial organisation of society.

As populism is a phenomenon taking place in the socio-political sphere, it would be quite obvious to expect metaphors sharing the same or similar source domains as those used to represent other political movements. The structure of society is indeed very often represented with certain metaphorical scenarios drawn from spatial organisations and, as a consequence, social hierarchization is also metaphorised spatially. Social space is generally based on a hierarchy which is organised and qualified as physical space. In general, the appropriation of physical space functions “as a spontaneous metaphor for the social order” (Bourdieu 2018, 106). As argued by Bourdieu, “social space is inscribed both in the objectivity of spatial structures and in the subjectivity of mental structures, which are in part the product of the embodiment of these objectified structures” (Bourdieu 2018, 108). Conceptual metaphors with a physical basis having social organisation as their target may be a preferred gateway into the conceptualization of social space in discourse. For example, the organisation of society is traditionally described and visualised in vertical terms and represented in language according to a vertical classification (Ossowski 1963), and this classification extends to political practice as well as discourse. The social structure of the West is traditionally viewed in vertical terms, with the establishment and the wealthy seen as ‘high’ (realised by a myriad of lexical items, such as *high society*, *friends in high places*, *social climber*, *the top 1%*), and the poor and the disadvantaged seen at the bottom. The vertical classification of society is actually created and institutionalised socially but is so ingrained in our socio-political consciousness to appear

“natural and inevitable” (Kreckel 1990, 142). Indeed, being “the ‘natural language’ of social inequality” (Schwartz 1981, 150) and “*the effect of naturalization*” (Bourdieu 2018, 107; italics in the original) typical of the way social realities are inscribed in the natural world, this vertical classification may constitute the framework for both the representation and the interpretation of political practice, actors and events.

The recurrence of certain metaphors of populism in the *Daily Mail* and *The Guardian* indicates that news media follow a traditional physical or spatial arrangement of social agents. Happening in the year when populism was seen as ‘rising,’ this fact in a way facilitates as well as constraints the perception and interpretation of populism: in the antagonistic social space opened up by populism in which the ‘people’ aspire to dismantle the privileges of the elite, ‘going up’ signals a struggle to advance in the social and political hierarchy and probably even an edge in these struggles. This is done according to prevailing models which may not always represent the complexity and the political uniqueness of populism.

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