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Euro-American Relations in the Age of Globalization: Risks and Opportunities

Guest Editors

Massimiliano Demata, University of Turin
Marco Mariano, University of Turin

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Introduction

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Massimiliano Demata, Marco Mariano

This special issue of *De Europa* on "Euro-American Relations in the Age of Globalization: Risks and Opportunities" addresses the current state of Euro-American relations by employing a set of multi-disciplinary approaches. Perhaps this is almost inevitable, given that the topic is so controversial and allows – or even demands – multiple perspectives from different academic disciplines. The papers in this issue discuss Euro-American relations in their political, historical and linguistic complexity and offer original insights into one of the key political issues of our time.

What is the current state of Euro-American relations? While most observers agree that 1989 ushered in a new era, what is exactly the place of Atlantica within a global framework transformed by the acceleration of interdependence is subject to debate. At the end of the 20th century exports of goods and services accounted for 20% of the world GDP, a sharp increase from the 13% of 1913 which marked the culmination of the previous wave of globalization. China, as well as Eastern Europe and the new republics created after the collapse of the Soviet Union, were integrated in the world market in a way that, at least initially, seemed to exemplify the irresistible pull of capitalism. Finally, American hard and soft power, and software too, led to what Charles Krauthammer defined the "unipolar moment" of the 1990s. However this acceleration of globalization, far from putting an end to conflicts and crises, opened the way to new ones, as first the wars in Yugoslavia and central Africa and later the attacks of 9.11 and the 2007-2009 Great Recession made abundantly clear.

Such a turmoil has ignited risks and opportunities for Euro-American relations. On the one hand, instability and threats posed by state as well as non-state actors forced transatlantic institutions to adjust to a new reality, while the massive growth of Asian markets has questioned more than ever the centrality of "first world" economies. Furthermore, the post-1989 reality impacted the two sides of the Atlantic in significantly different ways. On the other, the members of the transatlantic club had the unique opportunity to reinvent the mission, the membership, and the mechanisms of that very club created in the aftermath of the World War II.

As "the West" is a polysemic term and transatlantic relations come in different shapes and forms, the assessment of their transformation in the current age of globalization depends very much on the analytical perspective we adopt. For institutionalists like John Ikenberry, for example, the U.S. and its European partners will be able to preserve their

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leading role in the global arena by adjusting post-World War II multilateral institutions to the post-1989 reality. In his view, American and Western hegemony based on NATO, the IMF, and other organizations has created a legal and political order and disciplined the exercise of power in such a way that, in the event of a relative decline of *Atlantica*, such hegemony would remain intact. Thus, the answer to current global challenges lies in the adaptation and extension of those institutions (Ikenberry 2001).

From a different perspective, Samuel Huntington has stressed the resurgence of cultural and religious identities as major drivers in the global arena. In this perspective, the end of the cold war and the acceleration of globalization by no means led to the triumph of liberalism and capitalism or, as Francis Fukuyama famously put it, to "the end of history". After the end of the confrontation between universalist ideologies that informed the 20th century, the "clash" between civilizational blocs is the major driving force of international politics. As a consequence, America and Europe are bound to face this new reality, rediscover their common ground and relinquish utopian, unrealistic dreams of Westernization of the world (Fukuyama 1989; Huntington 1993).

A similarly gloomy outlook is shared by John Mearsheimer, a leading scholar in the neorealist camp. He maintains that the collapse of the cold war order led to a condition of anarchy which is responsible for the promotion of aggressive state behavior in international politics. "The Cold War we have known for almost half a century is over and the postwar order in Europe is ended… the prospects for major crises and war are likely to increase markedly… this pessimistic conclusion rests on the argument that the distribution and character of military power are the root causes of war and peace," he wrote in 1990. The increasing assertiveness of China in the Far East, for example, would force Western powers to resort to a containment of sorts, which testifies how underlying geopolitical realities continue to affect the post-1989 global order (Mearsheimer 1990).

The election of Donald Trump as President of the United States in 2016 started a period of withdrawal of the USA from most world scenarios, including Europe, and the Euro-American relations in the last four years have never been so problematic since probably the Second World War. However, and somewhat paradoxically, Trump's isolationism derives from the common framework of populist politics shared with certain political movements in Europe. Indeed, the populist rise in both the USA and most European nations has been the catalyst for the creation of a shared rhetoric of fear, hate and verbal violence addressed towards the "other", represented mainly by migrants (Wodak 2015).

The essays featured in this special issue deal with some of these major themes by focusing on specific case studies. The first three essays address Euro-American relations from a historical or political perspective. Alessia Chiriatti and Davide Borsani discuss the changing role of Turkey within NATO in the light of the transition from the bipolar order of the cold war to the present-day multipolar order. From the vantage point of Ankara, the initial crisis generated by the undermining of its historical role as bulwark of "the West" against Soviet influence in the Mediterranean gave way to the opportunity of playing a neo-imperial role in the Middle East while at the same time preserving its ties with the Atlantic community. This change seems to be a significant

stress-test for NATO vis-à-vis the post-cold war, globalized world we live in. Stefano Luconi shows how the birth of a new era in transatlantic relations was significantly affected by the enduring influence of the geopolitical paradigms of the cold war on the George H.W. Bush administration. His discussion of Bush's cautious attitude toward Mikhail Gorbachev's "common European home" between 1989 and 1990 reveals not only widespread U.S. skepticism that the cold war had really ended, but also the belief that such a proposal would disrupt Euro-American relations, undermine the decades-old American hegemony over Europe, and finally create a Moscow-dominated collective security system in Europe which could pave the way to the Soviet control of Eurasia. Finally, Patricia Chiantera deals with the fears triggered by the collapse of the cold war order and the ensuing globalization within Euro-American culture. Focusing on major authors such as Huntington and Fukuyama, she argues that they both voiced fears about the West itself, rather than about "the other", as shown by the former's concern about the decay and "de-westernization" of élite circles, and the latter's anxiety about the despair of the modern individual and the need to restore his spiritedness in order to consolidate Western democracies. Such fears are all the more relevant within a context dominated by the contradiction between the expansion of cultural differences and the convergence toward market liberalism and capitalism.

The papers on Discourse Analysis of this issue show that the language used in Europe and the USA in the policy areas in which Euro-American relations are most evident reflects (and shapes) both the turmoil in Euro-American relations of the last couple of decades and the shared populist trend. This turmoil emerges quite clearly in Paolo Donadio's paper. On the basis of the analytical tools provided by Critical Discourse Analysis and cognitive linguistics, Donadio discusses the way Trump's narratives undermines the European Union. Through his analysis of Trump's aversion to the EU and his "logic of confrontation", Donadio traces elements of continuity between the discourse of the Cold War and that of the EU as elaborated by US administrations in very different political contexts. Liudmila Arcimavičienė highlights the importance of certain metaphorical constructions as part of legitimacy strategies at the basis of diplomatic discourse in the relations between Ukraine and Russia, the U.S. and Russia, and the EU and Belarus. It has been determined that the collective identity of the international order is mainly represented by two metaphorical legitimacy strategies, value-systems and targeting, serving different ideological purposes. Addressing the populist framework shared by Donald Trump and some right-wing parties and leaders in Europe, Maria Ivana Lorenzetti argues that there are "similar discursive strategies, pointing to a likely cross-fertilisation of ideas and strategies among right-wing populists across the globe." She looks at the convergence between Donald Trump and US right-wing populist leader Matteo Salvini in the discursive strategies employed by the two leaders.

All in all, the papers presented in this special issue of *De Europa* prove that the history of Euro-American relations is a very fertile ground for research from multiple angles. The upcoming Presidential elections in the USA and the current global COVID-19 crisis will certainly determine a very interesting evolution in these relations and will demand even more attention from scholars and observers.

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Essays

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La Turchia nella NATO, un ruolo in evoluzione per un antico alleato

Alessia Chiriatti, Davide Borsani

Introduzione

La conclusione della Guerra Fredda ha avviato un processo di ridefinizione del ruolo della Turchia in seno all'Alleanza Atlantica nonché della sua politica estera e di sicurezza. Da un lato, fin dal suo ingresso nella NATO nel 1952 (Oğuzlu 2013), Ankara gode di una posizione geostrategica privilegiata per due ragioni: il controllo degli Stretti del Bosforo e dei Dardanelli tra Mar Nero al Mediterraneo e il suo essere punto di intersezione tra Asia ed Europa. Forte di tale consapevolezza e della rilevanza di ciò per la NATO, Ankara ha modellato per molti anni le sue politiche di sicurezza anzitutto sulla base della sua *membership* all'organizzazione e dunque dell'alleanza con gli Stati Uniti. Dall'altro lato, la dissoluzione dell'URSS ne ha mutato ruolo e compiti e la Turchia ha riconfigurato la sua posizione, passando dalla rigidità del *containment* del nemico sovietico alla flessibilità e volatilità del mondo post-bipolare. Questa evoluzione ha portato la Turchia a condurre una politica estera e di sicurezza più libera ed autonoma, talvolta meno allineata alle esigenze dell'Alleanza e degli Stati Uniti stessi, in particolare a partire dall'inizio del XXI secolo. D'altronde, le sfide alla sicurezza sia per la Turchia che per la NATO sono profondamente cambiate nel corso degli ultimi trent'anni. Ad oggi, comunque, Ankara non solo contribuisce alle forze della NATO con il maggiore Esercito dopo gli Stati Uniti, ma anche attraverso una spese militare che, in particolare dal 2011 a oggi, è cresciuta con regolarità, soprattutto nell'ambito degli equipaggiamenti (NATO 2019).

Sebbene una parte della classe dirigente turca sia tutt'ora fortemente convinta dell'importanza della *membership* NATO, si registra, come si vedrà, un significativo scetticismo all'interno del Paese in particolare nei confronti dell'alleato statunitense (Özel 2019). Al di là della convergenza strategica tra la Turchia e i Paesi occidentali, ad esempio nelle operazioni in Afghanistan e nelle operazioni militari NATO in Libia, Ankara ha dimostrato di cercare una sua relativa autonomia rispetto al mondo atlantico durante l'ultimo ventennio, anzitutto a seguito dell'invasione americana dell'Iraq, un vero e proprio spartiacque nella relazione con Washington. La crisi degli ultimi anni nei rapporti tra Stati Uniti e Turchia non può quindi che essere compresa con uno specifico riferimento alle dinamiche storiche e all'evoluzione del ruolo di Ankara nella NATO.

L'analisi qui presentata è dunque centrata sul ruolo della Turchia nell'Alleanza Atlantica con una particolare attenzione rivolta al rapporto tra questa e gli Stati Uniti. Muovendosi all'interno di tale cornice analitico-concettuale, l'obiettivo degli Autori è

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di concentrarsi sull'evoluzione della Turchia da paese di frontiera della NATO durante la Guerra Fredda a quello attuale di *swing State* con una propria strategia di autonomizzazione, anzitutto in relazione a Washington. Sullo sfondo resteranno, inoltre, le questioni di politica interna non pertinenti ai fini del saggio e quelle riguardanti i rapporti con l'Unione Europea, certamente complementari e rilevanti nella comprensione della politica estera turca, ma che, per una trattazione non superficiale, andrebbero studiate tenendo in considerazione dimensioni e livelli di analisi diversi.

1. Le radici storiche della Turchia nella NATO

Il contenimento dell'espansionismo sovietico in Medio Oriente e nel Mediterraneo fu la motivazione del primo allargamento dei confini dell'Alleanza Atlantica all'indomani dello scoppio della guerra di Corea nel 1950 fino all'inclusione della Turchia nel 1952 (Winrow 1993). Ankara, in verità, aveva già manifestato vivo interesse nell'entrare a far parte dell'Alleanza insieme alla Grecia, entrambe beneficiarie del Piano Marshall già dal 1949 (Di Casola 1989). Ma la rilevanza turca negli equilibri eurasiatici, e presto euro-atlantici, era chiara agli Stati Uniti fin dalla Seconda guerra mondiale. Alla vigilia della Conferenza di Postdam del luglio 1945, il Dipartimento di Stato statunitense definì le relazioni tra Washington e Ankara come pacifiche e amichevoli, nonché basate sui seguenti principi democratici: «il diritto dei popoli a scegliere liberamente i loro sistemi politici, economici e sociali; l'uguaglianza nei rapporti commerciali; la libertà di stampa; la difesa delle istituzioni scolastiche americane in Turchia; la protezione dei diritti degli americani» (Armaoğlu 2010: 134). Al di là della dimensione ideologica, il Dipartimento di Stato statunitense indicò, inoltre, che una Turchia sotto influenza sovietica, in virtù della sua posizione geostrategica, sarebbe stata strategicamente pericolosa per gli Stati Uniti e i Paesi occidentali, inclusa la Francia, con cui erano aperte una serie di dispute anche territoriali (Altunışık, Ożlem 2005).

Tale rilevanza, già propria dell'Impero ottomano, nasceva anzitutto dal possesso degli Stretti del Bosforo e dei Dardanelli, porte di comunicazione tra il Mar Nero e il Mediterraneo e quindi di accesso ai mari caldi per la Russia (Rosso 1950). Ottenere il controllo degli Stretti, diretto o indiretto, non a caso costituiva un obiettivo storico della politica estera russa, a prescindere dal tipo di regime – sovietico o zarista – al potere. Prima della Conferenza di Postdam, anche il Dipartimento della Marina statunitense, sulla base dell'esperienza offerta dall'Impero britannico, osservò che la Turchia rappresentava uno snodo strategico per contenere l'espansionismo dell'Unione Sovietica in Eurasia:

> in periodo di pace, gli Stretti turchi devono rimanere aperti ai mercantili di tutti gli Stati così come alle navi militari degli Stati sul Mar Nero. In una guerra con gli Stati del Mar Nero coinvolti, le navi da guerra degli Stati che non si affacciano sul Mar Nero non devono avere accesso agli Stretti. Nessuno Stato, a parte la Turchia, può possedere fortificazioni sui Dardanelli. Se la Turchia è in guerra, o è vicina a intraprenderne una, deve essere libera di attuare le misure che ritiene più adatte nella zona degli Stretti. (Armaoğlu 2010: 311)

Dal canto suo, la Turchia aderì all'Alleanza Atlantica per tre ragioni: approfondire la cooperazione nell'ambito della difesa con gli Stati Uniti; la paura di restare isolata in virtù della sua posizione che, potenzialmente, la esponeva ad essere oggetto anziché soggetto della politica internazionale nel quadro della Guerra Fredda; i contrasti storici con l'"ingombrante" vicino russo, che ne prospettavano una minacciosità ben maggiore rispetto ai lontani Stati Uniti. Il Piano Marshall fu solo un lato della medaglia per Ankara, alla ricerca di sicurezza per mitigare la preoccupazione per l'espansionismo sovietico. La formazione dell'Alleanza Atlantica nel 1949 sembrava poter garantire tale cornice di sicurezza al territorio turco, prospettandole inoltre la possibilità di rinnovare qualitativamente il proprio Esercito. Inoltre, in qualità di membro del Consiglio d'Europa dal 1949, Ankara ritenne di avere i requisiti democratici per poter aspirare a essere membro a pieno titolo dell'Alleanza. Infine, la stessa opinione pubblica turca era convinta che far parte dell'Alleanza Atlantica avrebbe permesso di tutelare la seppur giovane Repubblica da possibili ingerenze comuniste (Baskin 2010). Per la Turchia, la necessità di alimentare stabilmente il sostegno americano si manifestò anche nel 1959, quando Ankara, nel quadro NATO, accettò di dispiegare sul suo territorio i missili di teatro *Jupiter* intesi a rassicurare gli Stati Uniti a fronte del (presupposto) *gap* strategico apertosi con l'Unione Sovietica a seguito del lancio dello *Sputnik* (Burr 1958).

Negli anni Settanta, il ruolo della Turchia nella politica euro-atlantica, soprattutto americana, mostrò le prime crepe. L'intervento militare turco a Cipro nel 1975, nel più ampio contesto della crisi con la Grecia, portò il Congresso statunitense a proclamare l'embargo alla vendita di armi ad Ankara (Di Casola 1989). La Turchia rispose chiudendo temporaneamente la maggior parte delle installazioni di *intelligence* e di difesa degli Stati Uniti sul proprio territorio (Zanotti, Thomas 2019). La Rivoluzione in Iran del 1979 comportò ulteriori problematiche. Da un lato, Ankara sostenne pienamente gli Stati Uniti nella gestione della crisi degli ostaggi americani. Ma, dall'altro, si innescarono importanti attriti quando, nell'aprile 1980, Washington decise di bandire l'importazione del petrolio iraniano e di proibire ai cittadini statunitensi di viaggiare verso l'Iran. Alla richiesta che la Turchia, in quanto alleato, facesse lo stesso, Ankara declinò, giustificando la scelta con la necessità che almeno un Paese NATO mantenesse aperta la sua ambasciata a Teheran per tutelare gli interessi dell'Alleanza. Il quotidiano turco *Hürriyet* rivelò a quel punto una nota in base alla quale Washington chiedeva ad Ankara di intraprendere decisioni severe nei confronti dell'Iran. Nel riaffermare la propria linea, e nonostante la minaccia di possibili sanzioni, il governo turco rifiutò di concedere l'uso della base aerea alleata di Incirlik per liberare gli ostaggi, affermando che sarebbe stata un'operazione out-of-area all'interno del contesto NATO, in quel momento non ancora previste dal Concetto Strategico dell'Alleanza (Baskin 2010).

La Prima Guerra del Golfo nel 1991 non fu solo un momento importante per la politica internazionale che sembrò dar vita, per citare l'allora Presidente americano George H. W. Bush, a un "nuovo ordine mondiale" (Kirkham 1993: VII), ma, benché poco riconosciuto, segnò un momento rilevante anche per l'evoluzione del ruolo della Turchia nella NATO, quest'ultima interessata da un conflitto armato al di fuori della propria area di competenza, ma con implicazioni di sicurezza per un alleato. Alla vigilia

della proclamazione del blocco navale ed aereo all'Iraq di Saddam Hussein tra l'agosto e il settembre 1990, gli Stati Uniti avevano iniziato a radunare le truppe in Arabia Saudita (operazione *Desert Shield*) e la NATO, dietro richiesta del governo turco, aveva dispiegato parte delle proprie Forze aeree, decollate dalle basi di Belgio, Germania e Italia, in difesa del confine tra Turchia ed Iraq (operazione *Anchor Guard*) (Hendrickson 2006). Dopo la sconfitta delle forze di Saddam, nell'aprile 1991, la comunità internazionale avviò la politica di contenimento dell'Iraq. La risoluzione 687 del Consiglio di Sicurezza delle Nazione Unite, avente come scopo anche quello di proteggere il confine della vicina Turchia, creò un cuscinetto di sicurezza di quindici km ed una *no–fly–zone* sopra il 36° parallelo inaccessibili a qualsiasi mezzo aereo di Baghdad. Ciò testimoniò quanto sia la Turchia che l'Alleanza Atlantica, conclusasi la Guerra Fredda, avrebbero dovuto volgere il rispettivo sguardo oltre la deterrenza territoriale in Europa e dunque in direzione di un'instabilità fuori area, quella mediorientale, che nel corso degli anni si sarebbe fatta sempre più marcata e complessa. Nel 1992, non a caso, l'influente Senatore americano Richard Lugar affermò che la NATO sarebbe andata "*out of area*" oppure "*out of business*" (Asmus 2005).

Così come per la NATO, la disintegrazione dell'Unione Sovietica nel dicembre 1991 causò cambiamenti radicali per la Turchia sia nella percezione delle minacce esterne sia per il suo ruolo nell'Alleanza Atlantica. Venuta meno la rigida rilevanza geostrategica nel quadro del *containment* della Guerra Fredda, il timore di divenire uno Stato periferico, accerchiato da Potenze con interessi sempre più eterogenei, si diffuse rapidamente tra l'opinione pubblica nazionale, proiettando lo spettro di trasformare la Turchia in oggetto della politica internazionale nonostante la *membership* NATO. Ciò (ri)assunse il nome di "Sindrome di Sèvres", che riecheggiava l'infausto passato tra la firma nel 1920 del Trattato di pace da Potenza sconfitta della Prima guerra mondiale, che sottraeva alla "nuova" (e occupata) Turchia il pieno controllo degli Stretti, e quello di Losanna del 1923, che invece di fatto glielo riassegnava, come anche ribadito dalla Convenzione di Montreaux del 1936[1]. Nel post-Guerra Fredda, dunque, si diffuse l'idea che gli alleati occidentali insieme agli Stati confinanti potessero rinvigorire gli effetti del Trattato di Sèvres, smembrando – almeno in termini di influenza – il territorio turco per i propri interessi. Ciò sarebbe avvenuto attraverso il ricorso alle "cinque colonne" all'interno del Paese, ossia le minoranze etniche e religiose, che avrebbero funzionato come "cavalli di Troia" per le ambizioni di *competitor* e nemici (Frappi 2018).

Il timore di perdere il ruolo di soggetto della politica internazionale fece emergere una nuova narrativa. La Turchia non avrebbe più dovuto essere solo un bastione dell'Occidente in un'area minacciata da un nemico comune, bensì avrebbe dovuto portare stabilità alla regione eurasiatica sulla base dell'esperienza storica che ne proiettava l'influenza dall'Adriatico fino alla Grande Muraglia cinese (Zürcher 1998). Cominciò dunque a farsi strada l'idea che, in autonomia, Ankara, pur rimanendo inquadrata nell'Alleanza Atlantica, potesse giocare su piani strategici differenti: da quello euro-me-

[1] Con la firma della Convenzione di Montreaux, alla Turchia fu riservato il totale controllo del Bosforo e dei Dardanelli in tempo di guerra; in tempo di pace, essi rimanevano aperti al libero transito delle navi mercantili e, a determinate condizioni, di quelle da guerra.

diterraneo all'Asia centrale, passando per quello mediorientale. Nel 2002, l'arrivo sulla scena politica turca dell'AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*, il Partito della Giustizia e dello Sviluppo) di Recep Tayyip Erdoğan accolse tale narrativa e la inquadrò in una dottrina strategica, elaborata da Ahmet Davutoğlu, docente universitario e poi Ministro degli Affari Esteri turco dal 2009 al 2014, basata anzitutto sulla *zero-problems with neighbors* (Davutoglu 1993 e 2001). Un approccio, questo, volto a eliminare gli annosi e radicati conflitti con alcuni dei Paesi vicini, a costruire rapporti pacifici e costruendo il proprio *soft power* come forma di proiezione della Turchia oltre i confini percepiti come limitanti, sia al livello geografico che ideologico, della Guerra Fredda (Askerov 2017).

2. Lo spartiacque dell'invasione dell'Iraq

Da quasi vent'anni, il dibattito sulla politica estera turca verte anzitutto su una domanda: l'Occidente sta perdendo la Turchia (Alessandri 2010)? Se è vero che i primi attriti con Washington risalgono, come si è visto, agli anni della Guerra Fredda, tuttavia l'impatto di quanto accaduto all'indomani degli attentati terroristici dell'11 settembre 2001, in particolare nel contesto dell'invasione americana dell'Iraq del 2003, non dovrebbe essere sottovalutato. La perdita della rigidità bipolare e la maggiore volatilità del contesto internazionale sono stati amplificatori dei dissensi tra i due Paesi, con cruciali riverberi in seno all'Alleanza Atlantica. La mutua sfiducia emersa tra 2002 e 2003, in altre parole, ha avuto conseguenze di più lungo periodo nei rapporti bilaterali, sulla politica estera della Turchia e sul suo ruolo nella NATO.

Il coinvolgimento di Ankara, in quanto alleato NATO, nelle operazioni militari degli Stati Uniti in Iraq fu inizialmente prospettato il 4 dicembre 2002 dal Sottosegretario alla Difesa americano, Paul Wolfowitz. Ai rappresentanti dei Paesi membri riuniti a Bruxelles, Wolfowitz propose quattro differenti opzioni militari, che avrebbero implicato l'utilizzo della struttura integrata della NATO, tra cui l'assistenza della Turchia nell'eventuale possibilità che l'Iraq l'avesse attaccata per rappresaglia. Alcuni alleati applaudirono all'iniziativa del Sottosegretario, ma a minarne l'ottimismo, fu l'assenza di *lobbying* degli statunitensi, che generò gradualmente l'impressione che per Washington l'aiuto militare della NATO fosse davvero superfluo, da utilizzare come strumento politico. Di fronte agli ostacoli al Consiglio di Sicurezza dell'ONU, in particolare l'ostracismo degli alleati di Francia e Germania, gli Stati Uniti avrebbero inoltrato alla NATO varie richieste militari specifiche (seppur secondarie) affinché fossero discusse ed approvate, giungendo così implicitamente al consenso politico (Borsani 2012). In questo quadro, effettivamente, la richiesta di protezione alla Turchia la rendeva uno strumento se non un oggetto della politica statunitense, anziché elevarla ad attore prioritario.

Il 17 gennaio 2003, Wolfowitz esplicitò precisamente al Consiglio Atlantico quali serie di misure Washington avrebbe voluto che venissero adottate in supporto alla coalizione: tra queste, vi era il dispiegamento di batterie di missili *Patriot* per la difesa aerea della Turchia. Francia e Germania si rifiutarono di discuterle, e quindi votarle, ricorrendo al silenzio; per la procedura NATO, che richiede l'esplicita unanimità dei membri per intraprendere concrete misure, ciò significava un'*impasse* dell'Alleanza. Fu dunque la Turchia a sottrarsi dal ruolo di subordinazione che le era stato assegnato invocando

l'articolo 4 del Patto Atlantico, benché il Rappresentante permanente, Ahmet Uzumcu, evitasse di prendere chiaramente posizione (Hendrickson 2006). Conseguentemente, il Segretario Generale, Lord Robertson, impose la procedura del silenzio-assenso: chi si fosse astenuto dal dibattito, avrebbe dato indirettamente un parere favorevole. Con non poca fatica, le misure proposte da Wolfowitz furono infine approvate, anche grazie all'accordo preliminare raggiunto sul piano bilaterale tra Germania e Turchia sul dispiegamento dei *Patriot*. Ma la beffa era dietro l'angolo per gli Stati Uniti (Borsani 2012).

Mentre erano in corso le discussioni al Consiglio Atlantico, Washington aveva anche richiesto ad Ankara di concederle il passaggio di quindicimila soldati americani attraverso il suolo turco per attaccare l'Iraq da nord; in cambio, l'amministrazione Bush aveva promesso aiuti militari alle Forze Armate turche, sostegno economico, un facile accesso ai programmi del Fondo Monetario Internazionale e una forte *sponsorship* per l'adesione all'Unione Europea, in quel momento storico tra gli obiettivi della politica estera turca. Il Parlamento di Ankara - sostenuto dall'opinione pubblica e dall'Esercito (Gordon, Shapiro 2004) - rifiutò però la proposta: con 264 a favore, 250 contro e 19 astenuti, che equivalsero a voto contrario, venne negato alle truppe americane il passaggio, dichiarando la Turchia di fatto neutrale. Dunque, difficilmente ci sarebbero state rappresaglie sul territorio turco e, di conseguenza, le misure NATO sarebbero state superflue. Con tale mossa, la Turchia aveva voluto sottolineare che il suo ruolo nel "nuovo" mondo post-11 settembre non l'avrebbe vista spettatrice, bensì protagonista delle dinamiche internazionali, così come la *membership* NATO non ne avrebbe appiattito la politica estera sulle posizioni statunitensi. Il Presidente George W. Bush scrisse a riguardo nelle sue memorie che "su una delle più importanti richieste che avevamo mai fatto, la Turchia, nostro alleato NATO, aveva abbandonato l'America" (Bush 2010: 369).

Sulla base delle misure approvate dal Consiglio Atlantico, la NATO avviò l'operazione *Display Deterrence* per la difesa aerea della Turchia. Il 20 febbraio 2003, il *Supreme Allied Commander in Europe* della NATO, Generale James L. Jones, ordinò il trasferimento di due aerei radar dalla base tedesca di Geilenkirchen a quella turca di Konya, raggiunti poi da un'altra coppia nei giorni seguenti. Sei giorni dopo, i quattro velivoli iniziarono a sorvegliare lo spazio aereo della Turchia. Nel frattempo, sedici piattaforme di lancio e tre batterie di *Patriot* erano arrivate dall'Olanda a Diyarbakir e Batman, due città nei pressi del confine con l'Iraq. Due giorni dopo, la Germania rifornì Ankara di altri missili *Patriot*, tecnologicamente più avanzati di quelli olandesi. Il 3 marzo, la Turchia inoltrò richiesta per ottenere assistenza medica e civile nel caso la sua popolazione fosse stata attaccata dagli uomini di Saddam Hussein con armi di distruzione di massa. Risposero prontamente la Polonia, che promise cinquanta specialisti in attacchi chimici e batteriologici, la Norvegia e la Repubblica Ceca, che inviarono ai turchi migliaia di maschere protettive ed equipaggiamenti speciali. Ad invasione americana iniziata, gli Stati Uniti dispiegarono in Turchia altre due batterie di missili *Patriot* nella città di Incirlic come misura di rassicurazione (NATO 2006). Di certo, insomma, se i rapporti tra Washington e Ankara si erano incrinati, la NATO, dal canto suo, non era rimasta inerte in un quadro diplomatico e strategico molto complesso e, nel quale,

la Turchia aveva fatto valere la propria *membership* come strumento di una "nuova" politica estera assertiva.

La contemporanea presenza di unità turche di *peace keeping* e *peace enforcement* nell'ambito delle missioni internazionali di KFOR nei Balcani, di *International Assistance Security Force* in Afghanistan, dove il retaggio culturale islamico le permetteva di guidare la missione a Kabul e dintorni con piena legittimità agli occhi dell'opinione pubblica locale, e della successiva NATO *Training Mission* in Iraq contribuirono, sia da parte statunitense che da parte turca, a ridurre in parte le tensioni occorse alla vigilia dell'invasione dell'Iraq, riavvicinando i due Paesi nel breve-medio periodo. Parimenti importante, da un punto di vista diplomatico, fu il *summit* NATO che nel 2004 si tenne simbolicamente a Istanbul. Durante tale vertice, la sovranità dell'Iraq fu riposta nelle mani del governo locale, concludendo così l'esperienza del "proconsolato" degli Stati Uniti; inoltre, fu lanciata il partenariato tra la NATO e i Paesi del Golfo (la I*stanbul Cooperation Initiative*), a dimostrazione delle necessità di ancorare tale ragione alla stabilità euro-atlantico. La Turchia si presentava così come la finestra dell'Alleanza Atlantica sul Grande Medio Oriente, nonché come porta per il dialogo a unire due regioni così differenti culturalmente seppur contigue geograficamente e strategicamente.

L'arrivo al governo nel novembre 2002 dell'AKP, partito che incarna l'Islam politico, aveva infatti impresso un rinnovato orientamento alla politica estera turca, dandole una maggiore attenzione al Grande Medio Oriente e fino agli Stati del Maghreb. Ciò non avvenne solo per affinità religiosa e culturale con gli altri Paesi musulmani dell'area, ma fu una precisa scelta politica per dare un nuovo ruolo alla Turchia nel "turbolento" vicinato. Tale riorientamento trova una precisa formulazione nella dottrina della "profondità strategica" elaborata nel 2001 da Davutoğlu, considerato l'architetto di ciò che è stato poi definito come "neo-ottomanesimo" (Burç 2014). La dottrina fa leva principalmente sulla considerazione che la rilevanza di uno Stato nel sistema internazionale dipende anzitutto dalla sua posizione geostrategica. E da questo punto di vista la Turchia, trovandosi all'intersezione di molteplici aree geopolitiche e culture differenti, è storicamente avvantaggiata (Murinson 2006). Accanto al tradizionale orientamento in politica estera, infatti, la Turchia, secondo Davutoğlu, per la sua capacità di proiezione strategica a carattere etno-linguistico e per la sua possibilità di ripercorrere l'eredità dell'Impero ottomano, sarebbe l'unico attore strategico dotato di margini di manovra così importanti e vasti in Eurasia. La Turchia del XXI secolo, a suo avviso, non doveva più considerarsi come un semplice Stato-nazione affiliato all'Occidente, ma come uno Stato a vocazione imperiale in grado di respingere qualunque condizione periferica che le veniva assegnata, a cominciare dagli alleati (soprattutto gli Stati Uniti), e di perseguire un indirizzo basato sulla valorizzazione della sua posizione geostrategica a cavallo tra area euro-atlantica e mediorientale (Ulusoy 2015). La sfida per la Turchia del XXI secolo sarebbe perciò stata quella di considerarsi come il centro di diverse regioni geopolitiche interconnesse tra loro e in opposizione all'idea di rappresentare una semplice appendice europea e un avamposto occidentale (Bulent 2009).

Dal punto di vista geostrategico, il Bosforo e i Dardanelli rientravano nel medesimo disegno e sono stati oggetto di attrito tra Washington e Ankara negli anni dell'amministrazione di George W. Bush. Nell'agosto 2008, a seguito dell'attacco operato dalle truppe georgiane alle forze separatiste nell'Ossezia meridionale, la Russia intervenne rapidamente in supporto a quest'ultime. Dopo più di una settimana di ostilità, le due parti firmarono un accordo mediato dalla Francia. Allo stesso tempo, navi militari spagnole, tedesche, polacche e statunitensi attraversarono gli Stretti come parte di un'esercitazione della NATO in linea con le clausole della Convenzione di Montreaux. Terminato il conflitto, gli Stati Uniti richiesero alla Turchia di concedere l'accesso al Mar Nero a due navi militari ospedaliere, il *USNS Mercy* e il *USNS Comfort*, per consegnare aiuti umanitari in Georgia. Secondo i dati comunicati dagli americani, il dislocamento delle due navi eccedeva le 69.000 tonnellate, e dunque al di là del limite delle 45.000 tonnellate concesso dalla Convenzione di Montreaux. Una circostanza, questa, portata immediatamente alla luce dal governo russo. Ankara decise di accettare la protesta di Mosca, respingendo dunque la richiesta di Washington. Negli Stati Uniti, ciò diede la chiara impressione che "la Turchia non fu d'aiuto" (Gokcicek 2009: 48). Come affermò Mark Kirk, influente Senatore repubblicano,

> as hundreds of Georgian civilians cry out for international assistance, Turkey is dragging its feet on approving the transit of U.S. hospital ships through the Turkish Straits. Blocking humanitarian and medical supplies from reaching the people of Georgia is unacceptable. We should expect more from a NATO ally like Turkey. (Enginsoy 2008)

Washington decise dunque di ripiegare su tre navi più leggere, rientrando nei limiti della Convenzione, alle quali fu concesso il transito. Tale misura, comunque, sollevò ulteriori proteste da parte della Russia. Nelle parole di Anatoly Nogovitsyn, al tempo portavoce delle Forze armate russe,

> [T]he NATO warships' entrance to the Black Sea is a serious threat to our security. Under the Montreux Convention, signed in 1936 on the status of the Turkish Straits, the warships can only stay in the Black Sea for 21 days. If the NATO ships continue to stay in the Black Sea after the expiration of 21-day period, then I would like to remind you that Turkey would be responsible. The U.S. ships are carrying nuclear missiles that can hit Russian targets as far away as St. Petersburg. (Hurriyet 2008)

Le operazioni statunitensi avvennero poi nel pieno rispetto della Convenzione. La guerra in Ossezia del Sud ha comunque dimostrato che gli Stretti turchi e gli equilibri nella regione del Mar Nero rimangono militarmente e strategicamente di vitale importanza anzitutto nel quadro dei rapporti NATO-Russia, con al centro una Turchia sempre più in qualità di swing State tutt'altro che intenzionata a limitare la propria azione in qualità di "cliente" degli Stati Uniti. Per tale ragione, la *National Security Strategy* americana del 2010 enunciò che tra gli obiettivi di Washington vi era di "coinvolgere" (*engage*) la Turchia nella stabilità della "sua regione" dai Balcani al Caucaso, passando per Cipro (US National Security Strategy 2010).

3. La Turchia come swing State?

L'evoluzione del ruolo strategico della Turchia ridisegna, o almeno intende farlo, la sua influenza nell'area euro-asiatica, rivalutando la *membership* NATO in quanto funzionale agli stessi interessi nazionali turchi. Anzitutto per tale motivo, un'uscita dall'Alleanza Atlantica non risulta essere stata presa in seria considerazione ad Ankara. Anzi, l'approvazione da parte dei Capi di Stato e di Governo del Concetto Strategico della NATO nel novembre 2010, in occasione del *summit* di Lisbona, venne salutata dal governo turco come la chance per l'Alleanza di far fronte, con rinnovati slancio e capacità, alle sfide future della sicurezza internazionale, incluse quelle nel Grande Medio Oriente di particolare rilevanza per la Turchia.

Se, per Ankara, la NATO è un forum strategico "unico" in ambito euro-atlantico, in grado di garantire alla Turchia la possibilità di intervenire e avere voce nelle iniziative transatlantiche, il governo dell'AKP non ha rinunciato però anche a ribadire come la Turchia rappresenti un asset fondamentale per l'Alleanza stessa, con la capacità di assumersi la responsabilità di proteggere il confine a sud-est e proiettare la propria influenza nella regione mediorientale. Per la NATO, d'altronde, l'adozione del Concetto Strategico, che il Ministero degli Affari Esteri turco ribadì essere basato sul principio di cooperazione tanto caro ad Ankara, ha rappresentato l'apice della trasformazione post-Guerra Fredda dell'Alleanza (Davutoglu 2012). Un percorso, questo, che dalla caduta del Muro di Berlino ha portato la NATO a concentrarsi sempre più sul *crisis management* anche al di là dei confini euro-atlantici a scapito delle funzioni di deterrenza territoriale, accelerando lo sviluppo di capacità innovative nell'ambito, ad esempio, della *cybersecurity*, della *counter-insurgency* o dell'*energy security*. Com'è noto, tuttavia, la crisi ucraina e la Wales Declaration del settembre 2014 hanno riorientato nuovamente l'attenzione dell'Alleanza in direzione del fianco orientale (Borsani 2014).

Tra le questioni recentemente poste sul tavolo nell'ambito del ruolo della Turchia nella NATO ve ne sono alcune apparentemente di politica interna, ma con rilevanti implicazioni per la solidità e l'omogeneità dell'Alleanza. Nel preambolo del Patto Atlantico, firmato il 4 aprile 1949, l'accento sulla democrazia, sulle libertà individuali e sul predominio del diritto ha rappresentato non di rado per la Turchia una fonte di frizioni con gli alleati. Di certo, l'adesione di Ankara alla NATO non fu mai messa seriamente in discussione nel corso della Guerra Fredda nonostante tre colpi di Stato ad opera delle Forze armate – nel 1960, 1971 e 1980 – che fecero venire meno uno dei pilastri dei regimi democratici, ovvero il controllo del potere civile su quello militare. La rilevanza geostrategica del Paese, come spiegato poc'anzi, rappresentava nel quadro bipolare una priorità per la NATO, in primo luogo per gli Stati Uniti, che poteva richiedere anche compromessi di natura ideologica. Tanto più che il Patto Atlantico non prevede alcuna procedura di espulsione per quei Paesi che vengono meno ai valori e principi fondativi enunciati del preambolo[2].

[2] La Turchia non fu comunque l'unica beneficiaria di una simile corsia preferenziale: il Portogallo di António de Oliveira Salazar e Marcelo Caetano, governato da un regime autoritario fino al 1974, fu addirittura uno Stato fondatore dell'Alleanza; allo stesso modo di Ankara, anche la Grecia rimase membro della NATO nonostante la "dittatura dei colonnelli" tra il 1967 e il 1974 (de Leonardis 2013).

La Turchia governata dall'AKP ha progressivamente rappresentato uno Stato su cui mantenere alta l'attenzione. Se da un lato il tentato colpo di Stato del 2016 ha riproposto le medesime problematiche della Guerra Fredda, dall'altro le conseguenze del suo fallimento hanno prodotto una politica governativa di repressione e censura contro i media e contro alcune parti della società civile, tra cui il mondo accademico, che mettono in dubbio le fondamenta democratiche del Paese, a cominciare dalla salvaguardia delle libertà individuali, e dunque la piena aderenza ai valori e principi del Patto Atlantico (Saatçioğlu 2014). Le cause internazionali del vacillare della democrazia turca - o della sua apparente svolta autoritaria (Esen, Gumuscu 2016) - negli ultimi vent'anni hanno fattori endogeni ed esogeni. La Turchia, come evidenziato dall'invasione irachena e dalla guerra in Ossezia del Sud, mantiene ancora una grande importanza strategica per la NATO che suggerisce ai Paesi membri di non metterne in discussione la *membership*. Sono poche le voci in favore di un'esclusione turca dall'Alleanza, tra cui quella dell'influente Senatore repubblicano Lindsey Graham negli Stati Uniti. L'ambivalenza turca tra ideologia e strategia si è riflessa negli anni Novanta anche nel pensiero di due importanti studiosi statunitensi, Samuel P. Huntington e Zbigniew Brzezinski, già *National Security Advisor* con origini polacche. La "scontro di civiltà" di Huntington vedeva la Turchia come un Paese lacerato, politicamente diviso, sulla *fault-line* e intrinsecamente legato ad un conflitto ideologico per via di processi di civilizzazione esogeni che coinvolgono a livello interno le comunità religiose cristiane, e dunque filo-occidentali, da una parte e islamiche dall'altra (Huntington 1996). Secondo Brzezinski, invece, la Turchia è destinata a rappresentare un Paese *pivot* della cintura di sicurezza statunitense nella zona mediorientale e per l'Europa del sud-est (Brzezinski 1997).

All'indomani dello scoppio delle Primavere arabe e dell'intervento NATO in Libia (operazione *Unified Protector*) a cui le Forze aeree e navali della Turchia presero parte al fianco di altri quindici Paesi, nel 2012 il Ministro degli Esteri Davutoglu offrì una profonda riflessione che aiuta a comprendere la visione del governo sul ruolo di Ankara nella NATO del XXI secolo:

> since the early years of the Republic, Turkey's defence and security policies have been characterised by dialogue, cooperation and multilateralism. Turkey's membership to NATO is a clear testimony to this fact. Moreover, it is a solid symbol of Turkey's Western vocation and her choice of joining with democratic societies governed by universal values. (Davutoglu 2012: 15)

Da un punto di vista strategico,

> Turkey is located at the heart of a vast geography in which NATO is engaged in constructive dialogues, comprehensive partnership mechanisms, as well as a number of other operations. Over the last 60 years as a member of the Alliance, Turkey has not only benefited from NATO's security umbrella but also contributed immensely to the security of her Allies and to NATO's efforts to project security in the Euro-Atlantic geography and beyond. (Davutoglu 2012: 15)

Ciononostante, sottolineava Davutoglu in coerenza con la dottrina della profondità strategica,

> due to her geographical proximity as well as cultural and historical ties with the Balkans, Caucasus, Central, Asia and the Middle East, Turkey plays a special role in the Alliance's outreach to its partners in these regions- (Davutoglu 2012: 16)

Non solo, Ankara perseguiva anche

> Turkey has a multidimensional foreign policy with goals of maximum integration in the neighborhood, involvement in nearby regions, and development of ties in areas such as Africa, Asia and Latin America. (Davutoglu 2012: 16)

Rispetto alla Guerra Fredda, questa rappresentava dunque la "nuova" linea di politica estera. Se da un lato, insomma, la Turchia ribadiva il suo impegno nel far parte dell'Alleanza, rivendicava però anche il diritto a perseguire una serie di politiche proattive anzitutto nel quadro del Grande Medio Oriente (Davutoglu 2012).

Oltre al tradizionale ruolo di "guardiana" degli Stretti, per l'Alleanza Atlantica la Turchia rappresenta un importante fattore nel difendere una frontiera in evoluzione che si estende dall'Artico al nord della Siria, e che, in virtù anzitutto della sua posizione, la proietta ad essere uno *swing State* nelle dinamiche Nord-Sud e, a fronte dell'assertivo ritorno della Russia sulla scena euro-mediterranea, anche in quelle Est-Ovest. Alla luce di ciò e del suo percorso di autonomizzazione "neo-ottomana", la Turchia è così divenuta sia un'opportunità che una sfida per la NATO e per gli Stati Uniti[3]. Si pensi, nel quadro della crisi in Siria, a quanto accadde nel 2015, quando Ankara rischiò di trascinare direttamente la NATO in un difficile e complesso teatro, quello siro-iracheno, a causa dell'abbattimento di un velivolo militare russo a sostegno delle forze lealiste siriane che aveva violato lo spazio aereo turco (Chiriatti, Donelli 2016). In quell'occasione, Ankara invocò l'articolo 4 del Patto Atlantico secondo cui, senza che comunque ciò portasse all'applicazione dell'articolo 5.

Nello stesso lasso di tempo, ulteriori divergenze di interessi e vedute emersero con gli Stati Uniti in merito alla gestione e al contenimento della minaccia terroristica rappresentata da *Daesh*, che nel 2016 colpì anche il suolo turco (Bıçakcı 2019). Un rischio, quello degli attacchi terroristici, a cui la Turchia è stata esposta per decenni - soprattutto per via della questione curda (Starr 2003) - e a cui l'Alleanza Atlantica, in particolare a seguito del vertice di Varsavia nel 2016, si è dimostrata (nuovamente) sensibile per via delle istanze presentante da vari Paesi, tra cui l'Italia, che si affacciano sul fianco sud. Si tratta dunque di una sfida comune, anche se con sfumature non sempre sovrapponibili, che ha portato il Segretario Generale, Jens Stoltenberg ad affermare nell'ottobre 2019 che la Turchia resta un asset fondamentale per la lotta al terrorismo internazionale, rimarcando il ruolo del Paese nel Grande Medio Oriente (Al Jazeera 2019). Non un caso, dunque, che ad Ankara vi sia il *NATO Centre of Excellence on Defence against Terrorism*, creato tra il 2005 e il 2006 e volto allo studio di misure comuni, standardizzate e integrate tra Alleati per combattere la minaccia del terrorismo internazionale.

[3] Nella National Security Strategy americana del 2015, tra gli obiettivi delineati vi era quello di «trasformare la nostra relazione con la Turchia». (US National Security Strategy 2015: 25).

L'opinione pubblica turca rappresenta storicamente un fattore rilevante nel delineare il ruolo di Ankara nell'Alleanza Atlantica. Secondo quanto riportato dal *German Marshall Fund* nel 2015, il 38% dei cittadini turchi ritiene la NATO ancora essenziale per la sicurezza turca, mentre il 35% è contrario a tale visione. Se il 41% degli intervistati sostiene il ruolo della NATO nella difesa del territorio dell'Europa, la stessa percentuale decresce fino al 35% per operazioni realizzate *out-of-area* in teatri come l'Afghanistan (The German Marshall Fund 2015). Secondo i dati raccolti dall'*Atlantic Council* nel 2017, il 47% dei turchi ritiene che la NATO sia importante per la sicurezza del Paese al contrario di un 42% che dimostra scetticismo. È rilevante, però, che all'interno di coloro che si dichiarano essere elettori dell'AKP, la maggioranza, seppur di poco, affermi che la NATO non sia così centrale per la difesa nazionale (Stein 2017). È inoltre interessante rilevare come, secondo i *Transatlantic Trends* del 2014 del *German Marshall Fund*, il 30% dei turchi vorrebbe che la *leadership* globale appartenesse a Russia o Cina, mentre solo il 20% agli Stati Uniti (The German Marshall Fund 2014). Secondo altri più recenti dati raccolti nel 2019, la Turchia dovrebbe restare membro della NATO per il 49% degli intervistati, benché quasi due terzi (il 64%) ritiene che la base aerea dell'Alleanza ad Incirlik, dove vi sono circa cinquanta armi nucleari, dovrebbe essere chiusa. È infine curioso che alla richiesta di definire gli Stati Uniti con una sola parola, il 58,9% abbia scelto "colonizzatori", mentre il 23,5% abbia optato per "nemico".

Il ritorno della Russia al ruolo di grande Potenza, dopo un periodo di offuscamento post-crollo sovietico, ha rappresentato per la Turchia tanto una minaccia quanto un'opportunità per continuare la sua ascesa a Potenza influente nel quadro euro-mediterraneo. D'altro canto, i rapporti tra Turchia e Russia sono fortemente mutati di recente nell'ottica della securitizzazione del confine con la Siria e del mutato ruolo in via di ridimensionamento che gli Stati Uniti hanno recentemente assunto nello scacchiere mediorientale (Chiriatti 2019). Al di là del conflitto in Siria, per la NATO, in primo luogo per gli Stati Uniti, tutt'altro che secondario è stato l'accordo tra Ankara e Mosca per l'acquisto di missili russi di difesa aerea (il sistema S-400). Come si è visto, la necessità di una difesa missilistica da parte della Turchia a causa del turbolento vicinato risale al periodo della Prima Guerra del Golfo e si è manifestata nuovamente negli anni seguenti. Tra il 2013 e il 2015, Ankara aveva negoziato con la Cina per avviare una collaborazione per la realizzazione di un sistema missilistico (Meick 2013). Negoziati, questi, che si sono infine arenati a seguito del disinteresse cinese nel *technology transfer* verso la Turchia, una precondizione posta da Ankara per avere in futuro l'intero controllo del sistema difensivo. Già allora, i negoziati sino-turchi avevano sollevato perplessità in seno alla NATO, in particolare dagli Stati Uniti, in quanto il sistema turco-cinese non avrebbe potuto essere integrato in quello dell'Alleanza. Il tentato colpo di Stato nel 2016, con le sue implicazioni internazionali - come il caso Gulen (Donelli 2019) - sommate all'annosa "Sindrome di Sevres", e l'annesso peggioramento dei rapporti con gli Stati Uniti, che nel frattempo negarono la vendita del sistema Patriot sotto la condizione del *technology transfer*, hanno spinto dunque Erdogan ad accelerare il processo di acquisizione da terzi, ovvero la Russia, disponibile a concedere il *know how* alla Turchia:

> [f]irst and foremost […] the deep trauma left by the botched coup, and the consequent shift in Ankara's threat perceptions. The survival of Turkey's regime and its top leader was now at stake, and Turkey could not count on traditional allies anymore. […] The turn of events during the coup had shown that the main danger to Turkey's rulers came from the air, and exposed the need to immediately resurrect effective air defenses over critical targets […]. Conveniently enough, Russia, [which] had helped the Turkish government during the botched coup, was gracious enough to offer the world's most capable long-range air defense system. From this perspective, if the purchase of S-400s risked straining relations with NATO and the U.S., then that was a price [the] Turkish leadership was ready to pay. (Egeli 2019: 82)

Nel dicembre 2017, la Turchia ha firmato dunque un accordo con la Russia per la fornitura del sistema S-400. La risposta della NATO e degli Stati Uniti, che mantengono circa duemila soldati su suolo turco, non è stata naturalmente accondiscendente. Il Congresso ha approvato immediatamente misure sanzionatorie per i Paesi che avrebbero acquisito equipaggiamento militare dalla Russia (*Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act*). L'Alleanza ribadì nuovamente che un sistema di difesa missilistica prodotto da un Paese esterno alla NATO non poteva essere integrato nella sua architettura di difesa, in particolare in Turchia non sarebbe stato compatibile con i radar dispiegati nella base orientale di Kurecik e con i velivoli di sorveglianza aerea in quella di Konya. Parallelamente, a Washington fu evidenziato come Ankara fosse un *partner* nel programma degli F-35, velivoli militari considerati tra i pilastri della difesa NATO per il futuro. Non un caso, dunque, che nel luglio 2019 la Turchia sia stata estromessa dalla Casa Bianca dal programma F-35. D'altro canto, Ankara ha sottolineato che l'accordo con la Russia prevede il trasferimento di tecnologia, rifiutatale in passato sia dalla Cina che dagli Stati Uniti. Erdogan ha affermato a più riprese che, nonostante le pressioni americane, quello con la Russia è un "affare fatto" (*done deal*) e da cui il suo Paese non recederà (Haaretz 2019). Non deve essere inoltre sottovalutato che la Turchia ha siglato un accordo nel novembre 2017 con due membri NATO, la Francia e l'Italia, per sviluppare in parallelo un ulteriore sistema di difesa missilistico aereo (Aydın-Düzgit 2018). A prescindere dall'esito della vicenda, emerge dunque la volontà della Turchia di dotarsi, nel medio-lungo periodo, di mezzi di difesa autonomi, strumenti essenziali per perseguire quel nuovo ruolo in politica estera che le alte sfere dell'AKP hanno coerentemente delineato fin dall'avvento al potere di Erdogan.

Conclusioni

Il ruolo della Turchia nella NATO nel 2020 appare profondamente mutato rispetto a quello giocato nel corso della Guerra Fredda. L'evoluzione del sistema internazionale, transitato dal bipolarismo al multipolarismo dopo la breve parentesi unipolare degli anni Novanta, ha avuto profonde implicazioni per Ankara. Da una parte, ciò ha costituito una sfida, sottraendo alle Forze armate turche l'ormai tradizionale ruolo di "bastione" dell'Occidente nella regione del Mar Nero in difesa dall'espansionismo sovietico. A fronte della caduta del vecchio nemico, le alte sfere della Turchia hanno percepito un iniziale senso di smarrimento, in bilico tra incertezza e timore che il nuovo contesto internazionale riducesse la rilevanza del Paese e lo rendesse obiettivo del-

le mire e delle influenze delle grandi Potenze, anche alleate, in modo non dissimile da quanto accaduto al decadente Impero ottomano. Dall'altra parte, in particolare a seguito dell'avvento al potere dell'AKP, il nuovo quadro multipolare si è dimostrato un'opportunità per Ankara per ridefinire il suo ruolo nella regione euro-mediterranea, e dunque nella NATO.

Nel corso dell'ultimo ventennio, la Turchia ha dunque condotto una politica estera di maggiore autonomizzazione nel quadro transatlantico con l'obiettivo di ritagliarsi una sua rilevanza nel Grande Medio Oriente sulla base, anzitutto, del proprio glorioso passato imperiale. Ciò si è tradotto in un maggiore *criticism* verso le posizioni dell'Alleanza Atlantica e, soprattutto, degli Stati Uniti, transitati dal ruolo di protettore turco degli anni Cinquanta a quello di alleato-rivale del Ventunesimo secolo. La recente crisi tra Washington e Ankara sull'acquisizione da parte di quest'ultima del sistema missilistico di difesa russo rappresenta, dunque, null'altro che un'ulteriore fase nella ridefinizione di un rapporto iniziata all'indomani degli attentati dell'11 settembre 2001 e di cui le prime avvisaglie erano già state percepite nell'ultima fase della Guerra Fredda, benché ben lontane dall'incrinare potenzialmente la relazione bilaterale e la rilevanza turca nella NATO.

Guardando alla storia recente, pare difficile che la Turchia abbia interesse nel recedere sia dal percorso di autonomizzazione della sua politica estera dagli Stati Uniti sia dalla *membership* dell'Alleanza Atlantica. D'altro canto, l'importanza della sua posizione geostrategica rimane un *asset* prioritario per gli alleati nel quadro euro-mediterraneo e, dunque, pare nell'interesse anzitutto dell'Europa, in particolare per i Paesi che si affacciano sul fianco sud, mantenere ancorata Ankara alla NATO in virtù del suo ruolo nelle dinamiche regionali.

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De Europa
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George H.W. Bush's "Pause" and Mikhail Gorbachev's "Common European Home"

Stefano Luconi

1. Introduction

Europe was a major geostrategic and ideological battlefield between the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, if not even "the epicenter" of that struggle (Morewood 2003: 12). Although the latter had progressively shifted its centerpiece from the Old World to the developing countries at least since the early 1960s (Westad 2005: 158-395), Europe retained its relevance in the eyes of both Washington and Moscow in the final stages of the East-West confrontation, too. Consequently, even after the tension between the two superpowers began to scale down and the Cold War seemed to be approaching its demise in the late 1980s, the U.S. government remained wary about the Kremlin's proposals concerning Europe.

Focusing primarily on George H.W. Bush's first year at the White House, this article examines the U.S. president's response to General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev's new course in Moscow's foreign policy for Europe, which was framed under the proposal for a "common European home". In particular, by analyzing Bush's public statements, with a specific attention to an address he made in Mainz, Germany, on 31 May 1989, the piece highlights Bush's concerns and how he countered what the American president and its aides initially tended to regard as part of Gorbachev's propagandistic offensive to gain consensus in western Europe and to interfere with Washington's relations with U.S. allies. Indeed, the Mainz speech not only outlined Bush's vision for the future of Europe, which included a unified Germany, but it also epitomized his attitude towards the Kremlin at the beginning of his administration. Yet, it has generally received relatively scanty attention in scholarship. While exploring whether the forty-first U.S. president's dealing with the Kremlin revealed realism or a lack of vision, historiography has addressed primarily Bush's proposal for a partnership in leadership with Germany (Beschloss, Talbott 1993: 81; Cox, Hurst 2002: 132; Jumppanen 2009: 54, 74-76, 92-93; Sarotte 2009: 54; Blanton 2014: 293-294; Rhodes 2018: 25-26), before studies about the Cold War in the Old Continent, especially by European-based researchers, have begun to overcome their previous bipolar approach and to focus on national actors other than the two superpowers (Bozo, Rey *et alii* 2008; Autio-Sarasmo, Miklóssy 2010).

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2. The Background

In a recent tribute to Bush in *Time* magazine, Gorbachev has stressed his friendship with the late U.S. president. In particular, the former Soviet leader has recalled the first face-to-face conversation he had with then vice president Bush on 10 December 1987, during a limousine ride to Andrew Air Force Base after signing the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in Washington two days earlier. According to Gorbachev's reconstruction, Bush "assured me that, should he be elected, he would continue what we had started with President Reagan" (Gorbachev 2018: 24).

Yet, the relations between Bush and Gorbachev were rather unsympathetic at the very beginning. The image of Bush's early overtures in Gorbachev's reminiscences contrasts with the former's lack of enthusiasm about the dialogue between Washington and Moscow, as the then Soviet leader himself acknowledged to the Politburo after meeting both the American president and the vice president in early December 1988 during the transition from the Reagan to the Bush administration: "we should take into account that Bush is a very cautious politician" (quoted in Hoffman 2009: 315). Indeed, the U.S. vice president revealed an initial alarmist perception of Gorbachev. Back from the funeral of Kostantin Chernenko, which he had attended in Moscow on 13 March 1985, Bush reported to President Ronald Reagan that

> Gorbachev will package the Soviet line for Western consumption much more effectively than any (I repeat any) of his predecessors. He has a disarming smile, warm eyes, and an engaging way of making an unpleasant point and then bouncing back to establish real communication with his interlocutors. (Bush, Scowcroft 1998: 4)

Besides questioning Gorbachev's real goals, Bush also doubted that the Soviet leader would succeed in enforcing Moscow's retreat from the arms race and was afraid that a hawk would eventually take his place at the Kremlin (Herring 2008: 904). As a result, after entering the Oval Office, Bush placed Reagan's opening to Moscow on hold, waiting for an overall review of Washington's Soviet policy and envisioning some discontinuity with the previous administration in this field (Garthoff 1994: 375-379; FitzGerald 2000: 467-468; Engel 2017: 86-99). He was so watchful and wary in his approach to the Kremlin that Reagan himself expressed distress for his successor's attitude (Cannon 1989: A21). Even such an otherwise hardliner as British premier Margaret Thatcher revealed her worries about the policy of the new U.S. government towards the Soviet Union (Collins 1998: 214)[1]. Gorbachev has admitted Bush's so-called "pause" (Chollet, Goldgeier 2003; Gaddis 2005: 35; Maynard 2008: 15; Meacham 2015: 368) in his 2018 encomium. But he has also blamed "the hard-liners" in the U.S. federal administration for "pushing Bush to continue to play the waiting game" and pointed to the Malta summit on 2-3 December 1989 – the occasion of the two statesmen's first meeting in their capacity as leaders of the respective nations – "as a historic breakthrough" that "drew a final line under the Cold War" (Gorbachev 2018: 24).

[1] According to Thatcher's (1993: 463) well-known definition, Gorbachev was a Soviet leader with whom the West "could do business".

An April 1989 report by the Central Intelligence Agency about Washington's understanding of the Soviet behavior under Gorbachev actually indicated that

> Some analysts see current policy changes as largely tactical, driven by the need for breathing space from the competition. They believe the ideological imperatives of Marxism-Leninism and its hostility toward capitalists countries are enduring. (Central Intelligence Agency 1989)

Nonetheless, skepticism about the actual demise of the global struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union also characterized high-ranking officers of the foreign policy team in the Bush administration. For instance, on 22 January 1989, two days after Bush entered the White House, appearing on ABC television network, his National Security Advisor, General Brent Scowcroft, warned the audience that Gorbachev was "interested in making trouble within the Western Alliance" and concluded that "the Cold War is not over". He later contended that the Soviet leader

> was attempting to kill us with kindness, rather than bluster. He was saying the sort of things we wanted to hear, making numerous seductive proposals to seize and maintain the propaganda high ground in the battle for international public opinion. (Bush, Scowcroft 1998: 13)

Likewise, Secretary of State James A. Baker thought that "Gorbachev's strategy [...] was premised on splitting the alliance and undercutting us in Western Europe, by appealing past Western governments to Western publics" (Baker with DeFrank 1995: 70)[2].

In retrospect, Eduard Shevardnadze (1991: 98), Gorbachev's minister of foreign affairs, has called Malta as the place where "the cold war quietly came to an end". Still, Bush shared Baker's concerns and hanged on to his own anxiety about the Soviet intentions beyond the Malta summit. At the end of the latter event he observed that "we stand at the threshold of a brand new era of U.S.-Soviet relations", thereby implicitly suggesting that the United States and the Soviet Union had not yet passed ahead of such a point and consequently emasculating at least Gorbachev's remark that "we don't consider you an enemy any more" (quoted in Oberdorfer 1998: 383, 381). Then, contrary to the advice of his Defense secretary, Dick Cheney, who notoriously was not a dove[3], Bush confirmed the existing level of round-the-clock airborne nuclear command surveillance. He also refused to discontinue funding for the development of the Stealth bomber until 1992. Moreover, while overlooking the development of Islamabad's nuclear program (Waheed 2017: 75), the U.S. president appropriated 588 million dollars in military aid to Pakistan in 1990 to counter Moscow's expansionism, although the Soviet Union had completed the withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan on 14 February of the previous year (Ambrose, Brinkley 1997: 366-368). In July 1990 Bush even made a point of instructing his staff not to resort to the expression "'Cold War is over' in any draft statements" (quoted in Engel 2014: 119).

[2] Although he was not an insider of the foreign policy team, Vice President Dan Quayle joined the field of the skeptics and called Gorbachev "a Stalinist in 'Gucci shoes'" (quoted in Craig, Logevall 2009: 338).
[3] For Cheney's characterization as a Cold-War hawk, see Mann (2004: 201).

Of course, Bush's cautiousness towards Gorbachev and Cold War mood had political and economic motivations, too. The president endeavored to consolidate his own following among conservatives on military issues, after the allegation that Michael Dukakis, his Democratic opponent in the 1988 race for the White House, was weak on national defense because of his criticism of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative and backing of the nuclear freeze had contributed to Bush's election (Hayward 2009: 618). In addition, reductions to the defense budget resulting from a less wary approach to the Soviet Union would have been painful for employment levels. As late as mid 1990, for instance, senators on the opposite sides of the partisan and the geographical spectrum, such as Republican Arlen Specter from Pennsylvania and Democrat Daniel K. Inouye from Hawaii, still fought to maintain defense program in their states intact (Schmitt 1990).

3. The Struggle for the Soul of Europe

Bush's response to Gorbachev's "common European home" proposal was a case in point for the hesitant course in the White House's attitude toward the Kremlin at the beginning of his administration. On the one hand, it resulted from the still lingering Cold War mood in Washington in 1989. On the other, the hypothesis of a European security system allegedly underlying Gorbachev's blueprint seemed to interfere with Bush's global strategy and pursuit of a U.S. hegemonic role both worldwide in general and within the Old World in particular.

Even before his address at the Strasbourg Council of Europe on 6 July 1989, Gorbachev had already introduced the notion of a "common European home" in 1984 and had made it part of his "New Political Thinking" since 1986 (Rey 2004; Casier 2018: 18-22). As the responsiveness to this concept gained momentum in a Western Europe in which a growth in economic integration and clout could result in the temptation to distance these countries from Washington, so was Gorbachev's popularity. After all, the revival of European integration with the Single European Act contributed to encourage the Soviet leader to formulate his proposal (Guasconi 2018) and to develop a pan-continental vision by which Moscow's relations with western Europe no longer played second fiddle to the Kremlin's American diplomacy (Rey 2008). At the same time, the commitments of the European Community (EC) to turn the EC into a "partner" rather than a "fortress" and to develop a "political dialogue with our eastern neighbours" in the Rhodes Declaration of 3 December 1988 indicated that Brussels had begun to turn eastwards in response to Gorbachev's overtures (European Council, 2000: 149, 150). Therefore, to Secretary of State Baker, by the Spring of 1989 it was time for Bush "to get ahead of the power curve" (Baker with DeFrank 1995: 93).

To counter the Soviet leader's political attractiveness, Bush (1990b: 651, 652) outlined the idea of a Europe "whole and free" in a speech he gave in Mainz on 31 May 1989. In retrospect, Scowcroft (2014) has contended that the "goal" of the address was "encouraging the liberalization of Eastern Europe". But, as scholar Jim Hoagland (1989-1990: 34) has more aptly pointed out later, "Europe whole and free" was a "competing"

concept with Gorbachev's "common European home". Against this backdrop, the Mainz speech also resulted from Bush's endeavors to counter criticism by prominent European allies such as French President François Mitterrand and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl that the United States was yielding to the Soviet Union in the struggle for public opinion's consensus, following the Kremlin's dynamism as opposed to the White House's lack of initiative (Brown 2015: 480). Indeed, the address was "designed to seize the public relations initiative from Mr. Gorbachev" (Weinraub 1989: A1).

Bush intended to emphasize the shortcomings of Gorbachev's vision for Europe and the lingering potential threat of the Kremlin by focusing on the most vulnerable area of Soviet foreign policy, namely Moscow's relations with Eastern European countries, which were then excluded from what the U.S. president called "the commonwealth of free nations" (Bush 1990b: 652). Specifically, he argued that Gorbachev's blueprint lacked the paramount foundations of Washington's model, namely democracy and freedom, and therefore was unwise and not viable for western Europeans. Bush's deliberate stress was on the lack of "self-determination" in Moscow's satellite countries in the attempt to defuse Gorbachev's popularity in western Europe (Zelikow, Rice 1995: 31). After all, as early as the previous March, portraying the Soviet leader as a competitor of the United States for European consensus, Scowcroft (1989) had suggested to the American president that Washington should

> counter Gorbachev's "common European home" theme by pointing out that we remain in that home as welcome guests, not as with the Soviets in Eastern Europe, as occupiers.

Bush planned to exploit his trip to the other shore of the Atlantic in the Spring of 1989 in order to "whip Western Europe into line" (quoted in Beschloss, Talbot 1993: 81). It was hardly by a chance that he made a point of stigmatizing the collapse of the Soviet model so as to discourage any attempt at taking inspiration from the Kremlin. Against this backdrop, the U.S. president's emphasis on freedom seemed to play on the EC's stand by echoing the call for "a continent […] more free" in the Rhodes Declaration of the European Council in December 1988 (2000: 151). It is unlikely that such an implicit reference was fortuitous. Washington had become aware that the "European unification was in train" following the Hannover EC summit of June 1988 (Gilbert 2013: 258-259) and Bush possibly intended to address the EC as a collective entity by drawing on the latter rhetoric. Specifically, he reminded his audience at Mainz that "on the other side of the rusting Iron Curtain, their vision failed" (Bush 1990b: 651). Bush's efforts were not in vain. When he met German President Richard von Weizsaecker a few days later, the latter reported that "Gorbachev cannot substantiate his concept of the European house" and added that "there is a sense among all the peoples of Europe […] along the lines of the President's Mainz speech" (White House 1989: 2).

As William Forrest Harlow (2006: 40) has remarked, Bush's words in Mainz were per se "confrontational in tone". CBS News White House correspondent Lesley Stahl (2000: 344), welcomed his challenge to Gorbachev, following months of "reticence in

foreign policy", by calling the U.S. president "the conqueror". Similarly, according to *New York Times* editorialist Raymond W. Apple Jr. (1990), with this speech Bush "moved out of the camp of prudence and vigilance and into that of optimism and movement". Nevertheless, his language became even stronger and more explicit after the Soviet leader articulated his plan in Strasbourg. Ten days later, on 16 July, at a press conference in Paris, Bush (1990d: 973) stated that Gorbachev's

> common European home is fine so long [...] you can move from room to room. And that means coming along further on human rights. [...] it means an evolution in the Soviet Union, and it means an evolution in Eastern Europe. [...] A Europe whole and free does not visualize a Europe where you still have barbed wire separating people, where you still have human rights abuses.

Bush's proposal "to promote free elections and political pluralism in Eastern Europe" (1990b: 652) in his Mainz speech seemed to take a leaf out of the Cold War "Washington playbook" when the White House intended to torpedo the Kremlin's openings to the West[4]. It echoed, for instance, Dwight D. Eisenhower's reaction to Soviet Premier Georg Malenkov's call for a peaceful coexistence between the two superpowers in 1953, when the U.S. president retorted by asking whether "the new leadership of the Soviet Union" was "prepared to allow other nations, including those of Eastern Europe, the free choice of their own forms of government" (Eisenhower 1953). Similarly, Bush's (1990b: 653) proposal for "greater transparency" and "open […] skies" in his Mainz address appeared a replica of Eisenhower's analogous 1955 plan to assure compliance with any arms control agreement, revealing the same distrust in Moscow's willingness to act in accordance with weapon-related covenants (Rostow 1982). Bush's urging to "Bring glasnost to East Berlin" and his remarks that the "wall stands as a monument to the failure of communism. It must come down!" (1990b: 652) also sounded as a reverberation of his predecessor's 1987 exhortation at the Brandenburg Gate "Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall", at a time when U.S.-Soviet relations were still tense (Reagan 1989: 635).

In Strasbourg Gorbachev pointed to a new Europe in which "the only battlefield will be markets open for trade and minds open to ideas" (quoted in Rusi 1991: 76). Yet, the Bush administration read his words through the deforming lens of the Cold War. Scowcroft, for instance, was convinced that, rather than planning to overcome the divisions of the Cold War, "Gorbachev continued to express a belief in a socialist future for Eastern Europe" (Bush, Scowcroft 1998: 115). This was an outcome that Washington was not ready to tolerate because it clashed with the U.S. president's emerging doctrine of a "New World Order", in which "free governments" went hand in hand with "free markets". Specifically, Bush (1990e: 1249) would argue before the General Assembly of the United Nations, on 25 September 1989, that

[4] The expression "Washington playbook" is used here with regard to Barack Obama's meaning, although he did not refer to the Cold War and stressed the military implications, namely a set of predetermined guidelines that presidents are supposed to follow strictly in foreign policy, regardless of the diverse circumstances they may face (Goldberg 2016: 76).

> the possibility now exists for the creation of a true community of nations built on shared interests and ideals a true community, a world where free governments and free markets meet the rising desire of the people to control their own destiny, to live in dignity, and to exercise freely their fundamental human rights.

Therefore, he made it clear that Europe could not keep on experiencing two different social and economic models. As Bush (1990d: 973) put it in his press conference on 16 July, "Europe whole and free" entailed that Eastern European countries would "continue to move towards what works, and what works is freedom, democracy, market economies – things of that nature". After all, Scowcroft hastily "cooked up" the "New World Order" to prevent Gorbachev from keeping the initiative on collective security (Alter 1992: 39). The doctrine was less a strategic choice, to move the United Nations back to the center of the security system, than a tactical retreat, to prevent Washington's overexposure as a worldwide policeman. Furthermore, its formulation did not stifle the U.S. search for global hegemony and Washington's longing for primacy in Europe either, as the 1992 draft of the *Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994-1999* was to demonstrate with its emphasis on the prevention of the emergence of any other nation as a challenger to the U.S. supremacy not only in the global arena but also at the regional level[5].

In the Summer of 1989, the United States enjoyed more leverage than the Soviet Union as the dynamics within Moscow's camp were moving in the direction Bush hoped for. On the political side, the previous June Poland held the first partially free elections since 1947, which led to the victory of *Solidarność* and, consequently, paved the way to the end of the Communist monopoly of power. At the same time, the beginning of the Round Table talks saw the return to a multi-party system in Hungary. In the view of the White House such developments marked steps towards "ending the division of Europe on Western democratic terms" (quoted in Domber 2014: 240). On the economic side, Washington was elaborating an aid "package" to help Hungary and Poland (Bush 1990c: 897), thereby demonstrating the superiority of Washington's model in the face of Moscow's impotence to rescue its own satellites. Moreover, further support for these countries was on the agenda of the G-7 summit that was the reason for Bush's visit to Paris (Bideleux 1996: 238-239). Finally, as for the falling of barbed wires, 27 June 1989 had seen the first breach in the Iron Curtain as the Hungarian government opened the country's border with Austria with a symbolic fence-cutting ceremony in a modest public-relations event at Sopron after dismantling the electronic signaling system in the previous weeks (Eichtinger, Wohnout 2012: 164-165, 177-178). In an interview with David Frost the following September, Bush stated that the opening of the Hungarian-Austrian border was an indication that the "Berlin Wall will come down" before the end of his own term at the White House (Nelson 1989: 49).

[5] Within the elaboration of a post-Cold War strategy for the United States, the 1992 draft outlined a set of policy imperatives to ensure the consolidation of U.S. global primacy against the backdrop a unipolar international system resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. After sections of the classified text were leaked to the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*, the Bush administration disavowed it as a preliminary work in progress and replaced it with a less assertive version in the mist of criticism because the main goal of the document, Washington's hegemony, conflicted with the White House's official strategy of a "New World Order" that relied on a new centrality for the United Nations in the world arena (Hemmer 2015: 114-115).

The ineffectiveness of the Soviet economic model and the rejection of the Communist rule in some of Moscow's satellites enabled Bush to take the initiative in antagonizing Gorbachev's efforts to reach out to Western European countries by means of his concept of a "common European home". The latter vision implied that the Soviet Union could be counted as an undisputed part of the continent, while the legitimacy of the U.S. involvement was at least questioned. In order to prevent this outcome, at Mainz Bush (1990b: 650) emphasized the "common heritage" of "Americans and Europeans alike", as opposed to an allegedly Soviet-centered Europe, reviving the notion of an Atlantic community overlapping with the Western block that had been a leitmotif of the Cold War rhetoric[6].

4. Collective Security in Europe and the Future of the U.S. Role

On 13 June 1989, Gorbachev and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl signed a joint political declaration calling for the establishment of "a European order, the Common European Home, where the United States and Canada will have their place" (quoted in Rey 2004: 54). Still, metaphorically speaking, Bush feared that, while Moscow lived in such a house by birthrights, Washington would risk being let in by invitation only. After all, if the Soviet leader's citation of Victor Hugo's "European brotherhood" of France, Russia, Britain, and Germany in Strasbourg a few weeks later would sound almost as Moscow's application for membership in the Council of Europe (Taubman 2017: 466-467), the French author's nineteenth-century vision of the continent did not include the United States (Jumppanen 2009: 91-92).

A new collective security system underlay Gorbachev's "common European home". Indeed, at Strasbourg, the Soviet leader called for a new meeting of the thirty-five nation that had elaborated the 1975 Helsinki Final Act in order to outline a new system of collective security for Europe (Rusi 1991: 76). Along this line, after progressively turning into less military and more political structures, in due time the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact would come to their demise and would yield to the continent-wide Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). A memorandum to Gorbachev, by his close aide Georgy Shakhnazarov, on 14 October 1989, specifically suggested

> the liquidation of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO by the end of the twentieth century. Within the framework of this process, we should define a number of interim stages, the most important of which should be the elimination of the military structures of the two blocs by 1995. (quoted in Taubman, Savranskaya 2009: 80)

Yet, as Sarah Snyder (2013) has pointed out, Bush was unconvinced about the usefulness of the CSCE, discontinued the resort to it to advance cooperation with the Soviet Union, and conceived it primarily as a means to safeguard the survival of the Atlantic alliance. The latter, in Bush's opinion, should remain the cornerstone of collective security in Europe. The 1992 draft of the Defense Planning Guidance would emphasize that

[6] For the genesis of this concept, see Mariano 2010.

> it is of fundamental importance to preserve NATO as the primary instrument of Western defense and security, as well as the channel for U.S. influence and participation in European security affairs. […] we must seek to prevent the emergence of European-only security arrangements which would undermine NATO. (Vesser 1992: 5)

Along this line, the U.S. president's "Europe whole and free" speech highlighted the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in ensuring peace and stability in the Old World for forty years: "The NATO alliance – Bush stated (1990b: 650) – did nothing less than provide a way for Western Europe to heal centuries-old rivalries, to begin an era of reconciliation and restoration." Its next mission was to let "Europe be whole and free" (Bush 1990b: 651).

At the conclusion of a NATO summit in Brussels the day before his address in Mainz, Bush (1990a: 638) declared that "America is and will remain a European power". Subsequently, on 16 December 1989, when a journalist asked him whether there was "any room for you Americans in this [Gorbachev's] common house", Bush (1990g: 1714) replied that "I don't want to see us pull out of Europe" and made a point of stressing that "I don't find any countries suggesting that the United States should decouple from Europe, even the [Soviet] bloc countries".

The Atlantic alliance was tantamount to the United States and helped ensure Washington's hegemony in Europe. NATO meant the deployment of American troops in the continent, which, in turn, contributed to enhancing U.S. influence. Scowcroft suggested that Washington should "continue to play a significant role in European security", adding that "the vehicle for that role must be NATO" (Bush, Scowcroft 1998: 230-231). He had the upper hand because, as the U.S. president's top advisers Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice have subsequently acknowledged, "the Bush administration was determined to crucial features of the NATO system for European security even if the Cold War ended" on the grounds that, in the U.S. president's views, "the American troops presence [...] served as the *ante* to ensure a central place for the United States as a player in European politics" (Zelikow, Rice 1995: 169).

As a result, the Bush administration obstructed any effort, not only by the Soviet Union but by West Germany as well, to enhance the CSCE and to hold a follow-up meeting to Helsinki's 1975 summit, until it was clear that the CSCE would complement NATO instead of replacing it (Pond 1993: 191). For instance, on 4 May 1990, in an address at Oklahoma State University, Bush (1991a: 627) outlined an agenda to achieve "a Europe that is whole and free" which included among its issues "strengthening the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, CSCE, to reinforce NATO".

5. After the Demise of Communism

In the wake of the fall of the Berlin Wall unified Germany's membership in NATO became the main terrain of confrontation between Bush's "Europe whole and free" and Gorbachev's "common European home". According to Soviet foreign affairs minister

Shevardnadze, for instance, this possible outcome of the unification process would be at odds with "the security structure of the Common European Home" (Shevardnadze 1991: 235).

In a display of restraint, Bush repeatedly refused to "dance on the wall" (quoted in Beschloss, Talbot 1993: 135). Yet, the collapse of communism encouraged more activism on the part of the U.S. president regarding an issue that he particularly cared for because, in his opinion, it was tantamount to the end of the last legacy of World War II, namely the overcoming of Germany's division (Meacham 2015: 400). By the time Bush met President of the European Commission Jacques Delors in early December 1989, the issue had become key to Washington's *agenda* for the future of Europe (Burghardt 2015: 207). As for the endorsement of the reunification of the country, Bush was ready to force the hand of his reluctant western European allies that still feared the resurrection of Teutonic dreams of hegemony over the continent. Thatcher, for instance, vainly tried to persuade Bush that if "we are not careful, the Germans will get in peace what Hitler couldn't get in the war" (quoted in Engel 2017: 346). Mitterrand, too, was concerned, at least initially, about the reversal of German partition[7]. Even Italy was skeptical, especially Premier Giulio Andreotti, although Rome endeavored to slow down the process primarily in order to jockey for a role in it (Nuti 2008: 194-196; Varsori 2013: 23-46). Moreover, Bush's rush to back German reunification aimed at preempting a possible agreement between Kohl and Gorbachev by which the Soviet Union would support this outcome in return for the unified country's neutrality, which would jeopardize the survival of NATO and, consequently, the U.S. main foothold in Europe (Cox, Hurst 2002: 134-135).

The crumble of communism also made the U.S. president more confident of a decrease in the appeal of Gorbachev's vision to western European countries. In his 1989 *Thanksgiving* address, Bush (1990f: 1582) implied that the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the first step in the implementation of his "Europe whole and free" blueprint in Mainz because such an achievement was the reception of his appeal "Let Berlin be next" after the opening of the Austrian-Hungarian border. In Scowcroft's opinion, too, the events in the former German capital implied that "a Europe whole and free" was "within sight" (Schmitz 2011: 118). To Bush, therefore, it was time to "move beyond containment and once and for all end the cold war". In this speech, he revealed the awareness of the strength of the U.S. vision of "a new world, with a new Europe, rising on the foundations of democracy" because Washington's determination was eventually "paying off" (Bush 1990f: 1582).

On the same Thanksgiving Day, the U.S. president wrote to Gorbachev about the incoming Malta summit and offered him to seize the opportunity of their meeting also to discuss "the difference when you say 'common European home' and I say 'Europe whole and free'" (quoted in Savranskaya, Blanton 2016: 521-522). Bush felt positive that Berlin's events had consolidated the course that the United States wanted

[7] Frédéric Bozo (2009) has reassessed the conclusion of previous studies, suggesting the alleged French attempts at obstruct German unification. For an overview of the issue, see Saunier (2015).

history to take and conceived some nominal openings to the Soviet Union to prevent intransigence from pushing Moscow into reversing this favorable process. U.S. public opinion's favorable assessment of the Soviet conduct, which grew from less than 40 percent in May 1989 to more than 60 percent in February 1990 (Holsti 1996: 70), also encouraged such a move, as a majority no longer called for "getting tougher" with Moscow (Brown 1996: 238) and wanted greater cooperation (Haas 2005: 202-203). By the end of 1989 68 percent of Americans thought that "the Soviet Union and the West will be living peacefully together" (DeStefano 1990: 27). After all, Bush's performance rating underwent a significant boost after the U.S. president announced his meeting with the Soviet leader at Malta (Holsti 1996: 76). In an entry of his diary on the eve of the beginning of the summit, Bush (2013: 446) wrote that

> things are coming our way, so why do we have to jump up and down, risk those things turning around and going in the wrong direction.

With this respect, the meeting was inconclusive. But, after the end of 1989, a span of time that Gorbachev's aide Anatoly C. Chernyaev (2000: 201) has called "the lost year", when Bush met Shevardnadze on 6 April 1990, while preparing the subsequent Washington summit with the Soviet leader, the U.S. president was ready to admit that "a common European home" was "a [*sic*] idea that is very close to our own" concept of "a Europe, whole and free" (White House 1990a). However, Washington's stand on this issue continued to be inconsistent and wavering, revealing the administration's persisting skepticism about Gorbachev's real intentions. A month later, for instance, advocating reunified Germany's membership in NATO with the Soviet leader in Moscow, Baker argued that

> It's nice to talk about pan-European security structures, the role of the CSCE. It is a wonderful dream, but just a dream. In the meantime, NATO already exists and participation in NATO will mean that Germany will continue to rely on this alliance to ensure its security (White House 1990b).

In any case, by then the main effort to shape a European collective security system, with the Soviet Union but without the United States, had failed to take off. On 31 December 1989, French President François Mitterrand (1989) launched the idea of a European confederation, open to Moscow. As Frédéric Bozo (2008: 393) has suggested, the project echoed General Charles De Gaulle's "vision of a 'European Europe'", which implied pushing Washington into a backseat in the continent or even promoting the U.S. withdrawal from the Old World. The blueprint, therefore, displeased Bush who, while acknowledging that "the Europeans need a space to talk among themselves", stuck to his point that "we need to enlarge the role of the [Atlantic] Alliance" to ensure Europe's security (quoted in Short 2013: 483). Mitterrand's plan, however, subsequently collapsed because of the growing aloofness of a few eastern European countries which were afraid that their participation would ultimately interfere with their plans to join the European Community (Friend 2001: 58). Moreover, Gorbachev's acquiescence to reunified Germany's membership in NATO in July 1990 eventually "allowed the Western alliance to become the cornerstone of

European security rather than being put in jeopardy, whereas the Warsaw Pact was doomed", as Bush's notion of "Europe whole and free" implied (Wettig 1993: 966).

6. Conclusion

At the time he gave his speech at Mainz, Bush was convinced that the Cold War had not come to its demise, yet. The U.S. president's criterion to assess the intensity of the struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union was the political situation in Europe. "The Cold War began with the division of Europe", he stated. "It can only end when Europe is whole" (Bush 1990b: 651). Since Europe was still divided, the Cold War was still ongoing. Indeed, it was only upon signing the "Charter of Paris for a New Europe", on 21 November 1990, that Bush (1991b: 1648) eventually acknowledged that "we are closing a chapter in history. The Cold War is over". Therefore, as the American president opposed Gorbachev's plan in his address to the German people on 31 May 1989, he stuck to Washington's long-established Cold War strategy of preventing the Kremlin from implementing policies that could lead the Soviet Union to exert its control over the whole Eurasia (Romero 2009). Conversely, Bush discontinued his previous obstinacy in overstressing the shortcomings and dangers of the "common European home" blueprint after realizing that the fight with Moscow definitely belonged to the past and Gorbachev's allegedly hegemonic aims in the Old World had turned out to be abortive in the face of the definitive collapse of the Soviet bloc. As the United States was a latecomer to the summit and followed for instance Kohl's decision to join the meeting, the American president's contribution to revamping the CSCE in Paris in the Fall of 1990 offered per se evidence that Bush had overcome his 1989 fears of a Moscow-dominated collective security system in Europe. By then the supposed threat of the "common European home" project had been defused to such an extent that when Bush and Gorbachev met on 19 November 1990 they even ignored the issue that had worried Washington so much during the preceding year (White House 1990c).

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Fears of oneself: perceptions of the role of the American élites in the political literature during the 1989 crisis

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The theme of fear is like a sinking stream, going to re-emerge in the political literature under particular conditions. As Remo Bodei stated, in his investigation about passions,

> hope and fear allow privileged access to fundamental philosophical and political problems. […] they seem like an obstacle to those who propose reaching full mastery of oneself, while they offer the most effective tool of domination to those who govern others. (Bodei 2018:18).

Fear originates not only from the relation with other individuals or groups, but also from the inability to master oneself. The fear of anarchy and disorder, of facing personal challenges and social events, namely of not mastering oneself, namely of loosing one's control on external events, are therefore so fundamental in political discourse as the fear of the other. Since at least Thomas Hobbes, fear is a fundamental feature of humans, as well as a "resource", useful in order to overcome the miserable state of nature and to reach a reasonable order (Pasini 1977, Mura 1984, Polin 1987, Raphael 1987, Sorgi 1989:161-87). The Hobbesian mutual fear of each other represents also the fear of oneself, of self-destruction, of disorder and craziness that leads to the covenant with the Leviathan (see for instance T. Baehr 2011).

Following this suggestion, the fear of oneself originated in particular periods of crisis will be sketched out in the following pages in some interpretations of international relations that apparently deal with the fear of the other (civilizations, nations) or with the hegemony of one political and economic model towards other ones. The critical period that will be considered is represented by the years around 1989, namely the fall of the Berlin Wall, when some main and contrasting theories about the role of Western society and USA in the world became successful in the American and European political literature. Some of them have dominated and continued to be popular in the public opinion: Francis Fukuyama's idea of *The End of history* (1989) and Samuel P. Huntington's *Clash of civilizations* (1993). Usually the two books have been interpreted as contrasting models of IR about the future global political scenario. For that reason, their respective visions of the American society, as well as their definition of the role of the western élites in the global development has been almost ignored. "Clash of civilizations", for instance, has been considered as a "prophetic" model of the future

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relations between civilizations, that has inspired the following political literature and praxis (Lozada 2017).

However, analyzing Huntington's and Fukuyama's works in their context, as reactions of the neoconservative movement to the development of mass democratic movements, is useful in order to shed light on the reasons and aims of these two works, which originate from the anxiety of the decline of the Western world, from the fear of oneself. This issue is shown in Huntington's concern about the decay of the Western élites, their "de-westernization" (Huntington 1996) and, in Fukuyama's worry about the loss of enthusiasm of the modern individual and the need to restore the *thymos* (spiritedness) in order to consolidate Western democracies.

The perspective used in the following pages in order to investigate these two works will highlight the respective models of Western society, the role of the Western élites in the world and the fear of possible decay of the Western culture and identity. Concerning these issues, Fukuyama's and Huntington's attitudes and perspectives seem far too nearer than they are normally considered.

A fragmented and incoherent world: Huntington's fear of de-westernization

In 1993 in *The Clash of civilizations?*, the political scientist Samuel P. Huntington adopted the model of civilizations in order to explain contemporary events and foresee future conflict. In the 1990s, the world was in a time of trouble, in "a condition of geopolitical vertigo […] where the old nostrums of the Cold War were redundant and new ones had not yet been invented, issued and approved" (O'Thuathail 1998: 173, Said 2001, Ignatieff 1996, Walt 1997, Gray 1998, Pfaff 1997, Borgognone 2011) However, the "Clash"was not only - as the critical literature has seen it - a reaction to a new global political situation and a new paradigm for international relations, but also defined a theory of power distribution inside American society and between the American élites and the Western ruling classes.

Like Toynbee, Huntington experienced the political crisis of the 1990s not only as an academic, but also as a member of the influential group of emerging neo-conservative American public intellectuals (Steinfels 1979, Thompson 2007). From the 1960s, he was a political advisor to the Johnson administration, writing a report on the Vietnam War (*The Bases of Accommodation*, 1968), while throughout Carter's presidency he served as coordinator of the Security Planning. Huntington was also into the 1980s as a member of the Presidential Commission on Long-Term Integrated Strategy. Huntington was much influenced by the conservative American political milieu of the Cold War: he avowed his intellectual debt to Louis Harz, known for his criticisms of liberalism, to Arthur N. Holcombe and to the law professor and political advisor William Y. Elliot. His life-long collaboration with the political scientist and politician Zbigniew Brzezinski led not only to joint works but launched his career as a public intellectual and political expert. Between the 1960s and 1970s, when Huntington's work became widely debated on account of his antidemocratic leanings, the neo-conservative intellectual movement emerged in the US in a critical political

situation characterized by huge social protest movements, by economic crises and by a drift of the Democratic party towards the left. In a highly debated book written with Crozier and Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy,* he interpreted the social unrest that broke out in the American society and the large diffusion of social movements as dangerous challenges for the American system, suggesting that the spreading call for participatory democracy represented an "overload" for the political system and that the increasing expectations and demands from the society disrupted democracies. Apathy and lack of interest for politics, that had characterized American society before the 60ies were the necessary conditions for the government's social control.

The democratic expansion of political participation generated a breakdown of traditional means of social control, a delegitimation of political and other forms of authority, and an overload of demands of government, exceeding its capacity to respond. (Crozier, Huntington, Watanuki 1975: 164).

Therefore, the only possible effective reaction to the overload could be to reduce democracy, namely to invert this cycle of ever increasing demands and lowering the political participation. The thesis about the "democratic malaise" spread more and more in the public opinion, supporting the reaction of Republicans and some sectors of Democrats against the democratization project of Kennedy's new Frontier and Johnson's Great Society. The neoconservative reaction should be framed in the backlash against the new leftism in the 60s that followed the American democratization (Thompson 2007).

Huntington's work on civilization many years later should be read on the background of his previous attitude with regards to the decadence of democracy and to the dangers of a liberal society. In a different context, when the neocons were no more a group of sparse influential intellectuals, but had become "mainstream" in the American public opinion (Thompson 2007) Huntington's book on the clash of civilizations meant much more than a prevision about the future of international relations: it promoted a specific idea of the role of American *élites*. In his 1993 *The Clash of Civilisations?* Huntington defined the possible "enemies" of Western, dividing the world into blocs, as Bernhard Lewis (1990) had done before him, and explaining political conflicts as battles between civilizations. Here Huntington reasserted the role and primacy of external politics for the definition and defense of American power, arguing against Fukuyama's theory that the global hegemony of the US model of democracy and liberalism was a reality after 1989: US hegemony was not a given according to Huntington and the end of the Cold War did not mean the final triumph of US economic liberalism. Thus, Huntington constructed a world map that could fill the intellectual vacuum after containment and he did so partly as a reaction to official US government policy. Indeed, in 1992, after his election, Clinton tried unsuccessfully to move from a military-oriented American foreign policy to consolidation of economic world hegemony (McLean 2006).

In *The Clash of Civilizations*, both as book and as an article, Huntington's writing style was simple and free-flowing, and the civilizations he described were primordial

and stable: their main qualities were "strength, resilience and viscosity"(Bassin 2007: 354). Huntington overtly stated that he wanted to give the ordinary reader all the pieces of the jigsaw required to complete a mental political map:

> finding one's way through unfamiliar terrain – he explained - generally requires a map of some sort. Cartography, like cognition itself, is a necessary simplification that allows us to see where we are, and where we may be going […]. World views and causal theories are indispensable guides for international politics. (Huntington 1996:30).

His discourse may be analyzed as a speech act: he first identified the main actors in world politics (civilizations), then explained the causes of their behavior (power and the protection of traditions) and finally gave the public the tools needed to localize and identify the main game players, before suggesting they take a stand for their own civilization.

Instead of highlighting complex historical interactions between civilizations, Huntington described them "geographically", as spots on a geopolitical map. Civilizations were conceptualized "as a tangible geographical entity [...] the 'biggest we' in which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all the other 'thems out there'" (Bassin 2007:355). The resulting "culturalization of politics", prompted by this approach, led to a paradox, *i.e.*, the naturalization and neutralization of political differences into "cultural differences, that is into different 'ways of life' which are something given, something that cannot be overcome"(Zizek 2008: 119). This naturalization was, in its turn, made possible through the use of geopolitical schemes aimed at transforming the fluid reality and the unpredictable behavior of individuals and states into a stable grid of possibilities and needs for rigid cultural entities, whose conduct was explained through their civilizational classification. In sum, despite the fact that Huntington dealt with culture, and therefore with historical developments, the "Clash of civilization"theory reduced history to geography, or rather, geopolitics (Bassin 2007: 354).

The Clash of Civilizations offered also some indispensable prejudices and biases to guarantee a stable representation of the world, providing the reader with the ways to construct his/her world.

Living in a situation of uncertainty was, according to Huntington, far worse than having prejudices,

> [s]implified paradigms or maps are indispensable for human thought and action [...] in the back of our mind are hidden assumptions, biases, and prejudices that determine how we perceive reality […] We need explicit or implicit models so as to be able to: 1) order and generalize about reality; 2) understand causal relationships between phenomena; 3) anticipate and, if we are lucky, predict future developments; 4) distinguish what is important from what is unimportant and 5) show us what paths we should take to achieve our goals (Huntington 1996:13).

Following the realist tradition of international relations and highlighting the situation of anarchy between different civilizational groups, Huntington stated that

every civilizational bloc had to fight to achieve hegemony over its competitors. In so doing, he disregarded any form of international order based on agreements between nations and on diplomacy, as well as any future federation of states, working according to the principles of multilateralism and rule of law. For Huntington, globalism meant the universal capitalist economic development of a culturally fragmented world. Yet, the main tension is between the West and the rest: he described this division in geographical terms as the world's main fault line without looking at the interactions between cultures or even at the consequences of colonialism.

Huntington's paradigm was based on a strong internal contradiction between his description of the world market and his interpretation of culture. The main Western universalistic institutions, democracy and capitalism, were not equally influential global forces. Huntington dismissed democracy and its universal ambitions and reinforced the gap between Western culture, whose values were seen as liberal and individualistic, and the 'Rest'. In this view, the world of the global economy was dominated by the Western capitalistic model, but the universe of cultures was fragmented and conflictual. "Modernisation – Huntington wrote – does not necessarily mean westernisation. Non-Western societies can modernize and have modernized without abandoning their own culture and adopting wholesale Western values, institutions and practices" (*ibid* : 78).

The map of a world divided into civilizations meant that in every civilization there should be a homogeneous, or at least a dominant, power. The "suggestive maps" showed different continents and groups of different colours: inside them, however, there were no differences. What Huntington implicitly denied is the existence of multicultural societies: he did not acknowledge that America, Europe and other continents are not homogeneous stable civilizations, but are composed of various diverse ethnic and cultural groups, and even different economic strata. However, in actual fact, the fragmentation is inside our societies, not "only"outside. Indeed, Huntington's theory retained its greatest political impact when it rejected both the existing plurality and differences inside the "great civilisations" - like Western civilization - and the multicultural nature of our societies, and separated what is already interwoven, *i.e.*, cultures, ethnicities and traditions.

On this account, Western civilization was not a reality: rather, it is a task to be fulfilled by the American élites, which implied that Western élites should possibly "westernize"their civilizational bloc. From this point of view, making common cause against an enemy was, according to Huntington, the best way to achieve the homogenization of a culture and the mobilization of one culture against another. He argued here for a typical realistic conservative approach in domestic policy and for a new Atlanticism in international relations:

> only an appreciation of power politics can counter business drift towards East. Asia, while Americanization counters the de-Westernizing threat of multiculturalism. Both are aspects of an internal ideological-cultural project driven by an external dynamic – the so-called civilizational threats. Only a foreign threat can prevent these corrosive forces combining to pull apart the country (*Ibid*: 308).

Clearly the main actors in order to revive the Western civilizations were the American élites. Huntington's main target was therefore to deny the conditions for a plural and multicultural society, that de facto showed the impossibility of any homogeneous civilization bloc. This is clear in his attack against the de-westernization of western élites and in his plea for the American cultural leadership in the Western civilization as well as in his definition of "Davos men":

> whether the West comes together politically and economically - he affirms - depends overwhelmingly on whether the United States reaffirms its identity as a Western nation and defines its global role as the leader of Western civilization. (Huntington 2006:318)

Even if *The Clash of Civilizations* was the subject of many critical attacks by political scientists and sociologists for its conservatism and attack on multiculturalism, Huntington's straightforward paradigm for the defence of the Western/American civilization was "ready to use"after the terrorist attacks in 2001 (Abrahmamain, 2003) and perfectly suited the transformation in US defence policy in the following time of crisis (Barry 2011). The lack of an identified enemy – Russia – led, at the turn of the twentieth century, to a new "grand strategy"in US foreign policy in which "military needs would no longer be determined by known threats, but by a new variety of virtual known and unknown challenges". The *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report* and *Donald Rumsfeld's Defence University Speech* in 2002, as well as the *Patriot Act* (2001) and the creation of a Homeland Security Department (2003) clearly reveal the new US "strategic culture", based on perpetual mobilization against unidentified threats – "permanent war" (Schoomaker 2004) - and on the perception of American vulnerability. In this perspective, Huntington's analysis predicting inevitable conflicts between civilizations, the possibility of any kind of conflict between political agents and his plea for the unity of the social body(led by strong élites), is not only part of the neo-conservative ideology, but also provides the perfect intellectual legitimation for Rumsfeld's defence strategy, which is based on his belief that the US' "challenge in this new century is to defend our nation against the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen and the unexpected" (Rumsfield 2002). No wonder that Huntington's defence of Western civilization led by the US and by strong American élites was seen as a prophecy of future conflicts between the West and Islam.

The universal gaze by Fukuyama

Nothing seems to be more different from Huntington's civilizational division than Fukuyama's theory of the end of history, written in an article in 1989. Apparently Huntington defies Francis Fukuyama's universal argument, following which the democratization of the world and the expansion of the free market are world developments that cannot be arrested. Francis Fukuyama shared with Huntington his cultural political belonging to the neoconservative ideological constellation in America – he eventually claimed to leave the neoconservatives in 2006 and openly criticized their foreign policy in his book *After the Neocons: America at the crossroad* (2006). He

was a student of Allan Bloom, a scholar who was strictly collaborated with Leo Strauss. He researched for the Rand corporation, a think tank for military and industrial issues and followed his mentor Paul Wolfowitz to join Reagan's administration.

Fukuyama's main contribution to the neoconservative thinking, namely his *End of History* represented a plea for a democratic, capitalistic economic society, that encompassed the world. His argumentation was grounded both on a normative principle, according to which "today […] we have troubles imagining a world that is radically better than our own, or a future that is not essentially democratic and capitalist" (Fukuyama 1992:46) as well as on the inescapable political and human development towards modern science and the expansion of welfare in the world. Fukuyama's statement that the liberal political system – and the market economy seen as the main engine of politics – would dominate the world history rested on the assumption that the main values of freedom and equality "stand at the end of a long process of ideological evolution and that there is no higher set of alternative principles that will in time replace them" (Fukuyama in Burns 1994: 242).

Many critical arguments have been presented against Fukuyama's interpretation of history: two of them seem relevant here. Timothy Fuller (in Burns 1994) pointed out the Hegelian structure of Fukuyama's thesis, showing that his allegedly triumph of liberalism and capitalism did not consider the factors pointing to the crisis of the global free market society and that the crisis of communism did not necessarily mean the effectiveness and rationality of capitalism in order to guarantee a free society and the well-being of its members.

Moreover – and this is the second critique – liberalism is not only what Fukuyama claims to represent: as for all neoconservatives, liberalism was interpreted as a system dominated by the market and in which individuals were seen as free atoms, without any reciprocal relations – other than economic ones (Thompson 2007). This is one specific interpretation of liberalism, which willingly ignores liberal theories after the Second World War, that explicitly theorized the necessity to bring together equality and liberty and to consider the individuals as embedded in social and political relations - like in Dewey's and Weyl's models. In other words, Fukuyama posited that liberalism corresponded to individualism and to the primacy of market over politics - disregarding all interpretations of political liberalism in the Twentieth century and reducing liberalism to the hegemony of the capitalist system and the primacy of economics on politics. According to Thompson (2007) in so doing, Fukuyama and all neoconservatives revive the first tradition of liberalism - Adam Smith for ex. - while ignoring the following liberal theories, which take into account the necessity to consider political issues like justice and equality.

This interpretation of liberalism as faith in the market and in invidualism dominates also "the End of History". All developments that Fukuyama foresaw in his account of the global history were grounded on the disregard of any cultural difference and of any geographic or geopolitical peculiarity. In this perspective, the other (culture) is seen also as an entity to be compared and related to the superior liberal culture. The

assimilation of the other – a process which has been also analyzed by Stuart Hall (2017) – is here complete.

Contrary to Huntington, Fukuyama seemed to neglect the geopolitical differences and geographic-cultural distinctions: "places across the globe are not read in terms of their geographical particularity, but in terms of sweeping abstract and universal Western philosophical categories" (O'Thuathail 1998:105). This "end of geopolitics" (Black 2015) led, contrary to Huntington who gave up any claim to "export democracy", to the American active engagement in the international politics for the expansion of democracy and free market. A demonstration of this point would be Fukuyama's membership of neoconservative group *Project for a New American century*, created in 1997.

Even if the geopolitical approach by Huntington seemed to differ completely from Fukuyama's global view of the universal diffusion of liberalism all over the world, there are at least three points that show a common ground in Huntington's and Fukuyama's perspective in "The end of History". The first is that the civilizational divide, placed in Huntington's works between "the West and the rest" and is the main fault line also in Fukuyama's text. Fukuyama stresses in the last part of his book that the capitalistic democratic society is not homogeneous and that along the way towards the democratic universal state, some will be left behind, some will be lost. He writes:

> Rather than a thousand shoots blossoming into as many different flowering plants, mankind will come to seem like a long wagon train strung out along a road. Some wagons will be pulling into town sharply and crisply, while others will be bivouacked back in the desert, or else stuck in ruts in the final pass over the mountains. […] Others will have found alternative routes to the main road, though they will discover that to get through the final mountain range they all must use the same pass. But the great majority of wagons will be making the slow journey into town, and most will eventually arrive there. (Fukuyama 1992; 338-9)

This is not an example of a view that neglects geography and culture, but rather the expression of an old idea of civilizational geopolitics, stating, as defined by J. Agnew (2002), that the different stages of development towards the superior civilization are incorporated into different cultures or nations; some are just laying behind, some are developing. Therefore, the cultural difference is seen as the product and at the same time the demonstration of an unaccomplished or successful development of some countries in their relation to other ones. Also in this case the West is clearly divided from the rest and is the "model" that has to be imitated by the other cultures – as well as the benchmark for all.

Secondly, the real effective division is, as in Huntington's model, not based on the Western strive to economic development, which is universal and is the "core" of Fukuyama's liberalism, but on the cultural backwardness, or on the inability to accept the Western values – and democracy – shared by a group of countries. At a deeper look neither Fukuyama nor Huntington have ever cast doubt on the economic hegemony of America over the world: this is clear in Fukuyama's approach, as well as

in Huntington's conviction that the economic world is Americanized. Only cultures are different – but economy is the only modern capitalistic one. Both Fukuyama and Huntington leave out here the possibility of questioning the supremacy of the Western economic model, whereas the Western cultural values are "local" or rather "territorialized", rooted in the Western bloc of States and culture. It is interesting to notice that Huntington and Fukuyama take for granted that the universal economic capitalist development has become dominant in the history – in this respect the "Hegelianism" of Fukuyama becomes clear. The main leading force in the world is the capitalist economy and in Fukuyama's model, democratic development goes together with the development of capitalism.

Another common point is Fukuyama's and Huntington's anxiety about the Western élites. Fukuyama, whose main reference is clearly not only Hegel, but also Tocqueville, is afraid about the emergence of the "last men", whose prototype is described, following his interpretation, by Tocqueville in his *Democracy in America*. The last men is according to Fukuyama the product of Western civilization and of the Western democratization process: he has forgotten his *Thymos*, his passion and pride. Contrary to the "first men" he has a passion for equality, for mild feelings, and for his economic welfare. The first men is identifies by Fukuyama in Hegel's *Meister*, trying to get recognition and defying death. The contemporary liberal State neglects the *Meister* model of individual conduct and shares an ambiguous relation with *Thymos* – *i.e.* with the natural human desire of recognition. As in Leo Strauss, the problem of politics consists in "the effort to persuade the would-be-masters to accept the life of the slave in a kind of classless society of slaves" (Xenos in Thompson 2007). The main issue for the modern democracy is for Fukuyama – and before him for Alan Bloom and Leo Strauss – to reconcile the spiritedness (*Thymos*) of the *Meister* and the material desire of self-preservation of the slave, the enthusiasm of the élites with the material needs of the masses. Modernity, namely the ideal of a society of equals, promotes a un-heroic idea of political engagement and community that, according to Fukymana, betrays the core of liberal thinking, in which societies were originally grounded on a strong idea of commitment and pride. If this original elan is lost, they would cease to exist.

As Nicholas Xenos (in Thompson 2007) shows, Fukuyama shares his worry about the loss of "spiritedness" of the Western individuals with Allan Bloom and, before him, with Leo Strauss: all of them are seriously concerned about the Western élites, whose superiority and responsibility has to be defined towards the masses and the other cultures. In this perspective, liberalism, or rather the defense of natural rights, pleaded by Strauss, Bloom and then Fukuymana, goes together with the acknowledgment that the few and the best have to govern and give order to the society and that inequality between individuals is natural and represents the better condition for a stable society. Fukuyama's *Thymos* incarnates, therefore, the quality of the élites and reveals the strong conservative and elitist perspective on politics: the élites should preserve their *Thymos* and their hegemonic position in the society.

A short conclusion

According to Fukuyama, the last men, an individual without *Thymos*, is bored "with peace and prosperity" (Fukuyama 1992:330) and becomes crazy and fight against these too ideas. But, we may ask, are prosperity and peace the main goods in a liberal democracy? Why should peace and prosperity be at odds with justice and equality? Should the democratic society strive for peace and prosperity or for justice and equality? For material welfare or for political participation? Here Huntington's and Fukuyama's – and the whole neoconservatives' – attack against the idea of participatory democracy emerges clearly, as well as their critique of a strain of liberalism that combines the individual liberty with the promotion of equality and justice.

The main sources of anxiety according to Fukuyama, as well as to Huntington, have to be found in moral relativism and equality – interestingly equality is here seen in juxtaposition to liberty. Moreover relativism is according to both the consequence of openness to other cultures: tolerance, according to Fukuyama, and dewesternization, according to Huntington, represent the moral weakness of democracy and the only real possible reason of its failure: "Modern thought raises no barriers to a future nihilistic war against liberal democracy. […] Relativism must ultimately end up undermining democratic and tolerant values as well" (*Ibid*: 332). A society of last men can end up becoming a society of "first men", of violent masses. The refusal of coming to terms with the other and with the multicultural nature of contemporary society represents a technique that is even more radical than Said's well-known praxis of orientalism, that consolidates the hegemony of the West on the East: Fukuyama and Huntington praise the reinforcement of a close identity of the Western élites against the other. The reason of political and social decline derives from the "democratic principle of equality" that makes all individual positions and all cultures similar and equivalent – this seems to be clear in both theories. Modern societies loose their ability to define their enemies and fight against them according to Fukuyama:

> If the strongest communities are bound together by certain moral laws that define right and wrong, the same moral laws define that community's inside and outside as well […] But democratic societies constantly tend to move from simple tolerance of all alternative ways of life to an assertion of their essential equality. (*ibid*:323)

Fukuyama's attack against the ideal of equality demonstrates the difference between his theory of liberalism and Tocqueville's argumentation, that is allegedly taken as one of the main intellectual sources of the *End of History*. Equality and liberty are both the fundamental basis of a democratic society – this is not the case for Fukuyama and Huntington.

Both Fukuyama's and Huntington's models of international relation are based on an elitist and undemocratic idea of society – and of the global relations. For both the international society is vertical, based on the hegemonic relation of USA on the world; for both the internal structure of a society represents the hierarchy between élites who govern and masses who obey. The distrust in the "democratic" individual, in the spreading of equality and of participatory democracy is clear in their argumentations.

In The End of History the apparent triumph of liberal regimes all over the world and the representation of liberalism as the only possible political model in order to guarantee peace and prosperity conceals a radical distrust of democracy and a strong anxiety concerning the Western "open" élites. On his part, Huntington's definition of the world as a patchwork of cultures shares Fukuyama's anxiety about the Western élites, who are forgetting their identity and mission, becoming weak and unable to assert their hegemony on other cultures. In other words, Huntigton's and Fukuyama's interpretation of the relation and place of the Western culture in the world are inherently split and ambiguous: their trust in capitalism is balanced with a fundamental distrust about democracy. Moreover according to the two authors, history is characterized by a parallel contradictory movement: the exterior development of cultural differences, that are going to persist, and the real economic convergence to market liberalism and capitalism.

Their conservative critique on democracy is subtle because it is based on a specific interpretation of liberalism and democracy, which transforms them: liberalism represents for both prosperity and peace – of the masses – and power and control – for the élites; democracy, on the other part, is used as a value the legitimizes the world hegemony of USA. The attack on liberal institutions is therefore made possible, radicalizing some principles of liberalism – free market and individualism – and creating a hiatus between liberty on the one hand, and, on the other, justice and equality. In so doing, democracy and liberalism are used as weapons to legitimize and consolidate the hegemony of stronger dominating political powers and élites.

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Trump vs. the EU: framing the enemy

Paolo Donadio

Introduction

In the history of transatlantic relations, a broadening European Union and its strengthening political and economic cohesion have triggered several and sometimes different approaches in the US (Lundestand 1998). After Bill Clinton's open support of monetary union in the EU, the progress towards a tighter political union among European states was seen as a geopolitical threat at the time of the G. W. Bush administration (2000-2008), potentially jeopardising American global interests (see Kopstein and Steinmo 2008). Obama's era, in the long term, resulted as quite disappointing (Cowles and Egan 2012). However, the new course of the Conservative administration led by Donald Trump, the most divisive supporter of US national isolationism and protectionism, has upgraded US – EU relations to a new political rivalry.

This rivalry was symbolic, on the one hand, when President Trump supported the political forces that challenged Brussels' rule and shrank EU borders. Nigel Farage, former leader of UKIP, was the only European political leader to take part in Trump's electoral campaign. Introduced as the "Brexit winner" at a rally in Jackson, Mississippi (August 2016), his backing was consistent with Trump's message addressed to the people dissatisfied with mainstream parties. (Webb 2013; Donadio 2017)

On the other hand, the downgrading of EU diplomatic status in the US seems to be a more aggressive act than just a campaign strategy[1]. Trump's decision to transform the EU diplomatic status of nation state into that of an international organization reversed a decision taken by Obama in 2016. This means that Washington will not deal with the European Union anymore as a single national entity, but with the single European countries.

This paper aims to investigate, by combining the tools of Critical Discourse Analysis and cognitive linguistics (Czarniawska 2004; Lakoff 1987, 1995, 1997, 2002, 2016; Wodak 2006), the way in which Trump constructs foreign politics by following a narrative frame that undermines the EU as an institutional global actor and its political integration. The study starts from Donald Trump's approach to the electoral process in 2016. Campaign speeches, along with interviews and statements by Trump, will be the main objects of a qualitative investigation, since the main terms of his attitude to Europe are already outlined therein.

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[1] https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/jan/08/trump-administration-downgrades-european-union-status

1. The electoral competition and Trump's approach

The electoral process can be regarded as a macro-cultural political model embedded in any democratic system and fundamental to any definition of democracy (Sartori 1987). It includes a competitive interaction between several and different parties, and thus features:

a) several categories of interacting participants, among which we have some competing candidates;

b) the accomplishment of different types of actions: call to general elections, candidates' acceptance, public debates, polling, voting and vote counting, acceptance speeches;

c) a sequence of some steps that mark the beginning of the whole process (primary elections), its development (the electoral campaign), and its conclusion (the election day).

The competition, taking place over time, can last a few months, one year or more in the cases of the so-called "long campaigns" (Norris 2000). The effect of the choice between candidates is to give power to one of them and transform him/her into a "ruler", just as it reduces voters' power and transforms them into "ruled". In order to accomplish a democratic process, the attribution of power and its actual exercise do not remain in the same hands before and after the election day (Sartori 1987: 30).

General elections in modern democratic states can, therefore, be considered as a consolidated democratic practice (Bobbio 2004), framed as a macro-cultural model with prototypical variations (Lakoff 1987) between different countries and depending on different political and institutional structures and electoral systems.

It is, in a nutshell, a competition between opposite actors for the governing of the country, carried out through a public and mediated debate. Being mainly a discoursal practice, the electoral process is often considered a metaphorical form of "battle" – an "ARGUMENT IS WAR" conceptual metaphor in Lakoff and Johnson's terms (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), in which we have a "battlefield", "winners", "losers", "camps", "attacks", "defense", and "strategies"[2].

In 2016, Trump's rhetoric altered the basic elements of political confrontation by simplifying the standardized cultural frame of electoral competition. His rhetoric was based on a weak, but coherent and constant narrative structure (Polletta- Callahan 2017), which inspired much of his political communication.

To start with, even Trump's slogan (coined and already recorded in 2014) "Make America Great Again" was structured around a temporal conflict between the nation's glorious past and a present situation to blame. Its simple narrative structure is founded on the basic elements of any narrative: a) an initial state b) the action of a character and c) a final transformation (Frye 1969).

[2] Bobbio (2004: 241-242) describes a formal democracy as a game ("un gioco") having its specific rules ("le regole del gioco") and defining the ways in which citizens are allowed to select their representatives.

In "Make America Great Again", the narrative is embedded in the sentence: the addressee is identified by the imperative form, targeted to a potential YOU/elector. He/she is the main character in Trump's narrative. The American elector is directly invited to take action (MAKE) upon an object and change its state, that is to say, America . The invitation to action leads to a positive result (GREAT), which is implicitly in contrast with a bleak present, but at the same time idealizes a glorious past (AGAIN)[3].

The slogan, therefore, does not ask American citizens to vote for Trump, but mobilises everybody to act in first person and be an agent of change.

2. Framing elections through narrative

In 2016, Trump campaigned in a way that actually introduced a "simplification of the political space" (Laclau 2005: 18), as it happens with populist movements.

According to Olson[4], Trump built his success thanks to the narrative intuition of an expert salesman, quite used to dealing with and solving problems. Conceived in terms of roles or Greimas's actants (1963), Hillary Clinton's campaign constructed a "standard" network that can be outlined as follows: if the "addressor" is to be found in American democracy, Hillary Clinton is the "political-hero" candidate to the Presidency who fights against an "opponent" (Trump) for the electoral victory, whose ultimate "beneficiary" is the American people.

Trump, instead, modified this taken-for-granted model:

a) he did not introduce himself as a "hero" external to the American electorate, but "internal" to it;

b) he constructed and delegitimized his opponent's role as a rival of the final beneficiary of the electoral "battle", *i.e.* the American people - as if he had said "Hillary Clinton fights for the Presidency against the American people, not Trump".

c) in 2015, when he announced his candidacy, he introduced himself as an entrepreneur, not a politician:

> […] politicians are all talk, no action. Nothing's gonna get done. They will not bring us — believe me — to the promised land[5].

Moreover, Trump did not appear to fight for a personal electoral victory, but for a radical transformation in which he marketed himself as "representing" the American people. Populism simplifies and radicalizes political antagonism and creates a direct link between the people and one of the candidates: Trump's rhetoric was effective because it was structured around a narrative, and this narrative had a unifying function.

[3] That glorious past dates back to the years after the WWII, from Truman to Eisenhower, as Trump exposed in two telephone interviews to Maggie Haberman and David Sangers of New York Times. Transcript: "Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views". https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html

[4] https://www.convinceandconvert.com/podcasts/episodes/how-trump-won-the-election-by-using-core-narrative-techniques

[5] Donald J. Trump, Remarks Announcing Candidacy for President in New York City Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/310310.

During an interview to CBS in 2012, Obama admitted that one of his biggest mistakes, during the first two years of his office, had been his inability "to tell American people a story", and give "a sense of unity":

> the mistake of my first term - couple of years - was thinking that this job was just about getting the policy right. And that's important. But the nature of this office is also *to tell a story to the American people* that gives them a sense of unity and purpose and optimism, especially during tough times[6].

In 2016, people elected themselves in the person of Trump, whose aspiration to the presidency was shaped in function of the advantages for the American people. Trump the businessman, unlike Hillary Clinton, politician and former member of the government as Secretary of State (2009-2013), was able to give American people a "sense of unity" and played a downsizing of the ego in favour of a collective and inclusive stance engaged in a fight against "the establishment".

> I believe true reform can only come from outside the system. I really mean that. Being a businessman is much different than being a politician because I understand what is happening. "And we are going outside the establishment"[7].

The political rival – "crooked Hillary" – was not framed as Trump's rival, but the American people's, embodied in the person of Hillary Clinton and, from time to time, in the power groups that were said to support her candidacy - the "media-donor-political complex", "out of touch media élites", "big business", a "failed élite in Washington", and the "establishment".

3. America's enemies

Along with the socio-political analyses of populist movements (see for example Mudde 2004; Pasquino 2005), populism can be defined as a simplification of the political debate taking place through a narrative restructuring of a macro-ICM (Lakoff's Idealized Cognitive Model, 1987) rooted in contemporary democratic societies. This cultural model is challenged and delegitimized through a restructuring of the orders of discourse (Foucault 1971). The populist leader literally gives people access to discourse and allows people to spread a kind of knowledge that is *silenced* in public communication. Giving voice back to the people means giving back power in the form of rights, security, protection:

> I have visited the laid-off factory workers, and the communities crushed by our horrible and unfair trade deals. These are the forgotten men and women of our country. And they are forgotten, but they' re not going to be forgotten long. "People who work hard but no longer have a voice. I am your voice!"[8]

[6] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/obama-reflects-on-his-biggest-mistake-as-president/ (my emphasis).

[7] Donald J. Trump, Remarks at Great Faith International Ministries in Detroit, Michigan Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/319646.

[8] Donald J. Trump, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/318521.

However, Trump's people are identified by their geographical residence, not by their beliefs or social class. Therefore, in Trump's vision of foreign policy, at least during his 2016 campaign statements and speeches, every country/body/organization "outside" the US borders can become a potential enemy. His populist impetus puts forth a radicalisation of America's enemies, which are no longer defined in ideological terms, but according to the physical space they occupy. The national border defines who's who and its relationship to the USA.

Within US borders, the enemy is basically the power held by groups or organizations in opposition to Trump's worldview: Hillary Clinton and the Democratic Party, the media spreading fake news, the political establishment and its corrupted élite, even including some Republicans:

> I mean, you looked at Bush, it took him five days to answer the question on Iraq. He couldn't answer the question. He didn't know. I said, "Is he intelligent?"
>
> Then I looked at Rubio. He was unable to answer the question, is Iraq a good thing or bad thing? He didn't know. He couldn't answer the question[9].

Outside the US borders, the label of "enemy" is a shortcut to identify a long list of threats, such as some rogue states – *e.g.* Iran and North Korea, which represent a clear military threat, but also ISIS, Al Qaeda and radical Islam and the threat of global terrorism; immigrants (especially from Mexico), who can endanger American people's safety; the European Union, considered as threat to US commercial interests along with China; not to forget the failing social policies in Germany and France (on immigration) and the antidemocratic nature of United Nations.

> Which brings me to my next point, the utter weakness and incompetence of the United Nations. The United Nations is not a friend of democracy, it's not a friend to freedom, it's not a friend even to the United States of America, where, as you know, it has its home[10].

In this long list, the European Union has its own place of honour. At the beginning of 2016, after criticizing some European capitals (London and Paris) for their poor control of immigration from Muslim countries, Trump started by defining Brussels a "hellhole", being home to "radical Islamic terrorists"[11].

However, Trump's aversion to European Union (indeed, his scepticism was and is against all forms of "international unions"[12]) became manifest before and, above all, after the Brexit referendum. Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of Brexit (23 June 2016), Nigel Farage was the only European political leader to endorse Donald Trump and

[9] Donald J. Trump, Remarks Announcing Candidacy for President in New York City, June 16, 2015. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/310310.

[10] Donald J. Trump, Remarks at the AIPAC Policy Conference in Washington, DC, 21 March 2016. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/317133.

[11] https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/28/world/europe/trump-finds-new-city-to-insult-brussels.html

[12] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/04/28/donald-trumps-real-foreign-policy-a-clash-of-civilizations

take part in his electoral campaign. He was introduced as the "Brexit winner" at a rally in Jackson, Mississippi (August 24, 2016), before 15,000 Republican supporters.

Trump did not involve a member of the British Conservative Party supporting the *leave* campaign, but opted for the symbol of the new anti-establishment politics, in line with Trump's message addressed to people dissatisfied with mainstream parties and asking for greater political participation or desiring a more direct democracy (Webb 2013).

In his short introduction to Trump's speech, the UKIP leader shared the same anti-international and anti-globalist approach as Trump, and made a list of the enemies that had conspired against the British people and had been eventually defeated:[13]

> […] if the little people, if the real people, if the ordinary decent people are prepared to stand up and fight for what they believe in we can overcome "the big banks", we can overcome "the multinationals". [applause] And we did it. We made June the 23rd our independence day. [applause]
>
> When we smashed "the establishment". And we did it. Everybody said we would lose but what did we see? We saw "experts" from all over the world. We saw the "international monetary fund". We saw "Moody's". We saw "Standard and Poor's". We saw "global leaders" project fear.
>
> Telling us that if we voted not to be run by "a bunch of unelected old men" in Brussels. [applause] […] our economy would fall off of a cliff. They told us there'd be mass unemployment. They told us that investment would leave our country. And David Cameron, then our Prime Minister, but no longer, told us that we might even get World War III[14].

And Farage's "black list" goes on, in a mix between UK and US enemies that was meant to create a parallel between Brexit and Trump's election: "Barack Obama", the "polling industry", "global corporatism", "Hillary Clinton", the "political class in Washington", and the usual "liberal media élite".

The long list of enemies of the British people is not dissimilar to the enemies that Trump mentions in reference to the American people (in the name of his anti-internationalism, Trump even discredited NATO as an "obsolete" institution during his electoral campaign)[15]. Farage's short speech reinforced the narrative structure of Trump's rhetoric, since it outlined a list of opponents who were not dubbed as political competitors, but simply hostile to the American nation and its people.

4. European Union and the "logic of confrontation"

The so-called "logic of confrontation", which was so pervasive until the end of the cold war (Ivie 1997: 72), even prompted Trump to declare in 2016 that the European

[13] According to Incisa di Camerana (2004), the idea that strong lobbying groups conspire against *the people* is quite frequent in populist movements.

[14] Donald J. Trump: "Remarks at the Mississippi Coliseum in Jackson, Mississippi", August 24, 2016. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=123198 (emphasis added).

[15] See the transcript of his interview to NYT on foreign policy (March 2016), "Trump Expounds his foreign policy views", https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html

Union had been created to beat the United States in trade:

> Don' t forget, Europe got together, why, primarily did they get together? So that they could beat the United States when it comes to making money, in other words, foreign trade[16].

This opinion was held even after being elected. In 2018, as President, Trump labelled the European Union a "foe" of the United States, in a list that included Russia and China:

> "Well, I think we have a lot of foes," Trump told CBS News at his Turnberry golf resort in Scotland. **"**I think the European Union is a foe, what they do to us in trade. Now you wouldn't think of the European Union but they're a foe." […] EU is very difficult. I respect the leaders of those countries. But – in a trade sense, they've really taken advantage of us." [17]

This was not the first time that European Union had been deemed an enemy of the United States. During G. W. Bush's second term, the debate within The Heritage Foundation (a leading think tank of US neo-conservative thought, closely connected to the Republican Party) was focused on EU's political role in the transatlantic relationship and its status of "friend or foe"[18]. At that time, the concerns were similar to Trump's worries: the European Union was forging its economic and political ties and, despite the referendum defeats in France and Holland in 2005, the European constitution conferred a continental superpower status comparable to that of the United States and Russia.

The element in common between Trump's worldview and past US administrations seems to be the "logic of confrontation", which once opposed the USA to the Communist threat. This moral vision of international relations (Hassner and Vaïsse 2003; Lakoff 1995) was based on the *need* to find an external antagonist that represented a challenge to the principles and values of American people.

Indeed, the idea of threat was a leitmotif of Cold War rhetoric (Donadio and Napolitano 2011). The Reagan administration drew upon quite a wide range of terms that identified the USSR as a destroying force of savage nature. They talked about Soviets as if they were "snakes, wolves and other kinds of dangerous predators [...] primitives, brutes, barbarians, mindless machines, criminals, lunatics, fanatics and enemies of God" (Ivie 1997: 74).

After 9/11, the conservative political strategy and its discourse framing rethoric changed dramatically to meet the needs of the post-Cold War. Philippe Golub, during the years of Bush's first term, described the new conservative approach to foreign policy as a form of legitimisation of the American *régime* after the end of the Cold War:

[16] Meet the Press, July 24, 2016: https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-july-24-2016-n615706
[17] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-interview-cbs-news-european-union-is-a-foe-ahead-of-putin-meeting-in-helsinki-jeff-glor
[18] https://www.heritage.org/europe/report/the-eu-americas-friend-or-foe

> During most of the Cold War, the existence of an existential enemy gave meaning to American power. It grounded the country's collective identity by generating cohesion behind unifying national objectives. For the most part, Vietnam being the major exception, cohesion and acceptance of the "permanent war economy" (Melman, 1974) was obtained relatively effortlessly thanks to the guns and butter offered by the Keynesian warfare-welfare state. However, as Peter Katzenstein suggested in 1996, in the post cold war "America's collective identity can no longer be reinforced by the invocation of an overpowering foreign enemy - unless, of course, one was to reinvent that enemy for political reasons in a new cultural gestalt" (Katzenstein, 1996: 536). That is what the Bush coalition has been attempting to accomplish. Post September 11 state-led mobilization against a newly defined global enemy aimed to unify the country behind a power political group that had repeatedly failed, as Wallerstein rightly notes, in its efforts to consolidate domestic hegemony (Golub 2004).

Trump pushes this logic to a further extreme, since his concerns are not about the changes of the geopolitical balance, but, at least, gaining and maintaining an internal political consensus.

The difference between the concerns of the Bush administration and Trump's aggressiveness towards the European Union lies in the US willingness to impose a world geopolitical order, as in the case of Bush, or reduce American commitment at a global level, as in the case of Trump's isolationism. The logic of confrontation and that of "find-an-enemy" strategy seem the same, but the main assumptions are different.

On the one hand, as demonstrated by political analysts (Burgoon et al. 2017; Payne 2017), the Republican and then Bush government's positions in the first half of the 2000s derived from contingent concerns: Europe and its own constitution, its own single currency and the project of a European military force threatened the world hegemony of the American giant and could weaken the North Atlantic alliance and US commitment against global terrorism. The initiatives aimed at delegitimising the European Union and the desire to build relations with single European states responded to the desire to undermine the unity of the Union (Donadio and Napolitano 2011).

In the case of Trump, on the other hand, the European Union, along with other supranational players, seems to be part of an archetypal vision of the enemy. The EU is a foe *a priori* of Trump's America First, because of his "transactional view of foreign affairs" (Payne 2017). The narrative structure of Trump's rhetoric, made explicit in his electoral campaign and then reiterated in his public addresses, includes an apparently random list of enemies who are such by definition: not because they are hostile to American interests, but because they are "non" American.

In this sense, Trump's concept of the enemy seems to draw on a notion of enemy as a cultural archetype, rather than individually defined enemies, and exploits the sense of fear that seems to haunt American society after 11 September 2001 (Sheets and Johnstone 2010).

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The polarity of collective identity in diplomatic discourse: legitimacy by metaphor

Liudmila Arcimavičienė

Introduction

It has been observed for a while how political leadership is becoming more identity-oriented. More and more leaders across the world are assuming the role of saviours and protectors of "the oppressed and pure people" against "the corrupt *élites*" (Mudde 2016). Populist leaders today are rhetorically enacting the role of the people's defenders against national élites, leading to such political consequences as Brexit and declining political trust in the EU institutions and membership (Akkerman, Mudde & Zaslove 2014). Moreover, it has been determined that the public opinion all across the EU is leaning towards more authoritarian rule and leadership (Inglehart & Norris 2016).

A similar trend can be observed in the way foreign policies are approached by leaders across the world. The language of diplomacy has become more conflict-oriented, whereby leaders position themselves in the hierarchy of dominance and compete for the recognition of "hard leadership" (Nye 2008) or hegemonically coercive style (Min 2003). President Obama's strategy of 'resetting the button' in his reference to the U.S.-Russia relationship has been replaced by Donald Trump's "America First" and "Make America Great Again". This hegemonic stance of coercion delivered by President Trump cannot go unnoticed and it is hypothesised that it might have reinstilled the recycled metaphor of the U.S. as The Oppressor to new ideological levels. It is also presumed that Donald Trump's isolationist foreign policy can cause a certain shift towards a less ideologically balanced representation of the political world order. To test these presumptions, the UN General Assembly speeches delivered by the leaders of the EU, Ukraine, Russia and Belarus in the time period of three years (i.e. 2015-2018) were collected and metaphorically analysed, specifically in their reference to the current international order. It is also expected that the leaders of the EU and Ukraine will align with the collective identity of the West, while Belarus and Russian leaders will be out-grouping the West. The current analysis will attempt to provide answers to the following research questions:

1) How do the representative leaders of the EU, Ukraine, Russia and Belarus discursively construe power relations within the current international order?
2) How do the leaders legitimise their stance?
3) What kind of metaphors are used to create legitimacy?

The chapter is divided into four main sections. The first section provides the theoretical background covering two major topics. First, some of the previous

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research on how the concept of political hegemony can be linguistically identified and approached. More specifically, the concepts of hegemony, identity politics and social agentivity are overviewed. Second, the metaphorization of conflict and its ideological representation are discussed. The third section describes the specific characteristics of the analysed data and methodological procedure, while the fourth section deals with the research findings. Finally, some results and implications of the prevalent metaphor models in the context of the international world order from the perspective of the leaders of the EU, Ukraine, Russian and Belarus are to be illustrated and discussed and, on the basis of the findings, conclusions will be drawn.

1.1 Hegemony and identity politics

The concept of hegemony is interdisciplinary in the sense that its analysis must include both discourse and society. The discursive importance of hegemony is highlighted by Michel Foucault (1990), who refers to it as discursive power that, by shaping the identities and subordination of discourse subjects, regulates and produces power relations. The societal perspective is well-developed in political studies, where the idea of discursive production of power relations is always located within the social context of non-discursive practices (Laclau, 2004; Laclau & Mouffe 1985). This combination of discourse and power points to an essential characteristic of hegemony, which is produced and enacted in discourse interactions and is thus defined by the social context. This interdependency of power on discourse is what Torfing (2005, p. 15) refers to as hegemonic struggles aiming to establish "a political and moral-intellectual leadership through the articulation of meaning and identity". In that regard, hegemonic struggles are an inseparable part of foreign policy and its discursive construal. It is thus expected that the analysis of the selected speeches will shed more light on how the leaders perceive power relations and how they shape the identity of their own country within the context of international hegemony.

The discursive analysis of hegemony can be carried out at different levels of linguistic enactment, *i.e.* transitivity patterns and positioning (syntactic), morpho-semantic (nominalization), lexico-semantic (framing and metaphor, pronominal use). Despite the chosen pattern of analysis, hegemonic stance is generally analysed *vis-à-vis* ideological dichotomy of inclusion and exclusion. In linguistic research, it is also widely recognized as Van Dijk's ideological square (1998; 2009), whereby legitimisation of the in-group is linguistically analysed in parallel with delegitimsation of the out-group. This discursive construal also performs a function of social agentivity, whereby social actors can be represented in discourse by highlighting, back-grounding or suppressing their own and others' identity representation (Van Leeuwen, 2013). This study deals with political actors who are the leaders of different countries and are speaking on behalf of their people and expressing their national identity in the context of international world order. The analysis of such political agentivity is expected to provide us with two-fold insights about 1) national identity representation and 2) international identity representation. Both refer to the metaphorically enacted collective identity (Melucci 1995; Gongaware 2010) that becomes politically relevant when political leaders share their national identity on behalf of that collective.

The collective stance is ideologically grounded and is recognized as an essential feature of identity politics. In this study, identity politics is perceived as a category of belonging to the in-group, the identity of which is represented via its relationship with an out-group. In social movement studies, specifically the study of protest movements, identity politics is disclosed via establishing the qualitative characteristics of the collective identity by analysing such phenomena as language, group ritual, beliefs, and symbols (Lofland 1995). In international politics collective identity is realised in the struggle for recognition and superiority. As rightly argued by Greenhill (2008: 344), this struggle "represents the process through which actors come to exist as actors within the international system and take on a particular identity within that system". Moreover, the struggle for recognition motivates 'state behaviour' (ibid.: 345) that consequently leads to various conflicting situations.

This study will analyse the perceptions of state behaviour within the context of three current confrontations between Ukraine and Russia, the U.S. and Russia, and the EU and Belarus. Moreover, it is expected that that all the leaders will shape their power discourse and collective identity formation within their relationship axis with the "other" (*i.e.* the West) against whom the "*self*" (*e.g.* Ukraine, Russia, Belarus or the EU) is constituted. The followings subsection will discuss the metaphorical representation of the collective identity and the possible procedure of establishing it.

1.2 Metaphorisation of conflict in political discourse

The concept of collective identity derives from the complex metaphorical system of body politic with its primary metaphor being STATE AS BODY (Musolff 2016) or STATE AS PERSON (Lakoff & Chilton 1995; Charteris Black 2011). Within this metaphorical system, leaders of the representative countries reinstate their national identities by personifying their states and representing them as active agents with their goals and trajectories of movement in space, etc. Moreover, they create a narrative of the superordinate collective identity (*i.e.* as "the World State" in Gongaware 2010, p. 345) within which overarching multiple collective identities of lower- and higher-order are encompassed and redistributed.

In addition, the leader becomes a metonymical representative of his/her own people by speaking on their behalf. This is also known as a category of political populism when politicians refer to "the people" as the core of their political agenda and talk about their duty to exercise the *volonté générale* (general will) of "the people" (Mudde 2004). The populist category of "the people" becomes an extended metaphor in diplomatic discourse. This is due to the fact that with the STATE AS PERSON metaphor system, certain states are seen as "the oppressed people", while other states are represented via another populist category as the "corrupt *élite*" (Arcimavičienė 2019). The antagonism is created between the STATES AS PURE PEOPLE and STATES AS CORRUPT ÉLITE that eventually leads to an ideological conflict, which is driven by a sense of superiority of one group of nations over the other.

Within the context of this study, the conflict between two kinds of collective identities of ingroup as the self and outgroup as the other are analysed by identifying

metaphorical legitimacy categories in the collected speeches. These are established by following Maynard's classification of violence categories in identity politics (Maynard 2013, 2015). It is finally maintained that these categories are also used to legitimise state collective identity.

To summarise the above, it is argued that the collective identity of a state is always metaphorically represented in its relation with the other. Discursively, the collective identity is construed via the metaphorical extension of the STATE AS PERSON and STATE AS BODY metaphors, especially when they are used in the context of legitimacy categories such as Targeting, Mobilisation, Value System, Obligation hierarchies and Victimhood. The next section will provide more detail of how the research data was collected and procedurally analysed.

2. Data characteristics and methodology

In order to test a metaphorical representation of the collective identity and a possible polarity between 'ingroup nations' and 'outgroup nations' three subsequent UN General Assembly speeches delivered during the period of three years (*i.e.* 2015-2018, excluding the year of 2016) by the representative leaders of the EU, Ukraine, Russia and Belarus were collected. More specific data description is summarized in Table 1 below:

UN General Assembly speeches				
Nations / leadership	**2015**	**2017**	**2018**	**No. of tokens**
RUSSIA	President Vladimir Putin	FA Minister Sergey Lavrov	FA Minister Sergey Lavrov	7,257
BELARUS	President Lukashenko	FA Minister Vladimir Makei	FA Minister Vladimir Makei	7,727
UKRAINE	President Piotr Poroshenko 3129	President Piotr Poroshenko 2593	President Piotr Poroshenko 2,847	8,832
The EU	Donald Tusk	Donald Tusk	Donald Tusk	4,295
				Total 28,111

Table 1: Data Characteristics

The data samples were collected by following two chronological selection criteria: (1) the year of 2015 being marked by the rising conflict between Russia and Ukraine as a follow-up to Crimea events in spring of 2014; and (2) the subsequent UN speeches of 2017 and 2018 to Donald Trump's presidency in autumn of 2016.

The speeches were collected one year prior to Donald Trump's presidency, in 2015, when the conflict between Russia and Ukraine reached its peak after the Crimea events in spring of 2014. This gave impetus to President Putin to deliver one of his most important speeches at the UN General Assembly, as well as to President Lukashenko, who is generally an occasional speaker at the UN, except for 2015 when both Presidents of Russia and Belarus delivered their speeches in person. Another set of subsequent

speeches was collected after Donald Trump became President and made his isolationist and unilateral foreign policy stance very clear (Druckman 2019). It is thus expected that other leaders will respond to his unilateralism by either ideologically opposing it and ideologically reinstating Western multilateralism (especially the EU and Ukraine) or setting and revisiting it as a new standard for international cooperation (especially Russia and Belarus).

The collected data was analysed in the framework of two theoretical approaches to metaphor: (1) cognitive perspective or metaphor as thought-based (Fillmore 1982, Gibbs 1992, Johnson 1994, Lakoff 1991 1996, Lakoff & Johnson 1980 1999, Kövecses 2003 2004); (2) discourse perspective or metaphor as discourse-based (Cameron 2003 2013, Goatly 2007, Charteris-Black 2004 2006, 2011, Musolff 2016 2018). Both perspectives on metaphor analysis are closely intertwined and complement each other, as the discourse-based view is inspired by the cognitive view and emphasizes the need for "the importance of the metaphorical use of language in context" (Cameron 2013: 342). By combining both cognitive (i.e. deconstruction of source and target domains) and discourse perspective (i.e. identification of systematic patterns in the specific context of use), this study will attempt to trace how the foreign policy and international order are metaphorically represented in the leaders' talk of the EU, Ukraine, Russian and Belarus.

Procedurally, metaphor analysis in the collected speeches was carried out at three levels: (1) metaphor identification by procedurally applying Pragglejaz group's Metaphor Identification Procedure (MIP, Pragglejaz Group 2007); (2) deconstruction of source domains; (3) coding of metaphorical expressions into legitimacy categories of in-group legitimacy (*i.e.* self-values, in-group obligation hierarchies, Victimhood) and out-group delegitimisation (*i.e.* Targeting, Mobilisation, out-group hatred). During the first step, contextual and basic meanings were compared by using three dictionaries as a point of reference for the English data set (Macmillan, Oxford and Online Dictionary of Etymology). Subsequently, the identified metaphorical expressions were tagged according to their representative source domains derived from basic meanings (*e.g.* War, Nature, Person, Structure, Object). Finally, the source domains were assigned a legitimacy category using Maynard's classification (Maynard 2015). Each legitimacy category is viewed here as a basic level concept with the following semantic reference:

- "Values" as normative codes of Self-representation;
- "Targeting" as delegitimization of the Other;
- "Mobilisation" as a call for collective action against the Other;
- "Victimhood" as a scenario of the oppressed;
- "Obligation hierarchies" as moral and other kinds of responsibilities on behalf of the in-group allies and supporters;

The following section demonstrates how foreign policy is metaphorically represented in the collected speeches of the EU, Ukraine, Russian and Belarus, and how their styles of legitimacy are discursively enacted.

3. Research findings

The metaphorical analysis of the collected speeches resulted in the total number of 587 metaphorical linguistic expressions, whereby political leaders communicate their foreign policy and leadership style in response to pressing international issues. The identified metaphorical expressions were classified according to the five legitimacy categories: Values, Targeting, Mobilisation, Victimhood and Obligation. Hence, metaphor use within these categories indicates how the selected policy political leaders approach foreign policy and what kind of implications it can have for diplomacy and negotiation. The overall metaphor frequency as well as its count across legitimacy categories is provided in Table 2 below.

	Metaphorical legitimacy categories					
Country / Speaker	**Overall No. of me**	**Values**	**Targetin**	**Mobilisation**	**Victimhood**	**Obligation**
Ukraine 2015 Pr.Poroshenko	**47**	27	6	6	6	2
Ukraine 2017 Pr.Poroshenko	**64**	32	20	10	2	0
Ukraine 2018 Pr.Poroshenko	**70**	20	38	9	0	3
The EU Council 2015 Pr. Donald Tusk	**26**	14	4	4	4	0
The EU Council 2017 Pr. Donald Tusk	**43**	28	3	8	0	4
The EU Council 2018 Pr. Donald Tusk	**28**	12	5	5	0	7
Russia 2015 Pr. Putin	**53**	18	25	4	3	3
Russia 2017 MFA Lavrov	**64**	32	32	0	0	0
Russia 2018 MFA Lavrov	**45**	33	10	0	2	0
Belarus 2015 Pr. Lukashenko	**77**	17	47	4	0	9
Belarus 2017 MFA Makei	**38**	13	16	1	2	6
Belarus 2018 MFA Makei	**32**	13	11	3	2	3
Total No. of me	**587**					

Table 2. Metaphorical Legitimacy Categories

As seen in Table 2, political leaders tend to focus more on the construction of their (psychological) collective identity via two legitimacy categories: Values and Targeting. It has been determined that the in-group identity is represented by the metaphors disclosing Value Systems, while the out-group is mainly being targeted by a variety of metaphors. It should also be noted that Donald Tusk's UN General Assembly speeches are mainly focusing on the self-values of the EU and the West; while the rest of the speakers predominantly employ the targeting metaphors whether in reference to the exact referents such as Russia (*i.e.* President Poroshenko) and Ukraine (i.e. President Putin), or less explicit references to the West (*i.e.* President Lukashenko, MAF Makei, MAF Lavrov). This conclusion highlights several main findings. First, the results of the analysed speeches confirm that the collective identity in the context of international order is established along the two lines of pro-Western and anti-Western approaches to foreign policy. Second, the findings also confirm the fact that diplomacy is becoming more oriented towards strong leadership and ideological fragmentation. In the case of the EU and Ukraine, the role of strong leadership is assigned to the multilateral West, whereas President Putin, President Lukashenko, MFA Lavrov and MAF Makei offer their own perception of multilateralism by opposing and questioning the legitimacy of the current status quo. This also raises a question of the credibility of international negotiation due to these divergent representations of what is seen as appropriate and just in political arrangements.

3.1. Metaphorical legitimacy of the multilateral West: a case of the EU and Ukraine

The multilateral West is the key underlying element of the metaphorical narrative structure in the speeches of Donald Tusk and Piotr Poroshenko, though with a different ideological emphasis. In the former's case, the main representative of the collective identity of the West is Europe and its underlying ideals of moral values representing the West. The use of metaphors in the context of Value Systems is the most prominent in all three of Donald Tusk's speeches, i.e. 29% in 2015, 62% in 2017 and 41 % in 2018. By contrast, in Poroshenko's speeches the in-group is represented by Ukraine's alliance with the West and Western values and value metaphors are used with the overall frequency of 33% in 2015, 48% in 2017 and 28% in 2018, as illustrated in Figure 1.



Figure 1. The chronological distribution of Self-value metaphors by %

The overall higher frequency for self-legitimacy in Donald Tusk's speeches can be explained by the fact that the EU de facto is recognized as a Western alliance, while the status of Ukraine is still negotiable (in terms of economic and social progress, still seeking the EU membership), though its administration is positioning Ukraine as being a part of the Western block and progressing towards its full acceptance. Despite this slight ideological difference in positioning, both leaders align their self-identity with Western values (1 and 3) and multilateralism (2), as illustrated below:

(1) I am here today to reassure you that "Europe" is as "committed to its values" and objectives now, as it has ever been: Europe "will stay the course", even though it is "now confronting challenges" unseen and unheard for decades. Wars are "raging" both to the South and to the East of our borders. European leaders are tackling the consequences of borders "being changed on our continent by force", like in Ukraine, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations. (UN2015, Donald Tusk) [PERSON, JOURNEY, NATURE metaphors]

(2) The European Union is "fighting intensely" to preserve the rules-based international order, which is currently "under great strain", in terms of trade, security, climate change or human rights. We say this not only as countries strongly supporting the United Nations, but as a continent that "cares deeply" about respect, mutual understanding and solidarity between nations. (UN2018, Donald Tusk) [PERSON, WAR, HEALTH metaphors]

(3) Let me stress – Ukraine "has always put" of conflict resolution first. We have prioritized multilateralism, by turning for support of the United Nations, OSCE, the Council of Europe and other international organizations, fora and mechanisms. And we will "continue along that path". Moscow shall "feel the strength of the rule" of international law. (UN 2018, Piotr Poroshenko) [PERSON, JOURNEY metaphors]

The most recurrent metaphorical patterns of self-value legitimacy are construed via the PERSON, JOURNEY and WAR metaphors. Personification is central to the foreign policy narrative, which is grounded in the STATE-AS-PERSON/BODY metaphor. The analysis of this metaphor shows how national identities are represented and what kind of goals and values are ascertained as being central to their foreign policy strategy. In this case, both Europe and Ukraine are represented as agents who are committed to values such as respect, solidarity (in 2) and international law (in 3). The crisis of the Western values within the international order is expressed by the WAR and JOURNEY metaphors. The WAR metaphor (as in 1) creates a sense of action aiming to protect Western values (as in 2 the use of the metaphorical expression "fight"), while the JOURNEY metaphor creates a sense of continuity and change for the better ("stay on the course" in 1 or "continue along that path" in 2), despite all the obstacles. It is also interesting to observe how positioning towards the enemy is expressed. In Donald Tusk's case, the enemy is always expressed implicitly vis-a-vis the metaphors of NATURE ("force" in 1) or HEALTH ("under great strain," "rage" in 1), without giving direct reference to it. By contrast, President Poroshenko targets the enemy of both Ukraine and the West very directly as in his reference to "Moscow" in (3).

This clear-cut targeting of the enemy is another ideological difference that is noted between the two speakers, which is also explained by the striking irregularity in the frequency of targeting metaphors between the two speakers, as shown in Figure 2.



Figure 2. The chronological distribution of targeting metaphors by %

As shown above, President Poroshenko's stance is at least twice more targeting-oriented; he does explicitly refer to Russia as "Kremlin" as an aggressor against both Ukraine and the international community (as in 4). This is explained by at least two factors of, firstly, direct military conflict between Ukraine and Russia, and, secondly, the speaker's need to reinstate the Western obligation to protect its ingroup against the attack and provide necessary help. Here are a few typical examples of the targeting metaphors that also illustrate a different ideological stance of the two speakers:

(4) Let me be clear on this point: Nothing will stop Moscow "from continuing its aggressive expansionist policies" if it "does not face" a united stand of the international community, if punishment for its actions does not become inevitable. It is due to the lack of relevant punishment that "after Georgia· came Ukraine", that after Lytvinenko came Skrypals, that after Aleppo came Idlib... Kremlin "has no intention to stop". After occupation of Crimea, it aims now at occupation of the Sea of Azov between Ukraine and Russia. (UN2018, Piotr Poroshenko) [PERSON, JOURNEY metaphors]

(5) The European Union and the United Nations were created in answer to the atrocities of the Second World War. This is why our European priority will always be to "vigorously react against evil", violence and lawlessness in the international life. In "confrontation with evil", the EU and the UN "cannot hesitate". In our political life there are situations that are black and white, that are crystal clear, like in the case of the North Korea's nuclear blackmail, terrorism, or the aggression on Ukraine. And it is then when we need to demonstrate that we are still able to distinguish between good and evil. Sometimes this takes courage. But the UN is not there to cowardly look for a "compromise with the evil", but to "mobilise the global community in the fight against" it. Therefore, a moral judgement of the reality, clear and univocal,

should be the first principle of "our common action". (UN2017, Donald Tusk) [PERSON, JOURNEY, WAR metaphors]

Differently from President Poroshenko, who uses direct references to his enemy "Moscow" and "Kremlin" in (4), Donald Tusk refers to "evil" that reinstates the mythical narrative of good and bad in (5). Such binary opposition is a symbolic representation of the archetypes of the collective unconscious (Jung, 2014) that always resonate with the collective identity and provide a sense of deep familiarity. In this context, it is clear that the good is represented by the West (namely the EU and the UN) who are confronting the evil, which in the collective unconscious is always defeated in the end. Ideologically, it serves the purpose of legitimizing the in-group and giving it the right to act in its "fight against evil."

In addition to the cases of Values and Targeting, the legitimacy of the Western multilateralism is metaphorically enacted through the semantic categories of Mobilisation, Victimhood and Obligation. Though these categories are more scarcely represented, they ideologically reinstate the legitimacy myth of the Western multilateralism. It should also be mentioned that Mobilisation as a legitimacy category is the most frequent in the list of three (i.e. Mobilisation, Victimhood and Obligation) with both speakers and serves an ideological purpose of inducing collecting action to effectively mobilise support to further advance their interests, as show in Figure 3.



Figure 3. Legitimacy by Mobilisation in Poroshenko and Tusk's speeches

As numbers in Figures 3 show, the collective identity is legitimised by using the rhetorical strategy of Mobilisation by both leaders. It can also be observed that Piotr Poroshenko metaphorically enacts this legitimacy strategy more frequently. This can be explained by a few factors. First, President Poroshenko's leadership is constrained by the on-going conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation and Crimea events in 2014. The leader clearly positions the collective identity of Ukraine in the realm of Western alliance, whose legitimacy in this conflict cannot be questioned and must be defended by collective action. As a consequence, Piotr Poroshenko is both positioning Ukraine's collective identity in the realm of the West and is calling for action against its opponent, as in (9). In Donald Tusk's case, the legitimacy narrative of Western multilateralism has a clear representative line. The leader recurrently refers to the leading role of the

European Union in the fight against global issues and tries to mobilise the international community to follow its example. Here are some of the typical examples of how the category of Mobilisation can be metaphorically represented:

(6) This year will also be crucial in the "global efforts to fight" the causes and consequences of climate change. In the last days and weeks we have listened with great hope and satisfaction to the pledged of leaders, committed to "fighting" global warming. Europe is determined that the Paris Summit be a breakthrough, symbolising our readiness "to undertake unified action" in the face of this global problem. With a pledge to reduce CO2 by 40%, as compared to 1990, Europe remains "in the lead" of this process. But "fighting" global warming is not a sports competition. Victory is possible when everybody "moves in the same direction" and "at a similar pace". This is why we invite all of you to take part in this common endeavour. Without a global agreement, Europe's isolated efforts will be impractical. What matters for Europe is practical effects, not ideological "fervour". (UN 2015, Donald Tusk) [WAR, JOURNEY, HEALTH metaphors]

(7) 2017 showed us that Da'esh as a territorial entity is fated for "defeat". That's good news. Sadly however, repeated terrorist attacks, also in Europe, demonstrate that "the threat" continues. So, we need to keep on strengthening "the global fight" against terrorism and violent extremism. In short, we must be more determined than they are. (UN2017, Donald Tusk) [WAR metaphor]

As seen in the examples above, the legitimacy of the EU is represented mainly *vis-à-vis* a WAR metaphor, whereby the leader mobilizes the international community against common threats with the EU given a position of superpower. In that light, the EU identity is given a mandate of Western civilization that is leading not only in terms of actions (*i.e.* "global fight efforts" in 6) but also thought and values (*i.e.* "practical efforts not ideological fervour" in 6). The use of the HEALTH metaphor in "ideological fervour" in (6) is also an implicit indication of Othering, whereby European civilized values serve as the defining base of the collective Western identity, also referred to as "multilateralism" in (3). In such context, Western multilateralism is perceived as a popular production of alterity, within which the European identity is given the role of traditional authority that projects universal values and knows right from wrong.

Unlike his counterpart, President Poroshenko uses a Mobilisation strategy more specifically in his reference against the specific agent, *i.e.* an external enemy against whom he is Mobilising the Western alliance. Though the specific agent can be implied, as in (8), the collective Mobilisation against it is enacted within a similar legitimacy narrative of the Western civilized multilateralism (*i.e.* by empathising the role of the UN):

(8) Let me say it more precisely - the beautiful language of the Charter worth nothing if it is not "enforced". No more words, "time for deeds!" The United Nations must gain momentum as there are continued attempts "to ruin" the rules-based international order and revise internationally recognized state borders "by force". This "dangerous slide" towards the world with no civilized rules has to be stopped. (UN2018, Piotr Poroshenko) [JOURNEY, MOTION metaphors]

(9) Having illegally constructed a bridge across the Kerch Strait, Russia launched a systematic disruption of freedom of international navigation through the Kerch Strait for Ukrainian and foreign ships. Such brutal actions must be rejected as illegal, including under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. They require "a strong response", including an enhanced sanctions policy and other "targeted measures". Efficiency of international actions often falls short of expectations and the relevance of the United Nations itself is questioned. We must admit that the responsibility for "fixing" the current state of affairs rests with all of us collectively and each of us individually. (UN2018, Piotr Poroshenko) [PERSON, CRIME, WAR, STRUCTURE metaphor]

The use of such metaphorical expressions as "enforced" and "by force" activate the conceptual metaphor of INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS PHYSICS (Chilton & Lakoff, 1989). Ideologically, the use of this metaphor, as argued by Chilton and Lakoff (Chilton & Lakoff 1989 : 12) removes any notion of human will. Instead, international politics is perceived as a domain where states-as-physical objects project an outward force. Thus, the state that exerts a more powerful physical force is stronger and has more legitimacy within this conception of world politics. The aspect of forcefulness and strength as a part adequate response is also traced in Piotr Poroshenko's Mobilisation strategy, *i.e.* "a strong response" in (9).



Figure 4. Legitimacy via Victimhood and Obligation strategies

Finally, the legitimacy categories of Victimhood and Obligation hierarchies are represented differently by the two speakers. A short overview of their overall frequency is provided in Figure 4.

As seen from Figure 4, the overall frequency of Victimhood is higher in President Poroshenko's speeches, which is context-driven. The collective identity of Ukraine is represented as a victim of Russia's criminal and oppressive foreign policy. By comparison, Donald Tusk more frequently focuses on obligations on the part of the Western collective identity, where the European sovereignty plays a central role. Here are some of the typical examples of how the category of Values is linguistically enacted by the two leaders:

(10) By contrast, many countries represented here deal with this problem in a much more simple way; namely by not allowing migrants and refugees "to enter their

territories at all". This is why suggesting that "Europe is an example of poor treatment or indifference" towards asylum-seekers is sheer hypocrisy. (UN2015, Donald Tusk) [CONTAINER, PERSON metaphors]

(11) "Ukraine has paid and continues to pay an extremely high price for its freedom", and the right to live in a free country – "the price of human lives". (UN 2015, Piotr Poroshenko) [PERSON metaphor]

(12) "A three-year-long war with Russia" has resulted in 10 thousand people killed, 7% of Ukrainian territory occupied, 20% of Ukrainian economy and industrial output is "seized, destroyed or simply stolen". (UN 2017, Piotr Poroshenko) [PERSON, CIME metaphors]

In the case of Donald Tusk, the collective identity of the EU is victimised in the context of its self-values. The fact that the EU concern for human rights can be questioned, as in the case of how the EU governments managed the migration crisis of 2015, is represented as wrong and unacceptable. This is achieved by using the victim frame that delegitimizes criticism toward the EU and its policies. This is achieved by personifying the EU (*i.e.* EU AS A VICTIM) in (10) and also using the containment metaphor in reference to migration policies (*i.e.* STATE IS A CONTAINER). Similarly, Piotr Poroshenko is using Victimhood as another form of in-group identity process. In his case, the speaker asserts that the identity of his own country is the target of violence by the Russian Federation (*i.e.* RUSSIAN IS A CRIMINAL IN (12)), by thus raising the salience of in-group identity.

With the use of obligation strategies, both speakers define boundaries of morally regulated behaviour both explicitly and implicitly. Obligation narrative is another legitimacy frame that creates a moral bond within the members of the in-group. The analysis of this legitimacy strategy also helps to clarify who the members of the in-group are, and what kind of behaviour and relationships hierarchically schematize their obligations to each other. It is also interesting to observe how frequent this kind of references can be, and how they are metaphorically enacted. There are only five such references in Poroshenko's speeches, while Donald Tusk has enacted obligation hierarchies 11 times. For example:

(13) "Europe has undertaken action" against the increased use of disinformation and outside propaganda in open democratic elections. The anonymity of cyberspace is used by external actors "to cloak malicious" political interference. It is not just Europe's problem; many others here today are similarly affected. The United Nations should help "expose this phenomenon", attribute responsibility and "increase democratic resilience". (UN2018, Donald Tusk) [PERSON, HEALTH metaphors]

(14) After the failure of the UN "to prevent aggression against" Ukraine, we still hoped that the UN would help "settling the conflict" by· deploying an UN-mandated multinational peacekeeping force in the occupied Donbas. A mission, with a strong mandate and broad responsibilities to help "bring peace" on the Ukrainian soil. Rather than to "freeze the conflict" or "cement" the presence of the aggressor and

its proxies in Donbas. We firmly count on further progress on this important issue. (UN2018, Piotr Poroshenko)

In both cases, the leaders use an obligation strategy in order to declare their commitments to universal human rights (*i.e.* "peace in Ukraine" in 14) and the protection of democratic principles (in 13). Although President Poroshenko mostly uses the obligations strategy to intensively raise an obligation on behalf of the in-group to protect Ukraine against "aggression" and "bring peace on the Ukrainian soil" in (14), its use also emphasizes the obligation of Ukraine to belong to the Western identity. Different from his counterpart, Donald Tusk refers to EU commitments to democratic values as natural and fixed by positioning the EU collective identity as morally superior.

To summarise, it can be argued that both speakers' diplomatic narratives are based in legitimacy strategies to confirm the ideological importance of the West and its in-group identity. This is achieved by focusing on the in-group values and mobilising in-group members for further cooperation, especially in Donald Tusk's case. By comparison, Piotr Poroshenko seems to be focusing more on confirming the legitimacy of Ukraine collective identity by targeting the Russian Federation and emphasizing the duty of the ingroup members to protect Ukraine's right to peace and prosperity. The following subsection discusses how Western values and their legitimacy can be ideologically questioned and opposed.

3.2. Metaphorical Illegitimacy of the Multilateral West: a case of Russia and Belarus

In their speeches, the leaders of Russia and Belarus mainly concentrated on questioning and opposing the status quo of the West. Both Presidents of Russia and Belarus and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Russia and Belarus focused on systematically out-grouping the West via a range of metaphors. The two most frequently implemented strategies are those of Value Systems and Targeting. Here is an overview of the metaphors used to directly oppose the West (*i.e.* by targeting) and represent it as an ideological outgroup (*i.e.* by referring to the Value Systems) across all their speeches, as illustrated in Figure 5.



Figure 5. The chronological distribution of Targeting and Value Systems metaphors

Overall, Targeting is the key legitimacy strategy for the political leadership of both Russia and Belarus with 141 instances of use for the former and 85 instances for the latter. The highest distribution of the Targeting metaphors is established in President Putin and President Lukashenko's speeches at 52% with the former and 57% with the latter. There is also a noticeable change of tone in Vladimir Makei's speeches, whose Targeting metaphors decreased by 17% in 2018. By contrast, Sergey Lavrov shows a similar pattern of intensity at 44% for 2017 and 45% for 2018. By comparison, Value System metaphors are almost twice as low in their frequency of use, *i.e.* 83 references in the Russian data set and 43 in the Belarusian one.

The most critical to the Western powers are President Putin and President Lukashenko who use the scenario of the "West As The Oppressor" to legitimise their own national stance in the international order. They also deny the idea of Western multilateralism, by evoking the STRUCTURE metaphor and referring to "block-type confrontation" in (15) or "one centre of dominance" and "the top of the pyramid" in (16) below:

(15) The entire system of international security is going through "a severe crisis". Loss of "mutual trust between global players", unwillingness to compromise and partial "return to the bloc-type confrontation" have essentially "put the world on the verge of a new war. Efforts to impose upon other countries a certain development model" continue unabated. Where does it lead to? As a result of "foreign intervention, export of 'colour' revolution" and controlled regime change, previously stable countries have been "plunged into chaos and anarchy". Do we feel better now that a number of national leaders were "brutally murdered?" (UN2015, Alexander Lukashenko) [HEALTH, GAME, WAR, STRUCTURE, CRIME metaphors]

(16) We all know that after the end of the Cold War the world was left with "one center of dominance", and those who found themselves "at the top of the pyramid" were tempted to think that, since they are so powerful and exceptional, they know best what needs to be done and thus they don't need to reckon with the UN, which, instead of "rubber-stamping the decisions" they need, often *stands in their way*. (UN2015, Vladimir Putin) [PHYSICAL SPACE, STRUCTURE, JOURNEY metaphors]

The oppressive superiority of the West is expressed via the WAR and JOURNEY metaphor and such metaphorical expressions as "confrontation, on the verge of a new war, foreign intervention" (in 15) and "the UN stands in the way" (16). The out-group intensity is well complemented by the pronominal use of "they" in (16). The metaphors of HEALTH "a severe crisis" and CRIME "plunged into chaos and anarchy" or "brutally murdered" add more emotional intensity and implicitly victimise the in-group. Such ideological stance also emphasizes the urgency to act against the oppression, which is causing "chaos and anarchy."

In addition to the Targeting legitimacy, both Ministers of Foreign Affairs Vladimir Makei and Sergey Lavrov offer a solution that reinstates the ideological stance of opposing Western multilateralism. It is interesting to observe how both speakers offer an "Eastern economic multilateralism." This is done vis-a-vis the metaphor of JOURNEY

and its metaphorical expressions "One Belt, One Road" in (17) and "Russian-Chinese roadmap" in (18). Here are the excerpts where the speakers by using the metaphor of JOURNEY to challenge Western multilateralism:

(17) **"**Belarus" has been vigorously "advocating" the ideas of cooperation and interconnectivity among regional processes for the last couple of years. We call such an approach "integration of integrations". <...> When it comes to new creative ideas, we certainly point to the initiative called "One Belt, One Road" promoted by the People's Republic of China. This initiative stands as a new type of economic multilateralism. It is seeking to bring benefits not only to its individual participants, but to the global economy as a whole. It is a true "'win-win' approach". The Republic of Belarus "both participates in" and supports the initiative. In our view, the "integration of integrations' and the "One Belt, One Road" initiative can help us "shift the global economy from the path of divergence to one of convergence". Globalization must become more equitable. (UN 2017, Vladimir Makei) [PERSON, JOURNEY]

(18) An equal and undivided "security architecture" also needs to be created in other parts of the world, including the Asia Pacific Region. We welcome the positive developments around the Korean Peninsula, which are following the logic of the "Russian-Chinese roadmap". It is important to encourage the process with "further steps by both sides toward a middle ground" and incentivise the practical realisation of important agreements between Pyongyang and Seoul through the Security Council. We will keep working to put in place a multilateral process as soon as possible, so that we can "build a durable mechanism" of peace and security in Northeast Asia. (UN2018, Sergey Lavrov) [STRUCTURE, JOURNEY]

In the context of the JOURNEY metaphor, both speakers target the Western model by using either the binary opposition as "divergence" vs. "convergence" in (17) or the "middle ground" in (18). The in-group identity is aligned with China, generally viewed as a key Western competitor, whose contribution to new "Eastern multilateralism" is aimed to weaken the position of the West. The competitive streak is implied by the use of the metaphorical expression "win-win approach" in (17). Furthermore, this more implicit Targeting is very explicitly used to express ingroup values through the CONSTRUCTION metaphor, as in "build a durable mechanism of peace and security in Northeast Asia" or "security architecture" in (18) or personification in (17) where Belarus As A Moral Agent "advocates cooperation, integration and interconnectivity."

Delegitimization of the West is also carried out by metaphorical references to the in-group values. As discussed in the previous section, the category of Value System is generally enacted by the use of the STATE AS PERSON metaphor. The state-as-person metaphor is known as a part of folk conceptualisations of governments, whereby "a state-person repletes with a personality, a community, a susceptibility to disease, a home, a tendency to get into fistfights, and a body that can topple under force" (Chilton & Lakoff 1987, p. 13). In the context of foreign policy, this metaphor is ideologically significant, and its analysis helps to identify a set of internalised norms and values that guide behaviour and decision-making on behalf of the collective identity, e.g.:

(19) Only through common efforts will we be able "to forge a new formula" of universal mutually beneficial cooperation. As a "foundation" of such cooperation, "Belarus proposes the idea of integration of integrations" as the most topical trend of the modern world. Just think of how many "new integration entities have emerged" in the past years. Today we speak about "the prospects of cooperation between" the European Union and the Eurasian European Union, about the large-scale Great Silk Way project, about creating the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Zone, as well as about dozens of others. (UN2015, Alexander Lukashenko) [CONSTRUCTION, MECHANISM, PERSON metaphors]

(20) An equal and undivided "security architecture" also needs to be created in other parts of the world, including the Asia Pacific Region. We welcome the positive developments around the Korean Peninsula, which are following the logic of the "Russian-Chinese roadmap". It is important to encourage the process with "further steps by both sides toward a middle ground" and incentivise the practical realisation of important agreements between Pyongyang and Seoul through the Security Council. We will keep working to put in place a multilateral process as soon as possible, so that we can "build a durable mechanism of peace and security in Northeast Asia". (UN2018, Sergey Lavrov) [CONSTRUCTION, JOURNEY metaphors]

As seen from above, both Alexander Lukashenko and Sergey Lavrov approach their Value System by using similar metaphors, one of which is foreign policy-as-architecture/construction realised by the use of such words as "foundation", "forge", "architecture", "build". By using this metaphor, both speakers question the current status quo and offer their own vision of Eastern multilateralism and universal cooperation. Also, they both position their legitimacy status within their relationship with the out-group (*i.e.* Belarus with the EU, and Russia with China).

It can also be noticed how the other legitimacy strategies are used with much lesser frequency, as has been observed with the previous speakers who defined and promoted the multilateral West. Despite this similarity, a few differences can be observed in terms of the contextual use. The overall frequency for the legitimacy strategies of Mobilisation, Obligation hierarchies and Victimhood are provided in Figure 6 below.

Figure 6. Legitimacy by Mobilisation, Obligation and Victimhood for Russia and Belarus

As can be seen, the leaders, who represent their nations from the position of questioning the status quo, rarely use the strategies of Mobilisation, Obligation and Victimhood. Also, the representatives of the Russian Federation, more specifically Vladimir Putin, used only three references to obligation hierarchies, while his Belarusian counterparts used such references 18 times. This is explained by how the speakers position themselves in the position of power. While the representatives of the Russian Federation are proposing the new "road-map" between Russia and China as in (20), Belarusian politicians are trying to do both – cooperate with the West and join a new model of global relations (as in 21). This difference in their own self-perception is traced in their references to the obligation hierarchies. Moreover, it should be noted that obligation hierarchies were only used a few times by President Putin (i.e. 3 occurrences) and more frequently by President Lukashenko and MFA Makei (*i.e.* 9 occurrences each), while MAF Lavrov did not refer to them at all. Similarly, the strategy of Victimhood was used just a few times by the speakers. Both categories are closely intertwined, as the speakers always evoked the obligations on behalf of the out-group by victimizing their own collective identity, *e.g.*:

(21) In political terms, troubles emerged because the so-called "winners" in the Cold War failed to integrate the "losers" in their system. Moreover, like in the case with WWI, the "'winners' did their best to impose their will on the opponents" in an effort to realize serious global changes, which affected everyone rather themselves, in a unilateral manner. The attempt has failed. It could not have been otherwise. <…> As a result, "the world is in a transition" in political terms. It is unclear, however, "where we are transitioning" to. (UN2016, Alexander Lukashenko) [COMPETITION, JOURNEY metaphors]

(22) Nowadays, the realities are different, which require us to reconsider both the role and the place of the Organization in the world. What is specifically at stake is how the UN fits into a world that is being increasingly "dominated by various closed clubs and informal entities". We are convinced that, as ever before, the United Nations must aim to strengthen the "inter-state system". It is at the UN where its Members should successfully resolve their differences and forge acceptable solutions. Moreover, it is at the United Nations, where they can successfully tackle transboundary threats. What is more, the UN should serve as a uniting force for the system of international relations as a whole. (UN2017, Vladimir Makei) [COMPETITION, PERSON me]

(23) Dear colleagues, I must note that such "an honest and frank approach on Russia's part" has been recently used "as a pretext for accusing it of its growing ambitions" — as if those who say that have no ambitions at all. However, "it is not about Russia's ambitions", dear colleagues, but about the recognition of the fact that "we can no longer tolerate" the current state of affairs in the world. (UN 2015) [PERSON metaphor]

In all the examples above, it can be seen how the leaders oppose the status quo by using the metaphors of competition (*e.g.* "winners, losers, opponents" in (21), "dominated, closed clubs" in (22), and "ambitions" in (23)). The competition metaphor

is known for its psychological effect on the user – "desire to survive" (Chilton & Lakoff 1989: 10). By using this metaphor, the speakers justify their need to oppose and metaphorically contest their opponents. This metaphorical imperative to stay ahead and to outrace the opponent becomes a natural necessity to their political survival.

To summarise, it can be argued that the legitimacy strategies in the speeches of Russia and Belarus aim to challenge the status quo of Western multilateralism. This is done by explicitly representing the West as an oppressor and intimidator (in President Putin and President Lukashenko's speeches) or implicitly opposing the status quo vis-a-vis a new version of Eastern multilateralism (in Sergey Lavrov and Vladimir Makei's speeches).

4. Conclusion

The analysis of the collected speeches has demonstrated that the collective identity can be metaphorically represented by two legitimacy strategies: ingroup Value Systems and outgroup Targeting. It has also been demonstrated that the current international order is ideologically viewed from two opposing perspectives: (1) reinstating the status quo of the West (as illustrated by Piotr Poroshenko and Donald Tusk's metaphor use), and (2) opposing the status quo of Western multilateralism (as illustrated by the metaphors used by Vladimir Putin, Alexander Lukashenko, Sergey Lavrov and Vladimir Makei). Each of these perspectives has developed its own narrative line, where the speakers offer a unified ground for the collective identity by complementing it with their own personal differences.

The collective identity of the multilateral West is represented as a key ingroup value in Donald Tusk and Piotr Poroshenko's speeches, with a few noticeable differences. Donald Tusk mainly focuses on the Value System of the in-group represented by the EU, the UN and the West. His Targeting metaphors are centred on the implicit and undefined enemy of the Western world, generally referred to as "evil." The symbolism of this unconscious collective provides a sense of familiarity and self-awareness that evil is always defeated by the good, which is represented by the West. Different from his counterpart, Piotr Poroshenko focuses on clearly targeting the out-group by metaphorically representing it as a criminalized enemy of Ukraine and the Western world. Also, Poroshenko's value metaphors perform two functions: firstly, validating Ukraine as a part of the West; secondly, raising a set of moral obligations on behalf of the ingroup (*i.e.* the West) to defend Ukraine against the attacks by the Russian Federation. His metonymical references to the Russian Federation as "Moscow" and "Kremlin" provide a clearly defined image of the enemy as well. Despite these differences, both speakers emphasize the critical situation of the current status quo and reinstate the Western multilateralism, especially by using the JOURNEY metaphor, which ideologically provides a sense of direction and hope for positive outcomes.

By contrast, the leaders of Russia and Belarus in their speeches systematically oppose the Western status quo. This is particularly seen in President Putin's and President Lukashenko's speeches which include the metaphor of the West As an

Oppressor that both degrades the system of Western multilateralism and victimizes the oppressed. The victimization of the oppressed serves as a Mobilisation strategy against the West and its policies. Different from the presidents' speeches, Ministers of Foreign Affairs do not directly attack the outgroup, though they continuously imply that by using the HEALTH and NATURE metaphors signifying chaos, anarchy and utter crisis. In addition, both Sergey Lavrov and Vladimir Makei offer a solution of proposing the Eastern version of multilateralism (*i.e.* by evoking the metaphor of JOURNEY). In that 'roadmap' both speakers assign a high value role to Russia and Belarus. Despite their positive interpretation of the new scenario for the international order, it is clear that it is used to oppose the outgroup by extending their collective identity to China, which is generally seen as the major competitor of the West.

This study has attempted to demonstrate how closely intertwined collective identity and metaphorical legitimacy in diplomatic discourse are. This is mainly done by the primary conceptual metaphor of STATE AS PERSON, whereby ingroup and outgroup legitimacy is constructed. It has been also clarified that principal leaders (President Poroshenko, President Putin and President Lukashenko) tend to be more antagonistic in their reference to the out-group, as compared to their subordinates (Donald Tusk, Sergey Lavrov and Vladimir Makei). Finally, it has been shown that not only is the current international order challenged and opposed, but new ways of reshaping it can be offered by using psychological categories of legitimacy linguistically enacted by metaphorical expressions.

Finally, this study has demonstrated the pervasiveness of metaphor use in the creation of legitimacy narratives. This can be explained by the importance of politicians' desire to make sense of current political arrangements through legitimacy myths. The development of such narratives legitimise mechanisms for allocating economic and political in-group status in the hierarchy of international power relations that help to gain influence over others and deliver desired outcomes. The analysed narratives of the selected political leaders have shown how they exercise their authority and make judgements based on their beliefs of what is right and acceptable for their collective identity and its relationship with the other. Such discursive construal of the legitimate collective in political discourse is echoing Michael Foucault's (2001) argument about self-attachment (*i.e.* in our case legitimate self-identity) as the first sign of ideological madness. In Foucault's view, "self-attachment is the first sign of madness, but it is because man is attached to himself that he accepts error as truth, lies as reality, violence and ugliness as beauty and justice" (ibid.: 23). This is exactly how critical metaphor analysis of legitimacy strategies can help to recognize a narrative of perceived political reality with its own truths and moments of madness.

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Anti-Immigration Rhetoric in Italy and in the USA: A Comparative Perspective

Maria Ivana Lorenzetti

"We few have drifted here to your shores.
What race of men is this? What land is so barbaric as to allow
this custom, that we're denied the hospitality of the sands?
They stir up war, and prevent us setting foot on dry land.
If you despise humans and mortal weapons,
still trust that the gods remember right and wrong".
(Virgil, *Aeneid*, Book I, 538-543)

1. Introduction

Liquidity as ease of movement of people, objects, and information is a fitting metaphor for the present time, associated with the complex transplanetary sets of processes characterising globalisation (Bauman 2000; Ritzer and Dean 2010). Thanks to the increased porosity of barriers and boundaries, movement often occurs in terms of flows, but this does not always happen without frictions.

A case in point are the many frictions caused in several parts of the world by international migration and the backlash against it. Based on the UN estimates, in 2019, there are nearly 272 million international migrants, around 3,5% of the world's population. More than half of them live in Europe (82 million) and North America (59 million), while the United States of America is the country attracting the highest number of migrants (51 million), equal to 19% of the world's total (UN DESA 2019).

In the last few years, and particularly since 2012 onward, migration has become a hot topic in both the media and the political agenda of many European countries as a result of several conflicts, in Syria, in the Middle East, in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, and more recently on account of the massive flow of Rohingya people to Bangladesh in 2017, and of the Kurdish people at the border between Turkey and Syria. Across the ocean, the Venezuelan political crisis in Latin America, which led many citizens to flee their country seeking asylum elsewhere, fueled the already heated immigration debate in the US, where the US-Mexico corridor is one of the world's most critical routes for international migration. Based on the UN 2017 data, the number of forcibly displaced people between 2010 and 2017 increased by about 13 million, and in 2017 the number of refugees[1] and asylum seekers[2] worldwide reached 29 million people (UNHCR 2019).

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[1] A refugee is defined as a person who has fled their country of origin and is unable or unwilling to return due to a well-founded fear of being persecuted because of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion. An exhaustive definition of "refugee" can be found in the 1951 *Convention related to the Status of Refugees*.

[2] An asylum seeker is an individual seeking international protection. In countries with individualised procedures, an asylum seeker is someone whose claim has not yet been finally decided on by the country in which he or she has submitted it. Not every asylum seeker will ultimately be recognised as a refugee, but every refugee is initially an asylum seeker.

However exceptional these data might seem, migration is by no means a new phenomenon, as people have always migrated in great numbers from a territory to another searching for better living conditions since ancient times. America has constantly witnessed waves of newcomers since the end of the 19th century and through the entire 20th century primarily from Europe. During the great Atlantic migration, and prior to 1880, entry to the US was largely unregulated, while additional and drastic restrictions on immigration were imposed soon afterwards.

In Europe, the free movement of people is one of the pillars of the European Union, where the Maastricht Treaty had originally aimed at making Europe an increasingly borderless society. However, not only has the arrival of immigrants from the less developed East progressively led to calls for a reassertion of border controls, but the concern about unauthorised immigration is growing. The mass migrations of people entering Europe from Africa and the Middle East often with very precarious means, fleeing war, religious persecutions, and famine led the media to speak of a "refugee crisis" due to the difficulties of some Southern European countries (most notably Italy, Greece, and Spain) facing the influx. Such a critical situation emphasised the lack of stable coordination among EU institutions and its member-states for resettling people. Furthermore, the global concern over terrorism, following a series of dramatic terrorist attacks in Europe, caused a reinforcement of immigration restrictions in both Europe and the US amidst general fear of Islamic terrorism.

The election of Donald Trump as American President in 2016 contributed to the rise and spread of anti-immigration sentiment. During his entire presidential campaign, he pledged to erect a border wall between US and Mexico[3] to prevent "criminal illegal aliens" from entering the country. Moreover, one of his first acts after taking office in 2017 was the so-called Muslim ban, an executive order that lowered the number of refugees to be admitted into the US for that year, suspended the entry of Syrian refugees and created a blacklist of countries that did not meet adjudication standards under US law, and from where immigration and visas were temporarily suspended. Despite its limited duration, this ban, which raised serious protests throughout the country, certainly fostered a climate of persecution and hate.

In Europe, the Visegrád countries[4] articulated a very pronounced anti-immigration policy exemplified by the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán erecting an anti-migrant wall along the Hungary-Serbia border. At the same time, the Brexit referendum outcome in the United Kingdom in June 2016, after an anti-immigration-fueled Leave campaign, fomented the instrumentalisation of some ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities as scapegoats and "dangerous others" all over the continent.

[3] The building of what is generally referred to as "Trump's wall" started in 1990 under the Presidency of George H.W. Bush, while additional barriers were erected under Bill Clinton's administration. Trump advocated for the expansion of such border barrier to the entire US-Mexico border.

[4] The Visegrád Group is an alliance of four East European countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, that are members of the EU and NATO for the purpose of promoting cooperation with one another and furthering their integration in the EU.

In a moment of great political turmoil, with countries still coming to terms with the effects of the 2008 economic crisis, and the growing disaffection of citizens towards politics (Mair 2003), this critical juncture resulted in the growing consensus of right-wing Euro-sceptic and anti-immigration populist parties promoting nationalistic policies. Claiming to represent "the true people" in contrast with usurpers alleged to threaten the identity and integrity of each nation (Wodak 2015; Lorenzetti 2018), these parties (*League* in Italy, *Rassemblement National* in France, *UKIP* and *Brexit Party* in the United Kingdom, the Dutch *Freedom Party*, *FPÖ* in Austria among others) and their leaders promote the creation of ever new linguistic, political, and physical "borders". They put the core principles of democratic systems and fundamental human rights at stake with harshly divisive and dehumanising rhetoric, they showing that solidity and barriers are far from dead in the liquid world (Bauman 2000).

Discourse lies at the heart of exclusion and discrimination. Dominant group members, such as politicians, mass-media, or members of the educational, research or bureaucratic élites, with their privileged access to, and control over the most influential forms of public discourse play a crucial role in the discursive reproduction of discrimination and racism. What they say about outgroups or ethnic minorities, and how they say it, may have an impact on people's minds, thus shaping attitudes towards them (Van Dijk 2002a; Bonilla-Silva 2003). Describing immigration as a "crisis" that requires "restrictions" is not neutral but evokes an issue-defining frame (Lakoff 2014). Framing immigration as a problem is not merely an oversimplification, but the more a frame is activated, the stronger it gets in people's minds, pre-empting considerations of the multiple facets of such a complex phenomenon, most notably that of civil rights. Besides, politicians endorsing a highly stigmatising language towards ethnic minorities, framing them as dangerous, using racial slurs or animal personifications to refer to them, normalise the use of such a language and are ultimately responsible for the spread of hostility and racism in society (Van Dijk 2013).

Critical discourse analysis as a type of discourse analytical framework is interested in the study of the ways social power abuse, dominance, manipulation and inequality are enacted by text and talk (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Van Dijk 2001, 2013; Wodak 2015). Drawing on Van Dijk's (2013) socio-cognitive framework and Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) and framing (Lakoff 2014), this paper addresses the rhetorical representation of migrant people in the oratory of American President Donald Trump and Italian *League* leader Matteo Salvini, two politicians who reflect the globalised return of populism to the political scene, in two corpora of collected speeches and tweets.

Primarily focusing on the lexical level of analysis, the argumentative frame, and the rhetorical strategies employed, Trump's rhetoric of the forgotten man, foregrounding the plight of working-class whites at the expense of other ethnic minorities is compared with Matteo Salvini's anti-immigration discourse (Kazin 2016). Not only do the two leaders share a consistent position on immigration, but they rely on similar communication tactics, including a straightforward language and a massive usage of social networks to

spread their messages according to the logic of virality, thus bypassing media channels, that they both portray as part of the corrupt establishment (Gerbaudo 2018; Mazzoleni and Bracciale 2018). These communicative strategies enable them to build a consensus community, legitimising and normalising the use of discriminating and racist language towards outsiders, by playing upon people's deeply rooted fears (Wodak 2015).

Despite the contextual and historical differences between right-wing populism in Europe and the US (Pelinka 2013), the data analysed highlight similar discursive strategies, pointing to a likely cross-fertilisation of ideas and strategies among right-wing populists across the globe, and the emergence of a "script" that can be flexibly adapted to multiple national settings. Moreover, Trump's coarse language and politically incorrect rhetoric might have had an impact and an additional legitimising effect on Salvini's anti-immigration language, but also on the rhetoric of other European right-wing populist politicians.

2. Right-Wing Populism

The pervasiveness and transversality of populist parties cross-nationally gaining ground on both the left and the right of the political spectrum has led scholars to argue that we are currently experiencing a "populist zeitgeist" (Mudde 2004). However, it is the right-wing parties' upsurge, conjuring *bêtes noires* of liberal democracy, such as xenophobia, racism, fascism, homophobia, and misogyny that drove the media to talk about a "populist epidemic" or a "populist contagion".
Bearing on the work of Freeden (1996), Mudde defined populism as a

> thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the "pure people" and the "corrupt élite", and which argues that politics should be the expression of the *volonté générale*, or general will, of the people. (Mudde 2004: 543)

All politicians, populists of different orientation, or even non-populists, appeal to the people as the primary addressee of political argumentation. In the last few years, however, we saw "the people" back in the foreground in political communication like never before. Let us consider an excerpt from Trump's Inaugural Address:

> Today we are not merely transferring power from one Administration to another, or from one party to another – but we are transferring power from Washington, DC and *giving it back to you, the American People*[5].
> For too long, a small group in our nation's Capital has reaped the rewards of government while *the people have borne the cost*.
> Washington flourished – but *the people did not share in its wealth*.
> […] What truly matters is not which party controls our government, but whether *our government is controlled by the people*.
> 20 January 2017, will be remembered as *the day the people became the rulers of this nation again*.
> *The forgotten men and women of our country* will be forgotten no longer.
> (President Donald Trump's Inaugural Address, Washington DC, 20 January 2017)

[5] Emphasis by the author.

Aside from the symbolic occasion and *captatio benevolentiae* strategy, several senses of the expression "the people" appear in this speech. They are mostly references to the American people, as the primary addressees of this speech, thus defined by their nationality. They are sovereign and back in control of their government. However, they are also portrayed as those who "have borne the cost" (while the nation's capital has reaped the government rewards), and as "the forgotten men and women" of the country. Therefore, the people are in charge, but at the same time, they have been betrayed and robbed of their wealth. In some occurrences, multiple senses seem to be intertwined.

Populism is based on Abraham Lincoln's definition of democracy as "government of the people, for the people, and by the people", but the identity of the people is never made explicit. This leads to one of the paradoxes of populism: who is included or excluded from the people is treated as a self-evident dogma, without taking cultural developments or societal cleavages into account. One of Laclau's (2005) most influential observations is that populists do not speak for some pre-existing people, but rather bring the entity "the people" into being through a performative act of naming and their rhetorical representation (Smith 2001), since society is highly heterogeneous, and the construction of a popular subjectivity is possible only by reducing to the minimum its particularistic content (Laclau 2005).

The concept "the people" and its denotatum are fundamentally ambiguous in extension, as Latin *populus* and Greek *dēmos* (see Lorenzetti 2016 for a brief overview of these senses). Canovan (1984; 1999) isolates several senses of "the people":

- The political community as a whole, *i.e.* "the united people" in a very inclusive sense.
- The people as a nation. An ethnic group in an exclusionary/nativist way, *i.e.* "our people" *versus* those who were not born here.
- The people as underdogs in contrast with a power class, thus referring to the less privileged majority inside the entire community.
- Ordinary people, a sense highlighting the egalitarian ideal in the appeal to the people, which in this case refers to "people in general".

Populism may have different contents depending on the enemy it is mobilising against and is overall founded on a Manichean dichotomy between an underdog (the people) and some usurpers exploiting or threatening them. It is a narrative structure through which the crisis of a people can be popularised, and a group can be mobilised for something and often against someone. In whatever manner the people and its values are defined, there must always be an enemy as a *conditio sine qua non*, acting as a people's definer, but also functioning as a scapegoat (Lee 2006) with whom to engage in perpetual confrontation (Wodak 2017).

The specific sense of "the people" put in the foreground, together with the identification of a specific type of usurper is ultimately crucial, among other characteristics, to differentiate between left-wing and right-wing populists. Both of them are (or claim to be) essentially anti-elitist. However, left-wing populists, who

have a strong ethical idea of how society should be ruled, and aim at empowering citizens and involving them in the direct decision-making process, put forward a pyramidal view of society, where corrupt élites or the economic establishment stand at the top (UP), while the exploited people are at the bottom of the social scale, as the underdogs (DOWN). On the other hand, right-wing populists, despite being anti-establishment, strongly emphasise a nuclear view of society, not just based on the UP/DOWN dichotomy "the people" *versus* "the *élite*", but centred on the IN/OUT one "the people" *versus* "outsiders", namely foreigners due to birth, citizenship, culture, religion, or race. The people here are conceived in a nativist sense, while outsiders are at the same time construed as out of the realm of legitimate people, but also less worthy, as the untouchables in the Indian caste system.

The construction of the people and its enemies, be they the establishment or foreigners, migrants, or Muslims, varies in their inclusionary or exclusionary specifics, sometimes implying a sort of conspiracy between these two outgroups to the detriment of "the people".

Parties pursuing discrimination against societies or given social groups follow a narrow ethno-nationalist and potentially racist agenda. They claim to speak for the people, but the identity of this people is defined in a nativist sense by the exclusion of non-natives as outsiders. They are against multiculturalism, hence against globalisation, combine different political imaginaries and traditions, and evoke or rhetorically construct an idyllic past, or "heartland" in Taggart's (2000) terms in the form of *ad hoc* identity narratives to create common ground with their "imagined community" (Anderson 1983), and the values they campaign for depend on local concerns (Wodak 2015). Ambiguity is their ID card, as they may flirt with fascism and nazism, proposing a revised interpretation of historical events, emphasise a perceived Islamic threat, or endorse a Christian conservative and reactionary agenda highlighting a particular vision of the American Dream (Pelinka 2013).

The use of divisive and aggressive rhetoric, characterised by scapegoating and covert or overt xenophobic messages sit at the core of nearly all contemporary right-wing populist parties, while in the most extreme cases migrants are portrayed as the vanguard of apocalyptic racial, religious and civilisational struggles (Taguieff 2001; Hogan and Haltinner 2015).

Right-wing populists simplify complex matters by looking for a culprit, a scapegoat to be blamed and construed as dangerous for the alleged cohesion of the nation, emphasising a nativist ideology.

Furthermore, they use anti-intellectualism, or the rhetoric of "common sense" (low style of performativity) (Moffitt and Ostiguy 2016), which is vital for spreading their message to the majority of the population, mobilising resentment and protest and normalising discriminating language. Social media affordances are key in offering the perfect platform for their performance (Moffitt 2016; Gerbaudo 2018).

3. Political Discourse and Racism

Political discourse is crucial in the production and reproduction of racism in society, since as a form of social practice it acts on people's mental models and frames, not only spreading and reinforcing ideological stances but also legitimising and favouring prejudice, hate speech and intolerance towards minorities (Van Dijk 2002a; Lakoff 2014).

Racism can be defined as a complex societal system of domination resulting in inequality and discrimination that "inscribes itself in practices […], discourses and representations articulated around stigmata of otherness" (Balibar 1991: 17). It acts by conferring the dominated groups stereotyped features, and it is the combination of these practices of intolerance and contempt, discourses and representations based on negative stereotyping that enables us to account for the formation of racist communities.

Whilst real racism, with its explicit endorsement of racist ideologies and myths can be currently found only in the extreme right usually ostracised from the political spotlight, neo-racism tends to be very different from forms of slavery, apartheid and explicit derogation (Balibar 1991). New racism typically wants to prove itself democratic and respectable. Hence it denies being racism at all, and due to its often subtle and indirect nature, discourse is its primary setting of reproduction. What appears as "mere talk", far removed from forms of subjugation and segregation associated with the old practices of racism, may nevertheless be ultimately effective in marginalising and excluding specific minorities since ethnic prejudices and ideologies are neither innate nor spontaneous but acquired and learned through communication, i.e. through text and talk.

Racism rests on pseudo-scientific theories that, mimicking academic discourse, associate visible facts to hidden causes and connect with the spontaneous process of theorisation typical of the racism of the masses (Balibar 1991). In today's society, social media platforms, taking advantage of the social affordances of the Internet, which is alleged to cultivate homophily, the "tendency of similar individuals to form ties with each other" (Colleoni, Rozza and Arvidsson 2014: 318), are preferential settings for the spread and proliferation of such theories through the logic of virality enhanced by the exponential growth of fake news (Van Aelst et al. 2017; Gerbaudo 2018).

The periodical return of racism is a symptom of the inability of societies to accept their inherent heterogeneity, the vexing plurality of human beings, and cope with difficulty and difference (Young 1999; Bauman 2000; 2016), while at the same time it underscores an insurmountable dependency on archaic structures of collective thinking (Balibar 2005). Post-modern racism of the globalised world stems from mixophobia, the "fear of the unmanageable volume of the unknown, untamable, off-putting and uncontrollable" (Bauman 2016: 9). It is the product of some of the uncertainties of the individual in liquid society, namely existential precariousness, and material insecurity endemic in the social structure (Young 1999).

A characterising feature of these new forms of racism is that the category "immigration" today assumes the function that "race" had for earlier racism. This is a racism without races developed in the era of decolonisation, with a reversal of population movement from former colonies to big cities in the industrialised world. Minorities are no longer portrayed as biologically inferior, but as different. This racism postulates an alleged insurmountability of cultural differences, due to different values, customs, and lifestyles, without, at first glance, suggesting the superiority of certain groups of people over others. It is what Taguieff (2001) terms differentialist racism.

Differentialism posits the inevitability of group conflicts and the impossibility of conviviality among cultures. Its ultimate thesis is that it is necessary to keep "us" separate from "them". Despite an apparently hierarchical neutrality, the different culture associated with minorities is regularly presented as having deficiencies or pathologies that need to be corrected, or as deviant based on the moral values and norms of dominant groups (Bonilla-Silva 2003).

The theory of cultural differentialism at the basis of differentialist racism suggests that globalisation occurs only on the surface, while the nuclear elements of each culture remain unaffected. The world is seen as a mosaic of separate cultures largely independent of one another. Huntington's *Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order* with its telling title is the most famous and controversial example of this theory. Displaying a concern for the decline of the West, and especially of the US, threatened by multiculturalism, Huntington (2011) argues in favour of cultural continuity and cultural purity within civilisations. In his ideal sense globalisation is a process, where civilisations will continue to exist and move in largely parallel fashion. Behind a simplistic representation of cultures as monolithic entities, it is not hard to detect ideas, like the purity of culture, or the exclusion of minorities, that recall "spectres of the past", like fascism and nazism, and promote racism and Islamophobia.

3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis and the Structural Properties of Racist Discourse

The main characteristic of racist discourse is the negative portrayal of "the others" combined with the positive presentation of one's own group. A corollary of this strategy is to avoid or mitigate the positive representation of the others and the negative presentation of one's group. Such a goal may be accomplished through multiple levels of discourse, or more effectively, with the joint combination of multiple linguistic strategies.

Critical discourse analysis (or critical discourse studies) is the broad research framework focusing on the relationship between language, power and domination, and investigates the ways language and discourse, in general, may contribute to enacting a system of power abuse and discrimination (Van Dijk 2001; 2006; Wodak 2015).

This paper sets itself within this research paradigm and, influenced by Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) and framing (Lakoff 2014), builds on Van Dijk's (2002b; 2013) socio-cognitive framework, viewing discourse as a social practice.

Based on Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) metaphors are structuring principles of thought that organise most of our experiences through mappings between familiar (source) and unfamiliar (target) knowledge domains, and language presents evidence of the metaphorical nature of our conceptual system[6].

Van Dijk's socio-cognitive model, on the other hand, is characterised by its reliance on the Discourse–Cognition–Society triangle and studies the relationship between discourse and society, arguing that it is cognitively mediated. Social structures and discourse structures can only be related through the mental representations of language users, in both their roles as individuals and as social beings. In this line of research, the linguistic structures of texts which contribute to their discursive component are interpreted and explained in terms of underlying, socially shared beliefs and ideologies, considering the ways they influence people's mental models (Van Dijk 2002b; 2006; 2013). Finally, the extent to which and how such discourses and their underlying cognitions are socially and politically functional in the (re)production and spread of inequality is investigated.

Van Dijk (2002a; 2013) outlines several linguistic and discursive dimensions in which this system of domination can be linguistically enacted:

- At the syntactic level, passives and nominalisations help in mitigating the role of ingroup members in negative actions, whereas the role of outsiders as agents is emphasised in active constructions.
- At the lexical level, negatively connoted lexemes are selected to refer to "them", while more positive terms are chosen for "us".
- At the propositional level, negative meanings about outgroups may be emphasised with an accumulation of negative predicates and their related implications, pointing to the portrayal of immigrants as criminals or abusers, also thanks to a high level of granularity in the event description. Conversely, negative actions by ingroup members are vaguely and indirectly mentioned.
- At the topic level, in the polarised structure of ideological discourse, negative aspects about the outgroups are underlined, such as crimes, deviance, or violence, with the result that immigration is framed as dangerous or problematic in multiple respects. Positive aspects about outgroup members are largely de-emphasised or altogether ignored, while ingroup members are globally presented as tolerant, often with disclaimers mitigating any negative comment they are about to make ("I have nothing against blacks/Muslims/ immigrants, but…"). One of the functions of such disclaimers is to form a positive self-presentation, ensuring that the second part of the utterance is not interpreted as racist.
- At the global level of *schemata* or frames (Fillmore 1982), narrative argumentation is tailored to provide evidence that immigration is a problem, a burden, a danger, or a threat. Frames allow human beings to understand reality, shape the way we

[6] An example of metaphorical mapping is LOVE IS A JOURNEY, that goes from the source domain (JOURNEY) to the more abstract target domain (LOVE). In CMT mappings are conventionally written in capital letters with the mapping from source to target domain being presented in the reverse order, as TARGET IS SOURCE (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).

think and even impact on how we act. The more such deep frames are activated through repetition, and reinforced, the more they become entrenched in people's mind, pre-empting the activation of the opposite frame or blocking relevant concerns if those concerns are outside the scope of the frame. In the case of immigration, right-wing populist politicians have an interest in strengthening the "immigration is a problem" frame. Hence moral concerns related to *pietas* or solidarity are blocked (Lakoff 2006; 2014).

- Rhetorical devices, such as metaphor, metonymy, hyperbole, euphemism, and irony, are extremely effective in underlining the "us" *versus* "them" dichotomy leading to the emergence of specific mappings. Metaphor is undoubtedly the most widely employed rhetorical figure and is particularly effective in political discourse. Not only is it used to simplify and make issues more intelligible, stir emotions and bridge the gap between the logical and the emotional, but Charteris-Black (2011) argues, it is also effective for its ability to resonate with latent symbolic representations at our unconscious level. Moreover, it frames the debate, thus setting the political agenda (Lakoff 2014) contributing to the formation of covert ideologies through myth-making.
  In relation to immigration, metaphor is pivotal in conveying ideologically-biased interpretations, also due to the range of conflicting representations that may be activated in public discourse. The possibility of embracing the victims of dictatorial regimes or repression is often counterbalanced by fear of terrorism. Alternatively, immigrants are associated with burdens, for the alleged possibility of driving down natives' wages. Moreover, in right-wing populist discourse, the rhetorical potential of metaphor is exploited in reinforcing both conscious and subliminal fears of alien invasions and consequent conflicts (IMMIGRATION IS WAR), while dehumanising metaphors, of immigrants as natural disasters or as animals have also been repeatedly identified (Santa Ana 1997; Musolff 2015). An important asset for political leaders using metaphors of this kind, it is here argued, is that in most cases an alleged racist or discriminatory intention may be easily denied as accidental and unwanted.
  The skilful interplay of multiple rhetorical strategies in the same speech makes it particularly effective, distracting the audience from the single strategy and any on-going manipulatory intent (Van Dijk 2006; Lakoff 2014).

4. Data and Methodology

For the purpose of investigating the rhetorical representation of immigration in Donald Trump's and Matteo Salvini's oratory, two corpora have been created, including policy-making speeches, consensus-building ones (electoral campaign speeches) (Charteris-Black 2013), and Twitter posts of the two leaders.

Both corpora selected contain approximately 65000 tokens. Speeches range from the period 2015-2019. As for Twitter, 1000 tweets of the leaders have been collected from their two accounts, @realDonaldTrump and @matteosalvinimi, from December 2018 to April 2019, excluding retweets. The time range chosen is significant, because it coincides with both Donald Trump's candidacy as American President and subsequent start of presidential term, and also marked Matteo Salvini's rising success as *League* secretary,

senator, Deputy-Prime Minister, and Interior Minister[7]. Moreover, the growing threat of Islamic terrorism and the dramatic increase in immigration from Africa and the Middle East make this time frame salient from the perspective of anti-immigration rhetoric.

Some remarks are in order on the decision to include social media data in this study. The rise to public prominence of social media has coincided with a moment of deep discontent with politics and of profound global crisis. Social networks have become preferential platforms for people as *cahiers de doléances*, where they can make their voice heard with attacks against the economic and political establishment and the mainstream media (Gerbaudo 2018). Online discussions provide a sort of meeting place, where individuals can gather in a temporary fusion into a new collective identity with some shared sense of community or purpose.

The interactive features of social networks have also increasingly provided populist movements and media-savvy leaders with a way not just to constantly update their followers on their political agenda, but also to market consensus through never-ending propaganda. Both Trump and Salvini are renowned for their ability to exploit the mediatic affordances of social networks. Since his candidacy in 2015, Trump has constantly used Twitter as a preferred channel over press conferences also due to his disdain for the alleged "fake news media". As President, he keeps using his private account to disseminate his ideology with an impactful, simple, and straightforward language of common words, while media channels often report his tweets as news (Demata 2018).

As for Salvini, since his party started to grow in consensus, passing from niche ethno-nationalist party promoting the independence of Northern Italy (the so-called *Padania*)[8] to national party with representation in the Italian government, nationwide support, and an increasingly nationalistic and anti-immigration agenda, he skillfully exploited the power of social media communication to demonise his opponents, stoke fears about marauding migrants, and accuse bureaucrats (Donadio 2019). However, he also displays an aura of authenticity mixing incendiary rhetoric with cheeriness and pizza- or pasta-posts to present himself as "one of the people".

This study has a primarily qualitative aim and comparatively investigates the structures and strategies employed in the framing of immigration by the two leaders. Particular attention is devoted to the lexical level of analysis and rhetorical devices employed. However, the first part of the analysis has been conducted which a mixed quantitative-qualitative methodology, searching for relevant collocates of selected lexemes through the Sketch Engine query interface. Meanings are mostly constructed in context, through words in combinations, but in non-compositional ways, not by merely summing individual units, and features such as patterns of co-occurrence have a central function in the language system (Rundell 2018). Furthermore, collocations can provide insights into the narrative polarisation of discourse.

[7] Matteo Salvini had the roles of Deputy-Prime Minister and Interior Minister until September 2019, after the end of the so called "yellow-green" government with *Five Star Movement* (*Movimento 5 Stelle*).

[8] It is worth noticing that the *League* was called *Northern League* (*Lega Nord*) until 2017. That was a turning point explicitly marking a new political agenda for the party. Changes in the political interests and tactics of the party, however, had started when Matteo Salvini became Secretary in 2013.

5. Donald Trump's and Matteo Salvini's Anti-Immigration Rhetoric: Linguistic Analysis

The study consists of two parts. Firstly, a co-occurrence pattern analysis using a corpus-linguistic methodology is presented, while a qualitative analysis of the rhetorical strategies employed follows.

5.1 Co-occurrence patterns analysis

The corpora collected have been queried through the Sketch Engine interface to outline the most relevant co-occurrence patterns for the terms "immigrant", "immigration" (and their Italian counterparts). The term "alien" has also been queried in the case of Trump, being a relevant and established legal term in Common Law Jurisdictions.

"Immigrant(s)" occurs 67 times in the Trump corpus, "alien" is reported 37 times, while "immigration" has 74 occurrences. The adjective "illegal"[9] in combinations, such as "illegal immigrants" or "illegal aliens" frames immigrants as criminals who must be punished, although their offence is of a very different entity compared to prototypical criminals (1), while "criminal" often occurs in clusters with other elements (2). "Immigrant" may be found with post-modifiers, in constructions of the form (Pre-mod+N+Post-mod) (3). Both these cluster-combinations of negatively connoted elements have an intensifying function to stress the "illegal frame", activating the idea of an emergency that must be fought.

A few *hapax legomena* as pre-modifiers are also worth mentioning since despite not being statistically significant, they are indicative of the general attitude towards the phenomenon. For instance, "low-skilled" emphasises the problem of economic migrants, portrayed as unfit for the competitive American job market. At the same time "many", "million", and "uncontrolled" as pre-modifiers of "immigration" in turn stress the idea of an overwhelming number of incoming people.

(1) "Notice that *illegal immigrants* will be given ObamaCare and free college tuition, but nothing has been mentioned about our VETERANS". (D. Trump)
(2) "We will begin *removing* the more than 2 million *criminal illegal immigrants* from the country". (D. Trump)
(3) "Texas Police arrested a *serial illegal immigrant rapist* who had been *deported* five times". (D. Trump)

"Alien" frequently co-occurs with the adjective "criminal" but may be preceded by a 2-adjective group, as in (4). These combinations do not just stress criminality, but also otherness since "alien" in popular culture is associated with nonhuman beings invading from outer space to take over the planet. This language is dehumanising, emphasising an assumed 'diversity' of "them" on multiple grounds, thus pre-empting the activation of any solidarity-frame with feelings of empathy for people crossing the border in precarious conditions.

[9] Potter (2014) provides evidence of the emergence of "illegal" used as a noun in public discourse, in the plural "illegals". Although this usage is not documented in our corpus, it appears as a further strategy aimed at the dehumanisation of immigrants.

(4) "Donald Trump will end *illegal immigration* once and for all and remove *dangerous criminal aliens* from our country". (D. Trump)

The lexicon employed highlights security as the primary concern. The issue-defining frame is also activated by such verbs as "stop", "end", or "control". Moreover, a dehumanising strategy is employed with verbs like "deport", associated with jail detention, or "remove", equating people with objects. Results are summarised in Tables 1, 2 and 3 with the 3 most frequent collocates.

Pre-modifier + *Immigrant/s*		*Immigrant* + post-modifier		Verb + *Immigrant* as Object		*Immigrant* as Subject	
illegal	34	*killer*	2	*deport*	3	*kill*	22
criminal	10	*rapist*	2	*detain*	2	*murder*	19
undocumented	2	*gang member*	2	*apprehend*	2	*beat*	4

Table 1: Co-occurrence patterns for "immigrant" in the Trump Corpus

Pre-modifier + *Immigration*		*Immigration* + post-modifier		Verb + *Immigration* as Object		*Immigration* as Subject	
illegal	35	*proposal*	9	*end*	25	*cost*	10
unlimited	7	*reform*	5	*stop*	15	*control*	5
massive	5	*security*	2	*control*	10	*come*	3

Table 2: Co-occurrence patterns for "immigration" in the Trump Corpus

Pre-modifier + *Alien*		Verb + *Alien* as Object	
criminal	18	*deport*	9
violent	11	*remove*	5
dangerous	8	/	

Table 3: Co-occurrence patterns for "alien(s)" in the Trump Corpus

Despite the different situational contexts, similar patterns emerge in the Salvini corpus for "immigrant(s)" (*immigrato/i*) and "immigration" (*immigrazione*)[10]. "Immigration" occurs 59 times, while 44 occurrences are reported for "immigrant(s)". Salvini's use of adjectives with the two terms highlights the idea of something necessarily wrong and defying standards of lawfulness and regularity, as someone "clandestine" hides from the law, and as such is construed as inherently bad (5). The presence of apparently benevolent verbs, like "disembark", or "recover", references to the salvages of migrants at sea, strategically employed for positive self-presentation, is counterbalanced by "stop" or "block" as co-occurring terms of "immigration" framed as a problem (6). The term "invasion" is also

[10] Translation from Italian into English of the terms and examples reported by the author.

significantly used as a mantra by the leader, depicting a scenario of a society at war, a right-populist reference to the "us" *versus* "them" dichotomy in a nativist sense, implying that outsiders are usurpers who claim rights they do not have.

(5) "DP[11] has already caused enough problems to the country, allowing *reckless clandestine immigration*". (M. Salvini)

(6) "*Stop irregular immigration*. *Stop Invasion*". (M. Salvini)

As reported in the case of Trump in (2) and (3), although in fewer instances, the noun "immigrant(s)" may be used as a post-modifier (7a) or be followed by other post-modifiers (7b). Even in this case, the function of the construction is to reinforce the idea of a security danger with a group of lexemes pertaining to the domain of unlawful activities.

(7a) "Thanks to our Police, who arrested *7 drug dealers (most of them immigrants)*". (M. Salvini)

(7b) "*An immigrant with a criminal record* was arrested after causing panic". (M. Salvini)

A summary of the main co-occurring patterns is reported in Tables 4a and 4b.

Pre-modifier + *Immigrant(s)*		*Verb + Immigrant/s* as Object	
clandestine	17	*disembark*	7
irregular	11	*recover*	5
illegal	7	*individuate*	3

Table 4. a: Co-occurrence patterns for "immigrant(s)" (Immigrato/i) in the Salvini Corpus

Pre-modifier + Immigration		Verb + Immigration as Object	
clandestine	27	*stop*	25
illegal	16	*block*	13
irregular	10	*handle*	5

Table 4. b: Co-occurrence patterns for "immigration" (immigrazione) in the Salvini Corpus

What emerges from this co-occurrence pattern analysis is that immigration is never presented in a favourable light. On the contrary, both leaders stress the view of a security danger and display a tough-on-crime attitude, although Salvini tries to show a benevolent humanitarian side with references to the salvages at sea.

5.2 Anti-Immigration Rhetorical Strategies: Immigration as a threat

Coherently with the results in 5.1, and showing similar trends as identified in academic research on political discourse about immigration (Santa Ana 1997; Van Dijk 2002a; 2013; Charteris-Black 2006; Hogan and Haltinner 2015; Musolff 2015; Wodak 2015), the data examined suggest that in the discourse of both Donald Trump and Matteo Salvini the category "immigration" displays a strongly negative polarisation.

The effectiveness of the anti-immigration rhetoric enacted by the two leaders, it is here argued, rests on its being strategically articulated around multiple aspects

[11] *Democratic Party* (*Partito Democratico*), the Italian leading centre-left party.

which cover some of the basic fears of the individual in liquid society, insisting on one's existential precariousness and insecurity (Bauman 2000). The narratives put forward by the two leaders trigger the interpretation of immigration as a threat on multiple grounds:

- A threat to security
- A threat to the economy
- A threat to culture

These three alleged threats, it is here argued, are not equally salient, but stronger emphasis is placed on security, which, also thanks to an effective "visual rhetoric", as exemplified by images of Trump's wall at the border with Mexico on tv, or of the police dismantling Gypsy camps, can generate "an atmosphere of a state of emergency, of an enemy at the gates" (Bauman 2016: 27).

The "(naturally) good insiders" *versus "*bad outsiders" dichotomy typical of nationalistic rhetoric, which in a nativist sense promotes the interests of native inhabitants over immigrants (Wodak 2015) is portrayed in (8), with an emphasis on border politics evoking the NATION IS A CONTAINER mapping (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). The IMMIGRATION IS WAR mapping is also indirectly evoked, with hints at conflicts and invasions, while the word "border" represents an ideological trope evoking a *limen* between American exceptionalism and Latin American weakness, separating law from the absence of law (Demata 2017; Heuman and González 2018).

(8) "Countless innocent American lives have been *stolen* because our politicians have failed in their duty to *secure our borders*". (D. Trump)

In (9) Trump operates a discriminatory generalisation equating Mexicans with crime. Such equivalence leads to the metonymic chain CRIMINAL FOR IMMIGRANT, which on occasion may turn into TERRORIST FOR IMMIGRANT. The noun *Mexico* here is also used metonymically to refer to the government, thus licensing the idea that immigrants are passive objects expelled by a government colluded with criminals. Outsiders are portrayed as inherently defective, ('they have lots of problems') (Taguieff 2001; Van Dijk 2002a) and are accused of letting those problems penetrate the country from without, thus activating the IMMIGRATION IS A WAR mapping, but also indirectly another fear, that of immigrants bringing disease into the country (IMMIGRATION IS A WEED/IMMIGRATION IS A DISEASE/IMMIGRATION IS POLLUTION).

The disease is figurative here, referring to the corruption and crime allegedly insinuated into the country, thus putting the good American people in danger. The security problem is reinforced by parallelism and the list of three apodictic statements underlining Trump's negative stance, a derogatory evaluation presented as common knowledge, as something that does not need to be substantiated any further. The last part of this passage, on the other hand, is a face-saving hedged disclaimer attempting to mitigate his discriminatory stance.

(9) "When Mexico sends its people, *they're not sending their best*. [...]They're sending *people with lots of problems*, and they're bringing those problems with

us. They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists. And some, I assume, are good people". (D. Trump)

In (10) with a strategy that shows a remarkable similarity to that of other right-wing populists[12], but also partly licensed by the media frequently talking about migratory waves or migratory flows, immigrants are compared with liquids, with floods and with some apocalyptic plague licensing the dehumanising mapping IMMIGRATION IS A NATURAL DISASTER, but also IMMIGRANTS ARE INSECTS/RATS, and IMMIGRATION IS A DISEASE (Santa Ana 1997).

(10) "They don't care about crime and want *illegal immigrants*, no matter how bad they may be, to *pour into* and *infest our country*". (D. Trump)

Salvini also thrives on equating immigrants with crime, thanks to the deeply rooted fear of terrorism in Europe. In (11) his strategy is casting doubt about the legitimacy of their refugee status, claiming that they are not genuine. Either they are economic migrants or terrorists, thus in one case they would be classified as parasites for the economy, or simply as criminals. His argumentation goes on by evoking the war scenario with alleged enemies disembarking on the Italian shores and infiltrating the country with crime. The mapping IMMIGRATION IS WAR is relevant here, together with the metonymy TERRORIST FOR IMMIGRANT. It is worth noticing that similarly to Trump in (9), here the fact that immigrants bring a rise in crime rates is treated as a fact and is not substantiated.

(11) "In the last few years 160.000 fake refugees disembarked in our country. They do not flee from war, but bring war to our country. Look at crime statistics, rape, burglaries and homicides". (M. Salvini)

In anti-immigration rhetoric, immigrants are mostly treated as collectivities, and their otherness, their not being rightful members of "the people" is their defining feature in a way that deprives them of their humanity and identity as single human beings and does not attract feelings of empathy. Coherently with the strategies outlined by Van Dijk (2013) to enact the rhetoric of exclusion, when single outgroup members are mentioned, the focus is on their negative acts presented with a fine-grained description, as in (12), leading to the CRIMINAL FOR IMMIGRANT equivalence chain. It is worth noticing that the slogan preceded by the hashtag is very similar to Trump's "Zero tolerance for criminal aliens", showing a perfect strategy coordination between the two leaders.

(12) "A clandestine from Northern African armed with a knife got on a bus in Milan causing panic among the passengers. We are working for his EXPULSION to his home country. #Zerotolerance for criminals". (M. Salvini)

The second type of relevant threat articulated is about the economy and thrives on the fear of the individual of losing personal economic independence. It is commonly held that in many countries, immigrants readily accept underpaid jobs that natives

[12] Marine Le Pen of *Rassemblement National* often talks of *vagues migratories* (migratory tides) in her speeches.

would not want. The economic threat narrative focuses on the alleged possibility of immigrants driving down wages, or reducing jobs, thus emphasising their parasitic nature, with the mappings IMMIGRATION IS A BURDEN, and IMMIGRANTS ARE PARASITES. In (13), this is strategically reinforced by two additional elements. One is the fact that immigrants are presented as low-skilled, therefore not fit for the American highly competitive job market, which also makes them inherently defective by nature (Taguieff 2001), hence unwanted. The second element used by Trump to strengthen his point is a *captatio benevolentiae* strategy directed at African Americans and other Latinos in the country. Explicitly addressing other minorities, who have been targets of discrimination and racism in the past, and still are today, enables him to show a benevolent attitude including them as legitimate members of "the American people", and hence inherently good (Bonilla-Silva 2003). The parasitic nature of immigrants is also hinted at in (1), where they are juxtaposed with veterans, implying that they do not deserve any help or provisions because they have not contributed to the American society and its values as veterans have.

(13) "Uncontrolled, low-skilled immigration that continues to reduce jobs and wages for American workers, and especially for African-American and Hispanic workers within our country. Our citizens". (D. Trump)

Salvini resorts to a ridiculing strategy through hyperbole to dismiss refugees as a fraud (14), also indirectly criticising his left-wing opponents for the rise in crime on account of their "do-gooder" (*buonista*) attitude towards "illegal" immigrants, and for not caring about Italians still resenting of the economic crisis.

(14) "The party is over for clandestines in luxury hotels, while Italians are unemployed". (M. Salvini)

Part of this strategy is also explicitly stating who is entitled to a job and a welfare service, hence the nativist slogans "America First", and its Italian mirror copy "Italians first", thus once again separating those IN, worthy of attention as lawful citizens, from those OUT, not deserving anything as aliens, others, unimportant.

On the other hand, the parasitic nature of (criminal) immigration is highlighted in (15), where through a hyperbole Salvini ridicules the previous government attitude blamed for saving not just human lives ("taxi service"), but criminals' lives (CRIMINAL FOR IMMIGRANT), while economic resources should be used for honest Italians (IMMIGRANTS ARE PARASITES).

(15) "I don't want any wall. I just don't like that our military ships are used as a taxi service by thousands of clandestine migrants". (M. Salvini)

The third type of threat articulated focuses on a danger for the alleged cohesion of the country, its values and culture. In (16) and (17) Trump delineates his prototype of the ideal immigrant candidate. Immigrants are supposed to endorse the American values, although those values are just vaguely articulated and are supposed to be unanimously shared by the people, and never changing. Here the contrast rests on different values and an alleged cultural incompatibility leading to a problematic coexistence. The

main point is that foreigners are supposed to renounce to their own original culture and identity to enter a new one. The verb "assimilate" in this respect is indicative of what Lévi-Strauss (1955) called an anthropophagic strategy. Anthropophagic societies, he argued, deal with strangers and deviants by swallowing them up, making them their own and gaining strength from them. This strategy involves the "annihilation of their otherness" (Bauman 2000: 101). Lévi-Strauss associated this aspect with primitive societies, claiming that modern societies are anthropoemic, that is they vomit out the deviant, keeping them outside of society, barring dialogue and physical contact with them, to the extreme of deportation or incarceration, or the more modern variants of ghettos and spatial separation. Modern society, however, Young (1999) contends, still contains both swallowing and ejecting aspects, and is nevertheless based on the presumption that all that is alien is inherently defective, hence must be either corrected (redeemed from a Christian point of view) or expelled, as it happens in the case of immigrants' deportations, or the building of separation walls.

(16) "I only want to admit individuals into our country who will support *our values* and love *our people*". (D. Trump)

(17) "Not everyone who seeks to join our country will be able to successfully *assimilate*. Sometimes it's just not going to work out. It's our right to choose immigrants that we think are the likeliest to thrive and flourish and love us". (D. Trump)

Salvini expresses the same stance in a coarse language in (18). Immigrants here are framed as invaders, usurpers, and criminals, thus triggering the overlapping of more threats.

(18) "This city welcomes you with values, roots and culture. It's an open city but demanding respect, if you don't pay respect, we'll kick your ass out of here". (M. Salvini)

The thesis of cultural differentialism (Huntington 2011) at the basis of differentialist racism (Balibar 1991; Taguieff 2001) is explicitly presented in (19), where Salvini hints at an alleged Western cultural superiority. Differentialist racism views cultures as homogenous, dogmatic and monolithic entities not supposed to embrace differences or multiculturalism since the integration of a different culture would lead to a sort of (cultural) pollution of their original values (IMMIGRATION IS WAR, IMMIGRATION IS POLLUTION). Islamism is a favourite target for the cultural differentialist threat, with the generalisation TERRORISM FOR ISLAMISM. This is countered by "our house", referring at the same time to the country/continent (NATION/EUROPE IS A BUILDING) and to Judaic-Christian values (20).

(19) "Immigration is a system to *dismantle those values* grown together with the progress of this continent". (M. Salvini)

(20) "Islamic terrorist uses mass immigration to affirm that Europe is theirs. Europe is not Islamic; it's our house. It's not and will never be Islamic". (M. Salvini)

The threat to culture, concerning one's identity, is less prominent than the security

and the economy ones that have to do with people's and society's interests. Threat-to-culture discourse relies on colour-blind language, which explains contemporary racial inequalities as the outcome of non-racial dynamics, such as market dynamics, naturally occurring phenomena and outgroup-imputed limitations (Bonilla-Silva 2003). Arguing that race no longer matters and that society has moved beyond racism more subtly and insidiously enables people and politicians to employ derogatory and covert racist rhetoric, while at the same time mitigating possible accusations of racism (Holling, Moon and Jackson 2014).

6. Conclusions

Despite the contextual differences in the phenomenon of immigration in the US and in Italy, our linguistic analysis reveals similar stances, and a strong negative polarisation of immigration in the rhetoric of both Donald Trump and Matteo Salvini, with the absence of any positive mapping or frame. The rhetorical representation of immigration as something that "does not belong to us", without any sympathy in two countries that have both been characterised by in-coming or out-going migration in the past, is here articulated around the threat trope. The emphasis on a nuclear view of society based on the right-wing populist IN/OUT dichotomy in a nativist sense (Wodak 2015), and the remarkably similar lexical and rhetorical strategies adopted by the two leaders, sometimes resorting to identical slogans, point to a cross-fertilisation of ideas among right-wing populists across the globe, and the emergence of a "script" that may be flexibly adapted to different national contexts. Immigration is framed as a security threat activating fears of crime, drugs and terrorism invading the country from outside, with the IMMIGRATION IS WAR and IMMIGRATION IS A DISEASE mappings. The economic threat narrative highlights the view of immigrants as parasites (IMMIGRATION IS A BURDEN) pitting them against the forgotten men and women of the country that these two leaders claim to bring back at the centre of the political scene. Dehumanising metaphorical mappings are also relevant to the flood imagery (IMMIGRATION IS A NATURAL DISASTER) stressing the overwhelming number of incoming people.

Immigrants are mostly framed as collectivities with a focus on their otherness and their presumed criminal status, and when single cases are discussed, the focus is still on the negative actions of the outgroup member. The last threat highlights an alleged cultural incompatibility, in particular between Christianity and Islamism, but also presuming a veiled Western cultural superiority, thus enacting differentialist racism (Taguieff 2001).

A rhetoric of exclusion is enacted framing the arguments in a colour-blind language, while forms of both covert and more overt racist discourse can be outlined in the rhetoric of the two leaders pointing out the importance to keep "us" separate from "them" (Bonilla-Silva 2003). Self-glorification of American exceptionalism and Italian endorsement of Christian values is counterbalanced by the dehumanising language used for minorities, treated as homogeneous entities, as undifferentiated

and as alien. An instrumental logic leading to the criminalisation of immigration is supported by a process thath pre-empts the activation of solidarity- or human rights-frames, obscuring the sufferings and pain of human beings from view. This technique is facilitated by what Bauman terms adiaphorisation, the restriction of "the realm of moral obligations that we are ready to admit and take responsibility for" (Bauman 2016: 80). Adiaphoric action is measured only against a purpose-oriented logic, dismissing a moral evaluation. The use of a stigmatising and dehumanising language, diminishing the moral status of immigrants, highlighting an alleged criminal intent, and turning them into perceived threats as undesirables to be controlled or expelled facilitates this logic of immorality and legitimates the spread of discriminatory behaviour in society.

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Euro-American Relations in the Age of Globalization: Risks and Opportunities

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