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The Epistemological Model of Vedantic Doxography According to the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* for the Study of Indian Philosophy

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Abstract Since there is no proper Sanskrit word corresponding to the English 'doxography', the literary genre of the compendium (*samgraha*) is examined, in the context of the school of the *kevalādvaitavāda*. The work chosen for the analysis is the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (Compendium of all the *darśanas*) by Mādhavācārya. Some critical remarks on the structure of this work allow to conclude that a possible alternative hermeneutical model used to explain the particular attitude of Indian doxography, such as 'Inclusivism', is not entirely satisfactory. The doxographic and hermeneutical structure of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* seems an entirely coherent theoretical model, within the limits of its own cultural context.

Keywords Doxography. Inclusivism. Hermeneutics. Sanskrit. Indology.

Summary 1 Methodological Remarks about Indian Doxography. – 2 A Survey of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* along with Methodological and Hermeneutical Remarks. – 3 Hermeneutical Remarks in Relation to Both Western and Indian Theories. – 4 Conclusions.



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1 Methodological Remarks about Indian Doxography

There is no proper Sanskrit word corresponding to the English 'doxography' (from δόξα 'opinion, point of view' + γράφειν 'to write, to describe'). This is not surprising, due to the fact that the term is a neologism, invented by the German philologist Hermann Diels (1848-1922), in his work *Doxographi Graeci* (1879), being used properly for the works of classical historians, describing the points of view of past philosophers and scientists. This notwithstanding, in fact doxography is a largely diffused literary genre in Indian philosophical tradition. Indian philosophical production employs an ample range of different literary genres, each one of them corresponding to different conceptual and pedagogical requirements. Within this perspective, the founding text of a system is generally speaking a *sūtra*, 'aphorism', a genre that, due to its characteristic feature of stylistic concision, needs to be explained in a number of different types of commentaries, such as the *kārikā* (mnemonic strophe), a sort of versified *sūtra*, the *vārttika* (explanatory gloss) inspired by a criterion of brevity, the *bhāṣya* (commentary), etymologically 'that about which it is to be spoken of', more detailed and extensive in style, with a particular propensity for long nominal compounds and a technical use of inflectional cases in order to indicate different causal, temporal or situational relationships, and the *ṭīkā* (delucidation), more colloquial in style, in order to delucidate the meaning of the glossed text, this one being often referred to as the 'root' (*mūla*) of all the entire textual stratification. But the conceptual building is not exhausted in the stratification starting with the *mūla* text and ending with the *ṭīkā*. In order to better vehiculate the concepts and technicalities of a philosophical system a further step is needed. This step must be accomplished by the treatises. So to the founders of a system, a large rank of scholars must follow, so that the scholastic thought could assume its final form as a structured system, and not simply a muddle of intuitive statements without a clear internal order. Coordination, elimination of apparent internal contradictions, internal coherence, are some of the goals that this kind of production is called to satisfy.

More than this, a confrontation with different systems of thought is now necessary, because all of the Indic thought lives and grows in the continuous and fruitful debate with different schools of thought, being them internal (related to the same central tenets of one's own school, and differing in matters of detail), or external (related to altogether different worldviews). To this demand a definite class of works may offer an answer, the so-called 'summaries' (*saṃgraha*). A *saṃgraha* is a compendium, a synopsis, being able to build a conceptual scheme including a wide range of different philosophical tenets and organizing them into an intellectual model. This model fulfils a double requirement: it offers a clear structure of the main tenets of

the school, and at the same it offers a useful pedagogical summary of the interrelated positions of one's own school and of rival schools, a summary used in public debates in order to support one's own position and to contrast the opponent's position. So its scope is not only, or not properly, a theoretical one, but rather a practical one, in accord with the practical undertone of all Indic classical philosophical tradition, being always connected with the main human goal (*puṛuṣārtha*), the liberation (*mokṣa*) from the cycle of rebirths (*saṃsāra*).

This epistemological and pedagogical model centred on the literary genre of the compendium (*saṃgraha*) is not restricted to brahmanical tradition, but it is shared outside the pale of the Vedic milieu. As we will see, at least one important work comes from the context of Jainism. It is to be noted that the literary genre of the compendium (*saṃgraha*) must be accurately distinguished from an only apparently similar genre, this second one being the scholastic résumé, *sāra*. A *sāra* collects the main tenets of a school for a better mnemonic study of the system, but it is not so diffused in technicalities as the compendium, and above all it has no specific reference to other schools' point of view, it is no fit for a confrontation with different intellectual positions. For the Vedantic milieu the classical example of a *sāra* is the *Vedāntasāra* by Sadānanda (fifteenth century CE) (Kumar 1987).

The doxographical production of the school of Śaṅkara, the *kevalādvaitavāda* (doctrine of absolute non dualism), offers a complete review of nearly all the existing philosophical tendencies in Indian classical thought. This review is not an objective, impartial or impersonal one: it presents the thought of rival schools as seen through a particular filter. This is precisely what distinguishes a doxography from a history of philosophy, the conscious intention of the author is not to offer an unrealistic, cold and aseptic report of different views, a position impossible from the point of view of many Indian schools of thought, e.g. the *jaina* epistemological model, according to which only a multilateral view could avoid the risk of an over-simplification of the object studied, through the 'doctrine of the may be' (*syādvāda*) applied through the so-called 'sevenfold application [of *syāt*]' (*saptabhaṅginaya*) (Jaini [1979] 2001, 94-7). Rather, a doxography offers a record of positions different from one's own, but from the point of view of this very one's own tenet, in order to offer to the disciple a sort of road map to find his way out of a difficult route. This is not to be considered as a biased or partial presentation of intellectual facts, it is rather the intellectually honest acknowledgement that in philosophy simply does not exist a neutral point of view, a point of view above all other ones, but that to declare one's own position is the only way to be clear and sincere in the exposition of concepts and beliefs.

It should be noted that an intellectual *caveat* of this sort is at the root of contemporary interreligious dialogue, be it a theological or an existential one: only those who declare frankly and honestly their

position could compare it with others, there is no possibility for an 'outside from the mēlée' position, everyone must seat on a particular chair if a productive dialogue could start (Coward 1990; Prabhu 1996; Sharma 2011; Swindells 1997).

In the production of the Śāṅkarite school, all surrounding schools are arranged into a system of concentric orbits, in such a way that the school of Śāṅkara is situated at the very centre, with all the other ones gravitating around it according to different orbits corresponding to a degree of lesser or greater approach to the centre, represented by the *kevalādvaitavāda*. The *Veda* authorizes the people eligible for its teachings (Śāṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1, 3, 25-6) determining a sphere of legitimate 'differentiation of disciples' (*virābheda*), a hierarchy based upon the concept of 'differentiation of eligibility' (*adhikārabheda*) (Śāṅkara, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣadbhāṣya* 3, 9, 9), a differentiation depending upon the different grade of knowledge, character, inner disposition, sensitivity of disciples, in a word, depending upon their individual peculiarities. The subsequent use of the concept of *adhikārabheda* by thinkers like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (*Prasthānabheda*, a commentary upon the seventh verse of the *Śivamahimnastotra* by Puṣpadanta, stating that the systems of triple *Veda*, *sāṃkhya*, *yoga*, doctrine of Paśupati and *vaiṣṇava* faith are just different paths towards one and the same religious goal) (Norman Brown 1983; Hanneder 1999) redefines the term in a more accentuated inclusivistic nuance, opening the way to the contemporary use of the concept of *adhikārabheda* as a definitely inclusivistic tool for neo-hinduistic apologetic literary production, being able to absorb every sort of alien issues into one's own system of values (Young 1981, 1982; see also Bouthillette 2013).

The most famous text of the *saṃgraha* literary genre is probably the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (Compendium of All the *Darśanas*) by Mādhavācārya (fourteenth century CE).¹ The vast majority of manuscripts have only 15 chapters, and do not contain the chapter on Śāṅkara's philosophy. To the very same master Śāṅkara (Śāṅkarācārya, Ādiśāṅkara, sixth-seventh century CE) it has been attributed (with not so much plausibility) the possibly earlier work of this kind, the *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṃgraha* (Compendium of the Résumé of All the Definitive Conclusions of the *Vedānta*'), nearly contemporary of an important *jaina* work, the *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (Collection of the Six *Darśanas*) by Haribhadra Sūri (eighth century CE). The scene is enriched with an anonymous treatise (date unknown), the *Sarvamataṣaṃgraha* (Compendium of All Opinions), with the *Siddhāntaśaṣṭasāṃgraha* (Small Compendium of the Definitive Conclusions) by

¹ Abhyankar 1978; Apte et al. 1977; Cowell, Gough [1892, 1894] 1986. I had not the possibility to see Agrawal 2002.

the *śaiva* teacher Appayya Dikṣita (1552-1624), and completed with the *Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha* (Compendium of All the Definitive Conclusions) by a group of scholars (under the patronage of the *marāṭha* king of Tañjāvūr of Śāhajī, 1685-1711) (Winternitz 1967, 506-8).

As far as the authorship of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (*floruit* 1350) is concerned, a great debate is active about the identity of its author: should we consider Mādhava as the same as Vidyāraṇya (born to Māyañacārya and Śrīmatidevī in Pampakṣetra), the brother of Sāyaṇa, or identical with Sāyaṇa, or what else? Should we consider Vidyāraṇya as a different person, and Mādhava and Sāyaṇa as his disciples? The author of the treatise should be identified with Mādhava-Sāyaṇa, or with Bharatīrtha, or with Cinnambhaṭṭa? (Thakur 1961). Cinnambhaṭṭa (*alias* Cannibhaṭṭa, Cinnabhaṭṭa, Cennubhaṭṭa), one of the many scholars in the court of Mādhava, raised to the position of royal preceptor, *rājapaṇḍita*, was a younger contemporary of Mādhava and Sāyaṇa, son of Sarvajñaviṣṇu who was the teacher of both of them, and is considered as the author of a commentary (*Prakāśikā*) on Keśava Mīśra's *Tarkabhāṣā* and of another commentary (*Vivarana*) on Varadarāja's *Tārkikarakṣasārasamgraha*.

The *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* by Haribhadra Sūri (Śivakumara 1977) treats of the *bauddha*, *nyāya*, *sāṃkhya*, *jaina*, *vaiśeṣika*, *jaiminīya* (= *pūrvamīmāṃsā*) and *cārvāka* (*nyāya* and *vaiśeṣika* must be considered together if we want to have the total sum of the six *darśanas*). The *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasamgraha* by Śaṅkara (Raṅgācārya 1983) treats of the *lokāyatika*, *ārṣata* (= *jaina*), *bauddha* (*mādhyaṃika*, *yogācāra*, *sautrāntika*, *vaibhāṣika*), *vaiśeṣika*, *naiyāyika*, *prabhākara* (*pūrvamīmāṃsā*), *bhaṭṭa* (*pūrvamīmāṃsā*), *sāṃkhya*, the school of Patañjali, of Vedavyāsa (the philosophy of the *Mahābhārata*), and finally *vedāntadarśana*. The *Sarvamatasamgraha*² treats of two kinds of subjects, not Vedic (*bauddha*, *jaina*, *cārvāka*) and Vedic, that is the systems of Kaṇāda (*vaiśeṣika*), Akṣapāda (*nyāya*), *yoga*, *sāṃkhya*, (*pūrvamīmāṃsā*, and *vedānta*).

2 A Survey of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* along with Methodological and Hermeneutical Remarks

The *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* **com** **ends** 16 chapters, each one of them dedicated to a different 'vision' or 'point of view' (*darśana*). This term, nowadays usually employed with reference to the six 'canonical' schools of classical Indian philosophy, that is *sāṃkhya* and *yoga*, *vaiśeṣika* and *nyāya*, and finally *pūrvamīmāṃsā* and *uttaramīmāṃsā*



2 Gaṇapatiśāstrī, *The Sarvamatasamgraha*.

(or popularly, *vedānta*), derives from the root (*dhātu*) *drś*, ‘to see’, and it could be usefully compared (from the semantic point of view, not etymologically) with the Greek term *θεωρία*. Both *darśana* and *θεωρία* are linked with roots meaning ‘to see’, both seem to envisage a sort of objective perspective of the philosophical enquiring, aiming at discerning the essence of truth beyond the veil of the **phenomenal** level. This notwithstanding, the Sanskrit term *darśana* is perpetually hanging in the balance between a weak acceptance, – and in this sense it is potentially synonymous with *naya* (principle, method, procedure), *vāda* (doctrine), *mata* (opinion), *dr̥ṣṭi* (vision, conception), all of them being potentially used in a disdainful undertone (similar to the Greek *δόξα*) –, and a strong acceptance, referring properly to the well structured worldview of a philosophical school, be it theistic or not. In this second acceptance, *darśana* could be considered as almost synonymous with *siddhānta* (definitive conclusion, ultimate point of view). The architecture of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* is very interesting to enquire, because it says something about the mutual relationships of the different *darśanas* contained in it from the author’s perspective. It works as a sort of planetarium, a model of a solar system for educational purposes. The first *darśana* presented is the more external or peripheral orbit, and the structure proceeds with more and more internal orbits, till we reach the very core of the system, where the solar orbit is situated, at the very centre of the structure, its pulsating heart. Let us see briefly but in some detail the structure of the work.

The first *darśana* is named *cārvākadarśana* (134 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the system of the materialists, those who deny the authority of the *Vedas*, the moral mechanism of *karman*, and the existence of *ātman*, and consequently the mechanism of rebirth (*samsāra*). They are completely outside the pale of the *Vedas*, the more external worldview with respect to *smārta* tradition. The chapter is a precious doxographical source, because it contains a lot of quotations from lost works of the *cārvākas*, a school that has severely suffered from a sort of *damnatio memoriae*, so that most of its basic texts have not been preserved (Bhattacharya 2013). The general trend of the work is to use primary sources, only rarely does it represent a *darśana* using second-hand material: this fact is more and more evident in the course of time, particularly nowadays when new texts are available for scholars, texts being unknown to the previous generations of scholars that have studied the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* (Nakamura 1968).

The second *darśana* is named *baudhdarśana* (375 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the system of the followers of the Buddha, Siddhārtha Śākyamuni, those who deny the authority of the *Vedas*, and at least partially the existence of *ātman*, but admit somehow the moral mechanism of *karman*, and consequently the

mechanism of rebirth (*saṃsāra*). They are completely outside the pale of the *Vedas*, but in a less radical way than the previous *darśana*. The positions being analyzed within this *darśana* are in fact four, corresponding to the schools *mādhyaṃika* (nichilism), *vijñānavādin* or *yogācāra* (subjective idealism), *sautrāntika* (representationism) and *vaibhāṣika* (presentationism). It must be noted that in this chapter there is a reference to a *jaina* doxographical source, the *Vivekavilāsa* by Jinadatta Sūri.

The third *darśana* is named *ārhatadarśana* (438 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the system of the *jaina*, the followers of the Jina, Vardhamāna Mahāvīra, those who deny the authority of the *Vedas*, but admit the moral mechanism of *karman*, and consequently the mechanism of rebirth (*saṃsāra*). They are completely outside the pale of the *Vedas*, but in a less radical way than the preceding *darśana*. In part the chapter reflects Kumārila's arguments against *jaina* doctrine. The author shows a good familiarity with both well-known and lesser-known *jaina* sources (*Prameyakamalamārtāṇḍa*, *Āptanīś-cayālaṅkāra*, *Paramāgamasāra*, *Tattvārthasūtra*, *Svarūpasambodhana*, *Syādvādamañjari*). It is not at all meaningless the fact that this *darśana* is put after the *baudhdadarśana* and before the *rāmānujadarśana*, so in a position immediately following the tenets of *baudhdha* school(s) and preceding Rāmānuja's doctrine. In fact it is the doctrine of *syādvāda*, the multilaterality of points of view, that assigns to *jaina* doctrine this intermediate position. This remark will become possibly more evident *infra*, when we will refer to the notion of Inclusivism.

The fourth *darśana* is named *rāmānujadarśana* (387 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the system of Rāmānuja, that is the qualified nondualism (*viśiṣṭādvaita*), the tradition of *śrīsampradāya*. It should be noted that within the structure of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* this school is situated in a conceptual position far remote from the school of Śaṅkara, not at all contiguous with it, immediately after the *jainas* that are still outside the pale of the *Vedas*. This collocation sounds somehow strange, due to the evident contiguity between *viśiṣṭādvaita* and *kevalādvaitavāda* within the pale of *uttaramīmāṃsā*. Perhaps this choice could reflect the attempt at building a block against the more direct rival of the Śaṅkarite *kevalādvaitavāda* within the *vedānta* front, a debate field much animated in Indian philosophical controversies (Comans 1989, 1990; Lacombe 1937; Mumme 1992; Sawai 1991; Schmücker 2003; Veezhinathan 2003). Some important doctrinal points of the content of the chapter are a comparative analysis of the hermeneutics of a *mahāvākya* (great dictum), namely *tat tvam asi* (thou art that) (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6, 8, 7)³ from the points of view of the rival schools of Śaṅkar

³ For a controversial interpretation of the passage see Brereton 1986.

and Rāmanuja; an exposition of the theory of the *vyūha* (emanations) of Kṛṣṇa, that is, Vāsudeva (Kṛṣṇa himself), Saṃkarṣaṇa (namely Balarāma, Kṛṣṇa's elder brother), Pradyumna (son of Kṛṣṇa and Rukmiṇī) and Aniruddha (son of Pradyumna, Kṛṣṇa's grandson); and finally an analysis of the concepts of *bhakti* and *brahman* according to Rāmānuja's school.

The fifth *darśana* is named *pūrṇaprajñadarśana* (301 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the system of Madhva (*alias* Pūrṇaprajña, *alias* Ānandatīrtha), that is the dualism (*dvaita*), the tradition variously known as *brahmasampradāya*, *sadvaiṣṇava*, *atyantabheda* (Ikebe 1997). Here the polemic attitude of the nondualism (*advaitavāda*) against the dualism (*dvaitavāda*) is much emphasized, in order to show the internal contradictions of the *dvaita* system. A lot of sources are employed, some of them being part of the *itihāsa*, the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the commentary *Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya* by Madhyamandira, the *Sākalayasamhitā*, the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, the *Agnipurāna*, the *Bhagavadgītā*, the *Bhāllaveyopaniṣad*, the *Viṣṇupurāna*, the *Tattvavādarahasya*, the *Mahopaniṣad*, the *Nyāyasūtra*, the *Tārkikarakṣā*, the *Brahmasūtra*, the *Garuḍapurāna*, the *Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa*, the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, the *Kūrmapurāna*, the *Skandapurāna*, the *Bṛhatsamhitā*, the *Ānandatīrthabhāṣyavyākhyāna*. A reference is made to the well-known interpretation of the great dictum (*mahāvākya*) *tat tvam asi* (thou art that) (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* 6, 8, 7), that the *dvaita* school reads as *tāt tvam asi* (thou are not that).

The sixth *darśana* is named *nakulīśapāśupatadarśana* (135 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of a *śaiva* school foreign to the tradition of the *āgamas*, inspired by the master Nakulīśa (*alias* Lakulīśa). The form of Śiva being object of veneration is Paśupati, the Lord (*pati*) of tied cattle (*paśu*). The main works of this tradition are the *Pāśupatasūtra*, 168 aphorisms commented by Kauṇḍinya (*Pañcārthabhāṣya*) and the *Gaṇakārikā* by Bhāsarvajña (tenth century CE, with comment *Rātnaṭikā*) (Hara 1992). The doctrine is very systematic, comprehending *inter alia* a correlate structure of eight pentads (acquisition, impurity, expedient, locality, perseverance, purification, initiations, powers). The ritual antinomistic behaviour of the devotee in a certain grade of his spiritual career is examined in detail, with accurate references to the primary sources of the school.

The seventh *darśana* is named *śaivadarśana* (209 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of a *śaiva* school belonging to the tradition of the *āgamas*, a partly dualistic school, diffused mostly in Southern India (but having a strong tie with masters from Kaśmīr, and depending not only on Sanskrit but even on *tamil* sources), the *śaivasiddhānta* (definite conclusion of *śaiva* doctrine) (Torella 1980). Its main categories are the Lord, the bound soul and the bond, *pati*, *paśu* and *pāśa*. The sources of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* for this chapter can be divided into two groups: the first is formed by the

āgamas, the second one by a number of individual works with historical or semi-historical authors. In the first group we may mention the *Mṛgendrāgama* (a minor *āgama*, *upāgama*, affiliated to the tradition of the *Kāmikāgama*), with the commentary thereupon (*Mṛgendravṛtti* by Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha), the *Pauṣkarāgama*, the *Kiraṇāgama*, the *Kālotarāgama*, the *Saurabheyāgama*. In the second group we may mention Bhojarāja (*Tattvaparakāśa*), Bṛhaspati (the mythical founder of the *cārvāka* system), and above all Sadyojyotiḥ, Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha, Rāmakaṇṭha, Aghoraśiva, Somaśambhu: these last names are the most renowned masters of the *śaivasiddhānta*. It is to be noted that the chapter does not mention the *tamil* tradition of the school, whose main work is the *Śivajñanabodham* by Meykaṇḍa.

The eighth *darśana* is named *pratyabhijñādarśana* (149 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of a *śaiva* school belonging to the tradition of the *āgamas*, the renowned school of the nondualistic Kashmirian Śaivism, founded by Somānanda (*Śivadṛṣṭi*, ninth century CE) and developed by Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta, the *pratyabhijñā*, ‘recognition’ school.⁴ A partially obsolete method of classification of the *śaiva* schools puts this current within the so-called ‘nondualist Kashmirian Śaivism’, together with such currents as *kula*, *trika*, *spanda* and *krama*. This historiographical label has recently been criticized for its supposed generality and imprecision (Sanderson 2007). A number of quotations from the *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā*, the *Mnemonic stanzas of the recognition of the Lord* by Utpaladeva, commented upon by the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarsinī*, the *Examination of the recognition of the Lord* by Abhinavagupta are the main source for this chapter. Apart from it we may mention a quotation from the *Śāstraparāmarśa* by Madhurāja Yogin. The texts quoted are practically the only source for the systems expounded in this chapter and in the previous one.

The ninth *darśana* is named *raseśvaradarśana* (135 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the school of Indian alchemy (Mazars 1977), whose keyword is *rasa*, a complex term important in Indian aesthetics and music (where it means flavour, taste, the aesthetic feeling or sentiment), but indicating in this specific context mercury, quicksilver, regarded as a sort of quintessence of the human body, as the seminal fluid of the god Śiva, the virile semen and so on. Even here a number of primary sources are quoted, namely the *Rasārṇava*, the *Rasahr̥daya*, the *Raseśvarasiddhānta*, the *Parameśvarī* by Parameśvara, the *Sākārasiddhi*, and such authorities as Govindabhagavat, Sarvajñarāmeśvara, Viṣṇusvāmin, Śrīkāntamiśra.

The tenth *darśana* is named *aulūkyadarśana* (182 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the school of Indian atom-

⁴ The pioneering work is Pandey 1963.

istic physics, the *vaiśeṣikadarśana*, whose semi-mythical founder is the sage (*muni*) Ulūka (a name meaning ‘owl’, because according to the hagiographic tradition he had assumed the form of an owl in order to gratify Śiva), better known as Kaṇāda (atom-eater). The chapter contains a synopsis and a résumé of the root text of the school, the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*. A specific interest is attributed to epistemology, particularly to the theory of the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*); to the six categories (*padārtha*); to the twenty-four qualities (*guṇa*); to the process of perception (*pratyakṣa*); to the theory of numbers (*apekṣābuddhi*), particularly to the production of ‘twoness’ and duality (*dvitva* and *dvitvatva*); obviously to the atomic theory, with the two main concepts of atom and aggregate of two atoms (*aṇu*, *dvyāṇuka*); and finally to the category of non-existence (*abhāva*). Critics from both the currents of the *pūrvamīmāṃsā*, *prābhākara* and *bhātṭa*, from Śrīdhara cārya (a commentator upon the *Bhagavadgītā*), and from the logicians, *naiyāyika*, are taken into consideration.

The eleventh *darśana* is named *akṣapādadarśana* (216 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the school of Indian logic, the *nyāyadarśana*, whose founder is Gautama, nicknamed Akṣapāda (probably ‘having his eyes fixed [in intellectual rapture] on his feet’). The chapter contains a synopsis and a résumé of the root text of the school, the *Nyāyasūtra* by Gautama, commented for the first time by Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana (*Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*). There is also a reference to the *Nyāyakusumañjali* by Udayana; and a quotation from **Śvetāśvataropaniṣad (3, 2)** towards the end of the chapter. The section treats particularly of epistemological and logical categories such as the fourfold means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*): perception, inference, analogy, verbal testimony (*pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda*); the doubt (*saṃśaya*); the definite conclusion (*siddhānta*); the hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*); the ascertainment (*nirṇaya*); the fallacy (*hetvābhāsa*); the futility (*jāti*); but even ethic categories such as fault (*doṣa*) and the concept of self (*ātman*). A doxographical juxtaposition of *naiyāyika* doctrine with *bauddha* (*sautrāntika* and *yogācāra*) positions on point of detail is attempted; the same happens with *cārvāka* and *sāṃkhya* points of view. The theistic position of *nyāya* is debated, particularly with reference to the proofs in order to claim the existence of God. These proofs are defended, and possible defects in them are refuted, such as their hypothetical status as unproved, contradictory, too general, precluded, counterbalanced (*asiddha*, *viruddha*, *anaikānta*, *bādhita*, *satpratipakṣita*).

The twelfth *darśana* is named *jaiminidarśana* (291 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the school of Indian ritual exegesis, the *pūrvamīmāṃsā* (*breviter mīmāṃsā*), whose founder is Jaimini, the author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, a complex and deeply structured text containing 2745 aphorisms (*sūtra*). The key term of this section is obviously *dharma*, to be intended in all its main accepta-

tions, such as duty, law, rule, norm and so on. Other significant key terms in this section are centred around the link existing between the ritual act and its result effect, expressed by such concepts as the semantic sphere of 'unseen' (*apūrva*); the distinctions of the sections of a text concerning ritual practice in different parts, such as 'injunction' (*vidhi*), 'explanatory passage' (*arthavāda*), 'formula' (*mantra*) and so on. After a detailed synopsis of the root text of the school taken into consideration, the author starts from the very beginning of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (1, 1), having as its object the intense desire to know duty (*dharma*), this must be examined through a five-fold hermeneutical path, comprehending subject, doubt, *prima facie* argument, definite conclusion and connection (*viśaya, saṃśaya, pūrvapakṣa, siddhānta, saṅgati*). The sources used comprehend, apart from the teachings of the very same *pūrvamīmāṃsā* school and of its two main currents, *prābhākara* and *bhāṭṭa*, the *Manusmṛiti*, the *R̥gvedasamhitā*, the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* by Pāṇini, the *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* by Bhāsarvajña, the *Nyāyakusumañjali* by Udayana. A number of counterarguments from *sāṃkhya* and *nyāya* are taken into consideration and discussed. The particular position of the *pūrvamīmāṃsā* in the field of language philosophy is referred to, clearly distinguishing the two opposite positions inside the school about the mechanism of primary signification (*abhidhā*), namely the *abhihitānvayavāda*, or theory of the construction of the uttered (relating the meanings of words in a sentence after they are uttered, hold by the *bhāṭṭa* current), and the *anvitābhidhānavāda*, or theory of the expression of the construed (according to which the words convey their own meanings as well as the construed meaning of the sentence, hold by the *prābhākara* current). This section is very important, due to the strict and everlasting bond connecting the two *mīmāṃsās*, the first (*pūrvā*) and the second one (*uttara*), both of them being interested in the preservation of the Vedic lore, the *pūrvamīmāṃsā* from the ritual point of view (*karmakāṇḍa*), the *uttaramīmāṃsā* from the point of view related to knowledge (*jñānakāṇḍa*). In this perspective the two *mīmāṃsās* are perhaps to be considered more as mutually synergistic schools, rather than as openly rival schools (Bronkhorst 2007; Halbfass 1983).

The thirteenth *darśana* is named *pāṇinidarśana* (284 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the school of Indian traditional grammar, the *vyākaraṇa*, whose founder (or at least the more ancient author whose work has arrived to us) is Dākṣiṣiputra Pāṇini, the author of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, *Eight Day Grammar* (eight sections, each one of them divided in four 'feet', *pāda*, for a total sum of almost 4.000 aphorisms, *sūtra*), glossed by Kātyāyana (*vārttika*) and commented upon by Patañjali (*bhāṣya*). The term *vyākaraṇa* covers both the semantic spheres of grammar (and more generally of linguistics) and of philosophy of language, and it may etymologically be explained alternatively as 'formation of words' or as 'analysis', in the sense of

‘separation, distinction’ of words into their constituent parts (such as root, prefix, suffix, and so on) (Thieme 1935; Palsule 1961). In this section too, as in some of the previous ones, the author takes into consideration the *incipit* of the root text of the school under examination, Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī*. In fact, the most celebrated example of the *incipit* (*sāstrārambha*, ‘beginning of a treatise’) of Sanskrit literature is the *sāstrārambha* of two works both attributed to Patañjali (and it is even deemed a sort of stylistic fingerprint of the author by those who consider these two authors being one and the same Patañjali, not two homonymous authors): the *Yogasūtra* begins with “*atha yogānuśāsanam*” (and now the teaching of *yoga*), and the *Great Comment* (*Mahābhāṣya*) to Pāṇini’s *Eight Day Grammar* (*Aṣṭādhyāyī*) begins with “*atha śabdānuśāsanam*” (and now the teaching of word) (Slaje 2008). In this case *atha* works as a sort of illocutionary act, being able to begin a teaching and to validate its content (Austin 1962). The author of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* then discusses the distinction between Vedic words and common language words (*vaidika*, *laukika*), in this following the “Introduction” to Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya*, namely the *Paspaśā*. In fact, the *Paspaśā* is strictly followed in this section of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, and a famous Vedic passage quoted herein is discussed (*Ṛgvedasamhitā* 4, 58, 3). A number of Paninian rules are referred to (1, 2, 58; 1, 2, 64; 1, 4, 14; 2, 2, 14; 2, 3, 50; 2, 3, 65-6; 3, 2, 1; 3, 2, 3; 5, 1, 119), and for their exegesis on some occasions the classical subcommentary is used, namely the *Kāśīkāvṛtti* (Benares commentary) by Vāmana and Jayāditya. Another very important grammatical work quoted in this section of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* is the *Trikāṇḍī* (Threefold work), *alias* ‘About word and phrase’, *Vākyapadīya* (such passages quoted as 1, 1; 1, 11; 1, 14; 1, 16; 3, 1, 2; 3, 1, 33-4; 3, 2, 15-16) by Bhartṛhari (fifth century CE) (Abegg 1914; Yamashita 1998). There is even a reference to one of Bhartṛhari’s commentators, Helārāja, and to a subcomment to Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya*, the *Bhāṣyapradīpa* by Kaiyaṭa. So, not only the technicalities of Paninian Sanskrit grammar are referred to, but even the soteriological side of Bhartṛhari’s work, the so called ‘verbal absolute, absolute made of word’, *śabdabrahman*, a soteriological point of view dangerously contiguous with *kevalādvaitavāda*, and for this reason much attacked by Śaṅkara in such passages as *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1, 3, 28 against the semantic doctrine of *sphoṭa* (Alston 1989, 108-16). Other works used in a doxographic attitude in this section are the *Mīmāṃsāsīlokavārttika* by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, the *Nyāyasūtra* by Gautama; and grammar masters prior to Pāṇini are quoted too, such as Vājapyāyana and Vyāḍi.

The fourteenth *darśana* is named *sāṃkhyadarśana* (153 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the school of Indian cosmology, the *sāṃkhya* (enumeration [of the categories of reality]), the dualistic school founded upon the dialectics between the two main

principles of reality (*tattva*), the male inactive and conscious principle (*puruṣa*), and the female active and unconscious principle (*prakṛti*). The root text of the school is the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, commented upon by Gauḍapāda (*bhāṣya*) and by Vācaspati Miśra (*Tattvakaumudī*). The *Sāṃkhyasūtra* by Kapila, commented upon by Aniruddha (fifteenth-sixteenth century CE, *Aniruddhavr̥tti*) and by Viṅṅānabhikṣu (sixteenth century CE, *Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya*), is a late artificial work, entirely different from the 'real' *sūtras* being at the root of other schools. In fact the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (main passages quoted being 3-4, 9, 21-2, 24-7, 57, 59) is the main source for this chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*; even the *Tattvakaumudī* by Vācaspati Miśra is used as a doxographical source. Two other important sources used by Mādhava are the *Bhagavadgītā* (2, 16) and the *Śvetāsvataropaniṣad* (4, 5). The two famous metaphors of the system, the lame and the blind, and the actress on the stage (respectively *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 21 and 59), are reserved for the conclusion of the chapter. Evidently for the author of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, as for ourselves today, the literary sensitivity and a sort of theatrical attitude were an important feature of the *sāṃkhya* school.


The fifteenth *darśana* is named *pātañjaladarśana* (609 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the school of Indian ascetics, the *yoga* (discipline), the dualistic school founded upon the *sāṃkhya* doctrine, and adding to it the figure of a supreme deity (*īśvara*), so that the school is generally known with the alternative name of 'theistic *sāṃkhya*' (*seśvarasāṃkhya*). Its root text is the *Yogasūtra* by Patañjali, and from this author the chapter derives its name. As usual for our text, immediate attention is dedicated to the *incipit* of the root text of the school being examined (*Yogasūtra* 1.1); a number of quotations from the same source are present in the chapter (*Yogasūtra* 1, 2; 1, 12-13; 1, 15; 1, 17-18; 1, 30; 1, 36; 1, 42; 1, 48; 2, 1; 2, 3-9; 2, 12-13; 2, 15; 2, 29-32; 2, 46; 2, 49; 2, 54; 3, 1-3; 3, 49-50; 4, 1; 4, 18; 4, 34), as well as from Vyāsa's comment upon it (*ad* 4, 21), and from Vācaspati Miśra's *Tattvakaumudī* (*ad* 2, 4-5). Other doxographical sources used are *Amarakośa* (*sub voce atha*); *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (1, 5, 3; 4, 4, 23); *Kaṭhopaniṣad* (2, 12); *Bhagavadgītā* (2, 47; 2, 53; 6, 3; 6, 34); *Brahmasūtra* (1, 1, 1); Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* (*Paspaśā*); *Tāṇḍyamahābrāhmaṇa* (16, 8, 1; 16, 10, 1); Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (3, 3, 49); *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (2, 1, 33-5; 3, 3, 14); *Yājñavalkyaḡitā*; Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (3, 2, 4; 3, 2, 78; 5, 2, 115; 7, 2, 115); *Sāradātīlaka*; *Kāvya prakāśa* (2, 9-12); *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (6, 7, 36-8; 6, 7, 43-5); *Taittirīyāranya* (1, 2, 5). A certain interest is dedicated to non Vedic practices of Tantric *mantras*, a phenomenon properly extraneous to the *yogadarśana*, more related with *haṭhayoga* doctrine.

The sixteenth *darśana* is named *sāṃkaradarśana* (918 lines according to Abhyankar 1978), and it treats of the school of the absolute nondualism, *kevalādvaitavāda*, based on the 555 aphorisms (*sūtra*) of

the *Brahmasūtra*, divided into four chapters (*adhyāya*), each one of them divided into four feet (*pāda*), ascribed to Bādarāyaṇa (first-third centuries CE?). The second author relevant for the school is Gauḍapāda (sixth century CE?), author of the *Āgamaśāstra* (Authoritative Treatise on Tradition), divided in four books (*prakaraṇa*) and including in the first of them the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad*, for a total of 215 mnemonic strophes (*kārikā*). The real founder and head of the school is Śaṅkara (probably sixth-seventh century CE; an older date previously accepted, 788-820, is not so sure, being based on erroneous presuppositions), author of commentaries (*bhāṣya*) on the *Brahmasūtra*, on some *Upaniṣads* (mainly *Bṛhadāranyaka*, *Taittirīya*, *Chāndogya*, *Aitareya*, *Īśa*, *Kaṭha*, *Kena*, *Muṇḍaka*, *Praśna*) and on the *Bhagavad Gītā*; and of a lot of original works (most famous the *Upadeśasāhasrī*). The doxographical sources of this chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* are numerous: *Brahmasūtra* 1, 1, 1-4; Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1, 1, 4 and 2, 1, 1; *Tarkabhāṣā*; *Tarkasamgraha*; *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 3, 1, 1; 6, 2, 1; 6, 8, 6-7; *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2, 4, 1; *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 1, 10; 4, 5; 6, 19; *Bhāmatī*; *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 2, 4, 5; *Yogasūtra* 4, 1; *Nyāyakusumañjali* 1, 15; *Ślokaṅvārttika*, *Autpattikasūtra*, *śabdapariiccheda* 4; *Citsukhī*; *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3, 3, 169; *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*; Śalikanātha, *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā*; *Sābarabhāṣya* 1, 15 and 8, 3, 14; Vācaspati Miśra explaining Maṇḍana Miśra's *Vidhiviv-eka*; *Mahābhāṣya* 6, 1, 9; *Nyāyasūtra* 5, 2, 23; Padmapāda, *Pañcapādikā*; Prakāśātman, *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa*; *Mañikaṇa*; Sarvajñātman, *Samkṣepaśārīraka*; *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* 5, 17, 14; *Parāśarasarmṛti* 12, 70; *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 2, 1, 5; *Taittirīya Samhitā* 1, 7, 4; Bhartṛhari, *Vākya-pādiya* 1, 34; *Ślokaṅvārttika* 1, 1, 61; Śrīharṣa, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*; *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* 22, 1; *Āpastambadharmasūtra* 1, 8, 22, 2. Apart from the work of tracing the sources quoted, already made by Abhyankar (1978) and Nakamura (1968-69), Klostermaier (1999) has traced the sources of some more quotations;⁵ some of them have nevertheless remained so far untraced.⁶ The content of the *sāṃkara-darśana* chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* may be summarized as follows. First there is a refutation of *sāṃkhyadarśana*, based on the absence of necessary concomitance (*vyāpti*) between *probandum* and *probans* (*sādhya*, *sādhana*), and on the fallacy of the *probans* not being present in the minor term (*svarūpāsiddha*; sources Śaṅkara, *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2, 1, 1; *Tarkabhāṣā*; *Tarkasamgraha*; lines 1-13). Then follows the remark of the absence of authoritative testimony for causality of *prakṛti* (sources *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 3, 1, 1; *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 4, 5; lines 14-25). The refutation of *sāṃkhya* proceeds (source *Bhāmatī*; lines 26-63). Then the subject matter of the *Brah-*

⁵ Klostermaier 1999, 102 fn. 109; 104 fnn. 139, 142.

⁶ Klostermaier 1999, 104 fnn. 136-8, 140-1, 143, 148.

masūtra is expounded (lines 64-83). Then the exegesis of the term *brahmajijñāsā* (*Brahmasūtra* 1, 1, 1) is expounded (source *Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 2, 4, 5; lines 84-9). The impossibility to doubt that the desire to know the *ātman* is impossible is the next theme (lines 90-114). The next theme regards the impossibility of desire to know the self (lines 115-26). Then follows the expounding of absence of contradiction between the true experience of self and the world of daily experience (different opinions of Prabhākara Miśra and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa are compared; lines 127-37). Then follows the syllogistic proof that *brahman* cannot be the object of study (lines 138-47). The syllogism according to which *ātman* and non-*ātman* cannot be not different is expounded (lines 148-57). Then follows the *uttarapakṣa* about the possibility of beginning of *brahmajijñāsā* (lines 158-63). Then are expounded examples of the six characteristics (*upakrama* and *upasamhāra* together, *abhyāsa*, *apūrvatā*, *phala*, *arthavāda*, *upapatti*) of definite knowledge in a text (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6, 2, 1; 6, 8, 6, 164-71). Then follows the superimposition of the objectiveness of self on the  experience according to *vaiśeṣika* point of view (lines 172-85). Then follows the use of the metaphorical expression 'Rāhu's head' to illustrate the real meaning of verbal cognitions such as 'my body' (source *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1, 1, 4; lines 186-94). Then follows the proof of superimposition of *ātman*, and the refutation of difference (sources *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1, 1, 1; *Bhāmatī*; lines 195-205). Then the refutation of the *jaina* point of view about *jīva* is expounded (lines 206-19). Then follows the refutation of the proposition of *yogācāra* according to which *viññāna* is *ātman* (here a certain degree of doxographical distorsion is actually present; lines 220-36). Then a doubt about the status of *ātman* is examined (sources *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6, 8, 6; *Brahmasūtra* 1, 1, 2; lines 237-53). Then the proposition according to which *āgama* is the means to ascertain *brahman* is illustrated (source *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* 2, 4, 1; lines 254-66). Then follows the proposition according to which *brahman* cannot be the subject matter of authoritative teaching (lines 267-70). Then it is expounded a *pūrvapakṣa* according to which *Veda* cannot be a *pramāṇa* for obtaining definite knowledge (source *Ślokavārttika*, *Autpattikasūtra*, *śabdapariccheda* 4; lines 271-92). Then it is expounded an *uttarapakṣa* according to which meaning of words comes from established meaning (sources *Citsukhī*; *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3, 3, 169; lines 293-321). Then follows a critique of the *nyāyavaiśeṣika* point of view relative to the doctrine of the beginning of the world (*pariṇamavāda* as *ārambhavāda*) (source *Vaiśeṣikasūtra*; lines 322-6). Then follows a discussion of superimposition (*adhyāsa*; source *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1, 1, 4; lines 327-43). Then begins a long *pūrvapakṣa* concerning the criticism of *adhyāsa* by *mīmāṃsā* point of view (source Śalikanātha, *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā*; lines 344-61). This *pūrvapakṣa* is articulated in five points: 1) absence of proof for illusory knowledge (lines 362-78); 2) absence

of knowledge of the content of non-being (lines 379-84); 3) conjunction of cognition and remembrance (lines 385-407); 4) non-difference or identity of perception and memory (lines 408-32); 5) the common explanation of the phrase 'yellow conch' (lines 433-50). Then follows the *mīmāṃsā* point of view about the final proposition 'that is not silver' (lines 451-61). Then the critique of *abhāva* from the point of view of Prabhākara Miśra is expounded and discussed (lines 462-89). Then the answer of Śāṅkara to the preceding point of view is expounded (lines 490-538, source *Śābarabhāṣya* 1, 15). Then the confutation of a doubt regarding *adhyāsa* is expounded (lines 539-46), followed by a reply to *mīmāṃsā* criticism (sources Vācaspati Miśra explaining Maṇḍana Miśra's *Vidhiviveka*; *Tarkabhāṣā*; lines 547-71). Then follows the refutation of two distinct *bauddha* points of view: first from *mādhyamika* perspective (lines 572-99); and subsequently from *vi-jñānavādin* perspective (lines 600-14). Then follows the refutation of the *anyathākhyāti* theory of error supported by the *nyāya* school (source *Nyāyakusumañjali*; lines 615-23). Then the epistemological problem of the unity of cognition of 'this' and 'silver' is dealt with (sources *Nyāyasūtra* 5, 2, 23; *Pañcapādikā*; lines 624-55). Then follows the exposition of the three levels of truth (*pāramārthikasatya*, *vyāvahārikasatya*, *prātibhāsikasatya*) and of the theory of error according to *advaitavedānta* (*anirvacanīyakhyaivāda*; sources Prakāśātman, *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa*; *Citsukhī*; lines 656-76). Then the same-ness of *māyā* and *avidyā* is expounded (lines 677-92). Then the proof for the existence of *avidyā* is dealt with (lines 693-704). Then follows the refutation of the thesis according to which absence, *abhāva*, is known through perception, *pratyakṣa*, supported by the *nyāya* school (lines 705-31). Then it is expounded the establishment of the nature of ignorance through a different interpretation of the phrase 'I am ignorant' (source *Maṇikaṇa*; lines 732-48). Then follows the establishment of ignorance through inference (source Sarvajñātman, *Samkṣepaśārīraka*; some quotations untraced; lines 749-70). Then it is supported the proposition according to which nescience or ignorance, *avidyā*, can be ascertained from Vedic authoritative verbal testimony, *śruti* (source *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 1, 10; 6, 19; some quotations untraced; lines 771-80). Then the point of view of *śākta* thought about *māyā* and *śakti* is dealt with and refuted (lines 781-92). Then the point of view according to which the world is a projection of nescience is dealt with and refuted (sources *Parāśarasamṛti* 12, 70; *Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* 2, 1, 5; *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* 1, 7, 4; Bhartṛhari, *Vākya-pādīya* 1, 34; *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 6, 8, 7; *Śloka-vārttika* 1, 1, 61; Śrīharṣa, *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*; lines 793-845). Then follows the critique of the reality of the world, due to the reason that there is no sublation of reality (source *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* 22, 1; lines 846-70). Then follows the discussion of the theme of the cessation of nescience through self-knowledge (parable of the prince) (sources *Chān-*

dogya Upaniṣad 6, 8, 7; *Āpastambadharmasūtra* 1, 8, 22, 2; lines 871-97). Then it is expounded the conclusion of the first *sūtra* from the *Brahmasūtra*, and its connection with the rest of the work in the following *sūtras* (source *Brahmasūtra* 1, 1, 1; lines 898-902). Finally, the other *sūtras* of the portion of the *Brahmasūtra* known as *ca- tuḥsūtrī* are dealt with, and the concepts of *svarūpalakṣaṇa* and *taṭasthalakṣaṇa*; this part ends with some concluding remarks (source *Brahmasūtra* 1, 1, 2-4; lines 903-18).

3 Hermeneutical Remarks in Relation to Both Western and Indian Theories

After the analysis of the content and nature of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, along with a short review of its main doxographical sources, a pair of observations are now necessary. First, it is to be noted that no relevant mention is made in the treatise of any *śākta* school (apart from a brief refutation of *śākta* tenets in the last chapter, lines 781-92), and this is something strange, not easily to be accounted for. It is unlikely that no theoretical position from the *śākta* point of view could be present in the mind of the author of the treatise. The possibility that *śākta* position could have been considered by him as almost contiguous with *kevalādvaitavāda* is strengthened by the traditional attribution to Śaṅkara himself of such *śākta* works as the *Saundaryalaharī*. But it is obviously an *argumentum e silentio*, and it cannot resolve the problem definitively. The same kind of *argumentum e silentio* could be invoked for a possible solution to the problem of the contested authorship of the *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivarāṇa* ascribed to Śaṅkara; even this text is not alluded to in the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*. Second, even in absence of an overall study about the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, it is possible to conclude that its author uses frequently selected primary sources for the exposition of a single *darśana*, and that doxographical voluntary misrepresentation of rival schools is generally limited in the treatise. So we can confidently subscribe the conclusion by Nakamura about the third chapter of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, according to which sources employed in it are generally «authoritative and reliable» (Nakamura 1968, 514), and extend it to the entire work.

A possible hermeneutic tool for the theoretical interpretation of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* could be the application to the doxographical method of this text of the category of Inclusionism (German *Inklusivismus*), introduced by Paul Hacker (1983) and discussed by Wilhelm Halbfass (1988a; 1988b). In this perspective, Indian doxography could be hypothetically read as a good example of Inclusionism, that is of the peculiar Indian attitude to divide the subject matter into an easily recognizable hierarchy, putting at the extreme periphery

the doctrinal positions more distant from the position of one's own school, in an intermediate position those less distant from it, the ultimate position being obviously one's own and considered as the acme of the entire intellectual building of the different points of view. A certain degree of doxographical voluntary distortion of points of view different from one's own is unavoidable in this epistemic model of Inclusivism, being necessary to adapt other people's view to one's own point of view, in order to build a credible and consistent intellectual hierarchy.

A further hermeneutical tool for the theoretical interpretation of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* consists in a group of studies about the problem of the debate between different Indian schools of thought in the light of their possible political background and side-effects. Apart from two wide range works by David Smith (2003) and Jonardon Ganeri (2011), a useful trend of research has been carried out by more sectorial works (Black, Patton 2015; Fisher 2017; Galewicz 2010; Mills 2018).

Within the hermeneutic perspective supported by Paul Hacker (1983) and Wilhelm Halbfass (1988a; 1988b), Inclusivism as described above stands in strong contrast with its opposite ideological position, namely Exclusivism, this last being a typical attitude for Middle East originary monotheisms (Hebraism, Christianity and Islam). Within this theological environment, Exclusivism means the fully aware will to exclude every possible alternative choice to one's own position, claiming for one's own concept of God as an absolute truth, irrespective of any serious confrontation with other possible options. Within Indian intellectual tradition this kind of trend is simply unconceivable, due to the importance of the vital need for each and every school to consider the opponents' positions, first of all in order to better confute them. This attitude is raised up to a hermeneutic and epistemological system within the horizon of *jaina* doctrine, with the concept of *anekāntavāda*, the doctrine according to which all phenomena and ideas are relatively manifold (Bhattacharya 2013; Mookerjee 1944). No proposition can be affirmed absolutely, all affirmations are at the same time true (and false, as says vedantic critique to this conception) under different conditions. So the nature of reality can be approached only through several steps: no single unilateral definition is adequate to describe things as they are, in their effective manifoldness and complexity.

According to *jaina* point of view,⁷ due to the fact that qualities are innumerable and their modalities are infinite, because they encompass both beginningless past and endless future, for the common peo-

⁷ For a far deeper and more extensive treatment of *jaina* doctrine see Long (forthcoming).

ple, not endowed with omniscience, it is not possible to perceive the existing (*sat*) in its entirety: in every single moment it will be possible only to perceive either the uniqueness (*ekatva*) of substance, or alternatively the transient multiplicity (*anekatva*) of its modalities. Complexity of what is existing, 'being' (*sat*), a reality simultaneously unique and multiple, is the very core of the doctrine of multiplicity of points of view, *anekāntavāda*, the only model being able to cope with the complexity of reality according to *jaina* epistemology. Change (*pariṇāma*) is continuous, and in epistemology this means that it is impossible (*rectius*: useless) to express judgments apart from the irrevocable multiplicity of points of view: *anekāntavāda* will become the pivot of *jaina* philosophy. The continuous change in which substances are immersed determines the doctrine of multiplicity of points of view (*syādvāda*, *anekāntavāda*), a position resulting in a 'doctrine of modes of considering' (*nayavāda*), having as its main rule the 'seven-fold method' (*saptabhaṅginaya*), a sum of possible statements about a given argument, starting from specific points of view, being defined by four specific peculiar factors: substance (*svadṛavya*), occurrence (*svakṣetra*), time (*svakāla*), and condition (*svabhāva*). The seven 'modes of considering' are: 1) 'current mode' (*naigamanaya*), considering the object regardless of generic and specific qualities; 2) 'synthetic mode' (*saṃgrahanaya*), putting in evidence generic features to the detriment of specific ones; 3) 'empiric mode' (*vyavahāranaya*), putting in evidence specific features to the detriment of generic ones; 4) 'straight mode' (*rjusūtranaya*), considering only the actual present aspect of its object; 5) 'verbal mode' (*śabdānaya*), considering the conventional meaning of words regardless of etymology; 6) 'advanced mode' (*samabhirūḍhanaya*), considering words according to etymology; 7) 'basic mode' (*evambhūtanaya*), considering the object as possessing or not possessing the qualities attributable to it according to etymology, that is, according to the relation of etymology with effective reality. Truth about a specific object can originate only from the comparison of these seven points of view, and only *jaina* doctrine can reach this goal, because each and every different speculation is overly unilateral. For example, *vedānta* overestimates *naya* 2 to the detriment of the other ones; *cārvāka* point of view overestimates *naya* 3; Buddhist position overestimates *naya* 4 and so on. The favorite formulation of *anekāntavāda* is named 'doctrine of the may be' (*syādvāda*), and it too involves seven points, applicable to any possible object of research whatsoever. The term *syāt* 'it may be', means more properly 'from a particular point of view', and the indeclinable particle *eva* has a limitative value, meaning 'only', excluding all unspecific conditions of the situation under exam. According to this formulation, about the object under exam it is legitimate to say that: it is (*syād asti eva*); 2) it is not (*syād nāsti eva*); 3) both it is and it is not (*syād asti nāsti ca eva*); with reference to different observers, or in dif-

ferent times; 4) it is undetermined (*syād avaktavyam eva*); with reference to the impossibility to see in it opposite qualities in one and the same moment; 5) it is and it is undetermined (*syād asti avaktavyam ca eva*); 6) it is not and it is undetermined (*syād nāsti avaktavyam ca eva*); 7) it is, it is not and it is undetermined (*syād asti nāsti ca avaktavyam ca eva*). For example, a certain piece of food may be available for subject A (1), but not for B (2), either it may be available or not for A or for B, or alternatively it may be available only for A in the course of time (3), it may be perceived as hot for A but not for B, or alternatively as hot for A in a moment and not hot in a subsequent moment, so resulting as undetermined (4), it may be available for A and undetermined (5), it may be not available for A and undetermined (6), and lastly, it may be available or not available, and undetermined for different subjects and under different circumstances (7). The continuous flux of becoming is channeled into a jail of judgments that try to preserve its fluidity: this is the only chance to offer an adequate description of a complex reality, opposing both perils: the declared impossibility of judgment, and the unilaterality of judgment. These two extremes must be avoided for *jaina* logic, insofar as they generate three wrong points of view, respectively illusionism (*māyāvāda*), determinism (*niyatīvāda*) and nihilism (*ucchedāvāda*). According to *jaina* doctrine, the multiplicity or multilaterality of points of view allows for a coordinated method (*samuccaya*), a method capable of coordinating different methods, being able to find a single path towards liberation (*mokṣamārga*), mainly based upon intuition (*darśana*), critical knowledge (*jñāna*), and behaviour (*cāritra*) (Bhattacharya 2013; Van den Bossche 1995).

From a hermeneutical perspective it is possible that the incentive to cope with logic may have **come in into** Jainism, surely from the above mentioned *syādvāda* and *anekāntavāda* methods, but even from the continuous attribution of authority and prestige to the *Veda* being maintained by the followers of the brahmanical school of the first exegesis (*pūrvamīmāṃsā*). Along this apologetical and polemical line we may collocate such works as the *Āptamīmāṃsā* by Samantabhadra (fifth century CE). A great focus about the problem of how to confer authority to a source, this work is the basis of a vast commentarial work, always rich in controversy, including such works as the *Aṣṭasatī* by Akalaṅka (eighth century CE) and the *Aṣṭasahasrī* by Vidyānanda (ninth century CE).

A method resembling *anekāntavāda* in the scope of its feasibility, but starting from very different theoretical premises, is the so-called tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭī*) ascribable to Nāgārjuna (secondo-third century CE). This dialectic method applies the fourfold negation to a thesis A in four steps (negating A, negating not-A, negating both A and not-A, negating neither A nor not-A), mainly applicable to being (*sat*), as negating being, negating not-being, negating both be-

ing and not-being, negating neither being nor not-being. As such, this method denies each and every possible ontological presumption. It is the main dialectical tool of the *mādhyaṃika* school, able to dismantle any conceptual building with meticulous and ruthless elegance (Chakrabarti 1980; Ruegg 1977; Westerhoff 2006). Within Nāgārjuna's thought, the tetralemma is functional to the doctrine of voidness (*śūnyatā*), but in a different context it will be considered as a neutral dialectical tool. As such it will be used within an entirely different hermeneutical perspective, without involving its extreme consequences proper to its Buddhist context, and it will be considered fitting within Vedantic apologetics, in such works as the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā* by Śrīharṣa (twelfth century CE) and the *Tattvapradīpikā* aka *Citsukhī* by Citsukha (thirteenth century CE).

Should we adopt, methodologically and provisionally, the point of view of *nyāyadarśana* about the core of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, that is the way in which the different *darśanas* are expounded, we could affirm that the author of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* adopts a style of debate in the use of its arguments, while exposing perspectives different from his own, that we may identify in *naiyāyika* terms as *vāda*, a term meaning first of all 'speech, discourse, talk, utterance, statement' and more specifically 'thesis, proposition, argument, doctrine', if the exposition of an argument is concerned; and 'discussion, controversy, dispute, contest' (but even 'demonstrated conclusion, result'), if the discussion of the argument within a formal environment is concerned.

The founding text of *nyāya* school, its root (*mūla*) teaching, is the *Nyāyasūtra*, ascribed to Gauṭama Akṣapāda (200 CE?), a collection of aphorisms that characterizes a philosophical system already well-structured, claiming to be a *vādaśāstra*, an ideal normative system dealing with the philosophical debate, with all its variants, starting with the ideal debate (*vāda*), the philosophical discussion perfectly regulated in every minute detail. This method of discussion is not a monopoly of the logicians of the *nyāyadarśana*. We may find substantial traces of *vādaśāstra* in the works of Buddhist logicians such as Maitreya, Asaṅga, Dignāga, and principles of scientific methodology of philosophical debate (*tantrayukti*), including norms for dialectics and eristic, both in the *Arthaśāstra* and in the *Carakaśāhitā*. The main distinction at work distinguishes above all the means for valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), and the objects of valid knowledge (*prameya*), that is to say, mainly the individual conscious principle, the self (*ātman*). The *pramāṇas* constitute the main interest for *nyāya* and are considered as mere tools, means to the end consisting in the correct knowledge of the *prameya*. The *pramāṇas* accepted by Akṣapāda are four: direct sensory perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), analogy (*upamāna*) and authoritative verbal testimony (*śabda*).

Within *nyāya* we find the harmonic fusion of two originally distinct

epistemological traditions: the *ānvīkṣikī vidyā* (science of critical examination), the very basis for treatises, because it individuates the norms according to which a treatise could be composed; and the tradition of the debate (*vāda*), that allows to defeat an opponent during a public dialectical debate. The debate in turn derives probably from the dialogical and enigmatic hymns of the *Vedas*, *brahmodya* and *vāk-ovākya*. The norms for composing a treatise (*tantrayuktis*), are the immediate and logical antecedent of the sixteen categories of *nyāya* system: we find them in medical texts (*Carakasamhitā* and *Suśrutasaṃhitā*) and in political texts (*Arthasāstra*). A list of 39 *tantrayuktis* includes: argument (*adhikaraṇa*); combination of words (*yoga*); determination of the meaning of a polysemic term according to its context (*padārtha*); illustration of unknown things in the light of known examples (*hetvartha*); brief enunciation of a theme (*uddeśa*); detailed description of a theme (*nirdeśa*); general instruction (*upadeśa*); presentation of a logical reason (*apadeśa*); resolution of a present difficulty through analogy with a past one (*pradeśa*); anticipation of a future event according to a present norm (*atideśa*); exception (*apavarga*); completing the meaning of a sentence according to its context (*vākyaśeṣa*); implication (*arthāpatti*); contrary assertion (*viparyaya*); referring to themes described in a different section of the treatise (*prasaṅga*); univocal assertion (*ekānta*); possibility of different points of view (*anekānta*); preliminary thesis (*pūrvapakṣa*); further thesis (*uttarapakṣa*); scrutiny through question and answer (*nirṇaya*); implicit acceptance of an opponent's position (*anumata*); arrangement according to a preset order (*vidhāna*); anticipation of arguments to be developed further on (*anāgatāvekṣaṇa*); allusion to previously discussed themes (*atīkrāntāvekṣaṇa*); doubt (*saṃśaya*); elaborate explanation (*vyākhyāna*); technical use of a term (*svasaṃjñā*); etymologic explanation (*nirvacana*); illustration by example (*nidarśana*); injunction (*niyoga*); collation of different themes (*samuccaya*); alternative choice (*vikalpā*); understanding of something left unexpressed according to the context (*ūhya*); making extrinsic (*uddhāra*); analogy (*upamāna*); example (*drṣṭānta*); expression of missing terms (*pratyutsāra*); purpose (*prayojana*); possibility (*sambhava*) (Lele 1981).

According to *nyāya* the different typologies of debate are articulated as follows. The debate properly (*vāda*) is a discussion carried out using valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*), with its arguments exposed in the form of inference (*anumāna*). The *vāda* has not the purpose of contrasting an opponent's theory, but of ascertaining the factual truth with reference to the discussed theme. Both the supporter and the refuter of a thesis (*vādin*, *prativādin*) are led by the sincere desire to arrive to the truth, as in the case of a debate between master and disciple from the same school. Eristic (*jalpa*) is an insincere discussion, in which the two parts are led by the aim to defeat the opponent, not of ascertaining a

part of truth being possibly common to both of them. The arguments used are, in full consciousness of the debaters, possibly counterfactual and insincere. The trophy of the dialectic competition is the only real goal of this style of discussion, irrespective of any judgement about effective truth. The quibble (*vitaṇḍā*) is at play when, within a discussion, the goal is not to support a thesis (like was still the case in the eristic), but exclusively to defeat the opponent's point of view, using a merely destructive method. The method of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*, using wherever possible original sources for the schools under examination, and limiting at the most the doxographical distortion of their doctrine, allows us to suppose that the type of debate that its author had in mind was a sincere debate (*vāda*), not eristic (*jalpa*) and least of all a quibble (*vitaṇḍā*).

4 Conclusions

We have, *inter alia*, referred to two possible comparisons of Vedantic hermeneutical and doxographical tools from *jaina* and *bauddha* contexts, namely *anekāntavāda* and *catuskoṭi*, and to the methodological tools common to *nyāya* and scientific treatises (*tantrayukti*), these being partially shared by Vedantic exegesis.

More than this, it is to be noted that the very same possibility of a multilateral point of view in the interpretation of other people's positions is not at all an exclusive privilege of *jaina* epistemology (with its doctrine of *syādvāda* and *anekāntavāda*, alluded to above) within India's intellectual history. Indeed, it has been explicitly considered within *smārta* sphere by Bhartṛhari (fifth century CE, in such passages such as *Vākyapadīya* 2, 489), and it has been proposed to call this theoretical position Perspectivism (Houben [1997] 2007; see also Passi 2000), the point of view according to which the validity of different perspectives is accepted, and eventually one's own intellectual position emerges as the result of a sort of integration with the contrasting views of one's own opponents. Seen in the light of this additional hermeneutic model originating from *smārta* environment, in fact the more coherent interpretation of the doxographic methodology of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* could result in considering it as inspired by the dialectical method of the succession of the three classical positions presented in the large majority of Indian philosophical treatises. Within this perspective, arguments are presented according to a conceptual stratigraphy, considering in the first position the exposition of an argument by a disciple (*śiṣya*, etymologically 'the one that must be instructed'), so a preliminary exposition. In the second position there is the argument expounded by a subject being nearly a master, but still not in the role of a real master (*ācāryadeśīya*, 'al-

most a master'), so an intermediate position, being radically unilateral (*ekadeśin*). The final position is expounded as the definite conclusion of a master (*ācārya*, 'authoritative master'), so it is the definite position of the school with regard to the debated argument. This hierarchical sequence takes the name of 'preliminar point of view' (*pūrvapakṣa*), 'further point of view' (*uttarapakṣa*) and 'definite conclusion' (*siddhānta*) (Tubb, Boose 2007, 239-42).

Due to the fact that 1) our treatise uses a lot of original sources for the points of view under examination, and that 2) a doxographical distortion of opponents' points of view for dialectical goals is reasonably limited, and in many cases a simple hypothesis *sub iudice*, the natural conclusion is that 3) the triadic dialectical model starting with *pūrvapakṣa*, going on with *uttarapakṣa* and concluding with *siddhānta*, is probably still the best and most appropriate way to consider the doxographical method of the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*. This kind of interpretation offers the methodological convenience that it uses an 'emic' rather than an 'etic' point of view (Pike 1967; Swadesh 1934). The glasses we wear above our nose can sometimes heavily influence our vision of the world outside us, and to use Indian lenses in order to enquire into Indian world is perhaps still the best thing to do, at least under certain conditions.

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