A Marriage, a Battle, an Honour.

The Career of Boniface of the Hucpoldings during Rudolf II’s Italian Reign, 924-926

This article investigates the events of Rudolf II’s military campaign in Italy (922) and considers the political ramification of this, both immediately thereafter and subsequently during the rule of Rudolf. Particular attention is cast on the career of Boniface of the Hucpoldings: an Italian aristocrat who attained prominence thanks to his close relationship with Rudolf. The Hucpoldings belonged to the aristocratic elite of the Carolingian empire, came to Italy under Lothar I (c. 847) and tried to settle there. Until now, scholars have underestimated their role in the wider context of the early medieval Italian kingdom. This study will stress how Boniface’s career was a turning point in the lineage’s development, and how his political achievements were essential for his kinship’s further hegemony. Thanks to Rudolf’s policy, his control over some Emilian fiscal estates in the first quarter of tenth century led to the seignorial control of his descendants over the Bologna area, bordering with the former Exarchate of Ravenna. Furthermore, Boniface’s acquisition of the rank of marchio shaped strongly his descendants’ self-consciousness, allowing them to play a significant role among the Italian aristocracy at the apex of the kingdom until at least the half of the eleventh century.

Introduction

The Hucpoldings were active in the kingdom of Italy from the mid-ninth century.¹ Hucpold is regarded as their eponymous founder. Probably loyal to Emperor Lothar
Hucpold served as Louis II’s (844–875) Count Palatine during the first decade of his reign. Hucpold’s descendants continued to play a leading political role in the kingdom of Italy throughout the following century and well into the eleventh. The most turbulent phase in the struggle between the pretenders to the Italian crown marked a real turning point for the Hucpoldings: in the early decades of the tenth century, Boniface, Hucpold’s grandson, earned the rank of marchio and acquired the landed wealth on which his descendants were to base their lordship.

This turning point coincided with the short reign of Rudolf II, King of Burgundy from 911, who had crossed the Alps in 922 and defeated Berengar I (887–924) in 924. According to Liutprand of Cremona (c.920–972), Rudolf was urged to act by a good number of Italian proceres who sought to replace Berengar I with a king less involved in the internal conflicts of the aristocracy. Moreover, they were searching for a king who had no real patrimony in the kingdom and hence who would be easier to manipulate. Among the proceres siding with Rudolf we find our Hucpolding Boniface.

The aim of this article is to show how choices and strategies negotiated with Rudolf’s royal power allowed Boniface’s brilliant and meteoric career. We shall evaluate the central role played by fiscal estates as a means for Boniface and his kinsmen to gain power. At the same time, I shall examine how the leading position which he acquired in such a short time at the beginning of the tenth century was then maintained by the Hucpoldings for over a century, despite the rapid political changes, in ways that do not quite tally with the picture of the post-Carolingian office aristocracy drawn by Italian scholars in recent decades. The mismatch between public functions, officia and honores, and benefices and, therefore, Hucpolding seignorial power constitutes a
remarkable anomaly, even more interesting because it developed from a strong Königsnähe (proximity to the king).

A marriage and a battle

At the beginning of the tenth century, Boniface and his kinsmen wielded considerable power. His father Hubald, while a less prominent figure than his grandfather Hucpold in the last years of Louis II’s reign, was among the followers and main supporters of Charles III in Italy. In the fight for the crown after 888 he supported Guy of Spoleto (889–894), together with Adalbert II, Marquis of Tuscany, probably Hubald’s brother-in-law. His sister Engelrada, Boniface’s aunt, had acquired a pre-eminent role in Ravenna and the Exarchate through her marriage with Martin, a member of the most prominent ducal family in Ravenna.

Fig. 1 The Hucpoldings and the aristocracies of the Italian kingdom (second half of the 9th – first half of the 10th century).

According to Liutprand’s Antapodosis, the only source we have on these events, Boniface became involved at the time of Rudolf’s military expedition in 922. He describes the situation, which led to the decisive battle. The aristocracy was divided into two factions: one supported Berengar, who was firmly entrenched in Verona and in the eastern part of the kingdom; the other, led by the Marquis of Ivrea Adalbert I, backed Rudolf, who already controlled Pavia and the west. The clash took place in an area on the fringes of the kingdom’s marches: the stretch of the Po Valley to the south
of the River Po, at the crossroads between the marches of Ivrea, Friuli and Tuscany. François Bougard has recently described this as the *ventre mou* of the kingdom, which is to say a region only weakly structured from a political and administrative perspective, where ties with the religious authorities and control over fiscal estates were crucial for anyone seeking to hold the Italian crown.

The battle took place at Fiorenzuola d’Arda, a few miles east of Piacenza. In all likelihood, the two armies met along the Via Emilia. At first, Berengar’s troops had the upper hand, routing the enemy. It is at this stage that Liutprand introduces the figure of Boniface of the Hucpoldings, informing us first of all of his strong bond with the King of Burgundy, who had made him his brother-in-law by giving him his sister Waldrada in marriage. This marriage can hardly be explained with the rather limited Italian politics of Rudolf I (888–912), the father of Rudolf II and Waldrada. It is much more likely that after his father’s death in 912, Rudolf II arranged a marriage for his sister that also constituted a political alliance. The same happened before in the case of his mother Willa and his sister Willa II, who after the passing of Rudolf I were given in marriage to Hugh of Arles (926–947) and probably to the latter’s brother Boso, the leading members of the Bosonid dynasty. Liutprand described Boniface as Rudolf’s champion, as a *comes potentissimus* and *vir tam callidus quam audax*. Together with Count Gariard, a vassal of the Anscarids, who also supported Rudolf, Boniface led a rescue army to help his brother-in-law and they succeeded in taking Berengar’s troops by surprise as they were busy carrying off their spoils of war, and slaughtered them. This marked the victory of Rudolf’s side. The dispute over the crown was settled for good the following year, 924, when Berengar was betrayed and murdered in Verona.
A new march at the edge of Rudolf’s kingdom

What is most striking here is the leading role which the Bishop of Cremona assigns to Boniface in relation to Rudolf’s success. As we shall soon see, Boniface too had much to gain from his brother-in-law’s rise to the throne. Still, the course of action he adopted, carried considerable risks: his marriage to a female descendent of the powerful dynasty of the Welfs of Bavaria stands as a classic example of the highest degree of Königsnähe to which a member of the Reichsadels might attain. For Boniface, marrying Waldrada meant establishing a bond of kinship with the most important group among those traditionally tied with the Carolingian dynasty. On the other hand, such a hypergamous marriage was a risky bet for Boniface. If it was sealed before 922, then he could not be sure of his brother-in-law’s success. In any case, the marriage did not increase Boniface’s landed wealth, since Waldrada’s family had no estates in Italy.

Boniface was rewarded for his ambitious choice to involve himself at the highest political level after Rudolf II’s victory, when he was awarded the rank of marchio and the prestigious title of consiliarius regis. We know of Boniface’s position at his brother-in-law’s side through the charters issued by the king, especially in 924. Out of the thirteen known charters from Rudolf’s reign, two mention Boniface as a mediator: a key figure in the relation between the king and his subjects which was shared by the proceres supporting him. The function of the mediator, as someone enjoying direct access to the prince, was to winnow all requests for external intervention.

The first charter was issued on the 8 October 924 in Pavia, for the benefice of the Bishop of Parma Aicardus, through the intercession of the Anscarid Ermengarde and the
Hucpolding Boniface, both of whom were counsellors of the king. The second charter was issued on the 12th of November of the same year in Verona, for the benefice of the monastery of St Sixtus in Piacenza and of its abbess Berta, through the intercession of the Archbishop of Milan, the Bishop of Bergamo, and Boniface himself.

Both these concessions concern fiscal estates in the region of Emilia, which became a focus of land and political interest for Boniface and his descendants in those years. An investigation of their activities sheds light on the aims of Rudolf II who, contrary to what the established historiography suggests, strove to consolidate his position as King of Italy, albeit in the limited time available to him. The two charters, then, record the arrangements which Rudolf and the proceres close to him sought to make in order to stabilize the Emilian sector.

The first charter assigned the personal property of the royal manor of Sabbioneta, on the Po River north of Parma, to the local bishop, Aicardus. The latter was among Rudolf’s earliest supporters and was very close to the Anscarids, who through the wife of Adalbert I, Ermengarde of Tuscany, had extended their influence in the Parma area, a gateway to the southern part of the kingdom through the Apennine passes. With this first charter, then, the king established a point of control along the main artery of the kingdom, relying on the Anscarids’ network of relations, which already afforded him strategic control over the route to Tuscany in the same sector.

The second charter too concerns fiscal estates of crucial importance for controlling navigation along the Po River. This time, the document issued confirms the fiscal estates already held by the monastery of St Sixtus in Piacenza. As Roberta Cimino pointed out recently, the monastery owed its considerable landed wealth to Empress Engelberga,
who had accompanied its foundation with the donation of several fiscal estates,\textsuperscript{29} in such a way as to create a strategic patrimonial reserve for the king.\textsuperscript{30} Most of the estates were located along the Po, the aim clearly being to exercise control over the river routes of the Po Valley. This was a key sector for anyone wishing to establish himself in Pavia. Ever since its foundation, then, St Sixtus played a crucial role for the Kings of Italy: controlling the monastery and having its abbess on one’s side meant extending one’s influence over much of northern Italy. In 917 Berengar’s daughter Berta was appointed abbess.\textsuperscript{31} Berta remained the head of the monastery for over thirty years, well beyond the end of her father’s political career in 924. She was therefore forced to engage with subsequent rulers of Italy as well. None of the successors of the Marquis of Friuli, not even Rudolf, who had defeated her father and seized his kingdom, ever failed to issue charters confirming Berta’s privileges: the wealth of the monastery was essentially preserved intact, remaining what it had been at the time of its foundation.

Rudolf’s charter, however, leaves out two curtes located a certain distance away from the river: Campo Migliacio, in the countryside of Modena, and Cortenuova, in the Reggio area.\textsuperscript{32} This omission acquires considerable importance in the light of the fact that the charter granted to St Sixtus in 926, the second surviving charter issued by King Hugh, includes both properties in its list of estates.\textsuperscript{33} To whom had the two fiscal properties been assigned, then, if not to the religious institution which had been managing them for half a century? To whom might Rudolf have assigned these estates for his own benefice?

Among the Italian proceres who supported Rudolf, the figure closest to him and who most benefited from the situation would appear to have been none other than
Boniface.\textsuperscript{34} His role as mediator in relation to the charter constitutes a significant clue, given what we know about his patrimony. A charter issued by Otto I (962–970) in 962 informs us that in the same territorial district Boniface held another royal \textit{curtis in beneficium}, the estate of Antognano.\textsuperscript{35} While the document does not mention which king bestowed this benefice, in all likelihood it was Rudolf II, who was no doubt far closer to Boniface than his successors Hugh of Provence (926–947) and Berengar II (950–961). The estate in question was located in the stretch of flatland between Modena and Bologna known as \textit{Saltusplanus},\textsuperscript{36} within a district which local sources refer to as the \textit{iudiciaria Mutinensis}.\textsuperscript{37}

In recent years, Tiziana Lazzari has suggested that this territorial district may have encompassed the \textit{territoria civitatum} of Reggio, Modena and partly Bologna: the creation of this district was an attempt on the part of the Widonid dynasty to gain control over the Emilian sector,\textsuperscript{38} along the lines of what had already been achieved in Piedmont through the creation of the March of Ivrea, assigned to Anscar I.\textsuperscript{39} In the case of Emilia as well, the district was assigned to an official, albeit one of comital rank, whom we find involved in a \textit{placitum} in 898, as we shall soon see. The district thus created acquired a crucial strategic role for the holders of the Italian throne, since it bordered with the Exarchate to the west and, to the south, with the Apennine passes connecting the Po Valley not just to Tuscany but to Rome.\textsuperscript{40}

Berengar had no real interest in further reinforcing this district, since it lay outside the area within his direct control from the March of Friuli to the Po River.\textsuperscript{41} The king sought to exercise control over Emilia, on the one hand, by drawing upon the support of local comital families with well-rooted land interests and a very limited political
horizon;\textsuperscript{42} and, on the other hand, by controlling St Sixtus. In 917 Berengar assigned the monastery to his daughter Berta as \textit{domina et ordinatrix atque rectrix},\textsuperscript{43} confirming in full the fiscal wealth acquired through Engelberga’s donation. In the king’s intentions, the monastery, which had originally been established as a means to ensure fiscal estates for the kingdom,\textsuperscript{44} was to play a more practical and organizational role, entailing considerable political responsibilities.\textsuperscript{45}

The situation was completely different in the case of Rudolf. In order to ensure his power, he was bound to rely on his alliance with the Anscarids, the most powerful kinsmen among the \textit{proceres} supporting him, and to make the most of his family connections with the Hucpoldings. The close ties with these relatives, moreover, provided a privileged contact with the Exarchate, where a branch of the Hucpoldings had earned a leading role among the local aristocracy: in the latter half of the ninth century, through the marriage between Hucpold’s daughter Engelrada and Martin, a scion of the Duchi’s family,\textsuperscript{46} the Hucpoldings had gained extensive properties throughout the Exarchate.\textsuperscript{47} At the same time, this marital union had afforded them a foothold in the political milieu of the Church in Ravenna, whose archbishop up until 878 had been Martin’s uncle.\textsuperscript{48}

In virtue of these family bonds, Rudolf’s brother-in-law Boniface was ideally suited to receiving the office of the \textit{iudiciaria Mutinensis}. From this perspective, then, I believe the probable assignment of the three fiscal estates of Campo Miliacio, Cortenuova and Antognano to Boniface may be regarded as a redistribution of resources: as a means for Rudolf to furnish his brother-in-law with the material resources to truly exert hegemonic control over the district just outlined. Moreover, as though to confirm the importance
of Rudolf’s operation, Boniface was given the title of marchio: according to the king’s intentions, therefore, the district was meant to become a genuine march of the kingdom, a key strategic area.

A step back: Hucpolding political activism and the Widonid creation

It is now necessary to take a step back in order to better explore the aforementioned policies adopted by the Widonid dynasty in the Emilian sector. King Guy’s territorial creation is of crucial importance in order to understand how and why the Hucpoldings focused their political action precisely on that particular stretch of the kingdom.

The Italian political theatre in which Hucpold found himself operating in the mid-ninth century did not offer many opportunities for him to carve out a place for himself among the main territorial divisions of the kingdom. At the end of the military campaign of 847, Hucpold was appointed comes palacii in the kingdom of Italy by Emperor Lothar. This appointment to the royal court propelled Hucpold to political prominence. At the same time, however, this appointment prevented Hucpold from finding a place within an administrative district. By contrast, this is what lay at the basis of the power attained by the leading representatives of the Reichsadel who had been in Italy for two generations at least: the kinship groups of the Adalbertings, Widonids, Unruochings and Supponids. Paolo Cammarosano describes these kinship groups as having the rank of marchio, as opposed to the other Frankish families of comital rank, as they had more limited territorial interests. The exponents of these groups chiefly based their power on close ties of collaboration with the Carolingian dynasty, and hence on the
opportunities to establish themselves in a district that the political control of regional and supra-regional spaces provided.\textsuperscript{52}

Hucpold’s military career and appointment as Count Palatine show that he belonged to this distinguished aristocratic milieu.\textsuperscript{53} Nevertheless, Hucpold made his début in the political theatre of the kingdom of Italy at what was hardly the most favourable moment for him to establish himself in a district – this being the first step towards the dynastic establishment of his kinship group. In the mid-ninth century, all the larger districts on the periphery of the kingdom were already under the more or less stable control of marquises belonging to the above-mentioned groups,\textsuperscript{54} who also managed to guarantee their power through matrimonial alliances among themselves. At the same time, the importance carried by the Supponids at Louis’ court had increased considerably following the Emperor’s marriage with Engelberga, a member of this kinship group.\textsuperscript{55} From his very first years in Italy, then, Hucpold was forced to find alternatives to the benefices assigned by royal power, as his appointment at court did not favour his direct establishment in any one area.

The Count Palatine then sought to make the most of the networking opportunities provided by his position at court,\textsuperscript{56} by installing his offspring in two specific areas of the Italian peninsula: his elder daughter Berta I was made abbess of the monastic community of St Andrew in Florence;\textsuperscript{57} Engelrada I – as already noted – was instead given in marriage to Duke Martin, a scion of one of the most distinguished ducal families of the Exarchate.

Two aspects of Hucpold’s conduct are particularly noteworthy. First of all, the kinship structures of the Hucpoldings – who had only established themselves in Italy for
one generation – continued to operate on a supra-regional scale: the kinship bonds did not weaken, but were maintained by the second generation of the group, especially in Romagna and Tuscany, strongly affecting land policies of its members. Secondly, both these areas were located in loosely structured and marginal positions: the former on the edge of the march governed by the Adalbertings, the latter even beyond the borders of the kingdom of Italy. These elements bear witness to the range of solutions open to individuals at the upper echelons of society, but also to the difficulties which political actors encountered when they sought to operate outside of the conventional means of acquiring territorial footholds in accordance with royal power. Only the third Hucpolding generation in Italy succeeded in establishing themselves in a district of the kingdom: in all likelihood, it was Rudolf II who appointed Boniface as public official in the extensive district of Modena, created only a few decades earlier by the Widonids.

Having seized the throne in Pavia (889), Guy and his son Lambert changed the political order of the kingdom by creating two new marches, with the aim of preventing outside attacks: the first march, extending along the left bank of Lake Garda in the north-east, was entrusted to Guy’s uncle Conrad; the second one, around the city of Ivrea in the north-west, was entrusted to Anscar I of Oscheret.

Having reinforced the northernmost section, Guy turned his attention to the Po Valley, the economically productive area on the route between the capital Pavia and the Duchy of Spoleto. The traditional interlocutors of royal power in that area, such as the Abbey of Nonantola, had experienced a considerable reduction in the endowment of fiscal estates and hence in their managerial and administrative capacity, particularly on account of Louis II’s resolute fiscal policy in favour of his wife and hence of St Sixtus.
Moreover, Engelberga’s relatives had consolidated their presence particularly between Piacenza and Parma. As for the rival faction, the king from Spoletò enjoyed the support of bishops Wibod of Parma and Leodoin of Modena. Guy attempted to establish an official of comital rank at the head of the vast area roughly between Reggio and Modena, a figure that brings to mind that of Autramnus, Count of Modena and active in the mid-ninth century. This new territory encompassed those rural districts that had developed around the castra on the frontier between Langobardia and Romania in the plain and in the Bologna Apennines. An 898 placitum provides a first glimpse of this new district, which in later charters – up until roughly 1039 – was known as the iudiciaria Mutinensis.

Fig. 2 The iudiciaria Mutinensis (late 9th – first half of the 10th century).

Possibly in view of this ambitious political operation, Guy came up with another political plan, on a smaller scale, designed to coordinate a strategic area of the Bologna Apennines set between four castles: Brento, Monte Cerere, Barbarolo and Gesso. Towards the end of 891, the emperor granted Thietelm – a vassal of Adalbert II of Tuscany – the public estates located within the territory of the four castra, thereby creating a new district called iudiciaria de quattuor castellis. Although this new Apennine district was not to endure long, in the judicial assembly held at Cinquanta in 898 it was included in the iudiciaria Mutinensis. The text of this placitum enables us to define the boundaries of the new district, since the assembly was attended by over seventy judges, notaries, scabini and boni homines from the areas of Reggio, Modena
and Bologna.\textsuperscript{68} The assembly was presided by one Count Guy, who must have been in charge of the new countship. In all likelihood, he belonged to the same Spoleto branch of the Widonids.\textsuperscript{69}

In the same period, abbess Berta I of the Hucpoldings donated some rural estates near Bologna to the monastery of St Benedict \textit{in Adili},\textsuperscript{70} located at the centre of the Bolognese sector of the plain included in the \textit{iudiciaria Mutinensis}. This monastery had been founded around the mid-eighteenth century by \textit{dux} Ursus and his wife Ariflada.\textsuperscript{71} In the later Lombard period it had fallen under the jurisdiction of Montecassino, along with the other monasteria in the same Bolognese sector, between the rivers Muzza and Reno. Its transfer under the influence of the powerful Cassinese monastery was most probably part of the anti-Nonantola policy of King Desiderius (757–774), designed to limit the rise to prominence of the monastery founded by \textit{dux} Anselm and very richly endowed by the previous king, Aistulf (749–756).\textsuperscript{72}

We may surmise that over the following century the Emilian monasteries followed the same course as their mother abbey, which was pillaged and destroyed by the saracen\textit{i} in 883 and thereafter no longer capable of managing its considerable and widely scattered estates. In this context, we should place the \textit{breviarium} written by one John, a priest at Montecassino, who in the late ninth century carried out some land investigations on the Emilian monasteries controlled by the abbey.\textsuperscript{73} Probably in order to overcome these difficulties, around 899 abbot Ragemprand assigned Empress Ageltrude two cells under the jurisdiction of Montecassino \textit{in finibus Lambardie}, including \textit{Adili}.\textsuperscript{74} In the late ninth century, therefore, the Hucpoldings had land interests very close to those of the Widonids in an area densely scattered with fiscal estates.\textsuperscript{75}
Between the time of Count Guy and the period of Boniface I, there is not enough evidence to assign any Italian aristocrat political control over the *iudicia Mutinensis*. However, it is possible to identify this area as the field of struggle between the Hucpoldings and the kinship group of the Supponids, both of whom – as we have seen – were already present in Emilia and eager to exploit the new political creation of the Widonids. Although the documentary sources make no mention of Boniface I’s father Hubald, his engagement in the Piacenza area, closeness to the kings from Spoleto, and especially the estates and political goals achieved by his descendants in some of these districts make his involvement in this area most likely.

After ascending the throne, Rudolf II stabilized and increased the hegemony of his brother-in-law Boniface in the Emilian district, with the aim of guarding the eastern frontiers of his kingdom. The endowment of fiscal estates further broadened the Hucpolding’s field of action, particularly in areas such as the Reggio territory, where his kinship group is unlikely to have previously held any estates or public offices. At the same time, by the acquisition of the rank of *marchio* Boniface attained the most distinguished position at head of the Italian aristocracy, a position destined to shape the political course of his descendants for over a century.

**Political struggles and local hegemony**

Only two years after 924, Boniface’s political standing was to change completely. Already by April 926, after having sought to put down a revolt of the Italian aristocracy with the help of his father-in-law Burchard of Swabia, Rudolf II found his position in Italy considerably weakened, not least because of the political engagement of Hugh of
Provence. From that year onward, most Italian proceres – with the likely exception of Boniface – came to favour the Count of Arles, who was probably regarded as someone easier to influence than Rudolf.80 Within a few years, the King of Burgundy would appear to have quit the Italian scene for good, and in a peaceful way: according to Liutprand of Cremona, Rudolf and the new King of Italy Hugh struck a formal agreement that included the former’s acquisition of certain rights over the March of Provence, in exchange for a commitment not to interfere with the situation across the Alps.81 Signed between 931 and 935,82 this agreement brought an end to the engagement of Rudolf and his kinship group in Italy, these few years marking a significant reorientation of their political focus.83

The rise to the throne of Hugh of Provence brought a temporary halt to Boniface’s career, as he found himself facing a sovereign more and more hostile to the group of the proceres regni that had hitherto shaped the destiny of the Italian kingdom.84 In order to stabilize his position, Hugh set out to oppose and, if necessary, do away with his enemies, who for the most part were also his relatives on the side of his mother, Berta of Tuscany.85 It was possibly on account of this lack of any direct bond of kinship with the ruler, and of his marriage with the Rudolfing Waldrada, that Boniface was spared his life, even though he was stripped of his title of marchio.86

As already noted, Hugh immediately sought to re-establish the patrimonial condition of St Sixtus in Emilia by newly assigning to the monastery the two fiscal estates omitted from Rudolf’s charter.87 In the following period, moreover, we find several figures of comital rank exercising a specific authority over the Reggio and Modena area: in all likelihood, they were backed by the king as a means to counter the Hucpoldings. A
clear picture of the situation emerges from a *placitum* issued near Modena in 931: it presents a judgement jointly delivered by the Count of Parma Maginfred, the Count of Reggio Raymond and the Count of Modena Suppo, three followers of Hugh who had been entrusted with the administration of the whole area formerly under the influence of Boniface. The bestowal of the titles of count and bishop on the last Supponids in the Modena area would appear to have been a way to cement the new territorial division established by Hugh, while at the same time marginalising the rival group of the Hucpoldings.

Boniface’s loss of office and of most of his fiscal estates did not mean the end of his political engagement. King Hugh’s strategy proved successful in the Reggio and Modena areas, where Italian kings had always wielded a greater influence. The sector of the *iudiciaria Mutinensis* extending into the Bologna area, by contrast, remained under the influence of the Hucpoldings, who in that area could rely on the fiscal manor of *Antognano* and on considerable allodial estates, which had further been extended through the bond of vassalage with the Archbishop of Ravenna. It was on these estates, and on an awareness of their rank of marquis, that the Hucpoldings were to lay the material foundations enabling them to hold their place among the leading aristocratic families of the Kingdom.

When, after twenty years, Hugh’s political situation weakened and the *proceres* succeeded in depriving him of any real power, Boniface regained the title of *dux et marchio*, but this time in relation to the Duchy of Spoleto and the March of Camerino: an area well outside the Emilian sector, which by then had become an entrenched base for new emerging kinship groups, such as Canossa, Riprandings and Obertenghi.
Boniface’s career enabled his descendants to gain power and to turn their hegemony over a strategic area at the fringes of the kingdom into a dynastic rule. After acquiring the rank of marquis within the highest aristocracy of the kingdom, Boniface successfully maintained this rank even in the face of unfavourable political developments. Furthermore, he turned it into one of the defining elements of Hucpolding self-awareness, together with a precise stock of family names and the traditional adoption of the Ripuarian law, so peculiar and therefore so distinctive in early medieval Italy.93

Conclusions

The outline that has been traced of Boniface’s political career enables us to investigate the behaviour and strategies of those aristocracies who settled in Italy one or two generations after the Frankish conquest and sought to find a place for themselves within the kingdom. In the mid-ninth century, when the Hucpoldings first crossed the Alps, the most powerful members of the Reichsadel had already gained control over the main regions of Italy, making the most of their close collaboration with the Carolingians and of the opportunities which their role as imperial officials offered them in terms of the acquisition of influence at the local level. The conflicts which broke out following the dissolution of the empire and the need for pretenders to the crown to secure new military loyalties paved the way for more sudden and significant changes even among the ranks of the high aristocracy of the Kingdom.

Boniface was able to present himself as a candidate for marriage into the Rudolfian dynasty by virtue of the scale and quality of the relations, which his own kin
had built over the two previous generations. In the case of success, the relation of greatest Königsnähe would put Boniface in the best possible position to turn the situation to his own advantage. The positive outcome of the military campaign rewarded the Hucpolding for his risky course of action, propelling him to the summit of the kingdom as consiliarius regis and marquis. Access to the fiscal estates in Emilia proved crucial for Boniface’s acquisition of power. While on the one hand the arrival of Hugh of Provence restored the Modena and Reggio area to its original order, on the other hand the estate of Antognano, which Boniface was able to retain, laid the foundations for the seigniorial control over the Bologna area bordering with the Exarchate.

The extent to which Boniface’s course of action affected his kinsmen’s position may be appreciated by considering later developments: in the late tenth and early eleventh century three of Boniface’s descendants gained control over a march – i.e. his grandson Hugh and his grandnephew Boniface II in Tuscany and his great-grandson Hugh III in Spoleto – one invariably remote from the bases of Hucpolding allodial properties and entirely dependent upon royal power. Holding office within a given area of the kingdom – such as the Duchy of Spoleto around 945 – and exercising lordship within a different region constitutes an anomaly within the context of Italian aristocracies, which tended on the contrary to exploit public offices as a means to extend their lordly power. By contrast, after Boniface’s success, his descendants came to base their political fortunes on their relationship with the rulers, often jeopardising their political standing yet always remaining faithful to their kin tradition as office-holders.

Fig. 3 Boniface’s descendants (10th – 11th century).
* I am indebted to Tiziana Lazzari, Giacomo Vignodelli, Giovanni Isabella, Christopher Heath, the two anonymous reviewers and editors of the journal for their helpful comments on earlier written drafts. The views expressed are of course my own.


2 Liutprand, *Antapodosis*, in P. Chiesa (ed.), *Liudprandi Cremonensis Opera omnia*, CCSL 156 (Turnhout, 1998), II, c. 64, p. 60.
21


5 The Hucpoldings’ case is anomalous and does not follow the usual patterns of developments of the Italian aristocracy, as traced in G. Sergi, I confini del potere. Marche e signorie fra due regni medievali (Torino, 1995), pp. 42–4.

6 On the concept of Königsnähe see G. Tellenbach, ‘From the Carolingian imperial nobility to the German estate of imperial princes’, in T. Reuter (ed.), The medieval nobility. Studies on the ruling classes of France and Germany from the sixth to the twelfth century (North-Holland Amsterdam, 1979), pp. 207–8.


Bougard, ‘Du centre à la périphérie’, p. 16.

Liutprand, Antapodosis, II, c. 66, p. 61.


See F. Bougard, ‘Gariardo (Gaddo)’, in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, 52 (Roma, 1999), pp. 311–2.


Demotz, *La Bourgogne, dernier des royaumes carolingiens (855-1056). Roi, pouvoirs et élites autour du Léman*, Mémoires et documents. Société d'Histoire de la Suisse Romande 4. 9 (Lausanne, 2008), p. 218. Demotz simply views Waldrada’s marriage with Boniface within the context of her brother’s network of relationships, as a way for Rudolf to improve his status outside his kingdom: according to Demotz Boniface was already Duke of Spoleto by the 920s (*ibid.*, p. 240). A closer analysis has shown that Boniface’s appointment as Duke only occurred after 945; therefore, Boniface’s marriage with Wadrada was of course an illustrious one for Rudolf II’s politics but carried even greater importance on the Hucpoldings’ side; on Boniface’s achievement of Spoleto see Manarini, *I due volti*, pp. 59–67.


29 The will of Engelberga, which contains arrangements about the monastery, is published in E. Falconi (ed.), *Documenti dei fondi cremonesi: 759-1069*, Le carte cremonesi dei secoli VIII-XII 1 (Cremona, 1979), n. 20, pp. 49–58.


32 The curtis of Campo Migliacio occupied what is now the area of Fiorano, in the province of Modena, while Cortenuova was located near Novellara, in the province of Reggio Emilia: G. Tiraboschi, Dizionario topografico-storico degli Stati Estensi (Modena, 1824), I, pp. 104–5; pp. 245–8.


34 In his monograph on the history of the comune of Bologna, Alfred Hessel ascribed power over the comitatus of Bologna to Boniface: A. Hessel, Geschichte der Stadt Bologna von 1116 bis 1280 (Berlin, 1910), pp. 39–40. This assumption was disproven by T. Lazzari, Comitato senza città. Bologna e l’aristocrazia del territorio nei secoli IX-XI (Torino, 1998).

35 T. Sickel (ed.), Conradi I., Heinrici I. et Ottonis I. diplomata, MGH Diplomata regum et imperatorum Germaniae 1 (Hannover, 1879-1884), n. 249, p. 357. While the exact location of the court is unknown, it must have been near present-day San Vincenzo, a fraction of Galliera, in the province of Bologna.

36 In Roman antiquity, saltus meant a large estate used as woodland or pasture, which generally belonged


40 The city of Arezzo held a key position on the north-south transit axis, as it was located on the Via Cassia, linking the eastern Tuscan Apennines to Rome; see V. Fumagalli, ‘Vescovi e conti nell’Emilia occidentale da Berengario I a Ottone I’, in Studi medievali 14/1 (1973), pp. 174–82. Boniface’s son Eberhard was bishop of Arezzo from ca. 963 to 979 (at least), see Manarini, I due volti, pp. 80–2.


L. Schiaparelli (ed.), I diplomi di Berengario I, Fonti per la storia d’Italia 35 (Roma, 1903), n. 115, pp. 296–9; Böhmer, Regesta Imperii, I, 3.2, n. 1329.


Manarini, I duevolti, p. 45.

See ibid., pp. 82–8; 150–8.

This was the military campaign launched by Emperor Lothar with the charter *De expeditione contra Sarracenos facienda* in the spring of 847, in response to the forays made by the *saraceni* in southern Italy, and especially Rome, in August 846; see the text of the charter in *Capit.*, II, n. 203, pp. 65–8; J.F. Böhmer (ed.), *Regesta Imperii I. Die Regesten des Kaiserreichs unter den Karolingern 751-918* (926/962), H. Zielinski (ed.), *Die Regesten des Regnum Italiae und der burgundischen Regna 3, Das Regnum Italiae in der Zeit der Thronkämpfe und Reichsteilungen 888 (850)-926* (Köln, 1991), vol. 1, nn. 41, 46. The year 847 is not specified in the charter, it is determined by H. Zielinski, ’Ein unbeachteter Italienzug Kaiser Lothar I. im Jahre 847’, Quellen und Forschungen aus italienischen Archiven und Bibliotheken 70 (1990), pp. 1-22.


Between 858 and 860, he attended and was part of a great assembly of magnates of the Carolingian Empire hosted in Sermorens in the bishopric of Vienne, where «religiosissimi et venerabiles patres illustrissimaque societas comitum» (the most pious and revered fathers, together with an illustrious groups of counts) gathered together to discuss a patrimonial dispute regarding the powerful Archbishop of Vienne, Agilmarus; see Manarini, I due volti, p. 41.

The Adalbertings’ marchional power extended from Lucca to much of present-day Tuscany; the Unruochings’ presence is recorded in the March of Friuli; finally, the Widonids governed the Duchy of Spoleto: Cammarosano, Nobili e re, pp. 176–9.


The same mechanism took place a century later with Count Palatine Hu bert I, first of the Obertenghi group, see M. Nobili, ‘Alcune considerazioni circa l’estensione, la distribuzione territoriale e il significato del patrimonio degli Obertenghi (metà secolo X – inizio secolo XII)’, in M. Nobili (ed.), Gli Obertenghi e altri saggi, Collectanea 19 (Spoleto, 2006), pp. 261–2.

Manarini, I due volti, p. 44.
Among the vast properties of Engelrada, the estates in the Faenza area stand out both in terms of sheer numbers and on account of the specific military purposes they served. These properties were located along the Apennine routes to Tuscany; see *ibid.*, pp. 150–63.


On Anscar and his kinship group see Sergi, *I confini*, pp. 43, 66–9.


On Bishop Wibod's policies and his relations with the upper echelons of the kingdom, see Lazzari, ‘Tra Ravenna e regno’.

On this count see E. Hlawitschka, *Franken, Alemannen, Bayern und Burgunder in Oberitalien (774-962)*, Forschungen zur oberrheinischen Landesgeschichte 8 (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1960), pp. 144–6.

L. Schiaparelli (ed.), I diplomi di Guido e di Lamberto, Fonti per la storia d’Italia 36 (Roma, 1906), n. 12, pp. 32–4; Böhmer, Regesta Imperii, I, 3.2, n. 918.

The placitum was also attended by notables from Brento. The connection between the two districts emerges again in the eleventh-century documents recording the Hucpoldings’ patrimony; see Manarini, I due volti, pp. 210–8.


Bonacini, Terre d’Emilia, p. 109 n. 57.

Mention is made of this property in the breviarium of John of Montecassino. John’s text has probably been interpolated, but its content appears to be reliable. It is included in Peter the Deacon’s Registrum: J.-M. Martin (ed.), Registrum Petri diaconi (Montecassino, Archivio dell’abbazia, Reg. 3), Fonti per la storia dell’Italia medievale. Antiquitates 45 (Roma, 2015), III, n. 566, pp. 1541–3.

News of the founding of the monastery is given in a donation made to the Abbey of Nonantola by Duke John and his sister Orsa, the offspring of the aforementioned Duke Orso: in 776 the two of them donated
a number of estates to Nonantola, with the exception of those already donated by their father at St Benedict in Adili. The donation has been published in A. Gaudenzi, ‘Il monastero di Nonantola, il ducato di Persiceta, la chiesa di Bologna’, in Bullettino dell’istituto storico italiano 36 (1916), n. 2, pp. 19–24.


73 On this text see above note 75.


75 As late as 936, in a *permuta* stipulated by Boniface is mentioned a «terra que dicitur regia in fundo Persecetano»: G. Tiraboschi, *Storia dell’augusta badia di S. Silvestro di Nonantola* (Modena, 1785) II, n. 86, pp. 115–7.

76 This hypothesis was first advanced by Tiziana Lazzari in Lazzari, ‘La creazione’, p. 110; see also E. Manarini, ‘Sex, Denigration and Violence: A Representation of Political Competition between Two Aristocratic Families in 9th Century Italy’, in C. Heath, R. Houghton (eds.), *Conflict and Violence in Medieval Italy 568-1154*, forthcoming.
77 See Manarini, I due volti, pp. 52–3.

78 One source in particular, the Epitome chronicorum Casinensis, refers – through a fictional narrative – to Hubald’s considerable interest in the Modena district; on this source see ibid., pp. 27–9.


80 This view is put forward by Atto of Vercelli in his Perpendicular; on this source see G. Vignodelli, ‘Politics, prophecy and satire: Atto of Vercelli’s Polipticum quod appellatur Perpendicular’, EME 24.2 (2016), pp. 209–35.

81 Liutprand, Antapodosis, III, c. 48, p. 93.


83 Demotz, L’an 888, p. 57.

The same *permuta* already quoted attests to Boniface’s rank as *comes*: Tiraboschi, *Storia*, n. 86, pp. 115–7.


The Bishop of Modena referred to here is Ardingus, in office between 934 and 942, he was probably Suppo’s uncle; see *ibid.*., p. 121.

Bougard, ‘Du centre à la périphérie’, p. 16.


93 The rank of marchio had been among Hucpoldings’ marks of self-awareness since Boniface had first acquired this title; on this peculiarity and on the other elements of Hucpolding self-awareness developed in within the kinship group see, Manarini, *I due volti*, pp. 255–60; 295–301.

94 Although these characters belonged to different lines of the group, see the genealogical tree attached below; on their activities and political conducts see *ibid.*, pp. 97–107; 114–23.