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1. Introduction

In this paper I shall try to present some points of argumentation between the Advaitin Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (hearafter Madhusūdana, 1540-1600 ca., Sharma, 1981: 375) and the Dvaitin Vyāsa Tīrtha (hearafter Vyāsa, 1478-1539, Sharma, 1981: 286), which stand as the background for “the inference of the falsity of the phenomenal world” (prapañcamithyātvānumāna) and for the formulation and defence of “the five definitions of falsity” (pañcamithyātva). My preliminary investigation concerns, in some ways, also how Madhusūdana uses Navya Nyāya material and its consequent adaptation to Advaita tenets.

I am not going to strictly follow the order proposed by Madhusūdana but, starting from the prapañcamithyātva inference itself, I shall analyse the main disagreement sentence (vipratipattivākyā) and the consequent doubt which the Advaitins maintain to be a constitutive part (aṅga) of the debate or of the reflection (vicāra), and of the inference itself (anumāna). ¹

2. General Premises

The main concern of the Advaitins is to establish non-duality (advaitasiddhi). Of course advaitabrahman is always a self-established reality (svataḥsiddha), auto-luminous (svaprapākāsa), pure consciousness (suddhacaitāntya), so no proof is necessary to establish

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¹ I would like to thank Prof. Kamalasvar Bhattacharya for his precious advices and guidance. Many thanks also to Prof. Toshitiro Wada, Prof. Alberto Pelissero, and Dr. Elisa Freschi. Of course, every shortcoming is due to my own understanding.

¹ I will, obviously, just introduce the subject hence I shall skip over the complex discussion concerning paksatavacchedaka, briefly glancing through the analysis of paksatā.
it. As consciousness requires no proof, the falsity of the world alone is to be established. Once established the falsity of the world, the non-duality becomes automatically established (Chakrabarty, 1967: 41). That’s why at the very beginning of Advaitasiddhi (hereafter AS), Madhusūdana underlines that for establishing non-duality we must first prove the falsity of the world: 2 “Now, 3 since the establishment of non-duality is possible only having previously established the falsity of duality, in primis the falsity of duality alone should be proved.” 4

Madhusūdana 5 adapts to the present context an inference utilized by Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka 6 and, adding two probans (hetu), slightly improves it: 7 “the subject under consideration is false, because it is an object of cognition, because it is sentient, because it is limited, just as the silver [super-imposed] on the nacre.” (Pellegrini, 2011: 442-443). Here the term “vimata” is obviously the inferential subject (pakṣa), falsity (mithyātva) is the probandum (sādhya), the three probans (hetu) are “the property of being an object of cognition” (dṛṣṭyatva), “the property of being sentient” (jaḍatva) and “the property of being limited” (paricchinnatva) and the example (dṛṣṭānta) is the silver super-imposed on the nacre (suktirūpya).

3. Vipratipattivākya

Let’s now focus the attention on the subject, the pakṣa of this inference, expressed by the term “vimata”. I have roughly translated it as “the subject under consideration”, even if it more precisely means “the subject of disagreement”. The term vimata has been glossed as

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2 AS/SV/LC (p. 8): “tatrādvaitasiddhāt dvaitamithyātvasiddhipraśnativād dvaitamithyātvam eva prathamam upapadantyām”.
3 I could have interpreted the adverb “tatra” according to the reading of Madhusūdana direct disciple Balabhadra’s gloss, the Siddhāvyākhya (SV; AS/SV/LC, p. 8): “tatrait tasyām advaitasiddhau ...”; “There, that is in that Advaitasiddhi ...”
4 This same attitude is connected with some earlier Advaitins’ statements, just like in the Brahmasūtra (III.106a, p. 119): “avidyāstamyo mokṣaḥ sā ca samāra uḍāḥṭaḥ”, “The liberation consists in the setting of ignorance. That [= ignorance] is said to be the bondage ...”; or in the Tattvapradīpikā (TPNP, IV.8a, p. 602): “nivṛtīr ātā mohasya jīvatvamopalaśitaḥ”, “the Self is the withdrawal of delusion, indicated by the property of being the known ...”
5 At this point, obeying to the principle “lakṣaṇapramāṇābhyyāṃ hi vastusiddhiḥ”, Madhusūdana’s next step to prove the falsity of the world is to furnish the means of knowledge to determine the real nature of falsity (Pellegrini, 2011: 442, n. 3).
7 AS/SV/LC (pp. 30-31): “vimataṃ mithyā dṛṣṭvatvāt, jaḍasvāt, paricchinnatvāt śuktrāpyavat.”
“vimatīviśesyā”, “the [element] having as its qualificand the disagreement”. The word vimati is a synonym of the term vipratipatti. Vipratipatti is that kind of statement which, at the opening of a debate, expresses a divergence of opinions on a given subject.² Into AS, this sentence presents an incompatibility of views between the falsity and the reality of the world. The Laghucandrikā (LC, p. 30) of Brahmananda Sarasvati (18 cent.) glosses the term vimata as vipratipattīviśesyā “the [element] whose qualificand is the disagreement sentence”. Accordingly, vipratipatti is the qualificand portion of a certain statement. Therefore, that same sentence should also have a qualifier part, a viśeyana. This is clearly set forth in the Bālabodhini-vyākhyā of Yogendranath Bagchi, as the doubt born out from the double option proposed by the disagreement sentence.³

Madhusūdana showed two main vipratipattīvyākayas,⁴ even though the discussion is especially focused on the first one: “that [kind of entity which] is qualified by the property of being not sublatable by a valid knowledge different from that of brahman, that is worthy of being cognised as real and different from consciousness, is [this entity] the counter-positive of a triple-time negation in the [same] locus where it is cognised.”⁵

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² The definition proposed by AS (p. 2) is “vīraṇadhikajīvopasthāpakam vākyam”; see also the passage of AS/BB (p. 16): “ekadarmikāviniriṣṭhāvijayaprakāraṇaḥ āsanaṇakāvākhyasya vipratipattīrvātī”; “... since the nature of the disagreement sentence is to be a sentence producing a cognition having two sets of mutually contradictory determinations regarding one single subject...” See also Nyāyakośa (1978: 765-766).

³ AS/BB (p. 26): “vimatam ity asya vipratipattivākṣayayanasaṃsārayaviśeyam ity arthaḥ.”

⁴ Madhusūdana adds also another type of vipratipatti “pañcarātrikavātikāregopakāṇīṣedha-pratītya, na viniḥ?”, is the counter-positive of the mentioned negation endowed with an absolute degree of reality, or not?”, clearly inserted due to the upholders of the Vyādhikarāṇa advaita-vācchinnaprātyaṣṭikāṭābhāvā. A vyādhikarāṇa property with reference to a thing is said to be that property which exists only in a different entity. Hence a vyādhikarāṇaḥ advaita-vācchinnaprātyaṣṭikāṭābhāva is that absence in respect of which the counter-positiveness is determined by a property (pratyakṣa-vāčchita-dharma) which is not present in the relevant negatum but is something else. Here the term pañcarātrikavātikā means “the property of having the same degree of reality as brahman” (brahma-samāsāttikātavā). And it is related with the property of being a counter-positive (pratyakṣa-vātikā). For example, in the sentence “the cloth does not exist as endowed with the property of being a pot” (“ghatavena pato nāśī”), or “ghatavena patābhavī”, “the absence of the cloth as endowed with the property of being a pot”) Naiyāyikas, taking the property ghatavā which does not share the same locus with its counter-positive [= the cloth (patā)] (vyādhikarāṇa), say that the pāta is endowed with “the property of being a counter-positive of the absolute absence whose counter-positiveness is determined by the property of being a pot” (ghatavā-vācchinnaprātyaṣṭikāṭābhāvaprātyaṣṭikātvā). In the same way, this second vipratipatti can be re-written as “brahma-samāsāttikātvā prapañcī nāśī”, “the phenomenal universe does not exist as endowed with the same reality as brahman”, where the brahma-samāsāttikātvā has been considered a vyādhikarāṇa property (dīvarṇa) in respect to the phenomenal world (prapañcī), and consequently the phenomenal world is endowed with “the property of being a counter-positive of the absolute absence whose counter-positiveness is determined by the property of being endowed with the same level of reality of brahman” (brahma-samāsāttikātvāvācchinnaprātyaṣṭikāṭābhāvaprātyaṣṭikātvā).

⁵ AS/SV/LC (pp. 20): “tatra mithyāte vipratipattīḥ — brahma-pramāṇa-vātikādibhyavat satī satvāna pratiyākham cīddhīmaṇ prati-pāmayadhau traikākkānti-ādhār-prapṛciṇaḥ, na vaiḥ?”

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8 The definition proposed by AS (p. 2) is “viruddhakojijīvopasthāpakam vākyam”; see also the passage of AS/BB (p. 16): “ekadarmikāviruddhakojijīvopaprakāraṇāḥ āsanaṇakāvākhyasya vipratipattīrvātī”; “... since the nature of the disagreement sentence is to be a sentence producing a cognition having two sets of mutually contradictory determinations regarding one single subject...” See also Nyāyakośa (1978: 765-766).

9 AS/BB (p. 26): “vimatam ity asya vipratipattivākṣayajanyasyaṃsaṃsārayaviśeyam ity arthaḥ.”

10 Madhusūdana adds also another type of vipratipatti “pañcarātrikavātikāregopakāṇīṣedha-pratītya, na viniḥ?”, is the counter-positive of the mentioned negation endowed with an absolute degree of reality, or not?”, clearly inserted due to the upholders of the Vyādhikarāṇa advaita-vācchinnaprātyaṣṭikāṭābhāva. A vyādhikarāṇa property with reference to a thing is said to be that property which exists only in a different entity. Hence a vyādhikarāṇaḥ advaita-vācchinnaprātyaṣṭikāṭābhāva is that absence in respect of which the counter-positiveness is determined by a property (pratyakṣa-vāčchita-dharma) which is not present in the relevant negatum but is something else. Here the term pañcarātrikavātikā means “the property of having the same degree of reality as brahman” (brahma-samāsāttikātavā) and it is related with the property of being a counter-positive (pratyakṣa-vātikā). For example, in the sentence “the cloth does not exist as endowed with the property of being a pot” (“ghatavena pato nāśī”), or “ghatavena patābhavī”, “the absence of the cloth as endowed with the property of being a pot”) Naiyāyikas, taking the property ghatavā which does not share the same locus with its counter-positive [= the cloth (patā)] (vyādhikarāṇa), say that the pāta is endowed with “the property of being a counter-positive of the absolute absence whose counter-positiveness is determined by the property of being a pot” (ghatavā-vācchinnaprātyaṣṭikāṭābhāvaprātyaṣṭikātvā). In the same way, this second vipratipatti can be re-written as “brahma-samāsāttikātvā prapañcī nāśī”, “the phenomenal universe does not exist as endowed with the same reality as brahman”, where the brahma-samāsāttikātvā has been considered a vyādhikarāṇa property (dīvarṇa) in respect to the phenomenal world (prapañcī), and consequently the phenomenal world is endowed with “the property of being a counter-positive of the absolute absence whose counter-positiveness is determined by the property of being endowed with the same level of reality of brahman” (brahma-samāsāttikātvāvācchinnaprātyaṣṭikāṭābhāvaprātyaṣṭikātvā).

11 AS/SV/LC (pp. 20): “tatra mithyāte vipratipattīḥ — brahma-pramāṇa-vātikādibhyavat satī satvāna pratiyākham cīddhīmaṇ prati-pāmayadhau traikākkānti-ādhār-prapṛciṇaḥ, na vaiḥ?”
This sentence can be divided in two main portions “brahmapramāṭiriktābādhyaṭvate sati sattvena pratītyarhaṃ cidbhinnamaḥ” is the qualificand part (viśesyabhāga) and “pratītyāpādhau traikālikaniśedhapratīyogī na vā” is the qualifier part (viśeṣanabhāga). In the qualificand part as well, we distinguish three different portions: “brahmapramāṭiriktābādhyaṭvata”, “sattvena pratītyarhatva” and “cid-bhinnatva”. Generally speaking, when seen in the body of the inference, the vipratipattivākyā’s qualificand part (viśesyabhāga) constitutes the inferential subject (pakṣa), which also is the viśeṣa or dharmin of an inference, whilst the qualifier part (viśeṣanabhāga), namely the probandum, together with the probans constitutes the viśeṣaṇa or dharma of the inference. Unfortunately, there is no room here to treat more thoroughly the first among these properties, since it would involve the concept of the determiner of the inferential subjectness (pakṣatāvacchedaka). However, the first adjective “brahmapramāṭiriktābādhyaṭvata” is added to avoid “the flaw of proving what is already proved” (siddhasādhana) into apparent entities (pratībhāsikapadārtha); the second “sattvena pratītyarhatva” is to

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12 For that discussion glance through AS/SV/LC (pp. 20-27). 13 Without including in the body of the disagreement sentence the adjective “the property of being sublatable [by a valid knowledge] different from the knowledge of brahman” (brahmapramāṭiriktābādhyaṭvata) there will be the flaw of proving what is already proved (siddhasādhana) into apparent entities, like the silver projected on the nacre (suktrīpya), the snake on the rope (sarparajja), etc. Of course here the explanation involves the concept of the “determiner of the inferential subjectness” (pakṣatāvacchedaka). There are two ways to establish (sādhī) the occurrence of a probandum in an inferential subject. In the first option, technically called “pakṣatāvacchedakasāndhikāravanena sādhīsādhīh” (“establishment of the probandum as sharing the same locus with the determiner of the inferential subjectness”), only a limited number of pakṣas with a particular and specific form are chosen for this establishment, those which are homogeneus with the proposed inferential subject, that is “some inferential subjects qualified by the determiner of the inferential subjectness” (pakṣatāvacchedakavisayatikāṭīpakṣa). In the second instance the establishment of the probandum is done in all the pakṣas as such (pakṣatāvacchedakāvacchinnapakṣa), and that is named, “establishment of the probandum determined by the determiner of the inferential subjectness” (pakṣatāvacchedakāvacchedena sādhīsādhīh); K/NSM, pp. 500-504; Vattanky, 2003: 204-205, 210-214). If the aim (uddēṣya) of the debater is to establish the probandum according to the first instance (= pakṣatāvacchedakasāndhikāravanena) we have two options: before formulating the inference we should verify whether the probandum is established all over the pakṣa (sakalapakṣa) or just in a portion of it (pakṣaikadeśa). The AS/BB (2000: 20-21) points out a difference among old (prāctiṇa) and modern (navina) Nātyāyikas about the establishment of the probandum through pakṣatāvacchedakasāndhikāravanena. According to the modern the qualifier must be admitted as useful, because when a probandum is already established (sādhī) in an inferential subject determined by a certain property, the resulting inferential knowledge (anumiti) — namely the establishment of the probandum (sādhīsādhīh) — does not occur in another inferential subject determined by that property. Thus, the inferential knowledge produced by proving the probandum as sharing the same locus with the determiner of the inferential subjectness is obstructed by that very establishment. On the other hand, according to the old view, there is no need to accept the said qualifier, because when the probandum is established in a certain inferential subject determined by a certain property, then therein there will not be anumiti. Nevertheless, anumiti will occur in another inferential subject determined by that property. Hence the anumiti produced by proving the probandum as sharing the same locus with the determiner of the inferential subjectness is not obstructed by that establishment. In the present case, the inferential subject can either be the entire phenomenal world (vyāvahārīkāprapātīca) or the apparent world (pratībhāsākraparāpaṇca) as
prevent the contradiction (bādhā) into unreal entities (altikatuccha) and the third “cidbhinnatva” to avoid the contradiction with brahman. At any rate, to present the same vipratipatti in a simplified way, it could be stated that the sense of the entire qualificand part is merely “the phenomenal world” (vyāvahārikaprapaṇca): because it is sublatable only by the knowledge of brahman (brahmapramādhyāya = brahmapramātrīkritādbhāya), because it is conceivable as real (sattvena praṭītyarha) and because it is different from the supreme consciousness (cidbhinnatva). Besides, the qualifier part corresponds exactly to Prakāśātman’s definition of falsity, defended in AS’s dvītyamīthīyātva (Pellegrini, 2011: 444-445). So, it simply coincides with mithyā. Consequently, the vipratipattivākya will be reduced to this straightforward sentence: “Is the phenomenal world false or not?” (“vyāvahārikaprapaṇca mithyā na vā?”; AS, p. 5).

Advaitins consider this vipratipatti sentence the seed out of which sprouts the germ of doubt (saṃśaya) because, without suggesting a final solution, it presents two mutually contradictory positions: the falsity of the world (prapaṇcamithīyatva) vis-à-vis the reality of that world (prapaṇacasyatvata).

To understand the entire issue we must get back to the beginning of AS, where Madhusūdana clearly states that “proving a position by arguments (upapādana) takes place through the establishment of one’s own view and the rebuttal of the opponent’s view. Both acts are

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14 Here the main purpose is to highlight the nature of falsity (mithyātva). If we do not insert the adjective “the property of being cognised as real” (sattvena praṭītyarhhatva) it will result a contradiction flaw with the absolutely unreal entities (altika/sattuccha), like the son of a barren woman, the hare’s horn, etc. These “entities” are not false (mithyā) because they are not sublatable by any knowledge different from the knowledge of brahman, and, since they are absolutely non-existent, they are not cognisable by any cognition whatsoever. Moreover, they are different from supreme consciousness. Therefore, this qualification is necessary to avoid the said contradiction.

15 The last adjective “the property of being different from supreme consciousness” (cidbhinnatva = cidbheda) is necessary to avoid a contradiction of the disagreement sentence with the nature (svārtipa) of brahman itself, which is pure (suddha) and infinite (nirvacchinna) consciousness (cicittatartva). Thus, the property of being different from supreme consciousness is a distinctive mark of a false entity.

16 AS/SV/LC (p. 27): “tairavīśeṣaṇdvayaṁ tu tucebrahmaṁ ca bādhavāvāaṇāyyaḍaśaṇyāyam eva”. These three flaws, that of proving what is already proved (siddhastadhatu) and the two contradictions (badha), from another standpoint can simply be viewed as ativṛtyaśī.
accomplished by resorting to one among three kinds of debate (kathā): discussion (vāda, NyS I.2.1), sophistry (jalpa, NyS I.2.2) and cavil (vitaṇḍā, NyS I.2.3). The conclusion (parayavasāna) of vādakathā is the ascertainment of the truth (tattvanirnaya); the conclusion of jalpa is the victory (vijaya) or the defeat (nigraha); while the conclusion of vitaṇḍākathā is the mere refutation of the opponent’s view (khaṇḍanamātra) without presenting one’s own (AS/BB, p. 9).

At the beginning of the vāda and jalpa types of kathā, the judge of the debate (madhyastha) must utter the vipratipattivākya, because such a disagreement sentence generates a doubt (saṃśaya) into the debaters and into the audience. This initial doubt, according to Madhusūdana, is a constitutive part of the reflection (vicāra). On the other hand, if we interpret the term vicāra as inference (anumāna), then doubt becomes a fundamental element in formulating the subject of the inference (pakṣa) (Śukla, 2004: 21-23). In more simple words, it could be said that till the initial doubt (saṃśaya) is not clearly expressed, the debate cannot be undertaken (Matilal, 1999: 4).

Several centuries before Vatsyayana, commenting on NyS I.1.1, wrote that also the object of an inference should be a doubted one:

17 SV: “Debate is the extent of the sentences presenting the opponent’s and the proponent’s views as distinctly authored.” (p. 14: “kathā nāma nānākārāpārvottaraṇaṇkṣpratipadakāvyaśāstaraḥ”); or LC “Debate is the sentence aided by the five-members [of the syllogism].” (p 14: “pācaśavyavaparaparopetavākyaṃ kathā”)
18 The word vāda is translatable as “discussion”, and in Nyāyaśāstra (NyS, I.2.1) is defined: “pramāṇatarkasādhanopālaṃbhasa śiddhāntaviruddhaḥ pañcāvayaopapannopakṣpratipakṣaparipagaḥ vādak”; in LC takes a shorter and more useful shape (p. 14) “tattvabubhūsṇaḥ saha kathā.”
19 The jalpa is a “sophistry” (NyS, I.2.2): “yathoktopapannas ca chalaśāntigrahaśāsādhanopālambho jalpaḥ” in LC (p. 14) “vijigitaṃ sa kathāḥ.”
20 The third type of debate-mode is vitaṇḍā: “cavil” (NyS, I.2.3): “svapakṣasāśțhāpanāhino vitaṇḍāḥ”; in LC (p. 14) “svapakṣasāṭhāpanāhino kathā.”
21 AS/SV/LC (pp. 8, 14): “upapādanam ca svapakṣasādhanaoparapakṣanirākaraṇāḥ bhavatī tadbhayaṃ vādajalapavitandān dhanmin anyataṃ katham āṣrītaṃ sampādantiṃ.”
22 AS/SV/LC (p. 14): “tatra ca vipratipattiyasmatāyaasya vicārāṃgatvān madhyasthanadāv vipratipattiḥ pradarṣaṇaḥ.” “Among them, since the doubt generated from the disagreement sentence is a constitutive part of the reflection, at the beginning the judge should show the disagreement sentence.”
23 According to Balabhadrā’s SV, AS follows the discussion type of debate: “tasyaḥ vāda-kathāyāṃ ity arthaḥ, taretay asya vipratipattiḥ pradarṣaṇyeyeta anenāntayaḥ”. In addition, Madhusudana himself further in the text will use the word “ahamkāriṇaḥ” in the sense of “arrogant debater” (AS/SV/LC, p. 17) in order to designate someone who resorts to the jlipakatha and for showing his lack of interest towards sophistry. By his own admission, Madhusudana intended to produce a work of vāda (Gupta, 2006: 12). However, in AS’s fourth maṅgala verse it is said that the purpose of the text is twofold “bodhāya vādadvijāyaś ca” (“for the comprehension and the victory on the proponent”) where, if the term “bodhāya” refers to vādakathā, the compound “vādadvijāyaś” is undoubtedly connected with jlipakatha.
24 NySB (ad NyS, I.1.1): “nā ‘mupalabdhī na nirnīte ‘rthe nyōyaḥ pravartate. kīnārthiḥ samśayaite ‘rthe ...” See also NySB ad NyS I.1.41.
“the syllogism does not proceed towards an entity not perceived, or towards an entity already established. [Objection:] What’s then? [Answer:] [The syllogism proceeds] towards what is doubted ...”

4. Dvaitins’ position

Following in the text, from "yady api", Madhusūdana starts to present Dvaitins’ point of view as developed in Vyāsa’s Nyāyāmṛta (NyĀ). Even if Vyāsa himself presents the vipratipatti, he does not accept it as useful (upayogin) in the reflection/debate (vicāra). He writes that the vipratipatti sentence is used in accordance to the style of logicians, not because it is really useful. In fact, it does not generate a doubt, since those who are involved in the debate have already ascertained their respective positions and do not have any kind of doubt about them. So, from the disagreement sentence does not arise a real doubt to be dispelled and the vipratipatti itself is not necessary. If, notwithstanding, the rise of such a doubt would be accepted for a while, it cannot be maintained as fundamental part of the discussion and neither as indispensable constituent for inferential subject or inferential subjectness (pakṣata) considered in the sense demonstrated by Gangeśa’s Tattvacintāmaniri (hereafter TC).

I personally think that since the beginning Vyāsa aims at preventing the very formation of the mithyātvānumāna, showing that there are not the necessary causal presuppositions for constituting any inference whatsoever: nor the need of any doubt, neither any relevance of the vipratipatti sentence, and not even the formation of inferential subjectness.

Even the Navya Naiyāyikas do not accept doubt as constituent of the inferential subjectness (pakṣatāghaṭaka). According to them, whose methodology and technical terminology is fully utilized by Madhusūdana, the starting point is the definition of consideration

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25 Worth mentioning are some earlier connections with Madhusūdana’s view, at the beginning of Bhāmatt (BSBB, p. 2) Vācaspāti Mīra points out that the object of debate among expert philosophers should be something “doubted” (sandigdhā) and “useful” (sastrapajjana); “atha yad asandigdham aprayojanam ca na tat praksavatpratipitāsahec arah, vaḥa samanaksandraya- samnikṣajah sphitālokamadyavartāt ghatoh, karatadvānta vā ...” Another analogous instance is found at the very opening of the Sāmkhyaṭaṭtvavācaumūdī.

26 AS/SV/LC (pp. 14-15): “yady api vipratipattijayasaṃsāvyasya na pakṣatāsamptādaka-tapayogah, sādāhāvyavahahasthaśakrtasāhakamanābhāvaśarpyās tasyāḥ sāmānyaghaṭitaṇvāt.”

“Even though the doubt generated by the disagreement sentence is not useful in constructing the inferential subjectness, because that [inferential subjectness] whose shape is of an ‘absence of an establishing means of knowledge aided by the desire to infer’ is not constituted by the doubt...”

27 NyĀ/AS (p. 3) “idam ca vipratipattipradarṣānam tārākārtyadvokto na iti vastuṇaah.”
(parāmarśajñāna)\textsuperscript{28} which basically involves two notions: vyāpti (invariable concomitance) and pakṣadharma,\textsuperscript{29} that is the occurrence (vṛtti) of the probans in the inferential subject (pakṣa).\textsuperscript{30} This last concept is based on the notion of inferential subjectness (pakṣatā) and is directly responsible for the rise of the inferential knowledge (anumiti).

A question arises: what does make something fit to be the substratum of pakṣatā, namely, the subject or the pakṣa of an inference? Roughly speaking pakṣatā or inferential subjectness is the property of being the inferential subject, which is directly responsible for the rise of inferential knowledge (anumiti). This is a psychological requirement for inference: before inferring something there should be certainty concerning the conditions under which inference is possible and, among them, pakṣatā has an essential importance (Bhattacharya, 1978: 76). What’s more, if parāmarśa is the positive cause of the inference, pakṣatā can be viewed as the negative one (abhāvīya-kāraṇa) (Dravid, 2007: xvii–xix).\textsuperscript{31}

Gaṅgeśa discusses four different definitions of inferential subjectness (pakṣatā). Three are refuted whilst the last results flawless. The first definition analysed and refuted is the so-called “doubt-subjectness” (saṃśayapakṣatā), accepted by ancient (prācīna) Naiyāyikas;\textsuperscript{32} “inferential subjectness is being endowed with the property of a doubtful probandum”\textsuperscript{33} Gaṅgeśa rejects this definition

\textsuperscript{28} The Kārikāvalī (K/NM. II.68a; Vattanky, 2003: 88–91) defines consideration (parāmarśa) as: “vyāpyasya pakṣavṛtti vādānām parāmarśa ucaya”; “consideration is said to be the cognition of the occurrence of the pervaded [= probans] in the inferential subject”; while TS/D/NyB (p. 34): “vyāptivṛtti pakṣadharma jātānām parāmarśaḥ”, “consideration is the cognition of the occurrence of the probans in the inferential subject, qualified by the invariable concomitance [between the probans and the probandum]”. Consideration is the direct cause of inferential knowledge (anumiti): “inferential knowledge is the cognition born out of the consideration” (TS/D/NyB, p. 34: “parāmarśajñānam jñānam anumitiḥ”).

\textsuperscript{29} TS/D/NyB (p. 34) directly adapts the definition to the locus classicus of the inference (parvata vāhīnānām, dhiṃtāḥ): “vyāpyasya parvata vṛtti vādānām pakṣadharmaḥ.”

\textsuperscript{30} While the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) has been treated in the preceding part of TC, in order to explain parāmarśa, pakṣadharma must be properly understood (TCP, p. 1: “vyāpti-niratāpanīntara pakṣadharmaḥ nirāpyaye ...”).

\textsuperscript{31} I’d just like to remind that among the nine types of common causes (sādāhāraṇokārya) regarding all the effects, Naiyāyikas accept also the causality (kāraṇa) of the absence (abhāva), namely the antecedent absence (prāgābha) and absence of the obstructing element (pravāhika-abhāva).

\textsuperscript{32} The TCP (p. 3) presents the definition in this form: “saṃśayaḥsaṃśayadharmaḥvātānām pakṣatravam.” The same definition is also expressed as “saṃśayadharmaḥvātānām pakṣatravam” (translated above) and alternatively translatable as “inferential subjectness is the property of being endowed with a doubtful probandum” (AS, p. 2; TCP, Introduction: 2). In the second instance the possessive (matvarthya) vātUP affix (prat ya) clearly helps to understand the definition. The first one might be viewed as a bahuvrthi compound as well. For a thorough explanation of the several interpretative options see Rāmānuja Tatācārya’s Bālabodhini (TCP, pp. 5–8).

\textsuperscript{33} The closest occurrence to this definition is in Śivāditya’s Saptapadārthi (SP, p. 113):
arguing that doubt cannot have any direct involvement in the emergence of inference, since the perception of the inferential mark (liṅgarāṇa), the recollection of vyāpti (vyāptimāraṇa), etc., occur in the wake of doubt about the probandum. Only then inference arises. Hence, inference is not dependent on doubt. Ergo, since the cause is immediately antecedent to its effect (kāryaniyatapūrvavṛtti), between them there should not be any time-gap (avyavahāta). In our example doubt ceases to exist two moments before inference, because it has to leave room for other psychological events constitutive of the consideration (parāmarśa) and the subsequent inference (Bhattacharya, 1978: 78). Then Gangeśa, after refusing other two definitions, proposes his own, which is adopted also by Madhusūdana and Vyāsa: "the inferential subject is where there is the absence of an establishing

"sandhyasādhyadharmanavopāttavam paksatvam". In the Nyāyaśāstra (p. 452) it is also found a reference to Janakāṅna's Nyāyaśāsādhāntamanājijī (NySMa, p. 111) "śa ca sādhyavattvena sandhyamānatvam". It should be noted that TS/D/Nyb (p. 43) keeps the old definition: "sandhyasādhyatvam paksāb".

For explaining this passage I need to refer to a few Nyāya tenets. First of all, it is well known the rule according to which a specific quality (vīśesaguna), having as its locus (adhikarana) a pervasive substance (vibhadrārya) worthy of being perceived (yogya), is destroyed by the emergence in that same locus of another immediately subsequent specific quality (NSM ad K 127, p. 244): "yogavrīdhivīśesagunaṇāṁ svottaravārisyogeśavāt..." The Self (ātman) is this kind of pervasive substance and doubt is one among its specific qualities (vīśesaguna). Besides, it should be kept in mind that each and every specific quality lasts for three instants (kaṇa): emergence (uippati), permanence (sthiti) and destruction (nāsālaya). This is the process: in the first instant a specific quality is born, in the second persists and in the third is destroyed. Two specific qualities cannot emerge in the same instant (ekakālamātvedena) and in the same locus (ekadhikaranaśvaymedena), but once one vīśesaguna arises, it passes to its second instant and, only during the second instant of the first vīśesaguna, another vīśesaguna can arise in that same locus. Thus, when the second vīśesaguna is in the sthitiṣekṣaṇa, then the first is in the third moment, the layakṣaṇa, so it is destroyed. This same displaying order pertains to any other vīśesaguna arising in the third instant of the first vīśesaguna, and in the second of the second vīśesaguna. Now, let’s briefly analyse the present situation: if paksata were the doubt (saṃdeha) regarding the probandum and the cause of inferential knowledge, it should be present in the first moment. After that, following the inferential process, there is the perception of inferential mark (liṅgarāṇa), subsequently the recollection of the invariable concomitance (vyāptimāraṇa), then the consideration (parāmarśa) and, at last the inferential knowledge (anumāna). So, according to the previously mentioned rules, doubt is destroyed at the emergence of vyāptimāraṇa, ergo it cannot be considered a direct cause of parāmarśa, and even least of anumāna (TCP, Introduction: 3).

Then Gangeśa (TCP, p. 55) cites this definition: "śadhaḥkābdhahapramanābhavah", "the absence of an establishing or contradicting prove". Gangeśa rejects saying that in presenting both – the absence of śiddhi and bhāda – there is a redundancy: just either is enough for inference. The other definition called ichchāpaksata might have been formulated by Vīcaspāla "śadhaḥviṣistasa-dhyadharma dharnti paksab" (TCP, pp. 57, 63), "the inferential subject is the qualified element (dharma) having as property the probandum, which is the object of the desire to infer" (Bhattacharya, 1978: 78-79). Although someone knows the nature of the Self from scriptures and accordingly aims at liberation, if he desires to infer (śadhaḥviṣita) its existence he might take recourse to inference. In fact, TCP (p. 63) adds "the lovers of inferential arguments desire to know through inference also an entity already well cognised by means of a direct perception" (pratipaksaparīkṣapātaṃ any eva tathābharavānāna bhūtvatvān tarkarākidāḥ). Gangeśa refutes also this option, because the desire to infer is separated by a time-gap, so it cannot be direct cause. Conversely, even without any śadhaḥviṣita whatsoever, through the roar of a cloud that very cloudy or rain can be inferred. In fact, desire to infer does not precede the inference for one’s own sake (svārthānumāna) (Bhattacharya, G. M., 78-79; Rai, 1995: 3-4).
means of knowledge aided by the absence of the desire to infer”. As a consequence, the property residing into the pakṣa, capable of making such an inferential subject a pakṣa, is indeed pakṣatā. This definition clarifies the occurrence of inference in such cases where causal factors of perception, such as the ascertainment of a probandum etc., are present and accompanied by a desire to infer. It has two parts: the qualifier one “siṣṭhadāyasāvirahasahakrta”, which means “qualified by the absence of the desire to infer” (anumitsābhavaviṣṭa) and the qualificand one “śādhakapramāṇa”, corresponding to “ascertainment” (siddhi/niścaya). This is the reason why this definition involves a qualified absence (viṣṭābhāva): absence of a causal factor coupled with the absence of the desire to infer. This qualified absence is conditioned by three possible alternatives (Rai, 1995: 1):

1. viśeṣyābhāvaprayuktaviṣṭābhāva: absence qualified by the absence of the qualificand (viśeṣya);
2. viśeṣanābhāvaprayuktaviṣṭābhāva: absence qualified by the absence of the qualifier (viśeṣaṇa);
3. ubhayābhāvaprayuktaviṣṭābhāva: absence qualified by the absence of both [qualificand and qualifier] (ubhaya).

Once these cases are applied to the definition of inferential subjectness (pakṣatā) we are lead to four options:

A. the ascertainment of the probandum (sādhyaśiddhi [= niścaya]) qualified by a desire to infer (corresponding to viśeṣanābhāvaprayuktaviṣṭābhāva);
B. absence of the ascertainment of the probandum (sādhyaśiddhi) qualified by the absence of desire (corresponding to viśeṣyābhāvaprayuktaviṣṭābhāva);
C. absence of the ascertainment of the probandum (sādhyaśiddhi) qualified by the desire to infer (corresponding to ubhayābhāvaprayuktaviṣṭābhāva).

In all these cases we shall get the conditions for pakṣatā, so that the inferential judgement arise; but not in the fourth case:

D. the ascertainment of the probandum is not qualified by the desire to infer (TCP, Introduction: 5-6).

As a consequence, Vyāsa says that on accepting as pakṣatā the

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36 TCP (pp. 64, 66); “siṣṭhadāyasāvirahasahakṛtasādhakapramāṇābhāvah yatra asti sa pakṣaḥ”; K/NSM (II.170; Vatanky, 2003: 201): “siṣṭhadāyasva śāṣṭryā siddhir yatra na vidyate i sā pakṣas tatra vṛttivajjantad anumitr bhavet il” and the following remark of NSM (pp. 496-497; Vatanky, 2003: 201-205) “siṣṭhadāyasāvirahasahāviṣṭasiddhyābhāvah pakṣatā, tadān pakṣa ity arthah ...”
doubt regarding the *probandum* in the *pakṣa*, we will have to face a severe flaw. Supposing that someone has realised the highest liberating knowledge “I am *brahman*”, through the constant meditation on the meaning of *mahāvākyas*, if he successively has the desire to establish again the same by means of an inference like “I am *brahman*, because I am of the nature of Being, Consciousness and Beatitude” (AS, p. 3: “ahaṃ brahma saccidānandarūpatvāt”), then, since there is no more a doubt regarding the *probandum* in the *pakṣa*, it will result impossible to have such an inference. But we know that also such an inference might occur. In fact, on that occasion the definition of *pakṣatā* is present in its form as “absence qualified by the absence of qualifier” (*viśeśanābhāva-prayuktaviśiṣṭābhāva*): there is the ascertainment of the *probandum* and also the desire to infer (*anumṛtsā*), thus we have *pakṣatā* and the following inferential knowledge.

But, as maintained by Vyāsa, by Navyas and, to some extent, by Madhustūdana as well, this definition it is not tenable, so it cannot be admitted that doubt is a constitutive part of inference. Furthermore, the *vipratipatti* itself is not able to cause the rise of doubt in the proponent (*vādin*) and in the opponent (*prativādin*), because they are already sure about their respective positions. Therefore, for the debate or the inference, there is not any relevance of the doubt generated by uttering the *vipratipattivākyā*.

Furthermore, *pārvapaksin* goes on postulating a possible utility of doubt: if in the debaters, because of their ascertainment about their own points of view (*viśeśadarśanasadbhāvena*), does not appear a spontaneous doubt, then why not to admit a hypothetical doubt? In

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37 These remarks recall the discussion of TCP (pp. 55–57) concerning the rebuttal of *samsāyapaksata*. As explained earlier, this kind of *pakṣata* is not accepted by Navyas, because according to the scriptural passage “*śrūtyavo maṇḍavyo niḥlidhyāśītyavah*” (“should be heard, should be reflected, should be meditated upon”, BrU II.4.5) once something has been perceived and comprehended through hearing (*śravaṇa*), there is a subsequent reflection (*manana*). Here the word “*manana*” conveys nothing but inference (*anumāna*). So, *samsāyapaksata* contradicts the quoted upanisadic passage. In fact, once gained the scriptural knowledge whose content is the Self, it is not likely to have a doubt about the same. Moreover, there cannot even be an inference with the same object, because there is no trace of its cause, namely *pakṣatā* in form of *samsāya*.

38 AS/SV/LC (p. 15): “anyathā śṛūtyo maṇḍavyo ‘numītasya tadanumānam na syai, vādyādīnāṃ nīcāvavattavena saṁsāyosadbhāvād ahāryasaṁsāyasyātipprasahjakaravac ca’.” “Otherwise, someone who has realised the Self through [the teachings of] śṛūty, will not formulate its [= of the Self] inference [even] with a desire to infer [it], and since the debater and others [= the proponent and the opponent] have ascertained [their own positions], the doubt will not be possible and there will be an undue extension into hypothetical doubt (ahāryasaṁsāya).”

39 The hypothetical kind of doubt (ahāryasaṁsāya) is defined as: “ahāryasaṁsāyāḥ tathāhaṁ ‘vahyabhāvavān hrado vahinīmān na vā’ ity ākārakam”, “[the hypothetical doubt is] a cognition produced by a desire, simultaneous with its [own] contradiction. For example, it has this shape: ‘is the lake endowed with the absence of fire, possessed of fire or not?’” (AS, p.
fact, considering the statement of Vācaspati Miśra’s NyVṬ (ad NySBV I.1.1) “only two persons who have an ascertained knowledge carry on a discussion” (niścita hu vādam kurutah) according to which the vādin and the prativādin involve themselves into a debate only having ascertained their respective positions about a certain subject, there is no room for the rise of any effective doubt. And, if we were to accept for a while the utility of the doubt, then this doubt would acquire a hypothetical nature (āhāryatvena). Consequently, if the hypothetical doubt were a causal constituent (prayaṇaka) of the inferential subjectness (pakhṣatā), then we will also have to face the undesired event of the hypothetical consideration (āhāryoparāmarśa) being the cause of the inferential knowledge (anumiti). In fact here the hypothetical judgement wouldn’t be obstructed (pratibandhita) by a specific ascertainment. Thus, we will have to face the problem (āpatti) of explaining the rise of the consideration and of the inferential knowledge out of the hypothetical doubt (āhāryasamśaya).40 But this is clearly impossible, because if someone has already established the probandum and has not any desire to infer something, he will surely not infer anything. Actually, in that situation there is no kind of pakhṣatā, be it considered as Prācīnas do or according to Navyas. The conclusion of the pūrvapakṣin is therefore that the doubt born out of the disagreement sentence cannot be accepted as a part of the reflection/inference.

At last, the pūrvapakṣin41 intends to show that the vipratipatti isn’t a part of the reflection/inference, not only indirectly, but also directly (śākṣat = without generating the doubt). The vipratipattivākya serves to make accept (parigraha) to the vādin and the prativādin their own specific positions (pratipakṣa = pratiṇiyatapakṣa) about one single issue (pakṣa = dharmin). For this reason, it cannot be main-

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3. See also Nyāyakośa (pp. 135-136) and the remarks on the fact that āhārya “cognition is perceptual and it is supposed to take place in defiance of the contradictory perception ...” (Dravid, 1996: 166-167).

40. LC (p. 15): “sāṃśayasā āhāryahetuvasvākāsya. atiprasaṭṭjakavāt āhāryaparāmarśadhetuvāpaksakavāt.” The AS/BB (p. 12) interprets the passage stating that as far as the cause of the inferential knowledge is concerned, the hypothetical doubt cannot be a constitutive criteria of the inferential subjectness, since it is exceedingly extensive: “āhāryasamśayasyānunītihetu-vā “atiprasamgena pakhatsavāprayaṇakavāt”.

41. AS/SV/LC (pp. 15-16): “nāpi vipratipatteḥ svarūpata eva pakṣapratipakṣaparigrahaḥphala-kātyopayogah. ’treyedam sādhanyakam; ’anenedam dīrṣṭanyam’ iṣṭādhyauhauhauḥkāyāt eva tātāhbhena vipratipattivāryakavāt.” “Moreover, the disagreement sentence is indeed of no-use even by its own nature, [namely] by producing as result (phalakātaya) the acceptance [of their own positions] by the opponent and the proponent. In fact, since we get it [= the position of both] simply from the sentence of the judge such as ‘You should establish this’, ‘he should refute this’, there will be no relevance at all of the disagreement sentence.”
tained that it must be first uttered by the judge (*madhyastha*), because this result — i.e., the acceptance of respective positions — happens through command sentences (*ājnāvākyā*) of the *madhyastha*, such as: “You must establish this”, “He must refute this”, so the utterance of the *vipratipattivākya* is irrelevant (*anyathāsiddha*). Vyāsa 42 also writes that the *vipratipatti* is useless not only in the formation of *pakṣa* but also as far as the *probandum* is concerned, because both are actually presented by the proposition (*pratijñāvākya*). 43

5. Madhusūdana’s reply

The word “*tathāpi*” 44 marks *siddhāntin*’s reply. 45 He says that, since the definition of *pakṣata* is not constructed around the concept of the doubt (*saṃśaya-aghaṭita*) and even though the doubt generated by the utterance of the *vipratipattivākya* is not a constitutive part of the inferential subjectness, nevertheless the doubt is a part of the reflection/inference. This is why it presents the property of being a counter-positive of the absence of the doubt, and this absence of doubt is caused by the reflection/inference, which brings about certainty.

Here, in my opinion, the pivotal word for the entire explanation of Madhusūdana is *vyudasantyatayā*. As pointed out in *Viśhaleśīya* (a gloss on LC), this word cannot merely be interpreted as “because the

42 NyĀ/AS (pp. 3-4): “*nāpi sādhypasthiyarthān vipratipattivākyām pratijñāvākyenaiva tat-siddheḥ ...*”, “The disagreement sentence [is not relevant] even for the presentation of the *probandum*, because that [function] it is entirely satisfied by the proposition sentence.”

43 NyS I.1.33. The proposition is the first member of the syllogism, which mentions together the subject (*pakṣa*) as well as the *probandum* (*sādhyā*). That’s why in traditional circles it is also defined: “*sādhyaśīśṭa-pakṣābodhanaśaśca-vacanān*”, “the sentence which produces the knowledge of the subject qualified by the *probandum*.” (Śukla, 2005: 21-23).

44 Here, the *pūrva-pakṣin* could have posed a question. There is a clear mutual contradiction (*parasparavirodha*) in the two parts of this AS’s sentence: first it is said “*anumānyanāgatavato ‘pi*” and a few words later “*vicārāṅgatvam asyta eva*”. The purport of the sentence results: even though the doubt generated by the *vipratipatti* is not a part of the inference, it is nevertheless a part of it. But the *siddhāntin* wants to say that the doubt generated by the *vipratipatti*, being a part of the reflection, must consequently be also a part of the inference, namely the *pakṣa*. In order to avoid this incongruence (*saṃsaṅgati*) LC (pp. 16-17) interprets the adverb “*tathāpi*” as “*tathāvidhām*”. The opponent has stated that doubt is not a part of reflection/inference in two ways: as a constituent of the *pakṣa* and as having as result the capacity of making accept their respective positions to the *vādin* and the *pratitivādin*. But he failed to note that for the same two reasons also the *siddhāntin* does not accept the doubt as a part of the reflection/inference. On the contrary, he accepts the *vicārāṅgatvalanumānajñāgatvam* of the doubt as *vyudasantyatayā*. According to LC the twice repeated indeclinable “*api*” (the first in “*tathāpi*” and the second in “*anumānajñāgatavato ‘pi*”) has different meanings: the first means “*eva*” (*evakārāhaka*), while the second, not used in a concessive sense as could be intended from its position, indicates a mere conjunction (*samuccayārtha*).

45 AS/VS/LC (pp. 16-17): “*tathāpi vipratipattiyasamasyasyaśu-anumānajñāgatavato ‘pi vyudasantyatayā vicārāṅgatvam asy eva*”, “Anyway, even though the doubt risen from the disagreement sentence is not a constitutive part of the inferential knowledge, it is surely endowed with the property of being a part [of the inference], being it to be negated (*vyudasantyatayā*).”
doubt has to be dispelled, eliminated" (nirākaraṇīyatayā/nivartanīyatayā).\textsuperscript{46} But as explained in LC as “vicārasādhābhāvapratiyogitaya”.\textsuperscript{47} This means that what is to be accomplished (sādhyā) by the vicāra is the result (phala) of vicāra. This result is the absence of doubts (samśayabhāva) and the counter-positive (pratiyogin) of the absence of doubt is doubt itself, and the pratiyogitā resides in doubt. Therefore, doubt becomes a part of the vicāra since it is endowed with the property of being a counter-positive of its own absence (pratiyogitaya). The sense of this reasoning is that without reflecting it is not possible to dispel (nivṛtti) the doubt generated by a sentence like “prapañcino mithyā satyam vā?” Consequently, it is the duty of the judge to generate a doubt concerning the reality or the falsity of the world through the utterance of vipratipattivākya. If the judge (madhyastha) does not utter the vipratipatti doubt does not arise, so the debate results useless, being the purpose of the debate the eradication of every doubt. Therefore, doubt generated by the vipratipatti is a constitutive part (āṅga) of the vicāra.

Moreover,\textsuperscript{48} even though the same doubt is not generated by the vipratipattivākya due to the presence of an obstructing agent (pratibandhaka) in form of ascertainment about a specific view (niścayaśirūpa), it has anyway to be accepted that vipratipatti sentence, maintained as constitutive part of the reflection/inference, still conveys an immanent quality towards doubt, which represents that type of causality (kāraṇatva) called innate capability (svarūpa-yogyatā).\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{46} Vijnāhaleśya on LC (p. 17): “vyudasantyayaty eta vyudāso na nivṛttiḥ, nātāpi vipratipatter anuprayogatā”, “Here in the term ‘vyudasantsyayā’ the word ‘negation’ is not an ‘elimination’, because in that eventuality there would not be any use of the disagreement sentence ...”

\textsuperscript{47} LC (p. 17): “vyudasantasayayā vicārasādabhāvapratiyogitaya ...”

\textsuperscript{48} AS/SV/LC (p. 17): “vādrasamśayaman prati vipratipatīh kvaçin niścayaśirūpā pratiyakṣhād ajanakarte ‘pi svarūpāyayogavatvā, vādāntāt ca niścayaśirūpa manomāyavatā.” “But somewhere [= in some cases] even if the disagreement sentence has not the capacity to generate [the doubt], because of the opposition [represented] by an ascertainment etc., [anyhow] there is an innate capability [to generate such a doubt]; in fact, there is not a fix rule concerning the proponent and the other persons involved in a debate] as being endowed with a [precise] ascertainment (8).” According to LC’s interpretation, with the term “svarūpāyayogatvā” Madhusūdana intends “svarūpāyayatvāvarśikākaraṇāt”. Among the several classifications of causality, we also have svarūpasākāraṇatva and jñātasaikāraṇatva. When a cause is such only by being present (vartāmaṇa) even without the need of knowing its causality, it is called svarūpasākāraṇa. For example, without knowing that fire burns, it is nevertheless the cause of burning (dakṣakārya). On the other hand, some causes have a direct bear to the emergence of an effect only by knowing their specific causality. These are called jñātasaikāraṇas. For instance, if we need to know Madhusūdana’s reply to Vyāsa, we must read AS. So, to know the effect, namely Madhusūdana’s reply, we must have the knowledge of AS, which is the cause.

\textsuperscript{49} That is the reason why Vacaspāti Miśra in his NyāTT (ad NyŚBV I.2.1) wrote: “anadhigata-tattvadādāh, sāmātayanivṛttiḥ, adhyavastayādhyavanyajñānam iti phalāni trīṇi”, “Three are the results [of the debate]: comprehension of a reality not previously known, dispelling of doubts, and
Subsequently, Madhusūdana refutes the previous statement according to which the vādin and the pratīvādin must be sure of their respective positions.\textsuperscript{50} He says that there is not such a rule (niyama). In fact it is not possible to formulate this invariable concomitance (vyāpti = niyama),\textsuperscript{51} because it deviates (vyabhicārita) towards the position of that arrogant (ahaṃkārin)\textsuperscript{52} opponent (parapakṣa) who, to show his dialectical skills, assumes for a while the position of his own adversary resorting to the jalpa type of debate.\textsuperscript{53} In the sentence written by Vācaspati Miśra “niścitau hi vādaṃ kurutah”, the word “niścitau” is used for those who have an “ābhīmānikaniścayābhīprāyam”. I believe that this compound can be interpreted in two ways: “those who just pretend to have the certainty about something” or, it can be better paraphrased, in the sense that even if the two debaters are actually without a real ascertainment, they address each other in this way “I’m sure of the reality of duality”, “I’m sure of the falsity of duality”, and only then their debate begins.

Concluding his introductory remarks, Madhusūdana says that having established that the vipratīpatti sentence is a cause of the reflection/inference, in order to accomplish his duty, the madhyastha should utter this very sentence, together with all the other rules and regulations of the debate (samayabandhādi).\textsuperscript{54}

6. Conclusion

Later on in the text, Madhusūdana seems to come back to an

\textsuperscript{50} AS/SV/LC (p. 17): “... ‘niścitau hi vādaṃ kurutah’ ity ābhīmānikaniścayābhīprāyam, parapakṣanā ālambyāpy āhaṃkārinā vijñaptaniścayāvato jalpādau pravartitadarśanāḥ,” “... ‘Only two persons having an ascertained knowledge carry on the discussion’ this is the meaning given by someone who pretends to have an ascertainment; because the arrogant [debater], endowed with an opposed ascertainment taking up [for a while] the rival’s point of view, is seen to resort to sophistry (jalpa) and other [similar methods of debate].”

\textsuperscript{51} AS (p. 4) proposes this kind of invariable concomitance: “yatra yatra vādyādīnām anyatamadhatvān tatra tatra svapakṣaniścayāvattvām”, “wherever there is one among the proponent and the others, there, there is the possessing of the ascertainment of one’s own point of view…”

\textsuperscript{52} Using this word Madhusūdana shows that the seeker or the knower of truth doesn’t behave like that. See note 19.

\textsuperscript{53} LC (p. 17): “ābhīmānikaniścayābhīprāyam, niścayāvān asmitti jñāpayantau vivade ety arhatam. taḥā ca vādinor niścayakāle sahāpayādīnām sanśrayābhāvan adātyā vicitre pravṛtī tī bhāvaḥ.” “[The expression] ābhīmānikaniścayābhīprāyam’ means that two persons debate addressing [each other] in this way ‘I have an ascertainment!’. So, while the debaters are in this time of ascertainment, they approach discussion with regard to the absence of doubt of the president of the assembly [judge = madhyasṭha] and the other [members]. This is the idea.”

\textsuperscript{54} AS/SV/LC (p. 18): “tasmāt samayabandhādivat svakartāyaśnirvāhīya madhyastheṇa vipratīpatīḥ pradarsāntayaiva”, “Therefore, in order to accomplish his own duty, the judge should surely prevent the disagreement sentence just like [other] rules and regulations of the debate.”
alternative suggestion, precisely that an essential condition for inference, if not doubt itself, is at least the absence of certainty or want of proof, since every operation of the means of knowledge presents an acquisition of some novel knowledge, which was not earlier available (Sundaram, 1984: 67).\(^5\)

At any rate, what clearly emerges from Madhusūdana’s analysis is that there is not any kind of obstruction or logical flaw in uttering the vipratipatti sentence, which is useful in generating a doubt, essential for the formulation of the inferential subject (pakṣa) and the probandum (sādhyā) of the mīthyaśānaṃ, as well as the consequent continuation of the debate.

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BSBB = Brahmaśastrarāśāṅkarabhadhyāya śrīgovindāṅrāndakṛtyāḥ bhāsyaratnaprabhāyāḥ śrīvācaspatimārātricātyāḥ bhāṣāyāḥ śrīmadānandagīrīpraptaḥ śrīyāntānyena samupetam.

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55 AS/SV/LC (p. 29): “pakṣatvaṃ tu śādhyasyadhevatvaṃ śādhyasacaraśadhaḥkāma-nābhāvavatvaṃ va,” “But the inferential subjectness is the property of being endowed with a doubtful probandum or the property of being endowed with the absence of an establishing means of knowledge whose content is the probandum.”
IS THERE ANY NEED FOR DOUBT?


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