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This is a pre print version of the following article:

Original Citation:

Availability:

This version is available <http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1508434> since 2016-10-18T08:56:04Z

Published version:

DOI:10.1007/s10781-014-9240-9

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2

3 “Old is Gold!” Madhusūdana Sarasvatī’s Way 4 of Referring to Earlier Textual Tradition

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8 **Abstract** Madhusūdana Sarasvatī wrote several treatises on Advaita philosophy.
9 His *magnum opus* is the *Advaitasiddhi*, written in order to reply to the keen
10 objections moved by the Dvaitin Vyāsātīrtha’s *Nyāyāmṛta*. *Advaitasiddhi* is verily a
11 turning point into the galaxy of Vedānta, not only as far as its replies are concerned,
12 but also for the reutilization of earlier vedāntic material and its reformulation by
13 means of the highly sophisticated language of the new school of logic. This article is
14 an attempt to contextualize Madhusūdana’s works in a broader context through
15 three looking glasses: (1) the analysis of how Madhusūdana refers to his own works,
16 in order to reconstruct a relative chronology among them; (2) Madhusūdana’s
17 adherence to the tenets of the previous Advaita tradition, how much he is indebted
18 to Vyāsātīrtha, how he quotes him and how he replies to him; (3) Madhusūdana’s
19 acquaintance with other textual traditions, mainly Vyākaraṇa, Pūrva Mīmāṃsā and
20 Nyāya.

21

22 **Keywords** Advaita Vedānta · Madhusūdana Sarasvatī · *Advaitasiddhi* ·
23 Reverse indebtedness · Vyāsātīrtha · Textual reuse

Abbreviations Not Contained in the Bibliography

- 24 PM *Pramāṇamālā*
25 BG *Bhagavadgītā*
26 BS *Brahmasūtra*
27 BṛU *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*
28 MS *Madhusūdana Sarasvatī*
29 LC *Laghucandrikā*
30 VT *Vyāsa Tīrtha*
31 SŚSS *Samkṣepaśārīrakasārasaṃgraha*

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32 Structure and Finalities

33 This contribution deals with a philosophical network among philosophers, mainly
34 focusing on Advaita Vedānta as interpreted by one of the greatest *ācāryas* of the
35 pre-modern era: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (hereafter MS). Through the looking glass
36 of his masterpiece, the *Advaitasiddhi* (hereafter AS) and his other minor works, I
37 shall try to work out a general understanding of how Advaita authors of that period
38 used diversified materials in their works.

39 In MS's textual production there is a huge quantity of quotations, acknowledged
40 and not acknowledged references, hints and presuppositions. In this article I shall
41 highlight three layers of material used by MS:

- 42 (1) Cross-references: MS's quotations, references and hints at his own works;
- 43 (2) Quotations from Advaita material: reference, defence, re-evaluation and
44 reformulation of earlier authors' statements, adherence to the textual tradition
45 because quoting and referring to previous *ācāryas* strengthens one's own
46 position;
- 47 (3) Other schools' material: replies to the Dvaita *Nyāyāmṛta* and references
48 (acknowledged or unacknowledged) to texts or doctrines of other schools.

50 In the works of MS we easily feel his continuous attempt to interpret the efforts
51 of earlier Advaita *ācāryas* towards a common and unique aim, which is epitomized
52 in the title of his *magnum opus*: *Advaitasiddhi*. Apart from the first two sections of
53 this article, the rest of the analysis is thus especially focused on AS and his relation
54 with earlier sources. In order to better put in context MS's works, the first section is
55 an introduction dedicated to drawing a preliminary sketch of the historical and
56 cultural period, beginning with the emergence of the Navya Nyāya style and its
57 capillary diffusion, the long lasting debate between Dvaita and Advaita,
58 Vyāsatīrtha's (henceforth VT) utilization of *navya* style to demolish Advaita
59 positions, the consequent reply by MS and his adaptation of Advaita tenets to Navya
60 Nyāya technical terminology.

61 The second section is a survey on MS's works (case (1) above). It attempts to
62 establish a relative chronology among them and investigate how MS used his own
63 writings in others works. One notices that MS rarely copied and pasted passages or
64 discussions from one text to another. If this happens, it is just in the earlier stages of his
65 production. Many discussions are repeated, when but their subject is the same.
66 However, whenever MS approaches some issue already treated elsewhere, he simply
67 cross-refers and, closing the parenthesis, sends the reader to his own other text. Even
68 when dealing with similar issues, there is a precise differentiating balance which leads
69 to implementing his discussion with ever new materials, discussions and vocabulary.
70 As pointed out by Torella (2011, pp. 178–179) concerning the various recipients of
71 Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvr̥tti* and *Īśvarapratyabhijñā-vivṛtivimarśinī*,
72 MS's works are different because of their different *adhikārin*s.

73 The third section of this article is devoted to a rapid glance at Advaita literature
74 and MS's extensive knowledge of it (case (2)). To discharge the previous *ācāryas*
75 from the objections of VT, MS is compelled to quote many passages by VT. In fact,
76 polemical texts like AS are constructed following an established pattern so that they



77 are primarily focused on refuting opponents in extremely technical terms (this
78 constitutes a “reverse indebtedness”, see *infra*, Sect. IV.1). This, of course,
79 presupposes a great textual expertise on the part of the recipient of the text, because
80 the authors only give some clues about discussions held elsewhere and leave their
81 recollection to the scholarly background of the readers. The last section is a
82 rudimental attempt to show how much MS is acquainted with and how he re-uses
83 other *śāstras* (case (3)).

84 I will also attempt to show how the later Advaita way of referring and quoting is
85 apparently quite far from the modern concept of plagiarism.¹ In AS we find many
86 features and expressive modalities shared with other *śāstras*, but expressed in
87 Vedāntic terms. For instance, we deal with *verbatim* quotations from *Upaṇiṣads* (see
88 UP), re-propositions *verbatim* and *ad sensum* of well-known Advaitic doctrines and
89 references from earlier *ācāryas* (see Conclusions).

90 I Contextualization

91 From the X–XI century onwards, Advaitins shifted their attention to a different
92 referent for their attacks and confutations, mainly the Naiyāyikas and later on the
93 realist schools of Vedānta, whereas the previous adversaries like Sāṃkhyas and
94 Buddhists were just nominally inserted into the debates (Deshpande 1997, p. 460, n.
95 15). This trend is witnessed by texts of the calibre of *Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāḍya*
96 (hereafter KKK) of Śrīharṣa (XII century) and *Tattvaprādīpikā* (or *Citsukhī*,
97 hereafter TP) of Citsukha Muṇi (1220 ca., Potter 2006, p. 602; XIII CE, Sharma
98 1974, pp. 1–4; Divanji 1933, pp. CVIII–CX), which vehemently and sophisticatedly
99 questioned Naiyāyikas’ positions.

100 The Dvaita school of Vedānta emerged between the XIII and the XIV century,
101 due to Madhva’s work (or Ānanda Tīrtha, 1238–1317, Sharma 1981, pp. 77–79).²
102 In his writings, in particular in his *Anuvyākhyāna* commentary on *Brahmasūtra*
103 (hereafter BS), Madhva vehemently addressed the Advaitins and their *siddhāntas* as
104 the main adversaries, consequently directing the dialectical dispute with the
105 Naiyāyikas towards other frontiers. After Madhva comes an early stage of
106 development of dualist writings, culminating in the “standardization of Dvaita
107 thought” (Sharma 1981, p. 235) under the encyclopaedic genius of Jaya Tīrtha
108 (1365–1388, Sharma 1981, p. 245).³ This author won the title of *ṭīkācārya* for the

¹ See, in this volume, Doctor (section 5.1) and Neri (Conclusions).

² According to Dasgupta, who significantly anticipates the dates of this author, Madhva was born in 1197 (IV, 1991, p. 52). After entering *saṃnyāsa*, he became the head of the Aṣṭa Maṭha of Uḍipi. As *ācārya* of Dvaita Vedānta, he focused his keen refutation of Śaṃkara and his direct disciples, Sureśvara (IX cen.) and Padmapāda (IX cen.), as well as later important Advaita authors (Dasgupta 1991, p. 104) such as Sarvajñātman (between the end of the IX cen. and the beginning of the X cen.), Vācaspati Mīśra (X cen.) and Vimuktātman (XI cen.).

³ Following Dasgupta (1991, pp. 93–94), Jaya Tīrtha was a disciple of Akṣobhya Tīrtha (1230–1247), pupil and successor of Padmanātha Tīrtha (after Narahari Tīrtha, 1204–1213, and Mādhava Tīrtha, 1214–1230), a direct disciple and head of the Maṭha after Madhva (1197–1204). Jaya Tīrtha headed the Maṭha from 1247 to 1268.



109 *Nyāyasudhā*, a highly sophisticated sub-commentary on Madhva's *Anuvyākhyāna*.⁴
110 In the fourth generation of disciples departing from Jaya Tīrtha comes Vyāsa Tīrtha
111 (hereafter VT, 1478–1539)⁵ whose *magnum opus*, the *Nyāyāmṛta* (hereafter NA), is
112 undoubtedly one of the most outstanding treatises of the Indian philosophical
113 horizon. The Viśiṣṭādvaita school of Vedānta was also widely present in the debate
114 with both the other schools, lasting from the XI to the XVIII century.

115 Let us now leave the Dvaita thinkers for a while and briefly glance at the new
116 linguistic and philosophical tendencies of that pre-modern period. In the Mithilā
117 region a new (*navya*) methodologically precise way of expression arose. It was a
118 new rigorous philosophical style: the New Logic (Navya Nyāya), which was a
119 system of philosophical analysis arisen from the combination of Nyāya and
120 Vaiśeṣika. This school developed a technical language which became the standard
121 idiom for academic works in Sanskrit, not only in the systems of philosophy, but in
122 grammar, poetics and law. Even though the beginnings of this new school were
123 already visible in Udayana's writings (X century), the truly innovative output has
124 been assumed to be in Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya's (1320, Potter et al. 1993, pp. 85–86;
125 XIII century, Ingalls 1988, pp. 4–6; 1325, Matilal 1977, p. 105) *Tattvacintāmaṇi*
126 (hereafter TC). Although in the period separating Udayana and Gaṅgeśa⁶ the
127 process by which the new logic penetrated the usage of other systems was slow, it
128 was nevertheless inexorable. In fact, it caught the entire Indian philosophical
129 panorama within the span of two or three centuries, becoming an essential tool of
130 precision in both written and oral debates. Having tested the important and
131 innovative accomplishments of the logicians, all the other systems were obliged to
132 adjust their formulation to this kind of idiom. The adoption of Navya Nyāya
133 terminology in the late pre-modern Indian philosophy provided a new common
134 conceptual vocabulary, so that the debaters became able to mutually understand
135 each other. This process continued in the traditional training of Sanskrit scholars.

136 Bronkhorst et al. (2013)⁷ recently have tried to identify the point in which the
137 *navya* style penetrated the scholarly tradition of Vārāṇasī. According to their
138 research it seems that in the early years of the formation of Navya Nyāya, precisely
139 from Gaṅgeśa to Pakṣadhara (alias Jayadeva) Miśra (last part of the XV century,

⁴ Sharma (1981, p. 252) refers to the views quoted and refuted by Jaya Tīrtha in the *Nyāyasudhā*, where Śaṅkara's, Bhāskara's, Rāmānuja's and Yādavaprakāśa's commentaries on BS were subject to severe criticism. Even the sub-commentators were not spared, like Padmapāda, Vācaspati, Prakāśātman (XI CE; Divanji 1933, pp. CVII–CVIII) and Amalānanda Sarasvatī (XIII cen.), author of *Kalpataru*, a gloss on Vācaspati's *Bhāmātī*. Jaya Tīrtha attacks also *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī*, *Tattvabindu*, *Nyāyakusumañjalī*, *Nyāyavārtikatātparyāñikā*, *Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāḍya*, *Tattvapradīpikā*, *Mānamanohara*, *Nyāyalīlāvātī*, Gaṅgeśa, Bhasarvajña, Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara's *Nyāyakandalī*, Vyomaśiva, Kumārila and Prabhākara as well as the *sphoṭavādins*. It is likely that Vidyāranya (XIV cen.) and Jaya Tīrtha's *guru*, Akṣobhya Tīrtha, were contemporaries, meaning Jaya Tīrtha was slightly younger than Vidyāranya. There are also some textual evidences according to which they met (Sharma 1981, pp. 248–249).

⁵ The date accepted here is the one proposed by Sharma (1981, p. 286), one of the leading scholars of Dvaita Vedānta. Again Sharma (1981, p. 237) quotes a verse from *Śrīmuṣṇamāhātmya*, where Madhva, Jaya Tīrtha and Vyāsa Tīrtha bearing the title *munitraya* are said to be the utmost authorities of Dvaita Vedānta. According to Deepak Sharma, Vyāsa Tīrtha's birth can be placed 18 years before: 1460–1539 (2003, p. 17).

⁶ For further details see Bhattacharya (1987, pp. 1–7).

⁷ I would like to thank Professor Bronkhorst for sending me his article before its publication.



140 Kaviraj 1961, p. 35; Ingalls 1988, pp. 6–9), the technical language of Navya Nyāya
141 remained confined to Mithilā where the indigenous *paṇḍītas* monopolized its
142 teaching and transmission so as to secure their undisputed leadership on it
143 (Bronkhorst et al. 2013, pp. 73–75).⁸ But, this jealous attitude towards *navya*
144 language and methodology contrasts with its spread all over India.⁹ In order to
145 answer to this oddity, the three scholars affirm that “broadly speaking, it looks as if
146 the journey of Navya-Nyāya techniques from Mithilā to Varanasi” passed through
147 Vijayanagara.¹⁰ VT lived as royal preceptor in Vijayanagara, first hosted by the
148 Sāḷuva dynasty (1485–1505) and, later, by the Tuḷuva dynasty (1505–1570).¹¹

149 Controversies between Dvatins and Advatins occupy a pivotal position in the
150 history of Indian philosophy. VT’s NA has been considered the most colossal attack
151 to the very basis of Advaita, such as the notions of *avidyā*, of superimposition
152 (*adhyāsa*), falsity of the world (*mithyātva*), etc. In its four chapters, while clearly
153 presenting the opponents views, VT shows his deep learning in all the *śāstras*:
154 beside Nyāya and various schools of Vedānta, he was particularly proficient in
155 Mīmāṃsā, Vyākaraṇa as well as Vedic “philology”. To each and every Advaitins’
156 position he replies using a highly sophisticated Navya Naiyāyika style, pointing out
157 all the weaknesses, shortcomings and fallacies of his adversaries. NA seriously
158 mined the entire doctrinal building of *kevalādvaitavāda* (Gupta 2006, pp. 11–12).

159 After NA’s ponderous attack on Advaita the *Advaitādīpika* and *Bhedadikkāra* of
160 Narasiṃhāśrama or Nṛsiṃhāśrama (middle of the XVI century; NC, Sastri-Sastri
161 1959, pp. 47–48) or Appayya Dīkṣita’s *Mādhvamatavidhvamsana* with its own
162 commentary *Mādhvamatamukhamardana* or *Mādhvamatamukhabhaṅga* (Sharma

⁸ The above-mentioned scholars quote an interesting, even if partially unsupported, note of Kaviraj (1961, p. 36, n. 5), which suggests the attitude of Mithilā towards Navya Nyāya. According to Kaviraj, the manuscripts of Nyāya works produced in Mithilā were not allowed to leave the city or to be copied. Thus the “students had to commit text to memory” and later on were examined by their teachers. He adds that, since the expertise and diploma gained from Mithilā were guarantees of pan-Indian recognition, a lot of students used to go there to learn the new techniques (Bronkhorst et al. 2013, pp. 73–74).

⁹ It is important to specify that this “confinement” of Navya Nyāya lasted until the arrival in Mithilā of the Bengali Raghunātha Siromaṇi (ca. 1510), whose effort greatly helped the new logic to spread also in its second centre, Navadvīpa in Western Bengal (Potter and Bhattacharya 1993, pp. 3–4). However, the possible link made by Sharma (1981, pp. 291–926) between VT and Vāsudeva Sarvabhauma (1430–1530, Bhattacharya 1976, p. 81), whose commentary on the Lakṣmīdhara Kavi’s *Advaitamakaranda* was probably sent for criticism to Vijayanagara after the Kaliṅga war (1516), is also quite interesting. Vāsudeva Sarvabhauma was initially a Navya Naiyāyika disciple of Pakṣadhara (Jayadeva) Miśra (Kaviraj 1961, p. 51) in Mithilā. Later he shifted to Navadvīpa, where he founded a traditional school (*śol*) (Bronkhorst et al. 2013, pp. 80–81) and probably became the *guru* of Raghunātha. Therefore, he seems to be the real founder of the Bengali Navya Nyāya tradition (Bhattacharya 1976, p. 81). Subsequently, Vāsudeva became an Advaitin and then a follower of Caitanya (Potter and Bhattacharya 1993, p. 4).

¹⁰ It is a matter of fact that VT was acquainted with a number of texts from Mithilā, but it is not at all clear in which way he got this knowledge. Following Somanātha’s hagiography of VT, the *Īyāsayogīcarita*, Bronkhorst et al. offer some hypothetical solutions (2013, pp. 78–79). See also Sharma (1981, pp. 291–296).

¹¹ Clarks (2006, pp. 193–202) deals with the different religious orientation of the Vijayanagara rulers, during the kingdom of the three dynasties, which succeeded each other from the traditional foundation of the city (1336): the Saṅgama (1336–1486), then the Sāḷuva and the Tuḷuva. The Saṅgama were closely connected with the Śṛṅgerī *maṭha* and especially with Bhārati Tīrtha and Mādhava Vidyāraṇya (Minkowski 2011, p. 219). VT received the highest reputation during the reign of the Tuḷuva Kṛṣṇadevarāya.



163 1981, pp. 86–87, 387; Minkowski 2011, p. 210) are still pale attempts to defend the
164 system. By contrast, the most successful defence of Advaita positions has
165 undoubtedly been the AS (Nair 1990, pp. 20–21; Gupta 2006, pp. 11–12). As
166 noted by Minkowski (2011, pp. 212–213), the very tough criticism forced the
167 Advaitins to weaken the rigid separation among the opinions internal to Advaita,
168 perhaps clearly explaining them in anthological compendiums like Appayya
169 Dīkṣita's *Siddhāntaleśasamgraha* (hereafter SLS, see also infra, Sect. III.2). It is
170 possible to assume that “Advaita was rearticulated to become once again the meta-
171 discourse of Indian philosophy, and at the same time to represent the mainstream or
172 properly Vedic view” (Minkowski 2011, p. 223). Thus, with Appayya, MS and then
173 Dharmarāja Adhvarin, a new harmonizing spirit originated among the several
174 branches of Advaita. At the same time, the diffusion of the *navya* style compelled
175 the Advaitins to reformulate their tenets with a new idiom.

176 This was the intellectual and, consequently, textual panorama in which MS found
177 himself. AS, his *magnum opus*, is highly technical.¹² This text is the result of
178 Advaitins' need to reply to the keen objections moved by the Dvaitin VT's NA to
179 the very doctrinal structure of Advaita. Within the long sequence of propositions
180 and oppositions, which occupied the internal discussion between many schools of
181 Vedānta for at least seven or eight centuries, the AS is verily a turning point.

182 The importance of MS and his AS is witnessed by the rapidity and vehemence of
183 the reactions it provoked (Freschi's Introduction, Sect. 4.3; Preisendanz 2008, pp.
184 611–612): a full series of texts is based on the NA-AS polemics (Nair 1990, pp. 21–
185 24).

186 II MS Refers to His Own Works

187 II.1 MS

188 Already in the century preceding the appearance of MS there were several signs of a
189 renewed cultural vigour. The liberal Afghan Muslim ruler of Gauḍa, Alauddin
190 Hussain Shah (1493–1519), greatly patronized learning and the sciences. In this
191 period Nimāi Paṇḍita was born, subsequently better known as Śrīkṛṣṇa Caitanya
192 (1486–1533/4), founder of the *acintyabhedābheda*vāda current of Vaiṣṇavism, who
193 enormously influenced the Bengali *vaiṣṇava* thought. In 1575, Akbar (1556–1605)
194 defeated Daud Karrani, the last Afghan ruler and included Bengal in his Mughal
195 kingdom, where he left his army chief Mansingh as governor. This also was a period
196 of splendour for Bengal because, along with economic development, the magna-
197 nimity of the Mughal king allowed a free religious cult. Caitanya's movement had a
198 broad echo and stimulated Bengali people to undertake pilgrimages to distant
199 *tīrthas*, such as Mathurā-Vṛndāvana, Jagannātha Puri, Kāśī, etc. MS was born and

¹² A less known but decidedly appealing study of M.M. Ānantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī covering a whole issue of *Sarasvatī Suśamā* (1964, pp. 83–178), the journal of the Sanskrit University of Varanasi, discusses *Advaitasiddheḥ śāṅkaravedānte kiṃ sthānam?* This long monographic article is devoted to the disclosure of AS as a defence of Advaita tenets and an extremely precise survey on all its literature.



200 raised in this period of political stability and great economic, cultural and religious
201 mobility (Saha 2011, pp. 16–18).

202 It is quite a tough task to determine with a consistent grade of certitude the life of
203 MS, since one has to cope with hagiographical and contradictory information. It
204 seems quite likely that MS was born in Eastern Bengal (in the village Koṭālipādā in
205 the district of Faridpur, now Bangladesh). Several scholars have proposed their own
206 ideas concerning the *floruit* of MS (ca. 1500–1607?) or solutions for his *terminus*
207 *ante quem* and *terminus post quem*. The most plausible and extensive discussion is
208 found in Divanji (1933, pp. I–XXIX), who evaluates all the earlier attempts and to
209 whom nearly all the later authors refer.¹³ It is accepted that at the early stages of his
210 life MS was known by the birth name Kamalanayana (Divanji 1933, p. XVII). Most
211 probably, MS was a student of the Navya Nyāya school of Navadvīpa, founded by
212 Vāsudeva Sarvabhauma and strengthened by Raghunātha. MS apprehended the
213 *navya* techniques by Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa (according to Gambhirananda [1998, p.
214 14] he learned Navya Nyāya with Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa [1550]), probably a
215 pupil of Raghunātha himself (Kaviraj 1961, p. 60).¹⁴ This Navya Naiyāyika might
216 be the Śrīrāma mentioned in the second *maṅgala* verse of AS and in the closing
217 verse of MS's commentary on *Bhagavadgītā* (hereafter BG), the *Gūḍārthadīpikā*
218 (Divanji 1933, pp. XIV–XVIII). Or, maybe, the Rāma mentioned in these texts
219 could be Rāma Tīrtha, who is said to be the Advaita teacher of MS at Vārāṇasī.

220 By the middle of the XV century Caitanya was also living in Navadvīpa.¹⁵ MS
221 was profoundly touched by his teaching and through his mastering Navya Nyāya
222 logical tools he decided to firmly establish the devotional position of Caitanya
223 refuting the non-dualistic point of view. Since in Navadvīpa the teaching of Advaita
224 *darśana* was not allowed, MS moved to Vārāṇasī, which was considered the
225 Advaita headquarter. There, without openly expressing his aim, he started learning
226 Advaita with Rāma Tīrtha and Mīmāṃsā with Mādhava Sarasvatī (and maybe with

¹³ Together with Divanji's, good surveys on MS's date, life and works are Modi (1985, pp. 1–54), Nair (1990), Gupta (2006, pp. 1–13) and Saha (2011, pp. 10–31). For establishing his date it might be useful to mention Viśvanātha Pañcānana's *Bhedasiddhi*, in open polemic with AS, since the same Viśvanātha dated his *Gautamasūtravṛtti* 1556 of the *śaka* era (= 1634 CE) (Gupta 2006, p. 5). Furthermore, among MS's pupils we find Śeṣa Govinda, who calls himself the son of Śeṣa Paṇḍita. If the father of Govinda is held to be identical with the well-known Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa who lived in the XVI century, which is not unlikely, the synchronism of MS with Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa might be established (Kaviraj 1987, p. 156; Gupta 2006, p. 5). Śeṣa Kṛṣṇa was the *guru* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita (Gambhirananda 1998, pp. 14–15).

¹⁴ A popular verse quoted by all the monographs on MS informs us that he and two great Navya Naiyāyikas, namely Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa (ca. 1600-ca. 1675, Matilal 1977, p. 110) and Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya (between 1604 and 1709; Bhattacharya 1987, pp. 182–183) were contemporaries (even if this is rather unlikely). The verse runs like this: *navadvīpe samāyāte madhusūdanavākpatāu / cakampe tarkavāgīśaḥ kātaro 'bhūt gadādharaḥ //*, "When the lord of the speech Madhusūdana reached Navadvīpa, [Mathurānātha] Tarkavāgīśa trembled while Gadādhara [Bhaṭṭācārya] became confused" (Thangaswami 1980, p. 286).

¹⁵ From MS's commentary on Sarvajñātman's ŚŚ, the *Samkṣepasārīrakasārasaṅgraha* (SŚSS) II.51, I.62 and I.220, we know that MS had some contact with Vallabha (1479–1531), the *ācārya* of Śuddhādvaīta Vedānta. Moreover, MS and two Gosvāmins of Vṛndāvana, Rūpa Gosvāmin (1554/5) and Jīva Gosvāmin (1578/9), were almost contemporaries. MS's reading of *bhakti* superficially resembles that of the *vaiṣṇava* saints, even if it maintains strong peculiarities and irreducible differences due to a more marked emphasis on non-dualism (Gupta 2006, pp. 122–125).



227 Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa), both disciples of Rāmeśvara Bhaṭṭa.¹⁶ Tradition has it (Saha
228 2011, pp. 20–26) that MS, while studying Advaita, understood the very core of this
229 *darśana* and confessed his previous intention to his teacher. Rāma Tīrtha
230 appreciated and advised MS to enter into *saṃnyāsa* and, using *navya* style, to
231 refute the Dvaita point of view re-establishing the true message of Advaita. For
232 initiation he went to the senior authority among the *saṃnyāsins*, Viśveśvara
233 Sarasvatī, who asked MS to come back once he had written a new commentary on
234 BG. A year later the commentary was ready. Overwhelmed by its deepness,
235 Viśveśvara Sarasvatī conferred the *saṃnyāsadīkṣā* to Kamalanayana, who became
236 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. It is also believed that MS spent the last period of his life at
237 Haridvāra, where he passed away.

238 II.1.1 MS's Textual Production

239 Along with widely discussed problems of dating MS, the question related to the
240 authorship of all the works attributed to him is still open. Aufrecht's *Catalogus*
241 *Catalogorum* (I, 2001, pp. 426–427) mentions 22 works under the name
242 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.¹⁷ Among these texts Divanji (1933, pp. II–III) individuates
243 some repetitions,¹⁸ reducing the number to 18. Out of these, as he elaborately
244 shows, we can consider only 10 *granthas* genuine. It is possible to divide these
245 works in two main groups: independent treatises (*prakaraṇa*) and commentaries
246 (*bhāṣya/tīkā/vyākhyā*). Among them there are some works with a marked Advaitic
247 tendency, and others that are absolutely devotional, while still others present both
248 aspects.

249 Among the commentaries we find: 1. *Samkṣepaśārīrakasārasaṃgraha* (hereafter
250 SŚSS), a commentary on the *Samkṣepaśārīraka* of Sarvajñātman (hereafter SS);¹⁹ 2.
251 *Gūḍhārthadīpikā* (hereafter GAD), a running commentary on BG; 3. *Siddhānta-*
252 *bindu* (hereafter SB), an interesting compendium of Vedāntic topics based on the
253 *Daśaśloki* of Śaṅkarācārya;²⁰ 4. *Mahimnastotraṭīkā* (hereafter MST) on

¹⁶ Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa was the son of Rāmeśvara Bhaṭṭa, and, according to some accounts, the *guru* of Mādhava Sarasvatī. See fn. 71.

¹⁷ See also the XVIII volume of the *New Catalogus Catalogorum* compiled by Dash (2007, pp. 148–151) and the bibliography (1995, pp. 583–585) of the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophy* edited by K. Potter. I will not discuss works just attributed to MS or others surely not his own (such as *Ānandamandākinī*, *Vedastuti*, *Ānandobodhaṭīkā*, *Aṣṭavikṛtivarāṇa*, *Śāṅḍilyasūtraṭīkā*, *Rājñāṃpratibodha*, and *Kṛṣṇakūṭhalaṇaṭaka*).

¹⁸ For example, Aufrecht considers the *Prasthānabheda* an independent text.

¹⁹ Even though this gloss is not mentioned in other works by MS, based on its *maṅgala* verses and the colophons it appears to be genuinely written by MS (Gupta 2006, p. 8). Divanji (1933, p. VI) adds that in ARR (1917, p. 45) MS hints to his own other work while dealing with the removal of two of the four kinds of impossibility (*asambhāvanā*), which represent the impediments to attaining liberation. This same issue is treated in very similar terms in the beginning of the III chapter (*ad* SŚ III.1, 2005, pp. 256–257) and in a portion of the commentary of chapter IV (*ad* SŚ IV; 2005, pp. 642–643) of SŚSS. It might be suggested that, due to the style and the extreme clarity coupled with a strict adherence to the commented texts, this gloss is the first work of MS.

²⁰ SB is openly referred to five times in AS: four in the first *pariccheda* and one in the fourth (Divanji 1933, p. IV).



254 Puṣpadanta's *Śivamahimnastotra*;²¹ 5. *Harilīlāvyaḥkhyā* (hereafter HLV) a commen-
 255 tary on Vopadeva's (mid-XIII-CE) *Harilīlāmṛta*;²² 6. *Bhāgavataprathamāślo-*
 256 *kavyāḥkhyā* or *Paramahaṃsapriya*, a short commentary on the first verse of
 257 *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*.²³

258 On the side of the independent treatises, the following texts are listed: 7. AS; 8.
 259 *Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana* (hereafter BBR);²⁴ 9. *Vedāntakalpalatikā* (hereafter
 260 VKL);²⁵ and 10. *Advaitaratnarakṣaṇa* (hereafter ARR), a reply to Śaṅkara Mīśra's
 261 (XV cen. CE; 1442–1542, Saha 2011, p. 14) *Bhedaratna* (hereafter BR), which in
 262 turn was a reply to Śrīharṣa's KKK, mainly directed to the eighth section of the first
 263 *pariccheda* called *Caturvidhabhedakhaṇḍana* of the KKK (Yogīndrānanda 1992,
 264 pp. 96–121). This probably represents the last genuine work written by MS, since it
 265 mentions his other works but is not referred to in them (Modi 1985, p. 54).²⁶

266 As previously stated, according to tradition, in order to initiate the young MS into
 267 *saṃnyāsa*, Viśveśvara Sarasvatī demanded a commentary on BG (Saha 2011, p. 25).
 268 Hence, GAD is believed to be the first work of MS. However, even though its style
 269 is very clear and with minor uses of *navya* methodology, we find in it some
 270 references to AS, BBR, and SB, which make it impossible to consider it his first
 271 work.²⁷

272 II.1.2 MS between Advaita and Bhakti

273 From the glorious *vaiṣṇava* movement of Bengal MS inherited his devotion to Kṛṣṇa
 274 as it is depicted in the BP. MS, in fact, occupies an important position among the

²¹ Despite the fact that this *stotra* is evidently devoted to extolling Śīva, the commentator turns the verses to concern both Viṣṇu and Śīva. In addition, in the opening verses as well as in the colophon he mentions his *guru* Viśveśvara; the *Vedāntakalpalatikā* is also referred herein as the author's own work (*ad Mahimnastotra* 26–27). Divanji (1933, p. VIII) affirms that in the commentary on verse 27 the author writing *anyatroktam asti tat sarvam...* hints at the closing section on the VIII verse of *Daśaśloki* in SB. The *Prasthānabheda*, sometimes edited separately, is nothing but MS's commentary on the VII verse of the *Mahimnastotra*. Hanneder confirms both the genuine attribution to MS of this gloss and that the *Prasthānabheda* is an extract of the *Mahimnastotraṅgikā* (1999, pp. 576–577).

²² According to Modi (1985, p. 37) this is a work of MS, while for Abhyankar Sastri (SB 1986, p. 27), its author, is a different Madhusūdana; but there are no evidences for either of these views. However, Gupta (2006, p. 9) concludes that, due to the certain similarities in style and argumentations, this could be MS's work.

²³ Transmitted without a colophon, this short work mentions the *Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana* (Divanji 1933, p. VIII). Therefore many scholars accept it as a work of MS.

²⁴ This is perhaps the most important devotional work of MS in three *ullāsa*s, in which he treats the essence of devotion, the condition through which the mind becomes eligible for devotion, its various stages (*bhūmikā*), and the emotions (*bhāva*) produced by merging in those stages. In it MS, building on *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*'s teachings, describes *bhakti* as an independent spiritual path capable to leading to the supreme goal. MS mentions VKL (1998, p. 54) at I.19 and SB at I.24 (1998, p. 57). GAD (XVIII.66) refers to BBR for a deeper examination of the topic at hand.

²⁵ VKL is referred to six times in the AS (Divanji 1933, p. IV).

²⁶ By contrast, at the beginning of his introduction Modi (1985) says that the last works of MS are AS and GAD.

²⁷ In GAD *ad* BG II.16, II.18 and V.16 one can find a direct reference to AS; SB is mentioned in GAD *ad* BG II.18. *Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana* (BBR) is referred to in GAD *ad* BG VII.16, XVIII.65–66.



275 *vaiṣṇavas* of his time (Ananta Śāstrī Phaḍke 1961, p. 8). This is witnessed by the
276 four markedly devotional works attributed to him: BBR, *Harilīlāvyaḅhyā*, MSṬ, and
277 *Paramahaṁsapriya*.²⁸ His love for Kṛṣṇa and his faith in Advaita made him a
278 successor of the Advaita theological hermeneutics represented by the commentaries
279 on the *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* written by Vopadeva and Śrīdhara (XIII CE). These two
280 authors represented a tendency in which non-dualism and *bhakti* found a common
281 ground and, in some way, harmoniously merged into one. Vopadeva and Śrīdhara
282 harmonized the Upaniṣadic concept of an immutable, unqualified, formless,
283 ineffable *brahman* to the infinitely charming personality of a godhead.

284 Hence, it could be also maintained that in AS and in other writings, MS
285 transformed Advaita itself. He allowed a scope for *bhakti* as a path independent, or
286 rather complementary, to Vedic and Vedāntic prescriptions, in such a way that the
287 philosophical implications for Advaita have still not been fully assessed. Modi
288 (1985: 12-13) argues that:

289 In spite of being a follower of Śāṅkara's monism, he was an ardent devotee of
290 Śrī Kṛṣṇa. To Madhusūdana, this was neither self-contradictory nor surprising
291 [...] Just as in the days of Kumārila and Śāṅkara the most important problem
292 was the reconciliation of *karma* and *jñāna*, so in the days of Madhusūdana and
293 Vallabha the greatest problem was that of *jñāna* and *bhakti*²⁹ [...] but it was
294 left for Madhusūdana to solve it thoroughly.

295 Besides, in several places he openly, even if respectfully, disagreed with
296 Śaṅkarācārya himself (Minkowski 2011, p. 222).³⁰

297 II.2 Some Instances of Internal Evidences for Establishing a Relative 298 Chronology of MS's Works

299 Sanjukta Gupta courageously attempted an internal chronology of the works of MS
300 (2006, pp. 10–11). I personally believe we should wait for a further historical as
301 well as philological examination of them, since the elements we possess right now
302 are not at all conclusive. What I could plausibly say is just that among the ten works
303 by MS considered genuine, it seems that the first written was SSSS and the last
304 ARR. I could also push myself to affirm that VKL and SB, which mention each
305 other, might have been composed at around the same time. In addition, GAD and

²⁸ Among the devotional works attributed to MS there is also *Īsvaraṇṇatipattiprakāśa*, brought to light in 1921 by M. M. Gaṇapati Śāstrī at Trivandrum. According to Divanji (1933, p. XII) and Modi (1985, p. 46) it is a genuine work because it summarily covers almost all the issues touched by SB. However, since it is quite usual for Advaita textbooks to cover these issues, and since there are no direct references to MS's other works, its authorship remains an open issue.

²⁹ Together with the explicit devotionally directed works, it should be mentioned that MS tries, mainly in GAD XVIII.54 and XVIII.56–66, to harmonise *bhakti*, *yoga* and *jñāna*.

³⁰ Most famous instances of this reverential disagreement are in AS *Āgamabādhodhāra* (AS 1997, pp. 435–436) as regards Śaṅkara's interpretation of *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (hereafter BSBh) II.2.28–29, where according to MS the aphorism does not refute Vijñānavādins, as claimed by Śaṅkara, but Śūnyavādins (Modi 1985, p. 7). MS differs from Śaṅkara also in GAD where the views of the *ācārya* are not in harmony with the *bhaktimārga* of the *Gītā* (Modi app. iii), so he interprets it in a new light, especially as for the comments *ad* II.29, II.39, VI.14 and XVIII.66.



306 ARR mention AS, thus, they must be later, and HLV does not refer to any other
307 work of MS. AS mentions also VKL and SB. In fact, these three texts treat almost
308 analogous topics. To sum up, after SSSS come SB, VKL and only at a more mature
309 stage AS, where SB, VKL and GAD are mentioned. The MST mentions only VKL,
310 while dealing with the means of knowledge for establishing *brahman* (ad MS 26,
311 1996, p. 103) and with the arousal of the undetermined knowledge of the word (ad
312 MS 27, 1996, p. 107); BBR refers to VKL (1998, p. 54) while presenting the nature
313 of the mind, and later on to SB (1998, p. 58). The BPPP refers to BBR concerning
314 *bhaktirasa*.³¹ In any case it is interesting to note that in nearly all of his texts MS
315 refers very much to his other works. By some extent, this tendency is quite
316 remarkable, because it gives us an idea of the personality of MS and of his self-
317 confidence concerning his works (Devī 1988, pp. 9–12). It could also be maintained
318 that for attempting an internal chronology among MS's works we can look at them
319 from a diachronic perspective as well as from a synchronic one. It might be, in fact,
320 that MS composed part of a text and periodically abandoned it for some time while
321 working on other texts and later went back to it. On one side this could explain the
322 many cross-references of MS within his own works, and on the other the difficulty
323 to determine with certitude a relative chronology.

324 Here, I shall limit my investigation to a small number of the more relevant
325 instances of cross-references in SB, VKL, AS, GAD, BBR, and ARR (I will
326 mention SSSS just *en passant*). The comparison of the *maṅgala* verses offers
327 interesting data (the different writing style in the table shows the different versions
328 of the same concept.):
329

- 332 **AS** (1997: 8) **śrīrāmaviśveśvaramādhavānām** aikyena
sākṣātkṛtamādhavānām/
sparśena nirdhūtatamorajobhyaḥ pādotthitebhyo 'stu namo
rajobhyaḥ// 2 //
- 333 **GAD** (2005: 744) **śrīrāmaviśveśvaramādhavānām** prasādam āsādyā mayā
gurūṇām/
vyākhyānam etad vihitam subodham samarpitam
taccaraṇāmbujeṣu// 5 //
- 334 **SB** (SB/S, 1933: 1) śrīśaṅkarācāryānavāvatāraṃ **viśveśvaram** viśvagurum
praṇamya/
vedāntaśāstraśravaṇālasānām bodhāya kurve kam api
prabandham// 1 //
- 335 **VKL** (1962: 1) durāpaḥ śāstrārtho niyatayatamānair api budhair
na saṃprāptum śakyo malinamatinā yady api mayā/
tathāpi **śrīviśveśvaracaraṇapaṅkeruhasudhā-**
sudhārābhiḥ sikto na katham api rikto 'smi bhavitā// 2 //

³¹ In this contribution I limit myself to presenting some textual instances of internal cross-references in MS's works, so I shall not examine all their colophons (*puṣpikā*) except for VKL.



- 336
337 **MST** (1996: 1) **viśveśvaram** gurum natvā mahimākhyastuter ayam/
pūrvācāryakṛtavayākhyāsamgrahaḥ kriyate mayā// 1 //
- 338 **ARR** (1917: 46) advaitaratnam etat tu **śrīviśveśvarapādayoḥ**/
samarpitam athaitena prīyatām sa dayānidhiḥ//
- 339 **SSSS** (I, 2002: 2) **śrīrāmaviśveśvaramādhavānām** praṇamya
pādāmbujapuṇyapāmsūn/
teṣām prabhāvād aham asmi yogaḥ śilāpi caitanyam
alabdhayebhyaḥ// 2 //

341 GAD's instance (2005, p. 744) is an example of the content of these benedictory
342 verses: "Having obtained the grace of my teachers Śrīrāma, Viśveśvara and
343 Mādhava, I compose this easy explanation, offered at their lotus feet." In all the
344 instances presented MS extols his teachers (Viśveśvara, Śrīrāma and Mādhava) with
345 *maṅgala* stanzas placed either at the beginning or at the end (for GAD and ARR) of
346 his texts. These repeated and standardized references to his masters in the *maṅgala*
347 verses help us to reconstruct MS's life and to differentiate between the authentic
348 works and the spurious ones.

349 II.2.1 AS

350 The AS is certainly the pivotal point among all the works of MS, not only as a
351 landmark for the internal coherence of the author himself, but also for the later
352 generation of Advaitins. As a matter of fact, for the Advaitins post-MS, following
353 the AS becomes a must, a stamp of orthodoxy and adherence to tradition, as well as
354 a sign of great doctrinal skill. In other words, Advaitins after MS could not help
355 being "madhusūdanian". In addition, MS writes the AS to turn around the stagnant
356 dialectical *vis* of Advaita, defending, rewriting and correcting old positions. Nearly
357 all the positions of MS are present in the AS; all the issues treated in the other works
358 are here present in a very elaborated and enlarged way.³²

359 II.2.2 GAD

360 This running gloss to BG³³ is an extremely interesting text, free from all the
361 technicalities of AS, SB, VKL, and ARR, but extremely useful for comprehending

³² As for its relative chronology, AS is referred to in GAD *ad* BG II.16 (2005, pp. 79–80), while dealing with the difference between real (*sat*) and unreal (*asat*); GAD *ad* BG II.18 (2005, pp. 93–94), explaining the difference between direct and indirect cognition; GAD *ad* BG V.16 (2005, p. 276) dealing with the nature of the unreal. ARR refers to AS in dealing with hearing (*śravaṇa*, 1917, p. 9); with the nature of the unreal (1917, p. 26); with reflecting (*manana*) and meditating (*nididhyāsana*) in two passages (1917, pp. 24, 37). On the other hand, AS refers to SB in differentiating the empirical degree of reality from the absolute one (1997, p. 536); while diversifying direct and indirect cognition (1997, p. 579), discussing *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda* (1997, p. 537) and *manana* and *nididhyāsana* (1997, p. 559). AS mentions also VKL on *śravaṇa* (1997, pp. 524, 866), *manana* and *nididhyāsana* (1997, p. 519) as well as *abhihitānvayavāda* (1997, p. 705).

³³ The version of the BG used by MS for his commentary differs in some verses from the *vulgata*. Cf. I.8, I.46, VI.9, VIII.16, IX.21, XI.8, XI.17, XI.28, XI.37, XI.41, XIII.20, XIV.23, XIV.25 and XV.5 (Saha 2011, p. 370).



362 the XVI century understanding of the BG. Apart from being a real treasure chest of
363 quotations and new readings of several Advaitin and non-Advaitin texts, it directly
364 refers to many of MS's works.

365 For example, in GAD *ad* BG VII.16 (*caturvidhā bhajante mām janāḥ sukṛtino*
366 *'rjuna / āto jijñāsur arthārthī jñānī ca bhāratarṣabha /*), where the words in the
367 BG verse recall a devotional context, BBR is mentioned just as an internal
368 annotation of MS, maybe for his readers, which indicates that the subject *bhakti*,
369 with its subdivisions and its means, is analysed specifically in BBR.³⁴ More
370 interesting are the references to BBR in GAD *ad* BG XVIII.65 and 66. GAD
371 (XVIII) quotes two verses from *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* (VII.5.23–24), also cited in BBR
372 (1997, p. 108). Immediately thereafter, MS refers to BBR saying *etac ca*
373 *bhaktirasāyane vyākhyātam vistāreṇa* “and this has been explained at length in
374 *Bhaktirasāyana.*” However, in BBR, the topic concerned is the hearing of the
375 qualities of Viṣṇu (*hariḡuṇāsruti*, BBR 1997, p. 106), which constitutes the fourth
376 level of devotion (*bhaktibhūmikā*).³⁵ In the passage there is no original explanation,
377 but rather a sequence of verses from *Bhāgavatapurāṇa*, which are cited directly as
378 they are. What is interesting is that there also MS cites BG XVIII.65 (BBR 1997, p.
379 113). Therefore, we have a cross reference in the two texts.

380 Moreover, the next verse (BG XVIII.66)³⁶ is possibly another instance of the use
381 of BBR material in GAD. The context is the definition of *bhakti* and the means for
382 it, and the two texts are quite similar in referring to the subject:

386 **GAD** *ad* BG XVIII.66 (2005, p. 734)
387 niścayena paramānandaghanamūrtim
388 anantaṃ śrīvāsudevam eva bhagavantam
389 anukṣaṇabhāvanayā bhajasva, idam eva
390 paramaṃ tattvaṃ nāto 'dhikam astīti
391 **vicārapūrvakena premaprakaṛṣeṇa**
392 **sarvānātmacintāsūnyatayā manovṛttiyā**
393 **tailadhārāvad avicchinnayā satataṃ**
394 **cintayety arthaḥ.**

BBR I.1 (1998, p. 5)
tataś cādrutacittasya nirvedapūrvakaṃ
tattvajñānaṃ, drutacittasya tu
bhagavatkaṭhāśravaṇādibhāgavata-
dharmaśraddhāpūrvikā bhaktir ity
avadhitvena dvayam apy upātātam. tato
'ntaḥkaraṇaśuddhyāṣṭāṅgayogam
anuṣṭhāya tailadhārāvad
avicchinnabhagavadekākārapratyaya-
paramparātmakaikāgratāyogyam
manas sampādāyēt.

³⁴ GAD (2005, p. 393): *bhagavadanuraktirūpāyās tu bhakteḥ svarūpaṃ sādhanam bhedās tathā bhaktānām api bhagavadbhaktirasāyane 'smābhiḥ savīṣeṣaṃ prapañcitā iṭihoparamyate* “I especially elaborated on the nature, the means and the subdivisions of devotion, whose form is love for the Lord, as well as [the nature, the means and the subdivisions] of the devotees in the *Bhagavadbhaktirasāyana*, so here I stop.”

³⁵ There is also a terminological correspondence between BBR (1997, p. 115) and GAD (2005, p. 733). Both texts call the means to supreme *bhakti* the performance of duties related to the Lord (*bhāgavatadharmānuṣṭhāna*).

³⁶ In the commentary of this verse MS disagrees with Śaṅkara in interpreting the word *-dharmān*. According to MS it means all kinds of social duties etc. (GAD *ad* BG XVIII.66, 2005, p. 734, *kecid varṇadharmāḥ kecid āsramadharmāḥ kecid sāmānyadharmā ity evaṃ sarvān api dharmān parityajya, vidyamānān avidyamānān vā śaraṇatvenānādrīya*), while for Śaṅkara it stands for *karman*: *sarvad-harmān parityajya saṃnyāsya sarvakarmāni iti etat* (BG1, III, 2000, p. 400).



398 In both texts MS refers to *bhakti* using a very similar terminology, but this is due
 399 to an already commonly accepted definition, which drives us back to Rāmānuja's
 400 definition of *bhaktiyoga* as a condition of devotional contemplation (*dhyāna/*
 401 *upāsana*).³⁷ Both instances compare devotion with a flux of oil (*tailadhārā*)³⁸ and
 402 treat it as a series (*paramparā*) of uninterrupted (*avicchinna*) mental modifications
 403 (*manovṛtti*) with the Lord alone as content (*bhagavadekākāra*). This mental
 404 condition has some analogous requirements for both texts: in GAD a constant
 405 reflection (*vicāra*), an extreme degree of love (*premaprakarṣa*) and a mind free from
 406 all sensual objects (*sarvānātmacintāsūnya*); similarly, BBR presupposes a mental
 407 purity (*antaḥkaraṇasuddhi*) and the practice of the *aṣṭāṅgayoga*.

408 Modi (1985, p. 49, n. 41) noted that GAD *ad* BG II.13, II.15 and II.28 relies
 409 almost *verbatim* on SB without directly acknowledging it. To these unacknowledged
 410 references I would personally also add GAD *ad* BG II.17. Let us now consider two
 411 of them in detail.

412 BG II.13 regards a comparison of the several changes occurring within a single
 413 life, with the *jīvātman* who jumps from one bodily existence to another one. On the
 414 other side, the corresponding SB passage lies just at the beginning of the analysis of
 415 the meaning of the term *tvam* in the *mahāvākya* “Thou are That!” (*tat tvam asi,*
 416 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.8.7 ff.), where *tvam* is nothing but the individual self. Both
 417 texts present a few divergent opinions (*vipratipatti*) regarding the *ātman*'s nature:³⁹
 420

421 **GAD** *ad* BG II.13 (2005, pp. 63–64)

422 etena yad āhur **dehamātram ātmeti**
 423 **cārvākāḥ, indriyāṇi manaḥ prāṇas ceti**
 424 **tad ekadeśinaḥ, kṣaṇikaṃ vijñānam iti**
 425 **saugatāḥ, dehātiriktaḥ sthiro**
 426 **dehaparimāṇa iti digambarāḥ.**

SB I (SB/S, 1933, p. 5; SB/NR/LV,
 1989, pp. 106–113)

tatra **dehākārapariṇatāni catvāri**
bhūtāny eva tvampadārtha iti
cārvākāḥ. cakṣurādīni pratyekam
ity apare. militānīty anye. mana ity
eke. prāṇa ity anye. kṣaṇikaṃ
vijñānam iti saugatāḥ. sūnyam iti
mādhyamikāḥ. dehendriyātirikto
dehaparimāṇa iti digambarāḥ.

428 Here the close similarity between the two parts is clear. In both passages MS
 429 opens with Cārvākas, then Buddhists (*saugata*) and Jains (*digambara*). In SB he
 430 specifies that according to the majority of Cārvākas “the meaning of the term *tvam*”
 431 (*tvampadārtha*) is nothing but the four gross elements (*bhūta*) transformed into
 432 physical shape (*dehākārapariṇatāni*). Then he lists some divergent minor opinions

³⁷ Rāmānuja, in his *Śrībhāṣya* (I.1.1, 1989, pp. 55–56; see also IV.1.1), defines *dhyāna* as *dhyānaṃ ca tailadhārāvad avicchinna-smṛtis-antānarūpam*, “and contemplation is of the nature of a sequence of uninterrupted awareness, like a flow of oil”. A similar instance is in Rāmānuja's commentary on BG IX.34, precisely while he glosses on the first half-line *manmanā bhava: sarvasvāmīni tailadhārāvad avicchedena niviṣṭamanā bhava* “be with your mind like a flow of oil uninterruptedly immersed in the Lord of everything” (BG1, II, 2000, p. 196).

³⁸ The quality of oil is greasiness (*sneha*), which also means “affection” or “love”.

³⁹ This nearly resembles, in a matter of language and order, the opening part of VKL where MS lists the different views about liberation (1962, pp. 3–13). For an instance of this subject see the last part of the Sect. II.2.3 concerning VKL.



433 among them (*ekadeśin*): according to some philosophers the term *tvam* indicates
 434 respectively the faculties (*indriya*) or the breaths (*prāṇa*) or the mind (*manas*)
 435 individually taken (*pratyeke*); for others they should be understood jointly (*milita*).
 436 The slight difference between GAD and SB lies in the fact that while GAD refers to
 437 the divergences at a stretch SB is a bit more analytic. The short sentences concerning
 438 Buddhists and Jains are almost identical. Nonetheless, MS does not mention the
 439 other text in which he deals with the same issues, because this is a typical
 440 presentation of Advaita texts. Thus, in this case there is no real need for a clear
 441 citation or reference because every Advaitin is aware of the *locus classicus* for this
 442 introduction, meaning the Advaita's mine⁴⁰ of knowledge par excellence: BSBh
 443 (I.1.1).

444 Another instance of textual re-use from GAD, not recognized by Modi, is *ad* BG
 445 II.17 and concerns the condition of deep sleep. The passages are mutually connected
 446 but the way of referring to each other is not immediately clear:
 449

450 **GAD** *ad* BG II.17 (2005, p. 82)

451 **suṣuptāv** ahaṃkārahāve 'pi tadvā-
 452 sanāvāsītājñānabhāsakasya caitanyasya
 453 svataḥ sphuraṇāt. **anyathāitāvantaṃ**
 454 **kālam ahaṃ kim api nājñāsiṣam iti**
 455 **suṣuptotthitasya smaraṇam na syāt.** na
 456 cotthitasya jñānābhāvānumitir iyam iti
 457 vācyam, **suṣuptikālarūpapakṣājñānāl**
 458 **liṅgāsambhavāc ca. asmaraṇāder**
 459 **vyabhicāritvāt** smaraṇājanaka-
 460 nirvikalpādyabhāvāsādhakatvāc ca.
 461 jñānasāmagryabhāvāsyā
 462 cānyonyāśrayagrastatvāt.

SB VIII (SB/S 1933, pp. 69–70; SB/
 NR/LV 1989, pp. 420–426; SB 1986,
 pp. 121–125)

iha ca sukham aham asvāpsam na
kiṃcid avedīṣam iti suptotthitasya
parāmarśāt, ananubhave ca
parāmarśānupapatteḥ.
 antaḥkaraṇoparāgākālīnānu-
 bhavajanyatvābhāvāc ca na
 tattollekhābhāve 'pi **smaraṇatvānu-**
papattiḥ. smaraṇe
tattollekhanīyamābhāvāc ca
jāgraddaśāyām asvāpsam ity
anubhāvānupapatteḥ liṅgābhāvena ca
āśrayāsiddhyā cānumānasyāsaṃ-
bhavāt. ahaṃkāras tu utthānasamaya
 evānubhūyate. suṣuptau līnatvena
 tasyānanubhūtatvāt smaraṇānupapatteḥ
 [...] tatrāntaḥkaraṇavṛttijanakasāmagrī-
 sambhave 'pi pramātvābhāvāvarodhe-
 nāntaḥkaraṇasyāśamarthyāt.

464 In both passages MS refers to the recollection (*parāmarśa/smaraṇa*) arising in
 465 the awakened person (*suptotthita*) after deep sleep (*suṣupti*): in GAD “During that

⁴⁰ In SB VIII (SB/S 1933, p. 61), MS most probably refers to BSBh calling it the “mine” (*ākara*): *yathā caitat tathā vyaktam ākare*.



466 much time I did not know anything” (*etāvantaṃ kālam ahaṃ kim api nājñāśiṣam*)
467 and in SB “I slept well, I did not know anything” (*sukham aham asvāpsam na*
468 *kiṃcid avedīṣam*). These sections from both texts, in addition, point out the
469 impossibility of understanding this recollection as an inference (*anumānasyāsaṃ-*
470 *bhavāt*) because the *probans* (*hetu*) of this hypothetical inference would necessarily
471 be flawed. The two texts just differ on the nature of the *pseudo-probans*
472 (*hetvābhāsa*): a deviating (*vyabhicārin*) one for GAD and the non-establishment
473 of the inferential locus/subject (*āśrayāsiddhi*) for SB.

474 In the GAD passage the core of the analysis aims at establishing the auto-
475 luminosity (*svaprakāśatva*) of the self, which persists also during deep sleep. SB is
476 more focused on proving the nature of recollection of the cognition arising after
477 awakening. In deep sleep, while the ego has merged into its cause (i.e. ignorance),
478 the consciousness illuminates that ignorance consisting of ego impressions. If this
479 were not accepted, it would be impossible to explain the recollection of the just
480 awakened person: “I slept well, I did not know anything” (see below, Sect. 3.2.3).

481 II.2.3 VKL: Quotations as Evidence about Missing Portions

482 Karmarkar’s edition of VKL (1962) is based on two manuscripts, the first from the
483 British Library’s former India Office (IO) and the second from the Ānandāśrama
484 (Ā) Library in Poona, as well as on the only other printed edition, edited at Benares
485 in 1920 by Ganganath Jha and Gopinath Kaviraj. The two manuscripts end
486 respectively with these colophons: IO) *iti vedāntakalpalatikāyāṃ paramahaṃsa-*
487 *parivrajakamadhusūdanasarasvatīkṛtāyāṃ sasādhanāpavarganirūpaṇaṃ nāma*
488 *prathamastabakaḥ; Ā) iti śrīparamahaṃsaśrīviśveśvarasarasvatīśiṣyaśrīma-*
489 *dhusūdanasarasvatyuktavedāntakalpalatikāyāṃ sasādhanāpavarganirūpaṇaḥ pra-*
490 *thamastabakaḥ śaṃpūrṇaḥ* (Karmarkar 1962, pp. ix–xi). As easily visible, both the
491 colophons refer to the extant VKL as the first (*prathama*) *stabaka* ‘chapter’, named
492 “Description of the realization together with the means [for attaining it]”
493 (*sasādhanāpavarganirūpaṇa*), of the entire VKL. Until now, unfortunately, no
494 other manuscript of VKL has been found (Panicker 1995, pp. 116–117). More
495 precisely, there is more evidence for the assumption that there might be some
496 additional *stabakas* in VKL. For instance, VKL has been referred to twice in SB.
497 The first reference is in the commentary on the eighth stanza of *Daśasloki* (SB/S
498 1933, p. 70; SB/NR/LV 1989, pp. 431–432; SB 1986, p. 133). The reference is at the
499 end of an elaborate discussion concerning the condition of deep sleep (*suṣuptya-*
500 *vasthā*). Once the *jīvātman* penetrates deep sleep the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) is
501 also absorbed in its cause (*kāraṇa*), namely *avidyā*, and steps back remaining only
502 as a latent impression (*vāsanā*). On getting back to the waking condition, the
503 individual has a kind of recollection (*parāmarśa*): “I pleasantly slept, I did not know
504 anything!” (*sukham aham asvāpsam na kiṃcid avedīṣam*). This kind of cognition
505 presupposes an earlier direct experience of pleasure (*sukha*) and ignorance (*ajñāna*).
506 If the internal organ is absent during deep sleep, then to whom can these experiences
507 be attributed to? Without an experience there cannot be such a subsequent
508 recollection. To this MS answers by distinguishing three kinds of functional modes



509 (vṛtti) of ignorance: one in the form of the witness (*sākṣyākāra*) of that experience,
510 one in the form of pleasure (*sukhākāra*) and another in the form of a particular state
511 of ignorance limited to that precise situation (*avasthājñāna*).⁴¹

512 Here we find a peculiar reading of MS. He says that in deep sleep there is no
513 *antaḥkaraṇa*, no ego at all, so it cannot be experienced. A recollection of the self as
514 superimposed on the ego takes place, but this is only due to *avidyā*. Recollection,
515 like doubt and perceptual errors, is dependent on the witness, thus it cannot be
516 intended as right knowledge, which is grasped by the function of some means of
517 knowledge (*pramāṇa*); but it is also not a totally false cognition. Thus MS does not
518 understand it to be a kind of knowledge, but simply as a mental activity (*mānasī*
519 *kriyā*). By the way, in establishing this, MS refers to a passage from Śaṅkara's
520 *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* (I.1.4):
521

524 **BSBh** (BSBh/VK/KP 2000: 129; BSBh/B/
525 RP/NN 2000: 83)

SB (SB/S 1933, p 70; SB/NR/LV
1989, pp. 426–427; SB 1986,
p. 127)

526 yathā ca ‘puruṣo vāva gautamāgniḥ’ (ChU
527 V.7.1), ‘yoṣā vāva gautamāgniḥ’ (ChU
528 V.8.1) ity atra yoṣitpuruṣayor agnibuddhir
529 **mānasī kriyā** kevala**codanājanyatvāt**
530 kriyaiva sā puruṣatantrā ca.

ata eva **codanājanyatvān mānasī**
kriyā sā, na jñānam.

532 MS then completes his explanation by jumping to a different issue. Just as the
533 recollection is a mental function (*manovṛtti*) different (*vilakṣana*) from perceptual
534 error (*bhrama*) and right knowledge (*pramā*), the hypothetical argumentation
535 (*tarka*) is a kind of mental function which, being dependent on desire (*icchādhāna*),
536 is different from perceptual error and right knowledge. This particular understand-
537 ing of *tarka* plays a role in the analysis of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* ([hereafter
538 BṛU] VI.4.5): *ātma vā re [...] śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsītavyaḥ*. This Upaniṣadic
539 sentence is an injunction (*vidhi*), which in the process of reflecting the real purport
540 of Vedānta sentences (*vedāntavicāra*) prescribes as primary (*pradhāna/mukhya*)
541 towards realization (*darśana*) the hearing (*śravaṇa*) of the teaching about the self.
542 Conversely, reflection (*manana*) and meditation (*nididhyāsana*) are auxiliaries
543 (*sahakārin/ārādūpakāraka*). This kind of *vedāntavicāra* has the shape of a fourfold
544 *tarka*,⁴² the explanation of which, according to MS, is distributed within the four

⁴¹ MS has two different views of *sākṣin*, one metaphysical and one epistemological. For this division see Gupta (2006, pp. 92–93).

⁴² MS mentions these four types of *tarkas*, and adds a fifth one, which are nothing but five forms of positive (*anvaya*) and negative (*vyatireka*) agreements: (1) *dr̥gdṛṣyānvayavyatireka*; (2) *sākṣisākṣyānvayavyatireka*; (3) *āgamāpāyitadavadhyanvayavyatireka*; (4) *duḥkḥaparamapremāspadānvayavyatireka*; 5) *anuvṛttavyāvṛttānvayavyatireka*.



545 *adhyāyas* of the BSBh. At this point MS refers to VKL: *vistāras tu vedāntakal-*
546 *palatikāyām anusandheyah* “By contrast, an elaborate [explanation] should be
547 searched in the *Vedāntakalpalatikā*.”

548 What is interesting for our purpose is that in the VKL, apart from an elusive
549 mention to these *tarkas*, I could not find any elaborate discussion on these topics
550 (Divanji 1933, pp. 193–194 notes).

551 Let us now look at this issue through the words of both texts where, even without
552 *verbatim* citation, there is nonetheless clear mutual reference:⁴³
553

556 **VKL** (1962, pp. 172–173)

557 tato 'dviṭyābrahmaikyaviṣa-
558 yavedāntāśaktitātparyaniścayaphalake-
559 na **śravaṇākhyatarkeṇa**
560 kriyārthatvādibhir hetvābhāsair vā
561 adviṭyābrahmātmaikye vedāntānām
562 prāmāṇyāsambhavarūpaś cittadoṣaḥ.
563 evaṃ vedāntānām
564 prāmāṇyāsambhāvanāpracayahetu-
565 bhūtaccittaikāgryapratibandhakaś
566 cittadoṣaḥ
567 prameyasambhāvanāphalakena
568 **mananākhyena tarkeṇa**. tato
569 'nyānuparaktābrahmātmaikya-
570 viṣayasamśkārapracayena
571 hetujñānavṛttiphalakena **prayatnena**
572 **nididhyāsanākhyena**, anādi-
573 pravṛttidehātmañānanajan-
574 itasamśkārapracayaḥ cittadoṣo
575 'paśaryate.

SB (SB/S 1933, pp. 70; SB/NR/LV 1989,
pp. 427–432; SB 1986, pp. 127–133)
vyāpyaropeṇa
vyāpakaprasañjanātmakasya tasya
icchādhīnatayā
bhramapramāvilakṣaṇatvāt. ata eva
manananididhyāsanasaḥite **śravaṇākhye**
vedāntavicāre '**śrotavyo mantavyo**
nididhyāsitavya' ityādividhir
upapadyate, tasya **caturvidhānvayavya-**
tirekāditarkarūpatvāt.
dr̥gdṛśyānvayavyatirekaḥ,
sākṣisākṣyānvayavyatirekaḥ,
āgamāpāyitadavadhyanvaya-
vyatirekaḥ, **duḥkhaparama-**
premāspadānvayavyatireka iti.
anuvṛttavyāvṛttānvayavyatirekaḥ
pañcamaḥ. etac ca sarveṣāṃ
vedāntānukūlatarkāṇām
caturlakṣaṇīmīmāṃsāpratipāditānām
upalakṣaṇam ity abhiyuktāḥ.

577 In both texts the main referent is a particular meaning of hypothetical
578 argumentation or reasoning (*tarka*), again intended as a mental operation. But
579 while in VKL hearing (*śravaṇa*) and reflection (*manana*) are called *tarkas*, SB lists
580 the five *tarkas* mentioned in the table. Here we see that in VKL there is a reference
581 to *tarkas* as a means to attaining the non-dual, liberating knowledge, but they are
582 nothing but hearing (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*) and meditation (*nididhyāsana*).

⁴³ The two texts quote or refer to each other many times. SB (Sarasvati 1986, p. 133) refers to *śravaṇa* mentioning VKL; it differentiates between the *vyāvahārika* and *pāramārthika* level of reality referring to VKL (SB, 1986, p. 151). VKL (1962, pp. 163–164) mentions SB on presenting the process of manifestation (*śṛṅgikrama*).



583 So there is not a correspondence with the very technical meaning touched on in SB,
584 where MS informed the reader that VKL should treat the topic at length.

585 Another similar instance concerning again VKL and SB (SB/S 1933: 76; SB/
586 NR/LV 1989: 442; SB 1986, p. 141) is placed right at the end of the
587 commentary of the eighth stanza of *Daśaśloka*. Here MS, having already
588 described the three conditions (*avasthātraya*) through which the *jīvātman* and the
589 three principles identified (*abhimānin*) with those same conditions pass in a
590 microcosmic sphere, shifts to a macrocosmic sphere. In doing so, he follows
591 BSBh (I.3.13) and establishes a link between individual (*adhyātma*), elemental
592 (*adhibhūta*) and divine (*adhidaiva*) levels, which correspond to each letter of the
593 monosyllable *om*, namely *a*, *u* and *m*. A meditative practice (*upāsana*) aiming at
594 the unifying vision of all these principles leads to the world of Hiraṇyagarbha
595 (*hiraṇyagarbhalokaprāpti*) and the subsequent gradual liberation (*kramamukti*). In
596 contrast, direct liberation (*sākṣāt-mokṣa*) is the knowledge of the underlying
597 reality, the witness consciousness (*sākṣicaitanya*) of all these principles, free
598 from all limitations. Since the three conditions, together with the three principles
599 identified with them, are products of ignorance (*avidyātmakatvāt*), they are
600 ultimately false (*mithyā*), while the witness alone shines as the fourth (*turīya*). In
601 closing this section, MS again refers to a more detailed and developed
602 argumentation within VKL: *vistareṇa caitat prapañcitam asmābhir vedāntakal-*
603 *palatikāyām ity uparamyate* “And this very [issue] has been elaborately
604 developed by us in *Vedāntakalpalatikā*. So I stop [here].”

605 I agree with Divanji (1933, 201 notes) when he affirms that in VKL there is
606 nowhere a similar discussion regarding the three conditions of the *jīvātman*. The
607 only mention in VKL (1962, p. 98) of dream phenomena (*svapna*) is inserted in a
608 completely different analysis. Therefore, it should be rather likely that at least one
609 or more *stabakas* can still be found.

610 As a last remark in this section I would like to shift the attention to a common
611 issue of VKL (1962, pp. 3–13) and SŚSS (*ad* IV.1; 2005, pp. 634–643). Actually, if
612 SŚSS is the first work of MS, the first part of the fourth chapter really seems to be
613 the pattern on which MS built the discussion at the opening section of VKL. The
614 two sections are almost identical in many parts. I notice only very minor changes in
615 order or expression, such as the use of synonyms etc.

616 Since this discussion occupies many pages, I just extract a few less common
617 examples to show how much in this occasion VKL is indebted to SŚSS. The
618 analysis is the same as the one recalled above concerned with GAD *ad* BG II.13 vs.
619 SB I and regards the conception of *mokṣa* in several *darśanas*. MS, after presenting
620 all the rival views, deals with the view of the *aupaniṣadāḥ*, the Advaita Vedāntins,
621 which he believes to be the highest:



623

624 SŚSS *ad* SŚ IV.1 (2005, pp. 640–641)
 625 **sām̐khyās tu prakṛtipuruṣavivekāḍ**
 626 **anādyavivekanivṛttau taṃ puruṣaṃ**
 627 **prati nivṛttādhikārayāḥ prakṛter na**
 628 **punas tadbhogārthā pravṛttir iti**
 629 **trividhaduḥkhas-**
 630 **yaikāntikātyantanirodha eva**
 631 **svabhāvataḥ kevalasya puruṣasya**
 632 **kaivalyam iti. pātañjalās tu**
 633 **prakṛtipuruṣa-**
 634 **vivekenābhyāsavairāgyaparipākāḍ**
 635 **yamaniyamāsanaprāñāyāma-**
 636 **pratyāhāradhārañādhyaṇa-**
 637 **samprajñātasamādhipūrvakāt**
 638 **parameśvaraprasāḍajāt**
 639 **pañcavidhānāṃ cittavṛttināṃ nirodhāḍ**
 640 **eva dharmameghaśabditāḍ**
 641 **asamprajñātasamādheḥ kaivalyam**
 642 **iti kalpayanti. tridaṇḍinas tu**
 643 **jīvabrahmaṇor bhedaḍbhedam**
 644 **abhyupetya**
 645 **jñānakarmasamuccayābhyāsāḍ eva**
 646 **kāraṇātmakabrahmaṇi**
 647 **kāryātmakajīvasya**
 648 **karmavāsanāśahita-**
 649 **bhedāṃśanivṛttirūpalayo**
 650 **muktir iti vadanti. brāhmaṇa**
 651 **paramaiśvaryeṇa yoga ity anye.**
 652 **sarataṇḍanirastaraṇgabhedena**
 653 **samudradvaividhyavat**
 654 **savikāranirvikārarūpeṇā-**
 655 **vasthādvayaṃ brahmaṇaḥ parikalpya**
 656 **jñānakarmasamuccayābhyāsāḍ eva**
 657 **savikāravasthāparityāgena**
 658 **nirvikāravasthāprāptir eva mokṣa ity**
 659 **apare.**

661 It is clear that MS borrows the entire passage from SŚSS and inserts it *verbatim*
 660 in VKL. The minor differences might be due to manuscript differences and lack of a
 663 proper edition.

VKL (1962, pp. 8–9)
sām̐khyāḥ tu prakṛtipuruṣavivekāḍ,
anādyavivekanivṛttau taṃ puruṣaṃ
prati caritādhikārayāḥ prakṛter na
punas tadbhogārthā apravṛttir⁴⁴ iti
trividhaduḥkhasya
ekāntātyantanirodha eva svabhāvataḥ
kevalasyāpi puruṣasya kaivalyam ity
āhuḥ. pātañjalāḥ, tu prakṛti-
puruṣavivekenābhyāsavairāgyapa-
ripākāḍ yamaniyamāsanaprāñāyāma-
pratyāhāradhārañādhyaṇa
samprajñātasamādhipūrvakāt
parameśvaraprasāḍanāt
pañcavidhānāṃ cittavṛttināṃ
nirodhāḍ eva dharmameghaśabditāḍ
asamprajñātasamādheḥ kaivalyam iti
kalpayanti. tridaṇḍinaḥ tu
jīvabrahmaṇor bhedaḍbhedam
abhyupetya
jñānakarmasamuccayābhyāsāḍ eva
kāraṇātmakabrahmaṇi
kāryātmakajīvasya
karmavāsanāśahitabhedāṃśanivṛttih
mokṣaḥ iti vadanti.
paramaiśvaraprāptih, ity anye.
savikāranirvikārarūpeṇa
avasthādvayaṃ brahmaṇaḥ parikalpya
jñānakarmasamuccayābhyāsāḍ eva
savikāravasthāparityāgena
nirvikāravasthāprāptih eva mokṣa ity
apare.

⁴⁴ This seems an important modification of the VKL if compared to the published text of the SŚSS. The editor of the VKL gives in note also a different reading, namely *pravṛttih*, identical to SŚSS, which is the correct one, since this reading conveys that once the discriminating knowledge originates in *puruṣa*, then *prakṛti* withdraws from its earlier functions towards *puruṣa* and does not approach it anymore (*na punas...pravṛttih*). I would read accordingly also in the VKL.



664 II.2.4 General Remarks

665 I started my analysis by stating that any issue concerning MS's thought has to first
666 be confronted with the content of the AS. In the next sections, I shall show that
667 MS's originality is enclosed between the brackets of Advaita tradition, where a part
668 of the discussion is linked to fixed textual *topoi*, and the other part to the intellectual
669 ability of the writer. The works of MS, except for the devotional ones, treat nearly
670 the same issues and thus often refer to each other, so that the above analysis could
671 be easily broadened. In many cases, the very nature of some topics compels MS to
672 use similar arguments and consequently analogous vocabulary. Notwithstanding
673 that, it seems to me that MS rarely "copied and pasted" from one text to another.⁴⁵

674 I suppose that there are two main reasons for this ability of MS to deal with a single
675 subject in different ways. First, MS pays keen attention to the addressee of the texts.
676 Even though his style is almost always quite vigorous and technical, it has a margin of
677 change in accordance to the aim of the text and to the possible reader. In fact, for
678 example, the style and language of GAD, MST and BBR are much easier compared to
679 those of VKL and SB. On the other hand, both of these texts seem a great deal simpler if
680 compared to the intricate technicality of ARR and, even more than that, of AS. In fact,
681 MST and BBR are texts about *bhakti*, thus open to everyone; GAD deals with both
682 *bhakti* and *jñāna* in very straightforward terms; SB and VKL are considered by MS
683 mere textbooks for Advaita Vedānta beginners, while ARR and AS are *prauḍha-*
684 *granthas* 'mature works' for very advanced scholars.

685 The other reason could be ascribed to his own genius. While keeping his attention
686 focused on the root of the problem, MS has been capable to handle it from several
687 standpoints, each time enriching it with new examples and new vocabulary. We find
688 several clear cross-references in which MS tells us, just like a contemporary scholar,
689 that if someone wants to deepen a certain subject he can glance through another text
690 of his own. Therefore, he willingly does not need to repeat himself *verbatim*.

691 An interesting example for this practical attitude (no need to spend more time on
692 a subject that has already been analysed elsewhere) is ARR. As stated before, it is
693 quite likely that ARR is the last work of MS, since we find therein references to
694 other works, whereas ARR is not mentioned elsewhere. It refers to AS in dealing:
695 with hearing (*śravaṇa*, 1917, p. 9; *kintu sāṅgaśravaṇavidher eveti vyutpāditaṃ*
696 *advaitasiddhau*); with the nature of the unreal (1917, p. 26; *anyathā guṇajanyatvena*
697 *pramātvāpātād ity advaitasiddhau vistaraḥ*); with reflecting (*manana*) and meditat-
698 ing (*nididhyāsana*) in two passages (1917, p. 24; *tadākāratvaṃ ca vṛtiniṣṭha eva*
699 *kaścīd anirvacanīyo dharma ity advaitasiddhau vistaraḥ* and 37; *upapāditaṃ caitaḥ*
700 *advaitasiddhau dr̥śyatvāhetūpapādane*). ARR again mentions the same subject
701 pointing out that there is no reason for overextending the discussion therein, since it
702 has been treated in VKL and AS (1917, p. 44; *śabdātiriktaṃ cātmaviṣayaṃ*

⁴⁵ An exception to this are the almost identical passages of VKL (1962, pp. 3–13) and SSSS (*ad* IV.1; 2005, pp. 634–643), see Sect. II.2.3.



703 *pramāṇaṃ nāstūtyādi nirūpitam advaitasiddhivedāntakalpalatayor iti neha*
704 *prapañcyate*).⁴⁶

705 III MS's Use of Advaita Material

706 III.1 Doctrinal Milieu

707 Out of BSBh flowed an enormous hermeneutical activity which occupied all the post-
708 Śaṅkara Advaita textual developments. In summary, there are three schools of
709 interpretation: the *vivaraṇaprasthāna*, originating from the *Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa*
710 (hereafter PPV), a sub-commentary on Padmapāda's (IX CE) *Pañcapādikā* (hereafter
711 PP) on the BSBh; the *bhāmatīprasthāna*, originating from the *Bhāmatī* of Vācaspati Mīśra
712 (X CE), another sub-commentary on Śaṅkara's BSBh, but also heavily influenced by
713 Maṇḍana Mīśra's (VIII CE) *Brahmasiddhi* (hereafter BSi); and, in an earlier stage, the
714 *vārtikaprasthāna* of the *vārtikakāra* Sureśvara (IX CE), which has a direct bearing with an
715 indirect gloss and versified version of BSBh: Sarvajñātman's (IX CE) *Samkṣepa Śārīraka*
716 (hereafter SŚ). Although many other commentaries, glosses, and explanations flowered in
717 both of the main schools, the beginning of the controversy could be epitomized in the
718 double contraposition of *Brahmasiddhi-Bhāmatī* vs. *Pañcapādikā-Pañcapādikāvivaraṇa*,
719 whereas Sureśvara's school bears a closer similarity with the *vivaraṇa* one and is
720 decidedly different from Maṇḍana's position (BSi 1937, pp. xxv–lvii).

721 These three different approaches reached quite strong differences as they
722 embraced a wide range of more important issues of Advaita philosophy: the theory
723 of error (*khyātivāda*), the concepts of the individual self (*jīva*), the empirical
724 universe (*jagat*), the Lord (*īśvara*), *māyā*, *brahman*, *mokṣa*, and the means
725 (*sādhana*) to attain *mokṣa*. The more interesting and more often debated points are
726 indeed the nature of *jīva* and *īśvara*, their mutual relationship, and their relationship
727 with the world and with ignorance. The divergences of these interrelated issues
728 show the responsibility for the more philosophically oriented denomination of the
729 three schools: *pratibimbavāda* for the *vivaraṇaprasthāna*, *avacchedavāda* for the
730 *bhāmatīprasthāna* and *ābhāsavāda* for the *vārtikaprasthāna*.

734	prasthāna	Founder	other name	notes
736	<i>vivaraṇa</i>	Padmapāda	<i>pratibimbavāda</i>	
738	<i>bhāmatī</i>	Vācaspati (Maṇḍana)	<i>avacchedavāda</i>	
739	<i>vārtika</i>	Sureśvara (Sarvajñātman)	<i>ābhāsavāda</i>	closer to <i>vivaraṇa</i>

740 III.2 Influences on MS's Thought

742 Through the centuries, the internal polemic between *bhāmatī* and *vivaraṇa*
743 upholders touched on very strong points of disagreement.

⁴⁶ In the edition published by Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī (1997 [1937]), pp. 859–883) the third *pariccheda* of AS has eight chapters, and all of them focus on *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, *jñānavidhi* and *sābdāparokṣatva*. Among these the first four (859–870) are the enlarged version of the ARR passages mentioned herein.



744 This internal polemical tendency seemed to decline when several opponents
745 vigorously attacked the divided and vulnerable non-dualistic views. This new breeze
746 shifted the attention towards new investigations (e.g., about Advaita and *bhakti* instead of
747 *jñāna* and *karman*) and gathered all the scattered non-dualistic trends.⁴⁷ This commitment
748 had two faces: one compilatory and the other argumentative (see above, Sect. I).

749 MS's AS is truly a vivid example of both these inclinations. Thus, it is a reservoir of
750 quotations from earlier Advaitins, whose positions are discussed and strengthened by
751 MS's lucid logic, his deep exegetic understanding and his precise *navya* style. The
752 quantity of quotations, references and hints to other non-dualist writers helps us
753 identify which of the Advaita texts and authors were more relevant during the period of
754 MS's personal śāstric training and which sources he usually consulted and had at hand.
755 Along with Śaṅkara, he demonstrates in-depth knowledge of and often resorts to
756 Sureśvara⁴⁸ (Divanji 1933, pp. XCII–XCVIII) and his supposed disciple Sar-
757 vajñātman (Divanji 1933, pp. C–CVI) as well as to Padmapāda (Divanji 1933, pp.
758 XCI–XCII) and Prakāśātman (XI CE; Divanji 1933, pp. CVII–CVIII), Maṇḍana Mīśra
759 and Vācaspati Mīśra (Divanji 1933, pp. XCVIII–XCIX), Śrīhara, Vimuktātman (XI
760 CE; Divanji 1933, p. C), Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka (XI–XII CE; fl. 1150 ca., Potter
761 2006, p. 512), Amalānanda Sarasvatī (XIII CE; Divanji 1933, p. CVIII), Munīndra
762 Ānandapūrṇa (alias Vidyāsāgara, fl. 1350 ca.), Vidyāraṇya (XIV CE; Divanji 1933,
763 pp. CX–CXVII), Rāmādvaya (XIV CE), Nṛsiṃhāśrama and Appayya Dīkṣita (XVI
764 CE; Divanji 1933, pp. CXXI–CXXII).⁴⁹ Nevertheless, he seems to be particularly
765 influenced by Citsukha,⁵⁰ a follower of *vivaraṇaprasthāna*. Citsukha's *magnum opus*
766 is TP. The primary aim of this work is to refute the realistic points of view, be it of the
767 Naiyāyikas or of the *vaiṣṇava* types of Vedāntins, which were emerging during
768 Citsukha's period. It seems that the first objective of VT's NA was to refute TP.

769 In SB, following the *ābhāsavāda*, MS justifies the view according to which the
770 *brahman* could be both *jīva* and *īśvara* (SB 1986, pp. 42–45). Moreover, following
771 Sureśvara's line of interpretation, MS replies to the objection that someone should
772 attain immediate liberation once he knows the object previously covered by
773 ignorance. He says that in this case *avidyā* is not completely nullified but simply
774 overpowered by a mental modification (*vṛtti*), the nature of which is opposite to the

⁴⁷ Minkowski (2011, pp. 215–216) writes that the strong division between *vivaraṇa* and the *bhāmātī* is difficult to draw for this era. Although Appayya is said to have been under Nṛsiṃhāśrama's influence, he writes the *Parimala*, on the *Vedāntakalpataru*, a commentary on the *Bhāmātī*. Nṛsiṃhāśrama, on the other hand, writes the *Bhāvaprakāśikā*, a gloss on *Vivaraṇa*, but also a gloss on *Samkṣepa Śārīraka*, notoriously a text in the Sureśvara line.

⁴⁸ MS, quoting Sureśvara, calls him *vārtikakṛt* (ARR 1917, p. 5), *vārtikakārapāda* (SB 1986, pp. 43, 53; AS 1997, pp. 556, 558), *vārtikakāra* (SB 1986, p. 90) or his work *vārtika* (SB 1986, p. 150), *vārtikāmṛta* (SB 1986, p. 40; AS 1997, p. 467). See Divanji (1933, pp. 113–115) and Saha (2011, p. 72).

⁴⁹ Some scholars accept Appayya to be a younger contemporary of MS. Some others consider Appayya elder. According to tradition they met each other during the pilgrimage of Appayya to Kāśī, where he went accompanied by Nṛsiṃhāśrama (Minkowski 2011, pp. 216, 223–225). In any case, the dates and the mutual relationships among these authors are still being debated.

⁵⁰ The particularity of Citsukha, beside his earlier use of what will later be called *Navya Nyāya*, is that he treats all the *pūrvapakṣas* at a stretch and only having exhausted them he replies with the entire *uttarapakṣa*. This kind of presentation, usually called *mahāpūrvapakṣa*, is already used by Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya* (thanks to Elisa Freschi for this information). MS, as well as Appayya, quotes Citsukha's TP several times.



775 ignorance related to that particular condition. On the contrary, liberation can only be
 776 attained when *avidyā* is completely subjugated through the knowledge of *brahman*
 777 arising from the upaniṣadic *mahāvākyas*, that same *brahman* which is the object of
 778 *avidyā* (ŚŚ I.319). If ignorance concerning a particular object is the antecedent
 779 absence of its knowledge (*jñānaprāgabhāva*, SB 1986, pp. 62–64), then it should be
 780 accepted that there are countless instances of ignorance which need to be sublated
 781 before attaining liberation (SB 1986, p. 153).

782 MS is an *ekajīvavādin-dṛṣṭiṣṭivādin* (see Das 1977, p. 151), and very near to the
 783 *vivaraṇaprasthāna*'s positions. Nevertheless, faithful to his harmonizing attempt, he
 784 tries to defend and justify also those of Maṇḍana Mīśra and Vācaspati, to whom
 785 sometimes he refers (Divanji 1933, p. XCIX). Having once demonstrated his accord
 786 with Sarvajñātman and other *vivaraṇa* thinkers about *brahman* being the locus as well as
 787 the object of *avidyā*, MS also interprets Vācaspati's view according to which *brahman* is
 788 the object/content of *avidyā* and *jīva* is its locus (BSBh/B/VK/KP 2000, pp. 2–3). The
 789 *vivaraṇa* followers find fault with mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) in Vācaspati's
 790 opinion, because if *avidyā* is responsible for the distinction between *jīva* and *īśvara*,
 791 it cannot be located in its own effect, i.e. the *jīva*, which is supposed to be
 792 subsequent to *avidyā* itself: in this way *avidyā* is located in the individual selves and
 793 is at the same time their cause. MS simply affirms that it is not possible to search for
 794 a sequence or chronology among *avidyā* and *jīva*, because both are without
 795 beginning (*anādi*), and as regards entities without beginning the flaws of mutual
 796 dependence (*anyonyāśraya*), circularity (*cakrakāśraya*) or *regressus ad infinitum*
 797 (*anavasthā*; AS 1998, p. 585) cannot be postulated. Similarly, when MS states that
 798 only the single individual self whose ignorance is dispelled attains liberation, he
 799 justifies also the doctrine according to which there are as many *avidyās* as there are
 800 *jīvas* (ARR 1917, p. 6).

804	<i>prasthāna</i>	locus of <i>avidyā</i>	content of <i>avidyā</i>
805	<i>vivaraṇa</i>	<i>brahman</i>	<i>brahman</i>
806	<i>bhāmātī</i>	<i>jīva</i>	<i>brahman</i>

808 III.3 The Definitions of Falsity in the AS

809 I shall now try to show how MS cites, refers to, reads and interprets his Advaitin
 810 predecessors based mainly on the first sections of AS, which are concerned with the
 811 establishment of the falsity of the empirical world (*prapañcamithyātva*). In general,
 812 Advaitins' texts profusely cite upaniṣadic passages, greatly borrowing hermeneutical
 813 material from the commentarial tradition from Śaṅkara onwards. I will here focus
 814 on Advaita independent treatises (*prakaraṇa*) literature derived from the *prasthāna-*
 815 *trayī* (i.e., *Upaniṣads*, BS and BG) and its *bhāṣya* tradition.⁵¹

⁵¹ In a useful scheme regarding the citations in GAD, Saha (2011, pp. 370–371) lists all the instances where MS quotes earlier *ācāryas* in his commentary on the BG: Śaṅkara (*upodghāta* 1, II.17–18, II.25, II.41, II.48, II.56, III.2, III.20, III.34, IV.6, IV.18, IV.21, IV.24, IV.34, IV.37, VI.14, VI.29, VIII.24, XIII.2, XIII.12, XVII.10, XVII.16, XVII.28, XVIII.6, XVIII.12, XVIII.14, XVIII.37, XVIII.66, XVIII.67 and XVIII.75, including both implicit and explicit quotations from the *bhāṣyas* on BG and *Upaniṣads*),



816 The title of the AS hides a polemical vein. Establishment (*siddhi*), in fact,
817 presupposes the refutation of other's positions.⁵² I do suspect that *siddhi* texts
818 represent a peculiar type of polemical philosophical literature, which is still to be
819 properly researched.⁵³

820 As a matter of fact, MS starts quoting earlier (*prācām*) Advaitins after the *incipit*
821 of AS where—without acknowledging the exact source—he quotes the well-known
822 inference (*prayoga*) proving the falsity of the empirical world (*prapañcamithyātva*).
823 One of the first occurrences of this kind of inference is variously presented in
824 Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka's⁵⁴ three texts: *Nyāyamakaranda* (hereafter NM),
825 *Pramāṇamālā* (hereafter PM) and *Nyāyadīpāvalī* (hereafter ND):
826

829 AS (1997, pp. 30–31)

830 evaṃ vipratipattau prācām prayogāḥ—
831 vimatam mithyā dr̥ṣyatvāt, jaḍatvāt,
832 paricchinnatvāt śuktirūpyavad iti.
833 nāvayaveṣv āgrahaḥ.

NM (1901–1907, p. 128), PM (1907, p. 11) ND (1907, p. 1)

sati caivaṃ **prapañco 'pi** syād
avidyāvijṛmbhitaḥ/
jādyadr̥ṣatvahetubhyām
rajatasvapnadṛṣyavat// (NM)
sati caivaṃ **prapañco 'pi** syād
avidyāvinirmitaḥ/ avidyāto vibhinnatve
jaḍatvād rajjusarpavat//
jādyadr̥ṣatvahetubhyām mithyātvaṃ
vā prasādhyatām/ **prāg ukta eva**
dr̥ṣtānto mithyātve ceha bādhyatām//
(PM)

vivādapadaṃ mithyā, dr̥ṣyatvāt. yad
itthaṃ tat tathā.
yathobhayavādyavivādapadaṃ
rajatam. tathaitat, tatas tathā (ND).

Footnote 51 continued

Ānandagiri (implicit indication IV.6), Śrīdharasvāmin (II.41, VI.27 and two implicit indications ad XIII.12 and XVIII.12), Rāmānuja (implicit indication XIII.12). See also Saha (2011, pp. 117–121).

⁵² The very opening of AS (1997, pp. 8, 14) clears up this attitude: *tatrādvaitasiddher dvaitamithyātvaṃ pūrvakatvāt dvaitamithyātvaṃ eva prathamam upapādanīyam. upapādanam ca svapakṣasādhanaṃ parapakṣanirākaraṇābhyām bhavātīti* “There, since the establishment of non-duality is possible only after having previously established the falsity of duality, first the falsity of duality alone should be proved; and this very proving takes place through the establishment of one's own positions and the refutation of others' positions” (See Pellegrini 2014: 4).

⁵³ Nair (1990, pp. 13–17) lists and briefly presents sixteen *siddhi* texts with an Advaita point of view. Nonetheless, this kind of philosophical genre is quite ancient and diffused, for example Vasubandhu's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, Maṇḍana's *Sphoṭasiddhi*, Ratnakīrti's *Apoḥasiddhi* and *Kṣanabhaṅgasiddhi*, Yāmuna's *Īśvarasiddhi* and *Samvitsiddhi*, Udayana's *Prabodhasiddhi*, etc. See also the introduction of Kuppaswami Sastri to his edition of BSi (1937, pp. xxi–xxiv).

⁵⁴ Ānandabodha Bhaṭṭāraka is remembered among Advaita influential writers for his three main works: *Nyāyamakaranda*, *Pramāṇamālā* and *Nyāyadīpāvalī*. He is believed to be a disciple of Vimuktātman since the latter's *Iṣṭasiddhi* I.36 (1986, p. 135) is quoted in PM (1907, p. 4), where the quotation is preceded by *ata evoktaṃ gurubhiḥ*. Yet, this is still being debated (Mahadevan 2003, pp. 139–140).



835 Of the three versions of the *prapañcamithyātva* inference by Ānandabodha, the first
836 two are very similar and in metric form, while the third one is in prose. If one changes the
837 metric version into prose, the inference would sound like: *prapañco 'vidyāvijr̥mbhītaḥ/
838 avidyāvīnirmitaḥ, jaḍatvād dṛśyatvāt, rajatasvapnādīdṛśyavat*. The PM metric version
839 adds a specification (*viśeṣaṇa*) to the probans “insentience” (*jaḍatva*): *avidyāto
840 vibhinnatve*, “being different from ignorance”. This is to specify that the universe is
841 insentient like ignorance, but it is different from it, because it is its result. Ānandabodha
842 uses two *hetus* in the NM and one in the PM. Nevertheless, in the second stanza he states
843 that falsity can be established either through “insentience” and/or through its “being an
844 object of perception” (*dṛśyatva*). The examples are nearly the same. Nonetheless, in NM
845 he includes also “dream objects” (*svapnadṛśya*) as a positive instance (*sapakṣa*). These
846 two inferences, however, correspond to that of the ND, which seems to be the one
847 intended by MS. In fact, in ND’s prose version the syllogism is five-membered, as
848 prescribed in Nyāya (NS I.1.32): “The object under consideration [= the empirical
849 universe] is false” (*pratijñā: vivādapadaṃ mithyā*); “because it is an object of
850 perception” (*hetu: dṛśyatvāt*); “what is like this [= object of perception] is like that
851 [= false],⁵⁵ just as the silver [erroneously perceived while one is in fact looking at a piece
852 of shiny mother-of-pearl] which is agreed on by both the debaters” (*udāharaṇa: yad
853 itthaṃ tat tathā. yathobhayavādyavivādapadaṃ rajatam*); “and so/such [= false] it is this
854 [= the object under consideration]” (*upanaya: tathaitat*) and “therefore it [= the object
855 under consideration] is like that [= false]” (*nigamana: tatas tathā*). In this case
856 Ānandabodha uses just one *probans*, i. e. *dṛśyatva*.

857 The left side of the above chart shows MS’s version of the inference. In it, MS
858 adds another *probans* to those already used by Ānandabodha, namely “being
859 limited” (*paricchinnatva*). Also, the example is the same, although the way of
860 expressing it mentions the object of the perceptual error—the silver (*rūpya*)—along
861 with its locus—the nacre (*śukti*). This is clearly a slightly re-interpreted
862 representation of Ānandabodha’s inference. MS then adds *nāvayaveṣv āgrahaḥ*
863 “There is no insistence about the members [of the syllogism]”. This means that for
864 MS it does not matter how many members the syllogism has and that he possibly
865 refers to the ND formulation of the syllogism.

866 Let us now switch to a very important section of AS: the five (*pañca*) definitions of
867 falsity (*mithyātva*), a stock-topic of Vedānta since the time of Padmapāda and
868 Vācaspati. All these definitions are quotations from earlier texts. MS acknowledges his
869 indebtedness but defends and interprets these definitions with his own taste. This is
870 evident in the extremely concise passages that MS cites from his predecessors. The
871 importance of the quotation is, at any rate, qualitative more than quantitative, and it
872 stands exactly in the spirit of defence, discussion and re-interpretation which pervades
873 AS. It is not accidental that the first three out of the five definitions of falsity are placed
874 within *pūrvapakṣas* or very briefly at their opening. This is easily understandable
875 because in the introductory section of NA’s refutation of *mithyātva* VT refers to and
876 sums up all the earlier understanding of falsity quoting eleven definitions from various
877 sources (NA 2002, pp. 12–13). MS selects only five of these definitions and aims at re-

⁵⁵ This part of the example corresponds to the invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*), which could be viewed as *yad yad dṛśyaṃ tat tan mithyā*.



878 establishing their validity. The other definitions, along with VT's objections, are
879 ignored by MS as, perhaps, obviously faulty or lacking any substantial value.⁵⁶

880 The original source of the first definition of falsity is Padmapāda's *Pañcapādikā*
881 (hereafter PP). More specifically, MS replies *in primis* to VT's objections and VT
882 quotes Padmapāda. In any case, it is likely that MS while refuting VT, had in front of
883 him not only NA, but also the source text that originally hosted the definition under:
886

887 AS (1998, pp. 48–49)

888 na tāvat **mithyāśabdo**
889 '**nirvacanīyatāvaca**na iti
890 pañcapādikāvaca^{nāt}
891 sadasadanadhikaraṇatvarūpam
892 anirvācyatvam.

PP (1985, pp. 23, 26; 1992, pp. 42–43; cf.
also 1985, p. 156)

mithyāśabdo dvyarthaḥ—
apahnava^{vaca}naḥ
anirvacanīyatāvacanaś ca. atra ayam
apahnava^{vaca}naḥ [...] mithyā ca tad
ajñānaṃ ca mithyājñānaṃ. **mithyeti**
anirvacanīyatā ucyate.

894 Padmapāda offers a twofold signification of the word *mithyā*: “concealment”
895 (*apahnava*) and “indefinability, indeterminableness” (*anirvacanīyatā*).⁵⁷ It means
896 that falsity (*mithyā*), i.e. ignorance, has the power to conceal (*āvaraṇa*) the nature of
897 the self and to project (*vikṣepa*) something indefinable, indeterminate either as real
898 or not-real, just like the universe.

899 At first MS places PP's definition in the *pūrvapakṣa*. He reports only part of
900 Padmapāda's statement, skipping over the “concealment” meaning of *mithyā*, and
901 concentrates his analysis on *anirvacanīyatā*. Further, he displays his own
902 understanding of *anirvacanīyatā*: “the property of not being the locus neither of
903 what is real nor of what is not real” (*sadasadanadhikaraṇatva*).

904 Both the second and third definitions are taken from PP's foremost commentary,
905 the *Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa* (hereafter PPV) by Prakāśātman. The second definition of
906 falsity is undoubtedly the more complex among the five. I have partially discussed it
907 elsewhere (2011, pp. 444–451), so here I shall only show the sources of MS.

908 Again, MS puts forward the second definition (the first one in Prakāśātman's text)
909 just before the opening of the *pūrvapakṣa*:
912

913 AS (1998, p. 94)

914 **pratipannopādhau**
915 **traikālikaniṣedhapratīyogitvaṃ vā**
916 **mithyātvam.**

PPV (1985, pp. 174–175; 1992, p. 106)

pratipannopādhāv
abhāvapratīyogitvam eva **mithyātvam**
nāma, tac ca bādhakajñāne rajataṃ
pratipannopādhāv
abhāvapratīyogitayā avabhāsate iti
pratyakṣam.

918 MS quotes the definition almost *verbatim*: “falsity is the counter-positive of the
919 constant absence of an entity in the [same] locus in which it is perceived.” The

⁵⁶ In the *pūrvapakṣa* Citsukha gives ten options of definitions for *mithyātvā*. VT probably has in mind the list provided by Citsukha (TP 1974, pp. 56–57).

⁵⁷ Vācaspati's *Bhāmāṇī* expresses the same view (BSBh/ RP/B/NN 2000, p. 13).



920 difference with PPV is just that MS clearly specifies the nature of the absence
 921 (*niṣedha*, synonym of *abhāva*), qualifying it as “constant”⁵⁸ (*traikālika*, synonym of
 922 *atyanta*), while Prakāśātman uses the unqualified term *abhāva*, which, when not
 923 further specified, usually means *atyantābhāva*. PPV immediately applies the
 924 definition to the illusory silver wrongly cognized while looking at nacre.

925 An interesting issue appears a few lines further. MS has just defended his
 926 interpretation of the definition of falsity through which he is able to negate the
 927 nacre-silver example as well as the empirical world in their own locus of
 928 appearance (Pellegrini 2011, pp. 444–445). The opponent argues that the negation
 929 (*niṣedha*) of both cannot be by their own nature (*svarūpeṇa*). In the case of
 930 *śuktirūpya* the illusory silver is negated by the cognition “This is not silver, this is
 931 nacre” (*nedam rajatam, iyaṃ śuktiḥ*) and the counter-positive (*pratīyogin*) of this
 932 negation is not the illusory silver, but the empirical (*laukikapāramārthi-*
 933 *ka = vyāvahārika*) one, because during perceptual error the illusory silver is
 934 erroneously perceived as an empirical one. Similarly, in the case of *brahman*, when
 935 its knowledge arises, the empirical world is negated but the *brahman* does not
 936 contradict the empirical (*vyāvahārika*) world, which is on an altogether different
 937 level, but rather the view that the world has an absolute (*pāramārthika*) nature.⁵⁹
 938 But, on accepting this, there will be a contradiction (*matahāni/virodha*) with a
 939 sentence written in PPV, according to which the counter-positive of the negation of
 940 the illusory silver is that same illusory silver. The problem stands on this sentence,
 941 where MS (AS 1997, p. 123) precisely reports what is quoted by VT (NA 2002, p.
 942 26). The reference to PPV (PPV 1985, p. 192; 1992, pp. 124–125) is, instead, rather
 943 loose:

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 946
 947 AS (1997, p. 123) PPV (1985, pp. 192–193; 1992,
 pp. 124–125)
 948 **traikālikaniṣedham** prati nanu tarhi ‘pūrvaṃ rajatam abhūd idānīm
 949 svarūpeṇāpanasthaṃ rūpyaṃ na’ iti ghaṭavat **kālabhedena niṣedhaḥ**
 950 **pāramārthikatvākāreṇa** pratībhāsikaṃ **syāt. na,**
 951 **laukikaparamārtharajatasyātra**
kālatraye ’pi sūnyatvāt tadapekṣayā
nirupādhikaniṣedhasiddheḥ.

953 In some previous sentences, however, MS quotes *verbatim et literatim* a passage
 954 from TP which contains the same idea expressed by PPV:
 955
 956

⁵⁸ For this translation of *atyantābhāva* I rely on Sureśvara’s gloss, see *infra* in section III.3, after the BṛUBhV quote.

⁵⁹ It should be reminded that MS negates the absolute ontic status of the world, not its empirical one which is established by the means of knowledge. He also affirms that two entities contradict each other only when they pertain to the same level of reality, not otherwise.



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AS (1997, pp. 124–128)
tad uktam tattvapradīpikāyām—‘tasmāl
laukikaparamārtharajatam eva nedam
rajatam iti niṣedhapratīyogīti
pūrvācāryānām vācoyuktir api
purovartini rajatārthinaḥ
pravṛttidarśanāt laukikaparamārtha
rajatatvenāparokṣatayā pratītasya
kālatraye ’pi
laukikaparamārtharajatam idam na
bhavatīti niṣedhapratīyogītām
āṅgīkṛtya netavyeti.

TP (1974, p. 139)
tasmāl laukikapa
ramārtharajatam eva nedam
rajatam iti niṣedhapratīyogīti
pūrvācāryāvācoyuktir api purovartini
rajatārthinaḥ pravṛttidarśanāl⁶⁰
laukikarajatāmatvenāparokṣatayā
pratītasya kālatraye ’pi laukikapa
ramārtharajatam idam na bhavatīti
niṣedhapratīyogītām āṅgīkṛtya
netavyā.

972 Both MS and Citsukha affirm that there is no contradiction to PPV, because what
973 is meant by Prakāśātman’s statement is that the counter-positive of the negation is
974 indeed the illusory silver, simply misunderstood as identical with the empirical one.
975 It does not matter if this silver is negated by its own nature (*svarūpeṇa*) or
976 absolutely (*pāramārthikatvena*) (AS 1997, pp. 123–124). Therefore, continues MS,
977 when Prakāśātman maintains that the empirical silver is negated, he is taking the
978 negation as a mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*) which resides in (= “whose adjunct
979 [*anuyogin*] is”) the illusory silver (Bhattacharya 1992, pp. 82–84).

980 As stated above, the third definition of falsity also comes from PPV. Also on this
981 occasion MS quotes Prakāśātman not literally but, conforming to VT’s reconstruc-
982 tion (NA 2002, p. 37), he displays only Prakāśātman’s intended meaning framed
983 into a shorter statement,⁶¹ immediately followed by a *pūrvapakṣa*. MS himself, in
984 any case, is aware of the PPV statement because he quotes it *literatim* a few lines
985 later, merely inverting the order of the adjectives *vartamānena* and *pravilīnena*:
986

989 AS (1997, pp. 160, 164–168)
990 jñānanivartyatvaṃ vā mithyātvam [...]
991 ajñānasya svakāryeṇa pravilīnena
992 vartamānena vā saha jñānena nivṛttir
993 bādhaḥ.

PPV (1985, p. 178; 1992, p. 108)
ucyate—ajñānasya svakāryeṇa
vartamānena pravilīnena vā saha
jñānena nivṛttir bādhaḥ.

995 Hence, falsity is that which is contradicted once and for all by knowledge.
996 Whatever appears to be the content of an erroneous cognition and subsequently
997 ceases with the valid cognition of the real nature of that content is false.

998 Just after this citation, MS quotes a passage from Sureśvara’s BrUBhV (I.1.183),
999 again *verbatim*, with the two usual “quotation marks”: *uktam* and *iti*. This is of course
1000 just an example of the attention paid by MS in quoting Sureśvara. MS cites Sureśvara’s
1001 BrUBhV several times throughout his Advaita works, and usually *verbatim*.

⁶⁰ The edited text of the TP reads *pravṛttidarśanālaikikarajatāmatvena*, which does not make sense in this context.

⁶¹ I believe that the reformulation of the PPV passage was already well-established by the time of VT, because we find it in TP’s *mithyātvānirūpaṇa* (1974, p. 56) and in a slightly modified version in *anirvacanīyāvidyānirūpaṇa* (1974, pp. 92, 97), where Citsukha defines ignorance.



1003

1004 AS (1997, p. 168)
1005 vārtikakṛdbhiś coktam—
1006 **tat tvam asy ādi-**
1007 **vākyotthasamyagdhījanmamātrataḥ/**
1008 **avidyā saha kāryeṇa nāsīd asti**
1009 **bhaviṣyati//** iti.

BrUBhV I.1.183 (1982, p. 47)
tat tvam asy ādivākyotthasamyag-
dhījanmamātrataḥ/ avidyā
saha kāryeṇa nāsīd asti bhaviṣyati//

1011 Here it seems that MS wants to corroborate PPV's statement, which treats the
1012 terms *nivṛtti* and *bādha* as synonyms of constant absence (*atyantābhāva*), with the
1013 stanza of Sureśvara, again reinforcing the idea that the constant absence is indeed
1014 the absence connected with the three layers of time: "Just by the birth of the valid
1015 mental modification arisen from the sentence 'You are That', ignorance along with
1016 [its] effect [is experienced as] 'There was not, there is not, there will not be'!".

1017 I have discussed elsewhere (2011, pp. 451–455) the fourth definition of falsity,
1018 therefore I shall just briefly see how MS quotes it from TP. MS, unlike the usual
1019 scheme, on this occasion formulates the definition and immediately thereafter shows
1020 its real purport (it is noteworthy that also VT (NA 2002, p. 41) confutes not the
1021 definition but only its purport). In fact, MS does not feel the need to start directly
1022 with a *pūrvapakṣa* because, due to the extreme similarity of the second and fourth
1023 definitions, the major objections are displayed and replied within the discussion of
1024 the second definition.

1028 AS (1997, pp. 182–183)
1029 **svāśrayaniṣṭhātyantābhāva-**
1030 **pratiyogitvaṃ vā mithyātvam.**
1031 svātyantābhāvādhikaraṇa eva
1032 pratiyamānatvam.

TP (1974, p. 67)
sarveśam api bhāvānām āśrayatvena
saṃmate/ **pratiyogitvam**
atyantābhāvaṃ prati mṛṣātmatā// 7 //
tathā hi—paṭādinām bhāvānām
svāśrayatvenābhimatās tantvādayo ye
tanniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratyogitayaiva
teśam mithyātvam.

1034 Evidently, MS quotes *ad sensum* Citsukha's metric and prose versions of the
1035 definition, synthesizing it into a pure abstraction, without mentioning the "cloth and
1036 other objects" (*paṭādi*) given in TP's text. Beside the synonyms used, and beside the
1037 fact that MS's version is expressed with a compound while both Citsukha's versions
1038 are more dismembered, MS precisely interprets Citsukha's point, except for a
1039 philosophically not irrelevant adjective: *saṃmate* in metric and *-abhimatāḥ* in prose.
1040 Both these determinations convey the idea that a false entity does not exist, even in
1041 the only locus where it is supposed to be (*saṃmata/abhimata*). In *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*
1042 (hereafter VP) Dharmarāja Adhvarin (VP 2000, p. 239) writes that without
1043 *abhimata* there will result the flaw of impossibility (*asaṃbhava*) in the definition. In
1044 fact, when something is not perceived or found in its own locus it is understood as
1045 impossible. If we add the adjective *abhimata* to the locus (*āśraya*), it will result that
1046 the locus is not a real one but just a supposed one under particular conditions. For
1047 example, in the classical instance of the nacre-silver, the only possible locus for the
1048 illusory silver is the nacre, but the nacre is not the real locus of silver because it is



1049 just supposed to be so in that particular situation. Therefore, from Dharmarāja's
1050 treatment, it seems that something has gone wrong in MS's quotation. It might also
1051 be that MS recognized a weakness of the definition and therefore focused on
1052 rescuing its intended meaning, rather than its form (whereas at a later time
1053 Dharmarāja focused on rescuing the form of the definition by stressing the role of
1054 *abhimata-sammata*).

1055 Finally, MS gives a fifth definition of falsity taking the idea again from
1056 Ānandabodha's ND (1907, p. 1):
1058

1060 AS (1997, p. 195)

1061 **sadviviktatvaṃ vā mithyātvaṃ.**

ND (1907, p. 1)

satyavivekasya mithyābhāvasya
sādhyatvān nāprasiddhaviśeṣaṇatā,
nāpasiddhānto 'pi, satyam abādhyam,
bādhyam mithyeti tadvivekaḥ.

1063 First of all, in ND formulation the *definiendum* (*lakṣya*) is *mithyābhāva*, where
1064 the term *-bhāva* is a substitute for an abstract suffix (*bhāvapratyaya*, PA V.1.119:
1065 *tasya bhāvas tvatalau*, referring to *tva* and *taL*). So, interpreting the compound word
1066 *mithyābhāva* as a *ṣaṣṭhī tatpuruṣa* (*mithyāyāḥ bhāvaḥ*) the result will lead to the
1067 identification of *mithyābhāva* with *mithyātva*. On the side of the *definiens* (*lakṣaṇa*)
1068 we have again two forms: for MS *sadviviktatva* and for Ānandabodha *satyaviveka*. I
1069 believe that these two represent the same formulation. Both are compounds (most
1070 plausibly *pañcamī tatpuruṣas*: *sataḥ viviktatvam* and *satyāt vivekaḥ*) formed by two
1071 corresponding words, but their structures are reversed as a chiasm: in MS's
1072 formulation the second term (*uttarapada*) of the compound is an abstract noun,
1073 while in Ānandabodha the first (*pūrvapada*). The two formulations are thus
1074 apparently slightly different but fundamentally identical or, in other terms,
1075 substantially MS quotes *ad sensum*, but essentially he quotes it *verbatim*.

1076 Next follows the very technical discussion and defence of MS of the three
1077 *probans* given in his version of the *mithyātvaṇumana*. While explaining the purport
1078 and defending the *probans* "being an object of perception, cognisability"
1079 (*dr̥ṣyatvahetu*) MS quotes and re-uses Advaitins' earlier material. The centre of
1080 the discussion is how to interpret the word *dr̥ṣyatva*, that is, "to have a formal
1081 content" or "to be describable" or "to be a cognisable property". Here *brahman*
1082 is excluded because it is without any property whatsoever and, therefore, it cannot be
1083 the content of any kind of cognition. When it is the object/content of a certain
1084 mental modification (*vṛttivīśaya*), it is in its conditioned aspect (*upahita*) and not in
1085 its pure (*anupahita*) one (Nair 1990, p. 45). For MS, in fact, only the limited and
1086 conditioned *brahman* can be the object of a *vṛtti*. The conditioned *brahman*, as far as
1087 its conditioning adjunct (*upādhi*) is concerned, is ultimately false (*mithyā*).
1088 Moreover, while the *vṛtti* is present, the *brahman* cannot be unconditioned because
1089 that very modification becomes its *upādhi* (AS 1997, pp. 239–240). VT cites a
1090 stanza from Maṇḍana's BSi as evidence that for Advaitins also the unconditioned
1091 *brahman* is an object of a certain cognition, and the meaning of the word *dr̥ṣya*
1092 applies to it as well. So, for VT the definition of falsity is exceedingly extended
1093 (*ativyāpta*) so as to include also *brahman*. MS replies to VT by quoting the same



1094 stanza in the same way and affirms that BSI's statement only refers to the
1095 conditioned *brahman* (*upahitapara*). MS's quotation is embedded into the classical
1096 formula *na ca... vācyam*. It is curious, however, that the three texts (including two
1097 editions of AS) report the passage with very minor differences:⁶²
1100

1101	VT (NA: 2002, p. 51)	AS (1997, p. 240; NA: 2002, p. 51)	BSi IV.3 (1937, p. 157)
1102	sarvapatryayavedye	na ca— sarvapatryayavedye	sarvapatryayavedye vā
1103	ca brahmarūpe	'smin brahmarūpe	brahmarūpe vyavasthite/
1104	vyavasthite ity	vyavasthite iti	prapañcasya pravilayaḥ
1105	ādisvavacanavirodhaś	svavacanavirodha iti vācyam,	śabdena pratipādyate// 3 //
1106	ca syāt.	tasyāpy upahitaparatvāt (AS). na ca— sarvapatryayavedye vā brahmarūpe vyavasthite iti (NA).	

1108 On this point there are some further considerations. MS maintains that in the very
1109 moment when pure consciousness becomes the object of a *vṛtti* it does not remain
1110 pure. He cannot accept VT's option that the *vṛtti* becomes its own content,
1111 according to which in its ultimate stage the *vṛtti* cognises the conditioned
1112 consciousness and, since every other conditioning factor is absent, that limitation is
1113 nothing but the ultimate *vṛtti* itself. In fact, explains MS, since it is born out of a
1114 verbal cognition of upaniṣadic sentences, the final *vṛtti* must necessarily concern
1115 those words. That *vṛtti* is the ultimate undivided mental modification (*akhaṇḍākā-*
1116 *ravṛtti*) with *brahman* as its content. This *vṛtti*, even though it is the ultimate one
1117 (*carama*), is nevertheless—being a *vṛtti*—a product of ignorance. Thus, the *vṛtti*
1118 cannot completely remove ignorance (Gupta 2006, pp. 34–35).

1119 To corroborate this point, MS quotes a statement which he explicitly attributes to
1120 Amalānanda Sarasvatī's *Vedāntakalpataru* (hereafter B/VK), a gloss on the
1121 *Bhāmātī*:
1124

1125	AS (1997, pp. 259–261)	B/VK (2000, p. 57)
1126	tad uktam kalpatarukṛdbhiḥ—śuddham	nirupādhi brahmeti viṣayikurvāṇā
1127	brahmeti viṣayikurvāṇā vṛtṭiḥ	vṛtṭiḥ svasvetaropādhinivṛtṭihetur
1128	svasvetaropādhinivṛtṭihetur udayate,	udayate, svasyā apy upādhitivāviṣeṣāt.
1129	svasyā apy upādhitivāviṣeṣāt. evaṃ ca	tataḥ svasattāyāṃ vināśahetusāmnidhyād
1130	nānupahitasya viṣayatā, vṛtṭyuparāgo	vinaśadavasthatvam. evaṃ ca
1131	'tra sattayopayujyate, na bhāsyatayā	nānupahitasya viṣayatā, na copādher
1132	viṣayakotiṭpraveśeneti.	nirvartakāntarāpeṣeti bhāvaḥ [...] vṛtṭyuparāgo 'tra sattayopayujyate na pratibhāsyatayāto vṛttisamsarge satyātmā viṣayo bhavati, na tu svata iti na doṣaḥ.

⁶² MS refers to Maṇḍana again while discussing the *probans* "limitation" (*paricchinnatva*), cf. BSi II.31 (1937, p. 72) and AS (1997, pp. 317–318).



1134 What is noteworthy here is that MS reports B/VK almost *verbatim* but skips over
1135 a few sentences included into Amalānanda's text, only quoting what is essential for
1136 his analysis.

1137 B/VK says that while the ultimate *ṛtti* cognises the conditioned aspect of the
1138 pure *brahman* without cognising itself, it becomes the cause (*hetu*) for its own
1139 withdrawal and also for the withdrawal of other conditioning adjuncts similar to
1140 itself (*svasvetaropādhinivṛtti*) because that *ṛtti*, too, is a conditioning adjunct
1141 (*upādhitva*) which limits the consciousness. Therefore, the unconditioned *brahman*
1142 is not an object of any kind of *ṛtti*.⁶³ Moreover, concludes MS, the appearing
1143 connection (*uparāga*) with the *ṛtti* is due to the presence of that very *ṛtti* as
1144 *upādhi*, and not to the *ṛtti* being its own object/content. So the *ṛtti* is not its own
1145 content (*svaviśayaka*) but has as its content the conditioned *brahman*.

1146 At the end of the first part of this section on the *probans* of the *mithyātvānumāna*,
1147 MS discusses also a fourth *hetu* given in TP, namely “being endowed with parts”
1148 (*amśitva*). Also on this occasion, MS quotes Citsukha's entire inference. Again,
1149 Citsukha first formulates the inference in a stanza (I.8) and later in prose. MS quotes
1150 *ad sensum* because again he mixes up some words from the metric version and some
1151 from the prose one. The *hetu* concerned is *amśitva* and it is used in the stanza, while
1152 in the prose version the *hetu* is a synonym, i.e., *avayavitva*:
1153

1156 AS (1997, pp. 322–323)
1157 citsukhācāryais tu ayam **paṭa**
1158 **etattantuniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogī**
1159 **aṃśitvāt, itarāṃśivat** ity uktam.

TP I.8 (1974, p. 69)
aṃśinaḥ **svāṃśagātyantābhāvasya**
pratiyoginaḥ/ aṃśitvād itarāṃśiva dig
eṣaiva guṇādiṣu// 8 //
vimataḥ **paṭaḥ**
etattantuniṣṭhātyantābhāvapratiyogī
avayavitvāt paṭāntaravat.

1161 At the end of this section, MS quotes another inference for proving the falsity of
1162 the word. Its author is—according to MS—Ānandapūrṇa Munīndra, author of ten
1163 texts (Yogīndrānanda 1992, p. 9), among them the *Nyāyacandrikā* (hereafter NC)
1164 and an important commentary on *Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāḍya*, the *Khaṇḍanaphakkikā*
1165 better known as *Vidyāsāgarī*.⁶⁴ Unfortunately, I could not trace the inference quoted
1166 by MS in Vidyāsāgara's main works, which both contain a section on *mithyātvā*. At
1167 any rate, this is what MS quotes:

1168 In this way, it is correct also what has been said by Vidyāsāgara: “The object
1169 under examination apart from knowledge is unreal, because it is not
1170 cognisable apart from knowledge, like dreams etc.”⁶⁵

⁶³ In one of the sentences not quoted by MS, Amalānanda adds that the conditioning ultimate *ṛtti* does not cause any other *ṛtti* to arise (*na copādher nirvartakāntarāpekṣeti*).

⁶⁴ NC is mainly a text devoted to reply to the attacks directed to Advaita by Jaya Tīrtha's *Nyāyasudhā*; on the other hand, the *Khaṇḍanaphakkikā* is, as the *Khaṇḍanakhāṇḍakhāḍya* itself, a reply to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika positions.

⁶⁵ AS (1997, p. 325): *evaṃ ca—vimataḥ jñānavyātirekeṇāsāt jñānavyātirekeṇānupalabhyamānatvāt svapnādivat iti vidyāsāgaroktam api sadhu*.



1171 MS says that this inference is correct. According to him the *probandum*, namely
 1172 *jñānavyātirekeṇa asattva*, is tantamount to any of the previously given five
 1173 definitions of falsity. The *probans* of this inference, *jñānavyātirekeṇa anupala-*
 1174 *bhyamānatva*, means that the empirical world is only cognisable if the light of
 1175 consciousness is reflected on the internal organ (*cidābhāsa*) to illumine it. The
 1176 *cidābhāsa* is the appearance of consciousness where naturally there is none; it is
 1177 consciousness limited to itself (*svāvacchinnacit*, LC 1997, p. 325).⁶⁶ Therefore,
 1178 *jñānavyātirekeṇa anupalabhyamānatva* means not to be perceived without the aid of
 1179 the consciousness limited by itself, or better, being different from that which is
 1180 illuminated regardless of consciousness limited to itself. For what is independently
 1181 effulgent is the self-luminous (*svapṛakāśa*) *brahman* alone.⁶⁷

1182 At the very end of this passage, MS alludes to the validity of other inferences
 1183 used by other *ācāryas* without giving any specific reference.⁶⁸ In this case,
 1184 exceptionally, VT does not refer to the inference of NC but rather to two
 1185 inferences to the same effect taken from the *Vedāntakaumudī* (hereafter VK) of
 1186 Rāmādvaya:
 1189

1190 NA (2002, p. 87)
 1191 yat tu “vimatam mithyā dhīkāla
 1192 evānyathāpramitatvāc
 1193 citranimnonnatādivat”.
 1194 “bhārūpavastusamlagnatvāt
 1195 savitr̥chhidravat”.

VK (1955, pp. 91–92)
 kalpitaś cāyaṃ **pratītisamaya eva**
anyathā pramitatvāt
citranimnonnatādivat (91) vigītaḥ
 kalpito **bhārūpasvasamlagnatvena**
 bhāsamānatvāt **savitṛchhidravat** (92).

1197 The reference is clear. The more obvious reason for the small differences could
 1198 be seen in these ways: VT had at his disposal a manuscript presenting those readings
 1199 or he is quoting *ad sensum*, or maybe just remembering what he had previously
 1200 studied. Although finding a solution is not easy, following the interpretation given
 1201 by MS to Vidyāsāgara’s inference, I think that VT used a more correct manuscript
 1202 of the VK than the actually available edition. For, I prefer his reading of the *probans*
 1203 of the second inference (*-vastusamlagna-*, “connected with reality”), instead of that
 1204 of Subrahmanya Śāstrī’s edition of the VK (1955, p. 92: *-svasamlagna-*, “connected
 1205 with itself”). Here, in fact, the texts intend that an inert object only becomes
 1206 manifest once it is illuminated by a luminous entity (*bhārūpa*), which according to
 1207 MS is nothing other than the self.

1208 I will directly illustrate MS’s quotation of Citsukha’s definition of falsity in the
 1209 *caturthamithyātvā* section (AS 1997, pp. 182–194; Pellegrini 2011, pp. 451–455).
 1210 Connected with this is also the total accord and consequent defence by MS (AS,
 1211 1998, pp. 544–547) of Citsukha’s definition of ignorance (*avidyā*) (TP 1974, p. 97)
 1212 as a positive entity (*bhāvarūpa*). In order to establish the positive status of *avidyā*,
 1213 MS quotes (AS 1997, pp. 566, 567) two other TP’s inferences (1974, p. 98):

⁶⁶ AS (1997, p. 325): *jñānavyātirekeṇānupalabhyamānatvaṃ cidābhāse saty evopalabhyamānatvaṃ hetur iti na kiṃcid anupapannam*.

⁶⁷ I follow LC for this explanation (AS/LC 1997, p. 325): *cidābhāsamā svāvacchinnacitaṃ vinānupalabhyamānatvaṃ, tādr̥śacitān anapekṣyaiva yat prakāśate tadanyatvaṃ, svapṛakāśānyatvaṃ iti yāvāt*.

⁶⁸ AS (*ibid.*): *evam anyeṣāṃ api prayogā yathāyogam upapādāniyā iti*.



1215

1216 AS (1997, p. 566)
 1217 tattvapradīpikokṭam ca—
 1218 **caitrapramā caitragata-**
 1219 **pramāprā-**
 1220 **gabhāvātiriktānādinivartikā,**
 1221 **pramātvān maitrapramāvat [...]** iti.

TP (1974, p. 98)
devadattapramā
tatsthapramābhāvātirekiṇaḥ/
anāder dhvaṃsinī mātṽd
avigītapramā yathā// I. 10 //
vigītaṃ
devadattaniṣṭhāpramāṇajñānam
devadattaniṣṭhāpramā
'bhāvātiriktānāder nivartakam
pramāṇatṽd yajñadattādigatapramā-
ṇajñānavad ity anumānam.

1223 Here we see that MS's intention is clearly to quote the inference. The result is quite
 1224 interesting from an ecdotic point of view, but less so from a philosophical one. As usual
 1225 in his style, Citsukha opens the *uttarapakṣa* with a stanza, subsequently repeated in
 1226 philosophical prose. Nevertheless, the two renderings are substantially the same. The
 1227 inference quoted by MS, even though it seems closer to the metrical version,
 1228 corresponds to a condensed and simplified reading of both Citsukha's metrical and
 1229 prose formulations. However, MS's inference substitutes *devadatta-* ("the valid
 1230 knowledge of Devadatta") with *caitra-* ("the valid knowledge of Caitra") in the
 1231 inferential subject (*pakṣa*), and *yajñadatta-* with *maitra-* in the example (*drṣṭānta*).⁶⁹
 1232 The subject of the prose version of Citsukha's inference is slightly more complex:
 1233 "The knowledge under discussion risen out of the means of knowledge residing in
 1234 Devadatta." Citsukha's prose statement is, thus, more precise, insofar as it specifies
 1235 that the valid knowledge is the cognition generated by the action of the means of
 1236 knowledge and adds a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) to *-jñāna*, said to be *vigīta*
 1237 (= *vivādāspada* = *vipratipanna*) in order to strengthen that this valid knowledge is
 1238 the matter under examination. Moreover, affirming that this *pramā* is located in
 1239 Devadatta underlines more markedly the locus-located relation (*ādharādheyabhāva*)
 1240 between the two members. The *probandum* (*sādhyā*) of MS's inference is "to
 1241 eliminate [= to be the eliminator of] the beginningless [entity] different from the
 1242 antecedent absence of the valid knowledge related to Caitra". This is quite similar to
 1243 both versions of Citsukha's inference. Another small difference might be noticed: MS
 1244 repeats the proper name *caitragata-* and uses the particle *gata-* [formally the \sqrt{gam} past
 1245 participle] in composition. Citsukha, instead, uses a pronoun in substitution of
 1246 *devadatta-* in the metrical version, while in the prose inference he repeats
 1247 *devadattaniṣṭha-*. He also expresses the notion of absence without specifying, as
 1248 MS does, the antecedent (*prāk*) nature of that *abhāva*. Moreover, in both Citsukha's
 1249 versions the *probandum* is not a compound, but it is presented in an analysed form: in
 1250 prose, connected with *-jñāna*, its gender is neuter (*nirvartakam*) and in verse, together
 1251 with *-pramā*, it is feminine (*dhvaṃsinī*). MS's inference also uses a feminine, in
 1252 accordance to *-pramā*. The *probans* (*hetu*) is equal in the three versions, only deprived
 1253 of the *upasarga pra-* in Citsukha's metrical version. Last, MS uses Maitra in the
 1254 example and the same wording of the *pakṣa*: "like the valid knowledge of Maitra." In

⁶⁹ Devadatta, etc are all among the most used generic proper names for human beings.



1255 the metric form, Citsukha places the adverb *yathā* instead of the suffix *-vat* in
 1256 composition and refers to the quality of *dr̥ṣṭānta* as positive instance (*sapaḥṣa*). In the
 1257 *sapaḥṣa* the existence of the *probandum* has already been established by *pramāṇas* and
 1258 it is universally accepted (*avigīta* = *avipratipanna* = *saṃpratipanna*). The prose
 1259 version is just a repetition of the *probandum* with the substitution of the doubtful
 1260 instance relating to Devadatta with the established one of Yajñadatta.

1261 MS quotes the second inference at a stretch, but in TP we find it after some lines
 1262 of discussion. As evident here the aim of the inference is to establish ignorance as
 1263 the material cause of an erroneous cognition (*bhramopādānatva*):
 1264

1267 AS (1997, p. 566)
 1268 tattvaprādīpikoktaṃ ca—[...] **vigīto**
 1269 **vibhramaḥ**
 1270 **etajjñānakābādhyātiriktopādānakaḥ,**
 1271 **vibhramatvāt saṃmatavad** iti.

TP (1974, p. 103)
 prayogaś ca **vigīto vibhramaḥ**
etajjñānakāraṇābādhyāti-
riktopādānaḥ, vibhramatvāt
devadattādivibhramavad.

1273 Herein, we see that the difference between MS's and Citsukha's inferences is
 1274 superficially less evident. Although the *probandum* of the two inferences is literally
 1275 different, as the examples are different, the intended meaning is exactly the same.
 1276 Citsukha's inference is analyzable like MS's. The only difference is concentrated in
 1277 the *probandum etajjñānakāraṇābādhyātiriktopādānatva* and in the direct mention of
 1278 the victim of the erroneous cognition, i.e., Devadatta. Here the *probandum* is a
 1279 *bahuvrīhi* without the suffix *-ka*. The first part is not *etajjanaka-* but *etajjñā-*
 1280 *nakāraṇa-*. In MS's inference *etat* means "this erroneous cognition" (*etadbhrama*),
 1281 and also the erroneous cognition is a form of *jñāna*, a kind of cognition, as stated by
 1282 Citsukha. Thus, although MS's wording is different from Citsukha's, the intended
 1283 meaning of both inferences is the same. The quotation is not *verbatim*, but seems *ad*
 1284 *sensum*. However, the differences between the two could also be imputed only to the
 1285 manuscript tradition. But this will be made clear in the next steps of this study.

1286 In addition, MS (AS 1997, p. 663) quotes *verbatim et literatim a kārikā* by Citsukha's
 1287 (TP I.19, 1974, p. 192)⁷⁰ while discussing and defending another pivotal issue: the
 1288 definition of the indivisible meaning (*akhaṇḍārthalakṣaṇa*) arising out of great upaniṣadic
 1289 sentences. Another quotation and discussion (AS 1997, p. 884) on a stanza from TP (IV.8,
 1290 1974, p. 602), where MS does not mention neither Citsukha's name nor his works and only
 1291 uses the generic formula *tad uktam*, concerns the true nature of *ātman*, which is said to be
 1292 identical with the eradication of ignorance (Pellegrini 2014: fn. 4).

1293 IV MS's Approach to Other Schools' Texts

1294 In all his works, MS displays a considerable acquaintance with several branches of
 1295 learning and a great deal of works. Beside the intimate knowledge of Navya Nyāya,

⁷⁰ TP/NP I.19: *samsargāsamṅgisamyagdhīhetuā yā girām iyam/ uktākhaṇḍārthatā yad vā tat-prātipādīkārthatā//* "The said indivisible meaning is the causality of the words towards a valid cognition free from any relation whatsoever; or otherwise it is their [= *tat* = of those words] stem meaning alone." The same is quoted *verbatim* and discussed also in VP (2000, pp. 113–114).



1296 his expertise in many disciplines is evident: *dharmaśāstra* mainly in GAD,⁷¹
1297 *purāṇa-itihāsa*, grammar, *āstika* and *nāstika darśanas* in his other works.
1298 Undoubtedly the *Upaniṣads* are the first authority for an Advaita writer and so is,
1299 consequently, their direct commentarial tradition. However, MS also widely used
1300 *purāṇas* and *smṛtis*, thus elevating their authority. While this reliance is not so
1301 evident in his more polemical Advaita works (such as SB, VKL, AS and ARR), it is
1302 definitely clearer in BBR, GAD, MṢṬ, BPPP and HLV (Nair 1990, pp. 200–201).

1303 Due to the lack of space, I analyse only selected instances. I divide the section
1304 into two parts:

1305 (IV.1) reverse or indirect indebtedness: MS's reply to VT;

1306 (IV.2) MS's quotations, acknowledged and unacknowledged references from
1307 other schools' texts.

1308 IV.1 Reverse Indebtedness: NA and AS on the Definition of Falsity

1309 I have already stressed the point that AS is a reply to VT's NA. This generates an
1310 "indirect" or "reverse indebtedness". The indebtedness can, in fact, be twofold: a
1311 direct one, which corresponds to a *sacrum furtum* where a text or a chapter heavily
1312 owes its philosophical positions, terminology and development to another text or to
1313 a group of texts, usually of the same traditional milieu. Another kind of
1314 indebtedness is that which takes a specific doctrine, a text or a group of texts and
1315 focuses its internal organization and philosophical position on a completion,
1316 rectification or refutation of it. This kind of slightly polemical attitude is what I call
1317 "reverse indebtedness". In the AS, MS accepts the terms of debate established by
1318 VT and, in putting Advaitins' arguments into the form necessary for that
1319 confrontation, he slightly alters their structure here and there (Minkowski 2011,
1320 p. 222).

1321 This is the reason why AS is mainly a polemical reply (*vādaprasthāna*) to NA,⁷²
1322 which, in turn, is basically a polemical text answering to previous Advaita treatises.

⁷¹ MS demonstrates acute knowledge and hermeneutical ability on *dharmaśāstra* issues, which seems rather unusual for a śāṃkarian *saṃnyāsīn*. See, for example, the GAD commentary on BG's first chapter until the fifth verse of the second chapter, or again GAD (2005, pp. 711–716). Minkowski (2011, p. 218), while presenting the connections between the Advaitin of the South and those of Vārāṇasī, plausibly argues that Rāmeśvara Bhaṭṭa (beginning of the XVI cen. CE) was the Advaita teacher of Mādhava Sarasvatī, one of the *gurus* of MS. Rāmeśvara established the Bhaṭṭa family in Vārāṇasī. The writings on Mīmāṃsā and Dharmaśāstra of this family are considered authoritative all over India. So, beside MS's strong *śrauta* background, it might be possible that MS acquired his admirable knowledge of Dharmaśāstra from Mādhava Sarasvatī himself. According to other traditions, the *guru* of Mādhava Sarasvatī was the son of Rāmeśvara Bhaṭṭa, Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, author of the *Prakriyāsarvasva*, partly of the *Mānomeyodaya* and *Tristhalisetu*. Following this alternative tradition, it seems that Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa defeated Nṛsiṃhāśrama in debate (Sastri-Sastri 1959, pp. 47–48). See also fn. 16.

⁷² On this issue Minkowski (2011, p. 223) plausibly argues: "MS devoted all his efforts to the argument with the Dvaitins. An explanation of MS's choice of opponent that might be in keeping with the contextual suggestions above would be that, in doing so, MS sought to take up an argument about the conceptual organization of Hinduism as a whole. Through engaging with the Dvaitins, he was attempting to [...] (re)describe Advaita as the position most amenable to providing a "large-tent" theology for the many doctrines and traditions of Hindus to a word of religious practices and beliefs that were explicitly sectarian and irreducibly divided."



1323 Thus, a “reverse indebtedness” similar to MS’s one might be postulated also in the
 1324 case of NA’s *pūrvapakṣas*.⁷³ The Advaita texts, which initially stimulated VT, have
 1325 been identified in PP, PPV, TP, IS, NM, etc. (Nair 1990, p. 20). Although NA takes
 1326 earlier Advaita texts as *pūrvapakṣas* and the answer of MS reflects these Advaita
 1327 positions, the very text-to-text controversy began with VT (Nair 1990, p. 20). In this
 1328 kind of polemical treatises, the argument and discussions are placed in order to
 1329 nullify adversary’s positions, which are usually placed in a *pūrvapakṣa*. In fact,
 1330 according to the rules of debate, a *pūrvapakṣa* must be somehow re-proposed or
 1331 repeated (*anudita*) before being refuted.⁷⁴ Madhva’s Dvaita Vedānta is obviously a
 1332 full-fledged *darśana* with a deep and wide net of doctrines and texts. Nevertheless,
 1333 many of the debates and discussions presented in this textual tradition are written as
 1334 a reaction to the Advaitin interpretation of *prasthānatrayī*. In the *maṅgala* verse
 1335 itself, both MS and VT start by touching the pivotal point of their respective tenets:
 1336 VT the reality of the world, and MS its falsity. NA intends to establish the world as
 1337 *satya* rejecting the Advaitins’ *mithyātva* doctrine by attacking the philosophical
 1338 foundation of *mithyātva*: the superimposition (*adhyāsa*).

1339 Thus, on the one side stands VT’s conception of the reality of the entire universe
 1340 (*satyāśeṣaviśva*), and on the other side MS’s conviction that the world of duality
 1341 (*dvaitaprapaṅca*) is false (*mṛṣā*). MS individuates this falsity starting from its
 1342 components/characteristics, the foremost of which is the property of being the knower
 1343 (*mātrītamukha*), that are falsely attributed to the self because of *māyā* (*māyākalpita*).
 1344 Both the texts salute Viṣṇu, but while VT sees Hari as the merciful cause of the
 1345 universe and the companion of his great devotee Ānanda Tīrtha (= Madhva), according
 1346 to LC’s reading MS intends Viṣṇu as “the pervasive essential nature of the individual
 1347 self” (LC 1997, p. 2: *viṣṇuḥ vyāpakam jīvasvarūpam*).

1351 NA I.2 (2002, pp. 1–2)
 1352 vighaughavāraṇam
 1353 **satyāśeṣaviśvasya**
 1354 kāraṇam/ karuṇāsindhum
 1355 ānandatīrthabandhu**hariṃ** bhaje//

AS I.1 (1997, pp. 1–2)
māyākalpitamātrīta
mukhamṛṣādvaita-
prapaṅcāśrayaḥsatyajñānasukhātmakaḥ
 śrutiśikhhotthākhaṇḍadhīgocaraḥ/
mithyābandhavidhūnana
 paramānandaikatānātmakam mokṣam
 prāpta iva svayam vijayate
viṣṇuvikalpojhitah//

⁷³ Not only the NA’s *pūrvapakṣas* are influenced by other texts, but the position expressed by *uttarapakṣas* has often the form of quotations, references, restatements and widened discussions of preceding texts. These could be taken not only for the *śruti* and *smṛti* heritage, but also from other texts of VT, such as *Bhedojjivana*, *Tātparyacāndrikā*; or texts of the Dvaita tradition: Madhva’s *Anuvyākhyāna* on BS, Jaya Tīrtha’s *Nyāyasudhā* and *Vādāvalī*, Viṣṇudāsa’s *Vādaratnāvalī* etc. We shall also keep in mind the acquaintance of VT with other *śāstras* and his intimate knowledge of Navya Nyāya. See Bronkhorst et al. (2013, pp. 77–81).

⁷⁴ It is a common rule of the debate that once a debater has expressed his own position, the opponent should precede his reply by shortly summarizing the adversary’s last reasons (*anūdyā kathana*). This is done in order to verify that the debaters properly understand their opponents’ positions. If the replica is not preceded by the repetition (*anuvāda*) this is a ground for defeat (*nigrahashāna*). See also NS V.2.7, 9, pp. 16–17.



1357 VT, before starting the refutation of *mithyātva*, introduces the topic suggesting a
1358 few reflections about the nature of the *probandum* (= *mithyātva*) and the main
1359 *probans* (= *dṛṣyatva*) of the *mithyātvanumāna*. Beside a brief survey on the five
1360 definitions of *mithyātva* quoted *verbatim* from Advaita texts, he summarily cites and
1361 refutes some other Advaitins' opinions regarding *mithyātva* (NA 2002, pp. 12–13)
1362 and *dṛṣyatva* (2002, p. 13).

1363 The next step is the first definition of falsity. Therein, VT does not repeat the
1364 definition by PP already given in the last lines of the introductory section on
1365 *mithyātva* (NA 2002, p. 12), but immediately starts attacking Padmapāda's
1366 conception of falsity. He wonders how the word *mithyā*—as “assertion of
1367 indeterminability” (*anirvacanīyatāvacaṇa*)—should be interpreted. He furnishes
1368 three options, pointing out that all of them are flawed.⁷⁵ MS quotes almost *literatim*
1369 the first two objections by VT. VT, aware of the Advaitin interpretation of the word
1370 *anirvacanīyatā* as different (*vilakṣaṇa*) from real (*sat*) and unreal (*asat*), asks *in*
1371 *primis* if it should be read as the absence of unreality qualified by reality (*sattve saty*
1372 *asattvarūpaviśiṣṭasyābhāvaḥ*)⁷⁶ or if it has two properties (*dharmadvaya*), namely
1373 the constant absence of reality (*sattvātyantābhāva*) and the constant absence of
1374 unreality (*asattvātyantābhāva*); or again, he argues, if it is the constant absence of
1375 unreality qualified by the constant absence of reality (*sattvātyantābhāvavattve sati*
1376 *asattvātyantābhāvavattvarūpam*). NA (NA 2002, p. 14) refutes all these options. In
1377 the first case, VT says, according to the dualists' tenets there is a flaw of proving
1378 what has already been proved (*siddhasādhana*) because they already maintain that
1379 the world is definitely real. The second option is flawed by the mutual contradiction
1380 of the two properties involved. Furthermore, there is the ground for defeat
1381 (*nigrahasthāna*)⁷⁷ of proving something other than the intended thesis (*arthāntara*).
1382 In fac, *brahman* is also devoid of any kind of property such as *sattva* and *asattva*, yet
1383 it is not considered false but absolutely real. Similarly, it could be maintained that
1384 also in the empirical world there is the constant absence of reality and unreality and,
1385 like in *brahman*, these two properties do not contrast with its absolute reality. So the
1386 Advaitin wanted to prove the falsity of the world, but finally proved its reality
1387 (Sharma 1994, p. 19).

1388 The last part of the second objection is wider and more technical. MS refers to it
1389 in a summarized form, just pointing out the more salient tracts.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ The third option is similar to the second one, because it presents the same kind of flaws: mutual contradiction, proving an unintended thesis and weakness of the *probandum* (AS 1997, pp. 49–50): *ata eva na tṛṭīyaḥ, pūrvavad vyāghātāt, arthantarāt sādhyavaikalpāc ca iti cet.*

⁷⁶ Ānantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī (AS 1997, p. 92) reads VT's statement in an easier way: *tad hi sattvaviśiṣṭāsattvābhāvo vā ...*

⁷⁷ See fn. 74.

⁷⁸ MS also reports the last section of VT's objection (AS 1997, pp. 49–50): *śuktirūpye abādhyatvarūpasattvavyatirekasya sattve bādhyatvarūpāsattvasya vyatirekāsiddhyā sādhyavaikalpāc ca.* Herein, according to VT, there is the flaw of the weakness of the *probandum* (*sādhyavaikalpā*). In the body of the inference the validity of the *probandum* should be seen in the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) where it should already be proved (*prasiddha* = *pramāṇasiddha*) by other means of knowledge. The weakness of the *probandum* is when the *probandum* does not occur in the example. In the words “constant absence of reality” (*sattvātyantābhāva*) the meaning of “reality” is “unsublatability” (*abādhyatva*) and its absence is



1391

1392 NA (2002, p. 14)
1393 (14) ucyate—mithyātvaṃ hi tvayaiva
1394 pakṣāntaraṇiṣedhena pañcadhā niruktam.
1395 **tatrādye kiṃ sattve saty**
1396 **asattvarūpaviśiṣṭasyābhāvo**
1397 **’bhipretaḥ? kiṃ vā**
1398 **sattvātyantābhāvāsattvā-**
1399 **tyantābhāvarūpadharmadvayam? yad**
1400 **vā sattvātyantābhāvavattve sati**
1401 **asattvātyantābhāvavattvarūpaṃ**
1402 **viśiṣṭam? nādyah, manmate**
1403 **sadekasvabhāve jagati tasya**
1404 **siddhatvāt. na dvitīyah, vyāhateḥ,**
1405 **nirdharmakabrahmavat sattvarāhitye**
1406 **’pi sadrūpatvenāmithyātvpapat-**
1407 **tyārthāntaratvāc ca.**

AS (1997, pp. 48–49, 52–55)
(48–49) nanu kim idaṃ mithyātvaṃ
sādhayate? na tāvat mithyāśabdo
’nirvacanīyatāvacanahḥ iti
pañcapādikāvacanāt
sadasadanadhikaraṇatvarūpam
anirvācyatvam. **tad hi kim**
asattvaviśiṣṭasattvābhāvaḥ, uta
sattvātyantābhāvāsattvā-
tyantābhāvarūpaṃ dharmadvayam,
āhosvit sattvātyantābhāvavattve sati
asattvātyantābhāvarūpaṃ viśiṣṭam.
nādyah, sattvamātrādhāre jagaty
asattvaviśiṣṭasattvānabhyupagamāt,
viśiṣṭābhāvasādhane siddhasādhanāt.
na dvitīyah, sattvāsattvayor ekābhāve
aparāsattvāvaśyakatvena vyāghātāt,
nirdharmakabrahmasattvās-
tvarāhitye ’pi sadrūpena amithyātvo-
papatyā arthāntarāc ca.
(52–55) [...] yac ca—nirdharmakasya
brahmaṇahḥ sattvarāhitye ’pi
sadrūpavatprapañcasya
sadrūpatvenāmithyātvpapatyā
arthāntaram—uktam [...]

1409 MS refers quite faithfully to VT’s objection and quotes again *verbatim* the
1408 technical terms involved. Yet he presents them in a slightly more improved way
1411 and, to render the reading more comfortable, adds one or two words here and there.⁷⁹

1412 In the second definition VT refers to his comprehensive introduction to the issue
1413 and does not quote the PPV’s definition again but directly proposes his perplexities:

Footnote 78 continued

sublatibility (*bādhyatva*). This sublatibility occurs in the example of the nacre-silver (*śuktrirūpya*), given that there is not the constant absence of unreality/sublatibility because the unsublatibility kind of reality is not present in nacre-silver.

⁷⁹ A difficult case is when, while presenting the first option, VT writes *sattve saty asattvarūpaviśiṣṭasyābhāvaḥ* (“the absence of what is qualified by unreality, given that it is qualified by reality”) and MS refers to it in this way *asattvaviśiṣṭasattvābhāvaḥ* (“absence of reality qualified by unreality”). (A *satisaptamī* [= absolute locative] employed within a definition has to be interpreted as a qualifier of the defined entity.) Here, as also shown by Ānantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī (AS 1997, p. 92), MS exactly inverts VT’s statement placing the *asattva* as the qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) of the absence of *sattva*, while for VT it is *sattva* that is the qualification of the absence of *asattva*. However, *asattvaviśiṣṭasattvābhāvaḥ*, though present in all the editions consulted, could also be a typo for *sattvaviśiṣṭasattvābhāvaḥ*. The commentators follow MS’s reading, apart from Balabhadra’s *Siddhivākyā* (AS 1997, p. 48), who seems to follow VT.



1415

1416 NA (2002, p. 22)
1417 na dvitīyaḥ, **traikālikaniṣedhasya**
1418 **tāttvikatve 'dvaitahāneḥ.**
1419 **prātibhāsikatve siddhasāghanāt.**
1420 **vyāvahārikatve 'pi tasya bādhyatvena**
1421 **tāttvikasattvāvirodhitvenārthāntarāt.**
1422 **advaitaśruter atattvavedakatvāpātāc**
1423 **ca. tatpratīyogino 'prātibhāsikasya**
1424 **prapañcasya pāramārthikatvāpatteś**
1425 **ca.**

AS (1997, pp. 94–96)
pratīpannopādhau
traikālikaniṣedhapratīyogitvaṃ vā
mithyātvam. **nanu—pratīpannopādhau**
traikālikaniṣedhasya tāttvikatve
advaitahāniḥ, prātibhāsikatve
siddhasāghanam, vyāvahārikatve 'pi
tasya bādhyatvena
tāttvikasattvāvirodhitayā arthāntaram,
advaitaśruter atattvavedakatvaṃ ca
tatpratīyoginaḥ prātibhāsikasya
prapañcasya pāramārthikatvaṃ ca
syād iti cet.

1427 Despite the very minor differences of grammatical case changes, here MS quotes
1428 *verbatim* VT's objections, embedding them in the usual form *nanu ... iti cet.*⁸⁰

1429 All these were just some clues for understanding how and how much MS is
1430 indebted to VT. Of course, this same *iter* could be proposed for the entire AS.
1431 Usually at the beginning of every section MS quotes VT almost *verbatim*, or at least
1432 *ad sensum*. In the rest of the text, MS sometimes responds directly to VT's
1433 objections and, on other occasions, his replica has an independent structure and
1434 follows different logical paths.

1435 IV.2 MS and Non-Vedānta Material

1436 In traditional circles, MS is honoured with the title *padavākyapramāṇaprapīṇa*
1437 “learned in words (Grammar), sentences (Mīmāṃsā) and means of knowledge
1438 (Nyāya)” and, consequently, *sarvatantrasvatantra* “one for whom each *śāstra* is as
1439 if it were his own”, because of the really vast range of quotations and references he
1440 uses and discusses throughout his works. I have elsewhere (Pellegrini 2014)
1441 demonstrated how MS used (Navya) Nyāya texts and doctrines in a specific way,
1442 adapting them to Advaita tenets.

1443 IV.2.1 Padaśāstra: Vyākaraṇa

1444 It is possible (see fn. 13) that among the disciples of MS there was a certain Śeṣa
1445 Kṛṣṇa, probably the Vaiyākaraṇa *guru* of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita. Nonetheless, MS has
1446 been attacked also from a grammatical point of view. In fact, in his commentary on
1447 BG, *Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā*, Dhanapati Sūri (end XVIII–beginning XIX cen.) severely
1448 criticized MS's GAD basing his attacks mainly on philosophical points and on the
1449 “outrageous” contradiction of the commentary of Śaṅkara. Therein he attacked MS
1450 in one point (*ad* BG III.28, BG2 1936, pp. 164–165) also on a grammatical basis,
1451 leaving the idea that MS does not know the fundamentals of such an important
1452 *śāstra*.

⁸⁰ For the philosophical explanation of the three objections by VT see Pellegrini (2011, p. 445).



1453 Despite Dhanapati Sūri's judgement, MS rightly resorts to grammatical
1454 arguments in several circumstances. However, while he directly quotes the
1455 aphorisms of Pāṇini, he rarely quotes grammatical commentarial literature, and
1456 more frequently he just refers to texts, such as MBh with *Pradīpa*, *Kāśikā* with
1457 *Nyāsa* and *Padamañjarī*, etc. When he happens to quote them, he follows NA.

1458 An interesting case can be found in the second *pariccheda* of the AS (1997, pp.
1459 460–465), where MS wants to prove the indivisible efficient and material causality
1460 of *brahman* (*abhinnanimittopādānakāranatva*), whereas the Dvaitins accept the
1461 Lord only as the efficient cause of the universe (*nimittakāraṇa*) and not as the
1462 material (*upādāna*) one.

1463 In order to prove that the *brahman* is also the material cause of the universe, MS
1464 quotes the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (III.1.1: *yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante* “that from
1465 which these material elements are generated”) saying that the ablative case
1466 (*pañcamī*) attached to the pronoun *yat* is prescribed in the sense of a material cause
1467 (*upādānakāraṇa* = *prakṛti*) by the pāṇinian rule I.4.30 *janikartuḥ prakṛtiḥ*, “The
1468 material cause of the agent of the verb ‘to be born’ [is the *apādāna* (ablative)]”.

1469 According to MS, the efficient causality of the *brahman* is already established by
1470 *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI.2.3 and VI.3.2, and it is accepted by both the debaters. In
1471 this connection, MS also refers to the third chapter of Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*
1472 (hereafter JMS, III.3.14) where six means of proof (*pramāṇa*) or rules of
1473 interpretation are presented, by means of which the order among actions is fixed.
1474 The first two means are the direct statement (*śruti*) and the implicit sense of the
1475 words (*liṅga*). MS can accordingly say that the material causality is also proved
1476 through the direct statement of the ablative (*pañcamīśruti*) and the sense (*liṅga*)
1477 implicit in the last words of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*'s (III.1.1) passage (*yat prayanty*
1478 *abhisamviśanti* “to which they go, into which they dissolve”), which convey the idea
1479 that the *brahman* is the substrate (*āśraya*) of conservation (*sthiti*) and annihilation
1480 (*laya*) of the universe.⁸¹

1481 Following VT (NA, 2002, p. 947), in order to show that the ablative can be used
1482 also for something which is not a material cause, MS quotes an example from a
1483 *Vṛtti*, namely *putrāt pramodo jāyate* “from a son originates happiness”. However,
1484 the example is not in the *Kāśikāvṛtti* (hereafter KV) but in Jinendrabuddhi's (VII–
1485 VIII cen. CE) *Kāśikāvivaraṇapañcikā* or *Nyāsa* (hereafter KV/N; *ad* PA I.4.30;
1486 1985, p. 191).⁸²

1487 At any rate, this demonstrates to the Dvaitins that the word *prakṛti* in PA does not
1488 concern a material cause but merely a simple cause (*hetumātra*). To develop this
1489 position, MS also quotes in a *pūrvapakṣa* KV/N on the same passage of KV:
1490

⁸¹ AS (1997, p. 460): ‘*yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante*’ iti ‘*janikartur*’ iti *sūtraprakṛtyarthavihīta-
pañcamīśrutyā* ‘*yat prayanty abhisamviśanti*’*ti sthītilayādhāratavaliṅgā copādānavasiddhiḥ*, ‘*tad aikṣata*’
vyākaraṇavānī’*ti ikṣaṇādyādhāratayā kartṛtvāsiddhiḥ ca.*

⁸² I thank Elisa Freschi for kindly providing me this material.



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KV/N ad PA I.4.30 (1985, p. 191)
tatrāsati prakṛtighraṇe pratyāsatter
upādānakāraṇasyaiva syāt, netarasya.
prakṛtighraṇe tu sati sarvasyaiva
kāraṇamātrasya bhavati.

AS (1997, p. 460)
nyāse 'pi idam evāśritya **asati**
prakṛtighraṇe
upādānasyaivāpādānasamjñā syāt,
pratyāsatteḥ, netarasya.
prakṛtighraṇāt kāraṇamātrasya
bhavatīti prakṛtipadam anupādāne 'pi
apādānasamjñāsiddhyartham ity uktam.

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Here, MS quotes Jinendrabuddhi almost *verbatim*. In the first sentence he inverts the position of two words (*pratyāsatteḥ* and *upādānasya*). He, moreover, deletes from the word *upādāna* the specification *kāraṇa* and he specifies that if the word *prakṛti* is not intended as material cause, then the material cause alone should get the technical appellation of *apādāna*. In writing so, he adds the term *apādānasamjñā* which in KV/N is found two lines earlier, just after the sentence *putrāt pramodo jāyate* but not immediately after *upādānakāraṇasyaiva*. In the second sentence he writes *prakṛtighraṇāt* in ablative instead of the original locative and omits *sarvasyaiva*, which further specifies the compound *kāraṇamātrasya*.

Immediately after this passage MS, again following VT, quotes Patañjali's MBh ad PA I.4.30, modifying the original text:

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MBh (Kielhorn 1985, pp. 329–330)
āyam api yogaḥ śakyo 'vaktum. katham
gomayād vṛściko jāyate.
golomāvilomabhyo dūrvā jāyanta iti.
apakrāmanti tās tebhyaḥ.

AS (1997, p. 760)
mahābhāṣye 'pi 'āyam api yogaḥ śakyo
'vaktum. **golomājalomāvilomabhyo**
dūrvā jāyante apakrāmanti tās
tebhyaḥ ityādinā lomādinīnām dūrvādīn
prati avadhivād 'dhrūvam apāye
'pādānam' [PA I.4.24] ity
anenaivāpādānasamjñāsiddheḥ idam
sūtram anārambhaṇīyam iti sūtram
pratyakhyātam.

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I think that here MS did not look at the original text of MBh but simply quotes VT's statement reproducing it *verbatim*. In fact, beside Patañjali's statement quoted by VT and MS about the lack of necessity of this rule (*yoga*), the first part of the following question, which is meant to defend the legitimacy of Pāṇini's aphorism and without which the sentence "the scorpion is generated from cow dung" could not be explained, is not quoted *verbatim*. The second part of the question presents a minor addition of "the hair of the he-goat" (*ajaloma*) in NA and AS, which does not appear in MBh. The answer, on the other hand, does suffer changes in the quotation, since VT and consequently MS, interprets Patañjali's synthetic statement: "These" (*tāh*) mentioned elements proceed (*apakrāmanti*) from a certain place (*tebhyaḥ*). That place or entity from which they originate and then separate is called *apādāna*, which can be equally expressed with the aphorism *dhrūvam apāye 'pādānam* (PA I.4.24). So, the *sūtra* I.4.30 is not necessary at all.



1533 To corroborate his view, VT goes on to quote the opinion of the commentary on
 1534 Patañjali, Kaiyaṭa's (XI cen. CE) *Pradīpa* (hereafter MBh/U).
 1539

1538	MBh/P (II, 2006, p. 367)	NA (2002, p. 948)	AS (1997, p. 761)
1539	yathā bilād dīrghabhogo	kaiyaṭe 'pi 'yathā bilād	kaiyaṭe 'pi
1540	bhogī niṣkrāmann apy	dīrghabhogo bhogī	apakramaṇāvadhivte
1541	avicchedāt	niṣkrāmann apy	lomādiṣu kāryasya
1542	tatropalabhyate tathā	avicchedāt	sambhavadīti āsaṃkya
1543	dūrvā apīty arthaḥ	tatropalabhyate tathā	'bilān niṣkrāmato
		dūrvā apītyādi-	dīrghabhogasya
		nāvadhivtam	bhogaḥ
		evopapāditam. tad uktam	avacchinnatayā
		—śrīgāc charo	tatropalabdhitv
		'vilomabhyo dūrvā	kāryasyāpi dūrvādes
		gomayatas tathā/ vṛścikaś	tatropalabdhir' ity
		cety evam ādyeṣv	avadhivtam eva
		apādānatvam iṣyate//	tatropapāditam. ⁸⁴
		iti // ⁸³	

1545 Interestingly, in these passages VT quotes MBh/P exactly *verbatim*, while MS
 1546 quotes it *ad sensum*, slightly modifying Kaiyaṭa's text.

1547 The reason might be that in general MS avoids too technical grammatical
 1548 discussions and whenever gets involved with them this happens on safe domains or
 1549 whenever he is compelled to do so by the *pūrvapakṣin*. As usual in India, the *sūtras*
 1550 of Pāṇini are always quoted *verbatim*, simply inserting the quotation mark *iti* at their
 1551 end. This is probably because it was (as it is today) a compulsory requirement for
 1552 traditional students to learn by heart all the grammatical aphorisms. This is a
 1553 different case for the grammatical commentarial literature about which MS depends
 1554 on VT's initiative, even though he exhibits his ability to modify its structure without
 1555 changing the purport.⁸⁵ Thus, despite the shortcomings evidenced by Dhanapati
 1556 Sūri, MS shows a certain confidence with *vyākaraṇa* as well.

1557 IV.2.2 *Vākyāśāstra: Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*

1558 One of the teachers of MS was Mādhava Sarasvatī, probably a disciple of the great
 1559 Mīmāṃsaka and Vaiyākaraṇa Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa (see above fn. 16, 71).

1560 VKL is mainly intended to explain the true nature of liberation while refuting all
 1561 other views. The subject is closely connected with Vedic statements and with
 1562 *śabdapramāṇa* (linguistic communication as instrument of knowledge) in general.

⁸³ Here VT quotes this last passage from Madhva's *Anuvyākhyāna* I.4.71, referring to KV *ad* PA I.4.30.

⁸⁴ Also MS goes on with the discussion referring again to PA I.4.30 and to KV on it.

⁸⁵ Although there are not as many as could be supposed, in MS's works there are many grammatical discussions. Some other revealing examples in AS are concerned with *mīthvātvaśrutyupapattiḥ* (1997, pp. 507–508), *brahmaṇo jñātvādyupapattiḥ* (1997, p. 753), the quite interesting *tattvamasyādivākyārthanirūpaṇam* (1997, pp. 832–834) and *śābdāparokṣatvam* (1997, pp. 876–877); GAD *ad* BG II.18 (2005, pp. 94–95); VKL (1962, pp. 77, 80) etc.



1563 For MS, Bhāṭṭa and Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā are the major authorities on these issues
 1564 because, like Advaita, they come from a decidedly orthodox *smārta* milieu. This is
 1565 probably the reason why, though he quotes few Mīmāṃsā passages *verbatim*, MS
 1566 refers to Mīmāṃsakas' views several times, for instance on the function of the
 1567 words (VKL 1962, p. 65), *anvitābhīdhānavāda* (1962, pp. 68–69), *abhi-*
 1568 *hitānvayavāda* (1962, p. 69), the meaning potentiality (*śakti*, 1962, pp. 73–74) etc.⁸⁶

1569 More in general, all of MS's works are disseminated by Mīmāṃsā references
 1570 (see, e.g., the reference to the six *pramāṇas* in the previous chapter). MS mainly
 1571 quotes aphorisms from JMS, stanzas from ŚV, only a few words from
 1572 *Śābarabhāṣya*, or alternatively he roughly refers to doctrines treated in *Tantravārti-*
 1573 *ka* (GAD *ad* BG, 2).⁸⁷

1574 In order to exemplify MS's use of Mīmāṃsā material I will focus on a short part
 1575 of the first *pariccheda* of AS (1997, pp. 371–380), entitled *pratyakṣasyāgamabādhyat-*
 1576 *vam* “How direct perception can be invalidated by Sacred Texts”. According to MS, in
 1577 fact, scriptures can invalidate even direct perception (*pratyakṣa*). By contrast, VT (NA
 1578 2002, pp. 138–139) says that if perception is contradicted by linguistic communica-
 1579 tion, the whole Mīmāṃsā, Pūrva and Uttara will be deprived of its authoritativeness.
 1580 That is why Jaimini (JMS I.2.2) opposes the independent epistemologic value of this
 1581 laudative passage (*arthavāda*) “therefore during the day the smoke [arisen] from fire is
 1582 indeed seen, not the flame” (*Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa* II.1.4: *tasmād dhūma evāgner divā*
 1583 *dadr̥ṣe nārciḥ*) and this *mantra* “Aditi is the sky” (*Taittirīya Āraṇyaka* I.13.2: *aditir*
 1584 *dyaur*). According to Jaimini they cannot be considered valid means of knowledge
 1585 because in both these passages there is a contrast with vision (*dṛṣṭi*), i.e., direct
 1586 perception (*pratyakṣa*) (JMS I.2.2: *dṛṣṭivirodhāt*). In order to reply to these points, VT
 1587 and MS quote two aphorisms by Jaimini (JMS I.2.10: *guṇavādas tu*; I.2.47: *guṇād*
 1588 *apratīṣedhaḥ syāt*). According to these two statements, the *arthavāda* and the *mantra*,
 1589 convey their content with a secondary meaning (*gauṇa*) or have an indirect
 1590 application. In fact, the flame of the fire is not seen during the day because of the
 1591 distance from which the scene is observed, while the smoke is seen. In the *mantra*,
 1592 Aditi is simply extolled as everything: the sky, the atmosphere, the mother, father, the
 1593 son etc. Ergo, both passages are not lacking authoritativeness because they are not
 1594 actually contradicting perception.⁸⁸ In the same way throughout the string of *sūtras*
 1595 starting from *tatsiddhiḥ* (JMS I.4.23, *tatsiddhipetikā*) the apparent contrariety with
 1596 direct perception of the Vedic passage “The sacrificer is the bundle of [*kuṣā*] grass”
 1597 (*Taittirīya Saṃhitā* II.6.5.3: *yajamānaḥ prastaraḥ*) has been explained resorting to its

⁸⁶ Actually, all over the discussion beginning from p. 65 and roughly terminating on p. 95 of VKL, MS is strongly indebted to Mīmāṃsā's arguments. In the rest of the texts he mentions Kumārila's *Ślokavārtika* (hereafter ŚV) 114 *ad* JMS I.1.2 (1962, pp. 44–45), ŚV 53 *ad* JMS I.1.2 (1962, p. 130). He quotes also JMS I.1.5 (1962, p. 68) and a stanza quoted in Sucaritamīśra's commentary on ŚV 58 *ad* JMS I.1.1 (1962, p. 75). Thanks to Elisa Freschi for suggesting this translation of *śakti*.

⁸⁷ For example, in VKL (1962, p. 129) MS quotes a few words from *Śābarabhāṣya* (hereafter ŚāB) *ad* JMS I.1.6; in GAD *ad* BG II.20 (2005, pp. 97–98) he seems to refer to *Tāntravārtika ad Śābarabhāṣya* on JMS I.3.2.

⁸⁸ AS (1997, pp. 371–373): *kiṃ ca parīkṣitapramāṇabhāvaśabdabādhyam api pratyakṣam. nanu—pratyakṣam yadi śabdabādhyam syāt tadā jaiminīnā 'tasmād dhūma evāgner divā dadr̥ṣe nārcir' ityādyarthavādasya 'aditir dyaur' ityādimantrasya ca dṛṣṭavirodhenāpṛamāṇye prāpte guṇavādas tu 'guṇād apratīṣedhaḥ syāt' ityādinā gauṇārthatā nocyeta.*



1598 possessing a secondary meaning (*gauṇārthatā*). In fact, if direct perception resulted in
1599 being weak or invalid, every perception could be considered useless, because if verbal
1600 proof could contradict it, then there would be no more rule for the dignity of any
1601 expressed concept whatsoever and every one could say whatever he feels, be it logical
1602 or illogical.

1603 What is remarkable in this *pūrvapakṣa* as quoted by MS is the fact that he,
1604 differently from VT, mentions the six *sūtras* after *tatsiddhiḥ* (JMA I.4.23–28) in a
1605 unique string, possibly in force of their technical appellative *peṭikā*,⁸⁹ which
1606 conveys their close mutual relation.
1609

1610 JMS I.4.23–28 (II, 1981, NA (2002, pp. 138–139) AS (1997, pp. 371–373)
1611 pp. 313, 322, 323, 325,
1612 326)

1613 **tatsiddhiḥ**// I.4.23 //

1614 **jātiḥ**// I.4.24 //

1615 **sārūpyāt**// I.4.25 //

1616 **praśamsā**// I.4.26 //

1617 **bhūmā**// I.4.27 //

1618 **liṅgasamavāyāt**// I.4.28 //

... ‘**tatsiddhir**’
ityāditatsiddhipeṭikāyām
ca ‘yajamānaḥ prastara’
ityāder gauṇārthatā
nocyeta.

‘**tatsiddhijātisārūpya-
praśamsāliṅga-
bhūmalīngasamavāyād**’
iti tatsiddhipeṭikāyām
‘yajamānaḥ prastara’
ityāder gauṇārthatā
nocyeta.

1620 Apart from the particular quoting mode of MS, the citation is *verbatim*. Here MS
1621 does not only refer to VT to treat the issue thoroughly. The variant readings might
1622 have occurred because MS quoted these *sūtras* by heart or because he glanced
1623 through one of his manuscripts and found such readings.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ The term *peṭikā* applied to these six aphorisms taken together means “basket, small box, small whole”. The term is used by Khaṇḍadeva (XVII cen. CE) in his independent gloss on JMS, the *Mīmāṃsā-kaustubha* (hereafter MK, 1991, pp. 268, 279, 281, 283, 285, 292). Even though I could not find other authoritative Mīmāṃsakas using this term, it seems to me that at the time of VT, and later at the time of MS and Khaṇḍadeva, it was widely accepted. In *Mīmāṃsākośa* (Sarasvatī 1992, p. 2615) we find a reference to many groups of *adhikaraṇas* or *sūtras* called *peṭikā*, among which the *tatsiddhipeṭikā* is also mentioned without adding any information. Also Pārthasārathi Miśra in his *Śāstradīpikā* (ŚD 1988, p. 90) gives in *kārikā* form a final purport for the entire context, even though he does not use the word *peṭikā*: *tad evaṃ tatsiddhijātisārūpyapraśamsāliṅgabhūmabhīḥ / ṣaḍbhiḥ sarvatra śabdānām gauṇīvr̥ttih prakalpitā //*

⁹⁰ Also, the next chapter of the first *pariccheda* of AS (*apacchedanyāyavaiśamyabhaṅga* 1997, pp. 382–384) discusses an issue through Mīmāṃsaka means. The problem is to deny the difference through the “interpretative maxim of the subsequent sublating the earlier” (*apacchedanyāya*) proposed in JMS VI.5.54 (*paurvāparye pūrvadaurbalyam prakṛtvat*). According to MS affirming that an earlier knowledge is set aside by a subsequent one means that knowledge produced by direct perception or any other means of knowledge is later on sublating by knowledge produced by *śrutipramāṇa*. Before MS, several Advaitins such as Maṇḍana Miśra, Vācaspati, Ānandabodha etc., referred to *apacchedanyāya* in these very terms. AS, dealing with this same issue, quotes also other JMS, such as VI.5.51, VI.5.55 and Kumārila’s *Ṭuṭṭikā tasya prayogāntare nikṣepaḥ* (Yogīndrānanda NA 2002, pp. 149–150; Nair 1990, pp. 54–55; Sharma 1981, pp. 274–275). See also ŚD (1988, p. 503).

1624 IV.2.3 *Pramāṇasāstra: Nyāya*

1625 At the beginning of this article (see Sect. I) I tried to reconstruct the steps covered
1626 by MS to master Nyāya. Throughout his works we find an echo of his deep insight
1627 into this *sāstra*, mainly in its Navya form. Apart from the definitely Navya style
1628 employed in all of his works, MS resorts several times to Nyāya sources, either the
1629 ancient or the new ones. For example, the two opening sections of AS (1997, pp. 8–
1630 20, 20–48) offer a thorough insight into MS's intimacy with ancient and new Nyāya,
1631 although adapted to Advaita tenets.

1632 In the beginning of AS, MS considers the disagreement sentence (*vipratipat-*
1633 *tivākya*) essential to developing a doubt (*saṁśaya*), which is the basis for
1634 constructing the subject of the inference on which debate is based.⁹¹ On the
1635 contrary, VT, together with Navya Naiyāyikas, does not accept doubt as a
1636 constituent of the property of being an inferential subject or subjectness (*pakṣatā*).
1637 In the following passage MS refers to the view—refuted in VT's *pūrvapakṣa*—
1638 according to which doubt is essential for constructing the subject of the inference
1639 (*saṁśayapakṣatā*), which in an anomalous way starts with a concessive sentence
1640 (*yady api*):

1644 AS (1997, p. 14)
1645 yady api **vipratipattijanyasaṁśayasya**
1646 **na pakṣatāsampādakatayopayogaḥ.**

TCP (1988, p. 3)
na tāvat
sandigdhasādhyadharmavattvaṃ
pakṣatvam.

1648 In this passage, as well as in the following ones, the confidence, both intellectual
1649 and textual, with which MS treats this complex Nyāya issue, becomes apparent. He
1650 does not always quote *verbatim*, but he exactly refers or hints to specific discussions
1651 held in other texts in such a way that once again he reveals his ideal addressee, who
1652 should be able to recall these discussions held somewhere else by means of a clue or
1653 a quotation that is short and right to the point.⁹²

1654 In fact, in the next lines he simultaneously quotes and remarkably summarizes in
1655 a single line the new definition of *pakṣatā* given by Gaṅgeśa, which in Nyāya school
1656 sets aside the hackneyed *saṁśayapakṣatā* definition:

⁹¹ AS (1997, p. 14): *tatra vipratipattijanyasaṁśayasya vicārāṅgatvān madhyasthenādau vipratipattih pradarśaniyā*. See also Pellegrini (2014: 4–9). Accordingly, if one wants to know by inference something already known through *pratyakṣa* or *śruti*, s/he will need, in MS's view, to raise a hypothetical doubt (*āhāryasaṁśaya*).

⁹² For example, the discussion on *pakṣatā* starts, beside the four options given in TC itself, from the very beginning of Nyāya speculation. In fact, we already find its forerunners in Vātsyāyana-Pakṣilasvāmin *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* (hereafter NSBh *ad* NS 1.1.1, 1997, p. 3): *nānupalabdhe na nirṇite 'rthe nyāyah pravartate. kiṃ tarhi? saṁśayite 'rthe*. Some connected passages are also found in NSBh *ad* 1.1.41.



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AS (1997, pp. 14–15)
siṣādhayiṣāvira-
sahakṛtasādhakamānābhāvarūpāyās
tasyaḥ saṁśayaḡhaṭitatvāt.

TCP (1988, pp. 64–67)
ucyate,
siṣādhayiṣāvira-
sahakṛtasādhakamānābhāvo yatra sa pakṣaḥ.⁹³
ucyate—**siṣādhayiṣāvira-**
sahakṛtasādhakapramāṇābhāvo
yatrāsti sa pakṣaḥ. tena
siṣādhayiṣāvira-
sahakṛtasādhakapramāṇam yatrāsti sa na
pakṣaḥ. yatra sādhakapramāṇe sati asati
vā siṣādhayiṣā yatra vā ubhayābhāvas
tatra viśiṣṭābhāvāt pakṣatvam.

1666 MS clearly quotes Gaṅgeśa’s definition exactly in Gaṅgeśa’s terms and not in the
1665 newly shaped version (as in *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* [NSM] *ad Kārikāvalī* [K]
1668 II.70), which was also well known by the time of MS, namely *siṣādhayiṣāvira-*
1669 *viśiṣṭasiddhyabhāvaḡ pakṣatā*. I think that the structure of the reference, together with
1670 the common training among traditional Naiyāyikas to commit to memory the main
1671 refined definitions (*pariṣkāra*) of the system (which lasts even up until today) as well as
1672 the related discussions, may reveal that MS in this occasion is citing by heart.

1673 Next to this, from *anyathā* onwards (see next table), in the *pūrvapakṣa* MS starts
1674 to discuss the flaws (*hāni*) arising from accepting *pakṣatā* in the form of doubt
1675 concerning the *probandum*. The sense of the word *anyathā* conveys the problem
1676 produced on accepting *saṁśayapakṣatā*, so the alternative implied by it could be
1677 paraphrased in this way: “otherwise, if we accept this kind of property of inferential
1678 subjectness, according to which the doubt concerning the *probandum* in the
1679 inferential subject...”. Consequently, MS makes the opponent say that if someone
1680 has realised the self through the teaching of the *śruti* but desires to infer it, he will
1681 not be able to formulate this inference because he has already ascertained the self,
1682 and so there will be no room for doubt. Additionally, MS here seems to cryptically
1683 and silently hint at the second definition of *pakṣatā* refuted by Gaṅgeśa in TC (TCP
1684 1988, pp. 42, 55: *sādhyakabādhakapramāṇābhāvaḡ*, “the absence of means of
1685 knowledge establishing the *probandum* is inferential subjectness”)⁹⁴ and more
1686 relevantly at the third one (TCP 1988, p. 63; *siṣādhayiṣitasādhyadharmā dharmī*
1687 *pakṣaḡ*, “the inferential subject is the substrate whose property is the *probandum*
1688 which is the object of the desire to infer”).
1899

⁹³ This is the original definition of Gaṅgeśa *siṣādhayiṣāvira-**sahakṛtasādhakapramāṇābhāvo yatra asti sa pakṣaḡ*, “the inferential subject is where there is the absence of the establishing means of knowledge coupled with the absence of the desire to infer”. “Absence” in the latter case hints at the fact that the desire to infer is not absolutely necessary to infer.

⁹⁴ This cannot be the correct definition of inferential subjectness because in certain cases the inference could take place even when there is a positive cognition of the *probandum* (*siddhi*).



- 1692
1693 AS (1997, p. 15)
1694 anyathā śrutyaṭmaniścaya-
1695 vato 'numitsayā tadanumānaṃ
1696 na syāt, vādyādīnāṃ niścayavattvena
1697 saṃśayaśambhavād.
- TCP (1988, pp. 55–63)
nāpi sādhakapramāṇābhāvaḥ.
'śrotavyaḥ mantavyaḥ
nididhyāsitavya' iti śrutya samāna-
viśayaśravaṇānantaram
mananabodhanāt, pratyakṣadrṣṭe 'py
anumānadarśanāt, ekalingāv
avagate 'pi liṅgāntareṇa tadanumānāc
ca. 'śrotavyaś śrutivākyebhyo
mantavyaś copapattibhiḥ' iti
smaraṇāt. atha siṣādhayaṣita
sādhyadharmā dharmī pakṣaḥ, tathā hi,
mumukṣoś śabdād ātmāvagame 'pi
mananasya mokṣopayogitvena siddhi-
viśayānumitīcchayātmānumānam.

1699 Regarding the second option, for example, according to Gaṅgeśa, the BṛU
1700 (II.4.4.6) passage conveys the idea that when the nature of the self is fully
1701 ascertained from the statements of the śruti, then it could also be proved by
1702 inference. This shows that even non-inferentially known objects can, subsequently,
1703 also be inferentially known. Similarly, according to the third option, the prescription
1704 of the inferential ascertainment of the nature of the self when it is already known
1705 through the upaniṣadic statements can be justified. If there is a desire to know the
1706 self inferentially, its verbal knowledge cannot prove to be a hindrance to the
1707 acquisition of its inferential knowledge. The desire to infer can act as a stimulator of
1708 the inferential knowledge. Also, in VKL MS uses Nyāya material three times (1962,
1709 pp. 20, 22, 26), mainly from the old school. Interestingly, in the third instance he
1710 quotes a moderately long passage from NSBh *ad* I.1.2. *verbatim* (1997, pp. 7–8).

1711 IV.2.4 ARR and Bhedaratna

1712 A final short but due remark on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concerns ARR, which probably
1713 represents the last genuine work written by MS. This text is a rebuttal of Śaṅkara
1714 Mīśra's (XV CE) Bhedaratna. As stated earlier, BR is mainly a reply to the eighth
1715 section of the first *pariccheda*, the *Caturvidhabhedakhaṇḍana* (Yogīndrānanda
1716 1992, pp. 96–121) of Śrīharṣa's KKK in specific, and to Advaita in general (Potter
1717 1993, pp. 398–407).

1718 Also in this case, we find a kind of “reverse indebtedness” of MS to Śaṅkara Mīśra.
1719 As it has been shown for VT vs. AS, here MS also responds point by point to the
1720 objections of Śaṅkara Mīśra and, therefore, he quotes in his own way several passages
1721 from BR, introducing them with a very short explanation and closing them with an
1722 analysis and a refutation in his own style. Moreover, as usual in his replies, he
1723 transcends the boundaries of the text on which his rebuttal is based and discloses his
1724 lucid style and logic.



1725 Just like in NA, this pattern is followed throughout the booklet. As an example,
1726 let us examine the first *pūrvapakṣa* of the third section entitled *śrūtīnāṃ*
1727 *bhedaparatvabhaṅgaḥ* (ARR 1927, pp. 39–49; 1917, pp. 3–7):
1730

1731 BR (1927, pp. 1–2)
1732 **dehādes tāttvikād bhedam satyaṃ**
1733 **cātmany ajānatām/ mumukṣūṇām na**
1734 **mokṣo 'stīty ato bhedo nirūpyate// 3 //**
1735 **na sā dhīḥ kvacid apy asti yatra bhedo**
1736 **na bhāsate/ ata eva na tanmānaṃ yatra**
1737 **bhedapramāpakam// 4 //** tathāhi — ‘sa
1738 **hovācaitad vai tad akṣaraṃ gārgi**
1739 **brāhmaṇā abhivadanty asthūlam**
1740 **anaṅv ahrasvam adīrgham alohitam**
1741 **asneham acchāyam atamo 'vāyv**
1742 **anākāśam asaṅgam arasam agandham**
1743 **acakṣuṣkam aśrotram avāg amano**
1744 **'tejaskam aprāṇam amukham**
1745 **anāmāgotram ajaram amaram**
1746 **abhayam amṛtam arajo 'śabdām**
1747 **avivṛtam asaṃvṛtam apūrvam**
1748 **anaparam anantaram abāhyaṃ, na tad**
1749 **aśnāti kiṃcana, na tad aśnoti kaścana'**
1750 **[BrU III.8.8] iti**
1751 **śrūtānyonyābhāvātmakabhedasyaiva**
1752 **nañarthatvāt. tathā ca sthūlam yac**
1753 **charīrādi tadbhinnaṃ brahmety**
1754 **arthaḥ. evam aṅu yan manaḥ**
1755 **tadbhinnaṃ brahmety arthaḥ.**

ARR (1927, pp. 39–40; 1917, p. 3)
atra kaścīd āha, nādvaitajñānaṃ
muktihetuḥ kintu dehādi-
pratīyogikabhedajñānam. vadati cātra
bhedanirūpaṇapratījñāpūr-
vakabhedasthāpane pramāṇam. tathāhi
'dehādes tāttvikād bhedam satyaṃ
cātmany ajānatām/ mumukṣūṇām na
mokṣo 'stīty ato bhedo nirūpyate// 1 //
na sā dhīḥ kvacid apy asti yatra bhedo
na bhāsate/ ata eva na tanmānaṃ yatra
bhedapramāpakam// 2 //
'sa hovācaitad
vai tad akṣaraṃ gārgi brāhmaṇā
abhivadanty asthūlam anaṅv ahrasvam
adīrgham alohitam asneham acchāyam
atamo 'vāyv anākāśam asaṅgam
arasam agandham acakṣuṣkam
aśrotram avāg amano 'tejaskam
aprāṇam amukham anāmāgotram
ajaram amaram abhayam amṛtam
arajo 'śabdām avivṛtam asaṃvṛtam
apūrvam anaparam anantaram
abāhyaṃ, na tad aśnāti kiṃcana, na
tad aśnoti kaścane'ti [BrU III.8.8]
śrūtāv anyonyābhāvātmakabhedasyaiva
nañarthakatvāt. tathā ca sthūlam yac
charīrādi tadbhinnaṃ brahmety
arthaḥ. evam aṅu yan manaḥprabhṛti
tadbhinnaṃ brahmety artha ityādi.
tathā ca bhedajñānād eva kaivalyam iti.

1757 Here, as in the case of NA, MS starts quoting, discussing and refuting BR already
1758 from the very incipit, the *maṅgalaśloka*.⁹⁵ This also demonstrates that in the
1759 traditional point of view upheld by MS, the benedictory verses were already *in nuce*
1760 expressions of certain *siddhāntas* (as in NA and AS, see *infra* IV.1), and
1761 consequently subject to a reflection or a refutation just like the rest of the text. Next,
1762 MS opens the section with a general statement: someone (*kaścīd*) affirms that the
1763 cause of liberation is not the knowledge of non-duality, but a differentiating
1764 knowledge which has the body and other constitutive elements as its counterpart

⁹⁵ See also the second section of ARR (1927, p. 37; 1917, p. 2) where he quotes and starts his refutation from the first two *maṅgala* verses of BR.



1765 (*pratiyogika*), namely the knowledge that the self is different from the body, its
1766 faculties etc. MS goes on by saying that on this issue this “someone” furnishes a
1767 proof to establish the difference (*bheda*) preceded by a proposition dealing with this
1768 very difference. From here MS starts quoting *verbatim* the third and fourth
1769 benedictory verses of his opponent along with the entire and exact Upaniṣadic
1770 passages cited by him. Having quoted the long BrU (III.8.8) passage Śaṅkara Mīśra
1771 explains that all the privative *a-* compounded with a series of substantives
1772 expressing qualification or attribute are not to be interpreted in the sense of constant
1773 absence (*antyaṅtābhāva*) but as mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*). Thus, *a-sthūla*
1774 means that *brahman* is different from the gross body, *a-manas* intends that *brahman*
1775 is different from the atomic sized (*aṇu*) mind, and so on. Here ends the quotation by
1776 MS but Śaṅkara Mīśra further writes a short conclusion in order to clarify the
1777 purport of the entire objection: the final isolation is achieved through the knowledge
1778 of difference and not, as Advaitins maintain, by realising an identity or the non-
1779 duality.⁹⁶

1780 V Conclusions

1781 This article should be intended as a historical and philosophical reconstruction
1782 rather than a philological one. Although still incomplete, I have tried to show some
1783 of the possible routes for researching MS's works. I hope to elaborate in the future
1784 the points I could not touch herein and develop the topics I just mentioned in
1785 passing. In fact, MS, even though this tendency seems to be slowly reversing, has
1786 not been studied sufficiently in comparison with his pivotal role in pre-modern
1787 brahmanical philosophy. First of all, there are some texts attributed to him available
1788 only in manuscript form. Moreover, apart from the untiring effort done in the first
1789 decades of the last century by illustrious exceptions, such as Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī, at
1790 present MS's works are not accessible in critical editions.

1791 MS's knowledge of Sanskrit textual tradition is really remarkable. Throughout
1792 his production he quotes, refers, hints to, and mentions, acknowledgingly or not, a
1793 very wide range of Indian literary production: taken from Vedic lore, along with
1794 *Upaniṣads* and more common *Samhitā* passages, he quotes also from lesser-known
1795 texts, such as *Brāhmaṇa* and *Āraṇyaka* literature. He also demonstrates a deep

⁹⁶ A chapter apart would require MS's use of multifarious material from Yoga, Advaitic-Yoga (see also Gupta 2006, pp. 47–48), and Sāṅkhya, on the same path of earlier Advaita *ācāryas*, mainly Vidyāraṇyamuni. Even though this is a considerably debated issue, this same tendency of MS has been seen since the earliest manifestations of Advaita, from the controversial *Yogasūtrabhāṣyavivarāṇa* to the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (some would say even in Bhartrhari) etc. Moreover, this is still present in śaṅkarian milieu where the Advaita Vedānta seems inseparably mixed with the cult of Śrīvidyā. Even if MS clears up the issue that Yoga is not indispensable for the realization of Advaita's liberation (GAD ad BG VI.29), he thoroughly uses yogic material while commenting on three chapters of BG, in his GAD IV, V and VI. Mainly in the VI chapter of GAD he quotes several aphorisms from the *Yogasūtra* and some parts of the *Iyāsabhāṣya*, connecting and interpreting them through the looking glass of Advaita Vedānta. Worthy of mention is also the detailed and long discussion in VI chapter of the seven stages of knowledge, *yoga* or *jñānasaptabhūmikā* (GAD ad BG VI.35–43; 2005, pp. 355–371), where he uses material from Gauḍapāda, Sureśvara, *Yogavāsiṣṭha*, Vidyāraṇya, etc. (see also GAD ad III.18; 2005, pp. 183–185).



1796 knowledge of epic and purāṇic texts, Dharmāśāstra, āstika and nāstika darśanas, as
1797 well as thorough insight into devotional literature. By contrast, I did not see any
1798 quotations from tantric material.

1799 It is perhaps possible to trace a common matrix for certain subjects of debate,
1800 selected quotations and expressions or at least a common methodology, in pre-
1801 modern Advaita texts, which seems to share a common traditional network of ideas
1802 and reference works (see Doctor for the comparable case of Nyāya, Sect. 6.1.1)
1803 using similar style, vocabulary, question-answers, quotations and references. This
1804 also indicates that in the intellectual circles there was a common cultural
1805 background and that they shared the same interlanguage (see Freschi, Introduction,
1806 Sect. 3). It should also be remembered that one of the “duties” of the hermeneutical
1807 “living tradition” is to identify the hidden points of a text and analyse them. Hence,
1808 a wide philosophical *Weltanschauung* is the unavoidable background for any reader.
1809 That’s why unacknowledged quotations were simply be recognized by the readers
1810 (Doctor, Sect. 3.2). Maybe in some occasions only a clue (*saṃketa*, *jñāpaka*) was
1811 sufficient in order to recall an entire philosophical discussion for the reader. A basic
1812 knowledge of the doctrines of each school becomes compulsory to take the major
1813 advantage out of this dialogue between the texts and its reader (Doctor, Sect. 5).
1814 This common way of presenting the points of view and argumentations was widely
1815 spread among the Advaitins of MS’s time.

1816 In this regard, it is worth remembering that in a traditional *śrauta* environment
1817 like that of the Advaitins of pre-modern Vārāṇasī, to quote earlier authorities of
1818 one’s own *darśana* was not only felt as a tool to dignify the work, but also a
1819 compulsory step in order to corroborate one’s own views. Advaitins are often proud
1820 of their direct upaniṣadic affiliation and claim for themselves the same non-human
1821 unsystematic structure of *śruti*. In fact, they claim to stand in a privileged position
1822 within the Indian philosophical panorama, because every other *darśana* finds its
1823 sublimation in Advaita. The Advaitins believe themselves to be the only legitimate
1824 interpreters of *śruti* and specifically of the *Upaniṣads*. Especially in the earlier
1825 phases of the system, the absence of systematic character proper of the *Upaniṣads* is
1826 transferred also into the commentarial literature of the *darśana*. This adherence to
1827 the model is seen by the Advaitins as a conscious choice, which, according to their
1828 view, makes Advaita even nearer to the primordial non-systematic character of the
1829 *apauruṣeya* Veda. For this reason they consider their own point of view a direct
1830 interpretation and sometimes even an emanation of the intellectual peak of the
1831 Veda. According to Advaita every idea is already essentially contained in the Sacred
1832 Scripture, so the hermeneutical ability and introspective capacity of the exegete just
1833 brings a concept to light. Nonetheless, the skill of this exegete is not left alone,
1834 because he is a “ring” of the master-disciple “chain”. The individuality of the single
1835 interpreter dissolves in the impersonality of his own tradition, which Advaitins
1836 regard as beginningless (*anādi*) and uninterrupted (*avicchinna*). This, I think, could
1837 be a reason why Advaitins did not feel the need to acknowledge the borrowing of
1838 any ideas from other Advaitins, because for them the unique, true and inexhaustible
1839 source is nothing but *śruti*.

1840 This is also the reason why in the majority of the cases, it is even difficult to
1841 speak of *sacrum furtum*, because, as far as MS is concerned, he usually



1842 acknowledges all the directly cited passages. When he does not mention the name of
1843 a certain author or of his work, he opens the passage with expressions like *tad*
1844 *uktam*, *etad ucyate* etc. or closes them in the most classical way with *iti*, *ityādi*, *ity*
1845 *uktam*, etc., or similar “quotation markers” (Freschi, Introduction, Sect. 3.2 and 5),
1846 underlining that he is citing from a source that, I guess, should be familiar to the
1847 reader. Furthermore, when MS explicitly quotes, he does so *verbatim et literatim*.
1848 Conversely, when he refers to some discussion he mentions a certain passage more
1849 *ad sensum*.

1850 Many of the examined cases are inserted into *pūrvapakṣas* because MS is
1851 replying to the objections of VT. Therefore, he reports the quotation of the *prima*
1852 *facie* view and then, while answering, he gives his own interpretation of the passage.
1853 This is exactly the subject of the last section, where I tried to understand how far MS
1854 is indebted to VT's NA. In Sect. IV.1 I noticed what I called a “reverse
1855 indebtedness” of MS towards VT, even if I estimate it much less than is normally
1856 supposed. In fact, MS reports NA but not always *verbatim*. Sometimes he does so *ad*
1857 *sensum*, nonetheless usually following the style and precisely using the same key
1858 terms of VT. In these occasions, where we also find the classical formulas *na ca ...*
1859 *vacyam*, *nanu ... iti cet* etc. several times, he does not need explicit “quotation
1860 markers” because he puts every argument of VT in the *pūrvapakṣa* and thus leaves it
1861 to the well-trained reader to find it in NA. The replies are independent of VT. Their
1862 striking feature is that MS not only tellingly answers to VT, but simultaneously
1863 defends and harmonizes earlier *ācāryas'* views. So, we feel the need of MS to reply
1864 to all the objections of VT on one side, and on the other the independent structure of
1865 his replica, which follows a different logical path.

1866 As for MS's use of other *śāstras*, I observed that while dealing with Vyākaraṇa,
1867 Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya MS is less attached to literal quotations and just mentions
1868 well-known argumentations through evident references, such as definitions or
1869 discussions on these definitions. His knowledge and re-use of Navya Nyāya material
1870 is absolutely perfect, which is probably one of the reasons which enhanced MS's
1871 authoritativeness and efficacy. He also shows, however, a remarkable expertise in
1872 grammar and Mīmāṃsā from which he uses hermeneutical tools and profusely
1873 quotes *verbatim*. Interestingly, he very rarely, almost never, takes the name of his
1874 opponent but by quoting *literatim* from his text he resorts to the cultural background
1875 of his readers.

1876 If observing the contemporary traditional attitude towards research material we
1877 can, at least, extract a pale echo of how MS dealt with the material at his disposal,⁹⁷
1878 I suggest that in several situations the minor differences are due to the fact that MS
1879 is quoting texts committed to memory. I am also convinced that “behind his desk”
1880 MS had a sensible manuscript library and he was even interested in searching for

⁹⁷ The entire volume *The Pandit. Traditional Scholarship in India* (and especially the two articles by Ashok Aklujkar) is a really useful survey on the figure and the functions of the Indian man of letters. As for the way paṇḍits dealt with texts, in his introduction Michaels (2001, p. 11) quotes an interesting report produced by the Sanskrit Commission of the Government of India in 1958: “A Pandit, who devotes about 15 or 20 years to study a particular sastra or a group of allied subjects, generally becomes a master of his subject. His knowledge is precise and ready; there is no fumbling or hesitancy about him. He does not need notes, not even books, for expounding the text.”



1881 and going through rare or unusual texts, as proven by the quotations from
1882 Ānandapūrṇa Munīndra, an important South Indian author nearly forgotten by
1883 Advaita opponents.
1884 Last, MS is perfectly inserted in his period, when innovation was not for its own
1885 sake, but used to widen, deepen and improve earlier tradition, which was still kept in
1886 the highest consideration.

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