Youth employment policies in Italy

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i. to advance the knowledge base that underpins the formulation and implementation of relevant policies in Europe with the aim of enhancing the employment of young people and improving the social situation of young people who face labour market insecurities, and

ii. to engage with relevant communities, stakeholders and practitioners in the research with a view to supporting relevant policies in Europe. Contributions to a dialogue about these results can be made through the project website [http://www.except-project.eu/](http://www.except-project.eu/), or by following us on twitter @except_eu.

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Introduction

Analysis of the relationship between training orientation and labour-market insertion has frequently been undertaken in Italian political debate, which is suffering from a long-lasting economic crisis and a high rate of – especially youth – unemployment. Yet the debate is struggling to be converted into consistent, co-ordinated action and policies, both on the local and national levels.

For years scholars and stakeholders have agreed upon the gap between the educational system and a productive landscape undergoing rapid, profound change, as well as the weak, badly implemented youth-orientation and labour-market-insertion policies. But this is only an aspect of research/policy makers dialectics (Parisi, 2018; Leonardi & Pica, 2015; Caliendo & Schmidl, 2016). The other side of the coin is the number of young people who have not entered the labour market, creating social alarm in the light of the gradual weakening of active Italian policies (Aburrà, 2012; CEFEDOP, 2014).

Apart from the contingent effect of the recent crisis due mainly to production supply-chains and the expulsion of (mostly unskilled) adult workers, the meagre effect of active labour policies on young people has been studied for some time (Giubileo, 2016). Some point to the illegal economy (Isfol, 2011; Viviani, 2010; De Gregorio & Giordano, 2015), others to the scarce attention paid to small and medium-sized companies, the backbone of Italian production, which find themselves deprived of adequate means of support (Eurostat, 2013). Still others blame the complicated interweaving of labour-market economic and social transformations due to the growth of service industries, ICTs and 4.0 industry – plus changes in the structure of employment and modification of the country's demographic composition: an increase in the number of elderly and the appearance of immigrants on the market (the arrival of competition, not just complementarity). None of these approaches, however, explains the stalemate in policy-makers attention towards youth. The basis of such policies is obviously schools, which have trouble explaining their effectiveness in a context of continual reforms of the educational structure and little investment in updating training and educational personnel. Than there is the question of labour-market-insertion initiatives. Orientation activities, with work practice and intense study periods, address this issue: recently increased experiments have been carried out in school-work alternation with a view to offering all students – even those who intend to continue with their studies – the chance to gain work experience and acquire soft skills (Croce & Ghignoni, 2015). Rather than systematic opportunity it is a pilot experience whose effectiveness is often left to the organizational capacity of schools (or individual teachers) and the goodwill of the territorial network where they are situated.

Finally, we need to consider incentives for hiring youth (for example, a reduction in social contributions on the employer’s part) or for encouraging youth entrepreneurship, both by offering public advantages to companies with a high incidence of young entrepreneurs and supplying them with information and consultancy services.
But severe criticism levelled at the elevated numbers of NEETs, the problems of a labour market severely penalised by the recent economic-financial crisis and the necessity to ensure a smoother school-work transition results in debate and (limited) action at the local rather than the national level political agenda, contributing to a spotted-leopard definition of the structure of opportunity in Italy (Cordella, 2012; Pastore, 2015).

By means of bibliographical literature, data-gathering and stakeholder interviews, the WP will present and debate the main policy tools directed towards youth in the present Italian scenario, highlighting strengths and weaknesses.

**National labour market developments**

**Brief description of the key labour market developments since the mid-1990s**

Following significant labour market reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s, labour market outcomes have improved substantially in Italy. Employment rates increased, and the unemployment rate dropped to 6.1% in 2007 after a peak of over 12% in the mid-1990s (Schindler, 2009). However, the 2008 crisis changed the scenario. According to ISTAT (Italian National Institute of Statistics), the unemployment rate increased from 6.7% in 2008 to 11.9% in 2015. In the same period, the inactivity rate remained stable (from 37.1% in 2004 to 36% in 2015). This development was characterised by substantial differences according to industrial sectors, and employment losses were concentrated in the construction sector: more than 400,000 of the one million jobs lost during the crisis were in construction (CNEL, 2014). Also at regional level, the intensity of the crisis was very different: in the Southern regions, the number of employed decreased by almost 600,000 units compared with more than 400,000 units in the rest of Italy (CNEL, 2014). The most important driving forces were:

- Normative factors (see 1.1.3);
- Low labour market flexibility (Dell’Aringa & Lucifora 2000), but in the following years the situation changed (see 1.1.3) and flexibility increased especially among young people (Contini & Trivellato 2005);
- The entry of new workers into the labour market slowed by the tendency to postpone retirement, a phenomenon partly due to the reforms launched in the past (Treu, 2013).

However, the most important factor was the economic crisis of 2008 that produced a dramatic increase of the unemployment rate (especially among young people) in the last decade.

These reforms and their effects on labour insertion and labour remuneration should be framed in the context of the “current” economic crisis.
ISTAT data shows labour remuneration has been increasing in the last five years: however, there has been an increase in the average wages of Italian workers since 2010, but every year the rate of growth has decreased. According to ISTAT data, in the second quarter of 2014, the increase halted and then resumed weakly during 2015 (ISTAT, 2016). The data also shows persistent differences according to gender and the economic condition. With regard to Eurostat data, between 2010 and 2014, men and women working in the education sector (public health service and social work activities) did not benefit from an increase in their average monthly salary (as opposed to the industrial and service sectors).

Over the past two decades, the Italian labour market has undergone substantial reforms (Samek Lodovici, 2000; Samek, Lodovici & Semenza, 2008; Tompson, 2009; Barbieri & Scherer, 2009; Mussida & Lucarelli, 2014; Treu, 2013; Fana, Guarascio & Cirilli, 2015). In the 1990s, Italy was among the countries with the highest OECD employment protection legislation index; however, in 2010, the level changed and is now about average (Reyneri, 2011, p. 132). However, the Italian reform process is characterised by a “marginal and asymmetric process” (Boeri, 2012). “The reform process of the 1990s and early 2000s created a labour market that was fairly flexible for workers entering the labour market, namely youth and women. At the same time, prime aged workers, belonging to the “breadwinner generation”, were completely insured by the reform process. The reform process was thus marginal – in the sense that it applied only to new jobs, and asymmetric – in the sense that it affected only a fraction of the population; in other words, the reform process acted mainly through the labour market flows” (Garibaldi & Taddei, 2013, p. 19).

In Italy, a very rapid introduction of temporary employment, combined with very low and targeted social protection, affected the life of young people differently than in other countries where such changes were slower or accompanied by higher levels of social protection (Bertolini, 2011).

Moreover, the introduction of unstable work forms produced a strong segmentation of the Italian labour market into “outsiders” and “insiders” (Reini, 2000). Permanent workers often enjoyed a high level of protection when working or not (e.g. through state unemployment funds, sick leave arrangements etc.) while there was only a low level of social protection for fixed-term workers (e.g. no unemployment benefits between one contract and another).

In fact, two laws led to an even steeper increase in many forms of fixed-term employment, without the creation of an adequate system of new forms of social protection.

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1 This index measures the procedures and costs involved in firing individuals or groups of workers and the procedures involved in hiring workers on fixed-term or temporary work agency contracts. For more information see www.oecd.org/els/emp/oecdindicatorsemploymentprotection.htm.
Furthermore, social protection was low, in terms of not only income, but also job guarantees (Saraceno, 2002; 2005).

Adverse macroeconomic conditions, including an overall unemployment rate that exceeded 12% during the late 1980s, and Italy’s envisaged entry into the European Community in 1999, resulted in several reform measures starting in the early 1990s that liberalised the labour market (Blossfeld, Buchholz, Hofäcker & Bertolini, 2012) with new laws regarding collective firing and the abolishment of the automatic indexation of wages to inflation. In 1997, a group of measures (the “Pacchetto Treu”) organised employment contracts and legislation regarding the growth of flexible employment. The Treu law, aimed at increased flexibility, introduced temporary contracts and provided incentives for part-time work. In the same year, another law (Law 469/1997), concerning the privatisation and decentralisation of public employment centres, abolished the principle of a public monopoly of employment services. This flexibilization trend continues: in 2001, the Italian government extended the possibility of temporary contracts and, in 2003, the ‘Legge Biagi’ (Law 30/2003) introduced the use of staff-leasing contracts and part-time work, reforming some aspects of employment relationships.

The 2008 crisis produced the need for new rules to regulate the labour market and to try to reduce the growing unemployment rate. In 2012, the ‘Legge Fornero’ (Law 92/2012) reduced the effectiveness of ‘Articolo 18’ (Article 18)\(^2\). Nevertheless, a new reform, (‘The Jobs Act’) determined a new change; indeed, in 2014, Law 183/2014 was approved. The reform introduced a new type of contract (‘contratto a tutele crescenti’ – the so-called increased-protection contract), which no longer guaranteed reinstatement in the case of companies invalidly firing them.

Article 18 of Law 300/1970 was the mainstay of the previous Italian industrial relations set-up, protecting workers with open-ended contracts from “unjust dismissal”.

In 2015, as mentioned above, ‘The Jobs Act’ reform was approved, aimed – according to the Government – at contrasting the growing rate of youth unemployment and supporting their insertion in a more globalised, competitive labour market and negatively affected by the financial crisis. The first point of the reform concerned the regulation of employment contracts and layoffs: open-ended contracts became the main form of recruitment (replacing fixed-term contracts). The new – ‘increased-protection’ – contract was a novelty in the Italian labour market landscape. The reinstatement of workers (before almost inevitable with Article 18) in the workplace became the exception and was replaced with financial compensation, calculated according to seniority. In June 2015, the temporary project contract, the symbol of job insecurity, was repealed. Despite these measures, contractual insecurity did not diminish (since 2015, according to ISTAT, the number self-employed has increased). The Jobs Act\(^3\) also introduced greater organisational flexibility: employers have the right to modify unilaterally workers’ duties on condition that the new tasks are compatible to their level, a measure that may create a “bad job” situation for employees. Because of the Jobs Act, reform disseminated the

\(^2\) Modifying the text of Article 2103 of the Civil Code.
use of special “vouchers” provided by INPS (National Social Security Institute) to pay seasonal workers. “While employers purchased 535,000 job vouchers in 2008, the programme had expanded dramatically by 2015, with more than 115 million vouchers purchased. According to a study by the Italian Labour Union, more than 1.7 million workers received some form of voucher payment in 2015, representing 8% of all working Italians.” (Fairlab, 2016, p. 2). In this way, the vouchers have rapidly become a way of circumventing the end of temporary contracts.

Box 1 Labour market reforms in Italy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997-1998</td>
<td>“Pacchetto Treu”: use of temporary worker agency; new fiscal treatment of part-time work. New atypical contracts such as job-sharing; new fiscal treatment of part-time work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Decree Law no. 368: Fixed term contracts are extended to regular employees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>“Legge Biagi” (2003): which provides a common framework to atypical contracts and extends further the use of TWA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>“Jobs Act” (Law 183/2014): revision of the unemployment benefit system and introduction of the contract with increasing protection.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fano, Guarascio & Cirilli, 2015

The collective bargaining structure – laid out in the 1993 social pact – was structured on two levels: 1) collective bargaining at national level, to fix the terms of employment (renegotiated every four years) and basic wage guarantees (called “minimi tabellari”, renegotiated every two years); 2) bargaining at the second, optional level (regional or company), allowing the bargaining partners to supplement national contracts (valid for four years) (Bavaro, 2011). About 60% of Italian workers are covered by national collective bargaining agreements. However, the second bargaining level involved only 20% of Italian enterprises (CNEL, 2013). Italy does not have a legal minimum wage. However, the Italian constitution contains the indication of the “right to fair wages” (Art. 36); historically Italian courts have taken the “minimi tabellari” parameters as a guide. In Italy, there are three main trade-union federations, CGIL, CISL and UIL, together accounting for 12.5 million members, but almost half of these are retirees. The average union density is about 30%. The unions are strongest in the services sector with 70% of the total workforce (Namuth, 2013). In 2013, the number of wage and salary earners who were members of a trade union was 6,131,000 (Source: OECD, 2014). The total number of union members is higher (around 16 million according to union statistics) but around

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4 The Italian government implemented the “job voucher” payment system in 2008 to regularise payments made to seasonal agricultural workers. The voucher system has from the beginning been restricted only to “accessory” jobs (work lasting less than 30 days per year and generating no more than 5,000 euros). In 2015, The Jobs Act raised this limit to 7,000 euros.
half of them are retirees (7,000,000 according to INPS in 2015). However, the number of wage and salary earners who are members of a trade union increased over time; according to the OECD, there were 5,177,000 in 1999.

The key risk groups in the labour market in Italy

The Italian labour market does not absorb all its labour supply, particularly the young and the female labour supply, as attested to by the structurally high (and increasing) unemployment rates of these social categories. In the case of young people, among other factors, reasons deriving from social prejudices also explain their higher unemployment rates compared to adults. They have little labour experience and for this reason, they are less appealing to employers. In addition, not having family responsibilities (wife and/or children) particularly penalises men; having a family is considered an indicator of reliability unlike women who can be discriminated against in the labour market precisely because they have families (Reyneri, 2011). In the case of women, low employment rates in comparative and gender perspectives (and scarce capacity of the national labour market to absorb all the potential female labour supply) are due, among other factors, to the low availability of part-time jobs, which in Italy are less widespread than in other European countries, and to the scarcity of policies supporting conciliation between paid work and family life. Structural incapacity to absorb a highly-educated and highly-skilled labour supply is another characteristic of the Italian labour market. The share of tertiary-educated young people in Italy is lower than the European average, in spite of which they have lower employment rates because the Italian economic and productive system is characterised by the predominance of small- and medium-size companies who often do not need graduates. Add to this the structural incapacity of the Southern Italian labour market to absorb its labour supply because of the weakness of the economic background (industry is historically underdeveloped in Southern regions) and because of the high incidence of irregular work.

The main risk groups in labour market

The Italian labour market is characterised by a series of structural imbalances that increase the vulnerability of the categories briefly described below:

a) High youth unemployment rate

In 2015, the youth unemployment rate (aged 15-24) was 37.9%, deteriorating because of the economic crisis from 2008, when it was 19.4%, to 2012 when it reached 38.3% (Source: ISTAT). This picture was made even more dramatic by the high rate of NEET (Not in Education, Employment or Training, i.e. the young unemployed or inactive people): 21.4% in 2015 among 15-24 year-olds according to Eurostat.

b) Gender imbalance

According to ISTAT, the female unemployment rate was higher than the male one (12.7% in 2015 versus 11.3%). Considering the activity rates, gender difference became
even clearer: the female activity rate (15-64 age groups) in the same year was 54.1%, a decrease of 20% in comparison with men of the same age groups. In Italy, the traditional family model with the male breadwinner and female housewife continued to be the predominant model in couples, but in the last forty years it has declined, especially among the young cohorts, because of a growing participation of women in the labour market (Saraceno, 1994; Rosina & Fraboni, 2004).

c) Significant territorial inequalities

Italy was characterised by a territorial differentiation: Southern regions present lower employment rates and higher unemployment rates (especially for women) in comparison with the Northern ones, as well as a higher incidence of long-term unemployed and a higher rate of young NEET (ISTAT, 2014; 2015). This was a historical gap, which was never addressed with efficient and effective policies (Isfol, 2009).

d) High labour market segmentation and precarisation

According to a lot of research, the mix of different regimes of employment protection and the liberalisation of atypical, temporary contracts increased segmentation of the labour market (Lucidi & Raitano, 2009), allocating the worst jobs to the most vulnerable categories, especially the young and women, creating widespread effects of scarring and precarisation (Fumagalli, 2013).

e) Highly-skilled mismatching

The number of unemployed people with a university degree rose from 58,000 in 2007 to 128,000 in 2015: an increase of 120% (Source: ISTAT). According to an OECD analysis, “…there is a positive relationship between tertiary education and skill mismatch is especially strong, possibly suggesting that high-skilled labour is misallocated” (OECD 2015, 23). High levels of unemployment rates among tertiary education graduates was observed in other European countries affected by the economic crisis (e.g. Portugal, Spain and Greece) (see Rokicka et al., 2015)

Among these groups, current policies are focussing mainly on young people (especially the under-29 age group), with particular attention being devoted to those who can be considered NEET.

Youth In the labour market between data and perceptions

In Italy, young people (aged 15-24) are four times more likely to be unemployed than adults (25-64): this datum is understandable in a scenario where the unemployment rate for young adults is among the highest in Europe (See ISTAT, 2016; OECD, 2016). The persistence of the economic crisis and the beginning of a long phase of stagnation for the Italian economy have increased the rate of long-term (i.e. more than 12 months) unemployed.
In 2014, it reached 59.7% of young people unemployed and 61.4% of the all unemployed (compared with, respectively, 41.1% and 47.5% in 2007) (Source: ISTAT). Thus, more than half of unemployed youth were looking for work for over a year while seeing their chances of re-employment diminishing. In the last decade, the ratio between young and adults has remained stable.

In 1995, the unemployment rate was 29.9% for young people (15-24) and 4.6% for adults (over 35); in 2010, the rates were respectively 24.1% and 5.3% and, in 2015, 40.3% and 8% (Source: ISTAT).

Considering the youth’s social representation, we can start recalling two episodes. In 2007, the Italian Minister of the Economy Padoa Schioppa said “We are sending bamboccioni [Mummy’s boys] away from home”, and, in 2012, Elsa Fornero, the Minister of Labour, Social Policies and Gender Equality criticised unemployed young people for being too “choosy”, advising them to take the first job that was offered to see what it was really like, rather than waiting for “the perfect job” to come along. These are two examples of how policymakers (and some entrepreneurs and economists) tended to blame young people for the labour market situation and social exclusion. However, the scandal following these statements demonstrated that the population and the mass media did not agree.

The issue of youth unemployment has become central in recent years in the public debate and the attention of policy makers. Almost daily the major national newspapers, magazines and other mass media talk about cases of young unemployed people or young people with precarious jobs. Furthermore, the mass media’s rhetoric emphasises the “brain drain” from Italy to other countries, speaking about the resurgence of Italian emigration (Ricucci, 2017).

In recent years, internal mobility has increased. According to ISTAT, the domestic flow rose from 2013 to 2014 by 198,000 units, an increase of 15%. Most of these transfers concerned the historical movements from the South to the Centre-North, and mainly involved young people (SVIMEZ, 2016).

*Table 1: „Risk group”- importance by actors*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential risk groups</th>
<th>Importance by actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public opinion/ Media*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All young people</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young unemployed</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early school leavers</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people with low skills</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people with outdated qualifications</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people without qualifications</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEET</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education graduates</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrants/Ethnic minorities</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teenage/single parents</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people from workless families</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people from remote/disadvantaged areas</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young people with a disability</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These values have been assigned on the basis of the literature and stakeholder interviews. The scale is from 1=no significant role to 5=very important. In Italy, these values vary according to regional situation.

However, despite the NEET phenomenon being highlighted by numerous studies, there are some difficulties in studying this particular juvenile sub-group and empirical studies on the subject are still scarce at national level.

In general, scientific research seems to pay more attention to other potentially vulnerable groups, such as early school-leavers, highly-skilled youth ready to leave the country, and Migrants/Ethnic minorities. The first group is generally in the background of media news; the second is often portrayed by the media: it is not considered very credible that the country is not able to give jobs to potentially highly-qualified workers. As for young foreigners, while research emphasises the risks of the lack of education, policies ignore the issue, and public opinion mostly views them as potential “competitors”, as important resources and community members who are not likely to be included in the labour market. It is emblematic that the most recent school reform, “The Good School” (2015), did not at first mention immigration or measures for foreign students, a gap that was later bridged.

**Labour market policies**

**Main trends regarding active and passive national labour market policies since the mid-1990s**

Traditionally, the Italian social policy system has developed through two different circuits, one offering services and programmes to (current or former) workers, according to their employment history, namely insured-based benefits and policies; the other to people connected with some specific personal characteristics, regardless of their job history, namely social-assistance policies. This distinction, which is clear in theory, acquires different nuances in practice, with measures mixing the requirements for access and offering different degrees of support.

By looking at official data on expenditure, employment-support measures have been much more significant than social assistance and, public intervention has been characterised by the categorical and/or contributory nature of most benefits. This implies that only some categories – families with children under the legal age, elderly people, sick and disabled people – are supported regardless of their employment history. Partly because of the absence of a minimum income scheme, in Italy, if you do not fall into one of these categories, and do not have a working career with specific characteristics, you would have almost no access to economic benefits, at least considering those available.
in the country (Granaglia & Bolzoni, 2016; Madama, Jessoula & Natili, 2014; Verassi, 2000). Therefore, passive national labour market policies are available only to former workers who comply with specific employment characteristics. Unemployment benefits, for example, require a specific employment career and history. This is of course particularly relevant when focussing on youth, who may struggle to enter the labour market or who have experienced precarious, atypical (if not illegal) jobs and therefore cannot have access to such passive labour market policies. In this sense, it is not surprising that Italy is one of the countries in EU28 that shows a lower capacity to reduce poverty through social transfer.

Indeed, before social transfer the population at risk of poverty and social exclusion was 24.6%, while after the social transfer it became 19.1% - the numbers in EU28 changed from 25.9% to 16.6% (Eurostat, 2013). According to 2013 data, Italy devoted only 8% (about 10 points lower than the EU average) of its social expenditure to dealing with problematic situations connected with unemployment, housing, and family and social-exclusion risk.

According to Eurostat data the Passive Labour Market Policies involved 1,030,065 persons in 2005 and 1,648,058 in 2014; in the same period expenditure increased from 11,125,621 to 25,949,022 euro.

In contrast, involvement in active labour market policies decreased from 1,914,131 in 2005 to 1,131,791 in 2014, while expenditure was cut by 34% from 6,816 million euros in 2005 to 4,445 in 2014. In Italy, active labour policies were not very effective and have not worked well over the years, as can been seen from unemployment data (see paragraph above).

The reforms that made regulation of labour relations more flexible were not, however, accompanied by a comprehensive review of social policies. This was due to many factors: the weakness of the Italian ruling class, the ambiguous attitude of trade unions and the lack of financial resources (Berton, Richiardi & Sacchi, 2009). Recently, the Italian government led by Prime Minister Matteo Renzi approved “The Jobs Act” labour market reform on 14 September 2015. The law aims to reorganise active labour market policies and to improve their co-ordination at national level. Specifically, the main goal of “The Jobs Act” labour market reform is to co-ordinate and monitor the labour policies implemented by the network of employment services, including:

- the National Institute of Social Security (INPS) for the provision of public incentives and income support instruments;
- INAIL (National Institution for Insurance against Accidents at Work) for the job placement of people with disabilities;
- ItaliaLavoro: joint-stock company owned by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which aims to promote and provide employment services;
- ISFOL: Institute for the Development of Vocational Training of Workers
• all actors delivering employment services at local level e.g. Public Employment Services (PES), chambers of commerce, private employment placement agencies, universities, and upper secondary schools

This act is part of the reform process of the entire labour market introduced by Law 18/2014, which contained criteria for subsequent laws, circulars concerning dismissal procedures, governance and development of passive labour market policies, unemployment benefits, reduction of administrative costs for businesses, reforming employment contracts and promotion of the work–life balance. The National Agency for Active Labour Market Policies (ANPAL) was instituted (Decree No. 150/2015) and started working in 2016. Up to 395 workers were transferred to the new organisation from the Ministry of Labour and from ISFOL (Institute for the Development of Vocational Training of Workers), the public agency in charge of conducting research into and evaluation of labour policies. The act also entails taking over ItaliaLavoro, a joint-stock company owned by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, which aims to promote and provide employment services. The Jobs Act labour market reform defined the minimum level of services to be guaranteed by local administrations and Public Employment Services (Centri per l’Impiego). Furthermore, the reform was aimed at strengthening the link between active and passive labour market policies. There are penalties for unemployment benefit claimants who refuse “adequate job offers” or meetings with tutors or training courses.\(^5\)

The Jobs Act also revised the rules of the employment “services provision voucher”, introduced by Legislative Decree No. 22/2015. Now workers only receive the New Social Insurance Provision for Employment (NASpI). Those who have been unemployed for more than four months receive a voucher they can use with a public or private employment service. Unemployed persons can use this voucher as a sort of “virtual payment” for participation in tutoring or training programmes aimed at helping them to find a job. PES will define the amount depending on the beneficiary’s current employability using a methodology defined by The Jobs Act.

The policy-making process of labour market policies

The 1948 Constitution (Art. 117) assigned control of labour policies to the state, but in 1997, the Bassanini reform (Legislative Decree No. 233/1997) started decentralisation

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\(^5\) The definition of “adequate job offer”, introduced by the Monti-Fornero reform (Law 28 of June 2012, no. 92), will be replaced by a ministerial decree and will take into account:

• whether the role is appropriate for the jobseeker’s skills
• workplace–home distance
• duration of the unemployment period
• minimum level of proposed wage (at least 20% more than the amount of the latest unemployment allowance received). PES employees who do not enforce the rules will also be penalized
and gave this power to regions and provinces. The current model of governance for the management of labour-market interventions is a co-ordination between the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy (MLPS) and the Regions and Autonomous Provinces, which are committed to the implementation of active policies at local level (the subsidiarity principle). This system was schematised with the introduction of the new National Agency for Active Labour Market Policies (“ANPAL”).

The system of services to the Italian labour market consists of public entities and private institutions, which are formally recognised and accredited. In the public sphere, the complex, territorially-focussed system (20 regions, 110 provincial governments, 553 employment centres), operates according to specific law, with exclusive jurisdiction over some functions (including the assessment and certification of unemployment) and execution of regional planning guidelines.

On the other hand, in the private sphere, there has been a heterogeneous system – by type and geographical spread – including the employment agencies listed in a special ministerial charter, agencies subject to specific regional accreditation and entities subject to special authorisation, performing specific functions (universities, chambers of commerce, schools etc.). The entry of private agencies into the intermediation market should fill the public employment service gap in demand for highly specialised facilities. The coexistence of these two components of the system does not always take the form of cooperation or functional integration and their role and importance are determined by the patterns of governance implemented, the users and the local labour market characteristics. Regulatory policies that defined the current range of actors in the labour market, starting with Law No. 30/2003 and Legislative Decree No. 276/2003, which increased the role to private intermediaries.

In 2014, the Italian government initiated an active labour policy aimed at young people: the national declination of the Youth Guarantee Initiative. The implementation of this plan started with the opening of the National Portal Youth Guarantee on 1 May 2014. The national web portal dedicated to the initiative is one of the central elements of the link between the Ministry and the Regions/Autonomous Provinces. This platform is the “locus” where relevant information regarding all young people registered in the programme converges. In this way, the availability and job research of all the young people becomes accessible to the public employment services throughout Italy.

In the above mentioned scenario, there is a regular evaluation of regional and national policies (Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali 2013). In particular, the Italian Youth Guarantee is monitored in its implementation process and under evaluation.

---

6 In 2015, a Constitutional reform returned policy centralisation: social policies and active labour policies again became a matter for the state. However, this reform had to be approved by the constitutional referendum on 4 December 2016. “No” won, therefore power remained in the provinces and regions. Nevertheless, after decades in which Italian employment policies were decentralised to local level, with the Constitutional Reform Italy has re-started a process of policy centralisation.
according to the following criteria: the number and characteristics of beneficiaries, expense progress and Project effects on the employment situation of beneficiaries. The indicators used are those defined in Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 – Annex II, in the “Italian Plan of Implementation of the Youth Guarantee”, a document signed by the state and regions together. However, the evaluation of policies is still not widely used and developed/optimised in Italy.

**Youth employment policies: a general overview**

According to Eurostat data, the number of Italians involved in the active policies of the labour market declined over the past decade, decreasing from 1.9 million in 2005 to 1.3 million in 2014. Among people under 25, the decline was higher: those involved in these kinds of policies decreased from 585,000 in 2005 to 280,000 in 2014. These numbers outline a very worrying scenario, confirmed by the data showed in Table 2.

*Table 2: An overview of active labour market programmes at national level (2005-2015)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Total number of active labour market programmes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1 including youth-targeted</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Number of participants (stock) in active labour market programmes:</td>
<td>Source: Eurostat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Total number</td>
<td>1,914,131</td>
<td>1,414,723.00</td>
<td>1,131,791</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 % of the labour force (15-64)</td>
<td>7.88</td>
<td>5.75</td>
<td>4.44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Number of youth participants (up to 25 years old) in active labour</td>
<td>Source: Eurostat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Total number</td>
<td>585,937</td>
<td>413,122</td>
<td>280,310 (2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 % of the labour force (15-25)</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 % of the total number of participants (stock)</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Expenditure on active labour market programmes: (Source: Eurostat)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Total amount (Mln EUR)</td>
<td>6,816,633</td>
<td>5,098,422</td>
<td>4,445,649 (2014)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2 % of GDP</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.27</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Expenditure on all active labour market programmes for youth participants:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.1 Total amount (EUR)</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One of the problems pointed out by many scholars was the dimension of the “informal sector” (Isfol, 2007; Viviani, 2010; Ministro del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2010; De Gregorio & Giordano, 2015), which especially involved women and those who lived in Southern Italy: obviously, these workers could undergo passive labour policies.

Furthermore, these measures were adapted for large companies rather than SMEs (according to Eurostat, in 2015 Italian SMEs employed 81% of workers).

In the last three years, some positive changes have occurred thanks to the Youth Guarantee Initiative, a project on which the Italian government has focussed its labour policies. It is important to remember that in Italy – differently from other EU countries – the age range of people involved in the Youth Guarantee Initiative is different: the focus is on the age range 18-29 instead of 18-25. The data collected up to September 2016 showed that young people registered in the Initiative numbered 1,163,701 (50.5% of NEET recorded in 2015 by ISTAT7), of whom 774,401 are looked after by the Public Employment Centre: 33.8% of registered young people received training or a job opportunity.

### Measures and schemes for young unemployed

In Italy, there are many measures and initiatives devoted to contrasting youth unemployment, but they are impossible to categorise and scrutinise in a simple way for several reasons (see Table 3). First, they are promoted by a variety of actors, from regions to bank foundations, from State to religious associations, municipalities to educational institutions. This system affects the type of funds (i.e. public or private), geographical impact (i.e. local, regional, national) and the recipients’ characteristics (i.e. women, migrants, disabled persons, NEET).

**Table 3**: Overview of types of measures and schemas against youth unemployment in the last years (both running and finished ones; time horizon – last 5-6 years, 2011-2017)

7 Although there was a high number (over 150,000 units according to Rosolen & Seghezzi, 2016) registered without the stated requirements, so the real number is certainly lower than the official data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of measure</th>
<th>Importance</th>
<th>Youth specific (yes/no)</th>
<th>Target groups</th>
<th>Main source of funding</th>
<th>Linked to EU initiatives (if yes, which one)</th>
<th>Main actors of delivery</th>
<th>Evaluation present (Yes, Partly, No)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Re-)orientation courses, preparation for training or employment</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,3,4,6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational guidance, career counselling</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,4,6</td>
<td></td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training (with certificates)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training (without certificates)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment incentives, subsidies for employer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct job creation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start-up incentives, self-employment programmes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1,2,3,4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,5</td>
<td></td>
<td>Partly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secondly, the goals are very different from region to region. For example, Campania, Lombardy and Emilia Romagna have focussed their initiatives on (and addressed their funds to) generational turnover in enterprises; the Marche region has developed the “Creative Ground Contest” with the aim of rewarding the best business ideas in the cultural sector; Liguria has focussed its policies on encouraging crafts.

The third reason deals with an institutional issue: due to several experiences of governmental difficulties both at national and local levels, initiatives risk remaining at the

8 Importance depends on the comparative scale of the programme (coverage & expenditure) -> Does not exist = 0; Not relevant = 1; Quite important = 2; Very important = 3
9 Target: youth = 1, universal = 2, targeted risk group =3, targeted to youth risk group = 4
10 EU = 1; national = 2, regional = 3, local = 4; other -5
11 Youth Guarantee =1; Youth Employment Initiative =2; Framework for Quality traineeships and apprenticeship =3; Eures =4; Support to youth entrepreneurship =5; Other - 6
12 state = 1, region = 2, municipality = 3, church = 4, foundations, NGOs = 5, private sector = 6, educational institutions=7 Other, please specify=8.
stage of feasibility studies with a little implementation, and the risk of collecting feasibility studies rather than developing structural activities.

Considering to what extent policies focus on preventative measures or are purely reactive to manifest problems or part of a structural policy action, analysing more deeply the ISTAT data, it is clear there was an increase – across the time span considered – of investments by the Italian Government in supporting passive labour market policies (from 0.74% of GDP in 2005 to 1.6% in 2014) compared to a decline in active labour market programmes (from 0.46 % of GDP in 2005 to 0.27% in 2014).

Because of the present economic crisis, resources have been concentrated more on containing emergencies (workers in the mid-50s at risk of job loss; welcoming asylum seekers) than creating new opportunities for the unemployed (especially young people).

Some of these measures, especially those related to strengthening skills and training, the creation of early career paths have been planned to prevent the causes of unemployment and the mismatch between supply and demand in the labour market. Educational institutions (upper secondary schools and universities) and Public Employment Centres have played a key role in developing these initiatives, which has been mainly promoted by public agencies and focussed on developing an easy path to gain one’s first job experience or replace job losses.

**Youth employment policies: focus on selected interventions**

Italy has a multitude of local initiatives that can be defined as “good practices” (Pasqualini, 2010). As the previous pages have shown, Labour policies are fragmented among a multitude of contexts, targets and different agencies. If, on the one hand, this generates a structural weakness in developing a coherent and systematic framework, on the other it also develops a huge number of projects and locally based experiences. They produce significant findings, even in the face of scarce global resources. It is one of Italian labour policy paradoxes in which strengths and weaknesses overlap.

We chose to focus on an analysis of good practices in the Piedmont regional context for several reasons. First, it was one of two regions where qualitative Except Project teams carried out in-depth interviews with young people.13

Piedmont is a North-Western Italian region and – for several reasons – it can be considered as an interesting case study for our purposes (Ires, 2015). First, it is one of the regions where the local government historically paid attention to developing youth policies (Conforti, Dondona, Barella & Gallini, 2001). Secondly, there is a high rate of youth with a migrant background (in Piedmont 18-29-year-old foreigners are 16% of the

13 The other area was Catania, in Sicily. The reason Piedmont was chosen was that it has homogeneous characteristics – at the policies level very distant from Sicily
18-29-year-old population). Thirdly, it is a region that has suffered greatly from the still-ongoing economic crisis of 2008 and has seen a significant growth in its youth unemployment rate. Fourthly, Piedmont is an area where traditionally there has been a substantial role of NGOs in designing and implementing policies addressed to young people. Indeed, it is a region where there is a solid network of public and private agencies.

The criteria for selecting the policies were: 1) efficiency; 2) economic sustainability (demanding little public expense); 3) developed by public services in agreement with associations or directly by private agencies.

**Table 4: A brief overview of selected youth employment interventions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Level(^{15})</th>
<th>Main target group(^{16})</th>
<th>Type(^{17})</th>
<th>Starting year</th>
<th>Funding source(^{18})</th>
<th>Part of EU initiatives (if yes, which one)</th>
<th>Evaluation(^{19}) “Good practice” example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Lunedì giovani (Youth Monday)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Youth Guarantee (from 2015)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Master dei Talenti – Neo diplomati e neo laureati (Master of Talents – school leavers and graduates)</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Enel – Alternanza scuola lavoro (Enel – Young apprenticeship programme)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>2,4</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Piazza dei Mestieri (Place of Crafts)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Regional, national, EU</td>
<td>FSE</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>MIP (Mettersi in Proprio)</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>EU</td>
<td>FSE</td>
<td>Yes, positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{14}\) The risk group chosen for the qualitative analysis in the EXCEPT project by the Italian team.

\(^{15}\) National, regional or local

\(^{16}\) a. targeted youth, b. universal, c. targeted risk group, d. targeted to youth risk group

\(^{17}\) (re-)orientation courses, preparation for training or employment = 1; vocational guidance, career counselling = 2; training (with or without certificates) = 3; Employment incentives, subsidies for employer = 4; direct job creation = 5; and start-up incentives, self-employment programmes = 6.

\(^{18}\) EU, national, regional or local

\(^{19}\) Yes, positive; Yes, negative; Yes, mixed results; No
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>6,3,5,2</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Partially</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Comments on Table 4**

Enel - Young apprenticeship programme: it is a “good practice” related to an internship during the last years of upper secondary school, particularly interesting for Technical Schools. The project has received funds from the Italian government in recent years (Law 105/2015). In 2014, Enel (Enel is the Italian corporation manufacturer and distributor of electricity and gas) started apprenticeship training of 120 students enrolled in the last year of Technical Schools (ITIS) throughout Italy, according to the so-called “school and work alternation”. The selected students of seven Italian ITIS worked one day a week in Enel while during the summer school holidays (June to September) it became a full-time job.

This experience (not yet completed but valuable for the mid-term evaluation data) can be considered a successful project. First, it is a win-win game for all the actors involved:

- **ENEL** tested future young workers already trained by schools
- **Technical schools (ICT)** did not abdicate their educational role, delegating only professional, practical training to the firm
- **Young people** earned a small salary (7,000 euro), already during their last school year, and gained the opportunity to enter directly into the labour market after obtaining their diploma

The second valuable aspect deals with its easy transferability from one context to another: theoretically, every European SME could activate a similar partnership with technical schools.

The third aspect is the lack of additional costs to the community: the students’ wage and the tutorship costs are paid directly by the company.

Finally, it is a project that helps to prevent youth unemployment. Citing Benjamin Franklin’s statement: “An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure”, this practice fits in well with this philosophy, central for the Europe 2020 Strategy.

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20 EU Database of national labour market ‘good practices’ definition: “A specific policy or measure that has proven to be effective and sustainable in the field of employment, demonstrated by evaluation evidence and/or monitoring and assessment methods using process data and showing the potential for replication. It can cover both the formulation and implementation of the policy or measure, which has led to positive labour market outcomes over an extended period of time.”
In contemporary society, **none of these actions, considered case by case, can be effective** in contrasting (Pastore, 2011; Ricucci, 2015) the complex issue of youth unemployment in Piedmont or in other contexts: they are fragmented and devoted to specific targets. Some examples help to understand this point.

The MiP service was outstanding among labour-market policies in Piedmont, but it affected only young people who had the skills and aspiration to create their own companies. It was difficult to transform all unemployed young people into entrepreneurs. Despite these factors, it achieved significant results over the years, stimulating the local economy, as well as contributing to reducing – albeit not very much – youth unemployment in Piedmont (Aburrà, 2012).

Piazza dei Mestieri is another excellent private initiative that trained thousands of young people, giving them the skills to enter the catering-and-hospitality labour market. This was certainly an intervention that solved (and prevented) the unemployment of many young people. For better or worse, Piazza dei Mestieri have a business perspective, although its actions have social consequences, as hypothesised by the social innovation economy (Defourny, 2001; Hubert, 2010). The troubled teens are involved in the project, and sometimes when they have concluded the vocational path, they become tutors. In particular, “…we have an after-school project in collaboration with the Ministry of Education. It is a special course, using food craft activities, designed to rehabilitate school “bullies” with a migration background going through their “troubled teens”. It is an extraordinary and potentially explosive (in a positive sense) experience, sometimes very moving when a young rehabilitated person, reconciled with their family, with school, with the social services and police who have reported them.” (PdM supervisor).

The revival of crafts to resolve the crisis worked in a country like Italy, but it would be ingenuous to believe that it could solve the problem of youth unemployment on its own.

It is not easy to transfer programmes to other contexts, whose socio-economic characteristics, examples of policy transferability, should be taken into account in each individual situation.

Among the selected projects, Dieci idee per i giovani - Piano Giovani (Ten ideas to young - Youth Plan) promoted by the Piedmont regional government, was the one that **produced least results**. The core idea of the programme, i.e. integrating and harmonising regional policies to cope with youth unemployment, was reasonable and well-appreciated within the territory; (Barbera, Barella & Sinibaldi, 2011; Barella, 2014) but it failed due to the lack of financial and human resources, and because it was promoted and abandoned too quickly.

In Italy, many actors are involved in youth-policies partnerships that, although positive, need to be inserted within a framework of single initiatives rather than a coherent, inter-institutional policy.
Diffusion of EU youth employment initiatives

Among the various policy opportunities addressed to youth in the field of employment, the Youth Guarantee Initiative stands out considering several indicators, as the table below shows.

Table 5: Diffusion of inclusion policies for youth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU initiatives</th>
<th>When adopted by a policy document?</th>
<th>Date of regulation if available</th>
<th>Start of implementation</th>
<th>Presence in basic relevant national documents like NRP, CSR, National Employment Strategies</th>
<th>Number of young people involved (absolute number and as a share of all young people concerned)</th>
<th>Envisaged expenses (in absolute terms and as a share of employment programs; as a share of GDP etc.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quality traineeships and apprenticeships</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported young entrepreneurs</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erasmus for Young Entrepreneurs</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>NG</td>
<td>435 (2014)</td>
<td>NG</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comments on table 5

Concerning other EU programmes in Italy, EURES (European Employment Services) is particularly successful among youth. As for the majority of job programmes, up to now they have been managed at local (regional or provincial) level\(^{21}\). Again, therefore, the application is patchy: each Italian region (or sometimes province) has applied its method of intervention offering services. The role of PES is important: “In Italy, Information Technology (IT) tools cannot substitute human contact. Maybe we overdo it because we

\(^{21}\) If the Constitutional reform is passed in the referendum (4 December 2016), the state will assume authority at every level.
need personal contact as a cultural dimension. In Northern countries, EURES is essentially an IT tool, but in Italy, it does not work without information and counselling provided by Italian operators. It is a different methodology deriving from a different cultural context.” (Italian local EURES supervisor)

Beyond the above table, we need to remember the importance of the European Social Fund (EFS) and the European Structural and Investment Funds (ERDF) funding policies: both, thanks to their programmes and funds, have supported measures in favour of youth employment and the training of young workers. Italy, through 75 national and regional programmes, benefits from the ESIF (European Structural and Investment Funds) funding of 42.7 billion euros, an average of 704 euros per person over the period 2014-2020. In labour and educational sectors, the EU funding distribution is 5 billion euros for Sustainable and Quality Employment (4.19 billion from ESF, 567 million from YEI, 202 million from EAFRD, 58 million from EMFF) and for Educational and Vocational Training 4 billion euros (3 billion from ESF, 898 million from ERDF and 119 million from EAFRD).

(Source: European Commission 2016).

However, in these last years, Youth Guarantee (2013) assumed a central role in youth labour-market inclusion, aiming at countering youth inactivity and promoting the entry of young people into the labour market. At EU level, the Youth Guarantee initiative was designed to focus on the 18-25-year-old population, but Italy decided to extend access to the programme to young people between 25-29. The initial fund amounted to 1.5 billion euros to be spent by 2018, deriving from YEI (550 million euros), the European Social Fund (550 million euros), and from national resources (400 million euros). The first expense target was reached, albeit with some regional differences (Calabria, Campania and Apulia are significantly distant from the target; Liguria, the Aosta Valley and Lombardy slightly).

Up to now, the results of the project need to be scrutinised more and they seem unclear. On the one hand, reports (Destefanis, Esposito & Luciani, 2015; Rosolen & Seghezzi, 2016) stress the project’s failure due to the difficulties of finding a permanent, qualitatively good job. On the contrary, there are reports (Avola, Azzolina & Cuttone 2016) that stress the positive effect of the Initiative, paying close attention to the numbers of youth inserted in the data-system without considering what happens after this first step. A small positive sign is that the rate of NEET has decreased during the last year (according to ISTAT, by three percentage points from the second quarter of 2015 to the second quarter of 2016). It could be interesting to analyse youth paths after the first enrolment. Armed with this data, it would be possible to understand the real impact of this initiative on Italian NEET.

Other policy measures

As we have said, in Italy the rate of youth unemployment is high. Unfortunately, there are also other alarming figures to be considered. According to Eurostat, in 2013, 65.9%
of young people, aged 25-29 lived with their parents, while the EU28 average was 39.1%. For instance, data regarding education was not so comforting: in 2015, 14.7% of youth aged 18-24 were early leavers from education and training (Eurostat, 2016) and only 25.3% of Italians aged 30-34 (Eurostat, 2016) had a tertiary educational diploma (the EU28 average was 38.7%). These figures showed that the problems were not only confined to labour market policies, but involved other policy sectors, which were all closely interconnected (Sciolla, 2012; Cecchi, 2014).

Below, there is a brief summary of how policies in various fields have been developed in recent years. We will cite examples taken from several national areas, aiming at framing the current state of policies, which could be the support to youth’s job- and life-path.

Family policy measures are fundamental in policies aiming to mitigate the potential negative impact of the economic crisis on disadvantaged young people.

Policy-makers in Italy have traditionally considered issues relating to the family (e.g. forming a couple, childbirth and intergenerational care) as belonging to the private sphere (Saraceno, 2013; Ruspini & Leccardi, 2016). Thus, Italian family policies are often not explicit, and suffer from the lack of any unitary formulation. Rather, they are fragmented, exhibiting one of lowest levels of generosity in Europe, reflected in high rates of child poverty (in 2014 2.9 million under 16 years of age were at risk of poverty, according to Eurostat), as well as a low level of public support for working parents. Moreover, the Italian welfare state displays notable deficits in the provision of care services, such as early childcare facilities and social services for frail elderly people (Bertolini, Hofacker & Torrioni, 2014). According to ISTAT data, in 2015 the per-capita expenditure on family support amounted to 313 euros, consisting of only 4.1% of the total social spending that amounted to 28.6% of GDP (of which 50% went to the elderly). In Italy, family policy is based on an enlarged subsidiarity model and the welfare state supports more elderly people (pensioners) than young families (with children).

Table 6: Other policy measures which have an effect on the employment of different risk groups among young people

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy measures</th>
<th>All young unemployed</th>
<th>All young people</th>
<th>Early school leavers</th>
<th>Young people with low skills</th>
<th>Young people without qualifications</th>
<th>Migrants/ethnic minorities</th>
<th>Underage/sing parents</th>
<th>Young people from working families</th>
<th>NEET</th>
<th>Young people with disability</th>
<th>Young people from remote/disadvantaged areas</th>
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No. 49 – Youth employment policies in Italy

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Note: the scores were given based on interviews with stakeholders; some policies are still in progress, so the scores can vary. Values: very weak =1; weak = 2; medium = 3; strong =4; very strong=5.

From 2010 onwards, in response to the economic crisis, the Italian national government and many regional governments enhanced measures for families with children. Many different measures were formulated, albeit still fragmentary and limited. However, new measures were translated into new resources to support social policies. On the contrary, recent years have seen a steady reduction in funding for the National Fund for Social Policies, the main financial source for social policies. To finance social services and transfers to families, therefore, municipalities increasingly fall back on their own resources and ask beneficiary families to share some portion of the costs (Eurofound, 2016).

With regard to housing benefits, Italy is the least developed among EU countries. The Italian peculiarity is that housing policies in the twentieth century have facilitated home ownership in various ways: little investment in social rental housing, low support for private rental housing, and high tolerance of unauthorised building, which encouraged many Italian families to build their own house (Filandri, 2015).
Another peculiarity is the lack of data about housing benefits. The housing policies in Italy are enacted at regional level. The national level gives general indications and collects information via a centralised monitoring centre, the Observatory of Housing Conditions, which was created in 1999 (Ministerial Decree No. 205/1999) but is not yet operative (Filandri, 2015). Therefore, in Italy, evaluation of housing policies can be carried out at regional level, and with a high heterogeneity of available data: for these reasons, we can make only some general observations. The National Fund for supporting access to rental dwellings (Law 431/1998) is a policy implemented in different ways by Italian regions: indeed, application depends mainly on the choices of both town and regional administrations (Bertolini, Hofacker & Torrioni, 2014). The outcome of this fragmented approach is that both eligibility criteria and the number of people benefitting from the service may vary considerably from one region or local context to another. Additionally, the high cost of rental housing prevents many youths from leaving their parental home and induces a sort of negative selection effect, leading to a separation of young lower-income individuals from the rental market. About 70% of Italian families own their homes, while the share of renters amounts to only about 20%. At the same time, in the last two decades some policy measures have been directed towards supporting house buying through mortgages, above all with fiscal incentives, for example at the moment of buying or refurbishing a house. In recent years, credit has also been supported by the creation of Guarantee Funds. From 1 October 2014, a Guarantee Fund for youth (married couples or single-parent families) gives the opportunity to access loans for both the purchase of a first house and refurbishing of flats. The new fund has approximately 650 million euros to offer guarantees on mortgage loans for a total amount estimated at 20 billion euros. The guarantee is for a maximum of 50% of the principal amount. However, this measure was used in very few cases at the beginning (1 million euros disbursed of the 50 planned) because banks had to apply a reduction in their lending interest rate, which did not make this transaction very profitable. When this rule was dropped, banks offered loans at the normal interest rate, and the Guarantee was more widely used.

Adequate income is central to supporting disadvantaged young people. Several studies in comparative welfare state research highlighted the importance of providing minimum income support, but emphasized the absence in Italy of a proper anti-poverty strategy and especially the lack of a Minimum Income Scheme (MIS). Others focussed on the failed attempt to introduce a national MIS in the late 1990s while some scholars investigated the existence of several (still often-meagre) local anti-poverty programmes.

Italy experienced a dramatic increase in poverty during the prolonged recession that followed the 2008 economic and financial crisis. Severe material deprivation increased from 7.3% (2009) to 11.6% (2014), compared to 8.2% and 8.9% for the EU-27 average in the same years.

On 14 July 2016, the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT) released the latest data on poverty: 4.6 million people living in absolute poverty. This was the highest figure
since 2005. Among them, 1,013,000 were aged 18-34, or 9.9%, a rate that more than tripled from the 3.1% in 2005.

Young people and, in particular, children, were the subjects that in terms of poverty and deprivation paid the highest price of the crisis, reflecting a worsening of their condition than older generations (ISTAT, 2016).

Recently, the Italian government launched a national plan to fight increasing poverty and social exclusion. It could represent a first step towards the establishment of both a national minimum income scheme and an integrated social system of social services aimed at active inclusion.

In Italy, apprenticeship is regarded an important tool for integrating young people into the labour market, in line with the European social investment paradigm. However, the effects of the economic crisis felt in autumn 2008 resulted in a sharp reduction of apprenticeship contracts. Since 1997, various reforms have concerned the apprenticeship legal frame. In the last decade, apprenticeship has been the subject of several legislative actions.

In particular, in 2012, the Italian Government approved a new labour market reform (Law 92/2012) aimed at the reduction in labour market segmentation by reducing the incidence of temporary work and other precarious contractual arrangements, and widening the scope for hiring with apprenticeship contracts, which should become the main port of entry into the labour market. The latest legislative action, in chronological order, was Law No. 81/2015, strengthening the former regulation (Legislative Decree 167/2011) with some new features. This political intervention aimed at creating an integrated system, uniting education, training and work, especially thanks to two types of apprenticeship: one at upper secondary school level and one at tertiary education level. However, this is a recent transformation and today it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of these new rules. In 2015, apprentices in Italy amounted to 410,213 workers, 13.6% of employed people in the 15-29 age group (compared to 446,227 in 2014, 15.1% of the employed in the aged 15-29 – ISFOL and INPS 2016). This data confirmed the decline of this type of contract, which has continued uninterruptedly since 2009 (ISFOL and INPS 2015). Moreover, the rate of young apprentices (up to 24 years old) of the total declined from 53.3% to 47.5% between 2013 and 2015. In addition, the average age of workers in apprenticeship increased from 24.5% in 2013 to 25% in 2015, while the 15-19-year-old category has become increasingly marginal.

At territorial level, there is a significant disparity between the geographical areas of the country, with a prevalence of apprenticeship in Central Italy, and a strong under-representation in Southern regions, where the share of young people in apprenticeship in 2011 was only 9% of the total, compared with 18% in the Centre and 15% in Northern Italy (Villani, 2015).

Furthermore, the data available showed training gaps: slightly less than one apprentice out of three was able to go to school. For all the others the possibilities of access to
training – as required by law – depended on the initiative of individual companies. Training appears to be the most critical point (Corradini, Orientale & Caputo, 2015).

Very few apprenticeship contracts became permanent contracts: only 9.6% in 2011, 4.1% in 201222 and 8.4% in 2013 (Righi & Coccia, 2015).

The proposed legislation (currently under scrutiny by the Senate) is the continuation of the national anti-poverty strategy launched with the 2016 Stability Law (Law No. 208/2015), which had already introduced a national “Fund to fight poverty and social exclusion”. Increased resources devoted to anti-poverty measures with the Triennial National Plan Against Poverty and Social Exclusion, extended the means-tested benefit named SIA (Sostegno per l’Inclusione Attiva – Support for Active Inclusion), which was implemented through the national strategy in September 2016. It is targeted at households that meet at least one of the following conditions: i) one child less than 18 years old; ii) a disabled child; iii) a pregnant woman. SIA combines a monetary benefit with social services aimed at active inclusion based on individualised plans. The amount of the cash benefit (credited on an electronic payment card) increases according to the number of household members. Eligibility criteria are numerous, among which residency in Italy (min. 2 years), income and assets. In order to avoid cross-regional variations, this benefit will constitute one of the so-called “minimum levels of assistance” (Livelli essenziali delle prestazioni) envisaged by Laws No. 328/2000 and No. 3/2001. Nevertheless, criticism has been expressed by trade unions, experts and opposition parties, mostly regarding the following issues: the allocated resources are limited; in contrast with the “selective universalism” principle mentioned in the newly proposed law – the SIA/Inclusion Income is a category-based measure; SIA eligibility conditions are numerous and extremely severe. Consequently, official figures from the government indicate that coverage is limited to only 1.1 million individuals out of the 4.6 million people in absolute poverty. Young people will benefit from the measure only if they are minors.

The Italian Government in 2018 starting the process in order to introduce a minimum income scheme. The recipients should benefit of a 18 months transfer, provided that their availability to be involved in some active labour market policies and to give immediate willingness to work.

Microcredit was always present in Italy in the form of links between small firms and locally embedded banks and was crucially important for the Italian productive sector. Now, in the case of young people, there are two differences with respect to the past situation. On one hand, changes in the regulation on the banking sector following the Basel rules, in particular after the 2008 financial crisis, made access to credit for economic activities more difficult. On the other, the progressive shift to the private sector in the policy measures directed at unemployed people, given the restriction in the welfare state. Following European advice, access to credit is perceived by Italian public authorities as

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22 This is the year of the latest apprenticeship reform, which entered into force in July, reducing opportunities to apply the new contract.
a way to face an unemployment period for precarious workers. Following this new framework, microcredit was regulated by Decree No. 176/2014 of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Article 111 of Legislative Decree No. 141/2010 states that special subjects, enrolled in a special list, may grant loans to individuals, to enterprises and to those starting up in self-employment. The rule echoes the EU concept of microcredit but adds eligible subjects such as professional studios. In fact, Italian norms divide the object of microcredit into financially vulnerable individuals for personal needs (social microcredit) and individuals or small firms in order to start up an enterprise or a self-employment (microcredit for enterprises). A subsequent law (Legislative Decree 169/2012 further reinforces the dichotomy between the primary microcredit solution available for the launching of a micro-enterprise and the secondary type of micro-lending to individuals in difficulty, which was confirmed by Decree No. 176/2014 of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. In both types, there are interventions of three subjects: a bank or another financial institution that gives the credit; a promotor, that can be a public/private, profit/non-profit institution that creates a guarantee fund in order to cover the credit in case of insolvency by the debtors – Ministries of the State, Regions and Municipalities cover more than 80% of the supplied fund and are the promotors of the majority of the projects; a Third Sector Association that is in charge of training the debtors from the point of view of financial literacy.

In the years 2005-2013, there were 80,000 recipients (45,000 families, 23,000 firms and 12,000 students), and their numbers increased in 2013. Referring to companies, 50% of the cases were directed at a start-up; as for families, they were young precarious, working poor and unemployed people. There are few programmes at national level, 80% carried out at local level. Piedmont and Sicily showed a similar situation (20 and 17 programmes, between 1,000 and 2,000 recipients) but, in 2013, in the North of Italy, the ratio between social credit programmes (number) and people at risk of poverty increased. Instead, in the South it halved whose data highlighted lesser potential impact on these measures in the South (for further information see Andreoni et al., 2013, Borgomeo et al., 2013, Bendig et al., 2014, Ente Nazionale per il Microcredito, 2013).

It is impossible to predict the direction they will take in future policies in the areas shown in Table 6. However, in view of youth policies, current government action aims to improve apprenticeship/vocational training. The steady decline of apprenticeship might indicate a deterioration of the effectiveness of this measure.

We cannot foresee government efforts regarding the promotion of labour mobility, and family and child benefits but, so far, nothing concrete has come about.

In the near future, there is the possibility of worse and unpredictable policies: the massive public debt (132.7% of Italian GDP in 2016) and the economy being static for nearly a quarter of a century (between 1995 and 2014 GDP grew by only 1%) make it plausible for cuts in the near future. The past government led by Matteo Renzi has operated a moderately expansive policy of public spending, using all possible budgetary margins,
but without a reboot of the economy, further cuts may soon be necessary, which could affect youth-inclusion policies.

Consistency of youth inclusion policies

Relationship of youth employment policies to universal labour market policies

In recent years, there has been greater effort to integrate educational policies and labour market policies for young people. The 2015 education reform, called “The Good School” (especially Law 105/2015), provided significant resources (100 million euros) for schoolwork alternation paths (Ministero del Lavoro and MIUR, 2009). The idea was that the final-year students of upper secondary schools could enjoy work experience. In some cases, the schoolwork paths could guarantee direct recruitment of students once they leave school, such as the “good practice” implemented by Enel and described in the fourth chapter of this report. Indeed, in recent years, the government has implemented measures to encourage the connection between upper secondary schools and enterprises, but very little for tertiary education, especially universities. Today, the link between universities and the labour market is feeble and, in 2014, only 62% of youth aged 25-34 with a university degree were employed (OECD, 2016b).

Going beyond educational and training policies, we can take into account to what extent youth employment policies are related to other components of social policies (such as income policies, social assistance and social insurance).

As previously noted, the current labour market reform was inspired by the principles of “flexicurity”. However, while the flexibility dimension was improved, the security dimension did not see the same efforts. Especially concerning young people, precarious aid measures were limited. Therefore, one of the two flexicurity pillars was much weaker than the other. For younger cohorts, it becomes increasingly difficult to fully integrate into the protected insider labour market. At societal level, this process fosters concrete risks of persistent exclusion from full social citizenship rights, given the distortions of the Italian welfare system. This can be identified as the core-problem with the Italian deregulation policies, although atypical employment in Italy should not necessarily be thought of as ipso facto “de-qualified” employment (despite the fact that wages usually are considerably lower, all things being equal) these “flexible jobs” give very limited access to welfare entitlement, which in the near future will give rise to serious problems of social citizenship. (Barbieri & Scherer, 2009, p.13)

Strong local initiatives, weak national planning

Different ministries are concerned about these policies; often the policies of these areas are not harmonised. The situation is different at regional level, where often at local level
they can develop synergies helped by small-scale interventions. However, these practices vary from region to region, depending on the capacity of the local administrations. In the recent year, many reforms are changing the labour market and education sectors. For now, they have not produced a shockwave that could radically transform the Italian situation. They are still in their infancy and their effects will only be seen after some years.

In this scenario, many things need to be changed. First, long-term strategic planning is necessary. Second, structured (mandatory) co-operation is needed among the various ministries, perhaps with a common project with common public funding. Third, massive involvement of NGOs and all stakeholders in the formulation of new policies is required.

In this sense, a return to the centralisation of policies could create problems. Some regions have reached excellent levels of, and enjoyed good practices in, the planning and integrated management of youth policies. With this ongoing transformation, there is the serious risk that this heritage will disappear. Furthermore, every Italian region has its own social economic situation, so local authorities are more aware of the problems and better equipped to deal with them. Finally, there should be constant, neutral evaluation of the progress and results of what has been done.

**Estimation of effectiveness of policy measures**

**The dominant causes of youth unemployment and social exclusion**

All the interviewed stakeholders agreed in relating unemployment to structural factors. They cited several problems. The main one dealt with the Italian economy, which suffered a grave crisis. In addition to this macro factor, other problems were taken into account. According to a public employment services supervisor, many young people (including those who had a degree) did not have the necessary skills and training to enter the labour market.

Our daily experience shows a great distance between education paths and the labour market. On the one hand, there are young people who are autonomous (i.e. they look for a job, know their rights, and have strong social networks for asking about job opportunities) who do not need PES assistance. On the other, there are those who need to be supported because of lacunae in their school preparation and weak social ties.

According to another stakeholder, one hot issue concerns the role played by families in supporting youth in their transition to adulthood and autonomy: “Students’ families increasingly devolve educational tasks to us, and then boast of elaborate efforts by the youth to find a job. Every year we participate in a project in collaboration with *** [an
important European insurance group] and send our pupils to do summer internships in some of the best Italian hotels. Some families disagree with this initiative because of the distance involved. They do not want to send them so far away. It is not important that these internships are good educational opportunities, where there is a supervisor following the pupils. We find the same resistance when workshops are close to students’ homes. In several cases, we received complaints about parents who went to have coffee where their son/daughter was working.”

The high rate of youth unemployment is explained mainly by structural factors, especially related to the problems experienced by the country’s economy in over a quarter of the century. In short, the most common image is that of the economy being in a perpetual crisis, older workers remain in the labour market with permanent contracts while young people are struggling to find space: the slogan “old in, young out” is a reflection of the current perception (Abburrà, 2012).

Individual factors can also be taken into account: The Millennial generation, which in Italy is a generation of “trophy kids” (Alsop, 2008; Meier & Crocker, 2010), who do not always observe working times and rules – a problem that emerges when Italian native young people are compared with those who have a foreign background (Premazzi, Ricucci & Scali, 2015). This last group is more active and trustworthy than the Italian one. On this topic, one stakeholder has commented: “Foreigners are among our best students. I do not need to ask them: “Please be on time” as I sometimes do with their peers of Italian origin.”

Discussing policy interventions for supporting the risk groups among young people

The interviewed stakeholders affirm that the main cause of unemployment and social exclusion of young people is structural. There are multiple reasons for macroeconomic problems in the cultural background that produce this social situation. The causes are complex and involve many sectors of Italian society. Today, no policies are dealing with these problems. In the present Italian situation, inclusion policies are impossible for many reasons: 1) the lack of financial and human resources; 2) the short lifespan of policies; 3) those who have more safeguards and are therefore less vulnerable to the economic crisis (e.g. open-ended-contract workers, pensioners) do not want a reduction in their salaries or privileges to the benefit of those who are excluded from the labour market.

However, there are many small interventions that – in bottom-up logic – are attempting to change, or at least reduce, these structural problems: they are a great resource for Italian society and many Italians – thanks to the local initiatives – and are surviving at some national or macro level (see tab. 7). However, the country’s problems dealing with youth unemployment are serious and only a systemic approach can drastically reduce the significant social, economic and employment inequalities that affect young people.

Table 7: Strengths and weaknesses
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<th><strong>Strengths</strong></th>
<th><strong>Weaknesses</strong></th>
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<td>• A consolidated network (sometimes self-guided) of some agencies (i.e. PES, NGOs, School, Third Sector)</td>
<td>• Few financial and human resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>• A bottom-up approach which produces new projects more closely related to youth needs</td>
<td>• Bottom-up approach (lack of co-ordination among different policies and agencies)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• The measures involve young people aged up to 29 - or even 34</td>
<td>• Mismatch between education and the labour market</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Actors’ flexibility in adapting action to context</td>
<td>• Frequent lack of co-ordination between labour market policies and social policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Links between researchers and policy-makers (i.e., ISFOL, universities, policy evaluation agencies)</td>
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In the current policy context, unemployed young people are mainly supported by public/private employment services (Bergamante & Marocco, 2014) to learn how to make a good job interview, write an excellent CV or use web tools to find job offers. Unfortunately, this is often not enough: in Italy, the labour market mismatch is also linked to macro factors, primarily the lack of connection between work and education. Today in Italy, there are very few good job opportunities; young people cannot be employed without the skills required by enterprises (ISFOL, 2013). This is one reason why Youth Guarantee finds it difficult to discover a “good job” for many young Italians (Rosolen & Seghezzi, 2015; Burrati, Rosolen & Sghezzi, 2016). Another problem is the resistance of many young people to mobility: in a system where the family is still a primary agency of the welfare state (Naldini & Jurado, 2013), many young people are not completely autonomous.

Analysis of policies and interviews indicate that young people are rarely involved directly in the decision-making process regarding the formulation of new labour and social policies. However, policy makers, through academic research, policy evaluation reports and stakeholders who work with them on a daily basis, often hear their voice. This approach works quite well for decentralized policies where those who design and develop policies often have direct contact with people working with youth.

**Towards a possible policy transferability experience**

There are many “good practices” in Europe but it is important to remember that they are not always valid for every country. Each nation has its own culture, economic characteristics and social background. Interviewed stakeholders said that good foreign practices often do not work in Italy and vice versa. The exportable “good practices” are those where young people can learn a job through concrete work or building up a small
company (e.g. a cycle workshop or a PC repair shop). In some cases, the projects, in addition to producing jobs, have helped to encourage environmental and economic sustainability on their territory. A good example is the “Old School Clothing Co.” in the United Kingdom, a self-financed project, which is a vintage clothes and art store run by young volunteers to allow them to gain experience in merchandising, retail and business management. This social enterprise aims to support young people’s development through fashion creativity and to acquire a business approach. This includes involving the young people in decision-making at all levels of the organisation, providing them with a platform to sell their creative work and develop their social enterprises, and increase the chances of employment and access to further opportunities for volunteers. The target group consists of young (16-25) NEET, with a particular focus on those at risk of poverty.

According to an interviewed stakeholder in social innovation programmes, *The Millennials are now, not in the future. They have to design solutions for youth problems.* In the UK there is a project called “TaskRabbit”, a start-up that created an online marketplace using mobile-technology. The service matches freelance labour with local demand. Another interesting social innovation start-up created a website to cover the cost of studies through internet user loans [a sort of crowd funding]. Projects by young people for young people – simple, local and immediate.

Young Italians would benefit from many international co-operation projects. The EURES and Erasmus projects demonstrate the success and potential of European projects connected with youth aspirations and needs. Today, international co-operation is essential for the education and training sectors.

Services improved by the European Union are working well, although in some cases they would require minor adjustments. In Italy, the main problems of youth unemployment are due to macroeconomic factors resolvable only by integrated, long-term European growth policies.

**Policy recommendations**

One potential model is a hybrid between universal employment support for young people and actions on behalf of specific groups by means a “back-door targeting” approach. The best model would complement existing policies, often local and fragmented, in a larger framework. As shown in Figure 1, the two dimensions may co-exist with different specialisations.
General policies with a top-down approach aimed at all young people and local policies with bottom-up logic addressed to specific youth by “back-door targeting”. Collaboration between the two dimensions should strengthen the effectiveness of current policies.

To date, confronted with the working discontinuity of new contractual forms and new risks to be faced by young people approaching the work market, Italy has introduced no adequate forms of social protection of an institutional type, as compared to those introduced in other European states (e.g. the so-called flexicurity of some Northern European countries). With regard to young people, especially in Italy, we lack unemployment protection for young people looking for their first job (Bertolini, 2012). This is due to the insurance regime of social protection.

In order to plan policies for atypical workers, it is important to reflect on them as if they were a non-homogeneous universe in which their needs vary according to gender, educational qualifications and age.

It is also necessary to invest in the development of adequate active work policies, which would be fundamental within a flexible work system. These should go in two directions: 1) the orientation to work; 2) the guarantee of a more efficient and rapid match between demand and job offer. Therefore, we need to transmit an acquisitive orientation to young people, not so much to find a single job opportunity, but to guide them and provide them with the tools necessary for the construction of a work path, which would be both coherent and influential over time with regard to unstable employment (Bertolini, 2012). This would help to avoid the impoverishment of their human capital.

New Reforms must go in the direction of the transit from the idea of protection of the workplace to that of the protection of the occupation of workers. This would be an extremely strong cultural change in Italy, which could be very difficult to succeed and would need to be integrated with active work policies, of orientation and reorientation, combined with cultural support.
The second direction where active work policies should be developed would be to act on the system of transit between demand and job offer. If flexibility is to be sustainable it is necessary to be able to change jobs often and, therefore, information on new available jobs must be circulated quickly and made accessible to all workers (Bertolini, 2012).

The condition under which this may happen is that the use of strong social ties is no longer the main channel of selection and transit between demand and job offer, as is the case in Italy, today. In this sense, policies employment centres must have a privileged role of primary importance.
References


Annex 1 – Detailed description and evaluation of the selected measures

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the initiative</th>
<th>Lunedi giovani – Youth Monday</th>
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<tr>
<td>Short description</td>
<td>The measure aimed at offering young people dedicated time and space inside public employment services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intended effects:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To customise the services of the employment centre for youth;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To provide assistance dedicated directly to young job seekers;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To teach young people to find a job using Internet;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- To improve young people’s skills in presenting themselves to an employer (CV and interviews etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target groups:</td>
<td>Young people under 30 years old.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility criteria</td>
<td>Young people under 30 resident in the Turin Metropolitan Area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of intervention:</td>
<td>(Re-)orientation courses, preparation for training or employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level:</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start/end date:</td>
<td>2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Were stakeholders</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How/through which</td>
<td>Public Employment Service of Città Metropolitana di Torino (Turin Metropolitan Area).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>institutions was this</td>
<td>Budget (EUR, thousand) and source: 0 Euros. The project used Public Employment Services’ facilities and staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>measure implemented?</td>
<td>Targeting Unemployed youth (18-29 year-olds) was the target of these measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>43,854 youth engaged from January 2014 to October 2016. 32,963 were involved in orientation activities, 3,724 in interview practices, 2,557 in counselling activities, 2,252 in web tool formation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links to EU initiatives</td>
<td>Yes, Youth Guarantee from 2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available evaluations</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In your view: How would you assess the quality of the intervention?</td>
<td>Turin Metropolitan Area assisted young people to obtain useful skills to improve their chance of finding a job. Furthermore, it was a policy without additional cost, based on focussing the structure and personal resources of Public Employment Services on young people. The activities addressed to young people were concentrated into one day a week, and produced an increase in youth participation. The project achieved its objective by involving hundreds of young people. The most significant problem concerned coverage: it was a service aimed at young people who were actively trying to find a job. This measure was an additional service adapted to only a small proportion of the young population. It was a “good practice” because it created specific youth services simply by targeting youth resources already available without extra public costs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the initiative</th>
<th>Master dei Talenti (Master of Talents) – Neodiplomati</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short description</td>
<td>The measure aimed to offer real work opportunities and international internships during the last year of upper secondary schools. Intended effects: To strengthen the autonomy of young people; To provide useful experience for study – and career – paths; To strengthen both intercultural and European identities. Target groups: young people attending upper secondary schools in Piedmont and the Aosta Valley. Eligibility criteria for beneficiaries: to be a student of one of the schools involved in the project. Type of intervention: training. Level: regional (Piedmont and the Aosta Valley). Start/end date: 1994/today. Are stakeholders involved in the formulation/implementation of this measure? No. It is a private initiative which has been</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
set up by a bank foundation thanks to the advice of its scientific committee.

How/through which institutions is this measure implemented?
Fondazione Cassa di Riparmio di Torino (Bank Foundation)

Budget (EUR, thousand) and source: more than 14 million euro from the school year 2004/2005 until 2015/2016. The source is Fondazione Cassa di Riparmio di Torino (Bank Foundation).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Achieved results</th>
<th>More than 3,000 young students involved.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Targeting</td>
<td>Young students of the last year of upper secondary schools in Piedmont and the Aosta Valley.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links to EU initiatives</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available evaluations</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| How would you assess the quality of the intervention? | The Master of Talents (MdT) project was an example of an activity financed by a bank foundation, a private agency that produces positive effects on the territory. In Italy, bank foundations are important players for local development. In this context, the MdT project was excellent at Italian level and a good example of the impact of the private sector in the local context. 
The limits of this project were:  
• the limited territorial area involved  
• the few internships available 

However, MdT represented a unique opportunity for many students to explore new lifestyles and new countries. Moreover, a three-consecutive-months experience increased the beneficiary’s skill (e.g. in a foreign language). The growth of a European identity was a secondary but important result of this project. |

Name of the initiative | Enel Alternanza Scuola e Lavoro |
<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short description</td>
<td>The measure aimed to associate working experience with education and give students the opportunity to start working with an existing contract of apprenticeship in the last years of high school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intended effects for:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- Inserting new and young workers for technical and operational core job positions in ENEL;
- Merging school education and work training;
- Testing a new approach towards worker recruitment.

Target groups: Students of Technical Schools.

Eligibility criteria for beneficiaries: to be a student of one of the 7 Technical Schools involved in the Project.

Type of Intervention: Training with the possibility of obtaining certificates.

Level: National/Local.


Stakeholders involved: No.

How/through which institutions is this measure implemented? ENEL (Ente nazionale per l'energia elettrica), 7 ITIS (Italian Technical Schools)

Budget and source: 0 from MIUR; average 1,015,000 from ENEL.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Achieved results</th>
<th>145 students of 7 ITIS (Italian Technical school).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Targeting</td>
<td>Young students of Technical School.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Links to EU initiatives</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available evaluations</td>
<td>No. Only one scientific article (Vaccaro 2015). The assessment was excellent, but a mid-term review without final data.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In your view: How would you assess the quality of the intervention?

The programmes were a success: 141 students (on 145 involved) started to work in ENEL.

It was an interesting pilot project because it allowed combining education and in-company training. Moreover, the apprenticeship contract was a real possibility for the majority of participants.

It was interesting that companies started to train students during their education path. Enel had young, qualified staff, the schools continued its educational role, the students entered the labour market, and had the opportunity to start work immediately after completing their studies. A project that
had a win-win outcome for all actors and without costs for the state.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the initiative</th>
<th>Piazza dei Mestieri (Place of Crafts)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short description</td>
<td>The measure is aimed at developing skills of young people, particularly those at risk of marginalisation. Intended effects for: • Training young people in craft occupations, especially in the food sector; • Recreating, in its headquarters, an atmosphere where people meet arts and crafts in a cultural environment, and exchange knowledge and skills. Target groups: Young people. Eligibility criteria for beneficiaries: Piazza dei Mestieri offers a great variety of courses aimed at various beneficiaries: from courses dedicated to minors to courses for upgrading professional adults. Type of intervention: Vocational training. Level: Local/National. Start/end date: 1994/still in progress. Are stakeholders involved in the formulation/implementation of this measure? Yes, Piazza dei Mestieri have a network with public and private subjects. In particular, the enterprises are crucial stakeholders, useful for understanding labour market trends and what skills are most important to recruiters. How/through which institutions is this measure implemented? Piazza dei Mestieri Foundation. Budget (EUR, thousand) and source: 2,439 per year. Self-funded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieved results</td>
<td>Average students per day: 550 in Turin +600 in Catania. 52% found jobs (full-time contract or apprenticeship), 27% continued education in an upper secondary school.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Targeting              | The target groups are young people interested in vocational training in the economic sectors of catering and hospitality. They are mainly unemployed boys not enrolled in upper secondary school. Young people in financial difficulties are
Ricucci, Martino, Bertolini, Moiso

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the initiative</th>
<th>Mettersi in proprio – MIP (Starting one’s own business)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Short description      | The measure aimed to help people to start a business and become self-employed.  
Intended effects: The initiative counselled future business entrepreneurs about:  
- Training to understand a Business Plan;  
- Market and Competition studies;  
- Elaborating a Business Plan and Business Validation;  
- Obtaining a grant if unemployed.  
Target groups: residents in the Turin Metropolitan Area, particularly young people between 18 and 35.  
Eligibility criteria for beneficiaries: inhabitants of the Turin Metropolitan Area, locating new business in the Turin area.  
Type of intervention: self-employment programmes. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Links to EU initiatives</th>
<th>The project has been mostly privately financed; however, it receive funds from the Piedmont Region, within the framework of activities supported by the European Social Fund (ESF).</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Available evaluations</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| How would you assess the quality of the intervention? | It is a very successful private programme.  
There are connections with local government, but these are limited. The decision to invest in vocational training in the sectors of restaurants and hospitality (one of the few growth sectors in recent years) is successful in the creation of jobs.  
It is the case of a private business working in a network with other public and private organisations to realise significant social effects. In this sense, it is a good example of the social economy where business develops social impact.  
The opening of a similar *Piazza dei Mestieri* in Catania was proof of the success of the initiative. |

| granted scholarships that guarantee the right to attend courses. The scholarships include a monthly salary to allow these young people to be able to follow all the courses without having to find another source of income. |  

| **Level:** Local.  
**Start/end date:** 1997-2015.  
**Are stakeholders involved in the formulation/implementation of this measure?** Yes, the MiP works with many local subjects (i.e., Public and Private Employment Services, local government, universities, start-ups).  
**How/through which institutions is this measure implemented?** Turin Metropolitan Area. The service has become a responsibility of the Piedmont region as an effect of Delrio reform (Law 56/2014). At the time of compiling this report, the service is temporarily suspended.  
**Budget (EUR, thousand) and source:** Requested at the organisation – pending. Source: FSE.  
**Results Achieved**  
3,990 young people aged 18-35 under the responsibility of the service and followed in validating the business plan (2013).  
**Targeting**  
The priority target was young people aged 18-35, amounting to 59.2% of the total, and unemployed people. For the unemployed persons, there were financial resources to assist start-ups.  
In the seven years from 2007 to 2013 the unemployed were 39% of total users (both adult and youth), too which can be added those receiving unemployment benefits (6%).  
**Links to EU initiatives**  
FSE.  
**Available evaluations**  
There was an evaluation at mid-term and another ex-post conducted by external evaluators. MIP is a project funded by ESF and evaluation follows the time distribution of this fund.  
The 2013 final report contained the 1,221 businesses started by the MiP, of which only 53 were discontinued. 36% of the enterprises registered a good survival rate (from 7 to 9 years).  
**In your view: How would you assess the quality of the intervention?**  
The service was a success because of the established business numbers and low mortality rate. Indeed, the non-repayable funds provided by the service were limited to increasing the chances of people with no initial capital to start their own business.  
In reducing youth unemployment, the limit of this kind of service was that it addressed a small number of beneficiaries. It was necessary that non-employed people (young and old)
Ricucci, Martino, Bertolini, Moiso

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the initiative</th>
<th>Dieci idee per i giovani - Piano Giovani (Ten ideas to young - Youth Plan)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Short description</td>
<td>The measures aimed to deal with youth unemployment in Piedmont.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intended effects for:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• removing the barriers to employment access opportunities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• identifying new issues through bottom-up logic;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• building a favourable environment to bring out creativity and excellence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target groups:</td>
<td>Young people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eligibility criteria</td>
<td>youth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of intervention:</td>
<td>Mixed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level:</td>
<td>Regional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Start/end date:</td>
<td>2011/2015.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are stakeholders involved in the formulation/implementation of this measure?</td>
<td>Yes, local administration (especially at provincial and municipal levels).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How/through which institutions is this measure implemented?</td>
<td>Piedmont regional government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget (EUR, thousand)</td>
<td>409 million euros, of which 15 million euros from ESF.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Achieved results
Not available data.

### Targeting
Young people especially.

### Links to EU initiatives
European Social Fund.

### Available evaluations
No.
In your view: How would you assess the quality of the intervention? The essential idea of this project was to harmonise regional youth labour policies in Piedmont to deal better with youth unemployment. The financial resources assigned were small, but the project goal was fascinating. The project end was related mainly to the change of administration (in 2015) after regional elections. In the four years of implementation, the youth unemployment rate in Piedmont did not decrease but rather seemed to increase (according to ISTAT, from 26.6% in 2011 to 38.1% in 2015). Despite its overall failure, the idea of harmonising existing policies (i.e. reduction of IRAP for enterprises employing young people, supporting social entrepreneurship and internationalisation, simplification of bureaucracy, strengthening skills of young graduates.)