The local dimension of migration policymaking

This is the author's manuscript

Original Citation:
The local dimension of migration policymaking / Tiziana Caponio; Maren Borkert. - (2010), pp. 9-201.

Availability:
This version is available http://hdl.handle.net/2318/80386 since

Publisher:
Amsterdam University Press

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The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking

TIZIANA CAPONIO AND MAREN BORKERT (EDS.)
The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking
IMISCOE

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The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking

edited by Tiziana Caponio and Maren Borkert

IMISCOE Reports

Amsterdam University Press
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Introduction

Maren Borkert and Tiziana Caponio

1 From the nation state to the city: the emergence of local integration as a European policy issue

Whereas international migration primarily concerns the territorial sovereignty of nation states, being defined as persons crossing national borders, integration touches upon the social boundaries of nations. These geographic and social boundaries constitute the nation state as a collective agent. Immigrants moving into the nationalised territories and societies raise questions about the permeability of established boundaries. Thus, immigration and the integration of newcomers are a national concern in most member states of the EU and abroad.

Lately, however, it has become increasingly accepted that the majority of immigrants, particularly in Europe, are living in cities and small towns in rural areas (Penninx et al. 2004). Consequently, the awareness that migrant integration takes place at the local level has entered current political and scientific discourses on integration. In fact, the acceleration of international migration movements after World War II and increasingly since the mid-1980s, has pressured municipalities throughout Europe to adopt pragmatic solutions to emerging migration-related needs (Castles & Miller 2003: 4). However, not all local actors involved share the same experience and history in migrant integration: while non-governmental actors such as the German AWO or the Italian Caritas have a long-standing record in migrant-related social work, the issue has entered the political agendas of most European city councils more recently. Facing the local effects of globalisation, the transnationalisation of labour markets and an increase in international mobility, municipalities throughout Europe have turned to questions of social cohesion and the sustainable development of local markets and communities. Likewise, addressing key questions of today’s societies, local integration strategies have increasingly attracted the attention of European institutions, particularly the European Commission. But emphasis on the creative power of local actors in matching migration policies with economic and social needs, though in line with the principle of subsidiarity, seems to be motivated also by hegemonic structures inside the European Union.
In this section we will first analyse local integration as a European policy concern, reconstructing the timeline of political events and publications that might shed new light on the emergence of this issue on the European agenda. Secondly, we will retrace the main developments in the scientific research dealing with local-level policymaking on migration-related issues. In the third section we will introduce the new contributions of this book to the existing literature on local policy and policymaking.

In recent decades, international migration movements have become a major political concern worldwide (see e.g. Thranhardt 2003). Simultaneously, these migration movements are a consequence and a sign of the increase in international interdependence provoked by processes of globalisation. Both globalisation and migration are putting nation states to the test. As Hollifield formulates it, modern states are currently facing a severe dilemma between globalised markets and national civil rights. The so-called liberal paradox stands at the very basis of most migration debates in contemporary Europe: While economic interests have a lasting effect on the opening of national borders, the international political order and internal political system are built upon differentiation and the exclusiveness of power (Hollifield 2003: 35).

The question of integration, i.e. who needs to be integrated into what and how, refers to the core of self-perception and self-identification of societies that are at the destination of persisting migration movements towards Europe. But how do Europeans identify themselves?

One of the most explicit statements on immigration was made by the European Council within the context of the 2000 Lisbon Strategy. Within the Lisbon Program, the Council expressed its intention of ‘making the European Union the most competitive economy in the world and achieving full employment by 2010’, identifying immigration as one potential approach to compensate for the negative impact of demographic ageing and labour-force shortages that the labour markets of many European member states continue to experience. The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) was introduced to enable the development of national action plans. But the OMC caused the European Council objectives to become muddled, and the results achieved by the national action plans did not satisfy the expectations (COM (2005) 24 final; SCADPLUS 2007). A local approach appeared to be more promising. In 2006, Rotterdam mayor Ivo Opstelten invited policymakers and practitioners acting at local and European levels to the conference Integrating Cities: European Policies, Local Practices. The stated aim of the conference was ‘to find ways for better cooperation’. Integrating Cities was realised in close collaboration with European Commission vice-president and head of the Directorate-General Justice, Freedom and Security Franco Frattini. Representatives from EUROCITIES, a
network of 130 major European cities, attended the conference along with the Committee of Regions and other European High Commissioners. The list of participants showed a mixture of European and sub-national experts and practitioners. Following the conference, Migration Policy Group (MPG) director Jan Niessen elaborated a common position paper in which he highlighted opportunities for innovation and challenges for EU cities posed by the arrival of large numbers of new residents. A fundamental thesis of his position paper affirms that ‘integration is essentially a local process’ (Niessen & Engberink 2006).

Integrating Cities was considered so successful it was followed up by the conference Integrating Cities II, held one year later in Milan. Integrating Cities II explicitly addressed the city level as a major arena for implementing the 2005 European Common Agenda for Integration. The common goal of strengthening the city’s voices in European policies on immigrant inclusion culminated in the so-called Milan Declaration, signed on 5 November 2007 (see Milan Declaration 2007).

The Milan Declaration and the conferences indicate the emergent attention of European institutions towards processes, practices and policies of local migrant integration. Local solutions and management strategies are considered crucial for identifying, developing and diffusing new integration models across Europe. Thus, specific funds are introduced to promote benchmarking and policy-learning processes across European member states and municipalities. Here, a pattern becomes apparent among European institutions: they address simultaneously the nation state and sub-national-level entities as implementation agents for integration and innovation. Some political statements at the EU level display, indeed, the aptitude to move integration matters downwards to the city level (and outwards to civil society associations). Yet, if we look at policy action, this trend appears to be far less definite.

With the beginning of 2007, a new Framework Program on Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows was established by the European Commission (COM (2005) 123 final), which was designed to improve management of migration flows at the EU level and to strengthen solidarity between member states. This Framework Program has four dimensions. The first one concerned the integrated management of external borders and was accompanied by the establishment of an External Borders Fund applicable from 1 January 2007. The second dimension pertained to asylum policy and prolonged the European Refugee Fund. The third related to the social, civic and cultural integration of third-country nationals and established the European Integration Fund. The fourth dimension concerned the fight against illegal immigration and the return of so-called third-country nationals who reside illegally in the EU, setting up a European Return Fund (see DG Justice and Home Affairs 2008).
The European Integration Fund (EIF), of special relevance for integrating so-called third-country nationals in Europe, is based on previous experiences made with the Integration of Third Country Nationals (INTI) programme. INTI was a funding programme for activities concerning the integration of people who are not EU citizens. On the basis of these (fruitful) experiences with INTI, the European Commission launched the idea of an European Integration Fund during the Dutch presidency aimed at: 1) facilitating the organisation and implementation of admission procedures for migrants, 2) contributing to the organisation and implementation of introduction programmes and activities for third-country nationals, 3) increasing civic, cultural and political participation of international migrants in the host society, 4) strengthening the capacity of national organisations for accommodating the needs of different immigrant groups, 5) strengthening the host society in managing increasing diversity and 6) increasing the capacity of member states to develop and evaluate integration policies. In total, financial resources allocated to the EIF amounted to € 825 million over the time period 2007-2013.3 Basically, the EIF is implemented in annual programmes laid out by the beneficiary member states4 (see DG Justice and Home Affairs 2008), while 7 per cent of the total annual resources are assigned to Community Actions, directly pursued by the EU Commission.

At first it seems that this implementation procedure contradicts the political affirmations that integration takes place at the local level, and reinforces the nation state as the main actor for integration concerns. Are we observing a discrepancy between political claims and policy programming at the European level? To answer this question we take a closer look at the establishment of the European Integration Fund. Before the current structure of the EIF was institutionalised, some regional governments, among them the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna, developed diverging ideas for managing integration in Europe. Their sketch of an integration model for Europe was strongly oriented towards the sub-national level and addressed regional and local authorities as main actors for implementing integration policies.5 However, these attempts were unsuccessful; instead the beneficiary member states designated national authorities as responsible for the European Integration Fund. But other factors – the process of European integration and the role that member states assume in it – may also have had an impact on integration policymaking in Europe. In the area of immigration policies the situation of individual member states has been marked by a shift of responsibilities up to the level of the EU. Indeed, Europe’s external borders are officially managed and controlled in a joint effort with shared facilities (e.g. FRONTEX). But while member states experienced a net sovereignty loss with regard to the protection
of their own borders, labour market concerns and social cohesion stay within national competence (see also Geddes 2007). Today’s integration policies continue to be defined largely by national traditions and the perception of the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) of the nation (Brubaker 1992; Soysal 1994). However, local needs and experiences highlight some trends of convergence in Europe: There are similarities in the challenges that migration poses to local governments and services in the receiving communities throughout Europe. These trends challenge nation-bound policy programmes on integration and instead ask for local input on integration policymaking. The project known as Cities for Local Integration Policies (CLIP), financed by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, studies concrete integration measures and projects in the areas of housing, diversity management, intercultural and inter-religious dialogue, ethnic entrepreneurship in over twenty European cities. CLIP shows that the cities themselves have a great interest in developing successful local integration practices as they often pay the price for failed integration (Bosswick, Heckmann & Lüken-Kläßen 2007). Legally, however, municipalities largely depend on regional, national and European frameworks, each of which constitutes the basis for local integration.

Even if the nation state as integration policy actor has been recently strengthened by European institutions, regional and local activities on integrating migrants and on setting up dialogues structures at the sub-national level continue. On 13 and 14 March 2008, the European Regional and Local Authorities for the Integration of Migrants (ERLAIM) project, led by authorities of the Emilia-Romagna region, invited regional and local policymakers and practitioners to a conference intended to improve information flow from the EU to the sub-national level. During the EU Policy and Funding for the Integration of Migrants conference, ERLAIM members reaffirmed the relevance of regional and local experiences in integrating migrants, pointing out the lack of detailed and structured information on the part of EU institutions.

2 The study of local integration policy in Europe: where are we and where we are going?

Throughout the 1990s, immigration scholars in Europe focused on the nation state as the key dimension for understanding processes and policies of immigrants’ integration. Various typologies have been developed to describe national immigrant policies. From a juridical perspective, for instance, *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis* citizenship models have been distinguished (see Brubaker 1992); from an economic perspective,
Gastarbeiter systems have been opposed to settlement-oriented systems; and from a socio-political perspective, at least three different models of integration have been put forward: assimilationist, multiculturalist and pluralist (Soysal 1994).

However obvious these typologies of European integration models may seem, they have been criticised for being too simplistic (Favell 2001), with the risk of overshadowing how integration actually takes place in the different contexts where immigrants happen to live and work. When it comes to local integration practices and policies, these typologies certainly have to be treated with caution: They neither explain the variation in integration measures between different municipalities of the same nation state, nor elucidate observed trends of convergence and divergence in integration practices across European cities (Penninx & Martiniello 2004: 156). As a consequence, the local dimension of immigrant policy has emerged to the fore, attracting the attention of an increasing number of European researchers working in different countries.

Yet, not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, one has to acknowledge that typologies still represent a reference point in the debate on immigrant policy and policymaking, as well as in the emerging literature on its local dimension, as pointed out by most of the contributions collected in this book. This is why in the first part of this section we shall start by elucidating the main conceptual categories underlying research in this field, both classic concepts and new notions that have been emerging in local-level studies. In the second part, we will present the main lines of development of the existing literature on local immigrant policy and policymaking. A general trend can be highlighted, beginning with descriptive case studies (often collections of case studies) focused on policy content, to more recent theoretically oriented comparative research designs, addressing mainly issues of policymaking. However, being still at an early stage, the analysis of local policy processes on immigration-related issues reveals a number of gaps and inconsistencies. Critical nodes for future research in the field are also considered in the third part of this section, in an attempt to contribute to the further development of a promising perspective for the study of immigrants’ contexts of daily integration in Europe.

2.1 The debate on policy models: relevance for today’s research on local policy and policymaking

The phenomenon of migration is a rather complex discipline to study. Thus, in the course of time researchers have developed more or less complex models to compare and identify different social realities and to test empirical findings. With regard to integration, Anglo-American
researchers were particularly influential in investigating and interpreting the effects of migration in receiving countries. As early as the 1920s, the Chicago School started theorising the process of how migrants adapt to a mainstream American society imagined as being predominantly White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP). Focusing on European migration in American cities, scholars such as Park, Thomas and Znaniecki recognised that the process of ‘assimilation’, which would equalise newcomers to the standards of the majority population, is likely to last for more than one generation. With this assertion, the Chicago School introduced two basic aspects to modern migration research destined to animate scientific debates even today: the matter of time and space.

While the urban context has been a prominent one for studying the evolution of migration societies in the US, integration research in Europe developed in a different way. The level of immigration to Europe started to rise sharply after World War II and contributed to the transformation of European societies into the culturally diverse societies that we live in today. In fact, the immigration of workers and their subsequent settlement in Northern and Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s was succeeded by the rising of Southern European states such as Italy and Spain, considered to be ‘classic countries of emigration’, which became the destinations of international migration movements in the 1980s. Today, Central and Eastern European states are destined to become Europe’s new immigration lands (Castles & Miller 2003: 7f).

In response to the socio-political awareness that migration is a European reality and therefore needs to be managed, scientific tools were adapted successively to identify and reveal migration-related data. Moreover, national policy models on migration and integration developed, influenced by country-specific peculiarities such as the overall political culture or ‘national’ position on migration. Within migration research, these models differ from one another in being more assimilationist or more appreciatory in recognising ethnic-cultural differences. European member states can then be clustered according to their applied policy model as more ‘assimilationist’ (usually identified with France), multicultural (United Kingdom, Netherlands) or functionalist-pluralist (the German Gastarbeiter policy) countries.

The assimilationist model defines the nation as a political community which newcomers enter by will or by birth. Thus, whoever is born on the soil (ius soli) or willing to adopt the national culture and political rules (ius domicili) is admitted into the community. The assimilationist model has been criticised, however, as a policy based on a one-sided process of adaptation. On the other hand, the multicultural or pluralist model defines the nation as a political community constituted by cul-
tural-ethnic heterogeneity. This entails that newcomers be granted equal rights in all spheres of society, and by implication that they respect certain key values while keeping their cultural-ethnic heritage and autonomy (Han 2000: 287; Castles & Miller 2003: 249-252; Treibel 1999: 83-102). Castles and Miller identify two main variants of the multicultural model: the ‘laissez-faire approach’ typical of the US, where cultural diversity and ethnic communities are accepted, while it is not seen as a genuine task of the state to sustain and protect ethnic cultures and equality among ethnic groups. The second variant refers to multiculturalism as a government policy based on a societal consensus to accept cultural differences as well as on state policy to secure equal opportunities and rights for all. Castles and Miller attribute this variant particularly to Australia, Canada and Sweden (2003: 251). Last but not least, the guest worker policy model reflects, according to Castles and Miller, Germany’s classic approach to immigration based on matching immigration with labour-market demands and needs. Nationhood is defined on the basis of birth and descent (*ius sanguinis*) and, as a consequence, naturalisation of newcomers is regarded as exceptional and dependent upon a difficult and demanding process.

It is questionable, however, how far these policy models actually reflect and display the reality of everyday interethnic interactions in societies. While this typology is an instrument for identifying and distinguishing ideological discourses at the national level, it shows certain limitations in distinguishing between nation states and sub-national actors in admitting and incorporating newcomers (Alexander 2004; Ireland 2007; Money 1999). In fact, as it has never been proved that the French model is more assimilationist than the British one, neither can we possibly verify how far these models have been implemented in their country of reference as such studies are largely missing (see also Borkert 2008). Here, research on the local dimension of migration policy and policymaking can help to reassess both concepts and models against the background of new empirical findings, referring not to macro-institutional structures but to policies and services implemented and carried out at a regional, provincial and/or city level.

This book provides some interesting examples of how traditional, state-level concepts can be revised and applied to the study of policymaking at a local level. For instance, Vermeulen and Stotijn (this volume), in order to make sense of policy practitioners’ implementation strategies for immigrant youth employment, refer to De Zwart’s (2005) dilemma of recognition. According to De Zwart, general policies aimed at combating group inequalities do not recognise groups as being relevant to policymaking, while targeted policies may run the risk of perpetuating differences and inequalities among groups. Assimilationism (‘denial’ in De Zwart’s terms) and multiculturalism (‘accommodation’),
are regarded as alternative strategies which do not necessarily exclude one another, as pointed out by De Zwart’s third proposed policy approach, replacement, which constructs the targets of redistributive policies in such a way as to avoid recognition while still allowing for beneficial redistribution among the groups.

Another attempt to revise ‘old’ concepts in relation to the analysis of local policymaking is provided by Caponio’s discussion (this volume ch. 2) of grassroots multiculturalism. Apart from official discourse on policy recognition, this contribution points out how cultural mediation can be conceived more prosaically by street-level bureaucrats as an instrument to cope with the everyday challenges of immigrants’ perceived diversity. Community workers and operators with an immigrant background are hired by Italian municipalities, not necessarily on the basis of a political programme open to cultural recognition, but rather as a strategy to avoid the stress of dealing with diversity and to minimise challenges to established bureaucratic routines.

As is clear, the particular aim and achievement of this book is that of turning a new eye on processes of policymaking at the local level, and exploring what we have called the local dimension of migration policies. The models debate lies in the background, setting the main terms of reference in the analysis of local policy trajectories. Yet, such terms of reference are neither static nor established once and for all: the examples provided clearly point out how the investigation of the local dimension of migration policymaking can provide interesting inputs for the rethinking and reformulation of classic concepts.

2.2 Where we are: Local integration policy between networks and politics

First attempts to collect systematic information and data on local-level policies for immigrants were carried out in the mid-1990s in the context of international projects such as the UNESCO Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities (MPMC), in 1996,10 and the OECD report Immigrants, Integration and Cities. Exploring the Links (OECD 1998), including cities in Australia, the US and Canada. Local policy is essentially identified with city-level policy and, even more narrowly, with the interventions carried out by local/municipal administrations. To this list, the later Ethnobarometer programme should be added. Launched in 2001 with a contribution from the Italian government and of a number of European foundations, it aimed at reviewing local policies in nine cities in Europe.11

The main common feature of these studies was their promotion of large-N comparisons across cities in different national – European and non-European – contexts. To this end, each project devoted considerable effort to the specification of the main dimensions and/or variables for
data collection and analysis. Yet, the results hardly met such an ambitious goal; descriptive case studies adopting a vague comparative perspective prevailed. The main exceptions were the comparative studies carried out by Alexander (2003, 2004, 2007) who, based on the UNESCO MPMC programme, built up a comprehensive typology of European cities’ different attitudes and policies towards their foreign population. However, his focus is on cities’ official policy priorities, with little attention to implementation and policymaking processes.12

Still within the context of the programme, a number of small-N comparisons were also carried out.13 These studies yielded a far more complex picture, showing the interplay between official/formal local policy priorities and the various actors dealing with immigrant integration. Moreover, along with the UNESCO MPMC programme, other research studies have been undertaken in different local contexts, not only in cities but also in neighbourhoods and regions, thus contributing to the accumulation of an increasing corpus of data and knowledge on local policy for immigrants in Europe.

In this emerging literature, two research streams can be identified: the first is essentially concerned with bottom-up policymaking processes on immigrant integration, in order to account for the actors involved and the networks mobilised on the issue; the second looks at top-down implementation of legislative provisions on immigration, with particular attention to the practices adopted by the local branches/agencies of national/regional institutions such as the Home Office, the Labour Ministry, etc.

As for the first stream, two different approaches to the study of local policymaking on immigrants’ integration can be identified: a pluralist approach, emphasising issues of immigrants and civil society participation; and a power approach, looking more closely at the role of politics and political actors. The pluralist approach actually began to develop in the early 1990s, when a few pioneering researchers questioned the primacy of national-level politics and argued for the increasing relevance of local governments in promoting institutional arrangements aimed at providing opportunities for immigrants’ participation and inclusion (Joly 1992; Rex & Samad 1996; Vertovec 1996; Leggewie 1993). According to Mahnig (2004), these studies implicitly assumed that local governments are more inclined than national ones to pragmatically respond to immigrants’ needs.

This pragmatic attitude of local policymaking has been also noted by more recent studies such as those carried out by Marques and Santos (2004) on immigrants’ participation in Oeiras, a suburb of Lisbon, and by Moore (2004) on conflict mediation in Marseille, Toulouse and Manchester. Both studies show how immigrant policies are more the result of local-level mediation practices, than of official – national or local –
policy models. Moore (2004) illustrates how French cities, in their attempts to come to terms with immigrant-origin youth unrest, do not act much differently from English ones: if recruiting mediators in order to link up immigrant groups is officially pursued in the UK, in France it represents an established informal practice. In Oeiras, on the other hand, town hall policy does not officially recognise immigrant or ethnic-particularistic demands. Yet existing neighbourhood, sport and leisure associations are composed mainly of immigrants and actually represent the interests and channel the needs of the African resident groups.

Meanwhile, research studies on Southern European cities have also pointed out the crucial role played by autochthonous NGOs, charities and civil movement associations that provide various services and offer political support for immigrants’ rights claims (Campomori 2005; Zincone 1998; Esteves 2008; Morén-Alegret 2002). A ‘crowding out’ effect has been noted wherein native associations mobilising on behalf of immigrants actually become the main recipients of municipal funding and partners in policymaking, thus preventing immigrants from forming their own organisations (Caponio 2005).

In contrast with pictures emphasising mediation and local-level negotiation, a number of studies have focused on power relations in the development of immigrant policies in European cities. A case in point is the research study carried out by Mahnig (2004) on Paris, Berlin and Zurich that looks at how the presence of immigrants became a political issue in these cities forcing the issue of integration onto the political agenda. According to this analysis, the first local initiatives on immigration were aimed essentially at responding to the emerging perception of immigrants as a threat to social peace and public order by the local society. A similar perception can be found in the cases of Nanterre and Champigny (De Barros 2002, 2004): immigration became an issue as early as the 1960s, after French residents’ protested against the bidonvilles where Maghrebians and Portuguese immigrants lived. Local authorities and, in particular, the communist party governing the two cities, responded by joining the protest and using it as a tool to put pressure on the national government.

The role of political actors has been addressed in the case of Italian cities as well (Caponio 2006; CeSPI 2000; Campomori 2005). In-depth studies carried out in both southern and northern cities question the relevance of politics in the everyday programming and running of municipal services; the efficiency of established administrative structures and the capacity for networking with native and third-sector organisations seem to be more relevant. Yet, politics may set the frame for legitimate action in the development of immigrant policies thus indirectly influencing what can be done and what should be avoided (or at least not overly emphasised).
The second research stream identified above is implementation research, generally aimed at analysing how national/regional laws and policies are carried out by local responsible agencies and whether and to what extent the stated goals are achieved (Zincone & Caponio 2006). The classic top-down implementation framework has been adopted mainly for the investigation of immigration policies such as procedures of regularisation in Greece (Skordas 2000) and Italy (Zucchini 1998) or access to long-term residence permits in Austria (Jawhari 2000) and Italy (Fasano & Zucchini 2001). A chief finding of these studies is that administrative discretion is one of the main sources accounting for deviation from expected goals and policy failure.

A number of studies have focused more closely on civil servants’ behaviour and their administrative cultures, regarded as factors having a crucial impact on everyday implementation of labour-market provisions in Germany (Cyrus & Vogel 2003), residence permit renewal in Greece (Psimmenos & Kassimati 2003) and Italy (Triandafyllidou 2003) and access to protection for refugees in the UK14 (Düvell & Jordan 2003). What emerges is a substantial continuity among established administrative practices, directed essentially at controlling and restricting immigrants’ presence.

A small number of implementation studies have also focused on national and/or regional social integration programmes. Gaxie et al. (1999), for example, analysed the implementation of the contrats de ville (city contracts) in nine French cities,15 to find out whether, and to what extent, the official goal of empowering local governance was actually pursued and achieved. The empirical evidence contradicts expectations, since the city contracts policy often resulted in routine and purely symbolic consultation on the part of regional/local political authorities, reluctant to lose control over potentially hot immigration issues.16

Between top-down implementation analyses and bottom-up approaches stand a number of studies looking at immigrant policies in the context of urban segregation processes. The study of majority/minority relations in metropolitan areas and of the related dynamics of segregation/separation in the urban environment is a classic topic in American urban sociology since the Chicago School, which has also attracted over the course of decades urban geographers, social anthropologists, urban economists and political scientists. The literature on the different aspects of segregation processes is huge, especially in the United States but, more and more, also in Europe, the UK being in first place.17 Some of these studies are concerned with the impact of urban regeneration programmes, usually targeting neighbourhoods suffering conditions of economic and social deprivation, but often leading to gentrification in the renewed districts and segregation in other peripheral areas (Fonseca
Other studies investigate the relations between urban segregation and welfare policies, especially as far as public housing is concerned. If initially scholars focused mainly on cities in liberal, conservative corporatist and social-democratic welfare states (see the contributions collected in Musterd and Ostendorf 1998), more recent research has also taken into account Southern Europe (Allen et al. 2004; Malheiros 2002; Arbaci 2008).

Along with urban policy, another emerging research stream developed in the context of the UNESCO UN HABITAT programme focuses more broadly on the impact of migration for urban governance (Balbo & Tuts 2005: 1-14), taking into account not only European cities, but also urban areas outside of Europe which are pivotal in different regional migratory systems.

2.3 Where we are going: Key issues for future research

As is clear, existing literature on the local dimension of policymaking on immigrants’ integration is extremely diversified in terms of research approaches and theoretical perspectives. In order to develop a more coherent future research agenda, we identify here four key issues arising from this literature and envisage possible research paths that may contribute to the enrichment of the debate on local policy and policymaking.

The first critical point arises from the observation of a trend of convergence among local immigrant policies on some pragmatic solutions to perceived ‘common challenges’, i.e. the amelioration of housing conditions and residential concentration, and the improvement of diversity both in democratic bodies and municipal administration (Borkert et al. 2007). However, there is still a lack of systematic research on how common challenges pressure municipal policies towards convergence. On the contrary, as mentioned, a number of studies openly challenge such an assumption by pointing out that local policy on migration-related issues is more likely to respond to NIMBY (an acronym for the exclamatory ‘not in my backyard’) reactions on the part of national residents, rather than to the needs of the foreign immigrants living in the city.

In order to find out whether and to what extent a trend towards convergence can actually be identified, it should be first and foremost recognised that the intrinsic complexity of local policymaking processes may be observed at different levels in the institutions concerned, i.e. the high-level political arena, the middle-level implementation networks and the bottom-level bureaucratic practices. Patterns of convergence and divergence may differ across these different levels. In high-level decision-making arenas, where official policy priorities are envisaged, political actors are likely to play a key role in framing answers...
in accordance with their perception of the electorate’s preferences, which are not necessarily favourable to immigrants (see Helbling in this volume). In middle-level implementation networks, institutional pre-existing arrangements concerning relations between public administration and private/civil society organisations are crucial. Such institutional arrangements are likely to vary considerably across European cities, reflecting different welfare state traditions as well as different patterns in civil society mobilisation (see also Aybek in this volume). Yet, trends towards convergence appear particularly relevant as far as bureaucratic practices are concerned: in the context of access to services, immigrants’ needs are often dealt with informally by civil servants, operators of NGOs and volunteers, leading to some pragmatic answers and solutions to everyday pressures (see Vermeulen & Stotijn and Caponio ch. 2 in this volume).

Multi-level governance is another key point for future research. Many studies mention the relevance of intergovernmental relations in setting opportunities and constraints for local-level administrations, but do not actually explore them systematically. There are exceptions of course, as pointed out by the implementation studies taking into account complex integration programmes (Damay 2002; Gaxie et al. 1999) and by some contributions in this book (see Fourot on Canada). Another example of analysis concerned with multi-level governance is the study carried out by Favell and Martiniello (2008) on the policy-making processes on immigrant integration in Brussels, also addressing the role of the EU. Yet, generally speaking, while there is wide acknowledgment of the relevance of supra-national, national and regional institutions in local immigrant policy, relations among these different institutions are only rarely investigated.

A third issue to be mentioned relates to the research-policy nexus. As far as local-level policymaking is concerned, this is a particularly relevant point as shown by a wealth of programmes entailing research on best practices, conditions for mutual learning across cities and transferability. The CLIP project is a case in point, since it seeks the direct participation of cities in identifying policy needs and shaping bottom-up an ongoing research design. However, there is still a lack of knowledge and systematic analysis of the role of experts in local-level immigrant policymaking: How are experts identified and selected? What role are they supposed to play? What are their relations with the other actors involved in decision-making and with politicians in the first place? If the research-policy nexus is still an under-explored field (Zincone & Caponio 2006), it is even more so in terms of the local level.

Finally, from a methodological point of view, a crucial area for future research is represented by the spreading of comparative systematic analysis, both cross-city and cross-country. Of course, research designs un-
undertaking comparison across different contexts, including cities outside of Europe might appear somewhat puzzling, since it is difficult to control for a number of crucial variables, not least the national integration models, which are central to European literature. Nonetheless, much depends on the research goal: if we are to identify common challenges and patterns of convergence in local policymaking, maximising variance in terms of selected cities and national contexts can only strengthen the argument. In any case, to explore how policymakers in different cities/provinces/regions cope with immigration pressures and immigrant needs would undoubtedly enrich our knowledge of the dynamics of migration decision-making.

3 The content of the book

This book is the result of activities conducted within the context of the IMISCOE European Network of Excellence. Specifically, it arises from the work of IMISCOE Cluster C9, a research group focusing on the multi-level governance of migration. The development of a research programme on local-level immigrant and immigration policy was one of the main tasks of the cluster’s work in 2007, as highlighted by the international conference The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking held in May 2007 in Turin.

Four of the book’s six chapters are actually the result of papers presented at the conference, as it allowed early-stage researchers working in the field to present their work and discuss it with peers and senior researchers. The conference was based on a call for papers, to which some 35 young scholars responded and out of which twelve papers were selected for presentation. This selection revealed some interesting features – but also critical points – of today’s research on local policy and policymaking. They include:

– The crucial relevance of comparison, especially across regions/provinces/cities in a single country, but also more and more taking into account local contexts within different countries;
– The growing interest in the issue of governance, intended both as intergovernmental relations between different layers of government and as horizontal network relations between public and non-public organisations;
– The lack of systematic research on local-level policymaking in Eastern European countries, especially of studies adopting the so-called ‘policy approach’, i.e. focusing on local level policymaking processes.
This final point is particularly relevant for developing a future research agenda on the local dimension of migration policy and policymaking. Local-level policymaking is rarely addressed by scholars in Eastern Europe, where research on migration is just gaining momentum. This may result from the highly centralised state structures characterising these countries, which is probably a legacy of the past communist regimes. However, the debate on convergence/divergence on local migration policy and policymaking could be newly enlightened by also looking at the policy process in Eastern European emergent immigration cities/regions.

This book intends to provide a contribution to the existing literature on local-level migration policymaking by presenting a number of studies carried out in very different national contexts: namely, Italy, Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Canada. We are fully aware that these countries do not exhaust the range of possible relevant cases in the study of the local dimension of migration policy and policymaking. A major gap exists not only in the lack of a contribution on Eastern Europe, but also in the lack of a chapter addressing a case study in the Nordic welfare-state countries. However, as pointed out in the final comparative chapter, this book is intended as a first attempt to explore the various dimensions of local policymaking. It starts from some interesting pieces of research already carried out in this field. More systematic and theoretically grounded research, though indeed needed, is beyond the reach of this book.

Though all the collected contributions deal with local-level policymaking, they address different dimensions of integration, i.e. citizenship, welfare services, vocational training and employment, and religious diversity. Moreover, the studies display a great variety in the theoretical and methodological approaches adopted by the authors. This regards first and foremost the theoretical point of view: whereas Caponio’s (ch. 2) and Vermeulen and Stotijn’s chapters aim to shed new light on policymaking processes and accounting for different local-level policy responses, Aybek and Fourot are more interested in policy legacy and institutional analysis. Helbling, meanwhile, deals with the factors at a local level that explain naturalisation politics and ground people’s understanding of membership in a nation. Variations are evident from a methodological standpoint as well: while most chapters present comparative qualitative case-studies, Helbling adopts a large-N comparative research path. Such diversity in the theoretical focus and methodological approaches represents a characteristic feature of this book, that demonstrates how research on local policymaking is not necessarily confined to the ‘thick description’ of one case, but on the contrary draws its strength from comparison, either qualitative or quantitative.
The contributions to the book, while not exhausting all the possible local issue areas as identified by Alexander (2007), address three key policy domains: the legal-political domain, which addresses the civic incorporation of migrants/ethnic minorities in the host polity; the socio-economic domain, which concerns social inclusion policies; and the cultural-religious domain, which includes policies related to minority religious and cultural practices as well as to inter-group cultural relations. The final chapter of the book intends to draw some comparative conclusions on local policymaking processes in these different domains, while providing a basic theoretical toolkit for a more unitary and consistent framework of analysis of the local dimension of policymaking.

The first dimension, i.e. the legal-political one, is dealt with in Helbling’s contribution on naturalisation policy in Switzerland. The chapter takes a comparative perspective in an effort to explain why in some municipalities more candidates for naturalisation are rejected than in others. Three political and cultural factors are considered: different understandings of citizenship, i.e. diverging ideas of what it means to become a Swiss citizen; the strength at the local level of the Swiss People’s Party, namely the major Swiss right-wing populist party; the impact of direct democratic decision-making procedures, which may provide an opportunity for right-wing populist parties to mobilise the people. The analysis reveals that these three factors have a significant impact on rejection rates, while socio-economic and socio-structural factors such as unemployment rates, the ratio of foreigners living in a municipality and the ratio of applicants from Muslim countries have no influence. The contextualisation of the Swiss case in the still very scarce literature on the implementation of naturalisation laws shows how local/regional authorities’ attitudes towards the question of who has the right to become a citizen is a major neglected issue in migration policy research.

Three contributions address the socio-economic dimension of local migration policy and policymaking. Caponio (ch. 2) looks more generally at Italian cities’ welfare policies, while Aybek provides an account of employment in German cities and Vermeulen and Stotijn discuss vocational training in a Dutch city and a German city. Caponio (ch. 2) deals with the accommodation of cultural difference in Italy by comparing Milan, Bologna and Naples, three cities that represent very different contexts in terms of economic situation as well as cultural and political traditions. According to the analysis, at the level of official political priorities an opposition emerges between the assimilationist approach pursued by the administration of Milan and the multicultural one promoted by that of Bologna, while Naples lies in between. However, the reconstruction of implementation strategies points out a convergence towards practices of formal and/or informal recognition of
cultural differences in making services accessible/available for immigrants, even though this does not necessarily coincide with a move towards inclusion and participation of immigrant organisations in policymaking.

Vermeulen and Stotijn, for their part, provide an interesting example of cross-city and cross-country comparison by looking at how Amsterdam and Berlin policymakers and policy practitioners deal with youth unemployment among immigrant groups. They argue that local policymakers are confronted with what De Zwart (2005) calls ‘the dilemma of recognition’, which refers to whether local governments should pursue general or targeted policies to combat group inequality. Vermeulen and Stotijn show how, in the two cities, policy practitioners working with unemployed immigrant youth have responded to the dilemma of recognition with their own pragmatic solutions, which are considerably independent of the official policy integration framework.

The issue of migrant youth unemployment is also dealt with in Aybek’s contribution, focusing on local-level interaction in Germany between the highly institutionalised vocational education and training (VET) system and less-established networks on immigrants’ integration. The study considers two local contexts – Munich and Frankfurt/Main – with the purpose of discovering which factors and governance dynamics may help the development of new approaches to implementing VET programmes aimed at catering to the needs of immigrant youth, currently the main beneficiary of VET in Germany.

Finally, Fourot’s study deals with the cultural-religious domain. It investigates the settlement of new mosques in the cities of Montreal and Laval, both located in the Province of Quebec. This chapter looks at four sets of factors: intergovernmental relations in particular between provincial and municipal levels of government; the discourses surrounding the accommodation of ethno-cultural and ethno-religious demands in the two cities; relations among local actors, especially elected officials and municipal public servants; and the forms of mediation between municipalities and ethno-religious groups. Fourot points out how these factors have an impact on the processes of institutionalisation of religious pluralism in the two cities. A key element is represented by the degree of personalisation of mediation channels: whereas personalisation leads to a political process of institutionalisation, non-personalisation leads to administrative institutionalisation.

As is evident, the studies presented in this book not only analyse different dimensions of integration policy, but start also from very different research questions and theoretical perspectives. Yet, in the last concluding chapter, an attempt is undertaken by Caponio to provide a more coherent comparative framework aimed at elucidating the relevance and the main characters of the local dimension of migration pol-
icymaking in the five countries considered in this book: Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Canada. The notion of local migration policy arena is introduced, intended as a policymaking field structured around specific issue areas or dimensions of migration policy. Local migration policy arenas take shape in specific national contexts and systems of state-periphery relations. However, national legal frameworks do not appear to be sufficient in order to understand how local migration policy is actually worked out. To this end, particularly promising appear the analysis of patterns of similarities and differences in the local-level responses and policymaking processes across the five countries considered and in the three issue areas of migration policy analysed by the contributions to this book: citizenship, welfare services and religious diversity.

While tentative and provisional, such a comparative exercise yields a first important result: the local dimension of migration policymaking matters. This should be taken seriously by future migration policy-oriented research in the sense that it has an undeniable relevance in all the countries considered, despite differences in the state structures and models of centre-peripheral relations. Efforts to make sense of how this local dimension does currently take shape and operate require systematic and theoretically oriented research programmes. Comparisons across cities in different countries, although difficult and tricky in many respects, represent a crucial frontier for the development of migration studies.

Notes

1 See, for instance, ‘Challenges for Local Integration Policy in Germany and the US’, a workshop held in April 2006 in Berlin. The workshop was part of the Transatlantic Discourse on Integration conference programme organised by the European Forum for Migration Studies (efms), with the support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States.

2 Integrating Cities III was hosted by the City of Berlin on 2 April 2009.


4 With the exception of Denmark, all member states participate in the EIF. UK and Ireland have opted in.

5 These ideas and concepts were articulated in personal conversations with one of the authors.

6 European Regional and Local Authorities on Asylum and Immigration (ERLAI), www.emiliaromagnasociale.it/wcm/emiliaromagnasociale/home/immigrazione/Er-lai/Presentation.htm.

7 This frequently used term is generally attributed to Baltzell (1964).

8 On this, see also Bommes and Morawska (2005: 224).

See www.unesco.org/most/p97. Seventeen cities took part in the project: Amsterdam, Antwerp, Athens, Barcelona, Birmingham, Brussels, Cologne, Liège, Marseille, Milan, Oeiras (a suburb of Lisbon), Paris, Rome, Stockholm, Tel Aviv, Turin and Zurich.

To fill this gap, in-depth case studies on Paris, Amsterdam, Rome and Tel Aviv have also been carried out by Alexander (2007). However, he is much more concerned with changes in local-level migrant policy models than with reconstructing local policymaking processes and networks.

These have been published in a special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies that was edited by Jordan, Stráth and Triandafyllidou (2003).

See also Borkert (2008) on the achievements of integration policies in Italy.

This chapter is based on a paper presented at the 2007 Compass Annual Conference (held from 3-4 July in Oxford), in a workshop entitled ‘Southern European integration models’, chaired by Alessio Cagiano.

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INTRODUCTION


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Naturalisation politics in Switzerland: explaining rejection rates at the local level

Marc Helbling

Introduction

The way one gets a passport in Switzerland is very different from the procedures in other countries. To my knowledge, Switzerland is the only nation state in the world where naturalisations happen at the local level. Every municipality, be it a town of 100,000 or a village of 400 inhabitants, is accorded the right to decide who can become a Swiss citizen. As regulations on the national and cantonal (sub-national) levels are very sparse, each political local entity decides on the formal procedure and criteria according to which its alien residents are naturalised. Given the high degree of autonomy possessed by municipalities in this policy field, the naturalisation procedures, the applied criteria, and consequently the ratio of rejected candidates vary greatly from one municipality to another.

In the last few years, after discriminatory decisions were made, the Swiss system of naturalisation has aroused a great many political and judicial debates, especially when candidates from the former Yugoslavia were refused Swiss citizenship in municipalities where the population has decided on applications by secret ballot. Opponents of this system criticise the arbitrariness of the municipal decision-making processes because they expose the candidates to the attitudes of the local population and politicians. They demand that procedures be standardised and decisions be made exclusively by the local administration or by the executive body and no longer by the population. In July 2003, the Swiss Federal Court rendered a verdict according to which popular votes by ballot on naturalisation requests violate the Swiss Constitution. In May 2004, it further declared that decisions during municipal assemblies have to be made by open ballot. Since the Swiss Federal Court regards naturalisations as purely administrative procedures, it has declared that justifications for the decisions, and possibilities for appeals against such decisions on this subject, must be made available. These two rights, according to the Swiss Federal Court, are not guaranteed by the system of votes by ballot. Advocates of the existing system
object that these verdicts violate the autonomy of the municipalities and the democratic rights of the Swiss citizens. They claim that the population of each municipality should have the right to decide according to which procedures and criteria foreigners are naturalised.

Surprisingly, although local naturalisation politics in Swiss municipalities constitutes a timely political issue in Switzerland and provides a unique opportunity to study citizenship politics, this topic has been inadequately studied so far. The political debates on legal norms have been accompanied by judicial studies treating the question of the constitutionality of local naturalisation procedures (Auer & Von Arx 2000; Thürer & Frei 2004). At the same time, ethnographic studies have gone beyond the legal aspects of citizenship and demonstrated, among other things, the complexity of local citizenship politics by means of single case studies (Arend 1991; Centlivres 1990; Centlivres et al. 1991; Steiner & Wicker 2000, 2004; Achermann & Gass 2003). In particular, the works collected in Steiner and Wicker (2004) and the case study of the town of Basel in Achermann and Gass (2003) deliver helpful insights into the various aspects and moments of municipal naturalisations. However, these studies treat the question of why some municipalities pursue a more restrictive policy than others only at the margins, if at all. So far, Piguet and Wanner (2000: 66-74) and Bolliger (2004) provide the only, even if explorative, investigations that attempt to explain policy outcomes in citizenship politics.

This chapter seeks to explore local naturalisation politics more systematically, applies a comparative perspective and takes the question of causality more seriously, in an effort to explain why in some municipalities more candidates for naturalisation are rejected than in others. I will put forward three political and cultural factors to help us understand why some municipalities pursue a more restrictive naturalisation policy than others. Given the high degree of Swiss federalism and the autonomy of local units in citizenship matters, one first expects to find different understandings of citizenship, i.e. diverging ideas of what it means to become a Swiss citizen. While such ideological aspects certainly play a crucial role, I will further account for the contentious and political nature of citizenship politics. This will lead us to account for the political actors in these municipalities and how influential they are in local politics. I argue that municipalities in which the Swiss People’s Party – a major right-wing populist party – is powerful reject more applicants than others. Finally and especially in light of the recent controversies, I will also test whether or not direct democratic decision-making procedures lead to more rejections. I will argue that such institutions provide an opportunity for right-wing populist parties to mobilise the people. Moreover, the rule of anonymity favours discriminatory decisions as social control and external checks are absent to
inhibit selfish behaviour. The analyses will reveal that these three factors have a significant impact on the rejection rates. I will further show that socio-economic and socio-structural factors such as the unemployment rates, the ratio of foreigners living in a municipality and the ratio of applicants from Muslim countries – nowadays the largest immigration group in Switzerland – have no influence. The size of a municipality, its degree of urbanity or whether it is situated in a specific language region have no impact, either.

The next section will present in more detail how foreigners are naturalised at the local level in Switzerland. Then, I will specify why it is preferable to operationalise the naturalisation policy of a municipality with the rejection and not the naturalisation rates. As I will argue, the latter depends on both the demand and the supply side, while the former primarily reflects the actual citizenship policy. In order to get some ideas how to explain local naturalisation politics, I will in a next step discuss various studies that have explored local and regional naturalisation and immigrant politics in different European countries. Most of these works came to the conclusion that it is mainly political and cultural factors that help us understand the various policy outcomes. On the basis of this general idea I will then present in more detail three arguments and explore to what extent they help explain the local naturalisation policies. In light of the increasing political debates over the naturalisation of immigrants from Muslim countries, I will test the model for both the general rejection rate and that of this particular group.

2 What is to be explored: naturalisation procedures in Swiss municipalities

A Swiss citizen is not only a member of the national community of his or her country, but also of a canton (i.e. sub-national state) and of a municipality. Accordingly, a foreign resident applying for citizenship gets naturalised at all three levels. The sequence of decision-making with regard to naturalisations between the three political levels differs from canton to canton. However, in each case the procedure on the local level constitutes the crucial part of the process. Whereas the decisions of the Confederation and the cantons constitute rather formal and administrative procedures on the basis of very few but clearly specified criteria, the municipalities make mainly political decisions. The federal law on citizenship merely stipulates that only those foreign residents can be naturalised who have lived in Switzerland for at least twelve years, respect the legal order, do not compromise the interior and exterior safety of the country, and are integrated and familiar with Swiss habits and customs. The first three criteria are quite clear, easy
to verify and are always checked by the federal administration. As for the questions of integration and familiarity, not only do they constitute vague requirements, but they also are judged exclusively by local actors.

Which local actors are involved in the decision-making processes? The local administration is in most cases in contact with the applicants during the entire naturalisation procedure. They inform them about the formal aspects of the process and check whether certain criteria for naturalisation are fulfilled. Often they also discuss with candidates whether they have any chance of getting a Swiss passport and make recommendations to the political bodies (local parliament or naturalisation commission, etc.) involved in the process. In almost all municipalities a naturalisation commission composed of local politicians discusses in detail the dossiers and makes recommendations to those who make the final decisions. Sometimes dossiers are circulated several times between the various collective bodies involved in the decision-making processes. It might also happen that the local parliament or the executive body makes recommendations before the final decisions are made. Final decisions are made in some municipalities by the entire population, either by ballot or during a municipal assembly. In other municipalities, it is the local parliament or the executive body which decides who can become a Swiss citizen.

The candidates often have to pass some kind of exam or interrogation to verify that they are familiar enough with the Swiss political system, Swiss history, and the language of the particular region. There exists a wide range of different naturalisation policies, from very generous to very restrictive. In some municipalities, a complete integration of the naturalisation candidates is presumed after twelve years of residence in Switzerland. In other municipalities, applicants have to prove their degree of integration by passing tests or by showing how well they are acquainted with the Swiss citizens of their municipality. However, it would be too simplistic to range the municipalities exclusively along such a scale, since naturalisation procedures also differ with regard to the issues that mould the respective debates. In some cases, language ability constitutes the crucial element of the contest. It may happen that some actors in a specific municipality require that the applicants speak Swiss German, whereas for others it suffices that they have a good command of any of the four national languages. In still other municipalities, the question at the centre of debates is whether applicants can be naturalised who are benefiting from social security or disability insurance is.

The local administration and decision-makers decide whether and to what extent candidates have to pass such tests or interrogations. The criteria can therefore differ among municipalities even within the same
canton. Formal regulations at the local level are rare and, when they exist, the criteria that have to be fulfilled are formulated in a very general way. Decisions therefore depend even more on the interpretations of municipal politicians or the opinions of the local population. Moreover, it appears that various actors are involved in municipal naturalisations and that the evaluation of the candidates’ dossiers occurs at different stages. Naturalisations can therefore be compared to decision-making processes in other political fields where political actors have to come to an agreement as to which policy should be pursued.

3 What is to be explained: the rejection rate

Given the high degree of autonomy possessed in the naturalisation field, municipalities pursue different citizenship policies. While some prefer a high degree of integration and require that candidates fulfil many criteria, others have a more liberal position and put up only a minimum level of requirements. To analyse why some municipalities pursue a more restrictive naturalisation policy, how the dependent variable was operationalised – i.e. the outcome of naturalisation politics – must be specified. At first glance, the naturalisation rate, i.e. the ratio between the yearly number of naturalisations and the number foreign residents, appears to provide a useful indicator. These data have already been used in other studies on local naturalisation politics (Piguet & Wanner 2000; Bolliger 2004) and are easily accessible since they are provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. However, the application of this indicator poses a problem as it depends on both the demand and the supply side. A low naturalisation rate might be explained by either a restrictive naturalisation policy and/or because the demand on the part of the foreign population is low. Moreover, since the ratio is measured within the overall foreign-resident population, changes of the naturalisation rate might tell us more about the immigration flows (the denominator in the calculation) than about the desire of foreign residents to become naturalised (Ludwig 2004: 509-510; see also Bultmann 1999: 206-212). For the following analysis, however, an indicator that depends on the supply side only is needed, for I am not so much interested in why somebody applies for Swiss citizenship. Rather, I would like to know why in some municipalities the naturalisation policy is more restrictive than in others. I propose, therefore, to analyse the local naturalisation policy by means of the rejection rate: that is, the ratio between the rejected and the submitted applications. Once the applications are handed in, naturalisation candidates no longer have control over them; whether they are rejected or not depends entirely on the supply side: that is local citizenship policy.
Although the validity of this indicator is much better for what I seek to explain, it is somewhat problematic for two reasons. First, it does not consider that certain candidates interrupt their applications during the procedure. It may happen that applicants are recommended to withdraw their dossier when it appears that they do not fulfil all criteria for naturalisation (often because of insufficient command of language). Unfortunately, such information is not at my disposal. In interviews with the responsible officials at the local administrations it appeared that most municipalities do not know exactly how many dossiers are not passed through to the final decision. However, most of them told us that withdrawn applications are normally resubmitted some years later, for example, after candidates have improved their linguistic proficiency. As a relatively long period of twelve years is analysed, such applications should not strongly affect the validity of my indicator. Second, the indicator does not consider either that some alien residents might not apply because they do not expect to be naturalised in municipalities with a restrictive naturalisation policy. Such a deterrent effect is difficult to measure and could only be analysed by interviewing potential candidates who did not apply for Swiss citizenship. Such data have not been collected systematically so far, since studies analysing the reasons to acquire the citizenship of one’s host country have either left out this question or concentrated on freshly naturalised candidates.

In Switzerland, ethnographic studies not only investigated the motivations of potential candidates to apply for Swiss citizenship, they were also interested in the factors leading candidates from the idea for applying to the actual application (Centlivres et al. 1991: 157-160; Achermann & Gass 2003: 173-179). Interestingly, the studies reveal that such decisions are not always consciously taken and cannot be explained by clearly distinguishable factors. Rather, they often seem to be accidental and the result of a combination of causal factors and specific circumstances. It was found that foreign residents often apply only after they inadvertently acquired necessary information about the formal procedure or after friends or relatives have drawn their attention to the opportunity to naturalise themselves. These studies also discuss the discomfort naturalisation candidates have with some aspects of the procedure and reveal that some applicants experience the naturalisation procedure as exhausting, complicated and even humiliating to a certain extent.

Although such information reveals attitudes of candidates towards the naturalisation procedure, those are the statements of persons who were not deterred from submitting their application. They do not necessarily help us know whether or not – or, for that matter, how many potential candidates – did decide not to submit an application. On the other hand, however, these studies show that potential candidates seem
to know the naturalisation procedures and how difficult it is to get naturalised because they are often in contact with persons who have already been naturalised. Therefore, one can assume that some people are deterred from submitting an application in municipalities with a restrictive citizenship policy. But it is unlikely that such a deterrent effect lowers the rejection rate since it cannot be assumed that the local decision-makers would accept more applicants if such persons submitted a naturalisation request. On the contrary, it is likely that even more candidates would be rejected in municipalities with a restrictive understanding of citizenship, assuming that such deterred persons would constitute borderline cases. In this case, the rejection rate would be even higher in such municipalities, and the difference between local settings with a generous and restrictive naturalisation policy even more pronounced.

To obtain information on the rejection rates and further information on the formal aspects of local citizenship politics, the administrations of 207 municipalities were contacted in the summer of 2003 to complete a questionnaire. Despite the fact that citizenship politics constitutes a highly politicised issue, there were no major difficulties in obtaining the requested information. Seventy-eight per cent (N=162) of all 207 municipalities responded, and 74 per cent (N=154) provided us with their average rejection rates for the period between 1990 and 2002. For the selection of the municipalities, I resorted to a dataset comprising data of three national surveys in all Swiss municipalities in 1988, 1994, and 1998 executed by Ladner and his colleagues (see inter alia Ladner 1991). This dataset provides important information on the socio-economic and political structures of nearly 80 per cent of all Swiss municipalities, which were used for my analyses. Since almost no systematic information on local citizenship politics has been at my disposal, the only selection criterion was the size of the municipalities. I assumed that the ways according to which decisions are taken and opinions are formed are different in urban and rural areas. Accordingly, I first selected all municipalities in the dataset with more than 10,000 inhabitants (N=107), and randomly selected 100 municipalities among the remaining communities with fewer than 10,000 residents which are documented in the Ladner file.

Let us now take a closer look at the rejection rates of the municipalities in the sample. To make valid explanations, it must be certain that there is enough variance in the dependent variable and that the differences of rejection rates are significant. This refers to a central aspect of this study, namely that different practices of citizenship within a nation state are observable. Not even the most orthodox essentialist or culturalist would assert that all citizens of a nation state have exactly the same understanding of citizenship. To counter their arguments, that
the differences are significant must be demonstrated. To that end, it must be ensured that high rates are caused by a relatively high number of rejected applications. Keep in mind that 50 per cent of the roughly 2,800 municipalities in Switzerland have fewer than 1,000 inhabitants. Consequently, the number of naturalisation applicants is very low in these municipalities. The rejection of one or two candidates would already have a high impact on the rejection rate. For example, in one municipality of the sample, only four dossiers were submitted between 1990 and 2002, and one of them was rejected. Without looking in detail at this particular case, it would be too risky to conclude that this municipality pursues a restrictive citizenship policy by rejecting 25 per cent of the submitted applications.

Surprisingly, I found that in almost all municipalities where only up to ten applications were submitted between 1990 and 2002, none of them was rejected (Helbling & Kriesi 2004: 46-48; see also Piguet & Wanner 2000: 56-58). Does this mean that small communities pursue a more generous citizenship policy? Given the very small number of candidates, it is hard to tell, since the acceptation rate depends on very few individual cases. Of course, it might be that in such municipalities foreigners are better integrated, as it might be assumed that they have more contact with the local population and become faster accustomed to local customs and traditions. Therefore, they meet with less resistance of the local population when they seek to become a full member of their municipality. However, an opposing argument is also quite conceivable. It might be that in such places of mostly rural character the municipal citizens are less willing to accept new members because they are less used to being in contact with foreigners and much sooner consider their municipality as a homogeneous community than citizens of larger towns do. Considering the small size of these communities, negative decisions are anticipated more easily and potential candidates deterred from submitting their dossiers.

To be sure that there are significant differences among the various rejection rates, I decided to sort out those cases in which fewer than ten applications have been submitted in the period under investigation from 1990 to 2002. These cases correspond roughly to the group of municipalities in my sample with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants. From the 154 municipalities providing data on submitted and rejected applications, 48 cases are not considered for the following analyses. In the remaining 106 cases an average number of 336 applications were submitted, the standard deviation being 391. The rejection rate varies between 0 and 50 per cent, has a mean rate of 9.6 and a standard deviation of 10.6. I thus can be sure that the rejection rate varies considerably and that the variation is caused by a substantial number of rejected applications. Excluding cases with few applications for natura-
isation implies, of course, that any statements about citizenship politics in very small municipalities not be made.

4 Looking for explanations: local citizenship politics in Europe

Let us now turn to the question of how to explain diverging local citizenship policies. To this end, I first look at studies that have explored local citizenship politics in other European countries. Diverging applications of citizenship laws and understandings of nationhood are not found only in Switzerland. With regard to the implementation of naturalisation laws, the case that probably comes closest to the Swiss system is Germany, where citizenship law is regulated at the national level but executed by the Länder (sub-national states) (see Hagedorn 2001a, 2001b; Ludwig 2004; Dornis 1999, 2001; Bultmann 1999). The Länder are accorded the competence to organise the naturalisation procedure and to decide who fulfils the criteria for being naturalised and who does not. A crucial difference between the two countries is, however, that in Germany an administrative body decides on applications. This does not foreclose the possibility that different standards may be applied: various studies have shown that naturalisation rates and citizenship politics differ significantly between the Länder (Hagedorn 2001a, 2001b; Dornis 1999, 2001). The varying applications of federal citizenship laws in Germany are often explained by the political orientation of the regional governments and the attitudes of the authorities that are involved in the decision-making process. Hagedorn (2001a, 2001b), for example, observed changes in naturalisation policies when the political majority of a Land switched from right to left or vice versa. More interestingly, she has shown that the number of naturalised foreigners depends on the attitudes of the representatives of the regional administrations (see also Bultmann 1999: 196-202). Thränhardt (1999) has even revealed that in one Land differences exist at the local level between different naturalisation offices, depending on the resources of the responsible authorities, and how they control the documents of the applicants. Dornis (2001: 76-85) explored how language tests and the verification of the candidates’ documents varies among the Länder, and discovered that individual officers regularly encourage applicants to withdraw their application if the officers have the impression that they have little chance of being naturalised. Hagedorn (2001b: 40) reports that it sometimes happens that the authorities protract the procedures on purpose when they consider the regulations too generous for certain candidates.

In other countries, divergent practices of citizenship can be observed, too. Waldrauch and Cinar (2003) and Cinar and Waldrauch
present diverging implementation policies and integration requirements at the regional level in Austria. They explain regional differences with the indeterminate nature of the integration requirements. Some provinces require that applicants adapt to the ‘Austrian way of life’, be active in local associations and have a high level of language proficiency while other provinces are much more liberal. There are also differences concerning the fees for acquisition of Austrian nationality. North (1985, 1987) examined the administrative structure of the American naturalisation programme, and came to the conclusion that the formal procedures and the approaches of the examiners vary a great deal among district offices. There are differences with regard to how language tests are evaluated and how and when people are persuaded to withdraw their dossiers when they seem not to be qualified for naturalisation. He has demonstrated that rejection rates vary between 0.0 and 11.5 per cent (North 1985: 38-39). Differing implementations of the naturalisation laws can even be observed in highly centralised states such as France. Weil (2004: 377-387) observed applications that clearly contradict the idea of a voluntaristic citizenship model with which France is often associated. In some regional offices, candidates are even manifestly dissuaded from applying for French citizenship. While Costa-Lascoux (1996: 149) reports that the assimilation of candidates is tested very differently from one regional office to the other, Hagedorn (2001b: 43-44) found that candidates are often refused for lack of assimilation. Since the degree of assimilation is exclusively judged by regional officers, arbitrary decisions cannot be excluded (see also Fulchiron 1996).

Variations in the national consciousness can be observed not only in the context of naturalisations, but also, more generally, when local integration politics and how municipalities manage ethnic diversity are analysed. It is often argued that cities have always been more confronted by problems related to migration than nation states are, and thus constitute more interesting cases to analyse (Rogers & Tillie 2001; Rogers 2000; Penninx et al. 2004b; Favell 2001). In those studies, it is argued that the local political structures shape the ways migrants are integrated. Although an influence of the national citizenship regime on local politics can sometimes be detected (e.g. Garbaye 2004), various empirical studies have demonstrated that forms of local integration and citizenship policies cannot be explained (at least not exclusively) by their rootedness in a national system. The essays collected in Penninx et al. (2004a) demonstrate that in various countries local politics towards immigrants varies a lot, and that this heterogeneity is mainly attributable to differences between local political systems and prevailing citizenship paradigms. Ireland (1994), Koopmans (2004) and Bousetta (1997) demonstrate that local integration regimes and ci-
citizenship frameworks have an impact on the way, and on the degree to which, immigrants participate in political debates. Garbaye (2000) has explored how two cities in France and the United Kingdom manage ethnic diversity and identifies three elements which explain the different approaches: the relations between central and local governments, the organisation of political party systems and the organisation of local government. It is particularly interesting to observe that even in a country such as France cities make differential use of their existing discretionary power to integrate foreigners (Moore 2001, 2004).

5 The arguments and how to operationalise them

Studying naturalisation and migration politics at the regional or local level permits us to abolish the idea of homogeneous nation states and to demonstrate that citizenship can take different forms and meanings within a nation state. All of the aforementioned studies partly explain differences in naturalisation or migration politics by the different attitudes of the regional authorities and politicians towards the question of who has the right to become a citizen of their country. The fact that different citizenship or migration policies are pursued within a country suggests that these policies cannot simply be explained by national citizenship models. Rather, it is necessary to explore how these models are applied and how this implementation depends on local understandings of citizenship and political constellations. In other words, it is cultural and political factors that explain the diverging citizenship policies – how people perceive Swiss citizenship and how they struggle over the question of who can be admitted for naturalisation. To specify this idea, I develop three arguments.

The first argument draws on Brubaker (1992) and Favell (1998) who argue that it is cultural idioms and political traditions that explain the respective citizenship policies. Brubaker’s (1992) comparison of citizenship politics in Germany and France is probably the most prominent study adopting this approach. According to him, differences in citizenship politics and immigrants’ attitudes towards naturalisation are due to the fact that France represents a republican, expansive, and assimilationist model of citizenship, while Germany defines citizenry as a community of descent that is very restrictive towards non-German immigrants. Similarly, Favell (1998) explains the divergent responses to ethnic and racial groups in France and the UK in terms of each nation’s public philosophy and political tradition. According to him, it is France’s republican tradition that favours a policy of integration rather than accommodation and consequently opposes separate Islamic institutions because this arrangement would violate the state’s ideological
commitment to integrating individual outsiders into the French political culture. On the other hand, in the UK, more emphasis is placed on allowing separate groups to retain their distinctive identities. As a consequence, Islamic groups and the development of independent Muslim communities are recognised through public policy.

To be sure, Swiss municipalities are no nations. It might nonetheless be the case that different understandings of what it means to be part of the Swiss nation prevail at the local level. As it is hardly possible to distinguish clear citizenship models such as Brubaker and Favell have proposed, I prefer a continuous scale, which differentiates how restrictive or exclusive the understanding of citizenship of a certain municipality is. At one end of the scale are those municipalities with a very liberal understanding of citizenship. At the other end (though allowing for several options between the extremes), are those municipalities with very hostile attitudes towards immigrants. To measure cultural idioms or public philosophies Brubaker (1992) and Favell (1998) rely on official discourses, political decisions, etc. In this case, I had to resort to alternative sources, since written documents hardly exist and interviews with local actors were not possible for such a large sample. To find out how restrictive the understanding of citizenship of a municipality is, I base my analysis on municipal results of national referenda on aliens' acts, immigration and facilitated naturalisation between 1982 and 2002. These referenda provide information on the attitudes of the respective municipal Swiss population towards alien residents and on the significance of their national identity. If in a municipality laws on facilitated naturalisation are rejected and laws limiting immigration are approved, this indicates that the majority of Swiss citizens have a restrictive understanding of citizenship. I carried out a factor analysis with the percentages of yes votes. The second resulting factor matched fairly well with my conceptualisation of an understanding of citizenship and was therefore retained for the following regression analysis.

While ideological attitudes have a high impact on how foreigners are naturalised, it is necessary to bring to the contentious and political nature of citizenship to light: the outcome of a specific naturalisation policy is the result of ongoing political struggles over the questions of who we are and who belongs to us. Following Howard (2006), the actual politics of citizenship must be accounted for – we need to know which political actors participate in citizenship politics and what their ideas about the Swiss nation are. Joppke (2003) has argued that left-wing parties favour a liberalisation and de-ethnicisation of citizenship politics, whereas right-wing governments prefer a more restrictive policy and a re-ethnicisation of citizenship politics. I assume that citizenship politics depends to a large extent on right-wing populists and their influence in naturalisation politics (see also Howard 2006). Immigra-
Naturalisation politics has become one of the main issues of these parties in several European countries. In Switzerland the Swiss People’s Party – a major right-wing populist party – is the most active political actor in this policy field and defends very pronounced positions. Its representatives fear mass-naturalisations, and incessantly warn of the depreciation in the Swiss culture that would take place if too many people are granted Swiss citizenship.

Given the distinct political structures at the local level it is hardly astonishing that municipalities can also be distinguished by their party systems. Most municipalities have their own sections of cantonal and national parties. Thus, local political parties constitute crucial actors in municipal politics. I argue that local naturalisation politics depends to a large extent on the position of the local Swiss People’s Party. In those municipalities in which this party plays an important role in local politics, a higher rejection rate can be expected. For this analysis, I only have data at hand that provide us with information on the power of the local parties in municipal politics in general (and not for the domain of naturalisations in particular). This is a rather crude indicator, since the power structure within a municipality runs only partly along party lines. However, it is the most valid indicator that at my disposal for a large-N analysis. This indicator relies on the perception of the strength of the respective parties. The municipal secretaries were asked to indicate how important each political party is. Ladner (1991: 237-238) has shown that the evaluations of the municipal secretaries are congruent with the real power distribution. Such an operationalisation is better than accounting for the seats of the different parties in the local parliament or the executive body insofar as the number of received votes does not necessarily reflect the power of these parties. Particularly in small towns and villages, the position of individual actors is often more important than the size of the party.

A last relevant factor in naturalisation politics are the formal decision-making structures. They are of importance insofar as they provide different opportunity structures facilitating or inhibiting mobilisations against naturalisation or the activation of discriminatory attitudes (see Helbling 2009). In the last years, the political and judicial debates in the context of local naturalisation have mainly focused on those procedures in which the population makes the final decision on naturalisation requests by ballot or during a municipal assembly. It is argued that such procedures enable discriminatory decisions because people do not have to render an account for their decisions. I think that direct democratic institutions provide a particular opportunity for right-wing populists to mobilise the people for their cause and argue that anonymous decisions favour discriminatory decisions as social control and external checks to inhibit selfish behaviour are absent. Guiraudon
(1998: 287-297) puts forward a challenging argument concerning the mobilisation hypothesis. According to her, it is the scope and locus of political debate that is relevant for policy outcomes (see also Gamble 1997: 249). It makes a difference whether immigration and citizenship policies are the object of intense political mobilisation and public debates or whether the status of foreigners is discussed mainly within the bureaucracy. Whether these issues are debated in open or closed political arenas changes the actors and processes involved. In the case of immigration and citizenship, public debates are very much influenced by actors pursuing a restrictive immigration and citizenship policy. Marginal actors such as extreme-right parties who have otherwise no channels of access to the restricted policy venues get the opportunity to put forward their positions.

The most famous case of local naturalisation politics in Switzerland provides an excellent example in this regard. In the town of Emmen, on the outskirts of Lucerne, the municipal parliament decided about naturalisation applications until 1999, when the majority of the population voted in favour of a referendum, launched by the Swiss Democrats – a minor right-wing party – which required that henceforth decisions should be made by closed ballot. This change of procedure generated a lot of media attention and public debates in Switzerland as well as a great deal of astonishment beyond the Swiss borders. After the change, the population of this town regularly took discriminatory decisions refusing most or all candidates from Muslim countries. The fact that anonymous decisions can have an impact is also illustrated by one of my case studies in which decisions are often but not always taken by closed ballot (see Helbling 2008: ch.4). In this municipality, recent years have witnessed individual citizens requesting decisions be made by closed ballot. Each time the request was accepted, all applications of citizens from Muslim countries that were up for decision were rejected. During other assemblies, when the population voted by open ballot, almost no candidates were refused. A representative of the administration of this municipality told us that the persons who demanded a vote by closed ballot were known as quite xenophobic and normally did not attend the local assemblies. The exceptional appearance of such persons at these two particular assemblies provided an opportunity for a majority of the population to reject applicants from Muslim countries.

It seems that the absence of social control enhances discriminatory decisions when decisions are taken anonymously. Of course, social control only has an impact if the person is motivated to comply with the referents in question. Moreover, intentions are not only controlled, but they can also be reinforced if other people share the same attitudes. In municipalities with a traditionally rather restrictive naturalisation policy it is certainly much easier to publicly maintain discriminatory argu-
ments against certain groups of foreigners. It might however be assumed that the basic principles of liberal democracy such as equality of treatment constitute important arguments in most local debates on naturalisation. Such normative and moral standards are not only difficult to counteract, they also constitute in themselves social control mechanisms or external checks that avoid blind, selfish and short-sighted behaviour and enhance reasonable and non-regrettable outcomes (Offe & Preuss 1991).

As for the operationalisation of the decision-making structure, I have transformed the nominal variable of the formal procedures into dummy variables. In the analysis, I will make a distinction between municipalities in which the entire population decides at closed ballot and those in which decisions are taken during municipal assemblies. While both systems constitute direct democratic institutions, let us see whether it makes a difference when decisions are taken in complete anonymity at closed ballot or when people have to show their hands during municipal assemblies.

Besides these three explanatory factors – the local understanding of citizenship, the influence of political parties and the formal decision-making structures – I will control for a series of other variables. Various researchers have argued that the interrelationship between citizens of a country and its immigrants can be explained by economic and socio-structural factors. Olzak (1992) argues that economic competition between ethnic groups leads to conflict. Competition for its part is the result of socio-structural changes undermining traditional local identities and opening the opportunity for ethnic identities. She enumerates four processes that influence competition and ethnic conflicts: a large number of immigrations, economic crisis, augmenting resources of the ethnic groups and organisational structures (political parties and social movements). Quillian (1995) argues that prejudice is not necessarily linked to the individual interests of group members but is rather the result of a feeling that their prerogatives are threatened by the subordinate group. This feeling of threat is largely influenced, according to Quillian (1995), by both the relative size of the subordinate group and the economic circumstances of the dominant group.

To operationalise these arguments, I will resort to unemployment rates, ratios of foreigners living in a municipality and the ratios of applicants from Muslim countries. This last factor is of particular importance, as nowadays these people constitute the largest immigration and naturalisation group in Switzerland. As for the operationalisation of the unemployment rate, the secretaries of the local administrations were asked to what extent their municipalities have been affected. Contrary to the effective unemployment rate, this operationalisation allows us to better measure the perception of the local economic situa-
tion which might also be influenced by the situation at the regional level. For the share of foreigners, I simply resort to the percentage of the population living in a municipality that is of foreign origin. To account for the impact of the number of candidates from Muslim countries, I use the ratio between applications from immigrants from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey and all submitted applications.8

Finally, I will also test whether the location of the municipality has an impact on naturalisation politics. It might be argued that large and urban municipalities pursue a more liberal policy. Moreover, it is often put forward that the population of the French-speaking part of Switzerland has a different relationship with its nation and with its foreigners than the population of the German-speaking part, both being inspired by the French and German understandings of nationhood, respectively. The often-evoked gap between these two language regions, when it comes to questions about political opening towards Europe, could also be relevant in citizenship politics. Consequently, it may be expected that municipalities in the French part of Switzerland are inspired by the French republican citizenship model and thus pursue a more generous naturalisation policy than Swiss German municipalities being influenced by the German *ius-sanguinis* principle.

6 The impact of cultural and political factors

In the following paragraphs, I will test the various arguments presented in the foregoing part. Particularly, I would like to show whether the local rejection rates can be explained by cultural and political or socio-economic and socio-structural factors. Since data is lacking for the relative power of political parties for a considerable number of cases, I retained only the variable for the influence of the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP) for the regression analysis in Table 1.1. More detailed analyses have shown that other political parties have no significant influence on the rejection rate. As I disposed of information of the strength of the SVP only for a restricted number of municipalities, I had to make sure that both the full and the restricted samples are part of the same population. Thus, the regression analysis for both samples (see Models 1 and 2) was run. Since it might be assumed that the power of the SVP has an influence on the local understanding of citizenship and formal decision-making procedures, the respective variable has been included separately in Model 3. The individual coefficients change only slightly between the three models. Therefore, it can be presumed that both groups are from the same population and that the indicator of the strength of the SVP has no significant impact on other variables.
So far, the results in Table 1.1 confirm the hypotheses and challenge competing explanation models. It appears that the perception of the unemployment rate, the ratio of foreigners living in a municipality, the ratio of applicants from Muslim countries, the language region, the size and the urbanity of municipality have no direct influence on the naturalisation policy. Rather, political and cultural elements help predict the outcome of naturalisation policies: in municipalities with a restrictive understanding of citizenship among the population more applications are rejected. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the dominant actors and their attitudes must be accounted for: municipalities in which the SVP is an influential force in local politics refuse more persons the Swiss citizenship.

The rejection rate increases immensely when the entire population takes decisions by ballot, which confirms the commonly held opinion that direct democratic decisions lead to a more restrictive naturalisation policy. However, I observed no significant increase of rejected candidates in municipalities in which the population decides in municipal assemblies. This can be explained by the fact that in municipalities with votes by ballot the individual decisions are taken in complete anonymity, whereas in municipal assemblies one’s show of hands is exposed to other citizens. But what about those assemblies at which decisions are taken by closed ballot? With the data from this survey I was unable, unfortunately, to distinguish such cases and to systematically investigate this aspect. However, by means of a more detailed analysis of fourteen case studies, I was able to distinguish such cases and to re-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Popular votes at ballot</td>
<td>22.7*** (4.3)</td>
<td>25.7*** (4.5)</td>
<td>28.3*** (4.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal assembly</td>
<td>3.0 (2.4)</td>
<td>2.3 (2.8)</td>
<td>2.6 (2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding of citizenship</td>
<td>3.5** (1.2)</td>
<td>4.5*** (1.3)</td>
<td>4.7*** (1.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence of the SVP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.9** (2.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate</td>
<td>0.0 (2.1)</td>
<td>-0.1 (2.3)</td>
<td>0.3 (2.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of foreign residents</td>
<td>0.1 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.0 (0.1)</td>
<td>0.0 (0.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio of Muslim candidates</td>
<td>2.4 (4.2)</td>
<td>1.2 (4.6)</td>
<td>0.2 (4.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language region</td>
<td>-2.9 (2.4)</td>
<td>-2.8 (2.8)</td>
<td>1.1 (3.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural area</td>
<td>3.7 (2.5)</td>
<td>0.4 (2.7)</td>
<td>0.9 (2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of inhabitants</td>
<td>0.0 (0.0)</td>
<td>0.0 (0.0)</td>
<td>0.0 (0.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.5 (4.7)</td>
<td>6.5 (5.0)</td>
<td>-1.6 (5.6)</td>
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<tr>
<td>R² (adj.)</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
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Notes: Level of significance: ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; only municipalities have been retained in which at least ten applications were submitted between 1990 and 2002. Some cases in Model 1 were lost because data for one or several independent variables were missing (listwise deletion).
veal that municipalities with assemblies at which decisions are taken by closed ballot also reject significantly more candidates (Helbling 2008: ch.5).

I have seen that many incidents and controversies in the context of local naturalisation refer to a particular group of people, namely the increasing number of immigrants from the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. A look at the data from my survey shows that 36 per cent of all applications in Swiss municipalities between 1990 and 2002 were submitted by people from those countries. When it comes to the number of rejected dossiers, the ratio of these people rises to 56 per cent. This makes clear that the majority of rejections concern candidates from Muslim countries. Thus, it should be tested whether or not the models in Table 1.1 mainly explain the rejection rates of applications of candidates from Muslim countries.

The results of this test are presented in Table 1.2. It immediately becomes clear that the explanatory model predicts the number of rejected applications of candidates from Muslim countries even better than the general rejection rate. The explained variance rises to 66 per cent in Model 3. Looking at the individual coefficients it appears that the value of the indicator for popular votes at ballot increases strongly, although it is already relatively high in Table 1. The coefficients of the other explanatory factors – the understanding of citizenship and the influence of the SVP – do not change greatly. This reveals that candidates from Muslim countries face a particularly hostile naturalisation procedure in

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 1.2 Rejection rates of candidates from Muslim countries: non-standardised regression coefficients, standard error in brackets</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Independent variables</strong></td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>N</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Level of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; only municipalities have been retained in which at least ten applications were submitted between 1990 and 2002. Some cases in Model 1 were lost because data for one or several independent variables were missing (listwise deletion).
municipalities where the entire population decides on such requests. Popular votes not only entail a restrictive naturalisation policy, but are also the cause of discriminatory decisions against candidates from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey. It is of particular interest that the actual number of Muslim candidates has no significant impact on the rejection rates of this group. This finding reveals that it is not the mere presence, but rather the perception the local population has of this group of immigrants that explains the high rejections.

I have also tested the hypotheses for all rejected applications without those of candidates from Muslim countries (results not shown here). As expected, the individual coefficients and the explained variance are very low. Concerning the level of significance of the coefficients, however, I observed the same pattern as in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. It can be concluded that the proposed explanatory model explains the rejection rates for different groups of naturalisation candidates and is a particularly good predictor for the number of rejected candidates from Muslim countries.

7 Conclusion

As my results revealed, to understand local citizenship politics several factors must be accounted for: how people perceive their nation, how they struggle over naturalisation criteria which have to be fulfilled to become a member of one’s community and how decisions are taken. Contrary to immigration policy, which is often led by economic concerns and the questions of how much foreign workforce a country needs and sustains, naturalisation is about the much more sensitive aspects of how we see ourselves and of who might become a member of our national community. Accordingly, various studies on local and regional citizenship and immigration politics in the different European countries presented above have come to the conclusion that it is mainly cultural and political factors that explain naturalisation politics. Those works also make clear that the Swiss case is not as special as it first might appear. Diverging understandings and politics of citizenship can be observed in various countries.

Looking at a large group of municipalities, as has been done in this chapter, does not enable us to study local citizenship politics in detail. Rather, it permits us to sort out variables that have no explanatory power and to specify what has to be explained. More generally, such a survey helps set the stage for ensuing analyses and get a rough idea of which direction to take in a next step in order to unveil the causal mechanisms with which to explain citizenship politics. Such a step has in fact been made elsewhere by investigating naturalisation politics in fourteen municipalities (Helbling 2008, 2010). These case studies en-
abled the more adequate measurement of theoretical concepts and the confirmation of my hypotheses with new data.

More generally, these case studies allowed a better conceptualisation of what happens when a national group of political actors struggles over the question of who belongs to their community. To analytically grasp such struggles, citizenship politics by means of Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990) analytical instruments were studied. Bourdieu never specifically wrote on nations and nationalism, but he studied neighbouring themes such as regionalism and identity (Bourdieu 1980) and the genesis of groups (Bourdieu 1984). The political sociology that he has elaborated in these works and elsewhere provides challenging analytical tools to bridge the rigid division between essentialists/culturalists/objectivists and instrumentalists/cosmopolitanists/subjectivists. It has specifically done so by accounting for how in ongoing processes dominant interpretations emerge out of different representations of the social world. Resorting to his analytical instruments enabled the conception of nations as ‘political fields’ in which, according to Bourdieu, actors struggle over the legitimate manipulation of the comprehensive view of the social world. Observable in those fields are ‘power ideas’ between those defending a prevailing perception of the world and those challenging it. It is the political capital of the involved actors that helps us trace the power structures and predict which ideas have more chances of becoming dominant.

By generating an indicator for the individual understanding of citizenship by local actors, it was possible to distinguish diverging ideas on how cultural boundaries are drawn and how foreign residents who apply for Swiss citizenship are perceived. To distinguish majority and minority positions and to explain why a specific construction prevails, I proposed including the local power structures in the study. Community power studies and social network analysis were used to trace the ways in which influence is exerted. As it turned out, accounting for both the symbolic and material aspects of naturalisation politics enabled an explanation of rejection rates and the distinguishing of various local citizenship models.

Notes

1 This chapter presents results from a research project on local citizenship politics in Switzerland that has been generously financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation (NFP 40+) for three years between December 2003 and January 2007. This chapter draws on an extended discussion of our findings that can be found in Helbling (2008). See also Helbling (2004, 2009, 2010), Helbling and Kriesi (2004) and Helbling, Egli and Matter (2005).
To attain a high rate of return, I proceeded according to Dillmann’s (1978: 160-199) total design method, which describes the step-by-step details of how to conduct successful mail surveys.

As it turned out, however, no such difference exists.


The variables on the perceived strength of political parties and of the unemployment rate have been taken from a dataset provided by Ladner and his collaborators at the University of Berne. Together they carried out three national surveys in all Swiss municipalities in 1988, 1994 and 1998 (see Ladner 1991).

The municipal secretaries were asked how important, in their opinion, party X is in the political life of their municipality: ‘very important’, ‘important’, ‘rather unimportant’ or ‘unimportant’. For the regression analysis, the party variables have been dichotomised: ‘important’/’unimportant’.

The municipal secretaries were asked whether their municipalities have been affected ‘very much’, ‘partly’, or ‘not at all’ by increasing unemployment. This variable has been dichotomised (not affected/partly or very much affected).

I am aware of the fact that not all candidates who emigrated from the countries of the former Yugoslavia are Muslims, nor can it be certain whether all Muslim applicants are religious. Unfortunately, there is data at our disposal providing information about the religious affiliation of the individual candidates. However, it is a fact that Muslims from Kosovo constitute by far the largest immigrant group from the former Yugoslavia.

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2 Grassroots multiculturalism in Italy: Milan, Bologna and Naples compared

Tiziana Caponio

1 Integration models at a crossroad: a defeat of multiculturalism?

‘Multiculturalism’ is one of those polisemic terms whose use is likely to raise a great deal of misunderstandings and incomprehension. It is a notion that may be understood in very different ways (Martiniello 1997; Vertovec & Wassendorf 2004; Sciortino 2003; Vertovec 2007): while in a mere descriptive manner it acknowledges the de facto multicultural makeup of contemporary societies, in political philosophy and public discourse, more prescriptive and value-loaded understandings prevail. In this chapter, I will refer to multiculturalism as an analytical concept, which in sociological and political science research is usually linked to some notion of recognition. This may occur either on the part of groups/collectivities calling for the recognition of their own distinctiveness, or on the part of institutions through policies aimed at addressing groups’ differences. This study is concerned essentially with policy and, even more narrowly, with local policy, to find which actors at the local level are likely to mobilise and/or promote issues of recognition and cultural difference.

The existing literature has focused especially on national-level state policy, identifying different models or regimes for immigrants’ incorporation into the rights of citizenship (Brubaker 1992; Castles 1984; Soysal 1994). Starting from the late 1990s, these models have undergone a phase of crisis and revision (Joppke 2006; Carrera 2006). A convergence towards neo-assimilationist policies has been observed (Joppke 2006), as indicated by the diffusion of so-called ‘introductory courses’, i.e., language and civic education for candidate immigrants and for those who aspire to long-term resident status.

Yet one might wonder if distinct, national models have ever existed. The isolation of a few macro-institutional variables has often overshadowed the complexity of processes of social integration usually taking place at a local level, where policies have not necessarily complied with principles stated at the national level (Favell 2001). Germany is a clas-
sic case in point: whereas conservative Ländere in the South adhered to the national guest workers model, left-wing progressive Ländere in the North were more likely to promote settlement policies and initiatives aimed at improving integration (Thränhardt 1992). In the case of Belgium, on the other hand, instead of one unitary national system, two regional models have been identified (Blommaert and Martiniello 1996, 51), the assimilationist one in the Walloon region and a multicultural one in the Flanders region.

A further contribution to a reconsideration of the primacy of national integration models comes from the first systematic studies of immigrant policies in new immigration countries such as Italy and Spain (Zincone 1998; Baldwin-Edwards 1999, 2002). These countries have traditionally been characterised by a high degree of territorial differentiation, both in terms of cultural identity and socio-economic development, as well as by considerable differences in the performance of local/regional administrations and in the shape of welfare arrangements. Moreover, comprehensive national legislation on immigration has been approved in relatively recent times, while local/regional policies were in some cases already in place. As a consequence, especially as far as social policies are concerned, access may vary considerably according to the area where immigrants happen to live: for example, in certain areas, such as southern regions in Italy or regions like Murcia in Spain, delegation of services to third-sector organisations prevails; in other regions, such as Emilia Romagna or Catalonia, local and regional authorities have been promoting various integration programmes throughout the 1990s.

Thus, the study of national models of immigrants’ incorporation into host countries has not taken into sufficient account the actual complexity of immigrant policy, which often takes shape at a local or regional level. Studies analysing multiculturalism at a local level, are still few and far from systematic. In the emerging literature on local immigrant policy, at least two research pathways can be identified: studies reproducing the logic behind the models which attempt to reconstruct coherent configurations of local immigrant policies (Alexander 2004, 2007); and studies emphasising the specificity of the city context and of the policymaking processes taking place at this level (see e.g. Vertovec 1996; Gaxie et al. 1999; Mahnig 2004).

In the first kind of studies, multiculturalism represents one policy option among others. According to Alexander (2004, 2007), at least five attitudes towards immigrants can be identified, each one being the premise of different local policy responses: transient, guest worker, assimilationist, pluralist and intercultural. Alexander finds that, whereas transient attitudes are typical of initial labour migration, when immigrants make up a small and often undocumented population and the
local authority is not aware of, or prefers to ignore, their presence, guest worker attitudes imply the acknowledgement of this presence, albeit on a temporary basis. Since such immigrants are assumed to stay only a few years, policies will cater only to minimal basic needs. The other three categories mark a shift in the social construct of labour immigrants, and occur when local authorities finally realise that labour migrant presence has become permanent (Alexander 2007: 35). The first two are particularly relevant since they express opposite worldviews: while the assimilationist attitude assumes that migrants’ ‘otherness’ will eventually disappear, the pluralist attitude looks at it as permanent (Alexander 2007: 47). In terms of policies, local authorities adopting the first kind of attitude will help individual immigrants to integrate into the dominant host society while minimising the ethnic dimension; on the contrary pluralist policies are explicitly community-based, i.e. looking at ethnic-based empowerment as a vehicle rather than an obstacle in the integration process. Finally, the fifth attitude and policy response, the intercultural one, is represented essentially as a reaction to pluralist policies and its perceived pitfalls in terms of stigmatisation and segregation (Alexander 2007: 210): the intercultural attitude stresses the need for more common ground in a multiethnic society, in order to enable individual immigrants and minority residents to choose among multiple identities, including eventually their ethnic one.

Policy attitudes are combined by Alexander with a second dimension identifying four different local policy domains: legal-political, socio-economic, cultural-religious and spatial. This enables him to point out how cities may adopt different attitudes across the various policy domains. Yet, what I think is more relevant to stress here is that findings show how cities that more coherently implement a pluralist policy are Amsterdam, Birmingham and Frankfurt while, by contrast, Paris and Lille are prototypes of assimilationist attitudes and policies. Clearly, pluralist/multicultural cities are more likely to be found in national contexts traditionally characterised by a multicultural institutional structure, and the same holds true for the opposite case of assimilationist cities. Variation in local attitudes – and thus in local policies – towards immigrants seems to be largely dependent on the national institutional model into which cities are embedded.

On the other hand, studies emphasising the specificity of local policymaking contexts have yielded contradictory evidence on multicultural policies. Whereas some scholars point to the more open and pragmatic attitude of local governments in accommodating cultural difference (Joly 1992; Leggewie 1993; Rex & Samad 1996; Vertovec 1996, 1999), other accounts contradict such a positive view. Local policies on immigrants are generally designed to address the fears and particular-
istic demands of local electorates (Gaxie et al. 1999; De Barros 2004; Mahnig 2004), who are by no means more enlightened or pragmatic than national ones.

However, these studies addressing the problematic aspects of local policy often implicitly take into account just one aspect of the policy process, thus focusing on decisions pursued officially by municipal administrations and on the conditions that lead to the adoption of those decisions. To get a complete picture of how policies for immigrants actually take shape at a local level, implementation should also be considered. According to Penninx and Martiniello (2004: 156), ‘effective implementation [of immigrant policies] will be impossible without engaging the immigrant groups themselves in policy formulation and implementation’. A comparative analysis of integration policies in such different cities as Manchester, Toulouse and Marseille (Moore 2004) is revealing. In the first case, immigrant organisations have, since the very beginning, been called to take part in local policymaking. While, in the two French cities, more informal ways of dealing with immigrant problems, such as recruiting community mediators, have been put into place.

In more general terms, despite the convergence of national integration policies throughout Europe towards a kind of neo-assimilationist strategy, Penninx and Martiniello (2004) suggest that at the implementation level an opposite process can be observed. They identify a process leading to a convergence of strategies towards immigrants’ recognition and participation, i.e. what might be called soft recognition.4 Two different layers or spheres of local policymaking are noted: the sphere of local government’s official policymaking, on the one hand, and that of formal and informal practices of implementation, on the other. Different actors take part in these spheres, and different strategies are likely to be pursued.

Official policy has to be formally sanctioned by political actors governing the city, and thus is likely to be subject to cycles of politicisation. In contrast, formal and informal practices of intervention and implementation are carried out by complex networks of public institutions and private, especially non-profit, organisations. It is at this less official level that stakeholders’ collaboration is needed, even though different ways of pursuing this collaboration can be identified. Recognition and participation of immigrant groups, through the promotion of multicultural practices, is just one possible strategy, since collective actors already mobilised on the issue are likely to define ‘the stakeholder’ according to their own vested interests and identities.

This chapter intends to contribute to the emerging debate on local-level multiculturalism by comparing three Italian cities – Milan, Bologna and Naples – which represent very different contexts in terms of the
2 Policies for immigrants in Milan, Bologna and Naples: a comparison of official priorities

Milan, Bologna and Naples represent very different contexts both in economic and socio-political terms. Milan represents the post-industrial north-west, now successfully converted to the service economy. Bologna is characterised by the development of small and medium-sized firms, often export-oriented. Naples is a service metropolis in the less economically developed south. These cities necessarily offer immigrants different job opportunities (Ambrosini 2001), and are also characterised by very different cultural and political traditions. Milan has the legacy of its industrial past, with a division of responsibility between Catholic organisations providing social assistance to poor people, and the unions, which have traditionally been more concerned with issues of workers’ rights. Bologna has a strong left-wing tradition, as evidenced by the over 40-year hegemony of the Communist party in local government. Naples represents a traditional, Catholic, family-based culture, where the church has always played a role of moral guidance and material assistance.

In what follows I analyse official immigrant policy priorities from 1993 to 2001. During this period, the three cities were governed by different political majorities which assumed quite different positions on immigration during the electoral campaign. In the case of Milan, two right-wing majorities have been governing the city since 1993, the Northern League (Lega Nord) and the Pole for the Freedoms (Polo delle Libertà). In both cases, mayoral candidates’ electoral campaigns took a negative stance on immigration, emphasising the supposed link be-
tween illegal entries, deviant behaviours such as prostitution and begging, and criminality. Integration could be achieved only through work and acculturation into the receiving society lifestyle and culture.

By contrast, in the case of Bologna, an open, pro-immigrant attitude can be found in the political programme of the centre-left coalition (i.e. the Ds, Green Party and Popular Party) that won elections in 1995. Immigration was defined as a resource for the receiving society. The stated goal of public policy was that of building a multicultural society where cultural diversity should be not just tolerated, but positively integrated. To this end, particular emphasis was placed on policies favouring intercultural education, community mediation and immigrants’ participation in the running of social services. However, such a favourable political climate changed suddenly in the 1999 electoral campaign, when the centre-right-wing Pole for the Freedoms mayoral candidate Giorgio Guazzaloca succeeded in promoting an alternative definition of immigration as a problem of law and order.

As for Naples, in the period considered, immigration did not represent a relevant issue either in local electoral campaigns or in the political programmes of the winning centre-left majority. Traditional problems such as administrative corruption, unemployment and lack of public housing dominated the debate. However, starting from 1995 a number of official city documents began to consider the necessity of providing for immigrants’ participation and integration through specific policies aimed at supporting foreign groups and organisations.

Table 2.1 shows policy priorities in the period 1993-2001. These have been identified through an analysis of the official documents approved by the local executives and/or by the municipal councils (delibere di giunta e di consiglio), establishing and/or financing services for immigrants. At least in part, these decisions appear to reflect the political majorities’ different standpoints on immigration.

In the case of Milan, the Northern League majority focused from the beginning on a few priorities aimed at supporting individual integration through housing facilities (shelters and initial-accommodation centres) and access to jobs (vocational training). Attention was also devoted to vulnerable categories of immigrants such as refugees, with specific programmes aimed at assisting their insertion in the labour market (vocational training and Italian language courses), and trafficked women, with special protection and social integration programmes. Cultural projects were almost nonexistent, with the exception of the interpretation and translation service that hired professional interpreters on an ad hoc basis.

In Bologna, on the contrary, we find a far more diverse list of priorities, combining policy measures directed at integrating both foreign individual workers and immigrant groups. Similar to Milan, the first
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priority is represented by initial-accommodation centres, in order to cope with immigrants’ difficulties in finding decent housing at a reasonable price in the private rent market. However, in Bologna this policy was explicitly framed by the centre-left majority in terms of ‘community centres’, to be run by immigrant groups’ associations. Also policies such as intercultural education for children, community mediation to facilitate access to services and support for immigrants’ associations can be clearly characterised as group-oriented, recognising diversity in order to facilitate immigrants’ integration into the local society. At the same time, individual integration is also pursued through Italian language courses, vocational training schemes and projects to combat racial and ethnic discrimination.

The electoral victory of a centre-right majority in 1999 led to a partial revision of these priorities. The project of creating community accommodation centres was definitively abandoned while, similar to Milan, along with measures aimed at supporting processes of individual integration (i.e. first-accommodation, Italian language courses and vocational training), particular attention to vulnerable groups such as asylum-seekers came to the fore. Specific housing and vocational training schemes were developed, justified by the necessity of avoiding the risk of deviant behaviours and social marginality because of the uncertain legal status of this category of migrants. However, some degree of cultural recognition in making services more accessible to immigrants was maintained, as pointed out by the continuity of intercultural education for children and community mediation.

Finally, in the case of Naples, a mix of different measures can be observed. Similar to the Bologna centre-right administration, policy priorities combined individual integration (first-information points and vocational training), recognition of groups’ differences (intercultural education for children and community mediation) and a programme for trafficked women. As for this last priority, contrary to a similar project initiated in Milan in 1997, in Naples the programme was a consequence of the 1998 immigration law which introduced a special fund for the financing of actions aimed at protecting foreign women forced into prostitution and sustaining victims’ social insertion.

From the analysis of official policy on immigration, i.e. of the decisions formally agreed upon by different local government majorities, at least two models emerge: the multicultural model, emphasising immigrant organisations’ inclusion and group recognition, as in the case of Bologna in the period 1995-1999; and the assimilationist model, that favours individual integration and assistance to particularly disadvantaged categories, as in Milan. However, in the cases of Naples and of the Bologna right-wing administration, mixed patterns of policies emerge. As demonstrated by Figure 2.1, politics seems to have some
impact on official policy outputs: centre-left majorities usually show a preference for recognition policies, consistent with a definition of immigration as a resource for the local society; on the contrary, right-wing governments tend to privilege measures aimed at favouring individual integration and at preventing deviance among the most vulnerable groups (refugees, asylum-seekers, trafficked women), according to a definition of the issue as potential problem.

Thus, according to Figure 2.1, at the level of official policy, divergence in the priorities pursued prevails. Yet, external contingent factors can have an impact: as noted in the case of Naples, the social protection programme for trafficked women was essentially undertaken on the basis of national funding. Also, the continuity of cultural policies during the centre-right Guazzaloca administration in Bologna is at least in part explained by the availability of regional funding for the promotion of community mediation and intercultural education programmes. External funding represents the first factor to be taken into account when looking for policy divergence/convergence at the local level.

3 Policy networks and implementation: a reconstruction of practices

If we look across the columns of Table 2.1, we see that, along with vocational training, a minimum convergence on measures aimed at facili-
tating linguistic communication can be identified. However, only in the cases of the left-wing administrations in Bologna and Naples are these part of a broader policy project aimed at recognising and including immigrant groups. The following analysis of policy networks and implementation practices is aimed at finding out if, and to what extent, this project has translated into concrete actions. At the same time, I shall attempt to identify mechanisms and processes of cultural recognition which are also at work in Milan, despite the clear preference of official policies for individual integration.

In other words, the purpose of this section is to reconstruct practices of implementation in the three Italian cities in order to find out if there is any convergence towards soft recognition, i.e. some degree of – formal or informal – immigrant groups' inclusion and participation. To this end, I look at the actors involved in the delivery of immigrant policies and at their definitions of ‘the stakeholder’, which are crucial in order to identify who is in and who is out of the local policy networks.

3.1 Milan

Since the late 1970s, as the presence of foreign immigrants in Milan became increasingly perceived, two networks mobilised on the issue to propose quite different definitions of the phenomenon. There were Catholic third-sector organisations, on the one hand, and the unions supporting first-community associations, on the other.

Regarding the first network, two organisations emerged as being crucial. In 1979, Caritas Ambrosiana opened the first office providing assistance to foreign citizens in the city. In 1983, on the initiative of the Cardinal of Milan, the Curia established the Foreigners' Secretariat (Segreteria degli Esteri), with the aim of coordinating and integrating initial-help interventions (e.g. night shelters, canteens) provided by parish churches and other Catholic agencies. Both organisations shared a similar conception of immigrants, regarded as ‘new poor people’ coming from less developed countries to look for better life chances in Europe. Whereas the Curia, thanks to its network of informal voluntary services, copes with the most needy immigrants, including illegal ones, Caritas is more concerned with running facilities for legal immigrants and asylum-seekers, often in partnership with public administrations.

The second network is composed of two different kinds of organisations: immigrant associations and the unions. On the one hand, immigrant associations began to organise in the 1970s, either as informal networks or as homeland-oriented political movements. Nevertheless, the process of settlement taking place in the 1980s caused a reorientation of these movements, which started to take an interest in the living
conditions of fellow national workers. A case in point is represented by the two Eritrean Liberation Fronts, which during this period merged into the Eritrea Community, catering to the needs of Eritrean citizens living in the city. A similar pattern was followed by student associations – first Iranian and then Egyptian – which in the same decade became increasingly concerned with the living conditions of immigrants in Italy, particularly those of their fellow nationals. Labour unions, for their part, supported this new interest/orientation by promoting a discourse centred on the recognition of migrant workers' rights, including the right to associate. Community organisations were regarded as immigrants' legitimate representatives in the local policymaking processes.

Thus, at the beginning of the 1980s, two alternative discourses on immigration were confronting each other in Milan, each one mobilising different actors. The first one looked at immigrants as 'new poor people' who needed material help and moral assistance, and was promoted essentially by Catholic organisations. The second, in contrast, centred on issues of citizenship rights and group recognition, and gathered together immigrant associations and the unions with the explicit purpose of influencing local policy.

Official policies promoted by the then centre-left majority favoured the immigrant associations–unions coalition. In 1986, the Municipal Consultative Committee was established, an appointed body providing the local administration with advice and suggestions on immigration issues. In 1989, thanks to an agreement between the Education and the Social Services Department, the Foreigners' Centre (Centro Stranieri) opened, with the ambition of being a reference point for immigrants in the city. Social services were provided by the centre with the informal collaboration of ethnic leaders, members of the Consultative Committee who acted as interpreters and mediators. The centre also provided rooms and facilities for community associations to organise their activities and favoured the creation of immigrants' cooperatives. These were entrusted with the running of the municipal initial-accommodation centres – foreign-workers' hostels established with the funds provided by the 1990 immigration law.

Yet such a multicultural project of social integration yielded contradictory outcomes. The Consultative Committee progressively became less influential as a result of a lack of representativeness among many associations participating in it (Murer 2000: 19; Palidda 2000: 22). The project of the Foreigners' Centre also failed because of quarrels between the managers of the administrative departments: at the end just a small Foreigners' Office remained open to deliver first reception and assistance services. As for the multi-ethnic cooperatives, most of these organisations lacked experience in running accommodation services.
Maximum-stay rules (six months) were often disregarded, as were the monthly fees. Episodes of drug dealing and other illegal activities were reported by newspapers, causing tensions in the neighbourhoods concerned.

The situation was further exacerbated by the corruption scandals that decimated the Milanese political elite in 1992 (the so-called ‘Tangentopoli’). The Foreigners’ Office was left alone to face the degradation of the living conditions in the accommodation centres. The electoral victory of the Northern League in November 1993 left no room for any positive evaluation of previous multicultural policies. The first two years of the Northern League’s administration were marked by an effort to close down the most disreputable accommodation centres and get rid of the insolvent cooperatives.

Immigrant organisations and the unions mobilised against these plans for dissolution, and provided support to the people living in the centres. In order to face these tensions, in May 1995 a roundtable on immigrants’ housing problems was established gathering together local politicians, public officials, as well as representatives of the unions and of Caritas. At the same time, the decision of the Mayor to appoint the vice-president of a prominent Catholic organisation, the Italian Voluntary Movement (Movimento Italiano per il Volontariato, Mo.Vi), as head of the Social Services Department opened a window of opportunity for the institutionalisation of the Catholic policy network, sanctioning the definitive exclusion of immigrant associations (Caponio 2005).

Thus, the implementation of the Northern League policy priorities was pursued through a strategy of redefinition of the legitimate stakeholders. These were no longer identified with immigrant groups claiming recognition and participation, but rather with foreign individuals who needed to be assisted and/or integrated. As a consequence, Catholic associations were regarded as crucial, given their greater professional experience in providing social services to people of disadvantaged social strata.

Issues of cultural difference became of secondary relevance for such an implementation network. However, at the level of service delivery, communication problems continued to be dealt with by the Foreigners’ Office through the Interpretation Service. This was a legacy of the previous implementation network: as mentioned above, in 1989 the Foreigners’ Office began to collaborate informally with ethnic leaders in order to address problems of linguistic and cultural communication. In the following years, the number of foreign interpreters working for the administration increased constantly, and some of them were employed as community mediators to act as bridges with their own communities and facilitating their access to services. However, community mediation projects were run on a short-term basis, and targeted essentially
those groups which were regarded as the more problematic ones, i.e. the North African workers living in the initial-accommodation centres. In general, the prevailing approach has always been ad hoc, emergency interpretation, consisting of the hiring of professional interpreters on the basis of specific needs.

The service, which is still active, provides interpreters to other municipal offices/services as well as, on demand, to primary schools and hospitals. Tasks assigned to interpreters range from mere translation of documents to supporting social workers. Demands are different according to the services concerned. Whereas the Population Register usually asks for just the translation of documents and certificates, the Family Support Service (Servizio Sociale per le Famiglie) and the Minors Assistance Service (Pronto Intervento Minori) have more elaborate needs, such as supporting the establishment of communication with problematic foreign families and abandoned minors (Favaro 2001).

Cultural recognition and mediation, while denied in official policy and in the implementation network, based essentially on Italian Catholic third-sector organisations, actually inform at least in part delivery practices. However, this kind of intervention is generally regarded more as a resource for facing particularly difficult and problematic situations, rather than as a stable feature of social services for immigrants.

3.2 Bologna

First interventions in favour of immigrants were promoted by the municipality of Bologna as early as 1986, when foreigners living in the city were but a few hundred and, for the most part, students. The Orientation Centre was opened, run by the unions with the purpose of providing information and assistance to immigrant workers. In 1989, when flows started to increase consistently, it was always the municipality that took the lead: one billion lire were destined to the provision of initial-accommodation services. Old schools where groups of immigrants squatted were restructured and converted into accommodation centres managed by union-affiliated cooperatives.

Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s, the main actors dealing with immigration in Bologna were the municipality and the trade unions. They were replicating a model built up by the communist administrations governing the city since the end of World War II, i.e. direct delivery of basic services and contracting out of more specialised ones to highly professional, union-affiliated cooperatives. Significantly, one of these cooperatives, called Metoikos, was founded in 1990 by a group of first-generation immigrants – foreign students and political dissidents who had already arrived in the 1970s. Here, the Catholic movement was weaker than in Milan and highly fragmented. Parish churches and
voluntary groups provided some initial help and material assistance, but these were essentially spontaneous initiatives that never became a consistent alternative network (Bernadotti 1995).

As is clear, Bologna represents a case of strong public intervention and low third-sector autonomy. In fact, the local administration continued to develop ad hoc services for immigrants throughout the 1990s. This is the case, for instance, of the Documentation Centre on Intercultural Education (Cd-Lei): specialised in intercultural education, it was established in 1992 on the initiative of the Education Department, signing an agreement with the Province, the Provincial Education Authority (Provveditorato Agli Studi) and the Department of Science of Education at the University of Bologna. In this context, third-sector associations have always experienced a low degree of autonomy: either they were directly involved in the administration policies, as in the case of the union-affiliated cooperatives, or they were completely marginalised. Immigrant organisations could hardly have access to this system unless there were relational resources to affiliate them with the crucial actors, as in the case of the Metoikos cooperative.

However, at the beginning of the decade, an internal crisis of the communist party created pressure for the renewal of such a system and for the finding of new solutions to manage social policy. In the area of immigration, renewal meant essentially to shift attention from initial accommodation towards integration. In the programmes of the centre-left administration elected in 1995, this implied a recognition of immigrants’ differences, i.e. of their cultures of origin as well as of their associations.

To implement such an ambitious goal, a new autonomous agency was established in 1996, the Institution for Immigrants’ Services (Istituzione dei Servizi per l’Immigrazione, ISI), directed by an independent committee of experts in the field of immigration and social policy. Its mandate was to implement the policies formulated by the political executive and coordinate all the public and private actors working on the issue in the Bologna metropolitan area (Bernadotti & Mottura 1999). Immigrant associations were to take part in this process through the Metropolitan Forum of Extra-Communitarian Immigrant Associations, which was officially established in 1997 on the basis of a project co-financed by the European Commission. Compared to the Milan Consultative Committee, the forum was not an appointed institution; all the associations willing to take part were admitted. Over 40 organisations entered the forum and facilities were provided to support their activities. In 1998, immigrant associations were also invited to apply for municipal funding.

This opening of the implementation policy network to immigrant associations went hand in hand with the building of a multicultural pro-
gramme of integration. In the area of accommodation, for instance, the administration pressured the Pakistani, Moroccan and other Maghrebi men living in the municipal centres on the outskirts of the city to form community associations to be entrusted with the everyday running of the centres. Given a similar problem – providing initial-accommodation services for foreign male workers at reasonable costs for the administration – the Northern League in Milan and the centre-left majority in Bologna adopted two opposed strategies. While in Milan initial-accommodation services were curtailed, in Bologna the accommodation policy was framed as an opportunity to empower immigrants’ groups and organisations. Delegation allowed a lowering of the expenses for contracts to third-sector cooperatives.

A multicultural approach was also pursued in the areas of education and access to social services. As for education, the ISI coordinated the Inter-Ethnic Pole (Polo Interetnico) project, based on a joint partnership between various schools, seven city districts, the Cd-Lei and a Catholic association affiliated to the local Caritas. Community mediators of different nationalities were made available in order to facilitate foreign children and parents’ initial approach to schools, and to familiarise Italian students with their cultures of origin. At the same time, special courses of Italian as a second language were provided.

Access to social services was another key area of concern. In 1998 the first training course for cultural mediators in the social and health area was organised, which led to the foundation of an association specialising in health care mediation and interpretation. Other courses followed in 2000 and 2001, on the initiative of the Cd-Lei, and new associations of foreign cultural mediators were founded. Moreover, cultural mediators of various languages were directly employed by the ISI in the front office service, to welcome foreign clients and to help them to get access to the facilities offered by the municipality.

Despite the building of an essentially inclusive policy network aimed at fostering immigrants’ participation in service delivery, some contradictions have to be pointed out, particularly with the community accommodation centres. First, community associations were perceived as an imposition by the municipal administration, rather than an expression of genuine ethnic identities, as pointed out particularly in the case of Maghrebi immigrants, comprised of very different nationalities such as Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians (Però 2002). Moreover, many associations turned out to be unable to manage the accommodations, with a rapid degeneration of living conditions in the centres.

Another contradictory point was represented by participation of immigrant associations, although this was a key factor in the multicultural project implemented by the ISI. The Metropolitan Forum of Extra-Communitarian Immigrant Association was just a first step. It should
have been completed with immigrant residents over the age of eighteen directly electing two foreign representatives to the city council, the so-called ‘adjoined’ councillors. However, in 1999, the city council defeated the proposal elaborated by the ISI and the Forum, leading to the resignation of the Forum executive.

The election in June 1999 of a centre-right Pole for the Freedoms majority put a definitive end to the development of the multicultural model pursued by the ISI. The autonomous agency was closed, the experts directing it dismissed, and responsibility for immigration reassigned to the Social Services Department. In terms of policy priorities, the new Immigration Service focused its attention on initial accommodation. The implementation strategy they adopted was at least in part similar to the one pursued by the Northern League in Milan: an in-depth revision of the accommodation system was undertaken by redefining the stakeholders and thus the actors to be involved in service delivery. The emphasis shifted more and more to foreign workers’ individual needs. The implementation network was therefore opened to Catholic organisations close to Caritas, which were involved in the running of so-called ‘social centres’, smaller residential structures implementing specific projects aimed at supporting the autonomy of the immigrants’ hosts. Immigrant organisations were marginalised, except for the strongly professionalised union-affiliated cooperatives, which continued to be charged with the running of initial-accommodation centres. Most of them had been employing foreign cultural mediators since the mid-1990s.

However, the policy network did not change much as far as integration services were concerned. Many cultural activities initiated by the previous administration, such as the Inter-ethnic Pole or the Zonarelli Intercultural Centre, continued to receive financial support. Such continuity has been favoured by the Emilia-Romagna Region, by assigning funds to the municipalities in order to carry out projects aimed at enhancing the recognition of differences in the delivery of services. To avoid losing these funds, the Immigration Service continued to collaborate with the implementation network that had been consolidated in the previous years (Cd-Lei, associations of foreign cultural mediators, etc.), and which could ensure a long-term experience in the area of intercultural policy.

At the same time, the Immigration Service continued to employ cultural mediators of different nationalities in order to ease immigrants’ access to social services. There were ten such mediators in 2003. In 2002, a Centralised Service of Community Mediation and Social Interpretation was established by the Immigration Service providing qualified foreign operators to other offices of the municipal administration, as well as to other public and private institutions in the territory (hospitals, schools, training agencies, etc.). As is clear, during the cen-
tre-right administration, the implementation network encompassing the local administration, the unions, their affiliated cooperatives and immigrant associations was not completely discarded. On the contrary, it actually came to represent the backbone for the development of new projects, as pointed out by the Centralised Service of Community Mediation and Social Interpretation.

3.3 Naples

Similar to Milan, in Naples the first organisations to deal with immigrants were also Catholic parish churches, coping with basic material needs and providing services such as canteens, health centres, night shelters, showers, counselling and help centres. In some cases, Catholic institutions became a meeting point for informal groups, such as the Cape Verdean women hosted at the Cappuccini Monks’ convent of Mergellina and the Sri Lankan immigrants who attended the church of S. Pasquale in the Chiaia district.

At the end of the 1980s, immigrants also started to organise, often supported by the unions, which, during the two first amnesties for illegal immigrants, in 1986 and 1990, actively mobilised in favour of recognising immigrant workers’ rights, including the right to participate in public life through their autonomous organisations. In 1991 the Immigrants Regional Coordination Group was set up by the trade union CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana Lavoratori). Together with immigrant community associations (Senegalese, Somalis, Filipinos, Sri-Lankans, Eritreans, among others), prominent religious associations – Catholic ones, in particular – such as Caritas, the S. Egidio Community and the Federation of Evangelical Churches also took part in the initiative. A few years later, a new Coordination Group of Extra-Communitarian Associations in Campania (CASEC) was founded by ten foreigners’ associations. These also joined the anti-racism forum promoted by Italian civil rights organisations.

Thus, in contrast to the other two cities analysed so far, in Naples we do not find two networks supporting different views on the stakeholders, but rather an enlarged network agreeing on the necessity of involving immigrant groups in the development of local policy. This enlarged network found an opportunity to enter the policymaking arena in 1995, when the centre-left majority, which had been governing the city since 1993, started to get interested in the issue of immigration. An informal roundtable was established. Along with representatives from all of the public institutions (the prefecture, the police headquarters, the regional government, the Chamber of Commerce, the Provincial Education Authority, the Local Health Administration, municipal social services, and the Regional Employment Bureau), the un-
ions, lay and Catholic voluntary associations, and immigrants’ organisations (from Argentina, Somalia, Eritrea, Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Cape Verde and Sri-Lanka) also took part in it.

It is at this roundtable, led by a sociologist with expertise in the field of immigration, that the official policy priorities (see Table 2.1) of the centre-left majority were identified and agreed upon. The delivery of services was usually contracted out to Italian Catholic and lay organisations, the only ones able to offer a stable structure and long-term experience in providing social services. Yet, the projects, especially those implemented by lay cooperatives, were particularly keen to take into account issues of cultural difference and recognition. This was indicated by the initial-assistance and information points opened in 1996 in four districts of the city (territorial front offices). Originally run by Caritas, the service was contracted out in 1997 to third-sector lay organisations and became more and more culturally oriented, employing a number of cultural mediators of different national origins. Cultural mediators were also employed in the implementation of vocational training projects. Actually, the main initiative carried out in this area by the Dedalus cooperative was a professional course for foreign community mediators, which resulted in the founding of a multiethnic cooperative called Casba.

Thus, in the implementation of the various projects, as well as in everyday service delivery, a cultural approach prevails, even though stakeholders – immigrant associations – were not formally incorporated into the system of service provision. One partial exception was the Islamic community: in 1999 this association was awarded a public contract for the running of a municipal information office for immigrants thanks to the intermediary role played by an Italian association. Yet, informal participation of immigrant associations seems to be the rule, especially through cultural/community mediators hired on an individual basis. This sort of informal participation also takes place in intercultural education projects, which are run by Italian lay cooperatives employing foreign immigrants as social educators and/or community mediators.

4 Explaining grassroots multiculturalism: actors’ logic in different contexts

In this section I analyse in greater depth the interests of and logic behind the actions of the different actors taking part in the making of local policies for immigrants, to find out who might endorse multicultural policies and for what reasons. To this end, two different phases of local policymaking processes must be distinguished: 1) the decision-making phase, where official policy priorities and programmes are
agreed upon, approved and financed; and 2) the implementation phase, which consists of the translation of official priorities into service delivery practices. While strictly intertwined, for analytical purposes I keep these phases distinct.

4.1 Decision-making processes and the setting of official policy priorities

Despite images that tend to emphasise the role of politicians, a number of different actors actually take part in local decision-making processes on immigration-related issues. As a consequence, official policy priorities are the output of complex negotiations and bargaining, rather than of a coherent and pre-established model or ideology looking at immigrants either as individuals or cultural groups.

Nevertheless, at the local level, elected politicians represent crucial actors since they have to agree at least on a set of official policy priorities, even when these are somehow suggested or defined by someone else. For this category of actors, the main interest is that of building and maintaining a consensus. As a consequence, multiculturalism represents a viable solution insofar as it will be considered a ‘good’ policy frame to gain stable consensus on controversial migratory issues. This is the case of centre-left majorities in Bologna and Naples which present immigration as a resource for the society, and thus multicultural policies as a recipe for establishing positive relations with the foreign populations living in those cities. On the contrary, in the case of Milan, the prevailing centre-right parties’ political discourse on immigration as a problem does not allow for any positive evaluation of cultural difference.

According to the cases analysed, once politicians have set the general frame, either of a multicultural (Bologna and Naples) or an assimilationist (Milan) kind, a strategy of blame avoidance is often pursued: the responsibility for defining concrete intervention is delegated to experts, i.e. personalities who are well known for their competence in the field and are not subject to electoral judgement. In other terms, by resorting to experts, politicians attempt to minimise electoral risks.

In our analysis, this strategy is seen particularly in the case of Bologna, where an independent agency led by a committee of specialists was set up, and of Naples, where an expert was called upon to coordinate the roundtable charged with the task of establishing the basis for immigrant integration policies in the city. Also, in 1995 in Milan, the Northern League, despite a programme aimed at curtailing immigrant services appointed an expert as head of the Social Services Department. In all of the cases considered, experts have pursued a problem-solving-oriented logic, i.e. one aimed at providing sound solutions to perceived problems. As a consequence, multiculturalism will represent a viable solution for those experts who define issues of immi-
grants’ integration in terms of group recognition and the validation of differences. This was the case in Bologna and in Naples, where experts made considerable – if not very successful – efforts to involve immigrant associations in policymaking, but not in Milan, since the appointed expert was far more closed to Catholic NGOs acting for immigrants rather than with immigrants.

Of course, politicians usually take care to appoint experts who are not completely at odds with their own perceptions and definitions of the problem. Yet, the problem-solving logic is very often likely to contradict politicians’ search for consensus. Bologna is a case in point: the ISI experts committee strongly supported foreign groups’ participation, despite the indifference of the centre-left majority that actually defeated the ISI and Metropolitan Forum of Extra-Communitarian Immigrant Associations proposals in the Municipal Council.

However, politicians and experts do not act alone, but rather in a context where other actors are mobilised and seek to pursue their views on how immigrants should be integrated. This is the case of civil servants who might have been dealing with the issue well before politicians and appointed experts, thus developing their own ideas on the matter. They often take part in decision-making processes by providing proposals and advice, as well as crucial data and information on the feasibility of the policy interventions supported by politicians and experts. This a crucial veto power, which is likely to have a considerable influence on policymaking as well as implementation.19

Usually, bureaucratic offices will endorse multicultural policies insofar as these provide an opportunity to gain legitimacy and control over new financial and/or organisational resources. For example, since new resources were opened in Bologna by the Emilia-Romagna Region, public officials continued to carry out programmes such as community mediation and intercultural education even under the not very culturally sensitive centre-right administration, relying upon their established competence in these kinds of activities. Such expertise was clearly lacking in Naples and Milan but for opposite reasons. If in Naples it is a matter of administrative inefficiency, in Milan, the prevalence of Catholic NGOs in delivering services to immigrants, together with a public discourse emphasising issues of law and order, did actually prevent the emerging of any programme explicitly dealing with immigrants diversity.

Finally, there is a fourth category of actors who have to be taken into account when analysing local decision-making processes on immigrant integration. These are civil society organisations, i.e. third-sector associations and interest organisations such as the unions. They contribute to the setting of official policy priorities through formal and informal consultations, as well as through their close relationships with politi-
cians, bureaucracies and/or experts. Their logic of action is centred upon the recognition of their capacity to efficiently mobilise on the issues, by proposing bottom-up solutions. However, these organisations may be more or less open to cultural difference, and much depends on the definition of the stakeholder which is at the core of their mode of intervention. As pointed out, Catholic associations, which are central in Milan, have developed their interventions as a consequence of their traditional activities of assistance to the poor, and usually look at immigrants first as needy persons to whom they deliver both material and moral assistance. The unions and their affiliated NGOs, on the other hand, that have played a pivotal role in Bologna and Naples have always been concerned with issues of foreign workers' rights and, at least in principle, have been more prone to recognise specific cultural rights.

Official policy priorities are the output of this complex web of interactions in a policy arena which is likely to take a different shape according to the relative power of the actors involved. Consequently, multiculturalism represents a viable policy option only insofar as it proves to be a solution coherent with the interests and logic of all the actors concerned, or at least of those controlling the crucial resources for policymaking. If this was the case in Bologna, especially during the centre-left government, the situation seems to be much more fuzzy in Naples (political agreement, in principle, and convergence with the unions' approach to immigration, but scarce resources and lack of interest and efficiency on the part of the bureaucratic apparatus) and decidedly unfavourable in Milan.

4.2 Implementation networks and practices of service delivery

This analysis questions the thesis of a convergence in implementation processes towards some kind of immigrant group inclusion and participation, and thus of soft recognition. On the contrary, different policy networks are in place based on different definitions of the stakeholder who is not necessarily identified with immigrant associations or group representatives. This is especially the case of Milan, where the implementation network is centred on third-sector Catholic organisations, carrying out initiatives with the explicit purpose of catering to the needs of foreign individuals, such as initial and subsequent accommodation, vocational training, assistance to asylum-seekers and refugees and social protection for trafficked women.

This does not mean that immigrant associations in Milan are nonexistent. Yet, in the context described above, these associations did not have many opportunities to develop and establish themselves. The community associations, which were among the best established in the
1980s, are now far less organised and significant. The majority of immigrant associations present in Milan today can be depicted as ‘community leisure time associations’. They meet on weekends, such as the Philippine women in Catholic parish churches do (Lainati 2000: 56), or occasionally get together for national celebrations, as can be observed with the Albanian-Italian Cultural Association (Palidda 2000: 103). There are also a number of well-established multi-ethnic cooperatives specialising in cultural mediation services, but none was under any contract with the local administration in the period considered, i.e. 1993-2001.

In the case of Bologna and Naples, on the other hand, immigrant associations have been considerably involved in implementation networks, especially at an informal level. Their relationship with the union cooperatives and NGOs charged with implementing the municipality programmes proved to be crucial. However, formal contracts awarded have been few (Caponio 2005): one in Bologna in the period 1995-1999 during the centre-left administration and one in Naples to the Islamic Community in the period 1999-2001.

Despite differences in the three cities’ implementation networks, similarities emerge with respect to the practices of actually delivering services to immigrants. At the delivery level, some form of cultural recognition is pursued by street-level bureaucrats. The implicit assumption is that in order to efficiently deliver services to immigrants, basic problems of linguistic communication and cultural understanding have to be dealt with. Even though different conventions are used – social interpreters in Milan and community/cultural mediators in Bologna and Naples – foreign workers play similar functions: they facilitate immigrants’ first approach and relations with service providers, and they also support front office operators and practitioners in relating to foreign clients.

However, different conventions may also prove to be relevant, since these signal different conceptions of cultural differences on the part of public administrators. In Milan, the emphasis on interpretation clearly points to a conceptualisation in terms of a transitory problem, to be tackled by employing professionals able to provide ad hoc translation and to overcome obstacles in communication. Once these obstacles are removed, service delivery is supposed to continue in a standard way.

On the other hand, the use of labels such as cultural/community mediation point to the necessity of favouring a more long-term and ongoing process of reciprocal cultural adaptation. Usually the mediator is required to master both cultures in order to understand the two concerned parts: the stake here is mastering processes of social change. Immigrants should be included in order to properly account for their specific cultural point of view. In such a context, group participation and inclusion cannot be avoided. Even if not yet fully realised, this
seems a more favourable context for policies of soft recognition, linking immigrant groups to policy formulation and implementation.

5 Conclusion

If we look at multiculturalism as a policy option – i.e. as a set of public policies based on principles of (soft) cultural recognition – from the analysis thus carried out, we see that there are considerable differences between the cases, both at the level of official policy priorities and of implementation networks. On the first point, multiculturalism, or policies recognising groups’ cultural diversity in access to services and social resources, is a policy option which requires the agreement of all the actors taking place in local decision-making processes or at least of those having control of relevant resources.

Elected political majorities are in this respect crucial, since they rely upon the democratic source of legitimate decision-making: voting. The analyses carried out in this chapter clearly demonstrate the influence of other categories of actors. This is particularly the case of civil servants, who control vital resources for policy implementation. Moreover, as emphasised in the cases of Bologna and Milan, immigration and foreigners’ offices play a role in selecting, and thus including or excluding, civil society organisations which take part in policy implementation networks.

Consequently, as far as implementation networks are concerned, differentiation rather than convergence prevails, in the sense that different implementation networks are likely to be established and to consolidate over time. Immigrant associations may or may not be included. Inclusion depends on the definition of the stakeholder agreed upon by all the concerned actors, i.e. politicians, civil servants and prominent civil society organisations working in the field. As we have seen, these may either agree to favour immigrant groups, regarded as representing different interests and identities, or individual foreigners. The latter is usually the position of Catholic organisations, drawing upon their consolidated tradition of caring for the poor, regardless of any other specification. Thus, implementation networks do not necessarily imply the linking or participation of immigrant groups, since alternative definitions of the stakeholders may also prevail.

However, a certain convergence can be detected at the level of service delivery, where it is difficult to completely avoid issues of cultural and linguistic diversity. Here the key actor is the so-called ‘street-level bureaucrat’ (Lipsky 1980), i.e., social workers, teachers, counter-clerks, educators and others who may feel unable to provide adequate answers to a culturally different clientele. Yet ways of defining and dealing with
such issues are again different, suggesting that trends towards convergence are only partial and do not necessarily entail recognition of groups and their participation.

A sort of functional strategy prevails, in that accommodation of diversity is regarded first and foremost by practitioners as a way to overcome obstacles in the delivery of existing services to foreign users. This is especially the case in Milan. In Bologna and Naples, despite a public discourse open to cultural recognition, accommodation is more a matter of informal relations than an institutionalised system providing for groups’ inclusion and representation.

Rather than a convergence towards some sort of formal or informal linking of groups and foreign associations in policy implementation and formulation, our cases show a convergence towards functional recognition or, in Vermeulen and Stotijn’s terms (in this volume), pragmatic accommodation, driven by practitioners in order to address problems in everyday service delivery. Research studies on the level of delivery practices are still few and far from systematic – not only in Italy. However, if we are to understand how multiculturalism concretely takes place – and in spite of ideological opposition at the level of official policy – a more in-depth analysis of practices and their diffusion across similar institutions/organisations is of utmost relevance. In the case of health care services, for instance, a certain convergence has been noted across European hospitals towards practices of cultural recognition in the delivery of child-care and maternity services, as well as towards the incorporation of interpretation and/or cultural mediation services (Caponio 2006b).

In order to look at multiculturalism at the local level, one must thus overcome traditional political units of policymaking. This is in order to find out how practitioners in different organisations deal with issues of cultural diversity, as well as the conditions that, within organisations, favour or discourage the adoption and diffusion of different practices of recognition. To what extent these also entail groups’ inclusion and participation is still an open question. In the Italian cities analysed here, inclusion is not necessarily the case. After all, practices aimed at accommodating immigrants’ cultural differences in access to services might well co-exist in the absence of any – formal or informal – participation channel.

Notes

1 For a review of the literature on local policies for immigrants in Italy, see Zincone and Caponio (2004) and Caponio (2006a). For the case of Spain, see Morén-Alegret (2004).
2 The *intercultural* attitude is just sketched by Alexander. Doubts are cast on the real occurrence of a policy change since, according to him, it is difficult to establish whether the designation of ‘intercultural’ is just a rhetorical variant for pluralist attitudes (2007: 214). However, the fact that this attitude applies not only to once pluralist cities such as Amsterdam, Birmingham and Stuttgart but also to new immigration ones such as Turin, Rome and Barcelona, seems to point out a certain weakness in conceptualising intercultural attitudes and policies as a mere reaction to the shortcomings of multiculturalism. According to Wood and Landry (2008), the intercultural city is one that pursues intercultural exchange and cross-fertilisation in all policy domains in order to get the most from its multifaceted diversity.

3 It must be pointed out that Alexander intends his prevalent use of the term ‘pluralist’ to be essentially interchangeable with ‘multicultural’.

4 Soft recognition should not be confused with soft *multiculturalism* (Martiniello 1997). The latter indicates social practices, consumer and lifestyles that are oriented towards an appreciation of cultural difference though not related to public policy. It is also different from weak *multiculturalism* (Grillo 2007) in which cultural diversity is recognised in the private sphere, contrasted with the high degree of assimilation expected in the public sphere, i.e. law, the market, education, employment, etc. According to Entzinger (2000), this is the individual approach to cultural diversity, i.e. based on ideas of liberal pluralism, which is in opposition to strong *multiculturalism* and its promotion of the acknowledgement and institutionalised recognition of cultural difference. The category of soft recognition proposed here falls somewhere in between. It refers to immigrant policies that somehow take into account the relevance of cultural difference in access to social services and social resources overall, albeit without an explicit acknowledgement or strong institutionalisation of group differences.

5 The chapter is based on research initially carried out in 2001-2002 for my PhD in political science (obtained at the University of Florence), and enriched and completed in 2003 during my contract as researcher at the University of Bologna. As will be specified, my main sources were official documents approved by the three local administrations considered. Over 50 in-depth interviews with policymakers and ethno-graphic observations in the cities’ immigration offices were also carried out.

6 Priorities have been established according to three criteria: 1) the amount of financial resources invested in the various policies; 2) the number of administrative records concerning a certain policy; and 3) the source of the financial resources invested – if coming from the local administration budget or from external funding. This third point is a crucial dimension, since it distinguishes between priorities set directly by the local government and sustained with internal resources from policies drawing from regional and national laws and provisions that are thus based upon external resources.

7 For a more detailed description of the development of immigrant associations in the city of Milan, see Caponio (2005).

8 The longer-established associations, such as those in the Eritrean and Egyptian communities, were able to set up a range of initiatives, such as native language courses for children.

9 For details on immigration laws in Italy, see Zincone (1998, 2006).

10 However, must be pointed out that school and hospitals only marginally apply for this service, since there are other organisations in Milan providing cultural mediators specialised in the areas of education and health care.

11 These were primarily architects, mainly from Argentina and different African countries, who came to Italy and completed their studies (Bernadotti & Mottura 1999: 80).

12 A Metropolitan Forum of Extra-Communitarian Immigrant Associations office was opened and provided with computers, a printer and a photocopier.
However, only awarded were small grants, each around €2,500–€3,000.

In 2005, Bologna had at least four active associations of cultural mediators: one specifically catering to women, two specialising in children's education and one to facilitate access to health services (Provincia di Bologna – Osservatorio per l'Immigrazione 2006).

'Adjoined' councillors were voted on in the mid-1990s in Rome and Ancona. They are not allowed to vote in the Council, and have a mere consultative function. Other cities allowed for the direct election of consultative committees, the 'consulte.' This was the case of Turin in 1995 (though only until 1999), of Modena (1999), Palermo (2001) and Bergamo (1999).

This is the case, for instance, of a social centre run by the Arc-en-ciel association hosting foreign male workers who wish to reunite with their families living abroad. The centre assists them with finding a proper home in the private market and with bureaucratic procedures involved in family reunion.

The centre provides facilities to ethnic communities and associations to enable them to organise cultural activities (national celebrations, language courses, ethnic festivals, etc.).

These are selected by the Immigration Office based on a number of criteria. A list of qualified foreign community mediators and social interpreters is available on demand (Provincia di Bologna – Osservatorio per l’Immigrazione 2006: 11-13).

See, for instance, the role of bureaucracy in Bologna in impeding the consolidation of the ISI (Caponio 2006a).

This is the case of, for instance, the Crinali and Kantare cooperatives. Founded in the 1990s by Italian and foreign trade union activists, these cooperatives work particularly in partnership with city hospitals and health centres.

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3 Young immigrants’ low participation in the German vocational training system: how local actors in Munich and Frankfurt/Main try to make a difference

Can M. Aybek

1 Introduction

The vast majority of migration to Western Europe since the 1950s has been to cities (Messina 2007: 27; Van der Gaag, Van Wissen, Salt, Lynus & Clark 2001: 5-16). Manufacturing sector companies were located in these cities and provided the newcomers with a workplace, an income and a perspective on the future. However, the post-industrial urban centres at present are characterised, by a general decline of their blue-collar workforce and a small job market for low-skilled workers. In combination with cutbacks in social budgets in most European countries, these developments initiated stratification processes within the urban communities that created a new underclass characterised by, among other features, ethnic origin and/or migratory background. Persistent differences in educational outcomes between young natives and immigrants have led to a duplication of this stratification. This chapter focuses on one of the important thresholds where this achievement gap occurs in Germany: the transition from school to vocational training.

In the first part, I will illustrate the overall situation in the German vocational education and training system (known as VET), and will discuss the problems young immigrants face. My aim is to outline a broader framework as a prerequisite to understanding the general circumstances under which local policies are developed and implemented. As a second step, I will discuss – based on case studies of Munich and Frankfurt/Main – how, within the framework of local policymaking, policies on the integration and vocational training of immigrants relate to each other. And in the last part of my chapter, I will present two examples of practical approaches from the cases that, while not representing mainstream programmes, have had some success in bringing young immigrants into VET. Based on these examples, I will develop hypotheses on how and why certain characteristics seem to be more important than others in bringing about a policy shift that might offer more favourable conditions to disadvantaged young immigrants in search of vocational training.
2 The situation of young immigrants in the German vocational education system

Seen from a comparative perspective, the German secondary school as well as VET system appears to be both highly stratified and strongly selective (see Allmendinger & Leibfried 2003; Deutsches PISA-Konsortium, Baumert & Neubrand 2001; Walther, Stauber, Pohl, & Seifert 2004). Education policy is, in principle, a regional matter and may therefore vary to a certain extent between the regions (Länder). Nevertheless, there are some common characteristics valid for most of the country. After only four years of elementary schooling, in most regions pupils are regrouped onto different school tracks. This selection procedure is based on the recommendation given by the elementary schools, but the final decision is taken by the children’s parents. They apply to one of the three school tracks they want their child to attend: the basic secondary school track, the *Hauptschule*; an intermediate secondary school, the *Realschule*; or the more academic *Gymnasium*. Following the four years of elementary education, the *Hauptschule* leads to a certificate of compulsory education after five years; the *Realschule* provides a certificate of a higher status after six years, which nowadays in most professions is considered to be the educational minimum in order to be accepted as an apprentice; and the *Gymnasium* provides a qualification (*Abitur*) giving access to higher education after nine years.

According to empirical research, the transition to the *Gymnasium* track is determined not only by the individual achievement of the student, but also by the social background of the family (Konsortium Bildungsberichterstattung 2006: 49-50). The chances of a child attending the *Gymnasium* are fourfold if the parents belong to the highest occupational status group compared to a child coming from a working class family. Although there are some regional differences, the probability of attending the *Hauptschule* is also connected to family background: children with parents of higher social status are more often successful in avoiding lower school types compared to their peers, even if their achievement at school is equally weak.

According to a Report by Germany’s Commissioner for Integration, Maria Böhmer, in the school year 2004-2005 only 15 per cent of German children attended the *Hauptschule*, compared to over 40 per cent of children with a foreign citizenship. Furthermore, almost half (45 per cent) of the Germans attended the *Gymnasium*, but only a fifth (21 per cent) of the foreign-citizen students did so (Migrationsbeauftragte 2007: 57–58). This ‘ethnic divide’ with respect to school types also has consequences for the chances of these young people when they look for job training. Before sketching out the situation during the last years on the VET market, I will describe the system itself.
The German VET system can be roughly subdivided into three areas:

– company-based job training, better known as the ‘dual system’ (duales Berufsbildungssystem);
– school-based vocational training (Schulberufssystem), the typical preparation for certain professions such as nursing, and fully comparable to the dual system with respect to the qualification obtained; and
– the intermediate system (Übergangssystem), which consists of measures and programmes of different types and does not provide a vocational certificate.

The backbone of this VET system – at least in the public discourse – is still considered to be company-based training, the dual system. This is an institutionalised structure, in which the apprentice, after having been accepted by a company, is trained for a period of two to four years. She/he attends school one or two times a week and is trained the rest of the week within the company. This system is strongly regulated and the qualifications obtained are highly standardised. Every person finishing vocational education is supposed to have similar levels of knowledge and all the necessary skills to work in the profession in which he or she was trained.

Young people in Germany generally put much effort into obtaining training in one of over 340 acknowledged professions. However, the share of young immigrants with no vocational qualifications is much higher than that of youths of German origin (BMBF 2007: 123-126). Even the fact that – as the former Federal Government Commissioner for Foreigners and Integration, Marieluise Beck, once put it – young migrants show a great interest in obtaining a vocational qualification and ‘can – to the highest degree – be sure that their parents will encourage them in their ambitions’ (Beauftragte für Ausländerfragen 2002: 216), does not alter this negative outcome.

Based on data gathered for the Federal Report on Vocational Training in 2006, Burkert and Seibert illustrate that the percentage of young foreigners who participated in vocational training dropped in the previous ten years by nearly 10 per cent. In 1994 this share was still 34 per cent, whereas in the year 2004 only 25 per cent of school-leavers with non-German citizenship participated in vocational training (BMBF 2006: 31). In addition to the general decline in the participation rate, there are some gender-specific observations: young females of foreign citizenship – despite the unfavourable conditions – have been able to keep their participation rate almost constant (although at a very low level). A phenomenon which is coming more and more into the focus of political debate and scientific interest is the performance of male immigrants: their participation rate decreased sharply, by 14
percentage points from 42 per cent in 1994 to 28 per cent in 2004 (BMBF 2006: 3).

The trend shown in Figure 3.1 seems to be continuing, as the VET Report for 2008 with updated information shows: the participation rate of young foreigners dropped in 2006 even further to 23.7 per cent (BMBF 2008: 97). This is less than half of the share that could be observed for young people of German citizenship (56.9 per cent).

The classic strongholds of youth employment for those with lower educational levels, many of whom had a migratory background, were the small- and medium-sized companies in the German manufacturing sector. The blue-collar professions of the manufacturing sector have for years been a ‘safe haven’ for young people with lower educational qualifications, because in this training segment they did not have to compete for an apprenticeship with graduates of higher school tracks. In recent years, however, the economic conditions for these companies have been especially harsh so they have been forced to reduce their employment and VET capacities. Furthermore, economic restructuring processes and the shift towards more knowledge-based work have changed the face of the remaining training opportunities in the manufacturing sector. The actual content of the work became more similar to the tertiary, service sector, interpreted as the ‘internal tertiarisation’ of manufacturing (Baethge, Solga & Wieck 2007: 27-28). In many parts of the manufacturing sector, expectations of the profile of apprentices have risen, so that – besides the already limited capacities it can offer – the sector can no

*Figure 3.1* Participation rates in VET of youths with German and foreign citizenship by gender, 1993–2004

*Source:* Burkert and Seibert (2007: 9)
longer be viewed as the area offering VET opportunities to young people with lower educational credentials.

Although the service sector has more to offer in terms of job training, in many branches the competition for training is fierce. Students from the Gymnasium potentially apply for the same training slots as those with Hauptschule certificates. In some cases, where certain ‘soft skills’, such as social abilities and communication skills are required, acceptance can be especially difficult for young people with a working class and/or non-native background.

In recent years changes have occurred on the supply as well as the demand side of the VET market (see Beicht, Friedrich & Ulrich 2007; Ulrich, Eberhard & Krewerth 2006b). On one hand, the total number of school-leavers has increased for demographic reasons; on the other hand, there has been a general decrease in training locations due to structural changes in the economy. These factors have made it more difficult for young people with Hauptschule certificates to gain access to training opportunities.

A political reaction to these changes has been the expansion of the ‘intermediary’ system. The intermediary system channels certain groups of young people who are considered to be disadvantaged into further qualification programmes and schemes (Baethge et al. 2007). The biggest share of these programmes are called ‘vocational orientation’ (Berufsorientierung) or ‘vocational elementary education’ (Berufsgrundbildung) and give young people the chance to complete their compulsory schooling years, but do not provide them with a recognised vocational certificate. The second biggest and fastest-growing part of this system between 1995 and 2004 was the Labour Office programme for ‘vocational preparation’ (Berufsvorbereitung). In addition, there was a growing number of participants in school- or project-based programmes organised by the state (Länder) or local governments.²

Figure 3.2 illustrates the general participation structure of young people with foreign citizenship in the VET system, and points to the regional differences between the two Länder, Hesse and Bavaria. Participation in the intermediary system plays a more important role in Hesse – with Frankfurt/Main being one of the Hessian cities – than in Bavaria, where Munich is located. However, looking at the overall picture the trend is very similar: young foreigners are overrepresented in the programmes of the ‘intermediary system’ while the proportion of the share of foreigners in the whole student body in each Land to their overall share of 2004 school graduates is comparable.

The official statistics on developments in Germany’s VET system unfortunately do not deliver important information such as the socio-economic characteristics of the participants in the intermediary system. Nor do they describe what happens to participants after they leave the
programmes. Therefore a study has been initiated by the German Labour Office and the Federal Institute for Vocational Education (Bewerberbefragung, BA/BIB) in order to better understand certain developments in the VET system. Since 1997, this study has analysed annually the transition patterns of young people who applied to the Labour Offices in order to be channelled into job training. One of the main results is that young people with *Hauptschule* qualifications have a much higher probability of entering the intermediary system than those who have *Realschule* or *Gymnasium* certificates. This is especially true for the measures aimed at improving vocational orientation (Krewerth & Ulrich 2006: 77). At the same time, participation in any of the schemes does seem to have neither a positive nor a negative effect on the chances of entering job training in the dual system (Ulrich & Krewerth 2006: 169).

To assess the overall chances of young immigrants and natives of getting into the dual system (see Figure 3.3), we again refer to the aforementioned BA/BIBB Survey 2004 data (Ulrich, Eberhard, Granato & Krewerth 2006a: 202-206).

In 2004 the overall probability of getting an apprenticeship for native Germans was about 40 per cent. If these native-born young people had acquired a *Realschule* or *Gymnasium* certificate, their chances rose to 47 per cent. If, in addition to their better school certificate, their maths grade had been ‘good’ or ‘very good’, their transition rate to VET became 64 per cent. Finally, if the employment rate in their home re-
region was below 9 per cent, 71 per cent of them were able to take part in vocational training within the dual system.

For all the applicants who, in one way or another, had a migratory background the overall probability of finding a training location was 29 per cent. With a Realschule or Gymnasium certificate their chances improved by 5 per cent to 34 per cent. Having a ‘good’ or ‘very good’ maths score added another seven percentage points, so that the probability rose to 41 per cent. A favourable labour market situation in addition to all of this led to a transition probability of 44 per cent.

Some observations seem to be valid for both immigrants and natives: a better school certificate, a better maths score and a place of residence with favourable employment conditions raise the chances of entering the dual system. But these effects (if all three conditions are fulfilled) – as illustrated by the log-odds in Figure 3.3 – are much stronger for the native-born population than for immigrants.

There is also the possibility that certain unfavourable conditions may cumulate. If the immigrant applicant had ‘only’ a Hauptschule certificate, the probability of being accepted for vocational training was 25 per cent. If their maths score was no better than ‘sufficient’, their chances diminished by ten percentage points to 15 per cent. And if they happened to live in a region with an unemployment rate higher than 9 per cent, only eight in 100 were able to find a place as an apprentice.

To sum up, the traditional trajectory of leaving school and being immediately admitted to professional training seems to be more difficult for young immigrants than it is for their native-born peers. Generally favourable individual characteristics and contextual conditions have a

**Figure 3.3** Probability of successful transition into the dual system in 2004

![Probability of successful transition into the dual system in 2004](image)

*Source: Ulrich, Eberhard, Granato and Krewerth (2006a)*
less positive effect on them than on young Germans and the impact of negative factors is stronger. Furthermore, a within-group variation for young immigrants is also observed: among immigrants born in Germany the transition rate to vocational training was on average 33 per cent and among ethnic German immigrants (from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics) it even reached 35 per cent. However, of young people born abroad only 18 per cent were able to make a successful transition. The most difficult situation was observed for young people born in Turkey or with Turkish citizenship: only 16 per cent of them managed to find a vocational training place (Ulrich et al. 2006a: 205-206).

Instead of obtaining a proper vocational qualification, young migrants tend to pursue further schooling or participate in the schemes of the intermediary system. This might improve their chances, but they may also be ‘cooled out’, lose their interest, or put on ‘waiting loops’ without actually entering proper VET (see Lex 1997), and eventually be excluded from vocational training. Solga (2002) argues that a lower educational background in combination with the label ‘participated in programmes’ has a quite strong stigmatising effect on the VET market for all disadvantaged young people in Germany.

Having examined the situation of young immigrants on the individual level, we now turn our attention to institutional structures and approaches within integration policymaking on the local level.

\section*{3 Integration policy and local governance of vocational training}

For a long time, immigration- and integration-related issues in Germany were not at the heart of federal politics. Since the Citizenship Act (1999) and Immigration Act (2004) were passed, however, this trend seems to have been reversed. The Federal Commissioner for Foreigners, Refugees and Integration, Maria Böhmer, and even Chancellor Angela Merkel regularly address integration-related issues. Concerning young immigrants' transition problems Böhmer stated:

The difficult situation of young immigrants must represent a main issue in the political debate on vocational training. ... Within the context of the National Integration Plan the Federal Government will put all necessary effort into easing the transition of young foreigners into vocational training – for only those who have a vocational qualification have a fair chance of integrating and taking part in our country’s social life on an equal footing.
Official documents issued by local governments contain similar statements. In a document formulating a *Leitbild* (or ‘vision’) for the city of Munich, for instance, the following passage can be found:

> It is the aim of local policies to enable all foreigners who live here permanently or over a long time-period to benefit from work-related, social, cultural and educational opportunities on an equal footing. This means that their integration has to be supported with measures, while their cultural identity has to be preserved to avoid an uprooting of these immigrants. (LH München – Planungsreferat 1999: 20)

Rather than concentrating on declarations or policy goals, in the following part of this chapter I shall focus on the local institutional structures in integration and VET policymaking. The latter type of institutions, in a most manifest sense, determine the general conditions, in terms of available slots for job training, programmes and schemes of the intermediary system, etc. They design the opportunity structure the young people are confronted with during their transition processes into VET (Heinz, Weymann & Alheit 1996).

### 3.1 Institutional structures and strategies in integration policymaking

In order to better understand how the transition processes are influenced by local institutional structures we will refer to the cases of Frankfurt/Main and Munich. Rather than evaluating specific policies and their outcomes, institutional developments in the area of integration policymaking will be outlined. The objective of this comparison is to identify trajectories that have led to quite different institutional settings for integration policymaking on the local level.

The case selection is based on a ‘most similar systems design’ approach (Dogan 2002: 73-74; Landman 2008: 70-75; Przeworski & Teune 1970). The aim of such an approach is, on one hand, to reduce the number of variables that might have an effect on the question of ‘policymaking in the area of vocational education’ in order to support a higher transition rate of disadvantaged immigrant youth into VET. On the other hand, differences should be accounted for in a variable assumed to play a key role, the institutional structure of integration policymaking.

The selected cases share characteristics in the following realms:
- scale of the city
- economic structure and labour market situation
- composition of population and
- institutions concerned with immigrant integration.
Both Frankfurt and Munich are metropolitan cities. Their economic impact on the region in which they are located is strong. In terms of population, Frankfurt (660,000 people) is half the size of Munich (1.3 million) but, in economic terms, Frankfurt represents the centre of a region where 4.9 million people live (see Magistrat Frankfurt a. M. 2007; Schönwälder & Söhn 2007). The economic performance of the metropolitan areas of Munich and Frankfurt is similarly high. This is relevant for the argument made in this chapter, because it means that both cases represent full-fledged VET markets with the advantages as well as the downsides typical of urban service economies. The unemployment rates in recent years have been relatively low in both cities, and the ratios between the number of available apprenticeships and the number of young people searching for such a position have been advantageous.

Another commonality is that both cities have a high share of immigrants among their resident population. The German National Statistical Office recently published demographic data which, for the first time, count people not according to their citizenship but differentiating on the basis of migratory background. According to these tables from the 2005 census, in Frankfurt persons with a migratory background make up 39.5 per cent of the total population, whereas in Munich this share is 34.2 per cent (see Statistisches Bundesamt 2007). Together with cities like Stuttgart, Augsburg, Nuremberg or Wuppertal, they have the highest share of immigrants in urban areas. The composition of the immigrant groups in Frankfurt and Munich is also quite similar, although Frankfurt has a slightly more diverse composition, probably because the international airport there is used as an entry gate by immigrants of different ethnic backgrounds.

An important aspect within this analysis is that in current scientific debates both cities are treated as municipalities with advanced local integration or multicultural policies (see Filsinger 1998; Pröhl 1998; Schader-Stiftung, Deutscher Städetetag, GdW Bundesverband deutscher Wohnungs- und Immobilienunternehmen et al. 2007). A variety of immigration-related public policy and civil society organisations have developed in the last two decades. Issues related to immigration and integration processes have been continually put on the agenda of the local political institutions through public debates and the engagement of immigrants and their grassroots organisations. A number of politicians themselves have an immigrant background and are members of the city council. Furthermore, in both cities immigration-specific bodies have been established, although the strategies followed were quite different.

In 1989, the city of Frankfurt put a concept into practice that was absolutely unique at that time in Germany. The idea was to introduce an
administrative unit designed to play the role of a mastermind or pioneer for the whole city administration with respect to integration policies and give impulses to other departments. The initiative for an Office for Multicultural Affairs (Amt für multikulturelle Angelegenheiten, AMKA) came from the Green Party – at that time part of the governing coalition – and its prominent council member Daniel Cohn-Bendit. The Office started off with a multicultural team and a small budget. Formally it had the same rights as other units in the administrative hierarchy of the city, but it had no authority to give directives to other parts of the administration on any issues. It was therefore dependent on the willingness of the other departments and units to cooperate (Noormann 1994: 75-76). Even though this willingness to cooperate was not always present and in some cases even the contrary was true, the Office managed to set examples of good integration programmes and give impetus through projects it realised either in cooperation with immigrant organisations or alone. The projects were conducted in various policy fields, for example, in the area of youth policies (see AMKA 2000). The main approach in Frankfurt was thus to establish the AMKA as a central unit for coordinating and pioneering local integration policy.

A similar approach could be observed in Munich, at least until the end of the 1990s. In the mid-1990s the position of a Commissioner for Foreigners’ Affairs was established, which was later changed to an Ombudsman Office. Local integration policy was an important issue and therefore required institutional support and a sound knowledge of the related tasks. In 1997 the city collected data and published a detailed report called the ‘Life Situation of Foreign Citizens’ (LH München – Planungsreferat 1997b). Within the context of developing and formulating an urban Leitbild, the issue of foreigners was explicitly addressed (LH München – Planungsreferat 1997a; Reiß-Schmidt & Tress 2000).

At the end of the 1990s, however, the institutional framework of integration policymaking in Munich shifted towards a mainstreaming approach, trying to involve all relevant departments in local administration, and away from an integration policy where a single administrative unit was centrally responsible. The institutional bodies established before were either dissolved or their role and powers were diminished. The positions of the Councillor of Foreigners’ Affairs and the Ombudsman were abolished and instead a ‘Unit for Intercultural Work’ was created, which, as a subunit of the Housing Section within the Social Affairs Department, represents a lower position within the administrative hierarchy.

Despite these developments signalling, to a certain degree, the downsizing importance of migration and integration issues, the local
Office for Youth Welfare has been extremely active. For example, in the field of youth policies they have issued publications such as a ‘Concept of Doing Social Work with Immigrant Children and Youth’ and, later, ‘Guidelines for an Intercultural Children and Youth Welfare Policy’ (LH München – Sozialreferat/Stadtjugendamt 2000).

In academic as well as policymaking discourses, the approach followed in Munich in the field of youth welfare policies is regarded as highly innovative with its emphasis on the ‘intercultural orientation’ of publicly provided social services (Filsinger 2002: 44; Handschuck & Schröer 2003). ‘Intercultural orientation’ or ‘cultural mainstreaming’ as a policy approach aims to develop standards for every relevant policy field in order to ensure that the services provided within the respective fields take the needs and specificities of immigrant clientele into account. Once developed, the standards have to be generally acknowledged and put into practice by the relevant institutions. This policy goal is also termed the ‘intercultural opening’ of institutions for immigrants and migration-specific issues (Filsinger 2002; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung & Modellprojekt ‘Transfer interkultureller Kompetenz’ der iaf-Berlin 2002; Handschuck & Schröer 2000).

The approaches to integration policymaking in Frankfurt/Main as well as in Munich are both advanced, but at the same time very different. The Office for Multicultural Affairs in Frankfurt plays the role of a principal coordinator in migration and integration-related issues, whereas the strategy followed by the actors in Munich relies more on a mainstreaming approach. The question that arises here is: to what extent do these differences influence the policymaking in the area of vocational education and training?

3.2 Institutional structures of VET policy in Munich and Frankfurt

In both Munich and Frankfurt, networks were established during the 1990s to tackle problems related to the vocational education and training of young people. The network in Munich is named Working Group Youth, Vocation and Education, whereas in Frankfurt it is entitled Network for Youth and Labour. They constitute an important, if not the most important, institutional setting for local approaches to vocational training. As previously mentioned, most young people in Germany complete vocational training in the so-called ‘dual system’. The actors involved in delivering the training within this system must broadly coordinate their actions. The new networks were initially established to do exactly this in a more efficient way.

The network structure is similar in both cities (see Figure 3.4). Members of these networks include the local Labour Office and at least
three departments of the local government, namely the Department of Labour and/or Finance, Department of Education and the Department of Social Affairs (or Youth). In addition, the Chamber of Trade and Commerce (representing mainly the service sector) and the Chamber of Artisans (for the manufacturing sector) send representatives. Some other public or private organisations offering programmes to young people who are still in need of a VET placement also take part. In Frankfurt, this includes, for example, a semi-public organisation: the Local Association for Youth Employment, partly owned by the city itself; whereas in Munich there are several organisations involved. Moreover, there are always representatives of the Länder government from the Ministry of Education or other relevant parts of the administration at the Länder level. Along with other minor actors, local politicians occasionally take part as well. In Munich, for instance, this happens quite regularly. Munich’s vice-mayor has even chaired the network for a long time herself – a deliberate action by the city government to stress the political importance of this network at the local level.

It is important to mention that the networks have a closed membership structure. Indeed there are institutions wishing to participate which are not admitted. For example, the administrative units dealing directly with intercultural and integration-related issues are not necessarily members of the network: as of the year 2006 in Munich the Unit for Intercultural Work had only recently been admitted and in Frankfurt the AMKA was still not member of the network. This exclu-
sion may be explained by the attitude of the established members, although it may also be the result of a lack of personnel or the fact that potentially interested actors from the field of integration policy do not have the necessary technical know-how on VET related issues. There is also the possibility that certain actors do not get involved because they are already engaged in other types of local youth policy networks.

The permanent members making up the core of these networks are mainly higher ranking decision makers in their respective organisations. Only a few are from middle management with implementation responsibilities. The latter generally act as intermediaries and communicate the necessary information and instructions to the operational levels.

The high-ranking members meet only two to four times a year. These meetings are prepared well in advance by the lower-ranking staff, who come together on a regular basis in subgroups. Representatives of outside institutions join these meetings whenever the core members think it is necessary.

The roles played by the representatives of each institution are different. They differ according to their institution’s interests as well as their prominence, financial resources and political power. They also differ considerably according to the level of engagement of the person in charge.

In both networks in Munich and Frankfurt, the mode of cooperation is based on similar principles. There is no fixed statute describing the procedures or defining the rights and duties of the members. The networks thus have, in principle, an informal and voluntary character. No press releases are published after meetings, nor are any documents disseminated unless there is a specific reason for doing so and all members explicitly agree on the content. This is in accordance with the general principle that all decisions have to be taken consensually. There is, therefore, at least in theory, always the risk of a veto-player, but the agenda is prepared well in advance so the chances of parties not cooperating are low.

According to the actors themselves, the goals pursued by these networks can be summarised as follows:

– to exchange information and monitor developments in VET and youth policy in the city
– to track existing measures and programmes
– to identify actual or potential bottlenecks in the vocational training market and
– to confer on possible solutions.

It is important to look at the institutional structures of vocational training in more detail in order to assess the immigrant youths’
chances to participate in the VET market. Freeman (2004: 946-958) points out that immigrants’ integration processes are highly fragmented, i.e. are taking place in different realms of society and are influenced to different degrees by already existing institutions. Therefore the analysis of integration has to be disentangled and the conditions in each societal domain have to be analysed separately.

In the social science literature on German political economy, the skill provision structure is deemed to be a consensus-based regulation system, representing a ‘non-liberal’ or ‘socially embedded’ model of capitalism (see Crouch, Finegold & Sako 2001; Estevez-Abe, Iversen & Soskice 2001; Streeck, Hilbert, Kevelaer, Maier & Weber 1987; Streeck 1989, 1997). In essence, these VET networks represent exactly this corporate regulation system of the German labour market. A closer examination of the membership structure of the VET-related networks and their function reveals that the main objective of these networks is to provide a local structure for skill provision for the labour market. They do not follow an integration-related or immigrant-specific agenda, but rather maintain the traditional system and its regular tools. One of the central claims of this paper is that – regardless in which locality young immigrants in Germany reside – the vast majority of them who could not yet enter proper job training, participate in regular programmes – and not immigrant-specific programmes. These programmes are offered by the major actors in the field, such as the German Agency for Labour (Arbeitsagentur), which are part of the networks described above and have a big influence on what the opportunity structures look like on the local level.

The problem is that most of the programmes offered within the regular system address the group of ‘disadvantaged young people’ as a whole. Those with lower educational certificates are – in most of the cases – considered to be part of this youth. They are described as a group with great deficits and therefore are assumed to be in need of compensatory programmes. Even though no thorough direct evaluation of these programmes of the intermediary system has been conducted, the empirical data cited suggest that the schemes adopted so far have been inefficient or insufficient to reverse the prevailing negative trend in VET participation of young immigrants (see Granato & Meissner 1994; Granato 2003; Granato & Schittenhelm 2003; Uhly & Granato 2006; Ulrich & Granato 2006).

4 Introducing and establishing new approaches in VET

Under such circumstances, any potential improvement lies in the development of new approaches rather than continuing with the existing
programmes. But even though new approaches might be successful, they could also face some difficulties, such as finding the acceptance of established actors in the field. To discuss these issues, I will refer to some examples from my case studies.

4.1 Munich

My first example concerns the approach that a civil society organisation in Munich, the Iniativgruppe (IG), has developed. The IG has been engaged since the early 1970s in social work with immigrants and integration work, of which youth programmes are just one part. Because of its successful work, the organisation has managed to grow from a tiny non-governmental organisation to a medium-sized provider of various social services, always with an emphasis on programmes related to extracurricular support in schools and the successful management of the transition from school to vocational training. As part of a reflective manner of conducting its work the IG developed intercultural quality standards. These standards are continuously monitored and documented. Moreover, a large number of its employees have migratory background themselves.

The IG’s activities are grouped into and described as ‘work modules’. I will refer here only to the most important ones. Within the context of supporting the transition of young immigrants, cooperation with schools in the neighbourhoods plays an important role. Besides maintaining contacts with school administrations and teachers, specialists from the IG visit school classes from the seventh to ninth grades to inform the students about different vocations and train them in writing applications and preparing for interviews. After contacting the young people in their schools, the students are invited to come to one of the IG youth centres, where different programmes and projects are offered. These programmes have multiple primary and secondary goals: trips and sports tournaments are organised, and some of the activities involve teamwork or coaching in conflict management. Others aim to develop communication and social skills. As part of these projects, for instance, the young people may edit and publish a newspaper or manage a café and thus acquire specific skills. An important feature is that all types of participation are certified in detail and can later be used in applications for apprenticeships.

Furthermore, the IG actively approaches parents and tries to involve them in the process of deciding on the right vocational track and finding an apprenticeship.

Finally, the IG maintains close relationships with companies in the neighbourhood. These firms potentially take apprentices or offer traineeships. If young people are successful in finding a training opportu-
nity, the IG provides, if necessary, extra training for the theoretical part of the VET to prevent a dropout.

Although public actors generally confirm that the work of the IG is of high quality, the group does not enjoy reliable financing. The projects are funded by a range of institutions, including the Land of Bavaria, the European Union and the municipality. At the end of every financing period of one to two years, the IG faces the risk of having to give up parts of the work or release some of its personnel. For these reasons, the management and employees have to raise the level of transparency of their work by carrying out time-consuming public relations activities. They are also active in various political organisations and professional circles. The IG regularly organises debates on current migration-related topics and maintains contacts with representatives of political parties.

The work of the IG serves as a model for other actors and institutions in this field.

4.2 Frankfurt/Main

My second example regards a project which aims to convince entrepreneurs with migratory backgrounds to offer young people apprenticeships. Frankfurt’s AMKA launched this project in the early 1990s.

As mentioned, the dual system is highly regulated. Companies that intend to offer vocational training have to fulfil certain preconditions in order to offer an apprentice all the required support (e.g. skilled trainers or the necessary variety of activities related to the profession concerned). These preconditions may represent a handicap to small or medium-sized firms, even if they want to offer training.

The AMKA had the idea of approaching immigrant entrepreneurs, mobilising them, and offering to help them if they wanted to organise themselves as collaborative training providers. The advantage of collaborative VET provision is that no single company has to fulfil all the obligations, but rather each member can provide a part. For instance, it is sufficient that one in four companies has a skilled and certified vocational trainer among its employees.

At the beginning of the project, the AMKA started with a small study to assess which economic sector or part of the city would be most promising for such an endeavour. Through contacts with many entrepreneurs, they soon realised that the wholesale market for fruit and vegetables in Frankfurt was a good target and so the project started there. Soon the Chamber of Trade and Commerce took notice of the project and wanted to participate. After several successful years, the chamber fully incorporated the project into its own structures. At
the moment, it has two employees working full-time to coordinate the extended version of this project.

Meanwhile, this project and others have gained prominence and have been adopted in most of the big German cities with a high share of immigrant entrepreneurs. Even the Hessian Ministry for Trade and Commerce is convinced, and offers financial support to new projects of the type.

As in the first example from Munich, the approach serves as a model for other cities and institutions: first the ideas are developed; specific concepts are tested in practice and further elaborated; eventually, the established actors in the field notice the new approach and incorporate it.

5 Conclusion

In the context of this comparison between two cities it seems reasonable to argue that the established networks in the field of VET represent the typical mode of skill provision within the German corporate economy. Despite global processes of modernisation, certain institutional structures which have emerged historically within nation states prevail. Once these institutions gain a role within the socio-political system of a society and are commonly accepted, it is difficult to abolish them. This persistence in turn leads to ‘path dependencies’: even though countries may face similar pressures and problems, the way they deal with these external and internal influences will be different (Lehmbruch 1996, for a VET-specific discussion see Thelen 2004).

The VET networks are characterised by a fairly exclusive membership structure, and the main actors are still the traditional ‘social partners’ in this policy field. In other words, there is little overlap between the group of actors engaged in VET and those explicitly involved in immigrants’ integration policies. Moreover, the VET actors do not seem eager to overemphasise immigrant youth, but rather focus on the coordination of their main task: the provision of skilled labour to the regional economy. The ‘integration experts’, however, mostly do not have the necessary VET-related technical know-how to become fully engaged. The chances of making changes in the overall structure therefore seem to be rather low.

One decisive factor for new and innovative approaches to VET, however, seems to be the existence of institutions that could play the role of pioneers and serve as models for others. They are capable of doing so because of their accumulated knowledge in practical work and the information gathered during their contacts with the people and institutions involved. This is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to en-
courage the established actors to change their mindsets and reconsider their routines.

For an actor embedded in the administrative hierarchy, such as the Office for Multicultural Affairs in Frankfurt, it will generally be easier to enter new areas of engagement. Having a defined role and competencies within the local government structure will probably help in local agenda-setting as well as attracting the attention and gaining the support of potential partners. However, an administrative unit is also subject to political and bureaucratic sensitivities, whereas an organisation like the IG in Munich – not being a member of the administration – does not have to concern itself with these issues to the same degree. There may be situations in which such institutions can act in a more innovative ways on the implementation level.

Another lesson that can be drawn from the examples is that institutions with an innovating role obviously not only have to be flexible and eager to experiment, but should also have extensive local knowledge. The dissemination of their ideas is, however, only facilitated through the networks they are part of. Local governance structures therefore have to be permeable enough to provide these actors with opportunities to share and discuss their views. Of course, this is not only a question of opportunity structures, but also of the direct engagement of the respective institution in public relations activities. The chances of transferring innovative projects into the regular system will be higher if there is the will and openness on the side of the established actors to cultivate a dialogue with the initiators of new approaches.

Notes

1 I use ‘young migrants/immigrants’ and ‘young people with migratory background/of immigrant origin’ in this chapter as interchangeable terms that refer to the same group: young people who have immigrated themselves or whose parents have immigration. However, from this I distinguish terms such as ‘young foreigners’ and ‘young people of foreign citizenship’ etc., which refer to persons with a non-host-country citizenship.

2 The typical classification presented here, however, is by no means clear-cut, as the contents of different programmes may be quite similar on a (local) implementation level.

3 The survey was conducted by the Federal Labour Office (BA) and the Federal Institute for Vocational Training (BIBB) among young persons who applied to the Labour Office for a VET apprenticeship. Here, however, I refer mainly to the results of analyses of the dataset of the survey conducted in 2004. This survey, like the preceding ones, aimed to develop a better understanding of young people’s application behaviour and their further trajectories after a period of training applications. The data were assembled from all the labour offices in the country, and the probability of being selected into the sample – except for the condition of being acknowledged by the Labour Office as an applicant – is unbiased. Within the sampling framework con-
constructed, 9,688 individuals were randomly chosen from the Labour Office registries and invited to participate in the survey through a questionnaire sent by post. A total of 5,100 (53 per cent) of these young people replied. According to the administrators of the survey, this sample is suitable for making inferences about the population parameters as a whole (740,200 applicants in 2004) as the relevant results were calculated after applying various weighting procedures (Krewerth, Eberhard & Ulrich 2006).

To determine if a respondent has a migratory background, information from three different realms is combined in the survey: citizenship, first-acquired language and place of birth. A respondent is considered native-born if he or she has German citizenship, was born in Germany and speaks only German as native language. All other respondents are regarded persons of migratory background: they may have been born abroad, be ethnic German immigrants (young people who mostly have German citizenship but grew up in the former Soviet Union, Poland or Romania, or whose parents did so) or be young people who were born in Germany though are without German citizenship (cf. Ulrich et al. 2006a).


The information provided in this and the subsequent sections is based on field research and interviews with local actors conducted by the author in 2006 and reported in full detail in Aybek (forthcoming).

For a related discussion on the role of targeted (immigrant-specific) vs. general policies, see Vermeulen and Stotijn (in this volume).

See www.initiativgruppe.de/ueberuns/IGselbstdarst/english.htm.

See www.initiativgruppe.de/intern/leitbild/qm_leitbild4.htm.

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4 Local policies concerning unemployment among immigrant youth in Amsterdam and in Berlin: towards strategic replacement and pragmatic accommodation

Floris Vermeulen and Rosanne Stotijn

1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the manner in which Amsterdam and Berlin policymakers and policy practitioners deal with youth unemployment among immigrant groups. Unemployment among immigrant youth is an important policy topic in both cities (as it is in most other European cities), and the issue is closely linked to debates about local integration policies. We will argue that local policymakers dealing with immigrant youth unemployment are often confronted with what Frank de Zwart (2005) calls ‘the dilemma of recognition’. This dilemma refers to whether local governments should pursue general or targeted policies to combat group inequality. On the one hand, general policies do not recognise groups as being relevant to the policymaking process, which also means that the policies are seldom effective in combating group inequalities. Targeted policies, on the other hand, recognise groups as beneficiaries for specific policies, yet face the danger of perpetuating group inequalities. In this chapter we hope to explain how, on the local level, policy practitioners working with unemployed immigrant youth have responded to the dilemma of recognition with their own pragmatic solutions, which are considerably independent of the official policy integration framework. Because this independence allows for the possibility of mixing general policymaking on a national level and targeted policy implementation on the local level, we will argue that it is precisely this quality that should be seen as a valuable example for policymakers and practitioners to learn from.

In both Amsterdam and Berlin we conducted interviews with policy practitioners. In the interviews we focused on how policy practitioners deal with the dilemma of recognition when interacting with unemployed immigrant youth. We spoke both to practitioners who work for general job centres as well as to practitioners who work for non-profit organisations, immigrant or otherwise. This gave us the opportunity to see to what extent the practitioners in different organisations have different solutions for the dilemma of recognition. The comparison be-
tween Amsterdam and Berlin also provides an opportunity to analyse the influence of a different local integration policy framework, as each city has formulated different policies, which have uniquely evolved over the course of time. We have found that neither the different policy framework nor the different organisational setting is reflected in the way in which projects are implemented for unemployed immigrant youth.

2 The policy paradox: the dilemma of recognition

Many local governments around Europe endeavour to combat inequality by promoting a group-specific redistribution policy. Upon considering options that exist for a redistribution that benefits groups, however, some governments find themselves in a double bind. Unlike pensions or health and insurance plans, targeted redistribution policies require definition, recognition and, moreover, mobilisation of the groups concerned. However productive this targeting process may be for administrative purposes, it works to accentuate ethnic and racial distinctions – some governments fear precisely this side effect. Although deemed necessary to reduce group inequality, targeted redistributive policies may also encourage ethnic conflict, create vested interests in group distinctions and diminish public support for redistribution. In so doing, such policies work to defeat the very purpose they were intended for. De Zwart (2005) labels this paradox ‘the dilemma of recognition’. Governments usually try to resolve this dilemma by adjusting the category system that is used to target redistribution. According to De Zwart, three types of adjustment may be applied to policy: accommodation (the multicultural approach), denial (the ideal-typical liberal solution) and replacement (a compromise alternative).

Accommodation, which is also known by the names ‘multiculturalism’ or ‘the politics of recognition’, is meant to designate the beneficiaries of redistributive policies according to people’s membership in groups that state and society have come to take for granted. Policymakers treat these social categories as ‘self-evident’ groups, and representatives of immigrant groups who seek accommodation do so as well. An example of accommodation: the backwards socio-economic position of immigrant groups can be targeted by using specific social policies for specific immigrant groups. In order to implement these policies policymakers make use of ethnic policy categorisations. In the Netherlands it has been common to formulate specific measurements for Turkish or Moroccan immigrants. On the other hand, incentives to exclude immigrants from society can also be a reason for politicians and policymakers to use policy categorisation of immigrants. Geddes (2003) points to the example of asylum-seekers in the 1990s. As their
numbers grew in the Netherlands and Germany there was pressure to place these persons outside the welfare state using specific policy categories. However, such ethnic or group categories are not actually self-evident; they are constructed for a specific policy purpose. Categories can allow policymakers to better organise the ambiguous reality that they are confronted with. Nevertheless, once these categories have been created by the state there can be far-reaching consequences. As Yanow (2003: 7) states, ‘There is a power in naming groups. The name evokes a common identity, and in so doing, it presumes a common interest’. Brubaker (2003: 166) adds that by ‘invoking groups, they [policy-makers] seek to evoke them, summon them, call them into being. Their categories are for doing – designed to stir, summon, justify, mobilize, kindle and energize’. As such, many governments and critics of multiculturalism fear further segregation that could come as the result of mobilising groups and reiterating ethnic boundaries.

In view of this concern, we will show how these problematic aspects of accommodation pertain mainly to policymaking, and have a far less profound effect on implementation. The concretisation of categories for the sake of official policy and budget purposes is simply not the same as a practitioner’s dependence on group categories to inform decisions and make judgements. We propose use of the term ‘pragmatic accommodation’ to designate the significance of group-specific differences in the daily practice of policy implementation and to differentiate it from the idea – if not the ideal – of accommodating groups and their perceived group differences de jure. To exemplify accommodation’s complex nature: is a social worker consulting an imam about a Muslim youth accommodating group-specific differences by seeking out a religiously ‘relevant’ consultant? Or is the social worker using the group-specific position of the imam to most effectively get her counselling job done?

Another policy approach is denial or the insistence that, despite inequality between socially or culturally defined groups, redistribution policies do not benefit any particular demographic. Denial is consistent with the ideal-typical liberal state that stresses individual rights and does not recognise any pre-existing, organic or transcendent structure in society. A textbook example of denial is the philosophy of republican citizenship that officially informs policy in France. Although denial fits in an ideal-typical ethos, in reality, in France, as in most other liberal states, group inequalities are a major problem and tend to increase over time. In other words, denying the existence of group inequality does not seem to be an effective solution for the dilemma of recognition, either.

De Zwart’s third proposed policy approach combines accommodation and denial. Replacement constructs the targets of redistributive...
policies in such a way as to avoid the accentuation – or the mere recognition – of ‘inconvenient’ distinctions, while still allowing for beneficial redistribution among the groups. More and more, replacement policies are being favoured around the world, as the possible disadvantages of multiculturalism become apparent and denial is hard to sustain in the face of group inequality.

When a government pursues redistribution to benefit ethnic groups, it constructs its own social categories. These categories are different in name and usually more inclusive than the ethnic classifications they replace. This strategy is a purposeful attempt to avoid official recognition of the social divisions thought to cause the problem, while still permitting redistribution to benefit disadvantaged groups. According to De Zwart, however, replacement policies pose three problems. First, they create new inequalities and therefore become self-perpetuating: groups with the best mobilisation capacity are first in line for the benefits. Second, the social categories that emerge are exactly those that replacement aims to suppress: as De Zwart argues, the categories do not come despite the use of replacement strategies, but because of them. To provide an example, because unemployment rates among immigrants are relatively high, using ‘the unemployed’ as a constructed category for policymaking will, at least in some neighbourhoods, manifest itself in the same immigrant group categorisation that the policy tried to overcome. Finally, replacement categories rely on vague definitions to function and thus can only aim at ambiguous administrative concepts. As a result, control over the implementation of policies is impeded and there remains ample opportunity for political entrepreneurs to mobilise ethnic collectivities and pressure the government to recognise their claims.

Still, it should be noted, replacement’s actual effects are under-investigated and remain less understood than other policy adjustments. Our research found that vague definitions did not hinder policy practitioners in their attempts to deal with immigrant youth unemployment. Practitioners showed how they could deliver locally adequate services by pragmatically accommodating group-specific differences that only reveal themselves in the local context. Moreover, we witnessed how a sense of adequacy can be achieved with relative independence of the political context in which policy is implemented. We found that replacement does not necessarily lead to the effects De Zwart connects to it. Instead, replacement can be strategic, provided policymakers are aware that it may be accompanied by pragmatic accommodation at the level of implementation. As the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR 2001) notes, general measures combating inequality often come to ultimately benefit the immigrants anyway.

De Zwart’s dilemma of recognition deals primarily with the extent to which policymakers distinguish among specific groups in their integra-
tion policies in order to combat group inequality. Here, Amsterdam and Berlin provide an interesting case study. The cities are mirror images of one other in the extent to which social or cultural groups are recognised as beneficiaries of the last three decades of targeted policies. Amsterdam’s policy has developed from a multicultural, accommodate approach (with targeted policies for clearly defined ethnic groups) to a more generalised approach without any target groups whatsoever. Berlin officially did not have targeted policies throughout the 1980s and 1990s, though the city recently changed its approach to an accommodate one in which specific problems of immigrant groups would get more attention. This method has involved councils of immigrant organisations who advise local authorities on integration policies, an official integration policy framework and an appointed Senator for Integration Affairs (to some extent, this picture is very similar to that of multicultural policies in Amsterdam of the 1980s). It is compelling to ask why Amsterdam and Berlin are, in many ways, mirror images of one another and what this, in general, may tell us about the effectiveness of the cities’ integration policy frameworks. However, we will not deal specifically with these questions, so much as focus on current policymakers and policy practitioners who deal with immigrant youth unemployment. We seek to determine how they cope with the dilemma of recognition. To enable us to place the work of these policymakers in their policy context, we will first give an overview of how the local integration framework developed in each city.

3 Local integration policies in Amsterdam

Until the end of the 1970s, the settlement of immigrant groups in Amsterdam did not lead to the formulation of a specific local integration policy. Authorities of course dealt with social issues related to the growing immigrant communities in their city, but they saw the presence of these populations as temporary. It was therefore unnecessary to formulate any structural policy for them. By the end of the 1970s, this strategy of ignoring immigration was no longer feasible. Amsterdam authorities had to change their view on immigration for two reasons. First, increased immigration on such a large scale made it impossible for politicians to ignore the fact that immigrants had become a structural element of Dutch society. In addition, social problems related to immigration (segregation, discrimination, violence against immigrants, unemployment, criminal behaviour, etc.) swept the city and people expected politicians to come up with solutions. Second, in accordance with the policy shift that was taking place on the national level, Amsterdam authorities began to formulate specific policies to improve the position
of immigrants in the Amsterdam society. A multicultural policy was to be implemented that could be characterised as an accommodative approach. It officially classified the main immigrant categories as ‘minority target groups’ whose socio-economic position needed bettering. The minority policy had two principal objectives: first, the social and economic conditions of immigrant groups in Dutch society were to be improved. To ensure equal access for all, this would require active public interventions in the labour market and the education system. And second, the Netherlands was to become a tolerant, multicultural society where every immigrant culture would be accepted, respected and valued (Lucassen & Penninx 1994: 148). All the main political parties backed this policy shift. On the national level, issues related to minorities and integration were not politically contentious during the 1980s; in fact, the issues were highly depoliticised (De Beus 1998).

To illustrate, the new multicultural policy meant that, from 1981 onwards, different minority target groups became eligible for direct subsidies to establish and develop their own ethnic organisations. The city council envisaged three primary tasks for such organisations: to promote and preserve cultural identities, to emancipate their constituencies and to represent community interests (Vermeulen 2006). While in principle, political or religious organisations were not entitled to subsidy funding, Amsterdam authorities insisted that all segments of the guest worker community be included so as not to isolate certain groups or associations. To this end, authorities invited religious organisations to found additional social-cultural organisations so that the city would be able to financially support these groups.

In 1985, the government decided to establish five minority advisory councils consisting of members of ethnic immigrant organisations. Their task was to advise local authorities on new policies and to evaluate existing ones. However, the political influence of these councils was often questioned in local policy reports and the organisations never really cooperated harmoniously (Vermeulen 2005). Nevertheless, research on the development of Amsterdam’s minority policy throughout the 1990s indicates that these advisory councils did play a role in the formulation of minority policy; their role was at least as large as that of any individual immigrant organisation (Berveling 1994: 279).

As the 1980s drew to an end, Amsterdam followed the national lead, slowly beginning to embrace a more general policy approach without specific ethnic target groups, a structural integration policy framework or minority advisory councils. After much delay and political pressure, the city government published a 1989 report elaborately outlining its anticipated minority policy for the coming decade. The report stated that the policy effects of ten years of multiculturalism were disappointing; now more attention was to be given to the poor socio-economic po-
sition in which most of the city’s immigrant groups found themselves. After 1994, the multicultural policy with specific minority target groups was abandoned and, to a large extent, immigrant organisations lost their role in the policy system (Musterd, Ostendorf & Breebaart 1998: 41-42; Kraal 2001). By 1999, local authorities officially changed their intentions towards immigrants from a minority policy to a diversity policy. Within this diversity policy framework, focus fell on social problems across the entire Amsterdam population, not just those of the target groups. The central aim of this diversity policy for all inhabitants to feel ‘at home’ in their city and to ensure that everyone had equal opportunity to participate in society (Kraal 2001: 23-24).

The new diversity policy was intended to better serve the diverse Amsterdam population by focusing on differences between individuals instead of between groups. Within this framework, all citizens were encouraged to be more open to change and to increase their participation in society (Maussen 2006). Policymakers’ starting point should not be the population’s problems, but rather the ‘strength of the people’ (City of Amsterdam 1999). Amsterdam’s present-day diversity policy is best characterised as a combination of denial and replacement. It may be likened to denial because it refuses to acknowledge the relevance of groups in the policymaking process; yet, it resonates with replacement in attempts to ‘replace’ pre-existing ethnic groups with a broader, if not blurrier, definition of diversity. Research has already identified some of the negative side effects that were anticipated in Amsterdam’s replacement strategy. Uitermark and Van Steenbergen (2006) conclude in their study on the transformation of Amsterdam’s integration policy that the reforms have disadvantaged the already most deprived immigrant groups because they lack the resources to organise themselves within the new policy framework. Whereas the old multicultural policy provided them with instruments for political participation, a lack of targeted policies prevents these groups from mobilising. By contrast, groups that already have a well-established organisational structure profit from the policy reforms by exploiting the replacement categories for their own advancement.

Accommodative elements in Amsterdam’s integration policies have not completely vanished. For instance, current mayor Job Cohen has expressed his belief that immigrant religious organisations can play an important role in keeping the people of Amsterdam together. Cohen therefore promotes close collaboration between the government and some of these organisations (many of which are organised according to ethnic religious identities). Furthermore, because diversity policy may not always be executed by design at the local level, ‘street-level’ bureaucrats need to collaborate with ethnic organisations in order to stay in touch with residents of immigrant neighbourhoods (Maussen 2006).
It would thus be appropriate to say that present-day Amsterdam’s integration policy draws on denial, accommodation and replacement, producing a combination in which replacement is most visible (this contrasts with the accommodation dominant during the 1980s). We have found that a similar process is at work among policy practitioners dealing with unemployed immigrant youth. The policy targeted at unemployed youth may also be characterised as a replacement strategy, though in its method of providing assistance, it still gives attention to cultural ethnic differences. These accommodative elements suggest that the replacement strategy’s negative side effects, as De Zwart references, do not occur in the policy field of our present research. Before elaborating on this, let us look at Berlin’s integration.

4 Local integration policy in Berlin

Local integration policy in Berlin has been ambiguous from the beginning, largely because it is a mixed bag of both conservative and multicultural elements. On the one hand, Berlin is known throughout Germany for its uniquely progressive stance on immigrants and its consequently inclusive attitude towards immigrant organisations. On the other hand, local politicians have used very restrictive measures to control the growth and integration of the immigrant population in their city. It is also fair to say that immigration has been a highly politicised topic in Berlin, especially during the 1980s. This alone makes the Berlin case very different from Amsterdam’s (Hunger & Thra¨nhardt 2001: 111; Vermeulen 2006).

By the end of the 1970s, increased immigration to Berlin, as a consequence of both family reunification among migrants and a high number of asylum-seekers, caused serious social problems just as in Amsterdam. The city was forced to deal with segregation, racial violence, unemployment and housing problems, and the political significance of immigration and integration issues grew commensurately. Berlin faced in these years an immigration and integration crisis (Schwarz 2001: 129-130). The Christian Democrats (CDU) won the 1981 local elections, proposing strongly restrictive and sometimes xenophobic measures for the growing immigrant population in Berlin (Hunger & Thränhardt 2001: 109). After the election, a new directive by the new local government was introduced that was supposed to prevent a further rise in the immigrant population and simultaneously further the integration of those immigrants already living in Berlin. The policy programme’s motto was ‘integration or departure’ (Schwarz 2001: 131). This ultimatum in the form of a slogan well illustrates the two sides that characterised integration policy during the 1980s. On the one hand, the gov-
ernment emphasised restrictive measures to ensure the reduction of the number of immigrants in the city, such as increasing efforts to find illegal immigrants and expel them from the city, but also opposing dual nationality and stressing the need for immigrants to adapt to German norms and values. Several conservative CDU senators, of whom Heinrich Lummer (1981-1986) was the most renowned (Gesemann 2001: 16), were behind these measures. On the other hand, there was a focus on a more integrative regime, which aimed to incorporate newcomers into the host society, not to leave them behind. This aspect of the policy was to be implemented by the new Commissioner for Foreigners (Ausländerbeauftragte), a bureaucratic institution established in 1981 by the new local government.

The Ausländerbeauftragte’s founder was Barbara John, a moderate CDU politician who served in her position for more than twenty years. She was Berlin’s main actor in the field of integration throughout the 1980s and the 1990s. There were several similarities in the policies promoted by John herself and her institution and those being implemented in Amsterdam. In terms of policy, the Ausländerbeauftragte emphasised naturalisation, something that was very different from Germany’s national policy. In 1981, a successful campaign was launched around naturalisation that focused especially on second- and third-generation Turks (Böcker & Thränhardt 2003: 123). To this day, naturalisation rates in Berlin are much higher than in other German states. A second key element in the Ausländerbeauftragte policy was explicit financial support for immigrant organisations. These subsidies were not, however, part of a larger integration framework; they were a more practical strategy to sustain the position of the Ausländerbeauftragte within the local political field. Since the political pressure that the more conservative wing of the CDU exerted on the Ausländerbeauftragte was strong, and the issue of integration was unpopular among the CDU, John sought groups outside her party to secure the institution’s political position. Funding organisations would improve relations with the immigrant communities which would, in turn, ensure the Ausländerbeauftragte’s political legitimacy over a longer period (Schwarz 2001: 133). In addition, because the Ausländerbeauftragte could only advise in the policymaking process, it did not (up until 2005) formulate integration policies for the Berlin Senate.

After 2000, city authorities followed the national level’s footsteps to formulate a new integration framework. This resulted in the Berlin Senate’s first official integration policy and appointment of the first Senator for Integration Affairs. Berlin’s new integration policy is largely a replacement strategy, as in the case of Amsterdam, though it has strong accommodative elements. This is especially visible in the extent to which immigrant organisations and their advisory councils are given
a more influential role in the policymaking process. The policy itself is
classified by the Berlin Senate’s Commissioner for Integration and Migration (2005: 8) as follows:

Integration requires participation. Hence, the integration policy in
Berlin is primarily targeted both at the migrants and the majority
society. The integration of minorities is promoted by many specif-
ic measures, which aim at facilitating their full legal and social
equality; and simultaneously, integration also requires the majority
society to open up its institutions and procedures to intercultural
plurality. New forms of direct participation, like the State Advisory
Board for Integration and Migration Issues, incorporate represen-
tatives from the immigrant population into the advisory bodies.
Integration is a bilateral process, in which migrant organisations
perform the hinge function between the minorities and the major-
ity society.

This newly assigned role for immigrant organisations in Berlin is
meant to allow underprivileged groups opportunities for participating
in the policymaking process. The ultimate goal of Berlin’s integration
policy, however, is not to outfit immigrants with their own ethnic-speci-
fic institutions that enable participation. As described by the Commis-
sioner of Integration Affairs (2005: 9):

Successful integration policy leads to a new customer orientation
in Berlin’s administration and social services. Long-term integra-
tion also signifies that those immigrants residing in Berlin should
be sufficiently covered by the social welfare and support systems,
which enable them to gain equal chances of development. Primar-
ily, this should be achieved by an opening of public services and
institutions. They need to be accessible to all citizens in the same
way. This entails improvement in their customer orientation and
attainment of courteousness towards citizens. Specifically, this ap-
plies to migrant-specific administrations (e.g. Foreigners’ Office),
the common healthcare system, offers for elderly citizens, as well
as social and labour matters. Only in complex cases, where the
standard services do not suffice in terms of time and resources,
should exceptional offers for immigrants be carried out.
5 Immigrant youth unemployment in Amsterdam and in Berlin

In both Amsterdam and in Berlin, youth unemployment among immigrant groups is a serious problem. In Amsterdam, the level of youth unemployment among immigrants (ages twenty to 24) has decreased from 11 per cent in 2001 to 7 per cent in 2005 (compared to the 5 to 6 per cent among non-immigrant groups). In some immigrant neighbourhoods, however, the level of unemployment is much higher, at about 22 per cent, and the majority of the unemployed are under age 26 (O + S 2005). These neighbourhoods are among the poorest areas in the city and a high percentage of the inhabitants there have a low education, which does not put them in a good position to succeed at the labour market. The labour market situation is generally much worse in Berlin, where the unemployment level was 18 per cent in 2005. In the same year, unemployment among Turks, by far the largest immigrant group in Berlin, was approximately 40 per cent; it was nearly 50 per cent among Turkish youth (Der Spiegel 2005). These percentages suggest that Amsterdam has a few thousand unemployed immigrant youngsters, whereas Berlin’s numbers are in the tens of thousands. The cities’ individual discrepancies notwithstanding, youth unemployment among immigrants is significantly, persistently higher than it is among non-immigrant groups. As such, policymakers seeking to diminish group inequality have to contend with the ‘dilemma of recognition’.

5.1 The implementation of policies in Amsterdam

Amsterdam’s current policy towards unemployed immigrant youth was established in 2000, just after the new diversity policy was implemented. Two factors were important in creating the policy. First, there was a high rate of youth unemployment during the late 1990s despite the fact that Amsterdam’s economy was doing very well at the time. There was no specific policy for immigrant youth leading to a crisis in the city’s social security agency, which experienced a period wherein Amsterdam’s entire labour market office was heavily criticised (Van Genus 2004). Second, politicians found the high percentage of unemployed immigrant youth worrisome, believing that the situation was causing more and more problems in the city. Moroccan youth, in particular, were seen as the root of future social conflict. The riots of 1998 in Amsterdam-West that took place between the police and Moroccans youngsters had put the status of immigrant youth high on the political agenda. Youth unemployment and high school-dropout rates were seen as two of the main sources for problems within this group.
Politicians and policymakers decided to change their approach towards immigrant youth around 2000. Specific policies for ethnic groups were no longer possible, as multicultural policy had just been officially abandoned by the local government. Policies for unemployed immigrant youth were therefore more in-sync with the new diversity policy’s basic assumptions. Amsterdam tried to tackle its youth unemployment problem with what the city characterised as a stringent, yet humane, personal approach. This involved keeping track of unemployed youngsters via youth offices, and through their administration, assigning personal coaches to the youths. These coaches would have several intensive consultations with the youngsters, allowing them to evaluate their goals, skills and challenges. With the main problem being attributed to their lack of education, the policy’s main goal was to get youngsters back to school to improve their employable skills and thus enable themselves to find decent work. The youth offices found, however, that the proverbial right path – one that would take them back to school – was often blocked by various obstacles. If this were the case, a youngster was expected to enrol in an internship project where he or she could acquire employable skills. Amsterdam offers many such internship projects for unemployed youth.

A caveat to Amsterdam’s policy is that individuals under age 23 are not entitled to any form of social security. Instead, these youth must be enrolled in school, be engaged in a trainee programme or an internship or be holding a job. The individual attention offered by a personal coach, along with the policy’s positive approach that still maintains strict boundaries between the coach and the youth, have so far been seen as a successful formula. As one personal coach relayed in an interview:

“They [unemployed youth] can get some money, but they have to work for it. If they do not want to work: there is the door! [...] The money that they can get is at the same level as unemployment benefits – it is very low. It is explicitly not called ‘a benefit’, but rather, ‘an income’. It is the same amount as a benefit, but you have to work for it. (Interview with employer youth employment office)

If no work is available for a youngster, he or she must be engaged in a full-time trainee programme, whereby work and social skills are improved to ensure better job market prospects. Thus, Amsterdam opts for an integrated approach that allows different institutions and agencies to cooperate. The basic principle of this policy approach is fulfilling a right to work rather than a right to benefits. In practice, this means that unemployed youth should actively participate in work pro-
jects as well as receive benefits (at a level comparable to regular social security). If they refuse to participate in any of the prescribed projects, however, they may experience cutbacks to their benefits – or no benefits at all.

Despite, or perhaps because of, these drastic policy measures, it can be extremely difficult to reach out to unemployed youth, not least because many have severe social problems and show little interest in educational and employment programmes. Many unemployed youth suffer from personal issues such as psychiatric and drug-related problems (Zandvliet 2005). Moreover, their immigrant background is frequently implicated as the source of language barriers, a different cultural attitude towards work and education or labour-market discrimination.

Amsterdam authorities have deliberately chosen to follow a general policy free of ethnic categories and specific target groups. This strictly structured yet integrative programme is extended to all of Amsterdam's unemployed youth and appears to be more effective than targeted policies. What has proven remarkably helpful for immigrant youth is the policy’s provision of intensive personal guidance. This observation has not explicitly been stated by policymakers and practitioners, themselves, though this is the suggestion made in a handbook administered to youth office personal coaches. The book describes the specific problems of the target group as follows (Zandvliet 2005: 8):

The demands of the Western culture in terms of self-knowledge, formation of opinions and negotiating skills are often at odds with the norms and values of the families in which [unemployed immigrant youth] grew up. In these traditional families there is no room for negotiating. Individual departure from collective family rules will not be accepted. [...] There is a strong discrepancy between the Western I-culture and the we-culture of which they originate.

The intensive personal approach applied in the work projects and the educational methods administered by the youth office courses are all focused on trying to resolve the specific problem of unemployment. The consensus is that this can be accomplished through the social enrichment of immigrant youth. As demonstrated in the fragment above, insufficient social skills are viewed as a kind of culturally defined discrepancy. Concepts that may sound abstract at the policymaking level, such as ‘personal approach’ and ‘lack of social skills’, become concretised upon implementation in culturally ‘hands-on’ contexts. What is more, the importance of such a specification is overtly recognised by coaches. Coaches often distinguish work skills from social skills, suggesting that most unemployed immigrant youth possess good pro-
spects for employability, but lack appropriate social skills. Amsterdam’s main policy objective is for youths themselves to realise how crucial finding a good job is for the sake of their future. While policy projects and programmes provide some levels of support, the youngsters must invest in their own futures. Enhancing, if not altogether instilling, such awareness means teaching youth how to conduct themselves on the labour market and in the workforce. The individual-based personal coaching style of Amsterdam’s policy promotes making contact with this group of youth and communicating with them in ways conducive to increasing their aptitudes and heightening their levels of consciousness. In the fragment below, one of the coaches explains how this method is part of a general policy that has no targeted ethnic groups, but nevertheless manages to respond to the specific needs of unemployed immigrant youth:

I am not an advocate of specific policies that focus on specific ethnicities and cultures. However, I do think that you [as a coach] should be able to put yourself in the position of the youngster. On the other hand, you should also be able to demand something from them: that they be willing to take all kinds of jobs [no matter the status], that they do everything to improve their language skills. But you [as a coach] should also be prepared to assist the youngsters if they experience specific obstacles. (Interview with employer youth employment office)

Being a practitioner of the policy himself, the coach recommends an accommodative implementation strategy while, at the same time, also contextualising this strategy within the greater scheme of the programme. Incorporating an accommodative practice within general demands is thus viewed as part of an effective way of working. In practice, this means that the cultural background of a client may indeed play a role in selecting the best tactic for acquiring additional social skills. A coach contends that a personal coach’s approach is partly decided upon by the client’s ethnic background:

Yes, it might be the case that our approach is influenced by the client’s ethnic background. For instance, I have said that we should visit mosques [to reach out to Islamic youth who are unemployed] and that we should establish specific programmes for them. You need to train them [Islamic immigrant youth] to be more proactive, because they often say ‘yes’ out of politeness, because it is expected from them culturally. [...] For these things [culturally specific customs] you need to set up specific programmes. (Interview with employer youth employment office)
Therefore, not only do policy approaches differ, but so do methods of reaching out to specific groups. The coach continues:

I believe that we, as youth workers live too much in a castle. We should go out more often to the city districts and neighbourhoods. Go to mosques, schools and ethnic restaurants, it does not matter. We should be talking to youngsters there and put up our posters. Do not forget the schools, all youngsters go there and it is the place where they drop out. (Interview with employer youth employment office)

Another personal coach explains how the youth office promotes collaboration with many different parties, including immigrant organisations:

So, I do go to a mosque. [...] That is something that we do, but we should not completely focus on that. I do think that [immigrant] interest organisations can be relevant for our job, but these organisations also need to collaborate with each other. [...] You should always work in a network of organisations. (Interview with employer youth employment office)

Again, accommodation is said to be an effective part of implementation, but only in a pragmatic sense. That is, accommodation proves to be a necessary means to an end for realising general goals. In principle, there is not much room for accommodative elements in Amsterdam’s approach towards unemployed youth (or other social policy topics, for that matter). The city has no target groups, the policy is the same for everyone and the individual-based approach allows policymakers to avoid group-based thinking. By contrast, our interviews show how, in practice, a strong individual-based approach does leave room for cultural and ethnic differences. Such group delineations, however, are more closely related to the specific way in which cultural and ethnic background are already embedded in the life of unemployed immigrant youth. In addition, policymakers will take some specific cultural circumstances into account if such consideration enhances eligibility for work prospects. Amsterdam’s room for difference, so to speak, indicates that the replacement strategy’s negative side effects are less severe; in fact, group differences remain significant for the policy approach at the practical level. As we have observed, this policy adjustment does not require overpowering framework that perpetuates group inequality. Amsterdam has shown how replacement can work to combat it.

To conclude, in Amsterdam there is no clear one-to-one correlation between policymaking and implementation and, thus, no coherent
shift towards replacement. Instead, we see a delicate combination of replacement on one level, and pragmatic accommodation on another. Furthermore, it is apparent that pragmatic accommodation can be enabled by replacement, as opposed to being hindered by it. Replacement provides general criteria that can be set to work in a wide variety of different circumstances, precisely because they are broad.

5.2 The implementation of policies in Berlin

Berlin’s official government institutions dealing with employment issues, such as the Jobcenter, give special attention to unemployed youth, whether immigrant or not. These institutions use a replacement strategy: although they work with target groups (unemployed youth, for example), they do not make delineations according to social divisions such as ethnicity. There are some similarities between Berlin’s and Amsterdam’s policy approaches. Within the Jobcenter, there are special divisions for youngsters and each unemployed person under age 25 is entitled to a case manager equivalent to the personal coaches we found in Amsterdam. One main difference between the two cities’ policies is that unemployed youth in Berlin are consistently entitled to receive unemployment benefits. Although there are repercussions if regulations outlined by the case manager are not followed, youth never lose all their benefits; they simply face sanctions. Another difference is the fact that there are very few case manager of immigrant background, whereas it has been part of Amsterdam’s policy to increase its number of coaches of non-native origin. Apart from these differences, the methods used by the Jobcenter in assisting unemployed youth are similar to Amsterdam’s techniques. Below, two case managers we interviewed explain the protocol they follow when an unemployed immigrant youth is assigned to the Jobcenter:

First we start by talking to the youngsters. [...] Then we can establish what the problems are. The language skills are especially important, because this seems to be the biggest handicap – not so much verbal, but mainly writing language skills. [...] We also have a division for the difficult cases. This is for those [clients] who have more than one handicap. This approach is more intensive and we work together with other networks [organisations] to teach them everything that we are not able to do ourselves. We try to give them a positive perspective on their future. (Interview with case manager, Jobcenter)

Compared to Amsterdam’s youth offices, at the Jobcenter there seems to be less interest in, and subsequent attention given to, the specific
backgrounds of immigrant youth. In order to reach out and assist unemployed youngsters, case managers do not need explicit policy measures. Our interviewees referenced conversations a case manager had with the Türkische Bund Berlin (TBB), one of the city’s largest Turkish-interest organisations which also provides specialised projects for unemployed youth. As the fragment below suggests, Berlin’s approach is relatively all-encompassing.

It was an interesting case. [...] The TBB had the idea that there were many [Turkish] youngsters who were not reached and nobody knew about them. However, this was not the case. These youngsters were all known, either by the Jobcenters or by one of the partners. [...] We do think a lot about this [special policy measurements for Turkish youth]. (Interview with case manager Jobcenter)

Case managers, furthermore, are highly positive about their cooperation with other immigrant organisations, such as the TBB. Speaking about Turkish youngsters, another case manager pointed to the unique position immigrant organisation representatives have when it comes to improving the skills of unemployed youth with little education:

I think it is very important [to give immigrant organisations a role in the policymaking process], because the representatives [of the organisation] come from the same culture. They can teach them [immigrant groups] that Germany is their society, one in which they have to make it and that they will not go back to their country of origin. [...] They [organisation representatives] can get more out of collaborating with these youngsters because they know the structures [of the immigrant families] better. (Interview with case manager)

The Berlin Senate’s integration report encourages the assistance and support of unemployed immigrant youth by various organisations, including those that are immigrant organisations. It states (2005: 24):

In close collaboration with [...] many non-profit organisations, the Senate supports the transition [of unemployed immigrant youth] into job training.

Case managers acknowledge the new opportunities for organisations that are afforded by the new local integration policy report. As they state in the interview:
We also work together with the Commissioner for Integration and Migration of the Senate of Berlin. The integration report is adopted and this has made the topic [unemployed immigrant youth] relevant again. Other organisations have also devoted themselves to this topic. At the moment, we are involved in a bi-national project with Kreuzberg Educational Works. The project leader is of Turkish origin. What we do not like to do is to design completely Turkish measures, because then the Turks are left among themselves again, and that will not work. Although they might feel very comfortable in a [Turkish-only] environment, they would not even have to speak German there. (Interview with case manager)

Looking at the other organisations providing activities and projects for unemployed immigrant youth, we can distinguish between non-immigrant organisations and immigrant organisations. To this end, we will focus on two examples, Arbeit und Bildung (AUB) and the TBB. What is interesting here is that, compared to the attitude of Berlin’s Jobcenters, both these organisations display a more responsive attitude towards the specific needs of unemployed youngsters, and in this way, their methods are very similar to Amsterdam’s.

AUB is an independent organisation with a focus on integration through education and labour-market participation. Founded in 1986, AUB targets unemployed immigrants, both youngsters and adults. Through individual consultancies, AUB endeavours to guide unemployed immigrants to the labour market, whether for their first time or as returning employees. The organisation uses a database to locate available jobs, internship positions or opportunities for continued education. AUB works on a project basis and receives subsidies from the local government to execute such projects. In keeping with AUB mission’s, their projects aims to help the unemployed find work or proper education. The programme cooperates with several consultants, many of whom are social workers and some of whom come from immigrant backgrounds themselves. To better communicate with the youngsters, consultants speak various languages, including Turkish, Arabic, Polish, English, French and Russian. The idea, moreover, is that consultants with personal immigration experience have inside knowledge of the networks of specific ethnic groups, thus facilitating the reaching of target groups.

Despite AUB’s choice to work specifically with immigrant youth, we find it difficult to refer to their actual policy as ‘targeted’. The following interview fragment with an AUB manager illustrates this seemingly contradictory point:
I don’t particularly support targeted policies. I personally believe that mixing Germans with other groups in projects is more successful. Of course, there is some disagreement on this point. […] You have to be attentive to personal backgrounds. Those also tend to differ in significant ways within groups. Some immigrant youngsters have successfully gone through high school and have many German friends. They’ve been completely socialised in Berlin. It is for this group that a mixed approach is extremely important. For youngsters who have great language difficulties or have just recently arrived here a targeted approach is crucial. (Interview with manager of AUB)

Although Berlin’s political context is very different from Amsterdam’s, as evidenced by AUB’s approach, the two cities similarly – and successfully – combine an adherence to general programme demands with pragmatically accommodative approaches. The AUB policy is targeted insofar as it serves practical ends. In other words, in order to tackle youth unemployment (of which a substantial part happens to be immigrant), practitioners should pursue those specific measures that will help them reach the targeted group. In AUB’s case, this does not mean that group background or ethnic characteristics (other than language) significantly affect their approach. It does mean, however, that AUB tries to build a network that enables them to reach their target group. They therefore enjoy a large network of partners for cooperation. Many of these partners are immigrant organisations such as TBB and Respekt (comprising Russian immigrants).

TBB is another organisation that has had a key role in rehabilitating unemployed immigrant youth in Berlin. In 2005, TBB undertook a project primarily targeted at unemployed Turkish youngsters with low educational skills. Known as MOVE – Motivieren und Vermitteln (‘motivate and mediate’) – this project oversees 50 youngsters at a time who follow Jobcenter-assigned courses that are intended to better their abilities. MOVE is the only official immigrant organisation–founded youth project that is supported by the Jobcenters and Berlin’s Senate. Each MOVE project lasts for a period of six months, during which time youngsters get help with improving their social skills and must enrol themselves in an educational course, a work project, an internship at a business or a shop or, in some instances, a regular job. The manager of the programme explains MOVE’s method as follows:

In this phase [the programme’s introduction period] we examine what the young people can do. What are their strong and weak points, what do they actually want to do? After that, we teach them the following topics: German, math, general knowledge, basic
computer skills, job orientation, writing a letter of application and extended job orientation. They need to do one or two internships to really test whether it [the job they aspire to] is what they imagined it to be. (Interview with manager of MOVE programme)

During the internships, the youngsters are supervised by MOVE teachers who are also mainly of Turkish descent. Parents of enrollees also get involved in the programme via MOVE’s habit of making house calls and holding information meetings. TBB sees such practices as an effective way to encourage participation and motivate youngsters to succeed. According to MOVE’s manager, a main advantage the programme has over Jobcenter-assigned projects is that MOVE speaks the language of the youngsters. In the words of MOVE’s manager:

The teenagers do not understand the language of the administrative bodies. They start a project and after two to three weeks they already quit. Or they stay until the end, but with so many interruptions, that afterwards they can hardly tell you where they were, what they did and most important why they did it. [...] Another problem is the matter of time. We have here daily six to eight hours for 40 to 50 youngsters. The administrative bodies maybe have half an hour for them. That is too little and too short. And this job orientation is also not taught at school. [...] We cannot expect much of a young person, who is not aware of what he wants to do, who does not have the needed conditions and maybe also experiences language problems – and who the people from the administrative bodies hardly have time for. (Interview with manager of MOVE programme)

Kenan Kolat, a former TBB board member and the current president of the Türkische Gemeinde Deutschland (TGD) explains to what extent MOVE better assists unemployed Turkish youngsters than some of Berlin’s administrative bodies can. In an interview he gave with a newspaper (Berliner Zeitung 2006), Kolat was quoted as saying:

We will not solve all problems with our campaign. To integrate problematic young people we run projects like MOVE. These projects are divided into small sections; it is difficult, but very successful. Our colleagues there speak the language of the youngsters. They are, on the one hand, their team-mate, but they can also be inflexible. If needed, they will get them out of bed in the morning and bring them to the internship. Otherwise they will get a reduction of their unemployment benefit. [...] Many have
their strong points and we have to positively develop that. We want
education to get mainstream in the Turkish community.

According to one MOVE teacher we interviewed, Berlin’s authorities
should do more to promote targeted projects that have already proven
so successful. The teacher states:

It is not only the 50 youngsters we look after, who are unem-
ployed, dropped out of school and have no opportunity to find in-
ternship. There are, in Berlin alone, thousands of youngsters of
Arabic, Kurdish or Turkish origin who stand around without any
prospects. This cannot go ignored. Targeted projects should be
promoted. We can assist a maximum of 50 people, but more
youngsters come and go, so that per year a few hundred can be
supported. But it is thousands that need help. Projects like MOVE
should be financed – ten, twenty or a hundred times more. (Inter-
view with teacher of MOVE programme)

Ultimately, however, TBB does not seem to endorse the assignment of
all projects for unemployed immigrant youth to immigrant organisa-
tions. In fact, the MOVE programme highlights the fact that these
youngsters sometimes need even more intensive assistance than immi-
grant organisations can provide. As such, one TBB board member we
interviewed suggested that it is not always requisite, nor even an ad-
vantage, for the MOVE teacher to speak Turkish:

It can be [an advantage that MOVE’s teachers speak also Turkish] but
not always. Most [Turkish] youngsters have grown up here [in
Berlin] and speak German pretty well. Many have more difficulty
with the Turkish language. It can be an advantage for many
youngsters that most teachers have a Turkish background, but not
for everyone; it depends on the person. (Interview with board
member of TBB)

To summarise, as in Amsterdam, Berlin’s official policy towards young
unemployed immigrants is one of replacement. The policy neither tar-
gets unemployed youth nor does it accommodate further group specifi-
cations. When it comes to implementation, however, Berlin’s policy of-
fers considerable room for the accommodation of immigrant groups
and immigrant organisations. This is remarkable, seeing as Berlin has
no tradition of integration policy, let alone the accommodative form
that characterised Amsterdam’s policy during the 1980s. By contrast,
the networks, knowledge and initiatives fostered by immigrant organi-
sations are no longer of practical utility in Amsterdam.
The differences between the cities, however, are subtle. Even though immigrant youth are, in practice, a targeted group in Berlin, group-specific approaches are delimited. For example, AUB works with some consultants who have immigration backgrounds themselves and can thus offer insights into clients based on personal experience. For similar reasons, AUB also works with immigrant organisations that exploit wide networks and first-hand knowledge of immigrant languages. This enables an organisation like AUB to more effectively reach the target group, even without being informed by the belief that specific groups require ethnic- or culture-specific policies. Even the TBB, which does give special attention to the possible existence of culturally defined boundaries in its dealings with immigrant youth, prefers to be less explicit about culturally or ethnically specific policy. It thus seems that in Berlin, where the official policy is characterised by replacement, there is some room for the specification of target groups when it comes to actual practice. This does not lead, however, to targeted policy. In other words, Berlin’s policy implementation involves target groups, but not targeted policy.

6 Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the local policies in Amsterdam and in Berlin meant to reduce youth unemployment and assist immigrant youngsters in steadily acquiring positions in the labour market. In general, the cities’ policies are somewhat similar. Both cities have established an infrastructure of youth offices, personal coaches and an individual-based approach intended to improve youngsters’ social skills. In general, the main difference we observed in our comparisons is the stricter policy that Amsterdam tends towards. For example, in Amsterdam youth under age 23 do not receive unemployment benefits, and are obliged to work, be enrolled in work projects or go back to school.

In this chapter we also examined how the dilemma of recognition, as described by De Zwart, is manifested in both cities. Amsterdam and Berlin provide an interesting case for comparison because they are almost mirror images when it comes to local integration policy developments. Amsterdam has moved from a multicultural policy with official target groups to an approach that is primarily characterised by replacement, in which diversity is encouraged, though only on an individual basis. Berlin’s rather ambiguous integration policy of the 1980s and 1990s, which actually offered no official integration framework, developed into a replacement strategy with many accommodative elements, mainly as opportunities afforded to ethnic organisations and ethnic advisory councils.
Amsterdam and Berlin are also mirror images of one another in terms of how policy strategies for unemployed youth function. In Amsterdam, there are few accommodative elements in the policy framework: immigrant organisations have no major role and there are no group-specific programmes for immigrants. But in practice, we see that Amsterdam’s individual-based approach does leave room for cultural and ethnic differences. We witnessed how youth office-assigned personal coaches acknowledge that they cannot apply the same strategy across the board for all their clients. Our interviews revealed the need for practitioners to be aware of a number of specific cultural factors as they attempt to uniquely empower youngsters to improve their labour-market prospects. In Berlin, it is the reverse. The policy framework does leave room for cultural difference, mainly by assigning specific roles to immigrant and other organisations as they execute projects for unemployed youngsters. However, in practice, there seems to be less enthusiasm for giving attention to specific cultural backgrounds. TBB’s MOVE undertaking is one of the few programmes we found to illustrate a high sensitivity for the effect of specific cultural traits when it comes to increasing immigrant youngsters’ opportunities for decent work, but even in this project the approach for unemployed immigrant youth displays many similarities with the Amsterdam approach. The MOVE project uses a similar intensive personal approach towards the youngsters.

The situations in both cities are thus once again more similar than would, on first glance, be expected. Both Amsterdam and Berlin’s policy strategy is replacement, as evidenced by the very existence of the ‘unemployed youth’ category that policymakers and practitioners work with. Nevertheless, the policy still makes room for cultural and ethnic differences, if and when needed. While Amsterdam executes a top-down approach in this respect through the institutionalised administration of youth offices and personal coaches, Berlin’s approach is bottom-up, as seen in the opportunities immigrant organisations have to be included in the policymaking process. Because of the room made available for cultural and ethnic differences in the policy framework, we did not find negative side effects of the replacement strategy, as De Zwart described: in precise terms, that replacement would enable new social categories to emerge which are exactly those replacement aims to suppress (see also Stotijn 2006). Policy practitioners in Amsterdam and in Berlin seem sufficiently capable of targeting relevant groups and addressing their inequalities. Admittedly though, the definitions they use to delineate categories can be rather vague at times so as to avoid naming and perpetuating group differences.

We also conclude that the dilemma of recognition is a useful concept, as are the three policy approaches De Zwart outlined for dealing with the dilemma. But to adequately evaluate the effects of denial, ac-
commodation and replacement as strategies to cope with the dilemma of recognition, it is crucial to differentiate between the domains of policymaking and implementation. As Duyvendak and Uitermark (2006: 65) have noted:

[Policy] is based on a variety of motives and justifications as well as principles, and cannot be reduced simply to the implementation of an ideal. An idea that commonly crops up in the public and political debates is that the ideal of a multicultural society permeates all phases of policymaking, including the results, but the literature reveals serious doubts about whether there is a direct relationship between ideals and the actual results of policies.

Once the implementation of policies in Amsterdam and Berlin is scrutinised, it becomes clear that De Zwart’s categories should be refined. We have shown that replacement can be accompanied by what we have referred to as pragmatic accommodation. Moreover, practitioners are able to implement these replacement strategies because they make room for pragmatic accommodation. The relationship between policy and practice is dynamic and multivalent; it is not the so-often idealised one-to-one, unidirectional translation of policy into practice. In effect, a dynamic relationship prevents the solidification and consequent reaffirmation of social categories. By becoming aware of actual ‘street-level’ practice and the divergent logic of practitioners, policymaking may be able to evade the problems De Zwart identifies. In view of the policies discussed here, we would characterise Amsterdam and Berlin’s policymaking as strategic replacement, for replacement in policymaking does not necessarily entail replacement in implementation. Together with forms of pragmatic accommodation, such strategic replacement may be much better suited for dealing with the rich and complex relationships involved in social policy.

Notes

1 There were councils for Turkish immigrants, Moroccans immigrants, Surinamese/Antillean and Moluccan immigrants, Chinese, Pakistani and refugee immigrants and, finally, for immigrants from Southern Europe. Every council had about thirteen members, all of them immigrant organisations. Members were chosen by the local government and they were supposed to represent the main ideologies/movements/groups that exist within the different immigrant communities. The task of these councils was to provide policy advice on issues concerning integration (Göttgens 2004).

2 We would go even further, arguing that to encourage effective participation in the labour market and, for that matter, in society, policy must recognise and validate differences among groups while still holding individuals responsible for fulfilling general workforce demands.
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Interviews by Floris Vermeulen, Rosanne Stotijn, Stig Aagaard and Annemiek Munneke

Conducted in Amsterdam with:
Dirk Huiberts, Manager Jongerenloket Oost, 15 July 2005
Froukje Henniger, Jongerenloket Oost, 23 January 2006
Thea Zandvliet, Jongerenloket Nieuw-West, 25 January 2006

Conducted in Berlin with:
Frau Izgen, Project Manager, MOVE Project, 12 January 2006, 4 May 2006
Frau Töpper and Frau Fricke, Jobcenter Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg 23 March 2006
Herr Cumali Kangal, Board Member, TBB, 5 May 2006
Teacher, MOVE Project, 4 May 2006
Herr Kottula and Herr Nowack, Arbeit und Bildung (AUB), October 2005
Managing religious pluralism in Canadian cities: mosques in Montreal and Laval

Aude-Claire Fourot

Introduction: cities and the current challenges of religious pluralism

The duty to accommodate, which has had legal force since 1985 following a decision of the Supreme Court, plays a key role in the area of religious pluralism in Quebec and Canada. It requires governmental bodies and private persons or companies to change their rules and policies in order to accommodate the needs of those whose right to equality has been infringed, unless the needed accommodation would impose undue hardship. (Woehrling 1998: 325)

The duty affects Quebec municipal institutions and confronts them with issues in sharp contrast to the role traditionally assigned to the municipal government, namely, ‘dealing with such prosaic things as garbage-removal and sewers’ (Rowat 1969: 1). However, it is now widely accepted that ethno-cultural and ethno-religious differences are experienced on a daily basis in urban settings, and that not only do cities have a de facto responsibility for the management of religious pluralism, they also have the skills and tools to shape it. This is particularly true of municipalities that have the power to authorise or refuse the creation of places of worship.

That said, how does one account for the different processes of institutionalisation of places of worship in different cities? To answer this question, this chapter analyses cases in two large Canadian cities, Montreal and Laval, both located in the Province of Quebec. While previous studies have already addressed some issues underlying the creation of Muslim places of worship, my goal here is to identify processes of institutionalisation using a neo-institutional approach (Thelen & Steinmo 1992). This analytical framework reveals the institutional configurations (Katznelson 1997) specific to each city and characterised by the following: the state of inter-governmental relations; the discourses sur-
rounding the accommodation of ethno-cultural and ethno-religious demands; the relations among local actors, especially elected officials and municipal public servants; and forms of mediation between municipalities and ethno-religious groups. I then demonstrate the impact these configurations have on the processes of institutionalisation, and thus the degree of personalisation of mediation channels. In this way differences across cases can be explained. My principal hypothesis is that personalisation of mediation channels leads to a political process of institutionalisation whereas non-personalisation of these channels leads to an administrative one.

2 Issues and approaches associated with creating Muslim places of worship

Compared to the large corpus of European research on religious pluralism (inter alia Cesari, Bargach & Moore 2002; De Galembert 2006; Eckardt 2006; Frégosi 2006; Gale 2004; Garbaye 2006; Manco & Kamal 2002; Maussen 2005, 2007; Sunier 2005; Torrekens 2006), Canadian studies have not given much consideration to it. One possible explanation of this difference is that large-scale Muslim immigration to Canada and Quebec is a recent phenomenon, especially compared to the experience of former European colonial powers, such as France or the United Kingdom. However, with the increase in Canada of persons of Muslim, Hindu, Sikh or Buddhist faiths, there is new interest in the revival of religious pluralism and the building of places of worship.

2.1 Data on the Muslim population in Canada and Quebec

This chapter concentrates on Muslim places of worship because Islam has experienced the greatest growth rate among all religions (+129 per cent) in Canada. In Quebec, the increase has been even larger: from 1991 to 2001, the number of persons stating they were Muslim increased by 142 per cent. While Muslim immigration predates the 1990s, it was during this decade that there were significant increases in immigration flows. Thus, the immigration to Quebec of Muslims is overwhelmingly a recent immigration, 78 per cent of which is made up of first-generation immigrants.

While Muslims do not constitute a unified group, one of the distinctive features of Muslims in Quebec, in contrast to their co-religionists in the rest of Canada, is that most come from Africa and essentially from the Maghreb (Eid 2007: 49-50). Ever since the Canada-Quebec Accord on Immigration was signed in 1991, Quebec has had authority over immigrant selection. As the province favours French-speaking im-
migrants, the number of Muslim immigrants from North Africa has increased. In 2006, for example, Morocco and Algeria were two of the top four countries of birth of recent immigrants to Quebec (Quebec 2006; Quebec 2007).

These trends shape the situation in Montreal and Laval. More than 97 per cent of Muslims in Canada were settled in a census metropolitan area (CMA) in 2001 (Janhevich & Ibrahim 2004: 47). In Montreal, whose population in 2006 was 31 per cent immigrant (Canada 2007), the proportion of immigrants of Muslim confession increased. The same year, 20 percent of residents of the city of Laval were immigrants (Canada 2007), making it a particularly interesting case of the suburbanisation of immigration (Charbonneau & Germain 2002).

Concomitant with the increase in the Muslim immigrant population, there was an increase in the number of Muslim places of worship. For example, in the early 1990s, there were nine mosques in Montreal (McDonough 1994: 318). In 2002, over 45 mosques and prayer halls were counted on the Island of Montreal (Gagnon & Germain 2002), where today there are about 60 mosques and prayer halls on the Island. Whereas in the mid-1990s there were no mosques in Laval, today there are five Muslim places of worship.

Given that they are much frequented by immigrants, mosques’ roles differ from those in Muslim countries (Maussen 2005: 8). In addition to providing for religious observance, they are playing other important roles (McDonough 1994: 319; Germain, Gagnon & Polo 2003). Aside from the hall reserved for prayer, mosques may reserve some rooms as libraries or for social or educational activities, such as learning Arabic. Their socio-economic role has been acknowledged by local authorities. For example, both the City of Montreal and the Société de Transports de Montréal use them as sites for information sessions for job-seekers. In addition to their socio-economic role, they also play an identity-related and community-structuring role for the Islamic community (Etienne 1989: 96; Isin & Siemiatycki 1999). In Western countries ‘the mosque is the central element in the urban visibility of Islam and is affirmed as the vital location for the religious minority to organise itself’ (T, Cesari et al. 2002: 24). Thus, places of worship have a special status among the religious claims of Muslims.

While recent studies of the creation of mosques in Canada and Europe have emphasised situations involving less conflict than those of the past (De Galembert 2006; Frégosi 2006; Hoernig 2006), Canadian research, for the most part, still focuses on such conflicts, and in this respect dovetails with earlier studies of European cities (e.g. Beck 2002; Césari 2005; Naylor & Ryan 2002; Moreras 2002).
2.2 Literature analysing conflicts around the creation of mosques

There are several bodies of Canadian literature which have analysed the creation of mosques, and three will be briefly presented here. A first focuses on urban planning, because the creation of mosques in Canada involves planning authority by-laws. Several studies contend that the selection criteria used by planners may contain cultural bias. According to Sandercock (2000: 14), for example:

such a universalistic framework has always been regarded as neutral, that is unbiased with respect to culture, gender, religion, age and so on. But this allegedly neutral framework is in fact driven by a norm-focussed planning process which makes all sorts of implicit assumptions.

In their study of mosques in Toronto, Qadeer and Chaudhry show that the principal criteria employed by planning authorities are the compatibility of the place of worship with land usage, parking spaces and road traffic as well as architectural issues (especially as concerns their visibility and whether or not there is a minaret). In addition, the exemption from property taxes for places of worship emerges as an issue for municipalities, which perceive them in terms of lost revenue (Qadeer & Chaudhry 2000: 18). Based on the cases observed, Qadeer and Chaudhry conclude ‘planning standards (...) are subject to divergent and contentious interpretations, resulting in widely recognised uncertainties and delays in the planning process’ (Qadeer & Chaudhry 2000: 20). For Isin and Siemiatycki, municipal authorities also justify their reticence concerning the creation of mosques by using “technical” concern over site location, size or parking (Isin & Siemiatycki 1999: 14). Such findings are not unique to Canada since ‘research on how planning infrastructure mediates contestation over Muslim places of worship has been conducted in a variety of other national contexts’ (Gale 2007: 1026).

The second body of literature puts the accent on the challenges of intercultural cohabitation. In these analyses, space emerges as a central factor in the disputes between immigrants and local governments, and certainly is at the root of most of them (Isin & Siemiatycki 1999: 11). According to Gagnon and Germain, for example, ‘the question of public space is (...) sensitive’ particularly because several controversies have been created ‘around a perceived violation of its presumed neutrality’ (Gagnon & Germain 2002: 159). Studying how Brossard – a municipality adjoining Montreal – rejected a plan to create an Ismaili mosque, Helly interprets ‘the hostility of non-Muslim actors to the presence of Muslims in what the former seem to consider their space’ as
'opposition to a Muslim presence in the public sphere' (T, Helly 2007: 1-2). These analyses make clear that disputes over places of worship go well beyond a mere clash about whether there is ‘room’ for them. Rather

\[ \text{space (...) is a discursive contentious field that is linked up with a particular problem definition, the construction of identities, embedded in specific power and political relations. (Sunier 2005: 329)} \]^{16}

Another manifestation of the challenges following from intercultural cohabitation is the increase, especially since 9/11, in acts of Islamophobia.\(^17\) The literature has begun to keep track of such incidents (Helly 2004). Thus, like several Western European countries, where mosques are often described ‘as parallel societies or as obscure spaces where Muslim extremists can be heard defending anti-Western discourses’ (Maussen 2005: 3), Muslim places of prayer in Quebec are increasingly feared as a breeding ground for terrorism (Gagnon 2006a, 2006b; De Pierrebourg 2007). As a result, there is some hostility to the creation of new mosques.\(^18\)

The third approach briefly described is that evoking the concept of urban citizenship. One version of such analyses focuses on the consequences for Muslim groups themselves of such controversies. Employing an urban citizenship approach, Isin and Siemiatycki analyse ‘conflicts arising from requests by Muslim groups to build mosques across the Toronto region and symbolic and material resistances they have had to overcome’ (1999: 6). In this approach, Isin and Siemiatycki maintain, efforts made by Muslim groups to overcome the confrontations between municipalities and residents about mosques are in fact struggles for a more inclusive citizenship.

Thus, the literature on the creation of mosques in Canada is structured around three main currents: the role of norms in the land-use planning process, the challenges of intercultural cohabitation, and urban citizenship. However, notwithstanding the fact that the studies forming this varied literature all focus on creating mosques and their research provides solid results, they share a deficiency: they lack an institutional perspective. There is a need, I contend, for an approach in which institutional configurations are central to the analysis. This chapter provides such an analysis.
3 Muslim places of worship: a configurational analysis of institutionalisation processes

3.1 Institutions, mechanisms and process tracing

For neo-institutionalists, the definition of institutions ‘includes both formal organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct’ (Thelen & Steinmo 1999: 2). Institutions provide both opportunities and constraints in defining the interests and, consequently, the strategies that actors develop (Hall & Taylor 1996; Thelen & Steinmo 1999). My approach identifies four specific factors that explain how institutions shape the behaviour of actors and decisions involving the creation of places of worship: inter-governmental relations; relationships among local actors, especially elected officials and municipal employees, the discourses about managing and accommodating ethno-religious claims-making; and, lastly, the type of relations between municipalities and ethno-religious groups. I will demonstrate that the links among these various factors create institutional configurations (Katznelson 1997) that shape the behaviour of the municipal and religious actors involved.

A distinctive characteristic of the configurational approach is that it focuses ‘less on the causal importance of this or that variable contrasted with others but more on how variables are joined together’ (Katznelson 1997: 99). As such, it differs from

the logic of conventional variable-oriented social science [which] is explicitly organized around isolating the effect of each causal variable – estimating its effects on some outcome, net of the effects of competing variables. (Ragin 2000: 64)

Thus, it is only after establishing the relationship among the four variables identified above that we will be able to understand the decision-making processes involved in approving the creation or expansion of Muslim places of worship.

Following Chandra’s (2006: 2) recommendation to generalise about mechanisms rather than outcomes, I will show that the dependent variable (the process of decision-making regarding the establishment of places of worship) is linked to the independent variable (a specific institutional configuration) by a mechanism, namely the degree of personalisation of mediation channels between the religious authorities and municipal authorities. The main finding of this analysis is that where there is personalisation of mediation channels between religious and municipal authorities, the institutionalisation process is political, whereas the absence of personalised mediation leads to an administrative process.
Given that I am adopting a neo-institutional theoretical framework favouring the analysis of mechanisms, I use the methodological approach of process tracing (Bennett & George 1997; George & Bennett 2005; Hall 2003; Mahoney 2003). Specifically

the general method of process tracing is to generate and analyse data on the causal mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, expectations, and other intervening variables, that link putative causes to observed effects. (Bennett & George 1997: 5)

Process tracing as a method of analysis can be either qualitative or quantitative (Gerring & Thomas 2005: 13); this study is qualitative. I conducted more than fifteen interviews using open-ended questions. I interviewed elected officials, municipal employees and religious leaders in the two cities. I also searched the archives of the two municipalities and was able to collect data on the cases analysed and other information as well, including summaries of decisions and minutes of public consultation meetings.

The way I conducted the interviews was influenced by the topicality and sensitivity of the subject. On the one hand, I had to overcome the reluctance of political and administrative officials to deal with the issue of religion, and especially Islam, since they feared being accused of discrimination. On the other hand, interviewing subjects who are simultaneously stigmatised and proselytisers could present numerous difficulties (Boumaza & Campana 2007: 11). During my research, then, I had to conform to the behaviours preferred by my interviewees. During the interviews conducted in one mosque, I was asked to wear a veil and in others I was never alone with the man I was interviewing. In addition, I was several times invited – on one occasion, persistently – to convert to Islam.

3.2 The four elements in the configuration

The first element of the configuration follows from the fact that Canadian municipalities are in charge of approving the creation of places of worship. This is a legacy of past inter-governmental relations, even though these relations have changed greatly over time. Under article 92(8) of the Canadian Constitution, municipal affairs fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces, and city administrations thus have no constitutionally guaranteed existence. In addition, one of the distinctive features of inter-governmental relations in Canada as a whole, and Quebec in particular, is the asymmetry of municipal legislation (Bherer 2003). The City of Montreal is governed by a special charter that establishes a regime of exception and, among other things,
since the early 1960s and until recently, it has been prohibited from or-
ganising any referenda (Bherer 2003: 133). Laval, in contrast, faces no
such prohibition. Also, before the 2002 municipal restructuring, the
City of Montreal was not subject to the sections of the Act respecting
land-use planning and development, but the City of Laval was. Such
differences in status have an impact on the participatory framework of
the municipalities (Bherer 2003: 91) and on relations among local
actors.

Beginning with the creation of the municipalities in mid-nineteenth-
century Canada, their role has essentially been oriented towards ser-
vice, especially those provided to property owners. The management
of land and buildings including places of worship became the responsi-
bility of the municipalities because it primarily involved control over
ownership and use of property (Tindal & Tindal 1990). Canadian mu-
nicipalities, whose responsibilities are still rather limited, vary from
one province to the next.

Public protection (such as police, fire and public safety), transport
(public roads, public transport) and environmental health (drink-
ing water, sewage and waste) have always been at the heart of the
municipal activity and have counted among the heaviest budget
items. (T, Collin & Léveillée 2003: 10)

However, municipalities also have other important responsibilities
such as urban planning, sports, leisure, and culture.

In later years, Canadian municipalities saw an increase in their re-
sponsibilities as provincial governments engaged in decentralising stra-
tegies in the mid-1970s (Graham, Phillips & Maslove 1998: 72). They
were handed fields that a priori were not municipal concerns. Pro-
grames involving immigrants and ethnic minorities provide a good
illustration of this expansion. Another manifestation is an increase in
agreements among the three levels of government (municipal-provin-
cial-federal). The increasing complexity of inter-governmental relations
was also accompanied by greater interdependence among actors, sug-
gest that vertical as well as horizontal forms of public policy coordi-
nation are important (Andrew, Graham & Phillips 2002; Le Galès
1995: 60).

The second element in the configuration involves the relationships
between municipal employees and elected local officials. These rela-
tionships are characterised in particular by the power that each actor
wields in decision-making and by the coordination between the politi-
cal leadership and the administrative sphere (Jouve 2006; Sancton
2004). Indeed, given that
Local governments often have substantial service delivery responsibilities, this generates professional bureaucracies which are also both a constraint and a resource for elected officials. (...) This implies that a powerful bureaucracy limits the power of elected officials. On the other hand, control over a professional bureaucracy and the instruments of service delivery provides important resources to elected local governments. (Keating 1991: 7)

Recognising this dynamic implies that we need to adapt the Weberian perspective according to which government employees faithfully implement the decisions of elected officials, since in reality municipal employees often straddle the political and administrative spheres. In particular, due to

their presence, expertise and experience in certain fields – that is, due to their professionalism – they directly intervene at various stages of the decision-making and implementation processes. (T, Hoffman-Martinot 2007: 157)

In Montreal, analysts have shown that the Executive Committee has played a major role in the municipal decision-making system since the 1960s (Lustiger-Thaler 1993). In Laval, the emphasis is on the role of the mayor, whose first mandate goes back to 1989 and who since 2001 has faced no elected opposition. Leading a disciplined caucus, he has a lot of room to manoeuvre, especially since he also chairs the Laval Conférence Régionale des Élus (Regional Conference of Elected Representatives, CRE). In both cities elected officials have significant power providing examples of the ‘municipal presidentialism’ associated with Canadian mayors (Hoffman-Martinot 2007: 121). Nonetheless, this domination is never complete, mainly because of the lack of any strong ideological divisions between municipal political parties (Bherer 2003: 121-122). Therefore, the relationship among these key actors merits analytic attention.

Third, the discourses framing the accommodation of cultural and religious claims are important, since they reflect the general approach of the cities to diversity (Graham & Phillips 2007; Poirier 2005). Since 1987, the City of Montreal has advanced the principle of interculturalism in its relations with ethno-cultural communities. It emphasises respect for the French character of Montreal as well as French as the common language of public communication. It highlights also the notion of contract, i.e. a mutual recognition between host society and immigrants. The host society should be engaged in providing services adjusted to ethno-cultural diversity as should immigrants integrate themselves in the Quebec society and should respect its fundamental values.
In the last decade the city began to broach themes dealing with ethno-religious diversity, and this especially since ‘reasonable accommodation’ has become a major public issue. In 2001 the city published a guide for managers and organised training sessions on reasonable accommodation designed to increase public employee awareness around these issues. Nevertheless, the city’s discourse is not fixed, and recently, more universalistic references have modified it (Germain & Alain 2006; Poirier 2005: 209).

The City of Laval proposes an alternative which stresses near-universalistic criteria, thereby adopting a quite different stance than that of Montreal. Based on the Ensemble à Laval (‘together in Laval’) programme adopted in 1995, the position is described by its promoters as inclusive and based on a ‘sense of belonging to the same community of citizens’, implying that ‘all members of the civil community should be concerned about the greater welfare of their community, to the point of occasionally setting aside their personal motives or those of their interest group with a view to working towards the ‘general interest’ (T, Ville de Laval 1997: 3). Not surprisingly, therefore, many saw as paradoxical Laval’s refusal to consider that a prayer recited at the beginning of the city council meetings might be discriminatory.  

The fourth element of the configuration is the form of relations between the municipalities and the ethno-cultural and ethno-religious minorities specific to each city. An example of such relations is the presence of an advisory council that includes members of ethno-cultural minorities. In Montreal, an advisory council on ethno-cultural diversity was created to advise the Executive Committee and City Council. Currently known as the Conseil Interculturel de Montreal (CIM), the council gives its opinion on various matters, including minority places of worship. However, as in Toronto, no advisory council deals with religious questions specifically (Lefebvre 2005: 98). The CIM launched a research project in 2007 about municipalities’ management of places of worship for minority groups in Montreal.

In Laval, the forms of mediation between the city and its ethno-cultural and ethno-religious communities are different. Although a multicultural advisory council for the City of Laval was set up in 1990, it was abolished following the adoption of the Ensemble à Laval programme. In accordance with this concept, the city implemented a policy in 1995 for recognising community organisations based on ‘universalistic’ criteria. Associations considered to be providing services on the basis of their religion or cultural origins cannot be recognized by the city. This policy has important implications since without recognition associations are denied the forms of institutional mediation needed to advance their claims.
4 Examples of institutionalisation processes

In this section the analytical framework is applied to two cases of institutionalisation. The first is that of Montreal in which a request for a permit was made first in 2000, that is before the municipal mergers that changed certain legal circumstances of the city. In Laval the case began with a zoning change request in 2000. The examples reflect two different institutionalisation processes, one administrative and the other political. Process tracing focuses on three moments: the initial demand made by the religious authorities, the treatment of the application by municipal authorities and the results.

4.1 An administrative process of institutionalisation in Montreal

In 2000, recently arrived imam Said Jaziri set out to establish a new place of worship in the east end of Montreal. This case provides an interesting and useful one for understanding the configurations and mechanisms involved in such situations of religious pluralism and particularly that of Montreal.

In order to understand this case, it is important to locate it with respect to an already complex set of legal and political relationships. This configuration involved all three levels of government. In the mid-1990s, in general, places of worship were considered primarily in relation to issues of cultural heritage and its protection. The goal was to protect religious sites threatened by demolition or commercial conversion. A multi-denominational religious heritage foundation worked with the federal and provincial governments to restore and preserve Montreal’s heritage of religious architecture. In 1994 and 1995, agreements were concluded between the two levels of government and projects valued at 7.5 million dollars were planned within the framework of the Canada-Quebec Infrastructure Works Program to restore about 50 churches and synagogues (Myles 1994).

For its part, the City of Montreal also planned to recognise and protect traditional places of worship, and to this end adopted a by-law on land-use planning that created a specific class of use (religious building) to cover existing places of worship. While the question of new buildings was not initially on the agenda, it was raised later, because the effect of the by-law was to limit the sectors available for ‘new places of worship inserted into other zoning sectors (housing, commerce, industry and other public and institutional facilities)’. Any such building had ‘to be authorised through special exemption from the by-law on land-use planning’ (T, Arteau 2000).

In accordance with the asymmetry of Quebec’s municipal-provincial relations, the City of Montreal received its unique charter. This meant
that, at the time, Montreal was exempt from the provincial act respecting land-use planning and development. Instead, Article 524.2 (d) of the Charter of the City of Montreal stated that the city council could, notwithstanding any zoning by-laws and subject to the conditions it prescribed in each case, give individual and non-transferable authorisation for the use of land or construction, alteration and occupancy of buildings for religious purposes.

In 1998, faced with an increase in requests for special authorisation of non-traditional places of worship, the City Council amended the by-law on land-use planning. Its aim was to allow as a matter of right the creation of places of worship in moderate- and high-intensity commercial sectors (Ville de Montréal 2000). In 1999, the Executive Committee of Montreal asked the Department of Urban and Economic Development (Service de Développement Économique et Urbain, SDEU) to analyse ‘the issue of the creation and concentration of places of worship in Montreal’ and prescribed a moratorium on new places of worship until that time. In 2000, the SDEU presented its results and then was charged with preparing ‘a normative framework’ in order to better manage the establishment of new places of worship (T, Ville de Montréal 2000). The Executive Committee first agreed with the SDEU: it decided to refuse special authorisations in residential sectors and to maintain a moratorium in specific cases (Ville de Montréal 2000).

After that, however, the policy document and its proposals were presented, creating deep divisions in the Executive Committee and city council. The policy document proposed by the SDEU threatened to deprive elected officials of their discretion and the Executive Committee feared provoking a negative reaction on the part of ethno-religious communities. In the end, the Executive Committee Chairman came down in favour of the status quo and special authorisations, fearing that new zoning restrictions could go against the rights and freedoms of ethno-religious communities and be viewed as a refusal to accommodate. Some municipal employees viewed this decision as a challenge to their expertise, to give preference to short-term interests.

Therefore, knowing that the question of places of worship was a very sensitive issue at this juncture in Montreal and aware that he had no special relationship with an elected politician who might aid him, Jaziri adopted a circuitous strategy. After a city’s inspector reported that a socio-cultural activity was held without authorisation in 2000, the imam immediately asked for a permit. When he made his application, he did not mention specifically that it would involve a place of worship because he feared ‘being refused or held up’. Therefore, he told the public official his intention was to create a cultural association, named the Koranic Association of Montreal (Association Coranique de Montréal), allowing some ambiguity to remain.
about the mission of the institution. As he reported to me, he told the municipal employee: ‘We are engaged in cultural matters, a little Arabic, from time to time we pray… ’.

In principle, no activity is supposed to be held until the city permit is officially granted. However, on 14 September 2001, a citizen made a complaint, which especially considering the timing appears to have been a reaction to 9/11. For their part, the municipal authorities reacted rapidly. A few days later, the complaint was dismissed and the City of Montreal granted a permit to the Koranic Association for socio-cultural activities, a daycare centre and a place of worship. It is likely that the imam formulated the permit application the same day it was granted. Indeed, the religious leader explained to me, that having acquired a clearer understanding of the property tax exemption for places of worship and having checked that his application conformed to the zoning by-law, he acknowledged that the building was essentially a place of worship. ‘At that point’, the imam told me, ‘I publicised it widely!’ He went on to say that: ‘in the media, they know us as a mosque; it’s rare that people are familiar with the fact that we are also an association’.

Later, however, the same imam returned to the municipal authorities with other demands, framed in the language of reasonable accommodation. Indeed, by this time, the city had published its guide on reasonable accommodation and had already dealt with claims from religious congregations for exemption from parking regulations during religious high days and holidays. Following this example, Jaziri reports that he claimed flexibility for parking regulations around the mosque, but the demand was unsuccessful. No doubt, as well, elected politicians feared opening up an issue – that of parking – which was frequently in dispute elsewhere (Qadeer & Chaudhry 2000).

Up to that point, the mediation mechanisms between the imam and the municipality remained highly administrative, mimicking the neutrality and rationality of ‘heroic planning’ (Sandercock 2003). However, once the mosque was recognised by the City, the imam tried to abandon these impersonal forms of mediation. He sought, instead, to establish mediation channels of a more personal nature with elected municipal officials. In his view, it was a question of ‘establishing contact with those who represent the community; in that way, when I have a problem, it can be dealt with… ’.

In other words, this imam had come to understand the institutional configuration in which the processes of establishing new mosques in Montreal occurred. When he set out to create a grand mosque in Montreal, the imam sought to develop personal relationships with elected officials, especially the mayor of Montreal. He argued that the number of believers and increasing recognition of the Islamic form of
worship merited such an institution and he proposed his plan for a mosque in the city centre with Arabic architecture and on a plot of land to be provided for free by the city. If there had been political agreement among the three levels of government in Canada, the project would have been financed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The imam tried to unite Muslim groups around his proposal, and sought to represent himself to the municipal authorities as having a privileged relationship with the (supposed) Islamic community. However, he was criticised by several other religious leaders, including the head of the Muslim Council of Montreal, who found it ‘unacceptable to request public land and taxpayers’ money to finance a mosque’ (T, in Cauchy 2005).

In the end, then, apart from providing support for a mayoral candidate during an electoral campaign, the plan came to naught. Moreover, problems with the immigration services undermined the imam’s legitimacy, not only with government authorities, but also with other Islamic organisations. Thus, in spite of his efforts to use the resources of the institutional configuration, the imam failed to establish a personalised mediation mechanism with the city. Rather, the process of institutionalisation remained an administrative one.

Lacking the personalised relationship that he hoped for, Jaziri turned to the media which he had used, and threatened to use, before. Even before the municipality had stated its position, the imam said, ‘if the city turns us down (…) their decision will be based, unfortunately, on prejudice’ (T, in Cauchy 2005). He reported, however, that with respect to the Grand Mosque he was disappointed that this media-based strategy had so little effect. This lack of effect stood in contrast to his experience following a flood in the original mosque (a problem linked to Montreal drains) and for which the imam sought financial compensation and a visit by a municipal leader to demonstrate the city’s concern. He reported his efforts at exercising pressure via the media: ‘I told them, I’m going to contact the media. … So they [a city councillor] came… ’. Sometimes the media were also used as a threat ‘if Radio Canada gets wind of this, there will be a scandal!’

And, by way of summation he said: ‘If you don’t ask, you don’t get!’

In the end, the imam’s unsuccessful attempt to personalise mediation channels and his strategy of publicisation led to a lack of institutionalisation of his position as leader of Muslims in Montreal. Assessing this failure, the imam said, ‘In any case, in Montreal and Laval things are going nowhere: we’re moving to Saint-Eustache!’ Indeed, the imam hoped to have more success with a different municipal configuration, and this time, in addition to the mosque, he planned to set up a ritual slaughtering area. While his assessment of the situation in Montreal is easily understandable, since it derived directly from his ex-
perience, what should we make of his reference to Laval? This is what I intend to explore through the example of the establishment of a Muslim centre that amended a City of Laval zoning by-law.

### 4.2 A political process of institutionalisation in Laval

As noted, unlike the City of Montreal before the municipal restructuring of 2002, the City of Laval is subject to the Government of Quebec’s Land Use Planning and Development Act and its Act Respecting Elections and Referendums in Municipalities. Consequently, every zoning amendment in Laval is potentially subject to a referendum, which is part of the provincial procedures for public consultation. These requirements make the institutional configuration of Laval different from that of Montreal.

In comparison with those until recently in Montreal, Laval’s elected municipal officials do not have the latitude associated with the mechanism of special authorisations. Thus, every zoning request is potentially subject to a referendum process, which implies a high level of involvement by planning authorities and by residents. Provincial legislation provides for the direct participation of residents who have specific institutional instruments for expressing their position on zoning changes.

The possibility of a referendum can also be a major constraint for religious officials. Indeed, as explained by Qadeer (1997: 491): ‘Ironically, the very participatory procedures meant to give citizens a voice in planning provide the convenient means for some local groups to resist the accommodation of others’. In many cases, ‘[p]ublic hearings on planning regulations have often turned into the tools of NIMBYism and ethno-racism’ (Qadeer 1997: 491).

The process associated with this case is as follows. In 1999, a Muslim association of Laval bought a building situated in a commercial sector. They sought to increase the size of the building in order to set up a Muslim cultural centre, but the hoped-for renovations to enlarge the premises involved extending part of the building into a residential zone (Germain et al. 2003a: 32). Therefore, it would have been necessary to amend a municipal by-law and zoning plan.

The claimant filed an application in 2000 for a zoning change in order to accommodate a Muslim cultural centre. They felt the public would more easily understand a cultural centre than a mosque. From the moment the application was submitted to the planning authority, it was controlled by very specific regulatory procedures. First, the application for the cultural centre expansion was submitted to the planning authority, which recommended that the City of Laval Executive Committee accept the zoning change. The Executive Committee followed
the recommendation, and the municipal council adopted it. Laval residents were notified of a public meeting to consider the zoning change, while residents directly affected by the rezoning received a letter from the Clerk’s Department. For their part, the Muslim leaders carefully selected their representatives, an architect and an engineer, to explain the plan both to elected officials and during the public meeting.

Municipal councillors attended the public meeting, the mayor of Laval presided over it, and the engineer from the Islamic community spoke about the centre. As the minutes show, right from the start of the meeting, residents were opposed to amending the zoning by-law. The fears expressed were typical of this kind of exercise. Examples included the fear that the neighbourhood’s residential character would disappear, that parking problems would mount along with increased road traffic, and that residents would be bothered by noise, given that there would be five periods of prayer a day, including one early in the morning.

Faced with this hostility and the numerous questions raised, the representative of the Islamic community tried to reassure the residents. The mayor proposed that the by-law would stipulate that: (i) all activities would be held inside and (ii) a working group composed of five citizens of Laval, in addition to elected officials and municipal employees, would devise a plan acceptable to all.

No doubt, the elected officials had little interest in either embarking upon a referendum process, given the residents’ hostility, or withdrawing the proposed by-law. If either of these options were adopted, they could pay a high price at election time. While the universalistic view of the City of Laval was not always well received by Laval’s ethnic and ethno-religious groups, a lack of support for this view on the part of the elected officials could have been interpreted as a form of Islamophobia. A solution was found by inviting the residents to two additional public meetings. These damped down any interest in a referendum and led to a second draft regulation, limiting the surface area of the cultural centre and part of the land used for parking. Regulations proved acceptable to both sides and were carried by the municipal council.

The mechanisms of personal mediation between the elected officials and the ethno-religious community worked in favour of a positive outcome to this process. Efforts made at meetings by Laval’s mayor and municipal council in aid of the group’s application provided political support. Without such support, it is likely the plan would have been rejected.

Since this controversy was settled, the personalised mediation that took hold continues into the present: the opinions of these religious leaders are solicited when issues touching on Islam arise and they meet elected officials at several occasions. This was the case, for example, dur-
ing the controversy in 2006 surrounding cartoons of the Prophet published in Denmark and discussed around the world. These religious authorities are keen to maintain this personalised mediation, and indeed go out of their way to enthuse about their relationship with the city.42

Lastly, in terms of institutionalising Islam in Laval, this cultural centre serves as the ‘head mosque’ and is recognised as such by other Muslim religious associations.43 This has had the effect of putting the other Islamic associations into a different position to that of the ‘head mosque’ within the institutional configuration. These associations emerged more recently, and were created to meet a particular need, namely, having places of worship close to the homes of believers which are widely distributed across Laval. Given Laval’s universalistic discourse, they did not expect to be recognised by the city as religious associations.44 In their case, relations with elected officials and municipal employees are practically non-existent, and commercial types of mediation dominate. Indeed, these associations, which operate as de facto prayer rooms, are located in commercial spaces rented to individuals.45

For this case, I would hypothesise that mediation mechanisms via the market result in a type of commercial relationship in which the mediation is between owner and renter. That said, the hypothesis still needs to be tested empirically.

5 Conclusion

In 1969, Bourassa wrote the following about Quebec municipalities, with the exception of Montreal:

Obviously, they do not exemplify well-organised bureaucracies; most problems are solved thanks to a personal relationship, more often than not characterised by arbitrariness, and dominated almost entirely by a powerful elite. Thus, the municipal government rapidly becomes an oligarchy based not only on money and social status, but also on religious leaders. (T, Bourassa 1969: 342)

While obviously it would be unacceptable to artificially apply Bourassa’s quotation to the present situation, his analysis touches upon an important point in our argument, namely, almost 40 years later, the mechanism for personalising channels of mediation between municipal and religious authorities.

I have demonstrated that the strategies of municipal and religious actors are shaped by institutional configurations, which in turn are related to four specific factors. The cities find themselves in a new situation characterised by a new religious pluralism, especially as a result of
the diversity of immigration flows. Aside from the fact that municipalities have direct responsibility for approving places of worship, they have also developed discourses on ethno-cultural and ethno-religious diversity through which they convey their perception of their role in fostering social cohesion. Cities are now quite aware of their responsibility – in conjunction with the federal and provincial governments – in managing the new religious pluralism. However, inter-governmental relations are specific to each city, because in Quebec the status of municipalities varies. This variation has consequences for the relationship between elected officials and municipal employees, in the processes associated with land-use regulation. However, ethno-religious groups well understand the diversity of mediation channels and some seek to have a personal relationship with elected officials.

In these distinct institutional configurations, mediation between municipalities and religious leaders, whether personalised or not, is the mechanism that determines the institutionalisation processes. I have shown that the personalisation of mediation leads to a political process of institutionalisation, whereas the non-personalisation of mediation links leads to an administrative one.

Going beyond these two cases what are some of the lessons that could be drawn? One is that the theoretical framework is by no means limited to Quebec. It could be used to study European cases as well. Indeed, recent research in France also points to the importance of personal mediation channels in the creation of places of worship. It is interesting to note, moreover, that it is not only the ethno-religious group that seeks to use such a channel. Studies in France identify local elected officials who favour personal mediation channels, sometimes because they thereby gain symbolic resources (De Galembert 2006) or sometimes because they operate with a clientelistic form of regulation (Frégosi 2006). Systematic comparisons of mechanisms and institutional configurations across countries and continents could thereby improve our understanding of the way religious pluralism is managed by cities.

Notes

1 This chapter received financial support from the Law Commission of Canada (the Nathalie Des Rosiers Award for Audacity of Imagination) and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I wish to thank holder of the Canada Research Chair in Citizenship and Governance Jane Jenson and the other members of the Chair for their comments and advice when I presented this work in a seminar.

In Canada, the number of Muslims increased from 253,300 in 1991, to 579,600 in 2001. Of the total number of immigrants who arrived from 1991 to 2001, 15 per cent were Muslim (Canada 2003).

Muslim immigration expanded in the late 1950s and further increased as of 1975 with an intake of refugees (Rousseau & Castel 2006: 240).

According to Statistics Canada, a CMA consists of one or more adjacent municipalities centred on a large urban area (known as the urban core). The census population count of the urban core is at least 50,000 and the area must have a population of at least 100,000 to form a CMA. The census population count of the urban core is at least 100,000. Laval and Montreal are part of the Montreal CMA.

Algeria and Morocco represent, respectively, the first and third leading countries of birth of immigrants admitted to Quebec from 1996 to 2005 and residing in the administrative region of Montreal in January 2007 (Quebec 2007: 22). Lebanon, Morocco and Algeria provided a large proportion of these immigrants (Quebec 2007: 36).

However, this count is still approximate. There are no up-to-date, systematic lists of places of worship in the Montreal CMA. While some City of Montreal boroughs, through their taxation teams, have compiled exhaustive details on places of worship, this information is not available to the public (interview with an employee of a Montreal borough, 20 March 2006).

Interview with Montreal mosque imam Jaziri, 8 May 2006; interview with a member of a Laval Islamic association, 28 April 2006.

Interview with an official of the Société de Transports de Montréal, 2 March 2007.

In this article, T indicates that the quote has been translated from French by the author.

This analysis is shared by Germain et al. (2003b).

To mitigate conflicts surrounding the creation of mosques, Qadeer and Chaudhry (2000) have made recommendations to Muslim groups and municipal planners. These recommendations are found in discussions on land-use planning and the way it adapts to cultural and religious diversity (see e.g. Hoernig 2006; Qadeer 1997).

For more details on recognition strategies of ethno-religious communities in the CMA of Montreal, see e.g. Germain et al. (2003b).

Such observations are not that dissimilar to those made a number of years ago by feminists who understood that identities and space are always traversed by power relations (Jenson 1994).

Since 9/11, Canada has experienced an increase in acts of racial hatred towards Muslims (or those thought to be Muslim) (Helly 2004).

While Montreal mosques frequently exceed their legal capacity, which explains the attempts to expand and set up new mosques, we should not attribute this crowding to an increase in or extraordinary level of religious practice. On the contrary, Muslims born abroad and living in Canada constitute the group that is, proportionally, the most inclined to never participate in collective religious activities (...). In Quebec, the proportion of Muslim immigrants never participating in collective religious activities has reached a record high of 62.1 per cent. (T. Eid 2007: 35)

Thus, the surpassing of capacities could derive from the unfavourable ratio of places of worship to the number of believers.

Interview with a policy advisor, City of Montreal, 5 June 2006. Interview with a municipal employee, City of Montreal, 3 May 2006.

For several municipalities, including the City of Montreal (with their amalgamations and de-amalgamations), municipal restructuring refers to a long and complex process.
Given the timing of the two cases treated here, this article will not consider them. For
an analysis of municipal restructuring in Quebec, see e.g. Bherer (2006), Hamel

21 According to an observer of municipal politics in Laval, the mayor ‘is a colossus of
political life in Laval, with a strong and well-oiled machine behind him’ and if ‘others
are disputing his leadership or his domination in the town hall, (...) no one dares to

22 The prayer went: ‘Dear Lord, please bestow your grace upon us and give us the ne-
necessary enlightenment to lead our meeting and the good administration of our city’ (T).

23 In 2003, the Commission on Human Rights and Youth Rights (Commission des
Droits de la Personne et des Droits de la Jeunesse) recommended that the City of La-
val cease saying the prayer. In 2006, the Human Rights Tribunal (Tribunal des
Droits de la Personne) ordered the City of Laval to stop reciting the prayer and the
city conformed to the judgment.

24 The buildings were bought by Islamic associations in 2000 in Montreal and in 1999
in Laval.

25 Known at the time as the Association Pierres Vivantes.

26 Interview with an employee of the City of Montreal, 23 March 2006; interview with
an elected official of the City of Montreal, 12 April 2006.

27 Interview with an employee of the City of Montreal, 23 March 2006. See also Jézé-

28 Interview with an employee of the City of Montreal, 23 March 2006; interview with
an elected official of the City of Montreal, 12 April 2006.

29 Interview with Said Jaziri, 8 May 2006. Unless indicated to the contrary, this inter-
view is the source of all quotes by the imam in the present article. As the interview
was conducted in French, all quotes by Jaziri have been translated.

30 Interview with an employee of the City of Montreal, 3 March 2008.

31 According to an employee in Urban Planning, the decision-making process was ac-
celerated as the request was already under consideration, and the permit was granted

32 The request for a day care centre dated from May 2001.

33 Interview with an employee of the City of Montreal, 3 March 2008.

34 This plan was not the first in Montreal, since the creation of a grand mosque had
been announced twice before, in 1989 and 1999 (Béliveau 1989; Berger 1999).
Nevertheless, there is still no grand mosque in Montreal after the fashion of those in
Paris or London.

35 He ‘lost his refugee status because he concealed a criminal record in France’. In
2007, Jaziri was deported to Tunisia (Block 2007).

36 Interview with leading members of a Laval Islamic association, 14 May 2006.

37 In this matter, the decision to find mediators from professions conferring a certain
prestige is consistent with a strategy increasingly employed by ethno-religious
groups. Most of the time, it is practising professionals (engineers, architects, etc.)
who present the project rather than the directly responsible religious official. The eth-
no-religious groups assume that these professionals give it greater credibility and le-
gitimacy. Interview with an employee of the City of Montreal, 23 March 2006.

38 Compromises with residents and measures requested by municipal employees often
have an impact on the way the ethno-religious community’s activities are organised,
such as end times of activities.

39 Interview with a member of a Laval association, 29 June 2006; interview with a
member of a Laval Islamic association, 28 April 2006.

40 However, this agreement about the zoning change differs from the issue of the occu-
pancy certificate.
Interview with leading members of a Laval Islamic association, 14 May 2006. See also Germain et al. (2003b: 33).

Interview with leading members of a Laval Islamic association, 14 May 2006.

Interview with a member of a Laval Islamic association, 28 April 2006.

Interview with a member of a Laval Islamic association, 28 April 2006.

In Laval, a Muslim association has disbanded recently, probably because the rent was too high.

References


Conclusion: making sense of local migration policy arenas

Tiziana Caponio

1 Introduction

As pointed out in a recent literature review on the multilevel governance of migration carried out in the context of IMISCOE Cluster C9’s research on immigrant and immigration policymaking can be considered as still in its infancy (Zincone & Caponio 2006). This is even more the case when the local level is considered: not only is research on local immigrant and immigration policy very recent, but the policymaking dimension is only rarely addressed (see also the introduction chapter in this volume). Given the lack of systematic empirical accounts, theorising also appears to be still poorly developed.

Such an important gap in the literature cannot of course be filled overnight. More theoretically driven empirical work is needed, which can only be achieved through joint research programmes. As a consequence, the ambition of making sense of the local dimension of migration policymaking is beyond the scope of this book, which is the product of a far more modest effort: that of gathering together the contributions of a group of migration scholars looking at this underresearched topic from very different research questions and perspectives. Nevertheless, we undertake, at least in a tentative manner, a first comparative exercise aimed at elucidating the relevance and the main characteristics of the local dimension of migration policymaking in the five countries considered in this book: Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Canada.

At first glance, such an exercise may be regarded as highly questionable from a methodological point of view. The fact that the studies presented in this book analyse different dimensions of integration policy is puzzling: how to compare local citizenship policy and politics in Swiss cantons with vocational training in German and Dutch cities? Or access to services in Italian cities with mosque-building issues in Quebec? The risk of comparing apples to oranges is evident. In order to avoid methodological nonsense, in the first section of this chapter I shall try to devise a minimum set of theoretically relevant concepts drawing on both the general policymaking literature and specific work on local immigrant policy. This latter body of research has already ela-
borated a number of categories and typologies to account for the extreme diversity of local responses to immigrant presence, among which the one proposed by Alexander (2007) stands out as particularly compelling. Nonetheless, the dynamics and specific characters of local policymaking processes are not adequately considered. This is why I resorted to the classic notion of policy arena: first introduced by Lowi (1972) in order to account for power relations in policymaking, this category will be loosely interpreted and adapted to the study of local migration policymaking. More precisely, I shall speak of local policy arenas as policymaking fields arising around specific issue areas or dimensions of migration policy. The challenge is to understand how local migration policy is worked out through local policy arenas across the five countries considered, and what patterns of similarities and differences can be singled out in terms of dynamics of policymaking processes, actors involved and their reciprocal relations.

Of course, local migration policy arenas cannot be considered in a void, since they take shape in specific national contexts and systems of state-periphery relations. This is why in the second section, models of administrative centralisation/decentralisation in the five countries will be briefly described, and the role played in each one by sub-national authorities in the context of immigration and immigrant policy and policymaking1 will be considered. This is a crucial step if we are to understand the different institutional contexts in which local migration policy arenas may find themselves to take shape.

Based on the evidence provided by the case studies presented in this book and on other relevant pieces of literature, in the third section I shall provide some comparative analysis of local-level responses and policymaking processes in the three issue areas of migration policy analysed in the contributions to this book, i.e. citizenship, welfare services and religious diversity. These issue areas will be conceptualised as three different local policy arenas, of which I shall point out the specific stakes, networks of actors involved and patterns of policymaking relations. Given the heterogeneity of the empirical material on which the analysis is built, this should be considered more as a tentative exercise than as a systematic account.

In the fourth section the relevance of the local dimension of policymaking across the five countries considered will be assessed: to what extent do local policymaking arenas matter in migration policy? What is the impact of different state structures? Are there significant differences between centralised and decentralised countries? Or, on the contrary, can similar decision-making patterns be pointed out? And, if so, what are the common mechanisms lying behind local policymaking on migration? Of course, answers to these queries cannot but be provisory, confirming the need for systematic, theoretically driven re-
search on this – so far – neglected dimension of migration policymaking.

2 Looking for commonality in extreme difference: local policy arenas in the migration field

From a policymaking perspective, locality represents a crucial dimension for the study of policy processes, since it is at this level that the very essence of policy as a peculiar combination of decision and action in relation to some collective – more or less clearly – perceived issue takes shape. Different institutions and organisations usually operate in a specific territorial context, either of a public or private nature, with generic or specific tasks, political or executive functions, etc. Regardless of the investigated policy field, complexity is indeed intrinsically linked to local policymaking, a complexity given by the closeness and continuous overlapping and intertwining of decision and implementation, autonomy and execution.

Such complexity has not been sufficiently tackled in the existing literature on migration local policy. While often acknowledged, research on its consequences in terms of policymaking structures and processes is lacking. Alexander (2007), for instance, distinguishes between espoused and enacted policies, which recalls the classic distinction in policymaking studies between decision and implementation. Yet, what the relationship is between the two is not investigated. As pointed out by a number of contributions in this book (see in particular Vermeulen & Stotijn; Caponio ch. 2; Fourrot), implementation is a dynamic process, in which various actors are involved, and through which official policy may undergo profound transformation and reinterpretation. In order to look carefully at these processes, appropriate theoretical tools are needed: these might be borrowed from classic policy analysis, which emerged specifically with the purpose of looking inside Easton’s ‘black-box’ (1965) to shed new light on policymaking processes.

In particular, here I draw on Lowi’s seminal concept of policy arena, which, in my view, can be reinterpreted in a loose way and fruitfully applied to make sense of the complexity of local migration policymaking. Two features of Lowi’s approach appear particularly relevant: 1) the incorporation of the element of power, which is not always explicitly acknowledged in most of the metaphors and analytical tools used in implementation research (see, for instance, implementation structures, policy networks, advocacy coalitions, etc.); and 2) the ‘policy determines politics’ challenging argument, according to which different types of policy engender different power relationships among individuals and groups, and these relationships can be described and predicted on the
basis of different policy types. Below we examine why these two axes of Lowi’s reasoning may contribute to the analysis of local migration policymaking.

First, the element of power is central in local policymaking on migration since these policies have to be formally discussed and agreed upon by local representative and/or executive institutions, such as city councils, regional parliaments, municipal governments, etc. Confrontation between opposite ideologies and political framing of migration can be expected. Migration is usually a hot issue, one on which mass media attention is very high and public opinion, while divided, is more likely to be negatively oriented. As a consequence, local migration policymaking can hardly be depicted as characterised just by negotiation and pragmatic orientation. Such an orientation may happen under specific circumstances, but is not the rule. On the contrary, power relations and politicisation are very likely to occur.

Secondly, as for the ‘policy determines politics’ argument – while this has been the object of much criticism – it can still be regarded as an intriguing analytical perspective. In other terms, the challenge is that of analysing policymaking bottom-up, starting from the policy stakes and looking at how decision-making and implementation processes take shape across different cities in different countries. Of course, one must be aware that local policy, of whatever kind – migration policy included – does not take place in a void, but rather in complex institutional environments that impinge on different models of state/periphery relations. Depending on the specific issues or issue areas (Alexander 2007), local authorities may be assigned a crucial role in a given country while having just negligible competence in another. This is the case of, for instance, citizenship in Switzerland as compared to the other four countries considered in this study. Institutional settings cannot be dismissed, and thus I investigate them in the chapter’s second section. Nevertheless, to reverse the perspective and start from the issues at hand may help to identify common patterns of policymaking despite considerable institutional differentiation, and to answer to more general questions like: when and under what conditions does politicisation occur? What factors account for patterns of convergence in local policymaking on migration?

The concept of policy arenas, by emphasising both negotiation and power and by looking at policy processes from the bottom up, may help to overcome the risk of just concluding that each city/region is a case apart. This would inevitably follow if one adheres simply to the analysis of formal policymaking structures and institutional settings. Yet, by looking at how, despite differences, involved actors interact on specific issues, common features of local migration policymaking can be highlighted and accounted for. In this respect, the issue of politicisa-
tion, i.e. of the wielding of political power as opposed to the search for negotiation and pragmatic solutions, is indeed a crucial point. By focusing on the policy arenas around different migration policy stakes, and by comparing them carefully, my purpose is to isolate those mechanisms and processes that may lead to the prevailing of the coercive, or on the contrary, the consensual side of policymaking. If institutional settings provide the structure for the exercise of power and negotiation in relation to migration, local governments and policy networks may still engage in different patterns of relationships, depending on the issues at hand.

Of course, in order to undertake such an analysis, we need a clear specification of possible local policy issues related to migration and of their main characteristics. In this respect, Alexander’s (2007: 48-50) classification of policy domains and issue areas appears to be of particular relevance. He has identified four policy domains of local migrant policy: the legal-political domain, which addresses the civic incorporation of migrants/ethnic minorities in the host polity; the socio-economic domain, which concerns social inclusion policies; the cultural-religious domain, which includes policies related to minority religious and cultural practices as well as to inter-group cultural relations; and the spatial domain, which groups policies with a strong spatial dimension (housing, urban renovation, etc.). Each policy domain is then divided into more specific issue areas, representing ‘all the (potential and actual) local migrant policy’ (Alexander 2007: 48). The contributions collected in this book allow for the analysis of policymaking processes in three policy domains and four issue areas: Helbling’s account of Swiss local citizenship policy is an instance of the migrant civic status issue area, in the legal-political domain; Caponio ch. 2 on Italian cities, Aybek and Vermeulen and Stotijn on youth employment policies in German and Dutch cities illustrate two closely related issue areas in the socio-economic domain, i.e. welfare services and vocational training; Fourot’s essay on mosque-building in Quebec addresses the issue area of local authorities relations towards religious institutions and practices.

However, contrary to Alexander’s typological approach, the methodological path that will be followed here is not a deductive, but rather, an inductive one. Drawing on the contributions collected in this book as well as on other relevant pieces of literature, I shall attempt to analyse the local migration policy arenas structured around the three main issue areas specified to find, in each issue area, common patterns of policymaking across different cities.

The search for common patterns represents a key task for research on local migration policy and policymaking, since this is a condition for understanding how a relevant part of migration policy actually
works, and under what conditions it might eventually work better. The debate on ‘good’ or ‘best’ practices, which informs much of policy-practitioners’ literature on migration today, has shifted from an emphasis on exceptionality and uniqueness to a search for basic mechanisms that may allow for the transferability of a certain practice in different contexts. What these mechanisms are and what factors may have an impact on their – correct – functioning is an empirical question, to which only research can provide systematic and evidence-based answers.

3 The contexts: the role of local authorities in migration policymaking in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Canada

The relevance of the local dimension of migration policymaking varies considerably across European and non-European countries, depending on different state structures and, as a consequence, on the institutional role assigned to territorial levels (regional/provincial/local) of authority in shaping immigration and immigrant policy. In the following section, I shall first reconstruct general models of centre/periphery relations and levels of administrative centralisation/decentralisation, looking closely at sub-national levels in the context of migration policy and policymaking. As will be noted, the five different countries dealt with in the chapters of this book – from different points of view – maximise difference on the independent variable, in the sense that they provide distinct instances of state structures and administrative settings, both in general and in relation to migration.

In the classic terms of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), state structures and levels of decentralisation are the products of processes of state building, and reflect arrangements to the state/periphery cleavage in Europe and to the cultural/linguistic conflict between the anglophone majority and francophone minority in Canada. In this sense, the five countries considered represent different solutions to these historical challenges: Switzerland, Canada and Germany stand for different instances of federalism; Italy can be regarded as a case of a regionalised state structure in transition towards a quasi-federalist form; the Netherlands is a prototype of a unitary state, although with a non-negligible degree of administrative decentralisation.

As for federalist systems, the three countries considered present different forms of centre/periphery relations (McKay 2001; Watts 2008). First of all, Switzerland is a confederation characterised by a high degree of separation between the federal state and the cantons (so-called dual federalism), these latter enjoying exclusive authority on a signifi-
significant number of matters such as public order, health care, education, territorial organisation, state-church relations and taxation. In this context, municipalities raise their own taxes and autonomously organise themselves. While the degree of local autonomy may depend on the cantons, in general this is very high when compared with other countries (Kriesi 1998; Linder 2005). Similarly, Canada is also a case of dual federalism, based on two distinct jurisdictions, the federal parliament and the legislative assemblies of the provinces, with separate areas of legislative authority and a few shared ones (Rocher & Smith 2003). However, in contrast to Switzerland, the federal parliament has always enjoyed a certain primacy over the provincial ones, as pointed out, for instance, by the fact that the residuary powers are attributed to the central government (Bélanger 2001a). As for centre/periphery relations, these are more of an asymmetric kind: according to the so-called ‘opting-out formula’, provinces can decide not to participate in a federal programme and receive tax compensation for withdrawal. Currently, only Quebec availed itself of such an opportunity, which is part of the special status accorded to this province since the British North America Act of 1867 to accommodate its linguistic and cultural diversity (Bélanger 2001b). Municipal legislation falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces, and city administrations have no constitutionally guaranteed autonomy: at this level, asymmetry is the rule, so the exercise of prerogatives in one city does not necessarily apply in another (see Fourot in this volume).

Germany, on the other hand, has been depicted as a case of administrative federalism or cooperative federalism: the federal government has a very broad range of exclusive, concurrent (with federal law prevailing) and framework legislative jurisdiction, while the Länder have a mandatory constitutional responsibility for applying and administering most of these federal laws5 (Leonardy 1999: 12), as pointed out by the fact that public service is mainly organised and employed by Land governments. In contrast to Canada and similar to Switzerland, local governments enjoy constitutionally guaranteed autonomy: they carry out most of the administrative tasks attributed to Länder, who have legislative responsibility for their organisation and supervision (Leonardy 1999; Jeffery 2002).

Italy can be considered a case of a unitary state that has, in the last twenty years, undertaken a process of increasing devolution of authority to the periphery and, in particular, to the regions. The regional state structure was already envisaged in the 1948 Constitution, which also recognised municipal autonomy. Nevertheless, this was a kind of highly centralised and asymmetric regionalism: the fifteen ordinary regions could enjoy legislative powers only within state law limits, while the five regions with a special statute (i.e. the border regions Aosta Val-
ley, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Trentino Alto Adige, and the two insular regions Sicily and Sardinia) were accorded greater administrative and legislative autonomy (Ventura 2002: 114). Ordinary regions were implemented only in the mid-1970s and their functioning showed from the very beginning limits and contradictions. Reforms in the sense of decentralisation took place only in the early 1990s. In 2001, the reform of Title V of the Constitution, sanctioned by popular referendum, has substantially modified the originally unitary state structure in a federalist sense: areas of exclusive state legislative authority and shared ones have been specified, while legislative power on residuary matters has been assigned to the regions; yet, contrary to classic federalist models, Italy still lacks an institution allowing regions to participate in the national legislative process (Ventura 2002: 118-119). Administrative functions are the prerogative of the municipalities even though, according to the principle of subsidiarity, the provinces and the regions may intervene where deemed necessary.

In our sample, the Netherlands represents the only pure unitary state structure: Lijphart (1968) described it as a ‘centralised consensus democracy’. As such, provinces and municipalities, which represent the lowest tiers of government, are essentially responsible for the implementation of national policies. Whereas the twelve provinces have limited authority, municipalities are multi-purpose territorial governments and they outweigh provinces in terms of tasks, level of expenditure and number of personnel. Actually, municipalities do not only have executive responsibility but, according to the Constitution, also have the right to take the initiative in the administration of their territory (Toonen 1990). This ensures municipalities a considerable degree of autonomy.

Different state/periphery structures impinge of course on the treatment of migration in the countries considered. Generally speaking, immigration policy, according to Hammar (1985) the regulation of international migration flows, falls within the jurisdiction of central state authorities, with the notable exception of Canada, where immigration is a matter of shared jurisdiction with the provinces. Most provinces have agreements with the Canadian government that allow them to participate in the selection of immigrants to be admitted within the scope of federal programmes6 (Birrel & McIssac 2006: 103). On the other hand, the primacy of state authorities in Europe might be considered a reflection of the immigration history of the old continent, where international flows represent a relatively new phenomenon taking place in the context of established and supposedly homogeneous nation states. However, a more close attention to centre/periphery relationships on issues of immigration regulation highlights interesting differences across the four European countries considered in this chapter. As for the two federal systems, Germany and Switzerland, the Länder
and the cantons have a considerable say both in national decision-making and implementation. On the former, influence on immigration laws and regulations can be exerted through the regional legislative chambers (respectively, the Bundestag and the Ständerat) and through the regional ministers’ conferences.\(^7\) As for implementation, in both countries regional authorities enjoy extensive powers in carrying out admission policies, especially as far as the issuing of residence permits is concerned, while in Switzerland cantons are also responsible for the alien police and for enforcing repatriation decisions (D’Amato 2006).

On the other hand, in more centralised state structures such as Italy and the Netherlands, the influence of sub-national levels on immigration policy is far less extensive, even though local authorities may play a non-negligible discrentional role in the issuing and renewal of residence permits,\(^8\) as well as in tolerating irregular migrants.\(^9\) The aforementioned quasi-federalist turn in Italy is still far from endowing the regions with the kind of direct influence in national legislation that can be found in the other federal states, since there is no legislative chamber representing the regions at a national level. Yet, according to the 2002 Immigration Law, the regions can take advantage of the possibility to organise, in collaboration with the Minister of Education, training courses in the countries of origin: these courses offer the regions an instrument of selection of immigrants, to fill shortages in local labour markets. However, the national quota assigned for this category of entries is negligible and, furthermore, the regions have not taken advantage of this opportunity (Caponio 2007).

As is clear, different state structures and institutionalised centre/periphery relations set the formal framework of opportunities and constraints against which sub-national authorities may take action in immigration policy and policymaking. Their role may range from direct involvement in immigrant recruitment (Canada) and repatriation (Switzerland) to mere discretion in the implementation of elements of the national legislation (the Netherlands). Discretion, while not institutionally recognised as part of the implementation process, is nevertheless relevant for the effects it produces both for those who are subject to a certain law or regulation and for immigration policy as a whole. The case of Italy is in this sense paradigmatic: the toleration of illegal stays would have been impossible without considerable discretion on the part of local authorities in allowing access to services to all immigrants, including irregular ones. This, coupled with the absence of opportunities of legal entry and with an increasing demand in the labour market for low-qualified, highly flexible workers (especially in agriculture and for care and domestic services), has contributed to the consolidation of a so-called ‘half-closed/half-open door’ immigration policy (Colombo & Sciortino 2004).
As for *immigrant policy*, which has been the main focus of the contributions presented in this book, the picture is much more scattered and, along with the institutional division of responsibility in welfare policy, integration rhetoric and official immigrant policy must be considered. This is a clear point of distinction among the three federalist countries: whereas Switzerland never promoted a national integration policy, and Germany did so only in 2005, when the first national integration programme was introduced, the Canadian central government looks far more interventionist. As a consequence, whereas immigrant policy is essentially cantonal/regional policy in the first two countries, this is not the case in Canada. In 1971 the Multiculturalist Act established the basic principles of Canadian immigrant policy by recognising the right to difference and proclaiming cultural diversity as a national value. Moreover, federal programmes aimed at supporting first settlement, especially through English and French language instruction, are carried out by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in the context of various agreements with the provinces (Simmons 1999; Birrell & McIsaac 2006). The only exception is represented by Quebec, which under the terms of the Canada-Quebec Accord signed in 1991, has exclusive responsibility for welcoming and integrating immigrants who settle in the province, thus enjoying full autonomy in the management of federal funds allocated for immigrant policy. As for the other provinces, immigrant policy is composed of a mix of federal and provincial programmes, often overlapping each other. Depending on the provincial statutes, municipalities have been assigned varying degrees of influence in these policies, which are often implemented by NGOs selected on the basis of public bids. However, since the late-1990s, budget constraints and welfare retrenchment have been accompanied by a strengthening of provincial responsibility in immigrants’ accommodation and reception (see Fourot in this volume): in the case of Vancouver (Leaf 2005: 289), this led to an increased centrality of municipal authorities in dealing with non-governmental and community organisations.

As for Italy, beginning in 1998 immigrant policy became a regional matter. Law no. 40/1998, established a National Integration Fund to be allocated to the regions, which were actually responsible for approving annual integration programmes, in collaboration with provincial and local authorities. Throughout the 1990s, local administrations had played a crucial role – especially in the north – in providing first assistance and various integration projects (in this volume ch. 2), given the autonomy Italian municipalities enjoy in the organisation of public services delivery and implementation. The recent federal reforms have reinforced regional responsibility in welfare policy, and it is actually up to the regions now to decide whether to establish ad hoc immigrant integration pro-
grammes to be implemented by provincial and/or municipal authorities.

In the Netherlands, on the other hand, immigrant policy has been formulated and developed in a centralised way by the national government,\textsuperscript{10} which introduced an Ethnic Minority Policy as early as 1983. Local authorities, though, have enjoyed considerable autonomy in implementation throughout the 1990s, a trend that has been contradicted by the introduction, in 2003 of a national integration programme assigning to the central state control over integration courses and exams. Nevertheless, consistent with the general structure of the Dutch welfare state described above, many integration measures continue to be carried out by municipalities, which has produced a growing gap between national-level symbolic politics and local-level integration policies (Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2008).

Figure 6.1 sums up the results of the analysis carried out so far. A first picture of the relevance of the local dimension of migration policymaking in our five countries can be identified by crossing the two dimensions of: 1) local/regional degree of autonomy in immigration policy and 2) local/regional autonomy in immigrant policy in the formal division of responsibility between centre and periphery. According to the figure, the local dimension is likely to be extremely critical in Switzerland, while it will be of a minor relevance in the Netherlands, with the exception at least in part of immigrant policy.

\textbf{Figure 6.1}  \textit{The local dimension of policymaking in Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland: dimensions of analysis}
State/periphery institutional arrangements described so far represent sets of rules that shape local policymakers’ opportunities and constraints. Yet, if we are to understand how immigrant local policies actually work, the compilation of an inventory of opportunities and constraints is insufficient. I shall focus on the local dimension of migration policy per se, to find out if, and to what extent, there are common mechanisms at work behind – and maybe in spite of – extreme differences in formal state/local authority arrangements.

4 Policymaking patterns in local migration policy arenas: evidence from case studies

In this section I turn my attention to local migration policy arenas, particularly to the three local arenas that can be identified on the basis of the contributions collected in this book, i.e.: the legal status – namely citizenship – policy arena; the social welfare and employment policy arenas; the religious diversity arena. For each, I shall first identify the main structural differences across the five countries considered in terms of the local authorities concerned and the formal responsibility assigned to them. In a second step, I will focus on elements of similarity in the functioning of the local arenas with particular attention to the actors taking part in policymaking processes and the logic behind their actions.

As already mentioned, such an assessment can only be tentative: not only do the contributions collected in this book look at local policymaking from very different perspectives and with varying methodological approaches, but existing literature on local policy has unevenly addressed such a dimension. Moreover, while much has been written on various aspects of local socio-economic and religious diversity issue areas, a serious gap exists when considering the local dimension of citizenship policy. As a consequence, the following analysis has to be considered as a preliminary attempt to build an original heuristic perspective on the local dimension of policymaking rather than as an accomplished study.

4.1 Citizenship policy: an invisible local migration arena

According to Alexander (2007: 49), citizenship relates to the migrant civic status, which is a crucial issue area in the legal-political policy domain. In general, it is taken for granted that citizenship is the goal par excellence of national policymaking. It is up to national laws to draw the boundaries between citizens and non-citizens and to decide under which conditions the latter may aspire to become members of the na-
tional community. Even EU supra-national citizenship is currently based on membership in a nation state, i.e. one of the EU-27 member states.

However, as Helbling points out in this book, if in Switzerland national citizenship is explicitly based on membership in a local community, i.e. in the municipality, in other countries, centralised France included, regional differences in the implementation of naturalisation laws can be observed. This clearly indicates the relevance of local/regional authorities’ attitudes towards the question of who has the right to become a citizen (see also Helbling 2008: 18-19). The local dimension of citizenship policy, while only rarely acknowledged and studied, may nevertheless represent a crucial migration policymaking arena in contemporary receiving countries, since it is at a local level that criteria for membership in a certain community acquire social meaning.

How does the citizenship local policy arena look across the five countries considered in this study? What are the main differences and similarities? Answering such questions, even in a tentative manner, is extremely difficult since here a serious gap in the migration policy literature has to be faced: studies on citizenship policy have been carried out essentially in a taken-for-granted nation state perspective, with a prevailing macro-sociological and structural approach (Helbling 2008: 50). Consequently, the local dimension of citizenship policy can be considered as an invisible arena, i.e. one which cannot be noticed and accounted for through the theoretical and methodological lens characterising mainstream immigration and citizenship literature.

This does not mean that such a local arena does not exist or that it is relevant only in the few countries where it has received some attention. Probably more research is needed, especially if one considers that, according to an NGO survey carried out in the fifteen ‘old’ EU member states in the context of the NATAC study, one of the main complaints was the degree of discretion and power of decision left to administrative authorities (Chopin 2006: 229).

Notwithstanding the scarce literature and empirical evidence available, I shall try to point out some possible characterising features of the local citizenship policymaking arena across the five countries considered. We begin by identifying the main differences. Drawing on Helbling’s literature review in this book (see also Helbling 2008), a first distinction can be made between political local citizenship arenas and essentially administrative ones. Switzerland is the best example, and probably unique, of a political local citizenship arena, since final decisions on naturalisation applications are taken at a municipal level by a political body, i.e. the local parliament, the executive, or even the entire population through direct ballot. Politicians are also involved in various stages of the procedure, even if it is generally the local adminis-
tration that keeps in touch with the applicants, informs them about the formal aspects of the process, checks to see if the main criteria are fulfilled and makes a first assessment of the candidate's chances of obtaining a Swiss passport. Officials also deliver recommendations to the political bodies involved in the process (Helbling 2008: 13).

On the other hand, administrative local citizenship arenas can be further distinguished according to the type of bureaucracy responsible for handling applications and/or making final decisions. Only in Germany and Austria such responsibility falls entirely within, respectively, regional (Länder) and provincial authorities, while in the other EU-15 states applications are handled by local branches of the central executive authority that has the final say (Waldrauch 2006: 145). This is the case of the Ministry of the Interior in Italy, where the prefectures (local branches of the Ministry of the Interior) have the task of collecting applications and checking the documents, and of the Immigration and Naturalisation Service in the Netherlands (which is an authority subordinate to the Ministry of Alien Affairs and Integration). In the latter country, though, preliminary investigation and registration of applications is carried out by municipal authorities (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2006: 422-423). A similar centralised institutional setting can be found in Canada, where the administration of citizenship falls under the authority of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), a federal-level department (Bloemraad 2006: 107). At a local level, citizenship judges operate as officials of CIC to interview applicants, to organise promotional events and to preside over citizenship ceremonies.13

To sum up, three different structures of local citizenship policy arenas can be identified: the political policymaking arena, where procedures and decisions are dealt with locally and with a relevant involvement of political actors (Switzerland); administrative decentralised arenas, where naturalisation procedures and decisions are essentially administrative matters carried out at a sub-national level (as in the case of Germany and Austria); administrative centralised arenas, where local authorities have just executive functions and operate on behalf of a national decision-making institution, as pointed out in the cases of Italy, the Netherlands and Canada.

Having clarified the differences in the structures of the local citizenship policy arena, I now turn my attention to the possible elements of similarity in their functioning across the five countries considered. A first common element in all the arenas considered, both political and administrative, centralised and decentralised, is the key role played by local public officials in the crucial stages of the naturalisation procedure. Apart from the cases of Switzerland and Germany, treated extensively by Helbling elsewhere in this book, this seems to be the case in
the other three countries, although systematic accounts are lacking. In Canada, for instance, citizenship judges operating at a local level are responsible for interviewing applicants and ensuring that they meet the requirements of the Citizenship Act and regulations. In the Netherlands, under the 1984 Act, civil servants of the municipality were responsible for examining language and integration requirements, thus enjoying a considerable margin of manoeuvre which was drastically restricted though after the introduction in April 2003 of a standardised naturalisation exam (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2006: 423). As for Italy, it is assumed that the local branches of the Ministry of the Interior (prefectures) enforce the rules. Yet, the few studies available on the implementation of regularisation laws (Triandafyllidou 2003; Zucchini 1998) and on access to residence permits (Fasano & Zucchini 2001; Caponio 2007), show a high degree of differentiation in the attitudes and practices of local officials. Such differences can also be reasonably expected in relation to the implementation of citizenship policy by the prefectures.

It is extremely difficult, on the basis of the scarce empirical evidence available, to show the logic of action of local officials in the citizenship policymaking arena. However, drawing on existing research on the practices carried out by local-level bureaucrats in the migrant status issue area (see Jordan, Stråth & Triandafyllidou 2003), the need to investigate administrative cultures comes to the fore. Attitudes towards immigrants’ legal status take shape in the daily routines of the bureaucracy and in the way this copes with new challenges.

Given this pre-eminence of bureaucratic actors and their administrative culture in the local citizenship arena, one might hypothesise that politics will not play a relevant role with the exception of Swiss municipalities, where local governments are formally part of the decision-making process. Yet, this might be another common thread across the cases considered: political influence, either of a direct or indirect type, cannot be completely ruled out. In the case of Germany, studies have documented considerable variation in naturalisation rates and citizenship policies between progressive and conservative Länder (Hagerdorn 2001), these latter applying stricter requirements and criteria of examination. Hailbronner (2006: 241), for instance, points out how until 2005 the requirement of constitutional loyalty on the part of the applicant was interpreted differently by the Länder responsible authorities. While Christian Democratic Länder made it compulsory to have a formal consultation with security services, in other Länder such a consultation was required only in particular cases.14

In her comparative assessment of bureaucratic practices and structures of Canadian and United States citizenship policy, Bloemraad (2006) points out how different political views on migration, primarily
centred on security in the US and on integration in Canada, inform the organisational cultures of the agencies administering citizenship in the two countries. The analysis does not take into account the local dimension within the two systems, even though this has been noted as relatively important, at least in the US (see Helbling in this volume). As for Canada, it should be recalled that provinces have considerable influence on the selection of immigrants, and Quebec enjoys full autonomy. The selection of future, would-be citizens can be directly influenced by political preferences, as pointed out by the Quebec selection criteria favourable towards francophone immigrants, which are consistent with the political goal of preserving and reinforcing the French-speaking community.

Moreover, political actors may also attempt to play a role in administrative local citizenship arenas by promoting various measures aimed at favouring immigrants’ naturalisation. Language courses, information to would-be citizens and/or specific preparation to pass citizenship tests or examinations can be regarded as part of a local political strategy aimed at fostering access to citizenship. The naturalisation campaigns carried out in some German cities such as Berlin or Hesse (Chopin 2006: 226) are a case in point. In the Netherlands and Canada, national programmes explicitly assign to sub-national-level authorities the task of undertaking citizenship promotion. Meanwhile in Italy, the picture is far more scattered, and much depends on regional/local authorities, who might decide to start such programmes in the context of their integration policies. Political attitudes that are pro- or anti-immigrant are likely to influence the propensity for undertaking such policies. Hence, even if, in general (the only exception being Switzerland), local politicians are not formally involved in citizenship policy, they still seem to be able to exert indirect influence. This can be more or less significant depending on the kind of authority responsible for the final decision, i.e. if it is placed at a sub-national or national level. Moreover, much will depend on the authorities’ interest in the politicisation of the citizenship issue. Since political action is driven by a consensus-maximising logic (Mahnig 2004; Caponio ch. 2 in this volume), which is at the base of the ‘democratic impatience’ described by Vermeulen and Penninx (1994) – the political desire to achieve quick solutions for problems and processes of a long-term character – one can hypothesise that local political actors will enter into the local citizenship arena only insofar as they perceive some gain in terms of consensus in the party/coalition electorate. The kind of measures undertaken will depend on the party ideology or views of migration, and range from non-policy to support for the introduction of administrative restrictions (see the aforementioned conservative German Länder), to immigrants’ selection (e.g. preference for French-speaking immigrants in
Quebec), to facilitating programmes (e.g. naturalisation campaigns, language and culture courses, etc.). Favourable measures will be supported only when they are consistent with the perception of a consensus in the actual and potential electorate.

A third actor appears to have some relevance in the local citizenship arena: NGOs. These groups can mobilise at a local level to provide information and support to applicants on the basis of specific public programmes, as is the case in Canada and, at least in part of Germany and the Netherlands, or independently of municipal authorities (Chopin 2006: 221). Independent action is likely to be particularly prominent in those countries, such as Italy, where public authorities do not offer any counselling, and also initiatives on the part of local administrations are few and discontinued. NGOs’ logic of action generally leans in the direction of supporting their constituencies, i.e. immigrants. However, their role in the local citizenship arena arguably also depends on the relevance that naturalisation has in their perception of immigrants’ needs and interests. Where emergency issues prevail and basic needs are emphasised, especially by organisations traditionally volunteering for poor people as is the case of a considerable number of Catholic NGOs in Italy, citizenship will not be regarded as a priority.

Hence, despite the scarce existing literature, we can assert that the local dimension of citizenship policymaking is not of a minor relevance, even in countries where the crucial decisions are taken at a national level, such as Canada, the Netherlands and Italy. The local arena appears to be essentially of an administrative kind, even if the – in most cases, indirect – role and influence of political actors should not be disregarded. Moreover, the local conditions may be more or less favourable to naturalisation depending also on NGOs’ propensity to mobilise and campaign independently on this issue, which cannot always be taken for granted.

4.2 The social welfare migration policy arena: decision making versus implementation?

In Alexander’s (2007) classification, the socio-economic policy domain includes four issue areas that relate to the overall social inclusion of immigrants and access to welfare. In particular, on the basis of the contributions collected in this book, I shall focus on two such issue areas: social services and the labour market. These appear to be strictly interconnected at a local level, since labour market measures are usually part of broader local strategies of social inclusion composed of a mix of welfare services. After an assessment of the main differences in the structure of local socio-economic policymaking arenas, I turn my attention to an analysis of similarities in the functioning patterns.
As for the first point – access to social and employment services being a crucial element of immigrant policy – the importance of the local dimension will depend on the degree of administrative decentralisation of the welfare state overall and, in particular, of immigrant policy. Looking more closely at the institutions involved and at their respective authority, especially in terms of separation between decision-making and implementation, different models can be identified. The first model, which is prevalent in the four European countries considered in this book, is essentially bottom-up, since it is based on the principle of local autonomy, according to which municipalities enjoy considerable discretionary power in the implementation of national/regional/cantonal policy. General policy objectives and guidelines are translated by local authorities into specific measures and initiatives, a process which implies a relevant margin of manoeuvre in the choice of what services to deliver and how.

On the other hand, the second model, which reflects the case of Canada, is more top-down and characterised by a certain degree of competition between the federal and the provincial level, especially as far as labour market programmes are concerned (Birrell & McIsaac 2006: 111). Moreover, administrative arrangements for the delivery of services may vary considerably among Canadian provinces: while in Ontario and Manitoba, for instance, services are delivered by an extensive network of NGOs, in Quebec the local branches of the provincial government are also involved (Birrell & McIsaac 2006: 112). The role of municipalities depends on provincial jurisdiction, though, in general, it does not seem to be crucial.

Despite differences in the local policymaking structures, similarities can be noted in relation to the mechanisms of functioning of the local socio-economic immigrant arena. In all the countries considered, it constitutes a ‘new’ social policy arena which intersects with more established local welfare policies such as labour employment and vocational training, housing, social assistance, etc. Relations between ‘old’ and – relatively – ‘new’ arenas appear to be a particularly critical point. Established bureaucratic structures tend to resist innovation and to boycott new administrative units dealing with immigrants’ integration. In the cases of Munich and Frankfurt described in this book by Aybek, the ad hoc institutional bodies created by municipal authorities have encountered difficulties in cooperating with other administrative units as well as with the corporative policy networks dealing with vocational education and training. An even more separate system – setting apart immigrant settlement programmes and labour market development services – can be found in Canada, where federal and provincial departments working on these issues have just begun to address the problem of coordination (Birrell & McIsaac 2006: 111).
Similar issues are pointed out in this book by Vermeulen and Sto
tijn’s comparison of integration policies in Amsterdam and Berlin, and
by Caponio (ch. 2) in relation to Italian cities (see also Caponio 2006).
In Amsterdam, for instance, the role of the minority advisory councils
in the developing of immigrant local policy has been often ques-
tioned, as has been the case with the commissioner for foreigners
(Ausländerbeauftragte) in Berlin, the Institution for Immigrant Ser-
vices in Bologna and the Foreigners’ Office in Milan.

To explain such difficulties in the everyday operating of integration
policy, micro-level relations within the socio-economic immigrant arena
could be revealing. Three categories of actors must be considered:
elected political actors, the bureaucratic apparatus and civil society or-
ganisations, immigrant associations included. At first glance, we can
hypothesise a straightforward separation between the political, deci-
sion-making sphere and the administrative-plus-NGOs implementation
sphere. Yet, relations appear to be far more complicated, and have to
be considered in the context of the different policymaking structures
highlighted above.

First of all, elected politicians play a crucial role in setting the policy
frame according to which the socio-economic integration of immi-
grants is defined and dealt with by the administrative apparatus. This
may be regarded as a purely symbolic function, loosely related to the
actual working of services. Yet, the confrontation between the cases of
Vancouver and Toronto in Canada (Good 2009) and the European ci-
ties analysed by the contributions collected in this book can better clari-
fy the fundamental relevance of frame-setting in the local immigrant’s
socio-economic arena. Multicultural policies undertaken by the munici-
palities of Vancouver and Toronto have been actively promoted by the
political leadership in the context of strategies aimed at, respectively,
fostering Vancouver’s economic linkages with the Pacific Rim and af-
firming the city of Toronto’s autonomy vis-à-vis attempts to centralise
power in the hands of the Ontario province (Good 2009: 277-280). By
contrast, in most European cities, elected politicians show more reluc-
tant and ambiguous attitudes, which casts doubts on the relevance and
scope of action of the offices charged with the implementation of im-
migrant policy. Regardless of the political ideology of the governing
majority (i.e. left-wing- or right-wing-oriented), ad hoc offices and insti-
tutions established by political actors in the Italian, Dutch and German
cities analysed in this book are usually assigned a subordinate position
in the administrative structure, signalling an uncertain political legiti-
macy of the city’s integration policy. In the case of Zurich described by
Mahnig (2004), ambiguities in the local political frame, oscillating be-
tween openings to immigrants’ participation and requests for adapta-
tion to the Swiss society, have to be understood vis-à-vis a political sys-
tem that, through the instruments of direct democracy, allows the political mobilisation of hostile segments in the population.

Political actors also set the legitimising frame for the action of civil society organisations in the local immigrant socio-economic arena. In the case of Amsterdam, for instance, Vermeulen and Stotijn point out how even in the context of the present-day ‘diversity policy’, which fails to acknowledge the relevance of groups in the policymaking process, the mayor continues to regard immigrant religious organisations as an important counterpart. Such an accommodative stance is also evident in the new Berlin Senate integration policy, which opened new opportunities for immigrant organisations’ participation in 2005 and, as far as Italian cities are concerned, in Bologna and Naples where the empowerment of immigrant groups is a centre-left-wing official policy priority. In contrast, in Milan the political policy frame appears to be far more oriented towards sustaining the action of traditional Catholic NGOs working in the field.

Once the official policy frame is set by elected politicians, administrative bureaucracies and civil society organisations are, in order to implement it, supposed to act accordingly. As the chapters presented in this book currently signal, more attention should be paid to what happens in policy implementation. The local socio-economic arena cannot be identified just by political official priorities and attitudes towards immigrant integration. As pointed out by Vermeulen and Stotijn as well as by Caponio ch. 2, street-level bureaucrats and policy practitioners represent a crucial category of policymakers insofar as they are able to accommodate the original policy objectives in order to better cope with immigrant needs and/or to overcome obstacles in the delivery of existing services to foreign users. As is clear, if politicians follow a consensus-driven – electoral – logic, which accounts for the ambiguity of official policy priorities and frames, practitioners appear to be more user-oriented. Such an attitude on the part of practitioners and officials can be either the result of a strong professional ethos and commitment, consistent with Weber’s duty of office, or of more prosaic strategies to come to terms with everyday disparate users’ demands challenging established routines. More research on the administrative backgrounds and cultures of public officials operating in the local socio-economic immigrant policy arena might be revealing. 18

Civil society organisations also play a crucial role in the local immigrant socio-economic arena. These can be of different kinds, and may include traditional charity organisations, often of a religious type, professional NGOs working in partnership with public authorities, community and immigrant associations, etc. In the area of vocational training and youth employment, the unions and employers’ organisations would also be expected to play a role. However, this is not necessarily
the case, as pointed out by Aybek in this book. In both Frankfurt and Munich, social partners seem more interested in sticking to established practices of labour market regulation rather than tackling the issue of immigrant youth disadvantage.

Different configurations of civil society mobilisation will depend essentially on two factors: 1) the legitimate political policy frame, which can materially and/or symbolically support certain types of organisations; and 2) the more general local welfare policy context and legacy. In the Italian cities analysed by Caponio ch. 2 in this book (see also Caponio 2006), two different welfare policy legacies can be identified: one organised around the unions and the workers’ cooperatives in Bologna, these latter becoming over the course of time increasingly professional NGOs specialised in providing social services; and one centred on the primacy of Catholic charities and voluntary organisations in Milan and Naples. Whereas in Milan, thanks to the close relations with the regional and local administrations, they have developed into professional NGOs delivering services on the basis of public contracts, in Naples, the scarcity of public resources accounts for their less professional profile. However, in all three cities, these prominent autochthonous organisations appear to crowd out newer immigrant associations, which face difficulties in access to public funding and to policymaking processes (Caponio 2005). By contrast, in the case of Amsterdam, the combination of the pillarisation-policy legacy (see also Alexander 2007) and the political-legitimising framework reported above, seem to account for a greater opportunity policy structure for immigrant organisations, even in the present context of a ‘diversity policy’. Also in the cases of Berlin, Frankfurt and Munich, immigrant organisations seem to enjoy more leverage than in the aforementioned Italian cities. In particular, as far as Frankfurt and Munich are concerned, innovative approached to the German vocational education and training (VET) system, are started at the grass-roots level and rely upon the direct involvement of NGOs specialised in providing social services to immigrants (IG in the case of Munich) and of municipal institutions working with immigrant associations (AMKA in Frankfurt).

In Canada, if policy development, planning and priority-setting happens at both the federal and provincial level, services are delivered at a local level essentially through NGOs. Consequently, a multitude of organisations can be found in the various provinces competing for public funding and catering to different clienteles, either people of an immigrant background in general or of a specific national community. At the same time, federal multicultural policy started in the early 1970s provides a political-legitimising framework for ethnic commu-
nity and immigrant organisations (Bloemraad 2006: 125), even if grants tend to be modest.

Along with the three main categories of policymakers mentioned so far – i.e. elected political actors, public officials and civil society organisations – a fourth category must be considered: that of experts. Policymaking processes concerning the socio-economic integration of immigrants in the German, Dutch and Italian cities analysed in this book, often refer to scientific reports, white papers, advisory councils, individual consultants, etc. External actors whose legitimacy is based on their knowledge of the issues at hand, can play a non-negligible role in influencing local policy and giving certain direction to it. According to Caponio’s accounts of Milan, Bologna and Naples in this volume (ch. 2), experts are personalities who are well known for their competence in the field and usually pursue a problem-solving-oriented logic, i.e. one aimed at providing sound solutions to perceived problems. This is likely to enter into conflict with elected politicians’ consensus-driven logic, which is more oriented towards favouring popular solutions regardless of their efficacy in dealing with problems. However, evidence in the contributions to this book is too sparse to allow any further analysis. The local research-policy nexus appears to still be a neglected topic. It deserves more focused attention, especially at a time when the plea for policy evaluation and more knowledge-driven intervention is commonplace.

4.3 A potentially contentious arena: mosque-building

In the cultural-religious domain, a primary issue area is represented by religious and cultural minorities’ practices and institutions (Alexander 2007: 51). These usually are at the basis of specific demands and interests at a local level: one such demand regards the establishment of appropriate places of worship such as mosques for Muslim immigrant groups. Muslim minorities in Western Europe and North America are essentially the product of migration flows. Thus, the demand for the establishment of a mosque has a clear symbolic relevance, marking the evolution of Islam from the private space of a prayer room to the public sphere, making its presence open and visible (Cesari 2005a: 1018; Allievi 2009: 51). Notwithstanding national differences in state/religion legislation and cultural traditions (Aluffi Beck-Pecoz & Zincone 2004), a great wealth of literature has pointed out the crucial relevance of the local dimension in the accommodation of religious demands in Europe19 (Maussen 2007). In Canada, too, according to Fourot in this book, cities are regarded as having de facto responsibility for the management of religious pluralism in the context of official multiculturalism.
Next I shall attempt to identify the main actors and mechanisms of functioning in the local religious diversity arena. Following Landman and Wessels’ (2005) analysis of decisions on mosque-building in Dutch towns, three main categories of actors can be regarded as relevant: the mosque committees or, more generally, the promoters of the initiative; the municipality, as composed of two different actors – local elected politicians and political parties represented in the city council versus municipal bureaucrats; and the neighbours concerned by the new mosque’s plan. Attention has focused so far on the contentious cases, seeing a strong opposition by neighbours and a NIMBY-type mobilisation. However, Landman and Wessels (2005) point out how contentiousness is not always the case. Currently, under the general rubric of ‘mosque-building’ very different requests and demands are considered by researchers, from the granting of free land or premises, to funding and permissions and/or exemptions from specific rules such as parking. As suggested by Maussen (2007: 17-18), developing a more detailed typology of mosques in Europe and, it could be added, of the main related requests on the part of Islamic organisations, could be extremely helpful in identifying the main characteristics of the local mosque-building policy arena, as well as the factors and conditions that are likely to lead to politicisation and conflict. This would require a systematic research programme comparing purposely selected cases in different countries. Here, I shall simply attempt to draw some comparative observations starting from existing case studies carried out in the five countries considered.

As for the first category of actors taking part in the local mosque-building policy arena, the promoters of the initiative are usually identified with a mosque committee or an Islamic cultural association taking steps to establish a new mosque or to ameliorate/expand an existing one. Yet, this is a very heterogeneous and stratified category, since a number of factors are likely to influence the strategies and logic of action of the mosques’ promoters. First of all, the constitution of a committee or an organisation is not the rule: as pointed out by Fourot in the case of Montreal, action can also be taken by individual leaders loosely connected with the local Muslim community.20

Associations and/or leaders may differ in terms of their personal characteristics. Their level of education and knowledge of legal rules and the political climate of the receiving context can make the difference: in the two Quebec cities analysed by Fourot, for instance, promoters initially avoided openly declaring their intention of establishing a place of worship, fearing a refusal because of the universalistic orientation of local policy and public discourse. In a similar vein, according to Cesari (2005a: 1019), the new generation of highly educated and middle-class Muslim leaders emerging especially in France and the United
Kingdom knows how to frame requests in an appropriate manner and to pursue a successful negotiation strategy. Currently, Muslim communities composed mainly of citizens are more likely to be perceived as legitimate counterparts by local politicians, since they are also voters, as pointed out in the Dutch cities analysed by Landman and Wessels (2005), as well as in Brussels’ Schaerbeek mosque decision-making process analysed by Manço and Kanmaz (2005).

In contrast, first-generation communities of non-citizen Muslim immigrants inevitably encounter more difficulties in articulating their needs and demands. Mosque-building in Germany (Jonker 2005), Switzerland21 (Cattacin et al. 2003) and Italy22 (Saint Blancat & Schmidt di Friedberg 2005; Allievi 2009) are similar in this respect. Yet, the strategies adopted by the promoting groups in these contexts appear to be quite different: whereas recently established Muslim associations in north-east Italian cities such as Lodi have decided to assume a low profile role (Saint Blancat & Schmidt di Friedberg 2005), either abandoning their requests or accepting the relocation of the projected mosques to very marginalised areas outside the cities or, as in the case of Berlin described by Jonker (2005), openly confronting the Kreuzberg authorities, leading the two parties to judicial courts.

As is thus clear, different strategies are likely to be undertaken and pursued by a mosque’s promoters, according to the specific socio-economic profile and legal status of the leadership. The more the leaders hold established positions in the local society, the more they will be able to downplay conflicts and undertake negotiations. In contrast, weak groups, either from a socio-economic or a legal-political point of view, will find it more difficult to articulate their requests through established participative channels. Risks of marginalisation or radicalisation appear to be particularly evident.

This does not mean, however, that well-established leadership will prove successful. Division and conflict within the community is a crucial factor with respect to outcomes of the policymaking processes. The demand for a grand or ‘cathedral’ mosque is more likely to raise issues of representativeness, as pointed out in the case of Montreal described in this book as well as in the studies on Marseille and Toulouse carried out by Cesari (2005b).

Municipality is the second actor involved in the local mosque-building policy arena. Yet, at a more micro-level analysis, here again we find two distinct actors usually pursuing different strategies and logic of action: politicians and municipal civil servants. These latter, generally identified as city planners and technical officers, are particularly relevant, since, according to Landman and Wessels (2005: 1135), they are the ones able to suggest suitable sites for the planned mosques, which places the municipality on the side of the Muslim association if a con-
conflict does arise. However, their willingness to collaborate with the group promoting the mosque’s project cannot be taken for granted, and much depends, once again, on administrative cultures and, more specifically, on formal institutions or more informal practices of participative city planning. In the Dutch cities analysed by Landman and Wessels (2005), the town planners, while not sympathetic to the cause of Muslims, still accept as legitimate their claim for an adequate worship place. This does not seem to be the case in Berlin (Jonker 2005), where the impersonal, bureaucratic attitude of civil servants considerably contributed to reinforcing the lack of comprehension between the municipality and the Mevlana mosque committee. Also in the Italian cities analysed by Saint Blancat and Schmidt di Friedberg (2005), planning offices usually adopted a neutral and distant stance, just checking for the administrative conformity of the application. Such an impersonal style is not necessarily detrimental to Muslim groups: in the case of Milan, in 2000, the technical office accorded to an Italian convert permission to renovate a building of his own to be used as an Islamic cultural centre, despite the negative attitude of the then centre-right mayor. Bureaucracy acted essentially in a neutral way in the two Quebec cities analysed by Fourot as well, even though the specific institutional configuration governing the decision-making process in Laval, where zoning changes have to be approved by the resident population, gave offices a secondary role vis-à-vis political actors.

To sum up, if city planners do generally pursue a logic oriented towards rule enforcement and formal conformity, it may be hypothesised that different administrative cultures, as well as formal and informal rules and practices – particularly with reference to participative planning – have an impact on this category of actors will interpret their role. This may range from active support of the applicant whose requests are judged to be legitimate, to the impersonal, neutral treatment of mosques’ dossiers. However, a positive decision on the formal correctness of an application usually represents an important constraint for local politicians, since it is more complicate to oppose a building plan that respects existing urban planning rules and satisfies technical requirements.

Currently, when speaking of local politicians in such a potentially contentious arena as mosque-building, a distinction has to be made between the local governing majority and the opposition parties represented in the city council (see also Allievi 2009: 64). Even though the action of both is driven by the prospective electoral consensus, the action of the first group is subject to a specific set of constraints. Governing politicians have to deal first of all with the ‘neutral’ decisions taken by civil servants. As pointed out in the case of Milan, a positive technical decision cannot be easily overturned, unless one is willing to be exposed to accusations of open discrimination and Islamophobia.
other constraint is represented by the possibility of turning to a referendum. In order to avoid this, governing politicians will embark in a long negotiation process leading to a high level of personalisation of the policymaking process, as pointed out by Fourot in the case of Laval. A similar situation is described by Saint Blancat and Schmidt di Friedberg (2005) in the case of Lodi: the left-wing mayor initially supported the building of a mosque in a commercial area of the city. And yet, the Northern League threatened to promote a referendum (in addition to opposition encountered in the neighbourhood), leading the mayor to reconsider the location of the mosque to the very outskirts of the city.

Generally speaking, the level of openness of the local governing majority to accommodation depends on the legal status of the local Muslim population. Both Landman and Wessel (2005: 1135) on the case of the Netherlands and Fourot (in this volume) on the case of Quebec, observe that militating against the demands of the mosque committees would have implied a cost in terms of useful votes for re-election. On the other hand, in the case of Italy, foreign Muslims, as well as third-country nationals overall, can only become voters upon naturalisation, after ten years of regular residence. As is clear, the search for political consensus will be likely to sacrifice Muslim claims.

Radical political parties sitting in the opposition ranks are of course free from any of the constraints mentioned, and may take an active role in mobilising opposition to the mosque’s plans in the concerned neighbourhoods. This is the case, for instance, of the Northern League in Lodi, as well as of the Interest Party in Deventer (Landman & Wessel 2005: 1136). However, protests may assume very different forms and intensity, and as pointed out in this book by Fourot in her study on Montreal and Laval, they may range from a demand letter to heated discussions in public hearings. According to Landman and Wessel (2005), factors such as the demographic distribution of the Muslim population in the urban area, the immigration history of the city, as well as the social class of the opponent group, account for differences in the levels and fierceness of the opposition in the two small cities of Deventer and Driebergen and the city of Utrecht. In Utrecht, a town with a longer history of immigration, mosques are usually located in districts where Muslims represent a strong and numerous group, while the rest of the resident population come from socially weaker strata, lacking the personal and economic resources to mobilise the protest. Yet, more attention should be paid to the supply-side of the protest: populist parties with a radical stance towards immigration as well as religious authorities – for instance, in Italy, pre-eminent Catholic bishops expressing radicalised views – can be regarded as protest entrepreneurs (see the aforementioned case of Lodi), able to mobilise generic sentiments of aversion around political slogans and vocal opposition. At the same time, the
media may also play a role in giving wind to opposition campaigns: as pointed out by Triandafyllidou (2006) again regarding Lodi, a clear imbalance in the representation of the various social and political actors by the press can be identified, with political parties monopolising the discourse and Muslim voices being in contrast under-represented.

As a consequence, protest cannot be simply interpreted as a sort of inevitable, more or less fierce, reaction to change by the neighbours. Different actors taking part in the protests may pursue different strategies and have different goals. More comparative research on the local conditions leading to NIMBY mobilisation is of extreme interest in order to have a clearer understanding of the functioning of the local mosque-building policy arena.

5 Conclusion

In order to make sense of the local dimension in migration policymaking, this chapter has attempted to propose a theoretical toolkit to cast the chapters of this book into a more unitary and consistent framework. This can only be regarded as a tentative exercise, which draws its strength on the extreme variance between the national cases considered, but has also some weaknesses. First of all, the countries analysed represent a limited sample of contemporary migration receiving contexts: a major gap is the lack of an Eastern European case, which would have shed light on the local dimension of policymaking in an important transition – from emigration to immigration – area. Moreover, the studies presented in the chapters of this book are very different in terms of objects of analysis, research demands, theoretical backgrounds and methodological approaches. This poses a serious limit to systematic comparative analysis, which I have attempted to overcome by resorting to other relevant empirical studies and pieces of literature.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, the introduction of the notion of a local migration policy arena – here intended as a policymaking field structured around specific issue areas or dimensions of migration policy – has enabled me to focus on patterns of similarities and differences in the local-level responses and policymaking processes across the five countries considered and in the three issue areas of migration policy analysed by the contributions to this book: citizenship, welfare services and religious diversity.

On the basis of this analysis, I now return to the questions set at the beginning to provide some provisional answers. First, it can be maintained that the local dimension of migration policymaking has a non-negligible relevance in all the countries considered, despite significant differences in the state structures and models of centre/periphery rela-
tions. Local policymaking arenas matter, and more attention should be devoted to their analysis in migration policy-oriented studies. The relevance of the local dimension does not seem to be strictly dependent on the five countries’ state structures, but the way a specific issue is treated in each country should also be taken into account. In the case of Canada, for instance, federalism goes hand in hand with a strong interventionist stance on the part of the central government and a highly centralised policymaking structure as far as citizenship is concerned. This may contradict expectations based on a state-structures institutional analysis, yet it is consistent with the historical legacy of a nation based on the compromise between the English-speaking majority and the French-speaking minority. In this context, citizenship acquires the meaning of a republican style social contract (Bloemraad 2006), unifying in a modern constitutional polity different cultural and linguistic groups.

On the other hand, a strong tradition of local autonomy accounts for the leeway that local authorities enjoy both in the centralised Dutch state and in the regionalised Italian one, especially as far as the implementation of social policy is concerned, giving particular pre-eminence to the local immigrant welfare arena in these countries. In contrast, municipalities are subject to different provincial rules and statutes in Canada, where the very crucial sub-national authority in welfare policy is represented by the province.

In the case of religious diversity, the city emerges in all the five countries as the key arena for accommodation. Despite legal differences in national legislation and relations with Islam, demands for appropriate places of worship usually arise at the local level and touch upon issues such as the use of public space and urban planning, which are the exclusive responsibility of local administrations.

Clearly, state structures and systems of centre/periphery relations set the general framework of opportunities and constraints for sub-national authorities’ action in relation to immigration. Yet this is not a fixed framework: rather, it may change according to the specific issues, as pointed out in the case of citizenship policy in Canada. Moreover, the analysis of national institutional patterns does not tell us how policies are actually worked out. The case of accommodation of religious diversity is in this respect revealing.

Having analysed the specific decision-making structures characterising each issue area policy arena, I now turn my attention to the identification of similarities and differences across the three policy arenas in terms of policymaking dynamics, actors involved and logic of action. A first important element indicated by the analysis is the complex nature of local government, which is composed of at least two actors not necessarily sharing the same views on immigration. Politicians, on the
one hand, pursue a consensus-building strategy, and will thus favour those measures that are considered to be in line with their electorate’s perceived interests and preferences. Civil servants, on the other hand, are likely to conceive differently their role and goals in policymaking, according to the specific administrative cultures they have been socialised to in their office and institutions. Pragmatic accommodation of clients’ demands is not necessarily the rule, since indifference, neutrality and even instrumental attitudes have been noted. More systematic analyses of different local offices’ organisational cultures might contribute to a redefinition of the terms of the debate on convergence/divergence in local immigrant policy by drawing scholars’ attention to the constellations of factors that can lead to different types of answers to immigrants’ needs and demands.

But local policy and policymaking cannot be identified just with the action of local governmental actors. The contributions to this book and the discussion in this chapter indicate a far more complex picture. NGOs, immigrant associations, experts, media as well as neighbours may all play a role in local policymaking. In particular, NGOs appear to be crucially involved in the citizenship and social welfare arenas, usually showing a client-oriented logic of action, i.e. one aimed at supporting immigrants’ integration and access to rights. Yet, such a category needs more specification: in Italy, for instance, NGOs are usually identified with autochthonous traditional non-profit organisations, whose actions often crowd out newer and less organised immigrant ones; in the other countries considered in this book, with more established immigrant communities, NGOs often include immigrant organisations catering to their constituencies. As is clear, the different configurations assumed by NGOs working on migration in different countries may influence considerably the openness of local policy and policymaking to immigrants. Nevertheless, if a common trend towards the increasing incorporation of NGOs in local policymaking can be identified across the five countries considered, this does not necessarily imply greater inclusion of immigrants, who may well be at the margins of established welfare organisations and networks.26

Immigrant stakeholders necessarily play a central role in the religious diversity policy arena, as pointed out in the analysis of mosque-building policymaking. Here we find either specific organisations (Islamic cultural associations and/or mosque committees) or individual leaders all pursuing a similar strategy oriented towards obtaining recognition from the local authorities. Nonetheless, the more or less established presence of Islam in the city, the socio-demographic composition and the legal status of the leadership and of their constituencies, as well as the content of their specific demands (public soil, funding etc.), can influence considerably policymaking dynamics and
outcomes. More systematic comparative analyses might shed new light on how relations are actually structured in such a potentially contentious policy arena, as well as on the specific forms of mobilisation neighbours can assume in different contexts.

Last, a lack of attention to the role of experts and media in local policymaking has already been noted. As far as the media are concerned, these have sometimes been considered in relation to mosque-building conflicts. However, their way of communicating about immigration and immigrants’ integration into the city can influence the establishment of a more or less inclusive public discourse and public opinion climate. The role of local media in other issue areas should also be considered, since public discourse has a crucial relevance in the framing of the migration issue.

As is clear, there is still much to do in the study of the local dimension of migration policymaking. This book should be considered as a first effort to identify the main gaps in the literature and to propose possible future research paths that would help to fill them. More systematic and theoretically oriented research programmes are needed to tackle the issues considered so far, since existing literature has often developed in a disconnected way, through case studies that hardly interact with each other. Once again, comparison across cities in different countries should be regarded as a difficult yet necessary challenge for policy migration scholars. It is clear that empirically based knowledge on how immigration and immigrant-integration issues are presently treated and resolved day by day cannot be derived from comparison of national legal frameworks.

Notes

1 The distinction between immigration and immigrant policymaking recalls Hammar’s (1985) classic definitions of immigration and immigrant politics. Whereas immigration politics is concerned with the conditions of entry and admission on the state’s territory, immigrant politics deals with issues of access to citizenship rights for those immigrants who are admitted to reside and work in the country.

2 With reference to the cases of Sweden and the Netherlands, Penninx and Martiniello (2004) point out how local politicisation was avoided in the 1970s thanks to the introduction of a consistent framework for national integration policy to which local administrations had to adhere.

3 See, for instance, the EU Handbook on Integration for Policy-makers and Practitioners, a second edition of which was published in 2007 (Niessen & Shibel 2007).

4 Currently identifiable in the case of Canada is a centre/periphery cleavage between Quebec and Ontario versus the West Atlantic provinces. The latter are less populated yet rich with feedstocks and commodities, and have always perceived their position in the federation as subordinated by the most populated provinces’ interests in industrial development (Kent 1992).
However, it must be pointed out that the Länder participate actively in national decision-making through the Bundesrat, which is composed of Land first ministers and senior ministers and which possesses an absolute veto on all federal legislation affecting the Länder.

In the case of Quebec, such agreements date back to the 1970s and currently provide this province with a unique role in the selection of immigrants. It is directly carried out by provincial authorities in the context of selection and eligibility criteria set by the central government (Birrel & McIsaac 2006).

This is the case in Switzerland of the Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Justice and Police, which is particularly vocal on issues of interior security and asylum (D’Amato 2006).

For Italy, see studies on local implementation of regularisation procedures (Zucchini 1998; Triandafyllidou 2003), as well as those on local practices of residence permits’ renewal (Caponio 2007).

For the Netherlands, various studies have pointed out the tension between national and local policy with respect to the Amsterdam-based garment industry, employing predominantly undocumented Turkish workers tolerated by the city administration (Raes 2000). As for Italy, see, for instance, local administrations’ practices in dealing with immigrants’ reception and first accommodation described by Ponzo (2008).

For the main shifts in Dutch national integration policy since its start in the 1970s, see Bruquetas-Callejo et al. (2008: 11-19).

NATAC is an acronym for the project ‘Acquisition of Nationality in EU Member States: Rules, Practices and Quantitative Developments’. This specific targeted research project was co-funded by the European Community’s Sixth Framework Programme and the Austrian Ministry for Education, Science and Culture in the period 2004-2006. It was coordinated by the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Institute for European Integration Research of Vienna.

Actually, in Italy the decision is up to the President of the Republic on the recommendation of the Minister of the Interior. For details, see Arena, Nascimbene and Zincone (2006).

Applications are decided upon by the Citizenship Commission which is formed by all citizenship judges. For details, see www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/cit-ann-report-2006.asp#mandate.

As of January 2005, with the entering into force of the Immigration Act of 2004, the naturalisation authorities have to transmit all personal data of applicants to the security services (Hailbronner 2006: 241).

Basic policies are set by the federal government and implemented on the basis of various agreements signed with individual provinces, with the exception of Quebec that – as mentioned in the third section of this chapter – enjoys full autonomy in the definition and management of settlement and labour market programmes.

In the case of Amsterdam, Alexander (2008) points out the substantial isolation faced first by the Minorities Policy Coordination Bureau during the Minorities Policy period (i.e. 1980s to mid-1990s) and then by the Diversity Unit created in the mid-1990s under the new Diversity Policy Programme. He attributes this to bureaucratic resistance to change.

The same holds true as far as Swiss cities are concerned. See, for instance, Mahnig (2004) on the case of Zurich.

Campomori (2007), for instance, on the basis of a survey on the attitudes of public officials dealing with immigrants in the municipalities of the Lombardy regions, has pointed out how the accommodative and open attitude of these street-level bureaucrats is related to their personal and professional backgrounds, often characterised by voluntary work in Catholic charitable associations.
I am fully aware that more sophisticated models of explanation of Islam institutionalisation in Europe have been elaborated (see e.g. Rath et al. 2001; Koenig 2005; Fetzer & Soper 2005). Here I just highlight the main institutional elements affecting local policymaking arenas on mosque-building.

This is also the case in various episodes reported in Italy. In Turin, for instance, a recent plan to establish a grand Moroccan mosque founded by the Moroccan government has encountered opposition on the part of other Moroccan Muslim associations and from other Islamic groups more generally.

On Switzerland, see also the highly politicised dispute over minarets (Stüssi 2008).

The critical relevance of citizenship is evident if one considers that the promoters of a mosque project in Italian cities are usually either naturalised citizens or Italian converts to Islam, relying upon their personal social relations in the local political context (Saint Blancat & Schmidt di Friedberg 2005). Nevertheless, the personal ties of the leaders do not always prove to be sufficient in order to receive positive decisions.

On the other hand, a negative decision by planning authorities also serves as a major impediment for – supposedly – sympathetic politicians. On this point, see the case of Berlin’s Kreuzberg mosque described by Jonker (2005: 1075).

The municipality would have granted a piece of land at a favourable, off-market price.

For reasons explaining the lacunae, see the introduction chapter in this book.

This appears to be the case in the German cities analysed by Aybek in this book, since immigrant organisations do not take part in local vocational education and training policy networks.

References


CONCLUSION


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