Contracts are used to create new interaction possibilities among agents, and they therefore play an important role in the game theoretic analysis of agent interaction. We use normative multiagent systems to model both the contracts and the interactions. In particular, we formalize contracts as systems of regulative and constitutive norms within a larger rule-governed setting, and using recursive modelling we develop a game theory where agents make contracts.We show how agents can modify the behavior of normative systems by means of constitutive rules in the contract changing these systems, and we illustrate how agents use the game theory within contract negotiation in organizations.

A Game Theoretic Approach to Contracts in Multiagent Systems

BOELLA, Guido;
2006-01-01

Abstract

Contracts are used to create new interaction possibilities among agents, and they therefore play an important role in the game theoretic analysis of agent interaction. We use normative multiagent systems to model both the contracts and the interactions. In particular, we formalize contracts as systems of regulative and constitutive norms within a larger rule-governed setting, and using recursive modelling we develop a game theory where agents make contracts.We show how agents can modify the behavior of normative systems by means of constitutive rules in the contract changing these systems, and we illustrate how agents use the game theory within contract negotiation in organizations.
36(1)
68
79
Contracts; qualitative game theory; multiagent systems; normative systems
G. BOELLA; LEENDERT VAN DER TORRE
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/102851
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