The article analyses some relatively new aspects of the Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre. In particular it tackles the double bond for the Conselho do Orçamento Participativo (imperative mandate and budget constraint according to redistributive justice), as well as the rule providing for an equal proportion between the participants at the assemblies and the number of delegates for each Forum. Participatory budgeting is suggesting to be a procedure aimed at adopt fair decisions from a social point of view, and not only at promote the largest political participation of the citizens. According to the author the originality of the Brazilian experiment is to propose the formalization of “constitutional” rules for achieving social justice, beyond the virtues of popular participation.

Il bilancio partecipativo di Porto Alegre: un esperimento di democrazia redistributiva

PAZE', Valentina
2009-01-01

Abstract

The article analyses some relatively new aspects of the Participatory Budgeting in Porto Alegre. In particular it tackles the double bond for the Conselho do Orçamento Participativo (imperative mandate and budget constraint according to redistributive justice), as well as the rule providing for an equal proportion between the participants at the assemblies and the number of delegates for each Forum. Participatory budgeting is suggesting to be a procedure aimed at adopt fair decisions from a social point of view, and not only at promote the largest political participation of the citizens. According to the author the originality of the Brazilian experiment is to propose the formalization of “constitutional” rules for achieving social justice, beyond the virtues of popular participation.
2009
XXXIX, n. 2, agosto
209
233
democrazia; bilancio partecipativo; giustizia sociale
Valentina Paze'
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/103950
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