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EnglishWe evaluate the effect of information disclosure (feedback on individual contributions and payoffs) on players’ behavior in a multi-period common pool resource game experiment run in an area of notably scarce social capital, such as the Nairobi slum of Kibera. We document that cooperation significantly declines over rounds when such information is revealed. Our results are consistent with the Ostrom (J Econ Perspect 14:137–158, 2000) hypothesis that, in the absence of formal punishment rules, the availability of information about individual behavior makes common resource management more difficult and tragedy of the commons easier.
| Titolo: | Public disclosure of players' conduct and Common Resources Harvesting: Experimental Evidence from a Nairobi Slum | |
| Autori Riconosciuti: | ||
| Autori: | L. Becchetti; P. Conzo; G. Degli Antoni | |
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2015 | |
| Abstract: | We evaluate the effect of information disclosure (feedback on individual contributions and payoffs) on players’ behavior in a multi-period common pool resource game experiment run in an area of notably scarce social capital, such as the Nairobi slum of Kibera. We document that cooperation significantly declines over rounds when such information is revealed. Our results are consistent with the Ostrom (J Econ Perspect 14:137–158, 2000) hypothesis that, in the absence of formal punishment rules, the availability of information about individual behavior makes common resource management more difficult and tragedy of the commons easier. | |
| Volume: | 45 | |
| Fascicolo: | 1 | |
| Pagina iniziale: | 71 | |
| Pagina finale: | 96 | |
| Digital Object Identifier (DOI): | 10.1007/s00355-014-0867-y | |
| URL: | http://ftp://www.ceistorvergata.it/repec/rpaper/RP200.pdf http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs00355-014-0867-y | |
| Parole Chiave: | common pool resource game; conformism; information disclosure; field experiments; tragedy of commons | |
| Rivista: | SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE | |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 03A-Articolo su Rivista |
File in questo prodotto:
| File | Descrizione | Tipologia | Licenza | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Public disclosure of players’ conduct and Common Resources Harvesting- Experimental Evidence from a Nairobi Slum.pdf | POSTPRINT (VERSIONE FINALE DELL’AUTORE) | Accesso aperto | Open Access Visualizza/Apri | |
| Public disclosure of players’ conduct_4aperto_923926.pdf | POSTPRINT (VERSIONE FINALE DELL’AUTORE) | Accesso aperto | Open Access Visualizza/Apri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2318/117693
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