A widely accepted claim about counterfactuals is that they differ from strict conditionals, that is, there is no adequate representation of them as sentences of the form   . To justify this claim, Stalnaker and Lewis have argued that some fallacious inferences would turn out valid if counterfactuals were so represented. However, their argument has a flaw, as it rests on a questionable assumption about the relation between surface grammar and logical form. Without that assumption, no consequence of the alleged kind is obtained, hence the claim may be rejected.

Counterfactual Fallacies

IACONA, Andrea
2011-01-01

Abstract

A widely accepted claim about counterfactuals is that they differ from strict conditionals, that is, there is no adequate representation of them as sentences of the form   . To justify this claim, Stalnaker and Lewis have argued that some fallacious inferences would turn out valid if counterfactuals were so represented. However, their argument has a flaw, as it rests on a questionable assumption about the relation between surface grammar and logical form. Without that assumption, no consequence of the alleged kind is obtained, hence the claim may be rejected.
2011
19
1
9
http://www.humanamente.eu/Issues/Issue19.html
A. Iacona
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/129602
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