Timeless Truth

A fairly simple theory of the semantics of tense is obtained by combining three claims: (i) for any time t, a present-tense sentence `p' is either true or false at t; (ii) for any time t' earlier than t, the future-tense sentence `It will be the case that p at t' is true at t' if `p' is true at t, false otherwise; (iii) for any time t' later than t, the past-tense sentence `It was the case that p at t' is true at t' if `p' is true at t, false otherwise. This theory, which has been called the theory of timeless truth, is often dismissed on the basis of its alleged incapacity to comply with indeterminism. Here, instead, it will be suggested that there is no reason to be dismissive. §1 provides some elucidations about the theory. §2 and §3 explain how a foregone objection to it can be resisted. §4 and §5 show that there is a plausible sense in which (i)-(iii) are compatible with indeterminism. §6 and §7 dispel some misunderstandings that may lead to think that indeterminism is not vindicated in some important sense other than that outlined.