The aim of this paper is to show that in order to make sense of the ascription of truth and falsity to the things we say it is essential to acknowledge a divergence between two basic intuitions. According to one of them it is plausible to talk of what is said as what the speaker has in mind. According to the other it is plausible to talk of what is said as the bearer of truth or falsity. The paper presents three cases in which these two intuition seem not to coincide, and shows how this lack of coincidence can be accounted for in terms of underspecification.
True in a Sense
IACONA, Andrea
2006-01-01
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to show that in order to make sense of the ascription of truth and falsity to the things we say it is essential to acknowledge a divergence between two basic intuitions. According to one of them it is plausible to talk of what is said as what the speaker has in mind. According to the other it is plausible to talk of what is said as the bearer of truth or falsity. The paper presents three cases in which these two intuition seem not to coincide, and shows how this lack of coincidence can be accounted for in terms of underspecification.
File in questo prodotto:
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
True in a sense_ridotto.pdf
Accesso riservato
Tipo di file:
POSTPRINT (VERSIONE FINALE DELL’AUTORE)
Dimensione
1.37 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
1.37 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
