Two questions are raised and answered: first, why did Wittgenstein endorse verificationism in the early Thirties, as the Tractatus is neither verificationist nor compatible with verificationism? Secondly, why did Wittgenstein give up verificationism a few years later? As to the first question: immediately after his comeback to philosophy W criticized the "hallucinatory" model of language understanding he had envisaged in Tractatus; verificationism was the alternative view of understanding he believed was available. As to the second question: verificationism appeared to entail that understanding involved "hidden" facts or processes; but, as W came to think at this time, nothing essential to understanding could be hidden from our view.
Verificationism and the Transition
MARCONI, Diego
2002-01-01
Abstract
Two questions are raised and answered: first, why did Wittgenstein endorse verificationism in the early Thirties, as the Tractatus is neither verificationist nor compatible with verificationism? Secondly, why did Wittgenstein give up verificationism a few years later? As to the first question: immediately after his comeback to philosophy W criticized the "hallucinatory" model of language understanding he had envisaged in Tractatus; verificationism was the alternative view of understanding he believed was available. As to the second question: verificationism appeared to entail that understanding involved "hidden" facts or processes; but, as W came to think at this time, nothing essential to understanding could be hidden from our view.
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