Contingent Sameness and Necessary Identity

So-called (contingent) informative identity statements represent a well-known puzzle in contemporary philosophy of language since Frege onwards. Both Fregean and post-Kripkean, or Millian, treatment of such statements present both pros and cons. By claiming that in such statements the copula means something different from what it means in (necessary) non-informative identity statement, Castañeda has made a big step forward in this debate. Yet Castañeda’s own ‘ambiguity’- solution lies on a very problematic and definitely non-commonsensical ontology, that of guises as Meinong-like correlates of property sets. In what follows, a similar ‘ambiguity’ solution is put forward that however presupposes a simpler and more commonsensical ontology of ordinary possible entities, some actually existing and some others existing merely possibly.