Commercial Circuits and Economic Inequality

There is a growing number of studies on inequality in Cuba. They tend to focus on specific categories of actors, who have been in a position to cope better – or, in some cases, worse – than others in the evolving socioeconomic environment (characterized by a severe crisis and by recurrent reform attempts) that has been prevailing in Cuba since the early 1990s. Most of these studies are qualitative in nature. This chapter, by contrast, presents a quantitative empirical study based on a specific model of the social mechanism that is assumed to generate a well-defined form of economic inequality. I argue that a crucial feature of Cuba’s s socio-economic structure is the coexistence of various commercial circuits. Adapting to the Cuban context Burt’s concept of hole, I argue that the barriers between different circuits allow for the emergence of institutional holes, thereby allowing some actors to obtain particular economic benefits. Some individuals, in virtue of their official working position, can keep their feet on both sides of social frontiers normally separating different social worlds. As people populating these different social worlds are often willing to establish a contact between each other, the above-mentioned individuals can act as intermediaries, capturing significant advantages in terms of control and information. Moreover, they are more likely to develop entrepreneurial abilities than individuals who live in socially homogeneous environments, because they are embedded in particular relationships that are conducive to continual negotiations between people holding contradictory expectations. The first sections present some basic facts on inequality in Cuba and a brief review of the literature. Section 3 describes some relevant socioeconomic structures. Section 4 illustrates the brokerage mechanism that generates the form of inequality on which this chapter focuses. The last sections describe the sampling and analytical methodology and presents the results.