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We study how different rules for allocating litigation costs impact on royalty negotiation when a non-practicing patent holder asserts its patent against a product developer.

Different Rules of Legal-Cost Allocation and Patent Holdup

OTTOZ, Elisabetta;CUGNO, Franco
2015-01-01

Abstract

We study how different rules for allocating litigation costs impact on royalty negotiation when a non-practicing patent holder asserts its patent against a product developer.
2015
Economic and Legal Issues in Competition, Intellectual Property, Bankruptcy, and the Cost of Raising Children (Research in Law and Economics
Emerald Group Publishing Limited
27
143
159
978-1-78560-563-5
Legal costs, British system, American system, system favoring the defendant, patent holdup
Ottoz, Elisabetta; Cugno Franco
02A-Contributo in volume
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/1530438
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