Disclosure on Related Party Transactions: Evidence from Italian Listed Companies

Recent shortcomings in corporate affairs, related to the bursting of the New Economy Bubble and the global financial crisis, have forced regulators to strengthen current rules introducing new bans and requirements, aimed at guaranteeing the substantial and economic fairness of related party transactions (RPTs). In 2010 rules regarding RPTs were completely reshaped by the Italian Regulatory Body for the Italian Stock Exchange (CONSOB Regulation no. 17221). One of the most important amendments regarded the change in the criteria by which RPTs are mandatorily disclosed to investors. This change replaces a selection process based on a qualitative with a quantitative approach, in order to reduce the subjectivity of this particular evaluation. This study aims to analyze the effectiveness of the disclosure of RPTs after the introduction of the new rules. Our results show that although the new rules contribute to increasing the amount of information disclosed to investors through a higher number of documents reported by companies, their percentage in relation to the overall amount is worryingly low