We offer a simple model of patent settlement for examining how litigation prospects, patent strength and expected damage awards affect consumer benefits stemming from settlement agreements providing for per-unit royalties and non-negative fixed fees. The result shows that consumers may be harmed if expected damage payments forgone by settlement lead to agreements with high royalty payments that benefit both the patent holder and licensee at the expense of the consumer.
Side payments, litigation risks and settlement outcomes
OTTOZ, Elisabetta;CUGNO, Franco
2016-01-01
Abstract
We offer a simple model of patent settlement for examining how litigation prospects, patent strength and expected damage awards affect consumer benefits stemming from settlement agreements providing for per-unit royalties and non-negative fixed fees. The result shows that consumers may be harmed if expected damage payments forgone by settlement lead to agreements with high royalty payments that benefit both the patent holder and licensee at the expense of the consumer.File in questo prodotto:
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