Existence is a mode. This definition of existence is assumed as a guiding thread for both a historical and a theorical route, ranging from Aristotle to Heidegger. Starting from the question “what is a mode”, the route develops following the connection, individuated in medioeval philosophy, between modality and syncategorematical elements, until we reread in this perspective what we can consider the turning point of the traditional metaphysics, that is Kantian transcendentalism. In fact, what Kant calls “categories” are not possible predicates (as it happens in the Aristotelian definition), but syncategorems. Ryle took note of these differences comparing them precisely to the syncategorematical elements or constants such as everybody, somebody, the, a, nobody, not, and, if…then. It's a matter of "modality of synthesis", that is modes, to which Kant also adds the deictic expressions constituted by space and time. According to this Kantian restructuring of the ontological problem, leading to compare the transcendental logic to a propositional logic, the book analyses the question of the sense in Husserlian phenomenology and in Heideggerian hermeneutical ontology, which constitutes a resumption of the Aristotelian conception ascribing to the copula a consignificatio compositionis, which is also a consignificatio temporis. Through this consignificative function - that is syncategorematical - the copula consignificates, according to Heidegger, the existence: that is not firstly the existence of the object (represented by the logical subject), but the one of the extralogical (“transcendental”) subject, the Dasein, the zero point of each possible positionality. Contrasting the Fregean (and Parmenidian) interpretation of existence as analogous of number "one", existence is here intrerpreted precisely as "zero" (William of Ockham used to compare unequivocally the function of syncategorems to the one of the zero), or as the corner stone of every positiveness and negativeness. The Heideggerian conception of the existence allows then to get over the problematic positivism of Greek ontology, which came to maturity within a mathematics which ignores the zero. In the last chapter some theorical consequences deriving from this approach are developed, and particularly the contraposition between the notion of supervenience and the one, here defended, of convenience.
Modalitaet und Existenz. Von der Kritik der reinen Vernunft zur Kritik der hermeneutischen Vernunft: Kant, Husserl, Heidegger
CHIURAZZI, Gaetano
2006-01-01
Abstract
Existence is a mode. This definition of existence is assumed as a guiding thread for both a historical and a theorical route, ranging from Aristotle to Heidegger. Starting from the question “what is a mode”, the route develops following the connection, individuated in medioeval philosophy, between modality and syncategorematical elements, until we reread in this perspective what we can consider the turning point of the traditional metaphysics, that is Kantian transcendentalism. In fact, what Kant calls “categories” are not possible predicates (as it happens in the Aristotelian definition), but syncategorems. Ryle took note of these differences comparing them precisely to the syncategorematical elements or constants such as everybody, somebody, the, a, nobody, not, and, if…then. It's a matter of "modality of synthesis", that is modes, to which Kant also adds the deictic expressions constituted by space and time. According to this Kantian restructuring of the ontological problem, leading to compare the transcendental logic to a propositional logic, the book analyses the question of the sense in Husserlian phenomenology and in Heideggerian hermeneutical ontology, which constitutes a resumption of the Aristotelian conception ascribing to the copula a consignificatio compositionis, which is also a consignificatio temporis. Through this consignificative function - that is syncategorematical - the copula consignificates, according to Heidegger, the existence: that is not firstly the existence of the object (represented by the logical subject), but the one of the extralogical (“transcendental”) subject, the Dasein, the zero point of each possible positionality. Contrasting the Fregean (and Parmenidian) interpretation of existence as analogous of number "one", existence is here intrerpreted precisely as "zero" (William of Ockham used to compare unequivocally the function of syncategorems to the one of the zero), or as the corner stone of every positiveness and negativeness. The Heideggerian conception of the existence allows then to get over the problematic positivism of Greek ontology, which came to maturity within a mathematics which ignores the zero. In the last chapter some theorical consequences deriving from this approach are developed, and particularly the contraposition between the notion of supervenience and the one, here defended, of convenience.
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