We maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal externalism (PE) is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties. We consider what we take to be the five best arguments for PE. We try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. Unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism show up in the debate, we see no reason to relinquish an idea that seems intuitive and appeals to many cognitive scientists: that phenomenology is narrow, i.e., that phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of our experiences. This idea grounds the opposite philosophical position, phenomenal internalism (PI).

Against Phenomenal Externalism

Voltolini Alberto
2017-01-01

Abstract

We maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal externalism (PE) is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties. We consider what we take to be the five best arguments for PE. We try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. Unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism show up in the debate, we see no reason to relinquish an idea that seems intuitive and appeals to many cognitive scientists: that phenomenology is narrow, i.e., that phenomenal properties are intrinsic properties of our experiences. This idea grounds the opposite philosophical position, phenomenal internalism (PI).
2017
49
145
25
48
http://critica.filosoficas.unam.mx/pg/en/numeros_actual.php
epistemic and phenomenal indistinguishability, phenomenal character, phenomenal nature, phenomenal internalism
Sacchi Elisabetta; Voltolini Alberto
File in questo prodotto:
File Dimensione Formato  
Sacchi-Voltolini_Against Phenomenal Externalism.pdf

Accesso aperto

Tipo di file: PDF EDITORIALE
Dimensione 168.86 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
168.86 kB Adobe PDF Visualizza/Apri
Sacchi-Voltolini_Against Phenomenal Externalism.pdf

Accesso riservato

Tipo di file: POSTPRINT (VERSIONE FINALE DELL’AUTORE)
Dimensione 168.86 kB
Formato Adobe PDF
168.86 kB Adobe PDF   Visualizza/Apri   Richiedi una copia

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/1644639
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus 4
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? 1
social impact