Ontological Syncretistic Noneism

In this paper I want to claim, rst, that despite close similarities, noneism (as developed in both Routley 1980 and Priest 2016) and Crane's (2013) psychological reductionism are dierent ontological doctrines. For unlike the latter, the former is ontologically committed to objects that are nonentities. Once one splits ontological from existential commitment, this claim, I guess, is rather uncontroversial. Second, however, I want to claim something more controversial; namely, that this ontological interpretation of noneism naturally makes noneism be nonstandardly read as a form of allism, to be however appropriately distinguished from a Quinean form of allism in terms of the dierent scope of the overall ontological domain on which the only existential quantier that there is ranges. This may orient a noneist towards a syncretistic view of existence, according to which, appearances notwithstanding, existence as a whole is captured both by means of second-order and by means of rst-order related notions.