Can One Refer to and Quantify Over Non-existent Objects (of Hallucination)?

In this paper, against a view that has recently gained some popularity, I will try to show that we cannot have our cake and eat it too. This is to say, if we refer to and truly quantify over nonexistent intentional ordinary objects of hallucination and of thoughts in general, this is because they are full-fledged entities just as existent intentional objects of perception and of other mental states in general. In such a case, metaphysically speaking, both existent and nonexistent intentionalia are concrete objects, i.e., objects that may exist; while ontologically speaking, it is false parsimony to allow for concrete existent objects and to reject concrete nonexistent objects. Otherwise, either such intentional objects do figure in our overall ontological domain but as entities of phenomenologically unexpected metaphysical kinds, or even better, there really are no such intentionalia, but we just pretend that there are such things, even if our thoughts really fail to be about them and have instead merely proposition-like intentional contents. As a result, this proposal not only is partially ontologically committed to intentional objects, but also it re-evaluates fictionalist treatments of the matter, yet again just partially: just in some cases, it is merely fictionally that we refer to and quantify over such objects.