The article studies the dynamics of fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms in Italy and Spain under the EU governance that took shape as a reaction to the Eurozone crisis. We show how three types of EU pressure – fiscal and economic coordination rules, conditionality, and back-room diplomacy have operated in conjunction. We also show that Italy was more willing than Spain to resist EU pressure. Based on a Two-Level Game framework, we argue that this can be explained by the greater opposition to European integration that has developed in Italy compared to Spain.
Too big to fail? The dynamics of EU influence and fiscal consolidation in Italy and Spain (2008–2016)
Di Mascio, Fabrizio;
2019-01-01
Abstract
The article studies the dynamics of fiscal consolidation and public sector reforms in Italy and Spain under the EU governance that took shape as a reaction to the Eurozone crisis. We show how three types of EU pressure – fiscal and economic coordination rules, conditionality, and back-room diplomacy have operated in conjunction. We also show that Italy was more willing than Spain to resist EU pressure. Based on a Two-Level Game framework, we argue that this can be explained by the greater opposition to European integration that has developed in Italy compared to Spain.
File in questo prodotto:
| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
PMR_2019.pdf
Accesso riservato
Tipo di file:
PDF EDITORIALE
Dimensione
1.94 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
1.94 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
|
Too big to fail.pdf
Accesso aperto
Tipo di file:
POSTPRINT (VERSIONE FINALE DELL’AUTORE)
Dimensione
415.24 kB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
415.24 kB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
