Trivialism is the doctrine that everything is true. Almost nobody believes it, but, as Priest (2000) shows, finding a non-question-begging argument against it turns out to be a difficult task. In this paper, I propose a statistical argument against trivialism, developing a strategy different from those presented in Priest (1999, 2000, 2006).
Could Everything Be True? Probably Not
Plebani M.
2015-01-01
Abstract
Trivialism is the doctrine that everything is true. Almost nobody believes it, but, as Priest (2000) shows, finding a non-question-begging argument against it turns out to be a difficult task. In this paper, I propose a statistical argument against trivialism, developing a strategy different from those presented in Priest (1999, 2000, 2006).
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