Against Mythical Backward-looking Creationism

I want to hold an original position as regards the metaphysics of mythical entities, a kind of fictional entities that, typically at least, are not recognised as such by their purported authors, for they entertain no relevant act of makebelieve. This position is weak mythical creationism, which lies between straightforward mythical creationism, the position holding that all mythical entities are on a par by being created by their purported authors (Braun, David. 2005. “Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names.” Noûs 39: 596– 631; Salmon, Nathan. 2002. “Mythical Objects.” In Meaning and Truth: Investigations in Philosophical Semantics, edited by J. K. Campbell, M. O’Rourke, and D. Shier, 105–123. New York: Seven Bridges Press; Zvolenszky, Zsofia. 2016. “Fictional Characters, Mythical Objects and the Phenomenon of Inadvertent Creation.” Res Philosophica 93: 311–333), and mythical anticreationism, for which mythical entities are no artefactual creations (Goodman, Jeffrey. 2014. “Creatures of Fiction, Objects of Myth.” Analysis 74: 35–40; Goodman, Jeffrey. 2017. “On Inadvertently Created Abstracta, Fictional Storytelling, and Scientific Hypothesizing.” Res Philosophica 94: 177–188). According to weak mythical creationism, one must draw a distinction between standard and nonstandard mythical entities, i.e. legendary entities and post-empirical posits. For unlike legendary entities, a post-empirical posit is an artefact created only later by an audience. Thus, weak creationism rejects the form of mythical backward-looking creationism that straightforward mythical creationism entails: namely, the idea that the merely purported authors of post-empirical posits are nevertheless their original creators.