Democrazia deliberativa: considerazioni critiche

To date, deliberative democracy (DD) represents perhaps the chief defying paradigm with which representative democracy is must deal. The paper offers a critical analysis of DD aimed at treating it the same way that representative democracy usually is. In that vein, the promises and the reasons for the success of DD are delivered at first. Secondly, some flaws and aporiae of DD pertaining to the constituent aspects of its system are analyzed, namely, objectivism and rationality, the contraposition of deliberation and negotiation, consensus and power problems. Then, the actual place of DD with regard to representative democracy is discussed. The success of DD lies in its promise to re-politicise politics, yet the factual reasons for the deliberative turn can be traced back to the traditional mechanisms of representation crisis and the ability of deliberative processes to manage uncertainty and complexity. Despite the postulations on expanded rationality, pluralism and «thinning» of objectivism, DD embodies an attempt at building a unitary actor and achieving absolute rationality. Within this process, the deliberative citizen appears «fleshless»: facing the persuasive capability of a rational argument about the common good, she must divest herself of interests, preferences, tastes and emotions. Furthermore, deliberation is not easily distinguishable from negotiation, which makes DD a twofaced object encompassing its conceptual opposite. With regard to the agreement issue, it is shown how deliberation not only builds, but also presupposes consensus, at least about norms and the common good. This raises doubts about the DD actual viability in dealing with a diverse and plural society. Lastly, DD proclaims itself to be alien to power, when in fact it is not: the asymmetry induced by organized stakeholders in deliberative arenas constitutes an example. Far from replacing representative democracy, DD might possibly complement it. Democracy, as a matter of fact, can’t do without the device that make it responsive and accountable to citizens and which is an essential hinge of democratic legitimacy: elections. Having acknowledged this, after the voting market, negotiation is the main self-regulating process of politics, deliberation represents a resolution method operating on the margin of negotiation, more precisely of its failures. Finally, the presumed capability of DD to resolve problems is largely attributable not to deliberation but to participation per se, intended as opening of decision processes that is able to renew the context of decision making.