Revision without revision sequences: Self-referential truth

The model of self-referential truth presented in this paper, named emph{Revision-theoretic supervaluation}, aims to incorporate the philosophical insights of Gupta and Belnap's emph{Revision Theory of Truth} into the formal framework of Kripkean fixed-point semantics. In Kripke-style theories the final set of emph{grounded} true sentences can be reached from below along a strictly increasing sequence of sets of grounded true sentences: in this sense, each stage of the construction can be viewed as an improvement on the previous ones. I want to do something similar replacing the Kripkean sets of grounded true sentences with revision-theoretic sets of emph{stable} true sentences. This can be done by defining a monotone operator through a variant of van Fraassen's supervaluation scheme which is simply based on $omega$-length iterations of the Tarskian operator. Clearly, all virtues of Kripke-style theories are preserved, and we can also prove that the resulting set of ``grounded'' true sentences shares some nice features with the sets of stable true sentences which are provided by the usual ways of formalising revision. What is expected is that a clearer philosophical content could be associated to this way of doing revision; hopefully, a content directly linked with the insights underlying finite revision processes.