This paper analyses, by means of an economic experiment, the impact of a vertical review on third-party punishment. Whereas the existing empirical literature has studied, under many different aspects, third-party costly punishment as such, it has not addressed the impact of a second "instance" (competent to overrule punishment decisions by the first punisher) on the incidence and amount of such first-instance punishment and the underlying unwanted behaviour ("stealing"). In this paper, we apply experimental methodology that allows us to construct in the lab the counterfactual context for a direct institutional comparison that we cannot find in real life. In particular, we examine first of all whether and how the presence of a second "vertical" punishment layer (i.e. of a "second instance") affects the amount of punishment imposed in the first instance. Secondly, we check whether the presence of a second level of punishment has a deterrent effect on the underlying (undesired) behaviour. Finally, we examine the level of satisfaction of the victims in all scenarios. In our experiments, we find that the introduction of a second (vertical) tier of punishment increases (i) the level of punishment provided for in the first instance, (ii) deterrence with regard to the underlying behaviour (i.e. a reduction in the number of "thefts" being committed), and also (iii) the level of satisfaction for victims. Real-world applications of this study are plentiful, including the organisation of courts and the appeals process as a whole. Our evidence confirms that the presence of an "instance" (a second tier of legal decision making) is, other things equal, likely to generate beneficial effects.
Third-Party Punishment under Judicial Review: An Economic Experiment on the Effects of a Two-Tier Punishment System
Ottone S.
;
2015-01-01
Abstract
This paper analyses, by means of an economic experiment, the impact of a vertical review on third-party punishment. Whereas the existing empirical literature has studied, under many different aspects, third-party costly punishment as such, it has not addressed the impact of a second "instance" (competent to overrule punishment decisions by the first punisher) on the incidence and amount of such first-instance punishment and the underlying unwanted behaviour ("stealing"). In this paper, we apply experimental methodology that allows us to construct in the lab the counterfactual context for a direct institutional comparison that we cannot find in real life. In particular, we examine first of all whether and how the presence of a second "vertical" punishment layer (i.e. of a "second instance") affects the amount of punishment imposed in the first instance. Secondly, we check whether the presence of a second level of punishment has a deterrent effect on the underlying (undesired) behaviour. Finally, we examine the level of satisfaction of the victims in all scenarios. In our experiments, we find that the introduction of a second (vertical) tier of punishment increases (i) the level of punishment provided for in the first instance, (ii) deterrence with regard to the underlying behaviour (i.e. a reduction in the number of "thefts" being committed), and also (iii) the level of satisfaction for victims. Real-world applications of this study are plentiful, including the organisation of courts and the appeals process as a whole. Our evidence confirms that the presence of an "instance" (a second tier of legal decision making) is, other things equal, likely to generate beneficial effects.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.