パトリック・グリューネベルク 金沢大学国際基幹教育院・GS 教育系 大 橋 律 子

Georg Bertram recently argued that a consistent and accomplished philosophy of art should consider not only the specific nature of art, but also its value as human practice. Moreover, he resorted to artistic improvisation in order to illustrate a characteristic aspect of the constitution of artworks: the self-referential relations implied in the artworks and shaping the artworks do not result from an alleged closure of the artwork’s form, but are negotiated locally, in relation to each individual artwork. Following this line of reasoning, and while offering arguments both in the context of contemporary analytical aesthetics as well as in reference to Michel De Certeau’s philosophy of everyday life and to philosophy of art of the Turin philosopher Luigi Pareyson, I will defend that “art” may be a particular way to look at and to develop human practices and that the link between human practices and art is provided by improvisation. Improvisation is not only a particular artistic technique. Improvisation incorporates and genetically shows the specificity of autonomous art as well as the value of art, that is, the link between human practices and art as a specific human practice. Indeed, as I will explain, art both derives from and is a particular way to improvise (upon) human practices, i.e. to develop them in unprecedented and valuable ways. Accordingly, improvisation, as a specific artistic procedure, will be understood as that kind of artistic production in which the human practices art is based in come, as it were, exemplarily to the fore. Hence, improvisation can be understood as the paradigm of art as human practice: as I shall suggest, art begins with, and ends in, improvisation.