Notwithstanding Plato’s venerable opinion, many people nowadays claim either that mirrors are not pictures, or that, if they are such, they are just transparent pictures in Kendall Walton’s sense of a particular kind of picture (causally based representations, Peircean indexes, namely, natural signs, which are grasped by means of a perceptual experience of transparency—seeing-through—that lets one literally see the object perceived through the picture). In this article, however, I want to argue that mirrors are bona fide pictures. For they are grasped via what, as I assume in the article, makes a picture a picture, that is, a representation with a figurative value, namely, a depiction; namely, a certain seeing-in experience. This is the sui generis perceptual experience that Richard Wollheim originally appealed to. Once this experience is suitably reconceived, one can show how it successfully applies to mirrors as well, in order to prove that they are bona fide pictures. From an aesthetical point of view, this is an important result. For it shows that the class of pictures is broader than what people nowadays think and is closer to the original intuition sustaining Plato’s opinion.

Seeing in Mirrors

Voltolini, Alberto
2021-01-01

Abstract

Notwithstanding Plato’s venerable opinion, many people nowadays claim either that mirrors are not pictures, or that, if they are such, they are just transparent pictures in Kendall Walton’s sense of a particular kind of picture (causally based representations, Peircean indexes, namely, natural signs, which are grasped by means of a perceptual experience of transparency—seeing-through—that lets one literally see the object perceived through the picture). In this article, however, I want to argue that mirrors are bona fide pictures. For they are grasped via what, as I assume in the article, makes a picture a picture, that is, a representation with a figurative value, namely, a depiction; namely, a certain seeing-in experience. This is the sui generis perceptual experience that Richard Wollheim originally appealed to. Once this experience is suitably reconceived, one can show how it successfully applies to mirrors as well, in order to prove that they are bona fide pictures. From an aesthetical point of view, this is an important result. For it shows that the class of pictures is broader than what people nowadays think and is closer to the original intuition sustaining Plato’s opinion.
2021
79
3
315
327
https://academic.oup.com/jaac/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jaac/kpab021/6300437?redirectedFrom=fulltext
Mirrors, opaque pictures, transparent pictures, seeing-in, seeing-through
Voltolini, Alberto
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/1795162
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