In this short paper, we analyse whether assuming that mathematical objects are “thin” in Linnebo's sense simplifies the epistemology of mathematics. Towards this end, we introduce the notion of transparency and show that not all thin objects are transparent. We end by arguing that, far from being a weakness of thin objects, the lack of transparency of some thin objects is a fruitful characteristic mark of abstract mathematics.

Thin Objects Are Not Transparent

Plebani M.;
2023-01-01

Abstract

In this short paper, we analyse whether assuming that mathematical objects are “thin” in Linnebo's sense simplifies the epistemology of mathematics. Towards this end, we introduce the notion of transparency and show that not all thin objects are transparent. We end by arguing that, far from being a weakness of thin objects, the lack of transparency of some thin objects is a fruitful characteristic mark of abstract mathematics.
2023
89
314
325
https://doi.org/10.1111/theo.12373
abstraction; Rice's theorem; thin objects; Øystein Linnebo
Plebani M.; San Mauro L.; Venturi G.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/2318/1830089
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